Investigating The Psychological Profile of The Palestinian "Lone Wolf" Terrorist: Preliminary Findings

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Investigating the Psychological Pro;le of the Palestinian Lone Wolf Terrorist:

Preliminary Findings
Dr. Irwin J. Mansdorf,
May 29, 2017
Filed Under: Israeli Security, Palestinians, Radical Islam
Institute for Contemporary Affairs

Founded jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation
Vol. 17, No. 11
Lone wolf? Stabber at a check point.
The reasons behind lone wolf terrorism are an enigma, although it is assumed by many that cultural, religious, and
nationalistic factors drive the phenomenon. Identifying psychological factors associated with the lone wolf would be
important in gaining an understanding of who potentially may be prone to such behavior.
It is widely assumed that Palestinian incitement fuels lone wolf attacks. However, this does not account for speci;cally
who decides to carry out an act of violence. We looked at Palestinian Arab youth and attempted to identify a psychological
pro;le of the potential lone wolf.
A series of psychological measures was administered to residents of a refugee camp as well as a neighboring village, with
http://jcpa.org/article/investigating-psychological-profile-palestinian-lone-wolf-preliminary-findings/ Page 1 of 9
subjects asked to rate both themselves as well how they imagined actual perpetrators of lone wolf violence would see
themselves.
We found distinct patterns of response with differences between the refugee camp population and the village population
as well as differences within the village population between themselves and their perception of lone wolves.
Our results suggest a far more complex and nuanced picture of Palestinian Arab society insofar as attitudes toward Jews
and willingness to carry out terror attacks is concerned. We also found that many Palestinian Arabs see the lone wolves
as psychologically distressed individuals who are not solely driven by ideology.
Introduction
In an earlier study,1 a behavioral proIle of lone wolf Palestinian Arab terrorists was proposed. The discussion focused on
how the decision to carry out a violent terror attack requires both a motivational ideology to act as fuel and a speciIc
psychological event or state to serve as the trigger. Neither motivation alone nor a trigger alone would ordinarily suRce to
create the circumstances where an individual would actually carry out an attack. While many factors may be part of this
theoretical fuel-trigger mix, conventional wisdom holds that religious and nationalistic factors that are central to Palestinian
Arab culture and evident in both social and public discourse (commonly referred to as incitement) have played a signiIcant
role.
The question of what speciIc behavioral factors contribute to the susceptibility of an individual to act as a lone wolf remains
open. Are these individuals in any way different, especially psychologically different, from those Palestinians who may hold the
same cultural, ideological and/or religious beliefs, yet refrain from carrying out violent activities against Israelis or Jews? If so,
is there any way to identify potential lone wolves before they carry out an act?
Answering this question requires measuring speciIc psychological factors that may play a role in driving individuals to violent
behavior. To this end, we selected an initial pilot group in the Palestinian Arab population that included two separate sub-
groups of younger, mostly male residents of a refugee camp and a village both located south of Bethlehem on the Hebron-
Jerusalem road.
The Pilot Study

Our sample included a group of 27 subjects from the Al-Aroub refugee camp and another 59 subjects from the village of Beit
Ummar. This was a convenience sample of individuals between the ages of 15-21 who were randomly approached and agreed
to participate in a short survey that would measure a variety of psychological and ideological characteristics.
Subjects were explained the procedure and then asked to complete a number of scales that measured general health and
mental well-being (the General Health Questionnaire, GHQ-122), psychological hopelessness (Beck Hopelessness Scale3) and
the tendency towards violence in school (student survey on violence4).
The question of how to measure incitement effects remained. To tap into this assumed motivational attribute, we looked at
the components of incitement as noted by Kuperwasser in his description of pillars of identity.5 A scale designed to
measure the individual variables related to these pillars and thus incitement to violence was constructed and administered.
Constructing a Pro;le of Terror

Our procedure was fairly simple, with a twist. We initially described the general purpose of the study as seeking ways to
better understand the psychological makeup of Palestinian youth in general and asked subjects to complete the scales
described above as they apply to themselves. After they had completed this task, they were asked to again complete the scale,
but to this time complete it as if they were a person who actually carried out a terror attack (with many in both groups actually
knowing such people). The goal was to construct a psychological proIle of the young Palestinian lone wolf based on the
descriptions of those that knew him or her best, namely peers. (These acts were not described as terror to the group, but
rather as it is known in the Palestinian vernacular, i.e., as an action or operation.)
Results
Our data shows a distinct pattern that differentiates the Al-Aroub refugee camp group from the Beit Ummar villagers.
The Al-Aroub group showed a higher level of measured belief in the values related to incitement measured by our scale. On
our scale, each item could be scored from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). Since there were seven items measured,
scores could range from a low of 0 to a high of 28. A score of 14 indicates neutrality, neither agreeing strongly nor disagreeing
strongly with the items presented. Any score from 15 and above would thus indicate a general adherence and belief in factors
related to Palestinian incitement, as described by Kuperwasser. While the Al-Aroub group averaged close to 22 on this scale,
the Beit Ummar presented a much more moderate result of 15.8.
The graph below illustrates these differences.
Data analysis conducted found the difference to be statistically signiIcant at the .01 level, with a t=4.75. This means that the
results are likely not due to chance.
Another difference between the groups was in how they view themselves versus how they viewed those that committed acts
of terror. While the Al-Aroub groups personal proIle was virtually indistinguishable from the proIle they attributed to those
that carried out actions, this was not the case with the Beit Ummar. The Beit Ummar group attributed higher rates of
psychological distress, hopelessness, and belief in factors related to incitement to those that carried outs acts of violence
against Israelis (and consequently, saw themselves as being psychologically different from those lone wolves who carried
out violent attacks).
The graph below shows the results of the Al-Aroub group.
Below are the results of the Beit Ummar group.
Statistical analysis here shows that while the differences between perception of self and perception of terror operatives in Al-
Aroub are not signiIcant statistically at either the .01 nor at the .05 levels (for t), the differences in the Beit Ummar group on
psychological well-being, hopelessness, school violence, and identiIcation with variables related to incitement are all very
signiIcant (t probability <.01). Again, this would mean that the results are not likely due to chance.
The Incitement Factors

A speciIc look at the nature of incitement shows that Kuperwassers pillars may be divided into discrete categories. Table 1
displays the incitement scale and shows the seven items that probe the belief in the various pillars of Palestinian Arab
identity proposed by Kuperwasser. These items may be divided into three general factors: ideological-historical (Irst three
items), hatred-violence (next two items) and nationalism (last two items).
Table 1: The Incitement Scale
When examining the results of the incitement scale data in Al-Aroub, we Ind that there is little difference between the data of
how subjects scored themselves and how they scored a hypothetical terror operative. However, the differences in Beit Ummar,
as noted above, were statistically signiIcant. This warranted another look, which a factor analysis that divides the results
into ideological-historical, hatred-violence, and nationalism factors can be insightful.
These differences in Beit Ummar are indeed concentrated across the factors, showing that there is a qualitative difference in
the way this population views terror operatives as opposed to how the group in Al-Aroub views them.
On the Irst factor, ideological-historical, we see that in both agreement and disagreement with the concept of Jewish
connectivity to the land, differences are seen. The subjects in Beit Ummar saw themselves more likely to agree with the
concept of Jewish connectivity to the land and less likely to disagree with it than would perceived terror operatives. When
aggregating all data for this factor, statistical analysis shows a very signiIcant difference (.01 level) between what the Beit
Ummar group thought of their own ideas as opposed to how they perceived the terror operatives (t=-2.4).
With hatred-violence, again the Beit Ummar population saw the terror operatives as different and more likely to both
despise Jews and to carry out a violent act. Aggregate scoring data here showed a statistically signiIcant difference (.01
level) between how the subjects looked at their own feelings as opposed to how they viewed terror operatives (t=-3.8). It is
important to note, however, that while there is statistical signiIcance here, the actual behavioral signiIcance is limited to a
speciIc cadre, as much of the variance may be accounted for by the difference in degree (agree or agree strongly) and not in
actual behavior. In any case, the differences are worth looking at.
Finally, with the nationalism factor, little difference is seen, and statistical analysis bears this out. Analysis of the aggregate
data shows no statistically signiIcant difference between how the group viewed their own nationalistic attitudes as opposed
to how they felt the terror operatives viewed it. (t=.97, non-signiIcant). Beit Ummar subjects saw themselves no less
nationalistic regarding the rights of Palestinians than they saw terror operatives being, while at the same time being more
tolerant of Jewish rights and less tolerant of violent behavior towards Jews.
Discussion
We measured a variety of psychological variables in two groups of Palestinian Arab youth. One group from a refugee camp (Al-
Aroub) and another from a village located partially in Area B and partially in Area C (Beit Ummar). We found statistically
signiIcant Indings related to both how the residents of each site see themselves as compared to actual lone wolf operatives
as well as how committed they are to basic pillars of Palestinian identity related to incitement. The refugee camp residents
appear to have more closely identiIed with those that perpetrate attacks, while Beit Ummar residents see themselves as more
psychologically intact, less hopeless, less violent in school settings and more moderate in their beliefs related to incitement.
Also of interest was the general identiIcation with beliefs related to incitement, with the Beit Ummar group showing much
more moderate beliefs as compared directly to the Al-Aroub group, whose beliefs appear to be at the upper end of the scale.
Despite the inherent limitations of a convenience sample and preliminary pilot study, the trends shown reveal a behavioral
pattern that appears to indicate more extreme beliefs (and presumably behavior) in the refugee camp residents versus the
village residents. That is not to say that the Beit Ummar villagers have no record of violence toward Israelis (which, in fact, they
historically do). However, the differences are marked and are worth looking into.
Of greater interest are the speciIc differences on factors related to incitement, which are seen in the factor analysis of the
incitement scale based on Kuperwassers pillars. Here, it appears that Beit Ummars population see themselves no less
nationalistic or patriotic to the Palestinian cause than do terror operatives, but do see themselves as more accepting of
Jewish history and connections to the land, less hateful toward Jews and less prone to use violence against them. To be sure,
there still is a signiIcant presence of those who reject Jewish connectivity, those who would agree with the negative
description of Jews and those who would agree with violence, but there is also a clear cadre of those who do not. The fact
that Al-Aroub residents do not show this bifurcation would lead one to conclude that there are variables associated with life in
Beit Ummar or membership in Beit Ummar families than create or foster conditions that would mitigate against potential acts
of terror or violence.
One possible explanation relates to the needs of each group. While the refugee camp residents are essentially landless, the
villagers do identify with their residence as their permanent home and have a speciIc attachment to the land. The demands
of each and the perception of their victimhood is thus different. It is reasonable to assume that, given the highly tribal nature
of Palestinian society, willingness to participate in violent activities will vary according to the needs and charter of each group
(and, by extension, each village).
Another important observation is the higher level of psychological distress that villagers attribute to operatives. This may
point to a predisposing set of possibly identiIable behaviors that may characterize potential lone wolves and differentiate
them from their immediate social environment. Should such patterns become more identiIable, it may offer an understanding
of how to preempt attacks as well as how to create conditions where the probability of lone wolf attacks will be lower.
Two other points can be made concerning the implications of the data. First, the pattern of Beit Ummar and the differences
between self-perception and perception of lone wolf operatives may provide an insight into possible identiIable behavioral
characteristics that may provide early warning signals of potential terror operatives. For example, we could point to the
perception that such operatives were perceived to show more school violence than others. Other factors of general well-being
and hopelessness that characterized perception of the lone wolves are also potentially identiIable.
The second point pertains to intervention. Presumably, if these differences reject actual risk factors for carrying out terror
attacks, modifying the factors could potentially mitigate the effects and reduce the likelihood of engaging in terror related
violence. What form intervention would take and how individuals would be identiIed needs to be formulated, but considered in
future investigations.
Summary: Lessons Learned

What can we learn from the data we collected in this study? This appears to be a classic case of the glass half full, half
empty. On the one hand, we see that there are indeed Palestinian Arabs who eschew violence not only for practical reasons
but also apparently on principle. We see many who did not challenge the Jewish historical connection to the land and the
Jewish right to self-determination. On the other hand, a signiIcant portion of the sample, even among those in the relatively
moderate Beit Ummar group, still strongly support violence and maintain negative attitudes towards Jews. The other
interesting Inding is the attribution (repeated in anecdotal post-data collection reports) of some sort of personal problem or
issue unrelated to the political situation that is perceived to characterize terror operatives.
The fact that a portion of Palestinian Arab society is willing to accept Jewish self-determination as well as being against
violence is not inconsistent with results of previous polls, which have shown a consistent minority who likely feel this way.6 7
What is still unclear are the factors that can account for this behavior, i.e., why some feel so strongly in one direction while
others do not.
Insofar as the use of violence, our results seem to indicate that more moderate sections of Palestinian Arab society tend to
see lone wolf operatives as more psychologically distressed and distinctly different from themselves. More extreme
swatches of society, such as those in our refugee camp sample, apparently do not see it that way and more closely identify
with these individuals. While the fruits of incitement appear to be quite visible in the ideological acceptance of violence
towards and enmity for Jews in much of Palestinian Arab society, those that actually turn on the switch and move from
ideology or belief to concrete action are perhaps identiIable not by their ideology (which many share), but rather by their
speciIc social and personal distress, unrelated to political motives or the political situation. This is quite different from
ideologically driven militants and terrorists who see themselves as sacriIcing for the cause.8 In the case of lone wolves, it may
be that it is the cause that serves them, rather than them serving the cause.
Despite the limitations in the selection of subjects that characterizes this pilot work, the statistical data analysis does show
clear trends that should be looked at. These include the strong differences in ideological and psychological factors between
refugee camp residents and residents of other villages; the impression of greater psychosocial distress of terror operatives
that many of their peers perceive; and the greater ideological acceptance of the rights of Jews to the land in certain elements
of the Palestinian Arab population. The next stage would be to study how these behavioral trends develop and how to best
understand the variables responsible for them.
Further investigation is needed to clarify these hypotheses and to replicate, verify, and delineate the empirical reasons for the
Indings with a goal of applying methods to increase desired behavior in the Palestinian Arab population.
***
My thanks to Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser for his invaluable insight into designing and interpreting the results of this
project. Thanks also to Lt. Col. (res.) Yochanan Tzoreff of the Ministry of Strategic Affairs for his important perspectives on
the data. Tamara Elashvili was invaluable in assisting in data analysis. Special thanks also go out to Myron Joshua and to two
Palestinian associates on this project whose identities need to be kept conIdential.
***
Notes
1 http://jcpa.org/article/the-psychology-of-lone-wolf-palestinian-arab-violence-the-interaction-between-religious-cultural-and-political-national-motives/
2 https://www.gl-assessment.co.uk/products/general-health-questionnaire-ghq/
3 http://www.pearsonclinical.com/psychology/products/100000105/beck-hopelessness-scale-bhs.html
4 https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mde/PrePst_Violence_Beh_305688_7.pdf
5 http://jcpa.org/the-knife-and-the-message-the-roots-of-the-new-palestinian-uprising/the-palestinian-knife-campaign-a-policy-of-limited-liability/#_edn1
6 http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/600
7 http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/623
8 https://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp496.htm
Publication: Jerusalem Issue Briefs

Filed Under: Israeli Security, Palestinians, Radical Islam
Tags: Psychological
About Dr. Irwin J. Mansdorf
Irwin J. (Yitzchak) Mansdorf, PhD., is a clinical psychologist and a fellow at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. He
directs the Center's Israel-Arab studies program for university students.
view all posts by Dr. Irwin J. Mansdorf
2017 All rights reserved.

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Investigating the Psychological Profile of the Palestinian "Lone Wolf" Terrorist: Preliminary Findings 5/30/17, 12*10 PM

Contact Us Franais Deutsch

Investigating the Psychological Pro;le of the Palestinian Lone Wolf Terrorist:

Institute for Contemporary Affairs

Vol. 17, No. 11

Lone wolf? Stabber at a check point.

The Pilot Study

Constructing a Pro;le of Terror

The graph below illustrates these differences.

The graph below shows the results of the Al-Aroub group.

Below are the results of the Beit Ummar group.

The Incitement Factors

Table 1: The Incitement Scale

Summary: Lessons Learned

Publication: Jerusalem Issue Briefs

About Dr. Irwin J. Mansdorf

2017 All rights reserved.

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