Birkeland, S.T. Well Integrity of Subsea Wells During Light Well Interventions

Master thesis
WELL INTEGRITY OF
SUBSEA WELLS
DURING
LIGHT WELL
INTERVENTIONS
By
Stud.techn.
Sigbjrn Tornes Birkeland
June 2005
Well Integrity of Subsea Wells during Light Well Interventions
Preface
This thesis constitutes the results of the 10th semester of my master degree program at the
Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Department of Production and Quality
Engineering, Trondheim.
During the work, I would like to thank my teaching supervisor, Professor Marvin Rausand
Department of Production and Quality Engineering, Trondheim and assisting supervisor
Eivind Okstad at Sintef.
I would also like to thank Professor Sigbjrn Sangesland, at Department of Petroleum

Engineering and Applied Geophysics, NTNU for advising me where to gather information
and comments on important issues related to Riserless Light Well Intervention (RLWI) and
Big Bore Completions (BBC).
Finally I would like to thank Jan Fredrik Carlsen, and Harald Hansen at FMC Kongsberg
Production Services AS for providing me with valuable information regarding RLWI and a
stay at Kongsberg.
Trondheim, Norway, 15.06.2005
Sigbjrn T. Birkeland
Stud. techn.
Master thesis
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Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 2005 .
Summary
As the offshore oil and gas production continues to grow, the number of subsea wells
continues to increase. Today, there are roughly 2,000 subsea wells worldwide, in water depth
up to 2,000 m. About 400 of these subsea wells are located on the Norwegian Continental
Shelf (NCS), and they account for almost half of the oil and gas produced in this region.
Installation and maintenance of subsea wells are traditionally performed by costly, moored,
semi-submersible drilling rigs. Maintenance of subsea wells improves the recovery rate. This
is the principal driving force behind the development of light well intervention technology.
The thesis introduces and discusses different methods for subsea well intervention. The main
equipment and well intervention tasks is described. Furthermore focus is put on identification
of hazards and operability problems that may interfere during light well intervention tasks.
The concept of well integrity during light well intervention is discussed bases on NORSOK
D-010 Well integrity in drilling and well operations. The section incorporates technical,
operational and organizational solutions to reduce the risk of uncontrolled release of
formation fluids throughout the entire life cycle of a well.
A framework for Project Risk Analysis of a light well intervention project is carried out. The
purpose of the framework is to provide a consistent and systematic approach to risk handling
for light well intervention operations in order to allow project teams to proactively identify
and prevent problems or reduce the impact of problems when they do occur.
A hazard identification (HAZID) analysis is performed to identify potential hazards and

operability problems related to subsea light well intervention operations by use of the RLWI
system. The analysis is performed by combining the main operational phases and critical
events during operation. Based on the analysis, important issues and risk reducing measures
are discussed.
Hazards and operability problems related to light well intervention in BBC are shortly
described. The main factors which differentiate conventional and Big Bore completed light
well interventions are discusses.
Appendix B is carried out in corporation with FMC Kongsberg Subsea Production Services
AS. A technical description of the current RLWI design is presented. Furthermore the
evolution of the current RLWI concept is shown, based on the patent WO 01/25593 and two
different alternative configurations before a simplified design are presented.
A well barrier analysis of the simplified system is conducted for the phases affected of the
design changes. The suggested changes are evaluated after the evaluation criterias
functionality, barrier element and ability to perform testing.
Finally, an evaluation of alternative designs for the Wireline Seal Shear Ram (WRRS) in the
lubricator section is suggested.
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Abbreviations
BOP Blow Out Preventer
CT Coiled Tubing
CXT Conventional X-mas Tree
DHSV Down Hole Safety Valve
DP Dynamic Positioned
DTC Debris Tree Cap
ESD Emergency Shut Down
EQD Emergency Quick Disconnect
FMECA Failure Mode and Criticality Analysis
HAZID Hazard Identification
HAZOP Hazard and operability
HXT Horizontal X-mas Tree
LIP Lower Intervention Package
LLP Lower Lubricator Package
LUB Lubricator Tubular
NCS Norwegian Continental Shelf
NPD Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
PBR Polish Bore Receptacle
PCH Pressure Control Head
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis
PLT Production Logging Tool
PMV Production Master Valve
PSA Petroleum Safety Authority
PSV Production Safety Valve
PWV Production Wing Valve
RLWI Riserless Light Well Intervention
SCSSV Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety Valve
SJA Safe Job Analysis
SSR Shear Seal Ram
TCBV Tubing hanger Crown plug Ball Valve
ULP Upper Lubricator Package
WBE Well Barrier Element
WL Wireline
WLRSCSSV Wireline Retrievable Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety Valve
WHP Well Head Pressure
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis
THCP Tubing Hanger Crown Plug
TRSCSSV Tubing Retrievable Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety Valve
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Table of contents
PREFACE............................................................................................................................................................. II
SUMMARY .........................................................................................................................................................III
ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................................................. IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS......................................................................................................................................V
TABLE OF FIGURES...................................................................................................................................... VII
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................................................ VII
1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 8
1.1 OBJECTIVES AND LIMITATIONS ............................................................................................................. 9
1.2 REPORT STRUCTURE ........................................................................................................................... 10
2 SUBSEA LIGHT WELL INTERVENTION METHODS ..................................................................... 11
2.1 RIG ISSUES .......................................................................................................................................... 12
2.2 WHY IS INTERVENTION NEEDED? ........................................................................................................ 11
2.3 CLASSIFICATION OF SUBSEA INTERVENTION ....................................................................................... 11
2.4 LIGHT AND HEAVY WELL INTERVENTION. ......................................................................................... 12
3 TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS .............................................................................................................. 12
3.1 WIRELINE METHOD ............................................................................................................................. 13
3.1.1 Stuffing box.................................................................................................................................... 13
3.1.2 Lubricator ..................................................................................................................................... 14
3.1.3 Blow Out Preventer (BOP) ........................................................................................................... 14
3.1.4 Wireline unit.................................................................................................................................. 14
3.1.5 Hydraulic powerpack .................................................................................................................... 14
3.1.6 Measuring device .......................................................................................................................... 14
3.1.7 Control system............................................................................................................................... 15
3.1.8 Tool string ..................................................................................................................................... 15
3.1.9 Well tractor ................................................................................................................................... 15
3.1.10 Wireline .................................................................................................................................... 16
3.2 COILED TUBING (CT) ......................................................................................................................... 17
3.2.1 Injector head ................................................................................................................................. 17
3.2.2 Coiled tubing reel.......................................................................................................................... 18
3.2.3 Well control equipment ................................................................................................................. 18
3.2.4 3.2.4 Powerpack............................................................................................................................ 18
3.2.5 3.2.5 Gooseneck ............................................................................................................................ 19
3.2.6 Lifting frame.................................................................................................................................. 19
4 LIGHT WELL INTERVENTION AS A PROJECT. FRAMEWORK FOR PROJECT RISK
ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................................................................... 20
4.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 20
4.2 THE OBJECTIVES OF PROJECT RISK ANALYSIS...................................................................................... 20
4.3 STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR PROJECT RISK ANALYSIS ............................................................... 20
4.4 THE PROCESS OF PROJECT RISK ANALYSIS........................................................................................... 22
4.5 EVENT AND PARAMETER UNCERTAINTIES IN PROJECTS ..................................................................... 24
4.6 CONTINGENCY PLANNING ................................................................................................................... 24
4.7 QUALITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................. 24
4.8 QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................... 24
4.9 SEMI-QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................... 25
4.10 APPLICATION AREA FOR PROJECT RISK ANALYSIS ............................................................................... 25
4.10.1 Toolbox meeting/ Safe Job Analysis (SJA) ............................................................................... 25
4.10.2 Procedure Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) analysis............................................................ 25
4.11 DISCUSSION ........................................................................................................................................ 26
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5 WELL INTEGRITY ................................................................................................................................. 27

5.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 27
5.2 WELL INTEGRITY ................................................................................................................................ 27
5.2.1 Well Barriers................................................................................................................................. 27
5.2.2 Well Barrier methodology............................................................................................................. 28
5.2.3 Barriers in well operations ........................................................................................................... 29
5.2.4 Well barrier characteristics .......................................................................................................... 29
5.3 DISCUSSION ........................................................................................................................................ 30
6 6 RISERLESS LIGHT WELL INTERVENTION (RLWI) .................................................................. 32
6.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 32
6.2 AREA OF APPLICATION ........................................................................................................................ 32
6.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE RISERLESS LIGHT WELL INTERVENTION (RLWI) SYSTEM ................................ 33
..................................................................................................................................................................... 33
6.3.1 Lower Intervention Package (LIP)................................................................................................ 34
6.3.2 6.3.5 Lower Lubricator Package (LLP) ........................................................................................ 34
6.3.3 Lubricator Tubular (LUB) ............................................................................................................ 34
6.3.4 Upper Lubricator Package (ULP) ................................................................................................ 34
6.3.5 Pressure Control Head (PCH) ...................................................................................................... 34
6.3.6 Umbilical system ........................................................................................................................... 35
6.3.7 Control system............................................................................................................................... 35
6.4 RISERLESS LIGHT WELL INTERVENTION SYSTEM IN OPERATION......................................................... 35
7 HAZARD ASSESSMENT DURING WELL INTERVENTION .......................................................... 36
7.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 36
7.2 STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS ......................................................................................................... 36
7.3 METHODS TO IDENTIFY HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY PROBLEMS. ....................................................... 36
7.3.1 HAZID Hazard Identification..................................................................................................... 36
7.3.2 HAZID process.............................................................................................................................. 37
7.3.3 Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)........................................................... 37
7.3.4 What- If analysis. .......................................................................................................................... 37
7.3.5 Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP).................................................................................. 37
7.3.6 HAZOP process............................................................................................................................. 38
7.4 IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY PROBLEMS DURING A LIGHT WELL
INTERVENTION OPERATION. .............................................................................................................................. 39
7.4.1 Description of operational phases. ............................................................................................... 39
7.4.2 Identification of operational events............................................................................................... 40
7.5 COMBINATION OF PHASES AND EVENTS IN A MATRIX.......................................................................... 42
7.6 DISCUSSION ........................................................................................................................................ 42
7.7 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................................... 44
8 LIGHT WELL INTERVENTION IN BIG BORE COMPLETED WELLS ....................................... 45
8.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 45
8.2 BIG BORE COMPLETIONS .................................................................................................................... 45
8.3 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY PROBLEMS FOR BBC RELATED TO WELL INTEGRITY
DURING LIGHT INTERVENTION ........................................................................................................................... 45
8.3.1 Evaluation of upstream forces for Big Bore Completions............................................................. 45
8.3.2 Evaluation of equipment specifications needed for Big Bore light well interventions .................. 47
8.4 HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY PROBLEMS THAT MAY OCCUR DURING LIGHT WELL INTERVENTION IN BIG
BORE COMPLETIONS ......................................................................................................................................... 48
8.5 DISCUSSION ........................................................................................................................................ 48
9 CONCLUSIONS........................................................................................................................................ 49
10 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER WORK............................................................................... 50
11 REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................... 51
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Table of figures
Figure: 0-1:Frontpage. Riserless Light Well Intervention system in operation. Adapted from
(Andersen, 2004)..I
Figure 2-1: Subsea light well intervention system. Adapted from (Dick, 2004) ..................... 11
Figure 2-2: Indicate degree of intervention.............................................................................. 12
Figure 3-1: Subsea lubricator configuration located on a subsea well. Adapted from (Mller,
2004)...................................................................................................................... 13
Figure 3-2: Wireline tractor. Adapted from (Hansen, 2002).................................................... 15
Figure 4-1: The steps in a risk management process. Adapted from (BS 6079-3, 2000) ........ 22
Figure 4-2: Procedure framework for risk -and project risk analysis. Adapted from ROSS
Community 23
Figure 4-3: Indication of complexity versus time for planning and handling of operations.... 25
Figure 5-1: Well barrier schematic of a CT intervention stack up. Adapted form (NORSOK
D-010, 2004).......................................................................................................... 28
Figure 5-2: Methodology for breakdown of well barriers........................................................ 30
Figure 6-1: The modules of the RLWI configuration. Adapted from (Andersen, 2004) ......... 33
Figure 7-1: Show the steps in a HAZOP process chart............................................................ 39
Figure 8-1: Conventional versus big bore tubing diameters. ................................................... 46
Figure 8-2: Simplified upstream wellhead forces for three different completion sizes ........... 46
Figure 8-3: Required accumulator volumes with respect to water depth to operate a BOP
shear/seal valve...................................................................................................... 47
List of tables
Table 2.3-1: Categrization of subsea well intervention. Adapted from (Andersen, 2005) ...... 11
Table 3.1-1: Typical tasks for wireline operations................................................................... 16
Table 4.9-1: Estimating scales: Adapted from (Mogstad, 2000) ............................................. 25
Table 5.2-1: Typical well barriers. Adapted from Holand et al (2003) ................................... 29
Table 7.4-1: The main operational phases during a RLWI operation ...................................... 40
Table 7.4-2: Operational events during a well intervention using subsea lubricator .............. 40
Table 7.5-1: Combination matrix of operational phases and events.42
Appendix list
Appendix A: HAZID analysis of a light well intervention by use of the RLWI system
Appendix B: A simplified valve configuration for the RLWI system
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1 Introduction
The petroleum activity on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) has reached a mature
stage. One of the main work areas, from a technological point of view, is to increase the
recovery rates from existing oil and gas infrastructures. Subsea wells have traditionally a
lower recovery rate than platform wells. The main reason for this gap is related to well
intervention costs.
Increasing focus will be put on well interventions in subsea wells on the (NCS), and the
different tasks that are necessary to carry out such interventions. Many mature fields need to
intensify well intervention to both maintain production through well stimulation, sand or scale
handling, and for replacing systems and components that are worn. New technology creates
more cost effective methods to carry out lighter intervention tasks, such as riserless light
intervention and other subsea lubricator systems. This is contributing to close the gap between
platform and subsea completed wells. NPD statistics show that reservoir recovery is 36% for
subsea wells and 44% for platform wells. Today there are 17 subsea fields in operation on the
NCS today. The total amount of oil recovery is 5.7 Bn Bbl of oil at 33% reservoir recovery.
By increasing subsea recovery rates to 44% this will over a 10 year time period give 1 Bn Bbl
of oil (Inderberg, 2005). With todays oil price this approximately 300 Billion NOK in
potential extra values.
Challenges for the new technological solutions such as RLWI are to perform light well
intervention without compromising the well integrity during operation. This thesis identifies
and evaluates hazards and operability problems related to light well intervention tasks
conducted from a relatively small DP vessel as top side facility.
In appendix F is linked to FMC Kongsberg Subsea Production Services AS. A Riserless Light
Well Intervention (RLWI) system is here evaluated with respect to well barrier during
operation. The analysis suggests a simplified design. Appendix F is classified as restricted on
request from the company.
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1.1 Objectives and limitations

The main objective of this thesis is to evaluate well integrity when performing light well
intervention in subsea wells. The objectives and limitations are specified below.
1. The first task shall covers definitions and descriptions of the main tasks for typical
light well interventions into subsea wells by use of the wireline and the coiled tubing
method. Descriptions of the main equipment components to carry out the tasks are
included. This section shall give a base for the further tasks. The primary focus is set
on Wireline operations since this is of most relevance today.
2. A framework for Project Risk Analysis for light well intervention projects shall be
established. This shall give an overview of how to handle risks, methods to be used
and when to use the methods.
3. The concept of well integrity shall be defined and discussed based on the NORSOK
standard D-010 Well integrity in drilling and well operations. The primary focus
for this section shall be how well barriers affect the integrity of a well.
4. Identification and discussion of potential hazards and operability problems during

light well intervention shall be performed by using a RLWI system. HAZID is chosen
to be the method of analyze. The discussion shall contain suggestions of risk reducing
measures for the analyzed operation. The costs of the potential hazards and operability
problems are not detailed described, because available information is limited.
5. An evaluation of light well interventions in Big Bore completed wells shall be carried
out. This section shall focus on potential hazards and operability problems related to
well integrity during light intervention by increasing the production tubing diameter.
Thereby measures to reduce Big Bore related problems shall be suggested. Point 5 and
6 are merged together because to author
6. A barrier analysis shall be performed on a RLWI system. Based on the analysis a

simplified RLWI design shall be suggested. This is carried out in appendix F
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1.2 Report structure

The report structure
Chapter 1 provides the necessary background information, objectives and limitations,

and a presentation of the master thesis structure.
Chapter 2 gives an introduction to subsea light well intervention methods. Definitions

and categorization of intervention tasks are described. The background for why there
is a demand for intervention in subsea wells is explained.
Chapter 3 gives a technical description of the main equipment needed to carry out
wireline and coiled tubing operations.
Chapter 4 introduces a framework for project risk analysis in conjunction with light
well interventions.
Chapter 5 introduces and discusses the concept and factors which affect the integrity
of subsea wells during light well interventions based on NORSOK D-010.
Chapter 6 covers a describing and discussion of the main operational benefits and
weaknesses by using the RLWI system.
Chapter 7 describes a basis for identification and evaluation of hazards and operability
problems related to light well interventions in general.
Chapter 8 discusses hazard and operability problems for light well intervention in big
bore completed wells.
Chapters 9 conclude and summarize the results of the thesis.
Chapter 10 gives a recommendation for further work.
Appendix F evaluates the valve configuration of the current RLWI design before a
simplified design is introduces. A barrier analysis is then performed of the suggested
simplified RLWI configuration before conclusions and recommendations for further
work are given.
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2 Subsea light well intervention methods

As the deepwater development trend continues to accelerate utilizing subsea wells, the
importance of reliable and cost efficient subsea well intervention techniques is a key factor.
Subsea intervention tasks are costly and represent a major part of the total recovery costs.
Therefore the industry put a lot of effort in developing methods to reduce the expenses of
such operations. Figure 2.1 shows an example of a riserless well intervention system.
Figure 2-1: Subsea light well intervention system. Adapted from (Dick, 2004)
2.1 Why subsea intervention is needed

Subsea wells are mainly intervened due to reservoir reasons. These vary from field to field
due to the different reservoir conditions, the nature of the produced or injected fluids, the
configuration and status on the equipment installed. Two of the main objectives are to gain
information of the production condition downhole or to stimulate the well production. Wells
are normally maintained so that optimal well performance is met. This also includes any
modifications of the well completion to enable proper drainage of the reservoir. Data
acquisition is required to diagnose the well in case of unexpected performance, verification of
the composition and rates from the different zones open to production. This is important to
enable the best possible reservoir production management, and in some cases preparation for
heavier well intervention operations.
2.2 Classification of subsea intervention

When considering a functioning subsea facility, there are three categories of
intervention
Table 2.2-1: Categrization of subsea well intervention. Adapted from (Andersen, 2005)
Light intervention Medium intervention Heavy intervention
The operation is carried out Subsea well intervention Well workover operations
within the XT and production without removal of XT and that can imply pulling of
tubing. And without no use with use of high-pressure tubing and abandonment.
of riser from the subsea well riser from the well to the Demands complete drilling
to the topside facility. topside facility. BOP with stiff riser
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. The main parameters for classifying intervention tasks are:

Complexity of operation.
Time perspective
Necessary equipment.
Top side facilities.
2.3 Light and heavy well intervention

Traditionally well maintenance or workover operations have been divided into, heavy and
light interventions. Heavy interventions usually mean operations requiring use of a heavy 18
drilling blowout preventer (BOP) for pressure control. Removal of X-mas tree (XT),
tubing replacement and side tracking are typical examples of heavy intervention operations
today. This might change over time as capabilities of lighter systems are further developed.
Light interventions are commonly used to describe those operations that may be carried out
inside or through the XT and completion tubing, i.e wireline and coiled tubing operations.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the equipment needed and thereby the time and complexity of
performing intervention tasks. The more equipment involved in the workover task the more
heavy intervention. In the Ormen Lange Plan for development and operation they also
include the term medium intervention which is another way to classify intervention tasks.
Medium intervention is defined in table 2.3-1. In this context focus will be set on wireline
(WL) and coiled tubing (CT) methods classified as light interventions. Figure 2-2 categorize
the different intervention operations. The degree of intervention is a variable of operational
complexity and time. Complexity indicates the equipment and accessories needed to carry out
the operations.
Complexity
Conventional Drilling
and Workover
Snubbing and
Hydraulic Workover
Coiled tubing
Wireline
Time
Figure 2-2: Indicate degree of intervention
2.4 Rig issues

Traditionally, drilling rigs have been used for light well intervention operations. However, the
availability and flexibility of such drilling rigs have a significant impact on the timing, costs
and length of time to perform subsea intervention operations. The development of more
flexible, smaller and cost efficient Dynamic Position (DP) vessels now offers a viable option.
Well intervention is a regular task on fixed platforms, and is one of the major contributors to
increase the recovery rate. It is also accepted that well intervention is required in order to
achieve increased recovery rates in present and future subsea wells.
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3 Technical descriptions
This chapter gives a general description and overview of conventional methods for subsea
light well intervention by use of Wireline (WL) and Coiled Tubing (CT). The main equipment
needed to carry out operational demands are briefly introduced and discussed. The literature
is based on Subsea Well Intervention (Sangesland, 2004) and Production technique 1
(Jrgensen, 1998)
3.1 Wireline method

The most frequent technique for intervention is use of WL. In simple steps this is carried out
by a tool string attached to a wire that is run by the force of gravity into the well, to perform a
maintenance or service operation. The main components of a WL intervention system consists
in general of WL, stuffing box, lubricator, blow out preventer (BOP), WL unit, hydraulic
powerpack, measuring devices, and a control system. Figure 3-1 shows an subsea lubricator
system placed on a XT.
Figure 3-1: Subsea lubricator configuration located on a subsea well. Adapted from (Mller, 2004)
3.1.1 Stuffing box

The stuffing box is used as a means of running the WL into a lubricator that is subjected to
well pressure. The WL is passed over the sheave wheel and fed down through a packing in the
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stuffing box body. During operations the packing is tightened against the solid WL by a
packing nut which is either manually or hydraulically operated. The stuffing box incorporates
a plunger which in the event of a packing failure or wire breakage is designed to
automatically seal off flow. Stuffing boxes also include a quick union connector which can be
connected to the lubricator. Typical working pressure for the stuffing box is up to 1000 bar.
3.1.2 Lubricator
The lubricator is a pressure containing cylinder that allows the running and removal of WL
service tools from a well without having to kill it. Its purpose is to allow the WL tool string to
be raised above the wellhead valve prior to and after the WL operations and therefore enables
the wellhead valve to be opened and closed allowing entry and exit from the wellbore.
The lubricator is normally of long enough to cover the entire workstring. DHSV can be used
as lubricator barriers. The sections are joined together by quick unions that can be tightened
by hand, and are practically impossible to open while under pressure.
3.1.3 Blow Out Preventer (BOP)

The BOP, also called well control package, is a ram equipped stack that involves different
valves designed to prevent or control blowouts. Normally at least two rams are used in series,
alternatively a dual ram with the same functions can be used. One of the rams will close and
seal around the wire, isolating the well pressure from the lubricator section and the other ram
is a shear type ram to cut the wire in emergency situations.
The BOP is normally hydraulically operated from the workover control system, and is
qualified to seal against pressures up to 1000 bar. In addition to the primary power supply
from the hydraulic pump an accumulator bank is used as a secondary power system in case of
a primary system failure.
3.1.4 Wireline unit

The wireline unit consists of an electric or hydraulic driven reel drum containing the wire
used to run the tools into and out of the well and a control panel to hydraulically operate
actions. The length of the wire stored on the reel depends of the wire diameter, but its
typically 7 500 meters.
3.1.5 Hydraulic powerpack

The hydraulic powerpack supplies the WL unit with sufficient pressure and flow rates. It is
driven by a diesel or electrical motor.
3.1.6 Measuring device

The measuring device is an indicator for paid out wire length, and provides the operator with
valuable information concerning the tool depth. This is normally performed with a measuring
wheel mounted on the WL drum holding the running WL.
A weight indicator is used to monitor the load on the wire, and is especially important during
pulling operations to protect from equipment failure. The unit consist of a strain pad mounted
onto the reel unit connected to a display in a cabin. The pulling force is corrected for the WL
angle relative to the wellbore.
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3.1.7 Control system

The control functions of the reel and the BOP are located in the control, cabin or close to, and
metering parameters such as weight on reel and paid out length are displayed on dials.
3.1.8 Tool string

The basic tool string for WL operations consists if a: rope socket, WL stem, knuckle joint, jar
and tools.
The rope socket is a device to connect the wire and toolstring. The WL stem are weight
elements used to add weight to the toolstring for jarring operations. The amount depends on
the well pressure and weight of the device to be run or pulled. The knuckle joints are formed
as balls or sockets joints that provide a flexible element to permit angular movement in
crooked or cork screwed tubing. These joint can rotate 360 deg. and bend up to 15 deg. The
jar is mechanical or hydraulically operated device used to impose jarring impacts using the
weight of the stems to supply force.
The tools required to perform the specific operation will be attached to the end of the basic
tool string and can be divided into four categories:
Service tools.
Running and pulling tools.
Testing, gauging and monitoring tools.
Shifting tools.
3.1.9 Well tractor

A well tractor can pull and retrieve a WL or a CT in and out of deviated parts of a well. The
tractors contain wheels that make it possible to run and retrieve tools. The main limitations
incorporated with WL operations have traditionally been to reach the operation area in
deviated wells due to use of the gravity principle. As a rule of thumb a maximum deviation
angle of 70 deg. have been considered to be the limit for the WL method. This is carried out
by use of WL tractors. Figure 3-2 shows a well tractor.
Figure 3-2: Wireline tractor. Adapted from (Hansen, 2002)
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3.1.10 Wireline
There are mainly three types of wireline.
Slick line.
Braided line.
Electrical line.
Slickline is the one with smallest diameter continuous solid wire. It is only capable of pulling
and pushing by jarring action. Typical breaking strength of a 0.108 wire is between 7500 N
and 12500 N dependent of material specifications. Braided line is used for more heavy duty
pulling work. The wire consists of two layers of spirally coiled armour wire. Braided line
without an electrical conductor in the middle is also referred to as sand line and is used as a
heavy-duty slickline. A typical 3/16 braided wire has normally a breaking strength between
20000 N and 30000 N depending on the material applied.
The third application WL method is an electrical line also called mono-conductor cable. This
is a braided line with one or more electric conductors in the middle. It is used when using
intervention tools that require electric power or signal. The electrical lines have reduced
breaking strain compared to a slick line because of the conductor inside. The electrical lines
that only have one conductor inside are called mono-conductor cables. They are commonly
3/16, 7/32 5/16 3/8 and 7/16. The smallest sizes are used for through tubing well
servicing, while the larger sizes usually are used for smaller suites of openhole logs. Some
electrical lines have 7 conductors (logging cables,) and are used exclusively for openhole
logging. These logging cables are normally used on drilling rigs with well control by means
of a column of mud. An important issue for WL operations are that the wire should not be
worked past the plastic deformity limit, which usually is 50 % of the breaking strength.
The electrical lines are not used to manipulate tools downhole and the toolstring does not
contain any jars or running/pulling tools. The rope socket or cable head that attaches the
electric line to the toolstring is specially made. If electric WL tools get stuck in the hole, a
pull below the breaking strain of the wire will break a weak point in the cable head and
allow the wire to be retrieved.
In addition to being stronger, the main difference between slick and braided line is the
pressure control required. Because the braided line is made of an inner core and two layers of
wires, is it possible for well pressure to pass through the inside of the cable. This makes it
necessary to use grease as a seal within the wire.
Table 3.1-1: Typical tasks for wireline operations.
Slick line Braided line Electrical line
Running and pulling Heavier and deeper Data gathering/
plugs, chokes, valves. work outside the logging tools.
working scope of Perforation.
Opening and closing slick line. Chemical cutting
circulation devices. Fishing for larger lost Setting packers and
objects. bridge plugs.
Running gas lift or Pulling and retrieving Determining freepoint
chemical injection WL-SCSSV. (stuckpoint)
equipment.
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In a few years the WL may be replaced by a carbon composite line. The main features of such
a line are increased strength and more flexibility, because it reduces the wear in the tubing. A
slick or braided WL can sometimes have a cutting effect on the completion component. This
has been a problem especially for the down hole safety valves (DHSV). The WL creates a risk
of damaging the sealing capabilities for this valve and other valves, which can lead to
leakages and malfunctions of completions components.
In general it is desirable to use slickline for WL operations because it is smaller, cheaper and
easier to seal around. With increased water depths the capabilities and application area for
slickline decreases. The application area for a braided line is therefore in general where a
slickline is to week.
3.2 Coiled Tubing (CT)

The other frequent method of light intervention is use of CT. This is a process where a reel of
small-bore continuous tubes is run into a well that is still under pressure also called live well.
The coiled tube consists for pipe sections welded together to form a continuous long string. It
has constant outside diameter normally ranging from 1 to 3.5. A continuous string is often
made up with 2 to 3 different wall thicknesses; the thickest part is located in the upper section
where the highest load will interfere. This tapering gives several benefits such as reduced
weight, reduced cost, and lower pressure loss with larger inner diameters.
Typical CT tasks include:

Cleaning operations after workover.
Spotting acid at the perforations either to clean the perforations or remove formation
skin damage.
Fishing operations.
Cleaning out ratholes.
Spotting cement plugs.
Running through tubing tools such as straddle packers and bridge plugs.
Stiff WL (CT with a logging cable inside).
Sidetracking ad drilling small diameter holes.
Drilling/milling operations inside pipe.
Opening/closing sliding sleeves that WL is unable to perform.
The coiled tubing intervention unit comprise of the following main components: Injector
head, coiled tubing, reel, well control equipment, power pack, gooseneck and lifting frame.
3.2.1 Injector head
This unit is the driving mechanism that forces the tubing into and out of the well, and at the
same time support the weight of the tubing in the well. Its principle of operation is that two
opposed endless rotating chains of interlock drive blocks driven by hydraulic motors, pressed
against the tubing by hydraulic cylinders and give a frictional grip. A hydro-pneumatic
accumulator bank is used as backup for the hydraulic cylinders acting on the drive blocks.
The unit is equipped with a load cell measuring the axial force in the tubing displayed in the
control cabin. The capacity of a standard unit is a static pull of 27 tons and a maximum
running speed of 1 m/s.
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3.2.2 Coiled tubing reel

The CT reel stores and winds the tubing, and comprises of: framework, reel, hydraulic motor,
winding system, depth meter, swivel and a flushing system.
The framework function is to protect the reel and its components during transportation and
operation, while the reel facilitates storage for tubing. The reel can store up to 5000 m of 1
tubing. The hydraulic motor ensures power supply to keep the tubing under constant tension
during wrapping of the tubing. During unwrapping a torque brake keeps the tubing under
constant tension and rotating momentum. The winding system is made of a lead screw and a
tubing guide arm. The tubing guide positions the tubing onto the reel and is synchronized to
the rotation of the reel by a chain drive from the axle. The depth meter measures the length of
tubing paid out. The swivel facilitates fluid to pump through the tubing while the reel is in
motion and at any pressure. Modification to the swivel enables an electrical connection to be
made to a logging cable placed inside the tubing. The last main component of a conventional
coiled tubing assembly is the flushing system. It prevents the outside of the tubing from
corroding by spraying oil based corrosion inhibitor when the tubing is winded onto the reel.
3.2.3 Well control equipment

The well control equipment protects people, equipment and the environment in the event of
an emergency situation. It can be subdivided into:
BOP stack
Shear/seal BOP
Stripper
The BOP stack comprises up to four ram valves with the following functions:
Blind ram that seals against open bore.
Shear ram that cuts the tubing.
Slip ram that holds tubing.
Tubing ram that seals around tubing.
The ram valves can be operated both hydraulically and manually. Valves integrated in the
body allow circulation and pressure equalization before opening. An accumulator backup
power supply is also connected to the circuit.
The shear BOP is located just above the XT and its function is to cut and seal the bore in an
emergency situation. It can be both manually and hydraulically operated and it is controls
independently of the BOP stack. Also, an accumulator backup is connected to the circuit in
the event of a power failure.
The stripper is located between the injector head and the BOP and allows the CT to be
stripped in and out of a live well. It consists of two sealing rubber elements that are forced
against the tubing by a piston that is acted on by the well pressure. Also, a hydraulic circuit is
incorporated in the system to allow further pressure increase if necessary.
3.2.4 Powerpack
The powerpack provides the hydraulic and pneumatic power to operate the functions of the
intervention unit. The hydraulic fluid is supplied at 200 bars. As a safety precaution there is
an auto-shutdown of the engine if the temperature or pressure exceeds a preset level.
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Integrated into the power pack is a diesel engine that drives the hydraulic pumps and a
hydraulic system that comprises of pumps, motors accumulators and a power supply to
operate the well control system in addition to injector head and tubing reel. The powerpack
unit further consists of an air system that supplies power to the brake control, reel unit, unit
control system and safety system and a hose reel containing the umbilical for transportation of
hydraulic fluids and air to the operating units.
3.2.5 Gooseneck
The gooseneck is a device mounted on top of the injector head in order to guide the coiled
tubing from the tubing reel into the injector head.
3.2.6 Lifting frame

The lifting frame houses the injector head and the BOP stack during well intervention. It is
suspended in the elevator and compensated using the rigs heave compensation system. Since
the frame is motion compensated it provides for the operator a motionless unit relative to the
riser.
During operation, the CT is uncoiled from the reel when going into the well and coiled back
when going out of the well. The handling imposes plastic deformation to the tubing; hence it
is of utmost importance that a record of the number of runs is kept. When the tubing has
experienced plastic deformation a predefined numbers of times, it is replaced with new
tubing. The small diameter tubing imposes reduced flowrates and high pressure losses.
System and general equipment descriptions for the WL and the CT operations are
conventional technologies. There are constant changes in design to enhance and simplify the
intervention operations. Later in the thesis, focus is directed to a riserless light well
intervention system. This is in general an improvement of light intervention technology in the
sense of simpler topside demands, which induce reduction in time and complexity. This
enables light intervention tasks to be more cost efficient than existing methods.
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4 Light well intervention as a project. Framework for

project risk analysis
This chapter gives a general introduction to project risk analysis in addition to when and
where it is suitable to utilize project risk analysis. The target group is the staff, planning and
conducting offshore well intervention operations. The aim is to clarify how to use a
framework for a project risk analysis in a simple and a precise manner.
4.1 Introduction
Risk and uncertainty are inherent in all projects. The size, complexity, location and speed of a
project are all factors that represent risk elements. The evolution of risk management has
showed continuously more focus on the subject of project risk. Clients and service contractors
are aware of the consequences if work fails to succeed. Therefore a proactive way of
performing business is a must to survive within the industry. In this section an introduction to
risk theory, project risk management and project risk analysis is given.
NORSOK Standard Z-013 Risk and emergency preparedness analysis defines risk analysis
as: use of available information to identify hazards and to estimate the risk. The methods
considering risk and project risk analysis tend to have different approaches to what kind of
risk considered. Project risk analysis mainly deals with risks related to parameters such as
time, cost and quality. Project risk analysis has previously tended to cover quantitative
methods. Risk analysis methods take more into consideration risks related to accidents,
human loss and environmental damage (Walker, 2002). Therefore the main difference in the
methods is that risk analysis tends to cover a broader perspective than project risk analysis.
4.2 The objectives of project risk analysis.

The overall goal of a project from a risk point of view, is not necessary to eliminate all risk
elements which is an unsolvable task. It is rather to establish control of the risk factors. The
primary goal of a risk analysis is to calculate and evaluate the risk associated with operations
and compare it against acceptable criteria for risk. To execute this, it is essential that the
purpose and scope of the analysis is clearly defined and is in accordance with the needs of the
activity.
The purpose of a framework is to provide a consistent and systematic approach to risk

handling in projects in order to allow project teams to proactively identify and prevent
unwanted incidents before they occur or by reducing the impact of them if they occur. Risks
need to be continuously assessed throughout the project as the nature, probability, and impact
of risks change by phase and activity. The outcome of a project risk analysis shall therefore as
fare as possible give a picture of all critical situations and thereby make a better foundation
for decision making.
4.3 Standards and guidelines for project risk analysis

Guidelines and recommendations for handling project risks are carried out in NORSOK Z-
013 and BS 6079-3:2000 Project management - Part 3: Guide to the management of
business related project risk. BS-6070 is a general standard for all types of business related
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projects while NORSOK Z-013 is a more specifically designed standard for the petroleum
industry. BS 6079 specifies a more general methodology and describes a process for
identifying, assessing, and controlling risk within a broader framework than NORSOK Z-013.
The main features of this process are illustrated in the figure 4-1. The risk management
process described in this standard is applicable for each aspect of the business activity and
focuses at each level of decision making.
Another framework for dealing with project risk analysis is given by DNV in DNV-RP-
H101:Risk Management in Marine and Subsea Operations. This is carried out as a
specific procedure for handling project risk in marine operations. The recommended practice
gives more detailed guidelines for planning and handling project risks than the BS-6079 and
NORSOK Z-013. It goes into a wider perspective of specific tools and processes in the core
of the risk analysis.
The NORSOK Z-013, BS 6079 and DNV-RP-H101 can all be applied for handling project
risk analysis. For more specific information of different methods, tools and risk handling
techniques the ROSS community at www.ntnu.no/ross gives a good perspective and
application of how to conduct risk analysis.
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Figure 4-1: The steps in a risk management process. Adapted from (BS 6079-3, 2000)
4.4 The process of project risk analysis

There are several ways of performing a risk analysis. How it should be carried out depends on
the subject of investigation such as the projects complexity, time, organization and costs.
BS 6079 recommends using a set of guide words for each step of the process of the risk
analysis. NORSOK Z-013 recommends a guidance framework in the form of block diagrams
describing how the analysis should be conducted.
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Figure 4-2: Procedure framework for risk -and project risk analysis. Adapted from (Ross community,
2005)
The process for risk and project risk analysis is more or less the same. The first step in the
process is to define the scope and context of what to be analyzed. A typical lead question
according to the BS 6079 in the first step is to identify what is at risk and why. NORSOK Z-
013 emphasizes that the analysis shall be planned in accordance with the development and
operation of the activity ensuring that the risk studies are used actively in the design and
execution of the activity. The second step contains risk identification, the sources of risk in
addition to what and where the risk elements are. Third step is the risk analysis itself, while
the fourth step is risk evaluation. The fifth step is treatment of the outcome and the measures
that should be taken about the risks revealed in the analysis. A risk evaluation is based on the
outcome of the risk analysis where likelihood and potential consequences of the individual
risks or sets of risks is identified. The evaluation is then suitable to determine which risks take
the highest priority, which risks require further studies and which risks need less attention.
When the risk picture is identified and evaluated, there is always a remaining risk. The
remaining risk after risk treatment measures have been taken is often in literature referred to
as residual risk. The issue of handling residual risk is a cost/benefit evaluation.
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4.5 Event and parameter uncertainties in projects

Parameter or estimate uncertainty is the span of uncertainty elements in a base estimate or
time plan. Estimates that describe the consequence of certain conditions are often represented
in a continuous distribution. Event uncertainties on the other hand, are elements that indicate
the probability and consequence of the interference of undesirable event i.e. situations that
occur or not. This implies the probability and consequence of event that is not included in the
parameter uncertainty. (Metier, 2002). It is a difficult task to estimate and handle event
uncertainty for a project organization, because interactions and consequences are diffuse to
put in a base estimate. Statoil have the latest years experienced how event uncertainties can
affect a project. The latest major event was a gas leakage at Snorre A in 2004 during heavy
well intervention of a water injection well. The measures to deal with event uncertainties in a
base estimate are to make sure there are proper procedures for handling of unwanted
incidents.
4.6 Contingency planning

The term contingency include an alternative plan if something differs from the original
intention. In the field of risk management, there are other types of contingencies also.
Chapman and Ward (1997) explain contingency planning as setting aside resources to provide
a reactive ability to cope with impacts if they eventuate, introducing that the contingencies
may be different types of resources, e.g. time, cost, personnel, etc. Wideman (1986) states that
contingency planning includes the management of contingency budget, the development if
schedule alternatives or work-arounds and complete emergency responses to deal with
specific major risk areas. Wideman further indicates that contingencies may be in the form of
alternative solutions. This is supported by Dinsmore (1993), who identifies that contingency
planning may result in some redundancy in the project. An example of this is when two or
more promising solutions to same technical problem exist, and none clearly has a better
chance of success (Mogstad, 2000). Consequently, risk contingencies may be in the form of
cost reserves, time allowances, risk allowances in specifications, contract options, alternative
approaches and alternative design.
4.7 Qualitative risk analysis

Qualitative risk analysis is a process that primary have to aims: risk identification and initial
risk assessment. The objective is to identify a list of the main risk sources and a description of
their likely consequences. This is often illustrated through risk matrixes where the probability
of interaction and consequences is represented.
4.8 Quantitative risk analysis

Quantitative analysis uses descriptive scales to describe the risk i.e. the magnitude of potential
consequences and probability of occurrence (Mogstand, 2000). Quantitative analysis differs
from qualitative techniques in the way of quantifying the risk elements involved. To be able
to conduct this it is essential that correct input information is available. Offshore experience
databases such as OREDA and Wellmaster have in the latest years made it possible to get
more specific information as input to risk analysis, and thereby more suitable for quantitative
techniques. Fault tree and Event analysis is examples of quantitative methods.
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4.9 Semi-quantitative analysis

This is another type of analysis in which the scale is given values, often between 0 and 1, or
percentages. This provides a more detailed priority than qualitative analysis, but does not give
any realistic values as attempted in qualitative analysis (Mogstad, 2000). Table 4.9-1 shortly
summarize the main differences in the different methods described.
Table 4.9-1: Estimating scales: Adapted from (Mogstad, 2000)
Analysis level Example of scale
Qualitative Low/medium/high
Semi-quantitative 0-1 or 0-100 %
Quantitative
4.10 Application area for project risk analysis

The application area for project risk analysis depends on the complexity of the project that is
to be conducted. There are generally three forms of planning operational work.
Complexity
Project Risk Analysis
Procedure HAZOP
SJA
Time
Figure 4-3: Indication of complexity versus time for planning and handling of operations.
4.10.1 Toolbox meeting/ Safe Job Analysis (SJA)

Toolbox meeting or SJA are simple and practical orientated tools to identify hazards and
operability risks. These are conducted at the worksite just before operations shall be executed.
In short text toolbox meetings or SJAs consists in briefing involved personnel of hazards and
possible operational threats.
4.10.2 Procedure Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) analysis

A procedure HAZOP is a systematic and structured technique to examining a defined system.
It is a detailed problem identification process carried out by a team dealing with the
identification of potential deviations from the design intent. Further an examination of their
possible causes and assessment of their consequences.
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4.11 Discussion
One central part of definition of a project is that no projects are alike. Therefore risk
evaluation and risk approximation also differs from every project. There are several
approaches for dealing with risk element both qualitative and quantitative methods.
Risk management has to be integrated through the project processes. In some cases the
perception of risk analysis is additional work. Another important issue is a balance between
threats and opportunities. When planning and conducting intervention operations it is of
utmost importance to find a balance of how extensive the risk analysis should be. Factors
affecting the level of risk investigation are dependent on technology, the environment,
experiences and complexity of scope. For a regular intervention task, a Procedure HAZOP
and SJA might be the most suitable methods of handling the risk involved. While for an
intervention program involving new technology and harsh environmental conditions, it may
be more suitable to conduct a more detailed project risk analysis.
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5 Well integrity
This section introduces and discusses the concept and factors which affect the integrity of
subsea wells during light well interventions based on NORSOK D-010.
5.1 Introduction
NORSOK D-010 defines the minimum functional -and performance oriented requirements,
and guidelines for operations on the NCS. The standard are developed by the Norwegian
petroleum industry to ensure adequate safety, value adding and cost effectiveness for
petroleum industry developments and operations. It is carried out and prepared with support
from The Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF) and Federation of Norwegian
Manufacturing Industries (TBL). NORSOK D-010 is the leading document for minimum well
design, planning and execution requirements of safe well operations.
5.2 Well integrity

NORSOK D-010 defines well integrity as: The application of technical, operational and
organizational solutions to reduce the risk of uncontrolled release of formation fluids
throughout the entire life cycle of a well. Well barriers are the main elements that represent
the technical solutions to fulfill the specification of well integrity design.
NORSOK D-010 introduces a life cycle well perspective. There are generally three different
stages that influence the well integrity during a life time period. These are:
Drilling operations.
Production.
Intervention.
The three stages can be further subdivided. In this context focus is set on well integrity during
subsea light well interventions or in other words; deployment of tools and equipment in a
completed well and thereby how that affects the well integrity. This is influenced by
technical, organizational, and operational barrier elements.
5.2.1 Well Barriers

There are several types of barriers. In everyday language the word barrier is used with
different meanings. In this thesis focus is set on well barriers. A well barrier is defined in
NORSOK D-010 as: an envelope of one or several dependent well elements that prevent
fluids or gases from flowing unintentionally from the formation, into another formation or to
surface. These are further subdivided into primary and secondary well barriers. A primary
barrier is the first object that prevents flow of hydrocarbons from a formation. In well
completions a typical primary barrier is the production tubing and the production packers
which are in direct contact with the well stream. The primary barriers are often marked with
blue lines in barrier schematics. A secondary barrier is then logically the second object that
prevents flow from a source to another. A well casing is a typical example of a secondary
barrier. This are often marked as red lines in barrier schematics. Figure 5-1 adapted from
NORSOK D-010 which illustrates the concept of sketching barriers.
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Figure 5-1: Well barrier schematic of a CT intervention stack up. Adapted form (NORSOK D-010, 2004)
5.2.2 Well Barrier methodology

According to NORSOK D-010 there shall always be two available well barriers during all
well activities and operations, including suspended or abandoned wells, where a pressure
differential exists that may cause uncontrolled outflow from the borehole/well to the external
environment. Furthermore D-010 states that the primary and secondary well barriers shall to
the extent possible be independent of each other without a common well barrier element. If a
common well barrier element exists, a risk analysis shall be performed and risk
reducing/mitigation measures applied to reduce the risk to as low as reasonably practical. The
philosophy of two independent well barriers is set as a rule of thumb on the NCS to keep the
well integrity as high as possible.
D-010 further states that well barriers shall be designed selected and or/ constructed such that;
It can withstand the maximum anticipated differential pressure it may be exposed to.
It can be leak tested and function tested or verified by other methods.
No single failures of well barrier or well barrier elements lead to uncontrolled outflow
from the borehole/well to the external environment.
It can operate competently and withstand the environment it may be exposed to over
time.
Its physical location and integrity status of the well barrier is known at all times.
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5.2.3 Barriers in well operations

Barriers are divided into different types. They are grouped according to their functions, how
they are operated or how barrier failures are observed. This is illustrated in the table below.
Table 5.2-1: Typical well barriers. Adapted from (Holand et al, 2003)
Barrier type Description Example
Operational barrier Function while the operation is Drilling mud, Stuffing box
carried out. A barrier failure will
be observed when it occurs.
Active barrier An external action is required to BOP, XT, SCSSV
(Stand-by barriers) activate the barrier. Barrier failures
are normally observed during
regular testing.
Passive barrier A barrier in place that functions Casing, tubing, Well kill fluids,
continuously without any external packers
action.
Conditional barrier A barrier that is either not always Stabbing valve, (WR-SCSSV)
in place or not always capable of
functioning as a barrier
There are typically two main types of barrier;
Static barriers.
Dynamic barriers.
A static barrier is a barrier that is in place over a long period of time. This situation applies
during production/injection or when the well is temporary closed in. For static barriers, barrier
diagrams may be used to illustrate and analyze the relationship between the barriers and the
conduits. A dynamic barrier is a barrier that varies over time. This applies for well drilling,
intervention and completion phases (Holand et al, 2003).
5.2.4 Well barrier characteristics

There are many factors affecting the level of well integrity during a light or heavy
intervention task. This affects the level of well integrity. The well barrier picture changes
during different operation modes. Well barrier can be described as active and passive. These
can further be broken down to dynamic and static well barrier elements. A passive well
barrier is contributing in a static manner to perform the functioning of a system. Production
tubing and Polish bore receptacle (PBR) are examples of this. Active barriers require input
signals or some kind of trigger mechanism to perform a change of state. Active well barriers
changes over time. Closure of a DHSV is a typical example of an active barrier. DHSV
function as a barrier element if a critical situation requires.
The definition of well integrity in NORSOK D-010 uses the term application of technical,
organizational and operational. Well barriers are mostly technical appliances meanwhile
the two last elements are more barriers in the sense of Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary:
Something immaterial that impedes or separates. This can be exemplified through
behavioral barriers. In other words a technical well barrier is typically in the nature of
physical elements like casings, valves or packers. Operational and organizational measures
are used to ensure the integrity of the physical components. During light well interventions a
typical organizational and operational barrier might be calculations of the mud column weight
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which acts as a dynamic barrier during well operations. Miscalculations can either lead to
damage of formation or unintentional leakages to the surroundings. Figure 5-2 is meant to
clarify the connections and breakdown of well barriers.
Well Barrier
Active Passive
Dynamic Dynamic Static
Primary
Level? Secondary
Tertiary
Technical
Organizational
Operational
Figure 5-2: Methodology for breakdown of well barriers.
5.3 Discussion
As mention in chapter 6, D-010 is a guiding standard for well integrity and well operations on
the NCS. The standard is static in the way of determining the safety level for well activities.
Standards are in general cost effective in the sense of standardization of equipment and
accessory needs. One question that can be raised is: Have the D-010 in some cases a negative
effect on the value adding? In some cases the answer is probably yes. Every well has it own
characteristics when it comes to pressure, temperature, and reservoir fluids. The differences in
well characteristics do not to date reflect the safety level of the completion and intervention
tasks. This raises the question of how the standard should be handled and maintained. In the
introduction to D-010 it is stated that the standard focus, is to add value and cost
effectiveness. But is the safety level too high in some cases? Can the standard in some cases
hinder a cost efficient way of producing hydrocarbons? There must be a balance between the
risk involved and the safety measures taken. Since early 1980 there has been a major
collection of experience data from the NCS. Historical databases such as OREDA and
WellMaster provide key information input parameters in well risk evaluations to the safety
level and can contribute in some cases to lower the demand for well operations. D-010 opens
up for risk evaluations for specific projects. This should be the object for introducing a
concept of well integrity levels where risk evaluations for specific cases can estimate the most
correct and optimal level of choice to ensure well integrity without to use of extra costs.
By getting a more cost efficient way of producing hydrocarbons without necessarily reducing
the safety level, can increase the net incomes on the NCS significantly. Light well
intervention performed by RLWI is an example of reducing well intervention costs. Historical
experiences of oil and gas production on the NCS give valuable data to evaluate the safety
level. The handling of D-010 could probably be more cost efficient and value adding if the
standard had corporate specific levels of well integrity based on specific well and equipment
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characteristics. Today the regulation handling is the same for all activities. The Kristin and
Ormen Lange field developments where reservoir characteristics, water depths and
application of new technological solutions represent challenges for safe well operations.
Today the same regulation is prevailing, either it is a low or high profile risk operations.
An issue for current standards in general, is handling of new technology. Rules and regulation
should dynamically adaptable for new technological solutions when the quality of safety
barriers and well integrity can be documented.
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6 Riserless Light Well Intervention (RLWI)

This section covers a describing and discussion of the main operational benefits and
weaknesses by using the RLWI system. This chapter is the basis for identifying hazards and
operability problems related to well intervention operations. The literature are based on
(Andrersen, 2004) and (Inderberg, 2005).
6.1 Introduction
As the offshore oil and gas production continues to grow, subsea wells are becoming
increasingly important. According to FMC Energy Systems there are approximately 2 000
subsea wells in water depths down to 2 000 meters. These wells are normally installed and
maintained by large and costly semi-submersible drilling rigs. Potential cost savings provides
the principal driving force for performing light well intervention. Well interventions can be
performed using Dynamic Positioned (DP) vessels instead of using large anchored drilling
rigs designed for more complex operations and heavy equipment handling. The main purpose
in using DP vessels is to enable well intervention without rigid connections between vessel
and seabed. Therefore the main purpose of RLWI systems in general is to minimize the costs
of subsea well interventions. Today surface wells have a higher recovery rate than subsea
wells. A RLWI system can contribute to close this gap because the costs can be reduces with
2/3. This will make subsea installations more beneficial as a field development solution.
6.2 Area of application

Typical well intervention tasks for light well intervention include:
Verification of fluid properties from different perforated zones.
Installation of various mechanical devices such as plugs and screens.
Well stimulation by acid treatment of the reservoir to remove substances such as scale
of calcium.
Re-perforation.
Well abandonment.
The WL services available are many, but the services used for subsea wells is normally
product enhancing services such as; production logging to identify reservoir characteristics
and contribution from different perforated zones, installation of plugs and packers to isolated
zones in the well and perforation of new zones in the well. RLWI is equipped with a flushing
system that returns all hydrocarbons into the well. It also enables the options of chemical
treatments of the well such as scale squeezing operations.
A weakness of using the RLWI system is limited space topside. If a critical situation occurs
and there is a demand to kill the well by pumping kill fluids to regain well integrity, a semi-
submersible rig is required. A small DP vessel has not enough space to store kill mud.
There are not stored risers on the vessel for contingency actions. The RLWI system is either
not capable to perform fishing operations if the toolstring has to be cut during operation. In
such cases there is also a need for a semi-submersible rig to recover a cut wireline in the well.
The benefits of using the RLWI system for light well intervention operations are discusses in
the introduction. The drawback of using the system is when a critical situation occurs when
the toolstring is cut and well control is lost. This can be caused by a gas kick. The costs if a
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semi-submersible rig is required are approximately 2 MNOK per day (Sangesland, 2004). The
time period such a rig is required depends on availability, mobilizations, transportation and
complexity of operation. There are a limited number of semi-submersible intervention rigs
available on the world marked. The mobilization and de-mobilization of a rig depends on
where available and necessary equipment is stored. The rigs transportation time to and from
the well location, can be high. Loss of production is also an impacting factor. This cost is
normally not directed to the company providing the intervention services. The operator
company is not happy when a well is unable to produce over a period of time. When the
factors above are all summarized, it is difficult to estimate the time period, costs and
consequences if a semi-submersible rig is required but they are significant.
6.3 Description of the Riserless Light Well Intervention (RLWI)

system
The RLWI system consists of several modules that can be independently installed and
retrieved from the seabed. This systems main differences from conventional technology are
that operations are carried out with no use of marine riser from the XT to the topside unit.
Figure 6-1 shows the RLWI system configuration.
Figure 6-1: The modules of the RLWI configuration. Adapted from (Andersen, 2004)
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6.3.1 Lower Intervention Package (LIP)

The LIP is located on top of the XT. The purpose of the LIP assembly is to provide a well
safety barrier during intervention. This is designed to interface with both conventional and
horizontal subsea XTs. Included in the LIP is a shear/seal ram with the capacity to cut
wireline tools and coiled tubing. The lower intervention package represents the main barrier
element and safety head of the system.
6.3.2 Lower Lubricator Package (LLP)

LLP is the connection between the LIP and the Lubricator Tubulars in the RLWI stack-up.
The LLP acts as the running tool for the LIP and is where the connection between the control
umbilical, well kill hose and control module is.
The LIP contains the main control systems in the stack. There is a control module is located
inside which is supplied by energy and signals from the umbilical. The umbilical is connected
to the LLP which can be activated to free the vessel in case of vessel drive/drift off and case
emergency situations. In addition the LLP contains a well kill hub and a subsea grease
injection system for the wireline. Located at the bottom of the assembly there is a connector
that locks the assembly to a XT hub. The connector is available in a variety of designs to
allow for interfacing with different type of XTs.
At the bottom of the assembly is a subsea tool trap which prevents unintentional dropping of
the toolstring into the well. On top of the tool trap is the lubricator section.
6.3.3 Lubricator Tubular (LUB)

The lubricator section is the parking space for the wireline toolsting on its way in or out of the
well, while pressurizing the system before opening the well or depressurizing the system after
the well is closed in. The Lubricator section is long enough to house toolstrings up to 22
meters. If excessive forces are applied to the stack in an emergency situation, the lower part of
the lubricator section will bend and act as a weak link in the system located in the safety head
above the LLP. This will ensure that excessive bending forces are not transferred from the
well intervention system to the permanent installation system. The lubricator assembly is
locked on to the LIP assembly by means of a connector. The wireline toolsting is located
below the pressure control head (PCH) and is connected to a wireline which is treaded
through narrow tubes into the PCH.
6.3.4 Upper Lubricator Package (ULP)

The ULP assembly is the connection between the PCH and the lubricator providing a well
barrier element during well intervention. A Wireline Shear/Seal ram has the capacity to cut all
standard braided wires.
6.3.5 Pressure Control Head (PCH)
As part of the subsea lubricator system rig-up, the PCH is connected on top of the lubricator
and functions as a pressure barrier and seal toward the well bore during wireline operations,
allowing intervention access to wells under pressure. Located on the bottom of the PCH is a
tool catcher. The tool catcher will catch and hold the tool if the toolsting is unintentionally
pulled into the PCH and break the WL. The PCH represents the primary seal when the WL is
run into the well. The seal around moving Wl is performed by pumping viscous grease into
the limited free space in the wireline and the narrow tubes in the PCH. The grease pressure is
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supplied by a grease injection system located in the LLP and must always be higher then the
wellhead pressure.
6.3.6 Umbilical system

The main umbilical connects to the LLP with a remote operated multi-bore connector to allow
for a emergency quick disconnect function. The umbilical system is lowered to the seabed
along with the LLP/LIP assembly.
6.3.7 Control system

The subsea control system consists of a Workover Control Module, subsea camera, subsea
transducers and sensors, subsea jumpers and XT control valves. The system is designed to be
as fare as practical with redundancy. If a critical system should occur the control system will
activate fail safe close (FSC) procedures of valves in the main bore to prevent a blowout
situation.
6.4 Riserless Light Well Intervention system in operation

This section is a short summary of the RLWI system operation. The section is adapted form
FMC Kongsberg Subsea homepage
RLWI operations are performed from the moon pool, which is a 6x5 meters hole in the
middle part of a surface vessel and assisted by a Remote Operated Vehicle (ROV) subsea.
The first step is lowering the LIP and the LLP. Like all the other assemblies the LIP/LLP is
run on an active heave compensated wire, using guide wires. In addition there is a guiding
system that supports the assemblies, when they are located in or passing the splash zone. On
its way down to the subsea stack, the sea current can apply substantial forces to the WL and
toolstring. This requires continuous monitoring to avoid twisting of the wireline with the
guide or the guideline wires. When the WL toolstring enters the top of the lubricator assembly
the toolstring is guided with a combination of ROV and guide cones. The PCH is locked in
place by means of a connector. The RLWI system is then ready for replacing the seawater in
the stack by flushing in inhibitor fluids to avoid hydrate formation. The next step is to
pressure test the stack before opening the well and running the WL toolsting into the well.
The toolsting is run into the well by means of gravity until the well deviation reaches
approximately 70 degrees. Beyond this point a well tractor, described in section 3.1.9, is
required to help the toolsting into the high deviated parts of a well.
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7 Hazard assessment during well intervention

The purpose of this section is to describe a basis for identification and evaluation of hazards
and operability problems related to light well interventions in general.
7.1 Introduction
When new techniques and equipment for conducting subsea light well intervention is
introduced, sufficient planning and documentation of the tasks are important. Proper
evaluation of functionality, operability and hazards need to be conducted carefully.
A hazard is defined as a situation with a potential for human injury, damage to property,
damage to the environment, or some combinations of these (Rausand, 1993). Operability is
according to Statoil doc TR0034 defined as: the possibility to perform a planned well
operation, within a target weather window, without compromising structural safety. In other
words, operability comprises a systems availability to operate.
Further on standards and methods are described before hazard and operability problems
during a light well intervention is identified and discussed.
7.2 Standards and regulations

General requirement for intervention tasks is described in NORSOK D-010 and NORSOK D-
002. These procedures are made for light intervention tasks in general. These standards do not
in detail specify procedures for new light intervention techniques such as RLWI. This might
be a weakness in the mentioned standards. Operator companies therefore needs to prepare
their own procedures for handling specific operations.
7.3 Methods to identify hazards and operability problems

There are several techniques developed to identify hazards associated with an installation or
an activity, for example HAZOP/HAZID, FMECA, checklist, Top Down Approach,
qualitative review and What-If analysis (Walker, 2002). The technique to be used depends on
the type of risk analysis to be conducted and the type of operation or facility to be assessed.
7.3.1 Hazard Identification (HAZID)

Hazard identification (HAZID) is a common and frequent used technique within the
petroleum industry. It is commonly used on a great variety of areas, projects, and operations.
Similar techniques are Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) and Rapid Risk Ranking. HAZID
is a method usually carried out in groups where the objective is to reveal potential hazards in
an early stage of a project. The most common application is technical system reviews, but
also for reviews of operational procedures. A description of potential causes, effects and
seriousness of possible accidents are given to each hazard identified. Improvements or
preventive acts are suggested. It is essential to have a certain amount of experience with
similar equipment or situation to obtain applicable results (Rausand, 2000).
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7.3.2 HAZID process

The HAZID methodology defines a certain event. A common event during WL operations is
tool stuck in the well. This can be caused by hydrate formation in the well or sliding of valves
that lead to an obstruction in the main bore. Intervention operations are in general expensive
due to the rig rates and loss of production. When the time interval for the intervention task is
extended, this leads to a significant cost increase for the operation.
7.3.3 Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)

FMECA is a development of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). This method is
often a first step in a system reliability analysis and normally involves review of components,
assemblies and subsystems to discover failure modes, causes, and their effects. There is no
need for advanced analytical skills to obtain satisfactory results (Rausand et al., 2004).
Therefore one of the main advantages of the method is that it is relative easy to carry out even
for inexperienced personnel. On the other hand a disadvantage of the method is that it only
focuses on technical failures. In addition it does not cover combinations of failures
7.3.4 What- If analysis.
What-If analysis is a structured brainstorming method of determining what can go wrong and
judges the likehood and consequences of the occurring situations. The answers to these
questions form a basis for making judgement regarding the acceptability of those risks.
Furthermore it determinates a recommended course of action for those risks judged to be
unacceptable. An experienced review team can effectively and productively discern major
issues concerning a process or system. Lead by an energetic and focused facilitator, each
member of the review team participates in assessing what can go wrong based on their past
experiences and knowledge of similar situations.
At each step of the procedure or process What-If questions are asked and answers generated.
To minimize the chances that potential problems are not overlooked, the recommendations is
held until all of the potential hazards are identified. The review team then make judgements
regarding the likelihood and severity of the What-If answers. If the risk indicated by those
judgements is unacceptable then recommendation is made for further actions. The completed
analysis is then summarized, actions prioritized, and responsibilities are assigned
(Diberardinis, 1999).
7.3.5 Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP)

HAZOP studies are a systematic technique for investigation of how a system may deviate
from design intent. The method has the origin from the early 1970s in the chemical industry.
It is according to (Rausand, 2004) defined by the British Chemical Industry Safety Council
as:
The application of a formal systematic critical examination of the process and

engineering intention of the new facility to assess the hazard potential of mal-
operating or malfunction of individual items of equipment and the consequential
effects on the facility as a whole
The primary objective of a HAZOP study is to identify and reduce hazards and operability
challenges which, although not hazardous, can compromise a systems ability to meet
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productivity aims. Another objective may also be used to educate the involved personal in the
sense of operational problems.
7.3.6 HAZOP process.

A HAZOP study is normally carried out as a number of brainstorming sessions by a team of
people working together under the guidance of a chairman with thorough experience in the
HAZOP study technique. A HAZOP secretary is responsible for producing the record of the
teams discussions and outcomes. I main pillar in the HAZOP technique is the presence of
creative processes. The members can stimulate each other and build upon each others ideas.
Every part of the design or facility is studied systematically, and for each element in the
design, possible deviations from the original design intent are generated by applying a set of
guide words. The guidewords are applied to ensure a complete coverage of all possible
problems. The discussion is conducted so as to identify possible causes and effects of each
deviation. When a deviation has a credible cause and the design is not considered acceptable,
a recommendation for change or for further study is made. This are often also refereed to in
literature as actions. If the team require further information, guidance about company policy,
or that a detailed study of a particular issue is carried out, a question will be asked.
The output from the study consists of a set of recommendations and questions. Often it is
suitable to record of the team sessions in tabular form to enable the origin of any
recommendation to be traced.
As for all risk studies, a mechanism must exist to ensure that the teams recommendations and
questions are acted upon promptly and effectively. This is usually carried out by recording the
actions into an external or internal risk register and followed up on a regular basis, according
to specific project risk register requirements. Companies usually have a register where actions
and measures are listed.
There are several variants of HAZOP studies. It is dependent of object of investigation. The
two most common forms of HAZOP studies within the petroleum industry are system and
procedure examinations carried out during detailed design and operation phase. This involves
the following steps shown in figure 7-1.
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Figure 7-1: Show the steps in a HAZOP process chart.
When performing a HAZOP analysis it is important that all participants are well informed and
prepared to get optimal results. In many cases there are too many participants on the HAZOP
sessions without the necessary knowledge to be a part of the session. Participating in a
HAZOP is an easy way of getting an overview of the issue to be carried out. A problem is too
many involved in the session without the knowledge to contribute. This delay in the process
can reduce the quality of the outcome.
7.4 Identification of potential hazards and operability problems

during a Light Well Intervention operation
In this section an identification process of hazards and operability problems related to light
well intervention is presented. Thereafter a HAZID analysis is conducted based on the RLWI
system in operation described in chapter 6. The HAZID analysis has been chosen to be the
technique because it is relative simple to carry out and gives a good description of the
investigated issue. The process consists of the four following steps.
1) Definition and description of the main operational phases.

2) Definition and description of events that can lead to hazards and operability problems.
3) Combining events and phases in HAZID work sheets.
4) Evaluation and conclusion.
7.4.1 Description of operational phases.

The main operational phases identified are listed in table 7.4-1.
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Table 7.4-1: The main operational phases during a RLWI operation

No. Operational phases
1 Handover: XT closed prior to intervention.
2. Installation and retrieval of intervention equipment on XT.
3. Run toolstring in upper part of intervention package (lock-in, lock-out tool in
lubricator).
4. Running and retrieval of toolstring in and out of LLB/LIP and XT.
5. Toolstring in and out of well below XT.
Phase No.1: Handover: XT closed prior to intervention.

This phase involves preparation work in conjunction with handling activities for locating the
well; to establish guidelines, preparation of installing equipment topside and to conduct
testing procedures. A ROV normally has the function to assist and monitor the whole
operation. The Debris Tree Cap (DTC) is usually removed using the vessels hive
compensated crane. The ROV is used to connect the hook-up of the DTC.
Phase No.2: Run and retrieve intervention equipment on XT.

This phase incorporate installation and retrieval of intervention equipment. The system is
pressure tested and well control is established. The valve configuration in the XT is not
considered as a safety barrier for well control.
Phase No. 3: Run and retrieve toolstring in and out of lubricator.

Incorporate lock-in lock-out toolstring in the lubricator section. For a conventional X-mas tree
(CXT) the Production Safety Valve (PSV), Production Master Valve (PMW) and Production
Wing Valve (PWV) are closed when the toolstring is entering the lubricator the for first time.
The PSV and PMV are opened after being pressure tested. For a horizontal X-mas tree (HXT)
there are no valves in the bore that have to be open before phase No. 4.
Phase No. 4: Run and retrieve toolstring in and out of LLP/LIP and XT.
For a short period of time when the toolstring is entered or being retrieved from the well, all
valves that perform a barrier envelope are obstructed from closing and sealing off the well.
Retrieval of the Tubing Hanger Crown Plug (THCP) will be the first run in a HXT.
Phase No.5: Toolstring in and out of well XT

A situation with the toolstring above the SCSSV is similar to this. Closing of the
SCSSV usually have a time delay in order to allow a sheared toolstring to pass the SCSSV
before closed.
7.4.2 Identification of the operational events

The main hazardous events identified during operation are listed in table 7.4-2.
Table 7.4-2: Operational events during a well intervention using subsea lubricator
Operational events
A Stuck tool
B Loss of umbilical
C Drive off/ Drift off
D Power loss
E Failure in lock-in/lock-out and grease injection system
F Leakage to environment
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A: Stuck tool
There are primary two reasons why tool get stuck in the well or intervention system during
operations. This includes hydrate formation and sliding of rams or gate valves that make an
obstruction in the passage. Tools stuck in the well, XT, LIP/LLP induces one of the main
hazards and operability issues during intervention tasks.
B: Umbilical loss
This event implies that the electrical and hydraulic supply to subsea is interrupted. In addition
the communication between topside and subsea and grease injection to stuffing box stops.
This event leads to a control failure. The control system is then unable to perform its
functions to control the valves. Loss of umbilical is therefore a critical event.
C: Drive off/ Drift off

A drift off can occur if the DP system on the vessel fails. Rough weather conditions can also
cause the vessel to be unable to maintain its location. A drive of situation can occur if objects
are on a colliding course, e.g. vessels, icebergs or if failures in the vessels manoeuvring
system occur. The drift off event requires a fast response in order to maintain well control. A
drive off situation may pass into a drift off situation.
D: Power loss
Power loss can be divided into three main situations: 1) Loss of electrical power subsea, 2)
Loss of hydraulic power subsea and 3) Loss of both electrical and hydraulic power subsea.
This event is connected to loss of the umbilical. It is normally a critical because as long as the
umbilical is in place, reestablishment of power loss can be performed without retrieving the
intervention equipment.
E: Failure in lock-in/lock-out and grease injection system

Incorporate failure in PCH. The system fails to lock-in/lock-out the toolstring or the system
malfunction in the grease injection system.
F: Leakage to environment
Leakages to environment can be divided into three main situations: 1) Leakages in
permanently installed equipment or 2) Leakages in the intervention equipment and 3)
Leakages in 1).and 2). This is a critical event.
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7.5 Combination of phases and events in a matrix

Combinations of phases and events are listed in the matrix underneath. After a description of
subject for analysis is carried out, it is according to BS 6079-3:2000 recommended that
HAZID identification is performed. The matrix contains the basis for the HAZID study
carried out in appendix A.
Table 7.5-1: Combination matrix of operational phases and events
Failure in lock-in / lock-
Leakage to environment
out and grease injection
Drive off /drift off
Loss of umbilical
Operational events
Power loss
Stuck tool
system
Operational phases A B C D E F
Handover: XT closed prior to
1 1C 1D
intervention
Installation / retrieval of
2 2B 2C 2D 2F
intervention equipment on XT
Run and retrieve toolstring in and
3 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E 3F
out of lubricator
Running and retrieval of toolstring
4 4A 4B 4C 4D 4E 4F
in and out of LLB/LIP and XT
Toolstring in and out of well
5 5A 5B 5C 5D 5E 5F
below XT
7.6 Discussion
Based on the HAZID analysis performed in appendix A. The hazards and operability
problems identified can be divided into three groups. This are:
Technical factors.
Organizational and operational factors.
Environmental factors.
Technical factors which concern light well interventions are primary equipment design. The
consequences of failure during operation can be significant. This depends on type of failure
and in what phase the failure occurs. A light well intervention system must be designed to
incorporate as fare as possible contingency actions to cover unwanted events but first of all be
design so that technical failures does not interferes. An uncontrolled leakage to the
environment is the worst case scenario during an intervention. Prevailing rules and
regulations discussed in chapter 5 are set to minimize the risk of failure. It is comprehensive
task in the design phase to predict all possible unwanted situations for the different
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operational phases and estimate the consequences. The HAZID analysis conducted in
appendix A evaluate technical weaknesses and suggest corrective measures. A chain is newer
stronger than its weakest link. This applies for technical systems too.
Operational and organizational factor are mainly connected to personnel involved in the
operations. Human errors are in many cases the initiating factor to why operations fail to
succeed. A light well intervention project requires detail planning of all tasks to be carried
out. When all personnel involved is familiar with the operation and procedures, the risk of
failure are probably reduced. An operability problem that may arise, are lacking of skills.
Therefore sufficient training is an important part before an operation is carried out. An
operability problem can be too much general knowledge of the operations and too little detail
knowledge of a specific task. It is not practical possible for all involved personnel to have
detail knowledge of all operational procedures and technical specifications. It is therefore the
operational managers responsibility to give the correct information needed for the involved
personnel to carry out the operation in a safe manner. A training program should therefore
consist of specific training to gain skills for the exact operation to be carried out.
Tool stuck during operation is identified through the HAZID analysis as on of the most
frequent failure situations to occur during operations. A measure to reduce the risk of
toolstring hang up during operation is constantly monitoring of the toolstrings location on the
well or the intervention system. The toolstring running speed in and out of the hole is also a
parameter that important to be considered. This can be optimized based the parameters of
cable type, well configuration and completion design. The speed of running cables induces a
risk of damaging completion components. Especially when running too fast. Areas like the
DHSV, tailpipe or other items should therefore be paid particular attention during wireline
run. There is always a present risk for tool hang up that may cause damages in the
completion. A completion schematic in the WL control cabin can continuously lower the risk.
A drive off/drift off situation when the toolsting is in the well can initiate an emergency shut
down situation. If cut of wireline is performed when the toostring is in the well, expensive
recovery actions have to be performed. It is a time demanding process of catching/fishing for
a lost object in the well. The RLWI system is not design for larger fishing operations like
birds nest in the bore. This operation has to be carried out from a semi submersible rig. The
dayrates of such a rig is often 2 MNOK. When mobilization, operation, demobilization and
loss of production are considered the scope of this incident is significant. To reduce the risk of
tool string hang-up, the winch over pull shut down system can be adjusted so that the cable,
weak point or rope socket will not break in case of tool string hang- up during pull out of the
well.
Organizational issues to be noted are which responsibilities and formal communications lines
that are valid. This can be conducted through illustrative diagrams. Too many documents and
procedures that do not correspond with each other can lead to confusing and operational
errors. One clear detail step-by-step procedure should therefore be carried out in order to
ensure that maximum level of safety is achieved. This must also incorporate all action
procedures for where unwanted or unexpected situation occurs. One thing is to prevent
hazardous situation, another thing is to deal with them when they occur. Good planning is
therefore to conduct the correct actions fast when needed. Contingency procedures shall cover
critical situations that can interfere with handling actions. HAZOP is as described on section
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7.3-5 a well and common technique to identify critical situations. It is therefore important that
the HAZOP session is well conducted.
Environmental factors like wave motions and reservoir characteristics are always present
during well intervention. These have to be given particular attention during light well
intervention tasks because the topside facilities are reduced compared to more heavy
intervention tasks such as retrieval of XT and tubing operations. When a vessel is used as
topside facility the weather condition create hazards and operability problems. Vessel motions
such as sway, yaw, pitch, heave, roll and surge is affected by wave characteristics. This is a
limiting factor for deployment of light intervention tasks carried out from a vessel versus a
rig. These conditions therefore have to be continuously monitored.
The well head pressure (WHP) should be observed during a WL operation. Any sudden
change in WHP might impose a risk for loss of well control. Therefore the WHP should be
observed and monitored during operation. Dramatic changes as cause of loss of a barrier
element or a kick in the well must be reported. When a vessel is utilized as topside facilities, it
is normally not capable of performing well kill operations also called bullheading. This
situation also requires a rig with enough storage capacity.
7.7 Conclusion
Technical, operational, organizational and environmental factors have to be integrated during
planning and execution of light well intervention operations. The main reason for accidental
events is a consequence of human errors. Lack of knowledge of the current configurations,
communication failure and error of judgment, are all primary reasons for technical system
failure. The way of reducing the issues stated are primary better communication, training and
a holistic understanding of the tasks to be carried out. Good operational and contingency
procedures are measures to reduce unwanted incidents and deal with them if they occur. But
procedures have little meaning when the personnel involved does not act as intended.
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8 Light Well Intervention in Big Bore completed wells

This section discusses hazard and operability problems of light well intervention in big bore
completed wells.
8.1 Introduction
The main thing that differentiates a Big Bore Completion from a conventional completed well
is the inner diameter of the production tubing/liner. Big Bore Completions incorporate inner
production tubulars larger than 7 inches (BOT, 2002).
Big Bore Completion is meant to be the future choice of completion for gas producers as the
petroleum industry moves into deeper waters. This creates a demand for intervention systems
which are capable to perform light intervention in such wells. The main challenges such
systems must be design for are, increased flowrates and larger water depths.
8.2 Big Bore Completions

Large bore and high flowrate wells are in literature synonym used for Big Bores
Completions. A Big Bore Completion should not be considered as a new method of well
completion. It is rather a well completion concept developed through existing methods.
The main benefit of larger tubing sizes are increased flowrates. This makes it possible to
deplete a reservoir with fewer wells and thereby reduce the costs of a field development. On
the other hand, a drawback for Big Bore Completed wells is loss of production. The costs of
these wells unable to flow are higher than for conventional completions. Due to increased
flowrates, system configurations must be designed to control larger forces and dimensions.
There are a limiting number of Big Bore completed wells today. Therefore little experiences
are gained and completion and intervention equipment are such as XT are either not
standardized.
8.3 Identification of hazards and operability problems for BBC

related to well integrity during light intervention
Hazards and operability problems in Big Bore light well intervention operations are more or
less the same as for conventional light well intervention operations. In Big Bore light well
intervention operations the main differences that can affect well integrity is connected to:
1) Increased upstream forces

2) Equipment specifications
8.3.1 Evaluation of upstream forces for Big Bore Completions

When the inner diameter of the tubing is increased this generate a larger production volume
and thereby larger wellhead forces. The RLWI system is designed for a 690 Bars shut in
wellhead pressure on a 7 1/16 inner tubular. The upstream forces are a variable of the
wellhead pressure multiplied with the area. This is illustrated in figure 8-1. For Big Bore
produces the pressure drop is smaller because of lower friction between the well fluids and
the tubing.
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Big Bore tubing diameter

Conventional tubing
diameter
F = Wp A
F[kN]
Figure 8-1: Conventional versus big bore tubing diameters.
A light well intervention system design for Big Bore wells must overcome the wellhead
pressure for the specific well of intervention.
Figure 8-2 shows a simplified graph of the increase in forces comparing three different
completion alternatives. The completion sizes are 5 which is a common size in subsea
wells on the NCS. The 7 completions are also a common size, while 9 5/8 are not present
on the NCS today but shall be used in the Ormen Lange wells.
Simplified upstream well forces

for 5-1/2" , 7" and 9 5/8" completions
4000
9 5/8" 3753
3000
7"
F[kN] 2000 1985
5 1/2"
1226
1000
0
0,015 0,025 0,047
A [m2]
Figure 8-2: Simplified upstream wellhead forces for three different completion sizes
The graph illustrates the relations between the different completion sizes. The wellhead
pressure is set to 800 Bars. The figure shows that there is a significantly increase in the forces
needed to shut in the upstream flow when tubing sizes increases. This requires larger
dimensions for the BOP system to maintain well control. Current subsea lubricator system
design for riserless light interventions, have limited operating capabilities. The primary
limitation is subsea accumulators capacity to operate valves.
Accumulators are devices used in hydraulic systems to store energy. Energy is stored by
compressing a precharged gas bladder with hydraulic fluid from the operating or charging
system. Depending on the fluid volume and precharge pressure of the accumulator, a limited
amount of hydraulic energy is then available independent of any other power source.
(glossary.oilfield.slb.com, 2005)Well pressure-control systems typically incorporate sufficient
accumulator capacity to enable the blowout preventer to be operated with all other power shut
down.
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Subsea accumulators usually are mounted to the BOP stack to provide a shorter hydraulic
conduit to close valves. Benefits of these accumulators deteriorate rapidly with increasing
water depths (Curtiss et al, 2003). D-010 require that a there shall be enough energy stored in
a subsea accumulator to close, open and close. To satisfy this requirement the accumulator
volumes become very large. For the RLWI system, the Norwegian PSA have given
permission to only have one close capacity for the main control valves such as Shear Seal
rams.
Accumulator requirements to operate the shear/seal valve for the RLWI sytem
2000
1800 1845
1600 Accumulator volumes

1578
required to perform
1400 1378 close, open and close
Volume [dm3]
1200 a subsea Shear Seal

1134
ram
1000
800 Accumulator volume
600 615 required to only close
526 a Shear Seal ram
458
400 378
200
0
500 1000 1500 2000
Water depth [m]
Figure 8-3: Required accumulator volumes with respect to water depth to operate a BOP shear/seal valve.
Figure 8-3 show how simplified graph of how accumulator volumes increases with larger
water depths. The systems shut in wellhead pressure are 690 bars. When the inner tubing
diameter increases, the required accumulator volumes also increases to overcome the
upstream forces increases even more.
8.3.2 Evaluation of equipment specifications needed for Big Bore light well
interventions
Since there are very few Big Bore Completed wells world wide, the experience gained on the
subject are relative low. As a consequence of this, equipment component for the completion
and intervention system are usually not standardized. The main equipment components that
are not standardized and qualified for Big Bore Completions are XT and SCSSV. Ormen
Lange gas field located 120 km northwest for Kristiansund on the NCS have 7 XTs and 7
TR-SCSSV valves inside the 9 5/8 tubing. The drawbacks are restrictions in the well bore.
The reason for this is that there are to date no qualified equipment for completions of this
dimension.
A light well intervention system for Big Bore completed wells must interface the XT. This is
not an issue for the Ormen Lange project since the XT is of a standardized design. The
intervention tools must fit the dimension of larger completion size. The results performed in
the study: Development of Large-Bore Monobore Completion Systems for Gas Production
by (Simons et al., 2000) concludes that there are no restrictions on service/intervention tools
for larger completion sizes. Specific intervention tools as hone tools and well tractors must be
special design for larger dimensions. There exist today well tractors capable of operating in
10 diameter tubing (Hansen, 2002).
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8.4 Hazards and operability problems that may occur during light
well intervention in Big Bore Completions
The main difference of performing light well intervention in Big Bore versus conventional
completed wells is that the technical specifications of the intervention system are designed for
the task and the personnel involved are trained and skilled for the operation.
There exist no major hazard and operability problems related to light well intervention in Big
Bore Completions compared to conventional completed systems. The HAZID analysis in
appendix A give an identification of problems that may occur during light well intervention.
The corrective measures suggested for different unwanted situations combined with the main
operational phases are mainly the same. In section 7.5 the identified problems is discussed.
This also counts for light well intervention in Big Bore completed wells.
8.5 Discussion
Hazards and operability problems related to light well intervention in Big Bore Completions
is not really an issue because these are more or less the same as for conventional systems.
The main challenge for light intervention systems is mainly to get them qualified for deep
waters mainly because of the subsea accumulator volume requires. The larger inner diameter,
the larger upward flow of hydrocarbons is. The light well intervention system described is
design for 500 meter water depths.
The issue of performing light well intervention in Big Bore Completions is a question of
demands from the marked since there are so few Big Bore producers today. The number of
light well intervention operations in such wells are also very few. ExproSoft have used
Wellmaster and OREDA databases to perform a well intervention and regularity study. This
resulted in an estimated of light well intervention every third year. (PDO/PIO Support
Documentation, 2004)
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9 Conclusions
Operator companies have seen the benefits of more frequent light well intervention on subsea
wells. Chapter 7 concludes that light well interventions performed from smaller DP vessel do
not in any particular way affect well integrity. Still smaller DP vessels, can not fully substitute
semi-submersible drilling rigs. By use of smaller DP vessels approximately 2/3 of the
intervention costs saved. Since storage topside capacity are limited and DP vessels are more
sensitive to weather conditions this represent a uncertainty moment of performing subsea
operations in rough environment. The RLWI system analysed with respect to hazards and
operability problems are either not capable of bullheading if a well kill situations is necessary.
In these situations a semi-submersible rig is necessary. If the toolstring is cut in the well this
also require a rig as contingency. In some cases it is difficult to estimated the scope of
intervention, if a RLWI system is used and the scope of intervention is outside its
capabilities, this will only increase the intervention cost of regain production since a rig is
required.
In a framework for Project Risk Analysis it is suggested levels and methods for risk
evaluations in Light Well Intervention Projects. The scope of analysis depends on complexity,
time and costs of operation. For a regular intervention task, a Procedure HAZOP and SJA is
suggested to be the most suitable way of handling the involved risk. Meanwhile for an
intervention program involving new technology and hash environment, it might be more
suitable to conduct a more detailed Project Risk Analysis.
Prevailing NPD standards and regulations have contributed to reduce the number of serious
accidents on the NCS the latest decade. Since early 1980 there has been a major collection
and systematization of experience data from subsea equipment and systems on the NCS.
Historical databases can thereby provide key information in risk evaluations. D-010 opens up
for risk evaluations in specific projects. This should be object for introducing a concept of
well integrity levels where risk evaluations for specific cases can estimate the most correct
and optimal level to ensure well integrity and add value for ongoing and future development
projects. There must be a balance between the risk involved and the safety measure.
The HAZID analysis carried out in appendix A evaluates the involved risk by combining the
operational phases and critical events. This method is a relative simple technique that gives a
good overview to cover all critical situations that may occur. Technical, operational,
organizational and environmental factors have to be integrated during design, planning and
execution of light well intervention. The main reason for unwanted events is connected to of
human fails.
Per date there are a limited number of Big Bore producers world wide. The Big Bore
producers are usually gas wells since this is most beneficial because of low pressure drop in
the tubing and higher flowrates. Evaluation the projects where big bore is the choice of
completion show first of all that the demand for light well intervention is low. The case study
performed in Planning and Execution of Big Bore Wells - Offshore NW Australia show that
there are no particular restrictions for any intervention tools and systems due to light well
intervention in Big Bore wells except for the dimension.
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10 Recommendations for further work

A more detailed study with regard to operational hazards and operability problems during
light well intervention should be carried out. The HAZID analysis gives a description of the
main hazards and operability related problems during a light well intervention. This is not
further detailed described because the input information was limited
For light well intervention in Big Bore wells a further evaluation of system design should be
carried out with respect to increased flowrates.
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11 References
Andreassen J.: Status and guidelines by introducing light well intervention in subsea
wells on the Norwegian shelf. General presentation. Petroleum Safety Authority,
Norway, jan 2005.
Andersen J A.: Riserless light well intervention increases subsea well recovery.
FMC Kongsberg Subsea, Kongsberg, World Oil Magazine Vol. 225 No. 11 Norway,
2004.
Baker Oil Tools.: Cased hole completion systems. Baker oil tools 02-3485.
C00050. 9/02, 2002.
British Standard.: Project management Part 3: Guide to the management of business

related project risk BS 6079-3, 2000.
Diberardinis, L.: Handbook of Occupational Safety and Health, Second Edition,

Chapter 6 Risk Assessment Techniques. Thomas M. Dougherty, pp. 127-178, John
Wiley and Sons, 1999.
Dick A J.: Future deepwater well intervention will reduce costs, boost output.
Subsea Group, Expro International Group PLC. World Oil Magazine Vol. 225 No. 11.
Scotland, 2004.
DNV-RP-H101:Risk Management in Marine and Subsea Operations. Jan, 2003.
Dolan S P, Williams G J, Crabtree R J, Woodside Energy Ltd. Planning and

Execution of Big Bore Wells - Offshore NW Australia- SPE/IADC 67820, 2001.
Inderberg O.: Riserless Light Well Intervention. General presentation, FMC

Kongsberg Subsea, 2005.
Inderberg O., Lindland H.J., FMC Kongsberg Subsea; Braut A., Halliburton;
Headworth C., Subsea 7.: New Well-Intervention Technology That Will Enable
Increase in Recovery Rate. OTC 15182. Houston, USA, 2003.
Hansen B.: New Wireline Tractor Tools Reduce Light Well Intervention Costs.
Maritime Well Service. SPE/ICOTA, 2002.
Holand P., Sangesland S.: Safety regulations. Appendix no 3. Subsea Production

Systems, Course TPG 2400, 2003.
Jrgensen E.: Production technique 1. Vett & Viten, Norway, 1998
Metier Scandinavia.: The Complete Risk Manager Short description of methods and
terminology. jan, 2003.
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Mogstad M.: Risk Management in Projects. Master thesis. NTNU, 2000.
Mller R.: Cost efficient well interventions. General presentation. Statoil, sgard.
2004.
NORSOK standard D-010.: Well integrity in drilling and well operations. rev 3,
2004.
NORSOK Z-013.: Risk and emergency preparedness analysis. rev. 2, 2001.
Plan for development and operation.: Well engineering PDO/PIO Support

Documentation No 37-00-NK-K15-00048, 2004.
Rausand R., Hyland A.: System Reliability Theory- Models and Statistical
Methods. John Wiley & Sons., New York, US., 2004.
Rausand R.: Safety and Reliability of Subsea Production systems. Introduction and
basic concepts, 1993.
Rausand M.: Hazard Identification.HAZID. note. NTNU, Trondheim, Norway,

2000.
Sangesland S.: Brnnkonstruksjon Emnemodul. Note#2, 2001.
Sangesland S.: Subsea Well Intervention. Course SIG4070, NTNU, 2004.
Simonds R., Swan T.: Development of Large-Bore Monobore Completion Systems

for Gas Production. SPE 64279, 2000.
Tailby R J.: Barriers in Well Operations. Statoil Report no. R00290rjt/RJT.

Stavanger, Norway, 1990.
Internet sources:
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary.: www.m-w.com
Oilfield Glossary.: www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/Display.cfm?Term=accumulator
ROSS Community :www.ntnu.no/ross/srt/slides/riskanal.pdf
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Master thesis
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Birkeland, S.T. Well Integrity of Subsea Wells During Light Well Interventions

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Birkeland, S.T. Well Integrity of Subsea Wells During Light Well Interventions

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Master thesis

Sigbjrn Tornes Birkeland

I would also like to thank Professor Sigbjrn Sangesland, at Department of Petroleum

Trondheim, Norway, 15.06.2005

A hazard identification (HAZID) analysis is performed to identify potential hazards and

5 WELL INTEGRITY ................................................................................................................................. 27

1.1 Objectives and limitations

4. Identification and discussion of potential hazards and operability problems during

6. A barrier analysis shall be performed on a RLWI system. Based on the analysis a

1.2 Report structure

Chapter 1 provides the necessary background information, objectives and limitations,

Chapter 2 gives an introduction to subsea light well intervention methods. Definitions

Chapters 9 conclude and summarize the results of the thesis.

Chapter 10 gives a recommendation for further work.

2 Subsea light well intervention methods

2.1 Why subsea intervention is needed

2.2 Classification of subsea intervention

. The main parameters for classifying intervention tasks are:

2.3 Light and heavy well intervention

Figure 2-2: Indicate degree of intervention

2.4 Rig issues

3.1 Wireline method

3.1.1 Stuffing box

3.1.3 Blow Out Preventer (BOP)

3.1.4 Wireline unit

3.1.5 Hydraulic powerpack

3.1.6 Measuring device

3.1.7 Control system

3.1.8 Tool string

3.1.9 Well tractor

Figure 3-2: Wireline tractor. Adapted from (Hansen, 2002)

3.2 Coiled Tubing (CT)

Typical CT tasks include:

3.2.2 Coiled tubing reel

3.2.3 Well control equipment

3.2.6 Lifting frame

4 Light well intervention as a project. Framework for

4.2 The objectives of project risk analysis.

The purpose of a framework is to provide a consistent and systematic approach to risk

4.3 Standards and guidelines for project risk analysis

4.4 The process of project risk analysis

4.5 Event and parameter uncertainties in projects

4.6 Contingency planning

4.7 Qualitative risk analysis

4.8 Quantitative risk analysis

4.9 Semi-quantitative analysis

4.10 Application area for project risk analysis

4.10.1 Toolbox meeting/ Safe Job Analysis (SJA)

4.10.2 Procedure Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) analysis

5.2 Well integrity

5.2.1 Well Barriers

5.2.2 Well Barrier methodology

5.2.3 Barriers in well operations

There are typically two main types of barrier;

5.2.4 Well barrier characteristics

Dynamic Dynamic Static

Figure 5-2: Methodology for breakdown of well barriers.

6 Riserless Light Well Intervention (RLWI)

6.2 Area of application

6.3 Description of the Riserless Light Well Intervention (RLWI)

6.3.1 Lower Intervention Package (LIP)

6.3.2 Lower Lubricator Package (LLP)

6.3.3 Lubricator Tubular (LUB)