SECOND DIVISION

CHARLES B. BAYLON, A.C. No. 6962

Complainant,

- versus -

ATTY. JOSE A. ALMO,

Respondent. June 25, 2008

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.

This case stemmed from the administrative complaint filed by the

complainant at the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) charging the
respondent with fraud and deceit for notarizing a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) bearing the forged signature of the complainant as the supposed
principal thereof.

Complainant averred that Pacita Filio, Rodolfo Llantino, Jr. and his late
wife, Rosemarie Baylon, conspired in preparing an SPA [1] authorizing his wife
to mortgage his real property located in Signal Village, Taguig. He said that
he was out of the country when the SPA was executed on June 17, 1996, and
also when it was notarized by the respondent on June 26, 1996. To support
his contention that he was overseas on those dates, he presented (1) a
certification[2] from the Government of Singapore showing that he was
vaccinated in the said country on June 17, 1996; and (2) a
certification[3] from the Philippine Bureau of Immigration showing that he was
out of the country from March 21, 1995 to January 28, 1997. To prove that his
signature on the SPA was forged, the complainant presented a report [4] from
the National Bureau of Investigation stating to the effect that the questioned
signature on the SPA was not written by him.
 The complainant likewise alleged that because of the SPA, his real
property was mortgaged to Lorna Express Credit Corporation and that it was
subsequently foreclosed due to the failure of his wife to settle her mortgage
obligations.

In his answer, the respondent admitted notarizing the SPA, but he

argued that he initially refused to notarize it when the complainants wife first
came to his office on June 17, 1996, due to the absence of the supposed
affiant thereof. He said that he only notarized the SPA when the complainants
wife came back to his office on June 26, 1996, together with a person whom
she introduced to him as Charles Baylon. He further contended that he
believed in good faith that the person introduced to him was the complainant
because said person presented to him a Community Tax Certificate bearing
the name Charles Baylon. To corroborate his claims, the respondent attached
the affidavit of his secretary, Leonilita de Silva.

The respondent likewise denied having taken part in any scheme to

commit fraud, deceit or falsehood.[5]

After due proceedings, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline

recommended to the IBP-Board of Governors that the respondent be strongly
admonished for notarizing the SPA;that his notarial commission be
revoked; and that the respondent be barred from being granted a notarial
commission for one year.[6]

In justifying its recommended sanctions, the IBP-Commission on Bar

Discipline stated that

In this instance, reasonable diligence should have

compelled herein respondent to ascertain the true identity of the
person seeking his legal services considering the nature of the
 document, i.e., giving a third party authority to mortgage a real
property owned by another. The only saving grace on the part of
respondent is that he relied on the fact that the person being
authorized under the SPA to act as agent and who accompanied
the impostor, is the wife of the principal mentioned therein.[7]

On October 22, 2005, the IBP-Board of Governors issued Resolution No.

XVII-2005-109 which reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby

ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering Respondents failure to properly ascertain the true
identity of the person seeking his legal services considering the
nature of the document, Atty. Jose A. Almo is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year
and Respondents notarial commission is Revoked and
Disqualified (sic) from reappointment as Notary Public for two
(2) years.[8]

In our Resolution[9] dated February 1, 2006, we noted the said IBP

Resolution.

We agree with the finding of the IBP that the respondent had indeed been
negligent in the performance of his duties as a notary public in this case.

The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be

overemphasized. In Santiago v. Rafanan,[10] we explained,

. . . Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary

act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document
thus making that document admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
 administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to
rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and
appended to a private instrument.

For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted
the solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in
their performance of the notarial act are never to be
countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the
performance of their duties, which are dictated by public policy
and are impressed with public interest.[11]

Mindful of his duties as a notary public and taking into account the nature of
the SPA which in this case authorized the complainants wife to mortgage the
subject real property, the respondent should have exercised utmost diligence
in ascertaining the true identity of the person who represented himself and
was represented to be the complainant. [12] He should not have relied on the
Community Tax Certificate presented by the said impostor in view of the
ease with which community tax certificates are obtained these days. [13] As a
matter of fact, recognizing the established unreliability of a community tax
certificate in proving the identity of a person who wishes to have his
document notarized, we did not include it in the list of competent evidence
of identity that notaries public should use in ascertaining the identity of
persons appearing before them to have their documents notarized.[14]

Moreover, considering that respondent admitted [15] in the IBP hearing

on February 21, 2005 that he had already previously notarized some
documents[16] for the complainant, he should have compared the
complainants signatures in those documents with the impostors signature
before he notarized the questioned SPA.

WHEREFORE, the notarial commission, if still extant, of respondent

Atty. Jose A. Almo is hereby REVOKED. He is likewise DISQUALIFIED to be
reappointed as Notary Public for a period of two years.
 To enable us to determine the effectivity of the penalty imposed, the
respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to
this Court.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the courts all over the country. Let
a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of the
respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 3324 February 9, 2000

PASTOR EDWIN VILLARIN, PACIANO DE VEYRA, SR., and BARTOLOME

EVAROLO, SR., complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RESTITUTO SABATE, JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION

BUENA, J.:

Complainants Pastor Edwin Villarin, Paciano de Veyra, Sr. and Bartolome

Evarolo, Sr. prays that administrative sanctions be imposed on respondent
Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. for not having observed honesty and utmost care in
the performance of his duties as notary public.

In their Affidavit-Complaint,1 complainants alleged that through their counsel

Atty. Eduardo D. Estores, they filed a complaint against Paterno Diaz, et al.
under SEC Case No. DV091, Region XI Davao Extension Office, Davao City.
Respondents in the SEC Case filed their "Motion to Dismiss With Answer To
Villarin's Et. Al., Complaint To The Securities and Exchange
Commission"2 prepared and notarized by Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. The
verification of the said pleading reads:

V E R I F I C AT I O N

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY) S.S.

WE, REV. PASTORS PATERNO M. DIAZ, MANUEL DONATO, ULYSSES

CAMAGAY, LEVI PAGUNSAN, ALEJANDRO BOFETIADO, All of legal ages
after having been sworn in accordance with law depose and say:

1. That we were the one who caused the above writings to be written;

2. That we have read and understood all statements therein and

believed that all are true and correct to the best of our knowledge and
belief.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF hereunto affixed our signatures on the 6th day

of February, 1989 at the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines.

By: (Sgd.) Lilian C. Diaz (Sgd.) Camagay (Sgd.) M Donato

By: (Sgd.) Atty. Restituto B. Sabate

(Sgd.) Dr. Levi Pagunsan (Sgd.) Pastor A. Bofetiado

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before the above-named affiants on the

6th day of February, 1989 at the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines.

(Sgd.) RESTITUTO B. SABATE, JR.

Notary Public3

Complainants alleged that the signature of Paterno Diaz was not his, but that
of a certain Lilian Diaz; that with regard to the signatures of Levi Pagunsan
and Alejandro Bofetiado, it was Atty. Sabate, Jr. who signed for them; and
that herein respondent Sabate, Jr. made it appear that said persons
participated in the said act when in fact they did not do so. Complainants
averred that respondent's act undermined the public's confidence for which
reason administrative sanctions should be imposed against him.

In his Answer,4 respondent alleged that Paterno Diaz, Levi Pagunsan and
Alejandro Bofetiado swore to the correctness of the allegations in the motion
to dismiss/pleading for the SEC through their authorized representatives
known by their names as Lilian C. Diaz, wife of Paterno Diaz, and Atty.
Restituto B. Sabate, Jr. manifested by the word "By" which preceded every
signature of said representatives. Respondent allegedly signed for and in the
interest of his client backed-up by their authorization5; and Lilian Diaz was
authorized to sign for and in behalf of her husband as evidenced by a written
authority.6 Respondent alleged that on the strength of the said authorizations
he notarized the said document.

Respondent also alleged that in signing for and in behalf of his client
Pagunsan and Bofetiado, his signature was preceded by the word "By" which
suggests that he did not in any manner make it appear that those persons
signed in his presence; aside from the fact that his clients authorized him to
sign for and in their behalf, considering the distance of their place of
residence to that of the respondent and the reglementary period in filing said
pleadings he had to reckon with. Respondent further alleged that the
complaint is malicious and anchored only on evil motives and not a sensible
way to vindicate complainants' court losses, for respondent is only a lawyer
defending a client and prayed that the case be dismissed with further award
for damages to vindicate his honor and mental anguish as a consequence
thereof.

The designated Investigating Commissioner of Integrated Bar of the

Philippines recommended that respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. be
suspended from his Commission as Notary Public for a period of six (6)
months. The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
adopted the said recommendation and resolved to suspend the respondent's
Commission for six (6) months for failure to exercise due diligence in
upholding his duty as a notary public.

From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that respondent Atty. Restituto

Sabate, Jr. notarized the Motion to Dismiss With Answer prepared by him
which pleading he signed for and in behalf of Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro
Bofetiado (while Lilian Diaz signed for her husband Pastor Diaz), three of the
respondents in the SEC case, with the word "By" before their signatures,
because he was their counsel in said case and also because he was an officer
of the religious sect and corporation represented by the respondents-Pastors.

But while it would appear that in doing so, he acted in good faith, the fact
remains that the same cannot be condoned. He failed to state in the
preliminary statements of said motion/answer that the three respondents
were represented by their designated attorneys-in-fact. Besides, having
signed the Verification of the pleading, he cannot swear that he appeared
before himself as Notary Public.1wphi1.nt

The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal
or immoral arrangements.7 That function would be defeated if the notary
public were one of the signatories to the instrument. For then, he would be
interested in sustaining the validity thereof as it directly involves himself and
the validity of his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position, and
the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would
be thwarted.8

Sec. 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an

officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgment
of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The
notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify
that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known
to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate
shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a
seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.9

A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public should not
notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very
same persons who executed and personally appeared before said notary
public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The acts
of affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for what are stated therein are
facts they have personal knowledge of and swore to the same personally and
not through any representative. Otherwise, their representative's names
should appear in the said documents as the ones who executed the same
and that is only the time they can affix their signatures and personally
appear before the notary public for notarization of said document.

As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to

subscribe to the sacred duties pertaining to his office, such duties being
dictated by public policy impressed with public interest. Faithful observance
and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment
or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon and
failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his
professional indiscretion.10

That respondent acted the way he did because he was confronted with an
alleged urgent situation is no excuse at all. As an individual, and even more
so as a member of the legal profession, he is required to obey the laws of the
land at all times.11 For notarizing the Verification of the Motion to Dismiss
With Answer when three of the affiants thereof were not before him and for
notarizing the same instrument of which he was one of the signatories, he
failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his duty as a notary public.
WHEREFORE, for lack of diligence in the observance of the Notarial Law,
respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. is SUSPENDED from his Commission as
Notary Public for a period of one (1) year.

SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5864. April 15, 2005]

ARTURO L. SICAT, complainant, vs. ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA,

JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

In an affidavit-complaint,[1] complainant Arturo L. Sicat, a Board Member

of the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Rizal, charged respondent Atty.
Gregorio E. Ariola, the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, Rizal, with violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility by committing fraud, deceit and
falsehood in his dealings, particularly the notarization of a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by a one Juanito C. Benitez. According
to complainant, respondent made it appear that Benitez executed the said
document on January 4, 2001 when in fact the latter had already died on
October 25, 2000.
He alleged that prior to the notarization, the Municipality of Cainta had
entered into a contract with J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical
Management, represented by Benitez, for the construction of low-cost
houses. The cost of the architectural and engineering designs amounted
to P11,000,000 and two consultants were engaged to supervise the project.
For the services of the consultants, the Municipality of Cainta issued a check
dated January 10, 2001 in the amount of P3,700,000, payable to J.C. Benitez
Architects and Technical Management and/or Cesar Goco. The check was
received and encashed by the latter by virtue of the authority of the SPA
notarized by respondent Ariola.
Complainant further charged respondent with the crime of falsification
penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code by making it appear
that certain persons participated in an act or proceeding when in fact they
did not.
In his Comment,[2] respondent explained that, as early as May 12, 2000,
Benitez had already signed the SPA. He claimed that due to inadvertence, it
was only on January 4, 2001 that he was able to notarize it. Nevertheless,
the SPA notarized by him on January 4, 2001 was not at all necessary
because Benitez had signed a similar SPA in favor of Goco sometime before
his death, on May 12, 2000. Because it was no longer necessary, the SPA was
cancelled the same day he notarized it, hence, legally, there was no public
document that existed. Respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed
on the ground of forum-shopping since similar charges had been filed with
the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon. According to him, the complaints were later dismissed based on
findings that the assailed act referred to violations of the implementing rules
and regulations of PD 1594,[3] PD 1445,[4] RA 7160[5] and other pertinent rules
of the Commission on Audit (COA). He stressed that no criminal and
administrative charges were recommended for filing against him.
In a Resolution dated March 12, 2003, [6] the Court referred the complaint
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. On August 26, 2003, the IBP submitted its investigation
report:

x x x it is evident that respondent notarized the Special Power of Attorney

dated 4 January 2001 purportedly executed by Juanito C. Benitez long after
Mr. Benitez was dead. It is also evident that respondent cannot feign
innocence and claim that he did not know Mr. Benitez was already dead at
the time because respondent, as member of the Prequalification and Awards
Committee of the Municipality of Cainta, personally knew Mr. Benitez
because the latter appeared before the Committee a number of times. It is
evident that the Special Power of Attorney dated 4 January 2001 was part of
a scheme of individuals to defraud the Municipality of Cainta of money which
was allegedly due them, and that respondent by notarizing said Special
Power of Attorney helped said parties succeed in their plans.[7]

The IBP recommended to the Court that respondents notarial commission

be revoked and that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
one year.[8]
After a careful review of the records, we find that respondent never
disputed complainants accusation that he notarized the SPA purportedly
executed by Benitez on January 4, 2001. He likewise never took issue with
the fact that on said date, Benitez was already dead. His act was a serious
breach of the sacred obligation imposed upon him by the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which
prohibited him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. As a lawyer and as an officer of the court, it was his duty to serve
the ends of justice,[9] not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was expected to act at
all times in accordance with law and ethics, and if he did not, he would not
only injure himself and the public but also bring reproach upon an honorable
profession.[10]
In the recent case of Zaballero v. Atty. Mario J. Montalvan,[11] where the
respondent notarized certain documents and made it appear that the
deceased father of complainant executed them, the Court declared the
respondent there guilty of violating Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[12] The Court was emphatic that lawyers
commissioned as notaries public should not authenticate documents unless
the persons who signed them are the very same persons who executed them
and personally appeared before them to attest to the contents and truth of
what are stated therein. The Court added that notaries public must observe
utmost fidelity, the basic requirement in the performance of their duties,
otherwise the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds and
documents will be undermined.
In the case at bar, the records show that Benitez died on October 25,
2000. However, respondent notarized the SPA, purportedly bearing the
signature of Benitez, on January 4, 2001 or more than two months after the
latters death. The notarial acknowledgement of respondent declared that
Benitez appeared before him and acknowledged that the instrument was his
free and voluntary act. Clearly, respondent lied and intentionally perpetuated
an untruthful statement. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and
routinary act.[13] It converts a private document into a public instrument,
making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof
of its authenticity and due execution.[14]
Neither will respondents defense that the SPA in question was
superfluous and unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate him of
accountability. His assertion of falsehood in a public document contravened
one of the most cherished tenets of the legal profession and potentially cast
suspicion on the truthfulness of every notarial act. As the Municipal
Administrator of Cainta, he should have been aware of his great
responsibility not only as a notary public but as a public officer as well. A
public office is a public trust. Respondent should not have caused disservice
to his constituents by consciously performing an act that would deceive them
and the Municipality of Cainta. Without the fraudulent SPA, the erring parties
in the construction project could not have encashed the check amounting
to P3,700,000 and could not have foisted on the public a spurious contract
all to the extreme prejudice of the very Municipality of which he was the
Administrator. According to the COA Special Task Force:

Almost all acts of falsification of public documents as enumerated in Article

171 in relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code were evident in the
transactions of the Municipality of Cainta with J.C. Benitez & Architects
Technical Management for the consultancy services in the conduct of
Detailed Feasibility Study and Detailed Engineering Design of the Proposed
Construction of Cainta Municipal Medium Rise Low Cost Housing, in the
contract amount of P11,000,000. The agent resorted to misrepresentation,
manufacture or fabrication of fictitious document, untruthful narration of
facts, misrepresentation, and counterfeiting or imitating signature for the
purpose of creating a fraudulent contract. All these were tainted with deceit
perpetrated against the government resulting to undue injury. The first and
partial payment, in the amount of P3,700,000.00 was made in the absence of
the required outputs. x x x[15]

We need not say more except that we are constrained to change the
penalty recommended by the IBP which we find too light.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found guilty of
gross misconduct and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let
copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and
entered in the records of respondent, and brought to the immediate
attention of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
 SECOND DIVISION

RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and A.C. No. 9081

MAXIMO A. GLINDO, Complainants,

- versus -

ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAA, Respondent

Promulgated: October 12, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa

(Espinosa) and Maximo A. Glindo (Glindo) against
Atty. Julieta A. Omaa (Omaa).

The Antecedent Facts

Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaa with violation of her oath
as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in office.

Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife

Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaas legal advice on whether they could
legally live separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July
1983. Omaa then prepared a document
entitled Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay (contract) which reads:
REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS

BAYAN NG GUMACA

LALAWIGAN NG QUEZON

KASUNDUAN NG PAGHIHIWALAY

KAMI, ELENA MARANTAL AT RODOLFO ESPINOSA, mga Filipino,

may sapat na gulang, dating legal na mag-
asawa, kasalukuyang naninirahan at
may pahatirang sulat sa Brgy. Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, at
COMELEC, Intramuros, Manila ayon sa pagkakasunod-
sunod, matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay nagpapatunay
ng nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod:

1. Na nais na naming maghiwalay at magkanya-kanya ng a

ming mga buhay ng walang pakialaman,
kung kayat bawat isa sa amin ay maaari ng humanap ng m
akakasama sa buhay;

2. Na ang aming mga anak na sina Ariel John Espinosa,

14 na taong gulang; Aiza Espinosa,
11 taong gulang at Aldrin Espinosa,
10 taong gulang ay namili na kung kanino sasama sa amin
gdalawa. Si Ariel John at Aiza Espinosa
ay sasama sa kanilang ama, Rodolfo Espinosa,
at ang bunso, Aldrin Espinosa
at sasama naman sa ina na si Elena;

3. Na dahil sina Ariel John at Aiza ay nagsisipag-

aral sa kasalukuyan sila ay pansamantalang mananatili sa
kanilang ina, habang tinatapos ang kanilang pag-aaral.
Sa pasukan sila ay maaari ngisama ng ama, sa lugar kung
saan siya ay naninirahan;
 4. Na ang mga bata ay maaaring dalawin ng sino man sa a
ming dalawa tuwing may pagkakataon;

5. Na magbibigay ng buwanang gastusin o suporta ang am

a kay Aldrin at ang kakulangan sa mga pangangailangan ni
to ay pupunan ng ina;

6. Na lahat ng mga kasangkapan sa bahay tulad ng T.V.,

gas
stove, mga kagamitan sa kusina ay aking (Rodolfo) ipinagk
akaloob kay Elena at hindi na ako interesado dito;

7. Na lahat ng maaaring maipundar ng sino man sa amin d

alawa sa mga panahong darating ay aming mga sari-
sariling pag-aari na at hindi na pinagsamahan o conjugal.

BILANG PATUNAY ng lahat ng ito, nilagdaan namin ito ngayong ika-

17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon.

(Sgd) (Sgd)

ELENA MARANTAL RODOLFO ESPINOSA

Nagkasundo Nagkasundo

PINATUNAYAN AT PINANUMPAAN dito sa harap ko ngayong ika-

17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon

ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAA

Notary Public
 PTR No. 3728169; 1-10-97

Gumaca, Quezon

Doc. No. 482;

Page No. 97;

Book No. XI;

Series of 1997.

Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the

validity of the contract dissolving their marriage, started implementing its
terms and conditions. However, Marantaleventually took custody of all their
children and took possession of most of the property they acquired during
their union.

Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a law
graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omaa was not
valid. Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file a
complaint against Omaa before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).

Omaa alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not personally know
Espinosa. She denied that she prepared the contract. She admitted that
Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract
but she told him that it was illegal. Omaa alleged that Espinosa returned the
next day while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her part-
time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her
signature and notarized the
contract. Omaa presented Marantals Sinumpaang Salaysay (affidavit) to
support her allegations and to show that the complaint was instigated
by Glindo. Omaa further presented a letter of apology from her staff,
Arlene Dela Pea, acknowledging that she notarized the document
without Omaasknowledge, consent, and authority.
Espinosa later submitted a Karagdagang Salaysay stating that Omaa arrived
at his residence together with a girl whom he later recognized as the person
who notarized the contract. He further stated that Omaa was not in her office
when the contract was notarized.

The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline

In its Report and Recommendation1 dated 6 February 2007, the IBP-CBD

stated that Espinosas desistance did not put an end to the proceedings. The
IBP-CBD found that Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD stated
that Omaahad failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of her
function as a notary public and to comply with the requirements of the law.
The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense of Omaa who first
claimed that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract but then
later claimed that it was her former maid who notarized it. The IBP-CBD
found:

Respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet she still

disclaimed its authorship, thereby revealing much more her propensity
to lie and make deceit, which she is deserving [of] disciplinary sanction
or disbarment.

The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaa be suspended for one year from the
practice of law and for two years as a notary public.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2007, the IBP Board of Governors

adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Omaa filed a motion for reconsideration.

In a Resolution dated 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
denied Omaas motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether Omaa violated the Canon of
Professional Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal and
Espinosas Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.

The Ruling of this Court

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution
of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void.2 The Court has
also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a
marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses
and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership,3 which is exactly
what Omaa did in this case.

In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,4 the Court cited a number of cases where the
lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as the contract in
this case, such as: notarizing a document between the spouses which
permitted the husband to take a concubine and allowed the wife to live with
another man, without opposition from each other;5 ratifying a document
entitled Legal Separation where the couple agreed to be separated from
each other mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations,
authorizing each other to remarry, and renouncing any action that they
might have against each other;6 preparing a document authorizing a married
couple who had been separated for nine years to marry again, renouncing
the right of action which each may have against the other;7 and preparing a
document declaring the conjugal partnership dissolved.8

We cannot accept Omaas allegation that it was her part-time office

staff who notarized the contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD
that Omaa herself notarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her
part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only showed Omaas negligence
in doing her notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally
responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve
himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries 9 or any
member of his staff.

We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a void
document, Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Omaa knew fully well that
the Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay has no legal effect and is against public
policy. Therefore, Omaa may be suspended from office as an attorney for
breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.10

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaa from the practice of law

for ONE YEAR. We REVOKE Atty. Omaas notarial commission, if still existing,
and SUSPEND her as a notary public for TWO YEARS.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaas personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all
chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 4958. April 3, 2003]

FIDEL D. AQUINO, complainant, vs. Atty. OSCAR

MANESE, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint[1] (in Tagalog) dated September 7, 1998

addressed to the Office of the President which forwarded it to the Office of
the Court Administrator, Fidel D. Aquino (complainant) of Pinasling, Gerona,
Tarlac charged Atty. Oscar Manese (respondent) with falsification of public
document for preparing and notarizing a Deed of Absolute Sale [2] dated
September 15, 1994 which could not have been executed and sworn to by
Lilia D. Cardona, one of the therein three vendors-signatories, she having
died on November 25, 1990[3] or four (4) years earlier.
Complainant alleges that, inter alia, he has since 1960 been tilling the
land subject of the Deed of Absolute Sale as tenant of the now deceased
owner thereof, Luis M. Cardona; in 1975, the spouses Antonio and Fe Perez
unlawfully took possession of the land, thus spawning the filing of a case that
reached the Court of Appeals which recognized him to be the lawful tenant;
[4]
and on September 15, 1994, without his knowledge, the Deed of Absolute
Sale was purportedly executed on even date by the three heirs of Luis
Cardona, including the already deceased Lilia Cardona, in favor of Ma. Cita C.
Perez, daughter of the spouses Perez, and was notarized by respondent.
Attached to the letter-complaint are the following documents:

(1) Investigation Report of the Department of Agrarian Reform dated August

20, 1996; (2) Memorandum of Regional Director Eugenio Bernardo to the
DAR Secretary dated 4 June 1996; (3) May 20, 1996 letter of OIC-PARO Teofilo
Inocencio to Atty. Epifanio Devero, Chief Regional Legal Division, DAR (4)
Questioned Documents Report No. 517-696 of the National Bureau of
Investigation; (5) Death Certificate of Lilia Cardona; (6) Deed of Absolute
Sale; (7) Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 30, 1988 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 12847-CAR; (8) Special Power of Attorney dated 27 December 1989
executed by Jose D. Cardona in favor of Fidel D. Aquino; (9) General Power of
Attorney executed by Luis Cardona in favor of Fidel D. Aquino; and (10)
Certification dated October 27, 1977 of the Department of Agrarian Reform.

By his Comment of January 4, 1999,[5] respondent asserted that

complainant has no personality to complain as he has neither a legal right or
claim over the land nor any personality to challenge the sale; even assuming
that Lilia Cardona was already dead at the time of the execution of the Deed
of Absolute Sale, no interested party had complained about it; as a Notary
Public, he is not expected to personally know every person who goes to him
for notarization of documents; and when he notarized the Deed of Absolute
Sale on September 15, 1994, he was only performing his duty as a notary
public.
By Resolution of February 24, 1999,[6] this Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. Despite notice, respondent failed to appear at any of the
hearings scheduled by the IBP, he pleading ill health and/or unavailability of
counsel.
On June 29, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XV-
2002-220[7] adopting the Investigating Commissioners Report that
respondent was gravely remiss in his obligation as notary public. The IBP
Board of Governors, however, modified the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner that respondents commission as Notary Public
be revoked and that [he] be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of two (2) years by recommending that [r]espondents commission as Notary
Public be SUSPENDED with disqualification for appointment as Notary Public
for a period of two (2) years.
The IBP Board of Governors Resolution, which is before this Court for final
action pursuant to Sec. 12 par. (b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, is well-
taken.
Respondents assertion that complainant lacks the personality to institute
the present complaint does not lie. Complainant being a tenant at the land
subject of the sale, his rights as such have been disturbed by the transfer of
ownership of the land.
In any event, proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys may, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, motu
proprio be taken by this Court or the IBP upon the verified complaint
of any person.
On the merits of the complaint.
The death on November 25, 1990 of Lilia Cardona is documented. [8] Her
Death Certificate shows so. The National Bureau of Investigation, which
made a comparative examination of her specimen signatures and that
appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale, found that the signature on the
latter and the specimen signatures were not written by one and the same
person.[9]
In the Acknowledgment in the deed, respondent affirmed that before him
personally appeared said vendors [including the late Lilia Cardona] whos (sic)
personal circumstances are shown above below their names and signatures,
all known to [him] and to [him] known to be the same individual (sic) who
executed th[e] instrument and acknowledged to [him] that the same is their
free act and voluntary deed.
The said acknowledgment notwithstanding, respondent asseverated in
his Comment to the letter-complaint that he is not expected to personally
know every person who goes to him for notarization of documents. Such
jaunty indifference betrays his deplorable failure to heed the importance of
the notarial act and observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of his duties as a notary public which include the ascertainment
that the persons who signed the document are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him.

The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be

overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It
is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document thus making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument.

For this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence
of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined. Hence a notary public should not notarize a document unless
the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed
and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of
what are stated therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the
notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the partys free
act and deed.[10] (Underscoring and emphasis supplied.)

By respondents reckless act of notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale

without ascertaining that the vendors-signatories thereto were the very
same persons who executed it and personally appeared before him to
attest to the contents and truth of what were stated therein, he has
undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents and he
thereby breached Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes, and Rule 1.01 thereof which
proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
WHEREFORE, for violation of the Notarial Law and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Oscar Maneses notarial
commission, if extant, is REVOKED and he is DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two (2) years.
Respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of law also for a period of
two (2) years, effective immediately. He is DIRECTED to report to this Court
his receipt of this Decision to enable it to determine when his suspension
shall have taken effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona,
JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. Nos. 5907 and 5942 July 21, 2006

ELSA L. MONDEJAR, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VIVIAN G. RUBIA, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By two separate complaints filed with the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), Elsa L. Mondejar (complainant) sought the disbarment of Atty. Vivian
G. Rubia (respondent) and the cancellation of her notarial commission for
allegedly committing deceitful acts and malpractice in violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

The facts which gave rise to the filing of the administrative complaints are as
follows:

Sometime in 2002, complainant charged Marilyn Carido (Marilyn) and her

common law husband Japanese national Yoshimi Nakayama (Nakayama)
before the Digos City Prosecutor's Office for violation of the Anti-Dummy
Law,1 claiming that the Bamiyan Group of Enterprises (Bamiyan) which was
capitalized at P15 million and which was engaged in, among other things,
money lending business and operation of miki and siopao factory was
actually owned by Nakayama but it was made to appear that Marilyn was the
owner.2

Marilyn, by her Counter-Affidavit dated November 6, 2002 which she filed

before the Prosecutor's Office, denied the charge, in support of which she
attached a Memorandum of Joint Venture Agreement3 (the document) forged
by her and Nakayama, acknowledged before respondent on January 9, 2001
but appearing to have been entered in respondent's notarial register for
2002 and bearing respondent's Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) No. issued in
2002. The document purported to show that Marilyn owned Bamiyan, albeit
its capital was provided by Nakayama.

Contending that the January 9, 2001 document did not exist before she filed
the criminal charge in 2002 before the Prosecutor's Office, complainant, who
was formerly an employee of Bamiyan, filed the first above captioned
administrative complaint against respondent, as well as criminal complaints
for falsification of public document and use of falsified public document
before the Prosecutor's Office also against respondent, together with Marilyn,
Nakayama, and the witnesses to the document Mona Liza Galvez and John
Doe.4

It appears that on April 20, 2001, respondent notarized a Deed of Absolute

Sale5 of a parcel of land situated in Digos City, purportedly executed by
Manuel Jose Lozada (Lozada) as vendor and Marilyn as vendee. Complainant
alleged that respondent falsified the document by forging the signature of
Lozada who has been staying in Maryland, U.S.A. since 1992.6 Hence,
spawned the second above-captioned administrative complaint.

After respondent submitted her Comment to which she attached her

November 18, 2002 Counter-Affidavit7 to the Affidavit-Complaint of Marilyn
charging her with falsification before the Prosecutor's Office, the
administrative complaints were referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days
from notice.8

Commissioner Doroteo Aguila, to whom the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline

assigned the cases, set them for mandatory conference on November 24,
2003. It turned out that complainant had died on September 15, 2003.
Complainant's husband Celso Mondejar had requested, however, that
consideration of the cases continue on the basis of documentary evidence
already submitted.9
In her Position Paper filed with the IBP, respondent argued that complainant
was neither a party nor a witness to the document as well as to the Deed of
Absolute Sale, hence, devoid of legal standing to question the authenticity
and due execution thereof.10 Besides, added respondent, complainant had
passed away.11

To her Position Paper respondent again attached her November 18, 2002
Counter-Affidavit which she filed with the Digos City Prosecutor's Office
wherein she explained that the discrepancies of dates appearing in the
document executed by Nakayama and Marilyn on January 9, 2001 came
about when the document was "revise[d] and amend[ed]" in 2002.12

After evaluation of the evidence of the parties, Investigating Commissioner

Aguila, by Report and Recommendation13 dated May 12, 2004, recommended
the dismissal of the second complainant (Administrative Case No. 5942)
relative to respondent's notarization of the Deed of Sale.

As for the first complaint (Administrative Case No. 5907) relative to the
discrepancies of dates appearing in the document, Commissioner Aguila
found respondent to have violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility reading:

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct,

and recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for One
Month.

Pertinent portions of Atty. Aguila's Report read:

[T]here is sufficient proof to discipline the respondent in Adm.

Case No. 5907. In the Memorandum of a Joint Venture Agreement,
Atty. Rubia stated in the acknowledgment portion thereof that the
parties personally appeared before her "on this 9th day of
January, 2001." But then this document . . .
was enteredin respondent's notarial register as Document No. 5707;
Page No. 1144; Book No 25; Series of 2002 [Annex "A-1," Petition]. It is
further pointed out that respondent's PTR Number as indicated in this
document is PTRNumber 4574844 that is likewise indicated as
being issued on January 3, 2002. On the other hand, the [Counter]
Affidavit of Marilyn Carido, which Atty. Rubia notarized . . . was
notarized on November 6, 2002 [Annex "B-2" of the Petition]. This
[counter] affidavit also indicates respondent's PTR Number
as 4574844 issued on January 3, 2002. It must be stressed that this is
the same Number indicated in the Memorandum of a Joint Venture
Agreement [notarized on January 9, 2001]. But then a Deed of
 Absolute Sale dated 28 March 2001 between one Leandro Prosia and
Jocelyn Canoy-Alson [Annex "D," Petition] that was also notarized by
respondent, indicates that her PTR for the year 2001 was PTR
No. 4320009 [p. 14, SC Records].

As already pointed out, the [January 9, 2001] Memorandum of a Joint

Venture Agreement indicates that it was entered
as Document No. 5707, Series of 2002 in respondent's notarial
register. On the other hand, the [November 6, 2002] Affidavit of
Marilyn Carido was entered as Document No. 2791, Series of 2002.
Since the [Counter] Affidavit was notarized [o]n 06 November
2002, it is illogical why the document number for the
Memorandum of a Joint Venture is greater (higher) than that of
the former since the latter was supposed to have been
notarized many months earlier, or specifically,
on 09 January 2001.

All of the foregoing show that the respondent effectively made an

untruthful declaration in a public document when she attested that the
Memorandum of a Joint Venture Agreement was acknowledged before
her on 09 January 2001 when evidence clearly shows
otherwise.14 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

By Resolution of July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors (BOG) adopted the
finding of the Investigating Commissioner's Report that respondent violated
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for making a false
declaration in a public document. It, however, modified the recommended
sanction in that, instead of suspension from the practice of law for One
Month, it merely WARNED respondent that a repetition of the same or similar
act in the future would be dealt with more severely.15

By Resolution of March 12, 2005, the BOG denied respondent's motion for
reconsideration.16

Hence, the elevation of the first administrative case to this Court by

respondent who reiterates her challenge to the standing of complainant's
husband in pursuing the cases.

Rule 139-B, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "[p]roceedings for
the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
upon the verified complaint of any person."

That an administrative complaint filed by any person against a lawyer may

be acted upon by this Court is settled. In re Almacen17 explains the raison
d'tre:
 . . . [D]isciplinary proceedings [against lawyers] are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by
the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence,
in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor. (Emphasis supplied)

Complainant's husband's pursuance of the cases was thus in order.

Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public

document, thus rendering the document admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity.18

Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are thus mandated to subscribe to

the sacred duties appertaining to their office, such duties being dictated by
public policy impressed with public interest.19 A graver responsibility is
placed upon them by reason of their solemn oath to obey the laws, to do no
falsehood or consent to the doing of any,20 and to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangement,21 and other duties and responsibilities.

In exculpation, respondent, in her November 18, 2002 Counter Affidavit,

proffered the following explanation, quoted verbatim:

xxxx

5. That way back in the early 2001, specifically in January of the year
2001, Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama, had me prepared [sic]
a document in preparation of the business enterprises to be
established by Marilyn A. Carido, wherein Yoshimi Nakayama, will grant
the former CAPITAL for the establishment of the proposed enterprises,
the main purpose of which is to secure the future of Marilyn A. Carido,
their children, and the family of Marilyn A. Carido. A copy of the said
agreement is hereto attached as ANNEX "A," with its corresponding
submarking;
xxxx

7. That in fact, on May 10, 2002, Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi

Nakayama came to my office, for two (2) purposes: First, Yoshimi
Nakayama had me prepared a document which would be an
ADDENDUM to their original transaction in January 2001, wherein
Yoshimi Nakayama gave Marilyn A. Carido additional capital to
augment the operation of the "Bamiyan Superstore;" Second, that
Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama wanted me to REVISE and
AMEND the original agreement made by them in January, 2001,
because Yoshimi Nakayama wanted to add certain conditions to the
original agreement, specifically referring to the flow of money unto the
coffers of the enterprises of Marilyn A. Carido, and as to the fact of the
technical assistance that he is giving Marilyn A. Carido, because, at
that time, there were already many problems in the operations of the
Bamiyan enterprises. That, for the first purpose, I prepared the
ADDENDUM to the original agreement between Marilyn A. Carido and
Yoshimi Nakayama. A copy of the said addendum is hereto attached
and made another part hereof as ANNEX "C," with its corresponding
submarking;

8. That for the second purpose referring to the REVISION or

AMENDMENT of the original transaction, I told both Marilyn A.
Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama, to submit to me all the copies of the
original agreement in their possession, and I will just make another
instrument which would supplant or replace the old one while
incorporating the needed conditions suggested by Yoshimi Nakayama.
That I told them that I will be making a new and/or revised
agreement, but I will retain the original date of the first
transaction made in January, 2001, because anyway, I have not
yet submitted the documents which I have notarized for the
year 2001, since my notarial commission will expire yet on the
last day of December, 2002;

9. That, therefore, on the same date, Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi

Nakayama submitted to me all the copies in their possession of the old
agreement, and I proceeded to have another one encoded in my
computer by my secretary, Mona Liza Galvez, incorporating the needed
additional conditions in accordance with the wishes of my said clients.
A copy of the said REVISED agreement is hereto attached as ANNEX
"D," with the its corresponding submarkings;

10. That in fact, on November 6, 2002, I attached a copy of the revised

agreement on the COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT of Marilyn A. Carido, in the case
for a violation of the Anti-Dummy law filed against her by an assumed
witness, Elsa Mondejar who is also the assumed complainant in this
 instant investigation; That, however, while I was going over the
documents of Marilyn A. Carido, I noticed that the revised agreement
referred to above, although retained the original date of the original
one as January, 2001, mistakenly or erroneously bear the series of
2002 in my notarial register, and likewise bear my new PROFESSIONAL
TAX RECEIPT (PTR) NO. and IBP No. for the year 2002;

11. That even before then, I already instructed my secretary to make

the necessary corrections in the said revised document because the
accountant and administrator of the Bamiyan, Felicisima Abo, had
already brought the erroneous entries to my attention when all the
legal papers of Marilyn A. Carido were turned over to her profession, as
early as June, 2002. That, however, because of my workload, I forgot to
remind my secretary about the corrections that she should made
therein. However, I already told Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi
Nakayama, that the corrections are proper because I will just make the
necessary initials on the corrected portions;

12. That, again because of the fact, that I had to arrange certain
matters on the labor aspects of all the Bamiyan enterprises, because
at these times, both Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama, were in
Japan, it was only after I filed the counter-affidavit of Marilyn A. Carido,
in the said Anti-Dummy case, that I was reminded on the said
erroneous entries. Therefore, on November 8, 2002, I had Mona Liza
Galvez, my secretary, make the necessary corrections; A copy of
the corrected revised agreement is hereto attached as ANNEX "E," with
the corresponding submarkings; as well as copies of the memos that I
had issued in behalf of my principal, Marilyn A. Carido, for the
Bamiyan, are likewise hereto attached as ANNEXES "F" TO "I,"
respectively;

x x x x22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In sum, respondent claimed that the document was forged on January 9,

2001 but she made a "new and/or revised agreement" in 2002 to incorporate
additional conditions thereto, retaining, however, its original date January
9, 2001; that on noticing that the document "mistakenly or erroneously
[b]ore the series of 2002 in [her] notarial register and likewise b[ore] her new
. . . [PTR] No. and IBP No. for the year 2002," she instructed her secretary to
make the necessary corrections, but on account of her workload, she forgot
to remind her secretary to comply therewith; and that it was only after
Marilyn's Counter-Affidavit of November 6, 2002 was filed before the
Prosecutor's Office that she (respondent) was reminded of the erroneous
entries, hence, she had her secretary make the corrections on November 8,
2002.
And as reflected in her above-quoted portions of her Counter-Affidavit,
respondent further claimed that she retained the original January 9, 2001
date of the document since the "documents which [she] notarized for the
year 2001" were not yet submitted as her notarial commission was to expire
yet on the last day of December, 2002.23

Respondent's explanation does not impress as it betrays her guilt.

The document clearly appears to have been ante-dated in an attempt to

exculpate Marilyn from the Anti-Dummy charge against her in 2002.

The document was allegedly notarized on January 9, 2001 but a new

revised/amended document was made in 2002 bearing the original date of
execution/acknowledgment. If that were so, how could an error have been
committed regarding the other year 2001 original entries in the notarial
register, when the purported new document was to retain the original
January 9, 2001 date as it would merely input additional conditions thereto?
The above-quoted discussion by the Investigating IBP Commissioner of why
he discredited respondent's explanation behind the conflicting dates
appearing in the document is thus well-taken.

As for respondent's submission that corrections could be subsequently made

on the document, she not having anyway submitted the documents she
notarized for the year 2001 since her notarial commission was still to expire
in 2002, the same does not lie.

One of the grounds for revocation of notarial commission is the failure of the
notary to send a copy of notarized documents to the proper clerk of court or
Executive Judge (under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice) within the first
ten (10) days of the month next following.24

In fine, the recommendation of Investigating IBP Commissioner Aguila merits

this Court's approval.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Vivian Rubia, for violation of Rule 1.01 of

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is suspended for One (1)
Month, and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.

Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondent's personal records in

this Court.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing*, Chairman, Carpio, Tinga, Velasco, Jr., J.J., concur.

24
Vide: Notarial Law (Revised Administrative Code, Chapter II, Title IV),
Section 249(c) as well as the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule XI,
Section 1(b)(3).
 EN BANC

JUDGE LILY LYDIA A.C. No. 7036

A. LAQUINDANUM, Complainant June 29, 2009

v.

ATTY. NESTOR Q. QUINTANA, Respondent.

x------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

This administrative case against Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana (Atty. Quintana)

stemmed from a letter[1] addressed to the Court filed by Executive Judge Lily
Lydia A. Laquindanum (Judge Laquindanum) of the Regional Trial Court of
Midsayap, Cotabato requesting that proper disciplinary action be imposed on
him for performing notarial functions in Midsayap, Cotabato, which is beyond
the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued his notarial
commission, and for allowing his wife to do notarial acts in his absence.

In her letter, Judge Laquindanum alleged that pursuant to A.M. No. 03-
8-02-SC, executive judges are required to closely monitor the activities of
notaries public within the territorial bounds of their jurisdiction and to see to
it that notaries public shall not extend notarial functions beyond the limits of
their authority. Hence, she wrote a letter[2] to Atty. Quintana directing him to
stop notarizing documents within the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato (which is outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the commissioning court that issued his notarial commission for Cotabato
City and the Province of Maguindanao) since certain documents [3] notarized
by him had been reaching her office.

However, despite such directive, respondent continuously performed

notarial functions in Midsayap, Cotabato as evidenced by: (1) the Affidavit of
Loss of ATM Card[4] executed by Kristine C. Guro; and (2) the Affidavit of Loss
of Drivers License[5] executed by Elenita D. Ballentes.

Under Sec. 11, Rule III[6] of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Atty.
Quintana could not extend his notarial acts beyond Cotabato City and
the Province of Maguindanaobecause Midsayap, Cotabato is not part
of Cotabato City or the Province of Maguindanao. Midsayap is part of
the Province of Cotabato. The City within
the province of Cotabato is Kidapawan City, and not Cotabato City.
Judge Laquindanum also alleged that, upon further investigation of the
matter, it was discovered that it was Atty. Quintanas wife who performed
notarial acts whenever he was out of the office as attested to by the Joint
Affidavit[7] executed by Kristine C. Guro and Elenita D. Ballentes.

In a Resolution dated February 14, 2006, [8] we required Atty. Quintana

to comment on the letter of Judge Laquindanum.

In his Response,[9] Atty. Quintana alleged that he filed a petition for

notarial commission before Branch 18, Regional Trial Court, Midsayap,
Cotabato. However, the same was not acted upon by Judge Laquindanum for
three weeks. He alleged that the reason for Judge Laquindanums inaction
was that she questioned his affiliation with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Cotabato City Chapter, and required him to be a member of
IBP Kidapawan City Chapter and to obtain a Certification of Payments from
the latter chapter. Because of this, he opted to withdraw his petition. After he
withdrew his petition, he claimed that Judge Laquindanum sent a clerk from
her office to ask him to return his petition, but he did not oblige because at
that time he already had a Commission for Notary Public [10] issued by
Executive Judge Reno E. Concha of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
14, Cotabato City.

Atty. Quintana lamented that he was singled out by Judge

Laquindanum, because the latter immediately issued notarial commissions to
other lawyers without asking for so many requirements. However, when it
came to him, Judge Laquindanum even tracked down all his pleadings;
communicated with his clients; and disseminated information through
letters, pronouncements, and directives to court clerks and other lawyers to
humiliate him and be ostracized by fellow lawyers.

Atty. Quintana argued that he subscribed documents in his office at

Midsayap, Cotabato; and Midsayap is part of the Province of Cotabato. He
contended that he did not violate any provision of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, because he was equipped with a notarial commission. He
maintained that he did not act outside the province of Cotabato since
Midsayap, Cotabato, where he practices his legal profession and subscribes
documents, is part of the province of Cotabato. He claimed that as a lawyer
of good moral standing, he could practice his legal profession in the
entire Philippines.

Atty. Quintana further argued that Judge Laquindanum had no

authority to issue such directive, because only Executive Judge Reno E.
Concha, who issued his notarial commission, and the Supreme Court could
prohibit him from notarizing in the Province of Cotabato.

In a Resolution dated March 21, 2006, [11] we referred this case to the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

In the February 28, 2007 Hearing[12] before the OBC presided by Atty.
Ma. Crisitina B. Layusa (Hearing Officer), Judge Laquindanum presented a
Deed of Donation,[13] which was notarized by Atty. Quintana in 2004.
[14]
Honorata Rosil appears as one of the signatories of the document as the
donors wife. However, Honorata Rosil died on March 12, 2003, as shown by
the Certificate of Death[15] issued by the Civil Registrar of Ibohon, Cotabato.

Judge Laquindanum testified that Atty. Quintana continued to notarize

documents in the years 2006 to 2007 despite the fact that his commission as
notary public for and in the Province of Maguindanao and Cotabato City had
already expired on December 31, 2005, and he had not renewed the same.
[16]
To support her claim, Judge Laquindanum presented the following: (1)
Affidavit of Loss [of] Title[17] executed by Betty G. Granada with subscription
dated April 8, 2006 at Cotabato City; (2) Certificate of Candidacy[18] of Mr.
Elias Diosanta Arabis with subscription dated July 18, 2006; (3) Affidavit of
Loss [of] Drivers License[19] executed by Anecito C. Bernabe with subscription
dated February 20, 2007 at Midsayap, Cotabato; and (4) Affidavit of
Loss[20] executed by Santos V. Magbanua with subscription dated February
22, 2007 at Midsayap, Cotabato.

For his part, Atty. Quintana admitted that all the signatures appearing
in the documents marked as exhibits of Judge Laquindanum were his except
for the following: (1) Affidavit of Loss of ATM Card [21] executed by Kristine C.
Guro; and (2) Affidavit of Loss of Drivers License [22] executed by Elenita D.
Ballentes; and (3) Affidavit of Loss [23] executed by Santos V. Magbanua. He
explained that those documents were signed by his wife and were the result
of an entrapment operation of Judge Laquindanum: to let somebody bring
and have them notarized by his wife, when they knew that his wife is not a
lawyer. He also denied the he authorized his wife to notarize
documents. According to him, he slapped his wife and told her to stop doing
it as it would ruin his profession.

Atty. Quintana also claimed that Judge Laquindanum did not act on his
petition, because he did not comply with her requirements for him to transfer
his membership to the Kidapawan Chapter, wherein her sister, Atty. Aglepa,
is the IBP President.

On the one hand, Judge Laquindanum explained that she was only
performing her responsibility and had nothing against Atty. Quintana. The
reason why she did not act on his petition was that he had not paid his IBP
dues,[24] which is a requirement before a notarial commission may be
granted. She told his wife to secure a certification of payment from the IBP,
but she did not return.

This was denied by Atty. Quintana, who claimed that he enclosed in his
Response the certification of good standing and payments of his IBP
dues. However, when the same was examined, there were no documents
attached thereto. Due to oversight, Atty. Quintana prayed that he be given
time to send them later which was granted by the Hearing Officer.

Finally, Atty. Quintana asked for forgiveness for what he had done and
promised not to repeat the same. He also asked that he be given another
chance and not be divested of his privilege to notarize, as it was the only
bread and butter of his family.
 On March 5, 2007, Atty. Quintana submitted to the OBC the
documents[25] issued by the IBP Cotabato City Chapter to prove that he had
paid his IBP dues.

In a Manifestation[26] dated March 9, 2007, Judge Laquindanum

submitted a Certification[27] and its entries show that Atty. Quintana paid his
IBP dues for the year 2005 only on January 9, 2006 per Official Receipt (O.R.)
No. 610381. Likewise, the arrears of his IBP dues for the years 1993, 1995,
1996, and 1998 to 2003 were also paid only on January 9, 2006 per O.R. No.
610387. Hence, when he filed his petition for notarial commission in 2004, he
had not yet completely paid his IBP dues.

In its Report and Recommendation,[28] the OBC recommended that Atty.

Quintana be disqualified from being appointed as a notary public for two (2)
years; and that if his notarial commission still exists, the same should be
revoked for two (2) years. The OBC found the defenses and arguments raised
by Atty. Quintana to be without merit, viz:

Apparently, respondent has extended his notarial acts in

Midsayap and Kabacan, Cotabato, which is already outside his
territorial jurisdiction to perform as Notary Public.

Section 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides,

thus:
 Jurisdiction and Term A person
commissioned as notary public may perform
notarial acts in any place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a
period of two (2) years commencing the first
day of January of the year in which the
commissioning court is made, unless earlier
revoked [or] the notary public has resigned
under these Rules and the Rules of Court.

Under the rule[,] respondent may perform his notarial acts

within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning Executive
Judge Concha, which is in Cotabato City and the [P]rovince of
Maguindanao only. But definitely he cannot extend his
commission as notary public in Midsayap or Kabacan and in any
place of the province of Cotabato as he is not commissioned
thereat to do such act. Midsayap and Kabacan are not part of
either Cotabato City or [P]rovince of Maguindanao but part of
the province of North Cotabato. Thus, the claim of respondent
that he can exercise his notarial commission in Midsayap,
Cotabato because Cotabato City is part of
the province of Cotabato is absolutely devoid of merit.

xxxx

Further, evidence on record also shows that there are

several documents which the respondents wife has herself
notarized. Respondent justifies that he cannot be blamed for the
act of his wife as he did not authorize the latter to notarize
documents in his absence. According to him[,] he even scolded
and told his wife not to do it anymore as it would affect his
profession.

In the case of Lingan v. Calubaquib et al., Adm. Case No.

5377, June 15, 2006 the Court held, thus:
 A notary public is personally accountable
for all entries in his notarial register; He
cannot relieve himself of this responsibility by
passing the buck to their (sic) secretaries

A person who is commissioned as a notary public takes full

responsibility for all the entries in his notarial
register. Respondent cannot take refuge claiming that it was his
wifes act and that he did not authorize his wife to notarize
documents. He is personally accountable for the activities in his
office as well as the acts of his personnel including his wife, who
acts as his secretary.

Likewise, evidence reveals that respondent notarized in

2004 a Deed of Donation (Rollo, p. 79) wherein, (sic) Honorata
Rosel (Honorata Rosil) one of the affiants therein, was already
dead at the time of notarization as shown in a Certificate of
Death (Rollo, p.80) issued by the Civil Registrar General of
Libungan, Cotabato.

Sec. 2, (b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice

provides, thus[:]

A person shall not perform a notarial act if the

person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document (1) is not in the notarys presence personally at
the time of the notarization; and (2) is not personally
known to the notary public through competent evidence
of identity as defined by these Rules.

Clearly, in notarizing a Deed of Donation without even

determining the presence or qualifications of affiants therein,
respondent only shows his gross negligence and ignorance of the
provisions of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

xxxx
 Furthermore, respondent claims that he, being a lawyer in
good standing, has the right to practice his profession including
notarial acts in the entire Philippines. This statement is barren of
merit.

While it is true that lawyers in good standing are allowed to

engage in the practice of law in the Philippines.(sic) However, not
every lawyer even in good standing can perform notarial
functions without having been commissioned as notary public as
specifically provided for under the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. He must have submitted himself to the commissioning
court by filing his petition for issuance of his notarial (sic)
Notarial Practice. The commissioning court may or may not grant
the said petition if in his sound discretion the petitioner does not
meet the required qualifications for [a] Notary Public. Since
respondent herein did not submit himself to the procedural rules
for the issuance of the notarial commission, he has no reason at
all to claim that he can perform notarial act[s] in the entire
country for lack of authority to do so.

Likewise, contrary to the belief of respondent, complainant

being the commissioning court in Midsayap, Cotabato has the
authority under Rule XI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice to
monitor the duties and responsibilities including liabilities, if any,
of a notary public commissioned or those performing notarial
acts without authority in her territorial jurisdiction.[29]

We adopt the findings of the OBC. However, we find the penalty of

suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months and revocation and
suspension of Atty. Quintana's notarial commission for two (2) years more
appropriate considering the gravity and number of his offenses.

After a careful review of the records and evidence, there is no doubt

that Atty. Quintana violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code
of Professional Responsibility when he committed the following acts: (1) he
notarized documents outside the area of his commission as a notary public;
(2) he performed notarial acts with an expired commission; (3) he let his wife
notarize documents in his absence; and (4) he notarized a document where
one of the signatories therein was already dead at that time.

The act of notarizing documents outside ones area of commission is

not to be taken lightly. Aside from being a violation of Sec. 11 of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice, it also partakes of malpractice of law and
falsification.[30] Notarizing documents with an expired commission is a
violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. Since the public is deceived into believing that he
has been duly commissioned, it also amounts to indulging in deliberate
falsehood, which the lawyer's oath proscribes. [31] Notarizing documents
without the presence of the signatory to the document is a violation of Sec.
2(b)(1), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, [32] Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and the lawyers oath which
unconditionally requires lawyers not to do or declare any falsehood. Finally,
Atty. Quintana is personally accountable for the documents that he admitted
were signed by his wife. He cannot relieve himself of liability by passing the
blame to his wife. He is, thus, guilty of violating Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly
assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

All told, Atty. Quintana fell miserably short of his obligation under
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs every
lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
That Atty. Quintana relies on his notarial commission as the sole source of
income for his family will not serve to lessen the penalty that should be
imposed on him. On the contrary, we feel that he should be reminded that a
notarial commission should not be treated as a money-making venture. It is a
privilege granted only to those who are qualified to perform duties imbued
with public interest. As we have declared on several occasions, notarization
is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act
as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that
those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing
upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must
be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document, making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof.[33]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the notarial commission of Atty. Nestor Q.

Quintana, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from
being commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is also
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective
immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be
dealt with even more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his
receipt of this Decision to enable this Court to determine when his
suspension shall take effect.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of

respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
 Manila

THIRD DIVISION

ADELAIDA MENESES G.R. No. 172196

(deceased), substituted by
her heir MARILYN M. Present:
CARBONEL-GARCIA,
Petitioner, VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
ABAD,
- versus - MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:
ROSARIO G. VENTUROZO,
Respondent. October 19, 2011

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of the Court of Appeals

Decision dated October 27, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78217 and its Resolution
dated April 5, 2006, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals Decision reversed and set aside the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 40 in Civil Case No. D-
9040, as the appellate court declared respondent Rosario G. Venturozo the
owner of the land in dispute, and ordered petitioner Adelaida Meneses to
vacate and surrender her possession thereof to respondent.
 The facts are as follows:

On June 8, 1988, plaintiff Rosario G. Venturozo, respondent herein, filed a

Complaint[2] for ownership, possession x x x and damages in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City against defendant Adelaida Meneses,
petitioner herein, alleging that she (plaintiff) is the absolute owner of an
untitled coconut land, containing an area of 2,109 square meters, situated at
Embarcadero, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, and declared under Tax Declaration
No. 239. Plaintiff alleged that she purchased the property from the spouses
Basilio de Guzman and Crescencia Abad on January 31, 1973 as evidenced
by a Deed of Absolute Sale, [3] and that the vendors, in turn, purchased the
property from defendant as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale [4] dated
June 20, 1966. Plaintiff alleged that she has been in possession of the land
until May 1983 when defendant with some armed men grabbed possession
of the land and refused to vacate despite repeated demands prompting her
to engage the services of counsel. Plaintiff prayed that after preliminary
hearing, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued; and that after
hearing, a decision be rendered declaring her as the owner of the property in
dispute, ordering defendant to vacate the property in question and to pay
her P5,000.00 as attorneys fees; P1,000.00 as litigation
expenses; P10,000.00 as damages and to pay the costs of suit.

In her Answer,[5] defendant Adelaida Meneses stated that plaintiff is the

daughter of Basilio de Guzman, the vendee in the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated June 20, 1966 that was purportedly executed by her (defendant)
covering the subject property. Defendant alleged that she never signed any
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966, and that the said deed is a
forgery. Defendant also alleged that she never appeared before any notary
public, and she did not obtain a residence certificate; hence, her alleged sale
of the subject property to Basilio de Guzman is null and void ab
initio. Consequently, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 31, 1973,
executed by Basilio de Guzman in favor of plaintiff, covering the subject
property, is likewise null and void. Defendant stated that she acquired the
subject property from her deceased father and she has been in possession of
the land for more than 30 years in the concept of owner. Plaintiffs allegation
that she (defendant) forcibly took possession of the land is a falsehood.
Defendant stated that this is the fourth case the plaintiff filed against her
concerning the land in question.

In her Counterclaim, defendant stated that in view of the nullity of the

falsified Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject property, and the fact that
plaintiff and her father Basilio de Guzman had never been in actual
possession of the property, plaintiff is under legal obligation to execute a
deed of reconveyance over the said property in her favor.

The issue before the trial court was whether the sale made by
defendant Adelaida Meneses in favor of plaintiffs father, Basilio de Guzman,
was valid.[6]

On July 18, 1991, the RTC of Dagupan City, Branch 40 (trial court)
rendered a Decision in favor of defendant Adelaida Meneses. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Declaring the Deed of Absolute and Definite Sale dated

June 20, 1966 (Exhibit B) and the Deed of Absolute and
Definite Sale dated January 31, 1973 (Exhibit A) null and
void ab initio;

2) Declaring the defendant Adelaida Meneses as the owner

of the property in question;

3) Ordering the plaintiff Rosario G. Venturozo to execute a

Deed of Reconveyance in favor of the defendant Adelaida
 Meneses over the property in question described in
paragraph 2 of the complaint;

4) Ordering the plaintiff to pay to the

defendant P10,000.00 as damages; and P1,000.00, as
litigation expenses.

SO ORDERED.[7]

The trial court found that defendant Adelaida Meneses inherited the
land in dispute from her father, Domingo Meneses; that she did not sell her
property to Basilio de Guzman in 1966; and that the signature of Adelaida
Meneses on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 is a forgery. The
trial court stated that the signature of Adelaida Meneses, as appearing on
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966, is very much different from
her specimen signatures and those appearing in the records of Civil Case
No. 1096 in the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan. It held that since there
was no valid transfer of the property by Adelaida Meneses to Basilio de
Guzman, the conveyance of the same property in 1973 by Basilio de
Guzman to his daughter, plaintiff Rosario G. Venturozo, was also invalid. The
trial court stated that the claim of plaintiff Rosario G. Venturozo, that her
parents, Spouses Basilio and Crescencia de Guzman, purchased from
defendant Adelaida Meneses the subject property in 1966, is negated by
defendants continued possession of the land and she gathered the products
therefrom.

Plaintiff appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.

On October 27, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision

reversing the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the
appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City (Branch 40) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new one rendered declaring plaintiff-appellant the owner
 of the subject land and ordering defendant-appellee to vacate
and surrender possession thereof to the former.[8]

The Court of Appeals stated that appellee Adelaida Meneses failed to

prove by clear and convincing evidence that her signature on the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966was a forgery. Instead, she admitted on
direct examination that her signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was
genuine, thus:

Q. I am showing to you Exhibit 6 and Exhibit A for the plaintiff a

Deed of Absolute Sale o[f] Real Property of one (1) Adelaida
Meneses in favor of Basilio de Guzman. Will you examine this
if you know this Deed of Absolute Sale?
A. I do not know this document, sir.

Q. There is a signature over the name of the vendor Adelaida

Meneses which was previously marked as Exhibit 6-a and
Exhibit A-1 for the plaintiff, will you examine this signature, if
do you (sic) know this signature?
A. This is my signature, sir.[9]

According to the Court of Appeals, such admission is binding on her,

there being no showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was made.[10]

The Court of Appeals also stated that mere variance of signatures

cannot be considered as conclusive proof that the same were forged, as
forgery cannot be presumed.[11]Appellee Adelaida Meneses should have
produced specimen signatures appearing on documents executed in or about
the year 1966 for a better comparison and analysis.[12]
The Court of Appeals held that a notarized document, like the
questioned Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966, has in its favor the
presumption of regularity, and to overcome the same, there must be
evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant;
otherwise, the document should be upheld.[13] Moreover, Atty. Abelardo G.
Biala the notary public before whom the questioned Deed of Sale was
acknowledged testified and confirmed its genuineness and due execution,
particularly the signature in question. The appellate court stated that as
against appellee Adelaida Meneses version, Atty. Bialas testimony, that
appellee appeared before him and acknowledged that the questioned deed
was her free and voluntary act, is more credible. The testimony of a notary
public enjoys greater credence than that of an ordinary witness.[14]

The Court of Appeals held that appellee Adelaida Meneses failed to

present clear and convincing evidence to overcome the evidentiary force of
the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 1966, which appears on its
face to have been executed with all the formalities required by law.

Adelaida Meneses motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of

merit by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution[15] dated April 5, 2006.

Hence, Adelaida Meneses, substituted by her heir, filed this petition

raising this lone issue:

I
WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,
WHICH REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, IS IN KEEPING WITH BOTH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.[16]

Petitioner contends that her statement, made during the course of her
testimony in the trial court, was taken out of context by respondent to be
used merely as an argumentative point. The examining lawyer used the
words, Do you know this signature? viz.:

Q. I am showing to you Exhibit 6 and Exhibit A for the plaintiff a

Deed of Absolute Sale o[f] Real Property of one (1) Adelaida
Meneses in favor of Basilio de Guzman. Will you examine this
if you know this Deed of Absolute Sale?
A. I do not know this document, sir.
 Q. There is a signature over the name of the vendor Adelaida
Meneses which was previously marked as Exhibit 6-a and
Exhibit A-1 for the plaintiff, will you examine this
signature, if do you (sic) know this signature?
A. This is my signature, sir.[17]

Petitioner contends that in the above-quoted transcript of stenographic

notes, she was merely asked if she was cognizant of such a signature as hers
or whether the signature appearing on the questioned document was similar
to that of her signature, and not if she was the one who indeed affixed such
signature on the said deed of sale.

She avers that the general rule that a judicial admission is conclusive
upon the party invoking it and does not require proof admits of two
exceptions: (1) when it is shown that the admission was made through
palpable mistake; and (2) when it is shown that no such admission was in
fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by
denying that he made such an admission. For instance, if a party invokes an
admission by an adverse party, but cites the admission out of context, then
the one making the admission may show that he made no such admission, or
that his admission was taken out of context. [18] This may be interpreted as to
mean not in the sense in which the admission is made to appear.[19]
Petitioner also contends that a comparison of the signature on the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 and her specimen signatures, as
well as her genuine signature on pleadings, were made by the trial court, and
it ruled that her signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20,
1966 was a forgery. She submits that the trial courts evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect,
[20]
and the appellate court should have given weight to the trial courts
findings that her signature on the said Deed of Absolute Sale was a forgery.

The petition is meritorious.

 The rule is that the jurisdiction of the Court over appealed cases from
the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law
allegedly committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are
deemed conclusive.[21] Thus, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and
weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings
below.[22] However, this rule admits exceptions, [23] such as when the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings and conclusions of
the trial court[24] like in this case.

The necessity of a public document for contracts which transmit or

extinguish real rights over immovable property, as mandated by Article 1358
of the Civil Code,[25] is only for convenience; it is not essential for validity or
enforceability.[26] As notarized documents, Deeds of Absolute Sale carry
evidentiary weight conferred upon them with respect to their due
execution[27] and enjoy the presumption of regularity which may only be
rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all
controversy as to falsity.[28] The presumptions that attach to notarized
documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the
notarization was regular.[29] A defective notarization will strip the document of
its public character and reduce it to a private instrument. [30] Consequently,
when there is a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and
convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-notarized
document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such
document is preponderance of evidence.[31]

In this case, it should be pointed out that contrary to the finding of the
Court of Appeals, the Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1966 did not comply with
the formalities required by law, specifically Act No. 496, [32] otherwise known
as The Land Registration Act, which took effect on January 1, 1903, as
Section 127 of the Act provides:

FORMS
Section 127. Deeds, conveyances, mortgages, leases,
releases, and discharges affecting lands, whether registered
under this Act or unregistered, shall be sufficient in law
when made substantially in accordance with the following
forms, and shall be as effective to convey, encumber, lease,
release, discharge, or bind the lands as though made in
accordance with the more prolix form heretofore in
use: Provided, That every such instrument shall be signed
by the person or persons executing the same, in the
presence of two witnesses, who shall sign the instrument
as witnesses to the execution thereof, and shall be
acknowledged to be his or their free act and deed by the
person or persons executing the same, before the judge of a
court of record or clerk of a court of record, or a notary
public, or a justice of the peace, who shall certify to such
acknowledgment x x x.[33]

In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966, the Notary Public
signed his name as one of the two witnesses to the execution of the said
deed; hence, there was actually only one witness thereto. Moreover, the
residence certificate of petitioner was issued to petitioner and then it was
given to the Notary Public the day after the execution of the deed of sale and
notarization; hence, the number of petitioners residence certificate and the
date of issuance (June 21, 1966) thereof was written on the Deed of Absolute
Sale by the Notary Public on June 21, 1966, after the execution and
notarization of the said deed on June 20, 1966. [34] Considering the defect in
the notarization, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966cannot be
considered a public document, but only a private document,[35] and the
evidentiary standard of its validity shall be based on preponderance of
evidence.
 Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that before any
private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) by anyone who saw
the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of
the signature or handwriting of the maker.

In regard to the genuineness of petitioners signature appearing on the

Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966, [36] the Court agrees with the trial
court that her signature therein is very much different from her specimen
signatures[37] and those appearing in the pleadings [38] of other cases filed
against her, even considering the difference of 17 years when the specimen
signatures were made. Hence, the Court rules that petitioners signature on
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 is a forgery.

The Court agrees with petitioner that her admission was taken out of
context, considering that in her Answer[39] to the Complaint, she stated that
the alleged Deed of Sale purportedly executed by her in favor of Basilio de
Guzman is a forgery; that she never signed the said Deed of Sale; that she
did not appear personally before the Notary Public; and that she did not
secure the residence certificate mentioned in the said Deed of Sale. She also
testified that she never sold her land to Basilio de Guzman; [40] that she never
met the Notary Public, Attorney Abelardo Biala, [41] and that she did not meet
Basilio de Guzman on June 20, 1966. [42] The trial court found petitioner and
her testimony to be credible, and declared the Deed of Sale dated June 20,
1966 null and void ab initio. These circumstances negate the said admission.

The Court finds the Notary Publics testimony self-serving and

unreliable, because although he testified that petitioner was the one who
submitted her residence certificate to him on June 21, 1966, [43] the next day
after the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on June 20, 1966, Crescencia
de Guzman, respondents mother, testified that she and her husband got the
residence certificate from petitioner and gave it to the Notary Public on June
21, 1966.[44] Thus, it is doubtful whether the Notary Public really knew the
identity of the vendor who signed the Deed of Absolute Sale [45] dated June
20, 1966.

The Court notes that the trial court found petitioner and her testimony
to be credible. It is a well-settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the
credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect. [46] Having observed
the deportment of witnesses during the trial, the trial judge is in a better
position to determine the issue of credibility.[47]

In fine, the preponderance of evidence is with petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals

Decision dated October 27, 2005 and its Resolution dated April 5, 2006 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 78217 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40 in Civil Case No. D-9040
is hereby REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

ZENAIDA B. GONZALES, A.C. No. 6713

Petitioner,

- versus - Promulgated:

ATTY. NARCISO PADIERNOS, December 8, 2008

Respondent.

x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

BRION, J.:
 Before the Court is the Complaint for Disbarment of

Atty. Narciso Padiernos (respondent) filed on May 12, 2003 by Ms. Zenaida B.

Gonzales (complainant) with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan

conducted the fact-finding investigation on the complaint.

Commissioner San Juan submitted a Report and

Recommendation[1] dated September 10, 2004 to the IBP Board of Governors

who approved this Report and Recommendation in a resolution

dated November 4, 2004.

In a letter[2] dated March 14, 2005, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio

A. Vinluan transmitted to the Office of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.

(retired) a Notice of Resolution[3] and the records of the case.

The Factual Background

The complainant alleged in her complaint for disbarment that on three

(3) separate occasions the respondent notarized the following documents:

(1) a Deed of Absolute Sale[4]dated July 16, 1979 which disposed of her

property in Jaen, Nueva Ecija in favor of Asterio, Estrella and Rodolfo, all

surnamed Gonzales; (2) a Subdivision Agreement [5] dated September 7, 1988

which subdivided her property among the same persons; and (3) an affidavit

of Non-Tenancy[6] dated March 3, 1988 which certified that her property was

not tenanted. All three documents were purportedly signed and executed by

complainant. All three documents carried forged signatures and falsely

certified that the complainant personally appeared before the respondent and

that she was known to me (the respondent) to be the same person who

executed the foregoing and acknowledged to me that the same is her own

free act and voluntary deed. The complainant claimed that she never

appeared before respondent on the dates the documents were notarized

because she was then in the United States.

The respondent filed his Answer[7] on June 16, 2003. He admitted that

he notarized the three documents, but denied the unfounded and malicious

imputation that the three documents contained the complainant's forged

signatures. On the false certification aspect, he countered that with the same

or identical facts obtained in the instant case, the Highest Tribunal, the

Honorable Supreme Court had this to say That it is not necessary to know the

signatories personally, provided he or she or they signed in the presence of

the Notary, alleging that they are the same persons who signed the names.
 On October 13, 2003, the respondent moved to dismiss the complaint

for lack of verification and notification of the date of hearing.[8]

On December 19, 2003, complainant amended her complaint. [9] This

time, she charged respondent with gross negligence and failure to exercise

the care required by law in the performance of his duties as a notary public,

resulting in the loss of her property in Jaen, Nueva Ecija, a 141,497 square

meters of mango land covered by TCT NT-29578. The complainant claimed

that because of the respondents negligent acts, title to her property was

transferred to Asterio Gonzales, Estrella Gonzales and Rodolfo Gonzales. She

reiterated that when the three documents disposing of her property were

notarized, she was out of the country. Estrella Gonzales Mendrano, one of the

vendees, was also outside the country as shown by a certification issued by

the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) on September 14, 1989.

[10]
She likewise claimed that Guadalupe Ramirez Gonzales (the widow of

Rodolfo Gonzales, another vendee) executed an affidavit describing the Deed

of Absolute Sale and Subdivision Agreement as spurious and without her

husband's participation.[11] The affidavit further alleged that the complainants

signatures were forged and the respondent did not ascertain the identity of

the person who came before him and posed as vendor despite the fact that a

large tract of land was being ceded and transferred to the vendees.
 The complainant prayed for the revocation of the

respondent's notarial commission and his suspension from the practice of law

due to his deplorable failure to hold the importance of the notarial act and

observe [with] utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his

duties as a notary public which include the ascertainment that the person

who signed the document as the very person who executed and personally

appeared before him.

On May 3, 2004, the complainant moved that the case be considered

submitted for resolution in view of respondent's failure to answer the

amended complaint.[12]

The IBP Findings

In her report to the IBP Board of Governors, [13] Commissioner San Juan

categorically noted the respondents admission that he notarized the three

documents in question the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 16, 1979; the

Subdivision Agreement on September 7, 1988 and the affidavit of Non-

Tenancy on March 3, 1988. Commissioner San Juan also noted that the

complainants documentary evidence supported her claim that she never

executed these documents and never appeared before the respondent to

acknowledge the execution of these documents. These documentary

evidence consisted of the certification from the BID that complainant did not

travel to the Philippines on the dates the documents were allegedly notarized;
[14]
and the affidavit of Guadalupe Ramirez Gonzales described above. [15]

Commissioner San Juan found that the respondent had no participation in the

preparation or knowledge of the falsity of the spurious documents, and found

merit in the complainant's contention that the respondent was negligent in

the performance of his duties as a notary public. She faulted the respondent

for not demanding proof of the identity of the person who claimed to be

complainant Zenaida Gonzales when the documents were presented to him

for notarization. She concluded that the respondent failed to exercise the

diligence required of him as notary public to ensure the integrity of the

presented documents. She recommended that the

respondent's notarial commission be revoked and that he be suspended from

the practice of law for a period of three months.

The Court's Ruling

Rule II of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice[16] provides:

 SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - Acknowledgment
refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and

present an integrally complete instrument on
document;

(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary

public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules; and

(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on

the instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by
him for the purpose stated in the instrument or
document, declares that he has executed the instrument
or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and,
if he acts in a particular representative capacity that he
has the authority to sign in that capacity.

Under the given facts, the respondent clearly failed to faithfully comply with

the foregoing rules when he notarized the three documents subject of the

present complaint. The respondent did not know the complainant personally,

yet he did not require proof of identity from the person who appeared before

him and executed and authenticated the three documents. The IBP Report

observed that had the respondent done so, the fraudulent transfer of

complainant's property could have been prevented.

Through his negligence in the performance of his duty as a notary public

resulting in the loss of property of an unsuspecting private citizen, the

respondent eroded the complainants and the publics confidence in

the notarial system; he brought disrepute to the system. As we held

in Pantoja Mumar vs. Flores,[17] he thereby breached Canon 1 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility (which requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution,

obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal

processes) as well as Rule 1.01 of the same Code (which prohibits lawyers

from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct).

The respondent should be reminded that a notarial document is, on its face

and by authority of law, entitled to full faith and credit. For this reason,

notaries public must observe utmost care in complying with the formalities

intended to ensure the integrity of the notarized document and the act or acts

it embodies.[18]

We are not persuaded by the respondent's argument that this Court, in a

similar case or one with identical facts, said that it is not necessary to know

the signatories personally provided he or she or they signed in the presence

of the notary, alleging that they are the persons who signed the names. The

respondent not only failed to identify the cited case; he apparently also cited

it out of context. A notary public is duty bound to require the person

executing a document to be personally present, and to swear before him that

he is the person named in the document and is voluntarily and freely

executing the act mentioned in the document.[19] The notary public faithfully

discharges this duty by at least verifying the identity of the person appearing

before him based on the identification papers presented.

For violating his duties as a lawyer and as a notary public, as well as for the

grave injustice inflicted on the complainant, it is only proper that the

respondent be penalized and suffer the consequences of his acts. We note in

this regard that in her amended complaint, the complainant no longer sought

the disbarment of respondent; she confined herself to the revocation of the

respondents notarial commission and his suspension from the practice of

law. Thus, the recommendation of the IBP is for revocation of

his notarial commission and for his suspension from the practice of law for

three (3) months. We approve this recommendation as a sanction

commensurate with the transgression committed by the respondent as a

member of the bar and as a notary public.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, ATTY. NARCISO PADIERNOS of 103 Del

Pilar Street, Cabanatuan City, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a

period of THREE (3) MONTHS, and his notarial commission is

hereby REVOKED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 9514 April 10, 2013

BERNARD N. JANDOQUILE, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. QUIRINO P. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Bernard N.

Jandoquile against respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr.

The Facts of the case are not disputed.

Atty. Revilla, Jr. notarized a complaint-affidavit2 signed by Heneraline L.

Brosas, Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa and Elmer L. Alvarado. Heneraline Brosas is
a sister of Heizel Wynda Brosas Revilla, Atty. Revilla, Jr.'s wife. Jandoquile
complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. is disqualified to perform the notarial act3 per
Section 3( c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which reads as
follows:
SEC. 3. Disqualifications. A notary public is disqualified from performing a
notarial act if he:

xxxx

(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by

affinity or consanguinity of the principal4within the fourth civil degree.

Jandoquile also complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not require the three
affiants in the complaint-affidavit to show their valid identification cards.

In his comment5 to the disbarment complaint, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not deny
but admitted Jandoquiles material allegations. The issue, according to Atty.
Revilla, Jr., is whether the single act of notarizing the complaint-affidavit of
relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity and, at the same time, not
requiring them to present valid identification cards is a ground for
disbarment. Atty. Revilla, Jr. submits that his act is not a ground for
disbarment. He also says that he acts as counsel of the three affiants; thus,
he should be considered more as counsel than as a notary public when he
notarized their complaint-affidavit. He did not require the affiants to present
valid identification cards since he knows them personally. Heneraline Brosas
and Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa are sisters-in-law while Elmer Alvarado is the
live-in houseboy of the Brosas family.

Since the facts are not contested, the Court deems it more prudent to
resolve the case instead of referring it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation.

Indeed, Atty. Revilla, Jr. violated the disqualification rule under Section 3(c),
Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. We agree with him, however,
that his violation is not a sufficient ground for disbarment.

Atty. Revilla, Jr.s violation of the aforesaid disqualification rule is beyond

dispute. Atty. Revilla, Jr. readily admitted that he notarized the complaint-
affidavit signed by his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity.
Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice clearly disqualifies
him from notarizing the complaint-affidavit, from performing the notarial act,
since two of the affiants or principals are his relatives within the fourth civil
degree of affinity. Given the clear provision of the disqualification rule, it
behooved upon Atty. Revilla, Jr. to act with prudence and refuse notarizing
the document. We cannot agree with his proposition that we consider him to
have acted more as counsel of the affiants, not as notary public, when he
notarized the complaint-affidavit. The notarial certificate6 at the bottom of
the complaint-affidavit shows his signature as a notary public, with a notarial
commission valid until December 31, 2012.
He cannot therefore claim that he signed it as counsel of the three affiants.

On the second charge, we agree with Atty. Revilla, Jr. that he cannot be held
liable. If the notary public knows the affiants personally, he need not require
them to show their valid identification cards. This rule is supported by the
definition of a "jurat" under Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. A "jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or
document; (b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity; (c) signs the
instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath
or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document. In
this case, Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Atty. Revilla, Jr.s wife; Herizalyn
Brosas Pedrosa is his wifes sister-in-law; and Elmer Alvarado is the live-in
houseboy of the Brosas family. Atty. Revilla, Jr. knows the three affiants
personally. Thus, he was justified in no longer requiring them to show valid
identification cards. But Atty. Revilla, Jr. is not without fault for failing to
indicate such fact in the "jurat" of the complaint-affidavit. No statement was
included therein that he knows the three affiants personally.7 Let it be
impressed that Atty. Revilla, Jr. was clearly disqualified to notarize the
complaint-affidavit of his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity.
While he has a valid defense as to the second charge, it does not exempt
him from liability for violating the disqualification rule.

As we said, Atty. Revilla, Jr.s violation of the disqualification rule under

Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice is not a sufficient
ground to disbar him. To our mind, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not commit any deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct or gross immoral conduct, or any other
serious ground for disbarment under Section 27,8 Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. We recall the case of Maria v. Cortez9 where we reprimanded Cortez
and disqualified him from being commissioned as notary public for six
months. We were convinced that said punishment, which is less severe than
disbarment, would already suffice as sanction for Cortezs violation. In
Cortez, we noted the prohibition in Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice that a person shall not perform a notarial act if the person
involved as signatory to the instrument or document (1) is not in the notarys
presence personally at the time of the notarization and (2) is not personally
known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through a competent evidence of identity. Cortez had notarized a special
power of attorney without having the alleged signatories appear before him.
In imposing the less severe punishment, we were mindful that removal from
the Bar should not really be decreed when any punishment less severe such
as reprimand, temporary suspension or fine would accomplish the end
desired.1wphi1
Considering the attendant circumstances and the single violation committed
by Atty. Revilla, Jr., we are in agreement that a punishment less severe than
disbarment would suffice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr., is REPRIMANDED and

DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public, or from
performing any notarial act if he is presently commissioned as a notary
public, for a period of three (3) months. Atty. Revilla, Jr. is further DIRECTED
to INFORM the Court, through an affidavit, once the period of his
disqualification has lapsed.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 6470, July 08, 2014

MERCEDITA DE JESUS, Complainant, v. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ-

MALIT, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, C.J.:

Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Mercedita De Jesus (De

Jesus) against respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on
the following grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and
unworthiness to become an officer of the Court.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE

In the Affidavit-Complaint 1 filed by complainant before the Office of the Bar
Confidant on 23 June 2004, she alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent
had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall
that falsely named the former as its absolute and registered owner. As a
result, the mortgagee sued complainant for perjury and for collection of sum
of money. She claimed that respondent was a consultant of the local
government unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was therefore aware that the
market stall was government-owned.

Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused
complainant legal and financial problems. One contract was a lease
agreement notarized by respondent sometime in September 1999 without
the signature of the lessees. However, complainant only found out that the
agreement had not been signed by the lessees when she lost her copy and
she asked for another copy from respondent. The other contract was a sale
agreement over a property covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award
(CLOA) which complainant entered into with a certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala)
on 17 February 1998. Respondent drafted and notarized said agreement, but
did not advise complainant that the property was still covered by the period
within which it could not be alienated.

In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant

subsequently submitted three Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by
respondent and an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino), complainants
secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not signed by the principals named
therein and bore only the signature of the named attorney-in-fact, Florina B.
Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentinos Affidavit corroborated complainants
allegations against respondent.2

On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme Court issued a

Resolution requiring respondent to submit her comment on the Complaint
within ten (10) days from receipt of notice.3

In her Comment,4 respondent explained that the mortgage contract was

prepared in the presence of complainant and that the latter had read it
before affixing her signature. However, complainant urgently needed the
loan proceeds so the contract was hastily done. It was only copied from a
similar file in respondents computer, and the phrase absolute and
registered owner was inadvertently left unedited. Still, it should not be a
cause for disciplinary action, because complainant constructed the subject
public market stall under a Build Operate and Transfer contract with the
local government unit and, technically, she could be considered its owner.
Besides, there had been a prior mortgage contract over the same property in
which complainant was represented as the propertys absolute owner, but
she did not complain. Moreover, the cause of the perjury charge against
complainant was not the representation of herself as owner of the
mortgaged property, but her guarantee that it was free from all liens and
encumbrances. The perjury charge was even dismissed, because the
prosecutor found that complainant and her spouse had, indeed, paid the
debt secured with the previous mortgage contract over the same market
stall.

With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the

document attached to the Affidavit-Complaint was actually new. She gave
the courts copy of the agreement to complainant to accommodate the
latters request for an extra copy. Thus, respondent prepared and notarized a
new one, relying on complainants assurance that the lessees would sign it
and that it would be returned in lieu of the original copy for the court.
Complainant, however, reneged on her promise.

As regards the purchase agreement of a property covered by a CLOA,

respondent claimed that complainant was an experienced realty broker and,
therefore, needed no advice on the repercussions of that transaction.
Actually, when the purchase agreement was notarized, complainant did not
present the CLOA, and so the agreement mentioned nothing about it. Rather,
the agreement expressly stated that the property was the subject of a case
pending before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB); complainant was thus notified of the status of the subject property.
Finally, respondent maintained that the SPAs submitted by complainant as
additional evidence were properly notarized. It can be easily gleaned from
the documents that the attorney-in-fact personally appeared before
respondent; hence, the notarization was limited to the formers participation
in the execution of the document. Moreover, the acknowledgment clearly
stated that the document must be notarized in the principals place of
residence.

An exchange of pleadings ensued after respondent submitted her Comment.

After her rejoinder, complainant filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Submission of Additional Evidence.5 Attached thereto were copies of
documents notarized by respondent, including the following: (1) an Extra
Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the SPAs naming Limpioso as
attorney-in-fact; (2) five SPAs that lacked the signatures of either the
principal or the attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds of sale with incomplete
signatures of the parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn Statement; (5) a
lease contract that lacked the signature of the lessor; (6) five unsigned
Affidavits; (7) an unsigned insurance claim form (Annual Declaration by the
Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation Letter to a potential investor in Japan; (9)
an unsigned Bank Certification; and (10) an unsigned Consent to Adoption.

After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their
respective Position Papers.6Notably, respondents Position Paper did not
tackle the additional documents attached to complainants Urgent Ex
Parte Motion.

THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP

In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R.

Villadolid, Jr. recommended the immediate revocation of the Notarial
Commission of respondent and her disqualification as notary public for two
years for her violation of her oath as such by notarizing documents without
the signatures of the parties who had purportedly appeared before her. He
accepted respondents explanations with respect to the lease agreement,
sale contract, and the three SPAs pertaining to Limpioso. However, he found
that the inaccurate crafting of the real estate mortgage contract was a
sufficient basis to hold respondent liable for violation of Canon 187 and Rule
18.038 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he also
recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for six
months.9

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-245 dated 22

May 2008, unanimously adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with the modification
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.10

Respondent filed her first Motion for Reconsideration11 and Second Motion for
Reconsideration.12 She maintained that the additional documents submitted
by complainant were inadmissible, as they were obtained without observing
the procedural requisites under Section 4, Rule VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC
(2004 Rules on Notarial Practice).13 Moreover, the Urgent Ex Parte Motion of
complainant was actually a supplemental pleading, which was prohibited
under the rules of procedure of the Committee on Bar Discipline; besides,
she was not the proper party to question those documents. Hence, the
investigating commissioner should have expunged the documents from the
records, instead of giving them due course. Respondent also prayed that
mitigating circumstances be considered, specifically the following: absence
of prior disciplinary record; absence of dishonest or selfish motive; personal
and emotional problems; timely good-faith effort to make restitution or to
rectify the consequences of her misconduct; full and free disclosure to the
disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the proceedings; character
or reputation; remorse; and remoteness of prior offenses.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XX-2012-119 dated 10

March 2012, denied respondents motion for reconsideration for lack of
substantial reason to justify a reversal of the IBPs findings.14

Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, Director for Bar Discipline Pura
Angelica Y. Santiago through a letter addressed to then acting Chief Justice
Antonio T. Carpio transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment
Complaint against respondent.15

THE COURTS RULING

After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint against respondent and
the parties submissions in this case, the Court hereby modifies the findings
of the IBP.

Before going into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court
shall first dispose of some procedural matters raised by respondent.

Respondent argues that the additional documents submitted in evidence by

complainant are inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of Section
4, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A comparable argument
was raised in Tolentino v. Mendoza,16 in which the respondent therein
opposed the admission of the birth certificates of his illegitimate children as
evidence of his grossly immoral conduct, because those documents were
obtained in violation Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
1993.17 Rejecting his argument, the Court reasoned as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that evidence
is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law
or these rules. There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates
are relevant to the issue. The only question, therefore, is whether the law or
the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for
having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1993.

Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides
for sanctions against persons violating the rule on confidentiality of birth
records, but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records in
violation of said rule would render said records inadmissible in evidence. On
the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion
of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. It
should be emphasized, however, that said rule against unreasonable
searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person from interference by
the government or the state. In People vs. Hipol, we explained that:
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not
concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another
individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State
and its agents. The Bill of Rights only tempers governmental power and
protects the individual against any aggression and unwarranted interference
by any department of government and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be
extended to the acts complained of in this case. The alleged "warrantless
search" made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the treasurer's office,
can hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional proscription on
unwarranted searches and seizures.

Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals,

obtained the subject birth records as evidence against respondent, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the
Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of
the birth certificates in question, said public documents are, therefore,
admissible and should be properly taken into consideration in the resolution
of this administrative case against respondent.18

Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the
inadmissibility of documents obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP
correctly considered in evidence the other notarized documents submitted
by complainant as additional evidence.

Respondents argument that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion of complainant

constitutes a supplemental pleading must fail as well. As its very name
denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or adds something
to the primary pleading. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify,
enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter
as the controversy referred to in the original complaint.19 Accordingly, it
cannot be said that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by complainant was a
supplemental pleading. One of her charges against respondent is that the
latter notarized incomplete documents, as shown by the SPAs and lease
agreement attached to the Affidavit-Complaint. Complainant is not legally
barred from submitting additional evidence to strengthen the basis of her
complaint.

Going now into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court
finds that she committed misconduct and grievously violated her oath as a
notary public.

The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The

Court has repeatedly stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless
routinary act, but one invested with substantive public interest. Notarization
converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized document
is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason
that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in
the performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in
the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.20

Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false

statement or information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet
proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to
discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may
dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may
be undermined, and public confidence in notarial documents diminished. 21 In
this case, respondent fully knew that complainant was not the owner of the
mortgaged market stall. That complainant comprehended the provisions of
the real estate mortgage contract does not make respondent any less guilty.
If at all, it only heightens the latters liability for tolerating a wrongful act.
Clearly, respondents conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 122 and Rules
1.0123 and 1.0224 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondents explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by

complainant sometime in September 199925 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file
copy of the agreement bore the lessees signatures, she could have given
complainant a certified photocopy thereof. It even appears that said lease
agreement is not a rarity in respondents practice as a notary public. Records
show that on various occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent has notarized
22 documents that were either unsigned or lacking signatures of the parties.
Technically, each document maybe a ground for disciplinary action, for it is
the duty of a notarial officer to demand that a document be signed in his or
her presence.26

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed it are the very same ones who executed it and who personally
appeared before the said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of
what are stated therein.27 Thus, in acknowledging that the parties personally
came and appeared before her, respondent also violated Rule 10.0128 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer that she shall do
no falsehood.29

Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue enjoying the solemn office of a

notary public. In several instances, the Court did not hesitate to disbar
lawyers who were found to be utterly oblivious to the solemnity of their oath
as notaries public.30 Even so, the rule is that disbarment is meted out only in
clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court and the Court will not disbar a lawyer
where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.31 The
blatant disregard by respondent of her basic duties as a notary public
warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law
and perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of

violating Canon 1 and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility as well as her oath as notary public. Hence, she
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective
immediately. Her notarial commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY
REVOKED and she is hereby PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of

respondent as a member of the bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts of the country for their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del

Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen,
JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 8637, September 15, 2014

IMELDA CATO GADDI, Complainant, v. ATTY. LOPE M.

VELASCO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, ACTING C.J.:

The Case

Before us is an administrative complaint filed by Imelda Cato Gaddi (Gaddi)

against Atty. Lope M. Velasco (Velasco) for violation of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice.

The Facts

According to Gaddi, she was the Operations and Accounting Manager of the
Bert Lozada Swimming School (BLSS) when she broached the idea of opening
a branch of BLSS in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya (BLSS in Solano) to Angelo Lozada
(Angelo), the Chief Operations Officer of BLSS. Believing that Angelo agreed,
Gaddi opened a BLSS in Solano. However, in April 2010, Angelo informed the
management that he did not authorize a BLSS in Solano. Upon Angelos
complaint, the police officers apprehended the swimming instructors of BLSS
in Solano, namely: Jonathan Lagamzon Lozare, Katherine Agatha Gaddi
Ancheta, who is Gaddis niece, and Lorenz Ocampo Gaddi, who is Gaddis
grandson.

At past 10:00 a.m. of 22 April 2010, while inside the BLSS main office in Sta.
Ana, Manila, Gaddi was informed of the apprehension of the swimming
instructors. Worried, Gaddi pleaded with Angelos wife, Kristina Marie, and
the BLSS Programs Manager Aleza Garcia for permission to leave the office
and proceed to Nueva Vizcaya. Instead of acceding to her plea, they
commanded Gaddi to make a handwritten admission1 that the BLSS in
Solano was unauthorized. They warned Gaddi that she cannot leave the
office without the handwritten admission. Thus, Gaddi conceded in doing the
handwritten admission and left the office before 1:00 p.m. of the same day.
Subsequently, Gaddi found out that Angelo filed a complaint against her
regarding the BLSS in Solano using her handwritten admission, which was
already notarized by Velasco.

Thus, Gaddi filed the present complaint against Velasco for violation of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, specifically Rule IV, Section 2 (b) and Rule
VI, Section 3. Gaddi denied that she personally appeared before Velasco to
have her handwritten admission notarized. She alleged that she did not
consent to its notarization nor did she personally know him, give any
competent evidence of identity or sign the notarial register.

In his comment dated 17 September 2010,2 Velasco alleged that he was

commissioned notary public for Makati City from 4 January 2010 to 31
December 2011. He alleged that Gaddi appeared before him in his notarial
office in Makati City on 22 April 2010 and requested for the notarization of a
four-page handwritten document. He ascertained Gaddis identity, through
two identification cards her BLSS ID and Tax Identification Number (TIN) ID,
and that the document was her own. Thereafter, he notarized the document
and recorded it in his notarial register as Doc. No. 130, Page No. 27, Book No.
192, Series of 2010. Velasco insisted that he duly complied with the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice and it was Gaddis complaint, which was notarized
by a fake notary public. Velasco claimed that Gaddi only denied having the
document notarized when she found out that Angelo used the document
against her.

In a Resolution dated 18 October 2010,3 the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation dated 23 June 2011,4 Investigating
Commissioner Pablo S. Castillo (Investigating Commissioner) found the
complaint impressed with merit, and recommended a penalty of fine of
P5,000.00 on Velasco for violation of Rule IV, Section 2(b) and Rule VI,
Section 3 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

The Investigating Commissioner gave more credence to Gaddis statement

that she did not personally appear before Velasco to have her handwritten
admission notarized. The Investigating Commissioner found it contradictory
to logic and human experience that Gaddi went first to Makati City to have
her self-incriminating handwritten admission notarized before proceeding to
Nueva Vizcaya. The Investigating Commissioner also believed Gaddis
statement that the identification cards presented by Velasco were computer-
generated from the BLSS office, since the portion of the notarial certificate
listing the evidence of identity was left blank. As to Velascos claim that
Gaddis complaint had a fake notary public, the Investigating Commissioner
found it unsubstantiated.

In Resolution No. XX-2013-1275 passed on 13 February 2013, the IBP Board of

Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioners report
and recommendation, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED

and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex A, and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
for violation of Rule IV, Sec. [2(b) and Rule VI, Sec.] 3 of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, Atty. Lope M. Velascos Notarial Commission is hereby
REVOKED and DISQUALIFIED for being Commissioned as Notary Public for
two (2) years with stern [w]arning to be more circumspect in his dealing and
that repetition of the same act shall be dealt with more severely.

There was no motion for reconsideration filed.

The Ruling of the Court

We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendations with
modification.

Time and again, we have reminded lawyers commissioned as notaries public

that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, and routinary
act.6 Notarization converts a private document to a public document, making
it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity.7 A notarial
document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face; for this
reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties.8cralawred

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a notary public should not
notarize a document unless the signatory to the document is in the notarys
presence personally at the time of the notarization, and personally known to
the notary public or otherwise identified through competent evidence of
identity.9 At the time of notarization, the signatory shall sign or affix with a
thumb or mark the notary publics notarial register.10 The purpose of these
requirements is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the
signature and to ascertain that the document is the signatorys free act and
deed.11 If the signatory is not acting of his or her own free will, a notary
public is mandated to refuse to perform a notarial act.12 A notary public is
also prohibited from affixing an official signature or seal on a notarial
certificate that is incomplete.13cralawred

In the present case, contrary to Velascos claim that Gaddi appeared before
him and presented two identification cards as proof of her identity, the
notarial certificate, in rubber stamp, itself indicates: SUBSCRIBE AND
SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS APR 22, 2010 x x x AT MAKATI CITY. AFFIANT
EXHIBITING TO ME HIS/HER C.T.C. NO.__________ISSUED
AT/ON___________.14 The unfilled spaces clearly establish that Velasco had
been remiss in his duty of ascertaining the identity of the signatory to the
document. Velasco did not comply with the most basic function that a notary
public must do, that is, to require the presence of Gaddi; otherwise, he could
have ascertained that the handwritten admission was executed involuntarily
and refused to notarize the document. Furthermore, Velasco affixed his
signature in an incomplete notarial certificate. Velasco did not even present
his notarial register to rebut Gaddis allegations. It is presumed that evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.15cralawred

In Isenhardt v. Real,16 a notary public who failed to discharge his duties was
meted out the penalty of revocation of his notarial commission,
disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of
two years, and suspension from the practice of law for one year. For
notarizing a document without ascertaining the identity and voluntariness of
the signatory to the document, for affixing his signature in an incomplete
notarial certificate, and for dishonesty in his pleadings, Velasco failed to
discharge his duties as notary public and breached Canon 117 and Rule
1.0118 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Considering these findings
and our previous rulings,19 Velasco should not only be disqualified for two
years as a notary public, he must also be suspended from the practice of law
for one year.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Lope M. Velasco GUILTY of

violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of
law for one year, REVOKES his incumbent notarial commission, if any,
and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary public for two
years, effective immediately, with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to
be appended to respondents personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies
shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.cralawlaw library

Brion, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,* and Leonen, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 8384 April 11, 2013

EFIGENIA M. TENOSO Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Etigenia M. Tenoso (complainant) tiled a complaint against Atty. Anselmo S.

Echanez (respondent) alleging that respondent was engaged in practice as a
notary public in Cordon, lsabela, without having been properly commissioned
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, Isabela. This is the RTC
exercising jurisdiction over the Municipality of Cordon.

This alleged act violates Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (A.M.
No. 02-8-13-SC). To support her allegations, complainant attached the
following documents to her pleadings:

a. Two (2) documents signed and issued by RTC Santiago City

Executive Judge Efren M. Cacatian bearing the names of commissioned
notaries public within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Santiago
City for the years 2006 to 2007 and 2007 to 2008.1 Respondent's name
does not appear on either list;

b. Copies of ten (10) documents that appear to have been notarized by

respondent in the years 2006, 2007, and 2008; and

c. A copy of a certification issued by Judge Cacatian stating that a joint-

affidavit notarized by respondent in 2008 could not be "authenticated
as to respondent's seal and signature as NO Notarial Commission was
issued upon him at the time of the document's notarization."2
In his two-page Answer, respondent denied the allegations saying, "I have
never been notarizing any document or pleadings"3 and added that he has
"never committed any malpractice, nor deceit nor have violated thelawyers
(sic) oath".4 He dismissed such allegations as being "preposterous, full of lies,
politically motivated and x x x meant to harass or intimidate him".5

Also, he surmised that the documents annexed to the Affidavit-Complaint

were "tampered and adulterated," or that "somebody might have forged his
signature."6 He failed to attend the mandatory conference and likewise failed
to file his Position Paper.

In his Report and Recommendation dated 29 September 2008, Investigating

Commissioner Atty. Salvador B. Hababag recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and disqualified from
being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years for violating Rules
1.01 and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 7

In a Resolution dated 11 December 2008, the IBP Board of Governors

affirmed the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but increased the
penalty of suspension from six (6) months to one (1) year. Respondent did
not file a Motion for Reconsideration or any other subsequent pleading.

On 12 August 2009, the IBP Board of Governors transmitted its Resolution to

the Supreme Court for its action following Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.8

The Court modifies the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution.

Complainant presented evidence supporting her allegation that respondent

had notarized various documents in Cordon, Isabela from 2006 to 2008 and
that respondent's name does not appear on the list of notaries public
commissioned by the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela for the years 2006 to
2007 and 2007 to 2008.

Respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant's

allegations.1wphi1 Per Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,9 the
burden of proof is vested upon the party who alleges the truth of his claim or
defense or any fact in issue. Thus, in Leave Division, Office of Administrative
Services, Office of the Court Administrator v. Gutierrez,10where a party
resorts to bare denials and allegations and fails to submit evidence in
support of his defense, the determination that he committed the violation is
sustained. Respondent merely posited that the notarized documents
presented by complainant were "tampered and adulterated" or were results
of forgery, but he failed to present any proof.11 Respondent also resorted to a
sweeping and unsupported statement that he never notarized any
document. Accordingly, the reasonable conclusion is that respondent
repeatedly notarized documents without the requisite notarial commission.

Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued
with public interest and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his
client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the
nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State -
the administration of justice - as an officer of the court."12 Accordingly,
'"lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency,
but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing."13

Similarly, the duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy and
impressed with public interest.14"Notarization is not a routinary, meaningless
act, for notarization converts a private document to a public instrument,
making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof
of its authenticity and due execution."15

In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed party-

litigants, courts, other lawyers and the general public to the perils of ordinary
documents posing as public instruments. As noted by the Investigating
Commissioner, respondent committed acts of deceit and falsehood in open
violation of the explicit pronouncements of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Evidently, respondent's conduct falls miserably short of the
high standards of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing required from
lawyers. It is proper that he be sanctioned.

WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez guilty of engaging in notarial

practice without a notarial commission, and accordingly, We SUSPEND him
from the practice of law for two (2) years and DISQUALIFY him from being
commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe
sanction.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40145 July 29, 1992

SEVERO SALES, ESPERANZA SALES BERMUDEZ, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LEONILO GONZALES, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to annul and set
aside the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the then Court of
First Instance of Tarlac, Branch III which upheld the validity of the deed of
sale of a parcel of land executed by petitioner Severo Sales in favor of
respondent Leonilo Gonzales.

Severo Sales owned an unregistered parcel of land in Bugallon, Pangasinan.

Covered by Tax Declaration No. 5861, the property had an area of 5,733
square meters more or less. 1 On July 4, 1955, Sales mortgaged said
property, together with two other parcels of land, to Faustina P. Agpoon and
Jose Agpoon to secure the payment of a loan in the amount of P2,240.00
payable on or about July 4, 1956. 2 On October 30, 1957, Tax Declaration No.
5861 was canceled and in lieu hereof, Tax Declaration No. 13647 was issued
to Sales but the area of the property was stated therein as 5,229 square
meters more or less. 3

More than a year later, or on December 24, 1958, Sales, with the consent of
his wife, Margarita Ferrer, donated nine hundred (900) square meters of the
same property in favor of their daughter, petitioner Esperanza Sales
Bermudez. 4 The duly notarized deed of donation was presented to the
Assessor's Office on the day of its execution. Hence, Tax Declaration No.
13647 was replaced by two tax declarations: Tax Declaration No. 13875 5 in
the name of Esperanza Sales Bermudez for the 900-square-meter lot
donated to her and Tax Declaration No. 13874 6 in the name of Sales
covering the remaining portion or 4,339 square meters.

As a consequence of a case filed by Faustina P. Agpoon against Sales in the

Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, sometime in January 1959, the
mortgaged property of Sales was set for foreclosure. To prevent such
foreclosure, Sales requested his friend, Ernesto Gonzales, to pay his total
indebtedness of P2,700 to the Agpoon spouses. 7 Ernesto Gonzales acceded
to the request and asked Sales and his wife to sign a document transferring
the mortgage to him. According to the Sales spouses, they were not given a
copy of said document. 8 Around a month later, Sales had the land covered
by Tax Declaration No. 5861 surveyed by a private surveyor. 9

On February 3, 1959, a document entitled "Deed of Sale" between Severo

Sales and Leonilo Gonzales was registered with the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan. 10

In October 1968, Sales received a photostat copy of the deed of sale

appearing to have been signed by him and his wife on January 29, 1959
before ex-officio Notary Public Arturo Malazo in San Manuel, Tarlac. The
document stated that the Sales spouses had sold the land described under
Tax Declaration No. 5861 in consideration of the amount of P4,000 to Leonilo
Gonzales, son of Ernesto Gonzales.

In the Intestate Estate Proceedings of Ernesto Gonzales, (SP 42692) in the

then Court of First Instance of Manila, the land in question was claimed by
respondent Leonilo Gonzales. Subsequently, upon submission of the Deed of
Sale between Severo Sales and Leonilo Gonzales, the questioned land was
excluded therefrom. 11 Said parcel of land was declared by Leonilo Gonzales
under Tax Declaration No. 12483. 12

On November 7, 1968, Leonilo Gonzales filed an action for illegal detainer

against Sales before the Municipal Court of Bugallon. 13 Before the case could
be tried, Sales and his daughter, Esperanza Sales Bermudez filed in the Court
of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch III a complaint for annulment of the deed of
sale between Sales and Gonzales on the ground of fraud. Consequently, the
municipal court suspended the illegal detainer proceedings before it pending
the outcome of the annulment case.

On October 27, 1969, the Court of First Instance 14 rendered a decision

finding that the allegation of fraud was not supported by convincing
evidence. Its dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

defendant, and against the plaintiffs by:

1. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint;

2. Declaring that the defendant is the lawful owner of the land

described in Exhibits "2" and "2-A" (same as Exh. "H") and is,
therefore, entitled to the possession thereof;

3. Ordering the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, to pay the

defendant the sum of P2,000.00 by way of attorney's fees; and

4. Ordering the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

The lower court noted that while plaintiffs counsel claimed that Sales and his
wife were illiterates, their signatures on each page of the two-page deed of
sale revealed "striking features" of intelligence. The court added:

Defendant's defense hinges on the fact that the Deed of Sale is

valid, it having been properly executed and notarized, and is
therefore a public document, and carries weigh as provided for in
Section 31, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Defendant likewise
proved that the money paid by his father, Ernesto Gonzales was
his. Arturo V. Malazo, the Notary Public ex-officio and Justice of
 the Peace, before whom the Deed of Sale was executed, testified
personally in Court and confirmed the genuineness and validity
of the Deed of sale, together with the signatures appearing
therein, particularly those of the vendors Severo Sales and
Margarita Ferrer, and the witnesses thereto. The bare and naked
assertions of the plaintiff Severo Sales and his wife, could not
offset the presumption of regularity as to the execution of the
Deed of Sale, especially so, that the ratifying officer was, and still
is, a municipal judge. The contention of plaintiff Severo Sales
that he was made to sign the document hurriedly by the
deceased Ernesto Gonzales does not deserve credence,
considering that he has affixed (sic) or signed the said Deed of
Sale no less than three (3) times, together with his wife and the
other witnesses. Considering the interest of the plaintiff Severo
Sales and his wife in this case, it could not overthrow the
testimony of the Notary Public ex-oficio Arturo V. Malazo. 15

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied. Sales and his daughter
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals contending that the lower court
erred in upholding the validity of the deed of sale and in not considering the
unschooled Sales as an illiterate executor thereof. On December 19, 1974,
the Court of Appeals 16 affirmed the decision of the lower court but added
that the petitioners shall pay, jointly and severally, the amount of P1,000 as
attorney's fees. Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners primarily invoke Art. 1332 of the Civil Code which provides that
when one of the parties to a contract is unable to read, "or if the contract is
in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the
person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been
fully, explained to the former." Petitioners contend that respondent Gonzales
failed to prove that the contents of the deed of sale were ever explained to
Sales, an illiterate. They also argue that granting that the deed of sale was
valid, the courts below failed to take into consideration the fact that the deed
of donation was executed ahead of the deed of sale and must not, therefore,
be disregarded considering that with reference to unregistered lands, an
earlier instrument prevails over a later one.

With regard to the issue of whether or not there was compliance with the
provision of Art. 1332 of the Civil Code, before said article may be invoked, it
must be convincingly established that the disadvantaged party is unable to
read or that the contract involved in written in a language not understood by
him. 17 It is the party invoking the benefits of Art. 1332 or Sales, who has the
burden of proving that he really is unable to read or that English, the
language in which the deed of sale was written, is incomprehensible to him.
Only after sufficient proof of such facts may the burden or proving that the
terms of the contract had been explained to the disadvantaged party be
shifted to the party enforcing the contract, who, in this instance, is Leonilo
Gonzales.

The records of this case, however, show that although Sales did not go to
school and knew only how to sign his name, 18 he and his wife had previously
entered into contracts written in English: first, when Sales mortgaged his
property to Faustina P. Agpoon and second, when he donated a portion of the
property involved to his daughter, petitioner Esperanza Sales
Bermudez. 19 The court below also noted the fact that the signatures of the
Sales spouses in the deed of sale showed the "striking features of the
signatures of intelligent" individuals. Coupled with this is the fact that in
court, the Sales spouses themselves admitted that the signatures on the
deed of sale "looked like" their signatures. 20

But more revealing is the fact that the deed of sale itself, specifically the
notarial acknowledgment thereof, contains a statement that its executors
were known to the notary public to be the persons who executed the
instrument; that they were "informed by me (notary public) of the contents
thereof" and that they acknowledged to the notary public that the instrument
was freely and voluntarily executed. 21 When he testified at the hearing,
notary public Arturo Malazo stated, "I know Mr. Severo Sales and he
appeared before me when I notarized that document." Later, he added that
"the document speaks for itself and the witnesses were there and those were
the persons present" (sic). 22 Thus, the stark denial of the petitioners,
specially Sales, that he executed the deed of sale pales in the face of
Malazo's testimony because the testimony of the notary public enjoys
greater credence than that of an ordinary witness. 23

The extrinsic validity of the deed of sale is not affected by the fact that while
the property subject thereof is located in Bugallon, Pangasinan where the
vendors also resided, the document was executed in San Miguel, Tarlac.
What is important under the Notarial Law is that the notary public concerned
has authority to acknowledge the document executed within his territorial
jurisdiction. 24 A notarial acknowledgment attaches full faith and credit to the
document concerned. 25 It also vests upon the document the presumption of
regularity unless it is impugned by strong, complete and conclusive
proof. 26 Such kind of proof has not been presented by the petitioners.

While it seems improbable that Severo Sales sold the property described in
Tax Declaration 5861 when in fact this had been subsequently cancelled
already by Tax Declaration 13875 in the name of Esperanza Sales Bermudez
and by Tax Declaration No. 13874 in Severo Sales' name, one can hardly
ascribe bad faith to respondent, for unlike a title registered under the Torrens
System, a tax declaration does not constitute constructive notice to the
whole world. The issue of good faith or bad faith of a buyer is relevant only
where the subject of the sale is a registered land but not where the property
is an unregistered land. 27

On the issue of whether or not the earlier deed of donation should "prevail"
over the deed of sale or be "recognized", petitioner invokes Nisce
v. Milo 28 and Estate of Mota v. Concepcion 29 which purportedly ruled that
"with reference to unregistered lands, an earlier instrument, be it a sale or
mortgage, prevails over a later one, and the registration of any one of them
is immaterial." 30

The deed of donation explicitly provides that the land involved "has not been
registered neither under Act 496 nor under the Spanish Mortgage Law. The
parties hereto have agreed to register this document under Act
3344." 31Such agreement had to be expressly stipulated in the deed of
donation 32 because under Act 3344, the Register of Deeds is not authorized
to effect any registration unless the parties have expressly agreed to register
their transaction thereunder. A perusal of the records shows, however, that
the deed of donation was not registered at all. Besides, at the hearing,
petitioners failed to show any evidence proving registration. Petitioners'
counsel even failed to secure a certification from the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan of its due registration as directed by the trial judge.

Hence, while the deed of donation is valid between the donor and the donee
thereby effectively transmitting the rights to said property from Sales to his
daughter, such deed, however, did not bind Leonilo Gonzales, a third party to
the donation. This is because non-registration of a deed of donation under
Sec. 1 of Act No. 3344 does not bind other parties ignorant of a previous
transaction, notwithstanding the provision therein which petitioners invoke
that "any registration made under this section shall be understood to be
without prejudice to a third party with a better right" Petitioner Esperanza
Sales Bermudez may not be a considered a third party 33 being the daughter
of the vendor himself and the "better right" possessed by a third party refers
to other titles which a party might have acquired independently of the
unregistered deed such as title by prescription. 34

We take note of the fact that while the Deed of Donation was not registered,
the Deed of Sale was registered as evidenced by the notation made by
Cipriano Abenojar, Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan 35 and the
official receipt issued by the Registry of Deeds. 36

Finally, we cannot be convinced that it is useless to register deeds or

instruments affecting unregistered lands because the books of registration
provided under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code as Amended
by Act 3344 continue to remain in force even to this day. In fact, under
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, instruments dealing with
unregistered lands can still be registered. 37

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs

against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.