2014 Bar
XXVIII.
From an existing province, Wideland, Congress
created a new province, Hundred Isles,
consisting of several islands, with an aggregate
area of 500 square kilometres. The law creating
Hundred Isles was duly approved in a plebiscite
called for that purpose. Juan, a taxpayer and a
resident of Wideland, assailed the creation of
Hundred Isles claiming that it did not comply
with the area requirement as set out in the
Local Government Code, i.e., an area of at least
2,000 square kilometres. The proponents
justified the creation, however, pointing out
that the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code states that "the
land area requirement shall not apply where
the pr oposed province is composed of one (1)
or more islands." Accordingly, since the new
province consists of several islands, the area
requirement need not be satisfied. How tenable
is the position of the proponents? (4%)
2015 Bar
XIII.
On August 15, 2015, Congresswoman Dina
Tatalo filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5432,
entitled "An Act Providing for the
Apportionment of the Lone District of the City
of Pangarap." The bill eventually became a law,
R.A. No. 1234. It mandated that the lone
legislative district of the City of Pangarap would
now consist of two (2) districts. For the 2016
elections, the voters of the City of Pangarap
would be classified as belonging to either the
first or second district, depending on their
place of residence. The constituents of each
district would elect their own representative to
Congress as well as eight (8) members of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod. R.A. No. 1234
apportioned the City's barangays. The
COMELEC thereafter promulgated Resolution
No. 2170 implementing R.A. No. 1234.
Piolo Cruz assails the COMELEC Resolution as
unconstitutional. According to him, R.A. No.
1234 cannot be implemented without
conducting a plebiscite because the
apportionment under the law falls within the
meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition
or substantial alteration of boundaries of cities
under Section 10, Article X o f the 1987
Constitution. Is the claim correct? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Piolo Cruzs claim in incorrect. While the
Constitution and the Local Government Code
expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any
creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of the boundary of a local
government unit, no plebiscite requirement
exists under the apportionment or
reapportionment provision (Bagabuyo v.
COMELEC). In the case at bar, RA 1234 merely
increased its representation in the House of
Representatives. There was no creation,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of a
local government unit that took place. RA 1234
did not bring about any change in the City of
Pangaraps territory, population and income
classification. Hence no plebiscite is required.
 XVI.
(1) Gandang Bai filed her certificate of
candidacy (COC) for municipal mayor
stating that she is eligible to run for the
said position. Pasyo Maagap, who also
filed his COC for the same position,
filed a petition to deny due course or
cancel Bai's COC under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code for material
misrepresentation as before Bai filed
her COC, she had already been
convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Hence, she is disqualified
perpetually from holding any public
office or from being elected to any
public office. Before the election, the
COMELEC cancelled Bai's COC but her
motion for reconsideration (MR)
remained pending even after the
election. Bai garnered the highest
number of votes followed by Pasyo
Maagap, who took his oath as Acting
Mayor. Thereafter, the COMELEC
denied Bai's MR and declared her
disqualified for running for Mayor. P.
Maagap asked the Department of
Interior and Local Government
Secretary to be allowed to take his oath
as permanent municipal mayor. This
request was opposed by Vice Mayor
Umaasa, invoking the rule on
succession to the permanent vacancy
in the Mayor's office. Who between
Pasyo Maagap and Vice Mayor Umaasa
has the right to occupy the position of
Mayor? Explain your answer.
Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Vice Mayor Umaasa has the right to occupy the
position of Mayor. This was settled in Talaga v.
COMELEC (G.R. No. 196804 October 9, 2012).
where the court upheld that the disqualification
of Bai created a situation of a permanent
vacancy in the office of the Mayor. A
permanent vacancy is filled pursuant to the law
on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC
which states the If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the office of the governor or mayor,
the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned
shall become the governor or mayor.
Pasyo Maagap who garnered only the second
highest number of votes lost to Gandang Bai.
Applying the Labo case cited in Talaga, Maagap
could not assume office for he was only second
placer despite the disqualification of the
Gandang Bai because the second placer was
"not the choice of the sovereign will."60 Surely,
the Court explained, a minority or defeated
candidate could not be deemed elected to the
office.61 There was to be no question that the
second placer lost in the election, was
repudiated by the electorate, and could not
assume the vacated position.62 No law
imposed upon and compelled the people of
Lucena City to accept a loser to be their
political leader or their representative.
The only time that a second placer is allowed
to take the place of a disqualified winning
candidate is when two requisites concur,
namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b)
the electorate was fully aware in fact and in
law of that candidates disqualification as to
bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety but the electorate still cast the
plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate.64 Under this sole exception, the
electorate may be said to have waived the
validity and efficacy of their votes by
notoriously misapplying their franchise or
throwing away their votes, in which case the
eligible candidate with the second highest
number of votes may be deemed elected.65
The facts of the case at bar did not state the
existence of such exception, thus it cannot
apply in favor of Maagap simply because the
second element was absent.
XIX. 2016 Bar

Typhoon Bangis devastated the Province of

III.
Sinagtala. Roads and bridges were destroyed
which impeded the entry of vehicles into the
A law converted the component city of
area. This caused food shortage resulting in
Malumanay, Laguna into a highly urbanized
massive looting of grocery stores and malls.
city. The Local Government Code (LGC)
There is power outage also in the area. For
provides that the conversion "shall take effect
these reasons, the governor of the province
only after it is approved by the majority of
declares a state of emergency in their province
votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in the
through Proclamation No. 1. He also invoked
political units directly affected."
Section 465 of the Local Government Code of
1991 (R.A. No. 7160) which vests on the
Before the COMELEC, Mayor Xenon of
provincial governor the power to carryout
Malumanay City insists that only the registered
emergency measures during man-made and
voters of the city should vote in the plebiscite
natural disasters and calamities, and to call
because the city is the only political unit
upon the appropriate national law enforcement
directly affected by the conversion. Governor
agencies to suppress disorder and lawless
Yuri asserts that all the registered voters of the
violence. In the same proclamation, the
entire province of Laguna should participate in
governor called upon the members of the
the plebiscite, because when the LGC speaks of
Philippine National Police, with the assistance
the "qualified voters therein," it means all the
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to set
voters of all the political units affected by such
up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct
conversion, and that includes all the voters of
general searches and seizures including
the entire province. He argues that the income,
arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure
population and area of Laguna will be reduced.
public safety. Was the action of the provincial
Who, between Mayor Xenon and Governor Yuri,
governor proper? Explain. (4%)
is correct? Explain your answer. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

SUGGESTED ANSWER
Gov. Yuri is correct.

No, the action of the governor is not proper.

In the conversion of a component city into a
Under the Constitution, it is only the President,
highly urbanized city, the registered voters of
as Executive, who is authorized to exercise
the entire province should participate in the
emergency powers as provided under Section
plebiscite, not just the residents of the
23, Article VI, as well as the calling-out powers
concerned city. In converting a city into a
under Section 7, Article VII thereof. In the case
highly urbanized city, Sec. 453 of the LGC calls
at bar, the provincial governor is not endowed
for the conduct of a plebiscite by the "qualified
with the power to call upon the state forces at
voters therein." Meanwhile, Sec. 10, Art. X of
his own bidding. It is an act which is ultra vires
the Constitution mandates that no LGU shall be
and may not be justified by the invocation of
created, divided, merged, abolished or its
Section 465 of the Local Government Code
boundary substantially altered without
(Kulayan v. Gov. Tan, GR No. 187298, July 3,
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
2012).
plebiscite in the "political units directly
affected." Construing the law in harmony with
the Constitution, the phrase "by the qualified
voters therein" in Sec. 453 of LGC means the
qualified voters not only in the city proposed to
be converted to a highly urbanized city but also
the voters of the political units directly affected
by such conversion. (Umali v. COMELEC, GR
No. 203974, April 22, 2014)
As the income, population and area of Laguna
will be reduced, it will certainly be directly
affected by the conversion of Malumanay into a
highly urbanized area. Therefore, the province
of Laguna as well as the qualified voters in
Malumanay should participate in the plebiscite
called for its conversion.
XVIII
Sec. 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
provides that no elective official shall serve for
more than three (3) consecutive terms. Rule
and explain briefly the reason if the official is
prohibited to run for another term in each of
the following situations: (a) if the official is a
Vice-Mayor who assumed the position of Mayor
for the unexpired term under the Local
Government Code; (b) if the official has served
for three consecutive terms and did not seek a
4th term but who won in a recall election; (c) if
the position of Mayor of a town is abolished
due to conversion of the town to a city; (d) if
the official is preventively suspended during his
term but was exonerated; and (e) if the official
is proclaimed as winner and assumes office but
loses in an election protest. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The Vice Mayor who assumed the position
of Mayor may still be eligible to run for the
position of Mayor because when he occupied
the post of the mayor upon the incumbents
death and served for the remainder of the
term, he cannot be construed as having served
a full term as contemplated under the subject
constitutional provision. The term "served"
must be one "for which [the official concerned]
was elected." (Borja v. COMELEC, GR No.
133495, Sept. 3, 1998)
(b) The official may still run for another term
since the principle behind the three-term limit
rule is to prevent consecutiveness of the
service of terms, and that there was in his case
a break in such consecutiveness after the end
of his third term and before the recall election.
(Socrates v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 154512-84,
Nov. 12, 2002)
(c) The official may no longer run for another
term because the framers of the Constitution
specifically included an exception to the
people's freedom to choose those who will
govern them in order to avoid the evil of a
single person accumulating excessive power
over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a
result of prolonged stay in the same office. For
the three-term limit for elective local
government officials to apply, two conditions
must concur: (1) the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post; and (2) he has
served three consecutive terms.
In this case, while the new city acquired a new
corporate existence separate and distinct from
that of the municipality, this does not mean,
however, that for the purpose of applying the
subject Constitutional provision, the office of
the municipal mayor would now be construed
as a different local government post as that of
the office of the city mayor. The territorial
jurisdiction of the city is the same as that of
the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants
of the municipality are the same as those in
the city. These inhabitants are the same group
of voters who elected the official concerned to
be their municipal mayor for three consecutive
terms. These are also the same inhabitants
over whom he held power and authority as
their chief executive for nine years. (Latasa v.
COMELEC, GR No. 154829, Dec. 10, 2003)
(d) The official concerned cannot anymore run
for another term in violation of the prohibited
fourth term as preventive suspension does not
interrupt an elective officials term because the
suspended official continues to stay in office
although he is barred from exercising the
functions and prerogatives of the office within
the suspension period. (Aldovino v. COMELEC,
GR No. 184836, Dec. 23, 2009)
(e) The official may still run for another term
because he cannot be considered as having
been duly elected to the supposed third term,
and that he did not fully serve such term by
reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.
(Lonzanida v. COMELEC, GR No. 135150, July
28, 1999)