International Phenomenological Society

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Review
Author(s): Alvin P. Dobsevage
Review by: Alvin P. Dobsevage
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Dec., 1953), pp. 265-266
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2103343
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 REVIEWS 265

beingtakeson theaspectofa naughtfromtheperspective ofthetotality

of that-which-is. Here,I think,Mr. Collinseffectively defendsHeidegger
againstthecriticism thathis-doctrineis nihilistic.
In general thereaderwillfindthatthisbookpresents theseexistentialists
in a waythatis plausibleand intelligible to theAmerican reader.Onepri-
maryreasonforthisseemsto be thattheauthorhas managedfidelity to
hissubjectwhileavoidingtheHegelianheritageofformaldialecticwhich
is stillso common to thecontinentalstyleandwhichwe distrust so deeply.
Space doesnotpermita detailedexamination ofeach oftheseexisten-
tialistsbut it maybe said thatthe weakestof the chaptersis curiously
enoughtheoneonMarcel.Thisis partlydueto thefactthatMarcelis the
leastsystematic ofthegroup,but it also seemsthatCollinshas notfully
entered intohisthought.
Mr. Collinsmakesonemajorcriticism ofSartrewhich,ifextended, may
be themostseriousandfataloneforthewholemovement ofexistentialism.
It is this.In commenting on theexperience and idea of "nausea" Collins
writes"Theweakpointremains thenatureofthelinkbetweentheoriginal
emotional experienceandtheontological reflection.
No matterhowgenuine
and compelling a moodthissortmaybe, it cannotbe transformed intoa
philosophic firstprinciple
withoutpassingcertaintests.No reasonis ad-
vancedby Sartreformakingan unconditional ontologicalgeneralization
outofthisexperience. He admitsthatthemoodcouldnotby itselfestab-
lishhisprinciple, buttherelevant issueis whether ithas anyformally onto-
logicalsignificancewhatever." Collinsdoesnotstatewhatthesetestsmight
be,butifonecanformulate themat all thedoubtwillremainthatexisten-
tialismcan meetthem.Existentialism mustestablishthatit is notmerely
basedon somemoodorother.
JAMES GORDON CLAPP.
HUNTER COLLEGE.

Thinkers.
Six Existentialist H. J. BLACKHAM. London,Routledgeand Ke-
ganPaul, Ltd. 1951.Pp. vii,173.
(Owingtoproduction thisbookwasnotpublished
difficulties until1952.)
If existentialism
is a movement thatstemsfromtheseriousness ofthe
problemsof moderncivilization and verylittlehas been said about its
systematicnaturein theAmerican andEnglishphilosophicalreviews,then
certainlyMr.Blackham'sclearand conciseaccountoftheviewsofKierke-
gaard,Nietzsche,Jaspers, Marcel,Heidegger,and Sartreoffersa friendly
and not uncriticalsummation ofthisnewontology withrootsin certain
ancientideasthataffirm individualism.

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266 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICALRESEARCH

lie has takenthemaincategories

ofexistentialism:
liberty,
"pour-sowand en-soi and pour-autrui,Dasein and Zuhandeneand Sorge,
havingand beingand doing,instead (ofcategorieslike) biologicalpropensi-
ties, reflexmechanisms,organicand inorganic,the divisionof'our nature
into cognitive,affective?
and conativeaspects" (161)
andtracedtheirontologi6al-epistemological basisfora philosophy ofaction
through thesixprophets of"salvageand salvation."
Existentialism does notaccepttheusual attemptofotherphilosophies
to reducethediscontiniuitiesin theworld,to join "realmsofbeing' as in
evolutionary naturalism withits doctrineofemergence and refusalofre-
ductionnot less thanin "a monisticmaterialism or idealism"(160). The
discontinuitiesare notofthought but are rather"existential and have to
be lived."A person,a university, a culture,havebeingin theAristotelian
sensethattheirlife-mustbe livedbeforeit can be summedup. If these
termsareto betreferred to as concrete universalsit is onlyunderthecon-
ditionthattheydo notprecedeaction,arenotbinding onthefuture anddo
notendin totalachievement (161).
Sinceit doesnotoffer themkind'ofanalysisthatattempts to definecausal
laws,it is a philosophy of essencesand examinesand exploresultimate
structures and meanings.Rejectinghistoricism and scienceas ultimate
methods, it exaltsthehistorian and thescientist.
"When Ortegay Gasset says, 'Man has no nature,what he has is history',
or Heideggeror Sartresay thatexistenceprecedesessence,theyare not pro-
fessing'any sortof historicism;theyare agreeingwithHegel and Marx and
Vico that man is only what he does, and has no substanceor essence by
whichhe can be intuitivelyand absolutelyknownand by whichhe is or
shouldbe determined.But theyare not agreeingthat-heis historicallyde-
termined.They are sayingthatin whathe makeshimselfto be by his deeds
the existingindividualbecomes an essence to othersand to himself,but
it is an essencewhichhe can ownor repudiate,to whichhe can reactand by
whichhe is not bound" (162).
Sincethesemacroscopic groping philosophies can be emasculatedbythe
microscopicphilosopherwhoasks forclaritythrough logicchopping, we
shallnotattemptit here.
Certainlysucha pulpitphilosophy is oftenresented and deploredinside
thewallsofivy-towered Yet thesemenbearreadingandunder-
institutions.
perhapsbecauseoftheirinfluence
standing, butmoreso "becausetheyare
tryingnotmerelyto thinkbutpersonally to livethesituation ofmanem-
beddedin thesituation
oftheirtime."
Mr. Blackhamgivesa,sympathetic introduction to thesevisionists
that
mayaid manyrevisionists to see whatis perennial in existential
thinking.
ALVIN P. DOBSEVAGE.
BROOKLYN COLLEGE.

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