EN BANC 25).
The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is enclosed by a perimeter fence constructed
[G.R. No. 182484. June 17, 2008.]
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M. ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS
MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF
NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed in
Boracay Island, represented by the PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN
CEBU 18th DIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON & MA. LOURDES T. SANSON, respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J p:
Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant to Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; 1 and Sections 1 and 6 of the Rule on
the Writ of Habeas Data) 2 is the petition for certiorari and for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data
filed by the above-named petitioners against the Honorable Judge Elmo del Rosario [in his capacity as presiding
judge of RTC Br. 5, Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson de la Cruz [in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC], the Philippine National
Police stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP Station Commander, the Honorable Court of Appeals in
Cebu, 18th Division, and the spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson, respondents. aCIHAD
The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:
The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the "private respondents"), filed
with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga-Malay, Aklan (the "MCTC" ) a complaint 3 dated 24 April
2006 for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos
Madriaga, Everly Tapuz Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas (the "petitioners") and other John
Does numbering about 120. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered
owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of land located at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay,
Malay, Aklan (the "disputed land"); (2) they were the disputed land's prior possessors when the petitioners
armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons numbering 120
entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private respondents' permission and against the
objections of the private respondents' security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure. DCcHAa
In their Answer 4 dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint. They
essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the
private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private respondents' certificate of title to the disputed property
is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages.
The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision 5 in the private respondents' favor. It
found prior possession the key issue in forcible entry cases in the private respondents' favor, thus:
"The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the Amended Commissioner's Report and Sketch
found on pages 245 to 248 of the records and the evidence the parties have submitted. It is
shown in the Amended Commissioner's Report and Sketch that the land in question is
enclosed by a concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pink and green highlighter as
shown in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said perimeter fence was constructed by the plaintiffs 14
years ago. The foregoing findings of the Commissioner in his report and sketch collaborated
the claim of the plaintiffs that after they acquired the land in question on May 27, 1993
through a Deed of Sale (Annex 'A', Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.), they caused
the construction of the perimeter fence sometime in 1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp.
271-275, rec.). aICcHA
From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs were in actual physical
possession of the whole lot in question since 1993 when it was interrupted by the
defendants (sic) when on January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic) the Heirs of Antonio Tapuz
entered a portion of the land in question with view of inhabiting the same and building
structures therein prompting plaintiff Gregorio Sanson to confront them before BSPU,
Police Chief Inspector Jack L. Wanky and Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapao. As a result of
their confrontation, the parties signed an Agreement (Annex 'D', Complaint p. 20) wherein
they agreed to vacate the disputed portion of the land in question and agreed not to build
any structures thereon.
The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of January 4, 2005 when the plaintiff
posted security guards, however, sometime on or about 6:30 A.M. of April 19, 2006, the
defendants some with bolos and one carrying a sack suspected to contain firearms with
other John Does numbering about 120 persons by force and intimidation forcibly entered
the premises along the road and built a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex 'E', Complaint, p.
11) inside the lot in question which incident was promptly reported to the proper
authorities as shown by plaintiffs' Certification (Annex 'F', Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in
the police blotter and on same date April 19, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the
Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan but
no settlement was reached as shown in their Certificate to File Action (Annex 'G',
Complaint, p. 13); hence the present action. ETHCDS
Defendants' (sic) contend in their answer that 'prior to January 4, 2005, they were already occupants of the
property, being indigenous settlers of the same, under claim of ownership by open
continuous, adverse possession to the exclusion of other (sic)'. (Paragraph 4, Answer, p.
by the plaintiffs sometime in 1993 as noted by the Commissioner in his Report and
reflected in his Sketch, thus, it is safe to conclude that the plaintiffs where (sic) in actual
physical possession of the land in question from 1993 up to April 19, 2006 when they were
ousted therefrom by the defendants by means of force. Applying by analogy the ruling of
the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Molina, et al. vs. de Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, if the
land were in the possession of plaintiffs from 1993 to April 19, 2006, defendants' claims to
an older possession must be rejected as untenable because possession as a fact cannot be
recognized at the same time in two different personalities.
Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly entered the land in question on April 18, 2006
at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon as shown in their Certification (Annex 'D',
Defendants' Position Paper, p. 135, rec.). TIAEac
The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations made to the commissioner who
constituted (sic) the land in question that they built structures on the land in question only
on April 19, 2006 (Par. D.4, Commissioner's Amended Report, pp. 246 to 247), after there
(sic) entry thereto on even date.
Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements of defendants' witnesses, Rowena Onag,
Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, in their Joint
Affidavit (pp. 143-'144, rec.) [sic] categorically stated 'that on or about April 19, 2006, a
group of armed men entered the property of our said neighbors and built plastic roofed
tents. These armed men threatened to drive our said neighbors away from their homes but
they refused to leave and resisted the intruding armed men'.
From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible entry happened on April 18, 2006 but it
was only on April 19, 2006 when the defendants overpowered by their numbers the
security guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to the controversy. acTDCI
Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in their pictures attached as annexes to
their position paper were not noted and reflected in the amended report and sketch
submitted by the Commissioner, hence, it could be safely inferred that these structures are
built and (sic) situated outside the premises of the land in question, accordingly, they are
irrelevant to the instant case and cannot be considered as evidence of their actual
possession of the land in question prior to April 19, 2006." 6
The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court ("RTC", Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan) then
presided over by Judge Niovady M. Marin ("Judge Marin").
On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents' motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction through an Order dated 26 February 2007, with the issuance conditioned on the private
respondents' posting of a bond. The writ 7 authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision
was actually issued by respondent Judge Elmo F. del Rosario (the "respondent Judge") on 12 March 2007 after the
private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance
of the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition. TCaADS
The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and to Defer Enforcement
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in an Order dated 17 May 2007. 8
Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. 9 The respondent Judge nevertheless issued via a
Special Order 10 a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff's written notice to the
petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively take actual
possession of the land.
The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, a Petition for Review 11
(under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of
Demolition of the RTC of Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990.
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition on 19 March
2008. 12 TEAaDC
It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition last 29 April 2008. The petition
contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of
the writ of amparo under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual positions diametrically
opposed to the MCTC's findings and legal reasons. Most importantly, the petitioners maintain their claims of prior
possession of the disputed land and of intrusion into this land by the private respondents. The material factual
allegations of the petition bases as well of the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo read:
"29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge shot guns intruded into the property of
the defendants [the land in dispute]. They were not in uniform. They fired their shotguns
at the defendants. Later the following day at 2:00 a.m. two houses of the defendants were
burned to ashes. EcHIAC
30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence put up by defendants to protect their
property from intruders. Two of the armed men trained their shotguns at the defendants
who resisted their intrusion. One of them who was identified as SAMUEL LONGNO y
GEGANSO, 19 years old, single, and a resident of Binun-an, Batad, Iloilo, fired twice.
31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them to ashes. [. . .]
32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were reported by one of the HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [. . .].
1
The terrorists trained their shotguns and fired at minors namely IVAN GAJISAN and MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who resisted
their intrusion. Their act is a blatant violation of the law penalizing Acts of Violence against women and children, which is
aggravated by the use of high-powered weapons.
[. . .]
34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and unlettered petitioners continue because the
private respondents Sansons have under their employ armed men and they are influential
with the police authorities owing to their financial and political clout. HSTAcI
35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in dispute by defendants and the atrocities of
the terrorists [introduced into the property in dispute by the plaintiffs] are attested by
witnesses who are persons not related to the defendants are therefore disinterested
witnesses in the case namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin
Alvarez and Edgardo Penarada. Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia T. Carmen is submitted to
prove that the plaintiffs resorted to atrocious acts through hired men in their bid to
unjustly evict the defendants." 13
The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry that the
private respondents filed below. Citing Section 33 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7691, 14 they maintain that the forcible entry case in fact involves issues of title to or possession
of real property or an interest therein, with the assessed value of the property involved exceeding P20,000.00;
thus, the case should be originally cognizable by the RTC. Accordingly, the petitioners reason out that the RTC
to where the MCTC decision was appealed equally has no jurisdiction to rule on the case on appeal and could
not have validly issued the assailed orders. cDCHaS
OUR RULING
We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in
substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally
defective with respect to content and substance. SIcCEA
The Petition for Certiorari
We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition for certiorari to
nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. It is not lost on us that the petitioners have a pending
petition with the Court of Appeals (the "CA petition") for the review of the same RTC orders now assailed in the
present petition, although the petitioners never disclosedin the body of the present petition the exact status of
their pending CA petition. The CA petition, however, was filed with the Court of Appeals on 2 August 2007, which
indicates to us that the assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest of the interrelated assailed orders) were
received on 1 August 2007 at the latest. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or
more than eight months from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus, the present petition is separated in point of
time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RTC orders by at least eight (8) months, i.e., beyond the
reglementary period of sixty (60) days 15 from receipt of the assailed order or orders or from notice of the denial of
a seasonably filed motion for reconsideration. CcSEIH
We note in this regard that the petitioners' counsel stated in his attached "Certificate of Compliance with Circular
#1-88 of the Supreme Court" 16 ("Certificate of Compliance") that "in the meantime the RTC and the Sheriff issued
a NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION not served to counsel but to the petitioners who sent photo copy of
the same NOTICE to their counsel on April 18, 2008 by LBC." To guard against any insidious argument that the
present petition is timely filed because of this Notice to Vacate, we feel it best to declare now that the counting of
the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65 cannot start from the April 18, 2008 date cited by the petitioners'
counsel. The Notice to Vacate and for Demolition is not an order that exists independently from the RTC orders
assailed in this petition and in the previously filed CA petition. It is merely a notice, made in compliance with one
of the assailed orders, and is thus an administrative enforcement medium that has no life of its own separately
from the assailed order on which it is based. It cannot therefore be the appropriate subject of an independent
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the context of this case. The April 18, 2008 date cannot likewise be the
material date for Rule 65 purposes as the above-mentioned Notice to Vacate is not even directly assailed in this
petition, as the petition's Prayer patently shows. 17
Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of willful and deliberate
misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping. ADcHES
By the petitioners' own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA G.R. SP No.
02859) for the review of the orders now also assailed in this petition, but brought the present recourse to us,
allegedly because "the CA did not act on the petition up to this date and for the petitioner (sic) to seek relief in the
CA would be a waste of time and would render the case moot and academic since the CA refused to resolve
pending urgent motions and the Sheriff is determined to enforce a writ of demolition despite the defect of LACK OF
JURISDICTION." 18
Interestingly, the petitioners' counsel while making this claim in the body of the petition at the same time
represented in his Certificate of Compliance 19 that:
"xxx xxx xxx
(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION copy of
the petition is attached (sic);
(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held that the ORDER TO VACATE
AND FOR DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES OF PETITIONERS is not capable of being the
subject of a PETITION FOR RELIEF, copy of the resolution of the CA is attached hereto;
(underscoring supplied) IACDaS
(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to this date the same had not been
resolved copy of the MR is attached (sic).
xxx xxx xxx"
The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the appellate court level is replete with
significance regarding the petitioners' intentions. We discern from the petitioners' act of misrepresenting in the
body of their petition that "the CA did not act on the petition up to this date" while stating the real Court of Appeals
action in the Certification of Compliance the intent to hide the real state of the remedies the petitioners sought
below in order to mislead us into action on the RTC orders without frontally considering the action that the Court
of Appeals had already undertaken. EICSTa
At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the present petition, the same relief
that it could not wait for from the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02859. The petitioners' act of seeking against
the same parties the nullification of the same RTC orders before the appellate court and before us at the same time,
although made through different mediums that are both improperly used, constitutes willful and deliberate forum
shopping that can sufficiently serve as basis for the summary dismissal of the petition under the combined
application of the fourth and penultimate paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46; Section 5, Rule 7; Section 1, Rule 65;
and Rule 56, all of the Revised Rules of Court. That a wrong remedy may have been used with the Court of Appeals
and possibly with us will not save the petitioner from a forum-shopping violation where there is identity of
parties, involving the same assailed interlocutory orders, with the recourses existing side by side at the same time.
To restate the prevailing rules, "forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or
the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party against
whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in
another, other than by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses
their processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest court dockets. Willful and deliberate violation
of the rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct contempt." 20 ITESAc
Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is defective as one (1) of the seven
(7) petitioners Ivan Tapuz did not sign, in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section
1, Rule 65; all in relation with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of Court. Of those who signed, only five (5) exhibited
their postal identification cards with the Notary Public.
In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the basis of the supporting attachments,
to be devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over the private respondents' complaint, which
specifically alleged a cause for forcible entry and not as petitioners may have misread or misappreciated a
case involving title to or possession of realty or an interest therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The Judiciary
Reorganization Act, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts. These first-level courts have had jurisdiction over these cases called accion interdictal even before
the R.A. 7691 amendment, based on the issue of pure physical possession (as opposed to the right of possession).
This jurisdiction is regardless of the assessed value of the property involved; the law established no distinctions
based on the assessed value of the property forced into or unlawfully detained. Separately from accion interdictal
are accion publiciana for the recovery of the right of possession as a plenary action, and accion reivindicacion for
the recovery of ownership. 21 Apparently, these latter actions are the ones the petitioners refer to when they cite
Section 33, par. 3, in relation with Section 19, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7691, in which jurisdiction may either be with the first-level courts or the regional trial courts,
depending on the assessed value of the realty subject of the litigation. As the complaint at the MCTC was patently
for forcible entry, that court committed no jurisdictional error correctible by certiorari under the present petition.
aACEID
In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for violation of the
non-forum shopping rule, for having been filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.
The Writ of Amparo
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in
the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies
to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life,
liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing
Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the
reasonable certainty that its issuance demands requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be
supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit: TCcSDE
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the
name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed
appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is
2
 committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the
investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party
and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and ESTcIA
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs." 22
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts
determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a
threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being
committed.
The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations heretofore quoted, 23
that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the petition. These allegations are supported by the following
documents:
"(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and
Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of the petitioners, id., petitioners' prior
possession, private respondents' intrusion and the illegal acts committed by the private
respondents and their security guards on 19 April 2006; TSHIDa
(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts (firing of guns, etc.) committed by a
security guard against minors descendants of Antonio Tapuz;
(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially corroborating Nemia's affidavit;
(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson Jauod regarding the incident of petitioners'
intrusion into the disputed land;
(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis, narrating the altercation between the
Tapuz family and the security guards of the private respondents, including the gun-poking
and shooting incident involving one of the security guards;
(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a house owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr.,
rented by a certain Jorge Buenavente, was accidentally burned by a fire." cSDHEC
On the whole, what is clear from these statements both sworn and unsworn is the overriding
involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the
property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly
be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to
security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the
presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none
of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and
security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.
A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them the statements of Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and
Melanie Tapuz are practically identical and unsworn. The Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other
hand, simply narrates what had been reported by one Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the
burning of two residential houses was "accidental". aCTHEA
As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the forcible entry case which
rejected all the petitioners' factual claims. These findings are significantly complete and detailed, as they were
made under a full-blown judicial process, i.e., after examination and evaluation of the contending parties'
positions, evidence and arguments and based on the report of a court-appointed commissioner.
We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a dispute (with incidents
giving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof) that was brought to and ruled upon by the MCTC;
subsequently brought to the RTC on an appeal that is still pending; still much later brought to the appellate
court without conclusive results; and then brought to us on interlocutory incidents involving a plea for the
issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as the petitioners advocate, may render the pending RTC appeal
moot.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate
facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing
threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-related
and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators
criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the
use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo. DcTAIH
Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our action may carry the unintended
effect, not only of reversing the MCTC ruling independently of the appeal to the RTC that is now in place, but also
of nullifying the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though unintended, will obviously wreak havoc on the
orderly administration of justice, an overriding goal that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not intend to
weaken or negate.
Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point the indicators, clear and patent
to us, that the petitioners' present recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate
the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the appellate court because of the use of
an improper remedial measure. We discern this from the petitioners' misrepresentations pointed out above; from
their obvious act of forum shopping; and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies of the writs of
certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far from forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when
recourses in the ordinary course of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the use of improper
remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that of amparo extraordinary though they may be will
suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as a
substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these processes the
situation obtaining in the present case. DECSIT
While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the institution of
separate actions, 24 for the effect of earlier-filed criminal actions, 25 and for the consolidation of petitions for the
issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal and civil action. 26 These rules were adopted to
promote an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties
resort to other parallel recourses.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the
reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of
amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security the personal
concern that the writ is intended to protect is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat
is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by
motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the
writ with a separately filed criminal case. IaAScD
The Writ of Habeas Data
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of ultimate facts in a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in
possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or
files kept by the respondent. aDcEIH
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable."
Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:
"1. [ . . . ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the PNP may release the report on
the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence employed against them
by the private respondents, furnishing the Court and the petitioners with copy of the same;
[...]
66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine National Police [PNP] to produce
the police report pertaining to the burning of the houses of the petitioners in the land in
dispute and likewise the investigation report if an investigation was conducted by the
PNP." SEHaTC
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the
petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right
to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less
demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police authorities other than those it has already set
forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of
previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ
of habeas data is nothing more than the "fishing expedition" that this Court in the course of drafting the Rule on
habeas data had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright
denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order. 2upjur08
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present petition OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form
and substance patent from its body and attachments. aDcHIC
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Reyes
and Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr. and Nachura, JJ., are on official leave.
||| (Tapuz v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, [June 17, 2008], 577 PHIL 636-658)
3
 EN BANC waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.
[G.R. No. 182795. June 5, 2008.] WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CAPISTRANO, MARRIETA PIA, petitioners, vs. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS SO ORDERED.
||| (Canlas v. NAPICO Homeowners Association, I-XIII, Inc., G.R. No. 182795, [June 5, 2008], 577 PHIL 92-96)
ASS'N., I XIII, INC., ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, R.T., J p:
THE present petition filed on May 26, 2008 seeks the issuance of a Writ of Amparo upon the following premise:
Petitioners were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and embodied in our
Constitution, as the result of these nefarious activities of both the Private and Public
Respondents. This ardent request filed before this Honorable Supreme Court is the only
solution to this problem via this newly advocated principles incorporated in the Rules
the "RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO." 1
It appears that petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City. Their
dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished
pursuant to a court judgment.
While they attempted to focus on issuance of what they claimed to be fraudulent and spurious land titles, to wit:
Petitioners herein are desirous to help the government, the best way they can, to unearth these so-called
"syndicates" clothed with governmental functions, in cahoots with the "squatting
syndicates" the law so defines. If only to give its proper meanings, the Government must
be the first one to cleans (sic) its ranks from these unscrupulous political protges. If
unabated would certainly ruin and/or destroy the efficacy of the Torrens System of land
registration in this Country. It is therefore the ardent initiatives of the herein Petitioners, by
way of the said prayer for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo, that these unprincipled
Land Officials be summoned to answer their participation in the issuances of these
fraudulent and spurious titles, NOW, in the hands of the Private Respondents. The
Courts of Justice, including this Honorable Supreme Court, are likewise being made
to believe that said titles in the possession of the Private Respondents were issued
untainted with frauds. 2
what the petition ultimately seeks is the reversal of this Court's dismissal of petitions in G.R. Nos. 177448,
180768, 177701, 177038, thus:
That, Petitioners herein knew beforehand that: there can be no motion for reconsideration for the second or third
time to be filed before this Honorable Supreme Court. As such therefore, Petitioners herein
are aware of the opinion that this present petition should not in any way be treated as such
motions fore reconsideration. Solely, this petition is only for the possible issuance of the
writ of amparo, although it might affect the previous rulings of this Honorable Supreme
Court in these cases, G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701 and 177038. Inherent in the
powers of the Supreme Court of the Philippines is to modify, reverse and set aside,
even its own previous decision, that can not be thwarted nor influenced by any one,
but, only on the basis of merits and evidence. This is the purpose of this petition for
the Writ of Amparo. 3
We dismiss the petition.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
SEC. 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case was affirmed
with finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not included among the enumeration
of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their
claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them,
does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ
of amparo.
Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners' claim to the land in question is not alleged in the petition at all.
The Court can only surmise that these rights and interest had already been threshed out and settled in the four
cases cited above. No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and
legal basis of the right sought to be protected.
Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the petition, only if on its face, the
court ought to issue said writ.
SEC. 6. Issuance of the Writ. Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order the
issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ
under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge may issue
the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than seven (7)
days from the date of its issuance.
Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ will not be issued and the petition
will be dismissed outright.
This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the
highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare
any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not

4
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 182165. November 25, 2009.]
P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS, RUPERTO BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO
DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD TRIA, and GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN, ENGR.
REDENTOR S. DELA CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, "TISOY", and JOHN
DOES, petitioners, vs. DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. CRUZ, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J p:
Petitioners, 1 employees and members of the local police force of the City Government of
Malolos, challenge the March 28, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Branch 10 in
a petition for issuance of writs of amparo and habeas data instituted by respondents.
The factual antecedents.
Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz
(Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to
vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province)
which intended to utilize it for local projects.
The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Cruz before
the then Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bulacan, Bulacan.
By Decision of September 5, 1997, the MTC rendered judgment against the Spouses Cruz,
which judgment, following its affirmance by the RTC, became final and executory.
The finality of the decision in the ejectment case notwithstanding, the spouses Cruz
refused to vacate the property. They thereupon filed cases against the Province 2 and the judges who
presided over the case. 3 Those cases were dismissed except their petition for annulment of judgment
lodged before Branch 18 of the RTC of Malolos, and a civil case for injunction 833-M-2004 lodged before
Branch 10 of the same RTC Malolos.
The Spouses Cruz sought in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent writ of
injunction to prevent the execution of the final and executory judgment against them.
By Order of July 19, 2005, the RTC, finding merit in the Spouses Cruzes' allegation that
subsequent events changed the situation of the parties to justify a suspension of the execution of the final
and executory judgment, issued a permanent writ of injunction, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ESaITA
WHEREFORE, the foregoing petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated August 10, 2004 is hereby GRANTED. Order
dated August 10, 2004 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Further, the verified petition dated November 05, 2002 are hereby
REINSTATED and MADE PERMANENT until the MTC-Bulacan, Bulacan finally resolves the pending motions of petitioners with the
same determines the metes and bounds of 400 sq. meters leased premises subject matter of this case with immediate dispatch.
Accordingly, REMAND the determination of the issues raised by the petitioners on the issued writ of demolition to the MTC of
Bulacan, Bulacan.
SO ORDERED. 4 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Finding that the fallo of the RTC July 19, 2005 Order treats, as a suspensive condition for
the lifting of the permanent injunction, the determination of the boundaries of the property, the Province
returned the issue for the consideration of the MTC. In a Geodetic Engineer's Report submitted to the MTC
on August 31, 2007, the metes and bounds of the property were indicated.
The MTC, by Order of January 2, 2008, approved the Report and ruled that the permanent
injunction which the RTC issued is ineffective. On motion of the Province, the MTC, by Order of January 21,
2008, thus issued a Second Alias Writ of Demolition.
On receiving notice of the January 2, 2008 MTC Order, the Spouses Cruz filed a motion
before Branch 10 of the RTC for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) which it set for
hearing on January 25, 2008 on which date, however, the demolition had, earlier in the day, been
implemented. Such notwithstanding, the RTC issued a TRO. 5 The Spouses Cruz, along with their sons-
respondents Nixon and Ferdinand, thereupon entered the property, placed several container vans and
purportedly represented themselves as owners of the property which was for lease.
On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who
were deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R.
Mendoza instructing him to "protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property", entered the
property.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that
the RTC July 19, 2005 Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they
shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault,
trespassing and other forms of light threats.
Respondents later filed on March 3, 2008 a "Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of
Amparo and Habeas Data", docketed as Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008, which was coincidentally
raffled to Branch 10 of the RTC Malolos.
Respondents averred that despite the Permanent Injunction, petitioners unlawfully
entered the property with the use of heavy equipment, tore down the barbed wire fences and tents, 6 and
arrested them when they resisted petitioners' entry; and that as early as in the evening of February 20,
2008, members of the Philippine National Police had already camped in front of the property.
On the basis of respondents' allegations in their petition and the supporting affidavits, the
RTC, by Order of March 4, 2008, issued writs of amparo and habeas data. 7 AIDTHC
The RTC, crediting respondents' version in this wise:
Petitioners have shown by preponderant evidence that the facts and circumstances of the alleged offenses
examined into on Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data that there have been an on-going
hearings on the verified Petition for Contempt, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 306-M-
2006, before this Court for alleged violation by the respondents of the Preliminary
Injunction Order dated July 16, 2005 [sic] in Sp. Civil Action No. 833-M-2002, hearings were
held on January 25, 2008, February 12 and 19, 2008, where the respondents prayed for an
April 22, 2008 continuance, however, in the pitch darkness of February 20, 2008, police
officers, some personnel from the Engineering department, and some civilians proceeded
purposely to the Pinoy Compound, converged therein and with continuing threats of bodily
harm and danger and stone-throwing of the roofs of the homes thereat from voices around
its premises, on a pretext of an ordinary police operation when enterviewed [sic] by the
media then present, but at 8:00 a.m. to late in the afternoon of February 21, 2008, zoomed
in on the petitioners, subjecting them to bodily harm, mental torture, degradation, and the
debasement of a human being, reminiscent of the martial law police brutality, sending chill
in any ordinary citizen. 8
rendered judgment, by Decision of March 28, 2008, in favor of respondents, disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commitment Orders and waivers in Crim. Cases Nos. 08-77 for Direct
assault; Crim. Case No. 08-77 for Other Forms of Trespass; and Crim. Case No. 08-78 for
Light Threats are hereby DECLARED illegal, null and void, as petitioners were deprived of
their substantial rights, induced by duress or a well-founded fear of personal violence.
Accordingly, the commitment orders and waivers are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary
release of the petitioners is declared ABSOLUTE.
Without any pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED." 9 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to Section 19 10 of The Rule
on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC), 11 which is essentially reproduced in the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC). 12
In the main, petitioners fault the RTC for:
. . . giving due course and issuing writs of amparo and habeas data when from the allegations of the petition, the
same ought not to have been issued as (1) the petition in [sic] insufficient in substance as
the same involves property rights; and (2) criminal cases had already been filed and
pending with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, City of Malolos. (Underscoring
supplied)
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights. 13 In view of the heightening prevalence of extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued and took effect on October 24,
2007 which coincided with the celebration of United Nations Day and affirmed the Court's commitment
towards internationalization of human rights. More than three months later or on February 2, 2008, the
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data was promulgated. HaAIES
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall
cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of
rights to life, liberty and security. And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or
omissions.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo 14 teaches:
As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances", its
coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed
without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings". On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are
"attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups
or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or
whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law. 15 (Underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold
requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or
5
 omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial It need not be underlined that respondents' petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data
Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its are extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory
effect on respondents' right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of decision in a property dispute.
petitioners' entry into the property. AT ALL EVENTS, respondents' filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data
Apropos is the Court's ruling in Tapuz v. Del Rosario: 16 should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 24 of the Rules of Court.
the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by
and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address
respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs
violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy afforded by the writs may, however, be made available to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely proceedings. 25
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged March 4, 2008 Order of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial
uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the Court of Malolos is DECLARED NULL AND VOID, and its March 28, 2008 Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008 is DISMISSED.
requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying
SO ORDERED.
allegations of fact, to wit:
||| (Castillo v. Cruz, G.R. No. 182165, [November 25, 2009], 620 PHIL 654-667)
xxx xxx xxx
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts
determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to
what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved
party was or is being committed. 17 (Emphasis and italics in the original, citation omitted)
DACTSH
Tapuz also arose out of a property dispute, albeit between private individuals, with the petitioners therein
branding as "acts of terrorism" the therein respondents' alleged entry into the disputed land with armed men in
tow. The Court therein held:
On the whole, what is clear from these statements both sworn and unsworn is the overriding involvement of
property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the
property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to
liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has
been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the
treats and harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and
the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits
compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the
petitioners is imminent or continuing. 18 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)
It bears emphasis that respondents' petition did not show any actual violation, imminent
or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations that petitioners "in unison,
conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use of force
and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested
the herein petitioners (respondents)" 19 will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of
amparo. No undue confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail
for the offenses a day after their arrest. 20
Although respondents' release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication
for the writ of amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and
continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the
efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.
That respondents are merely seeking the protection of their property rights is gathered
from their Joint Affidavit, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
11. Kami ay humarang at humiga sa harap ng mga heavy equipment na hawak hawak ang nasabing kautusan ng
RTC Branch 10 (PERMANENT INJUNCTION at RTC ORDERS DATED February 12, 17 at 19
2008) upang ipaglaban ang dignidad ng kautusan ng korte, ipaglaban ang prinsipyo ng
"SELF-HELP" at batas ukol sa "PROPERTY RIGHTS", Wala kaming nagawa ipagtanggol ang
aming karapatan sa lupa na 45 years naming "IN POSSESSION". (Underscoring supplied)
Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not even
alleged that petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding their person,
family, home and correspondence.
As for respondents' assertion of past incidents 21 wherein the Province allegedly violated
the Permanent Injunction order, these incidents were already raised in the injunction proceedings on
account of which respondents filed a case for criminal contempt against petitioners. 22
Before the filing of the petition for writs of amparo and habeas data, or on February 22,
2008, petitioners even instituted a petition for habeas corpus which was considered moot and academic
by Branch 14 of the Malolos RTC and was accordingly denied by Order of April 8, 2008. SCADIT
More. Respondent Amanda and one of her sons, Francisco Jr., likewise filed a petition for
writs of amparo and habeas data before the Sandiganbayan, they alleging the commission of continuing
threats by petitioners after the issuance of the writs by the RTC, which petition was dismissed for
insufficiency and forum shopping.
It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in fact taken full
advantage of the legal system with the filing of civil, criminal and administrative charges. 23

6
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 182498. December 3, 2009.]
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR.,Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP);Police Chief Superintendent RAUL
CASTAEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG);Police Senior Superintendent
LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER);and GEN. JOEL R.
GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, petitioners,vs.MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by
ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR.,Attorney-in-Fact, respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J p:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari 1 the decision dated March 7, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A-G.R. AMPARO No. 00009. 2 This CA decision confirmed the enforced
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granted the Writ of Amparo at the petition of
his wife, Mary Jean B. Tagitis (respondent).The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court hereby FINDS that this is an "enforced disappearance"
within the meaning of the United Nations instruments, as used in the Amparo Rules. The privileges of the writ of amparo are hereby
extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.
Consequently: (1) respondent GEN. EDGARDO M. DOROMAL, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group
(CIDG) who should order COL. JOSE VOLPANE PANTE, CIDG-9 Chief, Zamboanga City, to
aid him; (2) respondent GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, Chief, PNP, who should order his men,
namely: (a) respondent GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM PNP, (b) COL.
AHIRON AJIRIM, both head of TASK FORCE TAGITIS, and (c) respondent SR.
SUPERINTENDENT LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response, to aid him as their superior- are hereby DIRECTED to exert extraordinary
diligence and efforts,not only to protect the life, liberty and security of Engr. Morced
Tagitis, but also to extend the privileges of the writ of amparo to Engr. Morced Tagitis and
his family, and to submit a monthly report of their actions to this Court, as a way of
PERIODIC REVIEW to enable this Court to monitor the action of respondents.
This amparo case is hereby DISMISSED as to respondent
LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and as
to respondent GEN. RUBEN RAFAEL, Chief Anti-Terror Task Force Comet,
Zamboanga City, both being with the military, which is a separate and
distinct organization from the police and the CIDG, in terms of operations,
chain of command and budget. TIaCHA
This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo a protective remedy against
violations or threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and security. 3 It embodies, as a remedy,
the court's directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the
disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor
pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility,or at least
accountability,for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to
address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts.
Accountability,on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those
who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to
the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge,
the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases,
the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that
the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.
We highlight this nature of a Writ of Amparo case at the outset to stress that the unique
situations that call for the issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations and measures necessary to
address these situations, may not at all be the same as the standard measures and procedures in ordinary
court actions and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo 4 (Amparo Rule) issued by
this Court is unique. The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer
points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress
may promulgate.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The background facts, based on the petition and the records of the case, are summarized below.
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior
Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in
Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong),an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the
early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at
ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to
Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. 5 The receptionist
related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room key with
the desk. 6 Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latter's Manila-based secretary
who did not know of Tagitis' whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait. 7
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of
Muslim studies and Tagitis' fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis' disappearance to the Jolo
Police Station. 8 On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of
the circumstances surrounding Tagitis' disappearance. 9
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007),the respondent filed a Petition for the
Writ of Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla. 10 The petition
was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I.
Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP);Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and
Detention Group (CIDG);Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response;
Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force
Comet [collectively referred to as petitioners].After reciting Tagitis' personal circumstances and the facts
outlined above, the petition went on to state: aCHDST
xxx xxx xxx
7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch but while
out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives,
forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without
the knowledge of his student, Arsimin Kunnong;
8. As instructed, in the late afternoon of the same day, Kunnong returned to the pension house, and was surprised
to find out that subject Engr. Tagitis cannot [sic] be contacted by phone and was not also
around and his room was closed and locked;
9. Kunnong requested for the key from the desk of the pension house who [sic] assisted him to open the room of
Engr. Tagitis, where they discovered that the personal belongings of Engr. Tagitis, including
cell phones, documents and other personal belongings were all intact inside the room;
10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and reported
the matter to the local police agency;
11. Arsimin Kunnong including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities in
Jolo, he was immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could have been abducted
by the Abu Sayyaf group and other groups known to be fighting against the government;
12. Being scared with [sic] these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported the matter
to the [respondent, wife of Engr. Tagitis] by phone and other responsible officers and
coordinators of the IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines, who alerted the office of
the Governor of ARMM who was then preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia;
13. [Respondent],on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos branch,
Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the
military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;
14. All of these efforts of the [respondent] did not produce any positive results except the information from
persons in the military who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of
the uniformed men;
15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent],subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of
police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being
held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr.
Tagitis with the different terrorist groups; CSEHcT
xxx xxx xxx
17. [Respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato * and in Jolo, as
suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but [respondent's] request
and pleadings failed to produce any positive results;
18. Instead of helping the [respondent],she [sic] was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband,
subject of the petition, was not missing but was with another woman having good time
somewhere, which is a clear indication of the [petitioners'] refusal to help and provide
police assistance in locating her missing husband;
19. The continued failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to release and/or turn-over subject Engr. Tagitis to his
family or even to provide truthful information to [the respondent] of the subject's
whereabouts, and/or allow [the respondent] to visit her husband Engr. Morced Tagitis,
caused so much sleepless nights and serious anxieties;
20. Lately, [the respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police Headquarters
again in Cotobato * City and also to the different Police Headquarters including [those] in
Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these places
have been visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed expenses
for her trips to these places thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for
financial help from friends and relatives only to try complying [sic] to the different
suggestions of these police officers, despite of which, her efforts produced no positive
results up to the present time;
21. In fact at times, some police officers, who [sympathized with] the sufferings undergone by the
[respondent],informed her that they are not the proper persons that she should approach,
but assured her not to worry because her husband is [sic] in good hands;
22. The unexplained uncooperative behavior of the [petitioners] to the [respondent's] request for help and failure
and refusal of the [petitioners] to extend the needed help, support and assistance in
locating the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis who had been declared missing since October 30,
7
 2007 which is almost two (2) months now, clearly indicates that the [petitioners] are
actually in physical possession and custody of [respondent's] husband, Engr. Tagitis;
xxx xxx xxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the
circumstances, [the respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect
and get the release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of the
[petitioners],their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the
subject's human and constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
[Emphasis supplied]
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set
the case for hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file their verified return within
seventy-two (72) hours from service of the writ. 11
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied
any involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis' alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the
petition were incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless, or at best
speculative; and were merely based on hearsay evidence. 12
The affidavit of PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon, attached to the Return, stated that: he did
not have any personal knowledge of, or any participation in, the alleged disappearance; that he had been
designated by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as the head of a special body called TASK FORCE USIG, to
address concerns about extralegal killings and enforced disappearances; the Task Force, inter alia,
coordinated with the investigators and local police, held case conferences, rendered legal advice in
connection to these cases; and gave the following summary: 13
xxx xxx xxx
4.
a) On November 5, 2007, the Regional Director, Police Regional Office ARMM submitted a report on the alleged
disappearance of one Engr. Morced Tagitis. According to the said report, the victim
checked-in at ASY Pension House on October 30, 2007 at about 6:00 in the morning and
then roamed around Jolo, Sulu with an unidentified companion. It was only after a few days
when the said victim did not return that the matter was reported to Jolo MPS. Afterwards,
elements of Sulu PPO conducted a thorough investigation to trace and locate the
whereabouts of the said missing person, but to no avail. The said PPO is still conducting
investigation that will lead to the immediate findings of the whereabouts of the person.
b) Likewise, the Regional Chief, 9RCIDU submitted a Progress Report to the Director, CIDG. The said report stated
among others that: subject person attended an Education Development Seminar set on
October 28, 2007 conducted at Ateneo de Zamboanga, Zamboanga City together with a
Prof. Matli. On October 30, 2007, at around 5:00 o'clock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis
reportedly arrived at Jolo Sulu wharf aboard M/V Bounty Cruise, he was then billeted at
ASY Pension House. At about 6:15 o'clock in the morning of the same date, he instructed his
student to purchase a fast craft ticket bound for Zamboanga City and will depart from Jolo,
Sulu on October 31, 2007. That on or about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis left
the premises of ASY Pension House as stated by the cashier of the said pension house. Later
in the afternoon, the student instructed to purchase the ticket arrived at the pension house
and waited for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter did not return. On its part, the elements of
9RCIDU is now conducting a continuous case build up and information gathering to locate
the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis. DAcSIC
c) That the Director, CIDG directed the conduct of the search in all divisions of the CIDG to find Engr. Tagitis who
was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence Operatives
since October 30, 2007, but after diligent and thorough search, records show that no such
person is being detained in CIDG or any of its department or divisions.
5. On this particular case, the Philippine National Police exhausted all possible efforts, steps and actions available
under the circumstances and continuously search and investigate [sic] the instant case.
This immense mandate, however, necessitates the indispensable role of the citizenry, as the
PNP cannot stand alone without the cooperation of the victims and witnesses to identify
the perpetrators to bring them before the bar of justice and secure their conviction in court.
The petitioner PNP-CIDG Chief, Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, submitted as well his affidavit,
also attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that upon receipt of the Writ of Amparo, he caused the
following: 14
xxx xxx xxx
That immediately upon receipt on December 29, 2007 of the Resolution of the Honorable Special Fourth Division
of the Court of Appeals, I immediately directed the Investigation Division of this Group
[CIDG] to conduct urgent investigation on the alleged enforced disappearance of Engineer
Morced Tagitis.
That based on record, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis attended an Education Development Seminar on October 28, 2007 at
Ateneo de Zamboanga at Zamboanga City together with Prof. Abdulnasser Matli. On
October 30, 2007, at around six o'clock in the morning he arrived at Jolo, Sulu. He was
assisted by his student identified as Arsimin Kunnong of the Islamic Development Bank
who was also one of the participants of the said seminar. He checked in at ASY pension
house located [sic] Kakuyagan, Patikul, Sulu on October 30, 2007 with [sic] unidentified
companion. At around six o'clock in the morning of even date, Engr. Tagitis instructed his
student to purchase a fast craft ticket for Zamboanga City. In the afternoon of the same
date, Kunnong arrived at the pension house carrying the ticket he purchased for Engr.
Tagitis, but the latter was nowhere to be found anymore. Kunnong immediately informed
Prof. Abdulnasser Matli who reported the incident to the police. The CIDG is not involved in
the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis to make out a case of an enforced disappearance
which presupposes a direct or indirect involvement of the government.
That herein [petitioner] searched all divisions and departments for a person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis, who
was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence Operatives
since October 30, 2007 and after a diligent and thorough research records show that no
such person is being detained in CIDG or any of its department or divisions.
That nevertheless, in order to determine the circumstances surrounding Engr. Morced Tagitis [sic] alleged
enforced disappearance, the undersigned had undertaken immediate investigation and will
pursue investigations up to its full completion in order to aid in the prosecution of the
person or persons responsible therefore.
Likewise attached to the Return of the Writ was PNP-PACER 15 Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A.
Espina's affidavit which alleged that: 16
xxx xxx xxx
That, I and our men and women in PACER vehemently deny any participation in the alleged abduction or illegally
[sic] detention of ENGR. MORCED N. TAGITS on October 30, 2007. As a matter of fact,
nowhere in the writ was mentioned that the alleged abduction was perpetrated by
elements of PACER nor was there any indication that the alleged abduction or illegal
detention of ENGR. TAGITIS was undertaken jointly by our men and by the alleged covert
CIDG-PNP intelligence operatives alleged to have abducted or illegally detained ENGR.
TAGITIS.
That I was shocked when I learned that I was implicated in the alleged disappearance of ENGR. MORCED in my
capacity as the chief PACER [sic] considering that our office, the Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response (PACER),a special task force created for the purpose of neutralizing
or eradicating kidnap-for-ransom groups which until now continue to be one of the menace
of our society is a respondent in kidnapping or illegal detention case. Simply put, our task is
to go after kidnappers and charge them in court and to abduct or illegally detain or kidnap
anyone is anathema to our mission.
That right after I learned of the receipt of the WRIT OF AMPARO, I directed the Chief of PACER Mindanao Oriental
(PACER-MOR) to conduct pro-active measures to investigate, locate/search the subject,
identify and apprehend the persons responsible, to recover and preserve evidence related
to the disappearance of ENGR. MORCED TAGITIS, which may aid in the prosecution of the
person or persons responsible, to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them
concerning the disappearance and to determine the cause, manner, location and time of
disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the
disappearance.
That I further directed the chief of PACER-MOR, Police Superintendent JOSE ARNALDO BRIONES JR.,to submit a
written report regarding the disappearance of ENGR. MORCED.
That in compliance with my directive, the chief of PACER-MOR sent through fax his written report.
That the investigation and measures being undertaken to locate/search the subject in coordination with Police
Regional Office, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (PRO-ARMM) and Jolo Police
Provincial Office (PPO) and other AFP and PNP units/agencies in the area are ongoing with
the instruction not to leave any stone unturned so to speak in the investigation until the
perpetrators in the instant case are brought to the bar of justice.
That I have exercised EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE in dealing with the WRIT OF AMPARO just issued.
Finally, the PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Supt. Joel R. Goltiao (Gen. Goltiao),also
submitted his affidavit detailing the actions that he had taken upon receipt of the report on Tagitis'
disappearance, viz.: 17
xxx xxx xxx
3) For the record:
1. I am the Regional Director of Police Regional Office ARMM now and during the time of the incident;
xxx xxx xxx
4. It is my duty to look into and take appropriate measures on any cases of reported enforced disappearances and
when they are being alluded to my office;
5. On November 5, 2007, the Provincial Director of Sulu Police Provincial Office reported to me through Radio
Message Cite No. SPNP3-1105-07-2007 that on November 4, 2007 at around 3:30 p.m.,a
certain Abdulnasser Matli, an employee of Islamic Development Bank, appeared before the
Office of the Chief of Police, Jolo Police Station, and reported the disappearance of Engr.
Morced Tagitis, scholarship coordinator of Islamic Development Bank, Manila;
6. There was no report that Engr. Tagibis was last seen in the company of or taken by any member of the Philippine
National Police but rather he just disappeared from ASY Pension House situated at
Kakuyagan Village, Village, * Patikul, Sulu, on October 30, 2007, without any trace of
forcible abduction or arrest;
7. The last known instance of communication with him was when Arsimin Kunnong, a student scholar, was
requested by him to purchase a vessel ticket at the Office of Weezam Express, however,
when the student returned back to ASY Pension House, he no longer found Engr. Tagitis
there and when he immediately inquired at the information counter regarding his
whereabouts [sic],the person in charge in the counter informed him that Engr. Tagitis had
left the premises on October 30, 2007 around 1 o'clock p.m. and never returned back to his
room; aAHSEC
8. Immediately after learning the incident, I called and directed the Provincial Director of Sulu Police Provincial
Office and other units through phone call and text messages to conduct investigation [sic]
to determine the whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons
8
 responsible for the threat, act or omission, to recover and preserve evidence related to the
disappearance of Engr. Tagitis, to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them
concerning his disappearance, to determine the cause and manner of his disappearance, to
identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the disappearance so that they
shall be brought before a competent court;
9. Thereafter, through my Chief of the Regional Investigation and Detection Management Division, I have caused
the following directives:
a) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1122-07-358 dated November 22, 2007 directing PD Sulu PPO to conduct joint
investigation with CIDG and CIDU ARMM on the
matter;
b) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1128-07-361 dated November 28, 2007 directing PD Sulu PPO to expedite
compliance to my previous directive;
c) Memorandum dated December 14, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO reiterating our series of directives for
investigation and directing him to undertake
exhaustive coordination efforts with the owner of
ASY Pension House and student scholars of IDB in
order to secure corroborative statements regarding
the disappearance and whereabouts of said
personality;
d) Memorandum dated December 24, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO directing him to maximize efforts to
establish clues on the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis by
seeking the cooperation of Prof. Abdulnasser Matli
and Arsimin Kunnong and/or whenever necessary,
for them to voluntarily submit for polygraph
examination with the NBI so as to expunge all clouds
of doubt that they may somehow have knowledge or
idea to his disappearance;
e) Memorandum dated December 27, 2007 addressed to the Regional Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group, Police Regional Office 9, Zamboanga City,
requesting assistance to investigate the cause and
unknown disappearance of Engr. Tagitis considering
that it is within their area of operational jurisdiction;
f) Memorandum from Chief, Intelligence Division, PRO ARMM dated December 30, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO
requiring them to submit complete investigation
report regarding the case of Engr. Tagitis;
10. In compliance to our directives, PD Sulu PPO has exerted his [sic] efforts to conduct investigation [sic] on the
matter to determine the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and the circumstances related to his
disappearance and submitted the following:
a) Progress Report dated November 6, 2007 through Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1106-10-2007;
b) Radio Message Cite No. SPIDMS-1205-47-07 informing this office that they are still monitoring the whereabouts
of Engr. Tagitis;
c) Investigation Report dated December 31, 2007 from the Chief of Police, Jolo Police Station, Sulu PPO;
11. This incident was properly reported to the PNP Higher Headquarters as shown in the following:
a) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Chief, PNP informing him of the facts of the
disappearance and the action being taken by our
office;
b) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Director, Directorate for Investigation and Detection
Management, NHQ PNP;
c) Memorandum dated December 30, 2007 addressed to the Director, DIDM;
4) In spite of our exhaustive efforts, the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis cannot be determined but our office is
continuously intensifying the conduct of information gathering, monitoring and
coordination for the immediate solution of the case.
Since the disappearance of Tagistis * was practically admitted and taking note of favorable actions
so far taken on the disappearance, the CA directed Gen. Goltiao as the officer in command of the area of disappearance
to form TASK FORCE TAGITIS. 18
Task Force Tagitis
On January 11, 2008, Gen. Goltiao designated PS Supt. Ahiron Ajirim (PS Supt. Ajirim) to
head TASK FORCE TAGITIS. 19 The CA subsequently set three hearings to monitor whether TASK FORCE
TAGITIS was exerting "extraordinary efforts" in handling the disappearance of Tagitis. 20 As planned, (1)
the first hearing would be to mobilize the CIDG, Zamboanga City; (2) the second hearing would be to
mobilize intelligence with Abu Sayyaf and ARMM; and (3) the third hearing would be to mobilize the Chief
of Police of Jolo, Sulu and the Chief of Police of Zamboanga City and other police operatives. 21
In the hearing on January 17, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted to the CA an
intelligence report from PSL Usman S. Pingay, the Chief of Police of the Jolo Police Station, stating a
possible motive for Tagitis' disappearance. 22 The intelligence report was apparently based on the sworn
affidavit dated January 4, 2008 of Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli (Prof. Matli), Professor of Islamic
Studies at the University of the Philippines and an Honorary Student Counselor of the IDB Scholarship
Program in the Philippines, who told the Provincial Governor of Sulu that: 23
[Based] on reliable information from the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila, Tagitis has reportedly taken and
carried away ...more or less Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) deposited and entrusted to
his ...[personal] bank accounts by the Central Office of IDB, Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, which [was] intended for the ...IDB Scholarship Fund. HDTISa
In the same hearing, PS Supt. Ajirim testified that since the CIDG was alleged to be
responsible, he personally went to the CIDG office in Zamboanga City to conduct an ocular
inspection/investigation, particularly of their detention cells. 24 PS Supt. Ajirim stated that the CIDG, while
helping TASK FORCE TAGITIS investigate the disappearance of Tagitis, persistently denied any knowledge
or complicity in any abduction. 25 He further testified that prior to the hearing, he had already mobilized
and given specific instructions to their supporting units to perform their respective tasks; that they even
talked to, but failed to get any lead from the respondent in Jolo. 26 In his submitted investigation report
dated January 16, 2008, PS Supt. Ajirim concluded: 27
9. Gleaned from the undersigned inspection and observation at the Headquarters 9 RCIDU and the documents at
hand, it is my own initial conclusion that the 9RCIDU and other PNP units in the area had
no participation neither [sic] something to do with [sic] mysterious disappearance of Engr.
Morced Tagitis last October 30, 2007. Since doubt has been raised regarding the
emolument on the Islamic Development Bank Scholar program of IDB that was reportedly
deposited in the personal account of Engr. Tagitis by the IDB central office in Jeddah,
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Secondly, it could might [sic] be done by resentment or sour
grape among students who are applying for the scholar [sic] and were denied which was
allegedly conducted/screened by the subject being the coordinator of said program.
20. It is also premature to conclude but it does or it may and [sic] presumed that the motive behind the
disappearance of the subject might be due to the funds he maliciously spent for his
personal interest and wanted to elude responsibilities from the institution where he belong
as well as to the Islamic student scholars should the statement of Prof. Matli be true or
there might be a professional jealousy among them.
xxx xxx xxx
It is recommended that the Writ of Amparo filed against the respondents be dropped and dismissed considering on
[sic] the police and military actions in the area particularly the CIDG are exerting their
efforts and religiously doing their tasked [sic] in the conduct of its intelligence monitoring
and investigation for the early resolution of this instant case. But rest assured, our office, in
coordination with other law-enforcement agencies in the area, are continuously and
religiously conducting our investigation for the resolution of this case.
On February 4, 2008, the CA issued an ALARM WARNING that Task Force Tagitis did not
appear to be exerting extraordinary efforts in resolving Tagitis' disappearance on the following grounds: 28
(1) This Court FOUND that it was only as late as January 28, 2008, after the hearing, that GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO and
COL. AHIRON AJIRIM had requested for clear photographs when it should have been
standard operating procedure in kidnappings or disappearances that the first agenda was
for the police to secure clear pictures of the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, for
dissemination to all parts of the country and to neighboring countries. It had been three (3)
months since GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO admitted having been informed on November 5, 2007 of
the alleged abduction of Engr. Morced Tagitis by alleged bad elements of the CIDG. It had
been more than one (1) month since the Writ of Amparo had been issued on December 28,
2007. It had been three (3) weeks when battle formation was ordered through Task Force
Tagitis, on January 17, 2008. It was only on January 28, 2008 when the Task Force Tagitis
requested for clear and recent photographs of the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis,
despite the Task Force Tagitis' claim that they already had an "all points bulletin",since
November 5, 2007, on the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis. How could the police look
for someone who disappeared if no clear photograph had been disseminated?
(2) Furthermore, Task Force Tagitis' COL. AHIROM AJIRIM informed this Court that P/Supt KASIM was designated
as Col. Ahirom Ajirim's replacement in the latter's official designated post. Yet, P/Supt
KASIM's subpoena was returned to this Court unserved. Since this Court was made to
understand that it was P/Supt KASIM who was the petitioner's unofficial source of the
military intelligence information that Engr. Morced Tagitis was abducted by bad elements
of the CIDG (par. 15 of the Petition),the close contact between P/Supt KASIM and Col.
Ahirom Ajirim of TASK FORCE TAGITIS should have ensured the appearance of Col. KASIM
in response to this court's subpoena and COL. KASIM could have confirmed the military
intelligence information that bad elements of the CIDG had abducted Engr. Morced Tagitis.
Testimonies for the Respondent
On January 7, 2008, the respondent, Mary Jean B. Tagitis, testified on direct examination
that she went to Jolo and Zamboanga in her efforts to locate her husband. She said that a friend from
Zamboanga holding a high position in the military (whom she did not then identify) gave her information
that allowed her to "specify" her allegations, "particularly paragraph 15 of the petition". 29 This friend also
told her that her husband "[was] in good hands". 30 The respondent also testified that she sought the
assistance of her former boss in Davao City, Land Bank Bajada Branch Manager Rudy Salvador, who told
her that "PNP CIDG is holding [her husband], Engineer Morced Tagitis". 31 The respondent recounted that
she went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City where she met Col. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim (Col. Kasim/Sr. Supt
Kasim) who read to her and her friends (who were then with her) a "highly confidential report" that
contained the "alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis" and informed her that her husband was abducted
because "he is under custodial investigation" for being a liaison for "J.I. or Jema'ah Islamiah". 32
On January 17, 2008, the respondent on cross-examination testified that she is Tagitis'
second wife, and they have been married for thirteen years; Tagitis was divorced from his first wife. 33 She
last communicated with her husband on October 29, 2007 at around 7:31 p.m. through text messaging;
Tagitis was then on his way to Jolo, Sulu, from Zamboanga City. 34
9
 The respondent narrated that she learned of her husband's disappearance on October 30,
2007 when her stepdaughter, Zaynah Tagitis (Zaynah),informed her that she had not heard from her
father since the time they arranged to meet in Manila on October 31, 2007. 35 The respondent explained
that it took her a few days (or on November 5, 2007) to personally ask Kunnong to report her husband's
disappearance to the Jolo Police Station, since she had the impression that her husband could not
communicate with her because his cellular phone's battery did not have enough power, and that he would
call her when he had fully-charged his cellular phone's battery. 36 cADaIH
The respondent also identified the high-ranking military friend, who gave her the
information found in paragraph 15 of her petition, as Lt. Col. Pedro L. Ancanan, Jr. (Col. Ancanan). She met
him in Camp Karingal, Zamboanga through her boss. 37 She also testified that she was with three other
people, namely, Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin and her two friends from Mati City, Davao Oriental, when Col.
Kasim read to them the contents of the "highly confidential report" at Camp Katitipan, Davao City. The
respondent further narrated that the report indicated that her husband met with people belonging to a
terrorist group and that he was under custodial investigation. She then told Col. Kasim that her husband
was a diabetic taking maintenance medication, and asked that the Colonel relay to the persons holding him
the need to give him his medication. 38
On February 11, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted two narrative reports, 39 signed by
the respondent, detailing her efforts to locate her husband which led to her meetings with Col. Ancanan of
the Philippine Army and Col. Kasim of the PNP. In her narrative report concerning her meeting with Col.
Ancanan, the respondent recounted, viz.: 40
On November 11, 2007, we went to Zamboanga City with my friend Mrs. Marydel Talbin. Our flight from Davao
City is 9:00 o'clock in the morning; we arrived at Zamboanga Airport at around 10:00
o'clock. We [were] fetched by the two staffs of Col. Ancanan. We immediately proceed [sic]
to West Mindanao Command (WESTMINCOM).
On that same day, we had private conversation with Col. Ancanan. He interviewed me and got information about
the personal background of Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. After he gathered all information, he
revealed to us the contents of text messages they got from the cellular phone of the subject
Engr. Tagitis. One of the very important text messages of Engr. Tagitis sent to his daughter
Zaynah Tagitis was that she was not allowed to answer any telephone calls in his
condominium unit.
While we were there he did not tell us any information of the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis. After the said meeting
with Col. Ancanan, he treated us as guests to the city. His two staffs accompanied us to the
mall to purchase our plane ticket going back to Davao City on November 12, 2007.
When we arrived in Davao City on November 12, 2007 at 9:00 in the morning, Col. Ancanan and I were discussing
some points through phone calls. He assured me that my husband is alive and he's last
looked [sic] in Talipapao, Jolo, Sulu. Yet I did not believe his given statements of the
whereabouts of my husband, because I contacted some of my friends who have access to
the groups of MILF, MNLF and ASG. I called up Col. Ancanan several times begging to tell me
the exact location of my husband and who held him but he refused.
While I was in Jolo, Sulu on November 30, 2007, I called him up again because the PNP, Jolo did not give me any
information of the whereabouts of my husband. Col. Ancanan told me that "Sana ngayon
alam mo na kung saan ang kinalalagyan ng asawa mo". When I was in Zamboanga, I was
thinking of dropping by the office of Col. Ancanan, but I was hesitant to pay him a visit for
the reason that the Chief of Police of Jolo told me not to contact any AFP officials and he
promised me that he can solve the case of my husband (Engr. Tagitis) within nine days.
I appreciate the effort of Col. Ancanan on trying to solve the case of my husband Engr. Morced Tagitis, yet failed to
do so.
The respondent also narrated her encounter with Col. Kasim, as follows: 41
On November 7, 2007, I went to Land Bank of the Philippines, Bajada Branch, Davao City to meet Mr. Rudy
Salvador. I told him that my husband, Engineer Morced Tagitis was presumed to be
abducted in Jolo, Sulu on October 30, 2007. I asked him a favor to contact his connections in
the military in Jolo, Sulu where the abduction of Engr. Tagitis took place. Mr. Salvador
immediately called up Camp Katitipan located in Davao City looking for high-ranking
official who can help me gather reliable information behind the abduction of subject
Engineer Tagitis.
On that same day, Mr. Salvador and my friend, Anna Mendoza, Executive Secretary, accompanied me to Camp
Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim. Mr. Salvador introduced me to Col. Kasim and we had a short
conversation. And he assured me that he'll do the best he can to help me find my husband.
After a few weeks, Mr. Salvador called me up informing me up informing me that I am to go to Camp Katitipan to
meet Col. Kasim for he has an urgent, confidential information to reveal.
On November 24, 2007, we went back to Camp Katitipan with my three friends. That was the time that Col. Kasim
read to us the confidential report that Engr. Tagitis was allegedly connected [with] different
terrorist [groups],one of which he mentioned in the report was OMAR PATIK and a certain
SANTOS a Balik Islam.
It is also said that Engr. Tagitis is carrying boxes of medicines for the injured terrorists as a supplier. These are the
two information that I can still remember. It was written in a long bond paper with PNP
Letterhead. It was not shown to us, yet Col. Kasim was the one who read it for us.
He asked a favor to me that "Please don't quote my Name! Because this is a raw report".He assured me that my
husband is alive and he is in the custody of the military for custodial investigation. I told
him to please take care of my husband because he has aliments * and he recently took
insulin for he is a diabetic patient.
In my petition for writ of amparo, I emphasized the information that I got from Kasim.
On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin (Mrs. Talbin)
to corroborate her testimony regarding her efforts to locate her husband, in relation particularly with the
information she received from Col. Kasim. Mrs. Talbin testified that she was with the respondent when she
went to Zamboanga to see Col. Ancanan, and to Davao City at Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim. 42
In Zamboanga, Mrs. Talbin recounted that they met with Col. Ancanan, who told them that
there was a report and that he showed them a series of text messages from Tagitis' cellular phone, which
showed that Tagitis and his daughter would meet in Manila on October 30, 2007. 43
She further narrated that sometime on November 24, 2007, she went with the respondent
together with two other companions, namely, Salvacion Serrano and Mini Leong, to Camp Katitipan to talk
to Col. Kasim. 44 The respondent asked Col. Kasim if he knew the exact location of Engr. Tagitis. Col. Kasim
told them that Tagitis was in good hands, although he was not certain whether he was with the PNP or
with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).She further recounted that based on the report Col. Kasim
read in their presence, Tagitis was under custodial investigation because he was being charged with
terrorism; Tagitis in fact had been under surveillance since January 2007 up to the time he was abducted
when he was seen talking to Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with
terrorism. Col. Kasim also told them that he could not give a copy of the report because it was a "raw
report". 45 She also related that the Col. Kasim did not tell them exactly where Tagitis was being kept,
although he mentioned Talipapao, Sulu. 46
On cross-examination, Mrs. Talbin clarified that the "raw report" read to them by Col.
Kasim indicated that Tagitis was last seen in Talipapao, Sulu. 47
Testimonies for the Petitioner
On January 28, 2008, on cross-examination by the Assistant Solicitor General, Prof. Matli
submitted a new affidavit dated January 26, 2008 retracting the statements he made in his affidavit dated
January 4, 2008. Prof. Matli testified that he relunctantly signed the January 4, 2008 affidavit which was
prepared by PS Supt. Pingay of the Jolo Police Station; he didn't want Pingay "to be disappointed or to be
hold as not cooperating with the investigation" of Tagitis' disappearance. 48 Prof. Matli confirmed that he
knew Tagitis personally, as both of them were Honorary Councilors in the IDB Scholarship program since
the 1980s. 49 He recounted that after reporting Tagitis' disappearance to the Jolo Police Station (where he
also executed the January 4, 2008 affidavit), a certain Nuraya Lackian who was working in the Office
Muslim Affairs in Manila called Cecille Chan, Tagitis' secretary, to inquire about Tagitis' whereabouts. Chan
told him personally over the phone that "Prof.,lalabas din yan." 50 Prof. Matli also emphasized that despite
what his January 4, 2008 affidavit indicated, 51 he never told PS Supt. Pingay, or made any accusation, that
Tagitis took away money entrusted to him. 52 Prof. Matli confirmed, however, that that he had received an
e-mail report 53 from Nuraya Lackian of the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila that the IDB was seeking
assistance of the office in locating the funds of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis' personal account. 54
On cross-examination by the respondent's counsel, Prof. Matli testified that his January 4,
2008 affidavit was already prepared when PS Supt. Pingay asked him to sign it. 55 Prof. Matli clarified that
although he read the affidavit before signing it, he "was not so much aware of . . . [its] contents". 56
On February 11, 2008, the petitioners presented Col. Kasim to rebut material portions of
the respondent's testimony, particularly the allegation that he had stated that Tagitis was in the custody of
either the military or the PNP. 57 Col. Kasim categorically denied the statements made by the respondent in
her narrative report, specifically: (1) that Tagitis was seen carrying boxes of medicines as supplier for the
injured terrorists; (2) that Tagitis was under the custody of the military, since he merely said to the
respondent that "your husband is in good hands" and is "probably taken cared of by his armed
abductors"; and (3) that Tagitis was under custodial investigation by the military, the PNP or the CIDG
Zamboanga City. 58 Col. Kasim emphasized that the "informal letter" he received from his informant in Sulu
did not indicate that Tagitis was in the custody of the CIDG. 59 He also stressed that the information he
provided to the respondent was merely a "raw report" sourced from "barangay intelligence" that still
needed confirmation and "follow-up" as to its veracity. 60
On cross-examination, Col. Kasim testified that the information he gave the respondent
was given to him by his informant, who was a "civilian asset", through a letter which he considered as
"unofficial". 61 Col. Kasim stressed that the letter was only meant for his "consumption" and not for reading
by others. 62 He testified further that he destroyed the letter right after he read it to the respondent and
her companions because it was not important to him and also because the information it contained had
no importance in relation with the abduction of Tagitis. 63 He explained that he did not keep the letter
because it did not contain any information regarding the whereabouts of Tagitis and the person(s)
responsible for his abduction. 64 IaTSED
In the same hearing on February 11, 2008, the petitioners also presented Police Senior
Superintendent Jose Volpane Pante (Col. Pante), Chief of the CIDG-9, to disprove the respondent's
allegation that Tagitis was in the custody of CIDG-Zamboanga City. 65 Col. Pante clarified that the CIDG was
the "investigative arm" of the PNP, and that the CIDG "investigates and prosecutes all cases involving
violations in the Revised Penal Code particularly those considered as heinous crimes". 66 Col. Pante further
testified that the allegation that 9 RCIDU personnel were involved in the disappearance of Tagitis was
10
 baseless, since they did not conduct any operation in Jolo, Sulu before or after Tagitis' reported
disappearance. 67 Col. Pante added that the four (4) personnel assigned to the Sulu CIDT had no capability
to conduct any "operation", since they were only assigned to investigate matters and to monitor the
terrorism situation. 68 He denied that his office conducted any surveillance on Tagitis prior to the latter's
disappearance. 69 Col. Pante further testified that his investigation of Tagitis' disappearance was
unsuccessful; the investigation was "still facing a blank wall" on the whereabouts of Tagitis. 70
THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision 71 confirming that the disappearance of
Tagitis was an "enforced disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. 72 The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed the
investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person case qualified as
an enforced disappearance. The conclusion that the CIDG was involved was based on the respondent's
testimony, corroborated by her companion, Mrs. Talbin. The CA noted that the information that the CIDG,
as the police intelligence arm, was involved in Tagitis' abduction came from no less than the military an
independent agency of government. The CA thus greatly relied on the "raw report" from Col. Kasim's asset,
pointing to the CIDG's involvement in Tagitis' abduction. The CA held that "raw reports" from an "asset"
carried "great weight" in the intelligence world. It also labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasim's subsequent and
belated retraction of his statement that the military, the police, or the CIDG was involved in the abduction
of Tagitis.
The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation"
police theories painting the disappearance as "intentional" on the part of Tagitis. He had no previous
brushes with the law or any record of overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding money entrusted to
him; no student of the IDB scholarship program ever came forward to complain that he or she did not get
his or her stipend. The CA also found no basis for the police theory that Tagitis was "trying to escape from
the clutches of his second wife",on the basis of the respondent's testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who
could have many wives under the Muslim faith, and that there was "no issue" at all when the latter
divorced his first wife in order to marry the second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom
by the Abu Sayyaf or by the ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis' disappearance, since the
respondent, the police and the military noted that there was no acknowledgement of Tagitis' abduction or
demand for payment of ransom the usual modus operandi of these terrorist groups.
Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis
and his family, and directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force
Tagitis heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to
exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the
obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the
petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael,
based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA
denied the motion in its Resolution of April 9, 2008. 73
THE PETITION
In this Rule 45 appeal questioning the CA's March 7, 2008 decision, the petitioners mainly
dispute the sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparo petition filed before the CA; the sufficiency of
the legal remedies the respondent took before petitioning for the writ; the finding that the rights to life,
liberty and security of Tagitis had been violated; the sufficiency of evidence supporting the conclusion that
Tagitis was abducted; the conclusion that the CIDG Zamboanga was responsible for the abduction; and,
generally, the ruling that the respondent discharged the burden of proving the allegations of the petition
by substantial evidence. 74
THE COURT'S RULING
We do not find the petition meritorious.
Sufficiency in Form and Substance
In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the respondent's Amparo petition,
the petitioners contend that the petition violated Section 5(c),(d),and (e) of the Amparo Rule. Specifically,
the petitioners allege that the respondent failed to:
1) allege any act or omission the petitioners committed in violation of Tagitis' rights to life, liberty
and security;
2) allege in a complete manner how Tagitis was abducted, the persons responsible for his
disappearance, and the respondent's source of information;
3) allege that the abduction was committed at the petitioners' instructions or with their consent;
4) implead the members of CIDG regional office in Zamboanga alleged to have custody over her
husband;
5) attach the affidavits of witnesses to support her accusations;
6) allege any action or inaction attributable to the petitioners in the performance of their duties in
the investigation of Tagitis' disappearance; and
7) specify what legally available efforts she took to determine the fate or whereabouts of her
husband. DAaIEc
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among
others (in terms of the portions the petitioners cite): 75
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in
supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the
identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5 (c) to be complete in every
detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim's rights. As in any other initiatory pleading,
the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the
evidentiary details. 76 In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature
and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able
to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or
arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or
covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of
specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to
make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty
and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo
situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available
to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the
victim's rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action. The petition should
likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the
required elements namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or
threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security are present.
In the present case, the petition amply recites in its paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances
under which Tagitis suddenly dropped out of sight after engaging in normal activities, and thereafter was
nowhere to be found despite efforts to locate him. The petition alleged, too, under its paragraph 7, in
relation to paragraphs 15 and 16, that according to reliable information, police operatives were the
perpetrators of the abduction. It also clearly alleged how Tagitis' rights to life, liberty and security were
violated when he was "forcibly taken and boarded on a motor vehicle by a couple of burly men believed to
be police intelligence operatives", and then taken "into custody by the respondents' police intelligence
operatives since October 30, 2007, specifically by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, . . . held against his will
in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect [him] with different terrorist groups." 77
These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleader's
knowledge about Tagitis' disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in this disappearance, the
failure of the State to release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well as
the actual violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any failure in its
statement of a cause of action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting
affidavit, as required by Section 5 (c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings
for the writ and to facilitate the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement
for supporting affidavits, with the annotation that these can be used as the affiant's direct testimony. 78
This requirement, however, should not be read as an absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of
the petition if not strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially complied with
the requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need
for the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to
attach the required affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin)
personally testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and February 18, 2008 to swear to and
flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.
Section 5 (d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an alleged
disappearance must have been made, specifying the manner and results of the investigation. Effectively,
this requirement seeks to establish at the earliest opportunity the level of diligence the public authorities
undertook in relation with the reported disappearance. 79
We reject the petitioners' argument that the respondent's petition did not comply with the
Section 5 (d) requirements of the Amparo Rule, as the petition specifies in its paragraph 11 that Kunnong
and his companions immediately reported Tagitis' disappearance to the police authorities in Jolo, Sulu as
soon as they were relatively certain that he indeed had disappeared. The police, however, gave them the
"ready answer" that Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group or other anti-government
groups. The respondent also alleged in paragraphs 17 and 18 of her petition that she filed a "complaint"
with the PNP Police Station in Cotobato * and in Jolo, but she was told of "an intriguing tale" by the police that her
husband was having "a good time with another woman".The disappearance was alleged to have been reported, too, to no
11
 less than the Governor of the ARMM, followed by the respondent's personal inquiries that yielded the factual bases for her
petition. 80
These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that reports have been made to the
police authorities, and that investigations should have followed. That the petition did not state the manner
and results of the investigation that the Amparo Rule requires, but rather generally stated the inaction of
the police, their failure to perform their duty to investigate, or at the very least, their reported failed
efforts, should not be a reflection on the completeness of the petition. To require the respondent to
elaborately specify the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority, as
well the manner and conduct of the investigation is an overly strict interpretation of Section 5 (d),given
the respondent's frustrations in securing an investigation with meaningful results. Under these
circumstances, we are more than satisfied that the allegations of the petition on the investigations
undertaken are sufficiently complete for purposes of bringing the petition forward. DaIACS
Section 5 (e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition that otherwise is not
supported by sufficient allegations to constitute a proper cause of action as a means to "fish" for
evidence. 81 The petitioners contend that the respondent's petition did not specify what "legally available
efforts were taken by the respondent", and that there was an "undue haste" in the filing of the petition
when, instead of cooperating with authorities, the respondent immediately invoked the Court's
intervention.
We do not see the respondent's petition as the petitioners view it.
Section 5 (e) merely requires that the Amparo petitioner (the respondent in the present
case) allege "the actions and recourses taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party
and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission".The following allegations of the
respondent's petition duly outlined the actions she had taken and the frustrations she encountered, thus
compelling her to file her petition.
xxx xxx xxx
7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch but while
out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives,
forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the
knowledge of his student, Arsimin Kunnong;
xxx xxx xxx
10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and reported
the matter to the local police agency;
11. Arsimin Kunnong, including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities in
Jolo, he was immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could [have been]
abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group and other groups known to be fighting against the
government;
12. Being scared with these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported the matter to the
[respondent](wife of Engr. Tagitis) by phone and other responsible officers and
coordinators of the IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines who alerted the office of
the Governor of ARMM who was then preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia;
13. [The respondent],on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos
branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur, who likewise sought help from some of their friends in
the military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;
xxx xxx xxx
15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent],subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police
intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against
his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the
different terrorist groups;
xxx xxx xxx
17. [The respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station at the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, as
suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but [the respondent's]
request and pleadings failed to produce any positive results
xxx xxx xxx
20. Lately, [respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police Headquarters again
in Cotobato * City and also to the different Police Headquarters including the police
headquarters in Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City,
and all these places have been visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which
entailed expenses for her trips to these places thereby resorting her to borrowings and
beggings [sic] for financial help from friends and relatives only to try complying to the
different suggestions of these police officers, despite of which, her efforts produced no
positive results up to the present time;
xxx xxx xxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the
circumstances, [respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect
and get the release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of [the
petitioners],their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the
subject's human and constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
Based on these considerations, we rule that the respondent's petition for the Writ of
Amparo is sufficient in form and substance and that the Court of Appeals had every reason to proceed with
its consideration of the case.
The Desaparecidos
The present case is one of first impression in the use and application of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo in an enforced disappearance situation. For a deeper appreciation of the application of this
Rule to an enforced disappearance situation, a brief look at the historical context of the writ and enforced
disappearances would be very helpful.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first attracted
notice in Adolf Hitler's Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941. 82 The Third
Reich's Night and Fog Program, a State policy, was directed at persons in occupied territories
"endangering German security"; they were transported secretly to Germany where they disappeared
without a trace. In order to maximize the desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited government
officials from providing information about the fate of these targeted persons. 83
In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearances resurfaced, shocking and
outraging the world when individuals, numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were reported to have
"disappeared" during the military regime in Argentina. Enforced disappearances spread in Latin America,
and the issue became an international concern when the world noted its widespread and systematic use
by State security forces in that continent under Operation Condor 84 and during the Dirty War 85 in the
1970s and 1980s. The escalation of the practice saw political activists secretly arrested, tortured, and
killed as part of governments' counter-insurgency campaigns. As this form of political brutality became
routine elsewhere in the continent, the Latin American media standardized the term "disappearance" to
describe the phenomenon. The victims of enforced disappearances were called the "desaparecidos", 86
which literally means the "disappeared ones". 87 In general, there are three different kinds of
"disappearance" cases:
1) those of people arrested without witnesses or without positive identification of the arresting agents and are
never found again;
2) those of prisoners who are usually arrested without an appropriate warrant and held in complete isolation for
weeks or months while their families are unable to discover their
whereabouts and the military authorities deny having them in custody
until they eventually reappear in one detention center or another; and
3) those of victims of "salvaging" who have disappeared until their lifeless bodies are later discovered. 88
In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two categories, 89
and 855 cases were recorded during the period of martial law from 1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595
remained missing, 132 surfaced alive and 127 were found dead. During former President Corazon C.
Aquino's term, 820 people were reported to have disappeared and of these, 612 cases were documented.
Of this number, 407 remain missing, 108 surfaced alive and 97 were found dead. The number of enforced
disappearances dropped during former President Fidel V. Ramos' term when only 87 cases were reported,
while the three-year term of former President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported cases. KARAPATAN, a
local non-governmental organization, reports that as of March 31, 2008, the records show that there were
a total of 193 victims of enforced disappearance under incumbent President Gloria M. Arroyo's
administration. The Commission on Human Rights' records show a total of 636 verified cases of enforced
disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of this number, 406 remained missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were
found dead, and 76 still have undetermined status. 90 Currently, the United Nations Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance 91 reports 619 outstanding cases of enforced or involuntary
disappearances covering the period December 1, 2007 to November 30, 2008. 92
Enforced DisappearancesUnder Philippine Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof". 93 We note that although the writ specifically covers
"enforced disappearances", this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of
the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo
Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced disappearance: 94
ECISAD
JUSTICE MARTINEZ:
I believe that first and foremost we should come up or formulate a specific definition [for] extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances. From that definition, then we can proceed to
formulate the rules, definite rules concerning the same.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO:
...As things stand, there is no law penalizing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances ...so initially also we have to
[come up with] the nature of these extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances [to be covered by the Rule] because
our concept of killings and disappearances will define the jurisdiction of the courts. So we'll have to agree among ourselves
about the nature of killings and disappearances for instance, in other jurisdictions, the rules only cover state actors. That is an
element incorporated in their concept of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In other jurisdictions, the concept
includes acts and omissions not only of state actors but also of non state actors. Well, more specifically in the case of the Philippines
for instance, should these rules include the killings, the disappearances which may be authored by let us say, the NPAs or the leftist
organizations and others. So, again we need to define the nature of the extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances that will be
covered by these rules. [Emphasis supplied] 95
In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House of
12
 Representatives 96 and in the Senate 97 on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and resolved
to do away with a clear textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee instead focused on the
nature and scope of the concerns within its power to address and provided the appropriate remedy
therefor, mindful that an elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing legislative efforts. 98
As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this
jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out
these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and
special laws. 99 The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination
of what acts are criminal and what the corresponding penalty these criminal acts should carry are matters
of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact under the country's constitutional
scheme and power structure.
Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings
and enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own
constitutional mandate to promulgate "rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts", 100 since extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, by their nature and purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the
constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and security. Although the Court's power is strictly
procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that
the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural
standards and thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of
constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference even if only
procedurally in a situation when the very same investigating public authorities may have had a hand in
the threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.
Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again that we do not rule
on any issue of criminal culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. This is an issue
that requires criminal action before our criminal courts based on our existing penal laws. Our intervention
is in determining whether an enforced disappearance has taken place and who is responsible or
accountable for this disappearance, and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address it. The
burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo,is
twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain
of indirect contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the individual
situations require. The second is to address the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved
and his or her liberty and security restored. In these senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ
are continuing efforts that are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced
disappearance is fully addressed by the complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the
victim, by the production of the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security,
and, in the proper case, by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties.
Enforced DisappearanceUnder International Law
From the International Law perspective, involuntary or enforced disappearance is
considered a flagrant violation of human rights. 101 It does not only violate the right to life, liberty and
security of the desaparecido; it affects their families as well through the denial of their right to information
regarding the circumstances of the disappeared family member. Thus, enforced disappearances have been
said to be "a double form of torture", with "doubly paralyzing impact for the victims", as they "are kept
ignorant of their own fates, while family members are deprived of knowing the whereabouts of their
detained loved ones" and suffer as well the serious economic hardship and poverty that in most cases
follow the disappearance of the household breadwinner. 102
The UN General Assembly first considered the issue of "Disappeared Persons" in
December 1978 under Resolution 33/173. The Resolution expressed the General Assembly's deep concern
arising from "reports from various parts of the world relating to enforced or involuntary disappearances",
and requested the "UN Commission on Human Rights to consider the issue of enforced disappearances
with a view to making appropriate recommendations". 103
In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of enforced disappearance
had become a global phenomenon, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Declaration). 104 This Declaration, for the first time,
provided in its third preambular clause a working description of enforced disappearance, as follows: TDAHCS
Deeply concerned that in many countries, often in a persistent manner, enforced disappearances occur, in the sense that persons
are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches
or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or
indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the
persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons outside the
protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General Assembly adopted the
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Convention). 105
The Convention was opened for signature in Paris, France on February 6, 2007. 106 Article 2 of the
Convention defined enforced disappearance as follows:
For the purposes of this Convention, "enforced disappearance" is considered to be the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or
groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the
fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the
protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there is a
right not to be subject to enforced disappearance 107 and that this right is non-derogable. 108 It provides
that no one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance under any circumstances, be it a state of war,
internal political instability, or any other public emergency. It obliges State Parties to codify enforced
disappearance as an offense punishable with appropriate penalties under their criminal law. 109 It also
recognizes the right of relatives of the disappeared persons and of the society as a whole to know the truth
on the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared and on the progress and results of the investigation. 110
Lastly, it classifies enforced disappearance as a continuing offense, such that statutes of limitations shall
not apply until the fate and whereabouts of the victim are established. 111
Binding Effect of UNAction on the Philippines
To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that the country
is not yet committed to enact any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a crime. The absence of a
specific penal law, however, is not a stumbling block for action from this Court, as heretofore mentioned;
underlying every enforced disappearance is a violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and
security that the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to protect through its rule-making
powers.
Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the Court is guided, in
acting on Amparo cases, by the reality that the Philippines is a member of the UN, bound by its Charter and
by the various conventions we signed and ratified, particularly the conventions touching on humans
rights. Under the UN Charter, the Philippines pledged to "promote universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or
religion". 112 Although no universal agreement has been reached on the precise extent of the "human rights
and fundamental freedoms" guaranteed to all by the Charter, 113 it was the UN itself that issued the
Declaration on enforced disappearance, and this Declaration states: 114
Any act of enforced disappearance is an offence to dignity. It is condemned as a denial of the purposes of the
Charter of the United Nations and as a grave and flagrant violation of human rights
and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and reaffirmed and developed in international instruments in this field. [Emphasis
supplied]
As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter made in a UN Declaration, the ban
on enforced disappearance cannot but have its effects on the country, given our own adherence to
"generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land". 115
In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, 116 we held that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism
such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere
constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic
law. [Emphasis supplied]
We characterized "generally accepted principles of international law" as norms of general or customary
international law that are binding on all states. We held further: 117
[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form
part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical
formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding
result from the combination [of] two elements: the established, widespread, and
consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion
juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity).Implicit in the latter element is a
belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of
law requiring it. [Emphasis in the original]
The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today is Article 38 (1)
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which provides that the Court shall apply "international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law". 118 The material sources of custom include State
practice, State legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other
international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and
resolutions relating to legal questions in the UN General Assembly. 119 Sometimes referred to as "evidence"
of international law, 120 these sources identify the substance and content of the obligations of States and
are indicative of the "State practice" and "opinio juris" requirements of international law. 121 We note the
following in these respects: EICSTa
First, barely two years from the adoption of the Declaration, the Organization of American States (OAS) General
13
Assembly adopted the Inter-American Convention on Enforced Disappearance of Persons in June 1994. 122 State
parties undertook under this Convention "not to practice, permit, or tolerate the forced disappearance of persons,
even in states of emergency or suspension of individual guarantees". 123 One of the key provisions includes the
States' obligation to enact the crime of forced disappearance in their respective national criminal laws and to
establish jurisdiction over such cases when the crime was committed within their jurisdiction, when the victim is a
national of that State, and "when the alleged criminal is within its territory and it does not proceed to extradite
him", which can be interpreted as establishing universal jurisdiction among the parties to the Inter-American
Convention. 124 At present, Colombia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela have enacted separate laws in
accordance with the Inter-American Convention and have defined activities involving enforced disappearance to
be criminal. 125
Second, in Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights has no explicit provision dealing with the
protection against enforced disappearance. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR),however, has applied the
Convention in a way that provides ample protection for the underlying rights affected by enforced disappearance
through the Convention's Article 2 on the right to life; Article 3 on the prohibition of torture; Article 5 on the right
to liberty and security; Article 6, paragraph 1 on the right to a fair trial; and Article 13 on the right to an effective
remedy. A leading example demonstrating the protection afforded by the European Convention is Kurt v. Turkey,
126 where the ECHR found a violation of the right to liberty and security of the disappeared person when the
applicant's son disappeared after being taken into custody by Turkish forces in the Kurdish village of Agilli in
November 1993. It further found the applicant (the disappeared person's mother) to be a victim of a violation of
Article 3, as a result of the silence of the authorities and the inadequate character of the investigations undertaken.
The ECHR also saw the lack of any meaningful investigation by the State as a violation of Article 13. 127
Third, in the United States, the status of the prohibition on enforced disappearance as part of customary
international law is recognized in the most recent edition of Restatement of the Law: The Third, 128 which provides
that "[a] State violates international law if, as a matter of State policy, it practices, encourages, or condones . . . (3)
the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals." 129 We significantly note that in a related matter that
finds close identification with enforced disappearance the matter of torture the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit Court held in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala 130 that the prohibition on torture had attained
the status of customary international law. The court further elaborated on the significance of UN declarations, as
follows:
These U.N. declarations are significant because they specify with great precision the obligations of member nations
under the Charter. Since their adoption, "(m)embers can no longer contend that they do not
know what human rights they promised in the Charter to promote".Moreover, a U.N.
Declaration is, according to one authoritative definition, "a formal and solemn instrument,
suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting importance are being
enunciated".Accordingly, it has been observed that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights "no longer fits into the dichotomy of 'binding treaty' against 'non-binding
pronouncement,' but is rather an authoritative statement of the international community."
Thus, a Declaration creates an expectation of adherence, and "insofar as the expectation is
gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by custom become recognized as
laying down rules binding upon the States." Indeed, several commentators have concluded
that the Universal Declaration has become, in toto, a part of binding, customary
international law. [Citations omitted]
Fourth, in interpreting Article 2 (right to an effective domestic remedy) of the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the Philippines is both a signatory and a State Party, the UN Human Rights
Committee, under the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, has stated that the act of enforced
disappearance violates Articles 6 (right to life), 7 (prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment) and 9 (right to liberty and security of the person) of the ICCPR, and the act may also amount to a
crime against humanity. 131
Fifth, Article 7, paragraph 1 of the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) also
covers enforced disappearances insofar as they are defined as crimes against humanity, 132 i.e.,crimes "committed
as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack". While
more than 100 countries have ratified the Rome Statute, 133 the Philippines is still merely a signatory and has not
yet ratified it. We note that Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute has been incorporated in the statutes of other
international and hybrid tribunals, including Sierra Leone Special Court, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in
Timor-Leste, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. 134 In addition, the implementing
legislation of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC has given rise to a number of national criminal provisions
also covering enforced disappearance. 135
While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on
enforced disappearance (or by the specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not formally declared
enforced disappearance as a specific crime, the above recital shows that enforced disappearance as a
State practice has been repudiated by the international community, so that the ban on it is now a
generally accepted principle of international law, which we should consider a part of the law of the
land, and which we should act upon to the extent already allowed under our laws and the
international conventions that bind us. aHTEIA
The following civil or political rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
ICCPR and the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR) may be infringed
in the course of a disappearance: 136
1) the right to recognition as a person before the law;
2) the right to liberty and security of the person;
3) the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
4) the right to life, when the disappeared person is killed;
5) the right to an identity;
6) the right to a fair trial and to judicial guarantees;
7) the right to an effective remedy, including reparation and compensation;
8) the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of a disappearance.
9) the right to protection and assistance to the family;
10) the right to an adequate standard of living;
11) the right to health; and
12) the right to education [Emphasis supplied]
Article 2 of the ICCPR, which binds the Philippines as a state party, provides:
Article 2
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective
remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in
an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent
judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority
provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial
remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. [Emphasis supplied]
In General Comment No. 31, the UN Human Rights Committee opined that the right to an
effective remedy under Article 2 of the ICCPR includes the obligation of the State to investigate ICCPR
violations promptly, thoroughly, and effectively, viz.: 137
15. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in addition to effective protection of Covenant rights, States Parties must
ensure that individuals also have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate
those rights ...The Committee attaches importance to States Parties' establishing
appropriate judicial and administrative mechanisms for addressing claims of rights
violations under domestic law ...Administrative mechanisms are particularly required
to give effect to the general obligation to investigate allegations of violations
promptly, thoroughly and effectively through independent and impartial bodies. A
failure by a State Party to investigate allegations of violations could in and of itself give rise
to a separate breach of the Covenant. Cessation of an ongoing violation is an essential
element of the right to an effective remedy. [Emphasis supplied]
The UN Human Rights Committee further stated in the same General Comment No. 31 that
failure to investigate as well as failure to bring to justice the perpetrators of ICCPR violations could in and
of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant, thus: 138 SEcITC
18. Where the investigations referred to in paragraph 15 reveal violations of certain Covenant rights, States
Parties must ensure that those responsible are brought to justice. As with failure to
investigate, failure to bring to justice perpetrators of such violations could in and of
itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. These obligations arise notably
in respect of those violations recognized as criminal under either domestic or
international law,such as torture and similar cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
(article 7),summary and arbitrary killing (article 6) and enforced disappearance
(articles 7 and 9 and, frequently, 6). Indeed, the problem of impunity for these violations,
a matter of sustained concern by the Committee, may well be an important contributing
element in the recurrence of the violations. When committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack on a civilian population, these violations of the Covenant are crimes
against humanity (see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article
7).[Emphasis supplied]
In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 139 this Court, in ruling that the right to security
of persons is a guarantee of the protection of one's right by the government, held that:
The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect
for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government
is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to
life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford
protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes
conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to
extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or
threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the
Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz.:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained
to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be
assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by
private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or
his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for
the truth by the government. [Emphasis supplied]
Manalo significantly cited Kurt v. Turkey, 140 where the ECHR interpreted the "right to security" not only as a
14
 prohibition on the State against arbitrary deprivation of liberty, but also as the imposition of a positive
duty to afford protection to the right to liberty. The Court notably quoted the following ECHR ruling:
[A]ny deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural
rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5,
namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness. ..Having assumed control over that
individual, it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this
reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures
to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective
investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and
has not been seen since. [Emphasis supplied]
These rulings effectively serve as the backdrop for the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which
the Court made effective on October 24, 2007. Although the Amparo Rule still has gaps waiting to be filled
through substantive law, as evidenced primarily by the lack of a concrete definition of "enforced
disappearance",the materials cited above, among others, provide ample guidance and standards on
how, through the medium of the Amparo Rule, the Court can provide remedies and protect the
constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that underlie every enforced disappearance.
Evidentiary Difficulties Posedby the Unique Nature of anEnforced Disappearance
Before going into the issue of whether the respondent has discharged the burden of
proving the allegations of the petition for the Writ of Amparo by the degree of proof required by the
Amparo Rule, we shall discuss briefly the unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced
disappearance cases; these difficulties form part of the setting that the implementation of the Amparo Rule
shall encounter.
These difficulties largely arise because the State itself the party whose involvement is
alleged investigates enforced disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that the
evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold.
First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators. 141 Experts note that
abductors are well organized, armed and usually members of the military or police forces, thus:
The victim is generally arrested by the security forces or by persons acting under some form of governmental
authority. In many countries the units that plan, implement and execute the program are
generally specialized, highly-secret bodies within the armed or security forces. They are
generally directed through a separate, clandestine chain of command, but they have the
necessary credentials to avoid or prevent any interference by the "legal" police forces.
These authorities take their victims to secret detention centers where they subject them to
interrogation and torture without fear of judicial or other controls. 142
In addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are, these witnesses are
usually afraid to speak out publicly or to testify on the disappearance out of fear for their own lives. 143 We
have had occasion to note this difficulty in Secretary of Defense v. Manalo 144 when we acknowledged that
"where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against
them comes as no surprise".
Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the
central piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance i.e.,the corpus delicti or the victim's body is usually
concealed to effectively thwart the start of any investigation or the progress of one that may have begun. 145 The
problem for the victim's family is the State's virtual monopoly of access to pertinent evidence. The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACHR) observed in the landmark case of Velasquez Rodriguez 146 that inherent to the
practice of enforced disappearance is the deliberate use of the State's power to destroy the pertinent evidence. The
IACHR described the concealment as a clear attempt by the State to commit the perfect crime. 147 ECDHIc
Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the enforced
disappearance ever occurred. 148 "Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the absence of
any proven disappearance makes it easier to escape the application of legal standards ensuring the victim's human
rights. 149 Experience shows that government officials typically respond to requests for information about
desaparecidos by saying that they are not aware of any disappearance, that the missing people may have fled the
country, or that their names have merely been invented. 150
These considerations are alive in our minds, as these are the difficulties we confront, in
one form or another, in our consideration of this case.
Evidence and Burden of Proof inEnforced Disappearances Cases
Sections 13, 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule define the nature of an Amparo proceeding and
the degree and burden of proof the parties to the case carry, as follows:
Section 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or
judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the
possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall establish their claims by
substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws,
rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by
applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed or evade responsibility or liability.
Section 18. Judgment. ...If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall
grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate;
otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. [Emphasis supplied]
These characteristics namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as
the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable
doubt in court proceedings) reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the
equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations.
The standard of diligence required the duty of public officials and employees to observe extraordinary
diligence point, too, to the extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights
and in the consequent handling and investigation of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearance
cases.
Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the
substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the
allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then
respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of
course, must show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of
the victim's constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating
authorities to appropriately respond.
The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations 151 provided the Court its
first opportunity to define the substantial evidence required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative
proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay:
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [citations omitted] The statute
provides that 'the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative
boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which
would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order. [citations omitted] But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in
administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence
having rational probative force. [Emphasis supplied]
In Secretary of Defense v. Manalo, 152 which was the Court's first petition for a Writ of
Amparo,we recognized that the full and exhaustive proceedings that the substantial evidence standard
regularly requires do not need to apply due to the summary nature of Amparo proceedings. We said:
The remedy [of the writ of amparo] provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the
petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable
doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.[Emphasis supplied]
Not to be forgotten in considering the evidentiary aspects of Amparo petitions are the
unique difficulties presented by the nature of enforced disappearances, heretofore discussed, which
difficulties this Court must frontally meet if the Amparo Rule is to be given a chance to achieve its
objectives. These evidentiary difficulties compel the Court to adopt standards appropriate and responsive
to the circumstances, without transgressing the due process requirements that underlie every proceeding.
TDAHCS
In the seminal case of Velasquez Rodriguez, 153 the IACHR faced with a lack of direct
evidence that the government of Honduras was involved in Velasquez Rodriguez' disappearance
adopted a relaxed and informal evidentiary standard, and established the rule that presumes
governmental responsibility for a disappearance if it can be proven that the government carries out a
general practice of enforced disappearances and the specific case can be linked to that practice. 154 The
IACHR took note of the realistic fact that enforced disappearances could be proven only through
circumstantial or indirect evidence or by logical inference; otherwise, it was impossible to prove that an
individual had been made to disappear. It held:
130. The practice of international and domestic courts shows that direct evidence, whether testimonial or
documentary, is not the only type of evidence that may be legitimately considered in
reaching a decision. Circumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions may be
considered, so long as they lead to conclusions consistent with the facts.
131. Circumstantial or presumptive evidence is especially important in allegations of disappearances,
because this type of repression is characterized by an attempt to suppress all
information about the kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the victim.
[Emphasis supplied]
In concluding that the disappearance of Manfredo Velsquez (Manfredo) was carried out
by agents who acted under cover of public authority, the IACHR relied on circumstantial evidence
including the hearsay testimony of Zenaida Velsquez, the victim's sister, who described Manfredo's
kidnapping on the basis of conversations she had with witnesses who saw Manfredo kidnapped by men in
civilian clothes in broad daylight. She also told the Court that a former Honduran military official had
15
 announced that Manfredo was kidnapped by a special military squadron acting under orders of the Chief
of the Armed Forces. 155 The IACHR likewise considered the hearsay testimony of a second witness who
asserted that he had been told by a Honduran military officer about the disappearance, and a third witness
who testified that he had spoken in prison to a man who identified himself as Manfredo. 156
Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is necessary under the unique circumstances that enforced
disappearance cases pose to the courts; to have an effective remedy, the standard of evidence must be responsive
to the evidentiary difficulties faced. On the one hand, we cannot be arbitrary in the admission and appreciation of
evidence, as arbitrariness entails violation of rights and cannot be used as an effective counter-measure; we only
compound the problem if a wrong is addressed by the commission of another wrong. On the other hand, we cannot
be very strict in our evidentiary rules and cannot consider evidence the way we do in the usual criminal and civil
cases; precisely, the proceedings before us are administrative in nature where, as a rule, technical rules of
evidence are not strictly observed. Thus, while we must follow the substantial evidence rule, we must observe
flexibility in considering the evidence we shall take into account.
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in
their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible
if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most
basic test of reason i.e.,to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency
with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it
satisfies this basic minimum test.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at
all novel in the Philippine legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a
Child Witness 157 is expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows the
admission of the hearsay testimony of a child describing any act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any
criminal or non-criminal proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-examination by
the adverse party. The admission of the statement is determined by the court in light of specified
subjective and objective considerations that provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the child witness. 158
These requisites for admission find their counterpart in the present case under the above-described
conditions for the exercise of flexibility in the consideration of evidence, including hearsay evidence, in
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.
Assessment of the Evidence
The threshold question for our resolution is: was there an enforced disappearance within
the meaning of this term under the UN Declaration we have cited?
The Convention defines enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or
any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which
place such a person outside the protection of the law." 159 Under this definition, the elements that
constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold: 160
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the disappeared person; and
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
We find no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct
evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key
with the hotel desk and was never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all
concerned the petitioner, Tagitis' colleagues and even the police authorities is that Tagistis
disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen again. The respondent injected the
causal element in her petition and testimony, as we shall discuss below. aHSAIT
We likewise find no direct evidence showing that operatives of PNP CIDG Zamboanga
abducted or arrested Tagitis. If at all, only the respondent's allegation that Tagistis was under CIDG
Zamboanga custody stands on record, but it is not supported by any other evidence, direct or
circumstantial.
In her direct testimony, the respondent pointed to two sources of information as her bases
for her allegation that Tagistis had been placed under government custody (in contrast with CIDG
Zamboanga custody).The first was an unnamed friend in Zamboanga (later identified as Col. Ancanan),who
occupied a high position in the military and who allegedly mentioned that Tagitis was in good hands.
Nothing came out of this claim, as both the respondent herself and her witness, Mrs. Talbin, failed to
establish that Col. Ancanan gave them any information that Tagitis was in government custody. Col.
Ancanan, for his part, admitted the meeting with the respondent but denied giving her any information
about the disappearance.
The more specific and productive source of information was Col. Kasim, whom the respondent, together with
her witness Mrs. Talbin, met in Camp Katitipan in Davao City. To quote the relevant portions of the respondent's
testimony:
Q: Were you able to speak to other military officials regarding the whereabouts of your husband particularly those
in charge of any records or investigation?
A: I went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City. Then one military officer, Col. Casim, told me that my husband is being
abducted [sic] because he is under custodial investigation because
he is allegedly "parang liason ng J.I.",sir.
Q: What is J.I.?
A: Jema'ah Islamiah, sir.
Q: Was there any information that was read to you during one of those visits of yours in that Camp?
A: Col. Casim did not furnish me a copy of his report because he said those reports are highly confidential,
sir.
Q: Was it read to you then even though you were not furnished a copy?
A: Yes, sir. In front of us, my friends.
Q: And what was the content of that highly confidential report?
A: Those alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis, sir. 161 [Emphasis supplied]
She confirmed this testimony in her cross-examination:
Q: You also mentioned that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And a certain Col. Kasim told you that your husband was abducted and under custodial investigation?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And you mentioned that he showed you a report?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Were you able to read the contents of that report?
A: He did not furnish me a copy of those [sic] report because those [sic] were highly confidential. That is a
military report, ma'am.
Q: But you were able to read the contents?
A: No. But he read it in front of us, my friends, ma'am.
Q: How many were you when you went to see Col. Kasim?
A: There were three of us, ma'am.
Q: Who were your companions?
A: Mrs. Talbin, tapos yung dalawang friends nya from Mati City, Davao Oriental, ma'am. 162
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you were told that your husband is in good hands, what was your reaction and what did you do? AcSEHT
A: May binasa kasi sya that my husband has a parang meeting with other people na parang mga terorista
na mga tao. Tapos at the end of the report is [sic] under custodial
investigation. So I told him "Colonel, my husband is sick. He is diabetic
at nagmemaintain yun ng gamot. Pakisabi lang sa naghohold sa asawa ko
na bigyan siya ng gamot, ma'am." 163
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You mentioned that you received information that Engineer Tagitis is being held by the CIDG in Zamboanga, did
you go to CIDG Zamboanga to verify that information?
A: I did not go to CIDG Zamboanga. I went to Camp Karingal instead. Enough na yun na effort ko because I know
that they would deny it, ma'am. 164
On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Talbin to corroborate her testimony that her husband was
abducted and held under custodial investigation by the PNP-CIDG Zamboanga City, viz.:
Q: You said that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City sometime November 24, 2007, who was with you when
you went there?
A: Mary Jean Tagitis, sir.
Q: Only the two of you?
A: No. We have some other companions. We were four at that time, sir.
Q: Who were they?
A: Salvacion Serrano, Mini Leong, Mrs. Tagitis and me, sir.
Q: Were you able to talk, see some other officials at Camp Katitipan during that time?
A: Col. Kasim (PS Supt. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim) only, sir.
Q: Were you able to talk to him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: The four of you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What information did you get from Col. Kasim during that time?
A: The first time we met with [him] I asked him if he knew of the exact location, if he can furnish us the location of
Engr. Tagitis. And he was reading this report. He told us that Engr.
Tagitis is in good hands. He is with the military, but he is not certain
whether he is with the AFP or PNP. He has this serious case. He was
charged of terrorism because he was under surveillance from
January 2007 up to the time that he was abducted. He told us that
he was under custodial investigation. As I've said earlier, he was
seen under surveillance from January. He was seen talking to Omar
Patik, a certain Santos of Bulacan who is also a Balik Islam and
charged with terrorism. He was seen carrying boxes of medicines.
Then we asked him how long will he be in custodial investigation. He
said until we can get some information. But he also told us that he
cannot give us that report because it was a raw report. It was not official,
sir.
Q: You said that he was reading a report, was that report in document form, in a piece of paper or was it in the
computer or what?
A: As far as I can see it, sir, it is written in white bond paper. I don't know if it was computerized but I'm certain
16
 that it was typewritten. I'm not sure if it used computer, fax or what, sir.
Q: When he was reading it to you, was he reading it line by line or he was reading in a summary form?
A: Sometimes he was glancing to the report and talking to us, sir. 165
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Were you informed as to the place where he was being kept during that time?
A: He did not tell us where he [Tagitis] was being kept. But he mentioned this Talipapao, Sulu, sir.
Q: After that incident, what did you do if any?
A: We just left and as I've mentioned, we just waited because that raw information that he was reading to us [sic]
after the custodial investigation, Engineer Tagitis will be released.
[Emphasis supplied] 166
Col. Kasim never denied that he met with the respondent and her friends, and that he
provided them information based on the input of an unnamed asset. He simply claimed in his testimony
that the "informal letter" he received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the
custody of the CIDG. He also stressed that the information he provided the respondent was merely a "raw
report" from "barangay intelligence" that still needed confirmation and "follow up" as to its veracity. 167
To be sure, the respondent's and Mrs. Talbin's testimonies were far from perfect, as the
petitioners pointed out. The respondent mistakenly characterized Col. Kasim as a "military officer" who
told her that "her husband is being abducted because he is under custodial investigation because he is
allegedly 'parang liason ng J.I.'" The petitioners also noted that "Mrs. Talbin's testimony imputing certain
statements to Sr. Supt. Kasim that Engr. Tagitis is with the military, but he is not certain whether it is the
PNP or AFP is not worthy of belief, since Sr. Supt. Kasim is a high ranking police officer who would
certainly know that the PNP is not part of the military." SCEHaD
Upon deeper consideration of these inconsistencies, however, what appears clear to us is
that the petitioners never really steadfastly disputed or presented evidence to refute the credibility of the
respondent and her witness, Mrs. Talbin. The inconsistencies the petitioners point out relate, more than
anything else, to details that should not affect the credibility of the respondent and Mrs. Talbin; the
inconsistencies are not on material points. 168 We note, for example, that these witnesses are lay people in
so far as military and police matters are concerned, and confusion between the police and the military is
not unusual. As a rule, minor inconsistencies such as these indicate truthfulness rather than prevarication
169 and only tend to strengthen their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses
dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but generate suspicion that the material circumstances they
testified to were integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated story. 170
Based on these considerations and the unique evidentiary situation in enforced disappearance cases, we
hold it duly established that Col. Kasim informed the respondent and her friends, based on the informant's
letter, that Tagitis, reputedly a liaison for the JI and who had been under surveillance since January 2007,
was "in good hands" and under custodial investigation for complicity with the JI after he was seen talking
to one Omar Patik and a certain "Santos" of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. The
respondent's and Mrs. Talbin's testimonies cannot simply be defeated by Col. Kasim's plain denial and his claim
that he had destroyed his informant's letter, the critical piece of evidence that supports or negates the parties'
conflicting claims. Col. Kasim's admitted destruction of this letter effectively, a suppression of this evidence
raises the presumption that the letter, if produced, would be proof of what the respondent claimed. 171 For brevity,
we shall call the evidence of what Col. Kasim reported to the respondent to be the "Kasim evidence".
Given this evidence, our next step is to decide whether we can accept this evidence, in lieu
of direct evidence, as proof that the disappearance of Tagitis was due to action with government
participation, knowledge or consent and that he was held for custodial investigation. We note in this
regard that Col. Kasim was never quoted to have said that the custodial investigation was by the CIDG
Zamboanga. The Kasim evidence only implies government intervention through the use of the term
"custodial investigation",and does not at all point to CIDG Zamboanga as Tagitis' custodian.
Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case of hearsay evidence i.e., evidence
whose probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs.
Talbin and Col. Kasim himself) but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand (the
informant). 172
To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible evidence of what it
substantively states is to acknowledge as the petitioners effectively suggest that in the absence of
any direct evidence, we should simply dismiss the petition. To our mind, an immediate dismissal for this
reason is no different from a statement that the Amparo Rule despite its terms is ineffective, as it
cannot allow for the special evidentiary difficulties that are unavoidably present in Amparo situations,
particularly in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated
with this intent or with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights. It was
promulgated to provide effective and timely remedies, using and profiting from local and international
experiences in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, as the situation may require.
Consequently, we have no choice but to meet the evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced
disappearances with the flexibility that these difficulties demand.
To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in
Velasquez, we should at least take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of
every piece of evidence even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of
evidence taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as
basic minimum admissibility requirement. In the present case, we should at least determine whether the
Kasim evidence before us is relevant and meaningful to the disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably
consistent with other evidence in the case.
The evidence about Tagitis' personal circumstances surrounded him with an air of
mystery. He was reputedly a consultant of the World Bank and a Senior Honorary Counselor for the IDB
who attended a seminar in Zamboanga and thereafter proceded to Jolo for an overnight stay, indicated by
his request to Kunnong for the purchase of a return ticket to Zamboanga the day after he arrived in Jolo.
Nothing in the records indicates the purpose of his overnight sojourn in Jolo. A colleague in the IDB, Prof.
Matli, early on informed the Jolo police that Tagitis may have taken funds given to him in trust for IDB
scholars. Prof. Matli later on stated that he never accused Tagitis of taking away money held in trust,
although he confirmed that the IDB was seeking assistance in locating funds of IDB scholars deposited in
Tagitis' personal account. Other than these pieces of evidence, no other information exists in the records
relating to the personal circumstances of Tagitis.
The actual disappearance of Tagitis is as murky as his personal circumstances. While the
Amparo petition recited that he was taken away by "burly men believed to be police intelligence
operatives",no evidence whatsoever was introduced to support this allegation. Thus, the available direct
evidence is that Tagitis was last seen at 12.30 p.m. of October 30, 2007 the day he arrived in Jolo and
was never seen again.
The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given the dearth of direct evidence on the
above aspects of the case, as it supplies the gaps that were never looked into and clarified by police
investigation. It is the evidence, too, that colors a simple missing person report into an enforced
disappearance case, as it injects the element of participation by agents of the State and thus brings into
question how the State reacted to the disappearance.
Denials on the part of the police authorities, and frustration on the part of the respondent,
characterize the attempts to locate Tagitis. Initially in Jolo, the police informed Kunnong that Tagitis could
have been taken by the Abu Sayyaf or other groups fighting the government. No evidence was ever offered
on whether there was active Jolo police investigation and how and why the Jolo police arrived at this
conclusion. The respondent's own inquiry in Jolo yielded the answer that he was not missing but was with
another woman somewhere. Again, no evidence exists that this explanation was arrived at based on an
investigation. As already related above, the inquiry with Col. Ancanan in Zamboanga yielded ambivalent
results not useful for evidentiary purposes. Thus, it was only the inquiry from Col. Kasim that yielded
positive results. Col. Kasim's story, however, confirmed only the fact of his custodial investigation (and,
impliedly, his arrest or abduction),without identifying his abductor/s or the party holding him in custody.
The more significant part of Col. Kasim's story is that the abduction came after Tagitis was seen talking
with Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. Mrs. Talbin
mentioned, too, that Tagitis was being held at Talipapao, Sulu. None of the police agencies participating in
the investigation ever pursued these leads. Notably, Task Force Tagitis to which this information was
relayed did not appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects of the case. DICSaH
More denials were manifested in the Returns on the writ to the CA made by the
petitioners. Then PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon merely reported the directives he sent to the ARMM
Regional Director and the Regional Chief of the CIDG on Tagitis, and these reports merely reiterated the
open-ended initial report of the disappearance. The CIDG directed a search in all of its divisions with
negative results. These, to the PNP Chief, constituted the exhaustion "of all possible efforts".PNP-CIDG
Chief General Edgardo M. Doromal, for his part, also reported negative results after searching "all divisions
and departments [of the CIDG] for a person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis ...and after a diligent and
thorough research, records show that no such person is being detained in the CIDG or any of its
department or divisions." PNP-PACER Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espina and PNP PRO ARMM Regional
Director PC Superintendent Joel R. Goltiao did no better in their affidavits-returns, as they essentially
reported the results of their directives to their units to search for Tagitis.
The extent to which the police authorities acted was fully tested when the CA constituted
Task Force Tagitis, with specific directives on what to do. The negative results reflected in the Returns on
the writ were again replicated during the three hearings the CA scheduled. Aside from the previously
mentioned "retraction" that Prof. Matli made to correct his accusation that Tagitis took money held in
trust for students, PS Supt. Ajirim reiterated in his testimony that the CIDG consistently denied any
knowledge or complicity in any abduction and said that there was no basis to conclude that the CIDG or
any police unit had anything to do with the disappearance of Tagitis; he likewise considered it premature
to conclude that Tagitis simply ran away with the money in his custody. As already noted above, the Task
Force notably did not pursue any investigation about the personal circumstances of Tagitis, his
background in relation to the IDB and the background and activities of this Bank itself, and the reported
sighting of Tagistis with terrorists and his alleged custody in Talipapao, Sulu. No attempt appears to have
ever been made to look into the alleged IDB funds that Tagitis held in trust, or to tap any of the "assets"
who are indispensable in investigations of this nature. These omissions and negative results were
17
 aggravated by the CA findings that it was only as late as January 28, 2008 or three months after the
disappearance that the police authorities requested for clear pictures of Tagitis. Col. Kasim could not
attend the trial because his subpoena was not served, despite the fact that he was designated as Ajirim's
replacement in the latter's last post. Thus, Col. Kasim was not then questioned. No investigation even an
internal one appeared to have been made to inquire into the identity of Col. Kasim's "asset" and what he
indeed wrote.
We glean from all these pieces of evidence and developments a consistency in the government's denial of
any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, disrupted only by the report made by Col. Kasim to the
respondent at Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however, eventually denied that he ever made the disclosure
that Tagitis was under custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism. Another distinctive trait that runs
through these developments is the government's dismissive approach to the disappearance, starting from
the initial response by the Jolo police to Kunnong's initial reports of the disappearance, to the responses made to
the respondent when she herself reported and inquired about her husband's disappearance, and even at Task
Force Tagitis itself.
As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the investigation was at best haphazard since
the authorities were looking for a man whose picture they initially did not even secure. The returns and
reports made to the CA fared no better, as the CIDG efforts themselves were confined to searching for
custodial records of Tagitis in their various departments and divisions. To point out the obvious, if the
abduction of Tagitis was a "black" operation because it was unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no
record of custody would ever appear in the CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not be detained in the usual
police or CIDG detention places. In sum, none of the reports on record contains any meaningful
results or details on the depth and extent of the investigation made. To be sure, reports of top police
officials indicating the personnel and units they directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive
and meaningful investigation, or equal detailed investigative reports of the activities undertaken to search
for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police authorities from the very beginning failed to come up to the
extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires.
CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY
Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasim's disclosure, made in an
unguarded moment, unequivocally point to some government complicity in the disappearance. The
consistent but unfounded denials and the haphazard investigations cannot but point to this conclusion.
For why would the government and its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had not
been to deny what they already knew of the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and thorough
investigation that at least credibly determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the government's cap
under the circumstances of the disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and developments,
particularly the Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance that the
Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted, 173 the evidence
at hand and the developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced disappearance and government
complicity, under a background of consistent and unfounded government denials and haphazard handling.
The disappearance as well effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection of the law a situation that
will subsist unless this Court acts.
This kind of fact situation and the conclusion reached are not without precedent in
international enforced disappearance rulings. While the facts are not exactly the same, the facts of this
case run very close to those of Timurtas v. Turkey, 174 a case decided by ECHR. The European tribunal in
that case acted on the basis of the photocopy of a "post-operation report" in finding that Abdulvahap
Timurtas (Abdulvahap) was abducted and later detained by agents (gendarmes) of the government of
Turkey. The victim's father in this case brought a claim against Turkey for numerous violations of the
European Convention, including the right to life (Article 2) and the rights to liberty and security of a
person (Article 5).The applicant contended that on August 14, 1993, gendarmes apprehended his son,
Abdulvahap for being a leader of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) in the Silopi region. The petition was
filed in southeast Turkey nearly six and one half years after the apprehension. According to the father,
gendarmes first detained Abdulvahap and then transferred him to another detainment facility. Although
there was no eyewitness evidence of the apprehension or subsequent detainment, the applicant
presented evidence corroborating his version of events, including a photocopy of a post-operation
report signed by the commander of gendarme operations in Silopi, Turkey. The report included a
description of Abdulvahap's arrest and the result of a subsequent interrogation during detention where he
was accused of being a leader of the PKK in the Silopi region. On this basis, Turkey was held responsible
for Abdulvahap's enforced disappearance. DScTaC
Following the lead of this Turkish experience adjusted to the Philippine legal setting and the Amparo
remedy this Court has established, as applied to the unique facts and developments of this case we
believe and so hold that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular,
the Chiefs of these organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully accountable for the
enforced disappearance of Tagitis.
The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975,
otherwise known as the "PNP Law", 175 specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the mandate "to
investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist
in their prosecution". The PNP-CIDG, as Col. Jose Volpane Pante (then Chief of CIDG Region 9) testified, is
the "investigative arm" of the PNP and is mandated to "investigate and prosecute all cases involving
violations of the Revised Penal Code, particularly those considered as heinous crimes". 176 Under the PNP
organizational structure, the PNP-CIDG is tasked to investigate all major crimes involving violations of the
Revised Penal Code and operates against organized crime groups, unless the President assigns the case
exclusively to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). 177 No indication exists in this case showing that
the President ever directly intervened by assigning the investigation of Tagitis' disappearance exclusively
to the NBI.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who
were remiss in their duties when the government completely failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence
that the Amparo Rule requires. We hold these organizations accountable through their incumbent Chiefs
who, under this Decision, shall carry the personal responsibility of seeing to it that extraordinary diligence,
in the manner the Amparo Rule requires, is applied in addressing the enforced disappearance of Tagitis.
We hold Col. Kasim accountable for his failure to disclose under oath information relating to the enforced
disappearance. For the purpose of this accountability, we order that Col. Kasim be impleaded as a party to
this case. The PNP is similarly held accountable for the suppression of vital information that Col. Kasim
could and did not provide, and, as the entity with direct authority over Col. Kasim, is held with the same
obligation of disclosure that Col. Kasim carries. We shall deal with Col. Kasim's suppression of evidence
under oath when we finally close this case under the process outlined below.
To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this case back to the CA for appropriate proceedings
directed at the monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of
their results through hearings the CA may deem appropriate to conduct. For purposes of these investigations,
the PNP/PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the CA a plan of action for further investigation, periodically reporting
the detailed results of its investigation to the CA for its consideration and action. On behalf of this Court, the CA
shall pass upon: the need for the PNP and the PNP-CIDG to make disclosures of matters known to them as
indicated in this Decision and as further CA hearings may indicate; the petitioners' submissions; the sufficiency of
their investigative efforts; and submit to this Court a quarterly report containing its actions and
recommendations, copy furnished the petitioners and the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the
first quarter counted from the finality of this Decision. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to
undertake their investigation. The CA shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of
the 4th quarter counted from the finality of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petitioners' petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit,
and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2008 under the following terms:
a. Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced disappearance
covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
b. Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility, declaring the
government (through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel
Julasirim Ahadin Kasim accountable for the enforced
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
c. Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;
d. Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly
responsible for the disclosure of material facts known to the
government and to their offices regarding the disappearance
of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper
investigations using extraordinary diligence, with the
obligation to show investigation results acceptable to this
Court;
e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable
with the obligation to disclose information known to him and
to his "assets" in relation with the enforced disappearance of
Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
f. Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings directed at the
monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions
and the validation of their results; the PNP and the PNP-CIDG
shall initially present to the Court of Appeals a plan of action
for further investigation, periodically reporting their results
to the Court of Appeals for consideration and action;
g. Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its
recommendations, copy furnished the incumbent PNP and
PNP-CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and the respondent, with the
first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from
the finality of this Decision;
h. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigations; the
18
 Court of Appeals shall submit its full report for the
consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter
counted from the finality of this Decision; TDEASC
These directives and those of the Court of Appeals' made pursuant to this Decision shall be
given to, and shall be directly enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of the Philippine
National Police and its Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, under pain of contempt from this
Court when the initiatives and efforts at disclosure and investigation constitute less than the extraordinary
diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the circumstances of this case demand. Given the unique
nature of Amparo cases and their varying attendant circumstances, these directives particularly, the
referral back to and monitoring by the CA are specific to this case and are not standard remedies that
can be applied to every Amparo situation.
The dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander Yano,
Commanding General, Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terrorism Task Force
Comet, Zamboanga City, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, [December 3, 2009], 621 PHIL 536-635)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 189155. September 7, 2010.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN
FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS,
MELISSA C. ROXAS, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S.
IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ,
MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN PERSONS WHO GO BY
THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE, respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J p:
At bench is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the Decision 2 dated 26 August
2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA a petition that was commenced jointly
under the Rules on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule). In its
decision, the Court of Appeals extended to the petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the writs of
amparo and habeas data but denied the latter's prayers for an inspection order, production order and
return of specified personal belongings. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby grants Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and
Habeas Data.
Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or causing the distribution to the public of any
records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to Petitioner's
Melissa C. Roxas, and/or Melissa Roxas; alleged ties to the CPP-NPA or pertinently related
to the complained incident. Petitioner's prayers for an inspection order, production order
and for the return of the specified personal belongings are denied for lack of merit.
Although there is no evidence that Respondents are responsible for the abduction,
detention or torture of the Petitioner, said Respondents pursuant to their legally mandated
duties are, nonetheless, ordered to continue/complete the investigation of this incident
with the end in view of prosecuting those who are responsible. Respondents are also
ordered to provide protection to the Petitioner and her family while in the Philippines
against any and all forms of harassment, intimidation and coercion as may be relevant to
the grant of these reliefs. 3
We begin with the petitioner's allegations.
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent. 4 While in the United States,
petitioner enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member. 5 During the course of her
immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she
volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac 6 in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for
a future medical mission. 7
In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with Fifteen
Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer,
external hard disk, IPOD, 8 wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines. 9
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito Carabeo
(Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr.
Paolo) in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac. 10 At around 1:30 in the afternoon,
however, petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of someone banging
at the front door and a voice demanding that they open up. 11
Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and
ordered petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face down. 12 The armed men were all in
civilian clothes and, with the exception of their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces. 13
Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up on her
and tied her hands. 14 At this juncture, petitioner saw the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc,
already blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout her name.
15 Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards the van bruising her
arms, legs and knees. 16 Once inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded, petitioner was able to see
the face of one of the armed men sitting beside her. 17 The van then sped away.
After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped. 18 Petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc were
ordered to alight. 19 After she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of the
Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated from her
companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was a jail cell from the sound of its metal doors.
20 From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing and some
construction bustle. 21 She inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur,
Nueva Ecija. 22
What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with torture. 23 The
thrust of the interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of
returning to "the fold." 24 The torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and
suffocating the petitioner. 25
19
 Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in blindfolds even in
her sleep. 26 Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath, during
which she became acquainted with a woman named "Rose" who bathed her. 27 There were also a few times
when she cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at her surroundings. 28
Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the names of
three of her interrogators who introduced themselves to her as "Dex," "James" and "RC." 29 "RC" even told
petitioner that those who tortured her came from the "Special Operations Group," and that she was
abducted because her name is included in the "Order of Battle." 30
On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncle's house in
Quezon City. 31 Before being released, however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM
32 card, a slip of paper containing an e-mail address with password, 33 a plastic bag containing biscuits and
books, 34 the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes. 35 Petitioner was also sternly warned not
to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her family. 36
Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular
phone given to her. 37 Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of
her family, petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card.
Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any
existing government files or records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for
the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009. 38 Petitioner impleaded public
officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the
belief that it was government agents who were behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner likewise
included in her suit "Rose," "Dex" and "RC." 39
The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be enjoined from
harming or even approaching petitioner and her family; (2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of
detention areas in the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be
ordered to produce documents relating to any report on the case of petitioner including, but not limited to,
intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and subsequent
to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered to expunge from the records of the respondents any
document pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name which sounds the same;
and (5) respondents be ordered to return to petitioner her journal, digital camera with memory card,
laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and
her P15,000.00 cash. 40
In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and referred the
case to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action. 41 The Resolution
also directed the respondents to file their verified written return. 42
On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return of the Writs 43 on
behalf of the public officials impleaded as respondents.
We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents.
The public respondents label petitioner's alleged abduction and torture as "stage
managed." 44 In support of their accusation, the public respondents principally rely on the statement of Mr.
Paolo, as contained in the Special Report 45 of the La Paz Police Station. In the Special Report, Mr. Paolo
disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner and her companions instructed him and his
two sons to avoid leaving the house. 46 From this statement, the public respondents drew the distinct
possibility that, except for those already inside Mr. Paolo's house, nobody else has any way of knowing
where petitioner and her companions were at the time they were supposedly abducted. 47 This can only
mean, the public respondents concluded, that if ever there was any "abduction" it must necessarily have
been planned by, or done with the consent of, the petitioner and her companions themselves. 48
Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate 49 of the petitioner, as actually belying
her claims that she was subjected to serious torture for five (5) days. The public respondents noted that
while the petitioner alleges that she was choked and boxed by her abductors inflictions that could have
easily produced remarkable bruises her Medical Certificate only shows abrasions in her wrists and
knee caps. 50
For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the very authenticity of
petitioner's alleged abduction and torture, more so any military or police involvement therein. Hence,
public respondents conclude that the claims of abduction and torture was no more than a charade
fabricated by the petitioner to put the government in bad light, and at the same time, bring great media
mileage to her and the group that she represents. 51
Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public
respondents insist on the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas Data petition based on the following
grounds: (a) as against respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular, because of her
immunity from suit, 52 and (b) as against all of the public respondents, in general, in view of the absence of
any specific allegation in the petition that they had participated in, or at least authorized, the commission
of such atrocities. 53
Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to
ascertain the truth behind the allegations of the petitioner. 54 In both the police and military arms of the
government machinery, inquiries were set-up in the following manner:
Police Action
Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around 4:30 o'clock in the
afternoon of 19 May 2009, when Barangay Captain Michael M. Manuel came to the La Paz Municipal Police
Station to report the presence of heavily armed men somewhere in Barangay Kapanikian. 55 Acting on the
report, the police station launched an initial investigation. 56
The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Mr. Paolo, who informed the
investigators of an abduction incident involving three (3) persons later identified as petitioner Melissa
Roxas, Juanito Carabeo and John Edward Jandoc who were all staying in his house. 57 Mr. Paolo
disclosed that the abduction occurred around 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, and was perpetrated by about
eight (8) heavily armed men who forced their way inside his house. 58 Other witnesses to the abduction
also confirmed that the armed men used a dark blue van with an unknown plate number and two (2)
Honda XRM motorcycles with no plate numbers. 59
At 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the investigators sent a Flash Message to
the different police stations surrounding La Paz, Tarlac, in an effort to track and locate the van and
motorcycles of the suspects. Unfortunately, the effort yielded negative results. 60
On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation were included in a Special Report 61
that was transmitted to the Tarlac Police Provincial Office, headed by public respondent P/S Supt. Rudy
Lacadin (Supt. Lacadin). Public respondent Supt. Lacadin, in turn, informed the Regional Police Office of
Region 3 about the abduction. 62 Follow-up investigations were, at the same time, pursued. 63
On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director of the
Regional Police Office for Region 3, caused the creation of Special Investigation Task Group CAROJAN
(Task Group CAROJAN) to conduct an in-depth investigation on the abduction of the petitioner, Carabeo
and Jandoc. 64
Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a series of background examinations
on the victims of the purported abduction, in order to reveal the motive behind the abduction and,
ultimately, the identity of the perpetrators. 65 Task Group CAROJAN also maintained liaisons with
Karapatan and the Alliance for Advancement of People's Rights organizations trusted by petitioner
in the hopes of obtaining the latter's participation in the ongoing investigations. 66 Unfortunately, the
letters sent by the investigators requesting for the availability of the petitioner for inquiries were left
unheeded. 67
The progress of the investigations conducted by Task Group CAROJAN had been detailed
in the reports 68 that it submitted to public respondent General Jesus Ame Verzosa, the Chief of the
Philippine National Police. However, as of their latest report dated 29 June 2009, Task Group CAROJAN is
still unable to make a definitive finding as to the true identity and affiliation of the abductors a fact that
task group CAROJAN attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or any of her fellow victims, to cooperate in
their investigative efforts. 69
Military Action
Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense, first came to know
about the alleged abduction and torture of the petitioner upon receipt of the Resolution of this Court
directing him and the other respondents to file their return. 70 Immediately thereafter, he issued a
Memorandum Directive 71 addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP, ordering the latter, among others, to
conduct an inquiry to determine the validity of the accusation of military involvement in the abduction. 72
Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public respondent General Victor S.
Ibrado, the AFP Chief of Staff, sent an AFP Radio Message 73 addressed to public respondent Lieutenant
General Delfin N. Bangit (Lt. Gen. Bangit), the Commanding General of the Army, relaying the order to
cause an investigation on the abduction of the petitioner. 74
For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition, public respondent
Lt. Gen. Bangit instructed public respondent Major General Ralph A. Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the
Commander of the 7th Infantry Division of the Army based in Fort Magsaysay, to set in motion an
investigation regarding the possible involvement of any personnel assigned at the camp in the purported
abduction of the petitioner. 75 In turn, public respondent Maj. Gen. Villanueva tapped the Office of the
Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th Infantry Division, to conduct the investigation. 76
On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry Division released an Investigation Report 77
detailing the results of its inquiry. In substance, the report described petitioner's allegations as
"opinionated" and thereby cleared the military from any involvement in her alleged abduction and torture.
78
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision, 79 the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to the
petitioner's version that she was indeed abducted and then subjected to torture for five (5) straight days.
The appellate court noted the sincerity and resolve by which the petitioner affirmed the contents of her
affidavits in open court, and was thereby convinced that the latter was telling the truth. 80
20
 On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of the public
respondents that the abduction of the petitioner was "stage managed," as it is merely based on an
unfounded speculation that only the latter and her companions knew where they were staying at the time
they were forcibly taken. 81 The Court of Appeals further stressed that the Medical Certificate of the
petitioner can only affirm the existence of a true abduction, as its findings are reflective of the very injuries
the latter claims to have sustained during her harrowing ordeal, particularly when she was handcuffed
and then dragged by her abductors onto their van. 82
The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against the
security of the petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of "RC" to contact and monitor her, even after she
was released. 83 This threat, according to the Court of Appeals, is all the more compounded by the failure of
the police authorities to identify the material perpetrators who are still at large. 84 Thus, the appellate
court extended to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo by directing the public respondents to
afford protection to the former, as well as continuing, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, their
existing investigations involving the abduction. 85
The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to informational
privacy of the petitioner, noting the existence of "records of investigations" that concerns the petitioner as
a suspected member of the CPP-NPA. 86 The appellate court derived the existence of such records from a
photograph and video file presented in a press conference by party-list representatives Jovito Palparan
(Palparan) and Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which allegedly show the petitioner participating in rebel
exercises. Representative Alcover also revealed that the photograph and video came from a female CPP-
NPA member who wanted out of the organization. According to the Court of Appeals, the proliferation of
the photograph and video, as well as any form of media, insinuating that petitioner is part of the CPP-NPA
does not only constitute a violation of the right to privacy of the petitioner but also puts further strain on
her already volatile security. 87 To this end, the appellate court granted the privilege of the writ of habeas
data mandating the public respondents to refrain from distributing to the public any records, in whatever
form, relative to petitioner's alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and
torture. 88
The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not convinced that the
military or any other person acting under the acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the
abduction and torture of the petitioner. 89 The appellate court stressed that, judging by her own
statements, the petitioner merely "believed" that the military was behind her abduction. 90 Thus, the Court
of Appeals absolved the public respondents from any complicity in the abduction and torture of petitioner.
91 The petition was likewise dismissed as against public respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in
view of her immunity from suit. 92
Accordingly, the petitioner's prayers for the return of her personal belongings were
denied. 93 Petitioner's prayers for an inspection order and production order also met the same fate. 94
Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.
AMPARO
A.
Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public
respondents from any responsibility in her abduction and torture. 95 Corollary to this, petitioner also finds
fault on the part of Court of Appeals in denying her prayer for the return of her personal belongings. 96
Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried out, as
well as the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in detention, as these were
detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court, are already sufficient evidence to prove
government involvement. 97
Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of command
responsibility to implicate the high-ranking civilian and military authorities she impleaded as respondents
in her amparo petition. 98 Thus, petitioner seeks from this Court a pronouncement holding the
respondents as complicit in her abduction and torture, as well as liable for the return of her belongings. 99
Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings
It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command
responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally
inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that
establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in
an amparo petition. 100
The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo, 101 which was the first to examine command responsibility
in the context of an amparo proceeding, observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico
notes that: 102
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and
armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms,
means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members
of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict." 103 In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal
complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command
responsibility, 104 foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior
accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his
duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission
mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for
crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators 105
(as opposed to crimes he ordered). (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied)
Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual
liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary
amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself:
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of
the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address
specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. 106 While
the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced
disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired the writ does not, by so
doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or
administrative under the applicable substantive law. 107 The rationale underpinning this peculiar
nature of an amparo writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of The Secretary of
National Defense v. Manalo: 108
. . . The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for
damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. 109
(Emphasis supplied)
It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command
responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police
commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or
indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleaded not actually on the basis of
command responsibility but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability. In
Razon v. Tagitis, 110 the distinct, but interrelated concepts of responsibility and accountability were given
special and unique significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to wit:
. . . Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a
measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts.
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be
addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without
bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are
imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden
of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.
Responsibility of Public Respondents
At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in
impleading the public respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibility on their part, based on her
assumption that they, in one way or the other, had condoned her abduction and torture. 111
To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government
agents who were behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the circumstances surrounding
her abduction and torture i.e., the forcible taking in broad daylight; use of vehicles with no license
plates; utilization of blindfolds; conducting interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and the
infliction of physical abuse which, according to her, is consistent with the way enforced disappearances
are being practiced by the military or other state forces. 112
Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort
Magsaysay a conclusion that she was able to infer from the travel time required to reach the place
where she was actually detained, and also from the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes she
heard while thereat. 113
We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not
inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was
detained at Fort Magsaysay.
First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those surrounding
previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the
government orchestrated such abduction. We opine that insofar as the present case is concerned, the perceived
similarity cannot stand as substantial evidence of the involvement of the government.
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as
evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of
evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct
evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on
patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and
21
 affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it
could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain.
In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of Exhibits, 114 the
cartographic sketches 115 of several of her abductors whose faces she managed to see. To the mind of this
Court, these cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the greatest certainty as to the
true identity and affiliation of petitioner's abductors. Unfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has
not been realized in view of the fact that the faces described in such sketches remain unidentified, much
less have been shown to be that of any military or police personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not
proven to be part of either the military or the police chain of command.
Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately established by her
mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place where she was detained and by the sounds that she heard
while thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, We are not inclined to take the estimate and observations of the
petitioner as accurate on its face not only because they were made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also
in view of the fact that she was a mere sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the
travel time required to reach it is in itself doubtful. 116 With nothing else but obscure observations to support it,
petitioner's claim that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.
In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors
were actually affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the military or the police organizations.
Neither does the evidence at hand prove that petitioner was indeed taken to the military camp Fort
Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually
impossible to determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact committed
with the acquiescence of the public respondents. On account of this insufficiency in evidence, a
pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made.
Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings
This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal belongings.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above prayer of the petitioner by reason of
the failure of the latter to prove that the public respondents were involved in her abduction and torture. 117
We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, but not entirely with the reason used to support it.
To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her belongings is doomed to fail
regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents responsible for the abduction
of the petitioner.
In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal
belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order
itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been
fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not
determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding. 118
But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies
with the fact that a person's right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general
rubric of property rights which are no longer protected by the writ of amparo. 119 Section 1 of the
Amparo Rule, 120 which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property
rights.
B.
The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of her prayer
for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay. 121
Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement in
petitioner's ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of
the military camp at Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a contrary stance would be
equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was never intended by the Amparo Rule in
providing for the interim relief of inspection order. 122 Contrary to the explicit position 123 espoused by the
petitioner, the Amparo Rule does not allow a "fishing expedition" for evidence.
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of
a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision. 124 A basic
requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is
reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does
not require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a
minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in
itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do.
Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make
out aprima facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot
be ordered. An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable
and doubtful.
HABEAS DATA
As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of the writ
of habeas data, by enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the
public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioner's
"alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture." Though not raised as
an issue in this appeal, this Court is constrained to pass upon and review this particular ruling of the Court
of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears to Us, an error infecting the grant.
For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals in granting the
privilege of the writ of habeas data, We quote hereunder the relevant portion 125 of its decision:
Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence reports and reports on the investigations
conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas be produced and eventually expunged
from the records. Petitioner claimed to be included in the Government's Order of Battle
under Oplan Bantay Laya which listed political opponents against whom false criminal
charges were filed based on made up and perjured information.
Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before Us, Ex-army general Jovito Palaparan, Bantay
party-list, and Pastor Alcover of the Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy party-list held a press conference where they
revealed that they received an information from a female NPA rebel who wanted out of the organization, that Petitioner was
a communist rebel. Alcover claimed that said information reached them thru a letter with photo of Petitioner holding
firearms at an NPA training camp and a video CD of the training exercises.
Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioner's denial that she was the person in said video, there were records of other
investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate her right to privacy. Without a doubt, reports of such nature
have reasonable connections, one way or another, to petitioner's abduction where she claimed she had been subjected to cruelties
and dehumanizing acts which nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation of her alleged membership in the CPP-NPA. And if said
report or similar reports are to be continuously made available to the public, Petitioner's security and privacy will certainly be in
danger of being violated or transgressed by persons who have strong sentiments or aversion against members of this group. The
unregulated dissemination of said unverified video CD or reports of Petitioner's alleged ties with the CPP-NPA indiscriminately made
available for public consumption without evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly violates Petitioner's right to privacy which
must be protected by this Court. We, thus, deem it necessary to grant Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis
supplied).
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to
privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. 126 The writ operates to protect a
person's right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be
extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right
to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. 127 This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do.
The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no
evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to
privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would
have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and
other reports about the petitioner's ties with the CPP-NPA, was not adequately proven considering that
the origin of such records were virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the
appellate court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their
press conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to such
video or photograph.
In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the
public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever
form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioner's "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA,"
appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from
distributing something that, in the first place, it was not proven to have.
Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually
responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the existence of
reports being kept in violation of the petitioner's right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature.
For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the
privilege of the writ of habeas data.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate insufficiency to
impute any form of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, revealed two important things
that can guide Us to a proper disposition of this case. One, that further investigation with the use of
extraordinary diligence must be made in order to identify the perpetrators behind the abduction and
torture of the petitioner; and two, that the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its
Constitutional mandate to "investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights," 128 must be tapped in
order to fill certain investigative and remedial voids.
Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken
Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not able to
adduce substantial evidence proving her allegations of government complicity in her abduction and
torture, may be attributed to the incomplete and one-sided investigations conducted by the government
itself. This "awkward" situation, wherein the very persons alleged to be involved in an enforced
disappearance or extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very ones tasked by law to investigate the
22
 matter, is a unique characteristic of these proceedings and is the main source of the "evidentiary assistance to the ongoing investigation of the CHR, including
difficulties" faced by any petitioner in any amparo case. 129 but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel
Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguard records circa the time of the petitioner's abduction and
requiring the "respondent who is a public official or employee" to prove that no less than "extraordinary torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the
diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty." Constitution and existing laws.
130 Thus, unless and until any of the public respondents is able to show to the satisfaction of the amparo 3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the
court that extraordinary diligence has been observed in their investigations, they cannot shed the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a
allegations of responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect. copy of the reports of its investigations and their
With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, recommendations, other than those that are already part of
was not fully observed in the conduct of the police and military investigations in the case at bar. the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt
A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN shows modest of this decision.
effort on the part of the police investigators to identify the perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said 4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from
reports are replete with background checks on the victims of the abduction, but are, at the same time, receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its
comparatively silent as to other concrete steps the investigators have been taking to ascertain the authors investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and to
of the crime. Although conducting a background investigation on the victims is a logical first step in (b) provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner
exposing the motive behind the abduction its necessity is clearly outweighed by the need to identify the during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as
perpetrators, especially in light of the fact that the petitioner, who was no longer in captivity, already came may hereinafter be determined by this Court.
up with allegations about the motive of her captors. Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of
Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on the monitoring compliance with the above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent reports
cooperation or non-cooperation of the petitioner who, they claim, was less than enthusiastic in or recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents
participating in their investigative efforts. 131 While it may be conceded that the participation of the responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit
petitioner would have facilitated the progress of Task Group CAROJAN's investigation, this Court believes its own report with recommendation to this Court for final action. The Court of Appeals will continue to
that the former's reticence to cooperate is hardly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN not to explore other have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tasks under this decision.
means or avenues from which they could obtain relevant leads. 132 Indeed, while the allegations of WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby render a decision:
government complicity by the petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as adequate evidence before a 1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner's prayer for the return of her personal belongings;
court of law they are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable investigative leads that must be pursued 2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner's prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort
and verified, if only to comply with the high standard of diligence required by the Amparo Rule in the Magsaysay.
conduct of investigations. 3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice, however, to any
Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJAN's reports still failed modification that this Court may make on the basis of the
to explain why it never considered seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolo who, along with the investigation reports and recommendations submitted to it
victims, is a central witness to the abduction. The reports of Task Group CAROJAN is silent in any attempt under this decision.
to obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the abductors or, at the very least, of the one who, by 4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as follows
petitioner's account, was not wearing any mask. a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency tasked with conducting
The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the sketches further investigation regarding the abduction
included in petitioner's offer of exhibits that, it may be pointed out, were prepared under the direction of, and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the
and first submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latter's independent investigation on the abduction and Commission on Human Rights shall, under the
torture of the petitioner. 133 But as mentioned earlier, the CHR sketches remain to be unidentified as of this norm of extraordinary diligence, take or
date. continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to
In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that further identify the persons described in the
investigation under the norm of extraordinary diligence should be undertaken. This Court simply cannot cartographic sketches submitted by the
write finis to this case, on the basis of an incomplete investigation conducted by the police and the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and
military. In a very real sense, the right to security of the petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy because (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to
of the deficient investigation that directly contributes to the delay in bringing the real perpetrators before petitioner's abduction and torture.
the bar of justice. b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, and the
To add teeth to the appellate court's directive, however, We find it fitting, nay, necessary incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
to shift the primary task of conducting further investigations on the abduction and torture of the of the Philippines, or his successor, to extend
petitioner upon the CHR. 134 We note that the CHR, unlike the police or the military, seems to enjoy the assistance to the ongoing investigation of the
trust and confidence of the petitioner as evidenced by her attendance and participation in the hearings Commission on Human Rights, including but
already conducted by the commission. 135 Certainly, it would be reasonable to assume from such not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of
cooperation that the investigations of the CHR have advanced, or at the very least, bears the most promise its personnel records circa the time of the
of advancing farther, in terms of locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus, vital for a final petitioner's abduction and torture, subject to
resolution of this petition. From this perspective, We also deem it just and appropriate to relegate the task reasonable regulations consistent with the
of affording interim protection to the petitioner, also to the CHR. Constitution and existing laws.
Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, to
follows furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and
1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding the petitioner or her representative, a copy of
the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the the reports of its investigations and their
CHR shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or recommendations, other than those that are
continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the already part of the records of this case, within
persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.
the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the Court of Appeals
any other leads relevant to petitioner's abduction and torture. within ninety (90) days from receipt of this
2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor, and the decision, a copy of the reports on its
incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend investigation and its corresponding

23
 recommendations; and (b) to provide or
continue to provide protection to the
petitioner during her stay or visit to the
Philippines, until such time as may
hereinafter be determined by this Court.
5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the following purposes:
a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and the CHR;
b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the CHR, the
abduction and torture of the petitioner was
committed by persons acting under any of the
public respondents; and on the basis of this
determination
c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the report and recommendation of
the Commission on Human Rights its own
report, which shall include a recommendation
either for the DISMISSAL of the petition as
against the public respondents who were
found not responsible and/or accountable, or
for the APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL
MEASURES, AS MAY BE ALLOWED BY THE
AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE
UNDERTAKEN as against those found
responsible and/or accountable.
Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to
answer for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.
Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 00036-WRA that are not contrary to this decision are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Roxas v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, [September 7, 2010], 644 PHIL 480-517)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 183711. July 5, 2011.]
EDITA T. BURGOS, petitioner, vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON,
JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL
CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, respondents.
[G.R. No. 183712. July 5, 2011.]
EDITA T. BURGOS, petitioner, vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON,
JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, LT. COL.
NOEL CLEMENT, respondents.
[G.R. No. 183713. July 5, 2011.]
EDITA T. BURGOS, petitioner, vs. CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., Commanding General of the Philippine Army, LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO;
Chief of the Philippine National Police, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR., respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J p:
We review, 1 in light of the latest developments in this case, the decision 2 dated July 17, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in the consolidated petitions for Habeas Corpus, 3 Contempt 4 and Writ of Amparo 5 filed by Edita T.
Burgos (petitioner). The assailed CA decision dismissed the petition for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus;
denied the petitioner's motion to declare the respondents in Contempt; and partially granted the privilege of the
Writ of Amparo. 6
On June 22, 2010, we issued a Resolution 7 referring the present case to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR),
as the Court's directly commissioned agency tasked with the continuation of the investigation of Jonas Joseph T.
Burgos' abduction and the gathering of evidence, with the obligation to report its factual findings and
recommendations to this Court. We found the referral necessary as the investigation by the PNP-CIDG, by the AFP
Provost Marshal, and even by the CHR had been less than complete; for one, there were very significant lapses in
the handling of the investigation. In particular, we highlighted the PNP-CIDG's failure to identify the cartographic
sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas, based on their interview of eyewitnesses
to the abduction. 8 We held:
Considering the findings of the CA and our review of the records of the present case, we conclude that the PNP and
the AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the
disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the
performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. Because of these
investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until a more meaningful
investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is undertaken.
From the records, we note that there are very significant lapses in the handling of the investigation among them the PNP-
CIDG's failure to identify the cartographic sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas based on their
interview of eyewitnesses to the abduction. This lapse is based on the information provided to the petitioner by no less than State
Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco of the DOJ who identified the persons who were possibly involved in the abduction, namely: T/Sgt.
Jason Roxas (Philippine Army), Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and an
alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the AFP. No search and certification
were ever made on whether these persons were AFP personnel or in other branches of the service, such as the Philippine Air Force.
As testified to by the petitioner, no significant follow through was also made by the PNP-CIDG in ascertaining the identities of the
cartographic sketches of two of the abductors despite the evidentiary leads provided by State Prosecutor Velasco of the DOJ. Notably,
the PNP-CIDG, as the lead investigating agency in the present case, did not appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects of the
case.
We note, too, that no independent investigation appeared to have been made by the PNP-CIDG to inquire into the
veracity of Lipio's and Manuel's claims that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE
and a certain @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerrilla unit RYG. The records do not indicate
whether the PNP-CIDG conducted a follow-up investigation to determine the identities and
whereabouts of @KA Dante and @KA ENSO. These omissions were aggravated by the CA
finding that the PNP has yet to refer any case for preliminary investigation to the DOJ
despite its representation before the CA that it had forwarded all pertinent and relevant
documents to the DOJ for the filing of appropriate charges against @KA DANTE and @KA
ENSO.
. . . While significant leads have been provided to investigators, the investigations by the PNP-CIDG, the AFP
Provost Marshal, and even the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) have been less than
complete. The PNP-CIDG's investigation particularly leaves much to be desired in terms of
the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. ACIESH
Following the CHR's legal mandate, we gave the Commission the following specific directives: 9
(a)ascertaining the identities of the persons appearing in the cartographic sketches of the two alleged abductors as
well as their whereabouts;
(b)determining based on records, past and present, the identities and locations of the persons identified by State
Prosecutor Velasco alleged to be involved in the abduction of Jonas namely: T/Sgt. Jason
Roxas (Philippine Army); Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron
Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and an alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with Military
Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the AFP; further proceedings and
investigations, as may be necessary, should be made to pursue the lead allegedly provided
by State Prosecutor Velasco on the identities of the possible abductors;
(c)inquiring into the veracity of Lipio's and Manuel's claims that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and
24
 @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG; HTCAED 47.On December 1, 2010, the Team together with the NBI Team were able to locate Jeffrey Cabintoy (Jeffrey), one
(d)determining based on records, past and present, as well as further investigation, the identities and whereabouts of the two (2) eyewitnesses who provided the police cartographic artist with the
of @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO; and description of two (2) principal abductors of Jonas Burgos. Jeffrey narrated in details (sic)
(e)undertaking all measures, in the investigation of the Burgos abduction, that may be necessary to live up to the the circumstances that happened before and during the abduction.
extraordinary measures we require in addressing an enforced disappearance under the 48.On December 7, 2010, the Team and Jeffrey went to the place of incident at Ever Gotesco Mall, Quezon City to
Rule on the Writ of Amparo. refresh his memory and re-enact what transpired. In the afternoon of the same date, the
In this same Resolution, we also affirmed the CA's dismissal of the petitions for Contempt and for the issuance of a Team invited Jeffrey to the CHR Central Office in Quezon City, where he was shown for
Writ of Amparo with respect to President Macapagal-Arroyo, as she is entitled as President to immunity from suit. identification twenty (20) copies of colored photographs/pictures of men and the almost
10 two hundred forty-four (244) photographs/pictures stored in the computer and lifted from
On March 15, 2011, the CHR submitted to the Court its Investigation Report on the Enforced Disappearance of the profiles of the Philippine Military Academy Year Book of Batch Sanghaya 2000.
Jonas Burgos (CHR Report), in compliance with our June 22, 2010 Resolution. 11 In this Report, the CHR recounted 49.Jeffrey pointed to a man in the two (2) colored group pictures/photographs, that he identified as among the 8-
man group who abducted Jonas Burgos. For record and identification purposes, the Team
the investigations undertaken, whose pertinent details we quote below:
encircled the face that Jeffrey identified in the two pictures; then he affixed his signature on
On June 26, 2010, the CHR issued Resolution CHR IV No. A2010-100 to intensify the investigation of the case of the
each picture. Also, while leafing through the pictures of the PMA graduates in the Year Book
Burgos enforced disappearance; and for this purpose, created a Special Investigation Team
of Sanghaya 2000 Batch, the witness identified a picture, with a bold and all-capitalized
. . . headed by Commissioner Jose Manuel S. Mamauag.
name HARRY AGAGEN BALIAGA JR. and the words Agawa, Besao, Mt. Province printed
xxx xxx xxx
there under the capitalized words PHILIPPINE ARMY written on the upper portion, as the
In compliance with the directive mentioned in the above-quoted En Banc Resolution of the Supreme Court, the
same person he pointed out in the two group pictures just mentioned above. Immediately
Team conducted field investigations by: (1) interviewing a) civilian authorities involved in
thereafter, the Team caused the production of the photo identified by Jeffrey and asked him
the first investigation of the instant case; b) military men under detention for alleged
to affix his signature, which he also did. aDcEIH
violations of Articles of War; c) Security Officers of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth
50.After examining each of these pictures, Jeffrey declared that it dawned on him that based on his recollection of
Avenue, Quezon City; d) two (2) of the three (3) CIDG witnesses; e) two (2) eyewitnesses
faces involved in the abduction of Jonas Burgos, he now remembers the face of a man, other
who described to the police sketch artist two (2) faces of a male and female abductors of
than the two (2) faces whose description he already provided before to a police sketch
Jonas Burgos; f) Rebel-Returnees (RRs); g) officers and men in the military and police
artist, who was part of the 8-man group of abductors. And he also confirms it now that the
service; h) local officials and other government functionaries; and i) ordinary citizens; (2)
person he is referring to was indeed seen by him as one of those who abducted Jonas
inquiring into the veracity of CIDG witnesses Lipio's and Manuel's claims that Jonas was
Burgos at Hapag Kainan Restaurant of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon
abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerrilla unit RYG; (3)
City.
securing case records from the prosecution service and courts of law; (4) visiting military
51.When asked how certain he was of the person he identified, considering that the printed copy of the photo lifted
and police units. Offices, camps, detention centers, and jails and requesting copies of
from the Face-book Sanghaya Account was taken sometime in the year 2010; while the
documents and records in their possession that are relevant to the instant case; (5)
picture appearing in the computer was lifted from the PMA Sanghaya 2000 Batch Year
searching for and interviewing witnesses and informants; and (6) pursuing leads provided
Book, Jeffrey replied "Ang taong ito ay aking natatandaan sa kadahilanan na nuong una siya
by them.
ay nakaupo na katabi sa bandang kaliwa nang taong dumukot at natapos silang mag usap
S.Email's "Star-Struck"
lumapit sa akin at pilit akong pinipigilan na wag daw makialam at ang sabi nya sa akin ay
38.Pursuing the lead mentioned in the anonymous e-mail, which was attached to the Burgos petition as Exhibit "J",
"WAG KA DITONG MAKIALAM KASI ANG TAONG ITO AY MATAGAL NA NAMING
"that the team leader (T.L.) in the Jonas Burgos abduction was a certain Army Captain,
SINUSUBAYBAYAN DAHIL SA DROGA" kahit pa halos nagmamakaawa na nang tulong ang
(promotable to Major), a good looking guy (tisoy), and a potential showbiz personality
taong dinukot; at matapos nuon ay sapilitan na nilang binitbit sa labas ang biktima." (I
known otherwise as Captain Star-struck," the Team requested the CHR Clearance Section,
remember this man for the reason that at first he was seated at the left side of the person
Legal Division for any information leading to T.L. or to all Philippine Army applicants for
abducted; and after they talked, he approached me and was preventing me forcefully saying
CHR clearance whose ranks are Captains or Majors promoted during the years 2007 to
not to interfere and he said to me: "DON'T YOU INTERFERE HERE SINCE WE HAVE BEEN
2009. cSICHD
DOING SOME SURVEILLANCE ON THIS MAN FOR SOME TIME ALREADY BECAUSE OF
39.Sometime in November 2010, the Team was able to track down one CHR clearance-applicant who most likely
DRUGS" despite that the man was already pleading for help, and after that, they forcibly
possesses and/or matches the information provided in the said lead. But when his
dragged the victim outside.)
photo/picture was presented to the eyewitnesses, they failed to identify him.
52.When asked if he could identify the picture of Jonas Burgos, Jeffrey affirmed that the person in the picture is the
40.Undaunted with the negative identification, the Team suspected that the "team leader" might not have
person referred to by him as the victim of abduction and his name is Jonas Burgos. He
participated in the actual abduction inside Hapag Kainan Restaurant, the scene of the crime,
further stated that he learned of the victim's name when he saw his picture flashed on TV
but most probably was in one of the "three cars" allegedly used during the operation while
and hear his name. When asked if he is willing to execute an affidavit on the facts that he
giving orders or commanding the actual abductors.
has just provided, he answered yes and at that juncture the Team assisted him in the
41.In relation to the above suspicion, the Team has theorized that officers below the rank of Captain might have
preparation of his "Sinumpaang Salaysay" based on his personal knowledge and in a
perpetrated the actual abduction.
language known to him. After which, the Team asked Jeffrey to read, examine and
42.The Team explored this possibility and focused its attention on the officers of the 7th ID, PA, namely: Lt. Vicente
determine whether all the information he just provided are reflected in his "Sinumpaang
O. Dagdag, Jr., the S-4 of 65 IB who executed an affidavit relative to the alleged stolen Plate
Salaysay" and Jeffrey answered yes. Thereafter, Jeffrey affixed his signature after being
No. TAB-194; 2Lt. Rey B. Dequito of 56th IB, the witness against Edmond Dag-Uamn for the
sworn to before a lady CHR lawyer and a duly commissioned Notary Public for and in
alleged crime of murder; and 1Lt. Usmalik Tayaban, the Team Leader with the 56th IB who
Quezon City.
issued a Custody Receipt in connection with the Petition for Habeas Corpus filed in Angeles
W.Daguman confirmed Tayaban's and Baliaga's actual affiliation with the military and their assignment at the 56th
City relative to the 2006 Emerito Lipio abduction case against the police and military
Infantry Battalion, 7th ID
personnel. DaTEIc
53.On December 10, 2010, the Team went to the Bulacan Provincial Jail to visit Edmond Dag-Uman and asked him
T.Face-book account
to identify his former Company Commander at the 56th IB, 71 ID, Lt. Usmalik Tayaban and
43.Google search of the names of the above mentioned individuals yielded negative result except for 1Lt. Usmalik
to identify the pictures. aAEHCI
Tayaban, whose name was connected to a social networking site, the Face-book account of
54.Edmond Dag-uman identified the encircled in the picture as LT. HARRY A. BALIAGA, JR., and the man with a
PMA BATCH SANGHAYA 2000.
receding hair as LT. USMALIK TAYABAN, his former Company Commander.
44.In the Facebook account Sanghaya, the contents of which is categorized as "PUBLIC" or open to public viewing,
55.When asked if he was willing to reduce in writing his precious statements and those that just mentioned, he
it appears that "Malik" Tayaban is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA)
replied "BAKA MAPAHAMAK AKO NYAN! (That might endanger me!). Following a lengthy
Batch Sanghaya of 2000. Other leads were also discovered, such as the following:
discussion on the pros and cons of executing a sworn statement and the assurance of the
vernacular description of "tisoy" which was mentioned by one of the users in the "comment
Team to exclude his statements that are critical to the military establishment, it dawned on
portion" of the account which incidentally was also mentioned in the anonymous e-mail as
Dag-uman that his statement would be of help to the Commission in bringing his case to the
the "team leader" (T.L.); the picture of a man sporting a "back-pack", which was also
proper authorities for review and appropriate action, that he eventually expressed his
mentioned by witness Elsa. Per Elsa's account, the person in the cartographic sketch was
willingness to do so.
wearing a "back-pack."
56.After which the Team immediately went to a "Computer Cafe" nearby to encode the "Salaysay", then the printed
45.Aware of the intricacies of the above-mentioned leads, the Team caused the reproduction of all pictures in the
copy was presented to him for his determination whether he is in full accord with the
Facebook account for future reference; and requested the NBI (Burgos) Team for a copy of
contents therein. Edmond spent about thirty (30) minutes reading it and changed the word
the PMA Sanghaya Batch 2000 Year Book, also for future reference.
"Charlie" to "Bravo" and then affixed his initial on it. He also signed the "Sinumpaang
U.The PMA Year Book
Salaysay" after being sworn to before a team member authorized to administer oath.
46.Through the efforts of the NBI (Burgos) Team, the Team was able to get the PMA Year Book of Sanghaya Batch
X.Second visit to ELSA AGASANG and her Supplemental Sworn Statement
2000 and the location of one important eyewitness in the abduction. DHTCaI
57.On January 26, 2011, the Team along with witness Jeffrey went to Bicol to meet witness Elsa. The aim was to
V.JEFFREY CABINTOY

25
 help Elsa recall the faces of those she saw in the abduction by showing to her recently-
acquired pictures of suspects. HAIaEc
58.For the first time they would re-unite, after almost four years since that fateful day of April 28, 2007, when both
of them had the experience of witnessing an abduction incident, which rendered them
jobless and unsafe.
59.The Team told Jeffrey to sit in front of Elsa without introducing him to her. After about half an hour into the
conversation, she expressed disbelief when she realized that she was facing in person he
co-worker that she knew very well.
60.On January 29, 2011, Elsa executed her Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay affirming her Salaysay given before
PCI Lino DL Banaag at the CIDU, Quezon City Police District Office, Camp Karingal, Quezon
City; and corroborating the material allegations contained in the Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Jeffrey.
On the basis of the evidence it had gathered, the CHR submitted the following findings: 12
Based on the facts developed by evidence obtaining in this case, the CHR finds that the enforced disappearance
of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos had transpired; and that his constitutional rights to life
liberty and security were violated by the Government have been fully determined.
Jeffrey Cabintoy and Elsa Agasang have witnessed on that fateful day of April 28, 2007 the forcible abduction of Jonas Burgos
by a group of about seven (7) men and a woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground
floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. SHADcT
xxx xxx xxx
The eyewitnesses mentioned above were Jeffrey Cabintoy (Jeffrey) and Elsa Agasang (Elsa), who at the time of
the abduction were working as busboy and Trainee-Supervisor, respectively, at Hapag
Kainan Restaurant.
In his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Jeffrey had a clear recollection of the face of HARRY AGAGEN BALIAGA, JR. as one of the
principal abductors, apart from the faces of the two abductors in the cartographic sketches that he described to the police, after he
was shown by the Team the pictures in the PMA Year Book of Batch Sanghaya 2000 and group pictures of men taken some years
thereafter.
The same group of pictures were shown to detained former 56th IB Army trooper Edmond M. Dag-uman (Dag-uman), who
also positively identified Lt. Harry Baliaga, Jr. Daguman's Sinumpaang Salaysay states that he came to know Lt. Baliaga as a
Company Commander in the 56th IB while he was still in the military service (with Serial No. 800693, from 1997 to 2002)
also with the 56th IB but under 1Lt. Usmalik Tayaban, the Commander of Bravo Company. When he was arrested and brought
to the 56th IB Camp in April 2005, he did not see Lt. Baliaga anymore at the said camp. The similar reaction that the pictures elicited
from both Jeffrey and Daguman did not pass unnoticed by the Team. Both men always look pensive, probably because of the pathetic
plight they are in right now. It came as a surprise therefore to the Team when they could hardly hide their smile upon seeing the face
of Baliaga, as if they know the man very well.
Moreover, when the Team asked how Jeffrey how certain was he that it was indeed Baliaga that he saw as among
those who actually participated in Jonas' abduction, Jeffrey was able to give a graphic
description and spontaneously, to boot, the blow by blow account of the incident, including
the initial positioning of the actors, specially Baliaga, who even approached, talked to, and
presented him from interfering in their criminal act.
A Rebel-returnee (RR) named Maria Vita Lozada y Villegas @KA MY, has identified the face of the female in the
cartographic sketch as a certain Lt. Fernando. While Lozada refuses to include her
identification of Lt. Fernando in her Sinumpaang Salaysay for fear of a backlash, she told
the Team that she was certain it was Lt. Fernando in the cartographic sketch since both of
them were involved in counter-insurgency operations at the 56th IB, while she was under
the care of the battalion from March 2006 until she left the 56th IB Headquarters in
October 2007. Lozada's involvement in counter-insurgency operations together with Lt.
Fernando was among the facts gathered by the CHR Regional Office 3 Investigators, whose
investigation into the enforced disappearance of Jonas Joseph Burgos was documented by
way of an After Mission Report dated August 13, 2008. DASCIc
Most if not all the actual abductors would have been identified had it not been for what is otherwise called as evidentiary
difficulties shamelessly put up by some police and military elites. The deliberate refusal of TJAG Roa to provide the CHR with
the requested documents does not only defy the Supreme Court directive to the AFP but ipso facto created a disputable
presumption that AFP personnel were responsible for the abduction and that their superiors would be found accountable, if
not responsible, for the crime committed. This observation finds support in the disputable presumption "That evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced." (Paragraph (e), Section 3, Rule 131 on Burden of Proof and Presumptions, Revised Rules
on Evidence of the Rules of Court of the Philippines).
In saying that the requested document is irrelevant, the Team has deemed that the requested documents and profiles would
help ascertain the true identities of the cartographic sketches of two abductors because a certain Virgilio Eustaquio has
claimed that one of the intelligence operatives involved in the 2007 ERAP 5 case fits the description of his abductor.
As regards the PNP CIDG, the positive identification of former 56th IB officer Lt. HARRY A. BALIAGA, JR. as
one of the principal abductors has effectively crushed the theory of the CIDG
witnesses that the NPAs abducted Jonas. Baliaga's true identity and affiliation with
the military have been established by overwhelming evidence corroborated by
detained former Army trooper Dag-uman.
For lack of material time, the Commission will continue to investigate the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos
as an independent body and pursuant to its mandate under the 1987 Constitution. Of
particular importance are the identities and locations of the persons appearing in the
cartographic sketches; the allegations that CIDG Witnesses Emerito G. Lipio and Meliza
Concepcion-Reyes are AFP enlisted personnel and the alleged participation of Delfin De
Guzman @ Ka Baste in the abduction of Jonas Burgos whose case for Murder and
Attempted Murder was dismissed by the court for failure of the lone witness, an army man
of the 56th IB to testify against him.
Interview with Virgilio Eustaquio, Chairman of the Union Masses for Democracy and Justice (UMDJ), revealed that
the male abductor of Jonas Burgos appearing in the cartographic sketch was among the
raiders who abducted him and four others, identified as Jim Cabauatan, Jose Curament,
Ruben Dionisio and Dennis Ibona otherwise known as ERAP FIVE. TCIHSa
Unfortunately, and as already pointed out above, The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) turned down the request of
the Team for a profile of the operatives in the so-called "Erap 5" abduction on the ground of
relevancy and branded the request as a fishing expedition per its Disposition Form dated
September 21, 2010.
Efforts to contact Virgilio Eustaquio to secure his affidavit proved futile, as his present whereabouts cannot be
determined. And due to lack of material time, the Commission decided to pursue the same
and determine the whereabouts of the other members of the "Erap 5" on its own time and
authority as an independent body.
Based on the above-cited findings, the CHR submitted the following recommendations for the Court's
consideration, viz.: 13
i.To DIRECT the Department of Justice (DOJ), subject to certain requirements, to immediately admit witnesses
Jeffrey T. Cabintoy and Elsa B. Agasang to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit
Program under Republic Act No. 6981; cEaDTA
ii.To DIRECT the Department of Justice (DOJ) to commence the filing of Criminal Charges for Kidnapping/Enforced
Disappearance and/or Arbitrary Detention against 1LT. HARRY AGAGEN BALIAGA, JR. of
the Philippine Army, as Principal by Direct Participation in the abduction of Jonas Joseph T.
Burgos on April 28, 2007 from Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City;
iii.To DIRECT the Department of Justice to cause the filing of Obstruction of Justice against Emerito Lipio y
Gonzales; Marlon Manuel y de Leon; and Meliza Concepcion-Reyes for giving false or
fabricated information to the CIDG and for their willful refusal to cooperate with the CHR
Team in the investigation of the herein enforced disappearance;
iv.To DIRECT Cavite Provincial Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco to appear before the Supreme Court and to divulge
his source/informant as the same does not fall under the privilege communication rule;
v.To DIRECT the PNP-CIDG RC, NCRCIDU, Atty. Joel Napoleon M. Coronel, to explain his Memorandum to the CIDG-
CIDD stating that "the witnesses were reportedly turned over by the Bulacan PPO and
Philippine Army to the CIDG for investigation . . .," considering that said witnesses were not
under police or military custody at the time of the supposed turn-over in the evening of
August 22, 2007 and to identify the PNP officer who directed the CIDG operatives to fetch
Emerito G. Lipio in Bulacan and the two other CIDG witnesses for tactical interrogation;
cDHAaT
vi.To REQUIRE General Roa of the Judge Advocate General Office, AFP, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,
JI, AFP, to explain their failure and/or refusal to provide the CHR with copies of documents
relevant to the case of Jonas T. Burgos, particularly the following: (a) Profile and Summary
of Information and pictures of T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army) and three (3) other
enlisted personnel mentioned in paragraph (1) of the dispositive portion of the Supreme
Court En Banc Resolution issued on 22 June 2010 in the instant consolidated cases,
including a certain 2Lt. Fernando, a lady officer involved in the counter-insurgency
operations of the 56th IB in 2006 to 2007; (b) copies of the records of the 2007 ERAP 5
incident in Kamuning, Quezon City and the complete list of the intelligence operatives
involved in that said covert military operation, including their respective Summary of
Information and individual pictures; and (c) complete list of the officers, women and men
assigned at the 56th and 69th Infantry Battalion and the 7th Infantry Division from January
1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 with their respective profiles, Summary of Information and
pictures; including the list of captured rebels and rebels who surrendered to the said camps
and their corresponding pictures and copies of their Tactical Interrogation Reports and the
cases filed against them, if any.
vii.To DIRECT the PNP-CIDG to comply with its mandate under paragraph (3) of the dispositive portion of the
Supreme Court En Banc Resolution promulgated on 22 June 2010 in the instant
consolidated cases.
viii.To DIRECT Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., the Philippine Army's 56th Infantry Battalion in Bulacan and 7th Infantry
Division at Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija to produce the living body of the victim
Jonas Joseph T. Burgos before this Court.
ix.To DIRECT the Department of Justice to review and determine the probable liability/accountability of the
officers and enlisted personnel concerned of the Philippine Army's 56th IB and the 7th ID,
relative to the torture and/or other forms of ill-treatment of Edmond M. Dag-uman, while
he was in detention at Fort Magsaysay sometime in October 2005, as part of the collateral
discoveries in the conduct of this investigation; DAETHc
x.To DIRECT the Department of Justice to review the case filed against Edmond Dag-uman alias DELFIN DE
GUZMAN with the Regional Trial Court Branch 10 in Malolos City docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 1844-M-2005 and 186-M-2006; and the legal basis, if any, for his continued detention
at the Bulacan Provincial Jail in Malolos City; and
xi.To DIRECT the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to study the probable liability of Adelio A.
Asuncion, former Jail Warden of Bulacan Provincial Jail for his failure to account the
records of the inmates more specifically the records of turn-over Edmond Dag-uman from
the 7th ID.
Pursuant to our June 22, 2010, the CHR furnished the petitioner with the copy of its report, which the petitioner
apparently relied upon in filing a criminal complaint against Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. and other members of the
military. 14
OUR RULING
A.Amparo
26
After reviewing the evidence in the present case, the CA findings and our findings in our June 22, 2010 Resolution
heretofore mentioned, including the recent CHR findings that Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., (Lt. Baliaga) of the 56th
Infantry Battalion, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army is one of the abductors of Jonas, we resolve to hold in
abeyance our ruling on the merits in the Amparo aspect of the present case and refer this case back to the CA in
order to allow Lt. Baliaga and the present Amparo respondents to file their respective Comments on the CHR
Report within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution. The CA shall continue
with the hearing of the Amparo petition in light of the evidence previously submitted, the proceedings it already
conducted and the subsequent developments in this case, particularly the CHR Report. Thereafter, the CA shall
rule on the merits of the Amparo petition. For this purpose, we order that Lt. Baliaga be impleaded as a party to
the Amparo petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA). This directive to implead Lt. Baliaga is without prejudice to
similar directives we may issue with respect to others whose identities and participation may be disclosed in
future investigations.
We also note that Office of the Judge Advocate General (TJAG) failed and/or refused to provide the CHR with
copies of documents relevant to the case of Jonas, and thereby disobeyed our June 22, 2010 Resolution. To recall,
we issued a Resolution declaring the CHR as the Court's directly commissioned agency tasked with the
continuation of the investigation of Jonas' abduction and the gathering of evidence, with the obligation to report its
factual findings and recommendations to this Court. In this same Resolution, we required the then incumbent
Chiefs of the AFP and the PNP to make available and to provide copies to the CHR, of all documents and records in
their possession and as the CHR may require, relevant to the case of Jonas, subject to reasonable regulations
consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.
In its March 15, 2011 Report, the CHR recommended, for the Court's consideration: 15
vi.To REQUIRE General Roa of the Judge Advocate General Office, AFP, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,
JI, AFP, to explain their failure and/or refusal to provide the CHR with
copies of documents relevant to the case of Jonas T. Burgos, particularly
the following: (a) Profile and Summary of Information and pictures of
T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army) and three (3) other enlisted
personnel mentioned in paragraph (1) of the dispositive portion of the
Supreme Court En Banc Resolution issued on 22 June 2010 in the instant
consolidated cases, including a certain 2Lt. Fernando, a lady officer
involved in the counter-insurgency operations of the 56th IB in 2006 to
2007; (b) copies of the records of the 2007 ERAP 5 incident in
Kamuning, Quezon City and the complete list of the intelligence
operatives involved in that said covert military operation, including their
respective Summary of Information and individual pictures; and (c)
complete list of the officers, women and men assigned at the 56th and
69th Infantry Battalion and the 7th Infantry Division from January 1,
2004 to June 30, 2007 with their respective profiles, Summary of
Information and pictures; including the list of captured rebels and rebels
who surrendered to the said camps and their corresponding pictures
and copies of their Tactical Interrogation Reports and the cases filed
against them, if any. DEcSaI
Section 16 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that any person who otherwise disobeys or resists a
lawful process or order of the court may be punished for contempt, viz.:
SEC. 16.Contempt. The court, justice or judge may order the respondent who refuses to make a return, or who
makes a false return, or any person who otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or
order of the court to be punished for contempt. The contemnor may be imprisoned or
imposed a fine.
Acting on the CHR's recommendation and based on the above considerations, we resolve to require General Roa of
TJAG, AFP, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of our June 22, 2010 Resolution, and
then incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, 16 to show cause and explain, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of this Resolution, why they should not be held in contempt of this Court for defying our June 22,
2010 Resolution.
B.Habeas Corpus
In light of the new evidence obtained by the CHR, particularly the Cabintoy evidence that positively identified Lt.
Baliaga as one of the direct perpetrators in the abduction of Jonas and in the interest of justice, we resolve to set
aside the CA's dismissal of the habeas corpus petition and issue anew the writ of habeas corpus returnable to the
Presiding Justice of the CA who shall immediately refer the writ to the same CA division that decided the habeas
corpus petition (CA-GR SP No. 99839). ASaTCE
For this purpose, we also order that Lt. Baliaga be impleaded as a party to the habeas corpus petition and require
him together with the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP; the incumbent Commanding General, Philippine Army; and
the Commanding Officer of the 56th IB at the time of the disappearance of Jonas, Lt. Col. Feliciano to produce
the person of Jonas and to show cause why he should not be released from detention.
The CA shall rule on the merits of the habeas corpus petition in light of the evidence previously submitted to it, the
proceedings already conducted, and the subsequent developments in this case (particularly the CHR report) as
proven by evidence properly adduced before it. The Court of Appeals and the parties may require Prosecutor
Emmanuel Velasco, Jeffrey Cabintoy, Edmund Dag-uman, Melissa Concepcion Reyes, Emerito Lipio and Marlon
Manuel to testify in this case.
C.Petition for Contempt
In dismissing the petition, the CA held: 17
Undoubtedly, the accusation against respondents is criminal in nature. In view thereof, the rules in criminal
prosecution and corollary recognition of respondents' constitutional rights inevitably come
into play. As held in People v. Godoy:
In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is on the prosecution to
prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. CITaSA
Hence, assuming that there is circumstantial evidence to support petitioner's allegations, said circumstantial
evidence falls short of the quantum of evidence that is required to establish the guilt of an
accused in a criminal proceeding, which is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court on contempt, in relation to a Habeas Corpus proceeding, is Section
16, Rule 102, which provides:
Sec. 16.Penalty for refusing to issue writ, or for disobeying the same. A clerk of a court who refuses to issue the
writ after allowance thereof and demand therefor, or a person to whom a writ is
directed, who neglects or refuses to obey or make return of the same according to the
command thereof, or makes false return thereof, or who, upon demand made by or on
behalf of the prisoner, refuses to deliver to the person demanding, within six (6) hours after
the demand therefor, a true copy of the warrant or order of commitment, shall forfeit to the
party aggrieved the sum of one thousand pesos, to be recovered in a proper action, and
may also be punished by the court or judge as for contempt. [emphasis supplied] EAcHCI
In Montenegro v. Montenegro, 18 we explained the types and nature of contempt, as follows:
Contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to
the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. It is defined as "disobedience to
the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity." 7 The power to punish
contempt is inherent in all courts, because it is essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the
courts; and, consequently, to the due administration of justice.
xxx xxx xxx
Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be civil or criminal depending on the nature and effect of the
contemptuous act. Criminal contempt is "conduct directed against the authority and
dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect."
On the other hand, civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a
court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is therefor, an offense
against the party in whose behalf the violated order was made. If the purpose is to
punish, then it is criminal in nature; but if to compensate, then it is civil. [emphasis
supplied]
We agree with the CA that indirect contempt is the appropriate characterization of the charge filed by the
petitioner against the respondents and that the charge is criminal in nature. Evidently, the charge of filing a false
return constitutes improper conduct that serves no other purpose but to mislead, impede and obstruct the
administration of justice by the Court. In People v. Godoy, 19 which the CA cited, we specifically held that under
paragraph (d) of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice constitutes criminal contempt.
A criminal contempt proceeding has been characterized as sui generis as it partakes some of the elements of both
a civil and criminal proceeding, without completely falling under either proceeding. Its identification with a
criminal proceeding is in the use of the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, to the extent that criminal
procedure is consistent with the summary nature of a contempt proceeding. We have consistently held and
established that the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt;
that the accused is afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases; and that proceedings
under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. 20
Contempt, too, is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and
the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. 21 The presumption of
innocence can be overcome only by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which means proof to the satisfaction
of the court and keeping in mind the presumption of innocence that precludes every reasonable hypothesis except
that for which it is given. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact
charged is more likely true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable certainty and
moral certainty a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon
it. 22
For the petitioner to succeed in her petition to declare the respondents in contempt for filing false returns in the
habeas corpus proceedings before the CA, she has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the
respondents had custody of Jonas. As the CA did, we find that the pieces of evidence on record as of the time of the
CA proceedings were merely circumstantial and did not provide a direct link between the respondents and the
abduction of Jonas; the evidence did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that the respondents had a hand in the
abduction of Jonas, and consequently, had custody of him at the time they filed their returns to the Writ of habeas
corpus denying custody of Jonas. ASHICc
However, the subsequent developments in this case, specifically, the investigative findings presented to us by the
CHR pointing to Lt. Baliaga as one of the abductors of Jonas, have given a twist to our otherwise clear conclusion.
Investigations will continue, consistent with the nature of Amparo proceedings to be alive until a definitive result
27
is achieved, and these investigations may yet yield additional evidence affecting the conclusion the CA made. For 1)The profile and Summary of Information and pictures of T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army);
this reason, we can only conclude that the CA's dismissal of the contempt charge should be provisional, i.e., Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air
without prejudice to the re-filing of the charge in the future should the petitioner find this step warranted by the Force); M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air
evidence in the proceedings related to Jonas's disappearance, including the criminal prosecutions that may Force), an alias T.L. all reportedly assigned
transpire. with Military Intelligence Group 15 of
To adjust to the extraordinary nature of Amparo and habeas corpus proceedings and to directly identify the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of
parties bound by these proceedings who have the continuing obligation to comply with our directives, the AFP the Philippines and 2Lt. Fernando, a lady
Chief of Staff, the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, the Director General of the PNP, the Chief of the officer involved in the counter-insurgency
PNP-CIDG and the TJAG shall be named as parties to this case without need of naming their current incumbents, operations of the 56th IB in 2006 to 2007;
separately from the then incumbent officials that the petitioner named in her original Amparo and habeas corpus 2)Copies of the records of the 2007 ERAP 5 incident in Kamuning, Quezon City and the complete
petitions, for possible responsibility and accountability. list of the intelligence operatives involved in
In light of the dismissal of the petitions against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo who is no the longer the that said covert military operation, including
President of the Republic of the Philippines, she should now be dropped as a party-respondent in these petitions. their respective Summary of Information and
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the foregoing reasons, we RESOLVE to: individual pictures; and
I.IN G.R. NO. 183711 (HABEAS CORPUS PETITION, CA-G.R. SP No. 99839) 3)Complete list of the officers, women and men assigned at the 56th and 69th Infantry Battalion
a.ISSUE a Writ of Habeas Corpus anew, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals and the 7th Infantry Division from January 1,
who shall immediately refer the writ to the same Division that 2004 to June 30, 2007 with their respective
decided the habeas corpus petition; profiles, Summary of Information and
b.ORDER Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 99839 and G.R. No. 183711, and pictures; including the list of captured rebels
REQUIRE him, together with the incumbent Chief of Staff, and rebels who surrendered to the said camps
Armed Forces of the Philippines; the incumbent Commanding and their corresponding pictures and copies
General, Philippine Army; and the Commanding Officer of the of their Tactical Interrogation Reports and the
56th IB, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army at the time of cases filed against them, if any. AHDaET
the disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, Lt. Col. These documents shall be released exclusively to this Court for our examination to determine their
Melquiades Feliciano, to produce the person of Jonas Joseph T. relevance to the present case and the advisability of their
Burgos under the terms the Court of Appeals shall prescribe, public disclosure.
and to show cause why Jonas Joseph T. Burgos should not be j.ORDER the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General of
released from detention; the Philippine Army to be impleaded as parties, in
c.REFER back the petition for habeas corpus to the same Division of the Court of Appeals which representation of their respective organizations, separately
shall continue to hear this case after the required Returns from the original respondents impleaded in the petition; and
shall have been filed and render a new decision within thirty the dropping of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as party-
(30) days after the case is submitted for decision; and aAHTDS respondent;
d.ORDER the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General of k.REFER witnesses Jeffrey T. Cabintoy and Elsa B. Agasang to the Department of Justice for
the Philippine Army to be impleaded as parties, separate from admission to the Witness Protection Security and Benefit
the original respondents impleaded in the petition, and the Program, subject to the requirements of Republic Act No.
dropping or deletion of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as 6981; and
party-respondent. l.NOTE the criminal complaint filed by the petitioner with the DOJ which the latter may investigate
II.IN G.R. NO. 183712 (CONTEMPT OF COURT CHARGE, CA-G.R. SP No. 100230) and act upon on its own pursuant to Section 21 of the Rule on
e.AFFIRM the dismissal of the petitioner's petition for Contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 100230, the Writ of Amparo.
without prejudice to the re-filing of the contempt charge as SO ORDERED.
may be warranted by the results of the subsequent CHR ||| (Burgos v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183711, 183712, 183713 (Resolution), [July 5, 2011], 668 PHIL 699-726)

investigation this Court has ordered; and

f.ORDER the dropping or deletion of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as party-
respondent, in light of the unconditional dismissal of the
contempt charge against her.
III.IN G.R. NO. 183713 (WRIT OF AMPARO PETITION, CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA)
g.ORDER Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA and G.R. No. 183713,
without prejudice to similar directives we may issue with
respect to others whose identities and participation may be
disclosed in future investigations and proceedings; ACDTcE
h.DIRECT Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., and the present Amparo respondents to file their Comments on
the CHR report with the Court of Appeals, within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
Resolution.
i.REQUIRE General Roa of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, AFP; the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of our June 22, 2010
Resolution; and then Chief of Staff, AFP, Gen. Ricardo David,
(a) to show cause and explain to this Court, within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
Resolution, why they should not be held in contempt of this
Court for their defiance of our June 22, 2010 Resolution; and
(b) to submit to this Court, within a non-extendible period of
fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, a copy of the
documents requested by the CHR, particularly:

28
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 199199. August 27, 2013.]
MARICRIS D. DOLOT, Chairman of the BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SORSOGON, petitioner, vs. HON.
RAMON PAJE, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
REYNULFO A. JUAN, Regional Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau, DENR, HON. RAUL R. LEE, Governor,
Province of Sorsogon, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, JR., VICTORIA A. AJERO, ALFREDO M. AGUILAR, and JUAN M.
AGUILAR, ANTONES ENTERPRISES, GLOBAL SUMMIT MINES DEV'T. CORP., and TR ORE, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Order 2 dated
September 16, 2011 and Resolution 3 dated October 18, 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Sorsogon, Branch 53. The assailed issuances dismissed Civil Case No. 2011-8338 for Continuing Mandamus,
Damages and Attorney's Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Environment Protection Order.
Antecedent Facts
On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish priest of the Holy Infant
Jesus Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for continuing
mandamus, damages and attorney's fees with the RTC of Sorsogon, docketed as Civil Case No. 2011-8338. 4 The
petition contained the following pertinent allegations: (1) sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore mining
operations being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore
in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco, located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2) Matnog is located in
the southern tip of Luzon and there is a need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the
municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and confronted with the environmental dangers
of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard; (4) after investigation,
they learned that the mining operators did not have the required permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor Raul
Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did not have
authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the Presidential Management Staff and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest of the
people of Matnog; 5 and (7) the respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People's Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the Local Government Code. 6 Thus,
they prayed for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop
the mining operations in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a temporary environment protection
order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency group to undertake the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4)
award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among others. 7
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the designated
environmental court. 8 In the Order 9 dated September 16, 2011, the case was summarily dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution 10 dated October 18, 2011.
Aside from sustaining the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC 11 further ruled that: (1) there was
no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition
for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the petitioners therein
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a
copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency, as required by the rules. 12 cDAEIH
Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
Issues
The main issue in this case is whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil Case No. 2011-8338. The
other issue is whether the petition is dismissible on the grounds that: (1) there is no final court decree, order or
decision that the public officials allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; and (3) the petitioners failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the
complaint to the government or appropriate agency.
Ruling of the Court
Jurisdiction and Venue
In dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC, in its Order dated September 16, 2011, apparently relied
on SC Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 defining the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Regions 1 to
12, and Administrative Circular (Admin. Circular) No. 23-2008, 13 designating the environmental courts "to try and
decide violations of environmental laws . . . committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions." 14
Thus, it ruled that its territorial jurisdiction was limited within the boundaries of Sorsogon City and the
neighboring municipalities of Donsol, Pilar, Castilla, Casiguran and Juban and that it was "bereft of jurisdiction to
entertain, hear and decide [the] case, as such authority rests before another co-equal court." 15 cCSTHA
Such reasoning is plainly erroneous. The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008
and confine itself within its four corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed by the
petitioners.
None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of the court to hear, try
and decide a case, is conferred by law. 16 It may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter,
over the person of the defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings. 17 By virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.)
Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC. Particularly, Section 21 (1) thereof provides that the RTCs shall
exercise original jurisdiction
in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction
which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions. (Emphasis ours)
A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 was issued pursuant to Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, which gave the
Court authority to define the territory over which a branch of the RTC shall exercise its authority. These
administrative orders and circulars issued by the Court merely provide for the venue where an action may be filed.
The Court does not have the power to confer jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is
lodged solely in Congress. 18 It also cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the Government. 19 Section
18 of B.P. Blg. 129, in fact, explicitly states that the territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area
of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions. It was
also clarified in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Matas 20 that IEHTaA
Administrative Order No. 3 [defining the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial Region]
and, in like manner, Circular Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial courts or its branches,
such that non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely defines the limits of the
administrative area within which a branch of the court may exercise its authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. 21
The RTC need not be reminded that venue relates only to the place of trial or the geographical location in which an
action or proceeding should be brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of the court. It is intended to
accord convenience to the parties, as it relates to the place of trial, and does not restrict their access to the courts.
22 Consequently, the RTC's motu proprio dismissal of Civil Case No. 2011-8338 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
is patently incorrect. ISCDEA
At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper
venue. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules)specifically states that a
special civil action for continuing mandamus shall be filed with the "[RTC] exercising jurisdiction over the
territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred . . . ." 23 In this case, it appears that the alleged
actionable neglect or omission occurred in the Municipality of Matnog and as such, the petition should have been
filed in the RTC of Irosin. 24 But even then, it does not warrant the outright dismissal of the petition by the RTC as
venue may be waived. 25 Moreover, the action filed by the petitioners is not criminal in nature where venue is an
essential element of jurisdiction. 26 In Gomez-Castillo v. Commission on Elections, 27 the Court even expressed that
what the RTC should have done under the circumstances was to transfer the case (an election protest) to the
proper branch. Similarly, it would serve the higher interest of justice 28 if the Court orders the transfer of Civil Case
No. 2011 8338 to the RTC of Irosin for proper and speedy resolution, with the RTC applying the Rules in its
disposition of the case.
At this juncture, the Court affirms the continuing applicability of Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 constituting the
different "green courts" in the country and setting the administrative guidelines in the raffle and disposition of
environmental cases. While the designation and guidelines were made in 2008, the same should operate in
conjunction with the Rules. HTDCAS
A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC: Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases
In its Resolution dated October 18, 2011, which resolved the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the order
of dismissal, the RTC further ruled that the petition was dismissible on the following grounds: (1) there is no final
court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely
filed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) there was failure to attach judicial affidavits and
furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency. 29 The respondents, and even the Office
of the Solicitor General, in behalf of the public respondents, all concur with the view of the RTC.
The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay. 30 Now cast in stone under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing
mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for the enforcement/violation of
environmental laws, which are covered by Part II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules
requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and substance before a court may take further action;
otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright. Courts must be cautioned, however, that the determination
to give due course to the petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be applied in a
reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of the law and always with the view in mind of seeing to it that
justice is served. 31 SaIHDA
Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the petition filed under Rule 8, Section 1:
When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station
in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation
or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right
and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns
29
 an environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered the case to the Regional Trial Court of Irosin, Branch 55, for further proceedings with dispatch. Petitioner Maricris
commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully D. Dolot is also ORDERED to furnish the respondents with a copy of the petition and its annexes within ten (10)
satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect
days from receipt of this Decision and to submit its Compliance with the RTC of Irosin.
to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition
shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. SO ORDERED.
||| (Dolot v. Paje, G.R. No. 199199, [August 27, 2013])
On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as well as a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an act
or omission of the government agency, instrumentality or its officer concerned. Sufficiency of substance, on the
other hand, necessitates that the petition must contain substantive allegations specifically constituting an
actionable neglect or omission and must establish, at the very least, a prima faciebasis for the issuance of the writ,
viz.: (1) an agency or instrumentality of government or its officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an act or
unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right; (2) the act to be performed by the government
agency, instrumentality or its officer is specifically enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such duty results from an office,
trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law, rule or regulation or a
right therein; and (4) there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law. 32 IEHTaA
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the performance of an
act specifically enjoined by law." 33 The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other related
law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The RTC's mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or
order is apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule n
(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or
instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts
decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied.
(Emphasis ours)
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually pertains to the judgment or
decree that a court would eventually render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and which
judgment or decree shall subsequently become final. CSHEca
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity. with Rule 8, Section 7 and such judgment
has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the government agency
concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is
only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ shall be made to
the court and if the court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be
entered in the court docket. 34 A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance
with a final judgment as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful
implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court's decision." 35
The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners should have first filed a case with the Panel
of Arbitrators (Panel), which has jurisdiction over mining disputes under R.A. No. 7942.
Indeed, as pointed out by the respondents, the Panel has jurisdiction over mining disputes. 36 But the petition filed
below does not involve a mining dispute. What was being protested are the alleged negative environmental impact
of the small-scale mining operation being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development
Corporation and TR Ore in the Municipality of Matnog; the authority of the Governor of Sorsogon to issue mining
permits in favor of these entities; and the perceived indifference of the DENR and local government officials over
the issue. Resolution of these matters does not entail the technical knowledge and expertise of the members of the
Panel but requires an exercise of judicial function. Thus, in Olympic Mines and Development Corp. v. Platinum
Group Metals Corporation, 37 the Court stated TEDAHI
Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a disagreement between the parties as to some
provisions of the contract between them, which needs the interpretation and the application of that particular knowledge
and expertise possessed by members of that Panel. It is not proper when one of the parties repudiates the existence or validity of
such contract or agreement on the ground of fraud or oppression as in this case. The validity of the contract cannot be subject of
arbitration proceedings. Allegations of fraud and duress in the execution of a contract are matters within the jurisdiction of the
ordinary courts of law. These questions are legal in nature and require the application and interpretation of laws and
jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial function. 38 (Emphasis supplied in the former and ours in the latter)
Consequently, resort to the Panel would be completely useless and unnecessary.
The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to attach judicial affidavits. As
previously stated, Rule 8 requires that the petition should be verified, contain supporting evidence and must be
accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion
of judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It is only if the evidence of the petitioner would consist of testimony of
witnesses that it would be the time that judicial affidavits (affidavits of witnesses in the question and answer form)
must be attached to the petition/complaint. 39
Finally, failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is not a fatal defect such that the case should be
dismissed. The RTC could have just required the petitioners to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents. It
should be remembered that "courts are not enslaved by technicalities, and they have the prerogative to relax
compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the
need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties' right to an opportunity to be heard." 40 THADEI
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated September 16, 2011 and Resolution dated October 18,
2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 53, dismissing Civil Case No. 2011-8338 are
NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon is DIRECTED to transfer

30
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 203254. October 8, 2014.]
DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, petitioner, vs. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN, respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision dated August 30, 2012 of the
1 2
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 (RTC) in SP No. 12-71527, which extended the privilege of the
writ of habeas data in favor of respondent Police Superintendent Neri A. Ilagan (Ilagan).
The Facts
In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data 3 dated June 22, 2012, Ilagan alleged that he and petitioner
Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former common law partners. Sometime in July 2011, he visited Lee at the latter's
condominium, rested for a while and thereafter, proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that his digital
camera was missing. 4 On August 23, 2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter's office regarding a purported sex
video (subject video) she discovered from the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan
denied the video and demanded Lee to return the camera, but to no avail. 5 During the confrontation, Ilagan
allegedly slammed Lee's head against a wall inside his office and walked away. 6 Subsequently, Lee utilized the said
video as evidence in filing various complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal complaint for violation of
Republic Act No. 9262, 7 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004,"
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati; and (b) an administrative complaint for grave misconduct before
the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). 8 Ilagan claimed that Lee's acts of reproducing the subject video and
threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the Internet
violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other woman, and thus, the
issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is warranted. 9
Finding the petition prima facie meritorious, the RTC issued a Writ of Habeas Data dated June 25, 2012, directing
10
Lee to appear before the court a quo, and to produce Ilagan's digital camera, as well as the negative and/or original
and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party." In other words, the petition
must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right
to life, liberty or security on the other. 19 Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by
substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim. 20 In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely
property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and
doubtful. 21
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or
security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject
sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video which he fears would
somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption he failed to explain the
connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot
speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter
evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one's privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or
security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas
data petition dismissible, as in this case.
In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be dismissible due to the
inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was
his sell-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas
Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act
towards the end of violating Ilagan's right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even
lead a reasonable mind to conclude 22 that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to achieve unlawful
ends say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan's reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it
clear in her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the
same as evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan. Hence, due to the
23

of the subject video and copies thereof, and to file a verified written return within five (5) working days from date insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to
of receipt thereof. reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.
In her Verified Return 11 dated July 2, 2012, Lee admitted that she indeed kept the memory card of the digital WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
camera and reproduced the aforesaid video but averred that she only did so to utilize the same as evidence in the City, Branch 224 in SP No. 12-71527 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition for Issuance
cases she filed against Ilagan. She also admitted that her relationship with Ilagan started sometime in 2003 and of the Writ of Habeas Data filed by respondent P/Supt. Neri A. Ilagan is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
ended under disturbing circumstances in August 2011, and that she only happened to discover the subject video SO ORDERED.
||| (Lee v. Ilagan, G.R. No. 203254, [October 8, 2014])
when Ilagan left his camera in her condominium. Accordingly, Lee contended that Ilagan's petition for the issuance
of the writ of habeas data should be dismissed because: (a) its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence
against Ilagan in the cases she filed; and (b) she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data
regarding the person of Ilagan. 12 ASTcEa
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision 13 dated August 30, 2012, the RTC granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data in Ilagan's favor,
and accordingly, ordered the implementing officer to turn-over copies of the subject video to him, and enjoined
Lee from further reproducing the same. 14
The RTC did not give credence to Lee's defense that she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data regarding the person of Ilagan, finding that her acts of reproducing the subject video and showing it to other
people, i.e., the NAPOLCOM officers, violated the latter's right to privacy in life and caused him to suffer
humiliation and mental anguish. In this relation, the RTC opined that Lee's use of the subject video as evidence in
the various cases she filed against Ilagan is not enough justification for its reproduction. Nevertheless, the RTC
clarified that it is only ruling on the return of the aforesaid video and not on its admissibility before other
tribunals. 15
Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ
of habeas data in favor of Ilagan.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a response,
given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances. 16 It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most
especially the right to informational privacy of individuals, 17 which is defined as "the right to control the
collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself." 18
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as "a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party." Thus,
in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires
that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, "[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened

31
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 180771. April 21, 2015.]
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAON STRAIT, e.g.,TOOTHED WHALES,
DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES, Joined in and Represented herein by Human
Beings Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio, In Their Capacity as Legal Guardians of the
Lesser Life-Forms and as Responsible Stewards of God's Creations, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY ANGELO
REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE),SECRETARY JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),LEONARDO R.
SIBBALUCA, DENR Regional Director-Region VII and in his capacity as Chairperson of the Taon Strait
Protected Seascape Management Board, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR),DIRECTOR
MALCOLM J. SARMIENTO, JR.,BFAR Regional Director for Region VII ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM
EXPLORATION CO.,LTD. (JAPEX),as represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC.,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 181527. April 21, 2015.]
CENTRAL VISAYAS FISHERFOLK DEVELOPMENT CENTER (FIDEC),CERILO D. ENGARCIAL, RAMON YANONG,
FRANCISCO LABID, in their personal capacity and as representatives of the SUBSISTENCE FISHERFOLKS OF
THE MUNICIPALITIES OF ALOGUINSAN AND PINAMUNGAJAN, CEBU, AND THEIR FAMILIES, AND THE
PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS OF FILIPINOS WHOSE RIGHTS ARE SIMILARLY
AFFECTED,petitioners,vs. SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Energy (DOE),JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR),LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, in his capacity as DENR Regional Director-Region VII and as
Chairperson of the Taon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board, ALAN ARRANGUEZ, in his capacity
as Director Environmental Management Bureau-Region VII, DOE Regional Director for Region VIII 1
ANTONIO LABIOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO.,LTD. (JAPEX),as represented by its Philippine
Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC., respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
Before Us are two consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
concerning Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46),which allowed the exploration, development, and
exploitation of petroleum resources within Taon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between the
islands of Negros and Cebu.2
The Petition docketed as G.R. No. 180771 is an original Petition for Certiorari,Mandamus,
and Injunction, which seeks to enjoin respondents from implementing SC-46 and to have it nullified for
willful and gross violation of the 1987 Constitution and certain international and municipal laws.
3
Likewise, the Petition docketed as G.R. No. 181527 is an original Petition for
Certiorari,Prohibition, and Mandamus,which seeks to nullify the Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) issued by the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR),Region VII in connection with SC-46; to prohibit respondents from
implementing SC-46; and to compel public respondents to provide petitioners access to the pertinent
documents involving the Taon Strait Oil Exploration Project.
4
ANTECEDENT FACTSAND PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals"
in the petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the
waters in and around the Taon Strait. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and Rose-Liza
Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as their legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as "the
Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine species.
Also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express
declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Taon Strait, among others.5
Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center
(FIDEC),a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental organization, established for the welfare of the
marginal fisherfolk in Region VII; and Cerilo D. Engarcial (Engarcial),Ramon Yanong (Yanong) and
Francisco Labid (Labid),in their personal capacities and as representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of
the municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu.
Named as respondents in both petitions are the late Angelo T. Reyes, as then Secretary of
the Department of Energy (DOE);Jose L. Atienza, as then Secretary of the DENR; Leonardo R. Sibbaluca, as
then DENR-Regional Director for Region VII and Chairman of the Taon Strait Protected Seascape
Management Board; Japan Petroleum Exploration Co.,Ltd. (JAPEX),a company organized and existing
under the laws of Japan with a Philippine branch office; and Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS),as the
alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX.
In G.R. No. 181527, the following were impleaded as additional public respondents: Alan
C. Arranguez (Arranguez) and Antonio Labios (Labios),in their capacities as then Director of the EMB,
Region VII and then Regional Director of the DOE, Region VII, respectively.
6
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into
a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved
geological and geophysical studies of the Taon Strait. The studies included surface geology, sample
analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted
geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Taon Strait. 7
On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the
exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850
square kilometers offshore the Taon Strait. 8
From May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Taon Strait.
A multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done to determine
the area's underwater composition. CAIHTE 9
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project.
Since the well was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Taon
Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental
10
Impact Assessment requirements pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586, entitled "Establishing an
Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other Environmental Management Related Measures
and for Other Purposes." 11
On January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board of the Taon Strait (PAMB-
12
Taon Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001, wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination
13
(IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the approval of JAPEX's application for an
ECC.
On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for
the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Taon Strait. Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX
14
began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the western
Cebu Province. This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008.
15 16
It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that petitioners applied to this Court for
redress, via two separate original petitions both dated December 17, 2007, wherein they commonly seek
that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among others, violation of the 1987
Constitution.
On March 31, 2008, SOS filed a Motion to Strike its name as a respondent on the ground
17
that it is not the Philippine agent of JAPEX. In support of its motion, it submitted the branch office
application of JAPEX, wherein the latter's resident agent was clearly identified. SOS claimed that it had
18
acted as a mere logistics contractor for JAPEX in its oil and gas exploration activities in the Philippines.
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards opposed SOS's motion on the ground
that it was premature, it was pro-forma,and it was patently dilatory. They claimed that SOS admitted that
"it is in law a (sic) privy to JAPEX" since it did the drilling and other exploration activities in Taon Strait
under the instructions of its principal, JAPEX. They argued that it would be premature to drop SOS as a
party as JAPEX had not yet been joined in the case; and that it was "convenient" for SOS to ask the Court to
simply drop its name from the parties when what it should have done was to either notify or ask JAPEX to
join it in its motion to enable proper substitution. At this juncture, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals
and Stewards also asked the Court to implead JAPEX Philippines as a co-respondent or as a substitute for
its parent company, JAPEX. 19
On April 8, 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 180771 and G.R. No. 181527.
On May 26, 2008, the FIDEC manifested that they were adopting in toto the Opposition to
20
Strike with Motion to Implead filed by petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards in G.R. No.
180771.
On June 19, 2008, public respondents filed their Manifestation that they were not 21
objecting to SOS's Motion to Strike as it was not JAPEX's resident agent. JAPEX during all this time, did not
file any comment at all.
Thus, on February 7, 2012, this Court, in an effort to ensure that all the parties were given
ample chance and opportunity to answer the issues herein, issued a Resolution directing the Court's
process servicing unit to again serve the parties with a copy of the September 23, 2008 Resolution of the
Court, which gave due course to the petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527, and which required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda. The February 7, 2012 Resolution reads as follows: 22
G.R. No. 180771 (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Taon Strait, e.g.,Toothed Whales, Dolphins, Porpoises and
Other Cetacean Species, et al. vs. Hon. Angelo Reyes, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy, et al.) and G.R. No.
181527 (Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center, et al. vs. Hon. Angelo Reyes, et al.). The Court Resolved to direct the
Process Servicing Unit to RE-SEND the resolution dated September 23, 2008 to the following parties and counsel, together with this
resolution:
Atty. Aristeo O. Cario 20th Floor Pearlbank Centre
Counsel for Respondent Supply 146 Valero Street
Oilfield Services, Inc. Salcedo Village, Makati City
JAPEX Philippines Ltd. 20th Floor Pearlbank Centre
146 Valero Street
Salcedo Village, Makati City
32

JAPEX Philippines Ltd.
c/o Atty. Maria Farah Z.G.
Nicolas-Suchianco
Atty. Maria Farah Z.G.
Nicolas-Suchianco
Resident Agent of JAPEX
Philippines Ltd.
This Resolution was personally served to the above parties, at the above addresses on
February 23, 2012. On March 20, 2012, JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. (JAPEX PH),by way of special appearance,
filed a Motion to Admit its Motion for Clarification, wherein JAPEX PH requested to be clarified as to
23 24
whether or not it should deem the February 7, 2012 Resolution as this Court's Order of its inclusion in the
case, as it has not been impleaded. It also alleged that JAPEX PH had already stopped exploration activities
in the Taon Strait way back in 2008, rendering this case moot.
On March 22, 2012, JAPEX PH, also by special appearance, filed a Motion for Extension of
Time to file its Memorandum. It stated that since it received the February 7, 2012 Resolution on February
25
23, 2012, it had until March 22, 2012 to file its Memorandum. JAPEX PH then asked for an additional thirty
days, supposedly to give this Court some time to consider its Motion for Clarification.
On April 24, 2012, this Court issued a Resolution granting JAPEX PH's Motion to Admit its
26
Motion for Clarification. This Court, addressing JAPEX PH's Motion for Clarification, held:
With regard to its Motion for Clarification (By Special Appearance)
dated March 19, 2012, this Court considers JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. as a real party-in-
interest in these cases. Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court, a real party-
in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Contrary to JAPEX Philippines, Ltd.'s
allegation that it is a completely distinct corporation, which should not be confused
with JAPEX Company, Ltd., JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. is a mere branch office, established
by JAPEX Company, Ltd. for the purpose of carrying out the latter's business
transactions here in the Philippines. Thus, JAPEX Philippines, Ltd., has no separate
personality from its mother foreign corporation, the party impleaded in this case.
Moreover, Section 128 of the Corporation Code provides for the
responsibilities and duties of a resident agent of a foreign corporation:
SECTION 128. Resident agent;
service of process. The Securities and
Exchange Commission shall require as a
condition precedent to the issuance of the license
to transact business in the Philippines by any
foreign corporation that such corporation file
with the Securities and Exchange Commission a
written power of attorney designating some
person who must be a resident of the Philippines,
on whom any summons and other legal
processes may be served in all actions or other
legal proceedings against such corporation, and
consenting that service upon such resident agent
shall be admitted and held as valid as if served
upon the duly authorized officers of the foreign
corporation at its home office. Any such foreign
corporation shall likewise execute and file with
the Securities and Exchange Commission an
agreement or stipulation, executed by the proper
authorities of said corporation, in form and
substance as follows:
"The (name of foreign
corporation) does hereby stipulate and agree, in
consideration of its being granted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission a license to
transact business in the Philippines, that if at any
time said corporation shall cease to transact
business in the Philippines, or shall be without
any resident agent in the Philippines on whom
any summons or other legal processes may be
served, then in any action or proceeding arising
out of any business or transaction which
occurred in the Philippines, service of any
summons or other legal process may be made
upon the Securities and Exchange Commission
and that such service shall have the same force
and effect as if made upon the duly-authorized
officers of the corporation at its home office."
Whenever such service of
19th Floor Pearlbank Centre summons or other process shall be made upon
146 Valero Street the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Salcedo Village, Makati City Commission shall, within ten (10) days
thereafter, transmit by mail a copy of such
Suite 2404 Discovery Centre summons or other legal process to the
25 ADB Avenue corporation at its home or principal office. The
Ortigas Center, Pasig City sending of such copy by the Commission shall be
a necessary part of and shall complete such
service. All expenses incurred by the Commission
for such service shall be paid in advance by the
party at whose instance the service is made.
In case of a change of address
of the resident agent, it shall be his or its duty to
immediately notify in writing the Securities and
Exchange Commission of the new address.
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the function of a
resident agent is to receive summons or legal processes that may be served in all
actions or other legal proceedings against the foreign corporation. These cases have
been prosecuted in the name of JAPEX Company, Ltd.,and JAPEX Philippines Ltd.,as its
branch office and resident agent, had been receiving the various resolutions from this
Court, as evidenced by Registry Return Cards signed by its representatives.
And in the interest of justice, this Court resolved to grant JAPEX PH's motion for extension
of time to file its memorandum, and was given until April 21, 2012, as prayed for, within which to comply
with the submission. 27
Without filing its Memorandum, JAPEX PH, on May 14, 2012, filed a motion, asking this
Court for an additional thirty days to file its Memorandum, to be counted from May 8, 2012. It justified its
request by claiming that this Court's April 24, 2012 Resolution was issued past its requested deadline for
filing, which was on April 21, 2012. 28
On June 19, 2012, this Court denied JAPEX PH's second request for additional time to file
its Memorandum and dispensed with such filing.
Since petitioners had already filed their respective memoranda, and public respondents
29
had earlier filed a Manifestation that they were adopting their Comment dated March 31, 2008 as their
30
memorandum, this Court submitted the case for decision.
Petitioners' Allegations
Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Taon
Strait, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards aver that a study made after the seismic survey
showed that the fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent. They claim that before the seismic
survey, the average harvest per day would be from 15 to 20 kilos; but after the activity, the fisherfolk could
only catch an average of 1 to 2 kilos a day. They attribute this "reduced fish catch" to the destruction of the
"payao," also known as the "fish aggregating device" or "artificial reef." Petitioners Resident Marine
31
Mammals and Stewards also impute the incidences of "fish kill" observed by some of the local fisherfolk
32
to the seismic survey. And they further allege that the ECC obtained by private respondent JAPEX is invalid
because public consultations and discussions with the affected stakeholders, a pre-requisite to the
issuance of the ECC, were not held prior to the ECC's issuance.
In its separate petition, petitioner FIDEC confirms petitioners Resident Marine Mammals
and Stewards' allegations of reduced fish catch and lack of public consultations or discussions with the
fisherfolk and other stakeholders prior to the issuance of the ECC. Moreover, it alleges that during the
seismic surveys and drilling, it was barred from entering and fishing within a 7-kilometer radius from the
point where the oilrig was located, an area greater than the 1.5-kilometer radius "exclusion zone" stated in
the IEE. It also agrees in the allegation that public respondents DENR and EMB abused their discretion
33
when they issued an ECC to public respondent DOE and private respondent JAPEX without ensuring the
strict compliance with the procedural and substantive requirements under the Environmental Impact
Assessment system, the Fisheries Code, and their implementing rules and regulations. It further claims
34
that despite several requests for copies of all the documents pertaining to the project in Taon Strait, only
copies of the PAMB-Taon Strait Resolution and the ECC were given to the fisherfolk. HEITAD 35
Public Respondents' Counter-Allegations
Public respondents, through the Solicitor General, contend that petitioners Resident
Marine Mammals and Stewards have no legal standing to file the present petition; that SC-46 does not
violate the 1987 Constitution and the various laws cited in the petitions; that the ECC was issued in
accordance with existing laws and regulations; that public respondents may not be compelled by
mandamus to furnish petitioners copies of all documents relating to SC-46; and that all the petitioners
failed to show that they are entitled to injunctive relief. They further contend that the issues raised in
these petitions have been rendered moot and academic by the fact that SC-46 had been mutually
terminated by the parties thereto effective June 21, 2008. 36
ISSUES
The following are the issues posited by petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and
33
 Stewards in G.R. No. 180771:
I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS HAVE LOCUS STANDI TO FILE THE INSTANT PETITION;
II. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 46 IS VIOLAT[IVE] OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION AND
STATUTES;
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE ON-GOING EXPLORATION AND PROPOSED EXPLOITATION FOR OIL AND NATURAL
GAS AT, AROUND, AND UNDERNEATH THE MARINE WATERS OF THE
TAON STRAIT PROTECTED SEASCAPE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE
PHILIPPINE COMMITMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWS AND INSTRUMENTS; AND
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE (ECC) IN
ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREAS AND HABITATS OF MARINE
WILDLIFE AND ENDANGERED SPECIES IS LEGAL AND PROPER. 37
Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 181527, petitioner FIDEC presented the following issues for our
consideration:
I. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 46 EXECUTED BETWEEN RESPONDENTS DOE AND JAPEX SHOULD
BE NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE FOR BEING IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION AND
APPLICABLE LAWS;
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE OFF-SHORE OIL EXPLORAT[I]ON CONTEMPLATED UNDER SERVICE CONTRACT NO.
46 IS LEGALLY PERMISSIBLE WITHOUT A LAW BEING DULY PASSED
EXPRESSLY FOR THE PURPOSE;
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE OIL EXPLORATION BEING CONDUCTED WITHIN THE TAON STRAIT PROTECTED
SEASCAPE VIOLATES THE RIGHTS AND LEGAL PROTECTION GRANTED
TO PETITIONERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE LAWS.
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE (ECC) FOR SUCH
AN ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL PROJECT INSIDE AN
ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREA SUCH AS THE TAON STRAIT
PROTECTED SEASCAPE CONFORMED TO LAW AND EXISTING RULES
AND REGULATIONS ON THE MATTER.
V. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS MAY BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO FURNISH PETITIONERS
WITH COPIES OF THE DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE TAON
STRAIT OIL EXPLORATION PROJECT.
38
In these consolidated petitions, this Court has determined that the various issues raised by
the petitioners may be condensed into two primary issues:
I. Procedural Issue: Locus Standi of the Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards, petitioners in G.R. No.
180771; and
II. Main Issue: Legality of Service Contract No. 46.
DISCUSSION
At the outset, this Court makes clear that the "'moot and academic principle' is not a
magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case." Courts have decided cases
otherwise moot and academic under the following exceptions:
1) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
2) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
3) The constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar,
and the public; and
4) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
39
In this case, despite the termination of SC-46, this Court deems it necessary to resolve
these consolidated petitions as almost all of the foregoing exceptions are present in this case. Both
petitioners allege that SC-46 is violative of the Constitution, the environmental and livelihood issues raised
undoubtedly affect the public's interest, and the respondents' contested actions are capable of repetition.
Procedural Issues
Locus Standi of Petitioners Resident MarineMammals and Stewards
The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, "claim" that they have the legal
standing to file this action since they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in this suit. Citing
40
Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., they also assert their right to sue for the faithful performance of international and
41
municipal environmental laws created in their favor and for their benefit. In this regard, they propound
that they have the right to demand that they be accorded the benefits granted to them in multilateral
international instruments that the Philippine Government had signed, under the concept of stipulation
pour autrui.
42
For their part, the Stewards contend that there should be no question of their right to
represent the Resident Marine Mammals as they have stakes in the case as forerunners of a campaign to
build awareness among the affected residents of Taon Strait and as stewards of the environment since
the primary steward, the Government, had failed in its duty to protect the environment pursuant to the
public trust doctrine.
43
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also aver that this Court may lower
the benchmark in locus standi as an exercise of epistolary jurisdiction.44
In opposition, public respondents argue that the Resident Marine Mammals have no
standing because Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires parties to an action to be either natural or
juridical persons, viz.:
Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. Only
natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil
action. The term "plaintiff" may refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the
cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may
refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-
defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant.
The public respondents also contest the applicability of Oposa,pointing out that the
petitioners therein were all natural persons, albeit some of them were still unborn. ATICcS 45
As regards the Stewards, the public respondents likewise challenge their claim of legal
standing on the ground that they are representing animals, which cannot be parties to an action.
Moreover, the public respondents argue that the Stewards are not the real parties-in-interest for their
failure to show how they stand to be benefited or injured by the decision in this case. 46
Invoking the alter ego principle in political law, the public respondents claim that absent
any proof that former President Arroyo had disapproved of their acts in entering into and implementing
SC-46, such acts remain to be her own. 47
The public respondents contend that since petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and
Stewards' petition was not brought in the name of a real party-in-interest, it should be dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action. 48
The issue of whether or not animals or even inanimate objects should be given legal
standing in actions before courts of law is not new in the field of animal rights and environmental law.
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards cited the 1972 United States case Sierra Club v.
Rogers C.B. Morton, wherein Justice William O. Douglas, dissenting to the conventional thought on legal
49
standing, opined:
The critical question of "standing" would be simplified and also put
neatly in focus if we fashioned a federal rule that allowed environmental issues to be
litigated before federal agencies or federal courts in the name of the inanimate object
about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and bulldozers and where injury is
the subject of public outrage. ....
Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has a
legal personality, a fiction found useful for maritime purposes. The corporation sole
a creature of ecclesiastical law is an acceptable adversary and large fortunes ride on
its cases. The ordinary corporation is a "person" for purposes of the adjudicatory
processes, whether it represents proprietary, spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable causes.
So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes,
estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even air that feels the
destructive pressures of modern technology and modern life. The river, for example, is
the living symbol of all the life it sustains or nourishes fish, aquatic insects, water
ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all other animals, including man, who are
dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life. The river as plaintiff
speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it. Those people who have a
meaningful relation to that body of water whether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a
zoologist, or a logger must be able to speak for the values which the river
represents and which are threatened with destruction. (Citations omitted.)
50
The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give animals
and inanimate objects standing is due to the need to comply with the strict requirements in bringing a suit
to court. Our own 1997 Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be either natural or juridical persons,
or entities authorized by law. It further necessitates the action to be brought in the name of the real party-
in-interest, even if filed by a representative, viz.:
Rule 3Parties to Civil Actions
Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. Only
natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil
action. The term "plaintiff" may refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the
cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may
refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-
defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant.
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. Where the action is allowed to
be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary
capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed
to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a
guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An
agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue
or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things
belonging to the principal.
It had been suggested by animal rights advocates and environmentalists that not only
natural and juridical persons should be given legal standing because of the difficulty for persons, who
34
 cannot show that they by themselves are real parties-in-interests, to bring actions in representation of
these animals or inanimate objects. For this reason, many environmental cases have been dismissed for
failure of the petitioner to show that he/she would be directly injured or affected by the outcome of the
case. However, in our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized
approach. While developments in Philippine legal theory and jurisprudence have not progressed as far as
Justice Douglas's paradigm of legal standing for inanimate objects, the current trend moves towards
simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases.
Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,
which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for
violations of our environmental laws:
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. Any Filipino citizen in representation of
others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce
rights or obligations under environmental laws.Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the
court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action
and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to
intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may
publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or
furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be
governed by their respective provisions. (Emphasis ours.)
52
Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, commented:
Citizen suit.To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing environmental rights to file
their cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws and collapses the
traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature.The terminology of the text
reflects the doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran,insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn. (Emphasis
53
supplied, citation omitted.)
Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure "may be
retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate
any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in
rules of procedure." 54
Elucidating on this doctrine, the Court, in Systems Factors Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission held that:
55
Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take
away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of
rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or
the general rule against retroactive operation of statutes. Statutes regulating the
procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that
sense and to that extent. ....
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective,
this Court had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In
Oposa,we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn "based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned."
Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to
be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. TIADCc 57
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has
been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to
enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the
Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-
Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat
of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.
Impleading Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyoas an Unwilling Co-Petitioner
Petitioners Stewards in G.R. No. 180771 impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for the following reasons, which we quote:
Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,also of legal age, Filipino and resident of Malacaang Palace, Manila Philippines. Steward
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo happens to be the incumbent President of the Philippine Islands. She is personally impleaded in this suit as
an unwilling co-petitioner by reason of her express declaration and undertaking under the recently signed ASEAN Charter to protect
Your Petitioners' habitat, among others. She is meantime dominated as an unwilling co-petitioner due to lack of material time in
seeking her signature and imprimatur hereof and due to possible legal complications that may hereafter arise by reason of her official
relations with public respondents under the alter ego principle in political law.
58
This is incorrect.
Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. If the consent of any party who
should be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the
reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.
Under the foregoing rule, when the consent of a party who should be joined as a plaintiff
cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a party defendant to the case. This will put the unwilling party
under the jurisdiction of the Court, which can properly implead him or her through its processes. The
unwilling party's name cannot be simply included in a petition, without his or her knowledge and consent,
as such would be a denial of due process.
Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners Stewards for including former President
Macapagal-Arroyo in their petition, is not sufficient to implead her as an unwilling co-petitioner.
51 Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she made in the performance of
the functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy against embroiling the President in suits, "to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering
that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's
time, also demands undivided attention." 59
Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be impleaded as one of the
petitioners in this suit. Thus, her name is stricken off the title of this case.
Main Issue:Legality of Service Contract No. 46
Service Contract No. 46 vis--visSection 2, Article XII of the1987 Constitution
Petitioners maintain that SC-46 transgresses the Jura Regalia Provision or paragraph 1,
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution because JAPEX is 100% Japanese-owned. Furthermore, the 60
FIDEC asserts that SC-46 cannot be considered as a technical and financial assistance agreement validly
executed under paragraph 4 of the same provision. The petitioners claim that La Bugal-B'laan Tribal
61
Association, Inc. v. Ramos laid down the guidelines for a valid service contract, one of which is that there
62
must exist a general law for oil exploration before a service contract may be entered into by the
Government. The petitioners posit that the service contract in La Bugal is presumed to have complied with
the requisites of (a) legislative enactment of a general law after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution
(such as Republic Act No. 7942, or the Philippine Mining Law of 1995, governing mining contracts) and (b)
presidential notification. The petitioners thus allege that the ruling in La Bugal, which involved mining
contracts under Republic Act No. 7942, does not apply in this case. The petitioners also argue that
63
Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972 cannot legally justify SC-46
as it is deemed to have been repealed by the 1987 Constitution and subsequent laws, which enunciate new
policies concerning the environment. In addition, petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 claim that paragraphs 2
64
and 3 of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution mandate the exclusive use and enjoyment by the
Filipinos of our natural resources, and paragraph 4 does not speak of service contracts but of FTAAs or
65
Financial Technical Assistance Agreements. 66
The public respondents again controvert the petitioners' claims and asseverate that SC-46
does not violate Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. They hold that SC-46 does not fall under the
coverage of paragraph 1 but instead, under paragraph 4 of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
on FTAAs. They also insist that paragraphs 2 and 3, which refer to the grant of exclusive fishing right to
Filipinos, are not applicable to SC-46 as the contract does not grant exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX nor
does it otherwise impinge on the FIDEC's right to preferential use of communal marine and fishing
resources. 67
Ruling of the Courton the legality of Service Contract No. 46vis--vis Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
56
Constitution
The petitioners insist that SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution, which reads as follows:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter
into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic
waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural
resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to
subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance
for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of
the country.In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days
from its execution.(Emphases ours.)
This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still allowed
under the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal, we held that the deletion of the words "service contracts" in the
35
 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, in that decision, we quoted in length,
portions of the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to show that in
deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to service contracts as
understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses
prevalent during the martial law regime, to wit: AIDSTE
Summation of the
ConCom Deliberations
At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful
reading of the ConCom deliberations, as follows:
In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, the
framers used the term service contracts in referring to agreements ...involving either
technical or financial assistance.
They spoke of service contracts as the concept was understood in
the 1973 Constitution.
It was obvious from their discussions that they were not about to
ban or eradicate service contracts.
Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to put in place
safeguards that would eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the marital
law regime.In brief, they were going to permit service contracts with foreign
corporations as contractors, but with safety measures to prevent abuses, as an
exception to the general norm established in the first paragraph of Section 2 of Article
XII. This provision reserves or limits to Filipino citizens and corporations at least 60
percent of which is owned by such citizens the exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources.
This provision was prompted by the perceived insufficiency of
Filipino capital and the felt need for foreign investments in the EDU of minerals and
petroleum resources.
The framers for the most part debated about the sort of
safeguards that would be considered adequate and reasonable. But some of them,
having more "radical" leanings, wanted to ban service contracts altogether; for them,
the provision would permit aliens to exploit and benefit from the nation's natural
resources, which they felt should be reserved only for Filipinos.
In the explanation of their votes, the individual commissioners
were heard by the entire body. They sounded off their individual opinions, openly
enunciated their philosophies, and supported or attacked the provisions with fervor.
Everyone's viewpoint was heard.
In the final voting, the Article on the National Economy and
Patrimony including paragraph 4 allowing service contracts with foreign
corporations as an exception to the general norm in paragraph 1 of Section 2 of the
same article was resoundingly approved by a vote of 32 to 7, with 2 abstentions.
Agreements Involving Technical
or Financial Assistance are
Service Contracts with Safeguards
From the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that the phrase
agreements involving either technical or financial assistance,referred to in paragraph
4, are in fact service contracts.But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are
between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the other,
the government as principal or "owner" of the works. In the new service contracts, the
foreign contractors provide capital, technology and technical know-how, and
managerial expertise in the creation and operation of large-scale mining/extractive
enterprises; and the government, through its agencies (DENR, MGB),actively exercises
control and supervision over the entire operation. 68
In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, we established that paragraph 4,
with the safeguards in place, is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII.The following
are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La Bugal:
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several
safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a
general law that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements,
presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible
insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government
because, supposedly before an agreement is presented to the President for signature,
it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms
to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President
shall report it to Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look
over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any. 69
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and
void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The General Law onOil Exploration
The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous
petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and
Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by then President Ferdinand Marcos to promote the discovery
and production of indigenous petroleum through the utilization of government and/or local or foreign
private resources to yield the maximum benefit to the Filipino people and the revenues to the Philippine
Government. 70
Contrary to the petitioners' argument, Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted in
1972, before the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless otherwise repealed, to
wit:
ARTICLE XVIII TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Section 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
If there were any intention to repeal Presidential Decree No. 87, it would have been done
expressly by Congress. For instance, Republic Act No. 7160, more popularly known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, expressly repealed a number of laws, including a specific provision in
Presidential Decree No. 87, viz.:
SECTION 534. Repealing Clause. (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
otherwise known as the "Local Government Code," Executive Order No. 112
(1987),and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other
decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the
barangay are hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939
regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act No. 5447 regarding
the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential
Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential
Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree
Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of
no force and effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it
governs locally-funded projects.
(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended
insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16 and 29
of Presidential Decree No. 704; Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as
amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree
No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts
thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court could not simply assume that while Presidential Decree No. 87 had not yet been
expressly repealed, it had been impliedly repealed. As we held in Villarea v. The Commission on Audit, 71
"[i]mplied repeals are not lightly presumed." It is a settled rule that when laws are in conflict with one
another, every effort must be exerted to reconcile them. In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcopper
Mining Corporation, we said: AaCTcI
72
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding
thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is
expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi,
i.e.,every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to
form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should
be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted
conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and
all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the
subject. (Citation omitted.)
Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a
construction that it is in harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that construction should be
preferred. This Court, in Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections
73 expounding on this point,
74
pronounced:
It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should
be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the
letter of the law determines its construction; for that reason, a statute must be read
according to its spirit and intent. . . . . (Citation omitted.)
Consequently, we find no merit in petitioners' contention that SC-46 is prohibited on the
ground that there is no general law prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and
requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and extraction.
But note must be made at this point that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the
general law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, as
will be discussed below, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be
allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Taon Strait is a NIPAS area. 75
36
2. President was not thesignatory to SC-46 and thesame was not submitted toCongress
While the Court finds that Presidential Decree No. 87 is sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of a general law, the absence of the two other conditions, that the President be a signatory to
SC-46, and that Congress be notified of such contract, renders it null and void.
As SC-46 was executed in 2004, its terms should have conformed not only to the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 87, but also to those of the 1987 Constitution. The Civil Code
provides:
ARTICLE 1306. The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided
they are not contrary to law,morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
(Italics ours.)
In Heirs of San Miguel v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that:
76
It is basic that the law is deemed written into every contract.
Although a contract is the law between the parties, the provisions of positive law
which regulate contracts are deemed written therein and shall limit and govern the
relations between the parties. ....(Citations omitted.)
Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the President
himself enter into any service contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 appeared to have been
entered into and signed only by the DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the
said constitutional requirement. Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor alleged that
Congress was subsequently notified of the execution of such contract. acEHCD
Public respondents' implied argument that based on the "alter ego principle," their acts
are also that of then President Macapagal-Arroyo's, cannot apply in this case. In Joson v. Torres, we
explained the concept of the alter ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency and its limit in
this wise:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents
of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required
by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally,the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated
by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Emphasis ours,
citation omitted.)
While the requirements in executing service contracts in paragraph 4, Section 2 of Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution seem like mere formalities, they, in reality, take on a much bigger role. As we
have explained in La Bugal, they are the safeguards put in place by the framers of the Constitution to
"eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime." Thus, they are not just mere
78
formalities, which will only render a contract unenforceable but not void, if not complied with. They are
requirements placed, not just in an ordinary statute, but in the fundamental law, the non-observance of
which will nullify the contract. Elucidating on the concept of a "constitution," this Court, in Manila Prince
Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, held: 79
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is
supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it
emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation.It
prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the
different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed
principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other
words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract
violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated
by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons
for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.Thus, since
the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract.(Emphasis ours.)
As this Court has held in La Bugal, our Constitution requires that the President himself be
the signatory of service agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving the exploration,
development, and utilization of our minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. This power cannot be
taken lightly.
In this case, the public respondents have failed to show that the President had any
participation in SC-46. Their argument that their acts are actually the acts of then President Macapagal-
Arroyo, absent proof of her disapproval, must fail as the requirement that the President herself enter into
these kinds of contracts is embodied not just in any ordinary statute, but in the Constitution itself. These
service contracts involving the exploitation, development, and utilization of our natural resources are of
paramount interest to the present and future generations. Hence, safeguards were put in place to insure
that the guidelines set by law are meticulously observed and likewise to eradicate the corruption that may
easily penetrate departments and agencies by ensuring that the President has authorized or approved of
these service contracts herself.
Even under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 87, it is required that the Petroleum
Board, now the DOE, obtain the President's approval for the execution of any contract under said statute,
as shown in the following provision:
SECTION 5. Execution of contract authorized in this Act. Every
contract herein authorized shall, subject to the approval of the President, be executed
by the Petroleum Board created in this Act, after due public notice pre-qualification
and public bidding or concluded through negotiations. In case bids are requested or if
requested no bid is submitted or the bids submitted are rejected by the Petroleum
Board for being disadvantageous to the Government, the contract may be concluded
through negotiation.
In opening contract areas and in selecting the best offer for
petroleum operations, any of the following alternative procedures may be resorted to
by the Petroleum Board, subject to prior approval of the President[.]
Even if we were inclined to relax the requirement in La Bugal to harmonize the 1987
Constitution with the aforementioned provision of Presidential Decree No. 87, it must be shown that the
government agency or subordinate official has been authorized by the President to enter into such service
contract for the government. Otherwise, it should be at least shown that the President subsequently
approved of such contract explicitly. None of these circumstances is evident in the case at bar.
Service Contract No. 46
77
vis--vis Other Laws
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 claim that SC-46 violates Section 27 of Republic Act No.
9147 or the Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection Act, which bans all marine exploration and
exploitation of oil and gas deposits. They also aver that Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7586 or the National
Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which allows the exploration of protected
areas for the purpose of information-gathering, has been repealed by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 9147.
The said petitioners further claim that SC-46 is anathema to Republic Act No. 8550 or the Philippine
Fisheries Code of 1998, which protects the rights of the fisherfolk in the preferential use of municipal
waters, with the exception being limited only to research and survey activities. 80
The FIDEC, for its part, argues that to avail of the exceptions under Section 14 of the NIPAS
Act, the gathering of information must be in accordance with a DENR-approved program, and the
exploitation and utilization of energy resources must be pursuant to a general law passed by Congress
expressly for that purpose. Since there is neither a DENR-approved program nor a general law passed by
Congress, the seismic surveys and oil drilling operations were all done illegally. The FIDEC likewise
81
contends that SC-46 infringes on its right to the preferential use of the communal fishing waters as it is
denied free access within the prohibited zone, in violation not only of the Fisheries Code but also of the
1987 Constitutional provisions on subsistence fisherfolk and social justice. Furthermore, the FIDEC
82
believes that the provisions in Presidential Decree No. 87, which allow offshore drilling even in municipal
waters, should be deemed to have been rendered inoperative by the provisions of Republic Act No. 8550
and Republic Act No. 7160, which reiterate the social justice provisions of the Constitution. 83
The public respondents invoke the rules on statutory construction and argue that Section
14 of the NIPAS Act is a more particular provision and cannot be deemed to have been repealed by the
more general prohibition in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 9147. They aver that Section 14, under which
SC-46 falls, should instead be regarded as an exemption to Section 27. 84
Addressing the claim of petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 that there was a violation of Section
27 of Republic Act No. 9147, the public respondents assert that what the section prohibits is the
exploration of minerals, which as defined in the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, exclude energy materials
such as coal, petroleum, natural gas, radioactive materials and geothermal energy. Thus, since SC-46
involves oil and gas exploration, Section 27 does not apply. 85
The public respondents defend the validity of SC-46 and insist that it does not grant
exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX; hence, it does not violate the rule on preferential use of municipal
waters. Moreover, they allege that JAPEX has not banned fishing in the project area, contrary to the
FIDEC's claim. The public respondents also contest the attribution of the declining fish catch to the seismic
surveys and aver that the allegation is unfounded. They claim that according to the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources' fish catch data, the reduced fish catch started in the 1970s due to destructive fishing
practices. SDHTEC
86
Ruling of the Courton the legality of Service Contract No. 46vis--vis Other Laws
Although we have already established above that SC-46 is null and void for being violative
of the 1987 Constitution, it is our duty to still rule on the legality of SC-46 vis--vis other pertinent laws, to
serve as a guide for the Government when executing service contracts involving not only the Taon Strait,
but also other similar areas. While the petitioners allege that SC-46 is in violation of several laws, including
international ones, their arguments focus primarily on the protected status of the Taon Strait, thus this
Court will concentrate on those laws that pertain particularly to the Taon Strait as a protected seascape.
37
 The Taon Strait is a narrow passage of water bounded by the islands of Cebu in the East
and Negros in the West. It harbors a rich biodiversity of marine life, including endangered species of
dolphins and whales. For this reason, former President Fidel V. Ramos declared the Taon Strait as a
protected seascape in 1998 by virtue of Proclamation No. 1234 Declaring the Taon Strait situated in
the Provinces of Cebu, Negros Occidental and Negros Oriental as a Protected Area pursuant to the NIPAS
Act and shall be known as Taon Strait Protected Seascape.During former President Joseph E. Estrada's
time, he also constituted the Taon Strait Commission via Executive Order No. 76 to ensure the optimum
and sustained use of the resources in that area without threatening its marine life. He followed this with
Executive Order No. 177, wherein he included the mayor of Negros Occidental Municipality/City as a
87
member of the Taon Strait Commission, to represent the LGUs concerned. This Commission, however,
was subsequently abolished in 2002 by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, via Executive Order No.
72. 88
True to the constitutional policy that the "State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature," Congress
enacted the NIPAS Act to secure the perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through the
establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected areas. These areas possess common
ecological values that were incorporated into a holistic plan representative of our natural heritage. The
system encompasses outstandingly remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that are
habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related
ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland, or marine. It classifies and administers all the designated
90
protected areas to maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems, to preserve genetic
diversity, to ensure sustainable use of resources found therein, and to maintain their natural conditions to
the greatest extent possible. The following categories of protected areas were established under the
91
NIPAS Act:
a. Strict nature reserve;
b. Natural park;
c. Natural monument;
d. Wildlife sanctuary;
e. Protected landscapes and seascapes;
f. Resource reserve;
g. Natural biotic areas; and
h. Other categories established by law, conventions or international agreements which the Philippine Government
is a signatory.
92
Under Section 4 of the NIPAS Act, a protected area refers to portions of land and water, set
aside due to their unique physical and biological significance, managed to enhance biological diversity and
protected against human exploitation.
The Taon Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1234, was set aside and declared a
protected area under the category of Protected Seascape. The NIPAS Act defines a Protected Seascape to
be an area of national significance characterized by the harmonious interaction of man and land while
providing opportunities for public enjoyment through recreation and tourism within the normal lifestyle
and economic activity of this areas; thus a management plan for each area must be designed to protect
93
and enhance the permanent preservation of its natural conditions. Consistent with this endeavor is the
94
requirement that an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) be made prior to undertaking any activity
outside the scope of the management plan. Unless an ECC under the EIA system is obtained, no activity
inconsistent with the goals of the NIPAS Act shall be implemented. 95
The Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) was established in 1978 under
Presidential Decree No. 1586. It prohibits any person, partnership or corporation from undertaking or
operating any declared environmentally critical project or areas without first securing an ECC issued by
the President or his duly authorized representative. Pursuant to the EISS, which called for the proper
96
management of environmentally critical areas, Proclamation No. 2146 was enacted, identifying the
97 98
areas and types of projects to be considered as environmentally critical and within the scope of the EISS,
while DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 provided for its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR).
DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 defines an environmentally critical area as "an
area delineated as environmentally sensitive such that significant environmental impacts are expected if
certain types of proposed projects or programs are located, developed, or implemented in it"; thus, before99
a project,which is "any activity, regardless of scale or magnitude, which may have significant impact on the
environment," is undertaken in it, such project must undergo an EIA to evaluate and predict the likely
100
impacts of all its stages on the environment. An EIA is described in detail as follows:
101
h. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process that involves evaluating and predicting the likely impacts of
a project (including cumulative impacts) on the environment during
construction, commissioning, operation and abandonment. It also
includes designing appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement
measures addressing these consequences to protect the environment
and the community's welfare. The process is undertaken by, among
others, the project proponent and/or EIA Consultant, EMB, a Review
Committee, affected communities and other stakeholders. 102
Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Taon Strait is an environmentally critical area, having been declared
as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope of its management plan may only be
implemented pursuant to an ECC secured after undergoing an EIA to determine the effects of such activity
on its ecological system.
The public respondents argue that they had complied with the procedures in obtaining an
ECC and that SC-46 falls under the exceptions in Section 14 of the NIPAS Act, due to the following
103
reasons:
1) The Taon Strait is not a strict nature reserve or natural park;
2) Exploration is only for the purpose of gathering information on possible energy
resources; and
3) Measures are undertaken to ensure that the exploration is being done with the least
damage to surrounding areas. 104
89
We do not agree with the arguments raised by the public respondents.
Sections 12 and 14 of the NIPAS Act read:
SECTION 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. Proposals for activities which are outside the scope of the management plan for
protected areas shall be subject to an environmental impact assessment as required by law before they are adopted, and the results
thereof shall be taken into consideration in the decision-making process.
No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed
without the required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under the
Philippine Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system. In instances where such
activities are allowed to be undertaken, the proponent shall plan and carry them out in
such manner as will minimize any adverse effects and take preventive and remedial
action when appropriate. The proponent shall be liable for any damage due to lack of
caution or indiscretion.
SECTION 14. Survey for Energy Resources. Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2 hereof, protected areas, except strict
nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration only for the purpose of gathering information on energy
resources and only if such activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be conducted only in
accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall be made available to the public and submitted
to the President for recommendation to Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy resources found within NIPAS areas shall
be allowed only through a law passed by Congress. AScHCD
It is true that the restrictions found under the NIPAS Act are not without exceptions.
However, while an exploration done for the purpose of surveying for energy resources is allowed
under Section 14 of the NIPAS Act, this does not mean that it is exempt from the requirement to
undergo an EIA under Section 12.In Sotto v. Sotto, this Court explained why a statute should be
105
construed as a whole:
A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent.
Consequently each part or section should be construed in connection with every other
part or section and so as to produce a harmonious whole. It is not proper to confine
the attention to the one section to be construed. It is always an unsafe way of
construing a statute or contract to divide it by a process of etymological dissection,
into separate words, and then apply to each, thus separated from its context, some
particular definition given by lexicographers, and then reconstruct the instrument
upon the basis of these definitions. An instrument must always be construed as a
whole, and the particular meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is usually to
be ascertained from the context, the nature of the subject treated of and the purpose or
intention of the parties who executed the contract, or of the body which enacted or
framed the statute or constitution. . . . .
Surveying for energy resources under Section 14 is not an exemption from complying with the EIA
requirement in Section 12; instead, Section 14 provides for additional requisites before any exploration
for energy resources may be done in protected areas.
The rationale for such additional requirements are incorporated in Section 2 of the NIPAS
Act, to wit:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. Cognizant of the profound
impact of man's activities on all components of the natural environment particularly
the effect of increasing population, resource exploitation and industrial advancement
and recognizing the critical importance of protecting and maintaining the natural
biological and physical diversities of the environment notably on areas with
biologically unique features to sustain human life and development, as well as plant
and animal life, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure for the Filipino
people of present and future generations the perpetual existence of all native plants
and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated
protected areas within the classification of national park as provided for in the
Constitution.
It is hereby recognized that these areas, although distinct in
features, possess common ecological values that may be incorporated into a holistic
plan representative of our natural heritage; that effective administration of this area is
possible only through cooperation among national government, local government and
concerned private organizations; that the use and enjoyment of these protected areas
must be consistent with the principles of biological diversity and sustainable
38
 development.
To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated
Protected Areas System (NIPAS),which shall encompass outstandingly remarkable
areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered
species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether
terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of which shall be designated as "protected areas."
The public respondents themselves admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC
prior to the second sub-phase of SC-46, which required the drilling of an oil exploration well. This means
that when the seismic surveys were done in the Taon Strait, no such environmental impact evaluation
was done. Unless seismic surveys are part of the management plan of the Taon Strait, such surveys were
done in violation of Section 12 of the NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586, which
provides: HESIcT
Section 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. The President of the Philippines may, on his
own initiative or upon recommendation of the National Environmental Protection Council, by proclamation declare certain projects,
undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate
any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by
the President or his duly authorized representative. For the proper management of said critical project or area, the President may by
his proclamation reorganize such government offices, agencies, institutions, corporations or instrumentalities including the re-
alignment of government personnel, and their specific functions and responsibilities.
For the same purpose as above, the Ministry of Human Settlements
shall: (a) prepare the proper land or water use pattern for said critical project(s) or
area(s);(b) establish ambient environmental quality standards; (c) develop a program
of environmental enhancement or protective measures against calamitous factors such
as earthquakes, floods, water erosion and others, and (d) perform such other functions
as may be directed by the President from time to time.
The respondents' subsequent compliance with the EISS for the second sub-phase of SC-46
cannot and will not cure this violation. The following penalties are provided for under Presidential Decree
No. 1586 and the NIPAS Act.
Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 1586 provides for the penalty involving violations of
the ECC requirement:
Section 9. Penalty for Violation. Any person, corporation or
partnership found violating Section 4 of this Decree, or the terms and conditions in the
issuance of the Environmental Compliance Certificate, or of the standards, rules and
regulations issued by the National Environmental Protection Council pursuant to this
Decree shall be punished by the suspension or cancellation of his/its certificates
and/or a fine in an amount not to exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for
every violation thereof, at the discretion of the National Environmental
Protection Council.(Emphasis supplied.)
Violations of the NIPAS Act entails the following fines and/or imprisonment under Section
21:
SECTION 21. Penalties. Whoever violates this Act or any rules and
regulations issued by the Department pursuant to this Act or whoever is found guilty
by a competent court of justice of any of the offenses in the preceding section shall be
fined in the amount of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) nor more than
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000),exclusive of the value of the thing
damaged or imprisonment for not less than one (1) year but not more than six
(6) years, or both, as determined by the court:Provided, that, if the area requires
rehabilitation or restoration as determined by the court, the offender shall be
required to restore or compensate for the restoration to the damages:Provided,
further, that court shall order the eviction of the offender from the land and the
forfeiture in favor of the Government of all minerals, timber or any species
collected or removed including all equipment, devices and firearms used in
connection therewith, and any construction or improvement made thereon by
the offender.If the offender is an association or corporation, the president or manager
shall be directly responsible for the act of his employees and laborers: Provided,
finally, that the DENR may impose administrative fines and penalties consistent
with this Act.(Emphases supplied.)
Moreover, SC-46 was not executed for the mere purpose of gathering information on the
possible energy resources in the Taon Strait as it also provides for the parties' rights and obligations
relating to extraction and petroleum production should oil in commercial quantities be found to exist in
the area. While Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service
contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and
utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress, since the Taon Strait is a NIPAS area. Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil
106
exploration and/or extraction in the Taon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization
may be done in said protected seascape.
In view of the foregoing premises and conclusions, it is no longer necessary to discuss the
other issues raised in these consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE,the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527 are GRANTED,Service Contract No. 46 is hereby
declared NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No.
1586.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J.,Carpio, Velasco, Jr.,Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,Perez, Mendoza, Reyes and
Perlas-Bernabe, JJ.,concur.
Leonen, J.,see concurring opinion.
Jardeleza, J.,took no part; prior OSG action.
*
Separate Opinions
"Until one has loved an animal,
a part of one's soul remains unawakened."
Anatole France
LEONEN, J., concurring:
I concur in the result, with the following additional reasons.
I
In G.R. No. 180771, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals allegedly bring their case in
their personal capacity, alleging that they stand to benefit or be injured from the judgment on the issues.
The human petitioners implead themselves in a representative capacity "as legal guardians of the lesser
life-forms and as responsible stewards of God's Creations." They use Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. as basis for
1 2
their claim, asserting their right to enforce international and domestic environmental laws enacted for
their benefit under the concept of stipulation pour autrui. As the representatives of Resident Marine
3
Mammals, the human petitioners assert that they have the obligation to build awareness among the
affected residents of Taon Strait as well as to protect the environment, especially in light of the
government's failure, as primary steward, to do its duty under the doctrine of public trust. 4
Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners also assert that through this case,
this court will have the opportunity to lower the threshold for locus standi as an exercise of "epistolary
jurisdiction." 5
The zeal of the human petitioners to pursue their desire to protect the environment and to
continue to define environmental rights in the context of actual cases is commendable. However, the space
for legal creativity usually required for advocacy of issues of the public interest is not so unlimited that it
should be allowed to undermine the other values protected by current substantive and procedural laws.
Even rules of procedure as currently formulated set the balance between competing interests. We cannot
abandon these rules when the necessity is not clearly and convincingly presented.
The human petitioners, in G.R. No. 180771, want us to create substantive and procedural
rights for animals through their allegation that they can speak for them. Obviously, we are asked to accept
the premises that (a) they were chosen by the Resident Marine Mammals of Taon Strait; (b) they were
chosen by a representative group of all the species of the Resident Marine Mammals; (c) they were able to
communicate with them; and (d) they received clear consent from their animal principals that they would
wish to use human legal institutions to pursue their interests. Alternatively, they ask us to acknowledge
through judicial notice that the interests that they, the human petitioners, assert are identical to what the
Resident Marine Mammals would assert had they been humans and the legal strategies that they invoked
are the strategies that they agree with.
In the alternative, they want us to accept through judicial notice that there is a
relationship of guardianship between them and all the resident mammals in the affected ecology.
Fundamental judicial doctrines that may significantly change substantive and procedural
law cannot be founded on feigned representation.
Instead, I agree that the human petitioners should only speak for themselves and already
have legal standing to sue with respect to the issue raised in their pleading. The rules on standing have
already been liberalized to take into consideration the difficulties in the assertion of environmental rights.
When standing becomes too liberal, this can be the occasion for abuse.
II
Rule 3, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in part, provides:
SECTION 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. Only natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
The Rules provide that parties may only be natural or juridical persons or entities that
may be authorized by statute to be parties in a civil action. caITAC
Basic is the concept of natural and juridical persons in our Civil Code:
ARTICLE 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do
acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
Article 40 further defines natural persons in the following manner:
ARTICLE 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes
that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article.
Article 44, on the other hand, enumerates the concept of a juridical person:
ARTICLE 44. The following are juridical persons:
39
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality
begins as soon as they have been constituted
according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical
personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 implicitly suggest that we amend, rather than simply
construe, the provisions of the Rules of Court as well as substantive law to accommodate Resident Marine
Mammals or animals. This we cannot do.
Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure further defines real party in interest:
SEC. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest. (2a)6
A litigant who stands to benefit or sustain an injury from the judgment of a case is a real
party in interest. When a case is brought to the courts, the real party in interest must show that another
7
party's act or omission has caused a direct injury, making his or her interest both material and based on an
enforceable legal right. 8
Representatives as parties, on the other hand, are parties acting in representation of the
real party in interest, as defined in Rule 3, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 3. Representatives as parties. Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone
acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in
interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law
or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the
principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal. (3a) 9 arrogant as to argue that we know the suffering of animals and that we know what remedy they need in
The rule is two-pronged. First, it defines a representative as a party who is not bound to
directly or actually benefit or suffer from the judgment, but instead brings a case in favor of an identified
real party in interest. The representative is an outsider to the cause of action. Second, the rule provides a
10
list of who may be considered as "representatives." It is not an exhaustive list, but the rule limits the
coverage only to those authorized by law or the Rules of Court. 11
These requirements should apply even in cases involving the environment, which means
that for the Petition of the human petitioners to prosper, they must show that (a) the Resident Marine
Mammals are real parties in interest; and (b) that the human petitioners are authorized by law or the
Rules to act in a representative capacity.
The Resident Marine Mammals are comprised of "toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises,
and other cetacean species inhabiting Taon Strait." While relatively new in Philippine jurisdiction, the
12
issue of whether animals have legal standing before courts has been the subject of academic discourse in
light of the emergence of animal and environmental rights.
In the United States, animal rights advocates have managed to establish a system which
Hogan explains as the "guardianship model for nonhuman animals": 13
Despite Animal Lovers, there exists a well-established system by
which nonhuman animals may obtain judicial review to enforce their statutory rights
and protections: guardianships. With court approval, animal advocacy organizations
may bring suit on behalf of nonhuman animals in the same way court-appointed
guardians bring suit on behalf of mentally-challenged humans who possess an
enforceable right but lack the ability to enforce it themselves.
In the controversial but pivotal Should Trees Have Standing?
Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects,Christopher D. Stone asserts that the
environment should possess the right to seek judicial redress even though it is
incapable of representing itself. While asserting the rights of speechless entities such
as the environment or nonhuman animals certainly poses legitimate challenges
such as identifying the proper spokesman the American legal system is already
well-equipped with a reliable mechanism by which nonhumans may obtain standing
via a judicially-established guardianship. Stone notes that other speechless and
nonhuman entities such as corporations, states, estates, and municipalities have
standing to bring suit on their own behalf. There is little reason to fear abuses under
this regime as procedures for removal and substitution, avoiding conflicts of interest,
and termination of a guardianship are well established.
In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement is indeed possible. The court indicated that ALVA might have
obtained standing in its own right if it had an established history of dedication to the cause of the humane treatment of animals. It
noted that the Fund for Animals had standing and indicated that another more well-known advocacy organization might have had
standing as well. The court further concluded that an organization's standing is more than a derivative of its history, but history is a
relevant consideration where organizations are not well-established prior to commencing legal action. ALVA was not the proper
plaintiff because it could not identify previous activities demonstrating its recognized activism for and commitment to the dispute
independent of its desire to pursue legal action. The court's analysis suggests that a qualified organization with a demonstrated
commitment to a cause could indeed bring suit on behalf of the speechless in the form of a court-sanctioned guardianship.
This Comment advocates a shift in contemporary standing doctrine to empower non-profit organizations with an established history
of dedication to the cause and relevant expertise to serve as official guardians ad litem on behalf of nonhuman animals interests.The
American legal system has numerous mechanisms for representing the rights and interests of nonhumans; any challenges inherent in
extending these pre-existing mechanisms to nonhuman animals are minimal compared to an interest in the proper administration of
justice. To adequately protect the statutory rights of nonhuman animals, the legal system must recognize those statutory rights
independent of humans and provide a viable means of enforcement. Moreover, the idea of a guardianship for speechless plaintiffs is
not new and has been urged on behalf of the natural environment. Such a model is even more compelling as applied to nonhuman
animals, because they are sentient beings with the ability to feel pain and exercise rational thought. Thus, animals are qualitatively
different from other legally protected nonhumans and therefore have interests deserving direct legal protection.
Furthermore, the difficulty of enforcing the statutory rights of
nonhuman animals threatens the integrity of the federal statutes designed to protect
them, essentially rendering them meaningless. Sensing that laws protecting nonhuman
animals would be difficult to enforce, Congress provided for citizen suit provisions: the
most well-known example is found in the Endangered Species Act (ESA).Such
provisions are evidence of legislative intent to encourage civic participation on behalf
of nonhuman animals. Our law of standing should reflect this intent and its implication
that humans are suitable representatives of the natural environment, which includes
nonhuman animals. (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
14
When a court allows guardianship as a basis of representation, animals are considered as
similarly situated as individuals who have enforceable rights but, for a legitimate reason (e.g.,cognitive
disability),are unable to bring suit for themselves. They are also similar to entities that by their very
nature are incapable of speaking for themselves (e.g.,corporations, states, and others).
In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law and the Rules of Court
as having standing to sue and, therefore, may be properly represented as real parties in interest. The same
cannot be said about animals.
Animals play an important role in households, communities, and the environment. While
we, as humans, may feel the need to nurture and protect them, we cannot go as far as saying we represent
their best interests and can, therefore, speak for them before the courts. As humans, we cannot be so
the face of an injury.
Even in Hogan's discussion, she points out that in a case before the United States District
Court for the Central District of California, Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n. v. Weinberger, the court held 15
that an emotional response to what humans perceive to be an injury inflicted on an animal is not within
the "zone-of-interest" protected by law. Such sympathy cannot stand independent of or as a substitute
16
for an actual injury suffered by the claimant. The ability to represent animals was further limited in that
17
case by the need to prove "genuine dedication" to asserting and protecting animal rights: ICHDca
What ultimately proved fatal to ALVA's claim, however was the court's assertion that standing doctrine further required ALVA to
differentiate its genuine dedication to the humane treatment of animals from the general disdain for animal cruelty shared by the
public at large. In doing so, the court found ALVA's asserted organizational injury to be abstract and thus relegated ALVA to the ranks
of the "concerned bystander."
xxx xxx xxx
In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an
arrangement is indeed possible. The court indicated that ALVA might have obtained
standing in its own right if it had an established history of dedication to the cause of
the humane treatment of animals.It noted that the Fund for Animals had standing and
indicated that another more well-known advocacy organization might have had
standing as well. The court further concluded that an organization's standing is more
than a derivative of its history, but history is a relevant consideration where
organizations are not well-established prior to commencing legal action.ALVA was not
the proper plaintiff because it could not identify previous activities demonstrating its
recognized activism for and commitment to the dispute independent of its desire to
pursue legal action. The court's analysis suggests that a qualified organization with a
demonstrated commitment to a cause could indeed bring suit on behalf of the
speechless in the form of a court-sanctioned guardianship. (Emphasis supplied,
18
citation omitted)
What may be argued as being parallel to this concept of guardianship is the principle of
human stewardship over the environment in a citizen suit under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases. A citizen suit allows any Filipino to act as a representative of a party who has enforceable rights
under environmental laws before Philippine courts, and is defined in Section 5:
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet
unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws.
Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a
brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all
interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15)
days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a
general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said
order.
There is no valid reason in law or the practical requirements of this case to implead
and feign representation on behalf of animals. To have done so betrays a very anthropocentric
view of environmental advocacy. There is no way that we, humans, can claim to speak for animals
let alone present that they would wish to use our court system, which is designed to ensure that
humans seriously carry their responsibility including ensuring a viable ecology for themselves,
which of course includes compassion for all living things.
Our rules on standing are sufficient and need not be further relaxed.
40
 In Arigo v. Swift, I posed the possibility of further reviewing the broad interpretation we
19
have given to the rule on standing. While representatives are not required to establish direct injury on
their part, they should only be allowed to represent after complying with the following:
[I]t is imperative for them to indicate with certainty the injured parties on whose behalf they bring the suit.
Furthermore, the interest of those they represent must be based upon concrete legal
rights. It is not sufficient to draw out a perceived interest from a general, nebulous idea
of a potential "injury."
20
I reiterate my position in Arigo v. Swift and in Paje v. Casio regarding this rule alongside
21
the appreciation of legal standing in Oposa v. Factoran for environmental cases. In Arigo,I opined that
22
procedural liberality, especially in cases brought by representatives, should be used with great caution:
Perhaps it is time to revisit the ruling in Oposa v. Factoran.
That case was significant in that, at that time, there was need to call attention to environmental concerns in light of emerging
international legal principles. While "intergenerational responsibility" is a noble principle, it should not be used to obtain judgments
that would preclude future generations from making their own assessment based on their actual concerns. The present generation
must restrain itself from assuming that it can speak best for those who will exist at a different time, under a different set of
circumstances. In essence, the unbridled resort to representative suit will inevitably result in preventing future generations from
protecting their own rights and pursuing their own interests and decisions. It reduces the autonomy of our children and our
children's children. Even before they are born, we again restricted their ability to make their own arguments.
It is my opinion that, at best, the use of the Oposa doctrine in environmental cases should be allowed only when a) there is a clear
legal basis for the representative suit; b) there are actual concerns based squarely upon an existing legal right; c) there is no
possibility of any countervailing interests existing within the population represented or those that are yet to be born; and d) there is
an absolute necessity for such standing because there is a threat of catastrophe so imminent that an immediate protective measure is
necessary. Better still, in the light of its costs and risks, we abandon the precedent all together. (Emphasis in the original)
23
Similarly, in Paje:
A person cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction if he or she has no
right or interest to protect. He or she who invokes the court's jurisdiction must be the
"owner of the right sought to be enforced." In other words, he or she must have a cause
of action. An action may be dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of action if the
person who instituted it is not the real party in interest. The term "interest" under
24
the Rules of Court must refer to a material interest that is not merely a curiosity about
or an "interest in the question involved." The interest must be present and substantial.
It is not a mere expectancy or a future, contingent interest.
A person who is not a real party in interest may institute an action if
he or she is suing as representative of a real party in interest. When an action is
prosecuted or defended by a representative, that representative is not and does not
become the real party in interest. The person represented is deemed the real party in
interest. The representative remains to be a third party to the action instituted on
behalf of another.
xxx xxx xxx
To sue under this rule, two elements must be present: "(a) the suit
is brought on behalf of an identified party whose right has been violated, resulting in
some form of damage, and (b) the representative authorized by law or the Rules of
Court to represent the victim."
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a
citizen's suit. A citizen's suit under this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action
for the enforcement of environmental law on behalf of minors or generations yet
unborn. It is essentially a representative suit that allows persons who are not real
parties in interest to institute actions on behalf of the real party in interest.
The expansion of what constitutes "real party in interest" to include
minors and generations yet unborn is a recognition of this court's ruling in Oposa v.
Factoran.This court recognized the capacity of minors (represented by their parents)
to file a class suit on behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility to ensure the future generation's access to and
enjoyment of [the] country's natural resources.
To allow citizen's suits to enforce environmental rights of others,
including future generations, is dangerous for three reasons:
First,they run the risk of foreclosing arguments of others who are unable to take part in the suit, putting into question its
representativeness. Second,varying interests may potentially result in arguments that are bordering on political issues, the
resolutions of which do not fall upon this court. Third,automatically allowing a class or citizen's suit on behalf of minors and
generations yet unborn may result in the oversimplification of what may be a complex issue, especially in light of the impossibility of
determining future generation's true interests on the matter.
In citizen's suits, persons who may have no interest in the case may
file suits for others. Uninterested persons will argue for the persons they represent,
and the court will decide based on their evidence and arguments. Any decision by the
court will be binding upon the beneficiaries, which in this case are the minors and the
future generations. The court's decision will be res judicata upon them and conclusive
upon the issues presented. 25
The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of environmental claims lies
in its potential to diminish the value of legitimate environmental rights. Extending the application of "real
party in interest" to the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, through a judicial
pronouncement will potentially result in allowing petitions based on mere concern rather than an actual
enforcement of a right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what their concerns are. At best, humans
can only surmise the extent of injury inflicted, if there be any. Petitions invoking a right and seeking legal
redress before this court cannot be a product of guesswork, and representatives have the responsibility to
ensure that they bring "reasonably cogent, rational, scientific, well-founded arguments" on behalf of 26
those they represent.
Creative approaches to fundamental problems should be welcome. However, they should
be considered carefully so that no unintended or unwarranted consequences should follow. I concur with
the approach of Madame Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro in her brilliant ponencia as it carefully
narrows down the doctrine in terms of standing. Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners
have no legal standing to file any kind of petition.
However, I agree that petitioners in G.R. No. 181527, namely, Central Visayas Fisherfolk
Development Center, Engarcial, Yanong, and Labid, have standing both as real parties in interest and as
representatives of subsistence fisherfolks of the Municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungahan, Cebu,
and their families, and the present and future generations of Filipinos whose rights are similarly affected.
The activities undertaken under Service Contract 46 (SC-46) directly affected their source of livelihood,
primarily felt through the significant reduction of their fish harvest. The actual, direct, and material
27
damage they suffered, which has potential long-term effects transcending generations, is a proper subject
of a legal suit.
III
In our jurisdiction, there is neither reason nor any legal basis for the concept of implied
petitioners, most especially when the implied petitioner was a sitting President of the Republic of the
Philippines. In G.R. No. 180771, apart from adjudicating unto themselves the status of "legal guardians" of
whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, human petitioners also impleaded Former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as "unwilling co-petitioner" for "her express declaration and
undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect Taon Strait." 28
No person may implead any other person as a co-plaintiff or co-petitioner without his or
her consent. In our jurisdiction, only when there is a party that should have been a necessary party but
was unwilling to join would there be an allegation as to why that party has been omitted. In Rule 3, Section
9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: TCAScE
SEC. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary party
is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is omitted. Should the court find the reason for the
omission unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.
The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver of
the claim against such party.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the
judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary
party.
29
A party who should have been a plaintiff or petitioner but whose consent cannot be
obtained should be impleaded as a defendant in the nature of an unwilling co-plaintiff under Rule 3,
Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 10.Unwilling co-plaintiff. If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be made a
defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint. 30
The reason for this rule is plain: Indispensable party plaintiffs who should be part of the
action but who do not consent should be put within the jurisdiction of the court through summons or
other court processes. Petitioners should not take it upon themselves to simply implead any party who
does not consent as a petitioner. This places the unwilling co-petitioner at the risk of being denied due
process.
Besides, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be a party to this suit. As a co-
equal constitutional department, we cannot assume that the President needs to enforce policy directions
by suing his or her alter-egos. The procedural situation caused by petitioners may have gained public
attention, but its legal absurdity borders on the contemptuous. The Former President's name should be
stricken out of the title of this case.
IV
I also concur with the conclusion that SC-46 is both illegal and unconstitutional.
SC-46 is illegal because it violates Republic Act No. 7586 or the National Integrated
Protected Areas System Act of 1992, and Presidential Decree No. 1234, which declared Taon Strait as a
31
protected seascape. It is unconstitutional because it violates the fourth paragraph of Article XII, Section 2
of the Constitution.
V
Petitioner Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center asserts that SC-46 violated
Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution because Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd.
(JAPEX) is 100% Japanese-owned. It further asserts that SC-46 cannot be validly classified as a technical
32
and financial assistance agreement executed under Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 4 of the 1987
Constitution. Public respondents counter that SC-46 does not fall under the coverage of paragraph 1, but
33
is a validly executed contract under paragraph 4. Public respondents further aver that SC-46 neither
34
granted exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX nor violated Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center's
41
 right to preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources. 35
VI
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 2.All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter
into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water
rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic
waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural
resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to
subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered
into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution. (Emphasis
supplied)
I agree that fully foreign-owned corporations may participate in the exploration,
development, and use of natural resources, but only through either financial agreements or technical ones.
This is the clear import of the words "either financial or technical assistance agreements." This is also the
clear result if we compare the 1987 constitutional provision with the versions in the 1973 and 1935
Constitution:
1973 CONSTITUTIONARTICLE XIVTHE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE PATRIMONY OFTHE NATION
SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, of exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources
of the Philippines shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
association at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens.
The Batasang Pambansa, in the national interest, may allow such citizens,
corporations, or associations to enter into service contracts for financial, technical,
management, or other forms of assistance with any foreign person or entity for the
exploitation, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural
resources.Existing valid and binding service contracts for financial, the technical,
management, or other forms of assistance are hereby recognized as such. (Emphasis
supplied)
1935 CONSTITUTIONARTICLE XIIICONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
SECTION 1. All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration
of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession,
or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another
twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial
use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
The clear text of the Constitution in light of its history prevails over any attempt to infer
interpretation from the Constitutional Commission deliberations. The constitutional texts are the product
of a full sovereign act: deliberations in a constituent assembly and ratification. Reliance on recorded
discussion of Constitutional Commissions, on the other hand, may result in dependence on incomplete
authorship. Besides, it opens judicial review to further subjectivity from those who spoke during the
Constitutional Commission deliberations who may not have predicted how their words will be used. It is
safer that we use the words already in the Constitution. The Constitution was their product. Its words
were read by those who ratified it. The Constitution is what society relies upon even at present.
SC-46 is neither a financial assistance nor a technical assistance agreement.
Even supposing for the sake of argument that it is, it could not be declared valid in light of
the standards set forth in La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos: 36
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.The grant thereof is subject to several
safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform terms,
conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a
certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the
possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the
country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is presented
to the President for signature, it will have been vetted
several times over at different levels to ensure that it
conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
cTDaEH
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of
government an opportunity to look over the
agreement and interpose timely objections, if any. 37
(Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
Based on the standards pronounced in La Bugal,SC-46'S validity must be tested against
three important points: (a) whether SC-46 was crafted in accordance with a general law that provides
standards, terms, and conditions; (b) whether SC-46 was signed by the President for and on behalf of the
government; and (c) whether it was reported by the President to Congress within 30 days of execution.
VII
The general law referred to as a possible basis for SC-46's validity is Presidential Decree
No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. It is my opinion that this law is
unconstitutional in that it allows service contracts, contrary to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution:
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral
oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law,based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and
technical resources. (Emphasis supplied)
The deletion of service contracts from the enumeration of the kind of agreements the
President may enter into with foreign-owned corporations for exploration and utilization of resources
means that service contracts are no longer allowed by the Constitution. Pursuant to Article XVIII, Section 3
of the 1987 Constitution, this inconsistency renders the law invalid and ineffective.
38
SC-46 suffers from the lack of a special law allowing its activities. The Main Opinion
emphasizes an important point, which is that SC-46 did not merely involve exploratory activities, but also
provided the rights and obligations of the parties should it be discovered that there is oil in commercial
quantities in the area. The Taon Strait being a protected seascape under Presidential Decree No. 1234 39
requires that the exploitation and utilization of energy resources from that area are explicitly covered by a
law passed by Congress specifically for that purpose, pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7586 or
the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992:
SEC. 14. Survey for Energy Resources. Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2, hereof, protected
areas, except strict nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration
only for the purpose of gathering information on energy resources and only if such
activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be
conducted only in accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of
such surveys shall be made available to the public and submitted to the President for
recommendation to Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy resources
found within NIPAS areas shall be allowed only through a law passed by Congress. 40
(Emphasis supplied)
No law was passed by Congress specifically providing the standards, terms, and conditions
of an oil exploration, extraction, and/or utilization for Taon Strait and, therefore, no such activities could
have been validly undertaken under SC-46. The National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 is
clear that exploitation and utilization of energy resources in a protected seascape such as Taon Strait
shall only be allowed through a specific law.
VIII
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was not the signatory to SC-46, contrary to the
requirement set by paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section 2 for service contracts involving the exploration of
petroleum. SC-46 was entered into by then Department of Energy Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr., on behalf
of the government. I agree with the Main Opinion that in cases where the Constitution or law requires the
President to act personally on the matter, the duty cannot be delegated to another public official. La
41
Bugal highlights the importance of the President's involvement, being one of the constitutional safeguards
against abuse and corruption, as not mere formality:
At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful reading of the ConCom deliberations, as
follows:
In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, the framers used the term service contracts in
referring to agreements ...involving either technical or
financial assistance.
They spoke of service contracts as the concept was understood in the 1973 Constitution.
It was obvious from their discussions that they were not about to ban or eradicate service contracts.
Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to put in place safeguards that would eliminate or minimize the
42
 abuses prevalent during the marital law regime. 42 obtaining an Environmental Compliance Certificate. At any rate, they assert that the activities covered by
48

(Emphasis in the original) SC-46 fell under Section 14 of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992, which they
Public respondents failed to show that Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was interpret to be an exception to Section 12. They argue that the Environmental Compliance Certificate is not
involved in the signing or execution of SC-46. The failure to comply with this constitutional requirement a strict requirement for the validity of SC-46 since (a) the Taon Strait is not a nature reserve or natural
renders SC-46 null and void. park; (b) the exploration was merely for gathering information; and (c) measures were in place to ensure
IX that the exploration caused the least possible damage to the area.49

Public respondents also failed to show that Congress was subsequently informed of the
execution and existence of SC-46. The reporting requirement is an equally important requisite to the
validity of any service contract involving the exploration, development, and utilization of Philippine
petroleum. Public respondents' failure to report to Congress about SC-46 effectively took away any
Section 14 is not an exception to Section 12, but instead provides additional requirements
for cases involving Philippine energy resources. The National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of
1992 was enacted to recognize the importance of protecting the environment in light of resource
exploitation, among others. Systems are put in place to secure for Filipinos local resources under the
50

opportunity for the legislative branch to scrutinize its terms and conditions. most favorable conditions. With the status of Taon Strait as a protected seascape, the institution of
In sum, SC-46 was executed and implemented absent all the requirements provided under additional legal safeguards is even more significant.
paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section 2. It is, therefore, null and void. Public respondents did not validly obtain an Environmental Compliance Certificate for SC-
X 46. Based on the records, JAPEX commissioned an environmental impact evaluation only in the second
I am of the view that SC-46, aside from not having complied with the 1987 Constitution, is sub-phase of its project, with the Environmental Management Bureau of Region VII granting the project an
also null and void for being violative of environmental laws protecting Taon Strait. In particular, SC-46 Environmental Compliance Certificate on March 6, 2007. Despite its scale, the seismic surveys from May
51

was implemented despite falling short of the requirements of the National Integrated Protected Areas
System Act of 1992.
As a protected seascape under Presidential Decree No. 1234, Taon Strait is covered by
43
the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992. This law declares as a matter of policy:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. Cognizant of the profound impact of man's activities on all components of the
natural environment particularly the effect of increasing population, resource
exploitation and industrial advancement and recognizing the critical importance of
protecting and maintaining the natural biological and physical diversities of the
environment notably on areas with biologically unique features to sustain human life
and development, as well as plant and animal life, it is hereby declared the policy of the
State to secure for the Filipino people of present and future generations the perpetual
existence of all native plants and animals through the establishment of a
comprehensive system of integrated protected areas within the classification of
national park as provided for in the Constitution.
It is hereby recognized that these areas, although distinct in
features, possess common ecological values that may be incorporated into a holistic
plan representative of our natural heritage; that effective administration of these areas
is possible only through cooperation among national government, local and concerned
private organizations; that the use and enjoyment of these protected areas must be
consistent with the principles of biological diversity and sustainable development.
To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS),which shall encompass outstanding
9 to 18, 2005 were conducted without any environmental assessment contrary to Section 12 of the
National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992.
XI
Finally, we honor every living creature when we take care of our environment. As sentient
species, we do not lack in the wisdom or sensitivity to realize that we only borrow the resources that we
use to survive and to thrive. We are not incapable of mitigating the greed that is slowly causing the demise
of our planet. Thus, there is no need for us to feign representation of any other species or some imagined
unborn generation in filing any action in our courts of law to claim any of our fundamental rights to a
healthful ecology. In this way and with candor and courage, we fully shoulder the responsibility deserving
of the grace and power endowed on our species.
ACCORDINGLY,I vote:
(a) to DISMISS G.R. No. 180771 for lack of standing and STRIKE OUT the name of Former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo from the title of this case;
(b) to GRANT G.R. No. 181527; and
(c) to DECLARE SERVICE CONTRACT 46 NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No.
7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1234.
(Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Taon Strait v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 180771 & 181527, [April
|||

remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and animals, 21, 2015])
biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of which shall be designated as "protected
areas." (Emphasis supplied)
44

Pursuant to this law, any proposed activity in Taon Strait must undergo an
Environmental Impact Assessment:
SEC. 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. Proposals for activities which are outside the scope of the
management plan for protected areas shall be subject to an environmental impact
assessment as required by law before they are adopted, and the results thereof shall
be taken into consideration in the decision-making process. (Emphasis supplied)
45

The same provision further requires that an Environmental Compliance Certificate be

secured under the Philippine Environmental Impact Assessment System before any project is
implemented:
No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under
the Philippine Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) system.In instances where such activities are allowed to be undertaken, the
proponent shall plan and carry them out in such manner as will minimize any adverse effects and take preventive and remedial action
when appropriate.The proponent shall be liable for any damage due to lack of caution or indiscretion. (Emphasis supplied)
46

In projects involving the exploration or utilization of energy resources, the National

Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 additionally requires that a program be approved by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, which shall be publicly accessible. The program shall
also be submitted to the President, who in turn will recommend the program to Congress. Furthermore,
Congress must enact a law specifically allowing the exploitation of energy resources found within a
protected area such as Taon Strait: cSaATC
SEC. 14. Survey for Energy Resources. Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2, hereof, protected
areas, except strict nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration
only for the purpose of gathering information on energy resources and only if such
activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be
conducted only in accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of
such surveys shall be made available to the public and submitted to the President for
recommendation to Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy resources
found within NIPAS areas shall be allowed only through a law passed by Congress. 47

(Emphasis supplied)
Public respondents argue that SC-46 complied with the procedural requirements of

43