1

AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF

INTERNATIONAL KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS

This article is concerned with the role of American philanthropic foundations in the
development of international knowledge networks.1 By an international knowledge
network is meant a system of coordinated research, results dissemination and
publication, study and often graduate-level teaching, intellectual exchange, and financing,
across national boundaries. The international networks may also include official
policymakers and international aid and other agencies. Landrum Bolling shows that,
despite the lack of a grand design, American foundations (and other agencies) have
constructed a remarkable foreign aid (educational and other) network that, he suggests,
has had a significant impact on the third world. It is clear that American foundations
consciously helped to construct US international hegemony after 1945 through
international knowledge networks that aimed to foster a pro-US environment of values,
methods and research institutions across a range of fields and academic disciplines. Such
international networks were modelled on previous foundation initiatives within the
United States itself, from the 1920s to the 1940s, resulting in the effective intellectual
hegemony of liberal internationalism, of empirical scientific research methods, and of
policy-oriented studies (mostly under the banner of realism or realistic research,
designed to be of practical utility to policymakers). Such domestic hegemony constructed
a key basis of Americas rise to globalism2 which, after 1945, required a continuing and
enhanced foundation role, especially with the onset of the Cold War.

The international knowledge networks of interest here were constructed and funded by
US-based foundations that operated as adjuncts (or parastates, as Eldon Eisenach calls
them) of official US foreign policy rarely, if ever, challenging dominant thinking within
the State Department (Whitaker, 1974). Their role appears to fit well with the corporatist
outlook of Michael Hogan et al, suggesting that a relatively unified and cohesive
domestic corporative political economy was projecting its power and vision overseas,
in coordination with the American state (Hogan, 1987, xii, 2-3). The underlying thinking,
heavily influenced by the outlook of liberal internationalism (a kind of nationalist
internationalism, Patterson, 1976; Herman, 1969), represents a genuine attempt to
organise and mobilise intellectuals, universities, etc of other nations in Africa, Asia,
Latin America, for example, to develop themselves in a direction that would not only
favour US economic and strategic interests but, in so doing, lead to greater general
economic growth, stability, and prosperity, and to peace. In short, the US-based
foundations believed that they had the answers based on their experiences of the first
30-40 years of the century to the worlds problems and a duty (alongside their
government) to mobilise knowledge to solve those problems. Their views were
enlightened in the sense that they believed that the American national interest would
benefit from other nations development, that is, greater levels of prosperity through
aid of various forms which, in truth, did have numerous positive side-effects as well as
causing more significant problems for recipient nations.
1
That there was such a network is plainly recognised, even by scholars generally supportive of foundations.
For example, see Bolling (1982) who suggests the importance of studying the network which, he claims,
arose spontaneously.
2
See, for example, Parmar (1999b; 2000).
 2

The US-based international networks operated across international boundaries to achieve

their objective of fostering and consolidating US hegemony. They did this by:

i. Financing the creation of new educational and research institutions with a view to
generating knowledge, ideas and trained manpower, favouring particular kinds of
economic development;
ii. Consolidating existing institutions to the same end;
iii. Sponsoring research programmes and projects that favoured particular lines of
inquiry at the expense of others, thereby setting the agenda of research;
iv. Establishing scholarships at elite US universities to educate and train students
from the third world;
v. Bringing together academics and practitioners, from the US and overseas, through
conferences and seminars, to create networks that would act further to strengthen
US hegemony.

The overall effect of network construction was to consolidate US hegemony in

economically or strategically important areas of the world through the fostering of pro-
US modernising elites (Ransom, 1974; Magat, 1979).

Such attempts to construct and consolidate intellectual hegemony fit well with Gramscian
ideas, according to which power is not only to be understood as coercion or force, but
also in regard to the mobilisation of knowledge, information and ideas. Such
mobilisation, according to Gramsci, occurs through the efforts of intellectuals who help
to construct, consolidate and disseminate a particular world-view of politics, economy
and society that wins broad assent across classes and, by extension, across nations. The
foundations, as intellectual actors with large financial resources, strategic vision, and
acting with official policy guidance, had the power to define academic fields, to identify
the most talented individuals, and the resources to build up key institutions, and thereby
consolidate US power, especially during the Cold War (Berman, 1983; Augelli and
Murphy, 1988; Gill, 1993; Hoare and Nowell-Smith, 1971). It is also argued here that the
foundations activities may be considered to align well with the corporatist school of US
foreign relations history, indicating the extension of US power abroad through active
new partnerships between public and private elites (Hogan, 1987, 3; McCormick,
1982).

Clearly none of the above suggests that the US foundations were value-free, neutral,
non-political or non-ideological. Yet, that is the thrust of a significant element of the
scholarship on foundations, underplaying or even denying the degree to which
foundations mobilised bias through their domestic or international activities. Scholars,
such as Karl and Katz, react to Gramscian critiques of US foundations by almost
reverting to the bland and optimistic interpretations of foundation insiders, who claim
that foundations merely sponsor good ideas or knowledge for its own sake, rather than
for political, strategic, or ideological ends (Karl and Katz, 1987, Karl 1997; Weaver,
 3

1967; Bulmer, 1984).3 Allied to this is the view that foundations represent a third sector
in society, somewhere between business and government, enhancing pluralism through
providing an alternative channel of influence to citizens and consumers (Colwell, 1980).

This article has two aims:

1. to show through concrete examples (from Asia, Africa and Latin America) how and
why and with what effects US foundations built international networks;
2. to show that the Gramscian view (which synthesises well with the corporatist view)
constitutes the best explanation of foundations behaviour.

The article begins by providing a brief outline of the domestic importance of US

foundations and how successfully they constructed domestic knowledge networks across
a range of fields which, after 1945, were used as guides to international knowledge
network construction. It then shows how international networks were constructed by
providing 3 examples: the Ford Foundation (and the Rockefeller Foundations) role in
Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s; the Ford Foundations role in Latin American social
science development in the 1960s and 1970s; and the role of the Carnegie Corporation,
Rockefeller and Ford foundations in African education from the 1950s to 1970s. The
article will consider the theoretical implications of foundations and knowledge networks,
and consider their continuing importance in an era of globalisation. Finally, the article
identifies the need for more micro-level research on the precise means by which
foundation ideas become realised in concrete research projects, through specific
individual scholars, in particular institutional settings, that are connected to a network,
and which have some impact on the world.

US Foundations Domestic Experience

It is important to note that the US foundations international efforts are widely
acknowledged to have their origins in the foundations prior domestic experience (Curti,
1963; Arnove, 1980; Berman, 1983; Weaver, 1967). Consequently, it is necessary briefly
to review some of the most important principles, aims, methods, and effects of the
foundations at home.

Two of the three foundations to be considered in this article (Carnegie Corporation and
the Rockefeller Foundation) were formed in 1911 and 1913 respectively, while the Ford
Foundation did not become active until the early 1950s (despite its formation in 1936.
Ford, however, did not stray from the principles of philanthropy as outlined below). The
Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation represented what became known as
scientific philanthropy, a rational activity that sought to maximise its effects on the
social and other problems of order and stability in an industrialising and urbanising
America at the turn of the twentieth century (Howe, 1980). They advanced a theory of
human capital development, as Fisher calls it, to explain and justify their activities,
3
Bulmer, for example argues that foundation officials were careful to not influence the research that they
funded. In fact, he claims, The foundations at this period possessed what universities and governments
both lacked, a cultivated sense of disinterestedness and detachment which made it possible for them to
reconcile the interests of patron and beneficiary without giving in to narrow academic self-interest or a
philistine desire to serve purely practical ends (Bulmer, 1984, 575).
 4

especially in funding higher education and advanced research, but also in attempts to
alleviate poverty and disease control. Briefly, this approach viewed human beings as
educable, and education as the means of constructing human capital, people with brains
and potential for leadership in solving societys problems (Fisher, 1978).

The foundations philosophy was generally practical, pragmatic, and utilitarian. They
funded research programmes and universities that were empirical in approach and sought
to generate knowledge for practical use by policymakers, urban planners and others.
They wanted to put knowledge to work, as one official put it. For example, Rockefeller
money re-established the University of Chicago, an institution renowned for its empirical
approach to society and economy (Arnove, 1980; Lagemann, 1989; Alchon, 1985). They
championed positivistic social science, the rational study of social problems, in order to
apply the benefits of modern physical science to society and politics, to solve the
problems of poverty, crime and the urban slum (Fisher, 1977; 1980; Arnove, 1980;
Lagemann, 1989). The foundations were elitist, convinced of their superior wisdom and
their duty to alleviate societys ills in the manner they saw fit through certified experts -
without the necessity of consulting those upon whose behalf they claimed to be acting
(Arnove, 1980; Berman, 1983).

These are the principles that motivated foundations behaviour within the United States:
elitist, technocratic, utilitarian, scientific. These principles were realised by the
investment of large funds in a range of individuals, universities, think tanks, and policy
research institutes from the 1910s through to the 1940s. Practically every field of human
endeavour was covered from the natural sciences to the dramatic arts, from domestic
social problems to the study and understanding of foreign affairs, both within the USA
and overseas (Lagemann, 1989; Whitaker, 1974; Weaver, 1967; Berman, 1983).

Since the foundations attitude to the social sciences played such an important role in
their overseas efforts in the 1950s and 1960s, it is worth devoting some time now to
considering what they understood by social science. From the very beginning,
Rockefeller philanthropy defined social science largely as atheoretical, empirical and
fact-gathering, aimed at producing realistic studies by properly trained researchers who
were close to their subject matter (Fisher, 1977; Fisher, 1980; Lagemann, 1989). This,
according to foundation officials, was social science interpreted as social technology
which could be used to ensure social control (Fisher, 1980). Having thus defined social
science (and its ultimate aim of social control) the study of problems by certified
experts - the foundation sought to disseminate the definition to the rest of the United
States (and to world-wide centres of excellence) via the universities (Fisher, 1980).
They aimed at building up a network of key institutions connected to each other through
fellowships and scholarships for advanced research and training either at US universities,
such as Chicago, Harvard and Yale, or at other key elements of a nascent international
network, such as the London School of Economics in Britain.4 Disciplines such as
4
In fact, Britain was seen a key strategic investment by Rockefeller Foundation, as it was at the centre of a
world-wide Empire that was the centre of a common culture, political control, financial and commercial
activity, educational ideas, social prestige, and family ties From London, it was seen, would spread the
philosophy and practises of the Rockefeller Foundation, in an influential international network (Fisher,
1978, 129).
 5

economics, cultural anthropolgy, international relations, public administration and

sociology were developed in such directions by the foundations with important effects in
academia and public policy (Lagemann, 1989).

In the academic discipline of international relations, the aim of which was scientifically
to analyze, interpret, and predict the course of world affairs (Mosely, 1967), the
foundations played a significant role in defining the discipline, building the key
institutions, and the network (Olson and Groom, 1991). Both the Carnegie Corporation
and the Rockefeller Foundation gave generous funds to the organisation that became the
core component of the American foreign policy establishment the Council on Foreign
Relations (CFR) and to other influential liberal internationalist bodies such as the
Foreign Policy Association and the Institute of Pacific Relations. These intellectual
bodies played key roles in both American official foreign policy formation and in
mobilising public opinion behind a policy of globalism (Shoup and Minter, 1977; Wala,
1994; Parmar, 1995, 1999a, 1999b, 2001).

In the universities, the foundations invested the venture capital for non-Western
studies and Soviet Studies, for example, during the inter-war years and up to 1945
(Beckmann, 1964; Engerman, 1999). Later, in the Cold War period, the foundations
established area studies programmes at elite US universities, as a key basis upon which
relevant practical advice and information could be produced for the benefit of official
policy makers and for the attentive and opinion-forming publics (Mosley, 1967; Berman,
1983). The Ford Foundation alone spent $190 million on building up US expertise in
world affairs at top US univesities such as Harvard, Columbia, Chicago, Berkeley,
Stanford, Cornell and Michigan (Magat, 1979). A State Department survey of 1967
showed that of that the 191 university centres of foreign affairs research, 107 depended
primarily on Ford funding (Berman, 1980b, 222). The Ford Foundation also, for example,
spent $45 million on its Foreign Area Fellowships Program through which a US-based
area studies intellectual network was constructed in order to spread the influence of the
programmes they had financed (Magat, 1979). The impact of Ford Fellowships has been
noted by Beckmann: Of the 984 former fellows, 550 hold faculty positions in 181
colleges and universities in 38 states. Beckmann further notes that some 29 universities
have employed ten or more [fellows] who, altogether, published 373 books, edited or
contributed to 516 volumes, and over 3000 articles and monographs (Beckmann, 1964,
17-18).5

According to Philip Mosely, who had been a member of the CFRs foundation-funded
programmes in the State Department during the Second World War and Director of the
foundation-funded Russian Institute at Columbia University (1951-55), without the
foundations, international relations in America would still be limping along not far from
5
The Rockefeller Foundation also contributed generously to area studies providing almost $1 million to the
Russian Institute (Columbia) between 1946-55 alone (Annual Report, 1951). Rockefeller Foundation gave
another $999,000 (mainly to Cornell) for Southeast Asian programmes (Annual Reports, 1951, 1954,
1959). The Carnegie Corporation, between 1947-60, contributed $2.4 million to Russian Studies (mainly at
Harvard) $721,500 to African Studies, $610,000 to Latin American Studies, and just under $500,000 to
Southeast Asian studies. Finally, CC donated over $750,000 to the Social Science Research Council to
establish a programme of area studies fellowships (Annual Reports, 1947-60).
 6

the starting line, and consequently the USA would be poorly equipped intellectually to
comprehend and fulfil its responsibilities as a member of the unruly family of nations
(Mosely, 1967, 375). During World War II, he suggests, practical men were genuinely
surprised to see that social scientists had proved indispensable to the winning of the
war (Mosely, 1967, 382). The foundations, in short, had generated and evolved
international relations into a policy science based on the analysis of possible, feasible,
alternative, and desirable courses of national and international action (Mosely, 1967,
383). In this area as in the social sciences in general, however, the foundations were not
content to focus solely on the United States. They constructed, even in the interwar years,
an international network of international relations institutes and programmes aimed at
improving international cooperation, often acting in fields in which American
governments, because of isolationist opinion, could not (Mosely, 1967; Parmar, 1992;
Fisher, 1977, 1980).

It was on such domestic experience and bases that foundations became increasingly
active in the period after 1945. The United States was now a global power, ready, able
and willing to lead the free world against aggression from any quarter, especially from
international communism, and to aid other countries as bulwarks against the Soviet
Union, its ideological and military rival. The following section of the article considers
three examples of international knowledge network building in the Cold War years,
revealing how area studies, the social sciences, large-scale financial investment by
foundations in collaboration with various official and unofficial, national and
international bodies, were used to construct networks of influence that were designed to
impact upon the world in support of United States foreign policy objectives. The first
example focuses on the role of US foundations (principally Ford but also Rockefeller) in
Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s.

US Foundations and Indonesia:

training the guys who would be leading the country when Sukarno got
out (John Howard, Director of Fords International Training and
Research Program; Ransom, 1974)

According to Dean Rusk, education and fighting communism went hand-in-hand. As

assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, just before accepting the presidency of
the Rockefeller Foundation in 1952, Rusk urged the United States to open up its
training facilities for increasing numbers of our friends from across the Pacific
(Ransom, 1974, 95). Due to the economic and strategic importance of Indonesia, the
United States actively intervened in Indonesia during the 1940s and 1950s. The Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), for example, intervened in numerous ways, including
supplying opponents of Sukarno with arms and ammunition to overthrow the elected
government (Simons, 2000, 165; McMahon, 1981, 323).

The Ford Foundation, in the common belief that the modernisation of Indonesia, and the
rest of the third world, would follow the pattern of western industrial development,
initiated the teaching of English (and other important European languages) on the
assumption that development required western knowledge (Magat, 1979). The Ford
 7

Foundation also expended large resources in helping to build a modernizing elite in

Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s, armed with the ideology of developmentalism
(Ransom, 1974, 93; Bodenheimer, 1970; Arnove, 1977). In brief, the ideology of
developmentalism suggested that there was a unilinear path to development that would
mirror western industrialisation and be based on the diffusion of cultural and material
factors from modern to traditional societies, initiating stable and orderly change
(Bodenheimer, 1970; Arnove, 1977; Cammack, 1997).6

The ultimate aim, as the quotation in the sub-heading indicates, was to train the leaders
and sub-leaders of Indonesia for the days when the nationalist President Sukarno would
no longer be in power. In this regard, the role of the Ford Foundation was fundamental to
Indonesias economic and political development.

In keeping with the foundations preference for basing their overseas efforts on
programmes in the United States, the Ford Foundation first constructed an American
university network of Indonesian Studies. In the early 1950s, the Ford Foundation, with
Rockefeller assistance, working with Harvard, Berkeley, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) and Cornell university, built up Indonesian Studies, with field-
experienced scholars as a key feature. In 1954, Ford financed the Modern Indonesia
Project at Cornell University, with seed money of $224,000, with the aim of building up
the social science wing of Indonesian Studies. The two foundations also financed grants
to Indonesian social scientists to study in the USA. It was during an MIT scholars visit
to Indonesia to study the causes of economic stagnation (one of which was discovered
to be armed insurgency), that US scholars built contacts with the Indonesian Army,
hoping to prepare the latter for a more clearly defined role in national economic
development, and to promote an alliance between it and the elitist Socialist Party of
Indonesia (SPI), headed by Sumitro (Ransom, 1974).

The Ford Foundation, therefore, was constructing a domestic US network of Indonesia

experts, part of which was connected with the Indonesian Army (which included
seminars at the Armys own educational facility SESKOAD - at Bandung). Political
scientists at Cornell (affiliated with Indonesian Studies), and economists from Berkeley,
also established connections with the economics faculty at the University of Jakarta.
Berkeleys role was central in training young Indonesian economics faculty, and in
transforming the Faculty of Economics, which was headed by the leader of the SPI
(Sumitro), into a modern American-style school of business administration, economics
and statistics. When President Sukarno complained about the fact that the young
Indonesians were not learning anything about Marx and only about Schumpeter and
Keynes, the Berkeley team placed the word socialist in a number of economics
courses titles at Jakarta, without altering course content.7 Once the $2.5 million
6
The Rockefeller Foundation, in addition to its contributions to Southeast Asian studies at Cornell and
Johns Hopkins universities, provided vital funding (almost $170,000 between 1956-62) for the Association
for Asian Studies, the principal professional society in the field (Annual Reports, 1956, 1957, 1959).
7
According to Joseph Fischer, university economics courses were dominated by tests and lectures [that]
dwel[t] almost entirely upon free enterprise and industry and devote little time to a discussion of state-
controlled systems and the agricultural sector. Similarly, he concludes, in other social sciences
authoritarian systems of government receive scant mention, and in general much more time is spent upon
 8

programme had been completed, the Berkeley team left and the US-trained Indonesians
returned to their Faculty, liaising closely with the Army (on economic aspects of
defence) and becoming drawn in to the militarys machinations against the nationalist
government. It was this modernising elite of economists at Jakarta that furnished the
five man Team of Experts for Economic and Financial Affairs when the Army assumed
power in 1966. Unsurprisingly, the Team of Experts suggested reforms and plans that
were favoured by the United States and the IMF and World Bank. Unlike Sukarno, who
had told the West to go to hell with your aid, the US-trained modernising experts noted
the uniquechemistry between Indonesias economic technocrats and the West
(Hills, 1996, 79). The New Order in Indonesia promised political stability and
economic development, the latter to be based on foreign investment in modern sectors of
the economy. According to Crouch, the Armys conception of economic development
was thus primarily oriented toward the interests of the elite and the white-collar middle
class (Crouch, 1978, 273). By 1968, the Team of Experts was integrated into a
development cabinet by General Suharto (Crouch, 1978, 318).

The above account shows that the Ford Foundation constructed an intellectual network
that included an Indonesian Studies academic community in the United States actively
connected to training a modernizing elite and participating in the transformation of
economics as a discipline in Indonesia. In addition, the US-based experts connected the
Indonesian economists to the Army that, they had noted, was a suitable vehicle for
Indonesian economic and political development.8 Given the resources of the Foundation,
and its close alignment with the general aims of US official policy to remove the
nationalist Sukarno and to put in place pro-US forces its network proved highly
influential in the economic and political development of Indonesia. As had been their
purpose, the Ford Foundation had trained the guys who would be leading the country
when Sukarno got out (Ransom, 1974, 99). Much more research is needed on the role of
the Ford Foundation in Indonesia, particularly now that the archival material is now
available to scholars.

The second example of the role of US foundations in fostering and consolidating

American hegemony is taken from their activities in Latin American social science
development in the 1960s and 1970s.

US Foundations and Latin American Social Science:

what makes a country change is the competence of its leaders (Ford
Foundation, 1967; Arnove, 1977).9

European and American rather than local or relevant Asian experiences. See his chapter, Indonesia, in
James S. Coleman, ed., Education and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1965), p. 93.
8
Not every Berkeley economist agreed with the political machinations of the Ford-sponsored experts. Len
Doyle and Ralph Anspach were disillusioned by their experiences in Indonesia and refused to comply with
what, they believed, was a rebellion against the government and an American policy of empire
(Ransom, 1974, 100).
9
It was taken as given by recipients of Ford grants that one of the requisites for development is a
competent elite, motivated to modernize their society, that is, to ensure economic growth and political
stability (Lipset and Solari, 1967, viii).
 9

By the late 1970s, the Ford Foundation had spent $50 million in Latin America on
developing basic training and research capacities in key social science disciplines [in
order to] stimulate an indigenous tradition of social science research., to encourage
regional and national networks of social scientists for collaborative work and [to
facilitate] the analysis and testing of development strategies (Magat, 1979, 157). Such
expenditures made Ford the largest source of funding for social science in Latin America,
in addition to being a major force in the development of Latin American Studies in the
United States (Bell, 1972, 116). By the late 1960s, networking social scientists of Latin
American nations with each other and with their American counterparts had become a
major preoccupation of the Ford Foundation. The Ford Foundation provided large-scale
funding for scholarships, seminars and conferences to encourage network-building
among scholars sharing similar guiding assumptions as to the questions which will be
examined, and the methodologies employed to study social, physical, and natural
phenomena (Arnove, 1977, 112). As the Foundation annual report noted in 1975,
numerous Foundation-funded scholars, trained in Foundation -funded programmes in the
US at Stanford, Chicago, Harvard often returned to their own countries only to be
employed in an emerging network of Foundation-supported research centers (Arnove,
1977, 113). In addition, the Rockefeller Foundation played a leading role in funding
scholarships in the region (Thompson, 1974, 199).

Following the Rockefeller Foundations lead, the Ford Foundation focused on building up
a few centres of excellence or lead universities and colleges with the aim of
developing competence in the various social science disciplines. Millions of dollars
were expended on fields such as agricultural economics, policy-related economic studies,
etc (Magat, 1979, 158). The idea was to create a group of strong universities in a few
of the strategically located and potentially important developing countries, in the hope
that such investments would create such a critical mass of scholars and teachers that
they could be instruments for broad national development (Bolling, 1982, 61). Once
developed, trained faculty and institutions would act as models of development within the
whole region, helping to strengthen the foundation-funded network. For example, in the
early 1970s, the Rockefeller-supported Federal University of Bahia (FUB) became a key
force for the development of northeastern Brazil, under the leadership of Gabriel
Velazquez of the Universidad del Valle, Cali (Columbia), an Rockefeller Foundation-
funded scholar and institution. With further Foundation backing, the FUB planned to
initiate several long-term development strategies, to work closely with other institutions
that had received Rockefeller assistance, and to propagate these [development] ideas and
experiences to other countries and to train leaders and experts in rural and urban
development (Velazquez, 1974, 243-244).10

By 1978, Ford had established ten educational research centres that examined the
educational needs of Latin America, including the Centro de Estudios Educativos (CEE)
in Mexico, Carlos Chagas Foundation, Brazil, and the Centre for Educational Research,
Argentina (Arnove, 1980a, 314). These institutions act as regional training centres for
advanced study and research, and as forums for discussion and conferences. The CEE, for
10
In all, the Rockefeller Foundation had earmarked $100 million for its University Development Program
for third world countries as a whole (Berman, 1983, 71). The main aim of expending such vast sums of
money was the extraordinary leverage that would be exerted as a result.
 10

example, received over $500,000 and publishes a prestigious Spanish language journal
that further cements the Latin Americanists of the region (Arnove, 1980a, 314).
According to Francis Sutton, the Ford Foundation has played a key role in training
Brazilian economists and Latin American social science in general (Bolling, 1982, 71).

Clearly, this was part of the general strategy of the US foundations to encourage western
style development through technocratic elites or competent leadership groups trained
with the necessary value-free social scientific ideology (Bodenheimer, 1970). The hope
was, according to Francis Sutton, a high official in the Ford Foundations International
Division, that successful and competent people will have a trusting view of this country
and be understanding and forthcoming partners in new ventures (Bell, 1972, 121).

Arnove asks: who benefits from US foundation investment in Latin American educational
institutions? He does not believe that the masses of Latin America have benefitted as
levels of poverty and social class inequality continue unabated. Bolling, a less critical
foundations scholar, notes that there was no evidence of any trickle-down of benefits
of development to the masses (Bolling, 1982, 62). Even studies funded by international
aid agencies including the Rockefeller and Ford foundations - for example, note the
severe structural social and economic inequalities that plague the region (Thompson and
Fogel, 1976, 194-196).

The principal benefit, Arnove concludes, is drawn by the United States whose regional
hegemony is strengthened by the fact that the Foundation induct[s Latin American
educators and researchers] into regional and international networks of individuals and
institutions conducting the type of research the Ford Foundation thinks is appropriate and
useful (Arnove, 1980a, 315). Indeed, network building to create a critical mass of
scholars is recognised as one of the most important by-products of foundation
largesse. Thompson and Fogels study argues the necessity of preserving and
strengthening the network of Latin American educators as a new communications
system, despite noting the relative failure of foundation grants to engender large-scale
development (Thompson and Fogel, 1976, 49; 204). Thompson, a former vice-
president of the Rockefeller Foundation, noted the need appropriately to make use of the
network of highly respected and responsible Third World educators that the
intellectual community of assistance agencies.. [had] called into being.. (Thompson and
Fogel, 1976, 13). One such use, Arnove suggests, is the generation of new ideas and
theories, even radical and critical ones, that foundations, Latin America specialists in US
universities, and other international assistance agencies might consume to better tailor
future funding programmes.

As Arnove (1980a) further argues, the World Bank and US foundations sponsor neo-
Marxist studies to better understand the causes of failure of previous aid programmes,
through scholars such as Fernando Henrique Cardoso (now President of Brazil), who was
sponsored by the Ford Foundation to teach in the United States. Dependency theory,
which came to prominence partly as the result of Foundation funding, has been consumed
largely by the foundation-funded scholarly communities of North and Latin America,
rather than by the impoverished masses in order to promote radical structural reform.
 11

Consequently, the networks constructed were able to facilitate the movement of ideas
among nationals of a region and between the metropolitan centers and the periphery
(Arnove, 1980a). Divorced from mass political movements, Arnove argues that radical
ideas become domesticated and applied, in diluted form, as incremental reforms
(Arnove, 1980a, 320-322). Regardless of the recognised failure of previous strategies of
development, the foundations have the resources to remain at the forefront of agenda-
setting and the establishment of new programmes.

The final example of network construction is drawn from the activities of the Carnegie
Corporation, Rockefeller, and Ford foundations in African education. Once again, an
economically and strategically important region for US foreign policy became the
recipient of large-scale foundation investment for national economic and political
development. Again, the foundations focused on promoting lead universities and
institutes, graduate training in economics, public administration, etc, and the building
of local and regional networks after promoting the development of area, that is, African,
studies, within the United States.

US Foundations and African Education: an example of foundation cooperation

American foundations cooperated actively in their investment strategies in African

education. While the Carnegie Corporation focused mainly on teacher education,
Rockefeller specialised in the biological and social sciences, and Ford in the social
sciences and public administration (Berman, 1980b). Carnegie and Ford also worked
together in establishing African Studies as a discipline in US universities (Berman,
1980b; Reining, 1964).

The Carnegie Corporation, during the colonial period, based its activities in British Africa
on its experiences with the education of southern US negroes. Between 1910 and 1945,
the Corporation operated on the basis that southern blacks needed only to learn the skills
and trades that would suit their position in the southern racial order, that is, the most
menial and manual labouring tasks, leaving the skilled trades and professions to whites.
Nevertheless, Carnegie Corporation officials recognised that even such limited black
education would require the fostering and training of a cadre of elite blacks teachers,
lawyers, doctors who would lead black society (Berman, 1980a). It was this
Tuskegee tradition that the Carnegie Corporation championed, along with other
northern US philanthropic bodies, in the teaching of hygiene, home economics, and
industrial and agricultural training. Such ideas and practices were Africanised with the
active assistance of the British Colonial Office which hoped to create an intelligent,
cheerful, self-respecting, and generally docile and willing-to-learn African native
(Berman, 1980a, 188).

According to Merle Curti, post-1945 US philanthropy effectively continued the

Tuskegee tradition in its attempts to develop sound native leadership in the third
world and to lift the lethargy imposed by ancient custom (Curti, 1963, 573). The
Ford Foundation, working on the basis that every society required an educated elite to
lead it, financed an active programme of training elite cadres in public administration,
 12

agricultural economics, and in the social sciences. Between 1958-69, Ford spent $25
million in Nigeria, over a third of it at the University of Ibadan alone (Berman, 1980b,
209-210); in addition, the Rockefeller Foundation donated $9 million to Ibadan between
1963-72. The foundations funding created the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic
Research, as well as departments of political science, economics and sociology. The
Foundation focused a great deal of its funding ($10 million between 1963-73) on the new
federated University of East Africa (UEA) and, with Ford Foundation cooperation,
established several institutes of economic and social research. The Rockefeller
Foundation also placed numerous Africans in US universities, employing American
faculty at Ibadan and UEA (Berman, 1980b, 213; Court, 1979, 250).11

The Carnegie Corporation, as noted above, focused on building the education schools and
faculties of African universities, on the interface between the university and the national
education system, spending over $10 million between 1953 and 1973 (Murphy, 1976,
36; 266). Focusing more specifically on upgrading the skills and capacities of key staff,
the CC established travel scholarships to British, American and other universities. In
effect, the Carnegie Corporation established a network of relationships involving
educators in British Africa and British and American university staffs and foundation
functionaries (Murphy, 1976, 37). Murphy estimates that over 50% of all African
university vice-chancellors and heads of institutes benefited by the travel grants provided
by Carnegie philanthropy. Further network construction took place within the United
States, through conferences of foundation representatives, members of the State
Department, the British Colonial Office, the World Bank, and major US corporations,
initiated by Carnegie in 1958 and 1960 (Murphy, 1976, 38-39; Berman, 1980b, 224). As a
result of such conferences emerged the Africa Liaison Committee, designed to strengthen
American university interest in the continent (Berman, 1980b, 224).

The immediate effects of Rockefeller and Ford Foundation funding are noted by
Thompson: 66% of all UEA faculty had held either Rockefeller scholarships or special
lectureships. 80% of UEAs full professors and deans had held such Rockefeller
Foundation awards. Thompson also notes that the presence of Rockefeller-funded
Americans also played a key role in institutional and curricular development, most
notably at the Institute of Development Studies in Nairobi, under the directorship of
James S. Coleman (Ward, 1974, 201). At a more substantive level, David Court shows
that foundation funds also caused a shift in specialisation within the social sciences, away
from small-scale anthropological studies towards current issues of social and economic
interest on a national and regional scale using positivistic methods (Court, 1979, 248).
Within the teaching of political science, UEA faculty made extensive use of texts, on
courses in political development, for example, by foundation-funded scholars such as
Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (1960), and by David Apter (1965). In addition,
Ford Foundation funding of public administration at the Congos National School of Law
and Administration trained 400 of that countrys corps of leading civil servants (Berman,
1980b, 214).

11
Rockefeller Foundation provided 85 scholarships for east Africans to pursue doctoral study overseas and
funded 167 visiting social science professors at the UEA (Court, 1979, 250).
 13

In relation to African Studies in the USA, the Carnegie, Rockefeller and Ford foundations
were vital in constructing several programmes Northwestern, Boston, Columbia,
Wisconsin, Indiana, UCLA, Harvard, Stanford, Michigan, Chicago and the African
Studies Association. In addition, Carnegie financed several study tours aimed at
familiarising important American leaders (David Rockefeller, Thomas Finletter, Paul
Nitze) with Africa (Berman, 1980b, 219; 222).

Overall, the developmental effects of university-building have not affected the living
standards of the majority of African peoples. Instead, the principal impact of foundation
investment has been, according to an African teams survey (funded by an international
consortium of funding bodies), the development of overall infrastructures, particularly in
the field of human resource development (Thompson and Fogel, 1976, 49). Foundation
expenditures have helped to construct institutions, many of them with practical training
programmes in government and even motor mechanics, and networks of major
significance in setting the research and political agendas and, most probably,
marginalising alternative development strategies. This cemented the ties between the
objectives of US foreign policy in regard to Africa in the Cold War and the actions of
African educational and political elites, but achieved little by way of social betterment in
general.

Discussion and Conclusions

This article shows that US foundations in support of their own principles and the
objectives of US official foreign policy during the Cold War played a key role in the
construction of international knowledge networks. Through such networks of scholars,
foundations, policymakers, administrators, and international agencies, across the world,
the foundations exercised intellectual influence by setting the research agenda. They
mobilised bias by strategically using their vast financial resources to determine which
questions were worthy of consideration, how they were to be addressed, the
methodologies and paradigms to be employed, and which scholars and institutions were
to be supported to conduct the research. The foundations provided the infrastructure the
institutional settings (such as professional associations, research institutes, universities,
career-progression, regular conferences and publications for specific audiences who
consumed their research results, and recognition of the social sciences by men of
power) - that generated prestige, recognition, and legitimacy to participants (Coser,
1965). Connected as they were to the established political leaders within the United
States and to its political and other allies in the third world, foundation-funded research
programmes took on the character of the policy sciences, much as was noted in regard
to international studies programmes within the United States (Mosely, 1967) contributing,
it was argued, to American national security (Morton, 1963, 142).

The foundations took a unified approach to their goals: they linked their overseas
network building to their domestic intellectual networks, and their modes of operation
bore remarkable similarities. Within the USA, foundation investment aimed at policy-
relevance, training of experts, and the creation of public (attentive and opinion-forming)
awareness and support for American interest in world affairs. Outside the USA, the
foundations aimed, according to the actual context, to do much the same: to build policy-
 14

relevant research and training institutions that would produce graduates with skills and
ideas that fit western notions of development, in collaboration with the American and
other states. If network construction had been the principal aim, the foundations were
spectacularly successful.

In this regard, however, more focused research is required. At the micro-level, it is

important that study be undertaken of specific funded programmes (in the social sciences)
in order to evaluate their successes and failures. Secondly, it is important in undertaking
such study to examine the degree to which foundation ideas and proposals were adapted
or appropriated by recipients with an agenda of their own (Tiratsoo, 1998). This is
particularly important in regard to recipients of scholarships and fellowships that
involved training in the USA. To what extent were the scholars/fellows effectively
socialised? The idea favoured by Shils (1972, 355-371) (and the foundations
themselves) of automatic deferential acceptance by the provinces of ideas from the
metropolis certainly needs to be evaluated; such evaluation is almost entirely absent in
the existing literature (Raggatt, 1983, 2). It is also important to study examples of
alternative development strategies that were not pursued because of foundation
intervention. That is, were there available alternative non-elite based strategies that were
actually marginalised? This would address the problem in the literature that suggests that
had foundations not intervened, other viable indigenous mass-based development plans
would have emerged. For example, the viability of strategies of non-formal education for
empowerment might be assessed.12 Finally, it would be interesting to identify and study
the impact of alternative foundations or other organisations, against which we might
compare the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie philanthropists. One example comes
immediately to mind: the American Fund for Public Service which, according to Curti,
was not especially successful, but would be worthy of deeper analysis. The latter two
points aim to try and place on a more viable footing the critique of foundations in much
of the literature on the subject. Clearly, the chances of success of left-wing foundations
are smaller than for the major ones, since the majors are linked not only to large
corporate resources but also to the establishment within the US political system
(Hodgson, 1972/3). It would be interesting to analyse the role and influence of US
foundations in societies ideologically opposed to capitalism, such as Cuba, parts of
eastern Europe, and Nicaragua under the Sandinistas. Finally, consideration is also due to
counter-hegemonic tendencies such as those exerted by the Soviet Union (educational
exchange programmes, etc) or the more radical elements of the movement for a New
International Economic Order (Cox, 1979).

What are the theoretical implications of the findings summarised in this paper? Were the
US foundations a third sector force, strengthening a pluralistic political order? The
above account would not appear to substantiate these claims. The foundations were
clearly linked with the US foreign policy establishment, with the American state, with
numerous independent policy research institutions, and with universities. They were
also, as Colwells research (1980) demonstrates, linked through overlapping directorships
with the major US corporations. In addition, their network construction activities meant

12
See for example, Suzanne Kindervatter (1979).
 15

that they tried to rationalise and unify formally independent bodies in order to make
them more effective in achieving their goals.

Were the foundations non-political or non-ideological and interested in knowledge

for its own sake, as many foundation insiders and others claim? This is also clearly not
the case from the evidence cited above. Knowledge is power, admits the Rockefeller
Foundations Annual Report for 1957, power which cannot escape the calculus of
political rivalry (Rockefeller Foundation, 1957, 9). The foundations, to be sure, were
careful to place representatives of both the Republican and Democratic political parties
on their boards. Yet, their support of US foreign policy objectives and of the ideology of
liberal internationalism, during and before the Cold War, cannot legitimately be
considered non-political or non-ideological. Neither can the fact that they exported
the American way of life and ideas about the role of education in development, be
considered non-ideological. The political, intellectual and ideological effects in Indonesia
and Africa, for example, are also very clear.13

It is the conclusion of this article that the foundations international behaviour can best be
explained by the Gramscian school of thought. A powerful establishment, overlapping
with the state, within the most powerful nation in the world sought to foster and
consolidate its global hegemony, mobilising on several fronts, including intellectual and
ideological. The foundations, in cooperation with the US foreign policy agencies State
Department and US Agency for International Development, for example provided the
financial resources to generate pro-US and pro-western elites, armed with the ideology of
modernisation backed by positivistic social science. Such modernising elites were
among the most important sources of ideological and political support for US foreign
policy during the Cold War.

International knowledge networks mattered during the Cold War, and they continue to
matter today. It is likely that improvements in communications technology, a greater level
of diversity in the ethnic, gender, and national origins of foundation trustees, a more
transnational outlook (exemplified by support for the Trilateral Commission (Gill, 1990),
and the relative absence of ideological opposition to foundations and other such agencies,
have enhanced the power of such bodies (Reinicke, 2000). As such, their activities ought
to draw the attention of all those interested in how power works and how elites try to
manage global change.

13
According to the social scientist and former Ford Foundation oFficial, Francis X Sutton, It is
unquestionable that the Ford Foundation promoted the social sciences in many parts of the world as a
means of development in ways that were not politically neutral, (Sutton, 1998, 36)
 16

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