POLITICAL & INTERNATIONAL LAW

Selected Recent Jurisprudence1 By Prof. Alexis F. Medina2

JUDICIAL REVIEW
ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT

Proposed bills do not present a justiciable controversy. A proposed bill does

not present an actual justiciable controversy. The filing of bills is within the legislative
power of Congress and is not subject to judicial restraint. Also, the judiciary cannot
speculate on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or
may not pass. (In The Matter Of: Save The Supreme Court Judicial Independence and
Fiscal Autonomy Movements v. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund and Reduction
of Fiscal Autonomy, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015)

THE STANDING REQUIREMENT

Assertion of a public right: If the petition is anchored on a public right, such

as the peoples right to information on matters of public concern, any citizen can be
the real party in interest. The requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere
fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which
possesses the right. There is no need to show any special interest in the result.
(Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment [IDEAL] v. Power Sector Liabilities and
Management Corporation [PSALM], G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012)

Facial challenge and legal standing: A facial challenge on grounds of

overbreadth or vagueness is an exception to the prohibition on third-party standing. A
petitioner may mount a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he
claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it involves free
speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute. This to counter the
chilling effect on protected speech. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335,
February 18, 2014)

Legal standing in actions for violation of environmental laws: The Rules of

Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino
citizen, as a steward of nature, to file an action before our courts for violations of our
environmental laws; this collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest,
on the principle that humans are stewards of nature. (Resident Marine Mammals of the
Protected Seascape of Taon Strait v. Secretary Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015)

POLITICAL QUESTIONS

Political questions: The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is

committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative--'the political'--

1 This is a working draft of capsules of recent jurisprudence, selected and organized under common
subjects. This material is subject to revision, modification or updating. Reproduction for purely
academic purposes with due attribution to the author is permitted.

2 AB Political Science, University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman; Order of the Purple Feather (OPF),
UP, College of Law; Valedictorian, San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila, College of Law; Philippine
Representative to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation Preparatory Committee
Meeting for Legal Review (Geneva, Switzerland, 2014); Philippine Representative, Senior Officials
Meeting, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 2015; former Philippine Youth delegate to Japan
and Southeast Asia; Litigation lawyer; formerly with the Ponce Enrile Reyes & Manlastas Law Offices
(Pecabar); Professor of Constitutional Law, San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila, College of Law,
and Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), Manila, College of Law; former professor of
Constitutional Law, New Ear University, College of Law, Quezon City; Bar Review Lecturer, Recoletos
Review Center, Manila
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departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise
of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. The question
whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a
foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political
branches. (Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010)

THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

Why PDAF/Pork Barrel System is void

The PDAF/Pork Barrel System violates the principle of separation of

powers, as it authorizes legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of
project implementation, such as project identification, fund release and fund
realignment, thus allowing legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly
belong to the sphere of budget execution. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
208566, November 19, 2013)

The PDAF/Pork Barrel System violates the principle of non-delegation of

legislative power considering that an individual legislator is given the authority to
dictate (a) how much fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that he
himself also determines, two (2) acts that comprise the exercise of the power of
appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
208566, November 19, 2013)

The PDAF/Pork Barrel System undermines the system of checks and

balance by impairing the Presidents item veto power. For the President to exercise
his item-veto power, there must be a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto.
Because PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the actual items of PDAF appropriation
would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated
without veto consideration. The legislators identification of the projects after the
passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on. (Belgica
v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)

The PDAF/Pork Barrel System undermines public accountability by

impairing Congress oversight functions considering that legislators would, in
effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. It also violates
the constitutional prohibition on legislators intervention on matters where he may be
called upon to act. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November
19, 2013)

The PDAF/Pork Barrel System violates the constitutional principles on

local autonomy as it allows district representatives who are national officers to
substitute the judgement of local officials on use of public funds for local development.
A Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects
on his own. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19,
2013)

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Power to transfer appropriations: The transfer of appropriated funds, to be
valid under Section 25(5), must be made upon a concurrence of the following
requisites, namely:

(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and

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the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective
offices;

(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations
for their respective offices; and

(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general

appropriations law for their respective offices. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July
1, 2014)

Why the transfer of funds under DAP is invalid

The transfer of funds under the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) is

invalid for lack of a valid law authorizing the transfer. The GAAs of 2011 and 2012
authorized the transfers "to augment any item in this Act", and the effect was that the
2011 and 2012 GAAs allowed the transfer of funds to augment any item in the GAAs
even if the item belonged to an office outside the Executive, contravention of the
Constitution. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)

The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid because DAP funds were not
necessarily savings. Savings are realized only when the purpose for which the
funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such funds had ceased
to exist. Funds described as unreleased or unalloted are not necessarily savings.
(Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)

The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid because DAP funds were not
transferred to augment existing items in the GAA. There must be an existing item,
project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which
savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. The power to augment
cannot be used to fund non-existent items in the GAA. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No.
209287, July 1, 2014)

The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid for because some of the transfers of
appropriation were not made to their respective offices. Cross-border transfers,
whether as augmentation, or as aid, are prohibited. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No.
209287, July 1, 2014)

THE JUDICIARY

The execution of a decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative function of

the Supreme Court. Thus, in the execution of its continuing mandamus against
agencies of the Executive Department, the Supreme Court may order such agencies to
perform their assigned tasks within specific time frames or completion periods. The
imposition of such time frames or completion periods is not an encroachment over the
powers and functions of the Executive Branch. (Metro Manila Development Authority
[MMDA] v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15,
2011)

JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

JBC can set standards for choosing nominees to the judiciary: JBCs policy
of requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify
as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional. The JBC has the authority to set
the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary,

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subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for
every position. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)

COMMISSION ON AUDIT

COA jurisdiction over money claims against the government. COA has
primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and
instrumentalities, including local governments. The COA and not the RTC has primary
jurisdiction to pass upon a money claim against a local government unit. (Province of
Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262,
November 27, 2013)

Money claims filed with COA must be liquidated. COAs authority over
money claims is limited to liquidated claims, or those determined or readily
determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other papers within reach of
accounting officers. (Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development
Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013)

NATIONAL ECONOMY

Constitutional requirements for a valid service contract: The Constitutional

requirements for a valid service contract for the large-scale exploration and
development of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils are the following: 1) the
service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set
standard or uniform terms, conditions; 2) the President shall be the signatory for the
government; and 3) within 30 days, the President shall report it to Congress. (Resident
Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape of Taon Strait v. Secretary Reyes, G.R. No.
180771, April 21, 2015)

Where the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt, the Grandfather

Rule will apply. Thus, the combined totals in the Investing Corporation and the
Investee Corporation must be traced (i.e., "grandfathered") to determine the total
percentage of Filipino ownership. The ultimate Filipino ownership of the shares must
first be traced to the level of the Investing Corporation and added to the shares directly
owned in the Investee Corporation. (Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corp. v.
Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp., G.R. No. 195580, April 21, 2014)

STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

An unincorporated agency without any separate juridical personality of its

own enjoys immunity from suit. The State will be deemed to have impliedly waived
its non-suability only if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private
capacity. Contracts for the construction of public roads that the DPWH enter into are
done in the exercise of its governmental functions, hence, there is no implied waiver by
the DPWH simply by entering into such contract. (Mendoza v. Department of Public
Works and Highways, G.R. No. 203834, July 9, 2014)

An unincorporated government agency performing proprietary function is

not immune from suit. An unincorporated government agency without any separate
juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit. However, if an
unincorporated government agency performs proprietary, private or non-governmental
functions, it is not immune from suit. The ATO was involved in the management and
maintenance of the Loakan Airport, which are primarily private or non-governmental
functions. Hence, the ATO has no claim to immunity from suit. (Air Transportation
Office v. Spouses Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011)

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 CITIZENSHIP IN GENERAL

Election of citizenship: Children born under the 1935 Constitution of a

Filipino mother and an alien father who executed an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the government upon reaching the age
of majority, but failed to immediately file the documents of election with the nearest
civil registry did not lose their right to elect Philippine citizenship. Their registration
of the documents of election should be allowed, if in the meanwhile positive acts of
citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done. (Ma v. Fernandez,
G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010)

Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 for those who have lost
the same by naturalization before the effectivity of RA 9225 -- has no retroactive effect.
A former natural-born Filipino citizen re-acquires his Philippine citizenship upon
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. (David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, March
18, 2015)

STATE POWERS

POLICE POWER

The rational relationship test for a valid exercise of police power: (1) the
interests of the public generally require its exercise and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Lacking these two requisites, the police power measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process clause.
(Fernando v. St. Scholasticas College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)

Police power and taking of property. The State may not, under the guise of
police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to
preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community. The requirement
under the ordinance for owners of educational institutions to build their fences six
meters back for beautification purposes is invalid for being unreasonable and
oppressive as it will substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial use of their
property solely for aesthetic purposes. (Fernando v. St. Scholasticas College, G.R. No.
161107, March 12, 2013)

EMINENT DOMAIN

When taking is an exercise of eminent domain: A city ordinance requiring

land owners to setback their fences by five meters to provide for parking space is
tantamount to a taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
The total destruction of value of the property is not required for a taking to be
compensable. (Fernando v. St. Scholasticas College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)

Agrarian Reform: The basic law allows two (2) modes of land distribution:
direct and indirect ownership. Direct transfer to individual farmers is the most
commonly used method by DAR and widely accepted. Indirect transfer through
collective ownership of the agricultural land is the alternative. By using the word
collectively, the Constitution allows for indirect ownership of land and not just outright
agricultural land transfer. Thus, allowing corporations or associations to own
agricultural land with the farmers becoming stockholders or members does not violate
the agrarian reform policy under the Constitution. (Hacienda Luisita Incorporated v.
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011)

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 No prescription for action for just compensation. An action for payment of
just compensation does not prescribe. If private property is taken by the Government
for public use without expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, the owners action
to recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe. (Secretary of the
Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1,
2013)

Reckoning point for determining the value of the property. The reckoning
point for determining just compensation is the value of the property at the time of
taking. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is
transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. (Department of Agrarian
Reform v. Spouses Sta. Romana, G.R. No. 183290, July 9, 2014)

Even if the government taking was in 1940, and the action for payment of just
compensation was only filed in 1995, the reckoning point for determining just
compensation is still the value of the property at the time of taking. Thus, just
compensation should be fixed not as of the time of payment but at the time of taking,
that is, in 1940, even though this valuation appear outdated. (Secretary of the
Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1,
2013)

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS & LIBERTIES

RIGHT TO LIFE

A general welfare in terms of economic benefits cannot override the very

basic rights to life, security and safety. An ordinance to promote the constituents
general welfare in terms of economic benefits cannot override the very basic rights to
life, security and safety of the people. In the absence of any convincing reason that the
life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the
presence of the oil depots in Pandacan, Ordinance No. 8187 in favor of the retention of
the oil depots is invalid and unconstitutional. (Social Justice Society Officers v. Lim,
G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014)

DUE PROCESS

Due process in NBI investigations. There is no violation of due process in an

NBI investigation if the respondents are not given an opportunity to file an answer or
submit counter-evidence. The NBI does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial powers
and its findings are merely recommendatory. (Shu v. Dee, G.R. No. 182573, April 23,
2014)

Preliminary investigation is not part of a trial. Requirements of

administrative due process do not apply. The requirements for due process in
administrative cases set in the Ang Tibay case do not apply to preliminary
investigations. The purpose of the Office of the Ombudsman in conducting a
preliminary investigation is to determine probable cause for filing an information, and
not to make a final adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties. The
Ombudsman and the prosecution service are inherently the fact-finder, investigator,
hearing officer, judge and jury of the respondent in preliminary investigations. There is
nothing unconstitutional with this procedure because this is merely an Executive
function, a part of the law enforcement process leading to trial in court. (Estrada v.
Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015)

Procedural safeguards in student disciplinary cases: Due process in

disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar
to those in courts of justice. Proceedings may be summary; cross-examination is not

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an essential part of the investigation or hearing; and the required proof in a student
disciplinary action is only substantial evidence. Official action must meet minimum
standards of fairness to the individual, which generally encompass the right of
adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. (Cudia v. The
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015)

EQUAL PROTECTION

Favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse is not a

violation of the equal protection clause. The unequal power relationship between
women and men, the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of
violence, and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women -- all make for
real differences justifying the classification under the law. These substantial
distinctions are germane to the purpose of preventing violence and abuse against
women and children. (Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013)

The policy of JBC requiring 5 years of service as judges of first-level courts

before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts does not violate the
equal protection clause. There is a substantial distinction between judges with 5 year
experience and those with less than 5 five years. The classification is reasonable and
relevant to its legitimate purpose of selecting those with proven competence.
(Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

Description in search warrants: A description of the place to be searched is

sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. The
specific room in the house to be searched need not be identified. (People v. Tuan, G.R.
No. 176066, August 11, 2010)

Search must precede the arrest. In a search incident to a lawful arrest, the
law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made -- the
process cannot be reversed. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)

Roadside questioning of a motorist pursuant to a routine traffic stop is not

necessarily an arrest that justifies a warrantless search. Also, a warrantless arrest
cannot be made for an offense penalized by a fine only. Hence, no valid search incident
to a lawful arrest can be made under such circumstances. (Luz v. People, G.R. No.
197788, February 29, 2012)

Informants tip alone is not enough to justify a warrantless arrest. An

informants tip that a pot session is going on inside a house is not sufficient
justification for police officers to enter such house to effect an arrest and seizure
without a warrant. Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be
based upon probable cause. (People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010)

Airport security searches: Valid even without a warrant, because of their

minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced
privacy expectations associated with airline travel. (Sales v. People, G.R. No. 191023,
February 06, 2013)

Requirements to establish violation of the right against unreasonable

searches and seizures: To establish a violation of ones right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, one must first prove that he has exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy in the place searched or the item seized; and second, his
subjective expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable
(objective). (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)

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 Reduced expectation of privacy for a government employee in his office. A
government employees expectation of privacy in a regulated office environment is
reduced. The employees privacy interest in an office is to a large extent limited by the
companys work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, and the inherent
right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. (Pollo v.
Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)

No expectation of privacy for a government employee in his government-

issued computer if the employee is so notified based on office policy. A
government employee cannot have a subjective expectation of privacy in his
government-issued computer containing his personal files, if the government office
implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of
privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers. (Pollo v.
Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)

Requirement for warrantless search by the government employer of a

government employees office: reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn
up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. A
warrantless search by a government employer of an employees office is justified at
inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. Thus, a search of a
government employees files in the government-issued computer, conducted in
connection with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous
letter-complaint -- is reasonable. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October
18, 2011)

Overt act requirement in in flagrante delicto arrest: For a warrantless arrest

of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer." Trying to
run away when no crime has been overtly committed, and without more, cannot be
evidence of guilt. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt. (People v. Edano, G.R. No.
188133, July 7, 2014)

Reliable information alone is not enough to justify a warrantless arrest.

The accused must perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. (People v. Racho, G.R.
No. 186529, August 3, 2010)

Overt act requirement in in flagrante delicto arrest: The mere act of

leaving a residence of a known drug peddler is not sufficient for a valid arrest, unless
there is an overt manifestation that the person had just engaged in, was actually
engaging in or was attempting to engage in the criminal activity of illegal possession of
shabu. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)

Police presence at the scene not required in a hot pursuit arrest. In a hot
pursuit arrest, police presence at the scene while the crime was being committed is
not required. It is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is
patent and the police officer has probable cause to believe, based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently
committed the crime. (Pestilos v. Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014)

Arrest of someone who voluntarily surrenders to clear his name. The arrest
of a person who has presented himself before the police station to clear his name and
prove that he is not the accused -- is not valid, as he was neither committing nor
attempting to commit an offense, and the police officers had no personal knowledge of
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any offense that he might have committed. (In the Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus
of Datukan Malang Salibo, v. Warden, Quezon City Jail, G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015)

FREE SPEECH

Prohibition against sending spam is invalid. The prohibition on the sending

of internet spam under Republic Act (R.A.) 10175 (the Cybercrime Prevention Act of
2012) is a violation of freedom of expression. To prohibit the transmission of
unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited
commercial ads addressed to him; commercial speech is also entitled to protection.
(Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014)

The law penalizing aiding and abetting the commission of internet libel:
Void for being vague and overbroad. The law penalizing aiding and abetting the
commission of internet libel is void for being vague and overbroad. The terms "aiding
or abetting" unnecessarily sweep broadly, thereby invading the area of protected
freedoms, generating a chilling effect on those who express themselves in cyberspace.
Also, netizens are not given "fair notice" or warning as to what is criminal conduct and
what is lawful conduct. Its vagueness also causes a chilling effect on the freedom of
expression. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014)

Why Comelec regulation of political speech on oversized tarpaulins posted

on private property by non-candidates during elections is void

Speech with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.

Tarpaulins put up by private individuals that contain statements of their approval or
criticisms of public officials vote on the RH Law, as part of these private individuals
advocacy campaign against the RH Law, and not paid for by any candidate or political
party are not election propaganda subject to Comelec regulation. (The Diocese of
Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

Prohibiting non-candidates from posting on their private property tarpaulins

containing their opinions that may affect elections is a content-based regulation that
is presumed invalid. A content-based prior restraint will only be valid it if passes the
clear and present danger test. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by non-

candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party which are principally
advocacies of a social issue during elections -- is unconstitutional. Regulation of
election paraphernalia involving speech of persons who are not candidates is valid, if
what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal
object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by
law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the
opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the
guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to
achieve that object. The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and
manner of the rendition of the message. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

The act of the Comelec in restraining private individuals from posting

tarpaulins expressing political views in their own private property is an impermissible
encroachment on the right to property. The Comelec prohibition is a deprivation of
property without due process. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

Why the aggregate-based time air-time limits on campaign advertising is

invalid

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 Restriction on freedom of speech and of the press: The Comelecs rule -- limiting
the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national
election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one
hundred eighty (180) minutes for political campaigns or advertisements -- is
unreasonable and arbitrary, as it unreasonably restricts the freedom of speech and of
the press. It unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political
parties to reach out and communicate with the people. (GMA Network v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014)

Violation of the right to suffrage: The COMELECs aggregate time-limit rule [rule
limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for
national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes
and one hundred eighty (180) minutes for political campaigns or advertisements]
violate the peoples right to suffrage by restricting the right of the people to be
adequately informed for the intelligent exercise of their right to determine their own
destiny. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2,
2014)

Why the Comelec prohibition on posting of an election campaign material

during an election period in Public Utility Vehicles (PUVs) and transport
terminals is void

The Comelec prohibition on posting of an election campaign material during an

election period in Public Utility Vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals --constitutes a
prior restraint on the right to free expression. Prior restraints are presumed invalid. (1-
United Transport Koalisyon [1-Utak] v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April
14, 2015)

A content-neutral regulation, which merely controls the time, place or manner

of speech, is valid if the following requisites concur: first, the government regulation is
within the constitutional power of the Government; second, it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; third, the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and fourth, the incidental restriction on freedom of
expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election campaign
materials is an invalid content-neutral regulation because, first, it is not within the
constitutionally delegated power of the Comelec, and second, there is no necessity to
restrict the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. (1-
United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14,
2015)

Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election

campaign materials cannot be justified under the captive-audience doctrine. The
commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials posted
on PUVs and transport terminals, nor are they incapable of declining to receive the
messages contained therein. (1-United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015)

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Benevolent Neutrality and the conscientious objector. Pursuant to the

Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality, the conscientious objector's claim to religious
freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the
government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the
accomplishment of an important secular objective. To compel a conscientious objector
to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction would be violate "the principle of
non-coercion" enshrined in the right to free exercise of religion. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R.
No. 204819, 8 April 2014)

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 Exception: Life threatening cases: The government may compel healthcare
providers to give reproductive health care, because the right to life of the mother
should be given preference. If it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures
endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against the religious
sentiments of the medical practitioner. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April
2014)

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Reasonable expectation of privacy test. The "reasonable expectation of

privacy" test should be used to determine whether there is a violation of the right to
privacy. The reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy depends on a two-
part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of
privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. (Spouses
Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)

Surveillance cameras should not pry into or cover places where there is
reasonable expectation of privacy. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June
26, 2013)

Expectation of privacy and use of privacy tools in Facebook. To have an

expectation of privacy in Facebook posts, a user must show intention to keep certain
posts private through the use of privacy tools. A Facebook user who opts to make use
of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her post or profile detail should not
be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said choice.
(Vivares v. St. Theresas College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014)

An ordinance requiring property owners such as private schools to expose their

property by limiting the height of fences to one meter and requiring fences in excess of
one meter to be at least 80% see-thru is a violation of the right to privacy of the
property owners. (Fernando v. St. Scholasticas College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12,
2013)

THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

Writ of habeas data: There must be a nexus between the right to privacy on
the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other for the writ to be
granted. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012)

Right to privacy must yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. An

application for a writ of habeas data may be denied if the right to privacy in life, liberty
or security must yield to an overriding legitimate state interest, such as dismantling of
private armed groups (PAGs). The state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the
alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa. Thus, the act of the police in collecting
information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, such as Gamboa, and in
sharing and forwarding such information to a government body tasked to investigate
PAGs was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life,
liberty or security. The fact that the PNP released information to the government
investigating commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without
affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or
threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of
intelligence-gathering and investigation. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24,
2012)

The right to privacy is not absolute. It may succumb to an opposing or

overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No.
193636, July 24, 2012)

RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

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 Not applicable in administrative investigations. Rights in custodial
interrogation apply only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to
those made in an administrative investigation. Thus, an employees written statement
given during an administrative inquiry conducted by an employer in connection with
an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his employment -- is
admissible as evidence against the employee, even if he was not assisted by a lawyer
when he signed the written statement. (Tanenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448, June 26,
2013)

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

Mandatory drug testing for those arrested: when invalid. Mandatory drug
testing of a person arrested for alleged extortion violates a persons right to privacy
guaranteed under constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
and the right against self-incrimination. The constitutional right against self-
incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when
it may be material. However, a drug test result is immaterial evidence in prosecuting
non-drug offenses. Moreover, to impose mandatory drug testing on the accused for all
persons arrested regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest was made is a
blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution. We cannot
condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for
which the arrest is being made. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014)

OTHER RIGHTS

Academic freedom gives institutions of higher learning the right to impose

disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel students who
violate disciplinary rules. The power to discipline students is subsumed in the
academic freedom to determine what may be taught, how it shall be taught and who
may be admitted to study. (Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military
Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWERS

Prior opportunity to be heard is required before an administrative agency

enforces rules and regulations that substantially adds to or increases the burden of
those governed. Thus, the Comelec should have conducted prior hearings before
promulgating the resolution on aggregate-based air time limits for political advertising,
as this administrative rule introduces a radical change, and adversely affects, or
imposes a heavy and substantial burden on the citizenry. Consequently, the new
Comelec resolution is ineffectual. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
205357, September 2, 2014)

QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS

The essence of due process as applied to administrative proceedings means a

fair and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In administrative proceedings, a
formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure
are not strictly applied. Also, the presence of counsel is not indispensable in the
conduct of administrative proceedings. Defects in procedural due process may be
cured when the party has been afforded the opportunity to appeal or to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. (Vivo v. Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013)

A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,

irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioners capacity to represent
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herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with
counsel. (Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 187689, September 7, 2010)

The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial

proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers. Adjudication signifies
the exercise of the power to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties.
Hence, if the only purpose of an investigation is to evaluate the evidence submitted to
an agency based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is
not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an
absence of judicial discretion and judgment. (Encinas v. PO1 Agustin and PO1
Caubang, G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013)

The results of a fact-finding investigation is not a judgment on the merits for

purposes of the application of the doctrine of res judicata. A fact-finding investigation
for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an administrative offense
should be filed is an exercise of administrative powers, not judicial or quasi-judicial
powers, as such investigation is not an adjudication upon the rights, obligations, or
liabilities of the parties involved. (Encinas v. PO1 Agustin and PO1 Caubang, G.R. No.
187317, April 11, 2013)

THE LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

NEPOTISM

The prohibition against nepotism applies to appointments made by a group of

individuals acting as a body. A relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity of a member of the body that is the appointing authority (such as the Civil
Service Commission) cannot be appointed by such body. (Civil Service Commission v.
Cortes, G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014)

LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

The Arias Doctrine: Heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on

their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase
supplies, or enter into negotiations. There should be other grounds than the mere
signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and
conviction. Even if the head of office erred in his assessment of the extrinsic and
intrinsic validity of the documents presented to him for endorsement, his act is all the
same imbued with good faith because the otherwise faulty reliance upon his
subordinates. (Jaca v. People, G.R. No. 166967, January 28, 2013)

Exception to the Arias Doctrine: If there are peculiar circumstances that

should have prompted a head of office to exercise a higher degree of circumspection,
he must go beyond what his subordinates had prepared or recommended. (Rivera v.
People, G.R. No. 156577, December 3, 2014)

The Arias Doctrine will not apply if the documents in question bore
irregularities too evident too ignore. In such case, the head of office must exercise a
higher degree of circumspection, and go beyond what their subordinates had prepared.
(Lihaylihay v. People, G.R. No. 191219, July 31, 2013)

The Arias Doctrine applies only to heads of offices, not to public officials whose
duty is to examine each voucher to ascertain whether it was proper to sign it.
(Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 189343, July 10, 2013)

The Arias Doctrine applies only where the head of an office is being held to
answer for his act of relying on the acts of his subordinate. It is not applicable when
the head of an office is being held liable for relying on other independent offices. (Jaca
v. People, G.R. No. 166967, January 28, 2013)

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 ELECTION LAW
JURISDICTION OF ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS

Party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives; once

the party or organization has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath
and assumed office as member of the House, the COMELECs jurisdiction ends and
the HRETs own jurisdiction begins (Abayon v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010)

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has no jurisdiction to

rule on the alleged nullity of naturalization of the father of a Member of the House. To
rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father
which is not permissible. (Villando v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R.
Nos. 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011)

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has no jurisdiction over

an action wherein an individual seeks to be seated as the second nominee of a winning
party list organization, as such action is not an election protest nor an action for quo
warranto. (Lokin v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010)

JURISDICTION OF THE COMELEC

The Supreme Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order

or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. (Cagas v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012)

When the COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial powers such as in an appeal

from an election protest decided by a trial court, the Commission must decide the case
first in division, and en banc only upon motion for reconsideration. (Eriguel v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190526, February 26, 2010)

A decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by

the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. (Cagas v. Comelec, G.R. No.
194139, January 24, 2012)

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES

An allegedly false nickname in the CoC is not a material misrepresentation

that is a ground to cancel or deny due course to a CoC under Section 78. (Villafuerte v.
Comelec, 25 February 2014)

Stating under oath in the CoC that one is eligible to run for public office, when
one is not, is a false material misrepresentation. (Hayudini v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014)

Opportunity to be heard is required before cancellation of or denial of due

course to a CoC. (Cerafica v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205136, December 2,
2014)

For cancellation of/denial of due course to a CoC for material

misrepresentation, there must be a verified petition. (Cerafica v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014)

Cancellation of CoCs: In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions of the Comelec,

the Comelec in Division should first decide the case. (Cerafica v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014)

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 Nuisance candidates: Comelec must give the candidate opportunity to be heard
before cancellation of/denial of due course of CoC. (Timbol v. Comelec, G.R. No.
206004, February 24, 2015)

PARTY-LIST ELECTIONS

CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT FOR ELECTION

Natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign

country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship must (1) take the
oath of allegiance under RA 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in
the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
(Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012)

The mere act of running for public offices does not suffice to serve as an
effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. (Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012)

Effect of use of foreign passport after oath of renunciation: Recantation of oath

of renunciation. (Maquiling v. Comelec, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013)

RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT FOR ELECTION

There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidates compliance with

residency requirement since the question of residence is a question of intention. Still,
jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile
or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he
acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time. To hold that
Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of
his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law
(Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or
residence somewhere. (Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191970, April 24,
2012)

A candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his

residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there
even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the
candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public
office. (Jalosjos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012)

Similarly, the fact that a candidate has no registered property under his name
does not belie his actual residence because property ownership is not among the
qualifications required of candidates for local election. It is enough that he should live
in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. To use ownership
of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or
residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency
requirement. (Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014)

The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a
day, seven (7) days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement. (Jalover v. Osmena,
G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014)

Subjective non-legal standards (such as, a man of stature does not live in a
dilapidated house or a feedmill) cannot be used to determine residence. (Jalover v.
Osmena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014)

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 Winning the elections cannot cure the defect of candidacy; disqualification is
not a matter of popularity. (Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
198742, August 10, 2012)

Burden of proof: To successfully challenge a winning candidates qualifications,

the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic
to constitutional and legal principles. (Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No. 209286, September
23, 2014)

Rule in case of doubt as to the winning candidates qualification: Courts must

respect the decision of the people and resolve all doubts in favor of the peoples
manifest will. (Jalosjos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012)

THREE-TERM LIMIT RULE

The three-term limit rule must be strictly applied. In case of legislative

reapportionment, where the district is practically the same as the district that
previously elected the same candidate, the three-term limit rule applies. (Naval v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014)

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
POWER OF LGUS TO ENACT ORDINANCE

An ordinance to promote the general welfare in terms of economic benefits

cannot override the very basic rights to life, security and safety of the people. In the
absence of any convincing reason that the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of
Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots in Pandacan,
Ordinance No. 8187 in favor of the retention of the oil depots is invalid and
unconstitutional. (Social Justice Society Officers v. Lim, G.R. No. 187836, November 25,
2014)

LGU PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL PROJECTS

National government agencies must conduct prior public consultation and

secure the approval of local government units for national government projects
affecting the ecological balance of local communities, pursuant to Sections 26 and 27
of the Local Government Code. The lack of prior public consultation and approval is
not corrected by the subsequent endorsement. (Boracay Foundation v. Province of
Aklan, G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012)

CONVERSION OF LGUS

Why conversion of a component city into a Highly Urbanized City (HUC)

requires approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite for the entire
province:

The creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries

of local government units involve a material change in the political and economic
rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein.
Thus, the Constitution requires the approval of the people in the political units
directly affected. Similarly, conversion will lead to material change in the political and
economic rights of not only of the component city but of the entire province. (Umali v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014)

The conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of

boundaries. Boundaries should not be limited to the mere physical one, but also to
its political boundaries. With the citys newfound autonomy, it will be free from the

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oversight powers of the province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction of
the latter. (Umali v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014)

LGUs whose boundaries are to be altered and whose economy would be affected
are entitled to participate in the plebiscite to approve the conversion. (Umali v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014)
Economic impact of conversion: The conversion of a component city into a
highly urbanized city will adversely impact the economic rights of the province, as this
will result in reduction of the provinces Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), and
reduction in tax collections due to reduction of taxing jurisdiction, and loss of shares
in provincial taxes imposed in the city to be converted. (Umali v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014)

Political impact of conversion: Administrative supervision of the province over

the city will effectively be revoked upon conversion. (Umali v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014)

INTERNATIONAL LAW

IMMUNITY OF A FOREIGN STATE FROM SUIT

A complaint based on an act of a foreign government done by its foreign agent is

barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suits without its consent. Thus,
Philippine courts cannot have jurisdiction over US Navy officers for acts committed in
their official capacity. (Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014)

IMMUNITY OF WARSHIPS FROM THE JURISDICTION OF COASTAL STATES:

EXCEPTION UNDER UNCLOS

Under UNCLOS, the flag State shall bear international responsibility for any
loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or
other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and
regulations of the coastal State concerning passage. (Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510,
September 16, 2014)

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