proof
A is true
proposition,~, . "truth
assertion
judgement
_1_is true
A v B is true A is true or B is true
A & B is true A is true and B is true
A D B is true B is true provided that A is true
(3x)A(x) is true A(a) is true for a specific individual a
(V x)A(x) is true A(x) is true for an arbitrary individual x
TRUTH OF A PROPOSITION 411
The first line of this table, which gives the truth conditions for
absurdity, should be interpreted as stipulating that absurdity is true on
no condition. Expressed in this way, the truth conditions make up
nothing but a formal scheme: there is a formal pattern here that we
are faced with, and, as with all formal patterns, the question arises,
How is it to be interpreted? I mean, How are these truth conditions to
be interpreted? One way of interpreting them is certainly the Tarskian
way which we all know from the thirties. What is defined then, by
Tarski's truth conditions, is what it means for a formula in the lan-
guage of first order predicate logic, say, to be true in the Tarskian
sense. Thus it is the Tarskian notion of truth which is defined by the
truth conditions when they are interpreted in his way. However, there
is another way of interpreting these truth conditions, and it is only
when you interpret them in this other way that they serve to determine
the meanings of the logical constants and are in complete agreement
with the explanations given by Heyting, Kolmogorov and Gentzen.
This is most simply seen by just turning the table of truth conditions
displayed above counterclockwise by one right angle. What happens?
The vertical line is turned into a horizontal line, what stands in the left
column is placed below the horizontal line, and what stands in the
right column, the conditions under which the proposition displayed on
the same line in the left column is true, above it:
A is true B is true
A v B is true A v B is true (A is true)
A is true B is true B is true
A & B is true A D B is true
A(a) is true A(x) is true
(3x)A(x) is true (Vx)A(x) is true
If you interpret the truth conditions in this way, you see that they are
identical with the introduction rules for the logical constants as
formulated by Gentzen. So I have now explained why, suitably inter-
preted, the explanation of a proposition as the expression of its truth
conditions is no different from Gentzen's explanation to the effect that
the meaning of a proposition is determined by its introduction rules.
How about the two other explanations, the Heyting explanation and
the Kolmogorov explanation, which they both agreed, already in the
412 PER MARTIN-LOF
proof
A is true
judgement
and ask yourself this time, What is a judgement? and, What is a proof
of a judgement? When you are dealing with such basic notions, it is
clear that there can be no question of reducing them to any other,
more basic notions: rather, you have to satisfy yourself that these
notions are the same as certain other notions that you use other words
to express, and there can only be the question of revealing the
structure into which these notions fit and finding the words for them
which make most clear their nature. So look at the picture, apply to it
the trick of turning it counterclockwise by one right angle, and
compare it with the picture
object of knowledge
act of knowing
TRUTH OF A PROPOSITION 417
at the same conclusion via this third path, namely, that the evidence
for a judgement is the very act of knowing it.
This would be all there is to it, concerning these fundamental
notions of proposition, truth, judgement and proof or evidence, if it
were not for the regrettable fact that we make mistakes: we constantly
make mistakes, not only in ordinary life, but we make mistakes in
proofs as mathematicians although mathematics is allegedly the most
rigorous of all sciences. A n d it is because of the fact that we make
mistakes that the notion of validity of a proof is necessary: if proofs
were always right, then of course the very notion of rightness or
rectitude would not be needed. The mathematician's activity would
simply proceed by his propounding his proposition or theorem, giving
its proof, and then another theorem, its proof, and so on, and you
would o n l y say proof all the time: there would be no need to add some
qualifying adjective and speak of valid proof or correct proof or
conclusive proof. The notion of correctness or validity, so to say, does
not belong to the mathematical activity when things go well, that is,
when you do not make mistakes, the notion does not arise: it arises
only when you make mistakes~ because then there begins a discussion
whether the proof, and we then call it alleged proof or seeming proof,
is really a proof or if it is wrong, that is, if it is a deceptive proof or an
illusory proof. Now, there can be no proof, no conclusive proof, that a
proof really proves its conclusion, because, if such a miraculous
means were available to us, we would of course always use it and be
guaranteed against mistakes. It would be a wonderful situation, but we
are human beings and we are not in that position. As human mathe-
maticians we constantly make mistakes, although we try to be careful
so that it does not endanger the stability of the whole of our enter-
prise. So, clearly, there can be no proof in the proper sense of the
word that a proof really proves its conclusion: the most there can be is
a discussion as to whether a proof is correct or not, and such
discussion arises precisely when we make mistakes, or when we have
insufficient grounds or evidence for what we are doing.
As should be clear from what I have just said, this notion of validity
or conclusiveness or correctness of a proof is a very fundamental
notion. Indeed, it is the most fundamental one of all, the one of all the
notions that I have digcussed which has no other notion before it,
because to say that a proof is valid or conclusive or correct, as should
be clear from the formulations that I have used, is nothing but saying,
TRUTH OF A PROPOSITION 419
either that it is a proof with an emphatic is, or, better, that it is a real
proof and not a deceptive proof: it is a real proof or it is a true proof,
if I use the word true or real the way you use it when you say that this
is true bread or that this is real bread and not some miserable bread
that you cannot still your hunger with. So the notion of validity or
conclusiveness or correctness as applied to proof is nothing but the
notion of truth or reality with its opposite falsehood or appearance.
This notion of truth is certainly not the same as the notion of truth of a
proposition which I started by explaining and identified with direct
provability or direct verifiability. In order to distinguish this notion of
truth or reality from the notion of truth of a proposition, let me call it
the metaphysical notion of truth as opposed to the notion of truth of a
proposition. So the outcome of what I have said about the notion of
validity of a proof is that validity is nothing but the notion of truth or
reality applied to the particular acts and objects with which we are
concerned in logic, namely, acts of knowing and objects of know-
ledge.
The last point I want to make is that the knowledge theoretical
idealism which is so characteristic of the explanation of the notion of
truth of a proposition, that is, the intuitionistic explanation of the
notion of truth of a proposition, is entirely compatible with realism, if
by realism you mean the philosophical position which takes the notion
of truth or reality for granted, realism, of course, signifying reality
here. And what is the opposite of that position? That is a position for
which the notion of truth or reality in this sense does not exist, which
means that the most that I can say about a judgement, for instance, is
that it is evident to me: it may not be evident to you, and to you
something may be evident which is perhaps even in conflict with what
is evident to me, and there is no way of resolving that conflict because
there is no notion of correctness to appeal to. So the ordinary
discussion as to who is right that we mathematicians embark upon in
that situation simply cannot arise. That is a position which is opposed
to realism in the sense that I just described: it is a position which we
normally call a relativistic or subjectivistic position, which is to say
that there is nothing but proof for me or evidence for me and evidence
for you without there being any absolute standard to invoke. Maybe
this kind of realism could be called metaphysical realism to distinguish
it on the one hand from knowledge theoretical realism, that is, the view
that the world exists independently of us and our cognitive activity,
420 PER MARTIN-LC)F
NOTE
* This talk was given at the workshop Theories of Meaning organized by the Centro
Fiorentino di Storia e Filosofia della Scienza at the Villa di Mondeggi near Florence,
3-7 June 1985. I am greatly indebted to the organizers of the workshop for recording
the talk on tape and subsequently making the tapes available to me for transcription.
Department of Mathematics
University of Stockholm
Box 6701
113 85 Stockholm
Sweden