People of the Philppines vs Efren

Mendoza
On July 14, 1993 about 7:30 pm in the Municipality of Vinzons, Camarines Norte, Mendoza
hacked Anchito Nano with a bolo which led to the instant death of the accused. The trial
court found the accused acted with evident premeditation hence convicted him of the crime
murder which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Prior to trial he voluntarily surrendered
but it was not appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrendered was offset by the aggravating circumstance of treachery.

HELD: Treachery is a qualifying circumstance in the present case therefore it cannot offset
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Therefore, pursuant to the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the accused should be sentenced to prision mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal in its minimum period

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
LADISLAO BACOLOD, defendants-appellee.

Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan. Jr. and Solicitor Jesus A. Avancea for appellant.
Jose L. Coscolluela, Jr. for appellee.

BENGZON, J.:

This appeal calls for practical application of the principles governing the defense of double jeopardy.

In the Court of First Instance of Cebu, on September 10, 1948. Ladislao Bacolod pleaded guilty to an
informations charging him the crime of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence committed
on February 21, 1948 in Santa Fe, same province. Thereafter he was arraigned in another case for
having caused a public disturbance on the same date, the second information alleging.

That on or about the 21st day of February, 1948, in the municipality of Santa Fe, province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused with deliberate intent, and on the occasion of a dance held in the municipal tennis
court in connection with the town fiesta, did then and there wilfully, criminally and feloniously
cause a serious disturbance in a public place by firing a sub-machine gun which wounded
one Consorcia Pasinio, thereby causing panic among the numerous people present in the
said dance who ran and scampered in all directions.
His counsel de oficio moved to quash this second information, invoking double jeopardy by reason of
the first information which for convenience is quoted:

That on or about the 21st day of February, 1948, in the municipality of Santa Fe, province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, then a
member of the PC patrol, by reckless imprudence and without taking due care and
precautions to avoid damage and injury to the life and property of other persons, did then
and there fire a shoot of the sub-machine gun thereby hitting Consorcia Pasinio at the back
of right side of her body which physical injury required or will require medical attendance for
more than 30 days but less than 90, and incapacitated or will incapacitate her from
performing her customary labor for the same period of time.

The motion to quash was granted, and the people appealed in due time.

Did the lower court err?

It will be observed that both informations have one common element: defendant's having fired a sub-
machine gun. The first, however, charged him with physical injuries inflicted on Consorcia Pasinio
thru reckless imprudence. On the other hand the second information accuses him of having
deliberately fired the machine gun to cause a disturbance in the festivity or gathering, thereby
producing panic among the people present therein. The two informations do not describe the same
offense. One is a crime against persons; but the other is an offense against public peace and order.1

The first is punished under article 263 of the Revised Penal Code and the latter under article 153
referring to individuals disturbing public gatherings or peaceful meetings. The proof establishing the
first would not establish the second, it being necessary to show, besides the willful discharge of
firearm, that there was a dance in the tennis court in connection with the town fiesta, and that the
people in attendance became panicky and terrified. The offenses are not the same although they
arose from same act of Ladislao Bacolod. Consequently conviction for the first does not bar trial for
the second.2

A majority of the American courts have held that the offense of unlawful assembly and riot is distinct
from the offense of assault and battery.3

The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A single act may be an offense
against two different provisions of law and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact which,
the other does not an acquittal or conviction under one does not a bar prosecution under the other.4

It is true that section 9 of Rule 113 prohibits prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the offense charged, in the former, informations. But it may not be held
that the second offense in this case necessarily included the first, physical injuries is included in a
charge of murder. Neither may it be maintained that every crime of physical injuries necessarily
produces such public disorder as is contemplated by section 153 of the Revised Penal Code. Note
especially that the first information did not describe the festal celebration in which the injuries were
inflicted.
It has been suggested that the new Rules of Court modified the above principles, and the precedent
of People vs. Tarok, 40 Off. Gaz., 3488 is invoked. Enough to state, that this last decision and its
doctrinal innovation has been expressly repudiated in Melo vs. People, 47 Off. Gaz., 4631, with
which our present, views substantially conform.

From the foregoing observations it follows that the court a quo made a mistake in dismissing the
second information. Therefore, the appealed resolution is reversed and the record is remanded for
further proceedings. So ordered.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GELASIO TABIANA and JULIAN CANILLAS, defendants-appellants.

Gregorio Araneta for appellants.

Acting Attorney-General Paredes for Appellee.

STREET, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of the Province of IloIlo convicting the
defendants upon the charge of attack upon agents of public authority, in violation of the article 249,
Penal Code, in connection with the second subsection of article 250, Penal Code. The offense is
alleged to have been committed in the municipality of Leon, IloIlo, upon the 23d day of February,
1915.

At the time of the acts giving rise to this prosecution the defendant Gelasio Tabiana was a well-
respected citizen of the municipality of Leon, was a member of the municipal council, and had twice
served as municipal president. He was also at the time a candidate for reelection to the latter office.
The defendant Julian Canillas was also a public officer, occupying the position of justice of the peace
of the municipality. The two men were brothers-in-law and occupied the same house. On the
morning of the date above-mentioned, a neighbor of Gelasio Tabiana had appeared before Julian
Canillas, justice of the peace, and had procured from him a warrant for the arrest of Tabiana and his
herdsman upon the charge of a trivial misdemeanor, consisting of an alleged trespass committed
upon the complainant's premises by Tabiana's cattle. The defendant Tabiana was subsequently
acquitted upon this charge; but the offense which was the subject of prosecution in the present case
had its origin in circumstances connected with the arrest under the warrant.

The acts which are the subject of the charge in this case occurred about 8 o'clock p.m. in
the tienda of the defendant Tabiana, which is located under the apartments occupied by him and
Julian Canillas as a residence. Some reference, however, to things which occurred earlier in the day
is necessary.

The warrant for the arrest of Tabiana and his herdsman was placed in the hands of two policemen,
Emiliano Callado and Baltazar Cabilitasan, who found the defendant Tabiana about 4 p.m. out in the
country. The defendant showed some irritation and instead of coming in at once told the policemen
that he would come in later and report at the municipal building with his herdsman, the other
defendant named in the warrant. The policemen consented, subject to the approval of the chief of
police, and went away. At 6 p. m., the defendant not having appeared at the municipal building, with
his herdsman, the other defendant named in the warrant. The policemen consented, subject to the
approval of the chief of police, and went away. At 6. p.m., the defendant not having appeared at the
municipal building, the policemen were directed by the chief to find him and have him come to the
municipal building in obedience to the warrant. The policemen then proceed to the defendant's
house where they found him in the company friends. When the policemen announced their errand
Tabiana showed further resentment over the idea of being arrested but yielded and started to the
municipal building with the two policemen. In passing near the market place Tabiana detached
himself from the custody of the policemen without their consent and entered the market. The
policemen appear to have been considerate and respectful to Tabiana and, instead of following the
defendant into the market, they waited about half an hour, at the end of which time they went into the
market and found Tabiana with some of his friends. As Callado, one of the policemen, approached
the defendant the latter arose and asked for the warrant saying, "Unless you show me the warrant of
arrest I shall not go with you." Callado drew the warrant from his pocket; and as he showed it to the
defendant the latter took it, looked at it, and put it into his pocket. After that he said, "Come along"
and gave the policeman a push, as did also more than one other of Tabiana's friends.

The party then repaired to the municipal building but as it was getting late, the chief of police and
other officials were gone. This had the effect of further angering Tabiana, and the result was that
while one of the policemen ran to find the chief of police, Tabiana and his friends left the municipal
building, saying that they were going to find the justice of the peace, the idea being to find somebody
who could set the defendant at liberty on bail. As the justice of the peace lived with Tabiana, they of
course directed themselves towards Tabiana's residence. It may be considered that their departure
from the municipal building was effected with the consent of the policemen.

Presently, however, the chief of police arrived at the municipal building, and learning what had taken
place, he dispatched the two policemen already mentioned and a third named Leon Cajilig to go
after Tabiana and procure the return of the warrant of arrest and to insist that Tabiana should come
down at once so that the matter could be finished, or as another witness expressed it, to bring him
(meaning Tabiana) to the police station.

When the policemen arrived they found Tabiana in his tienda, with a number of friends on hand.
When he was requested to give up the warrant and go to the police station he denied having taken
the warrant; and one of Tabiana's friends upstairs called out, "If he has no warrant send him up for a
beating." Tabiana then approached the policeman, Callado, and hit him in the breast with his hand or
fist, at which instant the policeman seized him by the wrist and resistance ceased. As the policeman
started to carry the prisoner away two bystanders interfered and took him away from the policeman.
By this time Julian Canillas, the justice of the peace, had arrived on the scene and being evidently
excited, he hit Callado on the back, when he too was stopped by another policeman. Mean-while
Tabiana seems to have retired to his apartment, and Julian Canillas directing himself to the
policeman said, "Go back to the municipal building and to-morrow you will take those clothes off,"
referring to the uniforms worn by the policemen. Canillas also appears to have spoken other excited
words little comporting with the dignity and duties of his office. The policemen then went away, which
may be attributed not only to the command of the justice of the peace but also to the fact that some
of Tabiana's friends indicated a determination to fight if the policemen should persist in their purpose
of arresting Tabiana. We do not believe that Tabiana should be held responsible for these menaces,
nor for anything that occurred after he was taken in hand by the policeman, as his active resistance
had been ceased.

At the beginning of this altercation the defendant Tabiana may have entertained the idea that
inasmuch as the warrant of arrest had been gotten out of the hands of Callado the authority of the
latter to the effect the arrest had thereby ended. This of course was a mistake, as Tabiana then had
the warrant wrongfully in his own possession, and he cannot be permitted to take advantage of the
fact that he was withholding it from the officer charged with its execution.

From the proofs of record we are convinced that everything done by Tabiana upon this occasion is
properly referable to the idea of resistance and grave disobedience. We discern in his conduct no
such aggression as accompanies the determination to defy the law and its representative at all
hazards. Upon the previous occasions of his contact with the policemen on this day, Tabiana yielded,
though with bad grace; and it is evident that he would upon this occasion, have gone to the police
station again if it had not been for the acts of others in rescuing him, and for the intervention of the
justice of the peace, who ordered the policemen to desist.

Upon the whole we find the defendant Tabiana guilty of resistance and serious disobedience to
public authority under article 252, Penal Code, and not of the more serious offense indicated in
subsection 2 of article 249, Penal Code, which was applied by the Court of First Instance. The
question whether an offense consists of simple resistance or of grave resistance is to be determined
with a view to the gravity of the act proved and the particular conditions under which committed. In
considering this question reference should also be had to the nature and extent of the penalties
attached by the authors of the Code of the different offenses. Thus, when it is observed that the
offense indicated in article 249 carries with it a penalty ranging from prision correccional to prision
mayor in its minimum degree, with corresponding fines, it is obvious that the lawmaker here had in
mind serious offenses, characterized in part at least by the spirit of aggression directed against the
authorities or their agents. It should be observed that the circumstances mentioned in subsections 1
to 4 of article 250 are not qualifications of the definition contained in article 249 but are aggravating
circumstances which are to be used in the application of the penalties. This means that the mere fact
that an offense of resistance happens to be characterized by some circumstance mentioned in one
of these subsections does not necessarily determine that the offense falls within the definition
contained in article 249. It is obvious, for instance, that a Government functionary may commit an
offense under article 252 as well as under article 249; and the relative gravity of the offense
determines whether it falls under the one article or the other.

The greatest hesistancy which we have felt in applying article 252 instead of article 249 to this cases
arises from the words "shall employ force against them" (emplearen fuerza contra ellos) contained in
article 249. These words, taken without reference to the context, would seem to make absolutely
necessary the application of article 249 in every case where any degree of force is exerted. We
believe, however, that the words quoted are to be understood as applying to force of a more serious
character than that employed in the present instance. We are led to this conclusion not only because
of the grave penalty attached, as indicated above, but for the further reason that the Code mentions
grave resistance further on the same paragraph and also make special provision for the offense of
simple resistance in article 252. Now practically and rationally considered in connection with the
subject of arrest, resistance is impossible without the employment of some force. A man may
abscond or evade or elude arrest, or may disobey the commands of an officer without using force
but he cannot resist without using force of some kind or in some degree. If at the ultimate moment
no force is employed to resist, there is not resistance but submission; and if it had been intended
that every manifestation of force, however slight, against the authorities, and their agents should
bring the case under article 249, it was an idle waste of words to make other provisions to cover
grave resistance and simple resistance. It therefore seems reasonable to hold that the words in
article 249 relating to the employment of force are in some degree limited by the connection in which
they are used and are less peremptory than they at first seem. Reasonably interpreted they appear
to have reference to something more dangerous to civil society than a simple blow with the hands at
the moment a party is taken into custody by a policeman.

As to the defendant Julian Canillas we find that he participated in the offense committed on this
occasion, knowing that the defendant Tabiana was liable to arrest under the warrant issued by
himself; and he is therefore punishable in the same manner.

The judgment of the court below is therefore modified and each of the defendants is sentenced to
two months and one day of arresto mayor, and to pay fine of P125, with the accessory penalties and
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, as provided by law, with costs against the appellants.
So ordered.

Arellano C.J., Johnson, Carson and Fisher, JJ., concur.

Torres, J., took no part

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NICOMEDES GUMBAN, Defendant-Appellant.

Block, Johnston & Greenbaum for Appellant.

Solicitor-General Paredes for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. ASSAULT AND BATTERY; ASSAULT UPON PERSONS IN AUTHORITY. The mere fact of having slapped the
face of an official, engaged in the performance of his official duties, constitutes the crime of assault with the
hands, committed upon a person in authority.

2. INFORMATION; CRIME CHARGED IS THAT DESCRIBED. In the information, the fiscal qualified the crime
charged as assault upon an agent of authority. Held: That the qualification given by the fiscal is not what
constitutes the crime, but the facts stated in the body of the information.

3. ID.; CONCLUSIONS OF LAW; SUFFICIENCY TO CONVICT. The fiscal alleges in the body of the
information that the offended party, as municipal president, was an agent of authority. Held: (1) That such
an allegation is but a conclusion of law, which ought to be considered discarded from the information; (2)
that a municipal president is a person in authority (U.S. v. Dirain, 4 Phil. Rep., 541); (3) that, it being
alleged in the information that the offended party was a municipal president, the information is sufficient to
convict the accused of the crime of assault upon a person in authority.

DECISION

AVANCEA, J. :
The information upon which this case brought is literally as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

"The undersigned fiscal accuses Nicomedes Gumban of the crime of assault upon agents of authority
committed as follows: jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"That on or about August 13, 1917, in the municipality of Jaro, Province of Iloilo, P.I., the said accused did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and criminally, attack, employ force, and lay hands upon the person of
Petronilo Gumban, municipal president of the said municipality of Jaro, and therefore upon the person of an
agent of authority of the said municipality, at a time when said Petronilo Gumban was engaged in the
performance of his official duties, giving said Petronilo Gumban a slap on the face. Committed in violation of
Article 250 of the Penal Code." cralaw virtua1aw library

On the morning of August 13, 1917, Petronilo Gumban, municipal president of Jaro, Iloilo, was in the barrio
of Pavia of the said municipality, inspecting the quarantine of animals. He was getting some information
from a councilor, Magdaleno Suliano, regarding the condition of the animals in his barrio, when Gregorio
Ismana, a tenant of Magdaleno Suliano, arrived to report the fact that he had surprised a carabao belonging
to Policarpio Gumban, destroying a planted area belonging to the said Magdaleno Suliano, and that, having
seized the carabao, he brought the same to the police station at Pavia, which is within the zone affected by
the quarantine. Then Epifanio Gumban and the accused Nicomedes Gumban, brothers of Policarpio Gumban,
the owner of the carabao, arrived there and protested to the president that their brothers carabao was
taken to Pavia which is within the zone affected by the quarantine. The president, upon hearing said protest,
said that it was his opinion that Gregorio Ismana was right in taking the carabao to the police station at
Pavia. However he promised to intervene in the matter and to telephone to the man in charge of the
quarantine to find out whether on the following day, the said carabao could not be withdrawn from the zone
affected by the quarantine. Upon hearing this statement of the president, the accused insulted the said
president and gave him a slap on the face which struck his left ear.

The lower court found the defendant guilty of the crime of assault upon an agent of authority, and sentenced
him to 3 years, 4 months, and 8 days of prison correccional, to pay a fine of P600, Philippine currency, with
the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. From this judgment
the defendant appealed.

However, the facts proved at the trial constitute the crime of assault with the hands upon a person in
authority as defined in paragraph 2 of Article 249 in connection with paragraph 3 of Article 250 of the Penal
Code. Article 249 says: jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"The offense of assault (atentado) is committed by: jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"1. . . .

"2. Any person who shall attack, employ force against, or seriously resist or intimidate, any person in
authority, or the agents of such person, while engaged in the performance of his official duties, or by reason
of such performance." cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 250 says: jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"The penalty for assaults falling within the next preceding article shall be . . . when the offense is committed
under any of the following circumstances: jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

"1. . . .

"2. . . .

"3. When the offenders lay hands upon any person in authority." cralaw virtua1aw library

According to the above provisions of law, in order that the crime of assault punishable by these articles may
exist, it is sufficient that there be an assault upon a person in authority committed by laying hands upon
him. The supreme court of Spain in a decision under date December 7, 1876, held: jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

"Considering that the fact of giving a slap to a person in authority should necessarily be qualified in the
sense of laying hands upon the same person and that the court has not thus erred in applying Articles 263
and 264, paragraph 3 (Articles 249 and 250, paragraph 3 of the Penal Code of the Philippines) to the
defendant who gave a slap to the person of the municipal judge of Canada when the latter was engaged in
the performance of the duties pertaining to his office, etc."
cralaw virtua1aw library

According to the doctrine above set forth, the facts proved in this case involve all the necessary elements
that constitute the crime of assault, inasmuch as the offended party, being a municipal president, was a
person in authority (U.S. v. Dirain, 4 Phil. Rep., 541), and was in the performance of his official duties. In
reaching this conclusion, we took into account the decision rendered by this court in the case against Gelacio
Tabiana and Canillas, 1 in which it is said that the distinction between an assault and a resistance to agents
of authority lies largely in the amount of the force employed in each case, and that a sudden blow given to a
policeman while engaged in effecting an arrest does not constitute that employment of force which is
punishable as assault. We have also considered the decision rendered by this court in the case against
Cipriano Agustin (R. G. No. 13083 [decided December 11, 1917, not published]) in which it was also held
that a blow upon a policeman was not an aggression amounting to an assault. It must be remembered,
however, that in these two cases the crime involved was that of assault upon agents of authority, in which
the essential element is substantially the force employed. It is said in these two cases that any force is not
sufficient to constitute an assault. but that it is necessary to consider the circumstances of each case to
decide whether the force used is, or is not, sufficient to constitute assault upon an agent of authority. In the
present case, the crime involved is that of assault upon a person in authority, in which the force necessary
to constitute this crime is specifically defined by the law and consists in laying hands upon the person. In
this case, it is not necessary to ascertain what force the law requires in order to constitute an assault, since
the law itself defines concretely this force in providing that it consists in laying hands upon the person. The
law simply mentions the laying of hands, without making any distinction as to the different cases, and it
would not be just to make that distinction when the law does not make it. It is to be noted that the same
provision of the law with regard to intimidation or resistance as other constitutive elements of assault
expressly requires that they be serious. If the law had intended to distinguish between the case of a serious
laying of hands and that which is not serious, it would have laid down that distinction. This seems to indicate
that the distinction which the law makes in the cases of intimidation or resistance is not intended to be
applied to the case of laying hands.

The information qualifies the crime charged as an assault upon an agent of authority. Inasmuch as the
offended party, as municipal president, is a person in authority and not a mere agent of authority, the
designation of the crime given by the fiscal is erroneous. But, as has been decided by this court in many
cases, this mistake does not affect the information, because the qualification which the fiscal makes is not
what constitutes the crime but the facts stated in the information. In relating the facts constituting the
alleged crime, the fiscal further says that the offended party was a municipal president and therefore an
agent of authority. This, however, is nothing but a mere conclusion of law which can be considered discarded
from the information. The allegation made that the offended party was a municipal president is sufficient to
make one understand that the crime charged in the information is that of assault upon a person in authority.
For this reason, we believe that, in accordance with the information filed in this case, the accused can be
found guilty of the crime of assault upon a person in authority.

In accordance with the recommendation of the Attorney-General, we hereby declare the defendant guilty of
the crime of assault upon a person in authority in accordance with Article 249, paragraph 2, in connection
with Article 260, paragraph 3 of the Penal Code, and, modifying the judgment appealed from, we hereby
sentence the accused to the penalty of 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day of prision correccional, to pay a fine of
625 pesetas, or to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.

In view, however, of the special circumstances of the case and of the degree of malice and the damage
caused, which may be deducted therefrom, we believe that the penalty imposed, by reason of the strict
application of the provisions above cited, is evidently excessive, and, in accordance with article 2 of the
Penal Code, it is hereby submitted and recommended to His Excellency, the Governor-General, to grant the
accused a partial pardon by reducing the penalty to 10 months of prision correccional. So ordered.
Separate Opinions

MALCOLM, J., dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

My views can best be presented by retrogressive elimination: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Should a person who slaps a municipal president be found guilty of a violation of Articles 249 and 250 of
the Penal Code because he laid hands on a person in authority, and sentenced therefor to four years, two
months and one day of prision correccional, to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of both instances all as recommended by the Solicitor-General and
agreed to by a majority of this court?

The information by means of which the charge was initiated, under which the accused was arraigned, and
regarding which the judge of first instance in his decision was in no doubt, charged the accused only with
assaulting an agent of an authority.

Certainly, we should not now strain the language of the information to include what it was not intended to
include, simply to furnish a means by which this offender can be severely punished.

2. Is the accused guilty of a violation of Articles 249 and 250 of the Penal Code or of the lesser offense
penalized by Article 252? The doctrine announced in The United States v. Tabiana and Canillas ([1918], 37
Phil. Rep., 515) is entirely applicable. Even if it were not, in view of the entirely unjustifiable penalties
provided by the Code, intended to protect monarchial officials, the principle should be broadened so as to
include every reasonable contingency. Under this hypothesis the defendant should be sentenced to two
months and one day of arresto mayor, and to pay a fine of P125, with the accessory penalties and subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, as provided by law, with costs against him.

3. Should the defendant be acquitted? On the facts he should not. On the ideas suggested in the dissenting
opinion of the undersigned in United States v. Tabiana and Canillas, supra, he should be. On the assumption,
however, that chapter IV, title III, of the Penal Code is still in force, it being not entirely appropriate to
repeat over and over again this dissent, the defendant should be convicted as above suggested, of a
violation of Article 252 of the Penal Code. I hold to the latter view.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelee,

vs.
FEDERIC BUSTAMANTE, defendant-appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Atty. Eduardo C. Abaya for appellee.
Ramon S. Milo for appellant.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Charged and convicted of the crime of bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Federico
Bustamante appealed to this Court on points of law.

The records disclose that defendant-appellant Bustamante was united in wedlock to one Maria
Perez on August 9, 1954, before the Justice of the Peace of Binalonan, Pangasinan (Exh. "A", pp. 9-
11, t.s.n.). A little over a year later, or on September 16, 1955, he contracted a second marriage with
Demetria Tibayan, solemnized before Vice-Mayor Francisco B. Nato of Mapandan, Pangasinan, who
was then acting as Mayor of the said Municipality (Exh. "B"), while the first marriage was still
subsisting. Defendant dwelt with Demetria and her parents for about a month, after which a time he
returned to Calasiao, Pangasinan to live with the first wife, Maria Perez. In the course of her search
for him, Demetria discovered from the Binalonan municipal authorities the previous marriage of
defendant Bustamante. Hence, this accusation.

Defendant did not testify in his behalf during the trial. the main problem poised in this appeal
concerns the authority of Francisco Nato to solemnize the second marriage.
It appears that Enrique Aquino and Francisco Nato were the duly elected mayor and vice-mayor,
respectively, of the municipality of Mapandan, Pangasinan in the elections of 1951. On September
16, 1955, Aquino went on leave of absence for one month. In view of this, the vice-mayor was
designed by the mayor to take over the rein of municipal government during his absence; and Nato
was acting in this capacity when he performed the second marriage of Bustamante with Demetria
Tibayan.

Appellant, relying upon article 56 of the Civil Code of the Philippines

Art. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court;

(2) The Presiding Justice and the Justice of the Court of Appeals;

(3) Judges of the Courts of First Instance;

(4) Mayors of cities and municipalities;

(5) Municipal judges and justices of the Peace;

(6) Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospel of any denominations, church, religion or sect,
duly registered, as provided in article 92; and

(7) Ship captains, airplanes chiefs, military commanders, and consuls and vice-consuls in
special cases provided in provided in articles 74 and 75.

contends that there could not have been a second marriage to speak of, as Nato was merely acting
as mayor when he celebrated the same, hence, without authority of law to do so. He lays stress on
the distinction made by this court in the case Salaysay vs. Hon. Fred Ruiz Castro, et al.* 52 Off.
Gaz., No. 2, 809, between "Acting Mayor" and "Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor", urging that while the
former may solemnize marriages, the latter could not.

We find this connection untenable. When the issue involves the assumption of powers and duties of
the office of the mayor by the vice-mayor, when proper, it is immaterial whether it because the latter
is the Acting Mayor or merely acting as Mayor, for in both instances, he discharges all the duties and
wields the power appurtenant to said office (Laxamana vs. Baltazar,1 48 Off. Gaz., No. 9, 3869; Sec.
2195, Revised Administrative Code). The case of Salaysay vs. Castro (supra) cited by the appellant,
which revolves upon the interpretation of section 27 of the Revised Election Code, is entirely distinct
from the one at bar. This instance does not involve a question of title to the office, but the
performance of the functions thereunto appertaining by one who is admitted to be temporarily vested
with it. As correctly observed by the lower court, that case even concedes and recognizes the
powers and duties of the Mayor to devolve upon the Vice-Mayor whenever the latter is in an acting
capacity. The word "acting" as held in the case of Austria vs. Amante,2 45 Off. Gaz., 2809, when
preceding the title of an office connotes merely the temporary character or nature of the same.
The information charges that the appellant contracted the second marriage before the Justice of the
Peace of Mapandan, Pangasinan, while the marriage certificate, Exh. "B", and the testimonies of
witnesses indicate clearly that it was performed by Francisco Nato. Appellant assigns as error the
admission by the lower court of the said evidence, notwithstanding counsel's objection. This is not
reversible error. The wrong averment, if at all, was unsubstantial and immaterial that need not even
be alleged, for it matters not who solemnized the marriage, it being sufficient that the information
charging bigamy alleges that a second marriage was contracted while the first still remained
undissolved. The information filed in this case which properly states the time and place of the
second wedding, was sufficient to apprise the defendant of the crime imputed. Neither procedural
prejudice nor error was committed by the lower court in finding appellant guilty.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code attaches the penalty of prision mayor to the crime of bigamy.
Pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court must impose an indeterminate penalty, the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the Code (in this case the medium period of prision mayor, there being no
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances), and the minimum which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense (or prision correccional medium) (People vs.
Gonzales, 73 Phil., 549).

The penalty imposed by the lower court (imprisonment for not less than two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional and not more than eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor), being in accordance with law, is affirmed. Costs against appellant.

SEVERINO P. JUSTO, Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.

DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte finding Petitioner Severino P. Justo guilty of
the crime of assault upon a person in authority.
The Court of Appeals found the following facts to have been established.
The offended party Nemesio B. de la Cuesta is a duly appointed district supervisor
of the Bureau of Public Schools, with station at Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. Between 9: 00 chanroblesvirt uallawlibrary

and 10: 00 a.m. on October 16, 1950, he went to the division office in Laoag,
chanroblesvirt uallawlibrary

Ilocos Norte, in answer to a call from said office, in order to revise the plantilla of his
district comprising the towns of Sarrat and Piddig. At about 11: 25 a.m., De la chanroblesvirt uallawlibrary

Cuesta was leaving the office in order to take his meal when he saw
the Appellant conversing with Severino Caridad, academic
supervisor. Appellant requested De la Cuesta to go with him and Caridad to the
office of the latter. They did and in the office of Caridad, the Appellant asked about
the possibility of accommodating Miss Racela as a teacher in the district of De la
Cuesta. Caridad said that there was no vacancy, except that of the position of shop
teacher. Upon hearing Caridads answer, the Appellant sharply addressed the
complainant thus: Shet, you are a double crosser. One who cannot keep his
chanroblesvirt uallawlibrary

promise. The Appellant then grabbed a lead paper weight from the table of Caridad
and challenged the offended party to go out. The Appellant left Caridads office,
followed by De la Cuesta. When they were in front of the table of one Carlos Bueno,
a clerk in the division office, De la Cuesta asked the Appellant to put down the
paper weight but instead the Appellant grabbed the neck and collar of the polo shirt
of the complainant which was torn. Carlos Bueno separated the protagonists, but
not before the complainant had boxed the Appellant several times. (Petitioners
Brief, pp. 17-18).
The present appeal is directed against that part of the decision of the Court of
Appeals which says: chanroblesvirt uallawlibrary

It is argued by Counsel, however, that when the complainant accepted the

cralaw

challenge to a fight and followed the Appellant out of the room of Mr. Caridad, the
offended party was no longer performing his duty as a person in authority. There is
no merit in this contention. The challenge was the result of the heated discussion
between the complainant and the Appellant occasioned by the latters
disappointment when he was told that Miss Racela could not be accommodated in
the district of the former as there was no more vacancy in said district except that
of a shop teacher. Be this as it may, when the Appellant grabbed the neck and collar
of the shirt of the complainant, which is actually laying hands upon a person in
authority, he did so while the latter was engaged in the performance of his duties as
the occasion of such performance, to wit: his failure to accommodate Miss Racela chanroblesvirt uallawlibrary

as a teacher in his district as he had supposedly promised the Appellant.

(Petitioners Brief, pp. 22-23.)
Petitioner argues: chanroblesvirt uallawlibrary

(1) that when the complainant accepted his challenge to fight outside and followed
him out of the room of Mr. Caridad where they had a verbal clash, he (complainant)
disrobed himself of the mantle of authority and waived the privilege of protection as
a person in authority; and chan roblesv irtualawlibrary

(2) that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that there was no unlawful
aggression on Petitioners part because there was a mutual agreement to fight.
Neither argument is tenable. The character of person in authority is not assumed or
laid off at will, but attaches to a public official until he ceases to be in office.
Assuming that the complainant was not actually performing the duties of his office
when assaulted, this fact does not bar the existence of the crime of assault upon a
person in authority; so long as the impelling motive of the attack is the
chan roblesv irtualawlibrary

performance of official duty. This is apparent from the phraseology of Article 148 of
our Revised Penal Code, in penalizing attacks upon person in authority while
engaged in the performance of official duties or on occasion of such performance,
the words on occasion signifying because or by reason of the past
performance of official duty, even if at the very time of the assault no official duty
was being discharged (People vs. Garcia, 20 Phil., 358; Sent. of the Tribunal chan roblesvirt ualawlibrary

Supremo of Spain, 24 November 1874; 26 December 1877; 13 June 1882 and chan roblesv irtualawlibrary chan roblesv irtualawlibrary

31 December 1896).
Thus, the Supreme Court of Spain has ruled that: chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary

No es razon apreciable para dejar de constituir el delito de atentado el que no

estuviera el guarda en el termino en que ejercia sus funciones, pues resultado que
se ejecuto con ocasion de ellas, esta circunstancias siempre es suficiente, por si
sola, para constituir el atentado, sin tener en cuenta el sitio en que haya ocurrido.
(Sent. 13 de Junio de 1882) (1 Hidalgo, Codigo Penal, 642- 643).
No other construction is compatible with the evident purpose of the law that public
officials and their agents should be able to discharge their official duties without
being haunted by the fear of being assaulted or injured by reason thereof.
The argument that the offended party, De la Cuesta, cannot claim to have been
unlawfully attacked because he had accepted the accuseds challenge to fight,
overlooks the circumstance that as found by the Court of Appeals, the challenge
was to go out, i.e., to fight outside the building, it not being logical that the fight
should be held inside the office building in the plain view of subordinate employees.
Even applying the rules in duelling cases, it is manifest that an aggression ahead of
the stipulated time and place for the encounter would be unlawful; to hold chan roblesv irtualawlibrary

otherwise would be to sanction unexpected assaults contrary to all sense of loyalty

and fair play. In the present case, assuming that De la Cuesta accepted the
challenge of the accused, the facts clearly indicate that he was merely on his way
out to fight the accused when the latter violently lay hands upon him. The
acceptance of the challenge did not place on the offended party the burden of
preparing to meet an assault at any time even before reaching the appointed place
for the agreed encounter, and any such aggression was patently illegal. Appellants
position would be plausible if the complaining official had been the one who issued
the challenge to fight; but here the reverse precisely happened.
chan roblesvirt ualawlibrary

We find no reversible error in the decision appealed from, and the same is hereby
affirmed. Costs against Appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AMADO DANIEL alias "AMADO ATO", accused-appellant.

Eraulio D. Yaranon for appellant.

Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor
Rosalio A. de Leon for appellee.

MUOZ PALMA, J:

This case originated from the Court of First Instance of Baguio City by virtue of a complaint filed by
13-year old Margarita Paleng accusing Amado Daniel alias "Amado Ato" of rape alleged to have
been committed as follows:

That on or about the 20th day of September, 1965, in the City of Baguio, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, armed with a
sharp instrument and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersignedcomplaint,
 against her will, and in her own room situated at No. 25 Interior, Pinsao, Guisad,
Baguio City.

That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance that it was
committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the latter not having
givenprovocation for it, is present. (p. 1, CFI record)

The trial court, presided then by Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, after due trial rendered its decision on
May 30, 1966, finding the accused guilty and sentencing him to suffer "not more than TWELVE (12)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal and not less than SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision mayor, and to pay the costs." 1

His motion for reconsideration and new trial having been denied, accused filed a notice of appeal;
forthwith the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals.

On September 23, 1974, the Court of Appeals through its Tenth Division rendered a decision the
dispositive portion of which follows:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, We find that the guilt of the accused Amado Daniel has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt, and he should accordingly suffer the penalty
for the crime herein charged.

We find, however, that the sentence imposed the accused in the judgment appealed
from is not in accordance with law.

Republic Act No. 4111, which took effect on June 20, 1964, amended Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, providing that

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly

weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.

Under Section 17 of Chapter 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296,
as amended)

The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments
and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in

(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment; ...

WHEREFORE, We hereby certify this case to the Supreme Court for appropriate
further proceedings pursuant to law. 2
By virtue of the foregoing decision of the Court of Appeals the case was certified to this Court and in
a Resolution of March 6, 1975, the same was ordered docketed. 3

Preliminary question

The certification of the case to Us poses a preliminary question which strikes at the very root of a
long standing practice and procedure evoked for the last forty years or so since the creation of the
Court of Appeals. 4

Is the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to act on an appeal in a criminal case where the offense is
punishable by reclusion perpetua or death certified to it by the Court of Appeals with findings of facts
and of the guilt of the accused, but without imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death on
the appellant pursuant to Rule 124, Section 12, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court? 5

Mr. Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, joined by other ,Justices, expresses the view that for this Court
to acquire jurisdiction over the appeal, the decision before Us must have imposed on the appellant
the penalty either of reclusion perpetua or death as the facts warranted.

The rest of the Justices together with the writer of this Opinion, believe otherwise and hold the view
that the dispositive portion of the decision as written and rendered is in accordance with the
Constitution and the law, and vests jurisdiction on the Court to act on the appeal.

A. In People v. Ramos, decided on November 28, 1947, 6 a case was certified to this Court by the
Court of Appeals without findings of facts and simply on the ground that it was "on the opinion that the
penalty that should be imposed ill this case is reclusion perpetua, as recommended by the Solicitor-
General, and not reclusion temporal, as imposed by tile lower court." The question arose as to the proper
procedure to be followed by the appellate court in certifying cases to this Court under Section 145-K of
the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Republic Act No. 52 which read:

Whenever in any criminal cases submitted to a division the said division should be of
the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed, the said
Court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify the case
to the Supreme Court for final determination, as if the case had been brought before
it on appeal.

In disposing of the issue several matters came up which evoked different, and We may say, strong
reactions from the Justices then composing the Court, but for brevity we shall not dwell on them.
Simply stated, it is was ruled that the Court of Appeals was duty bound to make its findings of facts
to support its opinion that the penalty to the imposed upon the appellant was either life imprisonment
or death so as to bring the case within the jurisdiction of this Court.

From the Resolution written for the Court by then Mr. Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran, We quoted the
following pertinent portions:

The jurisdiction of this Court predicated upon the opinion of the Court of Appeals, as
provided in the above-quoted provisions of the law, must of necessity defend upon
the correctness of that opi nion There is nothing in the law precluding this Court from
exercising ing its authority to pass upon such question which concerns its own
jurisdiction. And in order that this Court may exercise its power of review the Court of
appeals is bound to make in its order f certification such findings of facts as are
necessary to support its conclusion that either life imprisonment or death is the
penalty to be imposed. This is indeed covered by Rule 52, section 3, which provides
th where a court to which an appeal has been taken has no appellate jurisdiction
over lic case and it certifies the same to the proper court, it must do so "with a
specific and clear statement of grounds therefor." the requirement of with and
specific grounds is precisely a device to prevent erroneous transmissions of
jurisdiction from a lower to a superior court.

Furthermore, the words "shall refrain from entering judgment thereon" appearing in
the provision above quoted, are sufficient indication that the Court of Appeals, at the
time of certifying the case to this Court, had already examined the evidence and was
ready to render judgment on the merits, but having found from the facts established
by proof that the penalty to be imposed is either death or life imprisonment, instead
of entering judgment thereon , it certifies the case to the Supreme Court for final
determination. Since the Certification is the only ground for determining our
jurisdiction, it must contain not only conclusions of law but also findings of fact, the
latter being more important than the former for they supply the real basis for
determining jurisdiction ...

The instant case cannot be compared with cases coming directly from a Court of
First Instance wherein either life imprisonment or death penalty is imposed, for in
such cases, if we assume jurisdiction even where the judgment appears to be
erroneous on its face, it is because the Court of First Instance has already exhausted
its jurisdiction by rendering judgment on the merits containing both findings of fact
and conclusions of law, and under such circumstance it is more practical for the
administration of the law that this Court should exercise its appellate jurisdiction by
examining the evidence and correcting all errors both of fact and of law that might
have been committed by the trial court. But here, the Court of Appeals is refraining
from rendering judgment on the merits and is refusing to complete the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction because it believes that such jurisdiction belongs to the
Supreme Court and thus, it proceeds to transfer the case to this Court. lt is in that
transfer that we believe we may intervene in order to prevent an erroneous transfer,

xxx xxx xxx

Section 145-K of the Administrative Code is merely a method designed to make

effective the appellate jurisdiction of both the Court of Appeals and this Court, as
defined by law. According to the law of jurisdiction (section 138, Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259),
offenses, for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment, including
offenses arising from the same occurrence or committed on the same occasion,
 come within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the remaining
offenses fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals ...

We are of the opinion and so hold, therefore, that in a case like this, the Court of
Appeals, in certifying it to this Court, must state its findings of fact necessary to
support its conclusion that the penalty to be imposed is either life imprisonment or
death. While this Court will not review the findings of fact, it will pass upon the
correctness of the legal conclusions derived therefrom. And if this Court finds the
conclusions to be correct, it will assume jurisdiction. If it finds them to be wrong, the
case will be returned to the Court of Appeals. (pp. 613-616, supra, emphasis
supplied)

In Ramos, the case was accepted because the Court considered that there was substantial
compliance with the law as the order of certification made reference to the opinion and
recommendation of the Solicitor General whose brief contained sufficient findings of fact to warrant
the conclusion that life imprisonment should be imposed upon the appellant. Justices Paras, Feria,
Pablo, Hilado and Briones concurred in the Resolution.

Justice Gregorio Perfecto in a separate opinion concurred with the principle that the Court of
Appeals is bound to make its findings of fact and study the evidence so as to determine whether the
appellant is guilty or not, but dissented from that portion of the Resolution which accepted the case
as he was of the opinion that the case should have been remanded to the Court of Appeals. 7

Justice Pedro Tuason wrote a separate opinion and dissented from the majority insofar as it held
that it was necessary for the Court of Appeals or a division thereof to state the reasons for its opinion
that death penalty or life imprisonment should be imposed. He particularly dissented from
statements that if this Court found the conclusions of the Court of Appeals to be wrong, the case
should be returned to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. According to Justice Tuason
when a case is certified to this Court it is placed, by force of the Court of Appeals' opinion, within the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for the latter to decide the appeal on the merits; findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are neither essential nor necessary. Justice Tuason was joined in his dissent by
Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief Justice of this Court and Justice Sabino Padilla. 8

B. The theory is now advanced that We go one step further than that ruled in Ramos that is, for
the Court of Appeals not only to make its findings of fact and finding of guilt, but also to impose the
penalty either of reclusion perpetua or death as the facts warrant in order that We may exercise Our
appellate jurisdiction.

We believe that such a judicial ruling will be violence to the letter and spirit of the law which confers
on the Supreme Court the exclusive prerogative to review on appeal and impose the corresponding
penalty in criminal cases where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua or death.

Both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vest upon the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, in
"(A)ll criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment." 9 This jurisdiction is
constitutional: the Supreme Court ma not be deprived thereof by, Congress then, now the National
Assembly. 10
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act 1948 as amended in turn provides that the foregoing appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is exclusive.

Basically therefore, the objection to this new theory is one of jurisdiction - the lack of jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death.

The present controversy springs from the construction given to the second paragraph of Sec. 12,
Rule 124, Rules of Court 11 more particularly to the use of the phrases "should be imposed" and "shall
refrain from entering judgment", viz:

xxx xxx xxx

Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division the said division should be of
the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed, the
said court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify the
case to the Supreme Court for final determination, as if the case had been brought
before it on appeal. (Emphasis supplied)

As we construe it, the Rule cited does not charge the appellate court with the duty of
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death. All that the Rule requires is
that should the Court of Appeals be of the opinion that death or life
imprisonment should be imposed, it "shall refrain from entering judgment thereon ...

The clause "entering judgment" means "rendering judgment". Thus, the Court of Appeals shall
refrain from rendering judgment if and when it is of the opinion that reclusion perpetua or death is the
proper penalty for the crime committed. This can be the only logical interpretation considering that
the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to impose the penalties concerned. The phrase "entering
judgment" is not to be equated with an "entry of judgment" as the latter is understood in Rule 36 in
relation to Section 8, Rule 121 and Section 16, Rule 124, Rules of Court. "Entry of judgment"
presupposes a final judgment final in the sense that no appeal was taken from the decision of the
trial or appellate court within the reglementary period. A judgment in a criminal case becomes final
after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or
totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal. 12 It is
only then that there is a judgment which is to be entered or recorded in the book of entries of
judgments. 13

It would be incongruous or absurd to state that Section 12, second paragraph, Rule 124 enjoins the
Court of Appeals from entering judgment" when there is no judgment to be entered .

But then the argument is advanced what is there to be reviewed by the Supreme Court when the
decision being certified contains no penalty or sentence, as distinguished from appeals from the
Court of First Instance where there is a complete judgment to be passed upon. The answer is
simple. Section 12 itself states that the case is for final determination by the Supreme Court as if the
case had been brought before it on appeal. Hence, based on the findings of facts of the appellate
court which as a rule are conclusive and binding on Us, this Court "will pass upon the correctness of
the legal conclusions derived therefrom" (People v. Ramos, supra) and impose the correct penalty
for the offense committed.

We realize that had Section 12, Rule 124 used the phrase shall refrain from rendering judgment "
there would be no cause for any ambiguity. We can only assume that the intent of the Rule was so
clear to the Court when it drafted the Revised Rules of Court that it did not envision a possible
contrary or adverse interpretation or ambiguity in its implementation under the phraseology used. It
is incumbent upon Us to construe the Rule in the spirit and intent it was conceived and in harmony
with pertinent laws and jurisprudence.

On the merits of the appeal

1. Generally in a case of this nature, the evidence of the prosecution consists solely of the testimony
of the offended party. Here We have the declaration of the victim, who at the time of the incident was
a little less than 13 years of age, on the basis of which the trial court found the charge of rape duly
established. The happenings are briefly summarized in the People's brief as follows:

The offended party in this case is Margarita Paleng who was born on November 20,
1952 (p. 3, t.s.n., Manipon). She is a native of Balangabang Tublay, Mountain
Province (pp. 3, 12, Id.) At the time of the incident in question on September 20,
1965, complainant was temporarily boarding at a house located at Pinsao Guisad
Baguio City, as she was then a first year high school student at the Baguio Eastern
High School (pp. 3, 12, 20, Id.; p. 36, Estigoy).

On September 20, 1965, at about three o'clock in the afternoon, she had just arrived
in the City from Tublay in a Dangwa bus (p. 3, Manipon). Because it was then raining
and the bus was parked several meters away from the bus station, she waited inside
the bus (pp. 3, 22, Id.). After about three minutes of waiting, the accused came and
started molesting her by inquiring her name and getting hold of her bag (pp. 4, 22-
24, Id.). But she did not allow him to hold her bag (p. 24, Id.). She called the attention
of the bus driver and the conductor about the actuation of the accused, but it seemed
that the former were also afraid of him (pp. 24-25, Id.).

Despite the rain, she left the bus and went to ride in a jeep parked some 100 meters
away (pp. 4, 25, Id.). The accused closely followed her (p. 4, Id.). When the jeep
started to go, the accused also rode and sat beside her (p. 5, Id.).

When the jeep reached Guisad, she alighted on the road but she still had to
negotiate a distance of ten meters (p. 5, Id.). The accused also alighted and again he
tried to carry her bag (p. 5, Id.). Although he was not allowed to carry her bag, her
was adamant in following her (p. 5, Id.).

Reaching her boarding house, she opened the door and was about to close it when
the accused dashed in and closed the door behind him (pp. 31-32, Id.). When she
entered her room, the accused went in (p. 7, Id.). He pulled a dagger eight inches
long and threatened her: "If you will talk, 1 will kill you". (p. 7, Id.). Margarita was
 stunned into silence because of her fear (p. i Id.). Thereupon, the accused held her
hair with his left hand and forced her Lo lie down in bed (p. 7, Id.) He also placed his
left hand with a handkerchief in Margarita's mouth, at the same time holding the
dagger and her neck with his right hand (pp. 7-8, Id.). She was forcibly made to the
down and, at this moment, the accused removed the buttons of his pants (p. 8, Id.).
He then put down the dagger on tile bed (p. 8, Id.). Her attempts to extricate herself
from the accused was to no avail assile was only 4 ft. and 8 inches tall and weighed
about 95 to 100 pounds (p. 35, Id.) while the accused was 5 ft. and 7 inches tall and
weighed about 126 pounds (pp. 8, 59, Id.). He then held his penis (pp. 8. 36, Id.),
used his thigh to separate the legs of Margarita (p. 38, Id.). tried, but failed. to
remove her panty (p. 36, Id.). He nonetheless guided his penis and inserted it inside
the vagina of the complainant after prying open the part of her panty covering her
private parts (pp. 9, 36, Id.). Then he succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the
offended party (p. 9, Id.). Margarita lost consciousness. When she recovered, he was
already gone (p. 9, Id.).

The following morning, her father came to visit her. She confided to him the terrible
misfortune which befell her (pp. 9-10, Id.). She was immediately brought to the
Baguio General Hospital where she was examined (p. 10, Id.). Then they proceeded
to the Police Department. The Chief of Police accompanied them to the Health
Center where she was again examined by Dr. Perfecto O. Micu who thereafter
submitted his medical report (Exh. C; p. 3, rec.; pp. 11, 14-16, Id.). Margarita and her
father gave their respective statements before the police authorities (Exh. B, pp, 5-6,
rec.; p. 11, t.s.n.). She signed her criminal complaint prepared by the Fiscal's Office
of Baguio (Exh. A; p. 1, rec.; p. 11, t.s.n. (pp. 2-4, Brief at p. 83, rollo

The City Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Perfecto Micu was called to the witness stand and he testified on
the physical examination conducted on the person of Margarita Paleng on September 23, 1965 and
his findings as contained in the report were as follows:

1. Hymen-circular-stellate type with healing lacerations at 6:00, 8:00, 9:00 and 11:00
o'clock positions in the face of a clock.

2. Contusions at the base of the hymen at 3:00 & 9:00 o'clock regions.

3. Vaginal Orifice - tight and hardly admits 2 fingers.

4. Vaginal wall tight and vaginal folds are prominent.

5. Vaginal smear negative for spermatozoa and for gram negative intra or extra-
cellular diplococci. (Exh. "C", p. 3, CFI record)

Dr. Micu concluded that "defloration was recent". He further declared that the condition of the hymen
revealed that Margarita Paleng was a virgin before the incident complained of, and that the number
of lacerations and contusions at the base of the hymen indicated the degree of force exerted to
effect the sexual act. 14
For his defense, appellant claimed that he and Margarita were acquainted with each other since
1963, and there were occasions when they rode together in a bus; that the incident of September
20, 1965 inside the room of Margarita was with the latter's consent, and in fact it was the second
time he had carnal knowledge with her, the first time having occurred inside a shack; that he
promised Margarita that he would marry her, but to his surprise, she filed the instant complaint
against him. 15

2. The issue being one of credibility, We find no cogent reasons for discarding the findings of facts of
the trial court which were sustained by the Court of Appeals after the latter had examined the
evidence as a result of which it certified the case to this Court.

Appellant assails the veracity of the testimony of the complainant. But what possible motive could a
thirteen-year old girl barely in her teens have in fabricating a story that could only bring down on her
and her family shame and humiliation and make her an object of gossip and curiosity among her
classmates and the people of her hometown. It cannot be denied that a public trial involving a crime
of this nature subjects the victim to what can be a harrowing experience of submitting to a physical
examination of her body, an investigation by police authorities, appearance in court for the hearing
where she has to unravel lewd and hideous details of a painful event which she would prefer to
forget and leave it unknown to others. If Margarita did forego all these and preferred to face the cruel
realities of the situation it was due to her simple and natural instincts of speaking out the truth.

The insinuation that this complaint was filed because appellant had not married the girl although he
promised to marry her, is preposterous. On September 20, 1965, Margarita was only twelve years
and ten months old and was not of marriageable age, hence, marriage was a legal impossibility. And
as regards appellant's testimony that the complaint was instigated by the Chief of Police of Tublay
who was Margarita's uncle, the trial court did not give credit to such a declaration.

Counsel for appellant stresses that notwithstanding that Margarita had the opportunity to ask for help
or attract the attention of other people before she reached her boarding house, she failed to do so.
According to counsel there were people at the Dangwa station, in the busy streets, in the market
place, in the jeepney parking place where the girl took a jeep to proceed to the boarding house, and
in the neighboring houses the closest of which was about 5 meters away, but no attempt was ever
made by complainant to seek help so as to prevent appellant from molesting her. 16

Appellant's contention presupposes that Margarita was well aware all the time from the moment she
saw the appellate inside the bus that the latter had intentions of abusing or raping her. All that the
appellant did inside the bus was to hold her bag and she caged the attention of the driver and the
conductor to the impertinence of appellant but the two did not do anything about it. 17 And when
Margarita walked from the bus to the jeepney station, although she saw appellant walking behind her she
did not suspect that he was following her. To a question propounded by His Honor whether she suspected
that appellant was following her, Margarita answered: "No sir, I did not suspect." 18 All along Margarita
could not call the attention of the people in the street or shout for help inasmuch as at that particular
moment the appellant was not doing anything against her. And when Margarita reached the boarding
house there were no persons around 19 and in fact she went straight to her room and it was at that
particular moment when appellant barged into the room before she could close the door. In short, the
Poor girl was simply taken by surprise by the forced entrance of appellant who immediately took out an 8-
inch long dagger and said "If you will talk I will kill you."
Persons can have different reactions to a situation like that some may manifest an aggressive or
violent attitude of confronting a molesting or impertinent fellow while others, like 12-year old
Margarita, may assume a silent. fearful attitude.

Appellant's counsel also claims that Margarita did not offer any resistance to the acts of the accused
at the time the latter was allegedly forcing himself on her as shown by the medical findings that there
were no signs of extra-genital injuries on the girl's body, and no blood stains on her dress and
underwear.

The foregoing arguments are inadequate to weaken and destroy the veracity of Margarita's
straightforward and positive declaration as to how appellant, a 22-year old farmer in the prime of his
manhood, weighing 126 lbs and five feet 21 and six inches tall, 20 overpowered her and succeeded in
accomplishing the sexual act despite her resistance. Margarita was less than 13 years of age, was 4' 8 "
in height, and weighed around 95 lbs. 21

In a crime of rape, force need not be irresistible; "it need but be present, and so long as it brings
about the desired result, all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible, is beside the
point. 22

All that is necessary is that the force used by the accused is sufficient for him to consummate his evil
purpose. In U.S. v. Villarosa, 1905, there was a similar situation. A 12 year old girl was sexually
abused in the woods by a man of superior physical strength. In holding the accused Villarosa guilty
of rape the Court held:

It is a doctrine well established by the courts that in order to consider the existence of
the crime of rape it is not necessary that the force employed in accomplishing it be so
great or of such character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force
used by the guilty party be sufficient to consummate the purpose which he had in
view. (4 Phil. 434, 437 citing Judgment May 14, 1878, Supreme Court of Spain. The
Villarosa doctrine has been followed in numerous cases involving the crime of rape
and one of the latest is People v. Equec, 1977, per Justice Enrique Fernando, 70
SCRA 665.)

And as stated in People v. Savellano, per Justice Ramon Aquino, the force or violence necessary in
rape is naturally a relative term, depending on the age, size, and strength of the parties and their
relation to each other. 23

Rape is likewise committed when intimidation is used on the victim and the latter submits herself
against her will because of fear for her life and personal safety. In this case of Margarita Paleng,
appellant was armed with a dagger and with it threatened to kill the girl if she would talk or scream
for help. Her fear naturally weakened whatever resistance Margarita could muster at the time and as
a result appellant was able to consummate his coitus on the victim. 24

One last point raised by the able counsel of appellant, Atty. Braulio D. Yaranon, who at the time of
the trial in 1965 was the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, was that appellant voluntarily submitted to a lie
detector test with the National Bureau of Investigation and the report of the lie detector examiner is
in appellant's favor, that is, the latter was telling the truth on the questions propounded to him one of
which was whether he forced Margarita Paleng into having sexual intercourse with him and the reply
was "No". 25

On this matter We find the trial Judge's observations and conclusions meritorious and We quote
from his decision the following:

As to the N.B.I. lie detector test report, the Court does not put much faith and credit
on it. It is well known that the same is not conclusive. Its efficacy depends upon the
time, place and circumstances when taken and the nature of the subject. If subject is
hard and the circumstances, as in this instant, were not conducive to affect the
subject emotionally, the test will fail. The subject had nothing more to fear because
the trial was over. He was not confronted by the victim or other persons whom he
had a reason to fear. Naturally, his reaction to the questions propounded was normal
and unaffected and the apparatus could not detect it. (pp. 172-173, CFI record)

To conclude, the crime committed by the appellant is rape with the use of a deadly weapon with the
aggravating circumstance of having been committed in the dwelling of the offended party. Although
Margarita was merely renting a bedspace in a boarding house, her room constituted for all intents
and purposes a "dwelling" as the term is used in Article 14(3), Revised Penal Code. It is not
necessary, under the law, that the victim owns the place where he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a
boarder, or a bed-spacer, the place is his home the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and
uphold.

Hence, the correct penalty for the crime committed is death pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended. However, for lack of the necessary number of votes, the penalty next
lower in degree is to be applied.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, We affirm the judgment of conviction of Amado Daniel for the crime of
rape as charged, and We sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and order him to
indemnify Margarita Paleng by way of moral damages in the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos
(P12,000.00) and pay the costs.

Decision Modified.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, J., concurs.

Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur in the result on the merits.

Castro, C.J., Makasiar, Fernando and Fernandez, JJ., took no part.

Guerrero, J., is on leave.

 Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

The phrase shall refrain from entering judgment thereon" found in section 12 of Rule 124 and in
section 34 of the Judiciary Law means that the Court of Appeals should not decide the case. The
Court of Appeals has been certifying to this Court criminal cases, wherein the imposable penalty is
death or reclusion perpetua without rendering any judgment but merely expressing its opinion that
the penalty imposed by the trial court is erroneous and that the imposable penalty is death
or reclusion perpetua. Invariably, this Court accepted those cases and decided the same. This
Court's jurisdiction in criminal cases, as defined in the Constitution, cannot be diminished but it can
be enlarged.

Appealed criminal cases may be divided into three classes: (1) those wherein the lower court
imposed the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua and which are within this Court's exclusive
appellate jurisdiction; (2) criminal cases wherein the trial court imposed reclusion temporal or a
lesser penalty and which fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, and (3) criminal
cases wherein the trial court imposed a penalty of reclusion temporal or a lesser penalty but a
Division of the Court of Appeals, while in the process of deciding the case, comes to the conclusion
that the imposable penalty is death or reclusion perpetua. That third class of criminal cases should
be elevated to this Court "for final determination".

Reclusion perpetua was properly imposed in this case upon the appellant who is a pedophiliac.

CASTRO, C.J., dissenting:

The preliminary issue at bar is: What is the correct course of action that the Court of Appeals should
take when, in a criminal case properly appealed to it, that court determines that the penalty of death
or reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) should be imposed instead of the lesser penalty imposed
by the court a quo? Should it refrain from rendering judgment and forthwith certify the case to the
Supreme Court? Or should it render judgment imposing what it considers as the proper penalty
(either life imprisonment or death) but refrain from entering judgment and thereafter certify the case
to the Supreme Court?

At the center of scrutiny is the pertinent provision of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, and the Identical statement in the second paragraph of section 12 of Rule 124 of the
Rules of Court, both of which read:
 Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division [of the Court of Appeals] the
said division should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment
should be imposed, the said court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and
shall forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court for final determination, as if the
case had been brought before it on appeal.

Justices Claudio Teehankee, Cecilia Munoz Palma and Ramon C. Aquino interpret the phrase
"entering judgment" in the inhibitory clause "shall refrain from entering judgment" to mean "rendering
judgment" or "pronouncing judgment," arguing that [t]his can be the only logical interpretation
considering that the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction" to impose the penalties of death and life
imprisonment. They thus opt to maintain the present practice1 of requiring no more than a forwarding
certification (embodying findings of fact supporting the opinion that the penalty of death or life
imprisonment should be imposed) by the Court of Appeals for the purpose of placing such case within the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

For the reasons hereunder stated, we consider their interpretation unwarranted and therefore reject
the conclusion that it leads to.

2.

Section 34 of the amended Judiciary Act and the second paragraph of section 12 of Rule 124 of the
Rules of Court must be construed in the light of the unequivocal phraseology of paragraph (d),
subsection (2), section 5 of Article X of the Constitution, which states:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Review and revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferiors courts in

xxx xxx xxx

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, life imprisonment;

Varying the language of this provision only to the extent necessary to carry out its intention, the first
subdivision of the third paragraph of section 17 of the Judiciary Act made exclusive the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in the following words:

The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments
and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided in -

(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment: ...
The constitutional mandate, given due statutory acknowledgment, sets forth the pertinent appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. We accord capital significance to the phrases "final judgments and
decrees of inferior courts and "the penalty imposed." These phrases are crystal-clear. Read together
with the remainder of the provision, they state in precise and unmistakable terms the sole intended
inescapable meaning that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over final judgments
of inferior courts in criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment. No
hermeneutic expertise or exercise can validly fashion some other meaning or intention.

3.

The constitutionally determined nature of the criminal cases falling within the periphery of the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court fixes our perspective, defines and delimits our judicial
prerogative in the interpretation of section 34 of the Judiciary Act, and dictates the manner in which
the law in question should be read and made operative.

This being so, the clause enjoining the Court of Appeals to "refrain from entering judgment"
whenever it "should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be
imposed" cannot validly be interpreted as a bar to that appellate court's "rendering judgment." If the
meaning given to the law by the minority should prevail and the case is forwarded, as this case
before us was, to the Supreme Court on a bare certification by the Court of Appeals, then we have
the unacceptable happenstance of an ordinary legislative act upstaging the fundamental law, since,
plainly, the Supreme Court will be constrained to exercise its power to "review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal" in criminal cases where NO "final judgment" in which "the penalty
imposed is death or life imprisonment" has been rendered or pronounced.

The minority view would thus result not only in an unconstitutional imposition on the Supreme Court
of assumption of jurisdiction over a case that is beyond its original appellate competence but would
also compel abandonment by the Court of Appeals of appellate jurisdiction legally and duly vested in
and acquired by it.

4.

Because sec. 34 of the Judiciary Act does not and cannot have primacy or ascendancy over the
Constitution, we assert that the Court of appeals is legally empowered to impose the penalties of
death and life imprisonment. Four basic and compelling considerations underlie our view.

First: There is no law no law at all that states such prohibition in categorical terms. The minority
view rests solely on the strained interpretation foisted on the very law under consideration and
this interpretation, as we have said, is entirely unwarranted.

Second: In the case at hand, the Court of appeals duly and legally assumed appellate jurisdiction
over the accused Amado Daniel's appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio
sentencing him to suffer a penalty less than life imprisonment. This cannot be debated since section
29 of the Judiciary Act specifically places such appeal within the Court of Appeals' jurisdictional
ambit with the statement that
 The Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases,
actions, and proceedings, not enumerated i section seventeen of this Act, properly
brought to it.

Thus, absent any constitutional or legal constraints, the Court of Appeals should have rendered the
proper judgment in the case. For, verily, judicial jurisdiction is "the power with which judges are
invested for administering Justice that is, for trying civil or criminal cases, or both, and deciding
them and rendering judgment, ..., 2(emphasis supplied)

Third: Harking back to the Constitution, the Court of Appeals, by unmistakable constitutional
categorization, is an "inferior court." And it is its judgments as such inferior court which, so the
Constitution plainly states, are the subject of the Supreme Court's plenary power of review, revision,
reversal, modification or affirmance.

Fourth: Absurdity and incongruity should not be read into the law so as to support the view that a
panel of three Justices of the Court of Appeals is denied the power to impose the penalties of life
imprisonment and death at the same time that such power is recognized in a single judge of a lower
court of admittedly lesser category,

5.

The resulting conclusion that the Court of Appeals must impose the proper penalty does not justify
the apprehension that the Supreme Court will be hampered in the exercise of its jurisdiction because
the findings of fact made by the inferior appellate court "will have to be respected." This stated
procedural practice has never been honored in the absolute. The ultimate function of the Supreme
Court is to render justice. And we need not elaborate on or belabor the numerous occasions when,
to attain this objective, the Court shunted aside technicalities to bare wide open the controversy and
inquire into each and every aspect, be it legal or factual or a mixture of both.

And this is one perfect instance where the avowed ends of justice must override practice and
procedure, for, no less than human life is at stake. And this would not be a novelty. When a trial
court's judgment imposing the death penalty is elevated to this Court en consulta, we strip the case
into minutiae: fact by fact, detail by detail, facet by facet. We see no reason why, when a decision
imposing the penalty of death or life imprisonment is rendered by the Court of Appeals, the same
manner of meticulous inquiry should not be resorted to by the Supreme Court. A sentence imposing
death or life imprisonment is of the self-same gravity, whichever is the sentencing tribunal. 3

6.

It is rather obvious that the phrase "entering judgment" is completely disparate from the term
"rendering judgment." There is no need to perambulate and meander the provisions of sections 1
and 2 of Rule 36 of the Rules of court need merely be read to perceive the strikingly sharp antithesis
between the two phrases. These sections read:

Section 1. Rendition of judgments. All judgments determining the merits of cases

shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and
 distinctly the facts and the law on which it [sic] is based, signed by him, and filed with
the clerk of the court.

Section 2. Entry of judgments and orders. If no appeal or motion for new trial is
filed within the time provided in these rules, the judgment or order shall be entered by
the clerk. The recording of the judgment or order in the book of entries of judgments
shall constitute its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment
or order and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or
order has become final and executory.

The word "enter" (which undeniably is the root of "entering") with reference to judgments has
acquired a definite meaning in our procedure. There simply exists no ambiguity to warrant embroiled
interpretation. We need not hammer out meaning from the word "entered." It is there. Section 2, Rule
36 chisels out the legal import of the word. 4 To repeat and stress the Rule, "[t]he recording of the
judgment or order in the book of entries of judgments shall constitute its entry. Upon the other hand, the
rendition of judgment is the judicial act of the writing by the judge of the decision and the filing thereof with
the clerk of court. 5

Such being the precise acceptations of the terms "entering judgment" and "rendering judgment," we
see no cogent reason why our indisputably learned lawmakers should have written in the former
when they meant the latter. If, as the minority would have it, the intention was just that, why then has
not section 34 of the Judiciary Act been accordingly amended, considering that the said Act has
been amended no less than ninety (90) times 6 since its enactment thirty years ago in 1948?

The conclusion is thus ineluctable that section 34 of the Judiciary Act means exactly what it says.
(And its intendment cannot and should not be altered through tile expedient of palpably tortuous and
torturous statutory interpretation.) This rightly projects the limited character of the said section a
procedural device designed to effect and make effective the jurisdictions of both the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals. Read as written, this section neither imposes nor curtails constitutionally
and legally established jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals can and must render a decision and
impose the proper penalty of death or life imprisonment, and, to effect the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, refrain from entering its judgment, and forthwith certify tile case to the Supreme
Court.

7.

Aside from according the respect that is due to the Constitution and setting aright the import of
section 34 of tile Judiciary Act, our reading of the law will obviate unnecessary, pointless and time-
wasting shuttling of criminal cases between the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. We advert
to that portion of the Ramos 7decision, cited with approval by Justice Muoz Palma, which states:

We are of the opinion and so hold, therefore, that in a case like this, the Court of
Appeals, in certifying it to this Court, must state its findings of fact necessary to
support its conclusion that the penalty to be imposed is either life imprisonment or
death. While this Court will not review the findings of fact, it will pass upon the
correctness of the legal conclusions derived thereof And if this Court finds the
 conclusions to be correct, it will assume jurisdiction. If it finds then to be wrong the
case will be returned to the Court of Appeals. (emphasis supplied)

We particularly and especially object to the return of the ease to the Court of Appeals if the Supreme
Court "finds" the legal conclusions in the certification "to be wrong." This incident will never come to
pass if section 34 is correctly construed that is, as we construe it for, the Supreme Court will
acquire jurisdiction over the case from the very inception and can, without bothering the Court of
Appeals which has fully completed the exercise of its jurisdiction, do justice in the case.

8.

ACCORDINGLY, this Court directs that, henceforth, should the Court of Appeals be of the opinion
that the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) should be imposed in any criminal
case appealed to it where the penalty imposed by the trial court is less than reclusion perpetua the
said Court, with a comprehensive written analysis of the evidence and discussion of the law
involved, render judgment expressly and explicitly imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion
perpetua as the circumstances warrant, refrain from entering judgment, and forthwith certify the case
and elevate the entire record thereof to this Court for review.

Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos and Fernandez, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

The phrase shall refrain from entering judgment thereon" found in section 12 of Rule 124 and in
section 34 of the Judiciary Law means that the Court of Appeals should not decide the case. The
Court of Appeals has been certifying to this Court criminal cases, wherein the imposable penalty is
death or reclusion perpetua without rendering any judgment but merely expressing its opinion that
the penalty imposed by the trial court is erroneous and that the imposable penalty is death
or reclusion perpetua. Invariably, this Court accepted those cases and decided the same. This
Court's jurisdiction in criminal cases, as defined in the Constitution, cannot be diminished but it can
be enlarged.

Appealed criminal cases may be divided into three classes: (1) those wherein the lower court
imposed the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua and which are within this Court's exclusive
appellate jurisdiction; (2) criminal cases wherein the trial court imposed reclusion temporal or a
lesser penalty and which fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, and (3) criminal
cases wherein the trial court imposed a penalty of reclusion temporal or a lesser penalty but a
Division of the Court of Appeals, while in the process of deciding the case, comes to the conclusion
that the imposable penalty is death or reclusion perpetua. That third class of criminal cases should
be elevated to this Court "for final determination".

Reclusion perpetua was properly imposed in this case upon the appellant who is a pedophiliac.
CASTRO, C.J., dissenting:

The preliminary issue at bar is: What is the correct course of action that the Court of Appeals should
take when, in a criminal case properly appealed to it, that court determines that the penalty of death
or reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) should be imposed instead of the lesser penalty imposed
by the court a quo? Should it refrain from rendering judgment and forthwith certify the case to the
Supreme Court? Or should it render judgment imposing what it considers as the proper penalty
(either life imprisonment or death) but refrain from entering judgment and thereafter certify the case
to the Supreme Court?

At the center of scrutiny is the pertinent provision of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, and the Identical statement in the second paragraph of section 12 of Rule 124 of the
Rules of Court, both of which read:

Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division [of the Court of Appeals] the
said division should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment
should be imposed, the said court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and
shall forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court for final determination, as if the
case had been brought before it on appeal.

Justices Claudio Teehankee, Cecilia Munoz Palma and Ramon C. Aquino interpret the phrase
"entering judgment" in the inhibitory clause "shall refrain from entering judgment" to mean "rendering
judgment" or "pronouncing judgment," arguing that [t]his can be the only logical interpretation
considering that the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction" to impose the penalties of death and life
imprisonment. They thus opt to maintain the present practice1 of requiring no more than a forwarding
certification (embodying findings of fact supporting the opinion that the penalty of death or life
imprisonment should be imposed) by the Court of Appeals for the purpose of placing such case within the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

For the reasons hereunder stated, we consider their interpretation unwarranted and therefore reject
the conclusion that it leads to.

2.

Section 34 of the amended Judiciary Act and the second paragraph of section 12 of Rule 124 of the
Rules of Court must be construed in the light of the unequivocal phraseology of paragraph (d),
subsection (2), section 5 of Article X of the Constitution, which states:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Review and revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferiors courts in
 xxx xxx xxx

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, life imprisonment;

Varying the language of this provision only to the extent necessary to carry out its intention, the first
subdivision of the third paragraph of section 17 of the Judiciary Act made exclusive the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in the following words:

The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments
and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided in -

(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment: ...

The constitutional mandate, given due statutory acknowledgment, sets forth the pertinent appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. We accord capital significance to the phrases "final judgments and
decrees of inferior courts and "the penalty imposed." These phrases are crystal-clear. Read together
with the remainder of the provision, they state in precise and unmistakable terms the sole intended
inescapable meaning that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over final judgments
of inferior courts in criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment. No
hermeneutic expertise or exercise can validly fashion some other meaning or intention.

3.

The constitutionally determined nature of the criminal cases falling within the periphery of the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court fixes our perspective, defines and delimits our judicial
prerogative in the interpretation of section 34 of the Judiciary Act, and dictates the manner in which
the law in question should be read and made operative.

This being so, the clause enjoining the Court of Appeals to "refrain from entering judgment"
whenever it "should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be
imposed" cannot validly be interpreted as a bar to that appellate court's "rendering judgment." If the
meaning given to the law by the minority should prevail and the case is forwarded, as this case
before us was, to the Supreme Court on a bare certification by the Court of Appeals, then we have
the unacceptable happenstance of an ordinary legislative act upstaging the fundamental law, since,
plainly, the Supreme Court will be constrained to exercise its power to "review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal" in criminal cases where NO "final judgment" in which "the penalty
imposed is death or life imprisonment" has been rendered or pronounced.

The minority view would thus result not only in an unconstitutional imposition on the Supreme Court
of assumption of jurisdiction over a case that is beyond its original appellate competence but would
also compel abandonment by the Court of Appeals of appellate jurisdiction legally and duly vested in
and acquired by it.

4.
Because sec. 34 of the Judiciary Act does not and cannot have primacy or ascendancy over the
Constitution, we assert that the Court of appeals is legally empowered to impose the penalties of
death and life imprisonment. Four basic and compelling considerations underlie our view.

First: There is no law no law at all that states such prohibition in categorical terms. The minority
view rests solely on the strained interpretation foisted on the very law under consideration and
this interpretation, as we have said, is entirely unwarranted.

Second: In the case at hand, the Court of appeals duly and legally assumed appellate jurisdiction
over the accused Amado Daniel's appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio
sentencing him to suffer a penalty less than life imprisonment. This cannot be debated since section
29 of the Judiciary Act specifically places such appeal within the Court of Appeals' jurisdictional
ambit with the statement that

The Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases,
actions, and proceedings, not enumerated i section seventeen of this Act, properly
brought to it.

Thus, absent any constitutional or legal constraints, the Court of Appeals should have rendered the
proper judgment in the case. For, verily, judicial jurisdiction is "the power with which judges are
invested for administering Justice that is, for trying civil or criminal cases, or both, and deciding
them and rendering judgment, ..., 2(emphasis supplied)

Third: Harking back to the Constitution, the Court of Appeals, by unmistakable constitutional
categorization, is an "inferior court." And it is its judgments as such inferior court which, so the
Constitution plainly states, are the subject of the Supreme Court's plenary power of review, revision,
reversal, modification or affirmance.

Fourth: Absurdity and incongruity should not be read into the law so as to support the view that a
panel of three Justices of the Court of Appeals is denied the power to impose the penalties of life
imprisonment and death at the same time that such power is recognized in a single judge of a lower
court of admittedly lesser category,

5.

The resulting conclusion that the Court of Appeals must impose the proper penalty does not justify
the apprehension that the Supreme Court will be hampered in the exercise of its jurisdiction because
the findings of fact made by the inferior appellate court "will have to be respected." This stated
procedural practice has never been honored in the absolute. The ultimate function of the Supreme
Court is to render justice. And we need not elaborate on or belabor the numerous occasions when,
to attain this objective, the Court shunted aside technicalities to bare wide open the controversy and
inquire into each and every aspect, be it legal or factual or a mixture of both.

And this is one perfect instance where the avowed ends of justice must override practice and
procedure, for, no less than human life is at stake. And this would not be a novelty. When a trial
court's judgment imposing the death penalty is elevated to this Court en consulta, we strip the case
into minutiae: fact by fact, detail by detail, facet by facet. We see no reason why, when a decision
imposing the penalty of death or life imprisonment is rendered by the Court of Appeals, the same
manner of meticulous inquiry should not be resorted to by the Supreme Court. A sentence imposing
death or life imprisonment is of the self-same gravity, whichever is the sentencing tribunal. 3

6.

It is rather obvious that the phrase "entering judgment" is completely disparate from the term
"rendering judgment." There is no need to perambulate and meander the provisions of sections 1
and 2 of Rule 36 of the Rules of court need merely be read to perceive the strikingly sharp antithesis
between the two phrases. These sections read:

Section 1. Rendition of judgments. All judgments determining the merits of cases

shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it [sic] is based, signed by him, and filed with
the clerk of the court.

Section 2. Entry of judgments and orders. If no appeal or motion for new trial is
filed within the time provided in these rules, the judgment or order shall be entered by
the clerk. The recording of the judgment or order in the book of entries of judgments
shall constitute its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment
or order and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or
order has become final and executory.

The word "enter" (which undeniably is the root of "entering") with reference to judgments has
acquired a definite meaning in our procedure. There simply exists no ambiguity to warrant embroiled
interpretation. We need not hammer out meaning from the word "entered." It is there. Section 2, Rule
36 chisels out the legal import of the word. 4 To repeat and stress the Rule, "[t]he recording of the
judgment or order in the book of entries of judgments shall constitute its entry. Upon the other hand, the
rendition of judgment is the judicial act of the writing by the judge of the decision and the filing thereof with
the clerk of court. 5

Such being the precise acceptations of the terms "entering judgment" and "rendering judgment," we
see no cogent reason why our indisputably learned lawmakers should have written in the former
when they meant the latter. If, as the minority would have it, the intention was just that, why then has
not section 34 of the Judiciary Act been accordingly amended, considering that the said Act has
been amended no less than ninety (90) times 6 since its enactment thirty years ago in 1948?

The conclusion is thus ineluctable that section 34 of the Judiciary Act means exactly what it says.
(And its intendment cannot and should not be altered through tile expedient of palpably tortuous and
torturous statutory interpretation.) This rightly projects the limited character of the said section a
procedural device designed to effect and make effective the jurisdictions of both the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals. Read as written, this section neither imposes nor curtails constitutionally
and legally established jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals can and must render a decision and
impose the proper penalty of death or life imprisonment, and, to effect the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, refrain from entering its judgment, and forthwith certify tile case to the Supreme
Court.

7.

Aside from according the respect that is due to the Constitution and setting aright the import of
section 34 of tile Judiciary Act, our reading of the law will obviate unnecessary, pointless and time-
wasting shuttling of criminal cases between the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. We advert
to that portion of the Ramos 7decision, cited with approval by Justice Muoz Palma, which states:

We are of the opinion and so hold, therefore, that in a case like this, the Court of
Appeals, in certifying it to this Court, must state its findings of fact necessary to
support its conclusion that the penalty to be imposed is either life imprisonment or
death. While this Court will not review the findings of fact, it will pass upon the
correctness of the legal conclusions derived thereof And if this Court finds the
conclusions to be correct, it will assume jurisdiction. If it finds then to be wrong the
case will be returned to the Court of Appeals. (emphasis supplied)

We particularly and especially object to the return of the ease to the Court of Appeals if the Supreme
Court "finds" the legal conclusions in the certification "to be wrong." This incident will never come to
pass if section 34 is correctly construed that is, as we construe it for, the Supreme Court will
acquire jurisdiction over the case from the very inception and can, without bothering the Court of
Appeals which has fully completed the exercise of its jurisdiction, do justice in the case.

8.

ACCORDINGLY, this Court directs that, henceforth, should the Court of Appeals be of the opinion
that the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) should be imposed in any criminal
case appealed to it where the penalty imposed by the trial court is less than reclusion perpetua the
said Court, with a comprehensive written analysis of the evidence and discussion of the law
involved, render judgment expressly and explicitly imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion
perpetua as the circumstances warrant, refrain from entering judgment, and forthwith certify the case
and elevate the entire record thereof to this Court for review.

Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos and Fernandez, JJ., concur.