14. CASE TITLE: OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL vs.

AYALA LAND INCORPORATED, ROBINSON'S LAND

CORPORATION, SHANGRI-LA PLAZA CORPORATION and SM
PRIME HOLDINGS, INC
CASE NO: G.R. No. 177056 September 18, 2009

39. CASE TITLE: ARTURO M. TOLENTINO vs. THE SECRETARY

OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
CASE NO: G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995

64. CASE TITLE: JOSEPH B. TIMBOL vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS
CASE NO: G.R. No. 206004 February 24, 2015

89. CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANITA

CLAUDIO
CASE NO: G.R. No. 72564 April 15, 1988

114. CASE TITLE: ERWIN TULFO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

CASE NO: G.R. No. 161032 September 16, 2008

139. CASE TITLE: SECRETARY PEREZ vs, SANDIGANBAYAN

CASE NO: AM 01-4-03 SC June 29, 2001

164. CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENANCIO

MORTERA
CASE NO: G.R. No. 188104 April 23, 2010

189. CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUFINO

MIRANDILLA BERMAS
CASE NO: G.R. No. 120420 April 21, 1999

214. CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUDGE

RAFAEL R. LAGOS
CASE NO: G.R. No. 184658 March 6, 2013
CASE TITLE: OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL vs. AYALA LAND
INCORPORATED, ROBINSON'S LAND CORPORATION, SHANGRI-
LA PLAZA CORPORATION and SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC

CASE NO: G.R. No. 177056 September 18, 2009

FACTS:

Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and Shangri-la maintain and operate shopping
malls with parking facilities for all kinds of motor vehicles, either by way of parking spaces
inside the mall buildings or in separate buildings and/or adjacent lots that are solely devoted
for use as parking spaces in various locations in Metro Manila. Respondent SM Prime
constructs, operates, and leases out commercial buildings and other structures, among
which, are SM City, Manila; SM Centerpoint, Sta. Mesa, Manila; SM City, North Avenue,
Quezon City; and SM Southmall, Las Pias.

Furthermore, they expend for the maintenance and administration including the
security of their respective parking facilities. In lieu of this, In turn, they collect parking fees
from the persons making use of their parking facilities, regardless of whether said persons
are mall patrons or not.

On May 2, 2000, after a joint investigation by the Senate Committees on Trade and
Commerce and on Justice and Human Rights, they issued Senate Committee Report No.
225 concluding that the collection of parking fees by shopping malls is contrary to the
National Building Code and is therefore illegal and recommended among others, that the
Office of the Solicitor General should institute the necessary action to enjoin the collection
of parking fees as well as to enforce the penal sanction provisions of the National Building
Code. The Office of the Solicitor General should likewise study how refund can be exacted
from mall owners who continue to collect parking fees.

As a result of this recommendation, respondent SM Prime filed, on October 3, 2000,

a Petition for Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of Court, against the
DPWH Secretary and local building officials of Manila, Quezon City, and Las Pias. The
said Petition prayed for judgment among others that respondent SM Prime has clear legal
right to lease parking spaces appurtenant to its department stores, malls, shopping centers
and other commercial establishments.

On the other hand, the OSG filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction (with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) against
respondents. Hence, Judge Ibay of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 135, issued an Order
consolidating above-cited cases and agreed to resolve among other issues, whether
respondent Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangri-La and SM Prime are obligated to provide
parking spaces in their malls for the use of their patrons or the public in general, free of
charge.

The RTC declared that Ayala Land Inc., Robinsons Land Corporation, Shangri-la
Plaza Corporation and SM Prime Holdings Inc. are not obligated to provide parking spaces
in their malls for the use of their patrons or public in general, free of charge. It resolved that
the Building Code, which is the enabling law and the Implementing Rules and Regulations
do not impose that parking spaces shall be provided by the mall owners free of charge. The
provision on ratios of parking slots to several variables, like shopping floor area or customer
area found in Rule XIX of the Implementing Rules and Regulations cannot be construed as
a directive to provide free parking spaces, because the enabling law, the Building Code
does not so provide.

CA-G.R. CV No. 76298 involved the separate appeals of the OSG18 and respondent
SM Prime filed with the Court of Appeals. The OSG contended that the Trial Court erred in
holding that the National Building Code did not intend Mall Parking Spaces to be free of
charge. While respondent SM Prime contended among others that the trial court erred in
failing to declare RULE XIX of the implementing rules as having been enacted ultra vires,
hence, unconstitutional and void.

The Court of Appeals declared that Section 803 of the National Building Code and
Rule XIX of the IRR were clear and needed no further construction. Said provisions were
only intended to control the occupancy or congestion of areas and structures. In the
absence of any express and clear provision of law, respondents could not be obliged and
expected to provide parking slots free of charge.

ISSUE:

The court of appeals seriously erred in affirming the ruling of the lower court that
respondents are not obliged to provide free parking spaces to their customers or the public.

RULING:

Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate
the use and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The power to regulate, however, does
not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power
to confiscate. Police power does not involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the
exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order
to destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order and of promoting the general
welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and
firearms.

When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the State is
no longer exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers, namely, eminent
domain. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands intended for
public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.

Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or

appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason
appears why the said power may not be availed of only to impose a burden upon the owner
of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is a settled rule that neither
acquisition of title nor total destruction of value is essential to taking. It is usually in cases
where title remains with the private owner that inquiry should be made to determine whether
the impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. A
regulation that deprives any person of the profitable use of his property constitutes a taking
and entitles him to compensation, unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to permit the
regulation to be justified under the police power.

Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities
remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their collection of parking fees from the
public, for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their
properties. The State is not only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latters
properties for use as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public access
to said parking spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion into the property
rights of respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the right to use a portion of their
properties as they wish, they are further prohibited from profiting from its use or even just
recovering therefrom the expenses for the maintenance and operation of the required
parking facilities.

In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking

fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National Building
Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally invoking
police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents property without
payment of just compensation.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The
Decision dated 25 January 2007 and Resolution dated 14 March 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298, affirming in toto the Joint Decision dated 29 May 2002
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138, in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No.
00-1210 are hereby AFFIRMED.
CASE TITLE: ARTURO M. TOLENTINO vs. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

CASE NO: G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995

FACTS:

Petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco, and

Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA)) reiterate previous claims made
by them that R.A. No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives
as required by Art. VI, 24 of the Constitution. Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was
filed in the House of Representatives where it passed three readings and that afterward it
was sent to the Senate where after first reading it was referred to the Senate Ways and
Means Committee, they complain that the Senate did not pass it on second and third
readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630) which it
approved on May 24, 1994. Petitioner Tolentino adds that what the Senate committee
should have done was to amend H. No. 11197 by striking out the text of the bill and
substituting it with the text of S. No. 1630. That way, it is said, "the bill remains a House bill
and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the House bill."

On the other hand, the PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC (PPI) asserts that it
does not really matter that the law does not discriminate against the press because "even
nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional." PPI
cites in support of this assertion the following statement in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 87 L. Ed. 1292 (1943): The fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory" is
immaterial. The protection afforded by the First Amendment is not so restricted. A license
tax certainly does not acquire constitutional validity because it classifies the privileges
protected by the First Amendment along with the wares and merchandise of hucksters and
peddlers and treats them all alike. Such equality in treatment does not save the ordinance.
Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in preferred position.

Likewise, CREBA asserts that R.A. No. 7716 among others that violates the rule that
taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall "evolve a progressive
system of taxation."

ISSUES:

1. Whether R.A. No. 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.
2. Whether R.A. No. 7716 violated Press Freedom and Religious Liberty
3. Whether R.A. No. 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 28 (1) of the Constitution.

RULING:

R.A. No. 7716 did not violate Art. VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.

Art. VI, Section 24 of our Constitution reads:

All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.

In sum, while Art. VI, Section 24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills,
bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must
"originate exclusively in the House of Representatives," it also adds, "but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments." In the exercise of this power, the Senate may
propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. As petitioner Tolentino states in a high
school text, a committee to which a bill is referred may do any of the following:

(1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make changes in the bill omitting
or adding sections or altering its language; (3) to make and endorse an
entirely new bill as a substitute, in which case it will be known as
a committee bill; or (4) to make no report at all.

To except from this procedure the amendment of bills which are required to
originate in the House by prescribing that the number of the House bill and its other parts
up to the enacting clause must be preserved although the text of the Senate amendment
may be incorporated in place of the original body of the bill is to insist on a mere technicality.
At any rate there is no rule prescribing this form. S. No. 1630, as a substitute measure, is
therefore as much an amendment of H. No. 11197 as any which the Senate could have
made.

The SC have held that, as a general proposition, the press is not exempt from the
taxing power of the State and that what the constitutional guarantee of free press prohibits
are laws which single out the press or target a group belonging to the press for special
treatment or which in any way discriminate against the press on the basis of the content of
the publication, and R.A. No. 7716 is none of these.

Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from the
VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At
any rate, it is averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed
freedom is unconstitutional."

It would suffice to say that since the law granted the press a privilege, the law could
take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason is simple:
by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign
prerogative. Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the
same tax burden to which other businesses have long ago been subject.

A similar ruling was made by this Court in American Bible Society v. City of Manila,
101 Phil. 386 (1957) which invalidated a city ordinance requiring a business license fee on
those engaged in the sale of general merchandise. It was held that the tax could not be
imposed on the sale of bibles by the American Bible Society without restraining the free
exercise of its right to propagate.

The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise
of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or
exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of
properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden
the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to
general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.

Additionally, the Philippine Bible Society, Inc. claims that although it sells bibles, the
proceeds derived from the sales are used to subsidize the cost of printing copies which are
given free to those who cannot afford to pay so that to tax the sales would be to increase
the price, while reducing the volume of sale. Granting that to be the case, the resulting
burden on the exercise of religious freedom is so incidental as to make it difficult to
differentiate it from any other economic imposition that might make the right to disseminate
religious doctrines costly. Otherwise, to follow the petitioner's argument, to increase the tax
on the sale of vestments would be to lay an impermissible burden on the right of the
preacher to make a sermon.
 Finally, it is contended, for the reasons already noted, that R.A. No. 7716 also
violates Art. VI, Section 28(1) which provides that "The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation."

Equality and uniformity of taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property
of the same class be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make
reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this requirement
it is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons, forms and
corporations placed in similar situation. (Indeed, the VAT was already provided in E.O. No.
273 long before R.A. No. 7716 was enacted. R.A. No. 7716 merely expands the base of the
tax.

The SC have now come to the conclusion that the law suffers from none of the
infirmities attributed to it by petitioners and that its enactment by the other branches of the
government does not constitute a grave abuse of discretion. Any question as to its
necessity, desirability or expediency must be addressed to Congress as the body which is
electorally responsible, remembering that, as Justice Holmes has said, "Legislators are the
ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as
are the courts." It is not right, as petitioner in G.R. No. 115543 does in arguing that we
should enforce the public accountability of legislators, that those who took part in passing
the law in question by voting for it in Congress should later thrust to the courts the burden
of reviewing measures in the flush of enactment. This Court does not sit as a third branch
of the legislature, much less exercise a veto power over legislation.

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality and the
temporary restraining order previously issued is hereby lifted.
CASE TITLE: JOSEPH B. TIMBOL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

CASE NO: G.R. No. 206004 February 24, 2015

FACTS:

On October 5, 2012, Timbol filed a Certificate of Candidacy6 for the position of

Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan City. On
January 15, 2013, he received a Subpoena from COMELEC Election Officer Dinah A.
Valencia (Election Officer Valencia), ordering him to appear before her office on January
17, 2013 for a clarificatory hearing in connection with his Certificate of Candidacy.

Timbol, together with his counsel, appeared before Election Officer Valencia. During
the clarificatory hearing, Timbol argued that he was not a nuisance candidate. He
contended that in the 2010 elections, he ranked eighth among all the candidates who ran
for Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan City. He
allegedly had sufficient resources to sustain his campaign. He pointed out before the
clarificatory hearing panel that his name already appeared in the list of nuisance candidates
posted in the COMELEC website pursuant to Resolution No. 9610 dated January 11, 2013.

With the printing of ballots for the automated elections set on February 4, 2013,
Timbol filed on February 2, 2013 a Petition praying that his name be included in the certified
list of candidates for the May 13, 2013 elections. In the Minute Resolution dated February
5, 2013, the COMELEC denied the Petition for being moot, considering that the printing of
ballots had already begun.

On March 15, 2013, Timbol filed his Petition for Certiorari with this court, arguing that
the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring him a nuisance
candidate. According to Timbol, the COMELEC deprived him of due process of law when
he was declared a nuisance candidate even before Election Officer Valencia conducted the
clarificatory hearing. He prayed for a preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the
COMELEC to include his name in the certified list of candidates for the position of Member
of Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan City.

The COMELEC maintained that it did not gravely abuse its discretion. Contrary to
Timbols argument, he was given an opportunity to be heard when Election Officer Valencia
heard him during the clarificatory hearing. He even admitted that he attended the
clarificatory hearing with his counsel.

ISSUE:

Whether COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner Timbols

Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates.

RULING:

Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, "the State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service." This, however, does not guarantee "a
constitutional right to run for or hold public office. To run for public office is a mere "privilege
subject to limitations imposed by law." Among these limitations is the prohibition on
nuisance candidates.Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of
candidacy "to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among
the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide
intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus
prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate." In Pamatong vs.
Commission on Elections, this court explained why nuisance candidates are prohibited from
running for public office: The determination whether a candidate is eligible for the position
he is seeking involves a determination of fact where both parties must be allowed to adduce
evidence in support of their contentions. Because the resolution of such fact may result to
a deprivation of ones right to run for public office, or, as in this case, ones right to hold
public office, it is only proper and fair that the candidate concerned be notified of the
proceedings against him and that he be given the opportunity to refute the allegations
against him. It should be stressed that it is not sufficient, as the COMELEC claims, that the
candidate be notified of the Commissions inquiry into the veracity of the contents of his
certificate of candidacy, but he must also be allowed to present his own evidence to prove
that he possesses the qualifications for the office he seeks. Respondent commits grave
abuse of discretion if it denies due course to or cancels a certificate of candidacy without
affording the candidate an opportunity to be heard.

That petitioner was able to file a Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates
did not cure the defect in the issuance of Resolution No. 9610. First, he would not have to
file the Petition had he been given an opportunity to be heard in the first place. Second, in
the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013, respondent denied petitioners Petition on
the sole ground that the printing of ballots had already begun on February 4, 2013.

The SC understands the "insurmountable and tremendous operational constraints

and costs implications" of reprinting ballots had respondent ordered the inclusion of
petitioners name in the certified list of candidates. The ballots already printed would have
to be recalled, leading to the waste of the ballots previously printed. It should be noted that
these ballots are special as they have the capability of being optically scanned by Precinct
Count Optical Scan machines. Reprinting another batch of ballots would, indeed, be costly.

Still, "automation is not the end-all and be-all of an electoral process." Respondent
should also balance its duty "to ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly,
and peaceful"with the right of a candidate to explain his or her bona fide intention to run for
public office before he or she is declared a nuisance candidate.

WHEREFORE, this Petition for Certiorari is DENIED for being moot and academic.
CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANITA CLAUDIO

CASE NO: G.R. No. 72564 April 15, 1988

FACTS:

That on or about the 21st day of July 1981, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named ACCUSED without being
lawfully authorized, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly transport 1.1 kilos
of Marijuana dried leaves, which are prohibited drugs for the purpose of selling the same
from Baguio City to Olongapo City. (Rollo, p. 13)

To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution offered the following: Letter
request for Examination of suspected marijuana dried leaves weighing approximately 1.1
kilos dated July 25, 1981; plastic container; marijuana contained in the plastic container;
another plastic container; Chemistry Report No. D-668-81, Findings: Positive for marijuana;
photographs of accused with Pat. Daniel Obia and Pauline Tiongco showing the
marijuana, Victory Liner Ticket No. 84977, Sworn Statement of Pat. Daniel Obia, Request
for Field Test on suspected marijuana from accused by P/Lt. Antonio V. Galindo;" date of
of the request; Certificate of Field Test dated July 22, 1981; and the testimonies of
witnesses of the prosecution, Theresa Ann Bugayong; Pat. Daniel Obio, Cpl. Paulino
Tiongco, Cpl. Ernesto Abello and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang.

The lower court established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis that:

On board the Victory Liner, Daniel Obia was seated on the second seat at the back.
While he was thus seated, suspect Anita Claudio boarded the same bus and took the seat
in front of him after putting a bag which she was carrying at the back of the seat of Obia.
The bag placed by suspect behind his seat was a woovenburi bag made of plastic
containing some vegetables. The act of the accused putting her bag behind Pat. Obia's
seat aroused his suspicion and made him felt (sic) nervous. With the feeling that there was
something unusual, he had the urge to search the woven plastic bag. But it was only at San
Fernando, Pampanga when he was able to go to the bag. He inserted one of his fingers in
a plastic bag located at the bottom of the woven bag and smelt marijuana. The plastic woven
bag appearing to contain camote tops on the top has a big bundle of plastic of marijuana at
the bottom. He could recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at that
time at the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He did not, however, do anything after he discovered
that there was marijuana inside the plastic bag of the accused until they reached Olongapo
City and the accused alighted from the bus in front of the Caltex Gasoline Station in Sta.
Rita. Right after the accused alighted from the bus, policeman Obina intercepted her and
showed her his Id Identifying himself as a policeman and told her he will search her bag
because of the suspicion that she was carrying marijuana inside said bag. In reply, accused
told him, "Please go with me, let us settle this at home." However, the witness did not heed
her plea and instead handcuffed her right hand and with her, boarded a tricycle right away
and brought the suspect to the police headquarters with her bag appearing to contain
vegetables.

ISSUE:

Whether the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension were unlawful.

RULING:

The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.

Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides:

 .. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides: Search incident to lawful arrest. A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may
be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obia did
not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The
warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. Therefore, there
was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.

The accused takes inconsistent positions in her appellant's brief. At first, she does
not deny having had with her marijuana at the time of her arrest. Instead, she claims that
she should just be guilty of possession. In a complete turnabout, in the latter portion of said
brief, she claims that the evidence against her were mere fabrications and the marijuana
allegedly found in her possession was only planted Credence is accorded to the
prosecution's evidence, more so as it consisted mainly of testimonies of policemen. Law
enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to
the contrary (People v. De Jesus, 145 SCRA 521). We also find no reason from the records
why the prosecution witnesses should fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant in
such a serious crime (See People v. Bautista, 147 SCRA 500).

The accused testified that she was not on that bus that came from Baguio City but
rather she was in Olongapo City all that time. She alleged that she was arrested by Pat.
Obia for no reason at all.

In the case at bar, alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by
the accused herself (People v. De la Cruz, 148 SCRA 582).

Moreover, it is a well-established rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive testimony
(People v. De La Cruz, supra)

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.

CASE TITLE: ERWIN TULFO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

CASE NO: G.R. No. 161032 September 16, 2008

FACTS:

On the complaint of Atty. Carlos Ding So of the Bureau of Customs, four (4) separate
informations were filed on September 8, 1999 with the Regional Trial Court in
(RTC) PasayCity. These were assigned to Branch 112 and docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
99-1597 to 99-1600, and charged petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan Cambri,
as managing editor, Rey Salao, as national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip
Pichay, as president of the Carlo Publishing House, Inc., of the daily tabloid Remate, with
the crime of libel in connection with the publication of the articles in the column Direct Hit in
the issues of May 11, 1999; May 12, 1999; May 19, 1999; and June 25, 1999.

The following were admitted by petitioners: (1) that during the four dates of the
publication of the questioned articles, the complaining witness was not assigned at South
Harbor; (2) that the accused and complaining witness did not know each other during all
the time material to the four dates of publication; (3) that Remate is a newspaper/tabloid of
general circulation in the Philippines; (4) the existence and genuineness of
the Remate newspaper; (5) the column therein and its authorship and the alleged libelous
statement as well as the editorial post containing the designated positions of the other
accused; and (6) the prosecutions qualified admission that it is the duty of media persons
to expose corruption.

In a Decision dated November 17, 2000, the RTC found petitioners guilty of the crime
of LIBEL as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, and penalized by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods, or a fine ranging from P200.00 Pesos to
P6,000.00 Pesos or both, under Article 355 of the same Code.

The Eighth Division of the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the
trial court. A motion for reconsideration dated June 30, 2003 was filed by Tulfo, while the
rest of his co-accused filed a motion for reconsideration dated July 2, 2003. In a Resolution
dated December 11, 2003, both motions were denied for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether the assailed articles are qualifiedly privileged communication.

RULING:

In passing, it must be noted that the defense of Tulfos articles being qualifiedly
privileged communication is raised for the first time in the present petition, and this particular
issue was never brought before either the RTC or the CA. Thus, neither the RTC nor the
CA had a chance to properly consider and evaluate this defense.

Tulfo now draws parallels between his case and that of Art Borjal, and argues that
the prosecution should have proved malice in fact, and it was error on the part of the trial
and appellate courts to use the presumption of malice in law in Art. 354 of the RPC. This
lays an unusual burden on the part of the prosecution, the RTC, and the CA to refute a
defense that Tulfo had never raised before them. Whether or not the subject articles are
privileged communications must first be established by the defense, which it failed to do at
the level of the RTC and the CA. Even so, it shall be dealt with now, considering that an
appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review.
 Tulfo has clearly failed in this regard. His articles cannot even be considered as
qualified privileged communication under the second paragraph of Art. 354 of the RPC
which exempts from the presumption of malice a fair and true report, made in good faith,
without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings
which are not of confidential nature, or any statement, report, or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions.

This particular provision has several elements which must be present in order for the
report to be exempt from the presumption of malice. The provision can be dissected as
follows:

In order that the publication of a report of an official proceeding may be

considered privileged, the following conditions must exist:

(a) That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or

other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of
a statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any
other act performed by a public officer in the exercise of his functions;

(b) That it is made in good faith; and

(c) That it is without any comments or remarks.

The articles clearly are not the fair and true reports contemplated by the
provision. They provide no details of the acts committed by the subject, Atty. So. They are
plain and simple baseless accusations, backed up by the word of one unnamed
source. Good faith is lacking, as Tulfo failed to substantiate or even attempt to verify his
story before publication. Tulfo goes even further to attack the character of the subject, Atty.
So, even calling him a disgrace to his religion and the legal profession. As none of the
elements of the second paragraph of Art. 354 of the RPC is present in Tulfos articles, it
cannot thus be argued that they are qualified privileged communications under the RPC.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161032 and
161176 are DISMISSED. The CA Decision dated June 17, 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 25318
is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that in lieu of imprisonment, the penalty to
be imposed upon petitioners shall be a fine of six thousand pesos (PhP 6,000) for each
count of libel, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, while the award of actual
damages and exemplary damages is DELETED.
CASE TITLE: SECRETARY PEREZ vs SANDIGANBAYAN

CASE NO: AM 01-4-03 SC June 29, 2001

FACTS:

On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga BroadKaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an

association representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks
throughout the country, sent a letter requesting the Court to allow live media coverage of
the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President
Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full
transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history."2 The request
was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and,
still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo.

On 17 April 2001, the Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed
the instant petition, submitting the following:

"3. The foregoing criminal cases involve the previous acts of the former highest
official of the land, members of his family, his cohorts and, therefore, it cannot be over
emphasized that the prosecution thereof, definitely involves a matter of public concern and
interest, or a matter over which the entire citizenry has the right to know, be informed and
made aware of.

" 4. There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the people to be informed
on matters of public concern, as in the instant cases, can best be recognized, served and
satisfied by allowing the live radio and television coverage of the concomitant court
proceedings.

"5. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve
the dual purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of justice in
order to disabuse the minds of the supporters of the past regime of any and all unfounded
notions, or ill-perceived attempts on the part of the present dispensation, to 'railroad' the
instant criminal cases against the Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada.

ISSUE:

Whether the right to information of the press extends on covering judicial proceedings.

RULING:

An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than
anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to
ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights
are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with
publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come,
sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.

In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a

reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the
openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper
functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the
proceedings.

The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the
right to public information.
 It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and
comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the
public with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding
consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never
be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions. Justice Clark thusly
pronounced, "while a maximum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying out the
important function of informing the public in a democratic society, its exercise must
necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial process."

The sad reality is that the criminal cases presently involved are of great dimensions
so involving as they do a former President of the Republic. It is undeniable that these cases
have twice become the nation's focal points in the two conflicting phenomena of EDSA II
and EDSA III where the magnitude of the events has left a still divided nation. Must these
events be invited anew and risk the relative stability that has thus far been achieved? The
transcendental events in our midst do not allow us to, turn a blind eye to yet another possible
extraordinary case of mass action being allowed to now creep into even the business of the
courts in the dispensation of justice under a rule of law. At the very least, a change in the
standing rule of the court contained in its resolution of 23 October 1991 may not appear to
be propitious.

Unlike other government offices, courts do not express the popular will of the people
in any sense which, instead, are tasked to only adjudicate justiciable controversies on the
basis of what alone is submitted before them. A trial is not a free trade of ideas. Nor is a
competing market of thoughts the known test truth in a courtroom.

The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific advances
but to chance forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty to bid to use and apply
them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed
are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENANCIO MORTERA

CASE NO: G.R. No. 188104 April 23, 2010

FACTS:

That on or about August 25, 2002, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, armed with a knife, by
means of treachery and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, assault, attack and stab from behind with the use of said weapon that he was
then armed with, at the person of ROBELYN ROJAS y MALLARI, employing means,
manner and form which tended directly and specially to insure its execution without any
danger to the person of the accused, and as a result of which attack, the said Robelyn Rojas
y Mallari sustained stabbed wound on the fatal part of the latters body which directly caused
his death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.

Upon arraignment on February 6, 2004, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty."

Although the accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned, during the trial, he admitted
having stabbed the victim whom he referred to as Tonying, but claimed self-defense. By his
account, after leaving his uncle's house at Gov. Camins, he passed by a corner and saw a
group of people drinking. They were Ramil Gregorio, Jonel Veales and Tonying. Upon
seeing him, Tonying ran away and called his brother, Alberto Rojas. When the accused was
about to reach the main road, Alberto Rojas, Tonying and a certain "Duk" (brother-in-law of
Tonying) accosted him and asked him for liquor money. When he refused, the three men
got angry. After telling them that he had to go, Tonying hit him with a spray gun (for painting),
causing him to fall down. While he was in a supine position, Tonying attempted to hit him
again. It was at that point that he was able to get hold of his knife and thrust it forward and
hit someone. He did not know who got stabbed. He then immediately fled to Ayala and later
to Lintangan, Zamboanga del Norte.

The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime charged. The accused appealed to
the Court of Appeals raising the issues of denial of due process of law and his right to an
impartial trial. He claimed that the trial court judge, Judge Jesus Carbon, was hostile
towards him and prejudged his guilt as could be inferred from his "prosecutor-like" conduct.
The accused likewise reiterated his claim of self-defense.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision.

ISSUE:

Whether there was there was a denial of his right to due process and of his right to
have an impartial trial.

RULING:

The Court is not unaware of the case of Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, where it was
written:
The Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question
witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon any material point which
presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides. But not only
should his examination be limited to asking clarificatory questions, the right
should be sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should
stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the
conduct of trial hardly in fact can one avoid the impression that the
Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more precise, had taken the
cudgels for the prosecution in proving the case against Tabuena and
 Peralta. The cold neutrality of an impartial judge requirement of due process
was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its
overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate A
substantial portion of the TSN was incorporated in the majority opinion not to
focus on numbers alone, but more importantly to show that the court questions
were in the interest of the prosecution and which thus depart from the common
standard of fairness and impartiality. (emphasis added)

The situation in the case at bench is, however, different.

As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, although the trial judge might have
made improper remarks and comments, it did not amount to a denial of his right to due
process or his right to an impartial trial. Upon perusal of the transcript as a whole, it cannot
be said that the remarks were reflective of his partiality. They were not out of context. Not
only did the accused mislead the court by initially invoking a negative defense only to claim
otherwise during trial, he was also not candid to his own lawyer, who was kept in the dark
as to his intended defense.

The accused having admitted the killing, a reverse order of trial could have
proceeded. As it turned out, the prosecution undertook to discharge the burden of proving
his guilt, when the burden of proof to establish that the killing was justified should have
been his.

Most probably, the trial judge was peeved at the strategy he adopted. The trial judge
cannot be faulted for having made those remarks, notwithstanding the sarcastic tone
impressed upon it. The sarcasm alone cannot lead us to conclude that the trial judge had
taken the cudgels for the prosecution.

The invocation of Opida fails to persuade us either. The facts therein are not at all
fours with the case at bench. In Opida, we did not fail to notice the malicious, sadistic and
adversarial manner of questioning by the trial judge of the accused therein, including their
defense witness. In Opida, the accused never admitted the commission of the crime, and
so the burden of proof remained with the prosecution.

WHEREFORE, the January 23, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00518-MIN is AFFIRMED.
CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUFINO MIRANDILLA BERMAS

CASE NO: G.R. No. 120420 April 21, 1999

FACTS:

On August 3, 1994, complainant Manuela Bermas, 15 years old, was raped by her
own father, appellant Rufino Bermas, while she was lying down on a wooden bed inside
their house at Creek Drive II, San Antonio Valley 8, Paranaque, Metro Manila (pp. 6-7, TSN,
Oct. 19, 1994). Armed with a knife, appellant removed the victim's shorts and panty, placed
himself above her, inserted his penis in her vagina and conducted coital movements (pp. 7-
8, ibid.). After the appellant satisfied his lustful desire, he threatened the victim with death
if she reports the incident to anyone. (p. 9, ibid.)

"On August 9, 1994, complainant was medically examined at the NBI, which yielded
the following findings:

"The findings concluded: 1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on

the body of the subject at the time of examination; 2. Hymen, intact but distensible and its
orifice wide (2.7 cm. In diameter) as to allow complete penetration by an average sized,
adult, Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any hymenal laceration."

The defense proffered the testimony of the accused, who denied the charge, and
that of his married daughter, Luzviminda Mendez, who attributed the accusation made by
her younger sister to a mere resentment by the latter. The trial court gave a summary of the
testimony given by the accused and his daughter Luzviminda; viz:

The accused vehemently denied that he has ever committed the crime of rape on
her daughter, the complainant. He told the Court that he could not do such a thing because
he loves so much his daughter and his other children. In fact, he said that he even
performed the dual role of a father and a mother to his children since the time of his
separation from his wife. The accused further told the Court that in charging him of the crime
of rape, the complainant might have been motivated by ill-will or revenge in view of the
numerous scoldings that she has received from him on account of her frequent coming
home late at night. The accused stressed that he knew of no other reason as to why his
daughter, the complainant, would ever charge him of the crime of rape except probably in
retaliation for being admonished by him whenever she comes home late in the night.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused was denied his constitutional right to effective and vigilant
counsel.

RULING:

This Court finds and must hold, most regrettably, that accused-appellant has not
properly and effectively been accorded the right to counsel. So important is the right to
counsel that it has been enshrined in our fundamental law and its precursor laws.

The constitutional mandate is reflected in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedures

which declares in Section 1, Rule 115, thereof, that it is a right of the accused at the trial to
be present in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings from the arraignment
to the promulgation of the judgment.

The presence and participation of counsel in the defense of an accused in criminal

proceedings should never be taken lightly. Chief Justice Moran in People vs. Holgado,
explained: "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does
not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may
have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without
counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how
to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant
or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so
important that it has become a constitutional right and it so implemented that under our
rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have
an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor
or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own."

The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom
or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means
that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits
himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active
involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing
constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and
his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The
right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn
duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal
assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation.

The Court sees no other choice than to direct the remand of the case to the court a
quo for new trial.

WHEREFORE, let this case be REMANDED to the court a quo for trial on the basis
of the complaint, aforequoted, under which he was arraigned. Atty. Ricardo A. Fernandez,
Jr. of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force is hereby appointed counsel de officio for the
appellant.
CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUDGE RAFAEL R. LAGOS

CASE NO: G.R. No. 184658 March 6, 2013

FACTS:

On 30 March 2007, at 11:00 a.m., a confidential informant (CI) appeared before the
Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force (AIDSOTF) of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) in Camp Crame, Quezon City. The CI relayed to Police Senior Inspector Fidel
Fortaleza, Jr. (P S/Insp. Fortaleza) that an individual using the alias "Brian" was engaged
in the illegal sale of the prohibited drug "ecstasy" in BF Homes, Paraaque City. The CI
further reported that "Brian," who was later identified as herein private respondent Castel
Vinci Estacio y Tolentino (Estacio), promised a commission from any transaction the former
would help arrange. P S/Insp. Fortaleza, as team leader of the AIDSOTF, assembled and
briefed the team that would conduct the buy-bust operation. Police Officer (PO) 2 Marlo V.
Frando (PO2 Frando) was assigned to act as the poseur-buyer and PO2 Ruel P. Cubian
(PO2 Cubian) as back-up, while the rest of the team members were to serve as perimeter
security. P S/Insp. Fortaleza and PO2 Leonard So prepared and dusted two P500 bills for
use as buy-bust money. The CI then called respondent Estacio, informing him that a
prospective buyer wished to purchase thirty (30) tablets of ecstasy with a total value
of P50,000. That afternoon, respondent Estacio instructed them to proceed to Tandang
Sora Avenue, Quezon City, where the transaction was to take place.1

An Information dated 3 April 2007 was filed against respondents for the sale of
dangerous drugs, in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165. The
case was raffled to the sala of Judge Fernando Sagum, Jr. of the Quezon City RTC. Upon
arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty to the charges. Trial ensued, and the
prosecution presented its evidence, including the testimonies of four witnesses: PO2 Marlo
V. Frando, PO2 Ruel P. Cubian, Police Senior Inspector Yelah C. Manaog, and PO3 Jose
Rey Serrona. After the prosecution submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence on 17 November
2007, respondents filed a Motion for leave of court to file their demurrer, as well as a Motion
to resolve their Petition for Bail. On 2 January 2008, Judge Sagum issued a Resolution
denying both the Petition for Bail and the Motion for leave of court to file a demurrer.
Respondent Estacio then sought the inhibition of Judge Sagum, a move subsequently
adopted by respondents Dy and Castro. On 15 January 2008, Presiding Judge Sagum
inhibited himself from the case. On 31 January 2008, the case was re-raffled to public
respondent Judge Lagos.

Judge Lagos issued the first assailed Order on 23 April 2008 granting respondents
Petition for Bail and allowing them to file their demurrer. On 24 June 2008, he issued the
second assailed Order, acquitting all the accused. On Motion for Reconsideration filed by
the People, he issued the third assailed Order denying the above motion and granting the
Motion to Withdraw Cash Bonds filed by the accused.

The prosecution argues that Judge Lagos committed grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the demurrer despite clear proof of
the elements of the illegal sale, the existence of the corpus delicti, and the arrest in flagrante
delicto. Private respondents counter that the Petition is dismissible on the ground of double
jeopardy and is violative of the principle of hierarchy of courts.

ISSUE:

Whether Judge Lagos committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or

excess of jurisdiction.
RULING:

The Supreme Court grant the petition.

Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the demurrer.

It has long been settled that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal. An
acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality
of his acquittal. This rule, however, is not without exception. The rule on double jeopardy is
subject to the exercise of judicial review by way of the extraordinary writ of certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court is endowed with the power to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Here, the party
asking for the review must show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or
to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so
severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice. In such an event, the
accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.

Requiring the CI to testify is an added imposition that runs contrary to jurisprudential

doctrine, since the Court has long established that the presentation of an informant is not a
requisite for the prosecution of drug cases. The testimony of the CI is not indispensable,
since it would be merely corroborative of and cumulative with that of the poseur-buyer who
was presented in court, and who testified on the facts and circumstances of the sale and
delivery of the prohibited drug.

Similarly, in the present case, the fact of the illegal sale has already been established
by testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team. Judge Lagos need not have
characterized the Cl's testimony as indispensable to the prosecution's case. We find and
so hold that the grant of the demurrer for this reason alone was not supported by prevailing
jurisprudence and constituted grave abuse of discretion. The prosecution's evidence was,
prima facie, sufficient to prove the criminal charges filed against respondents, subject to the
defenses they may present in the course of a full-blown trial.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court
dated 23 April 2008, 24 June 2008, and 24 July 2008 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The RTC is ORDERED to reinstate Criminal Case No. Q-07-146628 to the court's docket
and proceed with trial.