Qua Chee Gan vs.

Deportation Board deportation but may not order arrest

FACTS:
· In May 1952 petitioners were charged
before the
Deportation Board with having purchased
US
Dollars in the total sum of $130, 000
without
the necessary license from the Central
Bank of
the Philippines and having remitted the
money
to Hong Kong and to themselves.
· Warrants were issued but upon filing for
a Philippines except upon prior
surety and cash bond they were released.
· Trial Court upheld the validity of the
delegation
by the president to the Deportation Board
of his
power to conduct investigations for the
purpose
of determining whether the stay of an
alien in
this country would be injurious to the
security,
welfare and interest of the State.
· Power to issue warrants and fix bonds
were held
to be essential to and complement the
power to
deport aliens under sec 69 of the revised
admin
code
ISSUE:
·Whether or not the President has the
power to deport
aliens and delegate those powers, under
EO 398
of Pres Quirino which authorized the
Deportation Board to issue warrants of
arrest of
aliens during investigation (on the ground
that
such power is vested in the legislature and
that
there must be a legislation authorizing the
same)
Held/Ratio:
The Pres has the power to carry out
order of
during
investigation. And no, power may not be
delegated.
· Sec 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code
SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign
power. — A subject of a foreign power
residing in
the Philippines shall not be deported,
expelled,
or excluded from said Islands or
repatriated to
his own country by the President of the
investigation,
conducted by said Executive or his
authorized
agent, of the ground upon which Such
action is
contemplated. In such case the person
concerned shall be informed of the charge
or
charges against him and he shall be
allowed not
less than these days for the preparation of
his
defense. He shall also have the right to be
heard
by himself or counsel, to produce
witnesses in
his own behalf, and to cross-examine the
opposing witnesses."
· While it did not expressly confer on the
President the authority to deport
undesirable
aliens and merely lays down the
procedure, the
fact that such a procedure was provided
for
before the President can deport an alien is
a
clear indication of the recognition, and
inferentially a ratification, by the
legislature of
the existence of such power in the
Executive.
· Under the present and existing laws,
therefore,
deportation of an undesirable alien may
be
effected in two ways: by order of the
President,
after due investigation, pursuant to
Section 69
of the Revised Administrative Code, and
by the
Commissioner of Immigration, upon
recommendation by the Board of
Commissioners, under Commonwealth Act
No.
613.
SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution
for and supersedes all previous laws
relating to the entry of aliens into the
Philippines, and their exclusion,
deportation, and repatriation wherefrom,
with the exception of section sixty-nine of
Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and
eleven which shall continue in force and
effect: ..." (Comm. Act No. 613).
· Re: the extent of the Pres’ power to
investigate does it include authority to
arrest? May it be
delegated? Here’s the history…
· Pres Roxas (EO 69) in July 1947 provided
for
filing of a bond to secure appearance of
alien
under investigation
· Pres Quirino (EO 398) in January 1951
reorganized the deportation board to issue
the
warrant of arrest of the alien complained
of and
to hold him under detention during the
investigation unless he files a bond for his
provisional release <this is incompatible
with….>
3. The right of the People to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects
against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon
probable cause, to be determined by the
judge
after examination under oath or
affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he
may
produce, and particularly describing the
place to
be searched, and the persons or things to
be
seized." (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights,
Philippine
Constitution).
· Justice Laurel said that this constitutional
provision is not among the rights of the
accused. Under our
Constitution, the same is declared a
popular
right of the people and, of course,
indisputably it
equally applies to both citizens and
foreigners in
this country. This requirement — "to be
determined by the judge" — do not specify
who
will determine the existence of a probable
cause.
Hence, under their provisions, any public
officer
may be authorized by the Legislature to
make
such determination, and thereafter issue
the
warrant of arrest.
· The contention of the Solicitor General
that the
arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry
into
effect the power of deportation is valid
only
when, as already stated, there is already
an
order of deportation. To carry out the
order of
deportation, the President obviously has
the
power to order the arrest of the deportee.
But,
certainly, during the investigation.
· The extent of the curtailment of liberty
dependent upon conditions determined by
the
discretion of the person issuing a warrant.
In
other words, the discretion of whether a
warrant
of arrest shall issue or not is personal to
the one
upon whom the authority devolves.
· It is an implied grant of power,
considering that no
express authority was granted by the law
on the
matter under discussion, that would serve
the
curtailment or limitation on the
fundamental
right of a person, such as his security to
life and
liberty, must be viewed with caution.

· The guarantees of human rights and

freedom
can not be made to rest precariously on
such a
shaky foundation.

World Health Organization v. Aquino

FACTS:

• Respondent judge's refuses to

quash a search warrant issued by
him at the instance of respondents
COSAC officers for the search and
seizure of the personal effects of
petitioner official of the WHO
(World Health Organization)
despite his being entitled to
diplomatic immunity, as duly
recognized by the executive
branch of the Philippine
Government and to prohibit
respondent judge from further
proceedings in the matter.
• Upon filing of the petition, the
Court issued a restraining order
enjoining respondents from
executing the search warrant in
question.
• Respondents COSAC officers filed
their answer joining issue against
petitioners and seeking to justify
their act of applying for and
securing from respondent judge
the warrant for the search and
seizure of ten crates consigned to
petitioner Verstuyft and stored at
the Eternit Corporation warehouse
on the ground that they "contain
large quantities of highly dutiable
goods" beyond the official needs of
said petitioner "and the only lawful
way to reach these articles and
 effects for purposes of taxation is
through a search warrant.
• The Court thereafter called for the
parties' memoranda in lieu of oral
argument, which were filed by
respondents and it was thereafter
deemed submitted for decision.
• Petitioner, Dr. Leonce Verstuyft,
who was assigned by the WHO
from his last station in Taipei to the
Regional Office in Manila as Acting
Assistant Director of Health
Services, is entitled to diplomatic
immunity, pursuant to the Host
Agreement executed on July 22,
1951 between the Philippine
Government and the World Health
Organization.
• When petitioner Verstuyft's
personal effects contained in
twelve (12) crates entered the
Philippines as unaccompanied
baggage on January 10, 1972, they
were accordingly allowed free entry
from duties and taxes. The crates
were directly stored at the Eternit
Corporation's warehouse at
Mandaluyong, Rizal, "pending his
relocation into permanent quarters
upon the offer of Mr. Berg, Vice
President of Eternit who was once a
patient of Dr. Verstuyft in the
Congo.
• Respondent judge issued on March
3, 1972 upon application on the
same date of respondents COSAC
officers search warrant No. 72-138
for alleged violation of Republic Act
4712 amending section 3601 of the
Tariff and Customs Code 3 directing
the search and seizure of the
dutiable items in said crates.
• Upon protest of Dr. Francisco Dy,
WHO Regional Director for the
Western Pacific with station in
Manila, Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Carlos P. Romulo, personally wired
on the same date respondent Judge
advising that "Dr. Verstuyft is
entitled to immunity from search in
respect of his personal baggage as
accorded to members of diplomatic
missions" pursuant to the Host
Agreement and requesting
suspension of the search warrant
order "pending clarification of the
matter from the ASAC."
• Respondent judge set the Foreign
Secretary's request for hearing and
heard the same day but the official
plea of diplomatic immunity
interposed by a duly authorized
representative of the Department
of Foreign Affairs who furnished the
respondent judge with a list of the
articles brought in by petitioner
Verstuyft, respondent judge issued
his order of the same date
maintaining the effectivity of the
search warrant issued by him,
unless restrained by a higher court.
• Petitioner Verstuyft's special
appearance on March 24, 1972 for
the limited purpose of pleading his
diplomatic immunity and motion to
quash search warrant failed to
move respondent judge.
• At the hearing thereof the Office of
the Solicitor General appeared and
filed an extended comment stating
the official position of the executive
branch of the Philippine
Government that petitioner
Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic
immunity, he did not abuse his
diplomatic immunity, and that
court proceedings in the receiving
or host State are not the proper
remedy in the case of abuse of
diplomatic immunity.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner is
entitled "to all privileges and
immunities, exemptions and
facilities accorded to diplomatic
envoys in accordance with
international law" under section 24
of the Host Agreement
Held: The executive branch of the
Philippine Government has
expressly recognized that
petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to
diplomatic immunity, prusuant to
the provisions of the Host
Agreement. The DFA formally
advised respondent judge of the
Philippine Government’s official
position. The Solicitor-General, as
principal law officer of the
Government, likewise expressly
affirmed said petitioner’s right to
diplomatic immunity and asked for
the quashal of the search warrant.
It is a recognized principle of
international law and under our
system of separation of powers
that diplomatic immunity is
essentlualy a political question and
courts should refuse to look beyond
a determination by the executive
branch of government, and where
the plea of diplomatic immunity is
recognized by the executive
branch of the government as in the
case at bar, it is then the duty of
the courts to accept the claim of
immunity upon appropriate
suggestion by the principal law
officer of the Government, the
Solicitor-General in this case, or
other officer acting under his
discretion. Courts may not so
exercise their jurisdiction by
seizure and detention of property,
as to embarass the executive arm
of the government in conducting
foreign relations.
The Court, therefore, holds that
respondent judge acted without
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in not ordering the
quashal of the search warrant
issued by him in disregard of the
diplomatic immunity of petitioner
Verstuyft.