American Academy of Political and Social Science

Briefing for the New President: The Terrorist Threat in Indonesia and Southeast Asia
Author(s): Sidney Jones
Source: The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 618,
Terrorism: What the Next President Will Face (Jul., 2008), pp. 69-78
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. in association with the American Academy of
Political and Social Science
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Briefing for the
Counterterrorism capacity in Southeast Asia is improv-
ing, reducing the likelihood of a major attack on
Western targets in the near term. However, jihadi ide-
ology has taken root in Indonesia, and while the
region s largest terrorist organization, Jemaah Islamiyah,
appears to be more interested in rebuilding than
mounting operations, its members still constitute
an important recruitment pool for other groups. Most
Indonesian jihadis appear to be more focused on local
than foreign targets, but that focus can aid recruitment
and facilitate alliances with other organizations. While
the Iraq insurgency has not attracted Southeast Asian

New President: participation, the resurgence of the Taliban on the

Afghan-Pakistan border could. The United States,
under the next president, could help develop better
The Terrorist information sharing between South and Southeast Asia.
Southeast Asia may not be the "second front" that many

Threat in feared after the first Bali bombs, but the terrorism
threat in the region has not gone away.

Indonesia and Keywords: Jemaah Islamiyah; Bali; Indonesia; de-

radicalization; thaghut; Christianization;
Southeast Asia Noordin Top

Southeast
on Asia holds many
the counterterrorism encouraging signs
front, particularly
in Indonesia, where the short-term likelihood
SIDNEY JONES of another suicide bombing aimed at Western
targets appears low. Long-term prospects, how-
ever, are more worrying.

Sidney Jones is senior adviser to the International Crisis

Group's Asia program. She previously was a Ford
Foundation program officer (1977-1984) in Jakarta and
New York; Amnesty International researcher on
Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Pacific (1985-1988);
and Asia director of Human Rights Watch (1989-2002).
She holds degrees from the University of Pennsylvania
in oriental studies and international relations and in
2006 received an honorary doctorate from the New
School in New York. She has written extensively on con-
flict, radical Islam, terrorism, and human rights in
Southeast Asia, with a particular focus on Indonesia.

NOTE: The information in this article was gathered

through direct field research carried out by the
International Crisis Group s Southeast Asia Project.
DOI: 10.1177/0002716208316962

ANNALS, AAPSS, 618, July 2008' 69

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70 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

Southeast Asia's most notorious jihadi organi

Islamiyah (JI), is largely dormant but far from
Western targets, but its members still constitute a
for other terrorist groups.
Noordin Top, the Malaysian national who heads t
major anti-Western bombings in 2003, 2004, and
capacity to mount another attack appears low, but his
discounted. It is worth noting that two of his key a
Most other known Indonesian jihadi groups appe
communal tensions than in attacking the United
is seen as the bigger threat.
Counterterror capacity in the region is improvin
ticularly impressive gains.
International funding for jihadi operations has l

These developments notwithstanding, jihad

spread beyond the groups known to have us
Jl-affiliated schools continue to educate the
members and recruit new leaders for the or
continue, particularly in Pakistan and Bangla
or understood; the Taliban resurgence on the
could draw in Southeast Asians. While militants
operate without any significant outside assistan
to be increasing among some Indonesian jiha
from several different groups continue to oper
those on the U.S. most-wanted list appear to be
it is important to underscore that the jihadi m
ing, adapting, and mutating. JI is importan
groups or individuals, perhaps now unknow
draw on dissatisfied members of JI and othe

Jemaah Islamiyah
JI has shrunk steadily since the first Bali
organization that spanned five countries
Philippines, and Australia), its administrati
Indonesia only, its al Qaeda links and intern
hundreds of its members were in prison across
cooperating with police and intelligence, so
tion's leaders were known to be opposed
Indonesian soil, not so much because they w
were counterproductive - attacks on Weste
than infidels, provoked community outrage,
From mid- 1999 on, JFs attacks on civilians w
nization, except in Ambon and Poso, two are
killed in communal fighting. Initiated by H
Guantanamo, and supported financially by a

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BRIEFING FOR THE NEW PRESIDENT 71

Christmas Eve bombings and Bali I

outside JFs formal structure and s
leaders. These teams drew largely on
ering Malaysia and Singapore, based
Johore; the strongest opposition ca
attacks took place (Jones 2005, 169-
arrest, Noordin Mohammed Top, a
nal director, continued the attacks,
studied or taught there. Noordins a
Australian embassy (2004), and Bali
ership, although individual members
calling his group "Al-Qaeda for the M
ical mentor was Ali Ghufron alias M
in Bali I (International Crisis Group
While most JI leaders consider Noo
have generally been willing to offe
exchange for a promise to refrain fro
self the "real" JI, since Mukhlas, wr
who sit on their hands while others
of JI having become dull and do-not
in early 2005, and others may follow b

Military Capacity

JI retains a structure with at least

more across Indonesia with other ind
structure, in Malaysia and the Philip
intricate web of kinship, friendship
combined with the obedience and loy
the organization together despite th
fissures. (After Noordin broke away
who believe JI should remain cland
should be free to join above-ground
tion of Islamic law.)3 Its leadersh
Afghanistan in the late 1980s and ea
working with the police, however, a
attacks on Western targets - and in an
More problematic are the Mindanao
Poso. About five fled to Java after p
have gone underground; they are unlik
scholars. Several expert bomb maker
sives and/or small arms is not particul
caches - military readiness is an impor
firearms and bombs found in March
clearly not planned for immediate u

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 72 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

While Noordin s group in particular has discu

of attacks - targeted assassinations and hosta
members say that these require at least as muc
few men with a known capacity to work out th
are mostly dead or in custody. Assassination
repertoire in Poso and Ambon, however, and
make attempts elsewhere.
The big exception to the generally low military
lies with the small group of Indonesians an
Mindanao working with the Abu Sayyaf group.
bombers, Umar Patek and Dulmatin, both J
with Hambali s "nonstructural" operations than
now closer to the organization KOMPAK than
eral times to being captured or killed in the pa
ing for ways to return to Indonesia. If they di
as commanders with up-to-date combat expe
the jihadi movement, either by joining Noordin
Both reportedly would like to help out in sou
militants have shown no interest in outside a
return to Indonesia, efforts to bolster links
groups could increase.

Funding
No significant external funding has come into JI since 2003 when a cell in
Karachi arranged a transfer through al Qaeda contacts. Many factors indicate that
the organization itself is strapped for funds; would-be participants in a JI training
project for ex-prisoners scheduled for late 2007 in central Java were told that they
would have to pay their own way. JI members arrested in March 2007 said the
major source of funding was infaq, or contributions from members, generally
monthly but based on ability to pay. Larger donations come from sympathetic busi-
nesses, some but not all Jl-owned. In 2005 and 2006, JI members in Poso relied on
fax, robbing of non-Muslims to support jihad, as did Noordin for the Bali II attack.
Donors in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Gulf have provided funding to
Indonesian jihadi groups in the past, particularly at the height of the Ambon and
Poso conflicts, but those donations do not appear to be significant for defraying
day-to-day operating expenses.

Training

A few Indonesians are still reaching Mindanao for training but on a very spo-
radic basis; the Moro Islamic Liberation Front is no longer a friendly host of for-
eign jihadis, although a few commanders in the Pawas area outside Cotabato may

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BRIEFING FOR THE NEW PRESIDENT 73

not have gotten the message. Increa

it is increasingly difficult to use the
Mindanao or up the coast of East Ka
patrolled route, from the island of M
Maluku, Indonesia, directly to the M
but it has never been preferred beca
Arrests of members of JI's military
training they received was little more
rare opportunities to use real weap
training center of any size or sophis
but for the moment, there is not a

Many factors indicate th

is strapped for fund

As of 2007, no evidence showed that

insurgents. The place to watch is
Afghanistan. Hundreds of Southeast A
between 1985 and 1994, with a few
courses between 1999 and 2001. A
September 2003, and Indonesian jihadis
have well-established contacts in Karac
students find their ways to madrasahs
Indonesians travel to India, Pakistan, a
of Tablighi Jamaat, a nonpolitical Is
used as cover by jihadis, particularly
Asians register with their embassies
capacity to monitor their whereabouts
early 1990s, the training of Southea
possible by factors absent in 2008: v
logistical assistance in Malaysia, throug
and tacit support or unconcern from m

Local Targets
Most of the jihadi groups in Indon
and thaghut (anti-Islamic) officials as e
in their view, the United States, as

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74 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

alliance aimed at destroying Islam, is ultimat

on Christians stems from several factors: a sen
of the Koran that Jews and Christians are the
viction that Christians will again attack Mus
unless they are "taught a lesson," the limit
evangelical movements in converting Muslim
"Christianization," and the fact that several of
terterrorist team are Christians.
The branding of Indonesian officials as tha
ticipation in a political system based on ma
given law. But it is also based on a reading o
Arabic and widely circulated in Indonesian j
ernments such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt of
readers are tacitly invited to make the obv
logues in this respect are Abu Muhammad al
prison in early 2008, and Abdul Qadir bin Ab
Although Western governments are genera
when those groups do not have foreigners i
attentive for several reasons.

The focus on local kafir, or infidels, can give jih

when resources to join the global jihad are lackin
The issue of apostasy at home - Christian organizat
far more fury than civilian deaths in Iraq or Afghanis
at the alleged source of funding and support for th
Local jihads such as Ambon and Poso have been h
combat training, and experience in local operation
thinkable.
Assassination of top government officials, if the
lead to that, would have far more serious polit
another attack on a bar or restaurant.
Focus on local targets provides an ideological m
groups and Islamist groups not involved in terroris
Groups with a local agenda always can be taken
international outlook.

We know of five or six such groups in Indo

more.8 The most urgent task to prevent the
develop a watch list of areas with serious comm
local political power struggles or land disput
work to reduce them. Two such areas, in add
Sulawesi and Manokwari in West Papua.

Prisons and the Legal Syst

Southeast Asian governments, like their cou
realizing that prisons have to be included as a f

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BRIEFING FOR THE NEW PRESIDENT 75

Indonesia does not have - and should

Security Act thatp permits indefinite
law allows terrorism suspects to be k
charged or released. Those charged are
open to the public and media and tha
are generally fair. Intimidation of jud
a problem, particularly in Poso; police
to try to get lenient sentences for me
to the police de-radicalization program
Since the first Bali bombs in Octob
been arrested. Of these, close to thr
been brought to trial. Many have b
some sixty in 2006 and 2007 alone, i
pens inside prison, in terms of recr
and dissemination of jihadi ideology
after release. Government capacity
remains very low. The problem in
treatment and poor prison conditio
uncontrolled radical discussion and stu
to the local jihadi publishing industr
Indonesian of material on internatio
ers with the requisite language experti
the printouts and collect the finished
They either post them on local jiha
linked to the major jihadi groups, an
Prisons are also a factor in the c
alliances as well as new fissures can
authority and others can rise, dependi
generally are not permitted to retu
their exposure; a clandestine orga
problem is that fewer and fewer su
combination of military training and
Police have embarked on a prison
aimed at persuading jihadis to reject th
provision of economic aid, usually
school fees for children, on the assum
entails a rejection of the jihadi premis
willing to take money from police, th
tion other jihadi teachings. By late
members were cooperating with the
bombings in Indonesia from the outset
changed many minds. Rather, it pro
cooperate with the police and helpe
rationists" and "purists." While pol
return to their communities and help

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76 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

there appears to be little strategic thinking

accomplished. They have also made little hea
hardcore ideologues of the movement to chan
Group 2007a). That said, no other agency in t
ing serious thought to how to address home
deserve credit for doing so.

New Groups
While the best-known jihadi groups are in a
appear to be under way to organize new ones,
sions a few years hence. Al-Muhajirun, the in
away from Hizb ut-Tahrir, for some time has m
but over the past two years, it appears to hav
members. In 2006 it produced two issues of a
sumably for lack of funding. It appears to rec
Abu Yahya, is a former Hizb ut-Tahrir Indo
from a Darul Islam faction in Central Java,
Bandung-based Jama'ah Tauhid wal Jihad, re
tures to JI and KOMPAK members about the
nization. Some ex-prisoners, marginalized by t
exposure, could find a new home there if th
Makassar, newly released members of Las
nucleus of a revived jihadi effort in Sulawesi.
the region would be to draw conclusions abou
from an analysis of the current state of JI alon

Policy Recommendations
In general, a new president could perform a us
importance of counterterrorism in U.S. policy w
international aid support to nations that curre
throughout the region is that the Bush administ
the region through a counterterror lens to the p
of assistance to Indonesian education was seen
program in its own right than (misguidedly) as
radical recruitment. Indonesia and other gove
countering terror as their number one priority,
States be seen as restoring some perspective in i
That said, U.S. counterterrorism assistance i
ing the capacity of police and courts to invest
been effective and should be continued. In par

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 BRIEFING FOR THE NEW PRESIDENT 77

of the police, Detachment 88 and th

from the Australian Federal Police,
in apprehending many terrorist sus
The United States is supporting a
Force within the attorney general s
general assistance to police through
Criminal Investigative Training A
important issues, although a thoroug
ism assistance is probably in order t
ers and why and where significant w
A new administration could help de
South and Southeast Asia, through supp
ligence officers and relevant governm
of South Asian militant Islamic networ
For Indonesia in particular, U.S. as
tively address communal tensions ac
to serving a more general conflict-
understand when and how radical g
this context, it would also be usef
between activities of Christian evang
ical Muslim backlash.
In some key areas, aid is needed b
assist. One is prison reform, where th
Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo remain
effective.
The new president needs to understand that jihadi groups in Indonesia are in
a state of flux, meaning their capacity for undertaking terrorist attacks is con-
stantly changing. Southeast Asia at the moment may not be the "second front"
that many feared after the first Bali bombs, but no one should be complacent in
the belief that attacks on Westerners are history.

Notes

1. See International Crisis Group (2006). Mukhlas was arrested in 2002, tried, and sentenced to death
in 2003.
2. After the second Bali bombing on October 1, 2005, police discovered that Noordin Tops associates
had developed a Web site specifically to disseminate jihadi teachings from al Qaeda sites. Several
Indonesians were also contributors, including Aly Ghufron alias Mukhlas, one of the masterminds of the
first Bali bombing. The site, www.anshar.net, was subsequently shut down.
3. One of these aboveground organizations is Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, led by Abu bakar ba asyir,
that includes many Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members among its ranks.
4. These include Reno alias Tedi, believed to be a Darul Islam member, who apprenticed himself to
Dr. Azhari Husein and escaped when police killed Azhari in November 2005; and Taufik Bulaga, also
known as Upik Lawanga, a local Poso recruit, who learned bomb making from another of Azhari s proteges.
5. The Thai insurgency is an ethnonationalist movement that builds on resentment ot a Muslim Malay
minority against a Thai Buddhist majority. Much of the recruitment takes place in Muslim schools, led by
teachers, including many trained abroad. But the pull is nationalism, not global jihad.

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 78 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

6. Salafi Muslims try to emulate the practices of the Prop

ing that seventh-century Islam was the purest. Salafi jihadis
the sense of actual physical war, is necessary to fight Islam
former see the latter as too political and religiously misgu
being waged, "pure" salafis are the most vocal opponents of
7. Al-Maqdisi is known in Indonesia as the mentor of the
distanced himself from Zarkawi s methods and wrote a tract
indiscriminate attacks on civilians. The Indonesian translation
the title Mereka Mujahid tapi Salah Langkah (They're Muja
said to be a bestseller in jihadi circles.
8. These include KOMPAK, an Islamic charity with a mil
whose veterans can be quickly mobilized; Ring Banten in W
KOMPAK ally; Laskar Jundullah in Makassar; (a different)
wal Jihad in Bandung.

References
Al-Maqdisi, Abu Muhammad. 2007. Mereka Mujahid Tapi Salah Langkah. Solo, Indonesia: JAZERA
Press.

Aly Ghufron. Wasiat dan Pesan-Pesan untuk Kaum Muslimin. www.anshar.net (closed 2005).
International Crisis Group. 2006. Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's networks. Asia Report no. 114, May 5.
http://www.crisisgroup.or2/home/index.cfm ?id=4092 (accessed February 8, 2008).

http://www.crisissroup.ore/home/index.cfm ?id=5 170 (accessed Feb

.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4792 (accessed February 8, 2008).

Jones, Sidney. 2005. The changing nature of Jemaah Islamiyah. Australian Jou
59 (2): 169-78.

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