[G.R. No. 9951. December 3, 1914.

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. A. A. ADDISON, Defendant-Appellant.

1. SEARCH WARRANTS; PROSECUTION FOR WRONGFUL ISSUANCE. The statute requires that both
malice and the absence of probable cause must exist concurrently in order to justify a conviction.

2. ID.; ID.; MALICE. Malice cannot be inferred from the fact that the search warrant failed of its
purpose.

3. ID., ID.; PROBABLE CAUSE. Probable cause required to justify the issuance of a search warrant is
such antecedent facts and circumstances as would induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in
pursuance thereof.

4. ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENCY OF PROOF. Testimony examined and held insufficient to show either malice or
the absence of probable cause.

TRENT, J. :

The defendant A. A. Addison, having been condemned to pay a fine of P100, to indemnify the injured
party in the sum of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to the payment of the
costs of the cause, for a violation of the provisions of section 106 of General Orders No. 58, appealed to
this court.

On the 23d of December, 1912, the appellant subscribed and swore to an affidavit wherein he stated
that on or about the 20th of that month at 8.30 a. m. he saw various bottles containing compounds of
opium in an aparador situated in the upstairs sala of the house of John McStay in Lucena, Tayabas. On
the same day the Court of First Instance issued a search warrant, based upon that affidavit, directing the
sheriff to search the house of McStay and seize the opium. In compliance with this warrant the sheriff
proceeded immediately to search the house, but found nothing of a contraband nature, and so reported
to the court. Subsequent thereto, and on the 3d day of January, 1913, John McStay filed a sworn
complaint (denuncia), charging the appellant with the "crime of malicious prosecution" and alleging that
the appellant did, on the 23d day of December, 1912, willfully and maliciously, with the sole intent and
purpose of gratifying his personal resentment against the complainant, procure and obtain, without any
probable cause whatever, a search warrant "of the person, residence, and place of business of the
undersigned, by signing and swearing before the Honorable Herbert D. Gale, judge of the Court of First
Instance, certain malicious, false, and defamatory statements, known to be false and defamatory by said
accused." On the 11th of April, 1913, the provincial fiscal filed a formal complaint against the appellant
charging him with the same crime and setting forth the same allegations as in the complainants
denuncia. After trial, the judgment above stated was duly entered.
For the purpose of showing that the search warrant was procured "maliciously and without probable
cause," the prosecution presented seven witnesses, who testified substantially as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

Juan Merchan, clerk of the court, and Agapito Villasenor, sheriff, testified only in reference to the filing of
the affidavit upon which the search warrant was based, the issuing of the warrant, and the search of the
complainants premises.

John McStay, the complainant, testified that for some time prior to the 23d of December, 1912, he was
running a hotel and canteen in Lucena, Tayabas; that the appellant lived in his hotel from the 28th of
September until the 23d of December; that on the 23d of December the appellant left his hotel on
account of certain disturbances which occurred therein on the previous night; that these disturbances
were caused by three of four guests, and disturbed the appellants sleep; that on the following day the
appellant had a quarrel with one of these guests; that at the time he left he was angry and stated that he
desired to leave the hotel and would arrange his account on the following day; that when he (the
witness) bought the hotel he also bought the beds and the aparadores; and that he and the appellant
were friends, never having had any trouble. As to the damages suffered by the complainant on account
of the search of his premises, he stated that some persons did not know whether he was guilty or not,
and, therefore, stayed away from his hotel during those days, resulting in damaging him in the sum of
P500.

James R. Gittings testified that he was one of the persons who were making the noise in the hotel on the
night of the 22d, while the appellant was sleeping upstairs; that the appellant called their attention to
these disturbances and asked them to stop so that he could sleep; and that on the following day he and
the appellant had a quarrel.

Thomas Hoey, an internal-revenue agent, testified that he accompanied the sheriff at the time the
complainants hotel was searched; and that he induced the appellant to present the affidavit upon which
the search warrant was based, after the appellant had stated to him that opium could be found in
McStays possession.

Guy B. Shiller, principal of the Lucena High School, testified that he had a conversation with the appellant
and Hoey at the government building, and that he heard Hoey ask the appellant if the latter would make
an affidavit for the purpose of securing the search warrant, and the appellant answered that he would.

Jose Nieva, an employee in the Bureau of Agriculture, stated that he was acquainted with Benigna
Robles, a witness for the defendant; that on the 24th of December he returned to Lucena from Manila,
and that when the train stopped at Calamba about 10 a. m., he saw Benigna Robles in the train.

The defense presented four witnesses; Joseph Rosemblatt, Charles R. Duffin, Benigna Robles, and the
Appellant.
Rosemblatt testified that he lived in Lucena up until some time in the month of August, 1912; that at that
time a Mr. Salmon owned the canteen and hotel which was searched by the sheriff; that he was in an
automobile accident when one of the passengers had his arm dislocated and, upon returning to Lucena
after the accident, they went to the drug store to get some opium liniment; that the pharmacist refused
to sell them this medicine without a doctors prescription; that the following day he went to the canteen,
which was located in the hotel, and was then informed by a Mr. Henson that the canteen had some 25
bottles of various kinds of medicines; that these bottles were shown him in an aparador; and that on
taking hold of one of the bottles he discovered that it contained an opium mixture.

Duffin, who was a mechanical engineer at that time, stated that he knew the canteen owner, at the time
the search warrant was issued, to be McStay; that when he first knew the hotel it was owned by one
Henson; that at the time he left Lucena McStay was negotiating for the purchase of that hotel; that he
saw in this hotel on various occasions opium in an aparador; and that this aparador was upstairs.

Benigna Robles testified that she was a dancing girl in McStays saloon in December, 1912; that two days
before Christmas she saw Hoey and McStay talking together in the hotel and heard Hoey use the word
"Addison;" that after Hoey and McStay terminated their conversation, Henson entered the room upstairs
and took out of the aparador some bottles and put them in his pocket; and that that same afternoon the
search was made.

Section 106 of General Orders No. 58 reads: "Any person who shall procure a search warrant maliciously
and without probable cause, and any officer who shall unlawfully exceed his authority or use
unnecessary severity in executing the same, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one
year or by a fine of not exceeding one thousand pesos, or by both such fine and imprisonment."cralaw
virtua1aw library

This section requires that both malice and absence of probable cause must exist concurrently in order to
justify a conviction. If the appellants act in making the affidavit was malicious and unfounded, but there
was probable cause for such act, he must be acquitted. "In a legal sense," says Greenleaf (vol. 2, sec. 453,
16th Ed.) , "any unlawful act done willfully and purposely to the injury of another, is, as against that
person, malicious." Malice cannot be inferred from the fact that no opium was found in the house of the
complainant by the sheriff.

"Probable cause may be defined as such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances, as will warrant a
cautious man in the belief that his action, and the means taken in prosecuting it, are legally just and
proper." (Burton v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 33 Minn., 189.)

Addison lived in McStays hotel from September 28 to December 23, when he left on account of certain
disturbances in the hotel on the night of the 22d. McStay took no part in these disturbances. He and
Addison were, according to his own testimony, friends. But it is said that the fact that Addison in effect
charged McStay with the commission of a serious crime is inconsistent with the latters testimony to the
effect that they were friends. McStay said that they were friends, and he is the person who claims to
have been injured. Again, Addison was induced by the internal-revenue agent to make the affidavit. In so
doing he was carrying out his obligation as an "informer," and as such informer he had reasonable cause
to believe that he would be rewarded therefor in accordance with certain provisions of the Opium Law.

Rosemblatt testified that he saw opium in the aparador before McStay bought the hotel. Duffin testified
to the same effect and, also, that at the time he saw the opium McStay was negotiating for the purchase
of the hotel. Benigna Robles said that she saw opium in the hotel two days before Christmas. She also
testified in effect that McStay was notified of the issuance of a search warrant and caused the opium to
be removed. The prosecution attempted to show that this witness was not in Lucena on the 23d of
December, and for this purpose presented Jose Nieva, who testified that on his return to Lucena on the
24th he saw Benigna in the train at Calamba. It does not appear that Benigna could not have come to
Manila on the afternoon or night of the 23d, or even on the morning of the 24th. We must, therefore,
conclude that there was an absence of malice on the part of the defendant in making the affidavit and
that there existed probable cause for making the affidavit.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is reversed and the defendant acquitted, with
costs de officio.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-69899 July 15, 1985

ROMMEL CORRO, petitioner,

vs.

HON. ESTEBAN LISING Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch XCV HON. REMIGIO
ZARI Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 98; CITY FISCAL'S OFFICE, Quezon City; LT. COL. BERLIN A.
CASTILLO and 1ST LT. GODOFREDO M. IGNACIO, respondents,

Reynaldo L. Bagatsing for petitioner.

RELOVA, J.:

On September 29, 1983, respondent Regional Trial Court judge Esteban Lising of Quezon City, upon
application filed by Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo of the Philippine Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service,
issued Search Warrant No. Q-00002 authorizing the search and seizure of

1. Printed copies of Philippine Times;

2. Manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine Times;

3. Newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times;

4. Subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners;

5. Typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines, video

machines and tapes

which have been used and are being used as instrument and means of committing the crime of inciting
to sedition defined and penalized under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD
1835 ... (p. 24, Rollo)

On November 6, 1984, petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to return
documents/personal properties alleging among others that:

2. ... the properties seized are typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape
recording machines, video machines and tapes which are not in any way, inanimate or mute things as
they are, connected with the offense of inciting to sedition.

3. More so, documents or papers seized purporting to do the body of the crime has been rendered
moot and academic due to the findings of the Agrava Board that a military conspiracy was responsible
for the slaying of the late Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983 at the Manila International
Airport. The Agrava Board which has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the facts and circumstances
behind the killing had virtually affirmed by evidence testamentary and documentary the fact that
soldiers killed Benigno Aquino, Jr.

4. More so, the grave offense of libel, RTC, Q.C. Branch XCV has dismissed said case against the
accused on all documents pertinent and more so as we repeat, rendered moot and academic by the
recent Agrava Report. (p. 27, Rollo)

On January 28, 1985, respondent Judge Lising denied the motion in a resolution, pertinent portions of
which state:

... The said articles presently form part of the evidence of the prosecution and they are not under the
control of the prosecuting arm of the government. Under these circumstances, the proper forum from
which the petition to withdraw the articles should be addressed, is the Office of the City Fiscal, Quezon
City and not with this Branch of the Court. It is to be further noted that it is not even with this Branch of
the Court that the offense of inciting to sedition is pending. (p 29, Rollo)

Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus, with application for preliminary injunction and
restraining order to enjoin respondent Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 98 from
proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. S3-Q-29243, praying (a) that Search Warrant No. Q-00002
issued by respondent Judge Esteban M. Lising be declared null and void ab initio and that a mandatory
injunction be issued directing respondents City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City and Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo
and 1st Lt. Godofredo Ignacio jointly and severally to return immediately the documents/properties
illegally seized from herein petitioner and that final injunction be issued enjoining respondents City
Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, Lt. Col. Castillo and 1st Lt. Ignacio from utilizing said documents/properties
as evidence in Criminal Case No. 29243; and (b) that respondent PC-CIS officers Lt. Col. Berlin A. Castillo
and lst Lt. Godofredo Ignacio be directed to reopen the padlocked office premises of the Philippine
Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Building, T.M., Kalaw, Ermita, Manila.

In Our Resolution of February 19, 1985, respondents were required to file their comment. The plea for
temporary restraining order was granted and respondents City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, Lt. Col.
Berlin Castillo and 1st Lt. Godofredo Ignacio were enjoined from introducing as evidence for the state
the documents/properties seized under Search Warrant No. Q-00002 in Criminal Cage No. Q-29243
(Sedition case against petitioner), pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from the Court.

Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that (1) the present action is
premature because petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration of respondent Judge
Lising's order of January 28, 1985; (2) probable cause exists justifying the issuance of a search warrant;
(3) the articles seized were adequately described in the search warrant; (4) a search was conducted in an
orderly manner; (5) the padlocking of the searched premises was with the consent of petitioner's wife;
(6) the findings of the Agrava Board is irrelevant to the issue of the validity of the search warrant; (7)
press freedom is not an issue; and, (8) the petition is barred by laches.

There is merit in the petition.

Respondents contend that petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the order in
question before coming to Us. This is not always so. When the questions raised before the Supreme
Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in and passed upon by the lower court, the filing
of the motion for reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in the Supreme Court is
no longer a pre-requisite. As held in Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, (t)he rule requiring
the filing of a motion for reconsideration before an application for a writ of certiorari can be entertained
was never intended to be applied without considering the circumstances. The rule does not apply where,
the deprivation of petitioners' fundamental right to due process taints the proceeding against them in
the court below not only with irregularity but also with nullity." Likewise, in Pajo, et al. vs. Ago, et al., 108
Phil. 905 and in Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 3 SCRA 465, this Court ruled that "it is only when
questions are raised for the first time before the high court in a certiorari case that the writ shall not
issue, unless the lower court had first been given an opportunity to pass upon the same." Further, in the
case of Matute vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768, We held that "while as a matter of policy a motion for
reconsideration in the lower court has often been considered a condition sine qua non for the granting
of a writ of certiorari, this rule does not apply where the proceeding in which the error occurred is a
patent nullity or where 'the deprivation of petitioner's fundamental right to due process ... taints the
proceeding against him in the court below not only with irregularity but with nullity (Luzon Surety Co. v.
Marbella et al., L-16038, Sept. 30, 1960), or when special circumstances warrant immediate and more
direct action. ..." The records of this petition clearly disclose that the issues herein raised have already
been presented to and passed upon by the court a quo.

Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides:

SEC. 3. ...no search warrant or warrant of arrest issue except upon probable cause to be determined by
the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

and, Section 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court, states that:

SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Probable cause may be defined as "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances, as will warrant a
cautious man in the belief that his actions, and the means taken in prosecuting it, are legally just and
proper (Burton vs. St. Paul, M & M. Ry. Co., 33 Minn. 189, cited in U.S. vs. Addison, 28 Phil. 566)." Thus,
an application for search warrant must state with particularly the alleged subversive materials published
or intended to be published by the publisher and editor of the Philippine Times, Rommel Corro. As We
have stated in Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, 133 SCRA 800, "mere
generalization will not suffice." A search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched
and the things to be seized. "The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to
be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant- to leave the officers of
the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable
searches and seizures may not be committed, that abuses may not be committed Bache & Co. Phil.
Inc. vs, Ruiz, supra)." The affidavit of Col. Castillo states that in several issues of the Philippine Times:

... we found that the said publication in fact foments distrust and hatred against the government of the
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities, defined and penalized by Article 142 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1835; (p. 22, Rollo)

and, the affidavit of Lt. Ignacio reads, among others

... the said periodical published by Rommel Corro, contains articles tending to incite distrust and hatred
for the Government of the Philippines or any of its duly constituted authorities. (p. 23, Rollo)

The above statements are mere conclusions of law and will not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. They can not serve as basis for the issuance of search warrant, absent of the existence of
probable cause. In fact, as a consequence of the search warrant issued, the items confiscated from the
premises of the office of the Philippine Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Bldg., T.M. Kalaw,
Ermita, Manila were the following:

1. One bundle of assorted negative;

2. One bundle of assorted lay out;

3. Three folders of assorted articles/writings used by Philippine Times news and other
paraphernalias;

4. Four tape alleged speech of Mayor Climaco, two alleged speeches of Aquino and a speech of
one various artist;

5. One bundle Dummies;

6. Ten bundles of assorted copies of Philippine Times issued on different dates (Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14 & 15):

7. One Typewriter Remington Brand Long Carriage with No. J-2479373;

8. OneTypewriterAdler-short with No. 9003011;

9. Three (3) bundles of Philippine Times latest issue for Baguio City (p. 26, Rollo)

In Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, this Court held that search warrants authorizing the seizure of
books of accounts and records "showing all the business transactions" of certain persons, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal, contravene the explicit comment of the Bill of Rights that
the things to be seized should be particularly described and defeat its major objective of eliminating
general warrants. In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed seizure of
printed copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper
dummies, subversive documents, articles, etc., and even typewriters, duplicating machines,
mimeographing and tape recording machines. Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to include
all conceivable records and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The
search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is constitutionally
objectionable.

Respondents do not deny the fact that the business office of the "Philippine Times" of which petitioner
was the publisher-editor was padlocked and sealed. The consequence is, the printing and publication of
said newspaper were discontinued. In Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
supra, We held that "[sluch closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the
freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of
petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a
democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry."

Finally, respondents argue that while the search warrant was issued on September 29, 1983 and was
executed on the very same day, it was only on November 6, 1984, or one (1) year, one (1) month and six
(6) days when petitioner filed his motion for the recall of the warrant and the return of the
documents/personal properties. Having failed to act seasonably, respondents claim that petitioner is
guilty of laches.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 35).

In his petition, Corro alleged that on October 1, 1983, less than forty-two (42) hours after the military
operatives shut down his newspaper on September 29, 1983, he was invited by the Director-General
PC/INP, and subsequently detained. Thereafter, he was charged with the crime of inciting to sedition
before the City Fiscal's Office in Quezon City, and on October 7, 1983, a preventive detention action was
served upon him. Consequently, he had to file a petition for habeas corpus. It was only on November 8,
1984 when this Court issued its Resolution in G.R. No. 68976, entitled: In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Rommel Corro Angle Corro vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., releasing Rommel
Corro on recognizance of his lawyers, Attys. Humberto B. Basco, Reynaldo Bagatsing and Edilberto Balce,
In the same month, November 1984, petitioner filed his motion to recall warrant and to return the
seized documents. When respondent judge denied the motion, he came to Us.

Considering the above circumstances, the claim that petitioner had abandoned his right to the
possession of the seized properties is incorrect.

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. Q-00002 issued by the respondent judge on September 29, 1983 is
declared null and void and, accordingly, SET ASIDE.

The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is GRANTED and all
properties seized thereunder are hereby ordered RELEASED to petitioner. Further, respondents Lt. Col.
Berlin A. Castillo and lst Lt. Godofredo M. Ignacio are ordered to RE-OPEN the padlocked office premises
of the Philippine Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita, Manila. SO
ORDERED

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC.,
petitioners,

vs.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE
CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL.,
respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon
City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We
Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the
said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to
be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum"
newspaper, were seized.

Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the
return of the seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential
Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their
representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined from using
the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal
Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1

In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The plea for
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to
July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.

At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned
articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of the
aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction
was rendered moot and academic.

Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come to this
Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before respondent judge.
Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court, should have filed a
motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw notwithstanding,
we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues
raised not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was
televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special
circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the
revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the
power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation,
whenever the purposes of justice require it...".

Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid on
the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition
impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six [6]
months.

Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5

Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the petition
thus:

Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation] with the fact that
the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than half a year after the petitioners' premises had been
raided.

The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this long to bring their
case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The events of the past eleven
fill years had taught them that everything in this country, from release of public funds to release of
detained persons from custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or largesse

Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the President, like Fiscal
Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet asking the return at least
of the printing equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino V.
Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security Command, they were further
encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired results.

After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo]

Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no ground
to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by
petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to the
possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.

Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as
evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from
challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of respondents. These
documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with them,
within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any way affect
the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.

Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in
question.

1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional
provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court . 6 This objection, however, may properly be
considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9,
1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his
witnesses.

2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19, Road
3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively.
Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the
ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:

Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing the crime of
subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road
3, Project 6, Quezon City.

The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were applied for
and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite
absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the same
place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the
application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed the search
warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent
than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units
C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of
the said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued
Warrant No. 20-82 [b].

In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient
particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in
the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant
on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant
intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the executing officer may
look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be
searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants
were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr.,
Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.

Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized under
a search warrant, to wit:

Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
the following personal property:

[a] Property subject of the offense;

[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and

[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against
whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b]
of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily,
stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may be at the time
of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person
against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the
warrants.

4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the disputed
warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments
or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on
in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or
works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo 9 where this legal provision
was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when
placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant,
usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent
of the owner.

In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the
ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col. Rolando N.
Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. 10 The application was accompanied by the Joint
Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and
Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of
the application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have provided
sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance
with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:

SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in
connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its
supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive
material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad
statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing
equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are
all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under
Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of
probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a
grave error for respondent judge to have done so.

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the
joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by
our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and things above-described
were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote
the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines,
and April 6 Movement." 13

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, ...
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; 14
the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the
facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance,
15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before
respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is
that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be
seized in this wise:

1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters, cabinets,
tables, communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or
connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents communication,
letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.

2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to promote the
objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-
a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,

3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive
materials and propaganda, more particularly,

1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;

2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969

3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;

4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,

5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong Silang."

In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records,
pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments
concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too
general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703
or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the
seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General
Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and
therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in
question cannot be characterized differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English history: the era
of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were
given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of
dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it
is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the
voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.

As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan
Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were
padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were
discontinued.

Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press
guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to
express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework
where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the
citizenry.

Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have
been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes "the
sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged in subversive activities against
the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance with implementing rules and
regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful however, if
sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any implementing rules and regulations
promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.

Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than President
Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property seized from
petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:

The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of the WE FORUM
newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.

On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in Quezon City and took a
detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in the premises.

Cendaa said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain at the disposal of the
owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19

That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed by the
reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S.
Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM " case.
20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:

2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our authorities to
close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses. 21

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent judge
on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a
writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized
thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-45358 January 29, 1937

NARCISO ALVAREZ, petitioner,

vs.

THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABAS and THE ANTI-USURY BOARD, respondents

IMPERIAL, J.:

The petitioner asks that the warrant of June 3, 1936, issued by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas,
ordering the search of his house and the seizure, at any time of the day or night, of certain accounting
books, documents and papers belonging to him in his residence situated in Infanta, Province of Tayabas,
as well as the order of a later date, authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain the articles
seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question be returned to him.

On the date above-mentioned, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the
Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner kept in his
house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in
connection with his activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the
law. In his oath at the and of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the
questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his
statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a
reliable person. Upon the affidavit in question the Judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the
subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the petitioner's house at nay time of the day or
night, the seizure of the books and documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to
him to be disposed of in accordance with the law. With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury
Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at seven o'clock on the night of June 4, 1936, and
seized and took possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936,
one ledger, two journals, two cashbooks, nine order books, four notebooks, four checks stubs, two
memorandums, three bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs, forty-eight stubs of purchases of copra, two
inventories, two bundles of bills of lading, one bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of
purchases of copra, two packages of correspondence, one receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez,
fourteen bundles of invoices and other papers many documents and loan contracts with security and
promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation. The search for and a seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of the
petitioner who stated his protest below the inventories on the ground that the agents seized even the
originals of the documents. As the articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued
the search warrant, the petitioner, through his attorney, filed a motion on June 8, 1936, praying that the
agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered immediately to deposit all the seized articles in
the office of the clerk of court and that said agent be declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed
the order of the court. On said date the court issued an order directing Emilio L. Siongco to deposit all
the articles seized within twenty-four hours from the receipt of notice thereof and giving him a period of
five (5) days within which to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court. On June
10th, Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed a motion praying that the
order of the 8th of said month be set aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized to retain the
articles seized for a period of thirty (30) days for the necessary investigation. The attorney for the
petitioner, on June 20th, filed another motion alleging that, notwithstanding the order of the 8th of said
month, the officials of the Anti-Usury Board had failed to deposit the articles seized by them and praying
that a search warrant be issued, that the sheriff be ordered to take all the articles into his custody and
deposit of the Anti-Usury Board be punished for contempt of court. Said attorney, on June 24th, filed an
ex parte petition alleging that while agent Emilio L. Siongco had deposited some documents and papers
in the office of the clerk of court, he had so far failed to file an inventory duly verified by oath of all the
documents seized by him, to return the search warrant together with the affidavit it presented in
support thereof, or to present the report of the proceedings taken by him; and prayed that said agent be
directed to filed the documents in question immediately. On the 25th of said month the court issued an
order requiring agent Emilio L. Siongco forthwith to file the search warrant and the affidavit in the court,
together with the proceedings taken by him, and to present an inventory duly verified by oath of all the
articles seized. On July 2d of said year, the attorney for the petitioner filed another petition alleging that
the search warrant issue was illegal and that it had nit yet been returned to date together with the
proceedings taken in connection therewith, and praying that said warrant be cancelled, that an order be
issued directing the return of all the articles seized to the petitioner, that the agent who seized them be
declared guilty of contempt of court, and that charges be filed against him for abuse of authority. On
September 10, 1936, the court issued an order holding: that the search warrant was obtained and issued
in accordance with the law, that it had been duly complied with and, consequently, should not be
cancelled, and that agent Emilio L. Siongco did not commit any contempt of court and must, therefore,
be exonerated, and ordering the chief of the Anti-Usury Board in Manila to show case, if any, within the
unextendible period of two (2) days from the date of notice of said order, why all the articles seized
appearing in the inventory, Exhibit 1, should not be returned to the petitioner. The assistant chief of the
Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice filed a motion praying, for the reasons stated therein, that
the articles seized be ordered retained for the purpose of conducting an investigation of the violation of
the Anti-Usury Law committed by the petitioner. In view of the opposition of the attorney for the
petitioner, the court, on September 25th, issued an order requiring the Anti-Usury Board to specify the
time needed by it to examine the documents and papers seized and which of them should be retained,
granting it a period of five (5) days for said purpose. On the 30th of said month the assistant chief of the
Anti-Usury Board filed a motion praying that he be granted ten (10) days to comply with the order of
September 25th and that the clerk of court be ordered to return to him all the documents and papers
together with the inventory thereof. The court, in an order of October 2d of said year, granted him the
additional period of ten(10) days and ordered the clerk of court to send him a copy of the inventory. On
October 10th, said official again filed another motion alleging that he needed sixty (60) days to examine
the documents and papers seized, which are designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5,
1016, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45, and praying that he be granted said
period of sixty (60) days. In an order of October 16th, the court granted him the period of sixty (60) days
to investigate said nineteen (19) documents. The petitioner alleges, and it is not denied by the
respondents, that these nineteen (19)documents continue in the possession of the court, the rest having
been returned to said petitioner.

I. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands,
signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search
for personal property and bring it before the court (section 95, General Orders. No. 58, as amended by
section 6 of Act No. 2886). Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential
to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his
private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others (In re Pacific Railways
Commission, 32 Fed., 241; Interstate Commerce Commission vs Brimson, 38 Law. ed., 1047; Broyd vs. U.
S., 29 Law. ed., 746; Caroll vs. U. S., 69 Law. ed., 543, 549). While the power to search and seize is
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights or citizen, for the enforcement of no statue is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basis principles of government (People vs. Elias, 147 N. E., 472).

II. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional right is one of the highest
duties and privileges of the court, these constitutional guaranties should be given a liberal construction
or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual
depreciation on, the rights secured by them(State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel,
231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general rule that statutes
authorizing searches and seizure or search warrants must be strictly construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed.,
[2d], 189; Leonard vs. U. S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U. S. 14 Fed. [2d],88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613).

III. The petitioner claims that the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has been based
upon the affidavit of agent Mariano G. Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no personal
knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a basis for the issuance of the warrant but that he had
knowledge thereof through mere information secured from a person whom he considered reliable. To
the question "What are your reason for applying for this search warrant", appearing in the affidavit, the
agent answered: "It has been reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that there are
being kept in said premises, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits, and other papers used by him in
connection with his activities as a money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the
law" and in attesting the truth of his statements contained in the affidavit, the said agent states that he
found them to be correct and true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution, relative to the bill of rights, provides that "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place top be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." Section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that "A search warrant shall not issue
except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized." It will be noted that both provisions require that there
be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be
based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant ands the witnesses he may produce. In its
broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in
conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined asan outward pledge
given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his
responsibility to God (Bouvier's Law Dictionary; State vs. Jackson, 137 N. W., 1034; In re Sage, 24 Oh. Cir.
Ct. [N. S.], 7; Pumphery vs. State, 122 N. W., 19; Priest vs. State, 6 N. W., 468; State vs. Jones, 154 Pac.,
378; Atwood vs. State, 111 So., 865). The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant,
of the existence of probable cause (U. S. vs. Tureaud, 20 Fed., 621; U. S. vs. Michalski, 265 Fed., 8349; U.
S. vs. Pitotto, 267 Fed., 603; U. S. vs. Lai Chew, 298 Fed., 652). The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit
to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury
could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused (State vs. Roosevelt Country
20th Jud. Dis. Ct., 244 Pac., 280; State vs. Quartier, 236 Pac., 746).

It will likewise be noted that section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizure. Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace against which the
constitutional guarantee afford full protection. The term "unreasonable search and seizure" is not
defined in the Constitution or in General Orders No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed, absolute or
unchangeable meaning, although the term has been defined in general language. All illegal searches and
seizure are unreasonable while lawful ones are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a
consideration of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search, the presence or
absence or probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured (Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. U. S. 75 Law. ed., 374;
Peru vs. U. S., 4 Fed., [2d], 881;U. S. vs. Vatune, 292 Fed., 497; Angelo vs. U. S. 70 Law, ed., 145; Lambert
vs. U. S. 282 Fed., 413; U. S. vs. Bateman, 278 Fed., 231; Mason vs. Rollins, 16 Fed. Cas. [No. 9252], 2
Biss., 99).

In view of the foregoing and under the above-cited authorities, it appears that the affidavit, which
served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the
manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question
and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal and do not in any way
warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected.

IV. Another ground alleged by the petitioner in asking that the search warrant be declared illegal and
cancelled is that it was not supported by other affidavits aside from that made by the applicant. In other
words, it is contended that the search warrant cannot be issued unless it be supported by affidavits
made by the applicant and the witnesses to be presented necessity by him. Section 1, paragraph 3, of
Article III of the Constitution provides that no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce. Section 98 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that the judge or justice must,
before issuing the warrant, examine under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and
take their depositions in writing. It is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the
applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant
in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Mariano G. Almeda and that he did not
require nor take the deposition of any other witness. Neither the Constitution nor General Orders. No.
58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the deposition of the witnesses to be presented by
the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring
the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the
existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the
judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was
insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the
judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of
probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant of the
complaint contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is
satisfied that there exist probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay,
the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the fact is necessary. We
conclude, therefore, that the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit
of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.

V. The petitioner alleged as another ground for the declaration of the illegality of the search warrant and
the cancellation thereof, the fact that it authorized its execution at night. Section 101 of General Orders,
No. 58 authorizes that the search be made at night when it is positively asserted in the affidavits that the
property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched. As we have declared the affidavits
insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is
equally well founded and that the search could not legally be made at night.

VI. One of the grounds alleged by the petitioner in support of his contention that the warrant was issued
illegally is the lack of an adequate description of the books and documents to be seized. Section 1,
paragraphs 3, of Article III of the Constitution, and section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 provide that the
affidavit to be presented, which shall serve as the basis for determining whether probable cause exist
and whether the warrant should be issued, must contain a particular description of the place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized. These provisions are mandatory and must be strictly
complied with (Munch vs. U. S., 24 Fed. [2d], 518; U. S. vs. Boyd, 1 Fed. [2d], 1019; U. S. vs. Carlson, 292
Fed., 463; U. S. vs. Borkowski, 268 Fed., 408; In re Tri-State Coal & Coke Co., 253 Fed., 605; People vs.
Mayen, 188 Cal., 237; People vs. Kahn, 256 Ill. App., 4125); but where, by the nature of the goods to be
seized, their description must be rather generally, it is not required that a technical description be given,
as this would mean that no warrant could issue (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 284; People vs. Kahn, supra).
The only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: "that
there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by
him in connection with his activities as money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of
the law." Taking into consideration the nature of the article so described, it is clear that no other more
adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a
particular description of the contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the
legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a
position enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.

VII. The last ground alleged by the petitioner, in support of his claim that the search warrant was
obtained illegally, is that the articles were seized in order that the Anti-Usury Board might provide itself
with evidence to be used by it in the criminal case or cases which might be filed against him for violation
of the Anti-usury Law. At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the court it clearly
appeared that the books and documents had really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to
conduct an investigation and later use all or some of the articles in question as evidence against the
petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed against him. The seizure of books and documents by
means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the
person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant
unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the
compulsion of an accused to testify against himself (Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil,, 886; Brady vs. U. S.,
266 U. S., 620; Temperani vs. U. S., 299 Fed., 365; U. S. vs. Madden, 297 Fed., 679; Boyd vs. U. S.,116 U.
S., 116; Caroll vs. U. S., 267 U. S., 132). Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in
question were seized for the purpose of using them as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal
proceeding or proceedings for violation against him, we hold that the search warrant issued is illegal and
that the documents should be returned to him.

The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the validity of the
search warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has waived his
constitutional rights in proposing a compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose
of evading the criminal proceeding or proceedings. We are of the opinion that there was no such waiver,
first, because the petitioner has emphatically denied the offer of compromise and, second, because if
there was a compromise it reffered but to the institution of criminal proceedings fro violation of the
Anti-Usury Law. The waiver would have been a good defense for the respondents had the petitioner
voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of the articles in question, but such was not the case
because the petitioner protested from the beginning and stated his protest in writing in the insufficient
inventory furnished him by the agents.

Said board alleges as another defense that the remedy sought by the petitioner does not lie because he
can appeal from the orders which prejudiced him and are the subject matter of his petition. Section 222
of the Code of Civil Procedure in fact provides that mandamus will not issue when there is another plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. We are of the opinion, however, that an
appeal from said orders would have to lapse before he recovers possession of the documents and before
the rights, of which he has been unlawfully deprived, are restored to him (Fajardo vs. Llorente, 6 Phil.,
426; Manotoc vs. McMicking and Trinidad, 10 Phil., 119; Cruz Herrera de Lukban vs. McMicking, 14 Phil.,
641; Lamb vs. Phipps, 22 Phil., 456).
Summarizing the foregoing conclusions, we hold:

1. That the provisions of the Constitution and General Orders, No. 58, relative to search and seizure,
should be given a liberal construction in favor of the individual in order to maintain the constitutional
guaranties whole and in their full force;

2. That since the provisions in question are drastic in their form and fundamentally restrict the
enjoyment of the ownership, possession and use of the personal property of the individual, they should
be strictly construed;

3. That the search and seizure made are illegal for the following reasons: (a) Because the warrant was
based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal knowledge of the facts of probable
cause, and (b) because the warrant was issued for the sole purpose of seizing evidence which would
later be used in the criminal proceedings that might be instituted against the petitioner, for violation of
the Anti-Usury Law;

4. That as the warrant had been issued unreasonably, and as it does not appear positively in the affidavit
that the articles were in the possession of the petitioner and in the place indicated, neither could the
search and seizure be made at night;

5. That although it is not mandatory to present affidavits of witnesses to corroborate the applicant or a
complainant in cases where the latter has personal knowledge of the facts, when the applicant's or
complainant's knowledge of the facts is merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require affidavits of
other witnesses so that he may determine whether probable cause exists;

6. That a detailed description of the person and place to be searched and the articles to be seized is
necessary, but whereby, by the nature of the articles to be seized, their description must be rather
general, but is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant
could issue;

7. That the petitioner did not waive his constitutional rights because the offer of compromise or
settlement attributed to him, does not mean, if so made, that he voluntarily tolerated the search and
seizure; and

8. That an appeal from the orders questioned by the petitioner, if taken by him, would not be an
effective, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and, consequently, the petition for
mandamus filed by him, lies.

For the foregoing considerations, the search warrant and the seizure of June 3, 1936, and the orders of
the respondent court authorizing the relation of the books and documents, are declared illegal and are
set aside, and it is ordered that the judge presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas direct the
immediate return to the petitioner of the nineteen (19) documents designated on pages 1 to 4 of the
inventory by Nos. 5, 10, 16, 23, 25,26, 27, 30, 31, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45, without
special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-8474 September 30, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.

PEDRO DE LA PEA, OSMUNDO RAMOS and HON. RAMON SAN JOSE, respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside certain resolutions of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
However, considering the allegations and the ultimate purpose of the petition, the same will be regarded
as one for mandamus, in accordance with the doctrine laid down in Guzman vs. Lichauco (42 Phil. 291)
and People vs. Concepcion (55 Phil. 485, 492).

Respondents, Pedro de la Pea and Osmundo Ramos, are accused, in Criminal Cases Nos. 24746 to
24755 and 24824 to 24833 (20 cases) of said court, of illegal procurement of search warrants, in
violation of Article 129 of the Revised Penal Code. In the information filed in case No. 24750the
language of which is analogous to that of the information filed in the other nineteen (19) cases, except
as regards the names and addresses of the respective complaining witnessesit is averred:

That on or about the 30th day of April, 1951, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the accused Pedro de la
Pea, being then the Chief of Special Investigating Team, and the accused Osmundo Ramos being then
an agent, of the Military Intelligence Service G-2, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and therefore public
officers or employees, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, and
pursuant to a common intent, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously procure a search
warrant without a just cause, by then and there applying for the same and filing a deposition of witness
in support of the application for search warrant before the Court of First Instance, this City; and that by
reason and on account of said application and deposition the said accused succeeded in procuring from
the said court a search warrant against Ty Kong Tek of 142 V. Mapa St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, where a
search was actually made or caused to be made by the said accused, both knowing fully well that the
statements and allegations contained in the said application as well as in the said deposition were false.
(Record, p. 4.)

At the joint hearing of said twenty (20) cases, before Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
presided over by respondent Judge, Honorable Ramon San Jose, the prosecution placed on the witness
stand, the offended party in said case No. 24750, namely, Ty Kong Tek, who testified that, while he was in
his house at 142 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, on March 1, 1951, at about 2:00 a.m., Pedro de la
Pea, one of the respondents herein, and one of the defendants therein, came, accompanied by several
persons, including two Chinese named Koa San and Tan Tek; that De la Pea and his companions, who
were provided with a search warrant, searched the house, stating that they were looking for firearms
and U. S. dollars, none of which were found in the premises; that they found, however, two (2) books of
account of Ty Kong Tek for the years 1948 and 1949; that at 6:00 a.m., De la Pea took Ty Kong Tek for
investigation to Camp Murphy, where he was urged to confess that he had been engaged in the
exchange business and had been handling U. S. dollars, which the witness refused to admit; and that,
later, in the afternoon, De la Pea arrested the son and a nephew of the witness. At this juncture, the
prosecution inquired whether he knew why his son and nephew were arrested, but, the defense
objected thereto upon the ground that the question referred to an act subsequent to the issuance of the
aforementioned search warrant and, hence, immaterial to the issue. Although the prosecution explained
that it sought to establish the motive of De la Pea in securing the search warrant, respondent Judge
sustained the objection. Thereupon, the prosecution asked Ty Kong Tek whether he knew whether or not
his abovementioned son and nephew had anything to do with the reason for the search made, in their
house, by the party headed by De la Pea. The defense objected to the question upon the same ground,
and the court sustained the objection.

Ty Kong Tek further stated, on the witness stand, that De la Pea investigated him six (6) times at Camp
Murphy; that, during the investigation, De la Pea told Ty Kong Tek that, unless he admitted that he had
dealt in U. S. dollars and engaged in the exchange of money, said respondent would arrest the son and
nephew of the witness, as they were in fact detained by De la Pea in the afternoon of March 1, 1951;
that, thereafter, one of the members of the party led by De la Pea, who made a search in complainant's
house, namely, Koa San, approached the witness and told him that he, his son and his (witness') nephew
would be released if he (Ty Kong Tek) gave him (Koa San) and De la Pea the sum of P20,000. On motion
of the defense respondent Judge ordered the last statement of Ty Kong Tek stricken from the record.

Ty Kong Tek, likewise, declared that Koa San was sometimes present during the investigation of the
former in Camp Murphy; that after the first investigation of Ty Kong Tek by De la Pea, the former was
sent to his quarters in said camp; and that Koa San came to see Ty Kong Tek and talked to him. This
statement was, also, ordered stricken out, on the motion of the defense. Moreover, the latter made of
record its general objection to all questions relative to events which occurred subsequently to the
issuance of the search warrant aforementioned. Although the prosecution explained that it was trying to
prove the unlawful motive with which the search warrant had allegedly been obtained, respondent
Judge hold that "anything that happened after that (issuance of the search warrant) will be immaterial"
(p. 28, t. s. n.) Thereupon, on motion of the herein petitioner, Jose G. Lucban, Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), who, as Special Prosecutor, handled the case for the Government, in
collaboration with Assistant City Fiscal, Guillermo Dacumos, respondent Judge suspended the hearing, in
order that the prosecution could bring the matter to this Court, for determination of the propriety of
introducing evidence of acts performed by the accused after the issuance of the search warrant in
question. Hence, the present case.
Respondents herein maintain that the alleged illegal procurement of the aforementioned search warrant
may be established only by proof of acts either preceding, or coetaneous with, the commission of
offense charged, not by acts performed subsequently thereto. Upon the other hand, petitioner herein
contends that the motive of the accused may be established by posterior acts, such as, for instance, an
attempt to extort money as a condition precedent to the release of the complainant.

It is clear to our mind that said attempt to extort money, even if effected after the issuance of the search
warrant, but prior to the release of the complainant, is relevant to the question whether or not said was
illegally procured, owing to the obvious tendency of the aforementioned circumstance, if proven, to
establish that the accused was prompted by the desire to get money from said complainant. The
relevancy would be more patent if a similar attempt has been made in the other nineteen (19) cases or
in some of them. It is, likewise, apparent that evidence of the intent of the party who obtained said
warrant or warrants is not only relevant, but very material, where the accused are charged with having
"willfully, unlawfully and feloniously procured" said process, "pursuant to a common intent," as alleged
in the information filed in the cases under consideration.

Respondents insist, however, that:1wphl.nt

. . . Our Supreme Court, in the case of People vs. Sy Juco, 64 Phil. 667, ruled thatmalicious
procurement of a search warrant under Article 129 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by a public
officer who procures search warrant without just cause, and that such cause consist of such facts and
circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant and not to facts subsequent (Emphasis ours).
(Respondent's memorandum, p. 2)

This statement is misleading. The accused in the Sy Juco case, cited by respondents, was not charged
with illegal procurement of a search warrant. The main issues in the said case was the validity of a search
warrant based upon affidavits showing, on the face thereof, that the statements therein contained were
hearsay. This Court answered the question in the negative. Referring to the need of a probable cause, as
a condition essential to the issuance of a valid search warrant, we declared:

. . . It has likewise been held by this court that by probable cause are meant such facts and circumstances
antecedent to the issuance of the warrant, that are in themselves sufficient to induce a cautious man to
rely upon them and act in pursuance thereof. (64 Phil., 667, 674)

The words "facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant" had no relation
whatsoever with, and were not meant to qualify, the evidence admissible to prove the illegal
procurement of a search warrant, in violation of Article 129 of the Revised Penal Code, which was not in
issue in the case. Said expression merely referred to the norm that should guide a Judge in determining
whether or not the process should be ordered issued. It is not concerned, either with the liability of the
person procuring the warrant, or with the competency of the evidence to establish his guilt.

In this connection, it may not be amiss to stress, once more, the need of adhering to the policy
enunciated in the case of Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co. (52 Phil., 807, 816-817) from which we
quote:
In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously
administered in the courts where trivial objections to the admission of proof are received with least
favor. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections
to the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of
first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether
testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney
offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the
attorney that the proof offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the
heat of the battle over which he presides a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging of
the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made
and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed
and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without returning the case for a new triala step
which the Court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first
instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in
much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law; and it is its duty upon
final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and
immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this
court then has all the material before it necessary to make a correct judgment. (Emphasis
supplied.)1wphl.nt

Inasmuch as the prosecution was entitled to introduce the evidence in question and respondent Judge
was, consequently, "under obligation by reason of his office" to admit said evidence, "and in refusing to
do so . . . he failed to perform his judicial duty"in the language used by this Court in the case of People
vs. Concepcion (supra)it follows that said respondent Judge should be, as he is hereby, orderedin
line with the rule laid down in said caseto allow petitioner herein to prove the motive of the accused
in obtaining the search warrant in question, even if the evidence therefor should refer to acts posterior
to the issuance of said process, and that the resolutions of the lower court sustaining the objections to
the questions above referred to, propounded by petitioner herein, and directing that portions of the
testimony of Ty Kong Tek be stricken from the record, should be, as said orders are hereby, reversed and
set aside, with costs against respondents, Pedro de la Pea and Osmundo Ramos. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-69401

RIZAL ALIH, NASIM ALIH, AISAN ALIH, MIJAL ALIH, OMAR ALIH, EDRIS MUKSAN, MULSIDI WARADIL, BILLY
ASMAD RAMSID ASALI, BANDING USMAN, ANGGANG HADANI, WARMIKHAN HAPA, GABRAL JIKIRI,
ALLAN TAN, MUJAHIRIN MARAJUKI, KENNEDY GONZALES, URDUJA ALIH, MERLA ALIH, and NURAISA ALIH
VDA DE FEROLINO, petitioners,

vs.
MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDER SOUTHCOM AND REGIONAL
UNIFIED COMMAND, REGION IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY, COLONEL ERNESTO CALUPIG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE) AND INTERNAL DEFENSE
COMMAND, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS IdC MAJOR ARNOLD BLANCO IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING
OFFICER OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES AND 1ST LIEUTENANT DARWIN GUERRA IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTS
SUPERVISOR, INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred Philippine marines and elements of the
home defense forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street,
Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. 1

The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a "zona," which was not unlike the feared
practice of the kempeitai during the Japanese Occupation of rounding up the people in a locality,
arresting the persons fingered by a hooded informer, and executing them outright (although the last part
is not included in the modern refinement).

The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the invasion with a burst of gunfire.
No one was hurt as presumably the purpose was merely to warn the intruders and deter them from
entering. Unfortunately, as might be expected in incidents like this, the situation aggravated soon
enough. The soldiers returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in a number of casualties. 2

The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and sixteen male occupants were arrested,
later to be finger-printed, paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The military also
inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and several rounds of
ammunition found in the premises. 3

On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a petition for prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary injunction and restraining order. Their purpose was to recover the articles seized from
them, to prevent these from being used as evidence against them, and to challenge their finger-printing,
photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right against self-incrimination.4

The Court, treating the petition as an injunction suit with a prayer for the return of the articles alleged to
have been illegally seized, referred it for hearing to Judge Omar U. Amin of the regional trial court,
Zamboanga City. 5 After receiving the testimonial and documentary evidence of the parties, he
submitted the report and recommendations on which this opinion is based. 6

The petitioners demand the return of the arms and ammunition on the ground that they were taken
without a search warrant as required by the Bill of Rights. This is confirmed by the said report and in fact
admitted by the respondents, "but with avoidance. 7

Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at the time of the incident in question,
provided as follows:
Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

It was also declared in Article IV, Section 4(2) that-

Sec. 4(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.

The respondents, while admitting the absence of the required such warrant, sought to justify their act on
the ground that they were acting under superior orders. 8 There was also the suggestion that the
measure was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem generated by the
assassination of Mayor Cesar Climaco. 9

Superior orders" cannot, of course, countermand the Constitution. The fact that the petitioners were
suspected of the Climaco killing did not excuse the constitutional short-cuts the respondents took. As
eloquently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan: 10

The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of
its protection all classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more
pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be
suspended during any of the great exigencies of government.

The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in question certainly did not excuse
the non-observance of the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. There
was no state of hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it could, the repressions committed therein
against the petitioners.

It is so easy to say that the petitioners were outlaws and deserved the arbitrary treatment they received
to take them into custody; but that is a criminal argument. It is also fallacious. Its obvious flaw lies in the
conclusion that the petitioners were unquestionably guilty on the strength alone of unsubstantiated
reports that they were stockpiling weapons.

The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted criminals or fugitives from justice. At the
time of the "zona," they were merely suspected of the mayor's slaying and had not in fact even been
investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed innocent and not guilty as summarily
pronounced by the military.

Indeed, even if were assumed for the sake of argument that they were guilty, they would not have been
any less entitled to the protection of the Constitution, which covers both the innocent and the guilty.
This is not to say, of course, that the Constitution coddles criminals. What it does simply signify is that,
lacking the shield of innocence, the guilty need the armor of the Constitution, to protect them, not from
a deserved sentence, but from arbitrary punishment. Every person is entitled to due process. It is no
exaggeration that the basest criminal, ranged against the rest of the people who would condemn him
outright, is still, under the Bill of Rights, a majority of one.

If the respondents did not actually disdain the Constitution when they made their illegal raid, they
certainly gave every appearance of doing so. This is truly regrettable for it was incumbent on them,
especially during those tense and tindery times, to encourage rather than undermine respect for the law,
which it was their duty to uphold.

In acting as they did, they also defied the precept that "civilian authority is at all times supreme over the
military" so clearly proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution. 11 In the instant case, the respondents simply
by-passed the civil courts, which had the authority to determine whether or not there was probable
cause to search the petitioner's premises. Instead, they proceeded to make the raid without a search
warrant on their own unauthorized determination of the petitioner's guilt.

The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They knew
where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant before making the raid.
If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they could have
surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There was absolutely no reason at
all why they should disregard the orderly processes required by the Constitution and instead insist on
arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military invasion.

Conceding that the search was truly warrantless, might not the search and seizure be nonetheless
considered valid because it was incidental to a legal arrest? Surely not. If all the law enforcement
authorities have to do is force their way into any house and then pick up anything they see there on the
ground that the occupants are resisting arrest, then we might as well delete the Bill of Rights as a fussy
redundancy.

When the respondents could have easily obtained a search warrant from any of the TEN civil courts then
open and functioning in Zamboanga City, 12 they instead simply barged into the beleaguered premises
on the verbal order of their superior officers. One cannot just force his way into any man's house on the
illegal orders of a superior, however lofty his rank. Indeed, even the humblest hovel is protected from
official intrusion because of the ancient rule, revered in all free regimes, that a man's house is his castle.

It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may enter; the rain may enter. But the King of England may
not enter. All the forces of the Crown dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement. 13

If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a crime about
to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the
record of such a justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113,
Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as
stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos. 14
If follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution, all the firearms
and ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of the proceedings
against the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of the poisonous tree. 15 As Judge Learned Hand
observed, "Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot
profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed. 16 Pending determination of the legality of such
articles, however, they shall remain in custodia legis, subject to such appropriate disposition as the
corresponding courts may decide. 17

The objection to the photographing, fingerprinting and paraffin-testing of the petitioners deserves slight
comment. The prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice
Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 "The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a
witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material."

The fearful days of hamleting salvaging, "zona" and other dreaded operations should remain in the past,
banished with the secret marshals and their covert license to kill without trial. We must be done with
lawlessness in the name of law enforcement. Those who are supposed to uphold the law must not be
the first to violate it. As Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee stressed in his concurring opinion in Lacanilao v.
De Leon, 19 "It is time that the martial law regime's legacy of the law of force be discarded and that
there be a return to the force and rule of law."

All of us must exert efforts to make our country truly free and democratic, where every individual is
entitled to the full protection of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights can stand as a stolid sentinel for
all, the innocent as well as the guilty, including the basest of criminals.

WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on November 25, 1984, is hereby declared ILLEGAL
and all the articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in evidence against the petitioners in any
proceedings. However, the said articles shall remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of the
criminal cases that have been or may later be filed against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,

vs.

HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting
Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA
and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal
Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG,
Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of
Quezon City, respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges issued,
on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of
which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or
the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the
following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and the Revised Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution
and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents,
books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3)
the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases
filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents,
papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed
of in accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this
original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final
disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-
Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any
copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision
be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and
commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in
accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash
moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and
have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by
petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against
herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the
papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are
concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and
seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question
may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of
the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of
the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to
above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:

. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not
relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby
the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the
rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be
raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect
the constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose
homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth
Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence
based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but
embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United
States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by
this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in
evidence against petitioners herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled,
namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the
authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative,
whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners
herein.1wph1.t

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and
that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection,
the Constitution 13 provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were
issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges
who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts,
or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would
be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the
aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of
peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above
quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in
times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even
though by legal means.

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants,
that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing
in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court
added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the
things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if
the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things
thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however,
we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned.
Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to
go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion
of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the searching
officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in
the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful
seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted
the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been
unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In
earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but
that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it
cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:

If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen
accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against
such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well
be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles
established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal
Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):

. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free
from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only
courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that
basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We
hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a State.

Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of
exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks
rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words,"
valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too,
without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly
severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not
to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time
that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process
Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth
Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf
"stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable against the
States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and
enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases.
Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable
searches state or federal it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine
an essential part of the right to privacy be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right
newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could
not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence
which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to
grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself
recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way by removing the incentive to disregard
it" . . . .

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right
to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be
secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no
longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and
to like effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be
revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to
suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than
that which the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration
of justice. (emphasis ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a
search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime
by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not
comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such
competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and,
hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification)
for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing
expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or
make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under
consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the
party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do
not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually but, understandably finds
itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and
moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of
the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962,
petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard,
House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among
the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert
P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other
effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said
petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which
they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States.
22

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been
Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought
to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits
attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent
allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases
relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree
thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave
the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned;
that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the
Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal;
that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and
other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the
writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the
aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs
prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29)
places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement
as to costs. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-342 May 4, 1946

AURELIO S. ALVERO, petitioner, vs. ARSENIO P. DIZON, ET AL., respondent.

DE JOYA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari with injunction originally filed in this court.

In the petition it is alleged that petitioner Aurelio S. Alvero has been accused of treason, in criminal case
No. 3 of the People's Court; that at the hearing on his petition for bail, the prosecution presented, as
part of its evidence, certain documents which had been allegedly seized by soldiers of the United States
Army, accompanied by Filipino guerrillas, in the petitioner's house; that petitioner immediately objected
to the presentation of said documents, and called the attention of the respondent judges to the fact that
he had filed a petition, in which he protested against the procedure of the government in the seizure of
said documents, and asked for their return to the petitioner; that the respondents permitted the
prosecution to present said documents as evidence, which were considered, upon the termination of the
presentation of the evidence for both parties, in denying said petition for bail; that the petition filed on
December 1, 1945, for the return of the documents allegedly seized illegally in petitioner's house, was
not considered by the respondents, before the commencement of the trial of petitioner's case, on the
merits, due perhaps to an involuntary oversight; that at the commencement of the trial of said criminal
case No. 3, and during its course, the prosecution again presented, as evidence, against the petitioner
said documents which had been taken from his house, and petitioner renewed his objection thereto, and
asked for their return to him, alleging that their seizure was illegal and that their presentation would be
tantamount to compelling him to testify against himself, in violation of his constitutional rights; that in
deciding the question so raised, the respondent judges, in open court, stated that the prosecution might
in the meanwhile continue presenting said documents, without prejudice to the final resolution of said
petition, when the prosecution should finish presenting its evidence; that in concluding the presentation
of its evidence and resting the case, after offering said documents as part of its evidence, the petitioner
again raised the question of the admissibility of said documents, and the respondent judges then
ordered the substantiation of said allegations of petitioner, and set for hearing his petition for the return
of said documents; that said petition was heard on February 16, 1946, and at said hearing, the petitioner
and his wife testified, without any contradiction that, on February 12, 1945, on the occasion of the arrest
of the petitioner by soldiers of the United States Army, the latter searched the house of the petitioner
and seized, among other things, the documents which he had in his house; that when said petition for
the return of said documents was submitted for the consideration and decision of the respondent
judges, the latter, on February 26, 1946, issued an order denying said petition, and admitted as
competent evidence the documents presented by the prosecution, marked as Exhibits A, C, G, H, K, L, P,
R, R-1, R-2, U, Z, CC, DD, FF, HH; that on the same date that said order was issued, denying the petition
for the return of said documents, petitioner asked for the reconsideration of said order, which was also
denied. (Petition, pars. 1-12.)

And herein petitioner now claims that the respondent judges, in denying the petition for the return of
said documents, acted without jurisdiction and committed a grave abuse in the exercise of their
discretion, alleging that even the seizure of documents by means of a search warrant legally issued,
constitutes a violation of the rights guaranteed in paragraphs 3 and 18 of section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution, and, consequently, when their seizure cannot be justified by the corresponding search
warrant, the court should order their immediate return; that the petitioner has no other speedy and
adequate remedy for the protection of his rights guaranteed by the Constitution, other than this petition
for certiorari, as the right of appeal granted by law to a person accused of a crime, is costly and highly
prejudicial to the petitioner, as it presupposes that the prosecution has established the guilt of the
accused by means of legal and competent evidence, as alleged in the last three (3) paragraphs of the
petition.

Consequently, herein petitioner asks for the annulment of the order issued by the respondent judges, on
February 26, 1946, in said criminal case No. 3, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Aurelio S. Alvero,
the return to him of the documents presented by the prosecution, mentioned above, and the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. .In their answer filed on March 21, 1946, herein respondents
have substantially admitted the allegations made and contained in the first twelve (12) paragraphs of the
petition, except the portions alleging that the documents in question had been obtained by means of
force and intimidation or through coercion; and that certain soldiers of the American Army took certain
personal properties of herein petitioner, at the time the search was made; and that the acquisition of
said documents was manifestly a violation of petitioner's constitutional rights and that their admission,
as evidence for the prosecution, would be tantamount to compelling petitioner, as accused, to testify
against himself all of which portions have been expressly denied by the respondents.

Respondents have also expressly denied the allegations contained in the remaining three (3) paragraphs
of the petition.

And as defenses, respondents allege (1) that petitioner himself has admitted the legality of the seizure of
the documents in question in his motion for reconsideration, dated February 26, 1946; (2) that petitioner
has not proven that said documents had been illegally seized for him; (3) that the seizure of the
documents in question took place, on February 12, 1945, in Pasay, Rizal, which was then still a combat
zone, and that the seizure of certain papers in the house of the petitioner was made by soldiers of the
United States Army of Liberation or its instrumentalities; (4) that said seizure was effected lawfully under
the terms of the proclamation of the Commander in Chief of the United States Liberation Forces, dated
December 29, 1944, in which he declared his purpose to remove alleged collaborators, when
apprehended, from any position of political and economic influence in the Philippines and to hold them
in restraint for the duration of the war; (5) that the documents in question had been properly admitted
as evidence for the prosecution in criminal case No. 3, as herein petitioner, as accused in said case, had
expressly waived his right to object to their admissibility, particularly Exhibits A, FF, HH and P; (6) that
petitioner's evidence of alleged ownership, relative to Exhibits C, G, H, K, I, P, R, R-1 and R-2, is altogether
insufficient, and petitioner himself has expressly admitted that said documents are not his personal
papers but part of the files of the New Leaders' Association, which was proven to be an organization
created, for the purpose of collaborating with the enemy; (7) and that none of the exhibits referred to in
the petition has been satisfactorily identified by the petitioner as included among the papers allegedly
wrongfully seized from his house and belonging to him.

Considering the allegations made by the parties in their respective pleadings, and their supporting
papers, as well as the admissions made therein, the following facts appear to have been sufficiently
established:

(1) That on February 12, 1945, while the battle for Manila was raging, soldiers of the United States Army,
accompanied by men of Filipino Guerrilla Forces, placed herein petitioner under arrest, having been
suspected of collaboration with the enemy, and seized and took certain papers from his house in Pasay,
Rizal;

(2) That on or about October 4, 1945, petitioner was accused of treason, in criminal case No. 3 of the
People's Court; after which, on December 1, 1945, he filed a petition, demanding the return of the
papers allegedly seized and taken from his house;

(3) That petitioner also filed a petition for bail, at the hearing of which the prosecution presented certain
papers and documents, which were admitted as part of its evidence, and said petition was denied;
(4) That at the trial of the case on the merits, the prosecution again presented said papers and
documents, which were admitted as part of its evidence, and were marked as exhibits, as described in
the petition for certiorari, filed in this court;

(5) That herein petitioner had failed to object properly to the admission of said papers and documents at
the hearing on said petition for bail, and at the trial of the case on the merits, in not having insisted that
the question of the legality of the search and seizure of the papers and documents taken from his house
should have been litigated and finally decided first, and thus practically waived his objection to their
admissibility, as evidence for the prosecution;

(6) That at the hearing on his petition for the return of the papers taken from his house, held after they
had been admitted as part of the evidence for the prosecution, at the hearing on the petition for bail and
at the trial of the case on the merits, herein petitioner had failed to identify satisfactorily the documents
now in question, and his ownership thereof; and

(7) That petitioner himself in his petition for reconsideration, dated February 26, 1946, admitted the
legality the legality of the seizure of the documents taken from his house, and at the hearing on his
petition for bail, he himself called for some of the documents in question.

The right of officers and men of the United States Army to arrest herein petitioner, as a collaborationist
suspect, and to seize his personal papers, without any search warrant, in the zone of military operations,
is unquestionable, under the provisions of article 4, Chapter II, Section I, of the Regulations relative to
the Laws and Customs of War on Land of the Hague Conventions of 1907, authorizing the seizure of
military papers in the possession of prisoners of war (Wilson, International Law, 3d ed., 1939, p.524); and
also under the proclamation, dated December 29, 1944, issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, as
Commander in Chief of the United States of Army, declaring his purpose to remove certain citizens of the
Philippines, who had voluntarily given aid and comfort to the enemy, in violation of the allegiance due
the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, when apprehended,
from any position of political and economic influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for
the duration of the war. (41 Off. Gaz., No. 2, pp. 148, 149.) As a matter of fact, petitioner himself, in his
motion for reconsideration, dated February 26, 1946, expressly admitted the legality of the seizure of his
personal papers and documents at the time of his arrest.

The most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as
an incident to a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made either while a crime is being committed or
after its commission. The right to search includes in both instances that of searching the person of him
who is arrested, in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means
by which it was committed. (Agnello vs. United States, 269 U. S., 20.)

When one is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found in his possession or in his control may be
seized and used in evidence against him; and an officer has the right to make an arrest without a warrant
of a person believed by the officer upon reasonable grounds to have committed a felony. (Carroll vs.
United States, 267 U. S., 132.).

The majority of the states have held that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, which is
also guaranteed by state constitutional provisions is not violated by the use in evidence of articles
obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure. (People vs. Defore, 242 N. Y., 13; 150 N. E., 585.)

It is true that on December 1, 1945, herein petitioner filed a petition, demanding the return of certain
papers and documents allegedly seized and taken from his house at the time of his arrest; but when he
consented to their presentation, as part of the evidence for the prosecution, at the hearing on his
petition for bail and at the trial of the case on the merits, without having insisted that the question of
the alleged illegality of the search and seizure of said papers and documents should first have been
directly litigated and established by a motion, made before the trial, for their return, he was and should
be deemed to have waived his objection to their admissibility as part of the evidence for the
prosecution; since the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination may be waived. (Weeks vs. United
States, 232 U. S., 383; Silverthorne Lumber Co. vs. United States, 251 U. S., 385; Gouled vs. United States,
255 U. S., 298; People vs. Carlos, 47 Phil., 626, 630, 631.)

At the hearing on his petition for bail, petitioner himself requested the production of the document
marked as Exhibit A, which was a letter sent by him to Dr. Jose P. Laurel; the document marked as Exhibit
HH, which was a memorandum to Col. Suzuki, dated December 30, 1944; and the document marked as
Exhibit P, which was a memorandum on Nippongo classes. And he is now, therefore, estopped from
questioning their admission.

Furthermore, petitioner could not properly identify many of said documents, such as Exhibit FF, nor
satisfactorily establish his ownership thereof; while the prosecution has sufficiently established the fact
that some of the papers now in question, such as Exhibit C, had been received at the Office of the CIC of
the United States Army in the City of Manila, since February 11, 1945, that is, one day prior to the
seizure of certain papers and documents in the house of the petitioner. And with reference to Exhibits C,
G, H, K, L, P, R, R-1 and R-2, petitioner himself admitted that they are not his personal papers but part of
the files of the New Leader's Association. And it is well established rule in this jurisdiction that in a
petition for the production of papers and documents, they must be sufficiently described and identified,
otherwise the petition cannot prosper. (Liebenow vs. Philippine Vegetable Oil Co., 39 Phil., 60, 67, 69;
Rule 21, section 1, Rules of Court.)

The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent
violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home,
by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such
usurpations when attempted. (Adams vs. New York, 192 U. S., 585.) But it does not prohibit the Federal
Government from taking advantage of unlawful searches made by a private person or under authority of
state law. (Weeks vs. United States, 232 U. S., 383; Burdeau vs. McDowell, 256 U. S., 465.)

As the soldiers of the United States Army, that took and seized certain papers and documents from the
residence of herein petitioner, on February 12, 1945, were not acting as agents or on behalf of the
Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that those papers and documents came in
the possession of the authorities of the Commonwealth Government, through the Office of the CIC of
the United States Army in Manila, the use and presentation of said papers and documents, as evidence
for the prosecution against herein petitioner, at the trial of his case for treason, before the People's
Court, cannot now be legally attacked, on the ground of unlawful or unreasonable searches and seizures,
or on any other constitutional ground, as declared by the Supreme Court of the United States in similar
cases. (Burdeau vs. McDowell, 256 U. S., 465; Gambino vs. United States, 275 U. S., 310.)

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the petition for certiorari with injunction, filed in this case, is
absolutely without merit, and it is, therefore, hereby denied and dismissed with costs.So ordered.

[G.R. No. 4367. September 3, 1908. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SALVADOR VALLEJO, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

SYLLABUS

1. ARREST BY MUNICIPAL POLICE WITHOUT WARRANT. Municipal policemen in the Philippine Islands
are peace officers and, as such are authorized to make arrests without warrant for breaches of the peace
committed in their presence, and may enter the house of an offender for such purpose, provided the
unlawful conduct is such as to affect the public peace. (U. S. v. Alexander, 8 Phil. Rep., 29; U. S. v.
Burgueta, 10 Phil. Rep., 188.)

2. CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE; TWO OFFENSES. A person may be tried and punished for
resisting an officer, although the act constituting this offense was apparently made a part of the charge
of disorderly conduct preferred against him before a justice of the peace, and for which he was
convicted. (U. S. v. Gavieres, 10 Phil. Rep., 694.)

3. PUBLIC FUNCTIONARY RESISTING AN OFFICER. A public official found guilty of resisting an officer
comes within the second subdivision of article 250 of the Penal Code, entailing upon him an increased
punishment, but if he was intoxicated at the time, and such condition is not habitual, the mitigating
circumstance of intoxication should be considered.

TRACEY, J. :

On the 17th of May, 1907, in consequence of a complaint of a public disturbance lodged by Januario
Duran with the police authorities of Polangui, in. the Province of Albay, the officer in charge at the city
hall sent two municipal policemen, named Tranquilino Saravillo and Dalmacio Sabio to the place of the
disturbance, which was the house of Salvador Vallejo, and the narrative of the policeman Sabio as to that
occurred there is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The guard said to us, Go to San Diego and get the people who are making a scandal there. I
immediately went, following Tranquilino, to the house of Salvador Vallejo. While we were still on the
ground we heard the shouts of Vallejo. He was running from one side to the other of his house. When I
approached the house of Vallejo I heard the words, in a loud voice, Matza, turco, tesorero municipal
secretario de . . . (using obscenity which it is unnecessary to quote). We were about 5 rods distant. When
he spoke those words he was upstairs in his house at the window. Tranquilino and I and a great many
other people were near the house. We were in front of the house, looking and listening. There are other
houses there, but none immediately opposite. We immediately went up the steps to arrest the accused
Vallejo. On arriving at the top of the stairs I knocked on the door. We heard Vallejo ask, Who is it?, and I
said, Municipal police. Thereupon Vallejo immediately came to the door to meet us, and as he
approached us he said . . . (another obscene expression), policias municipales. He stopped inside the
doorway and asked us, Have you any warrant to come in? I replied that we had none, and then he
immediately struck Tranquilino Saravillo with his fist, and immediately afterwards he struck me also.
When I felt him strike me here in the cheek, I dodged and struck him with my club. When he attempted
to strike me again with his fist, I caught his right hand. I said to Salvador Vallejo, You are arrested. We
arrested him because he did not come with us but resisted. Then Blas Ausina came out and threw his
arms around Vallejos body and dragged him away from us, and immediately drew him inside and closed
the door."cralaw virtua1aw library

Tranquilino Saravillo gives substantially the same account. Both policemen were at the time in uniform.

These facts are not seriously contested, and upon the the judge of First Instance found both defendants
guilty of an attempt against an agent of authority, and giving Vallejo the benefit of drunkenness as an
extenuating circumstance, sentenced him to Bilibid for three years and six months, with P100 fine, and
sentenced Blas Ausina to four years two months and one day, together with a like fine. The prosecution
was under the Penal Code.

The defense rests upon points of law: First. That within his own house a mans person in sacred and he
may conduct himself as he pleases. The inviolability of a dwelling has been well explained in United
States v. Arceo (3 Phil. Rep., 381), but while it may he true in general that "a mans house is his castle," it
is equally true that he may not use that castle as a citadel for aggression against his neighbors, nor can
he within its walls create such disorder as to affect their peace. It is clear from the testimony that in this
case the behavior of the defendant amounted to more than private misconduct and constituted a public
annoyance and a breach of the peace of the neighborhood.

Second. It is further urged that even for a breach of the peace the policemen had no right to arrest
without a warrant and that in doing so they acted without authority, so that resistance to them was
lawful. Municipal police in the Philippines hold office under the statutes of the Commission, by which
their powers are supposed to be defined, and which may be construed in the light of American law. It is
axiomatic in the law of England and America that a peace officer may arrest without warrant for a breach
of the peace committed in his presence, but it is contended that municipal policemen outside of Manila
have not conferred upon them by statute any such powers. The extent to which police officers may go in
the city of Manila is considered in the case of the United States v. Alexander (8 Phil. Rep., 29), in which
the policeman was held empowered to arrest without warrant for breach of municipal ordinances
committed in his presence. And their powers in other municipalities may be implied from our decision in
United States v. Burgueta (10 Phil. Rep., 188.)
The law for municipalities in general gives the municipal council power to established, regulate, and
maintain a police department to promote the prosperity, improve the orals, peace, good order, comfort,
and convenience of the township and inhabitants thereof, and to enforce obedience thereto with such
lawful fines and penalties as the council may prescribe. (Act No. 82, sec. 39, subdivision t, dd, and jj.)

There is nowhere any express definition of the word "policeman," not any specification of his powers,
which therefor, are left to be inferred from the common law or to be taken from the express provisions
of local; ordinances. In the municipality of Polangui, ordinances had been passed;prohibiting
disturbances of public order, drunkenness, and indecent behavior "in a public place or in a place which is
in view if the public," but the papers before us disclose no ordinance or regulation directing the police
when to act, or empowering a policeman in any instance to arrest without a warrant. Thus, in the
absence of any legislation by the commission or by the municipal council, we are thrown back on the
common law powers of the officer.

Among the public officers who may arrest for a felony or a breach of the peace in their presence are the
sheriff, the coroner and the constable(2 Blackstones Com. 292), who are included in the technical term
"peace officers," and the general trend of American decisions appears to be that local officers such as
policemen who are neither sheriffs, coroners, nor constables shall not be presumed to have such power
without a statutory grant of it. There are, on the other hand, decisions indicating that what the law looks
to is the character of the duty to be discharged by the officers, rather than the name under which he
acts, and that all officers that all officers having the general attributes of constables may be inferred to
be clothed with their ordinary powers of arrest. Whatever may be the historically theory on any on the
of the several States of the Union, we think that, under the circumstances existing in these Islands, in the
absence of an express legislative definition of the faculties of police officers, they must be assumed top
possess those powers necessary to the convenient exercise of the duties for which their offices were
created. The creation of the office of policeman implies the ability of the incumbent to perform the
functions usually inherent in it, and wherever in any American jurisdiction we find such powers in terms
conferred by a legislative grant, they appear uniformly to include those proper to peace officers, and
among these none is more important that the power to make arrests. See for example the Constabulary
Act, No. 175. We therefore hold that, in the absence of any other disposition in the statutes or in the
local ordinances, a duly appointed police officer in these Islands has those powers which, under the
common law of England and America, belong to a peace officer, and among them the power to arrest
without warrant for offenses of this nature committed in his presence.

Third. The accused, Vallejo, set up as a further defense double jeopardy, alleging a former conviction
under the municipal ordinance as a bar to his prosecution under the Penal Code. The merits of that
contention are covered by our discussion in the case of the united States v. Gavieres (10 Phil. Rep., 694),
on which the majority of the court held that the double prosecution under a municipal ordinance and a
general law would lie, and although that decision is now on appeal to the supreme Court of the United
States, we regard it as binding upon us in the present case, so that the defense must be overruled.

It has been suggested that is unnecessary to rely upon the Gavieres case, inasmuch as it will bear a
distinction from the one before us, on the ground that, while the conviction of Gavieres was for one act
viewed in two different aspects, in the present case the act of resistance to the policemen, which
characterizes the offense under the Penal Code, did not necessarily enter into the disorderly conduct of
the defendants, which indeed preceded the appearance of the policemen, and was not therefore to be
considered as part of the same act. But a reference to the complaint before the justice of the peace in
the first prosecution shows that this resistance was there specified as a constituent part of the disorder,
and for this reason the suggested distinction between the two cases can not be accepted as wholly
satisfactory.

The offense of Vallejo falls under the second paragraph of article "249 of the Penal Code, as it amounted
to a resistance to public officers while executing their duty. As he has been proved to be a public official,
that is, a sanitary officer duly commissioned, he comes within subdivision second of article 250, entailing
upon him an increased punishment, while on the other hand, having been intoxicated, without being an
habitual drunkard, he is entitled to that as one extenuating circumstance. He is sentenced to prision
mayor for two years, four months and one day, with a fine of P100. In the case of Blas Ausina, no one of
the circumstances specified in the four numbered paragraphs of article 250 exists, and therefore he is
sentenced to prision correccional for one year eight months and twenty-one days, and a fine of P100;
each of the defendants to pay one-half of the costs. The sentence of the court below is revoked in so far
as it may be in conflict with the foregoing, and in all other respects, as modified thereby, is affirmed. So
ordered.

G.R. No. L-25434 July 25, 1975

HONORABLE ARSENIO N. ROLDAN, JR., in his capacity as Acting Commissioner, Philippine Fisheries
Commission, and THE PHILIPPINE NAVY, petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE FRANCISCO ARCA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch 1) and
MORABE, DE GUZMAN & COMPANY, respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:

A petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain respondent Judge from
enforcing his order dated October 18, 1965, and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
thereunder issued.

On April 3, 1964, respondent company filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a civil case
docketed as No. 56701 against petitioner Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Roldan, Jr., for the recovery
of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI (one of two fishing boats in question) which had been seized and
impounded by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy.

On April 10, 1964, respondent company prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction with
respondent court, but said prayer was, however, denied.
On April 28, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila set aside its order of April 10, 1964 and granted
respondent company's motion for reconsideration praying for preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus,
respondent company took Possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI from herein petitioners by virtue of the
abovesaid writ.

On December 10, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed Civil Case No. 56701 for failure of
therein petitioner (respondent company herein) to prosecute as well as for failure of therein defendants
(petitioners herein)to appear on the scheduled date of hearing. The vessel, Tony Lex VI or Srta. Winnie
however, remained in the possession of respondent company.

On July 20, 1965, petitioner Fisheries Commissioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels
Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of
some provisions of the Fisheries Act and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.

On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite. Fish
caught with dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found aboard the two vessels.

On August 18, 1965, the Fisheries Commissioner requested the Palawan Provincial Fiscal to file criminal
charges against the crew members of the fishing vessels.

On September 30, 1965, there were filed in the court of First Instance of Palawan a couple of
informations, one against the crew members of Tony Lex III, and another against the crew members of
Tony Lex VI both for violations of Act No. 4003, as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 462, 659
and 1088, i.e., for illegal fishing with the use of dynamite. On the same day, the Fiscal filed an ex parte
motion to hold the boats in custody as instruments and therefore evidence of the crime (p. 54, rec.), and
cabled the Fisheries Commissioner to detain the vessels (p. 56, rec.).

On October 2 and 4, likewise, the Court of First Instance of Palawan ordered the Philippine Navy to take
the boats in custody.

On October 2, 1965, respondent company filed a complaint with application for preliminary mandatory
injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 62799 with the Court of First Instance of Manila against herein
petitioners. Among others, it was alleged that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats in issue, the
same were engaged in legitimate fishing operations off the coast of Palawan; that by virtue of the offer
of compromise dated September 13, 1965 by respondent company to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, the numerous violations of the Fishery Laws, if any, by the crew members of the
vessels were settled.

On October 9, 1965, petitioners, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed the above-mentioned
complaint, alleging among others, that: (1) the issuance of the writ would disrupt the status quo of the
parties and would render nugatory any decision of the respondent court favorable to the defendant; (2)
that the vessels, being instruments of a crime in criminal cases Nos. 3416 and 3417 filed with the Court
of First Instance of Palawan, the release of the vessels sans the corresponding order from the above-
mentioned court would deprive the same of its authority to dispose of the vessels in the criminal cases
and the Provincial Fiscal would not be able to utilize said vessels as evidence in the prosecution of said
cases; (3) that as petitioners herein were in possession of one of the vessels in point, they cannot now be
deprived of the legal custody thereof by reason of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 56701; (4) that
petitioner Fisheries Commissioner has the power to seize and detain the vessels pursuant to Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 3215 in relation to Sections 903 and 2210 of the Revised Tariff and Customs Code; (5)
that respondents herein have not exhausted administrative remedies before coming to court; (6) that
the compromise agreement approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
indorsed to the Fisheries Commissioner is never a bar to the prosecution of the crime perpetrated by the
crew members of the vessels belonging to respondent company.

And again, on October 15, 1965, herein petitioners filed their memorandum praying for the denial of the
application for preliminary mandatory injunction. On the same day, October 15, 1965, herein petitioners
filed an urgent motion to submit additional documentary evidence.

On October 18, 1965, herein petitioners, as defendants in said Civil Case No. 62799, filed their answer to
the complaint with affirmative defenses, reiterating the grounds in their opposition to the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and adding that herein private respondent admitted
committing the last violation when it offered in its letter dated September 21, 1965 to the Acting
Commissioner of Fisheries, to compromise said last violation (Exh. 12, pp. 60-61, rec.).

On said day, October 18, 1965, the respondent Judge issued the challenged order granting the issuance
of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and issued the preliminary writ upon the filing by private
respondent of a bond of P5,000.00 for the release of the two vessels(pp. 95-102, rec.).

On October 19, 1965, herein petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order issuing the
preliminary writ on October 18, 1965 on the ground, among others, that on October 18, 1965 the
Philippine Navy received from the Palawan Court of First Instance two orders dated October 2 and 4,
1965 requiring the Philippine Navy to hold the fishing boats in custody and directing that the said vessels
should not be released until further orders from the Court, and that the bond of P5,000.00 is grossly
insufficient to cover the Government's losses in case the two vessels, which are worth P495,000.00, are
placed beyond the reach of the Government, thus frustrating their forfeiture as instruments of the crime
(pp. 103-109, rec.).1wph1.t

On November 23, 1965, respondent Judge denied the said motion for reconsideration (p. 110, rec.).

WE rule that the respondent Judge of the Manila Court of First Instance acted without jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion when he issued on October 18, 1965 the order directing the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and when he refused to reconsider the same.

When the respondent Judge issued the challenged order on October 18, 1965 and the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction pursuant thereto, the fishing vessels were already under the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Palawan by virtue of its orders of October 2 and 4, 1965,
upon motion of the Provincial Fiscal (pp. 54, 55, rec.), directing the Philippine Navy to detain (pp. 108,
109, rec.) said vessels, which are subject to forfeiture as instruments of the crime, to be utilized as
evidence in Criminal Cases Nos. 3416 and 3417 for illegal fishing pending in said court (pp. 54-55, rec.).
The said vessels were seized while engaging in prohibited fishing within the territorial waters of Palawan
(pp. 45, 48,-53, rec.) and hence within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Palawan, in
obedience to the rule that "the place where a criminal offense was committed not only determines the
venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction"(Lopez vs. Paras, L-25795, Oct. 29, 1966,
18 SCRA 616, 619). The jurisdiction over the vessels acquired by the Palawan Court of First Instance
cannot be interfered with by another Court of First Instance. The orders of October 2 and 4, 1965 by the
Palawan Court of First Instance expressly direct the Philippine Navy "to hold in custody" the two vessels
and that "same should not be released without prior order or authority from this Court" (pp. 108, 109,
rec.). Only the Palawan court can order the release of the two vessels. Not even the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources nor the Fisheries Commissioner can direct that the fishing boats be
turned over to private respondent without risking contempt of court.

The grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent Judge was heightened by the fact that he
did not reconsider his order of October 18, 1965 after he was informed by petitioners in their motion for
reconsideration filed on October 19, 1965 that the Palawan Court of First Instance had already issued the
two orders dated October 2 and 4, 1965 directing the Philippine Navy to hold in custody the fishing boats
until further orders.

It is basic that one court cannot interfere with the judgments, orders or decrees of another court of
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction;
because if coordinate courts were allowed to interfere with each other's judgments, decrees or
injunctions, the same would obviously lead to confusion and might seriously hinder the administration
of justice (Ongsinco, etc. vs. Tan, et al., 97 Phil. 330; PNB vs. Javellana, 92 Phil. 525; Montesa vs. Manila
Cordage Company, 92 Phil. 25; Hubahib vs. Insular Drug Company, 64 Phil. 119; Hacbang, et al. vs. The
Leyte Auto Bus Company, et al., G.R. No. L-17907, May 30, 1963, 8 SCRA, 103, 107-109; NPC vs. Hon.
Jesus de Vera, G.R. No. L-15763, Dec. 22, 1961, 3 SCRA, 646, 648; Cabigao vs. del Rosario, 44 Phil. 182;
Araneta & Uy vs. Commonwealth Insurance Company, 55 OG 431; Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. III, 1970 ed., p. 64).

As early as October 2 and 4, 1965, the two boats were already in custodia legis under the sole control of
the Palawan Court of First Instance. The Manila Court of First Instance cannot interfere with and change
that possession (Hacbang vs. Leyte Bus Co., Inc., supra; NPC vs. Hon. Jesus de Vera, supra).

It is immaterial that the vessels were then in the Philippine Navy basin in Manila; for the same in no way
impugns the jurisdiction already vested in the Palawan court, which has custody thereof through the
Philippine Navy. This is analogous to the situation in Colmenares versus Villar (L-27124, May 29, 1970, 33
SCRA 186, 188-9), wherein We ruled "where the illegal possession of firearms was committed in the
town where the Court sits, the fact that the firearms were confiscated from the accused in another town
does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court" (pp. 186, 189).
It is likewise of no moment that the herein respondents were not notified by the herein petitioners of
the seizure of the questioned vessels by the Philippine Navy, because such previous notice is not
required by law.

II

The dismissal on December 10, 1964 of the first Civil Case No. 56701 by the Court of First Instance of
Manila had the necessary effect of automatically dissolving the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
issued therein on April 28, 1964, directing the return of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI (pp. 156-157, rec.).
Such a preliminary writ, like any other interlocutory order, cannot survive the main case of which it was
but an incident; because "an ancillary writ of preliminary injunction loses its force and effect after the
dismissal of the main petition" (National Sugar Workers' Union, etc., vs. La Carlota Sugar Central, et al., L-
23569, May 25, 1972, 45 SCRA 104, 109; Lazaro vs. Mariano, 59 Phil. 6Z7, 631; Saavedra vs. Ibaez, 56
Phil. 33, 37; Hi Caiji vs. Phil. Sugar Estate and Development Company, 50 Phil. 592, 594).1wph1.t

Moreover, the writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 28, 1964 in Civil Case No. 56701 was
directed against the detention of the vessel Tony Lex VI for violations committed prior to August 5, 1965,
and therefore cannot and does not extend to the seizure and detention of said vessel for violations on
August 5 or 6, 1965, which violations were not and could not possibly be the subject-matter of said Civil
Case No. 56701 which was filed on April 3, 1964 (p. 12, rec.).

III

Herein petitioners can validly direct and/or effect the seizure of the vessels of private respondent for
illegal fishing by the use of dynamite and without the requisite licenses.

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3512 approved on March 20, 1963 empowers the Fisheries Commissioner
to carry out the provisions of the Fisheries Act, as amended, and all rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder, to make searches and seizures personally or through his duly authorized representatives in
accordance with the Rules of Court, of "explosives such as ... dynamites and the like ...; including fishery
products, fishing equipment, tackle and other things that are subject to seizure under existing fishery
laws"; and "to effectively implement the enforcement of existing fishery laws on illegal fishing."

Paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the same Republic Act 3512 likewise transferred to and vested in the
Philippine Fisheries Commission "all the powers, functions and duties heretofore exercised by the
Bureau of Customs, Philippine Navy and Philippine Constabulary over fishing vessels and fishery
matters ..."

Section 12 of the Fisheries Act, otherwise known as Republic Act No. 4003, as amended, prohibits fishing
with dynamites or other explosives which is penalized by Section 76 thereof "by a fine of not less than
P1,500.00 nor more than P5,000.00, and by imprisonment for not less than one (1) year and six (6)
months nor more than five (5) years, aside from the confiscation and forfeiture of all explosives, boats,
tackles, apparel, furniture, and other apparatus used in fishing in violation of said Section 12 of this Act."
Section 78 of the same Fisheries Law provides that "in case of a second offense, the vessel, together with
its tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall be forfeited to the Government."

The second paragraph of Section 12 also provides that "the possession and/or finding, of dynamite,
blasting caps and other explosives in any fishing boat shall constitute a presumption that the said
dynamite and/or blasting caps and explosives are being used for fishing purposes in violation of this
Section, and that the possession or discovery in any fishing boat or fish caught or killed by the use of
dynamite or other explosives, under expert testimony, shall constitute a presumption that the owner, if
present in the fishing boat, or the fishing crew have been fishing with dynamite or other explosives."
(Emphasis supplied).

Under Section 78 of the Fisheries Act, as amended, any person, association or corporation fishing in
deep sea fishery without the corresponding license prescribed in Sections 17 to 22 Article V of the
Fisheries Act or any other order or regulation deriving force from its provisions, "shall be punished for
each offense by a fine of not more than P5,000.00, or imprisonment, for not more than one year, or
both, in the discretion of the Court; Provided, That in case of an association or corporation, the President
or manager shall be directly responsible for the acts of his employees or laborers if it is proven that the
latter acted with his knowledge; otherwise the responsibility shall extend only as far as fine is concerned:
Provided, further, That in the absence of a known owner of the vessel, the master, patron or person in
charge of such vessel shall be responsible for any violation of this Act: and Provided, finally, That in case
of a second offense, the vessel together with its tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall be forfeited to
the Government" (Emphasis supplied).

Under Section 13 of Executive Order No. 389 of December 23, 1950, reorganizing the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, the Philippine Navy has the function, among others, "to assist the proper governmental
agencies in the enforcement of laws and regulations pertaining to ... fishing ..." (46 OG 5905, 5911).

Section 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by PD No. 34 of October 27, 1972, authorized
any official or person exercising police authority under the provisions of the Code, to search and seize
any vessel or air craft as well as any trunk, package, bag or envelope on board and to search any person
on board for any breach or violation of the customs and tariff laws.

When the Philippine Navy, upon request of the Fisheries Commissioner, apprehended on August 5 or 6,
1965 the fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI, otherwise known respectively as Srta. Agnes and Srta.
Winnie, these vessels were found to be without the necessary license in violation of Section 903 of the
Tariff and Customs Code and therefore subject to seizure under Section 2210 of the same Code, and
illegally fishing with explosives and without fishing license required by Sections 17 and 18 of the
Fisheries Law (pp. 46-47, rec.).1wph1.t

The operation of the fishing boat Tony Lex III was suspended pursuant to the order dated January 28,
1964 issued by the Commissioner of Fisheries pending the final determination of the case against it for
illegal fishing with explosives on January 21, 1964 (p. 34, rec.) and remained suspended until its
apprehension on August 5 or 6, 1965 (p. 46, rec.).
For illegal fishing with explosives on March 23, 1963, the renewal of the fishing boat license of Tony Lex
VI was suspended for one year from the time said boat was moored at Pier 14 at North Harbor, Manila,
without prejudice to the institution of a criminal case against its owner and/or operator, pursuant to the
order dated May 19, 1964 issued by the Commissioner of Fisheries (pp. 35-36, rec.), the motion for
reconsideration of which order was denied by the Commissioner of Fisheries in an order dated August
17, 1964 (pp. 41-42, rec.).

For illegal fishing with dynamite on March 28, 1963, the operation of Tony Lex VI was suspended by the
Commissioner of Fisheries in an order dated April 1, 1963 (p. 62, rec.).

For illegal fishing again with explosives on April 25, 1963, the fishing boat Tony Lex VI together with its
tackle, apparel, furniture and all other apparatus used in fishing was ordered confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the Government and a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 was imposed on its owners-operators,
without prejudice to the filing of the necessary criminal action, pursuant to the order of June 2, 1964 of
the Commissioner of Fisheries(pp. 37-38, rec.).

Again, for comitting the same violation on June 19, 1963, a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 was imposed
on the owners-operators of fishing boat Tony Lex VI pursuant to the order of June 4, 1964 issued by the
Commissioner of Fisheries (pp. 39-40, rec.)..

It appears, therefore, that since January 28, 1964, the fishing boat Tony Lex III was suspended from
operating and was ordered moored at Pier 14, North Harbor, Manila (pp. 34, 46-47, rec.); and that the
fishing vessel Tony Lex VI was suspended for one year from May 24, 1964 and was actually ordered
forfeited to the Government pursuant to the order of June 2, 1964 for repeated violations of Section 12
of the Fisheries Act (pp. 37- 38. rec.).1wph1.t As a matter of fact, when apprehended on August 5 or
6, 1965, both vessels were found to be without any license or permit for coastwise trade or for fishing
and unlawfully fishing with explosives, for which reason their owners and crew were accordingly indicted
by the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan for illegal fishing with dynamite and without the requisite license (pp.
48-53, rec.).

As heretofore intimated, the two fishing boats were apprehended on numerous occasions for fishing
with dynamite from March 28, 1963 to March 11, 1964, which violations private respondent, as owner-
operator, sought to compromise by offering to pay a fine of P21,000.00 for all said prior violations.

Such previous violations of Sections 12, 17 and 18 of the Fisheries Act committed by the two fishing
boats, Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI, from March 28, 1963 until August 5 or 6, 1965, rendered the said
vessels subject to forfeiture under Sections 76 and 78 of the Fisheries Act, as amended.

Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and air crafts for violations of the customs laws
have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant, because the
vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be
sought before such warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search warrant
before such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected (Papa vs. Mago, L-27360, Feb. 28, 1968, 22
SCRA 857, 871-74; Magoncia vs. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770, 774; Caroll vs. U.S. 267, pp. 132, 149, 158; Justice
Fernando, The Bill of Rights, 1972 ed., p. 225; Gonzales, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1966 ed., p. 300).

The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are
usually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy
or Coast Guard.

Another exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant for a valid search and seizure, is
a search or seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest (Alvero vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637; Justice Fernando, The
Bill of Rights, 1972 ed., p. 224). Under our Rules of Court, a police officer or a private individual may,
without a warrant, arrest a person (a) who has committed, is actually committing or is about to commit
an offense in his presence; (b) who is reasonably believed to have committed an offense which has been
actually committed; or (c) who is a prisoner who has escaped from confinement while serving a final
judgment or from temporary detention during the pendency of his case or while being transferred from
one confinement to another (Sec. 6, Rule 113, Revised Rules of Court). In the case at bar, the members
of the crew of the two vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and without the
requisite license. Thus their apprehension without a warrant of arrest while committing a crime is lawful.
Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was equally valid as an
incident to a lawful arrest.

The alleged compromise approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on September
13, 1965 (pp. 63-64, 158-159, rec.) cannot be invoked by the respondents because the said compromise
referred to about thirty violations of the fisheries law committed by the private respondent from March
28, 1963 to March 11, 1964. The violations by the two vessels of private respondent by reason of which
these vessels were apprehended and detained by the Philippine Navy upon request of the Commissioner
of Fisheries, were committed on August 5 or 6, 1965.

Moreover, the power to compromise would exist only before a criminal prosecution is instituted;
otherwise the Department Secretary or any of his sub-alterns can render criminal prosecutions for
violations of the fisheries law a mere mockery. It is not in the public interest nor is it good policy to
sustain the viewpoint that the Department Secretary can compromise criminal cases involving public,
not private, offenses after the indictment had been instituted in court. The fishing vessels together with
all their equipment and the dynamites found therein are not only evidence of the crime of illegal fishing
but also subject to forfeiture in favor of the Government as instruments of the crime (Art. 45, Revised
Penal Code, Sec. 78, Act No. 4003, as amended). Section 80(j) of Act No. 4003, as amended, precludes
such a compromise the moment the Fisheries Commissioner decides to prosecute the criminal action in
accordance with Sections 76 and 78 of the other penal provisions of the fisheries law. Furthermore, any
compromise shall be upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission (Section 80[i], Act No.
4003), which did not recommend such a compromise for the violation on August 5 or 6, 1965 of Section
12 in relation to Sections 76 and 78 of Act No. 4003, as amended. On the contrary, the Fisheries
Commissioner requested the Provincial Fiscal to institute the criminal cases (pp. 43-45, rec.) and the
Provincial Fiscal filed the corresponding informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3416 and 3417 on
September 30, 1965 against the owners and the members of the crew of the vessels (pp. 48-53, rec.).
It should be noted that in the first indorsement dated September 13, 1965 of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources approving the compromise fine of P21,000.00 for the various violations
committed previous to August 5 or 6, 1965 (pp. 34-42, 47, 58-64, 149-155, 158-159, rec.), the
Department Secretary "believes that the offer made by the company was an implied admission of
violations of said provisions of the Fisheries Law and regulations, ..." (pp. 63, 158, rec.). The said approval
was granted after the private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the indorsement dated
March 5, 1965 of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources disapproving the offer by private
respondent to pay the fine by way of compromise.

There can be no dispute that the term fishing boat (employed in the second paragraph of Section 12 of
the Fisheries Act applies to the vessels Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI. Even private respondent refers to said
fishing boats as fishing vessels "engaged in fishing operations" or "in commercial fishing" in paragraph IV
of its complaint in Civil Case No. 62799 (p. 18, rec.), as well as in its various communications to the
Fisheries Commissioner (pp. 60-61, 65, 82, rec.).1wph1.t The two fishing vessels Tony Lex III and
Tony Lex VI likewise fall under the term vessel used in Sections 17, 76 and 78, as well as the term boats
utilized in the second paragraph of Section 76 of the Fisheries Act. They can also fall under the term
fishing equipment employed in Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3512; because a fishing equipment is never
complete and cannot be effectively used in off-shore or deep-sea fishing without the fishing boat or
fishing vessel itself. And these two vessels of private respondent certainly come under the term fishing
vessels employed in paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the same Republic Act 3512 creating the Fisheries
Commission.

Hence, no useful purpose can be served in trying to distinguish between boat and vessel with reference
to Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI. As a matter of fact, the accepted definition of vessel includes "every
description of water craft, large or small, used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on
water" (Cope versus Vallete, etc., 199 U.S. 625; U.S. vs. Holmes, 104 Fed. 884; Charles Barnes Co. vs. One
Dredge Boat, 169 Fed. 895; and Yu Con vs. Ipil, 41 Phil. 780).

The word boat in its ordinary sense, means any water craft (Monongahela River Construction, etc. vs.
Hardsaw, 77 NE 363, 365). The fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI are likewise vessels within the
meaning of the term vessel used in Sections 903 and 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code.

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED AND THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED
OCTOBER 18, 1965, THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION ISSUED THEREUNDER AND
THE ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 23, 1965, ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID, WITH COSTS
AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT

G.R. No. 16009 September 21, 1920

UY KHEYTIN, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
ANTONIO VILLAREAL, Judge of First Instance for the Twenty-third Judicial District, ET AL., respondents.

JOHNSON, J.:

This is an original petition, filed in this court, for the writs of injunction and prohibition. It appears from
the record that on April 30, 1919, one Ramon Gayanilo, corporal of the Philippine Constabulary,
presented to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an application for search warrant, the said
Ramon Gayanilo stating in his application; "That in the house of Chino Uy Kheytin, Sto. Nio St., No. 20,
Iloilo, under the writing desk in his store, there is kept a certain amount of opium." The application was
subscribed and sworn to by the said complainant before the Honorable L. M. Southworth, judge of the
Twenty-third Judicial District.

Upon that application the said judge, on the same day, issued a search warrant in the following terms:

The United States, to any officer of the law.

Whereas on this day proof , by affidavit, having been presented before me by Corporal Ramon Gayanilo,
Philippine Constabulary, that there is probable cause to believe that in the house of Chino Uy Kheytin,
Sto. Nio St., No. 20, under the desk for writing in his store there is kept a certain amount of opium.

Therefore, you are hereby commanded during day or night to make an immediate search on the person
of Uy Kheytin or in the house, Sto. Nio St., No. 20, for the following property opium and, if you find the
same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.

Witness my hand this 30th day of April, 1919.

(Sgd.) L. M. SOUTHWORTH,

Judge of the Court of Iloilo.

Armed with that search warrant, the respondent M. S. Torralba, lieutenant of the Philippine
Constabulary, accompanied by some of his subordinates, on the same day (April 30th) searched the
house of the petitioner Uy Kheytin and found therein 60 small cans of opium. They wanted to search
also the bodega on the ground-floor of the house, but Uy Kheytin positively denied that it was his or that
he rented it. Lieutenant Torralba wanted to be sure, and for this reason he placed a guard in the
premises to see that nothing was removed therefrom, and then went away to find out who the owner of
the bodega was. The next morning he learned from the owner of the house, one Segovia, of the town of
Molo, that the Chinaman Uy Kheytin was the one who was renting the bodega. Thereupon Lieutenant
Torralba and his subordinates resumed the search and then and there found and seized the following
articles:

No. 2. One wrap of paper containing a broken bottle of opium liquid, which is kept in a tin box No. 1.

No. 3. One wrap of paper containing an opium pipe, complete, one opium container, one wrap of
opium ashes, one rag soaked in opium and one thimble with opium.
No. 4. One leather hand bag containing 7 small bottle containing opium, with two cedulas belonging
to Tian Liong, with key.

No. 5. One wooden box containing 75 empty cans, opium containers.

No. 6. One tin box containing 23 small empty cans, opium containers.

No. 7. One cardboard box containing 3 pieces of wood, one old chisel, one file, one piece of soldering
lead, one box of matches, 5 pieces of iron plates, and several other tin plates.

No. 8. One roll of 7 sheets of brass.

No. 9. Three soldering outfits.

No. 10. One hammer.

No. 11. One Chinese scale for opium.

No. 12. Twelve small bottles empty.

No. 13. Two bottles containing opium.

No. 14. One bundle of Chinese books of accounts with several personal letter of Chine Uy Kheytin.

No. 15. One tin box containing 60 cans of molasses, with 1 small bottle containing molasses.

Thereafter a criminal complaint was filed in the court of the justice of the peace of Iloilo against all the
petitioners herein, charging them with a violation of the Opium Law. They were duly arrested, and a
preliminary investigation was conducted by the justice of the peace, after which he found that there was
probable cause for believing that the crime complained of had been committed and that the defendants
were the persons responsible therefor. The cause was duly transmitted to the Court of First Instance.

While said cause was in the Court of First Instance, pending the filing of a complaint by the provincial
fiscal, the defendants, petitioners herein, through their attorney, filed a petition in the Court of First
Instance, asking for the return of "private papers, books and other property" which the Constabulary
officers had seized from said defendants, upon the ground that they had been so seized illegally and in
violation of the constitutional rights of the defendants. It was urged (1) that the search warrant of April
30th was illegal because the requisites prescribed by the General Orders No. 58 had not been complied
with in its issuance; (2) that the searches and seizures made on May 1st had been made without any
semblance of authority and hence illegal; and (3) that the seizure of the defendants' books and letters
was a violation of the provisions of the Jones Law providing that no person shall be compelled to testify
against himself, and protecting him against unreasonable searches and seizures.

After a hearing upon said motion, the Honorable Antonio Villareal, judge, in a very carefully prepared
opinion, reached the conclusion that the searches and seizures complained of had been legally made,
and consequently, denied the defendants' petition.
Thereafter and on November 22, 1919, the said defendants, petitioners herein, filed the present petition
in this court, praying as follows:

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing allegations, it is respectfully prayed that a preliminary injunction
issue.

First, restraining the respondent judge, and his successors from making any cognizance of any action of
any kind which has or may be brought against these petitioners which have resulted directly or indirectly
from the unlawful searches and seizures above-mentioned;

Second, restraining the respondent clerk of the court, the respondent fiscal, the respondent
commandant of the Constabulary, and the successors of any of them, and the assistants of any of them,
from any further examination of the private papers, books, and other property unlawfully seized as
above alleged; from making or using the same for the purpose or in such a manner that the character or
reputation of these petitioners might be injured; from making or using any copies, memorandum, notes,
or extracts obtained from the books, papers, etc., so seized; from making any examinations of any of the
property thus obtained or from using any reports or from publishing in any manner any reports already
prepared as a result of the examination of such property; or from making any other use of the property
and papers so obtained until orders are received from this court regarding the disposition of the same.

It is further requested, that a writ of prohibition issue, restraining the respondent judge from at any time
taking cognizance of any action or prosecution growing out of the unlawful searches and seizures above-
mentioned, and directing such judge or his successor to order the immediate return to these petitioners
of all of the papers and other property thus unlawfully obtained, together with all copies, extracts,
memorandum, notes, photographs, reports, samples, or evidence obtained by reason of such searches
and seizures whereby the reputation and character of petitioners may be further damaged; furthermore
enjoining all of the respondents and their assistants from divulging any of the secrets or information
which they have thus unlawfully obtained from these petitioners; and especially ordering the
respondent judge to dismiss all actions or prosecutions already filed before him or which may hereafter
come before him as a result of the unlawful acts herein alleged.

THE SEARCH WARRANT OF APRIL 30TH

The petitioners contend that the search warrant of April 30, 1919, was illegal, (1) because it was not
issued upon either of the grounds mentioned in section 96 of General Orders No. 58, and (2) because
the judge who issued it did not determine the probable cause by examining witnesses under oath, a
required by section 98 of said General Orders No. 58.

Section 96 of General Orders No. 58 is as follows:

SEC. 96.It (a search warrant) may be issued upon either of the following grounds:

1. When the property was stolen or embezzled.

2. When it was used or when the intent exists to use it as the means of committing a felony.

In support of their first contention the petitioners argue that the property ordered to be seized, namely,
opium, under the said search warrant, had not been stolen or embezzled, nor had it been used or
intended to be used as the means of committing a felony; that the word "felony" is applicable only to a
serious crime which is malum per se and not to one which is merely malum prohibitum, such as the
possession of opium.

For the purpose of this decision we deem it unnecessary to draw the distinction between the words
"felony" and "misdemeanor" a used in the common law. Suffice it to say that, whatever may be the
technical common-law meaning of the word "felony," which is used in paragraph 2 of section 96 above
quoted, we believe it would be the height of absurdity to hold, upon technical grounds, that a search
warrant is illegal which is issued to search for and seize property the very possession of which is
forbidden by law and constitutes a crime. Opium is such property. "Search-warrants have heretofore
been allowed to search for stolen goods, for goods supposed to have been smuggled into the country in
violation of the revenue laws, for implements of gaming or counterfeiting, for lottery tickets or
prohibited liquors kept for sale contrary to law, for obscene books and paper kept for sale or circulation,
and for powder or other explosive and dangerous material so kept as to endanger the public safety."
(Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 432.)

In support of their second contention, the petitioners invoke section 98 of General Orders No. 58, which
provides a follow:

SEC. 98.The judge or justice must, before issuing the warrant, examine on oath the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing.

Section 97 provides that "a search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause" and section 98
above quoted provides the manner in which that probable cause shall be determined by the judge
issuing the warrant. In the present case, however, the judge did not examine any witness under oath but
relied solely upon the sworn application of the Constabulary officer in determining whether there was
probable cause. In that application the complainant swore positively: "That in the house of Chino Uy
Kheytin, Sto. Nio St., No. 20, Iloilo, under the writing desk in his store, there is kept a certain amount of
opium." This statement was found to be true by the subsequent finding and seizure of a considerable
quantity of opium in the place mentioned. The question now is, whether the omission of the judge to
comply with the requirements of section 98 would, under the circumstances, justify the court in
declaring that the search warrant in question was illegal and ordering the return of the opium found and
seized under said warrant.

A search warrant may be likened to a warrant of arrest. The issuance of both is restricted by the same
provision of the Jones Law (sec. 3) which is as follows:
That no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.

A person, then, is protected from unreasonable arrests just as much as he is protected from
unreasonable searches. But suppose he happened to be arrested without any warrant, or upon a
warrant which had been issued by a judge without first properly determining whether there was
probable cause, and upon investigation it should be found, from his own admission, that he was the
author of the crime, should he be released upon the ground that he had not been legally arrested? In
the case of Ker vs. Illinois (119 U. S., 436) Ker having committed the crime of larceny, escaped and went
to Peru. He was kidnapped in Peru and brought back to the State of Illinois without any pretense of
authority. Passing upon the question of the constitutionality of the arrest of Ker, the Supreme Court of
the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller, said:

We do not intend to say that there may not be proceedings previous to the trial in regard to which the
prisoner could invoke in some manner the provisions of this clause of the Constitution; but for mere
irregularities in the manner in which he may be brought into the custody of the law, we do not think he
is entitled to say that he should not be tried at all for the crime with which he is charged in a regular
indictment. He may be arrested for a very heinous offense by persons without any warrant, or without
any previous complaint, and brought before a proper officer, and this may be in some sense said to be
"without due process of law." But it would hardly be claimed that after the case had been investigated,
and the defendant held by the proper authorities to answer for the crime, he could plead that he was
first arrested "without due process of law." (Followed in U. S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122, 146;
U. S. vs. Wilson, 4 Phil., 317.)

In the present case there was an irregularity in the issuance of the search warrant in question in that the
judge did not first examine the complainant or any witnesses under oath, as required by section 98 of
General Orders No. 58. But the property sought to be searched for and seized having been actually found
in the place described by the complainant, reasoning by analogy from the case of an improper arrest, we
are of the opinion that that irregularity is not sufficient cause for ordering the return of the opium found
and seized under said warrant, to the petitioners, and exonerating the latter.

II

THE SEARCH MADE ON MAY 1ST

Petitioners content that this was made without any search warrant and without any authority of law;
that the search warrant of April 30th could not be used on May 1st because that warrant had been
executed on the day of its issuance. In support of this contention counsel for the petitioners, in the lower
court, argued that:

While it is true that a warrant is good for 10 days after the date of issuance, this cannot be interpreted to
mean that a search warrant can be used every day for 10 days, and for a different purpose each day. This
would be absurd. It is admitted, for sake of argument, that if upon a search, under a legally issued
warrant, some other prohibited articles than those named in the warrant should be found, these articles
might be seized. Also, it might possibly be true, that if a warrant was issued to search for a certain article
and it was not found after the first search, that another search could be made sometime within the 10
days. But this is certainly the furthest possible extreme the doctrine could be carried. It certainly could
not be interpreted to allow a search to be made, and after the articles for which the warrant was issued
had been seized, to use this same warrant as authority to make another search.

We agree with counsel that a search warrant cannot be used every day for ten days, "and for a different
purpose each day," and that after the articles for which the warrant was issued have been seized the
same warrant cannot be used as authority to make another search. But this argument is not applicable
to the facts in this case. It appears from the oral evidence adduced during the hearing of the petitioners'
motion in the court below that the search for opium, the property mentioned in the warrant, was not
completed on April 30th; it was interrupted by the necessity to ascertain who the owner of the bodega
on the ground-floor was, because the petitioner Uy Kheytin falsely disclaimed ownership thereof. In
other words, the search of May 1st was not made "for a different purpose," nor could it be considered
"another search," but was really a continuation of the search begun on April 30th. This is shown by the
fact that during the interval between the two searches the premises in question were guarded by
Constabulary soldiers, and the petitioners were made to understand on April 30th that the authorities
were not yet through with the search and would continue the same as soon as they found out that the
bodega was also occupied by the petitioner Uy Kheytin. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the search
made on May 1st was authorized under the search warrant of April 30th

III

THE SEIZURE OF BOOKS, LETTERS, ETC.

The important question that remains to be decided is whether, under a search warrant for opium, the
officers of the law were authorized to seize books, personal letters, and other property having a remote
or no connection with opium. The respondent M. S. Torralba, lieutenant of the Constabulary, testified
that he seized these articles because he believed or suspected that they had some relation with the
opium in question; in other words, he thought that they might be used as evidence against the
petitioners when they are prosecuted for a violation of the Opium Law. The respondents contend that
this was a sufficient justification under the law for the seizure of such articles under the same warrant
for opium.

We are of the opinion that the respondent's contention in untenable. Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and
General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that a search warrant should particularly describe the
place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is
to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant
to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that
"unreasonable searches and seizures" may not be made, that abuses may not be committed. That this
is the correct interpretation of this constitutional provision is borne out by American authorities.

In order to comply with the constitutional provisions regulating the issuance of search warrants, the
property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property can
be taken thereunder. The goods to be seized must be described with such certainty as to identify them,
and the description must be so particular that the officer charged with the execution of the warrant will
be left with no discretion respecting the property to be taken. . . . Under a warrant to search a person for
stolen goods, the officer cannot lawfully take from the person a letter, such letter not being particularly
described in the warrant as property to be searched for. (24 R. C. L., 714, 715.)

It is a violation of the declaration of rights respecting searches and seizures for an officer, while searching
one's person under a search warrant for stolen goods, to take from it, against the party's will, a letter
written to him. (State vs. Slamon, 87 Am. St. Rep., 711.)

We have said that if the officer follows the command of his warrant, he is protected; and this is so even
when the complaint proves to have been unfounded. But if he exceed the command by searching in
places not described therein, or by seizing persons or articles not commanded, he is not protected by
the warrant, and can only justify himself as in other cases where he assumes to act without process.
Obeying strictly the command of his warrant, he may break open outer or inner doors, and his
justification does not depend upon his discovering that for which he is to make search. (Cooley on
Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 434)

That the officers of the law believed that the books, papers, etc., which they seized might be used as
evidence against the petitioners herein a criminal action against them for a violation of the Opium Law, is
no reason or justification under the law for the seizure: First, because they were not "particularly
described" or even mentioned in the search warrant; second, because, even if they had been mentioned
in the search warrant, they could not be legally seized, for a search warrant cannot be used for the
purpose of obtaining evidence; and third, because to compel a person to produce his private papers to
be used in evidence against him would be equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself.

1. The authorities for the first proposition have already been given above.

2. It may be said that

Books of account, private documents, and private papers are property which men may lawfully possess.
It is not believed that the stature (subsection 2 of section 96, G. O. 58) was intended to cover property of
this class. Granting that property of which men may lawfully possess themselves has been used in the
commission of a crime and not possessed nor created purely for the purpose of committing a crime, and
not likely to be used again, then certainly its seizure can only be for the purpose of using the same as
evidence to prove the commission of the crime already committed. This purpose is not contemplated by
the provision of the law. The finding of evidence can not be the immediate reason for issuing the search
warrant. To use a search warrant for the purpose of obtaining possession of property for this purpose
would be an "unreasonable" use of the remedy by search warrant, which is prohibited by law. (Regidor
vs. Araullo, 5 Off. Gaz., 955, 961, 962; U. S. vs. De los Reyes and Esguerra, 20 Phil., 467.)

Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 431, says:
The warrant is not allowed for the purpose of obtaining evidence of an intended crime; but only after
the lawful evidence of an offense actually committed. Nor even then is it allowable to invade one's
privacy for the sole purpose of obtaining evidence against him, except in a few special cases where that
which is the subject of the crime is supposed to be concealed, and the public or the complainant has an
interest in it on its destruction.

3. In the case of Boyd vs. United States (116 U. S., 616), the Supreme Court of the United States,
speaking through Mr. Justice Bradley, said:

The seizure or compulsory production of a man's private papers to be used in evidence against him is
equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself, and, in a prosecution for a crime, penalty
or forfeiture, is equally within the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment.

Both amendments (fourth and fifth) relate to the personal security of the citizen. They nearly run into
and mutually throw light upon each other. When the thing forbidden in the Fifth Amendment, namely,
compelling a man to be a witness against himself, is the object of a search and seizure of his private
papers, it is an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the Fourth Amendment.

Search and seizure of a man's private papers to be used in evidence for the purpose of convicting him of
a crime, recovering a penalty, or of forfeiting his property, is totally different from the search and seizure
of stolen goods, dutiable articles on which the duties have not been paid, and the like, which rightfully
belong to the custody of the law. (Se also Silverthorne Lumber Co. vs. United States, decided Jan. 26,
1920, by the Supreme Court of the United States.)

The seizure of a person's private papers, to be used in evidence against him, is equivalent to compelling
him to be a witness against himself. (State vs. Slamon, 73 Vt., 212; 87 Am. St. Rep., 711.)

From all of the foregoing our conclusions are:

1. That although in the issuance of the search warrant in question the judge did not comply with
the requirements of section 98 of General Orders No. 58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return of
the opium and its paraphernalia which were found and seized under said warrant, and much less are
they entitled to be exonerated because of such omission of the judge.

2. That the search made on May 1st was a continuation of the search begun on the previous day,
and, therefore, did not require another search warrant.

3. That the seizure of the petitioner's books, letters, telegrams, and other articles which have no
inherent relation with opium and the possession of which is not forbidden by law, was illegal and in
violation of the petitioners' constitutional rights.

Therefore, it is hereby ordered and decreed that each and all of the respondents herein, their assistants
or successors, be, and they hereby are, forbidden from examining or making any use of said books,
letters, telegrams, etc., namely, the articles described in items Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, and 15 of the
sheriff's return (Exhibit 3, reproduced at the top of page 3 of this decision 1) and they are hereby
ordered to immediately return the said articles to the petitioners. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-1486 April 26, 1948

ZACARIAS MAGONCIA, recurrente,

vs.

PERFECTO R. PALACIO, EL FISCAL PROVINCIAL DE PANGASINAN, recurridos.

PABLO, J.:

Zacarias Magoncia fue arrestado por el delito de robo en cuadrilla cometido en la casa de Hilario
Enovejas en el barrio de Ariston del municipio de Asingan, Pangasinan en 17 de octubre de 1946. Por
informes fidedignos que tenia el jefe de Policia ordeno a cuatro policias queregistrasen la casa del
acusado. Cuando estos, sin mandamiento de registro, hacian la requiesa, la esposa del acusado les
reconvino "por que registrais la casa cuando mi esposo esta ausente?" Los policias hallaron en la casa
un paltik, una escopeta de fabricacion clandestina, una granada de mano (hand grenade), una caja que
contenia 42 balas y algunos pedazos de tela de algodon de la propiedad de Hilario Enovejas, dueo de la
casa asaltada.

Una querella por robo en cuadrilla, Causa Criminal No. 53 y otra poor posesion ilegal de armas de fuego
fueron presentadas contra el acusado ante el Juzgado de Paz de Asingan, Pangasinan. Elevados los
expedientes al Juzgado de Primera Instancia, el primero fue registrado como Causa Criminal No. 17290 y
el segundo como Causa Criminal No. 17289.

En esta causa criminal por posesion ilegal de armas de fuego, el acusado presento una mocion en 8 de
enero de 1947 pidiendo al Juzgado que ordenase la devolucion de los efectos ilegalmente decomisados
por los cuatro policias de Asingan, Pangasinan y que se ordenase al Fiscal Provincial que desista de usar
dichos defectos como prueba en la vista. El Hon. Juez Palacio denego la petition en 1. de Abril. en 21 del
mismo mes, el acusado presento su mocion de reconsideracion que fue denegada en 10 de Mayo.
Fracasados todos sus esfuerezos, el acusado como recurrente acude ante este Tribunal en un recurso de
certiorari y pide que se revoque la orden del Hon. Juez recurrido de 10 de Mayo de 1947 y que se
ordenase al Fiscal Provincial y Jefe de Policia de Asingan, Pangasinan que desistan de presentar como
prueba tales efectos por la razon de que han sido ilegalmente decomisados por los cuatro policias.

Funda su peticion en que el acusado no ha renunciado, segun las purebas obrantes en auto, a su
proteccion bajo el precepto constitutional contra un irrazonable registro; que no tenian justificacion los
policias municipales, bajo la prohibicion consitucional,de hacer el registro como incidente de un arresto
legal; y que dichos policias municipales por no estar provistos de un mandamiento de registro no podian
verificar el registro por la simple razzon de que iban en busca de un contrabando.

En apoyo de su primera contencion, el acusado opresento como testigo a su ejsposa, la cual declaro que
no dio permiso a los policias para registrar la casa. Santiago Mauricio, uno de los policias municipales
que registrar on la casa del acusado, fue presentado como testigo del Gobierno y preguntado poor el
Juez: "During the time that you were searching the room, did Raymunda Ballasca, the wife of Zacarias
Magoncia, ever prohibit you to search the room or the house?", contesto" "Yes, sir." No hubo, pues,
consentimiento en el registro ni del acusado que estaba ausente de su casa porque estaba arrestado por
el delito de robo que era objeto de investigacion, ni de su esposa Raymunda Ballasca. Es verdad que ella
no se opuso a la entrada de los policias en su casa porque es proverbial la costumbre filipina de tener
abiertas sus puertas para todos; sin embargo, esta demostracion de buena crianza o excesiva
hospitalidad no debe considerarse como permiso a los policias para registrar su casa. El acusado estaba
detenido por un delito grave y la accion inmediata era necesaria para localizar los efectos robados. El
registro era indispensable si querian re cuperarlos. No habia tiempo que perder. Confiado en los
informes recibidos, el Jefe de Policia en vez de pedir un mandamiento de registro de un juez, ordeno a
cuatro policias el registro de la casa del acusado, y encontraron pedazos de tela robados juntamente con
un paltik , municiones y una granada de mano. Hoy reclama el acusado la devolucion de estos efectos y
se calla en cuanto a los pedazos de tela que es parte del cuerpo del delito de robo. Es innecesario decidir
si el registro sin mandammiento correspondiente en el caso presente era irrazonable o no, si estaba
justificado o no. La legalidad o no de su incautacion por los policias no tiene importancia. La cuestion es
si el acusado tiene derecho a lo que pide: la devolucion de los efectos de contrabando, encontrados en
su poosesion. La Ley No. 4 de la Republica porohibe la posesion de armas de fuego y accesorios; su
simple posesion constituye delito. La posesion del contrabando esta castigada por la ley. Cuando un
individo posee un contrabando esta cometiendo un delito, y puede ser detenido si mandmiento de
arresto no solamente por un agente de autoridad sino tambien por un particular, y su contrabando
puede ser decomisado sin necesidad de mandamiento de registro. La Constitucion no garantiza
inmunidad al contrabandista. Devolver al acusado el contrabando e impedir al Fiscal Provincial que lo
presente como prueba es exonerarle de la responsabilidad criminal prescrita por la Ley No. 4. Es
inutilizar al Estado.

No debe confundirse la posesion de una cosa que es susceptible de apropiacion legal y que es objeto del
comercio libre, como un reloj, con un caja de armas de fuego cuya posesion se prohibe. En el primer
caso, cabe invocar la garantia consitucional contra registros y se cuestros irrazonables porque el poseer
un reloj no es delito; pero la posesion de un arma de fuego, sin licencia es violacion flagrante de la ley y
esta sujeto el poseedor a un arresto sin mandamineto debidamento expedido y el contrabando puede
ser decomisado.

There is a wide distinction between the seizure of property lawfully within the possession of a person
and the seizure of property held and used in violation of law. Thus contraband articles, and those things
which under the law one has no right to possess, for the purpose of issue or disposition, are not
embraced in the protection of the constitutional guaranty. Indeed, an individual in the possession of
such goods is entitled to no protection whatsoever, for such goods are not subject to ownership, and
may be forefeited or destroyed. They are, therefore, subject to search and seizure. (56 C.J., 116.)

En el asunto de Uy Kheyten contra Villareal (42 Jur. Fil., 935), los recurrentes pidieron la devolucion del
opio de que se inacutaron los constabularios al registrar su casa armados con un mandamiento de
registro expedido sin cumplir las disposiciones de los articulos 96 y 98 de la Orden General No. 58;
sostenian que los requisitos exigidos por dichos articulos no se habian cumplido, y por tanto, el
mandamiento de registro era ilegal, como si no existiera; queel registro se ha hecho sin mandamiento de
registro debidamente expedido. Este Tribunal denego la peticion, declarando que la irregularidad de la
expedicion del mandamiento de registro no era suficiente causa para ordenar la devolucion del opio.

El Hon. Juez recurrido no abuso de su discrecion al denegar la devolucion al acusado del platik, 42
municio nes y un agranada de mano, tampoco abuso de su sana discrecion al denegar la peticion del
acusado de que se prohiba al Fiscal Provincial y al Jefe de Policia de Asingan, Pangasinan a presentar
tales efectos como prueba en la vista. Se sobresee la solicitud con costas.

G.R. No. L-27360 February 28, 1968

HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, as Commissioner of
Customs; PEDRO PACIS, as Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and MARTIN ALAGAO, as
Patrolman of the Manila Police Department, petitioners,

vs.

REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Court of First Instance of
Manila, respondents.

ZALDIVAR, J.:

This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction filed by Ricardo
Papa, Chief of Police of Manila; Juan once Enrile, Commissioner of Customs; Pedro Pacis, Collector of
Customs of the Port of Manila; and Martin Alagao, a patrolman of the Manila Police Department, against
Remedios Mago and Hon. Hilarion Jarencio, Presiding Judge of Branch 23 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, praying for the annulment of the order issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 67496 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila under date of March 7, 1967, which authorized the release under bond
of certain goods which were seized and held by petitioners in connection with the enforcement of the
Tariff and Customs Code, but which were claimed by respondent Remedios Mago, and to prohibit
respondent Judge from further proceeding in any manner whatsoever in said Civil Case No. 67496.
Pending the determination of this case this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order in Civil Case No.
67496 and from proceeding with said case.

Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department,
acting upon a reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of
personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the
customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo
Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted
surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the
afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and
intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks consisting of nine
bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation,
a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of
Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a
certain Bienvenido Naguit.

Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their cargo,
Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition "for
mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, alleging,
among others, that Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized, having purchased them from
the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga; that she hired the trucks owned by Valentin
Lanopa to transport, the goods from said place to her residence at 1657 Laon Laan St., Sampaloc,
Manila; that the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police Department without search
warrant issued by a competent court; that anila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request of
counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and the goods contained therein be not
examined; that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to examine
the goods because the goods were no longer under the control and supervision of the Commissioner of
Customs; that the goods, even assuming them to have been misdeclared and, undervalued, were not
subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because Remedios Mago had
bought them from another person without knowledge that they were imported illegally; that the bales
had not yet been opened, although Chief of Police Papa had arranged with the Commissioner of
Customs regarding the disposition of the goods, and that unless restrained their constitutional rights
would be violated and they would truly suffer irreparable injury. Hence, Remedios Mago and Valentin
Lanopa prayed for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the above-named police and
customs authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of
mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and
exemplary damages in their favor.

On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining the
respondents in Civil Case No. 67496 now petitioners in the instant case before this Court from
opening the nine bales in question, and at the same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary
injunction on November 16, 1966. However, when the restraining order was received by herein
petitioners, some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the
presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of
herein respondent Remedios Mago.

Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an amended petition in Civil Case No.
67496, including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt.
Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. Herein petitioners (defendants below) filed, on
November 24, 1966, their "Answer with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction",
denying the alleged illegality of the seizure and detention of the goods and the trucks and of their other
actuations, and alleging special and affirmative defenses, to wit: that the Court of First Instance of
Manila had no jurisdiction to try the case; that the case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court
of Tax Appeals; that, assuming that the court had jurisdiction over the case, the petition stated no cause
of action in view of the failure of Remedios Mago to exhaust the administrative remedies provided for in
the Tariff and Customs Code; that the Bureau of Customs had not lost jurisdiction over the goods
because the full duties and charges thereon had not been paid; that the members of the Manila Police
Department had the power to make the seizure; that the seizure was not unreasonable; and the persons
deputized under Section 2203 (c) of the Tariff and Customs Code could effect search, seizures and arrests
in inland places in connection with the enforcement of the said Code. In opposing the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction, herein petitioners averred in the court below that the writ could not be
granted for the reason that Remedios Mago was not entitled to the main reliefs she prayed for; that the
release of the goods, which were subject to seizure proceedings under the Tariff and Customs Code,
would deprive the Bureau of Customs of the authority to forfeit them; and that Remedios Mago and
Valentin Lanopa would not suffer irreparable injury. Herein petitioners prayed the court below for the
lifting of the restraining order, for the denial of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and for
the dismissal of the case.

At the hearing on December 9, 1966, the lower Court, with the conformity of the parties, ordered
that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the representatives of the
claimant of the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti-Smuggling Center of the Manila Police
Department. On December 13, 1966, the above-named persons filed a "Compliance" itemizing the
contents of the nine bales.

Herein respondent Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966, filed an ex parte motion to release the
goods, alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited
importation, the same should be released as per agreement of the patties upon her posting of the
appropriate bond that may be determined by the court. Herein petitioners filed their opposition to the
motion, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to order the release of the goods in view of the fact
that the court had no jurisdiction over the case, and that most of the goods, as shown in the inventory,
were not declared and were, therefore, subject to forfeiture. A supplemental opposition was filed by
herein petitioners on January 19, 1967, alleging that on January 12, 1967 seizure proceedings against the
goods had been instituted by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila, and the determination of all
questions affecting the disposal of property proceeded against in seizure and forfeiture proceedings
should thereby be left to the Collector of Customs. On January 30, 1967, herein petitioners filed a
manifestation that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges due on the goods amounted to
P95,772.00. On February 2, 1967, herein respondent Remedios Mago filed an urgent manifestation and
reiteration of the motion for the release under bond of the goods.

On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order releasing the goods to herein respondent
Remedios Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, and on March 13, 1967, said
respondent filed the corresponding bond.

On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the
Manila Police Department had been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold
the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings.

Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they had
no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, herein petitioners filed the present
action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before this Court. In their petition
petitioners alleged, among others, that the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in ordering the
release to respondent Remedios Mago of the disputed goods, for the following reasons: (1) the Court of
First Instance of Manila, presided by respondent Judge, had no jurisdiction over the case; (2) respondent
Remedios Mago had no cause of action in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila
due to her failure to exhaust all administrative remedies before invoking judicial intervention; (3) the
Government was not estopped by the negligent and/or illegal acts of its agent in not collecting the
correct taxes; and (4) the bond fixed by respondent Judge for the release of the goods was grossly
insufficient.

In due time, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for prohibition and certiorari in this
case. In their answer, respondents alleged, among others: (1) that it was within the jurisdiction of the
lower court presided by respondent Judge to hear and decide Civil Case No. 67496 and to issue the
questioned order of March 7, 1967, because said Civil Case No. 67496 was instituted long before seizure,
and identification proceedings against the nine bales of goods in question were instituted by the
Collector of Customs; (2) that petitioners could no longer go after the goods in question after the
corresponding duties and taxes had been paid and said goods had left the customs premises and were
no longer within the control of the Bureau of Customs; (3) that respondent Remedios Mago was
purchaser in good faith of the goods in question so that those goods can not be the subject of seizure
and forfeiture proceedings; (4) that the seizure of the goods was affected by members of the Manila
Police Department at a place outside control of jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs and affected
without any search warrant or a warrant of seizure and detention; (5) that the warrant of seizure and
detention subsequently issued by the Collector of Customs is illegal and unconstitutional, it not being
issued by a judge; (6) that the seizing officers have no authority to seize the goods in question because
they are not articles of prohibited importation; (7) that petitioners are estopped to institute the present
action because they had agreed before the respondent Judge that they would not interpose any
objection to the release of the goods under bond to answer for whatever duties and taxes the said goods
may still be liable; and (8) that the bond for the release of the goods was sufficient.

The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the respondent Judge had acted with
jurisdiction in issuing the order of March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question.

The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess and
collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties,
accruing under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon
the customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. 1 The goods in question were imported from
Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry". 2 As long as
the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the payment of the duties, taxes and
other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for
withdrawal shall have been granted. 3 The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be
in full. 4

The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement and
Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor
General 5 wherein it is stated that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject of
this case amounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau of Customs,
that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid in full. Furthermore, a comparison of the
goods on which duties had been assessed, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected
on Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing the articles found in the bales upon examination and
inventory, 6 shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared, presumably to avoid the payment
of duties thereon. For example, Annex B (the statement and receipts of duties collected) states that
there were 40 pieces of ladies' sweaters, whereas Annex H (the inventory contained in the "compliance")
states that in bale No. 1 alone there were 42 dozens and 1 piece of ladies' sweaters of assorted colors; in
Annex B, only 100 pieces of watch bands were assessed, but in Annex H, there were in bale No. 2, 209
dozens and 5 pieces of men's metal watch bands (white) and 120 dozens of men's metal watch band
(gold color), and in bale No. 7, 320 dozens of men's metal watch bands (gold color); in Annex B, 20
dozens only of men's handkerchief were declared, but in Annex H it appears that there were 224 dozens
of said goods in bale No. 2, 120 dozens in bale No. 6, 380 dozens in bale No. 7, 220 dozens in bale No. 8,
and another 200 dozens in bale No. 9. The articles contained in the nine bales in question, were,
therefore, subject to forfeiture under Section 2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and
Customs Code. And this Court has held that merchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary
to law, is subject to forfeiture, 7 and that goods released contrary to law are subject to seizure and
forfeiture. 8
 Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the
customs area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said goods
were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police
Department, acting under directions and orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally
deputized by the Commissioner of Customs, 9 the Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and
custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of
Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other charges
have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same according to law. The goods in
question, therefore, were under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the time
the petition for mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore, could not exercise
jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure and detention of the goods for the purposes of
the seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet been issued by the Collector of Customs.

The ruling in the case of "Alberto de Joya, et al. v. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, et al.," G.R. No. L-24037,
decided by this Court on April 27, 1967, is squarely applicable to the instant case. In the De Joya case, it
appears that Francindy Commercial of Manila bought from Ernerose Commercial of Cebu City 90 bales of
assorted textiles and rags, valued at P117,731.00, which had been imported and entered thru the port of
Cebu. Ernerose Commercial shipped the goods to Manila on board an inter-island vessel. When the
goods where about to leave the customs premises in Manila, on October 6, 1964, the customs
authorities held them for further verification, and upon examination the goods were found to be
different from the declaration in the cargo manifest of the carrying vessel. Francindy Commercial
subsequently demanded from the customs authorities the release of the goods, asserting that it is a
purchaser in good faith of those goods; that a local purchaser was involved so the Bureau of Customs
had no right to examine the goods; and that the goods came from a coastwise port. On October 26,
1964, Francindy Commercial filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for mandamus
against the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs of the port of Manila to compel said
customs authorities to release the goods.

Francindy Commercial alleged in its petition for mandamus that the Bureau of Customs had no
jurisdiction over the goods because the same were not imported to the port of Manila; that it was not
liable for duties and taxes because the transaction was not an original importation; that the goods were
not in the hands of the importer nor subject to importer's control, nor were the goods imported contrary
to law with its (Francindy Commercial's) knowledge; and that the importation had been terminated. On
November 12, 1964, the Collector of Customs of Manila issued a warrant of seizure and identification
against the goods. On December 3, 1964, the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs, as
respondents in the mandamus case, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, and in view of the pending seizure and forfeiture proceedings. The
Court of First Instance held resolution on the motion to dismiss in abeyance pending decision on the
merits. On December 14, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a preventive and mandatory
injunction, on prayer by Francindy Commercial, upon a bond of P20,000.00. The Commissioner of
Customs and the Collector of Customs sought the lifting of the preliminary and mandatory injunction,
and the resolution of their motion to dismiss. The Court of First Instance of Manila, however, on January
12, 1965, ordered them to comply with the preliminary and mandatory injunction, upon the filing by
Francindy Commercial of an additional bond of P50,000.00. Said customs authorities thereupon filed
with this Court, on January 14, 1965, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
In resolving the question raised in that case, this Court held:

This petition raises two related issues: first, has the Customs bureau jurisdiction to seize the goods
and institute forfeiture proceedings against them? and (2) has the Court of First Instance jurisdiction to
entertain the petition for mandamus to compel the Customs authorities to release the goods?

Francindy Commercial contends that since the petition in the Court of first Instance was filed (on
October 26, 1964) ahead of the issuance of the Customs warrant of seizure and forfeiture (on November
12, 1964),the Customs bureau should yield the jurisdiction of the said court.

The record shows, however, that the goods in question were actually seized on October 6, 1964,
i.e., before Francindy Commercial sued in court. The purpose of the seizure by the Customs bureau was
to verify whether or not Custom duties and taxes were paid for their importation. Hence, on December
23, 1964, Customs released 22 bales thereof, for the same were found to have been released regularly
from the Cebu Port (Petition Annex "L"). As to goods imported illegally or released irregularly from
Customs custody, these are subject to seizure under Section 2530 m. of the Tariff and Customs Code (RA
1957).

The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power, among others to collect revenues from
imported articles, fines and penalties and suppress smuggling and other frauds on customs; and to
enforce tariff and customs laws (Sec. 602, Republic Act 1957).

The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should they be found to
have been released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are subject to seizure and
forfeiture, the proceedings for which comes within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to
Republic Act 1937.

Said proceeding should be followed; the owner of the goods may set up defenses therein (Pacis v.
Averia, L-22526, Nov. 20, 1966.) From the decision of the Commissioner of Customs appeal lies to the
Court of Tax Appeals, as provided in Sec. 2402 of Republic Act 1937 and Sec. 11 of Republic Act, 1125. To
permit recourse to the Court of First Instance in cases of seizure of imported goods would in effect
render ineffective the power of the Customs authorities under the Tariff and Customs Code and deprive
the Court of Tax Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate jurisdictions. As this Court has ruled in Pacis v.
Averia, supra, Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings
exclusively upon the Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such law being special in nature,
while the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance is a general legislation, not to
mention that the former are later enactments, the Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction
of the Customs authorities.
 It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over
imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are
actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been
issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present
case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from
that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the
enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would
the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector of
Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967. 10 And so, it cannot be
said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest the
respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The court presided by respondent
Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed
before it, and so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over
the goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned
order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.

Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of the Manila Police Department,
could not seize the goods in question without a search warrant. This contention cannot be sustained.
The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the
Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws,
effect searches, seizures, and arrests, 11 and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo,
articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine
imposed under customs and tariff laws. 12 He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope
or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of
dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and
examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as
aforesaid. 13 It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila,
could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code
authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter
has the legal duty to render said assistance. 14 This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt.
Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine
bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make
the interception of the cargo. 15

Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without
any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said
warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of
the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or
building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and
any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. 16 But in the
search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched
only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered view, therefor,
that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the
customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs
laws.

Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. United States, 39 A.L.R., 790, 799, wherein the
court, considering a legal provision similar to Section 2211 of the Philippine Tariff and Customs Code,
said as follows:

Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th Amendment, we find in the first Congress,
and in the following second and fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the necessity for a search
warrant between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house of similar place, and
like goods in course of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel, where readily they could be
put out of reach of a search warrant. . . .

Again, by the 2d section of the Act of March 3, 1815 (3 Stat. at L.231, 232, chap. 94), it was made
lawful for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within their own and adjoining districts,
but also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom they should suspect
there was merchandise which was subject to duty, or had been introduced into the United States in any
manner contrary to law, whether by the person in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they
should find any goods, wares, or merchandise thereon, which they had probably cause to believe had
been so unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and secure the same, and the vehicle or beast as
well, for trial and forfeiture. This Act was renewed April 27, 1816 (3 Sta. at L. 315, chap. 100), for a year
and expired. The Act of February 28, 1865, revived 2 of the Act of 1815, above described, chap. 67, 13
Stat. at L. 441. The substance of this section was re-enacted in the 3d section of the Act of July 18, 1866,
chap. 201, 14 Stat. at L. 178, and was thereafter embodied in the Revised Statutes as 3061, Comp. Stat.
5763, 2 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1161. Neither 3061 nor any of its earlier counterparts has ever
been attacked as unconstitutional. Indeed, that section was referred to and treated as operative by this
court in Von Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215, 219, 27 L. ed. 540, 541, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503. . . .

In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not
have to make any search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. In their original petition, and
amended petition, in the court below Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not even allege that
there was a search. 18 All that they complained of was,

That while the trucks were on their way, they were intercepted without any search warrant near
the Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila Police Department, where they were detained.

But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would be
needed under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case. Thus, it has been held that:

The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a
search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for
contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. (47 Am. Jur., pp. 513-514,
citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. ed., 543, 45 S. Ct., 280, 39 A.L.R., 790; People v. Case,
320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686.)

In the case of People v. Case (320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686), the question raised by
defendant's counsel was whether an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched without
search warrant or other process and the goods therein seized used afterwards as evidence in a trial for
violation of the prohibition laws of the State. Same counsel contended the negative, urging the
constitutional provision forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court said:

. . . Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution directly prohibits search and seizure without a
warrant, as is sometimes asserted. Only "unreasonable" search and seizure is forbidden. . . .

. . . The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the language of the Constitution
is a judicial and not a legislative question; but in determining whether a seizure is or is not unreasonable,
all of the circumstances under which it is made must be looked to.

The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development, which has multiplied by
quantity production and taken possession of our highways in battalions until the slower, animal-drawn
vehicles, with their easily noted individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form
in immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful
commission of crime a disguising means of silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of
the world before their advent. The question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or
other public places is a serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called "bootleging"
or "rum running," which is itself is no small matter. While a possession in the sense of private ownership,
they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their active use is not in
homes or on private premises, the privacy of which the law especially guards from search and seizure
without process. The baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of
crime of all degrees, from those against morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and
murder, is a matter of common knowledge. Upon that problem a condition, and not a theory, confronts
proper administration of our criminal laws. Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon a
highway or other public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be
determined as a judicial question in view of all the circumstances under which it is made.

Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in
question was in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction
over the goods for the purpose of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, We have thus resolved the principal and decisive issue in the present
case. We do not consider it necessary, for the purposes of this decision, to discuss the incidental issues
raised by the parties in their pleadings.
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

(a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by petitioners;

(b) Declaring null and void, for having been issued without jurisdiction, the order of respondent
Judge Hilarion U. Jarencio, dated March 7, 1967, in Civil Code No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila;

(c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on March 31, 1967
restraining respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing his order of March 7, 1967
in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and from proceeding in any manner in
said case;

(d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;
and1wph1.t

(e) Ordering the private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay the costs.

It is so ordered.

[G.R. No. L-6858. May 31, 1956.]

FERNANDO IGNACIO and SIMEON DE LA CRUZ, Petitioners-Appellants, vs. THE HONORABLE NORBERTO
ELA, Mayor of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, Respondent-Appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Petitioners, in their behalf and for the benefit of other Jehovahs Witnesses in the province of Zambales,
brought this action to compel Respondent to grant them a permit to hold a public meeting at the public
plaza of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, together with the kiosk, on such date and time as may be applied for by
them.

Respondent in his answer stated that he had not refused the request of Petitioners to hold a religious
meeting at the public plaza as in fact he grave them permission to use the northwestern part of the plaza
on July 27, 1952, but they declined to avail of it. He prayed that the action be dismissed.

The questions of fact raised in the pleadings being not controverted, and Petitioners having submitted a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was concurred in by Respondent, the court rendered a
decision dismissing the case without pronouncement as to costs. Plaintiffs appealed from this decision.

It appears that Petitioners are members of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, commonly known as
Jehovahs Witnesses, whose tenets and principles are derogatory to those professed by the Catholic
organization. In its publication FACE THE FACTS, that society branded the latter as a religious
organization which is a part of the monstrosity now appearing in and claiming the right to rule the
earth. Desiring to hold a meeting in furtherance of its objectives, Petitioners asked Respondent to give
them permission to use the public plaza together with the kiosk, but, instead of granting the permission,
Respondent allowed them to hold their meeting on the northwestern part corner of the plaza. He
adopted as a policy not to allow the use of the kiosk for any meeting by any religious denomination as it
is his belief that said Kiosk should only be used for legal purposes. And when their request for
reconsideration was denied, Petitioners instituted the present action for mandamus.

It is now contended by Petitioners that the action taken by Respondent is unconstitutional being an
abridgment of the freedom of speech, assembly, and worship guaranteed by our Constitution. The issue
raised involves a little digression on the extent to which the right to peacefully assemble guaranteed by
the Constitution may be invoked. Fortunately, this issue has already been passed upon by this Court in
Primicias vs. Fugoso, 45 Official Gazette, 3280, wherein this Court said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the
constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-
ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it
shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of
the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is
termed the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police
power is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating
those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as
towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies celled municipal and city councils
to enact ordinances for the purpose.

It therefore appears that the right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, though guaranteed
by our Constitution, is not absolute, for it may be regulated in order that it may not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society,
and this power may be exercised under the police power of the state, which is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare
of the people. It is true that there is no law nor ordinance which expressly confers upon Respondents the
power to regulate the use of the public plaza, together with its kiosk, for the purposes for which it was
established, but such power may be exercised under his broad powers as chief executive in connection
with his specific duty to issue orders relating to the police or to public safety within the municipality
(section 2194, paragraph c, Revised Administrative Code). And it may even be said that the above
regulation has been adopted as an implementation of the constitutional provision which prohibits any
public property to be used, directly or indirectly, by any religious denomination (paragraph 3, section 23,
Article VI of the Constitution).

The power exercised by Respondent cannot be considered as capricious or arbitrary considering the
peculiar circumstances of this case. It appears that the public plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at a
short distance from the Roman Catholic Church. The proximity of said church to the kiosk has caused
some concern on the part of the authorities that to avoid disturbance of peace and order, or the
happening of untoward incidents, they deemed it necessary to prohibit the use of that kiosk by any
religious denomination as a place of meeting of its members. This was the policy adopted by Respondent
for sometime previous to the request made by Petitioners. Respondent never denied such request but
merely tried to enforce his policy by assigning them the northwestern part of the public plaza. It cannot
therefore be said that Petitioners were denied their constitutional right to assemble for, as was said,
such right is subject to regulation to maintain public order and public safety. This is especially so
considering that the tenets of Petitioners congregation are derogatory to those of the Roman Catholic
Church, a factor which Respondent must have considered in denying their request.

It is true that the foregoing conclusion is predicated on facts which do not appear in the pleadings nor
are supported by any evidence because none was presented for the reason that the case was submitted
on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, but those facts like the situation of the kiosko and the
occurrence of religious controversies which disturbed the peace and order in the municipality of Sta.
Cruz are matters which may be deemed to come within the judicial knowledge of the court as in fact
they were so considered by the trial judge in his decision. This is what he said on this
point:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The presiding judge, through information, personal experience and
through the papers, has known of unfortunate events which caused the disturbance of peace and order
in the community. If the Petitioners should be allowed to use the kiosko which is within the hearing
distance of the catholic church, this may give rise to disturbance of other religious ceremonies
performed in the church. (Italics supplied.) This action of the judge may be justified under section 5,
Rule 123, of the Rules of Court, which is elaborated by this Court in the following
wise:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

There are facts, indeed of which courts should take judicial cognizance. These facts refer to a variety of
subjects legislative, political, historical, geographical, commercial, scientific, and artificial in
addition to a wide range of matters, arising in the ordinary course of nature or the general current of
human events. The matter of judicial notice is ever expanding and will surely keep pace with the advance
of the science and the arts. But, a matter to be judicially cognizable must be well-established or
authoritatively settled, or of common or general knowledge. Obviously, courts should take notice of
whatever is or should be generally known because judges should not be more ignorant than the rest of
mankind. (The Municipal Board of the City of Manila, et al. vs. Segundo Agustin, 65 Phil., 144.) (Italics
supplied.)

The contention that the northwestern part of the plaza cannot be considered as part of said plaza but of
the road in the northwestern portion beyond the concrete fence is untenable, for it appears that portion
is part of the plaza and has a space capable of accommodating hundreds of people. In fact, during the
past celebrations of the traditional town fiesta of the municipality, said portion has been utilized by the
authorities as a place for staging dramas, zarzuelas, and cinematograph shows. Verily, the pretense of
Petitioners cannot be attributed to the unsuitability of that portion as a meeting place but rather to their
obstinate desire to use the kiosk knowing it to be contrary to the policy of the municipality. 1 T
G.R. No. 36453 September 28, 1932

CRISANTO EVANGELISTA, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

TOMAS EARNSHAW, Mayor of the City of Manila, defendant-appellee.

OSTRAND, J.:

This is an action of mandamus brought against the defendant mayor of the City of Manila. The plaintiff
alleges that he is the president of the Communist Party in the Philippine Islands, a political group seeking
the speedy granting of independence in these Islands and the redemption of the proletariat, numbering
over 300,000 men and woman in its ranks; that on the 2d of March, 1931, by means of a letter to the
defendant mayor of the city, the plaintiff requested the necessary permission to hold a popular meeting
at Plaza Moriones in that city, on the afternoon of March 12, 1931, to be followed by a parade through
the streets of Juan Luna, Azcarraga, Avenida Rizal, Echague, and General Solano in order to deliver to the
Governor-General a message from the laboring class; that on the 3d of March, 1931, the mayor of the
city denied the plaintiff's petition, instructing his subaltern, the chief of police, to prohibit all kinds of
meetings held by the Communist Party throughout the city, because he had revoked their permits and
licenses; that consequently, the Communist Party has not been able to hold any private or public
meetings in the city since the 6th day of March, 1931; that in refusing the requested permission and in
prohibiting all meetings of the party within the city, the defendant deprived the Communist Party of a
constitutional right. The plaintiff further prays "that a writ of mandamus be issued against the herein
defendant compelling him to issue a permit for the holding of meetings and parades by the Communist
Party in Manila."

The defendant in his answer and special defense stated that subsequent to the issuance of the above-
mentioned permit, it was discovered after an investigation conducted by the office of the fiscal for the
City of Manila, that said Communist Party of the Philippines is an illegal association, or organization,
which having for its principal object to incite the revolt of the proletariat or laboring class, according to
its constitution and by-laws, states as follows:

The Philippines, as a subject nation, in order to establish an independent government, has to revolt
under the leadership of the laborers.

. . . It is clear that the different political parties of the burgesses (Nacionalista-Consolidado, Democrata,
etc.) are no different from another. They have but one aim; to rise into power and exploit, with
independence or not; to enrich themselves and strengthen the control of a government which is
procapitalist and proimperialist.

Because of these, we need a Communist Party, one that is not reformist but revolutionary. Only by
revolutionary means can we demolish the slavery of man by another and of one nation by another
nation. . .

The principal ideal of the C. P. P. (Communist Party of the Philippines) in the desire to head the Philippine
Government is different from that of the burgees political parties. Its aim is not to strengthen the
capitalist government but to engender as it cannot be avoided the war of the classes and to bring
about its downfall. Therefore, the aims of the C. P. P. are the following:

1. To lead the movement for the immediate and complete independence of the Philippines.

2. To fight and bring about the downfall of American imperialism which oppresses the Philippines;

3. To stop the exploitation of the laborers and defend their rights and interests;

4. To establish in the Philippines a Soviet Government under the laborers.

5. To bring about the downfall of capitalism.

6. Under the dictatorship of the laborers, to emancipate and redeem the laborers and farm hands,
to embrace communism.

With these high ideals the Communist Party of the Philippines will be established. And inasmuch as
these ideals are the same as those of the C. I. (Communist International), the C. P. P. will extend its full
help for the redemption and welfare of the laborers.

. . . Here in the Philippines, American Imperialism is being fought also. The reluctance of the Moros in
paying taxes to the Government, the disorders in the large haciendas, the farmers resisting the owners
and the Constabulary, the strike of the high-school students, the uprising of the Colorums, and the
oppression of the imperialists and capitalists of the laborers, are symptoms of a movement, which if
carried on with unity, will perforce bring about the downfall of American imperialism and the obtaining
of Philippine independence.

Before achieving this ultimate ideal of the C. P. P. we will have you take other steps. First, to overthrow
American imperialism which oppresses the Philippines; second, to overthrow capitalism and feudalism;
third, to seize the power in the government; fourth, the establishment of labor dictatorship; fifth, the
bringing about of class consciousness and class struggle and the prompt establishment of communism.

Under this state of affairs, a struggle is indespensable. This struggle may be peaceful or violent, but just
the same it will be a bitter struggle, where life and death will be staked.

For the prompt overthrow of the institutions of capitalism and for the purpose of opening the eyes of
the people that the imperialists are not really in earnest about giving subject peoples their
independence because independence is an enemy of oppression and exploitation unless their
downfall is brought about, it is necessary to struggle, not only during elections.

The difference of the revolutionary movement advocated by the C. P. P. is not found only in its principal
ideal but in the steps that it will take. While the reformists advocate understanding and cooperation with
the burgesses or capitalists, the movement of the laborers is based on the principle of class struggle.
Instead of cooperating with the enemy we should master our own strength and fight our enemies. And
in order to achieve this union, strong and powerful, it is necessary that we should counteract every move
that will tend to prejudice the laborers.
In view of the revolutionary campaign of the C. P. P. for the sake of the laborers and farm workers, the
capitalists and imperialists will become more violent and antagonistic toward them. And inasmuch as the
capitalists and imperialists have control of the government, it is not impossible that they will use their
power to more violently oppress us; in such a case they will make it clear that their ideals are
inconsistent with those of the laborers. When that day comes, the class struggle and the revolution will
redouble their force, for they will be forced to defend themselves by rising in revolt against the
oppression they are being subject to by means of the power of the state.

For the obtaining of the partial demands to be made by the C. P. P., it is necessary that all the laborers
and farm hands, now divided by their different industrial organization, be united. . . . If the factory
laborers and farm hands organizations are already established and ready for the struggle, and if their
movement is already under the leadership of the proletariat thru the C. P. P., it will endeavor to make the
movement more vigorous for the purpose of obtaining its partial demands until the time comes when
the factory laborers and farm hands are able to wrest the control of the Government from the capitalists
and imperialists and place it in the hands of the sons of the sweat;

By virtue of the original permits granted by the defendant mayor to the said Communist Party of the
Philippines, several public meetings were held under the auspices of the aforesaid association in
different parts of the City of Manila, in which seditious speeches were made urging the laboring class to
unite by affiliating to the Communist Party of the Philippines in order to be able to overthrow the
present government, and stirring up enmity against the insular and local police forces by branding the
members thereof as the enemies of the laborers and as tools of the capitalists and imperialists for
oppressing the said laborers.

The communists further insisted that it was the duty of the laborers to bring the government into their
hands and to run it by themselves and for themselves, like the laboring class in Russia; that when the
laborers were united, neither the Constabulary nor the United States Army nor the imperialist Governor-
General could stop them when they rose up as one body in order to free themselves from slavery by the
capitalists; that America was cunning and a coward, as evidenced by the fact that when she entered the
World War, her enemies were already weak; that the Constabulary and the police were the ones who
made trouble for the laborers because they were the agents of the American imperialists in the Islands
and they were used as instruments by the American Imperialist Government; that united together, the
laborers could down the American Imperialist Government; and other terms and expression of similar
tenor and import.

It will be readily seen that the doctrines and principles advocated and urged in the constitution and by-
laws of the said Communist Party of the Philippines, and the speeches uttered, delivered, and made by
its members in the public meetings or gatherings, as above stated, are highly seditious, in that they
suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and disturb and obstruct the lawful authorities in their duty.

Considering the actions of the so-called president of the Communist Party, it is evident that he cannot
expect that the defendant will permit the Communist Party to hold meetings or parades in the manner
herein described. Furthermore, it may be noted that the complaint of the case is written merely in
general terms and calls only for a judicial declaration upon a question which is not at present an issue
between the parties to this case. But be that as it may, it must be considered that the respondent mayor,
whose sworn duty it is "to see that nothing should occur which would tend to provoke or excite the
people to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order of the Government," did only the
right thing under the circumstances, that is, cancel and withdraw, as was done, the permit previously
issued by him to said Communist Party, in accordance with the power granted him by law "To grant
and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes and to revoke the same for violation of the
conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or municipal ordinance are being
committed under the protection of such licenses or in the premises in which the business for which the
same have been granted is carried on, or for any other good reason of general interest." (Act No. 2774,
sec. 4, amending sec. 2434, par [m], Administrative Code.)

Instead of being condemned or criticised, the respondent mayor should be praised and commended for
having taken a prompt, courageous, and firm stand towards the said Communist Party of the Philippines
before the latter could do more damage by its revolutionary propaganda, and by the seditious speeches
and utterances of its members. In the case of Gitlow vs. New York (268 U. S., 652), the Supreme Court of
the United States said:

Such utterances, by their very nature, involve danger to the public peace and to the security of the state.
They threaten breaches of the peace and ultimate revolution. And the immediate danger is none the less
real and substantial because the effect of the given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. The state
cannot reasonably be required to measure the danger from every such utterance in the nice balance of a
jeweler's scale. A single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smoldering for a time, may burst into
a sweeping and destructive conflagration. It cannot be said that the state is acting arbitrarily on
unreasonably when, in the exercise of its judgment as to the measures necessary to protect the public
peace and safety, it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has enkindled the flame or
blazed into the conflagration. It cannot reasonably be required to defer the adoption of measures for its
own peace and safety until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace
or imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its judgment,
suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency. In People vs. Lloyd, supra, p. 35 (136 N. E., 505)., it was
aptly said: "Manifestly, the legislature has authority to forbid the advocacy of a doctrine designed and
intended to overthrow the government without waiting until there is a present and imminent danger of
the success of the plan advocated. If the state were compelled to wait until the apprehended danger
became certain, then its right to protect itself would come into being simultaneously with the overthrow
of the government, when there would be neither prosecuting officers nor courts for the enforcement of
the law."

At any rate, the right of peaceful assemblage is not an absolute one. In the case of People vs. Perez (45
Phil., 599, 605), this court said:

. . . when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of
speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the
prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of
the State. (Citing III Wharton's Criminal Law, pp. 2127 et seq.; U. S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422;
People vs. Perfecto [1922], 43 Phil., 887.)

The judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-31687 February 26, 1970

NAVARRO, petitioner,

vs.

CITY MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, respondent.

GENTLEMEN:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court of even date:

"In Case G.R. No. L-31687 (Navarro vs. Villegas), the Court, after considering the pleadings and
arguments of the parties, issued the following Resolution:

Without prejudice to a more extended opinion and taking into account the following considerations:

That respondent Mayor has not denied nor absolutely refused the permit sought by petitioner;

That as stated in Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 75, respondent Mayor possesses reasonable discretion to
determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the assembly in order to secure
convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of
disorder and maintain public safety and order;

That respondent Mayor has expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful assemblies at
Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when they would not cause unnecessarily great
disruption of the normal activities of the community and has further offered Sunken Gardens as an
alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of the demonstration sought to be held this afternoon;

That experiences in connection with present assemblies and demonstrations do not warrant the Court's
disbelieving respondent Mayor's appraisal that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as compared to one at the
Sunken Gardens as he suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent danger of public disorders,
breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies, and
petitioner has manifested that it has no means of preventing such disorders;

That, consequently, every time that such assemblies are announced, the community is placed in such a
state of fear and tension that offices are closed early and employees dismissed, storefronts boarded up,
classes suspended, and transportation disrupted, to the general detriment of the public:

That civil rights and liberties can exist and be preserved only in an order society;

The petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of respondent Mayor to grant
their application for permit unconditionally; Court resolved to DENY the writ prayed for and to dismiss
the petition.

[G.R. No. L-18247. August 31, 1963.]

FLORENTINO GALLEGO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS TO FREE SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY; POWER OF STATE TO REGULATE
UNDER THE POLICE POWER. The rights to freedom of speech and to peaceably assemble and petition
the government for redress of grievances are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and
guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But the exercise of these rights is not absolute
for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal
rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society, and such power to regulate is termed the
sovereign "police power," which may in turn be delegated to political subdivisions, like municipalities and
cities, which may enact ordinances for the purpose.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; JUDICIAL NOTICE BY COURT OF APPEALS. There is nothing in
the law that prohibits a court, like the Court of Appeals, from taking cognizance of a municipal
ordinance. On the contrary, Section 5 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court enjoins courts to take judicial
notice of matters which are capable of unquestionable demonstration.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL NOTICE BY COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE. Court of First Instance should take
judicial notice of municipal ordinances within their respective jurisdictions.

4. CRIMINAL LAW; SLIGHT DISOBEDIENCE OF AN AGENT OF A PERSON IN AUTHORITY. Facts: In the

morning of March 10, 1957, appellant and his companions were about to hold a meeting of the
Jehovahs Witnesses in front of the public market of Lambunao, Iloilo. The Chief of Police, Avelino
Larrosa, approached appellant and inquired of him whether he had permit to hold said meeting. As
appellant could not produce any, the chief of police enjoined him from so proceeding with the meeting
but instead of desisting in obedience to the chief of polices intimation, appellant, in a challenging vein,
addressed his followers, "You must continue that, we will see what they (referring to the chief of police
and his policemen) can do for us." Whereupon, the chief of police warned appellant if he continued with
the meeting, he was to place him under arrest. However, appellant, disregarding the warning, continued
the meeting for at least 30 minutes more whereupon, he was arrested and charged accordingly. Held:
Appellant is guilty of slight disobedience of an agent of a person in authority.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISOBEDIENCE NOT JUSTIFIED UNLESS ILLEGALITY OF ORDER IS CLEARLY MANIFEST.
Although petitioner may have legitimate reason to protest the order of the chief of police, he was not
justified in disobeying him and in assuming a bellicose attitude by exhorting his followers to proceed
with their meeting, as in fact the latter did. As Justice Malcolm once said, "To authorize resistance (also
disobedience) to the agents of the authority, the illegality of the invasion must be manifested. Here,
there was possibly a proper case for protest. (But,) there was no case of excessive violence to enforce
defendants idea of a debatable legal question." (People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169).

REGALA, J.:

Petitioner was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to pay a fine of P10 and the costs and, in
case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, following his conviction of slight disobedience of
an agent of a person in authority. He appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed his sentence. He
now appeals to this Court.

The Court of Appeals found the facts as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . That in the morning of March 10, 1957, appellant and his companions were about to hold a meeting
of the Jehovahs Witnesses in front of the Public market of Lambunao, Iloilo. The chief of police, Avelino
Larrosa, approached appellant and inquired of him whether he had a permit to hold said meeting. As
appellant could not produce any, the chief of police enjoined him from so proceeding with the meeting
but instead of desisting in obedience to the chief of polices intimation, appellant, in a challenging vein,
addressed his followers, You must continue that, we will see what they (referring to the chief of police
and his policeman) can do for us.

"Whereupon the chief of police warned appellant if he continued with the meeting, he was to place him
under arrest. However, appellant, disregarding the warning, continued the meeting for at least 30
minutes more whereupon, he was arrested and charged accordingly."

In holding petitioner guilty of slight disobedience, the Court of Appeals stated:

"That there was disobedience on appellants part is self-evident from his immediate reaction to the chief
of police warning for him to discontinue the meeting his exhorting his followers to continue the
meeting as they were prepared to see what can the police do for them. And these words were followed
by the overt act of continuing the meeting for at least 30 minutes as sufficiently established by the
evidence. And it appears that, contrary to appellants contention, there was an existing municipal
ordinance at the time (Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957) providing for a previous permit for the holding of
religious meeting in public places."

Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

"The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person
who not being included in the provisions of the preceding articles shall resist or seriously disobey any
person in authority or the agents of such person, while engaged in the performance of official duties.

"When the disobedience to an agent of a person in authority is not of serious nature the penalty of
arresto menor or a fine ranging from 10 to 100 pesos shall be imposed."

There is no question here that petitioners, in defiance of the order of the chief of police, held a meeting
of his religious sect. He contends, however, that he cannot be convicted of slight disobedience because,
according to him, there is no proof of the existence of an ordinance in force on March 10, 1957,
requiring a permit for the holding of a meeting. For this purpose, petitioner assails the Court of Appeals
for taking judicial notice of Ordinance No. 2, series of 1957 of Lambunao, Iloilo, when the trial court itself
allegedly did not take cognizance of the ordinance.

There is no merit in the defense. There is nothing in the law that prohibits a court, like the Court of
Appeals, from taking cognizance of a municipal ordinance. On the contrary, Section 5 of Rule 123 of the
Rules of Court enjoins courts to take judicial notice of matters which are capable of unquestionable
demonstration. This is exactly what the Court of Appeals did in this case in holding that "contrary to
appellants (petitioners) contention, there was an existing municipal ordinance at the time (Ordinance
No. 2, Series of 1957) providing for a previous permit for the holding of religious meeting in public
places."cralaw virtua1aw library

Besides, it is not true, as claimed by petitioner, that the trial court did not take notice of the ordinance in
question. For the lower court mentioned petitioners "failure to secure the necessary permit" with
obvious reference to Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957. In People v. Gebune, 87 Phil. 727, We held that
courts of first instance should take judicial notice of municipal ordinances within their respective
jurisdictions. It must be in compliance with this ruling that the trial court took notice of Ordinance No. 2,
Series of 1957 of the Municipality of Lambunao.

It is also contended that the order of the chief of police was illegal and, therefore, not entitled to
obedience because the ordinance applies only to meetings held in places where the traffic is heavy.
Here, it is claimed there is no proof that the traffic where the meeting was held was heavy. Petitioner
adds that he was given a permit by the mayor although at the time he could not produce it because it
was given orally.

It should not be lost of sight that this is a prosecution for slight disobedience, not for violation of the
ordinance. Although petitioner may have legitimate reason to protest the order of the chief of people,
he was not justified in disobeying him and in assuming a bellicose attitude by exhorting his followers to
proceed with their meeting, as in fact the latter did. As Justice Malcolm once said, "To authorize
resistance (also disobedience) to the agents of the authority, the illegality of the invasion must be clearly
manifested. Here, there was possibly a proper case for protest. (But,) there was no case of excessive
violence to enforce defendants idea of a debatable legal question." (People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169)
Lastly, petitioner invokes the constitutional guaranty of free assembly to justify his act. The rights to
freedom of speech and to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances are
fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic
countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the
exercise of these rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society.
The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign
"police power," which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order of safety and the general welfare of the people. This power is exercised by the
government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other
constitutional and civil rights and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as municipalities and
cities, by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for
the purpose. (Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71)

The ordinance in this case is a reasonable regulation of the use of public streets. There is no claim that it
gives the authorities arbitrary power to grant or deny permit; in fact there is no claim that petitioner was
arbitrarily denied a permit.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, costs against the petitioner.

G.R. No. L-1800 January 27, 1948

CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Campaign Manager of Coalesced Minority Parties, petitioner,

vs.

VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, Mayor of City of Manila, respondent.

FERIA, J.:

This is an action of mandamus instituted by the petitoner, Cipriano Primicias, a campaig manager of the
Coalesced Minority Parties against Valeraino Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, to compel the latter
to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on Sunday afternoon, November
16, 1947, for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress to grievances on the groun that the
respondent refused to grant such permit. Due to urgency of the case, this Court, after mature
deliberation, issued a writ of mandamus, as prayed for in the petition of November 15, 1947, without
prejudice to writing later an extended and reasoned decision.

The right of freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the
Constitutions of democratic countries. But it a casettled principle growing out of the nature of well-
ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it
shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, not injurious to the rights of
the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is
termed the sovereign "police power" which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police
power is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating
those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as
towns, municipalities, and cities authorizing their legislative bodies, called municipal and city councils to
enact ordinances for the purpose.

The Philippine legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to the Municipal Board of the
City of Manila, which according to section 2439 of the Administrative Code is the legislative body of the
City. Section 2444 of the same Code grants the Municipal Board, among others, the following legislative
power, to wit: "(p) to provide for the prohibition and suppression of riots, affrays, disturbances, and
disorderly assemblies, (u) to regulate the use of streets, avenues ... parks, cemeteries and other public
places" and "for the abatement of nuances in the same," and "(ee) to enact all ordinances it may deem
necessary and proper for sanitation and safety, the furtherance of prosperity and the promotion of
morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants."

Under the above delegated power, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, enacted sections 844 and
1119. Section of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibits as an offense against public peace, and
section 1262 of the same Revised Ordinance penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place,
meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a
body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful
assembly." And section 1119 provides the following:

"SEC. 1119 Free for use of public The streets and public places of the city shall be kept free and
clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians, and the same shall
only be used or occupied for other purposes as provided by ordinance or regulation: Provided, that the
holding of athletic games, sports, or exercise during the celebration of national holidays in any streets or
public places of the city and on the patron saint day of any district in question, may be permitted by
means of a permit issued by the Mayor, who shall determine the streets or public places or portions
thereof, where such athletic games, sports, or exercises may be held: And provided, further, That the
holding of any parade or procession in any streets or public places is prohibited unless a permit therefor
is first secured from the Mayor who shall, on every such ocassion, determine or specify the streets or
public places for the formation, route, and dismissal of such parade or procession: And provided, finally,
That all applications to hold a parade or procession shall be submitted to the Mayor not less than
twenty-four hours prior to the holding of such parade or procession."

As there is no express and separate provision in the Revised Ordinance of the City regulating the holding
of public meeting or assembly at any street or public places, the provisions of saif section 1119 regarding
the holding of any parade or procession in any street or public paces may be applied by analogy to
meeting and assembly in any street or public places.

Said provision is susceptible to two constructions: one is that the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested
with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or
meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; and the other
is that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only to the
latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the
purpose, with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and
public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder.

After a mature deliberation, we have arrived at the conclusion that we must adopt the second
construction, that is construe the provisions of the said ordinance to mean that it does not confer upon
the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to
determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the
meeting may be held.

Our conclusions find support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox vs. State of New Hampshire, 312
U.S., 569. In that case, the statute of New Hampshire P.L. Chap. 145, section 2, providing that "no parade
or procession upon any ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special license therefor
shall first be obtained from the select men of the town or from licensing committee," was construed by
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board unfetted discretion to
refuse to grant the license, and held valid. And the Supreme Court of the United States in its decision
(1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes firming the judgement of the State Supreme Court, held that " a
statute requiring pewrsons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special
license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of
assembly or a freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the
licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration, the time, place,
and manner of the parade and procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of
affording an opportunity to provide proper policing and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to
issue or refuse license, ... ."

We can not adopt the alternative construction or constru the ordinance under consideration as
conferring upon the Mayor power to grant or refuse to grant the permit, which would be tantamount to
authorizing him to prohibit the use of the streets and other public places for holding of meetings,
parades or processions, because such a construction would make the ordinance invalid and void or
violative of the constitutional limitations. As the Municipal Boards is empowered only to regulate the use
of streets, parks, and the other public places, and the word "regulate," as used in section 2444 of the
Revised Administrative Code, means and includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain, but
can not be construed a synonimous with construed "suppressed" or "prohibit" (Kwong Sing vs. City of
Manila, 41 Phil., 103), the Municipal Board can not grant the Mayor a power that it does not have.
Besides, the powers and duties of the Mayor as the Chief Executive of the City are executive and one of
them is "to comply with and enforce and give the necessary orders for the faithful performance and
execution of laws and ordinances" (section 2434 [b] of the Revised Administrative Code), the ligislative
police power of the Municipal Board to enact ordinances regulating reasonably the excercise of the
fundamental personal rights of the citizens in the streets and other public places, can not be delgated to
the Mayor or any other officer by conferring upon him unregulated discretion or without laying down
rules to guide and control his action by which its impartial execution can be secured or partiality and
oppression prevented.

In City of Chicago vs. Trotter, 136 Ill., 430, it was held by the Supreme Court of Illinois that, under Rev. ST.
Ill. c. 24, article 5 section 1, which empowers city councils to regulate the use of public streets, the
council has no power to ordain that no processions shall be allowed upon the streets until a permit shall
be obtained from the superintendent of police, leaving the issuance of such permits to his discretion,
since the powers conferred on the council cannot be delegated by them.

The Supreme COurt of Wisconsin in State ex rel. Garrabad vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N.W., 1104, held
the following:

"The objections urged in the case of City of Baltimore vs. Radecke, 49 Md., 217, were also, in substance,
the same, for the ordinance in that case upon its face committed to the unrestrained will of a single
public officer the power to determine the rights of parties under it, when there was nothing in the
ordinance to guide or cintrol his action, and it was held void because "it lays down no rules by which its
impartial execution can be secured, or partiality and oppression prevented." and that "when we
remember that action or nonaction may proceed from enmity or prejudice, from partisan zeal or
animosity, from favoritism and other improper influences and motives easy of concealment and difficult
to be detected and exposed, it becomes unnecessary to suggest or to comment upon the injustice
capable of being wrought under cover of such a power, for that becomes apparent to every one who
gives to the subject a moment's consideration. In fact, an ordinance which clothes a single individual
with such power hardly falls within the domain of law, and we are constrained to pronounce it
inoperative and void." ... In the exercise of police power, the council may, in its discretion, regulate the
exercise of such rights in a reasonable manner, but can not suppress them, directly or indirectly, by
attempting to commit the power of doing so to the mayor or any other officer. The discretion with which
the council is vested is a legal discretion, to be exercised within the limits of the law, and not a discretion
to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer and arbitrary authority, making him in its exercise a
petty tyrant."

In re Frazee, 63 Michigan 399, 30 N.W., 72, a city or ordinance providing that "no person or persons, or
associations or organizations shall march, parade, ride or drive, in ou upon or through the public streets
of the City of Grand Rapids with musical instrument, banners, flags, ... without first having obtained the
consent of the mayor or common council of said city;" was held by the Supreme Court of Michigan to be
unreasonable and void. Said Supreme Court in the course of the decision held:

". . . We must therefore construe this charter, and the powers it assumes to grant, so far as it is not
plainly unconstitutional, as only conferring such power over the subjects referred to as will enable the
city to keep order, and suppress mischief, in accordance with the limitations and conditions required by
the rights of the people themselves, as secured by the principles of law, which cannot be less careful of
private rights under the constitution than under the common law."

"It is quite possible that some things have a greater tendency to produce danger and disorder in cities
than in smaller towns or in rural places. This may justify reasonable precautionary measures, but nothing
further; and no inference can extend beyond the fair scope of powers granted for such a purpose, and no
grant of absolute discretion to suppress lawful action altogther can be granted at all. . . . ."

"It has been customary, from time immemorial, in all free countries, and in most civilized countries, for
people who are assembled for common purposes to parade together, by day or reasonable hours at
night, with banners and other paraphernalia, and with music of various kinds. These processions for
political, religious, and social demonstrations are resorted to for the express purpose of keeping unity of
feeling and enthusiasm, and frequently to produce some effect on the public mind by the spectacle of
union and numbers. They are a natural product and exponent of common aims, and valuable factors in
furthering them. ... When people assemble in riotous mobs, and move for purposes opposed to private
or public security, they become unlawful, and their members and abettors become punishable. . . ."

"It is only when political, religious, social, or other demonstrations create public disturbances, or operate
as a nuisance, or create or manifestly threaten some tangible public or private mischief, that the law
interferes."

"This by-law is unreasonable, because it suppresses what is in general perfectly lawful, and because it
leaves the power of permitting or restraining processions, and thier courses, to an unregulated official
discretion, when the whole matter, if regualted at all, must be permanent, legal provisions, operating
generally and impartially."

In Rich vs. Napervill, 42 Ill., App. 222, the question was raised as to the validity of the city ordinance
which made it unlawful for any person, society or club, or association of any kind, to parade any of the
streets, with flags, banners, or transparencies, drums, horns, or other musical instruments, without the
permission of the city council first had and obtained. The appellants were members of the Salvation
Army, and were prosecuted for a violation of the ordinance, and the court in holding the ordinance
invalid said, "Ordinances to be valid must be reasonable; they must not be oppressive; they must be fair
and impartial; they must not be so framed as to allow their enforcement to rest on official discretion ...
Ever since the landing of the Pilgrims from the Mayflower the right to assemble and worship accordingto
the dictates of one's conscience, and the right to parade in a peaceable manner and for a lawful
purpose, have been fostered and regarded as among the fundamental rights of a free people. The spirit
of our free institutions allows great latitude in public parades and emonstrations whether religious or
political ... If this ordinance is held valid, then may the city council shut off the parades of those whose
nations do not suit their views and tastes in politics or religion, and permit like parades of those whose
nations do. When men in authority are permitted in their discretion to exercise power so arbitrary,
liberty is subverted, and the spirit of of our free institutions violated. ... Where the granting of the permit
is left to the unregulated discretion of a small body of city eldermen, the ordinance cannot be other than
partial and discriminating in its practical operation. The law abhors partiality and discrimination. ... (19
L.R.A., p. 861)

In the case of Trujillo vs. City of Walsenburg, 108 Col., 427; 118 P. [2d], 1081, the Supreme Court of
Colorado, in construing the provision of section 1 of Ordinance No. 273 of the City of Walsenburg, which
provides: "That it shall be unlawful for any person or persons or association to use the street of the City
of Walsenburg, Colorado for any parade, procession or assemblage without first obtaining a permit from
the Chief of Police of the City of Walsenburg so to do," held the following:

"[1] The power of municipalities, under our state law, to regulate the use of public streets is
conceded. "35 C.S.A., chapter 163, section 10, subparagraph 7. "The privilege of a citizen of the United
States to use the streets ... may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and
must be excercised in subordination to the general, be abridged or denied." Hague, Mayor vs.
Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S., 496, 516; 59 S. Ct., 954, 964; 83 Law, ed., 1423.

[2, 3] An excellent statement of the power of a municipality to impose regulations in the use of public
streets is found in the recent case of Cox vs. New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569; 61 S. Ct., 762, 765; 85 Law,
ed. 1049; 133 A.L.R., 1936, in which the following appears; "The authority of a municipality to impose
regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has
never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding
the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the
most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of highways in
that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be
disregarded by the attempted excercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be
entitled to protection. One would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red traffic light because he
thought it his religious duty to disobey the municipal command or sought by that means to direct public
attention to an announcement of his opinions. As regulation of the use of the streets for parades and
processions is a traditional excercise of control by local government, the question in a particular case is
whether that control is exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the
opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially
associated with resort to public places. Lovell vs. Criffin, 303 U.S., 444, 451;58 S. Ct., 666, 668, 82 Law.
ed., 949 [953]; Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S., 496, 515, 516; 59 S. Ct., 954,
963, 964; 83 Law. ed., 1423 [1436, 1437]; Scheneider vs. State of New Jersey [Town of Irvington]; 308
U.S., 147, 160; 60 S. Ct., 146, 150; 84 Law. ed., 155 [164]; Cantwell vs. Connecticut, 310 U. S., 296, 306,
307; 60 S. Ct., 900, 904; 84 Law. ed., 1213 [1219, 1220]; 128 A.L.R. 1352."

[4] Our concern here is the validity or nonvalidity of an ordinance which leaves to the uncontrolled
official discretion of the chief of police of the municipal corporation to say who shall, who shall not, be
accorded the privilege of parading on its public streets. No standard of regulation is even remotely
suggested. Moreover, under the ordinance as drawn, the chief of police may for any reason which he
may entertain arbitrarily deny this privelege to any group. in Cox vs. New Hampshire, 312 U. S., 569, 85
Law. ed., 1049, 1054, said:
"In the instant case the uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege of using the public streets in a
lawful manner clearly is apparent from the face of the ordinance before us, and we therefore hold it null
and void."

The Supreme Court of the United States in Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S.,
496, 515, 516; 83 Law. ed., 1423, declared that a municipal ordinance requiring the obtaining of a permit
for a public assembly in or upon the public streets, highways, public parks, or public buildings of the city
and authorizing the director of public safety, for the purpose of preventing riots, disturbances, or
disorderly assemblage, to refuse to issue a permit when after investigation of all the facts and
circumstances pertinent to the application he believes it to be proper to refuse to issue a permit, is not a
valid exercise of the police power. Said Court in the course of its opinion in support of the conclusion
said:

". . . Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the
use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places
has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The
privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on
national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be
exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and
good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.

"We think the court below was right in holding the ordinance quoted in Note 1 void upon its face. It does
not make comfort or convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables
the Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent 'riots,
disturbances or disorderly assemblage.' It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of
arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs for the prohibition of all speaking will
undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities. But uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege cannot be
made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection with the exercise of the right."

Section 2434 of the Administrative Code, a part of the Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that
the Mayor shall have the power to grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes, cannot
be cited as an authority for the Mayor to deny the application of the petitioner, for the simple reason
that said general power is predicated upon the ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board requiring
licenses or permits to be issued by the Mayor, such as those found in Chapters 40 to 87 of the Revised
Ordinances of the City of Manila. It is not a specific or substantive power independent from the
corresponding municipal ordinances which the Mayor, as Chief Executive of the City, is required to
enforce under the same section 2434. Moreover "one of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that
the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any
other body or authority," except certain powers of local government, specially of police regulation which
are conferred upon the legislative body of a municipal corporation. Taking this into consideration, and
that the police power to regulate the use of streets and other public places has been delegated or rather
conferred by the Legislature upon the Municipal Board of the City (section 2444 [u] of the Administrative
Code) it is to be presumed that the Legislature has not, in the same breath, conferred upon the Mayor in
section 2434 (m) the same power, specially if we take into account that its exercise may be in conflict
with the exercise of the same power by the Municipal Board.

Besides, assuming arguendo that the Legislature has the power to confer, and in fact has conferred, upon
the Mayor the power to grant or refuse licenses and permits of all classes, independent from ordinances
enacted by the Municipal Board on the matter, and the provisions of section 2444 (u) of the same Code
and of section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, such grant of
unregulated and unlimited power to grant or refuse a permit for the use of streets and other public
places for processions, parades, or meetings, would be null and void, for the same reasons stated in the
decisions in the cases above quoted, specially in Willis Cox vs. New Hampshire, supra, wherein the
question involved was also the validity of a similar statute of New Hamsphire. Because the same
constitutional limitations applicable to ordinances apply to statutes, and the same objections to a
municipal ordinance which grants unrestrained discretion upon a city officer are applicable to a law or
statute that confers unlimited power to any officer either of the municipal or state governments. Under
our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of
the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency. As stated in State ex rel. Garrabad vs.
Dering, supra, "The discretion with which the council is vested is a legal discretion to be exercised within
the limits of the law, and not a discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer an arbitrary
authority making in its exercise a petty tyrant."

It is true that Mr. Justice Ostrand cited said provision of article 2434 (m) of the Administrative Code
apparently in support of the decision in the case of Evangelista vs. Earnshaw, 57 Phil., 255- 261, but
evidently the quotation of said provision was made by the writer of the decision under a mistaken
conception of its purview and is an obiter dictum, for it was not necessary for the decision rendered. The
popular meeting or assemblage intended to be held therein by the Communist Party of the Philippines
was clearly an unlawful one, and therefore the Mayor of the City of Manila had no power to grant the
permit applied for. On the contrary, had the meeting been held, it was his duty to have the promoters
thereof prosecuted for violation of section 844, which is punishable as misdemeanor by section 1262 of
the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. For, according to the decision, "the doctrine and principles
advocated and urged in the Constitution and by-laws of the said Communist Party of the Philippines, and
the speeches uttered, delivered, and made by its members in the public meetings or gatherings, as
above stated, are highly seditious, in that they suggest and incite rebelious conspiracies and disturb and
obstruct the lawful authorities in their duty."

The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a
reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially
on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending
to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted
authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." As the request
of the petition was for a permit "to hold a peaceful public meeting," and there is no denial of that fact or
any doubt that it was to be a lawful assemblage, the reason given for the refusal of the permit can not
be given any consideration. As stated in the portion of the decision in Hague vs. Committee on Industrial
Organization, supra, "It does not make comfort and convenience in the use of streets or parks the
standard of official action. It enables the Director of Safety to refuse the permit on his mere opinion that
such refusal will prevent riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage. It can thus, as the record discloses,
be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs, for the
prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities." To this we may add the
following, which we make our own, said by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney vs.
California, 71 U. S. (Law. ed.), 1105-1107:

"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches
and burned women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To
justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if
free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is
imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one . . .

"Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political change.
They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. . . .

"Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these functions essential
effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively serious. Prohibition of free speech and
assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively
trivial harm to a society. . . . The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of
property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the
state. Among freemen, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crimes are education and
punishment for violations of the law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly."
Whitney vs. California, U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep., 71 Law., ed., pp. 1106-1107.)

In view of all the foregoing, the petition for mandamus is granted and, there appearing no reasonable
objection to the use of the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, for the meeting applied for, the respondent is ordered
to issue the corresponding permit, as requested. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-36277 October 26, 1932

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

CRISANTO EVANGELISTA and ABELARDO RAMOS, defendants-appellants.

OSTRAND, J.:

In case No. 41830 (No. 36277 in the Supreme Court) the herein accused, Crisanto Evangelista and
Abelardo Ramos, were charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with a violation of section 8 of Act
No. 292, as amended. Upon trial the court below found the accused guilty and sentenced each of them
to six month's imprisonment and to pay a fine of P400 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and each of the accused to pay one-half of the costs. Thereupon the defendants appealed to
this court.

The acts which gave rise to this accusation were as follows: On the first day of May, 1931, a parade was
to be held by the communists in the municipality of Caloocan within two and a half miles of the city
limits of Manila, but as the permit for the parade had been revoked, a Constabulary officer appeared
with his soldiers at the place to prevent the holding of the parade. The appellant, Crisanto Evangelista,
who apparently was the leader of the people therein assembled to take part in the parade, held a
conversation with the Constabulary officer about the permit and its revocation, after which Evangelista
was allowed by the Constabulary officer to say a few words to the people for the purpose of informing
them that the parade could not be held and that they should retire. But instead of telling the people to
retire, he raised his fist, which the people approved by shouting "mabuhay", and then said: "Comrades
or brethren, the municipal president, Mr. Aquino, has allowed us to hold the parade, but for reason
unknown to me, the permit has been revoked. This shows that the big ones are persecuting and
oppressing us, who are small, which they have no right to do." Then shouts were heard from the
audience saying, "Let us fight them". The accused Abelardo Ramos, who was among the people, shouted
"Let us fight them until death". Evangelista proceeded saying, "My heart bleeds", but could not continue
because the officer stopped him and placed them both, Crisanto Evangelista and Abelardo Ramos, under
arrest. Thereupon the mass began to advance against the Constabulary officer and soldiers, in an
attempt to wrest Evangelista from the constabulary and to continue the parade, but the soldiers made
use of a water pump and dispersed them. There were found on the body of Crisanto Evangelista the
permit issued by the municipal president and its revocation.

The appellants testified denying having said the words above quoted and attributed to them. They
further claimed that the people were peaceful, but the trial court found the facts as above stated, and
the appellant's brief does not point out any data or reason why the finding of the trial court should not
be upheld.1awphil.net
Under the circumstances of the case, the statements made by the accused on the occasion above related
are clearly seditious. It must be noted that the disorder took place on May 1, 1931, that is, several
months after the inauguration of the Communist Party and after the communists had already filled the
minds of their followers with their revolting ideas in several meetings. That the said utterances were
really inciting the people to revolt, is shown by the fact that the mass, not only shouted a protest against
the officers of the law, but did actually advance against them, and the latter had to use force in order to
enforce the law. The defense arguing upon the authority of United States vs. Apurado (7 Phil., 422),
maintains that there is no sedition here, because a mere disorder is not sedition, but the comparison is
inadmissible. In the Apurado case, the people assembled at the chamber of the municipal council to ask
for the removal of the municipal treasurer on account of religious differences. This court did not find any
disorder in that case. It was a petition for redress of grievances made in more or less excited language,
but the affair on the whole was peaceful and orderly; whereas in the instant case, there was an
inducement to fight, an actual though unexpected fight and resistance against the authorities. It was
simply the practical expression and repetition of the previous instigations to overthrow the government,
made by the communist leaders before.

For these reasons and those given in cases G. R. Nos. 36275 1 and 36276, 2 the judgment appealed from
will be affirmed with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-18853 August 22, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

EXEQUIEL ALIPIT and VICTORIO D. ALEMUS, defendants-appellants.

Pedro Guevara for appellants.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The information herein is as follows:

That on or about the 30th of May, 1920, in the municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna, Philippine
Islands, the defendants Exequiel Alipit and Victorio D. Alemus, being the municipal president and the
chief of police respectively of the said municipality of Cabuyao, did willfully, unlawfully, maliciously and
acting under a previous agreement and conspiracy entered into between themselves and assisting and
cooperating with each other, after the accused Exequiel Alipit had fired his revolver in the air, enter the
session room of the municipality building of Cabuyao wherein the municipal council of Cabuyao was
holding a meeting presided over by the vice-president, Manuel Basa, and once in said room, the
aforesaid accused Exequiel Alipit and Victorio D. Alemus, abusing their authority as municipal president
and chief of police respectively, the former with a revolver in his hand, and both using violence and
intimidation not only upon the person of said vice-president Manuel Basa, but also upon those of the
councilors present at the aforesaid meeting, and without any justifiable motive or legal authority and by
means of force, arrested said vice-president Manuel Basa and compelled him to submit himself to the
arrest against the latter's will and over his protest and that of each and everyone of the councilors and
took him to the jail of the municipal building of Cabuyao, the accused Victorio D. Alemus taking at the
same time possession of all the papers concerning the meeting that was being held by the municipal
council of Cabuyao, by which acts the defendants succeeded in interrupting and dissolving the aforesaid
meeting.

After the usual proceedings, the trial court found the defendant guilty of coercion through illegal
detention and sentenced them, under articles 497, in connection with article 89, of the Penal Code, to
five months of arresto mayor and fine of 1,500 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, the accessory penalties and costs. From this judgment the defendants appealed, assigning
eleven errors which raise these points, to wit, the illegality of that meeting of the municipal council; the
fact of the vice-president presiding over it; the finding of the trial court that the act committed by the
accused constitutes coercion; and the conviction of the accused Victorio D. Alemus, who, according to
the defense, acted by virtue of an obedience due another; and from this defendants conclude that the
appellants should have been acquitted.

The Attorney-General asks for the affirmance of the judgment.

From the record the following antecedents appear:

The accused Exequiel Alipit had been elected municipal president of Cabuyao, Laguna. Agustin
Dedicatora and others petitioned the Executive Bureau not to confirm said election, because said
president-elect was a minor. The matter was referred by the Executive Bureau to the provincial board of
Laguna for investigation. The provincial board in turn transmitted the papers to the municipal council of
Cabuyao, which proceeded to make an investigation, three meetings having held for the purpose, which
were presided over by president Alipit, who left the chair to vice-president Manuel Basa as soon as the
aforesaid investigation came up for discussion.

On the 30th of May, 1920, the municipal council held an extraordinary meeting which was presided over
by vice-president Basa because the hour fixed had come without the president being present. While the
meeting was being held, the accused Victorio Alemus, then the chief of police of that municipality,
entered the room, saying that he had an order from the president to arrest vice-president Basa. Basa
answered that he had not committed any crime. Dominador Delfino, one of the councilors present,
succeeded in persuading the chief of police to wait until the meeting was over. A few minutes thereafter
president Alipit arrived at the municipal building and after taking one of the revolvers in the police office,
fired a shot in the air, entered immediately the room where the meeting was being held and said in a
loud voice to the chief of police who was there: "Arrest him, arrest him," pointing out the vice-president.
The chief of police obeyed the order, holding the vice-president by the arm and taking him to the jail,
president Alipit following them with the revolver in his hand.

Shortly afterwards, councilor Delfino asked president Alipit if they could continue the meeting to the
end, to which Alipit answered: "Whoever dare continue holding the meeting will be arrested." the
councilors then dispersed, leaving the premises. Alipit ordered the taking of the books and documents
used in the meeting and went to Calamba where he asked and obtained from the Constabulary three
armed soldiers to protect him against any possible attack from the vice-president Basa. By his order, the
three soldiers watched vice-president Basa and held him incommunicated in the jail until about two
o'clock in the evening, when he was released by the provincial governor who had come there.

One of the points whereupon great stress is laid by the appellants is that that meeting of May 30, 1920,
was unlawful. The evidence shows that that special meeting of the council was called at the instance of
two councilors and that notices had been prepared for all the members of the council, although those
addressed to the municipal president and some councilors were not delivered to the addresses.

There were five councilors present at the meeting in question, who constituted a quorum, with vice-
president Manuel Basa as chairman. The record shows that the president, as well as the other
councilors, was absent from the municipality when an attempt was made to deliver to them the notice
of that meeting, the notices to the councilors who were in Manila having been placed in the hands of
Agustin Dedicatora who was coming to Manila. In American jurisprudence it is a doctrine frequently
followed that where the members of a council are absent from the municipality, the necessity of notice
is dispensed with. (Russell vs. Wellington, 157 Mass., 100; Lord vs. City of Anoka, 36 Minn., 176.)

But it must be noted that the question here is not concerned with the legality of any resolution adopted
by the council at that special meeting. The question is whether or not that meeting of the council in
which there was a quorum of the absence or inability of the municipal president on account of the
absence or inability of the municipal president (or of both causes) was a meeting the disturbance and
interruption of which should be punished. This is, in our opinion, the point at issue in this case.

The legality of that meeting is attacked on the ground of lack of notice to some members of the council.
Nobody has the right to dissolve, through violence, the meeting of a council under the present of the
existence of such a legal defect which was not apparent, but required an investigation before it could be
determined. Any stranger, even if he be the municipal president himself or the chief of the municipal
police, must respect the meeting of the municipal council which for the time being, at least, raises the
presumption that no defect exists to render it illegal. That meeting of the municipal council was entitled
too this respect on the part of the defendants and the aforesaid presumption was effective as to them.
Let it not be said that the presumption of legality did not operate as to the accused Exequiel Alipit for
the reason that he did in fact receive no notice of said meeting. The law (sec. 2220, Administrative Code)
does not require personal services of the notice; it is sufficient if the same be left in the domicile of the
member of the council. Besides said president Alipit was personally interested in the matter to be
transacted in the meeting, and so the notice sent to him was, according to the witness, Dominador
Delfino, as if it were to a party respondent. Said accused Alipit could not take part in the determination
of the matter as a member of the council.

It is universally recognized that it is improper and illegal for a member of a municipal council to vote
upon any question brought before the council in which he is personally interested. . . . When the council
is acting in a quasi judicial capacity, for a member to pass upon a question in which he is interested
renders the judgment void, even if his vote was not necessary to a decision. Thus the action of the
common council of a city in determining an election contest according to the weight of conflicting
evidence is judicial in its nature, and a contestant is disqualified to sit as a member of the council in the
determination of the contest. His participation makes the proceedings invalid even if the decision
reached did not depend upon his vote. (19 R. C. L., 897 and cases cited.)
We find no valid excuse, exempting the defendants from the criminal responsibility arising from the acts
committed by them. With regard to the accused Victorio Alemus, it is no valid justification for him to
have acted by virtue of an order received from is coaccused, because said order was unlawful..

We find no error in the judgment appealed from, except as regards the denomination of the crime and
the imposition of the penalty.

The information charges the accused with the crime of coercion and the trial court found them guilty of
arbitrary detention as a means to commit coercion. We are of the opinion that the law violated by the
accused is Act No. 1755, which in its section 1, says:

Any person who willfully or by force or fraud prevent or attempts to prevent the meeting of the
Philippine Commission or the organizing or meeting of the Philippine Assembly or of any Insular
legislative body of the Philippine Islands hereafter established, or the meeting or organizing of any
provincial board or municipal or township council, and any person who willfully disturbs the Philippine
Commission or the Philippine Assembly, or in Insular legislative body of the Philippine Islands hereafter
established, or any provincial board or municipal or township council, while in session, or who is guilty of
any disorderly conduct in the immediate view or presence of any such body tending to interrupt the
proceedings of such body or to impair the respect due to its authority, shall be punished by a fine of not
more than two thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or by both, in the
discretion of the court.

And in view of the allegations contained in the information herein, the accused may, and must, be
convicted of a violation of said section 1 of this Act and punished accordingly.

Regard being had of the gravity of the act committed, as well as the respective condition and position of
the accused, Exequiel Alipit is hereby sentenced to three years' imprisonment and Victorio Alemus to
one years' imprisonment, with the costs against them. The judgment appealed from being thus
modified, the defendants are found guilty of a violation of section 1 of Act No. 1755 and punishable with
the penalty thereby provided. So ordered.
G.R. No. 8722 September 10, 1913

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

BUENAVENTURA BALCORTA, defendant-appellant.

TRENT, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, sentencing the defendant,
Buenaventura Balcorta, to three years six months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, and a fine
of 625 pesetas, together with the accessory penalties provided by law.

It is alleged that the court does not sustain the guilt of the appellant. The record, however, clearly shows
that the accused entered a private house, uninvited, where services of the Methodist Episcopal Church
were being conducted by between ten and twenty persons, and threatened the assemblage with a club,
thereby interrupting of disturbing the divine service. The punishment meted out to the defendant by the
lower court is that provided for in article 223 of the Penal Code which reads as follows:

The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum degrees and a fine of not less than 625
and not more than 6,250 pesetas shall be imposed upon any person who, by means of threats violence,
or other equivalent compulsion, shall force some other person to perform an act of worship or prevent
him from performing such act.

This conclusion of law is assigned as error, it being insisted that the offense falls under paragraph 1 of
article 571, which reads:

The penalties of arresto from one to ten days and a fine of from fifteen to one hundred and twenty-five
pesetas shall be imposed upon:

1. Any person who shall disturb or interrupt any ceremony of a religious character in any manner
not failing within the provisions of section 3, chapter 2, title 2 of book 2 of this code.

The twenty-first article of the Spanish constitution of 1869 provided for a state religion, but also
guaranteed the privilege of freely practicing, both in public and private, the forms and ceremonies of
other sects, subject only to the restrictions imposed by general law and morality. Under this constitution
of Penal Code of Spain, now in effect, was promulgated in 1870. As a consequence of the removal of all
restrictions upon the exercise of religious beliefs, the Penal Code of Spain, enacted in 1870, in its chapter
on crimes against religion, is wholly impersonal. In none of its articles (Nos. 236 to 241) is any particular
religion mentioned, but offense against religion, as such, are defined and penalized. The heading of the
chapter is "Crimes relative to the free exercise of religion (los cultos)."
The constitution of 1876, in Spain, which is still in force, after providing for a state religion, guaranteed
that no one in Spanish territory would be molested for his religious opinions, nor for observing the forms
of his faith, provided due respect were shown for Christian morals. By this same article, however, only
the followers of the state religion could engage in public ceremonies or other manifestations. It will be
noted that this article materially modified article 21 of the former constitution. While everyone could
still worship God in his own manner, it was no longer permissible for cults other than the state religion to
demonstrate their religious beliefs in public.

It was under this constitution that the Penal Code for the Philippine Islands was promulgated in 1884. As
a consequence its provisions are considerably different from those of the Spanish Penal Code. Of the
eight articles defining and penalizing "Crimes against religion and worship" (which is the title of the
chapter), six refer specially and solely to crimes against the state religion. The only crime specifically
defined against religious other than that of the state is for disturbing, by means of violence, threats, etc.,
their ceremonies when conducted in cemeteries or other places were such ceremonies may be lawfully
authorized. (Art. 225.)

The change of sovereignty and the enactment of the fourteenth paragraph of section 5 of the Philippine
Bill caused the complete separation of church and state, and the abolition of all special privileges and all
restrictions theretofore conferred or imposed upon any particular religious sect. All became equal in the
eyes of the law, and those articles of the Penal Code defining special crimes against that denomination
which, under the former sovereign, was the state religion, as well as article 225, defining a crime against
all others than that religion, necessarily became inoperative. Only those articles of the Penal Code which
refer to all religious equally and without distinction can now be considered as in effect. They appear to
be two in number, viz, article 223 and 571.

Let us first examine article 223, from which, neither by the specific language used nor by implication, can
it be inferred that nay particular religious doctrine was in the minds of the code makers. What was the
object and purpose of this section? It will be remembered that at the time this article became law, all
faiths not opposed to Christian morals were, under the constitution of Spain, tolerated. According to the
terms of the constitution, everyone had the right to worship his Maker in his own manner; and as a
corollary no one could be compelled to indorse a particular creed. Were it lawful to prevent the one or
exact the other, the terms of the constitution would have become a dead letter. As is usual with
constitutions, no penalty was attached to this article. It remained for the legislature in the course of its
ordinary legislation to provide for its enforcement. In order to instil respect for this constitutional
provision, it was necessary to provide a punishment for anyone who sought to interfere with the
religious beliefs of his fellow citizens. A glance at the other articles of the Penal Code in the chapter we
are discussing shows that none of the crimes defined and punished therein would respond to a state of
facts where both the will and conscience of a human being were being tampered with upon the subject
of religion. The provisions of article 223 were relied upon to prevent such practices. The article says that
"the penalty . . . shall be imposed upon any person who . . . shall force some other person to perform an
act of worship . . ." In other words, any attempt, by coercive methods, to induce a person to worship God
in a manner different from or to an extent greater than that person desired, constituted an abridgment
of his constitutional right to believe or disbelieve, to regard or disregard the outer forms of a sect, even
though he were a member of that sect. Whatever may have been the inducement for the passage of this
article of the code, certainly it is in the closest harmony with the principles of government of the present
sovereign, one of which is the greatest freedom of thought and speech consistent with public order
upon religious matters.

The concluding portion of the article is, "or prevent him from performing such act." History has perhaps
demonstrated that it is a more common form of interference with freedom of religious thought to
prevent a person from worshiping the Supreme Being according to the dictates of his own conscience
than it is to force him to go through the forms of a religious ceremony in which he does not believe; but
whether the one method or the other is adopted, it remains interference with religious freedom, which
is incompatible with tolerance of all creeds as provided for in the Spanish constitution. To prevent a
person from performing acts of devotion which he desires to perform for the sole reason that this creed
does not meet with the approval of him who prevents them is as much as blow aimed at that
constitutional right to religious as is the first method of requiring a person to perform acts of devotion
against his will or conscience. Thus far the clause extends. But does it also extend to acts which, while
preventing a person from performing an act of devotion, are not prompted by religious intolerance but
from some other motive? It must be remembered that the great underlying purpose of this article is to
prevent and punish religious intolerance. There is no reason for presuming that the code makers had in
view mere disturbances of religious worship, since these offenses are provided for in other articles of the
same chapter. Even less is it to be presumed that they had in mind offenses which, while perhaps
seriously disturbing or preventing (for the time) religious services, were committed with some other
object in view. We are of the opinion that an essential element of the crime defined and penalized under
this article is the intent of the guilty person to coercively the religious beliefs of another person.

The offense defined and punished by article 571, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code falls under the
classification of "Misdemeanors against the public order." Due to the fact that all the articles in section 3,
chapter 2, of book 2 of the code, with the exception of article 223 have become inoperative, all offenses
against religious cults which do not amount to an attempt to control the conscience of persons must
now fall within the provisions of this article. While the punishment therein provided may be, in some
instances, not sufficient, we are of the opinion that, it together with those provided for "Threats and
coercion," will serve as a sufficient deterrent, and instil a wholesome respect for the decorum and
dignity of an assemblage gathered for religious devotion. We find it much easier to arrive at this
conclusion after comparing this penalty with those provided in the jurisdiction of that country from
whence came the clause of the Philippine Bill which insures to all religious orders in this country equal
protection. Mere disturbances of religious worship in the United States are generally classified as
misdemeanors only. The increased severity of the punishments affixed to such penalties under the Penal
Code is doubtless due to the long religious training of the nation which enacted the law and its
recognition of a particular faith as a state religion.

Thus, the offense of the defendant falls within the provisions of article 223 or of article 571. The record
fails to disclose the purpose of the defendant in committing the acts complained of. It is true that it is
shown that the defendant was of the Aglipayan faith, while the members of the congregation were of a
different sect, but none of the witnesses for the prosecution state that the defendant made any
comment whatever upon religion. He simply treatened to assault them with a sick he was carrying if they
did not stop the services. Under the circumstances, and considering that it is not proven that religious
hatred prompted the defendant to act as he did, his offense appears to be simply that of disturbing or
interrupting the religious services. An essential element of the crime provided for in article 223 was not
proved and the court erred in finding him guilty of the crime therein defined.

It is further alleged that the people thus dispersed by the defendant were not holding religious services,
as they were simply reading some verses out of the Bible. We have been unable to find any provision of
law which requires religious services to be conducted in approved orthodox style in order to merit its
protection against interference and disturbances. As stated in Hull vs. State (120 Ind., 153):

It makes no difference that the method of worship of those assembled was singular or uncommon. The
protection of the statute is extended to all, irrespective of creed, opinion, or mode of worship.

Persons who meet for the purpose of religious worship, by any method which is not indecent and
unlawful, have a right to do so without being molested or disturbed.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant is sentenced
to ten days imprisonment [arresto menor], and a fine of P20, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to the payment of the costs of the cause.
So ordered.