EDUARDO L. NUEZ, EUGENIO O.
NUEZ, ELISA NUEZ- late Eleuterio Nu[]ez, extrajudicially partitioned his estate, among others,
ALVARICO and IMELDA L. NUEZ, complainants, vs.
Atty. ARTURO B. ASTORGA,respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Disbarment and suspension of an attorney are the most severe
forms of disciplinary action; thus, they should be imposed with great
caution. They should be meted out only for duly proven serious
administrative charges.[1]
The Case and the Facts
This administrative case stems from a Complaint-Affidavit [2] filed
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Eduardo L. Nuez, Eugenio O. Nuez, Eliza
Nuez-Alvarico and Imelda L. Nuez. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga was
charged therein with conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. The
material averments of the Complaint are summarized by the IBP-
CBD as follows:
Complainants allege that sometime on June 5, 1968, the late Maria Ortega
Vda. De Nu[]ez executed a Sale with Right to Repurchase in favor of
Eugenio O. Nu[]ez Lot No. 106 covered by OCT No. 2651 (now TCT No.
8955) containing an area of 384 sq. ms. for a consideration of P400.00. In
the said contract, the stipulated time of repurchase was ten (10) years from
the date of execution thereof or until June 5, 1978. That said period of
vendors right to repurchase expired without any agreement of extending
said period of repurchase. To date, even the heirs of the late Maria Ortega
Vda. de Nu[]ez have not exercised[d] their right of repurchase. A year
after the execution of the said pacto de ret[r]o sale, the late Maria Ortega
Vda. de Nu[]ez and her son Ricardo Nu[]ez, as the surviving heirs of the
the subject [L]ot No. 106 was adjudicated to Ricardo Nu[]ez which
eventually was the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 8955 in the name of
Ricardo Nu[]ez. Eugenio O. Nu[]ez [has] occupied and possessed said
Lot No. 106 for more than 40 years up to the present and it is also where his
children, Eduardo, Elisa and Imelda, all surnamed Nu[]ez, grew and [are]
presently residing.
By virtue of a power of attorney executed sometime in 1982 by the late
spouses Ricardo Nu[]ez and Paterna Nu[]ez appointing respondent as
administrator, as well as on the alleged judicial confirmation of respondents
wife, as acknowledged natural child of Ricardo Nu[]ez, respondent, on the
pretext of administering the properties of the late spouses, had been
disturbing the peaceful occupation and possession of complainants of Lot
No. 106 claiming that complainants have no right over the same. With our
desire to peaceably settle the controversy, complainants agreed to buy Lot
No. 106, and respondent, who, without being appointed by the court as
administrator of the intestate estate of the late spouses Ricardo Nu[]ez and
Paterna Nu[]ez, sold and conveyed to Imelda Nu[]ez and Elisa Nu[]ez-
Alvarico the portions of Lot No. 106 they were occupying. After which
Elisa Nu[]ez-Alvarico filed a criminal complaint for Estafa against
respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte docketed as
Criminal Case No. R-4013-A.
Sometime on 29 March 2001 at around 7:30 in the evening, respondent
went to the house of Eduardo L. Nu[]ez at corner J.P. Laurel and M.L.
Quezon Sts., Baybay, Leyte and threatened to kill Eduardo Nu[]ez by
uttering the words ipaposil ta ka which means Ill have you shot. A
complaint for Grave Threats docketed as Case No. R-4012-A was filed by
Eduardo L. Nu[]ez before Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte.[3]
In a hearing held on June 5, 2002, complainants appeared with
their counsel, while respondent was represented by Atty. Arnold
Logares. As respondent had not yet filed his answer to the
Complaint despite a previous Order dated December 7, 2001, he
was granted a period of fifteen (15) days within which to do so. The
hearing was thus reset to June 26, 2002.[4]
On June 26, 2002, only respondents counsel, Atty. Arnold
Logares, was present. Respondent filed a Motion seeking a
cancellation of the scheduled hearing and another extension of
fifteen (15) days within which to file his answer. He was thus granted
a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days within which to do so. [5]
On July 18, 2002, Atty. Astorga finally submitted his Answer.
[6]
He denied that he had utilized his profession to circumvent the law
and averred that there were already several pending cases involving
the same issues raised by complainants in the present administrative
action:
2. That the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase executed by the late
Maria Ortega Vda. De Nuez on June 5, 1968 is more civil in nature and
can be best threshed out in the amended complaint of Civil Case No. B-
2001-10-27, entitled []The Intestate Estate of the late Spouses Ricardo O.
Nuez, et al versus Spouses Bonito D. Alvarico, et al[] for Rescission of
Contract[.] [T]he original complaint was filed in October 2001 at the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte; an amended complaint of
which is filed where one of the issues is the declaration of invalidity of the
foregoing questioned deed of sale with right to repurchase because if this
document is really valid and existing then why did complainant Eugenio
Nuez [affix] his signature as one of the instrumental witnesses in the Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition among Maria Ortega Vda. De Nuez and Ricardo
O. Nuez on May 19, 1969 otherwise he would have protested at the time
of the execution thereof because he is the temporary owner of Lot No. 106,
one of the properties subject of partition. Why did he allow the late Ricardo
O. Nuez to take control and full possession and ownership of Lot 106 to
his exclusion after the partition in 1969?
xxx xxx xxx
[3] b) It is not only the authority of the Spouses Ricardo O. Nuez and
Paterna Baltazar that herein respondent is relying as administrator of the
said intestate estate but the same had been duly confirmed by the judicially
declared daughter of Ricardo O. Nuez, namely, respondents wife Dr.
Linda Teresa Tan-Nuez who confirmed undersign[ed]s authority as
administrator of the aforenamed estate;
[3] c) With the discovery of the aforenamed deed of sale with the right to
repurchase only recently, the complainants were emboldened to actively
[question] [the] estate as they now [refuse] to recognize the ownership and
long time possession of the real properties forming part of the aforenamed
[estate] to belong to the offspring of the late Ricardo O. Nuez;
[3] d) Undersigned respondent did not utilize his profession to
circumvent the law. Complainants Elisa L. Nuez and Imelda L. Nuez are
actually renting the cornermost portion of the consolidated Lot Nos. 106
and 107 of the Baybay Cadastre with an area only of 201 square meters,
more or less, and when respondent was trying to eject them, complainants
negotiated with the respondent to buy their area of Lot No. 106 they rented
and in fact actually advanced part of the agreed consideration until their
father Eugenio Nuez discovered an existing document of sale with right to
repurchase when they, ill-advised by their counsel [started] filing [a] series
of criminal, civil and administrative cases against respondent and his wife at
the instigation of their lawyers, the late Atty. Jose C. Modina and their
current counsel, Atty. Norjue I. Juego as a way of pressuring respondent and
wife to give up [the] portion they are occupying [of] Lot No. 106[,]
including [the] portion which complainant Eduardo Nuez is now renting of
Lot No. 89;
4. That respondent in response to paragraph 7 of the complaint hereby
admit the pendency of Criminal Case No. R-4013-A which was personally
filed by Elisa L. Nuez without the intervention from any government
prosecutor but said case is no longer pending in the Municipal Trial Court
of Baybay, Leyte when then same was recommended for dismissal x x x.
Later it was ordered dismissed by the Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U.
Vivero and approved by Provincial Prosecutor Teresita S. Lopez on
February 22, 2001 x x x but complainants elevated the case for review to
the Department of Justice x x x. Because of the pendency of this criminal
case with the Department of Justice[,] a prejudicial question now exist[s]
whereby this administrative case should be suspended until the resolution of
that petition for review by the Department of Justice;
5. That respondent specifically denies the material allegations of
paragraph 8, 9 and 10 of the complaint, the truth of the matter is that Amado
Caballes at the instigation of the complain[an]ts and their counsel filed
Criminal Case No. R-4011-A with the Municipal Trial Court, Baybay, Leyte
which is pending pre-trial. Like Criminal Case No. R-4013-A, the same
was filed at the instance of Amado Caballes, x x x. But before the filing of
this present action initiated by Mr. Caballess counsel and complainants
Eduardo Nuez and Eugenio Nuez required Mr. Caballes to execute a
document of resale on August 14, 2001 despite knowing that the same has
already been long redeemed by respondent x x x. Despite legal redemption,
and despite Amado Caballes having executed x x x a Deed of Resale which
was witnessed by complainant Eugenio Nuez x x x, the complainants
convinced Amado Caballes to file Crim. Case No. R-4011-A[.] x x x. That
by virtue of the pendency of Criminal Case No. R-4011-A, there exist[s] a
prejudicial question and that further hearing of the present administrative
action should be suspended until the outcome of this criminal case;
6. That respondent is duly authorized to negotiate for the disposal of any
part of the Intestate Estate of the late Spouses Ricardo O. Nuez and
Paterna Baltazar x x x.
7. That regarding paragraph 12 and 13 of the complaint[,] this is a
matter of existence and pend[ing] with [the IBP-CBD] and need not be a
part of this complaint because this will be threshed out in another hearing[.]
[T]he truth of the matter is that respondent had been already acquitted in
Crim. Case No. CBU-29395 x x x.
8. That similar to other cases filed at the instance of the Nuezes, there
is also filed Crim. Case No. R-4012-A for Grave Threats by complainant
Eduardo Nuez and now pending in the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte
despite the lack of witnesses x x x. Again, the pendency of this case will
constitute a prejudicial question which necessarily will suspend further
hearing of the present administrative action until the final outcome of the
aforesaid Crim. Case No. R-4011-A;
xxx xxx x x x.[7]
On August 8, 2002, complainants submitted their Reply.
[8]
Thereafter, IBP-CPD Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala
scheduled the case for hearing on December 11, 2002. On this date,
respondent requested and was a granted a period of fifteen (15)
days to file his rejoinder. The parties agreed to file simultaneous
memoranda on January 15, 2003, after which the case was to be
considered submitted for resolution.[9]
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In her Report,[10] Commissioner Villanueva-Maala found
respondent guilty of serious misconduct. Thus, the investigating
commissioner recommended his suspension from the practice of law
for a period of one year.
In Resolution No. XV-2003-346 dated June 21, 2003, the Board
of Governors of the IBP adopted the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Villanueva-Maala.
The Resolution, together with the records of the case, was
transmitted to this Court for final action, pursuant to Section 12(b) of
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Respondent also filed a Petition
for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to set aside
Resolution No. XV-2003-346 of the IBP Board of Governors.
The Courts Ruling
We disagree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP,
but find respondents offensive language against complainants and
their counsel unbecoming an attorney.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
The legal profession exacts a high standard from its members.
Lawyers shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on their
fitness to practice law. Neither shall they, whether in public or in
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.[11] In Gonzaga v. Villanueva,[12] this Court,
[13]
citing Tucay v. Tucay, held thus:
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a
patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an
attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly
immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to the
practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court;
corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are
broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer
does or commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer
must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber, which are not only
conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential
demands for his continued membership therein.[14]
However, the penalties of disbarment and suspension are
severe forms of disciplinary action and must be imposed with great
caution.[15] The allegations in the Complaint were not substantiated
by clear evidence; they were bereft of convincing proof of
respondents deceit and gross misconduct.
The admission of respondent that there are various cases filed
or pending against him does not ipso facto constitute serious
misconduct. His contention that the pending cases against him pose
a prejudicial question that will bar the instant administrative case is
untenable. Likewise bereft of merit, however, is the finding of the
IBP investigating commissioner that the mere existence of the same
pending cases constitute serious misconduct on the part of
respondent.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138, conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension.
Suspension or disbarment may follow as a matter of course, upon a
finding that the crime a lawyer has been convicted of involves moral
turpitude. By such conviction, such lawyer has become unfit to
uphold the administration of justice and is no longer possessed of
good moral character.[16] In the present case, however, while
respondent has been charged with several criminal cases involving
moral turpitude, he has yet to be convicted of any of them.
Without clear and convincing evidence that he committed acts
that allegedly constituted serious misconduct, the mere existence of
pending criminal charges cannot be a ground for disbarment or
suspension of respondent. To hold otherwise would open the door to
harassment of attorneys through the mere filing of numerous criminal
cases against them.
Respondent contends that his right to due process was violated
when the IBP investigating commissioner failed to conduct a formal
investigation.[17] As borne by the records, Investigating Commissioner
Villanueva-Maala conducted hearings on the case on June 5 and
June 26, 2002, during which counsel for respondent, Atty. Logares,
appeared. Respondent was allowed to file his Answer, as well as his
Rejoinder. And, more important, he himself appeared at the
December 11, 2002 hearing when the parties agreed to file
simultaneous memoranda, after which the case was deemed
submitted for resolution. Records show that respondent filed his
Memorandum on January 29, 2003. Hence, he cannot claim that he
was not given ample opportunity to rebut the charges filed against
him.
While we are not convinced that complainants have clearly and
convincingly proven the charges of serious misconduct, we do,
however, note the use of offensive language in respondents
pleadings. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
Arguments, whether written or oral, should be gracious to both court
and opposing counsel and should use such language as may be
properly addressed by one gentleperson to another.[24]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Arturo B. Astorga is ACQUITTED of the
charge of serious misconduct, but is held liable for conduct
unbecoming an attorney and is FINED two thousand pesos.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and

candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

In his Memorandum[18] dated January 15, 2003, the opposing

counsel, Atty. Norjue I. Juego, points out the manner and tenor of the
language in the Answer[19] and the Rejoinder of respondent.[20] The
latter suggested that complainants and their counsel had caused the
filing of several baseless suits, including the present charge, merely
to harass and place him in a bad light. [21] He hurled insulting
language in describing the opposing counsel [22] and cast doubts on
the latters integrity by implying that the lawyer had instigated the
filing of the so-called baseless suits, violated the rules on non-forum
shopping and committed malpractice.[23]

Indeed, these statements, particularly the words who he is

despite x x x his shortness not only in size but in arrogance,
constitute conduct unbecoming a member of the legal profession and
cannot be countenanced by this Court.

A lawyers language may be forceful, but should always be

dignified; emphatic, but respectful as befitting an advocate.

A.M. No. (2170-MC) P-1356 November 21, 1979
HON. REMIGIO E. ZARI, complainant,
vs.
DIOSDADO S. FLORES, respondent.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
In a letter dated July 15, 1976 addressed to the Supreme
Court, Hon. Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge of Branch VI.
City Court of Quezon City, recommended the dismissal from
the service of Mr. Diosdado S. Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court
of Branch VI, City Court, on the following grounds:
1. Conviction for libel on April 28, 1967, (Criminal Case
No. Q- 7171), Branch IV, Court of First Instance, Quezon
City), a crime involving moral turpitude. He was sentenced
to pay a fine of P500.00, which he paid on July 18, 1974,
under Receipt No. 4736418.
2. Presistent attempts to unduly influence the
undersigned amounting to undue interest in cases pending
before Branch VI as shown by his handwritten notes to the
undersigned and to my present deputy clerk of Court, Atty.
Reynaldo Elcano.
On March 8, 1976, Mr. Flores was relieved from his position
as Deputy Clerk of Court upon request of the undersigned
primarily to dissociate myself from these actuations of Mr.
Flores, which I strongly disapproved of, and to avail my
Court of the services of a full-fledged lawyer with
unquestionable integrity. After his transfer, as can be seen
from his handwritten notes, he persisted in taking this
unwarranted course of action in at least three (3) cases of
Branch VI.
3. Gross discourtesy to superior officers as manifested
by his uncalled for and unjustified use of strong and
contemptuous language in addressing the City Judges, when
he wrote a letter, dated March 11, 1976.
In a resolution of this Court dated July 29, 1976, Deputy
Clerk of Court Diosdado S. Flores was required to file his
answer to the letter of Judge Remigio E. Zari and this case
was transferred to the First Division. 2
The respondent filed his answers 3 on August 12, 1976
wherein he alleged, among others, that his conviction for
libel did not involve moral turpitude; that the then
Commissioner Abelardo Subido, who was also convicted of
the crime of libel and was fined P5,000.00, had approved his
appointment as Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI of the
City Court of Quezon City; that the respondent never tried to
unduly influence the complainant in the discharge of the
latter's duties and responsibilities; that while respondent's
language in his letter dated March 11, 1976 is strong, the
same could not be considered contemptuous either directly
or indirectly, in as much as he was merely expressing the
sentiments of an aggrieved employee who deserves a better
treatment from his superior after more than six years and
nine months of highly dedicated and very efficient service in
the City Court of Quezon City; that if ever respondent
requested favors from his superior, these were all done in
the spirit of friendship which the complainant professed to
him before he left Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City
on March 9, 1976; that from October 15, 1975 up to his
illegal transfer on March 8, 1976, the respondent was
practically doing the work of the complainant; that the
respondent has tutored the complainant on the fine
interpretation and application of the law; that it was Judge
Zari who tried to corrupt him as may be gathered from the
following instances: On January 8, 1976, after the trial in
Criminal Case No VI-5783 vs. Juanito Chua and two criminal
cases against Emerito Lim, Judge Zari instructed the
respondent to conduct an ocular inspection on the illegal
constructions, subject of the cases; that Judge Zari, likewise,
told the respondent to join him for lunch at Alfredo's
Steakhouse in Quezon City; that after conducting the ocular
inspection, the respondent proceeded to Alfredo's
Steakhouse where he joined Judge Zari, Fiscal Loja and the
defense counsel of Chua and Lim; that thereafter, Judge Zari
directed the respondent not to prepare anymore his report
on the ocular inspection to the site; that up to the time of
his illegal transfer, the respondent did not see the records of
said cases anymore; that in Criminal Case No. VI-166624 vs.
Corazon and Macaria Tolentino, for the crime of estafa, the
respondent was instructed to convict both the accused
because the complainant was a relative of a certain Judge
Erochi; and that in Criminal Cases Nos. VI-170682 and VI-
170689 versus Gerundio Villanueva y Elazo, Dominador
Garcia y Orteza and Balbino Domingo y Ramos, for the crime
of theft, he was instructed by Judge Zari to convict the
accused Dominador Garcia y Orteza because according to
said judge, the complainant is AVESCO.
In a resolution dated September 1, 1976, 4 this Court
required Judge Zari to file a reply to the answer of the
respondent within ten (10) days from notice thereof.
The complainant alleged in his reply to the answer of the
respondent that he had not allowed the respondent to
interfere in the preparation of orders and decisions; that
while the complainant is aware of his limitations, he is
certainly not so naive as to allow someone not a member of
the Philippine Bar to "tutor" and give him finer interpretation
of the law; that he admits that Criminal Cases Nos. VI-5783
against Juanito Chua and
VI-5788-5789 against Emerito Lim are pending before this
court; that he did not call the respondent to his chamber
and instruct him to conduct an ocular inspection on the
illegal constructions; that he did not invite the respondent
for lunch that day; that the truth was that after the trial, he
went to Alfredo's Steakhouse in the company of his fiscal,
Fiscal Guillermo Loja; that while in the said place, the
complainant was surprised to see the respondent in the
company of the accused; that he counseled the respondent
to be more circumspect as these people had cases before
his sala; that it is true that from then on up to the relief of
the respondent on March 8, 1976, the records of the
aforesaid case could not be found by the respondent
because the complainant had the records brought inside his
chamber in order to forestall any attempt on the part of the
respondent to manipulate the records; that he did not
instruct the respondent to convict the accused in Criminal
Case No. VI-166624 and in Criminal Cases Nos. VI-170682
and VI-170689 just because the complainant is a relative of
a certain Judge Erochi and AVESCO, respectively; and that
he requested Atty. Reynaldo Elcano to affix his initial in all
orders, decisions and sentences in order to pinpoint
responsibility. 5
In his reply, the complainant additionally charged that when
the respondent applied for the position of Deputy Clerk of
Court, Branch VI, City Court of Quezon City, he submitted,
among others, an affidavit dated June 10, 1969 that
contains the following statement "That I am a person of
good moral character and integrity and have no
administrative, criminal or police record;" that the
respondent also accomplished Civil Service Form No. 212
(1965) which was subscribed and sworn to before then
Judge Oscar A. Inocentes; that in the aforesaid data sheet,
the respondent admits having acted as counsel for three
companies; and that the giving of legal advice by notaries
and others who are not admitted to the practice of law is
dangerous to the welfare of the community, because such
persons have not demonstrated their capacity by submitting
to examinations lawfully established in the practice of law.
This administrative case was referred to the Executive Judge
of Rizal, Quezon City, for investigation, report and
recommendation after City Judge Minerva Genovea and City
Judge Aloysius Alday had been allowed to inhibit themselves
from investigating this
case. 6
District Judge Sergio A. F. Apostol who conducted the
investigation of this administrative case recommended that
the respondent be separated from the service on the
following findings:
The first charge is "conviction for libel which is a crime
allegedly involving moral turpitude."
Presidential Decree No. 807, Sec. 36(b) No. 10 provides that
one of the grounds for disciplinary action is "conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude."
Evidence adduced by the complainant which was admitted
by the respondent was that on April 28, 1967 respondent
was convicted of the crime of Libel in Criminal Case No. Q-
7171 of Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City. Respondent was sentenced to pay a fine of P5,000.00
which he paid on July 18, 1974 under Official Receipt No.
276418.
Moral turpitude has been defined as including any act done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. 7
Some of the particular crimes which have been held to
involve moral turpitude are adultery, concubinage, 8 rape,
arson, evasion of income tax, barratry, bigamy, blackmail,
bribery, 9 criminal conspiracy to smuggle opium, dueling,
embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent
proof of loss on insurance contract, murder, mutilation of
public records, fabrication of evidence, offenses against
pension laws, perjury, seduction under promise of marriage,
10 estafa, 11 falsification of public document, 12 estafa thru
falsification of public document. 13
"Moral turpitude" has been defined as an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which
a man owes his fellow men, to society in general, contrary
to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals. 14 It implies something
immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable
by law or not. It must not merely be mala prohibita but, the
act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act
itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral
turpitude. 15 Moral turpitude does not, however, include
such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose
illegality lies in the fact of their being positively prohibited.
16 Hence, the crime of illegal possession of firearm or
ammunition does not involve moral turpitude for under our
laws, what is punishable is the possession of a firearm or
ammunition without a license or authority. 17
Bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude. 18
However in another, the Supreme Court seems to imply that
libel is not a crime involving moral turpitude.
The mere filing of an information for libel, or serious slander,
against a municipal officer is not a ground for suspending
him from office, as such offenses do not necessarily involve
moral turpitude. 19
When respondent submitted his application for the position
of Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI, City Court of Quezon
City, he submitted among others an affidavit dated June 10,
1969, which reads as follows:
That I am a person of good moral character and integrity
and have no administrative, criminal or police record.
On blank space of a personal data sheet opposite question
No. 10, which asked if applicant has previously been
convicted of a criminal offense, accused placed no. It was
later discovered that accused was previously convicted of
theft. Accused was acquitted of falsification of public
document under Art. 171, par. 4, because there is no legal
obligation to reveal previous conviction. 20 However he
maybe guilty of perjury under Art. 183. 21
One of the grounds for disciplinary action under PD 807,
Sec. 36(b) under No. 13 is "falsification of public
documents."
The second charge is "persistent attempts to unduly
influence the complainant amounting to undue interest in
cases pending before Branch VI as shown by his handwritten
notes to the complainant and to his present Deputy Clerk of
Court, Atty. Reynaldo Elcano."
Respondent admitted that in writing the four (4) notes
(Exhibits "F", "F-1", "F-2", & "F-3"), he intervened for and in
behalf of Gaw Chin in Criminal Case No. VI-6196 pending
before the sala of the complainant because the accused was
a compadre of his friend, Salvador Estrada.
On the other hand, the defense of the respondent is that he
was practically doing the work of the complainant and
tutoring him in the finer interpretation and application of the
law, and he was preparing the decisions in both criminal and
civil cases. Thus he was not trying to influence the
complainant.
The notes marked as Exhibits "F", "F-1, "F-2", & "F-3" speak
for themselves. There is no need for the undersigned to
quote the same.
A proposition by an attorney to his client to visit with his
wife the family of the judge before whom the client's cause
is to be heard, and to endeavor, in conversation thus to be
had in advance of the hearing, to commit the judge to an
expression of opinion favorable to the client's case warrants
his dismissal from the bar. 22
The acts of the respondent amounts to conducts prejudicial
to the best interest of the service. 23
The Third charge is "discourtesy to superior Officers as
manifested by respondent in calling for and unjust use of
strong and contemptuous language in addressing the city
judges when he wrote the letter, dated March 11, 1976."
To quote the pertinent provisions of Exhibit "D":
'By the tenor of your reply, you have made the change of
heart and have developed cold feet. You have badly shaken
my belief in your credibility. Indeed, you are truly a woman,
very fickle and unpredictable, but very impulsive.
I take this as a clear indication of your desire to enlist the
sympathies and, if possible, like the other five (5) judges,
involved them in the mess originally of your own making
and design and align them with you against me, hoping to
impress upon me that by the tyranny of numbers, I will be
convinced that mine is a lost cause.
However, I regret to inform the six of you that by your
conduct, you have dismally failed to live up to your oaths, ...
Kindly pardon me if I say that, the six of you must be out of
your wits when you all decided to lay the blame on me and
condemned without trial for the alleged inefficiency.
Yes, when you all decided to sacrifice me you are all laboring
under deep and nagging hallucinations, induced and
prompted by your serious concern to save the face of a
colleague.
By the way, could any of the Honorable Judges of Branches
I, III, V & IX honestly and truthfully say the public service in
their respective branches is efficient, so that they could now
come to the succor of a colleague and are also competent to
promote the efficiency in Branch VI. My God, if that is true,
promotions of Judges in the City Court would be fast, the
Purge in the Judiciary would not have affected Quezon City
and the unprepared and the inexperienced would not have
come to the Bench.'
Respondent reasoned out that the use of strong language by
him in his letter was justified and very much called for it
being the indubitable manifestation of the indignation and
disgust of the respondent, urged upon him by the
complainant who engineered the respondent's illegal
transfer from Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City
which he holds a valid and subsisting appointment to the
Appeal and Docket Division, by virtue of a letter of the
Executive Judge (Exhibit "43"), to quote the pertinent
provision of which:
'as a measure to promote more efficient public service, after
due and circumspect deliberation by and among the judges.
'
pursuant to the authority granted to the executive judge
under Administrative Order No. 6 of the Supreme Court
which provides as follows:
To re-assign temporarily the personnel of one branch (sala)
to another branch (sala) or to the Office of the Clerk of
Court, in case of vacancy in the position of Presiding Judge
of a branch (sala), or when the interest of the service
requires. In the latter case, the assignment shall be made in
consultation with the Presiding Judge of the branch (sala)
concerned; and in case of disagreement, the assignment of
the Executive Judge shall be effective immediately, unless
revoked by the Supreme Court.
The transfer was made in consultation with the presiding
judge of the branch concerned who is the complainant in
this case.
A detail is the movement of an employee from one agency
to another without the issuance of an appointment and shall
be allowed, only for a limited period in the case of
employees occupying professional, technical and scientific
positions. If the employee believes that there is no
justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to the
commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the
employee shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by
the commission. 24
An employee may be reassigned from one organizational
unit to another in the same agency. Provided: That such
reassignment shall not involve reduction in rank, status or
salary. 25
In the instant case there was actually a reassignment of
employee from one branch to the Office of the Clerk of Court
in accordance with Administrative Order No. 6 of the
Supreme Court and in consonance with PD 807.
The language of attorney in his motion for reconsideration
referring to the Supreme Court as a "Civilized, democratic
tribunal," but by innuendo would suggest that it is not; in his
motion to inhibit, categorizing the Court's decision as "false,
erroneous and illegal" and accusing two justices for being
interested in the decision of the case without any basis in
fact; asking the other members of the Court to inhibit
themselves for favors or benefits received from any of the
petitioners including the President constitute disrespectful
language to the Court. It undermines and degrades the
administration of justice.
The language is necessary for the defense of client is no
justification. It ill behooves an attorney to justify his
disrespectful language with the statement that it was
necessary for the defense of his client. A client's cause does
not permanent an attorney to cross the line between liberty
and license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the
thought that "since lawyers are administrators of justice,
oathbound servants of society, their first duty is not to their
clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of
justice; to this their client's success is wholly subordinate;
and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics. 26
Thru the use of uncalled language, respondent had
committed insubordination, a ground for disciplinary action.
27
The evidence of record supports the findings of the
investigating judge.
It is a fact that the respondent was convicted of libel in
Criminal Case No. Q-7171 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch IV, at Quezon City. 7 While this fact alone is
not sufficient to warrant disciplinary action, the respondent's
conviction for libel shows his propensity to speak ill of
others. His letter dated March 11, 1976 to Judge Minerva C.
Genovea, then Executive Judge of the City Court of Quezon
City 8 contains defamatory and uncalled for language.
The handwritten notes of the respondent regarding different
cases pending in Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City,
presided by the complainant, Judge Remigio E. Zari, show
that the respondent had exerted undue influence in the
disposition of the cases mentioned therein. 9
It is true that conviction for libel does not automatically
justify removal of a public officer. 10 However, the fact of
conviction for libel of the respondent, taken together with
the letter he wrote to then Executive City Judge of the City
Court of Quezon City, Judge Minerva C. Genovea, shows the
tendency of the respondent to malign people.
Respondent's act of interfering in the cases pending before
Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City presided by the
complainant is inimical to the service. This alone warrants
severe disciplinary measures.
In his affidavit subscribed and sworn to before then City
Judge Oscar A. Inocentes on June 10, 1969, the respondent
stated "That I am a person of good moral character and
integrity and have no administrative, criminal or police
record. " This averment is not true because the respondent
had been convicted of libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171, of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, in a sentence
dated April 28, 1967. This prevarication in a sworn
statement is another ground for serious disciplinary action.
The removal from the service of the respondent is warranted
by the evidence adduced during the investigation conducted
by Judge Sergio A. F. Apostol of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City.
WHEREFORE, the respondent, Diosdado S. Flores, is hereby
DISMISSED as Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI of the City
Court of Quezon City, with forfeiture of all retirement
privileges and with prejudice to reinstatement in the
national and local governments, as well as, in any
government instrumentality or agency including
government owned or controlled corporations effective upon
the finality of this decision.