Spouses Custodio vs.

CA
Spouses Custodio vs. CA, GR No. 116100 February 9, 1996

Facts:

Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a 2 door apartment. The property is surrounded by other immovables.
When Mabasa bought the land, there were tenants who were occupying the property. One of the tenants
vacated the land. Mabasa saw that thhere had been built an adobe fence in the apartment in the first
passageway that made it narrower. The fence was constructed by the Santoses. Morato constructed her fence
and extended it to the entire passageway, therefore, the passageay was enclosed. The case was broguth to
the trial court and ordered the custodios and the Santoses to give Mabasa a permanet ingress and eggress to
the punlic street and asked Mabasa to pay Custodios and Santoses for damages.

Issue:
Whether or not Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way

Ruling:

Yes, Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way. A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment
of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied.
As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in
a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another,
as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. When the owner of property makes use thereof in the
general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this
case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said use can be
considered as a mere consequence of community life

CUSTODIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996

DOCTRINE:
The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the
recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and
damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not
constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a
breach or wrong.

Damnum absque injuria There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal
invasion of a legal right;damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in
those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are
often called damnum absque injuria.

Article 21 Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides the basis for the principle of abuse of rights. For there to
be an abuse of rights, the following requisites must concur: (1) defendant acted in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful and; (3) There was damage or injury to the
plaintiff.

FACTS:
Private Respondent Mabasa wanted to establish an easement of right of way going into their property against
petitioners who built an adobe wall in their properties which thereby restricted access to the
Mabasa property. Petitioners claim that they built the wall in order to protect their persons and their property
from their intrusive neighbors. The Trial Court nonetheless ordered that an easement be created.

Not satisfied, Mabasa went to the Court of Appeals which modified the decision of the trial court by
awarding actual damages (p65,000.00), moral damages (p30,000.00) and exemplary damages (p10,000.00).
Hence this petition. Damages were based on the fact of loss in the form of unrealized rentals on the property
due to the adobe wall restricting access.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in awarding damages.

HELD:
Yes. The Court of Appeals erred, the award for damages has no legal basis. The mere fact of loss does not give
rise to a right to recover damages. There must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by
defendant and a damage to the plaintiff resulting therefrom.Damages are merely a part of the remedy
allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

An injury is an illegal invasion of a legal right, any loss, hurt and harm resulting from the injury is damage.
Damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. In this case, the petitioners
merely constructed an adobe wall which was in keeping with and is a valid exercise of their rights as the owner
of their respective propertiesi.e. there was no abuse of right as provided for in Article 21 of the New Civil
Code and where the following requisites must concur: (1) defendant acted in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful and; (3) There was damage or injury to the
plaintiff. None of these requisites was present in this case.

The loss was therefore not a result of a violation of a legal duty. Instances where the damage was not a result
of an injury is calleddamnum absque injuria and the plaintiff is not normally given an award for damages.

In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only
hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.
People v Buyagan
We resolve the appeal, filed by Teofilo Rey Buyagan (appellant), from the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated December 19, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01938. The CA decision[2] affirmed with modification
the October 30, 2000 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Baguio City, finding the appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, and sentencing him to
suffer the death penalty.

The RTC Ruling

In its October 30, 2000 decision, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide. It gave credence to the testimonies of witnesses Cristina Calixto and
Melvyn Pastor that they saw the appellant shoot Jun Calixto after the latter grabbed the appellants companion
(herein referred to as John Doe) who had robbed the WT Construction Supply store. The lower court likewise
gave credence to the testimonies of witnesses Allan Santiago, Joel Caldito, Jeanie Tugad, Carlos Maniago and
Orlando Viray that they saw the appellant shoot Police Officer 2 (PO2) Arsenio Osorio while the latter was
chasing him. The lower court further added that the gun recovered from the appellant tested positive for the
presence of gunpowder nitrates. In its dispositive portion, the RTC ordered the appellant to pay the heirs of
Calixto the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P22,400.00 as actual damages, and P592,000.00 as
unearned income; and to pay the heirs of PO2 Osorio P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P200,000.00 as moral
damages, P50,690.00 as actual damages, and P1,588,600.00 as unearned income.[3]

The CA Decision

On intermediate appellant review, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, but modified the penalty imposed on the
appellant from death to reclusion perpetua. The CA held that the appellant acted in concert with John Doe in
committing the crime; in fact, he shot Calixto to facilitate the escape of John Doe. It explained that in the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the killing may
occur before, during or after the robbery. The appellate court also ruled that the appellant failed to impute
any ill motive against the prosecution witnesses who positively identified him as the person who shot Calixto
and PO2 Osorio. It also disregarded the appellants denial for being incredible. [4]

Our Ruling

In this final review, we deny the appeal, but further modify the penalty imposed and the awarded
indemnities.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

Essential for conviction of robbery with homicide is proof of a direct relation, an intimate connection between
the robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes
were committed at the same time.[5] In the present case, we find no compelling reason to disturb the findings
of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. The eyewitness accounts of the prosecution witnesses are worthy of belief
as they were clear and straightforward and were consistent with the medical findings of Dr. Vladimir Villaseor.
Melvyn Pastor and Cristina Calixto positively identified the appellant as the person who shot Calixto at the
back of his head as the latter was grappling with John Doe; Orlando Viray, Jeanie Tugad, Allan Santiago, and
Joel Caldito all declared that the appellant shot PO2 Osorio at the market while the latter was chasing him.
Significantly, the appellant never imputed any ill motive on the part of these witnesses to falsely testify against
him.

The lower courts correctly ruled that the appellant and John Doe acted in conspiracy with one another.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and
community of interest. For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that there be an agreement for an appreciable
period prior to the occurrence; it is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, the
malefactors had the same purpose and were united in its execution.[6]

The records show that after John Doe robbed the WT Construction Supply store, he casually walked away from
the store but Calixto grabbed him. While John Doe and Calixto were grappling with each other, the appellant
suddenly appeared from behind and shot Calixto on the head. Immediately after, both the appellant and John
Doe ran towards the Hilltop Road going to the direction of the Hangar Market. Clearly, the two accused acted
in concert to attain a common purpose. Their respective actions summed up to collective efforts to achieve a
common criminal objective.

In People v. Ebet,[7] we explained that homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if its
commission was (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the
culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in
the commission of the crime. As long as there is a nexus between the robbery and the homicide, the latter
crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of the robbery.

Under the given facts, the appellant clearly shot Calixto to facilitate the escape of his robber-companion, John
Doe, and to preserve the latters possession of the stolen items.

The Proper Penalty

The special complex crime of robbery with homicide is penalized, under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, with reclusion perpetua to death. Since the aggravating circumstance of the use of an
unlicensed firearm had been alleged and proven during trial, the lower court correctly sentenced the appellant
to suffer the death penalty pursuant to Article 63 [8] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Nonetheless, we
cannot impose the death penalty in view of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346, entitled An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines. Pursuant to this law, we affirm the CAs reduction of the penalty
from death to reclusion perpetua for each count, with the modification that the appellant shall not be eligible
for parole.

Civil Liabilities

For the deaths of Calixto and PO2 Osorio, we increase the amounts of the awarded civil indemnities
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, as the imposable penalty against the appellant would have been death were it
not for the enactment of R.A. No. 9346.[9]

We affirm, to be duly supported by evidence, the award of P1,588,600.00 as indemnity for loss of earning
capacity to PO2 Osorios heirs. We, however, delete the award for loss of earning capacity to Calixtos heirs
because the prosecution failed to establish this claim. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate a claim for loss of earning capacity. While there are exceptions to this rule, these exceptions do
not apply to Calixto as he was a security guard when he died; he was not a worker earning less than the
current minimum wage under current labor laws.

With respect to actual damages, established jurisprudence only allows expenses duly supported by
receipts. Out of the P50,690.00 awarded by the RTC to PO2 Osorios heirs, only P15,000.00 was supported by
receipts. The difference consists of unreceipted amounts claimed by the victims wife. Considering that the
proven amount is less than P25,000.00, we award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in lieu of
actual damages, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Villanueva.[10] For the same reasons, we also award
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00, in lieu of actual damages, to the heirs of Calixto since the
proven actual damages amounted to only P22,400.00.
The existence of one aggravating circumstance also merits the grant of exemplary damages under Article 2230
of the New Civil Code. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, we award exemplary damages of P30,000.00,
respectively, to the heirs of PO2 Osorio and of Calixto.[11]

Finally, we uphold the award of moral damages to the heirs of PO2 Osorio and to the heirs of Calixto, but
reduce the amount awarded from P200,000.00 to P75,000.00 to conform to prevailing
jurisprudence.[12] However, we observed that the dispositive portion of the RTC decision, as affirmed by the
CA, only awarded moral damages to the heirs of PO2 Osorio. [W]hile the general rule is that the portion of a
decision that becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part thereof,
there are recognized exceptions to this rule: (a) where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the
opinion may be referred to for purposes of construing the judgment, because the dispositive part of a decision
must find support from the decision's ratio decidendi; and (b) where extensive and explicit discussion and
settlement of the issue is found in the body of the decision.[13]

We find that the second exception applies to the case. The omission to state in the dispositive portion the
award of moral damages to the heirs of Calixto was through mere inadvertence. The body of the RTC decision
shows the clear intent of the RTC to award moral damages to the heirs of Calixto.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 19, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01938
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Teofilo Rey Buyagan is hereby declared guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole. For the death of Calixto, the appellant is ordered to pay the victims
heirs the following amounts: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and P25,000.00 as temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages. For the death of PO2
Osorio, the appellant is ordered to pay the victims heirs the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; P25,000.00 as temperate
damages, in lieu of actual damages; and P1,588,600.00 as loss of earning capacity.
 [G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005]
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. AMAY
BISAYA, respondent.

One evening in October 1994, an exclusive party was being held at the Nikko Hotel Manila Garden. The party
was being held for a prominent Japanese national. The person in charge at the party was Ruby Lim who was
also the executive secretary of the hotel. Later during the party, she noticed Robert Reyes (popularly known as
Amay Bisaya). Reyes was not on the list of exclusive guests. Lim first tried to find out who invited Reyes to the
party. When she ascertained that the host celebrant did not invite Reyes, Lim approached Reyes and told the
latter, in a discreet voice, to finish his food and leave the party. Reyes however made a scene and began
shouting at Lim. Later, a policeman was called to escort Reyes out of the party.
Reyes then sued Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden for damages. In his version, he said that he was invited by
another party guest, Dr. Violeta Filart. He said that while he was queuing to get his food, Lim approached him
and ordered him in a loud voice to leave the party immediately. He told Lim he was invited by Dr. Filart
however when he was calling for Dr. Filart the latter ignored him. Later, he was escorted out of the party like a
common criminal.
The trial court ruled in favor of Lim and Nikko Hotel. However, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Reyes as
it ruled that Lim abused her right and that Reyes deserved to be treated humanely and fairly. It is true that Lim
had the right to ask Reyes to leave the party but she should have done it respectfully.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lim acted with abuse of rights.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court found the version of Lim more credible. She has been employed by the hotel for
more than 20 years at that time. Her job requires her to be polite at all times. It is very unlikely for her to
make a scene in the party she was managing. That would only make her look bad.
Reyes based his complaint on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Art. 19 which provides:
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
was not violated by Lim as it appears that even Reyes testified in court that when Lim told him to leave, Lim
did so very close to him so close that they could almost kiss. This only proves that Lim intended that only
Reyes shall hear whatever is it that shes going to tell Reyes and exclude other guests from hearing.
Article 21 on the other hand is commonly known as contra bonus mores:
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
This article is likewise not violated. Lim, as proven by evidence on record, did not demean Reyes. They do not
know each other personally. She has no reason to treat him wrongfully especially so that Reyes himself is a
prominent person.
On the other hand, Reyes brought whatever damage he incurred upon himself. Under the doctrine of volenti
non fit injuria, by coming to the party uninvited, Reyes opens himself to the risk of being turned away, and
thus being embarrassed. The injury he incurred is thus self-inflicted. Evidence even shows that Dr. Filart
herself denied inviting Reyes into the party and that Reyes simply gate-crashed. Reyes did not even present
any supporting evidence to support any of his claims. Since he brought injury upon himself, neither Lim nor
Nikko Hotel can be held liable for damages
 G.R. No. 80194 March 21, 1989
EDGAR JARANTILLA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE KUAN SING, respondents.
Corazon Miraflores and Vicente P. Billena for petitioner.
Manuel S. Gemarino for private respondent.

JARANTILLA v CA (SING)
171 SCRA 429REGALADO; March 21, 1989
NATURE
A p p e a l o n t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s upholding the decision of the trial court
awarding damages to the private respondent.
FACTS
- Private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was "side-swiped by a vehicle in the evening of July 7, 1971 in
lznart Street, Iloilo City" The respondent Court of Appeals concurred in the findings of the court
a quo
that the s a i d v e h i c l e w h i c h f i g u r e d i n t h e m i s h a p , a Volkswagen (Beetle type) car,
was then driven by petitioner Edgar Jarantilla along said street toward
t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e p r o v i n c i a l c a p i t o l , a n d t h a t private respondent sustained physical
injuries as a consequence - Petitioner was accordingly charged before the then City Court of Iloilo for
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence in Criminal Case No. 47207thereof.

P r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t , a s t h e c o m p l a i n i n g witness therein, did not reserve his right to institute

a s e p a r a t e c i v i l a c t i o n a n d h e i n t e r v e n e d i n t h e prosecution of said criminal case through
a private prosecutor. Petitioner was acquitted in said criminal case "on reasonable doubt".- On October
30, 1974, private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner in the former Court of First Instance
of Iloilo, Branch IV, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 9976,
a n d w h i c h c i v i l a c t i o n i n v o l v e d t h e s a m e s u b j e c t m a t t e r a n d a c t complained of
in Criminal Case No. 47027.

I n h i s answer filed therein, the petitioner alleged as special and affirmative detenses that the private
respondent had no cause of action and, additionally, that the latters cause of action, if any, is barred
by the prior judgment in Criminal Case No. 47207 inasmuch as
w h e n s a i d c r i m i n a l c a s e w a s i n s t i t u t e d t h e c i v i l liability was also deemed instituted since
therein plaintiff failed to reserve the civil aspect and actively participated in the criminal case.- Thereafter,
acting on a motion to dismiss of therein defendant, the trial court issued on April 3, 1975 an order
of denial. Petitioner thereafter filed in this C o u r t a p e t i t i o n f o r Certiorari p r o h i b i t i o n a n d
mandamus, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-40992, assailing the aforesaid order of the trial court.
Said petition was dismissed for lack of merit in the Courts r e s o l u t i o n o f J u l y 2 3 , 1 9 7 5 ,
a n d a m o t i o n f o r reconsideration thereof was denied for the same reason in a resolution of
October 28, 1975.- After trial, the court below rendered judgment on
May 23, 1977 in favor of the herein private respondent and ordering
herein petitioner to pay damages. Thus, petitioner appealed said decision to the CA but said respondent
court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court with a few changes in the amount of the damages
to be paid.
ISSUE
W O N t h e p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t , w h o w a s t h e complainant in thecriminal action
for physicali n j u r i e s t h r u r e c k l e s s i m p r u d e n c e a n d w h o participated in the p
r o s e c u t i o n t h e r e o f w i t h o u t r e s e r v i n g t h e c i v i l a c t i o n a r i s i n g f r o m t h e a c t o r omission
complained of, can file a separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or omission where
the herein petitioner was acquitted in the criminal action on reasonable doubt and no civil
liability was adjudicated or awarded in the judgment of acquittal

HELD
YES- The action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate
civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for
damages.

Ratio
The allegations of the complaint filed by the private respondent supports and is constitutive of a case
for a quasi-delict committed by the petitioner. The Court has also heretofore ruled in Elcano vs. Hill that:... a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is also actually
charged criminally, to recover damages on b o t h s c o r e s ; a n d w o u l d b e e n t i t l e d i n s u c h
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e e x t i n c t i o n o f c i v i l l i a b i l i t y referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100o f t h e R e v i s e d P e n a l C o d e ; w h e r e a s t h e
c i v i l liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused . . .- The afforested case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & TaxiCo., Inc., et
al. involved virtually the same factual situation. The Court, in arriving at the conclusion
hereinbefore quoted, expressly declared that the failure of the therein plaintiff to reserve
his right to f i l e a s e p a r a t e c i v i l c a s e i s n o t f a t a l ; t h a t h i s intervention in the criminal
case did not bar him from filing a separate civil action for damages, especially considering that
the accused therein was acquitted because his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt; that the
two cases were anchored on two different causes of action, the criminal case being on a violation of
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code while the subsequent complaint for damages was based on
a quasi-delict; and that in the judgment in the criminal case the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon
and resolved. Consequently, said civil case may proceed as authorized by Article 29 of the Civil Code.-
Under the present jurisprudential milieu, where the trial court acquits the accused on reasonable doubt, it
could very well make a pronouncement on the civil liability of the accused and the complainant could file a
petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to
i n c l u d e s u c h c i v i l l i a b i l i t y i n t h e j u d g m e n t o f acquittal. And that the failure of the
court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to
the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have
the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The
r u l e s n o w h e r e p r o v i d e t h a t i f t h e c o u r t f a i l s t o determine the civil liability it becomes no
longer enforceable.

Dispositive: Decision of CA affirmed, petition denied.