CIVIL LAW CONCEPT OF PROPERTY
What do we
All things, whether tangible or intangible,
which are, or may be the object of appropriation
PROPERTY: AS A SUBJECT
- It is that branch of Civil Law which
classifies and defines the different kinds
of appropriable objects.
Appropriation defined as a verb as used in the
definition of property which means to allot for
specific use. Distribute is a very narrow word
compared to appropriation. So anything that one
can possess that can be allotted for specific use is
property under the Civil Code.
Thing As used in the Civil Code, a thing
is synonymous to property. However,
thing is broader than property because
thing can be something that can or cannot
be appropriated. It may refer to both
appropriable or non-appropriable objects.
Right to property
It is the juridical tie that entitles a person
to make use, enjoy, dispose, abuse, and recover
the thing.
CLASSIFICATION OF THINGS:
According to the nature of their ownership:
1. res nullius those belonging to no one: this is
either because it has not been appropriated, or
there is abandonment
Examples:
i. Fishes swimming in the sea but once
they are caught, they are appropriated; they now
belong to the fishermen. They cease to be res
nullius.
Things which have been abandoned by their
owner without the intention of owning
them again;
2. res communes those belonging to everybody:
no one has the right to appropriate the same
exclusively at the expense of another person
Examples: air we breathe, the sunlight,
the wind
3. res alicujus belonging to someone. These are
objects that are tangible/intangible, which are
owned privately either in collective or individual
capacity. So if you own something like your
clothes, shoes, pen, land. These are res alicujus
and are considered as property.
3 CHARACTERISITICS OF PROPERTY.
(Absent any one of this, the thing may not be
considered as property)
1) Utility, which means it is capable of
satisfying human wants, either for
pleasure or for comfort.
understand by pleasure or comfort?
Anything or something that can form part
of the patrimony of man, his estate, in
order to satisfy his wants.
2) Susceptibility of appropriation. One
characteristic of property is that it is
susceptible to be appropriated, so that
what cannot be appropriated cannot be
considered as property.
3) Individuality or Substantivity: Meaning
the thing can exist by itself; it is not a part
of a whole. The example given by Paras is
the human hair. Once it is detached then
it becomes a property.
Art. 414: All things which are or may be the object of
appropriation are considered either:
1) IMMOVABLE OR REAL PROPERTY;
2) 2) MOVABLE OR PERSONAL
PROPERTY.
Classification of Property
1) Real or immovable (buenes immuebles)
2) Personal or movable (buenes muebles)
Importance of the Classification of
Property Into Immovables and
Movables:
They do not assume importance from the
fact that they are movables or
immovables, but because different
provisions of law govern their acquisition,
possession, disposition, loss and
registration.
Caltex vs. Central Board of Assessment Appeals
(GR L-50466)
Facts: This case is about a realty tax on machinery
and equipment installed by Caltex in its gas
stations located on leased land. The machines and
equipment consist of underground tanks, elevated
tank, water tanks, gasoline pumps, etc. The said
machines and equipment are loaned by Caltex to
gas station operators under a lease agreement
where it is stipulated that the operators, upon
deman, shall return to Caltex the machines and
equipment in good condition when received,
ordinary wear and tear expected. Hence the lessor
of the land where the gas station is located does
not become the owner of the machines and
equipment installed for ownership is retained by
Caltex.
The city assessor of Pasay City
characterized the said items as taxable realty. The
city board of tax appeals ruled that they are
personal property.
Issue: W/N the gas station equipment and
machinery permanently affixed by Caltex to its
gas station and pavement should be subject to
realty tax.
Held: Yes. Improvements on land are commonly
taxed as realty even though for some purposes
they might be considered as personalty. It is a
familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real
property for purposes of taxation which on
general principle might be considered personal
property.
2. NAVARRO VS PINEDA (GR L-18456)
Facts: On Dec. 14, 1959, Rufino Pineda and his
mother Juana borrowed form Navarro the sum of
Php 2, 550.00 payeable 6 months after or on
June 14. To secure the indebtedness, Rufino
executed a document captioned "DEED OF REAL
ESTATE AND CHATTEL MORTGAGES",
whereby Juana, by way of real estate mortgage
hypothecatd a parcel of land, and Rufino by way
of Chattel mortgage, mortgaged his 2 story
residential house, erected on the land of one Atty.
Castro, and one motor truck. The debts became
due and demandable. However, the private
respondents were unable to pay despite extension
grants.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a
complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage and for
damages.
Issue: W/N the residential house can be validly
the subject of a chattel mortgage
Held: Yes. The trial court did not predicate its
decision declaring the deed of chattel mortgage
valid solely on the ground that the house
mortgaged was erected on the land which
belonged to a third person, but also on the
doctrine of estoppel, in that "the parties have so
expressly agreed" in the mortgage to consider the
house as a chattel "for its smallness and mixed
materials of sawali and wood". In a case, a
mortgaged house built on a rented land, was
held to be a personal property not only because
the deed of mortgage considered. it as such, but
also because it did not form an integral part of
the landor it is now well settled that an object
placed on land by one who has only a
temporary right to the same, such as a lessee or
usufructuary, does not become immobilized
by attachment. Hence, if a house
belonging to a person stands on a rented land
belonging to another person, it may be
mortgaged as a personal property if so stipulated
in the document of mortgage. It should be noted,
however, that the principle is predicated
on statements by the owner declaring his house
to be a chattel, a conduct that may conceivably
estop him from subsequent claiming otherwise.
The doctrine, therefore, gathered from
these cases is that although in some instances, a
house of mixed materials has been considered as
a chattel between the parties and that the validity
of the contract between them, has been
recognized, it has been a constant criterion
nevertheless that, with respect to third persons,
who are not parties to the contract, and
specially in execution proceedings, the house is
considered as an immovable property.
3. TUMALAD vs VICENCIO (GR L-30173)
Facts: On Sept. 1, 1955, defendants executed a
chattel mortgage in favor of the plaintiffs over
their house of strong materials located at No. 550
Int. 3, Quezon Blvd, Quiapo, erected on lands
which were being rented from Madrigal and
Company Inc. The mortgage was to guarantee a
loan of Php 4, 800.00. When defendants defaulted
in paying, the mortgage was extrajudicially
foreclosed and sold at a public auction pursuant
to the contract. As the highest bidder, plaintiffs
were issued a deed of sale. Subsequently,
plaintiffs filed a civil case praying, among others,
that the house be vacated and its possession
surrendered to them.
Issue: W/N the house can be a valid subject of a
chattel mortgage, given the fact that it is made of
strong materials
Held: The rule about the status of buildings as
immovable has been stated in many cases to the
effect that "it is obvious that the inclusion of the
building, separate and distinct from teh land, in
the enumeration of what may constitute real
properties (Art. 415) could only mean one thing,
that a building is by itself an immvable property,
irrespective of whether or not said structure and
the land on which it is adhered to belong to the
same owner.
Certain exceptions have been recognized,
however. In the case at bar, the house on rented
land is not only expressly designated as Chattel
Mortgage; it specifically provides that "the
mortgagor ... voluntarily CEDES, SELLS and
TRANSFERS by way of Chattel Mortgage he
property together with its leasehold rights over
the lot on which it is constructed and participation
..."lthough there is no specific statement referring
to the subject house as personal property, yet by
ceding, selling or transferring a property by way
of chattel mortgage defendants-appellants could
only have meant to convey the house as chattel, or
at least, intended to treat the same as such, so that
they should not now be allowed to make an
inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise. oreover,
the subject house stood on a rented lot to which
defendants-appellants merely had a temporary
right as lessee, and although this can not in itself
alone determine the status of the property, it does
so when combined with other factors to sustain
the interpretation that the parties, particularly the
mortgagors, intended to treat the house as
personalty. Also, unlike in the Iya cases, it is the
defendants themselves who are attackin the
validity of the mortgage. The doctrine of estoppel
therefore applies to them.
2. ASSOCIATED INSURANCE AND SURETY
CO. INC. V IYA (GR L-10837), May 30, 1958

Facts: Spouses Valino were the owners and
possessors of a house of strong materials
constructed on a lot located at Grace Park Subd,
Caloocan, Rizal which they purchased on
installment basis from the Phil. Realty Corp. To
be able to purchse on credit rice from the NARIC,
Lucia filed a bond in the sum of Php 11,000
subscribed by the Associated Insurance Surety
Co, and as counter-guaranty, the spouses
executed an alleged chattel mortgage on the
aforementioned house in favor of AISCO.
Having completed payment on the
purchase price of the lot, the Valinos were able to
secure on October 18, 1958, a certificate of title in
their name. Subsequently, however, the Valinos,
to secure payment of an indebtedness in the
amount of P12,000.00, executed a real estate
mortgage over the lot and the house in favor of
Isabel Iya, which was duly registered and
annotated at the back of the certificate of title.
On the other hand, as Lucia A. Valino,
failed to satisfy her obligation to the NARIC, the
surety company was compelled to pay the same
pursuant to the undertaking of the bond. In turn,
the surety company demanded reimbursement
from the spouses Valino, and as the latter likewise
failed to do so, the company foreclosed the chattel
mortgage over the house. As a result thereof, a
public sale was conducted wherein the property
was awarded to the surety company as the
highest bidde The surety company then caused
the said house to be declared in its name for tax
purposes.
AISCO subsequently learned of the
existence of the real estate mortgage over the lot
together with the improvements thereon and thus
instituted a civil case naming the spouses and Iya
as defendants.
Held: A building cannot be divested of
its character of a realty by the fact that the land on
which it is constructed belongs to another. To
hold it the other way, the possibility is not remote
that it would result in confusion, for to cloak the
building with an uncertain status made
dependent on the ownership of the land, would
create a situation where a permanent fixture
changes its nature or character as the ownership
of the land changes hands.In the case at bar, as
personal properties could only be the subject of a
chattel mortgage (Section 1, Act 3952) and as
obviously the structure in question is not one, the
execution of the chattel mortgage covering said
building is clearly invalid and a nullity. While it is
true that said document was correspondingly
registered in the Chattel Mortgage Register of
Rizal, this act produced no effect whatsoever for
where the interest conveyed is in the nature of a
real property, the registration of the document in
the registry of chattels is merely a futile act. Thus,
the registration of the chattel mortgage of a
building of strong materials produce no effect as
far as the building is concerned.
Human organ can be a subject of donation
because there is a law allowing donations
of human organs. In other words, for
purposes of donations, human organs can
be considered as property for purposes of
giving effect thereto.
A dead body by law belongs to no one
and is therefore under the protection of
the public. There can be no property in
the person deceased.
LEUNG YEE vs. STRONG MACHINERY
GR No. L-11658. February 15, 1918
Parties to a contract may treat a real property by
nature as personal property. However, this is only
binding insofar the parties are concerned and do not
affect third persons.
FACTS
Compania Agricola Filipina purchased rice-
cleaning machineries from STRONG
MACHINERY. A chattel mortgage was executed
to secure payment of the sale, involving a
building with the exclusion of the land on which
it stood. Unable to pay the debt upon due, the
mortgaged property was auctioned by the sheriff
and was bought by STRONG MACHINERY. The
sale was registered in the chattel mortgage
registry and STRONG MACHINERY came into
possession of said property.
While a chattel mortgage was executed between
Compania Agricola Filipina and STRONG
MACHINERY, the former also entered into
another mortgage concerning the same building
with LEUNG YEE. Unable to pay, the building
was auctioned by the sheriff and was bought by
LEUNG YEE. The sale was registered in the land
registry.
When the execution was levied upon the building,
STRONG MACHINERY, being in possession of
the property, demanded its release from the levy.
LEUNG YEE filed an action to recover the
possession of the property.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not parties to a contract may treat
an immovable property as personal property.
(2) Whether or not LEUNG YEE was bound by the
chattel mortgage on the building executed
between Compania Agricola Filipina and
STRONG MACHINERY.
RULING
(1) YES, parties to a contract may treat an
immovable property as personal property.
However, the building was real property and that
mere fact that the parties seem to have dealt it
separate and apart from the land on which it
stood no wise changed its character as real
property. Its annotation in the Chattel Mortgage
Registry could not be given the legal effect of
registration in the Registry of Real Property.
(2) NO, he was not. LEUNG YEE was not
bound by the chattel mortgage on the building
executed between Compania Agricola Filipina
and STRONG MACHINERY. To treat a real
property, a building in this case, as personal
property, is only binding between the contracting
parties and does not affect third persons. Hence,
LEUNG YEE, being a third person to the
agreement, was not bound by it. However,
because there was bad faith on the part of LEUNG
YEE since he purchased the building despite
having knowledge that STRONG MACHINERY
had previously purchased it, the court ruled that
the latter has rightful ownership over it.
NAVARRO vs. PINEDA
GR No. L-18456. November 30, 1963. 9 SCRA 631
Where a house standing on a rented land is made
subject of a chattel mortgage, its validity cannot be
assailed by the contracting parties based partly upon
the principle of estoppel.
FACTS
PINEDA and GONZALES borrowed P2,550.00
from plaintiff NAVARRO, which was payable in 6
months. To secure the debt, PINEDA mortgaged:
(1) his 2-story residential house situated on a lot
belonging to another, and (2) 1 motor truck by
was of chattel mortgage. GONZALES on the other
hand, mortgaged her parcel of land by way or real
estate mortgage. A Deed of Real Estate and
Chattel Mortgages was executed. Both mortgages
were registered with the Registry of Deeds and
Motor Vehicles Offices.
When the debt became due and PINEDA and
GONZALES were unable to pay, NAVARRO
granted them 2 extensions but they still failed to
give payment. NAVARRO then filed a complaint
for the foreclosure of the mortgage and for
damages. In a Stipulation of Facts submitted by
the parties in court, PINEDA and GONZALES
admitted their indebtedness to NAVARRO and
that it was already long due and unpaid. They
also contended that only movables can be subject
of a chattel mortgage that the chattel mortgage of
PINEDAs house which was erected on a lot
belonging to another person made the Deed of
Real Estate and Chattel Mortgages invalid. The
court however, ordered the auction of the
mortgaged properties.
Hence, this appeal by PINEDA, contending that
his house which was built on a lot not owned by
him was real property that the chattel mortgage
on said house was invalid.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Deed of Real Estate and
Chattel Mortgages
is valid when the house PINEDA made subject of
the chattel mortgage was erected on a land
belonging to a third person.
RULING
YES, the mortgage was valid. Where a house
stands on a rented land belonging to another
person, it may be subject matter of a chattel
mortgage, the validity of which cannot be assailed
by the contracting parties based partly upon the
principle of estoppel. Parties to a contract may by
agreement treat as personal property that which
by nature would be real property but is only
binding in so far as the contracting parties are
concerned.
In the case at bar, the house was treated was a
personal or movable property by the parties to the
contract themselves. In fact, in the Deed of Real
Estate and Chattel Mortgages executed by
PINEDA, said house was referred to as personal
property and a chattel for its smallness and
mixed materials of sawali and wood, which was
to be conveyed by way of chattel mortgage. With
this, PINEDA and GONZALES are estopped to
question the validity of the mortgages.
SORIANO vs. GALIT
GR No. 156295. September 23, 2003. 411 SCRA
631
A building in itself is considered immovable. It may
then be a subject of a real estate mortgage separate from
the land.
FACTS
GALIT contracted a P480,000.00 loan from
SORIANO. The loan was secured by a real estate
mortgage over a parcel of land. For failure to pay
his obligation, SORIANO filed a complaint for
sum of money against GALIT. The court then
ordered the sheriff to levy the GALIT spouses
properties: (1) a parcel of land, (2) a storehouse
and (3) bodega. During the public auction,
SORIANO was the only and highest bidder. A
Certificate of Sale of Execution of Real Property
was issued. However, the Certificate of Sale
registered by SORIANO with the Registry of
Deeds included: (1) a parcel of land and (2) the
land on which the storehouse and bodega was
erected. He then filed a petition for the issuance of
a writ of possession over the land on which the
storehouse and bodega were situated. The
petition was granted by the court.
GALIT spouses assailed via certiorari the
inclusion of the land on which the storehouse and
bodega was built on since only the 2 buildings
were deemed sold to SORIANO to the exclusion
of the land. The petition was granted and the writ
of possession issued to SORIANO was declared
null and void. Hence, this appeal by SORIANO.
ISSUE
Whether or not the purchase of the of the 2
buildings necessarily included the land on which
they were constructed on since they are
immovable properties.
RULING
NO, it did not. Buildings in themselves may be
mortgaged apart form the land on which they
have been built on. Such would still be considered
immovable property even if dealt with separately
and apart from the land. In fact, the Civil Code
separately enumerated lands and buildings as
immovable property. Hence, a building, by itself,
is considered immovable.
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
ART. 415: The following are immovable property:
1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all
kinds adhered to soil;
2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they
are attached to the land or form an integral
part of an immovable;
3) Everything attached to an immovable in a
fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without breaking the
material or deterioration of the object;
4) Statues, reliefs, paintings, or other objects for
use or ornamentation, placed in buildings or
on lands by the owner of the immovable in
such a manner that it reveals the intention to
attach them permanently to the tenements.
5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or
implements intended by the owner of the
tenement for an industry or works which may
be carried on in a building or on a piece of
land, and which tend directly to meet the
needs of the said industry or works.
6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish
ponds or breeding places of similar nature in
case their owner has placed them or preserves
them with the intention to have them
permanently attached to the land, and forming
a permanent par of it; the animals in these
places are included;
7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land;
8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps while the
matter thereof forms part of the bed and
waters either running or stagnant;
9) Docks and structures which, though floating,
are intended by their nature and object to
remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or
coast;
10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes
and other real rights over immovable property.
CLASSES OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY:
1. Immovable by NATURE those
which cannot be moved from place to
place by their very nature such as
land, mines, slag dumps;
2. Immovable by INCORPORATION
those which are essentially movables,
but are attached to an immovable in
such a manner as to become an
integral part thereof. Examples of
which are those mentioned in Art. 415
par. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6.
3. Immovable by DESTINATION - those
which are essentially movables, but
by the purpose for which they have
been placed in an immovable, partake
the nature of the latter, such as those
mentioned in Art. 415 par. 4, 6, 7, and
9.
4. Immovable by ANALOGY or by
LAW those mentioned in Art. 415
par. 10, right of usufruct, easements,
and servitudes
Paragraph 1: Land, buildings, roads and
constructions of all kinds adhered to soil;
Land is immovable by NATURE.
The buildings, roads, and constructions
are immovable by INCORPORATION
because they form part of an immovable
or that they are adhered into the soil.
Paragraph 2: Trees, plants, and growing
fruits, while they are attached to the land
or form an integral part of an immovable;
They can be considered as immovable by
nature or incorporation.
By NATURE if they are spontaneous
products of the soil (naturally grows in
the land).
By INCORPORATION if they are
essentially attached or planted in the land
in such a manner to be an integral part
thereof.
Once, they are removed from or no longer
adhered to the land, they become
movables except if they timber from the
timberland.
Paragraph 3: Everything attached to an
immovable in a fixed manner, in such a
way that it cannot be separated therefrom
without breaking the material or
deterioration of the object;
These are immovables by
INCORPORATION because they cannot
be separated from the immovables
without breaking or substantial
deterioration. The fact of incorporation
determines the immovability of the thing.
It is not necessary that the objects are
placed by the owner in order to determine
its immovability
Paragraph 4: Statues, reliefs, paintings, or
other objects for use or ornamentation,
placed in buildings or on lands by the
owner of the immovable in such a manner
that it reveals the intention to attach them
permanently to the tenements.
It is necessary that the owner of the
immovable property must place the object
to the immovable property.
The properties here are essentially
movable but they become immovable
under PARAGRAPH 4 because of the
purpose of the owner to attach them
permanently to the immovable;
 GR: to be considered as immovable, the
machineries must be placed by the owner.
If it is not placed by the owner, then it is
considered as movable.
Exceptions:
1) if it is placed by the tenant acting as agent
of the owner of the immovable;
2) if the tenant has promised, or agreed in
the contract that the tenant would leave
the machinery or the equipment to the
owner of the land even after the lease has
expired.
Paragraph 5: Machinery, receptacles,
instruments or implements intended by the
owner of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land, and which
tend directly to meet the needs of the said
industry or works.
o REQUISITES:
1. the machineries must be placed by
the owner of the immovable or his
agent or his duly authorized
representatives;
2. there must be an industry, business,
or work must be carried on in
building or the land;
3. the machineries must tend directly to
meet the need of such industry or
said work;
4. the machines must be essential and
principal elements of the industry.
The properties here are
essentially movable but they
become immovable under
PARAGRAPH 5, because
they are used in the industry,
or in a business and placed by
the owner of the immovable.
o What is the effect of the
separation of these
machineries in Paragraph 5?
If the purpose is no longer
there, they become movables.
But if the separation is merely
temporary, and there is that
very intention to return them,
then their immovable
character remain
MACHINERY ENGINEERING SUPPLY V CA
Facts: MES filed a complaint for replevin against
Ipo Limestone Co for the recovery of the
machineries and equipments sold and delivered
to the latter. The judge issued an order
commanding the provincial sheriff to seize and
take possession of the properties.
Thereafter, the sheriff went to Bulacan for
the purpose of carrying out the court's order. The
manager of Ipo protested the seizure on the
ground that the same were not personal property
as dismantling them would result to damages to
the wooden frames attached.
The petitioner claims that the machineries
and equipment seized are still MES properties
until fully paid for and as such never became
immovable.
Issue: Should the sheriff execute the writ and
confiscate the machines?
Held: The machinery in question appeared to be
attached to the land, particularly to the concrete
foundation, in a fixed manner, in such a way that
the former could not be separated from the latter
without breaking the material or deterioration of
the object. Hence, they are considered real
property and not subject to replevin.
NB: the issue of ownership of the materials were
not raised in the CFI hence not discussed by the
SC.
DAVAO SAW MILL VS CASTILLO
Facts: DSM operated a sawmill in DC. The land
upon which the business was conducted belonged
to another person. On the land, DSM erected a
building which housed the machinery used by it.
The machines were placed and mounted on
foundations of cement. The contract of lease
between DSM and the owner provided that all
improvements and buildings introduced and
erected by DSM shall pass to the exclusive
property of the owner with the exception that the
machineries and accessories are not included as
improvements.
In another action brought by Davao Light
against DSM, judgment was rendered against the
latter and a writ of execution was issued thereon,
and the machines were levied as personalty by the
sheriff. DSM now contends that the machines are
real property (by destination), and thus cannot be
levied.
Held: Machine is movable by nature and only
becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by
the owner of the property or plant. Such result
would not be accomplished, therefore, by the
placing of machinery in a plant by a tenant or
usufructuary or any person having only a
temporary right. The distinction rests, as pointed
out by Demolombre upon the fact that one only
having a temporary right to the possession or
enjoyment of property is not presumed by the law
to have applied movable property belonging to
him so as to deprive him of it by causing it by an
act of immobilization to become the property of
another.
It follows that the machinery put by DSM
did not lose its character of movable property and
become immovable by destination. Hence could
be levied.
 The concrete immobilizatoin (of the
improvements, etc) took place because of the
express provisions of the lease, since the lease
deprived the tenant of any right to charge against
the lessor the cost, and it was expressly stipulated
that the improvements, etc should become part of
the property belonging to the owner without
compensation to the lessee. Under such
conditions, the tenant was acting but an agent of
the owner, and the immobilization which resulted
arose in legal effect from the act of the owner in
giving by contract a permanent destination of the
machinery.
MINDANAO BUS CO VS. CITY ASSESSOR
Facts: This is a petition to review the decision of
the Court of Tax Appels in holding that the MBC
is liable to the payment of the realty tax on its
maintenance and repair equipment.
Held: Movable equipments to be immobilized in
contemplation of the law must first be "essential
and principal elements" of an industry or works
without which such industry or works would be
"unable to function or carry on the industrial
purpose for which it was established."
The tools and equipments in question in
this instant case are, by their nature, not essential
and principal elements of petitioner's business of
transporting passengers and cargoes by motor
trucks. They are merely incidentals-acquired as
movables and used only for expediency to
facilitate and/or improve its service. Even
without such tools and equipments, its business
may he carried on since it can be repaired or
serviced in a shop belonging to another.
Aside from the element of essentiality the
above-quoted provision also requires that the
industry or works he carried on in a building or
on a piece of land. In the case at bar the
equipments in question are destined only to
repair or service the transportation business,
which is not carried on in a building or
permanently on a piece of land, as demanded by
the law.
BERKENKOTTER VS CU UNJIENG
Facts: There is a sugar central (Malabacat Sugar
Co), several machines were installed in the plant.
Now, there was a need for the plant to increase its
production. They needed to install additional
machines. The problem is that these machineries
were purchased on account and the whole of the
plant, including the land were the subject of a real
estate mortgage. What compounds the problem is
that merong mga machines installed after the
execution of the real estate mortgage.
Now, hindi nabayaran yung loan ng mga
machines. So that finoforclose na ngayon yung
mortgage. Sabi ng Malabacat, okay you can
foreclose all the mortgage but exclude the
machines since they are not part of the real estate
mortgage because they are not real property due
to the fact that the price is unpaid.
Issue: Are after acquired machines covered by the
real estate mortgage executed before acquisition
of the same?
Held: Machinery intended by the owner of the
building or land used in connection to any
industry or trade being carried on therein and
which are expressly adopted to meet the
requirements of such trade, are considered as real
property.
- Paragraph 8: Mines, quarries, and slag
dumps while the matter thereof forms
part of the bed and waters either running
or stagnant;
Slag dump - these are dirt and soil taken form a
mine and piled upon the surface of the ground.
You can find minerals inside the dump.
o They are considered immovables
while they form part of the bed. le.
But once the minerals are extracted
from the land like gold, they become
movable. So, this is immovable by
incorporation, for as long as they are
part of the soil.
- Paragraph 9: Docks and structures which,
though floating, are intended by their
nature and object to remain at a fixed
place on a river, lake, or coast;
o So the docks and structures have
to be fixed. But if you have a
houseboat that moves from one
place to another, it is not
considered immovable but
movable.
o Vessels, ships no matter how big
they are, are movable properties.
o In the case PRC V JARQUE, this
illustrates the fact that vessels are
considered as personal property.
Its just that when it comes to
vessels, there are certain
requirements for a sale to be valid
and binding against 3rd persons
such as registration in the
Registry of Property Vessels and
the affidavit of good faith. But
just take note that if a vessel is a
subject of transaction, it is
definitely movable.
- Paragraph 10: Contracts for public works,
and servitudes and other real rights over
immovable property.
o The contract itself, the piece of
paper is not immovable but
movable. But what is written on
the piece of paper, if it is a
 contract for public works, then
that is a real property.
o So if you have a right over
immovable property, you have
the right to sue somebody over
the immovable property in which
such right is also considered as
immovable. So, there are 2
properties here:
o We call this real property by
ANALOGY because these rights
involve here are not material but
they partake the essential
characteristics of the immovable
property.
PRC vs. JARQUE GR No. L-41506. March 25,
1935
Ship Vessels are personal property but when
it is a subject of a chattel mortgage, the
absence of an Affidavit of Good Faith as
required under the Mortgage Law makes the
mortgage void.
FACTS
PHILIPPINE REFINING CO. (PRC) and
JARQUE executed 3 mortgages on the vessels
Pandan and Zaragosa. The 2 vessels were referred
to as chattel mortgage. A 4th mortgage was
executed between JARQUE and Aboitiz on the
vessel Zaragosa, which was entered in the chattel
mortgage registry.
A petition to declare JARQUE as an insolvent
debtor was filed in court. After said petition was
granted, all of JARQUEs properties were
assigned to Corominas. However, the judge
refused to order the foreclosure of the mortgages
in favor of PRC declaring that it contained defects.
Being that chattel mortgages require an Affidavit of
Good Faith for their validity, the first 2 mortgages
lacked such affidavit and while although the 3rd
mortgage contained such, it was not registered
within 30 days before the commencement of the
insolvency proceedings against JARQUE.
On appeal, PRC contended that the vessels do
not need said Affidavit of Good Faith on the ground
that they were real property.
ISSUE
Whether or not motor vessels are real
property that when mortgaged, they do not need
an Affidavit of Good Faith to be valid.
RULING
NO, motor vessels are not real property but
are rather personal property under both the civil
and common laws. Hence, they are subject under
the Chattel Mortgage Law. A mortgage on a
vessel is generally like any other chattel mortgage
as to its requisites and validity. The difference is
that the title to a vessel subject of a mortgage
should be recorded not with the Registry of Deed
but rather with the Collector of Customs of the
port of entry.
The Chattel Mortgage Law includes the
requirement of an Affidavit of Good Faith appended
to the mortgage and recorded therewith. The
absence of said affidavit vitiates a mortgage as
against creditors and subsequent encumbrancers.
Being that no affidavit was executed, the
mortgage was lacking and was rule unenforceable
against third persons.
CALTEX vs. CBAA
GR No. L-50466. May 31, 1982. 114 SCRA 296
Gas station equipment and machinery are taxable as
realty because without them, a gas station would
entirely be useless. Some improvements although have
a characteristic of personalty are taxed as real property.
FACTS
CALTEX loaned to gas station operators, gas
station equipments and machineries under an
appropriate lease agreement or receipt. Said
machineries and equipments consist of
underground tank, elevated water tanks, water
tanks, gasoline pumps, computing pumps, car
washer, car hoists, truck hoists, air compressors,
etc.
In the contract, it was stipulated that these
equipments and machineries would still be
owned by CALTEX during the period of lease.
The operators shall also return to CALTEX these
equipments upon demand or upon the expiration
of the contract in good condition as when
received, ordinary tear and wear accepted.
The CITY ASSESSOR OF PASAY characterized
these machines as real property and thus taxable.
On appeal by CALTEX, the City Board of Tax
Appeals declared it as personalty. Upon appeal of
the CITY ASSESSOR OF PASAY to the CENTRAL
BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS (CBAA),
the latter declared said machineries as real
property and hence, taxable.
CALTEX filed a petition via certiorari with the SC
to set aside the resolution of the CBAA and to
declare said machineries as personal property and
hence, not taxable. It contended that their case
was similar with the Davao Saw Mills case,
wherein machinery fixed on rented property was
ruled as personal property.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the gas station equipment and
machinery were immovable property.
(2) Whether or not gas station equipment and
machinery permanently fixed by CALTEX to its
gas station and pavement which are taxable
realty, subject to realty tax.
RULING
(1) The court did not rule on the mobility or
immobility of the gas station equipment and
machinery.
(2) YES, they are subject to realty tax. These
gas station equipment and machinery are taxable
improvements as appurtenances to the gas station
building or shed owned by CALTEX, the latter,
which are also taxable realty. It is because without
these equipment and machinery, the gas station
would be useless. Improvements on land are
commonly taxed as realty even though for some
purposes, they might be considered personalty. It
is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as
real property for purposes of taxation which on
general principle might be considered personal
property.
BENGUET CORP. vs. CBAA
GR No. 106041. January 29, 1993. 218 SCRA 271
A dam is an immovable property by nature and by
incorporation. Hence, it is subject to realty tax.
FACTS
BENGUET CORP. owned a mine and a dam. The
Provincial Assessor of Zambales classified the
dam as a taxable improvement of the mine. On
appeal by BENGUET CORP. to the CENTRAL
BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS (CBAA),
the latter declared that the tailings dam and the
land submerged under it are subject to realty tax.
BENGUET CORP. then filed a petition to the SC
via certiorari asking the court set aside the
resolution of CBAA. It contended that the dam
should not be subject to tax because it was not an
assessable improvement of the mine but rather an
integral part of the mines operation. The Sol. Gen
argued however that the dam was an assessable
improvement because it enhanced the value and
utility of the mine like holding waste from the
mine and impounding water for recycling.
ISSUE
Whether or not the dam was an assessable
improvement of the mine and thus subject to
realty tax.
RULING
YES, the dam was an assessable improvement of
the mine and subject to realty tax. The mine can
operate without the dam because the primary
function of the dam is merely to receive and retain
the wastes and water coming from the mine.
There was no allegation that it was the only
source of water as to make the dam an integral
part of the mine.
The Real Property Code did not define what is
real property that the definition in Art. 415 of the
Civil Code shall apply. The dam was an
immovable under pars. 1 and 3 of Art. 415 hence
it was taxable realty. Under par. 1, the dam was
an immovable property since it was a
construction adhered to the soil. Under par. 3, it
was an immovable since it was fixed in a manner
that it cannot be separated from the land without
breaking or deteriorating.
SERGS PRODUCTS vs. PCI
GR No. 137705. August 22, 2000. 338 SCRA 499
Immovable property, when deemed as personal
property in an agreement cannot be assailed by
the contracting parties by virtue of the principle of
estoppel. It can then be a valid subject of a
replevin.
FACTS
SERGS PRODUCTS owned a sum of money from
PCI LEASING AND FINANCE. Unable to pay,
PCI LEASING filed an application for a sum of
money and for a writ of replevin to obtain
machineries against SERGS PRODUCTS. Upon
the issuance of the replevin, the sheriff seized 1
machinery of SERGS PRODUCTS with word that
he will come back for the others. SERGS
PRODUCTS prayed to the court that the
enforcement of the replevin be prevented on the
ground that the machineries were real property
by immobilization and thus not subject to said
replevin. PCI LEASING on the other hand
contended that the machines were personal
property. The sheriff came back to seize 2 more
machines but failed.
The Court of Appeals classed the machineries as
personal property and had only been leased and
not owned by SERGS PRODUCTS. Hence this
appeal.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the machineries became real
property by virtue of immobilization.
(2) Whether or not the machineries could be
subject of a replevin.
RULING
(1) YES, the machineries became real property
by virtue of immobilization. The machineries
were real property under par. 5 of Art. 415 being
that:
1) they were placed by SERGS PRODUCTS, the
owner of the tenement,
(2) they were intended for an industry, which in
this case is the chocolate-making industry and
(3) they were essential to said industry.
Hence, although each of them was movable or
personal property on its own, all of them have
become immobilized by destination because they
are essential and principal elements of the
industry.
However, in the Lease Agreement executed
between SERGS PRODUCTS and PCI LEASING,
said machineries were referred to as personal
property. Contracting parties may validly
stipulate that a real property be considered as
personal but is only good between them and do
not affect third persons. After agreeing on such
stipulation, they are consequently estopped from
claiming otherwise. SERGS PRODUCTS now, is
estopped from claiming that said properties were
real property when it had formerly agreed in the
Lease Agreement that said properties were
personal properties.
(2) YES, the machineries can be the subject of
a replevin because although they were real
property by nature, they became personal
property by agreement.
ARTICLE 416: The following things are deemed to be
personal property:
 Those movables susceptible of appropriation which
are not included in the preceding article;
Real property which by special provision of law is
considered as personalty;
Forces of nature which are brought under control
by science; and
In general, all things which can be transported
from place to place without the impairment of
the real property to which they are fixed.
- Two tests to determine whether the
property is movable or immovable
o the test by description:
if the property is capable of being moved
from place to place, then it is movable;
If such change in location can be made
without injury to real property to which
in the meantime attached, it is movable.
the test by exclusion:
If it is not enumerated under Art 415,
then it is considered as movable
But you have to take into account the
special provision of law to which makes
immovable property movable for that
particular purpose.
SIBAL vs. VALDEZ
GR No. 26278. August 4, 1927
The Chattel Mortgage Law fully recognizes that
growing crops are personal property. The existence
of a right on the growing crop is a mobilization by
anticipation. Being personal property, it could not be
subject of redemption.
FACTS
The sugar cane on 7 parcels of land owned by
SIBAL was foreclosed by the court. VALDEZ
purchased the sugar cane on said 7 parcels of
land. Macondray & Co. on the other hand bought
the 8 parcels of land owned by SIBAL. For
account of the redemption price of said parcels,
SIBAL paid Macondray & Co. P2,000.00. VALDEZ
purchased from Macondray & Co. all its rights
and interests in the 8 parcels of land by virtue of
the P2,000.00 paid by VALDEZ to Macondray.
Thereafter, VALDEZ became the absolute owner
of the 8 parcels of land.
SIBAL offered to redeem the sugar cane he
planted but VALDEZ refused on the ground that
the sugar cane was personal property and was not
therefore subject of redemption. SIBAL on the
other hand, contended that the sugar cane was
real property as deemed under par. 2 of Art. 415
of the Civil Code where growing crops, while
they are attached to the land or form part of an
immovable are immovable property. The court
decided in favor of VALDEZ. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the sugar cane was personal
property and could not be subject of redemption.
RULING
YES, the sugar cane was personal property.
Although par. 2 of Art. 415 of the Civil Code
states that growing crops, while they are attached
to the land or form part of an immovable are
immovable property, par. 2 of Art. 416 state that
real property which by any special provision of
law is considered as personalty.
The special provision of law in this case is found
in the Chattel Mortgage Law. The Chattel
Mortgage Law fully recognizes that growing
crops are personal property. Hence, for purposes
of attachment of property, execution of judgment
and the Chattel Mortgage Law, growing crops or
ungathered products raised by early labor and
cultivation are considered personal property. The
existence of a right on the growing crop is a
mobilization by anticipation. Therefore, the sugar
cane, being personal property could not be subject
of redemption.
ARTICLE 417: The following are also considered as
personal property:
Obligations and actions which have for their
object movables or demandable sums; and
Shares of stocks of agricultural, commercial,
and industrial entities, although they
may have real estate.
ARTICLE 418: Movable property is either consumable
or non-consumable. To the first class belong those
movables which cannot be used in a manner
appropriate to their nature without their being
consumed; to the second class belong all the others.
Classification of movable property
1. As to nature: consumables and non-
consumables
2. As to the intention of the parties: Fungible and
non-fungible
Consumable - refers to things whose use
according to their nature destroys the
substance of the thing or causes loss to the
owner.
Non- consumable refers to any other
kind which cannot be consumed.
Fungible can be replaced by an equal
quality or quantity either by the nature of
the thing or by agreement. A thing may
be fungible or non-fungible depending
upon the intention of the parties.
PROPERTY IN RELATION TO WHOM
IT BELONGS
ARTICLE 419: Property is either of public dominion
or of private ownership.
Properties are owned either:
1. in a public capacity (dominio
publico)
 - The function of
administering and disposing of
lands of the public domain in
the manner prescribed by law is
not entrusted to the courts but
to executive officials. (Bautista
v Barza)
2. in private capacity (propiedad
privado)
- Regarding the state, it may
own properties both in its
public capacity (properties of
the public dominion) and in its
private capacity (patrimonial
property).
ARTICLE 420: The following things are property
of public dominion:
1. Those intended for public use such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
2. Those which belong to the State without being
for public use and are intended for some
public service and for the development of the
national wealth.
PUBLIC DOMINION means ownership by the
State and that the State has control and
administration or ownership by the public in
general, in that not even the State or subdivisions
thereof may make them the object of commerce as
long as they remain properties for public use such
as a river or town plaza.
3 kinds:
1. for public use like roads, canals
To constitute public use, the public in
general should have equal or
common rights to use the land or
facility involved on the same terms,
however limited in the number who
can actually avail themselves of it at a
given time. The yardstick now is the
opportunity to use of the property is
open to all under the same terms and
conditions
2. for public service like the national
government building, army rifles, (may
be used only by duly authorized persons)
3. for the development of national wealth
natural resources
REPUBLIC VS GONZALES
Wherein a parcel of land has been leased to a
private individual, so there were improvements
on these properties. Later on, there was a need
to widen the road so the lease was cancelled.
The lessee contended that the taking is not for
public use because the people who are going to
benefit from the widening of the road will be
those people who have cars.
The SC held the conception urged by
appellants to restrict property reserved for public
use to include only property susceptible of being
used by a generally unlimited number of people is
flawed and obsolete. The number of users is not
the yardstick. To constitute public use, the public
in general should have equal or common rights to
use the land or facility involved on the same
terms, however limited in the number who can
actually avail themselves of it at a given time.
The yardstick now is the opportunity to
use the property is open to all under the same
terms and conditions.
CITY OF MANILA vs. GARCIA
GR No. L-26053. February 21, 1967
Public property are outside the commerce of men and
could not have been a lawful subject of a lease
agreement.
FACTS
The CITY OF MANILA owed parcels of land,
forming one compact area in Malate, Manila.
Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947,
GARCIA ET AL. entered upon these premises and
built houses of second-class materials without the
CITY OF MANILA's knowledge and consent, and
without the necessary building permits from the
city. There, they lived thru the years.
Later on, when the presence of GARCIA ET AL.
have been discovered, some of them were given
by Mayor Fugoso lease contract permits to occupy
specific areas in the property upon conditions
therein set forth and for nominal rentals charged.
The rest of the 23 defendants though, exhibited
none.
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School, which
was close, though not contiguous to the property,
came for the need of an expansion. The City
Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to
clear squatters' houses on city property, gave
GARCIA ET AL. 30 days to vacate and remove
their constructions or improvements on the
premises and to pay for the amount due by reason
of their occupancy. They however refused. They
sought to recover the possession of the property
in court. However, judgment was against them.
Hence, they appealed.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not GARCIA ET AL. had the right
to remain in the premises.
(2) Whether or not they have acquired the status
of legal tenants by reason of the lease contract
permits issued by the mayor.
RULING
(1) NO, they did not have the right.
Defendants had absolutely no right to remain in
the premises. The excuse that they had permits
from the mayor is at best flimsy. The city's right to
throw defendants out of the area could not be
gainsaid. The city's dominical right to possession
is paramount. If there was error in the finding that
the city needs the land, such error is harmless and
will not justify reversal of the judgment below.
The houses and constructions planted by
defendants on the premises clearly hindered and
impaired the use of that property for school
purposes, hence, constituted public nuisance per
se. The selfish interests of defendants must have
to yield to the general good for the use of the
property for a badly needed school building, so as
not to prejudice the education of the youth of the
land. The public purpose of constructing the
school building annex is paramount.
(2) NO, they have not acquired the legal
status of tenants. Their homes were erected
without city permits. These constructions were
illegal. In a language familiar to all, defendants
were squatters. Squatting is unlawful and no
amount of acquiescence on the part of the city
officials will elevate it into a lawful act. Official
approval of squatting should not, therefore, be
permitted to obtain in this country where there is
an orderly form of government. The permits then
were null and void. The property in controversy
was not a valid subject for lease because of the
fact that public property are outside the
commerce of men and could not have been a
lawful subject of a lease agreement.
REPUBLIC vs. VDA. DEL CASTILLO
GR No. L-69002. June 30, 1988
Property of public dominion being outside the
commerce of men, could not be subject to
registration and they could not be acquired by
prescription.
FACTS
The late MODESTO CASTILLO applied for the
registration of two parcels of land located in
Tanauan, Batangas. In a decision of the court,
MODESTO CASTILLO, who was married to
AMANDA LAT, was declared the true and
absolute owner of the land with the
improvements thereon and an original certificate
of title was issued to him by the Register of Deeds.
By virtue of an instrument, the 2 lots were
consolidated and sub-divided into 9 lots. After the
death of MODESTO CASTILLO, AMANDA LAT
VDA. DE CASTILLO and co-defendants executed
a deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in
favor of the latter. As a result of which, new
transfer certificates of title were issued to them.
The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES filed a
case with the lower court for the annulment of
said certificates of title issued to VDA. DE
CASTILLO ET AL., as heirs/successors of
MODESTO CASTILLO and for the reversion of
the lands covered thereby to the State. It was
alleged that said lands had always formed part of
the Taal Lake, washed and inundated by the
waters thereof and being of public ownership, it
could not be the subject of registration as private
property. DEFENDANTS on the other hand
alleged that the Government's action was already
barred by the decision of the registration court,
that the action has prescribed, and that the
government was estopped from questioning the
ownership and possession of appellants.
The lower court ruled in favor of the REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES. However, The Court of
Appeals on appeal reversed and set aside the
appealed decision. Hence, thIS instant petition.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the Government's action was
already barred by the decision of the registration
court under the principle of res adjudicata.
(2) Whether or not the action has prescribed.
RULING
(1) NO, it was not. Under par. 1, Art. 420 of the
Civil Code, shores are properties of the public
domain intended for public use. Thus, it has long
been settled that portions of the foreshore or of
the territorial waters and beaches could not be
registered. Their inclusion in a certificate of title
did not convert the same into properties of private
ownership or confer title upon the registrant. The
property in controversy were not subject to
registration, being outside the commerce of men;
and that since the lots in litigation were of public
domain, the registration court did not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate said lands as private
property, hence, res judicata did not apply.
(2) NO, the action has not prescribed. One of the
characteristics of property falling under public
dominion is that they could not be acquired by
prescription as again, they are outside the
commerce of men. The defense of long possession
is likewise not available in this case because, as
already ruled by this Court, mere possession of
land does not by itself automatically divest the
land of its public character.
REPUBLIC vs. CA
GR No. 100709. November 14, 1997
Shores are property of public dominion. When the sea
moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the
invaded property became foreshore land and passed to
the realm of the public domain.
FACTS
MORATO filed a free patent application on a
parcel of land situated at Calauag, Quezon. The
patent was approved and the Register of Deeds
issued an original certificate of title to MORATO.
Both the free patent and the title specifically
mandate that the land shall not be alienated nor
encumbered within five years from the date of the
issuance of the patent.
MORATO mortgaged the land to respondents CO
and QUILATAN, the later who constructed a
house therein. Portion of it was also leased to
another person, where a warehouse was
constructed. Acting upon reports that respondent
MORATO had encumbered the land in violation
of the condition of the patent, the DISTRICT
LAND OFFICER conducted an investigation.
Thereafter, it was established that the subject land
is a portion of the Calauag Bay and not suitable to
vegetation.
The DIRECTOR OF LANDS filed an action in
court to cancel the title of the land and its
reversion to the public domain as foreshore land.
However, both the lower court and the Court of
Appeals dismissed the said petition on the ground
that there was no violation of the 5-year period
ban against alienating or encumbering the land,
because the land was merely leased and not
alienated. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the questioned land was part of a
disposable public land.
RULING
NO, it was not but rather belonged to the public
domain as foreshore land.
Foreshore land is the strip of land that lies
between the high and low water marks and that is
alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of
the tide.
While at the time of the grant of free patent to
respondent Morato, the land was not reached by
the water yet. However, due to gradual sinking
of the land caused by natural calamities, the sea
advanced and had permanently invaded a portion
of the subject land. The land in question already
became foreshore land since during high tide, at
least half of the land was 6 feet deep under water
and 3 feet deep during low tide. When the sea
advances and private properties are permanently
invaded by the waves, such as in this case, they
become part of the shore or breach. They are then
passed to the public domain, but the owner thus
dispossessed does not retain any right to the
natural products resulting from their new nature;
it is a de facto case of eminent domain, and not
subject to indemnity.
Par. 1, Art. 420 of the Civil Code provides that
shores are property of public dominion. When the
sea moved towards the estate and the tide
invaded it, the invaded property became
foreshore land and passed to the realm of the
public domain. The subject land in this case, being
foreshore land, should therefore be returned to
the public domain.
CHAVEZ vs. PEA
GR No. 133250. July 9, 2002
Only an official classification and formal
declaration can convert reclaimed lands into
alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain.
FACTS
In 1973, the government, through the
Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a
contract with the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim
certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila
Bay, which also included the construction of
Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road
and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). CDCP
obligated itself to carry out all the works in
consideration of 50% of the total reclaimed land.
In 1977, then Pres. Marcos issued PD 1084
creating the PHILIPPINE ESTATES AUTHORITY
(PEA), a wholly government owned and
controlled corporation with a special charter. The
P.D. tasked PEA to reclaim land, including
foreshore and submerged areas, and to develop,
improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds
of lands. Another P.D. 1085 was issued,
transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in the
foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay under
the MCCRRP.
In 1981, then Pres. Marcos issued a memorandum
directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP,
so that all future works in MCCRRP shall be
funded and owned by PEA. A Memorandum of
Agreement was then executed between PEA and
CDCP, which stated that CDCP shall:
(1) undertake all reclamation, construction, and
such other works in the MCCRRP as may be
agreed upon by the parties and that all the
financing required for such works shall be
provided by PEA, and
(2) CDCP shall give up all its development rights
and hereby agrees to cede and transfer in favor of
PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and
participation of CDCP in and to all the areas of
land reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP.
In 1988, then Pres. Aquino issued Special Patent
No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA the
parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP.
The Register of Deeds of the Municipality of
Paraaque issued 3 Transfer Certificates of Title in
the name of PEA, covering the 3 reclaimed islands
known as the Freedom Islands.
In 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA) with AMARI COASTAL BAY
AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
(AMARI), a private corporation, to develop the
Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the
reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of
submerged areas surrounding these islands to
complete the configuration in the MCCRRP. PEA
and AMARI entered into the JVA through
negotiation without public bidding. The Board of
Directors of PEA, in its resolution, confirmed the
JVA, which was later approved by then Pres.
Ramos, through then Exe. Sec. Ruben Torres.
In 1996, then Senate Pres. Ernesto Maceda
delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and
denounced the JVA as the grandmother of all
scams. As a result, 2 of the Senate Committees:
(1) the Senate Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and (2)
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations, conducted a joint
investigation. In its Senate Committee Report No.
560, the Senate Committees concluded that:
(1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to
AMARI under the JVA were lands of the public
domain which the government has not classified
as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot
alienate these lands ,
(2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom
Islands are thus void, and
(3) the JVA itself is illegal.
In 1997, then Pres. Ramos issued A.O. 365 creating
a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the
legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee
Report No. 560. The Legal Task Force upheld the
legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions
reached by the Senate Committees. It declared
that reclaimed lands were classified as alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain.
In 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today
published reports that there were on-going
renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under
an order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos.
On April of the same year, a certain Antonio M.
Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition seeking
to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed the
petition for unwarranted disregard of judicial
hierarchy.
In the same month, petitioner FRANK I. CHAVEZ
as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for
Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order. CHAVEZ assailed the
following:
(1) that the sale to AMARI of lands of the public
domain as a blatant violation of Sec. 3, Article XII
of Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable
lands of the public domain to private corporations
and
(2) that he sought to enjoin the loss of billions of
pesos in properties of the State that are of public
dominion. CHAVEZ prayed that PEA publicly
disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA,
invoking the Constitutional right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.
In a Resolution dated 1999, the Court gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to
file their respective memoranda.
However, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended
Joint Venture Agreement (Amended JVA). The
subject matter of the Amended JVA, consisted of 3
properties, which covered a reclamation area of
750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750-
hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed,
and the rest of the 592.15 hectares are still
submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay. The
Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated
contract, not of a public bidding. The Amended
JVA was not an ordinary commercial contract but
one which sought to transfer title and ownership
to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and
submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private
corporation. Under the Amended JVA, PEA was
obligated to transfer to AMARI, the latters 70%
proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the
reclamation progressed. The Amended JVA even
allowed AMARI to mortgage at any time the
entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the
reclamation project.
The Office of the President under the
administration of then Pres. Estrada approved the
Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the
Office of the President, CHAVEZ now prayed that
on constitutional and statutory grounds the
renegotiated contract be declared null and void.
ISSUE
Whether or not AMARI can claim under the
Amended JVA, hectares of reclaimed foreshore
and submerged areas in Manila Bay held by PEA
in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the
alienation of lands of the public domain to private
corporations.
RULING
NO, the reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas
in Manila Bay could not be alienated in favor of
AMARI. The petition of CHAVEZ was granted.
The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the
time-honored principle of land ownership that
all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain. The Civil Codes of
1889 (Art. 339) and 1950 (Art. 420) incorporated
the Regalian doctrine.
History of Laws
(1) Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Land
reclaimed from the sea belonged to the party
undertaking the reclamation, provided the
government issued the necessary permit and did
not reserve ownership of the reclaimed land to the
State.
(2) Civil Code of 1889. Property of public
dominion, when no longer devoted to public use
or to the defense of the territory, shall become a
part of the private property of the State provided
that the legislature, or the executive department
pursuant to law, must declare the property no
longer needed for public use or territorial defense
before the government could lease or alienate the
property to private parties.
(3) Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission of
1907. It mandated that the government should
retain title to all lands reclaimed by the
government. The Act also vested in the
government control and disposition of foreshore
lands. Private parties could lease lands reclaimed
by the government only if these lands were no
longer needed for public purpose. Act No. 1654
mandated public bidding in the lease of
government reclaimed lands. Act No. 1654 made
government reclaimed lands sui generis in that
unlike other public lands which the government
could sell to private parties, these reclaimed lands
were available only for lease to private parties.
(4) Public Land Act of 1919 (Act No. 2874). It
authorized the Governor-General to classify lands
of the public domain into alienable or disposable
lands and to declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession. Lands disposable shall
be classified as government reclaimed, foreshore
and marshy lands, as well as other lands.
Disposable lands of the public domain classified
as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
lands shall be disposed of to private parties by
lease only and not otherwise. It reiterated the
State policy to lease and not to sell government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the
public domain, a policy first enunciated in 1907 in
Act No. 1654. Government reclaimed, foreshore
and marshy lands remained sui generis, as the
only alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain that the government could not sell to
private parties.
Under this Act, the government could not sell
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
lands to private parties, unless the legislature
passed a law allowing their sale. The rationale
behind this State policy is obvious. Government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public lands for
non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent
potential as areas for public service. This is the
reason the government prohibited the sale, and
only allowed the lease, of these lands to private
parties. The State always reserved these lands for
some future public service.
(5) 1935 Constitution. It barred the alienation of
all natural resources except public agricultural
lands, which were the only natural resources the
State could alienate. Thus, foreshore lands,
considered part of the States natural resources,
became inalienable by constitutional fiat, available
only for lease for 25 years, renewable for another
25 years. The government could alienate
foreshore lands only after these lands were
reclaimed and classified as alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain. Government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain,
being neither timber nor mineral lands, fell under
the classification of public agricultural lands.
However, government reclaimed and marshy
lands, although subject to classification as
disposable public agricultural lands, could only
be leased and not sold to private parties because
of Act No. 2874.
(6) C.A. 141 of 1936. This act remains to this day
the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the
public domain other than timber and mineral
lands. It empowers the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce to (1)classify lands of the public
domain into alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, which prior to such classification
are inalienable and outside the commerce of man
and (2) declare what lands are open to disposition
or concession.
The State policy prohibiting the sale to private
parties of government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy alienable lands of the public domain, first
implemented in 1907 was thus reaffirmed in CA
No. 141 after the 1935 Constitution took effect.
Since then and until now, the only way the
government can sell to private parties
government reclaimed and marshy disposable
lands of the public domain is for: (1) the
legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale and
(2) in case of sale or lease, it is required that it be
in a public bidding.
(7) The Civil Code of 1950. It readopted
substantially the definition of property of public
dominion found in the Civil Code of 1889. Again,
the government must formally declare that the
property of public dominion is no longer needed
for public use or public service, before the same
could be classified as patrimonial property of the
State. In the case of government reclaimed and
marshy lands of the public domain, the
declaration of their being disposable, as well as
the manner of their disposition, is governed by
the applicable provisions of CA No. 141.
Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950
included as property of public dominion those
properties of the State which, without being for
public use, are intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth. Thus,
government reclaimed and marshy lands of the
State, even if not employed for public use or
public service, if developed to enhance the
national wealth, are classified as property of
public dominion.
(8) 1973 Constitution. The 1973 Constitution
prohibited the alienation of all natural resources
with the exception of agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of
the public domain. Both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, therefore, prohibited the alienation
of all natural resources except agricultural lands
of the public domain. Thus, under the 1973
Constitution, private corporations could hold
alienable lands of the public domain only through
lease. Only individuals could now acquire
alienable lands of the public domain.
(9) PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates
Authority. PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim
both foreshore and submerged areas of the public
domain. Foreshore areas are those covered and
uncovered by the ebb and flow of the tide.
Submerged areas are those permanently under
water regardless of the ebb and flow of the tide.
Foreshore and submerged areas indisputably
belong to the public domain and are inalienable
unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands
open to disposition, and further declared no
longer needed for public service.
The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain did not apply to PEA since it was
then, and until today, a fully owned government
corporation.
Thus, PEA can hold title to private lands, as well
as title to lands of the public domain. In order for
PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and
submerged alienable lands of the public domain,
there must be legislative authority empowering
PEA to sell these lands. This legislative authority
is necessary in view of CA No.141. Without such
legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only
lease its reclaimed foreshore and submerged
alienable lands of the public domain.
Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to
PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain would be subject to the
constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain.
Hence, such legislative authority could only
benefit private individuals.
(10) 1987 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution
declares that all natural resources are owned by
the State, and except for alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain, natural resources
cannot be alienated. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of
the public domain except by lease, for a period
not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more
than 25, and not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area.
Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more
than 500 hectares, or acquire not more than 12
hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of
conservation, ecology, and development, and
subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the
Congress shall determine, by law, the size of
lands of the public domain which may be
acquired, developed, held, or leased and the
conditions therefore.
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy
in the 1973 Constitution banning private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain. Like the 1973
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private
corporations to hold alienable lands of the public
domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions, the general law governing the
lease to private corporations of reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the
public domain is still CA No. 141.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban
strengthens the constitutional limitation on
individuals from acquiring more than the allowed
area of alienable lands of the public domain.
Without the constitutional ban, individuals who
already acquired the maximum area of alienable
lands of the public domain could easily set up
corporations to acquire more alienable public
lands. An individual could own as many
corporations as his means would allow him. An
individual could even hide his ownership of a
corporation by putting his nominees as
stockholders of the corporation. The corporation
is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional limitation on acquisition by
individuals of alienable lands of the public
domain.
PEAs contention: Lands reclaimed from
foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay are
alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain.(Note: this contention is erroneous)
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141), reclaimed
lands are classified as alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. Section 8 of CA No.
141 provides that only those lands shall be
declared open to disposition or concession which
have been officially delimited and classified. The
President has the authority to classify inalienable
lands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain.
Under the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and
submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the
lands of the public domain, waters and other
natural resources and consequently owned by the
State. As such, foreshore and submerged areas
shall not be alienated, unless they are classified as
agricultural lands of the public domain. The
mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not
convert these inalienable natural resources of the
State into alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain. There must be a law or
presidential proclamation officially classifying
these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable
and open to disposition or concession.
Under Article 422 of the Civil Code, a property of
public dominion retains such character until
formally declared otherwise.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquinos
actual issuance of a special patent covering the
Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official
proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as
alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. However, at the time then President
Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had
already reclaimed the Freedom Islands although
subsequently there were partial erosions on some
areas. The government had also completed the
necessary surveys on these islands. Thus, the
Freedom Islands were no longer part of Manila
Bay but part of the land mass.
Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park
lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily
fall under the classification of agricultural lands of
the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution,
agricultural lands of the public domain are the
only natural resources that the State may alienate
to qualified private parties.
AMARIs contention: The Freedom Islands are
private lands because CDCP, then a private
corporation, reclaimed the islands under a
contract in 1973 with the Commissioner of Public
Highways .It cited Article 5 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866, argues that if the ownership of
reclaimed lands may be given to the party
constructing the works, then it cannot be said that
reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain
which the State may not alienate. (Note: this
contention is erroneous)
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be
read together with laws subsequently enacted on
the disposition of public lands. In particular, CA
No. 141 requires that lands of the public domain
must first be classified as alienable or disposable
before the government can alienate them. These
lands must not be reserved for public or quasi-
public purposes. Moreover, the contract between
CDCP and the government was executed after the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which barred
private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. This contract
could not have converted the Freedom Islands
into private lands of a private corporation.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom
Islands, but also an additional 592.15 hectares
which are still submerged and forming part of
Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential
act classifying these submerged areas as alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain open to
disposition. These submerged areas are not
covered by any patent or certificate of title. There
can be no dispute that these submerged areas
form part of the public domain, and in their
present state are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea,
these submerged areas are, under the
Constitution, waters owned by the State, forming
part of the public domain and consequently
inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from
the sea can these submerged areas be classified as
public agricultural lands, which under the
Constitution are the only natural resources that
the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and
transformed into public agricultural lands, the
government may then officially classify these
lands as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition. Thereafter, the government may
declare these lands no longer needed for public
service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be
considered alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain and within the commerce of man.
EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed
by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the
PEA, could not automatically operate to classify
inalienable lands into alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain. Otherwise, reclaimed
foreshore and submerged lands of the public
domain would automatically become alienable
once reclaimed by PEA, whether or not classified
as alienable or disposable.
As manager, conservator and overseer of the
natural resources of the State, DENR exercises
supervision and control over alienable and
disposable public lands. DENR also exercises
exclusive jurisdiction on the management and
disposition of all lands of the public domain.
Thus, DENR decides whether areas under water,
like foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay,
should be reclaimed or not. This means that PEA
needs authorization from DENR before PEA can
undertake reclamation projects in Manila Bay, or
in any part of the country. DENR also exercises
exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all
lands of the public domain. Hence, DENR
decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA should
be classified as alienable under CA No. 141.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to
authorize the reclamation of areas under water,
while PEA is vested with the power to undertake
the physical reclamation of areas under water,
whether directly or through private contractors.
DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable lands
subject to the approval of the President. On the
other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease
the reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain.
In the case at bar, 2 official acts are absent (1) a
classification that these lands are alienable or
disposable and open to disposition and (2) a
declaration that these lands are not needed for
public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain
inalienable lands of the public domain. Only such
an official classification and formal declaration
can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, open to
disposition under the Constitution, Title I and
Title III of CA No. 141 and other applicable laws.
Procedure to be followed in classifying reclaimed
lands as alienable:
1. DENR decides that the reclaimed lands should
be classified as alienable
2. DENR Secretary recommends to the President
the issuance of a proclamation classifying the
lands as alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain open to disposition.
3. The President issues a proclamation classifying
such land as alienable or disposable and open to
disposition and that they are no longer needed for
public service.
4. Congress must enact a law approving the
Proclamation of the President. Said re-
classification needs both executive and legislative
concurrence.
PEAs contention: PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525
constitute the legislative authority allowing PEA
to sell its reclaimed lands. (Note: this contention is
erroneous)
There is no express authority under either PD No.
1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed
lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred
ownership and administration of lands
reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No.
525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA shall
belong to or be owned by PEA. EO No. 525
expressly states that PEA should dispose of its
reclaimed lands in accordance with the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084, the
charter of PEA.
PEAs charter, however, expressly tasks PEA to
develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in,
subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all
kinds of lands owned, managed, controlled
and/or operated by the government. There is,
therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to
sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable
lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to
private parties its patrimonial properties in
accordance with the PEA charter free from
constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban
on private corporations from acquiring alienable
lands of the public domain does not apply to the
sale of PEAs patrimonial lands. PEA may also sell
its alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain to private individuals since, with the
legislative authority, there is no longer any
statutory prohibition against such sales and the
constitutional ban does not apply to individuals.
Private corporations remain barred from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain, including government reclaimed lands.
Procedure in selling inalienable land as alienable:
Although PEA has authority to determine the
mode of payment of the buyer of the land,
whether it be in cash or in installment, the
following is still required in the sale (PD 1445 -
Government Auditing Code):
1. When government property is no longer
needed, it should be inspected by the head of the
agency or his duly authorized representative in
the presence of the auditor concerned.
2. If found to be valuable, it must be sold through
a public bidding and awarded to the highest
bidder. At the public auction sale, only Philippine
citizens are qualified to bid for PEAs reclaimed
foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the
public domain. Private corporations are barred
from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
3. Prior to the bidding, there must be an
advertising by printed notice for not less than
three consecutive days in the Official Gazette, or
in any newspaper of general circulation.
4. If the public auction fails, the property may be
sold at a private sale at such price as may be fixed
by the same committee or body concerned and
approved by the Commission on Audit.
It is only when the public auction fails that a
negotiated sale is allowed, in which case the
Commission on Audit must approve the selling
price.
What happened in the PEA-AMARI bidding:
PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the
Freedom Islands in. PEA imposed a condition
that the winning bidder should reclaim another
250 hectares of submerged areas to regularize the
shape of the Freedom Islands, under a 60-40
sharing of the additional reclaimed areas in favor
of the winning bidder. No one, however,
submitted a bid. In 1994, the Government
Corporate Counsel advised PEA it could sell the
Freedom Islands through negotiation, without
need of another public bidding, because of the
failure of the public bidding on in 1991.
However, the original JVA dated 1995 covered not
only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250
hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an
option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares.
The original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged
the reclamation area to 750 hectares. The failure of
public bidding in 1991, involving only 407.84
hectares. is not a valid justification for a
negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the
area publicly auctioned. Besides, the failure of
public bidding happened in 1991, more than 3
years before the signing of the original JVA in
1995. The economic situation in the country had
greatly improved during the intervening period.
PEA and AMARIs contention: The issuance of
Special Patent No. 3517 and the corresponding
certificates of titles, the 157.84 hectares comprising
the Freedom Islands have become private lands of
PEA. (Note: this contention is erroneous)
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates
of title issued are those in the name of PEA, a
wholly government owned corporation
performing public as well as proprietary
functions. No patent or certificate of title has been
issued to any private party. No one is asking the
Director of Lands to cancel PEAs patent or
certificates of title. In fact, the thrust of the instant
petition is that PEAs certificates of title should
remain with PEA, and the land covered by these
certificates, being alienable lands of the public
domain, should not be sold to a private
corporation.
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No.
1529 does not vest in the registrant private or
public ownership of the land. Registration is not a
mode of acquiring ownership but is merely
evidence of ownership previously conferred by
any of the recognized modes of acquiring
ownership. Registration does not give the
registrant a better right than what the registrant
had prior to the registration. The registration of
lands of the public domain under the Torrens
system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into
private lands.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the
public domain to be transferred to PEA as private
lands will sanction a gross violation of the
constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. PEA will simply turn around, as PEA
has now done under the Amended JVA, and
transfer several hundreds of hectares of these
reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a
single private corporation in only one transaction.
This scheme will effectively nullify the
constitutional ban, which was intended to diffuse
equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the
public domain among Filipinos, now numbering
over 80 million strong.
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain
since PEA can acquire any and all kinds of
lands. This will open the floodgates to
corporations and even individuals acquiring
hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the
public domain under the guise that in the hands
of PEA these lands are private lands. This will
result in corporations amassing huge
landholdings never before seen in this country -
creating the very evil that the constitutional ban
was designed to prevent. This will completely
reverse the clear direction of constitutional
development in this country. The 1935
Constitution allowed private corporations to
acquire not more than 1,024 hectares of public
lands. The 1973 Constitution prohibited private
corporations from acquiring any kind of public
land, and the 1987 Constitution has unequivocally
reiterated this prohibition.
AMARIs contention: The Amended JVA is not a
sale to AMARI of the Freedom Islands or of the
lands to be reclaimed from submerged areas of
Manila Bay. In the words of AMARI, the
Amended JVA is not a sale but a joint venture
with a stipulation for reimbursement of the
original cost incurred by PEA for the earlier
reclamation and construction works performed by
the CDCP under its 1973 contract with the
Republic. (Note: this contention is erroneous)
Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint
venture, the fact remains that the Amended JVA
requires PEA to cause the issuance and delivery
of the certificates of title conveying AMARIs
Land Share in the name of AMARI.
This stipulation still contravenes the 1987
Constitution which provides that private
corporations shall not hold such alienable lands
of the public domain except by lease. The
transfer of title and ownership to AMARI clearly
means that AMARI will hold the reclaimed
lands other than by lease.
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our
legal system. Foreshore and submerged areas
form part of the public domain and are
inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and
submerged areas also form part of the public
domain and are also inalienable, unless converted
pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands
of the public domain. Historically, lands
reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not
available for sale to private parties unlike other
alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain
their inherent potential as areas for public use or
public service. Alienable lands of the public
domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural
resources, are to be distributed equitably among
our ever-growing population. To insure such
equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions have barred private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. Those who attempt to dispose of
inalienable natural resources of the State, or seek
to circumvent the constitutional ban on alienation
of lands of the public domain to private
corporations, do so at their own risk.
VILLARICO vs. SARMIENTO
GR No. 136438. November 11, 2004
Property of public dominion could not be
burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way
FACTS
VILLARICO was the owner of a lot in Paraaque
City, Metro Manila. His lot was separated from
the Ninoy Aquino Avenue (highway) by a strip of
land belonging to the government. As this
highway was elevated by 4 meters and therefore
higher than the adjoining areas, the DPWH
constructed stairways at several portions of this
strip of public land to enable the people to have
access to the highway.
SARMIENTO and his daughter and the latters
husband (RESPONDENTS), had a building
constructed on a portion of said government land.
A part thereof was occupied by 2 establishments
(lechonan and carinderia). By means of a Deed of
Exchange of Real Property, VILLARICO acquired
a 74.30 square meter portion of the same area
owned by the government.
VILLARICO filed in court a complaint for accion
publiciana against RESPONDENTS arguing that
the latters structures on the government land
closed his right of way to the Ninoy Aquino
Avenue and that it encroached on a portion of his
lot. RESPONDENTS denied VILLARICOs
allegations contending that VILLARICO had no
right over the subject property as it belonged to
the government. The trial court found that
VILALRICO was not deprived of his right of
way and had never been in possession of any
portion of the public land in question. On the
contrary, the DEFENDANTS were the ones who
had been in actual possession of the area. The
Court of Appeals affirmed said decision upon
appeal. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not VILLARICO may acquire a
voluntary easement of right of way over the land
of the government which is between his property
and the Ninoy Aquino Avenue.
RULING
NO. It is not disputed that the lot on which
petitioners alleged right of way existed
belonged to the state or property of public
dominion. Property of public dominion under
Art. 420 are those intended for public use. Public
use is use that is not confined to privileged
individuals, but is open to the indefinite public.
Records showed that the lot on which the
stairways were built was for the use of the people
as passageway to the highway. Consequently, it
was a property of public dominion. Property of
public dominion is outside the commerce of man
and hence it: (1) cannot be alienated or leased or
otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2)
cannot be acquired by prescription against the
State; (3) is not subject to attachment and
execution; and (4) cannot be burdened by any
voluntary easement.
Considering that the lot on which the stairways
were constructed was a property of public
dominion, it could not be burdened by a
voluntary easement of right of way in favor of
VILLARICO. In fact, its use by the public was by
mere tolerance of the government through the
DPWH. VILLARICO could not appropriate it for
himself. Verily, he could claim any right of
possession over it since only things and rights
which are susceptible of being appropriated may
be the object of possession.
ARTICLE 421: All other property of the State, which
is not of the character stated in the preceding Article, is
patrimonial property.
PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY It is the wealth
owned by the State in its private, as distinguished
from its public capacity.
Patrimonial property may be acquired by private
individuals or corporations thru prescription.
However, if a municipality has been taking the
products of a certain parcel of land, and planting
thereon certain other crops, this is NOT proof of
ownership, but only of the usufruct thereof.
CEBU OXYGEN vs. BERCILLES
GR No. L-40474. August 29, 1975
An abandoned road, declared by the City Council
through a resolution forms part of the patrimonial
property of the State.
FACTS
The terminal portion of M. Borces St. in Cebu City
was declared an abandoned road by the City
Council of Cebu through a resolution. The council
later, authorized the Acting Mayor to sell the
land. In the public bidding, the land was awarded
to CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO. being the
highest bidder. A Deed of Absolute Sale to CEBU
OXYGEN was executed by the Acting Mayor. It
then filed an application in court to have its title
to the land registered.
However, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu
filed a motion to dismiss the application on the
ground that the property sought to be registered
being a public road intended for public use was
considered part of the public domain and
therefore outside the commerce of man.
Consequently, it could not be subject to
registration by any private individual.
JUDGE PASCUAL BERCILLES of the trial court
then issued an order dismissing the petitioner's
application for registration of title. Hence, the
instant petition for review.
ISSUE
Whether or not the declaration of the road, as
abandoned by the City Council of Cebu, made it
the patrimonial property of the City of Cebu,
making said property as a valid object of a
common contract.
RULING
YES, it became patrimonial property and hence a
valid subject of a contract. The City of Cebu was
empowered to close a city road or street. The City
Council is the authority competent to determine
whether or not a certain property is still necessary
for public use. Such power to vacate a street or
alley is discretionary and the discretion will not
ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the
courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or
collusion.
Since that portion of the city street subject of
petitioner's application for registration of title was
withdrawn from public use by an ordinance of the
City Council of Cebu, it follows that such
withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial
property, which can be the object of an ordinary
contract.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides
that "Property of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State." Accordingly, the
withdrawal of the property in question from
public use and its subsequent sale to the
petitioner was valid. Hence, the petitioner has a
registerable title over the lot in question.
LAUREL vs. GARCIA
GR No. 29013. July 25, 1990. 187 SCRA 797
Abandonment of a property of public domain cannot be
inferred from the non-use alone. It must be a certain
and positive act based on correct legal premises.
FACTS
Under the Reparations Agreement entered with in
1956, the Philippine government has acquired 4
properties in Japan as part of the indemnification
to the Filipino people for their losses in life and
property and their suffering during World War II.
One of these properties is the Raponggi property
located in Tokyo, Japan, which was specifically
designated under the Reparations Agreement to
house the Philippine Embassy. Said property
consisted of the land and building, which indeed
became the site of the Philippine Embassy until
the latter was transferred to Nampeidai in 1976
when the Rappongi building needed major
repairs. Due to the failure of our government to
provide necessary funds, the Rappongi property
has remained undeveloped since that time.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the
Executive branch of the government has been
pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the
reparations properties starting with the Roppongi
lot. A bidding was then set.
Petitioner SALVADOR LAUREL filed this action
to enjoin respondents from selling the Raponggi
property. LAUREL asserted that the Roppongi
property is classified as one of public dominion,
and not of private ownership under Article 420 of
the Civil Code because it is a "property intended
for public service" in paragraph 2 of the above
provision. Hence, it could not be appropriated, is
outside the commerce of man, or to put it in more
simple terms, it could be alienated nor be the
subject matter of contracts.
RESPONDENTS Ramon Garcia (Head of the
Asset Privatization Trust), Raul Manglapus
(Secretary of Foreign Affairs) and Catalino
Macaraig (Executive Secretary) on the other hand,
contended that the Rappongi property has ceased
to become property of public dominion. It has
become patrimonial property because it has not
been used for public service or for diplomatic
purposes for over 13 years already and because
the intention by the Executive Department and
the Congress to convert it to private use has been
manifested by overt acts.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the Raponggi property is a
property of public dominion.
(2) Whether or not the abandonment of the
Rappongi property for over 13 years has ceased it
from being a property of public dominion and
was transformed into a patrimonial property.
RULING
(1) YES. The nature of the Rappongi lot as
property for public service is expressly spelled
out. It was dictated by the terms of the
Reparations Agreement and the corresponding
contract of procurement, which specifically
designated it as the site of the Philippine
Embassy. Such agreement bound both the
Philippine government and the Japanese
government. As property of public dominion, the
Rappongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It
could be alienated. Its ownership is a special
collective ownership for general use and
enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of
collective needs, and resides in the social group.
The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical
person, but the citizens. It is intended for the
common and public welfare and cannot be the
object of appropriation. The applicable provisions
of the Civil Code are Arts. 419 and 420. The
Roppongi property was correctly classified under
paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as
property belonging to the State and intended for
some public service.
(2) No. A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy
to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of the
Roppongi property's original purpose. The fact
that the Roppongi site has not been used for a
long time for actual Embassy service does not
automatically convert it to patrimonial property.
Any such conversion happens only if the property
is withdrawn from public use. A property
continues to be part of the public domain, not
available for private appropriation or ownership
until there is a formal declaration on the part of
the government to withdraw it from being such.
An abandonment of the intention to use the
Roppongi property for public service and to make
it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the
Civil Code must be definite. Abandonment cannot
be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the
non-use was attributable not to the government's
own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack
of financial support to repair and improve the
property. Abandonment must be a certain and
positive act based on correct legal premises.
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD vs. UP
GR No. L-52518. August 13, 1991. 200 SCRA 554
Ownership by the State of a property of the public
domain may be transferred in order to become
patrimonial property under the authority of a statute.
FACTS
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER
COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES was engaged
in the manufacture, processing and exportation of
plywood. In 1953, it was granted by the
government an exclusive license to cut, collect and
remove timber from that portion of timber land
located in certain municipalities in the provinces
of Quezon and Laguna. Said license was renewed
for another 25 years that was to expire in 1985
under License Agreement 27-A.
In 1961, the President Carlos P. Garcia issued
Executive Proclamation No. 791 which withdrew
from sale or settlement a parcel of land in the
municipalities of Quezon and Laguna in
reservation for an experiment station for the
proposed Dairy Research and production studies
of the UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES (UP).
In 1964, Congress enacted RA 3990, which
established a central experiment station for UP. It
ceded and transferred in full ownership to UP, the
reserved area under Executive Proclamation
No. 791 subject to any existing concessions, if any.
The said experiment station was within the area
covered by INTERNATIONAL HARDWOODs
timber license.
Later, UP demanded from INTERNATIONAL
HARDWOOD in writing: (1) the payment of
forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties
under the License Agreement 27-A and (2) that
the scaling, measuring, sealing and selling of any
timber felled or cut by plaintiff within the
boundaries of the Central Experiment Station as
defined in RA 3990 be performed by UP
personnel. INTERNATIONAL HARWOOD then
sought an action to enjoin UP from its demands
since it believed that RA 3990 did not empower
UP, in lieu of the BIR and Bureau of Forestry, to
scale, measure and seal the timber cut by the
petitioner within the tract of land referred to in
said act and collect the corresponding forest
charges prescribed by the National Internal
Revenue Code.
ISSUE
Whether or not the property has been removed
from the public domain in favor of UP that it was
vested with the right to regulate
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOODs timber
cutting and to demand from it the payment of
forest charges and other dues.
RULING
YES. Pursuant, however, to RA 3990, which
established a central experiment station for the
use of the UP in connection with its research and
extension functions, the reserved area was ceded
and transferred in full ownership to the
University of the Philippines subject to any
existing concessions, if any.
When it ceded and transferred the property to UP
through RA 3990, the State completely removed it
from the public domain. All its rights as grantor of
the license were effectively assigned, ceded and
conveyed to UP as a consequence of the above
transfer of full ownership. With respect to the
areas covered by the timber license of petitioner, it
removed and segregated it from a public forest.
The State divested itself of its rights and title
thereto and relinquished and conveyed the same
to the UP and made the latter the absolute owner
thereof, subject only to the existing concession.
The proviso regarding existing concessions
referred to the timber license of petitioner. All that
it means, however, is that the right of petitioner as
a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired
or diminished; it must be respected.
It follows then that respondent UP was entitled to
supervise, through its duly appointed personnel,
the logging, felling and removal of timber within
the area covered by R.A. No. 3990.
Note: In this case, the area ceded to UP by the
state was considered by the court as to have been
removed from the land of the public domain and
became patrimonial property. However, under
Art. 422, property of the public domain include
those intended for public service. Being that UP is
a state university and that it is devoted for public
service by way of providing education, the subject
property here should have still remained under
the States property of public domain and should
not have been classified as patrimonial property.
(Atty. Suarezs comment)
ARTICLE 422: Property of public dominion, when no
loner intended for public use or for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
CEBU OXYGEN V BERCILLES.
FACTS:
The City Council of Cebu, in 1968, considered as
an abandoned road, the terminal portion of one its
streets. Later it authorized the sale thru public
bidding of the property. The Cebu Oxygen and
Acetylene Co. was able to purchase the same. It
then petitioned the RTV for the registration of the
land. The petition was opposed by the provincial
fiscal who argued that the lot is still part of the
public domain, and cannot therefore be
registered.
ISSUE: May the lot be registered in the name of
the buyer?
HELD: YES. The land can be registered in the
name of the buyer because the street has already
been withdrawn from public use, and accordingly
has become patrimonial property. The lots sale
was therefore valid.
WHEN CHANGE TAKES EFFECT:
1. Property of public dominion ceases to be
such and becomes private property of the
State ONLY UPON DECLARATION BY THE
GOVERNMENT, thru the legislative or
executive departments, to the effect that it is
no longer needed for public use or public
service.
2. if the property has been intended for such
use or service and the government has not
devoted it to other uses, or adopted any
measure w/c amounted to a withdrawal
thereof from public use or service, the same
remains property for public use or service
notwithstanding the fact that it is not actually
devoted for public use or service.
ARTICLE 423: The property of provinces, cities, and
municipalities is divided into property for public use
and patrimonial property.
Properties of Political Subdivisions
1. Property for public use
2. Patrimonial property
Alienation of the Properties
1. Properties of the political subdivision for
public use can not be alienated as such,
and may not be acquired by prescription.
2. Properties of a political subdivision which
are patrimonial in character may be
alienated, and may be acquired by others
thru prescription.
ARTICLE 424: Property for public use, in the
provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist of the
provincial roads, city streets, municipal waters,
promenades, and public works for public service paid
for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of then is
patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code,
without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
ARTICLE 425: Property of private ownership, besides
the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities,
and municipalities, consist of all property belonging to
private persons, either individually or collectively.
Laurel vs. Garcia
Facts: The Roponggi property was acquired from
the Japanese government through reparations
contract. No. 300. It consisted of the land and the
building for the Philippine Embassy. As intended,
it became the site of the Embassy until the latter
was transferred to Nampeidai as the Roponggi
property needed major repairs. However, due to
the lack of funds, the property remained
undeveloped.
On July 25, 2987, Pres. Aquino issued EO
296 entitling non-filipino citizens or entities to
avail of reparations capital goods and service in
the event of sale, lease or disposition.
Issue: What is the nature of the Roponggi
property
Held: The nature of the Roponggi lot as property
for public service is expressly spelled out under
the Reparations Agreement between the Phil.
Gov't and Japan. As property of public dominion,
the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man.
It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special
collective ownership for general use and
enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of
collective needs, and resides in the social group.
The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical
person, but the citizens; it is intended for the
common and public welfare and cannot be the
object of appropriation,
Issue: Has it become patrimonial?
Held: The fact that the Roponggi property has not
been used for a long time for actual Embassy
service does not automatically convert it to
patrimonial property. Any such conversio
happens only if the property is withdrawn from
public use. A property continues to be part of the
public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership "until there is a
formal declaration on the part of the government
to withdraw it from being such. The respondents
enumerate various pronouncements by concerned
public officials insinuating a change of intention.
We emphasize, however, that an abandonment of
the intention to use the Roppongi property for
public service and to make it patrimonial property
under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be
definite. Abandonment cannot be inferred from
the non-use alone specially if the non-use was
attributable not to the government's own
deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of
financial support to repair and improve the
property.
Issue: Does the President have authority to sell
said property?
Held: Assuming arguendo that the Roppongi
property is no longer of public domain, there is
another obstacle to its sale by the respondents:
THERE IS NO LAW AUTHORIZING ITS
CONVEYANCE.
- Sec. 79 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides that for conveyances and
contracts which the gov't is a party,
respective Dept. Sec. shall submit the
papers to the Congress for approval. This
is retained in Sec. 48, EO 292. Hence, it is
not for the President to convey valuable
real property of the government on her
own sole will. Any such conveyance must
be authorized and approved by a law
enacted by the Congress.
- Are rivers whether navigable or not,
properties of public dominion?
A: it would seem that art 420 makes no
distinction. However, jurisprudence provides that
if a river is capable in its natural state of being
used for commerce, it is navigable in fact, and
therefore, becomes a public river.
OWNERSHIP
ARTICLE 427: Ownership may be exercised over
things or rights.
Ownership is the independent and general right
of the person to control a thing particularly in his
possession, to enjoy it, to dispose it, and to
recover it when it is lost.
Restrictions:
a) those imposed by law example
is the easement of right of way
b) imposed by the State
expropriation, the power of
taxation
c) those imposed by the owner
entering into a contract of lease
(the owner puts limitation to
himself over his property)
d) those imposed by the grantor
conditions of the donor
- KINDS OF OWNERSHIP:
a) full ownership includes all the
rights of the owner, to control, to
enjoy, to dispose, and to recover;
b) naked ownership there is this
kind of ownership that one has
when like usufruct giving this
person the usufructuary to use
the land and to enjoy the fruits of
the land. So your ownership over
your land is merely naked
because you do not enjoy its
fruits.
c) sole ownership where
ownership is vested only to one
person;
d) co-ownership when the
ownership is vested to 2 or more
persons
ARTICLE 428: The owner has the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder
and possessor of the thing in order to recover.
- Under Art. 428, the owner has 3 rights:
1. the right to enjoy (jus utendi) the right
to enjoy includes the right to possess. This
is the right to exclude any person from
enjoyment and disposal thereof.
2. the right to consume or abuse (jus
abutendi)
3. the right to consume, destroy and abuse.
4. the right to dispose ( jus disponendi )
5. the right to encumber and alienate.
the right to recover or vindicate (jus
vindicandi)- the right to recover.
THE RIGHT TO RECOVER
1) REPLEVIN an action or provisional
remedy filed by the complainant for the
recovery of the possession of the personal
property.
For the recovery of real property,
the 1st action is forcible entry.
That is also related to the 2nd one
which is unlawful detainer. The
3rd is accion publiciana, and the
4th is accion reinvindicatoria.
2) FORCIBLE ENTRY it is an action to
recover material or physical possession
because another person unlawfully
deprived him of possession because of
FISTS (Force, Intimidation, Stealth,
Threats, Strategy).
3) The issue here is possession only, not
ownership
The PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD to file
forcible entry is one year from
dispossession.
When you file a complaint for forcible
entry, what are the facts that you have to
state?
 1. That the plaintiff was in prior possession
of the property;
2. That he had been unlawfully deprived of
his possession by another person thru
FISTS
3. UNLAWFUL DETAINER it is an action
that is brought when possession by a
landlord, vendee, vendor, or other person
of any land or building is being
unlawfully withheld after the expiration
or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract,
express or implied.
1. PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD: 1-year from
the date of withholding
2. REQUIREMENTS:
a) that the defendant
originally had lawful
possession of the property;
b) that the defendant is now
unlawfully withholding the
possession of the property
from the plaintiff.
Unlawful Detainer vs Forcible Entry
1. In forcible entry, the requirement is that
the plaintiff was in prior possession
(essential) and then he was unlawfully
deprived of possession by the defendant
by means of FISTS.
2. In unlawful detainer, the defendant had
lawful possession but his possession
became unlawful. The possession of the
defendant was lawful because of a
contract, his possession becomes unlawful
perhaps because the contract expired or
he violated the terms or conditions of the
contract.
Characteristics common to unlawful
detainer and forcible entry
1. Ownership is not an issue, but
only the right of possession of the
premises.
2. the action must be filed within 1
yr from the discovery, from the
dispossession, and from the
withholding
4) ACCION PUBLICIANA-
This action is intended for the recovery of
the better right to possess. The issue here
is possession de jure not possession de
facto.
This is no longer a summary proceeding
but a full blown trial.
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD: 10 years
KINDS:
1. When the entry was not obtained thru
FISTS;
2. When the entry was thru FISTS and there
was a failure to file a case of unlawful
detainer or forcible entry within one year.
5) ACCION REINVINDICATORIA the
purpose here is to recover ownership over the
real property.
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD: 10
years if possessor in good faith;
30 years if in bad faith.
ISSUE: Ownership
ARTICLE 429: The owner or lawful possessor of a
thing has the right to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he
may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to
repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
Doctrine of SELF-HELP. The
doctrine of self-help exists once there
is an actual or threatened danger or
physical usurpation of property.
Principle of self-Help:
1. It is lawful to repel force by means of
force. Implies that the state of things to be deemed
enjoys juridical protection.
2. It is sort of self-defense, where the use
of such necessary force to protect proprietary or
possessory rights constitutes a justifying
circumstances under the Penal Code.
The actual invasion of self-help:
1. Mere disturbance of possession force may be
used against it any time as long as it continues,
even beyond the prescriptive period for an action
of forcible entry. Thus, if a ditch was opened by
Perdo in the land of Juan, Juan may close it or
cover it by force at any time.
2. Real Dispossession force, to regain
possession can only be used immediately after the
dispossession. Thus, if Juan w/o the permission
of Pedro picks up a book belonging to Pedro and
runs off with it, Pedro can pursue Juan and
recover the book by force.
Nature of the Aggression:
1. The aggression must be illicit or unlawful.
1. the right to self-help is not available
against the exercise of right by another,
such as when the latter executes an extra-
judicial abatement of nuisance.
2. neither can it be used against the lawful
exercise of the functions of a public
official.
2. The act however need not be illicit from the
subjective point of view.
1. it is immaterial that the aggression is
executed because of error of fact or law
2. the existence of a danger of violation of
law and right is sufficient, for the
possessor is not a position to the error of
the aggressor and he has to make a quick
decision.
 PEOPLE vs. NARVAEZ
GR No. L-33466. April 30, 1983
The owner has the right to use force as may be
reasonably necessary to prevent an actual or threatened
unlawful physical invasion of his property. The force
exerts must commensurate the unlawful aggression on
his property.
FACTS
MAMERTO NARVAEZ was among those persons
from Luzon who went to Mindanao in 1937 and
settled in Maitum, North Cotabato. He established
his residence therein, built his house, cultivated
the area. He was among those who petitioned
then President Manuel L. Quezon to order the
subdivision of the defunct Celebes and Kalaong
Plantations, for distribution among the settlers,
which included him. Shortly thereafter, Fleischer
and Company, headed by GEORGE W.
FLEISCHER, an American landowner in Negros
Oriental, filed Sales Application No. in 1937 over
the same area formerly leased and later
abandoned by Celebes Plantation Company.
Fleischer and Company purchased the said
property upon public auction. In 1966, the settlers
in said property were ousted. Among those
ejected was NARVAEZ, who voluntarily
dismantled his house and transferred to his other
house which he built near the highway. The
second house was not far from the site of the
dismantled house and was nearer the highway.
Aside from the store, he built a rice mill located
about 15 meters cast of the house, and a concrete
pavement between the rice mill and the house,
which is used for drying grains and copra.
In 1966, the settlers including NARVAEZ
questioned in court, the ownership of Fleischer
and Company of the disputed land. During the
pendency of the case in 1967, he entered into a
contract of lease with the company concerning Lot
38 of the latters property in order to avoid
trouble, until the question of ownership could be
decided. He never paid the agreed rental,
although he alleged that the milling job they did
for the deceased FLAVIANO RUBIA, who was
the assistant manager of Fleischer and Company,
was considered payment. Unable to pay, for 6
months, Fleischer and Company decided to
terminate the contract to lease and NARVAEZ
was also ordered to leave the premises and
remove the structures therein within 6 months
until December 1968 or else the company itself
will cause its demolition.
However, while it was still August 1968, Fleischer
and Company sent the 2 deceased, DAVIS Q.
FLEISCHER (secretary-treasurer and son of
owner) and FLAVIANO RUBIA (assistant
manager), whom together with 3 laborers,
commenced fencing Lot 38 leased by NARVAEZ
by putting bamboo posts along the property line
parallel to the highway. Some posts were planted
right on the concrete drier of NARVAEZ thereby
cutting diagonally across its center, with the last
post just adjacent to appellant's house. The fence,
when finished, would have the effect of shutting
off the accessibility to appellant's house and rice
mill from the highway, since the door of the same
opens to the Fleischer and Company's side.
The next day, the fencing was continued with the
installation of four strands of barbed wire to the
posts. At that time, NARVAEZ was taking his
rest, but when he heard that the walls of his house
were being chiseled, he arose and there he saw the
fencing going on. If the fencing would go on,
NARVAEZ would be prevented from getting into
his house and the bodega of his rice mill. So he
told the group to stop the construction and just
talk it over. The deceased FLEISCHER, however,
refused angrily. Upon hearing this, NARVAEZ
apparently lost his equilibrium, got his shotgun
and shot FLEISCHER, hitting him. As
FLEISCHER fell down, RUBIA ran towards the
jeep, knowing there is a gun in the jeep.
NARVAEZ fired at RUBIA, likewise hitting him.
Both died as a result of the shooting. NARVAEZ
surrendered to the police thereafter, bringing with
him shotgun, claiming he shot two persons. He
was tried for murder and was found guilty in a
1970 decision by the trial court.
On appeal, NARVAEZ alleged that although he
has killed FLEISCHER and RUBIA, he should be
exempted from criminal liability because he
merely acted in defense of his person and right.
The prosecution on the other hand, claim that the
deceased were in lawful exercise of their rights of
ownership over the land in question, when they
did the fencing that sealed off appellant's access to
the highway.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the deceased in constructing a
fence were in the lawful exercise of their rights of
ownership over the land, leased by NARVAEZ.
(2) Whether or not there was unlawful aggression
on NARVAEZs property.
RULING
(1) NO, they were not in the lawful exercise
of ownership. Although ownership over the land
was still pending in court, the fact that Fleischer
and Company gave him until December 1968 to
vacate the premises, the company should have
allowed NARVAEZ to enjoy peaceful enjoyment
of his properties up to that time.
(2) YES. There was an actual physical
invasion of appellant's property which he had the
right to resist, pursuant to Art. 429 of the Civil
Code. However, when NARVAEZ fired his
shotgun from his window, killing his two victims,
his resistance was disproportionate to the attack.
Although under Art. 429 of the Civil Code, he was
the owner or lawful possessor of the property and
that he has the right to use force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual
or threatened unlawful physical invasion of his
property, the force he exerted was unreasonable
to commensurate the unlawful aggression on his
property.
It must be noted that the reasonableness of means
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression is also a requirement of the justifying
circumstance of self defense or defense of one's
rights in the Revised Penal Code. Be that as it
may, appellant's act in killing the deceased was
not justifiable, since not all the elements for
justification were present. He should therefore be
held responsible for the death of his victims, but
he could be credited with the special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense under the
RPC.
NARVAEZ was found guilty of two crimes of
homicide with the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense as well as by
two (2) generic mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and obfuscation, without any
aggravating circumstance. He was sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of 4 months of arresto
mayor and payment of indemnification. But
considering that he has been under detention for
almost 14 years, his immediate release is hereby
ordered.
ARTICLE 430: Every owner may enclose or fence his
land or tenements by means of walls. Ditches, live or
dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment
to servitudes constituted thereon.
ARTICLE 431: The owner of a thing cannot make use
thereof in such manner as to injure the rights of a 3 rd
person.
ARTICLE 432: The owner of a thing has no right to
prohibit the interference of another with the same, if the
interference is necessary to avert an imminent danger
and the threatened damage, compared to the damage
arising to the owner from the interference, is much
greater. The owner may demand from the person
benefited indemnity for the damage to him.
STATE OF NECESSITY
This principle allows the use of defensive
force to preserve an existing situation, as
against an external event which the
passive subject is entitled to repel as
much as an unlawful aggression by
another
This superior to the doctrine of self-help
REQUISITES:
1. existence of an evil sought to be avoided
2. the injury feared is greater than that done
to avoid it
3. that there be no other practical and less
harmful means of preventing it
4. the means employed is necessary and
indispensable to avert danger.
EFFECT: Indemnity may be demanded by the
owner from the person benefited.
Effect of Mistake
The right to act in a state of necessity
depends upon the objective existence of
the danger with the requisites provided
by law.
If through error, one believed himself to
be in a state of necessity, or used means in
excess of the requirements, his act would
be illicit and the owner of the property
can use the defensive force authorized in
art 429.
EFFECT OF NEGLIGENCE
The law does not require that the person
acting in a state of necessity be free from
negligence in the creation of such situation. Thus,
if a person picks up an unknown object in a drug
store and eats it, thinking it to be candy, and it
turns out to be poison, he can lawfully drink any
antidote he may find in the store, even without
the consent of the owner.
Basis of liability the benefit derived
Conflict of rights the rights of self-help under
Art 429 is not available against the act in a state of
necessity.
SPOUSES CUSTODIO vs. CA
GR No. 116100. February 9, 1996. 253 SCRA 483
The owners have the right to enclose and fence
their property provided that it should be without
detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.
FACTS
PACIFICO MABASA owned a parcel of land with
a 2-door apartment erected thereon in Taguig,
Metro Manila. Said property was surrounded by
other houses owned by PETITIONERS Spouses
CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and
Spouses LITO and MARIA CRISTINA SANTOS.
Taking P. Burgos Street as the point of reference,
there are two passageways, which could be used
to reach MABASAs apartment.
When said property was purchased by MABASA,
there were tenants already occupying the
premises and who were acknowledged by
MABASA as tenants. In 1982, one of said tenants
vacated the apartment. When MABASA went to
see the premises, he saw that the spouses
SANTOS had built an adobe fence in the first
passage, making it narrower in width. Defendant
MORATO also constructed her adobe fence and
even extended said fence in such a way that the
entire passageway was enclosed. It was then that
the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated
the area.
MABASA filed an action for the grant of an
easement of right of way against defendants
CUSTODIOs and SANTOSes. The trial court
granted said petition and ordered them to give
MABASA permanent access to the public streets.
However, it also ordered MABASA to pay them
P8,000 as indemnity for the permanent use of the
passageway. MABASA subsequently died and
was represented by his heirs, when the case was
appealed with the Court of Appeals, raising the
sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred
in not awarding damages in their favor. It
affirmed the trial courts decision with
modification that MABASA be awarded damages
for incurred losses of unrealized rentals when the
tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of
the closure of the passageway. Hence, this appeal
by PETITIONERS.
ISSUE
Whether or not PETITIONERS has the right to
build the adobe fences to enclose their property
even if it blocked the passageway to and fro
MABASAs property.
RULING
YES. The act of PETITIONERS in constructing a
fence within their lot was a valid exercise of their
right as owners, hence not contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy. The law
recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law. Under Art. 430 of the
Civil Code, it is within the right of PETITIONERS,
as owners, to enclose and fence their property
provided that it should be without detriment to
servitudes constituted thereon.
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot
was not subject to any servitudes. There was no
easement of way existing in favor of private
respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact
that the HEIRS OF MABASA had no existing right
over the said passageway is confirmed by the
very decision of the trial court granting a
compulsory right of way in their favor after
payment of just compensation.
Hence, prior to said decision, PETITIONERS had
an absolute right over their property and their act
of fencing and enclosing the same was an act
which they may lawfully perform in the
employment and exercise of said right. Whatever
injury or damage may have been sustained by the
HEIRS OF MABASA by reason of the rightful use
of the said land by PETITIONERS is damnum
absque injuria, which is damage caused by a
person by his lawful acts done upon his own
property.
ARTICLE 433: Actual possession under claim of
ownership raises a disputable presumption of
ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial
process for the recovery of the property.
ARTICLE 435: No person shall be deprived of his
property except by competent authority and for public
use and always upon payment of just compensation.
Should this requirement be not first complied
with, the courts shall protect and in proper case, restore
the owner in his possession.
REQUISITES:
1. The taking must be done by the
competent authority;
2. observance of the due process of law;
3. taking must be for public use;
4. upon payment of just compensation
ARTICLE 436: When any property is condemned or
seized by competent authority in the interest of health,
safety, or security, the owner thereof, shall not be
entitled to compensation, unless he can show that such
condemnation or seizure is unjustified.
RULE ON SEIZURE:
GENERAL RULE:
Owner should not be entitled for any
compensation as to property seized or
condemned by competent authority if it is
done in the interest of health, safety, or
security.
EXCEPTION:
The owner should be entitled to
compensation if he can show that such
condemnation or seizure is unjustified.
ARTICLE 437: The owner of the parcel of land is the
owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he
can construct thereon any works or make any
plantations and excavations which he my deem proper,
without detriment to servitudes and subject to special
laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the
reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.
ARTICLE 438: Hidden treasure belongs to the owner
of the land, buildings, or other property on which it is
found.
Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on the
property of another, or of the State, or any of its
subdivisions, and by chance, thereof shall be allowed
the finder. If the finder is a trespasser, he shall not be
entitled to any share of the treasure.
If the things found be of interest to science or
the arts, the State may acquire them at their just price,
which shall be divided in conformity with the rule
stated.
If the treasure is discovered on the
property of the finder, the treasure
belongs to him
If the treasure is discovered on the
property of another, the sharing is 50-50.
50% belongs to the landowner; 50% goes
to the finder.
Requirements:
1. The finder must not be a trespasser;
2. It should be found by chance
If the finder is a tenant, lessee, or
usufructuary of the property, the sharing
is 50-50.
If the finder is the employee of the owner
of the property, the sharing is 50-50, if he
discovered it by chance. If he is, however,
employed to look for treasure, then, the
treasure belongs to the owner.
ARTICLE 439: By treasure is understood, for legal
purposes, any hidden and unknown deposit of money,
jewelry, or other precious objects, the lawful ownership
of which does not appear
CUSTODIO VS CA
Facts: Mabasa owned a parcel of land with a 2
door apartment erected thereon. The property is
surrounded by other immovables belonging to
Custodios, Morato and the Santoses. There are
two possible passageways to the said property.
One passing through row of houses, and the other
through the residence of Morato and the Santoses.
When one of the tenants of the petitioner's
left, Mabasa saw that the Santoses had built an
adobe fence in the first passage making it
narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first
constructed by defendants Santoses along their
property which is also along the first passageway.
Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence
and even extended said fence in such a way that
the entire passageway was enclosed. It was then
that the remaining tenants of the apartment
vacated the area. RTC ordered the private
respondents to give plaintiff ingress and access.
Issue: W/N private respondents are liable for
damages
Held: No. The act of petitioners in constructing a
fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their
right as owners, hence not contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy. The law
recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law. It is within the right of
petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their
property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides
that "(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land
or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or
dead hedges, or by any other means without
detriment to servitudes constituted thereon."
At the time of the construction of the
fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes.
There was no easement of way existing in favor of
private respondents, either by law or by contract.
The fact that private respondents had no existing
right over the said passageway is confirmed by
the very decision of the trial court granting a
compulsory right of way in their favor after
payment of just compensation. It was only that
decision which gave private respondents the right
to use the said passageway after payment of the
compensation and imposed a corresponding duty
on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of
said right.
ACCESSION
ARTICLE 440: The ownership of property gives the
right by accession to everything which is produced
thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto,
either naturally or artificially.
Accession is the extension of ownership over a
thing to whatever it produces thereby or which is
incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally
or artificially.
KINDS:
1. ACCESSION DISCRATA (fruits)- the
right of the owner to own everything
which is produced thereby;
Example: natural fruits, industrial fruits,
and civil fruits;
2. ACCESSION CONTINUA (incorporated)
the right of the owner to own
everything which is incorporated or
attached thereto either naturally or
artificially
SECTION 1: RIGHT OF ACCESSION WITH
RESPECT TO WHAT IS PRODUCED BY
PROPERTY
ACCESSION DISCRETA:
ARTICLE 441: To the owner belongs:
1. the natural fruits;
2. the industrial fruits;
3. the civil fruits.
GENERAL RULE: if you are the owner of the
land, you are the owner of the fruit
EXCEPTIONS:
1. if there is a possessor in good faith;
2. when there is usufructuary;
3. when the lessee gets the fruits of the land
(the owner gets the civil fruits in the form
of rentals);
4. the contract of antichresis
BACHRACH MOTOR vs. TALISAY-SILAY
GR No. 352230. September 17, 1931
Bonus granted as compensation for the risk of having
subjected ones land to a lien in favor of the bank is not
a civil fruit of the mortgaged property.
FACTS
In 1923, the TALISAY-SILAY MILLING CO. INC.,
was indebted to the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK (PNB). To secure the payment of its debt, it
succeeded in inducing its planters, among whom
was MARIANO LACSON LEDESMA, to
mortgage their land to the creditor bank. In order
to compensate these planters for the risk they
were running with their property under that
mortgage, TALISAY undertook to credit the
owners of the plantation bonuses which is 2% of
the debt secured according to the yearly balance.
LEDESMA owned a sum of money to
BACHRACH MOTOR CO. that the latter filed a
complaint for the delivery of LEDESMAs bonus
of P13,850 or promissory notes in its favor.
PNB, to which LEDEMSAs land was mortgaged
filed a third party claim alleging a preferential
right to receive any amount which LEDESMA
might be entitled to from TALISAY as bonus. It
argued that said bonus were civil fruits of the
land mortgaged to said bank by LEDESMA. PNB
prayed that TALISAY be ordered to deliver
directly to the bank, LEDESMAs bonus.
The trial court ruled against PNB. Hence, this
instant appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the bonus in question is civil
fruits.
RULING
NO. The bonus which the TALISAY, had to pay
the planters who had mortgaged their lands to
PNB in order to secure the payment of the
company's debt to the bank, is not a civil fruit of
the mortgaged property.
Article 441 of the Civil Code (then Art. 441)
considers 3 things as civil fruits: (1) the rents of
buildings; (2) the proceeds from leaes of lands;
and (3) the income from perpetual or life
annuities, or other similar sources of revenue.
As the bonus in question is not the rent of a
building or of land, the only meaning of "civil
fruits" left to be examined is that of "income." The
said bonus bore no immediate, but only a remote
and accidental relation to the land mentioned. It
was only granted as compensation for the risk of
having subjected one's land to a lien in favor of
the bank, for the benefit of the entity granting said
bonus. If this bonus be income or civil fruits of
anything, it is income arising from said risk or
from LEDESMA's generosity in facing the danger
for the protection of TALISAY. But, it certainly is
not civil fruits or income from the mortgaged
property, which, as far as this case is concerned,
has nothing to do with it.
ARTICLE 442: Natural fruits are the spontaneous
products of the soil, and the young and other products
of the animals.
Industrial fruits are those produced by lands
of any kind thru cultivation or labor.
Civil fruits are the rents of buildings, the price
of leases of lands and other property and the amount of
perpetual or life annuities or other similar income.
ARTICLE 443: He who receives the fruits has the
obligation to pay the expenses made by a 3 rd person in
their production, gathering, and preservation.
ARTICLE 444: Only such as are manifest or born are
considered as natural or industrial fruits.
With respect to animals, it is sufficient that
they are in the womb of the mother, although unborn.
DISCRETA ( PRODUCED)
NATURAL INDUSTRIA CIVIL
L The trial court found that the 3 parcels of land
1. Spontaneous Those - rents
products of the produced by - price of
soil lands of any - leases
2. The young and kind of amount
other products cultivation of
of animals or labor perpetua
l or life
annuitie
s
SECTION 2: RIGHT OF ACCESSION WITH
RESPECT TO IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
ARTICLE 445: Whatever is built, planted or sown on
the land of another and the improvements or repairs
made therein belong to the owner of the land, subject to
the provisions of the following articles.
This article deals with accession:
1. building
2. planting
3. sowing
To the owner of the principal (land) must
belong also the accession
The union musty, w. certain exception, be
effected in such a manner that to separate
the principal from the accessory, would
result in substantial injury to either
He who is in good faith may be held
liable but he should not be penalized
He who is in bad faith may be penalized
TACAS vs. TOBON
GR No. 30240. August 23, 1929
The possessor in good faith must return the fruits
received from the time the answer to the complaint was
filed, that is, from the time he became aware that he
was in undue possession. During that time, before the
law, good faith ceased.
FACTS
3 parcels of land were owned by and registered in
the name of Francisco Dumadag. He died in 1911.
In 1912, during the season for planting tobacco
immediately following the death of Dumadag,
EVARISTO TOBON took possession of the 3
parcels of land in question planting them with
tobacco. Since then, TOBON had been collecting
the fruits therefrom, which consisted of rice and
tobacco.
AQUILINA TACAS ET AL., Francisco Dumadags
predecessor in interest filed an action seeking to
recover from TOBON the ownership and
possession of said 3 parcels of land, together with
the fruits collected by him during the time he was
in possession of said land since 1912. They alleged
that TOBON unlawfully took said parcels upon
the death of Francisco Dumadag and that he
remained in possession, enjoying the fruits
thereof. TOBON however insisted that he was the
owner of said lands, having purchased them from
one Exequiel or Gil Tacas, deceased, about fifteen
years before.
under discussion, were parts of an estate
belonging to Francisco Dumadag, having
inherited them from his parents. It declared the
HEIRS OF TACAS to be the absolute owners of
the 3 parcels of land in litigation and ordered
TOBON to deliver said parcels of land to the
them, together with the fruits collected each year
since 1912 until the complete termination.
Hence, this appeal by TOBON, questioning the
order of the court that he should deliver the fruits
collected each year since 1912 until the complete
termination of the case.
ISSUE
Whether or not the restitution should be made
since 1912 when TOBON collected the fruits of the
land of the late TACAS until the termination of
the case.
RULING
NO. The possessor in good faith must return the
fruits received from the time the answer to the
complaint was filed, that is, from the time he
became aware that he was in undue possession.
The court affirmed the decision of the lower court
but modified the award of damages, said
judgment and ruled that TOBON should only be
bound to return to the HEIRS OF MABASA, the
fruits received from April 1918 (when TOBON
filed his answer) to 1927.
The restitution must be made when there was
already the legal consequences of the interruption.
Before the law, good faith ceased when the
answer to the complaint was filed, taking this
doctrine from the partidas.
In the present case, TOBON hopefully believed in
good faith that the subject property was his and
his belief only disappeared upon the unfavorable
judgment of the court against him. Although he
may not have been convinced of it before, TOBON
became aware that his possession is unlawful
from the time he learned of the complaint or from
the time he was summoned to the trial. It was at
this time that his possession was interrupted and
that he ceased to receive the fruits. Whether or not
the defendant was a possessor in good faith, there
existed an act that his right was not secure, that
someone disputed it, and that he might yet lose it.
However, on the basis of Art. 443 of the Civil
Code (then Art. 365), TOBON was also given the
right to deduct the expenses of planting and
harvesting, which shall be determined by the trial
court, after hearing both parties.
BERNARDO vs. BATACLAN
GR No. 44606. November 28, 1938
A builder in good faith, looses his right of
retention when after the owner of the land has
chosen that the builder pay for the land over
indemnifying the builder instead for the
building, the builder fails to pay.
FACTS
VICENTE STO. DOMINGO BERNARDO
entered into a contract of sale in 1920 with Pastor
Samonte and others, over a parcel of land in
Silang, Cavite. To secure possession of the land
from the vendors, BERNARDO instituted a civil
case, where the court rendered judgment in his
favor. When he entered the premises, he found
CATALINO BATACLAN therein, who was
authorized to clear the land and make
improvements thereon by the previous owners
since 1922. BERNARDO then filed a case against
BATACLAN, where the lower court held that
indeed, BERNARDO was the owner but
nevertheless, BATACLAN was a possessor in
good faith. Because of this, the court ordered that
BATACLAN be reimbursed for work done and
improvements he made on the property.
When both parties appealed to the Supreme
Court, the compensation in favor of BATACLAN
was increased and BERNARDO was given the
option to either sell the land to the BATACLAN
or to buy the improvements from him within 30
days. BERNARDO chose to sell the land to
BATACLAN. The latter however, informed the
court that he was unable to pay. The court then
issued and order that BERNARDO should pay
BATACLAN for the improvements made on the
subject property within 30 days or else the land
would be ordered sold at public auction. Being
that BERNARDO did not have money to pay
BATACLAN for the improvements he made on
the land, he moved to reconsider that he be
preferred in the order of payment over
BATACLAN. Said motion was denied by the
court though.
At the instance of BERNARDO and without
objection from BATACLAN, the court ordered the
sale of the land in question at public auction. The
land was sold to Toribio Teodoro. Teodoro moved
that he be placed in possession of the land
purchased by him, which was granted by the
court.
BATACLAN complained that he was a
possessor in good faith and that the amount for
reimbursement, to which he was entitled has not
yet been paid to him by BERNARDO. Therefore,
he said that he has a right to retain the land in
accordance with the provisions of Article 453 of
the Civil Code.
ISSUE
Whether or not the BATACLAN is still
entitled to reimbursement in lieu of the
improvements he constructed on the disputed
property.
RULING
NO, he was not. BATACLAN has lost his
right of retention.
The Civil Code confirms certain time-honored
principles of the law of property. One of these is
the principle of accession whereby the owner of
property acquires not only that which it produces
but that which is united to it either naturally or
artificially. Under Art. 445 (then Art. 385),
whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of
another, and the improvements or repairs made
thereon, belong to the owner of the land. Where,
however, the planter, builder, or sower has acted
in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between
the owners and it becomes necessary to protect
the owner of the improvements without causing
injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the
impracticability of creating what Manresa calls a
state of "forced coownership", the law has
provided a just and equitable solution by giving
the owner of "the land the option to acquire the
improvements after payment of the proper
indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to
pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper
rent (Art. 361). It is the owner of the land who is
allowed to exercise the option because his right is
older and because, by the principle of accession,
he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory
thing.
In the case before us, BERNARDO as owner
of the land, chose to require BATACLAN, as
owner of the improvements, to pay for the land.
But since BATACLAN said he could not pay, the
land was sold at public auction to Toribio
Teodoro. The law, as we have already said,
requires no more than that the owner of the land
should choose between indemnifying the owner
of the improvements or requiring the latter to pay
for the land. When he failed to pay for the land,
the defendant herein lost his right of retention.
ARTICLE 446: All works, sowing, and planting are
presumed made by the owner and at his expense, unless
the contrary is proved.
ARTICLE 447: The owner of the land who makes
thereon, personally or thru another, plantings,
constructions or works with the materials of another,
shall pay their value; and, if he acted in bad faith, he
shall also be obliged to the reparation of damages. The
owner of the materials shall have the right to remove
them only in case he can do so without injury to the
work constructed, or without the plantings,
constructions or works being destroyed. However, if
the landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the
materials may remove them in any event, with a right
to be indemnified for damages.
Rights and Obligations of the
Landowner who Uses the Materials of
Another:
The owner is also the builder, sower, planter
but the materials do not belong to him
If the landowner (LO) acted in good
faith:
a. he becomes the owner of the materials
but he must pay for their value
b. exception: when they can be removed
w/o destruction to the work made or the
plants the material owner can remove
them
If the LO acted in bad faith
a. he becomes the owner of the materials,
but he must pay their value and damages
b. exception - when the material owner
decides to remove them whether or not
destruction would be caused the
materials will revert to the material owner
who will still be entitled to damages
Rights and Obligations of the Material
owner (MO)
If the MO acted in good faith
a. reimbursement provided he does not
remove them
b. removal provided no substantial injury
is caused
If the MO acted in bad faith
a. absolute right or removal and damages
whether or not substantial injury is caused
b. reimbursement (value of the materials) and
damages in case he chooses not to remove
Landowner is in Good Faith but
Material Owner is in Bad Faith
Landowner would:
not only be exempted from
reimbursement
but he would also be entitled to
consequential damages as when the
materials are of inferior quality
Material Owner would lose all rights
such as the right to removal,
regardless of whether substantial
injury would be caused
PACIFIC FARMS vs. ESGUERRA
GR No. L-21783. March 25, 1970
The buyer of the building is obliged to pay for
the unpaid balance for the materials use in its
construction. Compensation should be borne
by the person who has been benefited by the
accession.
FACTS
6 buildings were constructed by INSULAR
FARMS INC. Lumber and construction materials
used therein were furnished by CARRIED
LUMBER COMPANY. When INSULAR was
unable to pay the price of the lumber and
construction materials, a case was filed by
CARRIED LUMBER against it to redeem the
unpaid purchase price.
Being that PACIFIC FARMS contended that it
was the owner of the 6 buildings, the lower court
ordered that it pay the unpaid portion of the
procurement price of the lumber and construction
materials furnished by the CARRIED LUMBER to
its predecessor-in-interest, INSULAR. It ordered
for the sale of the 6 buildings but granted the
option to redeem the same to PACIFIC FARMS, in
order to pay CARRIED LUMBER the unpaid
balance of the construction materials.
Hence, PACIFIC appealed. It contended that it
was a purchaser for value and in good faith of the
six buildings in question.
ISSUE
Whether or not PACIFIC, as buyer of the
buildings should pay CARRIED LUMBER the
unpaid lumber and materials used by the previous
owner INSULAR in the construction of said
buildings.
RULING
 YES. In applying Article 447 by analogy, the 6
buildings were the principal and the lumber and
construction materials that went into their
construction were the accessory. Thus, PACIFIC,
if it did own the 6 buildings, must bear the
obligation to pay for the value of the said
materials. CARRIED LUMBER, which apparently
had no desire to remove the materials, and, even
if it were minded to do so, it could not have
removed them without necessarily damaging the
building. It had acquired then the corresponding
right to recover the value of the unpaid lumber
and construction materials.
Because it was assumed that PACIFIC was in
good faith, it was not pronounced that it be liable
for the reparation of damages but only for the
payment of the unpaid price of the lumber and
construction materials due to CARRIED
LUMBER. Thus, since PACIFIC benefited from
the accession, i.e., from the lumber and materials
that went into the construction of the 6 buildings,
it should shoulder the compensation due to
CARRIED LUMBER, as unpaid furnisher of
materials. Hence, compensation should be borne
by the person who has been benefited by the
accession.
ARTICLE 448: The owner of the land on which
anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith
shall have the right to appropriate as his own the
works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in the Articles 546 and 548 or
to oblige the one built or planted to pay the price of the
land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to
buy the land if its value is considerably more than that
of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose
to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of
the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix
the terms thereof.
This article applies only if the builder,
planter or sower is in Good Faith
3 options available to the landowner in
good faith if the BPS is in good faith:
1. right to appropriate as his own
the works, sowing or planting,
after payment of the indemnity;
2. to compel the builder/planter
(BP) to pay the price of the land.
With respect to the sower, pay the
proper rent
3. to demand the BP to pay the
proper rent, , if the owner of the
land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees,
after proper indemnity
The land owner (LO) has the choice
whether to appropriate or compel the
builder/planter/sower (BPS) to
purchase the land. And once the
choice is made by the LO, he cannot
change it anymore. However, the
option granted to the LO is not
absolute as when it is impractical for
the LO to exercise the option #1. If the
option #1 is not practical then the
probable solution is the 2 nd
alternative.
Art 448, however, is inapplicable
when:
1. the BPS does not claim
ownership over the land but
merely possesses it as a mere
holder
2. the BPS is a co-owner.
4. when the land owner constructed
a building in his own land and he
sold the land, excluding the
building, to another.
MARTINEZ vs. BAGANUS
GR No. 9438. November 25, 1914.
Art. 448 applies only if there is good faith on
both the part of the land owner and the
builder, planter or sower. It is Art. 546 of the
Civil Code which governs this situation.
FACTS
PAULA MARTINEZ was an owner of a town
lot situated in Batangas. His son, JOSE MOJICA,
sold the said lot to VICTORINO BAGANUS for
P70. MARTINEZ filed a case seeking recovery of
ownership and possession of the lot. She also
prayed that the sale made by his son MOJICA to
BAGANUS be declared null and void. BAGANUS
in contrast alleged that:
1. he bought the lot from MOJICA with
the consent of MARTINEZ in the belief that
it belonged to the former,
2. he had paid a deposit of P30 in
advance and agreed to pay the P40 balance
when the instrument of sale had already
been executed as was later done and
3. relying in good faith in the validity of
his acquisition, he had made necessary
improvements on the lot, having built a
house and a warehouse and having planted
fruit trees.
MOJICA confirmed the sale of the land for the
price of P70, having received P30 in advance and
P40 later when the sale was put to record.
However, he contended that he made the
condition that if his mother, MARTINEZ, would
not agree to the sale, he might take back the land
and would return the money received.
MARTINEZ, in fact, did not agree to it.
The court declared that the sale made by
MOJICA as null and void and ordered
BAGANUS:
1. to return the lot to claimed to
MARTINEZ,
2. to remove at his own expense the
buildings and plants he had placed thereon,
and
3. to pay the costs.
Said order was without prejudice to the right of
action he had against MOJICA, which was
reserved, on the ground of ejectment.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not BAGANUS acquired the
land in good faith.
(2) Whether or not he should return the lot
claimed and to remove the buildings and plants
he placed thereon at his own expense.
RULING
(1) NO. BAGANUS acquired the lot in bad
faith, for he himself said that he dealt with
MARTINEZ but later on consented that MOJICA,
who was not the owner, should appear as the
vendor. However, MARTINEZ was also in bad
faith. Bad faith on the part of the owner is
understood whenever the act (of building or
planting) has been executed in his presence with
his knowledge and tolerance and without
objection.
(2) YES. Being that there was bad faith on the
part of MARTINEZ, the owner and BAGANUS,
the builder and planter, the bad faith of one
cancels the bad faith of the other. It is Art. 546 of
the Civil Code which governs this situation and
not Art. 448, as the latter applies only if there is
good faith on both the part of the land owner and
the builder, planter or sower.
The court ordered without special finding as
to the costs:
1. that MARTINEZ should
indemnify BAGANUS to the value of
the he has placed thereon, with the right
on his part to retain it until she has
reimbursed him for said necessary and
useful improvements; or
2. that BAGANUS should pay
MARTINEZ the price of the land,
making himself the legitimate owner
thereof.
IGNACIO vs. HILARIO
GR No. L-175. April 30, 1946
The owner of the land, on which buildings,
plantings and sowings had been erected
thereon under Art. 448 has 2 options either:
(1) to pay for the building or (2) to sell his
land to the owner of the building. He cannot
refuse to choose an option.
FACTS
ELIAS HILARIO and his wife DIONISIA
DRES filed a case against DAMIAN, FRANCISCO
and LUIS IGNACIO, concerning the ownership of
a parcel of land, which was partly rice-land and
partly residential. The lower court rendered
judgment in favor of HILARIO and DRES
declaring:
1. that HILARIO and DRES were the
owners of the whole property and entitled to
the possession of the same,
2. that the IGNACIOs were still entitled
to hold the possession of the residential lot
until after they are paid the actual market
value of their houses and granaries erected
thereon, unless HILARIO and DRES prefer
to sell them said residential lot, in which
case the IGNACIOs shall pay HILARIO and
DRES the proportionate value of said
residential lot taking as a basis the price paid
for the whole land, and
3. that upon the IGNACIOs failure to
purchase the residential lot in question, they
shall remove their houses and granaries
after this decision haD becomes final and
within the period of 60 days from the date
that the court is informed in writing of the
attitude of the parties in this respect.
The court also declared that should the parties
could not come to an extra-judicial settlement with
regards to their rights under Art. 448 (then Art.
361), they may appear again before court to
determine said rights.
HILARIO and DRES prayed for an order of
execution alleging that since they chose neither to
pay the IGNACIOs for the buildings nor to sell to
them the residential lot, the latter should be
ordered to remove the structure at their own
expense and to restore plaintiffs in the possession
of said lot. Although the IGNACIOs objected to
this motion, the court granted the same. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not PACIFIC the IGNACIOs
should remove their buildings from the land
belonging to HILARIO and DRES because the
latter chose neither to pay for such buildings nor
to sell the land to the IGNACIOs.
RULING
NO, they should not. The provisions
applicable are Art. 448 (then Art. 361) and Art. 546
(then Art. 453) of the Civil Code.
Under Art. 546, the owner of the building
erected in good faith on a land owned by another,
is entitled to retain the possession of the land until
he is paid the value of his building.
Under Art. 448, the owner of the land, upon
the other hand, has 2 options either: (1) to pay for
the building or (2) to sell his land to the owner of
the building.
But the owner cannot, refuse both to pay for
the building and to sell the land and compel the
owner of the building to remove it from the land
where it is erected, as in the present case when
HILARIO and DRES refused to choose any of the
options. The landowner is entitled to a demotion
only when, after having chosen to sell his land,
the other party fails to pay for the same.
IGNAO vs. IAC
GR No. 72876. January 18, 1991
Art. 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where
a co-owner builds, plants or sows on the land
 owned in common for then he did not build,
plant or sow upon land that exclusively
belongs to another but of which he is a co-
owner. EXEPTION: Unless the co-ownership
was already terminated by partition.
The court cannot also exercise the options
given to the landowner under Art. 448.
FACTS
FLORENCIO IGNAO and his uncles JUAN
and ISIDRO IGNAO were co-owners of a 523 sq.
meter parcel of land with in Kawit, Cavite.
Pursuant to an action for partition filed by
FLORENCIO, the court directed the partition of
said land, alloting 133.5 square meters or 2/8
thereof to JUAN and ISIDRO, and giving the
remaining portion with a total area of 266.5
square meters to FLORENCIO. However, no
actual partition was ever effected.
Later, FLORENCIO instituted a complaint for
recovery of possession of real property against
Juan and Isidro, wherein he alleged that the area
occupied by the 2 houses built by JUAN and
ISIDRO exceeded the 133.5 square meters
previously allotted to them by the trial court
during partition.
Upon agreement of the parties, the trial court
ordered a licensed geodetic engineer to conduct a
survey to determine the exact area occupied by
the houses of JUAN and ISIDRO. The survey
subsequently disclosed that the house of Juan
occupied 42 square meters while that of Isidro
occupied 59 square meters of Florencio's land or a
total of 101 square meters.
In its decision, the trial court ruled in favor of
JUAN and ISIDRO. In its decision, it was stated
therein that although they occupied a portion of
FLORENCIO's property, they should be
considered builders in good faith.
Furthermore, the trial court stated that
pursuant to Art. 448 of the Civil Code, the owner
of the land (FLORENCIO) should have the choice
to either appropriate that part of the house'
standing on his land after payment of indemnity
or oblige the builders in good faith (JUAN AND
ISIDRO) to pay the price of the land. However,
the trial court observed that based on the facts of
the case, it would be useless and unsuitable for
Florencio to exercise the first option since this
would render the entire houses of Juan and Isidro
worthless. The trial court then applied the ruling
in the similar case of Grana vs. Court of Appeals,
where the Supreme Court had advanced a more
"workable solution". Thus, it ordered Florencio to
sell to Juan and Isidro those portions of his land
respectively occupied by the latter and to execute
the necessary deed of conveyance to them.
On appeal, FLORENCIO argued that Art. 448
does not apply in the present case but rather Art.
486 since the land in question was not owned by
different parties but were owned in common by
the contending parties.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not Art. 448 should apply to a
builder in good faith on a property held in co-
ownership by the contending parties.
(2) Whether or not the court may choose the
options given to the landowner under Art. 448.
RULING
(1) NO. Art. 448 of the Civil Code cannot
apply where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on
the land owned in common for then he did not
build, plant or sow upon land that exclusively
belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner.
The co-owner is not a third person under the
circumstances, and the situation is governed by
the rules of co-ownership.
However, in this case, the co-ownership was
terminated by the partition. It appeared that the
homes of JUAN and ISIDRO overlapped or
occupied a portion of 5 sq. meters of the land
pertaining to FLORENCIO, which the former
obviously built in good faith, then the provisions
of Art. 448 should apply. In fact, Manresa and
Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision of
the Civil Code may apply even when there is a co-
ownership if good faith has been established.
In other words, when the co-ownership was
terminated by a partition and it appeared that the
house of an erstwhile co-owner has encroached
upon a portion pertaining to another co-owner,
which was however made in good faith, then the
provisions of Art. 448 should apply to determine
the respective rights of the parties.
(2) NO. When both the trial and appellate
courts peremptorily ordered the owner of the
land, FLORENCIO, to sell to private respondents,
JUAN and ISIDRO, the part of the land they
intruded upon adopted, they deprived
FLORENCIO of his right to choose. Such ruling
contravened the explicit provisions of Art. 448
where it is clear and unambiguous that the right of
choice is conferred upon the landowner and not
upon the builder and the courts.
The Supreme Court then modified the
decision and directed FLORENCIO IGNAO
within 30 days from entry of judgment to exercise
his option to either appropriate as his own the
portions of the houses of JUAN and ISIDRO
IGNAO occupying his land upon payment of
indemnity in accordance with Articles 546 and 548
of the Civil Code, or sell to private respondents
the 101 square meters occupied by them at such
price as may be agreed upon. Should the value of
the land exceed the value of the portions of the
houses that JUAN and ISIDRO have erected
thereon, they may choose not to buy the land but
they must pay reasonable rent for the use of the
portion of FLORENCIO's land as may be agreed
upon by the parties. In case of disagreement, the
rate of rental and other terms of the lease shall be
determined by the trial court. Otherwise, JUAN
and ISIDRO may remove or demolish at their own
expense the said portions of their houses
encroaching upon petitioner's land.
 PECSON vs.CA
GR No. 115814. May 26, 1995
The court cannot also exercise the options
given to the landowner under Art. 448.
FACTS
Petitioner PEDRO P. PECSON was the owner
of a commercial lot located in Quezon City, on
which he built a 4-door 2-storey apartment
building worth P53,000 in 1965. For his failure to
pay realty taxes, the lot was sold at public auction
by to Mamerto Nepomuceno, who in turn sold it
to the spouses JUAN and ERLINDA NUGUID.
PECSON challenged the validity of the
auction sale on the ground that the apartment
building was not included in the sale because it
was not subject of the litigation. Indeed, the lower
court ruled that there was no basis for the
inclusion of the apartment building in the auction
sale because what was sold was merely the lot for
PECSONs failure to pay his taxes. Said decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court.
Later on, the SPOUSES NAGUID filed with
the trial court a motion for the delivery of
possession of the lot and the apartment building.
They cited Art. 546 of the Civil Code. They agreed
to comply with said provision of the law
considering that PECSON was a builder in good
faith and has in fact, opted to pay the cost of the
construction spent PECSON. From the complaint
itself the plaintiff stated that the construction cost
of the apartment was much more than the lot.
This amount of P53,000.00 is what the SPOUSES
NAGUID was supposed to pay under the law
before a writ of possession placing him in
possession of both the lot and apartment would
be issued.
However, they also alleged that 3 doors of the
apartment building were being leased at the rent
of P7,000 a month each. The decision having
become final as per Entry of Judgment dated June
23, 1993 and from this date on, being the
uncontested owner of the property, the rents
should be paid to them instead of PECSON
collecting them. From June 23, 1993, the rents
collected by PECSON amounting to more than
P53,000.00 from tenants should be offset from the
rents due to the lot which according to SPOUSES
NAGUID's affidavit is more than P21,000.00 a
month.
The court rendered judgment in favor of them
and ordered the reimbursement of PECSON for
the construction of the apartment building at
P53,000 and that this amount due should be made
to offset against the amount of rents collected
previously by the PECSON. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals partly affirmed said decision. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUES
(1) How should Art. 448 in relation to Art. 546
be applied?
(2) Whether or not the cost of construction of
the apartment building in 1965 in the amount of
P53,000 and not its current market value, was
sufficient reimbursement for necessary and useful
improvements made by PECSON.
(3) Whether or not PECSON should pay
monthly rentals equal to the aggregate rentals
paid by the lessees of the apartment buildings.
RULING
(1) Useful expenses shall be refunded only to
the possessor in good faith with the same right of
retention, the person who has defeated him in the
possession having the option of refunding the
amount of the expenses or of paying the increase
in value which the thing may have acquired by
reason thereof.
By its clear language, Article 448 refers to
a land whose ownership is claimed by two or
more parties, one of whom has built some works,
or sown or planted something. The building,
sowing or planting may have been made in good
faith or in bad faith. The rule on good faith laid
down in Article 526 of the Civil Code shall be
applied in determining whether a builder, sower
or planter had acted in good faith.
Article 448 does not apply to a case where
the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or
planter who then later loses ownership of the land
by sale or donation. Elsewise stated, where the
true owner himself is the builder of works on his
own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is
entirely irrelevant. Thus in strict point of law,
Article 448 is not opposite to the case at bar.
Nevertheless, we believe that the provision
therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy
considering that the primary intent of Article 448
is to avoid a state of forced co-ownership and that
the parties, including the two courts below, in the
main agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil
Code are applicable and indemnity for the
improvements may be paid although they differ
as to the basis of the indemnity.
(2) NO. Article 546 does not specifically state
how the value of the useful improvements should
be determined. The respondent court and the
private respondents espouse the belief that the
cost of construction of the apartment building in
1965, and not its current market value, is sufficient
reimbursement for necessary and useful
improvements made by the petitioner.
The objective of Article 546 of the Civil
Code is to administer justice between the parties
involved. In this regard, this Court had long ago
stated that the said provision was formulated, in
trying to adjust the rights of the owner and
possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to
administer complete justice to both of them in
such a way as neither one nor the other may
enrich himself of that which does not belong to
him. Guided by this precept, it is therefore the
current market value of the improvements which
should be made the basis of reimbursement. A
contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the private
respondents who would otherwise be allowed to
acquire a highly valued income-yielding four-unit
apartment building for a measly amount.
 Consequently, the parties should
therefore be allowed to adduce evidence on the
present market value of the apartment building
upon which the trial court should base its finding
as to the amount of reimbursement to be paid by
the landowner. The value so determined shall be
forthwith paid by the SPOUSES NAGUID
otherwise, PECSON shall be restored to the
possession of the apartment building until
payment of the required indemnity.
(3) NO. Since the SPOUSES NAGUID have
opted to appropriate the apartment building,
PECSON was thus entitled to the possession and
enjoyment of the apartment building, until he was
paid the proper indemnity, as well as of the
portion of the lot where the building has been
constructed. This is so because the right to retain
the improvements while the corresponding
indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or
possession in fact of the land in which it is built,
planted or sown. PECSON not having been so
paid, he was entitled to retain ownership of the
building and, necessarily, the income therefrom.
PLEASANTVILLE DEVT CORP. vs. IAC
GR No. 79688. February 1, 1996
Good faith is presumed. It consists in the
belief of the builder that the land he is
building on is his and his ignorance of any
defect or flaw in his title.
FACTS
Edith Robillo purchased from
PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION a parcel of land designated as
Lot 9 in Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City.
In 1975, ELDRED JARDINICO bought the rights
to the lot from Robillo. At that time, Lot 9 was
vacant. Upon completing all payments,
JARDINICO secured a transfer certificate of title
in his name. It was then that he discovered that
improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by
respondent WILSON KEE, who had taken
possession thereof.
It appeared that in 1974, KEE bought on
installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from
C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC. (CTTEI), the
exclusive real estate agent of PLESANTVILLE.
Under the Contract to Sell on Installment, Kee
could possess the lot even before the completion
of all installment payments. After the preparation
of the lot plan, CTTEI through its employee,
Zenaida Octaviano, accompanied KEE's wife,
Donabelle Kee, to inspect Lot 8. Unfortunately,
the parcel of land pointed by Octaviano was Lot 9.
Thereafter, KEE proceeded to construct his
residence, a store, an auto repair shop and other
improvements on the lot.
After discovering that Lot 9 was occupied by
KEE, JARDINICO confronted him. The parties
tried to reach an amicable settlement, but failed.
In 1981, JARDINICO's lawyer wrote KEE,
demanding that the latter remove all
improvements and vacate Lot 9. When KEE
refused to vacate Lot 9, JARDINICO filed with a
complaint for ejectment with damages against
KEE. KEE, in turn, filed a third-party complaint
against petitioner and CTTEI. The court held that
the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was
attributable to CTTEI. However, it was found out
that PLESANTVILLE had already rescinded its
contract with KEE over Lot 8 for the latter's failure
to pay the installments due, and that KEE had not
contested the rescission, the court then concluded
that KEE no longer had any right over the lot
subject of the contract. He was ordered to vacate
the premises of Lot 8, to remove all structures and
improvements he introduced thereon, to pay
reasonable rentals for the use of Lot 9, and,
furthermore, he could not claim reimbursement
for the improvements he introduced on said lot.
On appeal, the RTC ruled that
PLESANTVILLE and CTTEI were not at fault or
were not negligent, there being no preponderant
evidence to show that they directly participated in
the delivery of Lot 9 to KEE. It found KEE a
builder in bad faith. It further ruled that even
assuming arguendo that KEE was acting in good
faith, he was, nonetheless, guilty of unlawfully
usurping the possessory right of JARDINICO
over Lot 9 from the time he was served with
notice to vacate said lot, and thus was liable for
rental.
The Court of Appeals however ruled that KEE
was a builder in good faith with respect to the
improvements he introduced on Lot 9, and is
entitled to the rights granted him under Articles
448, 546 and 548 of the New Civil Code. It was
because he was unaware of the "mix-up" when he
began construction of the improvements on Lot 8.
It further ruled that the erroneous delivery was
due to the negligence of CTTEI, and that such
wrong delivery was likewise imputable to its
principal, PLESANTVILLE. It also ruled that the
award of rentals was without basis.
PLESANTVILLE, having been ordered to be
solidarily liable with CTTEI., filed this instant
petition against KEE, JARDINICO and CTTEI.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not KEE, a lot buyer who
constructed improvements on the wrong property
erroneously delivered by the owner's agent, a
builder in good faith.
(2) What or not PLEASANTVILLE and its
agent CTTEI be solidarily liable for damages due
to negligence.
RULING
(1) YES. Good faith consists in the belief of
the builder that the land he is building on is his
and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title.
And as good faith is presumed, PLESANTVILLE
had the burden of proving bad faith on the part of
KEE. At the time he built improvements on Lot 8,
KEE believed that said lot was what he bought
from PLEASANTVILLE. He was not aware that
the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus,
KEE's in good faith. Petitioner failed to prove
otherwise.
 The roots of the controversy can be traced
directly to the errors committed by CTTEI, when
it pointed the wrong property to KEE and his
wife. It is highly improbable that a purchaser of a
lot would knowingly and willingly build his
residence on a lot owned by another, deliberately
exposing himself and his family to the risk of
being ejected from the land and losing all
improvements thereon, not to mention the social
humiliation that would follow.
Under the circumstances, KEE had acted in
the manner of a prudent man in ascertaining the
identity of his property. Because he was a layman
not versed in the technical description of his
property, he had to find a way to ascertain that
what was described in his transfer certificate of
title matched Lot 8. Thus, he went to the
subdivision developer's agent and applied and
paid for the relocation of the lot, as well as for the
production of a lot plan by CTTEI's geodetic
engineer. Upon KEE's receipt of the map, his wife
went to the subdivision site accompanied by
CTTEI's employee, Octaviano, who
authoritatively declared that the land she was
pointing to as indeed Lot 8. Having full faith and
confidence in the reputation of CTTEI, and
because of the company's positive identification of
the property, KEE saw no reason to suspect that
there had been a misdelivery. The steps KEE had
taken to protect his interests were reasonable.
(2). YES. PLEASANTVILLEs liability lies in
the negligence of its agent CTTEI. For such
negligence, PLEASANTVILLE should be held
liable for damages. Now, the extent and/or
amount of damages to be awarded is a factual
issue which should be determined after evidence
is adduced.
However, there was no showing that such
evidence was actually presented in the trial court;
hence no damages could now be awarded.
The rights of Kee and Jardinico vis-a-vis each
other, as builder in good faith and owner in good
faith, respectively, are regulated by law (i.e., Arts.
448, 546 and 548 of the Civil Code). It was error
for the Court of Appeals to make a "slight
modification" in the application of such law, on
the ground of "equity". At any rate, as it stands
now, KEE and JARDINICO have amicably settled
through their deed of sale their rights and
obligations with regards to Lot 9.
ALVIOLA vs. CA
GR No. 117642. April 24, 1998
To fall under Art. 448, the contruction must
be of permanent character. If it is not, like a
copra dryer and store, there is no accession
and the builder must remove them.
FACTS
In 1950, Victoria Sonjaconda Tinagan
purchased from Mauro Tinagan 2 parcels of land
situated in Valencia, Negros Oriental. Thereafter,
Victoria and her son Agustin Tinagan, took
possession of said parcels of land. Sometime in
1960, EDITHA ALVIOLA and PORFERIO
ALVIOLA occupied portions of said land, where
they built a copra dryer and a store wherein they
engaged in the business of buying and selling
copra.In 1975, Victoria died. 4 months thereafter,
Agustin died, survived by his wife, FLORENCIA
BULING VDA. DE TINAGAN and children
(TINAGANs).
In 1976, petitioner EDITHA assisted by her
husband filed a complaint for partition and
damages, claiming to be an acknowledged natural
child of deceased Agustin Tinagan and
demanding the delivery of her shares in the
properties left by the deceased. Said petition was
dismissed by both the trial court and upon appeal,
by the Supreme Court on the ground that
recognition of natural children may be brought
only during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
In 1988, the TINAGANS filed a complaint for
recovery of possession against the SPOUSES
ALVIOLA, praying, among others, that they be
declared absolute owners of the said parcels of
land, and that said spouses be declared to vacate
the same, to remove their copra dryer and store.
The court granted the petition of the TINAGANs
and ruled that they were the absolute owners of
said property and that the SPOUSES ALVIOLA
were in bad faith in possessing the disputed
properties and in ruling that the improvements
thereon are transferable. Hence, they were
ordered to remove their store and dryer on the
premises without injury and prejudice to the
TINAGANs.
ISSUE
Whether or not the SPOUSES ALVIOLA
possessed the property in bad faith.
RULING
YES. There was bad faith on the part of the
SPOUSES ALVIOLA when they constructed the
copra dryer and store on the disputed portions
since they were fully aware that the parcels of
land belonged to VICTORIA TINAGAN.
And, there was likewise bad faith on the part
of the TINAGANs, having knowledge of the
arrangement between petitioners and VICTORIA
TINAGAN relative to the construction of the
copra dryer and store.
Thus, for purposes of indemnity, Article 448 of
the New Civil Code should be applied. However,
the copra dryer and the store, as determined by
the trial court and respondent court, are
transferable in nature. Thus, it would not fall
within the coverage of Article 448. As the noted
civil law authority, Senator Arturo Tolentino,
aptly explains: "To fall within the provision of this
Article, the construction must be of permanent
character, attached to the soil with an idea of
perpetuity; but if it is of a transitory character or is
transferable, there is no accession, and the builder
must remove the construction. The proper remedy
of the landowner is an action to eject the builder
from the land."
 GEMINIANO vs. CA
G.R. No. 120303. July 24, 1996.
Art. 448 only applies when the possessor in
good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with
the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does
not apply where one's only interest is that of a
lessee under a rental contract.
FACTS
Paulina Amado vda. de Geminiano, mother or
petitioner GEMINIANOs originally owned a lot
containing 314 sq. m. A 12 sq. m. portion of it
stood the GEMINIANOs bungalow, which they
sold to DOMINADOR NICOLAS and MARY
NICOLOS in 1978 for P6, 000 with an alleged
promise to sell to the latter that portion of the lot
occupied by the house. Subsequently, vda. De
Geminiano, executed a contract of lease over a 126
sq. m. portion of the lot, including that portion on
which the house stood in favor of the NICOLASes
for P40.00 per month for a period of 7 years. The
NICOLASes then introduced additional
improvements and registered the house in their
names. After the expiration of the lease contract
however, vda. De Geminiano refused to accept the
monthly rentals.
It turned out that the lot in question was the
subject of a suit, which resulted in its acquisition
by one Maria Lee in 1972. In 1982, Lee sold the lot
to Lily Salcedo, who in turn sold it in 1984 to the
spouses Agustin and Ester Dionisio. In 1992, the
Dionisio spouses executed a Deed of Quitclaim
over the said property in favor of the
GEMINIANOs as such, the lot was registered in
the latter's names.
Later in 1993, the GEMINIANOs sent a letter
to the NICOLASes demanding that the premises
be vacated and that the rentals in arrears be paid
within 20 days. Upon failure of the NICOLASes to
heed the demand, the GEMINIANOs filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer and damages.
In its decision, the lower court ruled that since
the private respondents were assured by the
petitioners that the lot they leased would
eventually be sold to them, they could be
considered builders in good faith, and as such,
were entitled to reimbursement of the value of the
house and improvements with the right of
retention until reimbursement had been made.
ISSUE
Whether or not the NICOLASes were builders
in good faith and entitled to reimbursement for
the value of the house and improvements they
erected on the property of the GEMINIANOs or
were mere lesees.
RULING
NO, they could not be considered as
possessors nor builders in good faith. Being mere
lessees, the private respondents knew that their
occupation of the premises would continue only
for the life of the lease.
Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to
Article 546 of the same Code, which allows full
reimbursement of useful improvements and
retention of the premises until reimbursement is
made, applies only to a possessor in good faith,
i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he
is the owner thereof. It does not apply where one's
only interest is that of a lessee under a rental
contract', otherwise, it would always be in the
power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out
of his property.
Suffice it to say, "a state of forced
coownership" would not be created between the
petitioners and the private respondents.
It must be stressed, however, that the right to
indemnity under Article 1678 of the Civil Code
arises only if the lessor opts to appropriate the
improvements. Since the petitioners refused to
exercise that option, the private respondents
cannot compel them to reimburse the one-half
value of the house and improvements. Neither can
they retain the premises until reimbursement is
made. The private respondents' sole right then is
to remove the improvements without causing any
more impairment upon the property leased than is
necessary.
PADA-KILARIO vs. CA
G.R. No. 134329. Jan. 19, 2000.
If a possessor were in possession of the
property without paying any rental as they
only relied on the liberality and tolerance of
the landowner are not possessors nor builders
in good faith because they know that their
occupation of the premises may be terminated
any time.
FACTS
Jacinto Pada owned a parcel of land of
residential and coconut land in Leyte
denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 5581. During
his lifetime, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada,
obtained permission from him to build a house on
the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581.
When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued
living in said house. Petitioner Verona Pada-
Kilario, one of Pastor's children, had been living in
that house since 1960.
Later, Jacinto Pada died intestate. His 6
children, 1 personally and others through their
children, entered into an extra-judicial partition of
his estate, which included Cadastral Lot No. 5881.
One of the sons of Jacinto Pada was Marciano
Pada. The latters daughter, Maria Pada, sold the
co-ownership right of his father to respondent
SILVERIO PADA, who was also a first cousin.
Thereafter, SILVERIO demanded that spouses
VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO
KILARIO vacate the northern portion of Cadastral
Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the said area.
Unable to settle for an amicable settlement,
SILVERIO instituted a complaint for ejectment
with prayer for damages against spouses
KILARIO.
Later, heirs of Amador Pada, also a son of
Jacinto Pada, executed a Deed of Donation,
transferring to petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario,
their respective shares as co-owners of Cadastral
Lot No. 5581. Hence, the SPOUSES KILARIO
averred that the northern portion of Cadastral Lot
No. 5581 had already been donated to them by the
heirs of Amador Pada. Hence, they were virtually
converted as standing co-owners of the land
under controversy and became the undivided
owners of the whole estate. Their possession then
in the northern portion was being lawful. They
also contended that they had been occupying the
subject property since 1960 without ever paying
any rental.
The RTC ordered the SPOUSES KILARIO to
vacate the premises in issue and return peaceful
possession to SILVERIO being the lawful
possessor in concept of owner. When the
SPOUSES KILARIO appealed with the CA, the
same was denied. Hence, this petition
ISSUE
Whether or not the SPOUSES KILARIO were
builders in good faith.
RULING
NO, they were not builders in good faith.
The SPOUSES KILARIO were estopped from
impugning the extrajudicial partition executed by
the heirs of Jacinto Pada after explicitly admitting
in their Answer that they had been occupying the
subject property since 1960 without ever paying
any rental as they only relied on the liberality and
tolerance of the Pada family.
Considering that petitioners were in
possession of the subject property by sheer
tolerance of its owners, they knew that their
occupation of the premises may be terminated any
time. Persons who occupy the land of another at
the latter's tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that they will vacate the same
upon demand, failing in which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
Thus, they could be considered possessors nor
builders in good faith.
It is well-settled that both Article 448 and
Article 546 of the New Civil Code which allow full
reimbursement of useful improvements and
retention of the premises until reimbursement is
made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e.,
one who builds on land with the belief that he is
the owner thereof. Verily, persons whose
occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its
owners are not possessors in good faith.
Neither did to donate by some of the heirs,
convert SPOUSES KILARIO into builders in good
faith for at the time the improvements were built
on the premises, such promise was not yet
fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere expectancy of
ownership that may or may not be realized. More
importantly, even as that promise was fulfilled,
the donation was void for the sonors were not the
owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. As such,
petitioners cannot be said to be entitled to the
value of the improvements that they built on the
said lot.
ARTICLE 449: He who builds, plants, or sows in bad
faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted,
or sown without the right of indemnity.
ARTICLE 450: The owner of the land on which
anything has been built, planted, or sown in bad faith
may demand the demolition of the work, or that the
planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace
things in their former condition at the expense of the
person who built, planted, or sowed or he may compel
the builder or planter to pay the price of the land and
the sower the proper rent.
1. The landowner has :
i. the right of removal of whatever
is built, planted, or sown on his
property in bad faith; or
ii. may compel the builder/planter
to pay the price of the land; or the
sower to pay the proper rent
2. The right of removal is absolute.
3 options available to the land owner if the
builder is in bad faith:
1.) appropriation without need to indemnify
the builder in bad faith plus damages;
2.) demand the builder in bad faith to
remove the house he built. He has the
absolute right of removal plus damages;
3.) compel the builders in bad faith to pay
the value of the land if the value of the
land is not considerably more than the
value of the improvements. If the LO
chooses to compel the builder to pay the
land, he has to do so, plus damages.
DE VERA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 97761. April 14, 1999
He who builds in bad faith on the land of
another, losses what he built, without right to
indemnity.
FACTS
In 1947, private respondent RICARDO
RAMOS filed a homestead application for a parcel
of land in Isabela. His homestead application was
approved by the District Land Officer. In 1955, a
homestead patent and an original certificate of
title was was issued to RAMOS, covering an area
of 9 hectares, 28 acres and 20 centares.
RAMOS then brought a complaint for
recovery of possession against several people
occupying his land. The court came out with a
decision adjudging the validity of the title of
Ramos.
In 1981, RAMOS wrote petitioners AGUEDA
DE VERA, and her children MARIO DE LA
CRUZ, EVANGELINE DELA CRUZ, and
EDRONEL DE LA CRUZ (DE VERA ET AL.),
reminding them that their house was on his titled
property. He asked them whether they were
going to buy the portion occupied by them or to
lease the same on a yearly or monthly basis;
otherwise, he would be constrained to proper
legal action against them. But the letter of RAMOS
was ignored by DE VERA ET AL.
Hence, in 1983, RAMOS filed, a complaint for
recovery of property against DE VERA ET AL. He
alleged that he was the legal and absolute owner
of a certain parcel of land, containing an area of
3,670 square meters and that a triangular portion
of it, containing an area of 22 square meters was
occupied by DE VERA ET AL.. He also averred
that DE VERA ET AL. had constructed a house of
strong and permanent material that year after
removing their previous building of light
materials in January or February of 1970. He
added that he demanded that DE VERA ET AL.
remove their improvement thereon and vacate the
said portion but they had refused without any just
or lawful cause to do so.
DE VERA ET AL alleged on the other hand
that they had been in possession not only of 22
square meters but 70 square meters of land. Their
predecessor-in-interest, Teodoro de la Cruz,
husband of AGUEDA DE VERA, during his
lifetime, filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application,
which although pending was given due course. In
fact, Teodoro de la Cruz also declared the said
land for taxation purposes and after his death, by
them, as his heirs.
During trial, the patries agreed that a
relocation survey of subject property be
conducted. The survey showed that RAMOS
owned the land occupied by DE VERA ET AL.,
particularly portions A B & C. Hence, the court
ordered DEVERA ET AL., to vacate the land, to
deliver the possession thereof to the plaintiff, and
to remove, at their expense, all improvements
they have constructed or erected thereon. It also
declared that they were possessors in bad faith
and were made liable to RAMOS for rental
payments for the use of the disputed property.
On appeal with the Court of Appeals, said
decision was modified, dismissing the complaint
as to portion A of the property. Unsatisfied, DE
VERA ET AL. filed a petition via certiorari. They
contended that they should not have found to be
possessors in bad faith since their possession was
by virtue of a valid title, the Miscellaneous Sales
Application of their predecessor-in-interest,
Teodoro dela Cruz.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not DE VERA ET AL. were
possessors in bad faith.
(2) Whether or not they should also be made
liable to RAMOS for rental payments for the use
of the disputed property.
RULING
(1) YES, they were possessors in bad faith.
Records disclose that prior to the
construction in 1983 of DE VERA ET AL.'s house
on the land under controversy, a demand letter
dated 1981 was sent to them by RAMOS,
informing them that the land they were
possessing and occupying is within his titled
property.
In the same letter, the RAMOS gave
petitioner AGUEDA DE VERA the option to either
pay him the value of the property or lease the
same on a yearly or monthly basis. However, the
contending parties failed to reach a compromise
agreement.
Although they were sent said latter in
1981, DE VERA ET AL. still constructed their
house on said propety. Such were "outward acts
and proven conduct" indicating bad faith of DE
VERA ET AL. as possessor and builder.
(2) NO, they should be made liable for rental
payments for the use of the disputed property but
rather should remove what they built, as the
option chosen by RAMOS.
Under Art. 449 He who builds in bad faith
on the land of another, losses what he built,
without right to indemnity. Applying Art. 449, in
relation to Art. 450, the landowner has three
alternative rights, either:
1. to appropriate what has been built
without any obligation to pay indemnity
therefor; or
2. to demand the builder to remove
what he had built; or
3. to compel the builder to pay the value
of the land.
In any event, the landowner is entitled to be
indemnified by the builder in bad faith, pursuant
to Article 451.
In the case under consideration, RAMOS, the
landowner, availed of the second alternative,
which option is legally feasible under the
attendant facts and circumstances.
HEIRS OF DURANO vs. UY
GR No.136456. October 24, 2000
The landowner, when the builder is in bad
faith, may compel (1) appropriation what was
built, (2) removal of what was built, or (3)
payment for the value of the land. In any of
this options, the landowner is entitled for
payment of damages.
FACTS
A 128-hectare parcel of land located in the
barrios of Dunga and Cahumayhumayan, Danao
City eas owned by Cebu Portland Cement
Company (CEPOC). Said proerty had been
purchased by Durano & Co., Inc.
In 1973, the late Congressman RAMON
DURANO, SR., together with his son RAMON
DURANO III, and the latters wife, ELIZABETH
HOTCHKISS DURANO, instituted an action for
damages against SPOUSES ANGELES
SUPELVEDA UY and EMIGDIO BING SING UY
ET AL. (SPOUSES UY ET AL). They accused
SPOUSES UY ET AL of:
1. officiating a hate campaign against
them by lodging complaints in the Police
Department of Danao City for their so-
called invasion of SPOUSES UYs ET AL.
alleged properties,
2. sending another complaint to the
 President of the Philippines in February
1971, which depicted petitioners as
oppressors, landgrabbers and
usurpers of respondents alleged rights, were builders on bad faith.
3. After 2 investigations, the complaints
if SPOUSES UY ET AL. were dismissed as
baseless and
4. spreading false rumors and damaging
tales which put petitioners into public
contempt and ridicule.
SPOUSES UY ET AL. on the other hans,
alleged:
1. that they were the owners of the land
as some came into ownership through
inheritance from their parents, who in turn
inherited them from their own parents and
some by purchase from the former
occupants thereof.
2. that they and their predecessors were
responsible for the plantings and
improvements on the property.
3. that they were the ones who sought
for the properties to be tax-declared in their
respective names, and they continually paid
the taxes thereto.
4. that they received notices dated
signed by the late Ramon Durano, Sr.,
informing them that t he lands which they
were tilling and residing in, formerly owned
by the Cebu Portland Cement Company
(CEPOC), had been purchased by Durano &
Co., Inc.
5. However, even before many of the
respondents received notices to vacate, men
who identified themselves as employees of
Durano & Co. proceeded to bulldoze the
lands occupied by various respondents,
destroying in their wake the plantings and
improvements made by the respondents
therein.
6 .On some occasions, respondents
alleged, these men fired shots in the air.
7. Respondents maintained that they
were unaware of anyone claiming adverse
possession or ownership of these lands until
the bulldozing operations in 1970.
In 1970, Durano & Co. sold the disputed
property to petitioner Ramon Durano III, who
procured the registration of these lands in his
name.
The court rendered judgment in favor of
SPOUSES UY ET AL. and against the HEIRS OF
DURANO, directing the latter to pay the former
for indemnity in reparation of the destroyed
properties during the demolition. It also declared
that SPOUSES UY ET AL. were in possession of
the properties to be in the concept of owner and
that the HEIRS OF DURANO were the ones in
good faith.
Dissatisfied, the HEIRS OF DURANO
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
the trial courts decision. On appeal to the
Supreme Court, the HEIRS OF DURANO alleged
that they were builders in bad faith and that the
order for the return and payment of indemnity in
favor of the SPOSES UY ET AL. was erroneous.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the HEIRS OF DURANO
(2) Whether or not the HEIRS OF DURANO
should return the properties to the SPOUSES UY
ET AL. and pay indemnity in reparation of the
destroyed properties overran by the bulldozers.
.
RULING
(1) YES, they were builders in bad faith.
A purchaser of a parcel of land cannot
close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man upon his guard, such as when the
property subject of the purchase is in the
possession of persons other than the seller. A
buyer who could not have failed to know or
discover that the land sold to him was in the
adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad
faith.
In the same manner, the purchase of the
property by petitioner Ramon Durano III from
Durano & Co. could not be said to have been in
good faith. It is not disputed that Durano III
acquired the property with full knowledge of
respondents occupancy thereon. There even
appears to be undue haste in the conveyance of
the property to Durano III, as the bulldozing
operations by Durano & Co. were still underway
when the deed of sale to Durano III was executed
on September 15, 1970. There was not even an
indication that Durano & Co. attempted to
transfer registration of the property in its name
before it conveyed the same to Durano III.
Since petitioners knew fully well the
defect in their titles, they were correctly held by
the Court of Appeals to be builders in bad faith.
(2) YES, they should.
Art. 449. states that He who builds, plants
or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses
what is built, planted or sown without right of
indemnity.
In relation to Art. 50 & 51, the owner of the land
has three alternative rights:
(1) to appropriate what has been
built without any obligation to pay
indemnity therefor, or
(2) to demand that the builder
remove what he had built, or
(3) to compel the builder to pay
the value of the land.
In any case, the landowner is entitled to damages
under Article 451. Hence, the award of damages
was proper.
ARTICLE 451: In the cases of the 2 preceding articles,
the landowner is entitled for damages from the builder,
planter, or sower.
In summary:
a. BPS (in good faith) = 2 rights
under 448 + limited right of
removal and no damages.
b. BPS (in bad faith) = 2 rights
under 448 + absolute right of
removal + damages.

BAES vs. CA
GR No. 108065. July 6, 1993
If the riparian owner is entitled to
compensation for the damage to or loss of his
property due to natural causes, there is all the
more reason to compensate him when the
change in the course of the river is effected
through artificial means such as when the
government dug up a canal therein to
improve the flow of a creek.
FACTS
In 1962, the government dug a canal on a
private parcel of land covering an area of 33,902
sq. m. to streamline the Tripa de Gallina creek.
This lot was later acquired by FELIX BAES, who
registered it in his name. He then had it
subdivided into three lots, Lots A, B and C. In
exchange for Lot B, which was totally occupied by
the canal, the government gave BAES a lot with
exactly the same area through a Deed of Exchange
of Real Property. Said property was near but not
contiguous to Lot C of BAES. It was later
registered in the name of BAES. The soil displaced
by the canal was used to fill up the old bed of the
creek.
Meanwhile, BAES had Lot C and a portion of
Lot A was resurveyed and subdivided. In 1968, he
submitted a petition for the approval of his
resurvey and subdivision plane, claiming that
after the said lots were plotted by a competent
surveyor, it was found that there were errors in
respect of their bearings and distances. Said
resurvey-subdivision plan was approved by the
CFI of Pasay City. As a result, the old TCTs
covering the said lots were canceled and new ones
were issued, further dividing said lots into 4 lots.
Lots 3 & 4 were later consolidated and this time
further subdivided into 4 more lots.
In 1978, the Republic of the Philippines
discovered that Lot 2, on which the petitioners
had erected an apartment building covered a
portion of the Pasay Cadastre, which was a filled-
up portion of the Tripa de Gallina creek. It also
found that the land covered by BAES TCTs had
been unlawfully enlarged. In 1982, the
government filed a petition for cancellation of the
TCTs of BAES. The trial court therefore decreed
that the original be reverted to its status before the
resurvey-subdivision and ordered the cancellation
of the TCTs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
same decision in toto.
On appeal with the Supreme Court, FELIX
and RAFAELA BAES in relying on Article 461 of
the Civil Code, claimed as their own, the old bed
of the Tripa de Gallina Creek, which was filled up
by soil excavated from Lot B. Said Lot B was the
land of BAES, on which the government dug a
canal. The petitioners relied heavily on Dr. Arturo
M. Tolentino's interpretation of Article 461 to wit:
This article (461) refers to a natural
change in the course of a stream. If
the change of the course is due to
works constructed by concessionaires
authorized by the government, the
concession may giant the abandoned
river bed to the concessionaires. If
there is no such grant, then, by
analogy, the abandoned river bed will
belong to the owners of the land
covered by the waters, as provided in
this article, without prejudice to a
superior right of third persons with
sufficient title.
On the basis of their claim of ownership,
FELIX and RAFAELA BAES claimed for
compensation.
The government rejected this claim and
averred that the petitioners had already been fully
compensated for it in 1970 when they agreed to
exchange their B with another lot belonging to the
government.
ISSUE
(1) Whether or not the riparian owner is
entitled to compensation for the damage to or
loss of his property due to the act of the
government of digging therein.
(2) Whether or not FELIX and RAFAELA
BAES should be allowed compensation.
RULING
(1) YES, the riparian owner is entitled to
compensation for the damage to or loss of his
property.
If the riparian owner is entitled to
compensation for the damage to or loss of his
property due to natural causes, there is all the
more reason to compensate him when the change
in the course of the river is effected through
artificial means. The loss to the petitioners of the
land covered by the canal was the result of a
deliberate act on the part of the government when
it sought to improve the flow of the Tripa de
Gallina creek. It was therefore obligated to
compensate FELIX and RAFAELA BAES for their
loss.
(2) NO. FELIX and RAFAELA BAES have
already been so compensated. FELIX BAES was
given another lot in exchange for the Lot B
through the Deed of Exchange of Real Property
dated 1970. This was a fair exchange because the
two lots were of the same area and value and the
agreement was freely entered into by the parties.
FELIX and RAFAELA BAES could not now claim
additional compensation because, as correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, to allow
petitioners to acquire ownership of the dried-up
portion of the creek would be a clear case of
double compensation and unjust enrichment at
the expense of the state.
The exchange of lots between the petitioners
and the Republic was the result of voluntary
negotiations. If these had failed, the government
could still have taken Lot B under the power of
eminent domain, upon payment of just
compensation, as the land was needed for a public
purpose.
ARTICLE 452: The builder, planter, or sower in bad
faith is entitled to reimbursement for the necessary
expenses of preservation of the land.
ARTICLE 453: If there was bad faith, not only on the
part of the person who built, planted or sowed on the
land of another, but also on the part of the owner of
such land, the rights of one and the other shall be the
same as though both had acted in good faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the
part of the landowner whenever the act was done with
his knowledge and even without opposition on his part.
In other words, bad faith + bad faith = good
faith
ARTICLE 454: When the landowner acted in bad
faith and the builder, planter, sower, preceded in good
faith, the provisions of Article 447 shall apply.
The LO must pay for the value of the
house + DAMAGES because he is in
bad faith. If the material owner chose
to remove or destroy the house, the
LO would still be liable for damages.
ARTICLE 455: If the materials, plants or seeds belong
to a 3rd person who has not acted in bad faith, the
owner of the land shall answer subsidiarily for their
value and only in the event that the one who made use
of them has no property with which to pay.
This provision shall not apply if the owner
makes use of the right granted by Article 450. if the
owner of the materials, plants or seeds has been paid by
the builder, planter or sower, the latter may demand
form the landowner the value of the materials and
labor.
Three parties involved:
a. land owner (LO)
b. builder/ planter/sower (BPS)
c. material owner (MO)
GENERAL RULE: If they (all parties) are
all in good faith, the BPS who uses the
material of another must reimburse the
MO for the materials.
EXCEPTIONS:
a. the BPS may demand
reimbursement from the LO
provided the BPS is insolvent;
b. the BPS is in good faith;
c. the LO decides to appropriate
whatever is built, planted, or
sown.
The LO is only oblige to reimburse if the 3
items enumerated above are present. The
LO has also the option to reimburse the
BPS if he chooses to reimburse. Now after
the BPS pays the MO, when can he not
ask for reimbursement from the LO?
a. If he is in bad faith;
b. if the LO exercises his option
under 450 which is the
demolition;
c. if he compels the BPS to buy his
land.
ARTICLE 456: In the cases regulated in the preceding
articles, good faith does not necessarily exclude
negligence, which gives right to damages under Article
2176.
ACCESSION NATURAL
ARTICLE 457: To the owners of the lands adjoining
the banks of the rivers belong to the accretion which
they gradually receive form the effects of the current of
the waters.
GENERAL RULE To the owners of the lands
adjoining the banks of the rivers belong to the
accretion which they gradually receive form the
effects of the current of the waters
4 FORMS OF NATURAL ACCESSION:
1. alluvium is the soil deposited or added to
the lands adjoining the bank of rivers.
Accretion - the process by which the
soil is deposited.
Riparian owner - the owner of the
land adjacent to the river and this
includes creeks, streams, and lakes.
REQUISITES:
a) should be gradual, natural,
and imperceptible;
b) the cause of the alluvium is
the current of the river ( not
due to work expressly
designed for that purpose);
c) current must be that of a
river, lake, steam or creek;
d) river must continue to exist;
e) The increase must be
comparatively little (It should
not be so big.)
2. avulsion
3. change of course of rivers
4. formation of islands
GRANDE vs. CA
GR No. L-17652. June 30, 1962
To the owner of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers, belongs the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the water. But just because that it
was adjoined to the riparian owners
unregistered land does not ipso facto mean
that it is automatically registered as well.
Thus, if it is unregistered, third persons may
acquire equitable title thereto through
acquisitive prescription.
FACTS
IGNACIO GRANDE ET AL. were owners of a
parcel of land in the province of Isabela by
inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia
Angui. When it was surveyed for purposes of
registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern
boundary was the Cagayan River. Since then, and
for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on
the northeastern side took place, by action of the
current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by
1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of
about 105 meters from its original site, and an
alluvial deposit of .9964 hectares, more or less,
had been added to the registered area.
ESTEBAN CALALUNG and DOMINGO
CALALUNG were found to be possessing said
alluvium that GRANDE ET AL. filed an action to
quiet title to said portion formed by accretion
against the CALALUNGs. They alleged that they
and their predecessors-in-interest were formerly
in peaceful and continuous possession thereof,
until September, 1948, when the CALALUNGs
entered upon the land under claim of ownership.
The CALALUNGs on the other hand, claimed
ownership in themselves, asserting that they had
been in continuous, open, and undisturbed
possession of said portion, since prior to the year
1933 to the present. Hence, they had already
acquired the property by accretion.
The CFI ruled in favor of GRANDE ET AL.
and ordered the CALALUNGs to vacate the
premises of said property. The CA on the other
hand, ruled that the CALALUNGs had rightful
ownership over the contested property by
prescription.
ISSUE
(1) Whether or not the alluvium belonged to
GRANDE ET AL.
(2) Whether or not the CALALUNGs have
acquired the alluvial property in question through
acquisitive prescription.
RULING
(1) YES. That the area in controversy has been
formed through a gradual process of accretion
which started in the early thirties, is a fact
conclusively established by the evidence for both
parties. By law, therefore, unless some superior
title has supervened, it should properly belong to
the riparian owners, specifically in accordance
with the rule of natural accession in Art. 366 of the
old Civil Code (now Art. 457), which provides
that 'to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the water.
The land in question being an accretion to
the mother or registered land of GRANDE ET AL,
the accretion belongs to the them. Assuming,
arguendo that the accretion has been occupied by
the CALALUNGs since 1948, or earlier, is of no
moment, because the law does not require any act
of possession on the part of the owner of the
riparian owner, from the moment the deposit
becomes manifest. Further, no act of
appropriation on the part of the riparian owner is
necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the
alluvial formation, as the law does not require the
same.
There can be no dispute that both under
Article 457 of the new Civil Code and Article 966
of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of
said alluvial property, as they are the registered
owners of the land to which it adjoins.
(2) YES. GRANDE ET AL. lost right over the
land through prescription because the
CALALUNGs were in possession of the alluvial
lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and
adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the
filing of the action in 1958.
Just as an unregistered land purchased by the
registered owner of the adjoining land does not,
by extension, become ipso facto registered land.
Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and
registration under the Torrens system of that
ownership is quite another. To acquire
Imprescriptibility of registered land, it must first
be registered.
However, in the present case, GRANDE ET
AL. failed to register the contested property. The
increment, therefore, never became registered
property, and hence is not entitled or subject to
the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by
registered property under the Torrens system.
Consequently, it was subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons.
ZAPATA vs. DIR. OF LANDS
GR No. L-17645. October 50, 1962
The accretion on the land must be made by the
natural current of the river and must not be
artificially induced, so that it may be
rightfully claimed by the riparian owner.
When fish traps are set up on the river and
cause accretion, the riparian owner may still
claim ownership over the alluvium provided
that said fish traps were not expressly
intended or designed to cause or bring about
the accretion.
FACTS
JULIANA ZAPATA owned 2 parcels of in the
province of Pampanga, adjoining a non-navigable
and non-floatable river called the Candalaga
Creek. These 2 lands were registered in her name.
In 1915, when the cadastral survey of San
Fernando was begun, the width of the Candalaga
Creek adjoining the two parcels of land owned by
Juliana Zapata was about 90 or 100 meters.
However, later, the width was reduced to 15
meters, because soil bad been accumulated by the
water current of the river on the banks of said 2
lots that an additional 3 lots had been added to
the property.
In 1956, ZAPATA filed a petition to claim the
3 lots belong to her by accretion, as provided for
in Art. 457 of the Civil Code and prayed that the
same be registered in her name. The DIRECTOR
OF LANDS objected to the petition and prayed
that the registration of the 3 lots in the name of
Zapata be denied and that they be declared to
form part of the public domain. The trial court
granted the petition of ZAPATA. Hence, the
DIRECTOR OF LANDS appealed. The
DIRECTOR OF LANDS contended that Art. 457 of
the Civil Code should not be applied in the
present case because the accretion or deposit of
alluvial soil was not due to the natural effect of
the current of Calandaga Creek but was
artificially induced on account of the erection of
the fish traps on the creek, such as salag net,
bunuan (bamboo trap), sabat (cutting of channels)
and fencing that the fishermen bad built in the
stream,
ISSUE
Whether or not the alluvial accretion was
entirely due to the setting tip of such fish traps.
RULING
NO. True, those fish traps might have slowed
down the current of the Candalaga Creek and
might have brought about or caused the accretion.
But as there was no evidence to show that the
setting up or erection of the fish traps was
expressly intended or designed to cause or bring
about the accretion ZAPATA may still invoke the
benefit of the provisions of Art. 457 of the Civil
Code to support her claim of title thereto.
Moreover, the fishermen who since 1894 used to
set up fish traps in the creek, later on secured
permit from the Government that auctioned off
the right or license to set up fish traps in the creek,
and the setting up of such fish traps stopped or
was discontinued even before 1926. Being that the
petition to was only 1956, years after, it all
showed that the alluvial accretion was not entirely
due to the setting up of such fish traps.
AGUSTIN vs. IAC
GR No. 66075-76. July 5, 1990
Because of accretion, the land of A was
transferred to the land of B. The alluvium
then is owned by B. However, when because
of a sudden change in the course of river, the
land was reverted back to the property of A, B
still owned the same.
FACTS
The Cagayan River separates the towns of
Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the east in
the province of Cagayan.
In 1919, the lands east of the Cagayan River
were covered by the Tuguegarao Cadastre. On the
left of the River are the towns of Solana. In 1925,
EULOGIO AGUSTIN was issued an Original
Certificate of Title, covering the land east of the
Cagayan River.
As the years went by, the Cagayan River
moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on the
western bank. The shifting of the river and the
siltation continued until 1968. In 1950, all lands
west of the river were included in the Solana
Cadastre. Among these occupying lands covered
by the Solana Cadastre were RESPONDENTS
MARIA MELAD, TIMOTEO MELAD, PABLO
BINAYUG & GERONIMA UBINA, respondents.
Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded
lands of the Tuguerarao Cadastre on its eastern
bank among which was AGUSTIN's lot,
depositing the alluvium as accretion on the land
possessed by BINAYUG on the western bank.
However, in 1968, after a big flood, the
Cagayan River changed its course, returned to its
1919 bed, and, in the process, cut across the lands
of RESPONDENTS, whose lands were transferred
on the eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of the river.
To cultivate those lots they had to cross the river.
In 1969, while the RESPONDENTS and their
tenants were planting corn an their lots located on
the eastern side of the Cagayan River, AGUSTIN,
accompanied by the mayor and some policemen
of Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands as their
own and drove away the RESPONDENTS from
the premises.
Hence, RESPONDENTS filed a complaint to
recover their lots and their accretions. The lower
court ruled in their favor. Hence, AGUSTIN
appealed.
ISSUE
Whether or not the accretion belong to
RESPONDENTS.
RULING
YES. The accretion belonged to
RESPONDENTS and not AGUSTIN.
Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the
following requisites are present:
(1) that the deposit he gradual and
imperceptible;
(2) that it resulted from the effects of the
current of the water; and
(3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the bank of a river
(Republic vs. CA, 132 SCRA 514).
All these requisites of accretion are present in
this case for, as the trial court found that the
Cagayan River did move year by year from 1919
to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. It was gradual
and imperceptible. Within this period, the
alluvium deposited on the other side has become
greater in area than the original lands of
AGUSTIN in both cases. Still the addition in every
year is imperceptible in nature, one could not
discern it but can be measured after the lapse of a
certain time.
The reason for this principle is because, if
lands bordering on streams are exposed to floods
and other damage due to the destructive force of
the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject
to encumbrances and various kinds of easements,
it is only just that such risks or dangers as may
prejudice the owners thereof should in some way
be compensated by the right of accretion.
The RESPONDENTS' ownership of the
accretion to their lands was not lost upon the
sudden and abrupt change of the course of the
Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to
its old 1919 bed, and separated or transferred said
accretions to the other side (or eastern bank) of the
river. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code
apply to this situation.
In the case at bar, the sudden change of course
of the Cagayan River as a result of a strong
typhoon in 1968 caused a portion of the lands of
the private respondents to be "separated from the
estate by the current." Hence, RESPONDENTS
have retained the ownership of the portion that
was transferred by avulsion to the other side of
the river.
VDA. DE NAZARENO vs. CA
GR No. 98054. June 6, 1996
Accretion to be rightfully claimed by the
riparian owner must not me man-made or
artificial. When the accretion was caused by
the sawdust dumped on the river, the riparian
owner cannot claim the deposited land
because it already formed part of the public
domain.
FACTS
Antonio Nazareno, predecessor-in-interest of
petitioners DESAMPARADO VDA. DE
NAZARENO and LETICIA NAZARENO-TAPIA
owned a parcel of land in Cagayan de Oro City. In
1979, he leased portions of said land to private
respondents JOSE SALASALAN and LEO
RABAYA, who built their respective houses
therein. In the latter part of 1982, SALASALAN
ET AL. allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a
result, Antonio Nazareno and VDA. DE
NAVARENO ET AL. filed a case for ejectment,
which was granted by the court. Later, despite
successive efforts in court by SALASALAN ET
AL., the court finally executed its judgment and
they were ejected from the lots they occupied.
Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the
approval by the Bureau of Lands of a survey plan
with a view to perfecting his title over the
accretion area being claimed by him. Before the
approved survey plan could be released to the
applicant however, SALASALAN ET AL.
protested. Upon order of the District Land Officer,
respondent Land Investigator AVELINO LABIS
conducted an investigation and rendered a report,
recommending that the survey plan in the name
of Antonio Nazareno, be cancelled and that
private respondents be directed to file appropriate
public land applications. Based on the said report,
respondent Regional Director of the Bureau of
Lands Roberto Hilario ordered the amendment of
the survey plan in the name of Antonio Nazareno
by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by
SALASALAN ET AL. who, if qualified, may file
public land applications covering their respective
portions.
Respondent Director of Lands ABELARDO
PALAD then ordered Antonio Nazareno to vacate
the portions adjudicated to SALASALAN ET AL.
and to remove whatever improvements they have
introduced thereon. He also ordered that
SALASALAN ET AL. be placed in possession
thereof. Upon the denial of the motion for
reconsideration, VDA. DE NAZARENO ET AL.,
as heirs of late Antonio Nazareno filed a case to
annul the order of PALAD. Their argument was
that the subject land was not a public land but
rather a private land being an accretion to
Antonio Nazarenos titled property, applying
Article 457 of the Civil Code. They added that the
accretion site was the result of the late Antonio
Nazareno's labor consisting in the dumping of
boulders, soil and other filling materials into the
Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his
land.
ISSUE
(1) Whether or not the subject land formed
part of the property of NAZARENO through
accretion.
(2) Whether or not the property was a public
land.
RULING
(1) NO. Accretion, as a mode of acquiring
property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code,
requires the concurrence of these requisites:
(1) that the deposition of soil or
sediment be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be the result of the action of
the waters of the river (or sea); and
(3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or
the sea coast).
These are called the rules on alluvium which if
present in a case, give to the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any
accretion gradually received from the effects of
the current of waters.
However, in the case at bar, the 2nd and 3rd
requisites were absent. Hence, VDA. DE
NAZARENO ET AL., could not claim the rights of
a riparian owner.
The 3rd requisite that the alluvium be the
result of the action of the waters of the river was
not met since the subject land was the direct result
of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley
Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations.
Even if this Court were to take into consideration
petitioners' submission that the accretion site was
the result of the late Antonio Nazareno's labor
consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and
other filling materials into the Balacanas Creek
and Cagayan River bounding his land, the same
would still be part of the public domain.
The 2nd requisite that the deposit of soil or
sediment be gradual and imperceptible was also
not met it could not be claimed that the
accumulation of such boulders, soil and other
filling materials was gradual and imperceptible,
resulting from the action of the waters or the
current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan
River. The word "current' 'Indicates the
participation of the body of water in the ebb and
flow of waters due to high and low tide.
The conclusion of the court, therefore, was
that the accretion was man-made or artificial. The
requirement that the deposit should be due to the
effect of the current of the river is indispensable.
This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all
deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it
differently, alluvium must be the exclusive work
of nature.
 (2) YES. The property was a public land, being
an artificial accretion of sawdust.. Hence, it was a
proper subject of a public land applications.
The court agreed with SALASALAN ET AL.
that VDA. DE NAZARENO ET AL. were
estopped from denying the public character of the
subject land, as well as the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Lands when the late Antonio Nazareno
filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA).
The mere filing of said Application constituted an
admission that the land being applied for was
public land, having been the subject of a survey
plan.
HEIRS OF NAVARRO vs. IAC
GR No. 116290. December 8, 2000
Manila Bay is a sea and not a lake. When by the action
of Manila Bay, land is formed, it is not accretion to be
owned by the riparian owner under the Civil Code but
is rather converted into foreshore land as a property of
public domain, as deemed under the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866.
In 1946, SINFOROSO PASCUAL filed an
applications for foreshore lease covering a tract of
foreshore land in Bataan, having an area of
approximately 17 hectares. This application was
denied.
Subsequently, EMILIANO NAVARRO,
predecessor-in-interest of the HEIRS OF
EMILIANO also filed fishpond application with
the Bureau of Fisheries covering 25 hectares of
foreshore also in Bataan. Initially, such application
was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the
ground that the property, formed part of the
public domain but upon a motion for
reconsideration, the Director gave due course to
his application but only to the extent of 7 hectares
of the property.
In the early part of 1960, PASCUAL filed an
application to register and confirm his title to a
parcel of land and said have area an area of
146,611 square meters. PASCUAL claimed that
this land is an accretion to his property. It is
bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay River
as well as the Bulacan River flow downstream
and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing
sand and silt on PASCUALs land, thus claiming
accretion as the riparian owner.
NAVARRO thereupon filed an opposition to
PASCUAL's application. NAVARRO claimed that
the public domain, it being a part of the foreshore
of Manila Bay; that he was a lessee and in
possession of a part of the subject property by
virtue of a fishpond permit issued by the Bureau
of Fisheries and confirmed by the Office of the
President; and that he had already converted the
area covered by the lease into a fishpond.
During the pendency of the land registration
case, PASCUAL filed a complaint for ejectment
against Emiliano Navarro, one Marcelo Lopez and
their privies, alleged by Pascual to have
unlawfully claimed and possessed, through
stealth, force and strategy, a portion of the subject
property covered by his land. Because of the
similarity of the parties and the subject matter, the
appealed case for ejectment was consolidated
with the land registration case and was jointly
tried by the court a quo.
In 1961, during the pendency of the trial of the
consolidated cases, NAVARRO died and was
substituted by his HEIRS. Subsequently, in 1962,
PASCUAL died and was substituted by his HEIRS
as well.
During trial, the court found out that the land
of PASCUAL was bounded on the east by the
Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan River,
and on the north the Manila Bay. The Talisay and
Bulacan rivers come from inland flowing
downstream towards the Manila bay. In other
words, between the Talisay River and the Bulacan
River is the property of applicants with both
rivers acting as the boundary to said land and the
flow of both rivers meeting and emptying into the
Manila Bay. The subject land was formed at the
tip or apex of PASCUALs land adding thereto the
land now sought to be registered.
In 1975, the court rendered judgment in favor
of the HEIRS OF PASCUAL, finding the subject
property to be foreshore land and, being a part of
the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land
registration proceedings. On appeal, IAC reversed
the said decision.
Aggrieved, the HEIRS OF NAVARRO
appealed the case. They contended that they
owned the disputed land by accretion under Art.
457 of the Civil Code as said land was an
accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay
and Bulacan Rivers, which run their course on the
eastern and western boundaries of their land.
ISSUES
(1)Whether or not Manila Bay is a lake.
(2) Whether or not the land was formed by the
action of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers as an
accretion of was formed by the action of the
Manila Bay as a foreshore land.
RULING
(1) NO. It is a sea. It should not be compared
with Laguna de Bay, which is a lake. A Bay is an
opening into the land where the water is shut in
on all sides except at the entrance; an inlet of the
sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a
bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a
lake.
The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on
a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to
be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined
petitioners own tract of land on the northern side.
As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of
the Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866, which states that:
Lands added to the shores by
accretions and alluvial deposits caused by
the action of the sea, from part of the
public domain. When they are no longer
washed by the waters of the sea and are
not necessary for the coast guard service,
the Government shall declare them to be
the property of the owners of the estates
 adjacent thereto and as increment
thereof."
(2) The land was not formed by the action
of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers. It was formed
by the action of Manila Bay, hence, it was a
foreshore land, which belonged to the public
domain.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is
deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited on
the estate fronting the river bank. The owner of
such estate is called the riparian owner. Riparian
owners, the latter being owners of lands
bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other
tidal. The alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of
the Civil Code, is automatically owned by the
riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit
can be seen but is not automatically registered
property, hence, subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property
under said Article 457 requires the concurrence of
the following requisites:
(1) that the accumulation of soil or
sediment be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be the result of the action of
the waters of the river; and
(3) that the land where the accretion
takes place is adjacent to the bank of the
river.
In the present case, the 2nd and 3rd requisites
were absent. The 2nd requisite was absent
because if the accretion were to be attributed to
the action of either or both of the Talisay and
Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been
deposited on either or both of the eastern and
western boundaries of petitioners own tract of
land, not on the northern portion thereof which is
adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus,
is the third requisite of accretion, which is, that
the alluvium is deposited on the portion of
claimant's lot, which is adjacent to the river bank.
BAGAIPO vs. CA
GR No. 116290. December 8, 2000
The decrease in petitioners land area and the
corresponding expansion of respondents
property were the combined effect of erosion
and accretion respectively. Art. 457 and not
Art. 461 of the Civil Code then is applicable.
Registration does not protect the riparian
owner against the diminution of the area of
his land through gradual changes in the
course of the adjoining stream.
FACTS
Petitioner DIONISIA P. BAGAIPO was the
registered owner of Lot No. 415, an agricultural
land situated in Ma-a, Davao City. It was
bounded on the southeast by the Davao River.
Respondent LEONOR LOZANO on the other
hand, was the owner of a registered parcel of land
located across and opposite the southeast portion
of petitioners lot facing the Davao River.
LOZANO acquired and occupied her property in
1962 when his wife inherited the land from her
father who died that year.
In 1989, BAGAIPO a complaint for Recovery
of Possession against Lozano for the recovery of a
land area , which BAGAIPO lost when the Davao
River traversed her property. BAGAIPO
contended that as a result of a change in course of
the said river, her property became divided into
three lots. Later, BAGAIPO commissioned a
survey of Lot 415 and it was showed therein that
her land was taken up by the new course of the
Davao River and was then illegally occupied by
LOZANO. She presented a witness who testified
that the change of the course of the Davao River
was caused by a big flood in 1968 and that the
river which flowed previously in front of a chapel
located 15 meters away from the riverbank within
Bagaipos property now flowed behind it.
For his part, LOZANO insisted that the land
claimed by BAGAIPO was actually an accretion to
their titled property. He asserted that the Davao
River did not change its course and that the
reduction in BAGAIPOs domain was caused by
gradual erosion due to the current of the Davao
River. He added that it was also because of the
rivers natural action that silt slowly deposited
and added to his land over a long period of time.
He presented 3 witnesses, all who concurred that
each time there was flood, there was erosion that
occurred on the property of BAGAIPO, which
carried away the soil therein.
In 1991, after the trial court conducted an
ocular inspection, it dismissed the complaint. It
concluded that the applicable law was not Art.
461 but rather Art. 457, which states that to the
owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters.
Hence, this appeal by BAGAIPO.
ISSUE
(1) Whether or not the decrease in land area
was brought about by erosion and not a change in
the rivers course.
(2) Whether or not Art. 453 and not Art. 461
should be applied.
(3) Whether or not the registration of
BAGAIPO over the accretion to the land by a
Torrens certificate of title precluded LOZANO
from being the owner thereof.
RULING
(1) The trial court and the appellate court both
found that the decrease in land area was brought
about by erosion and not a change in the rivers
course. This conclusion was reached after the trial
judge observed during ocular inspection that the
banks located on petitioners land are sharp,
craggy and very much higher than the land on the
other side of the river. Additionally, the riverbank
on respondents side is lower and gently sloping.
The lower land therefore naturally received the
alluvial soil carried by the river current.
(2) The decrease in petitioners land area and
the corresponding expansion of respondents
property were the combined effect of erosion and DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN ALLUVIUM
accretion respectively. Art. 461 of the Civil Code AND AVULSION
then is inapplicable. Petitioner could not claim 1. Alluvium is a piece of land created by
ownership over the old abandoned riverbed accretion under 457. The deposit of soil is
because the same was inexistent. The riverbeds gradual; in avulsion, it is a sudden or
former location could not even be pinpointed abrupt process.
with particularity since the movement of the 2. In the former, the soil cannot be identified
Davao River took place gradually over an whereas in the latter, the portion that is
unspecified period of time, up to the present. segregated is identifiable or verifiable.
The rule is well-settled that accretion 3. Alluvium belongs to the owner to which
benefits a riparian owner when the following it was attached but avulsion belongs to
requisites are present: the owner from whom the property was
1) That the deposit be gradual and detached
imperceptible;
2) That it resulted from the effects ARTICLE 460: Trees uprooted and carried away by
of the current of the water; and the current of the waters belong to the owner of the
3) That the land where accretion land upon which they may be cast, if the owners do not
takes place is adjacent to the bank of claim them within 6 months. If such owners claim
the river. them, they shall pay the expenses incurred in gathering
These requisites were sufficiently proven them or putting them in a safe place
in favor of respondents. In the absence of
evidence that the change in the course of the river ARTICLE 461: River beds which are abandoned thru
was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion, the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto
the presumption is that the change was gradual belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the
and was caused by alluvium and erosion. new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the
(3)The fact that the accretion to his land used owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the
to pertain to plaintiffs estate, which is covered by right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof,
a Torrens certificate of title, cannot preclude him which vale shall not exceed the value of the area
(defendant) from being the owner thereof. occupied.
Registration does not protect the riparian owner
against the diminution of the area of his land GENERAL RULE: The abandoned river beds ipso
through gradual changes in the course of the facto belong to the owners whose land are
adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of occupied by the new course in proportion of the
rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the area lost. But the owners of the land adjoining the
current become the property of the owners of the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by
banks. Such accretions are natural incidents to paying the value thereof.
land bordering on running streams and the REQUISITES:
provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not 1. the change must be
affected by the Land Registration Act. sudden, not gradual;
2. the changing of the course
ARTICLE 458: The owners of the estates adjoining must be more or less
ponds or lagoons do not require the land left dry by the permanent and not
natural decrease of the waters, or lose that inundated temporary over flooding
by them in extraordinary floods. of anothers land;
3. the change of the river
The owners of the lands adjoining ponds and lagoons bed must be natural one
do not acquire the lands left dry by the natural decrease and not by artificial means;
of the water. 4. there must be a definite
abandonment by the
ARTICLE 459: Whenever the current of a river, creek, government. No effort has
or torrent, segregates from an estate on its banks been made to bring back
known portion of land and transfers it to another the river to its old bed;
estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated 5. the river must continue to
portion belonged retains the ownership of it provided exist.
that he removes the same within 2 years.
If the river dries up, then it belongs to the
This is AVUSION. It is the process public domain. It has no effect on the
whereby the current of a river, creek, or private lands.
torrent segregates from an estate on its
bank a known portion of land and Art. 58 of PD 1067 states that when the
transfers it to another state. river or stream suddenly changes its
course to private lands, the owners of the
avulsion is also referred as delayed affected lands:
accession 1. may not compel the
government to restore the
river to its former bed;
 2. they cannot restrain the
govt. from taking steps to
revert the river or stream
to its former course; So, the
owners have no right as to
the acts or omission by the
government.
3. they are not entitled to
compensation for any
damage sustained thereby.
The owners of the affected lands may
undertake to return the stream or river to
its bed at their own expense, provided:
1. a permit is secured from the DOH
and DOTC;
2. work commence within 2 yrs
from the change of the course of
the river or stream.
ARTICLE 462: Whenever a river, changing its course
by natural causes, opens a new bed thru a private
estate, this bed shall become of public dominion.
ARTICLE 463: Whenever the current of a river
divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or
part thereof isolated, the owner if the land retains his
ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is
separated from the estate by the current.
This refers to the formation of island by the
branching off a river as distinguished from the
formation of islands by successive accumulation of
alluvial deposits (unidentifiable sediments) referred to
in Arts. 464 and 465. In the first, no accession takes
place, the owner retaining his ownership of the
segregated portion; in second, accession takes place.
ARTICLE 464: Islands which may be formed on the
seas within the jurisdiction of the Philippines, on lakes,
and of navigable or floatable rivers belong to the State.
ARTICLE 465: Islands which thru successive
accumulation of alluvial deposits are formed in non-
navigable and non-floatable rivers, belong to the
owners of the margins or banks nearest to each of them,
or to the owner of both margins if the island is in the
middle of the river, in which case it shall be divided
longitudinally in halves. If a single island this formed
be more distant from one margin than from the other,
the owner of the nearer margin shall be the sole owner
thereof.
Who owns the island formed by
unidentifiable accumulated deposits? It
depends.
i. if formed on the sea Within the
territorial waters or maritime
zone or jurisdiction of the
Philippines State (464
Patrimonial property)
ii. If formed on lakes, or navigable
or floatable rivers the State.
iii. If formed in non-navigable or
non-floatable rivers
1. If NEARER margin to one
bank, owner of nearer
margin is the sole owner;
2. If EQUIDISTANT, the
island shall be divided
longitudinally in halves,
each bank getting half.
NAVIGABLE OR FLOATABLE RIVER if
useful for floatage and commerce, whether the
tides affect the water or not should benefit trade
and commerce.
SECTION 3: RIGHT OF ACCESSION WITH
RESPECT TO MOVABLE PROPERTY
ARTICLE 466: Whenever two movable things
belonging to different owners are, without bad faith,
united in such a way that they form a single object, the
owner of the principal thing acquires the accessory,
indemnifying the former owner thereof for its value.
3 TYPES OF ACCESSION WITH
RESPECT TO MOVABLE PROPERTY:
a.) adjunction
b.) mixture
c.) specification
ADJUNCTION a process by virtue of which
two movable things belonging to different owners
are untied in such a way that they form a single
object. It is also called conjunction. It may be done
in good faith or bad faith.
KINDS:
(a)inclusion
(b) soldering
(c) escritura
(d) Pintura
(e) weaving
ARTICLE 467: The principal thing, as between to
things incorporated, is deemed to be that to which the
other has been united as an ornament, or for its use or
perfection.
ARTICLE 468: If it cannot be determined by the rule
given in the preceding article which of the two things
incorporated is the principal one, the thing of the
greater value shall be considered, and as between two
things of equal value, that of the greater volume.
In painting and sculpture, writings,
printed matter, engraving and
lithographs, the board, metal, stone,
canvas, paper or parchment, shall be
deemed the accessory thing.
The principal is: (order of preference)
a. that to which the other has been
united as an ornament, or for its
use, or perfection;
b. that of greater volume;
c. that of greater value;
d. that which has greater merits.
ARTICLE 469: Whenever the things united can be
separated without the injury, their respective owners
may demand their separation.
Nevertheless, in case the thing united for the
use, embellishment or perfection of the other, is much
more precious than the principal thing, the owner of
the former may demand its separation, even though the
thing to which it has been incorporated may suffer
some injury.
In a separation without injury (1st par)
there is no real accession here. It is understood
that the 1st paragraph can apply only to soldering
and inclusion because all the rest, separation
would result in substantial injury.
In the 2nd par, there is separation,
although with injury (but not destruction) is
allowed, if the thing united for the use,
embellishment, or perfection of the other is much
more precious than the principal.
ARTICLE 470: Whenever the owner of the accessory
thing has made the incorporation in bad faith, he shall
lose the thing incorporated and shall have the
obligation to indemnify the owner of the principal
thing for the damages he may have suffered.
If the one who has acted in bad faith is the
owner of the principal thing, the owner of the accessory
thing shall have a right to choose between the former
paying him its value or that the thing belonging to him
by separated, even though for this purpose it be
necessary to destroy the principal thing, and on both
cases, furthermore, there shall be indemnity for
damages.
If either one of the owners has made the incorporation
with the knowledge and without the objection of the
other, their respective rights shall be determined as
though both acted in good faith.
RULES IN CASE OF BAD FAITH IN THE
ADJUNCTION
Owner of Accessory is in bad faith
If I in bad faith, will use the varnish on
the chair of my brother, I lose all rights to the
varnish. Moreover, I will be responsible for
damages.
Owner of the principal in bad faith
If I, in bad faith, will use my brothers
lead in soldering my pipes, my brother has
the right to ask for payment of the lead plus
damages; or he may choose to have the lead
removed from the pipes even if the pipes be
destroyed plus damages.
ARTICLE 471: Whenever the owner of the material
employed without his consent has a right to an
indemnity, he may demand that this consist in the
delivery of a thing equal in kind and value, and in all
other respects, to that employed, or else in the price
thereof, according to expert appraisal.
Indemnity how paid?
Either by:
a) delivery of a thing equal in kind
and value (quantity, (quality);
b) or payment of price a appraised
by experts. This rule is applicable
only when the consent of the owner
had not been obtained. The material
may have been the principal or
accessory.
ARTICLE 472: If by the will of the owners two things
of the same or different kinds are mixed, or if the
mixture occurs by chance, and in the latter case things
are not separable without the injury, each owner shall
acquire a right proportional to the part belonging to
him, bearing in mind the value of the things mixed or
confused.
ARTICLE 473: If by the will of only one owner, but in
good faith, two things of the same or different kinds are
mixed or confused, the rights of the owners shall be
determined by the provisions of the preceding article.
If the one who caused the mixture or
confusion acted in bad faith, he shall lose the thing
belonging to him thus mixed or confused, besides being
obliged to pay indemnity for the damages caused to the
owner of the other thing with which his own was
mixed.
MIXTURE - combination or union of
materials where the respective identities
of the component elements are lost. (As
distinguished from adjunction, there is in
mixture greater inter-penetration or
decomposition of the objects that have
been mixed.
2 KINDS OF MIXTURE:
1. COMMIXTION (if solids are mixed)
2. CONFUSION (if liquids are mixed)
RULES OF MIXTURE:
If the mixture is caused by one owner in
good faith, or by the will of both owners,
or by chance (accident), or by a common
agent, then CO-OWNERSHIP results,
each owner acquiring an interest or right
proportional to the value of his material
i) if the mixture is made by the owner in
bad faith, then --
1. he loses his material
2. and is liable for
damages to penalize
his bad faith.
ii) When the things mixed or confused
are of exactly the same kind, quantity
and quality, all that is needed would
be to divide the mixture into equal
parts.
SANTOS vs. BERNABE
GR No. 31163. November 6, 1929
When the palays of 2 different owners were
mixed up and it could not be determined as to
who owns which. The owners shall be paid not
for the entire palay but only a right
proportional to the part belonging to him.
FACTS
In 1928, plaintiff URBANO SANTOS
deposited in defendant JOSE BERNABEs
warehouse 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay. On
the same day, co-defendant PABLO TIONGSON
also deposited 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of the
same grain.
Later, TIONGSON filed in court a complaint
in against BERNABE, to recover from the latter
the 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay he deposited
in the latters warehouse. At the same time, the
court granted him a writ of attachment. At the
time of the attachment, the sheriff only found only
924 cavans and 311 kilos of palay in said
warehouse. SANTOS intervened in the
attachment of the palay but the sheriff proceeded
with the attachment upon filing of the proper
bond by TIONGSON. The attached property was
sold at public auction and the proceeds from it
were delivered to TIONGSON.
SANTOS then filed an action in court. He
contended that TIONGSON could not claim the
924 cavans and 31 kilos of palay attached by the
sheriff as part of those were deposited by him.
The court ordered TIONGSON to pay
SANTOS the value of the 778 cavans and 38 kilos
of palay, at the rate of P3 per cavan. Hence,
TIONGSON and the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF
appealed.
first paying indemnity for the value of the work, or
demand indemnity for the material.
If in making of the thing bad faith intervened,
the owner of the material shall have the right to
appropriate the work to himself without paying
anything to the maker, or to demand of the latter that
he indemnify him for value of the material and the
damages he nay have suffered. However, the owner of
the material cannot appropriate the work in case of the
value of the latter, for artistic or scientific reasons are
considerably more than that of the material.
SPECIFICATION - the giving of a new form to
anothers material thru the application of labor.
The material undergoes a transformation or
change of identity.
RULE IN CASE THE OWNER AND WORKER
ARE IN GOOD FAITH:
a. appropriation on the part of the
owner of the work;
b. reimbursement of the materials
employed by the worker.

ISSUE RULE IN CASE WORKER IS IN BAD FAITH:

Whether or not TIONGSON should refund
the value of SANTOS 778 cavans and 38 kilos of 1. appropriate the work without paying for
palay. labor;
2. demand payment for the material used
RULING plus damages.
NO. SANTOS should not be paid for the EXCEPTION: The thing shall be used for scientific
entire palay he deposited but only a right purposes.
proportional to the part belonging to him.
The palay of SANTOS and TIONGSON were ADJUNCTION MIXTURE SPECIFICATION
mixed up when they both deposited their palays 1. involves at 1. involves 1. may involve
in BERNABEs warehouse. It was because the least 2 things; at least 2 only 1 thing
palays did not bear any marks or signs, nor were things (may be more)
they separated one from the other. At the time of but form is
the attachment and the sheriff only found 924 changed
cavans and 311 kilos of palay in BERNABEs 2. As a rule, 2. As a rule, 2. As a rule,
warehouse. accessory co- accessory follows
There being no means of separating from said follows the ownership the principal
924 cavans and 31 1/2 kilos of palay those principal results
belonging to SANTOS and those to TIONGSON, 3. The things 3. The 3. The new object
Art. 472 (then Art. 381) of the Civil Code shall joined retain things retains or
apply. Being that the number of kilos in a cavan their nature mixed or preserves the
was not determined, each of the owner then, confused nature of the
SANTOS and TIONGSON shall acquire a right may either original object.
proportional to the part belonging to each. retain or
Hence, 924 cavans of palay were attached and lose their
sold. SANTOS, who deposited 778 cavans, shall respective
have the right over 398.49 thereof or the value nature.
thereof at the rate of P3 per cavan. TIONGSON,
who deposited 1,026 cavans, shall have the right AGUIRRE vs. PHENG
over 525.51, or the value thereof at the rate of P3 GR No. l-20851. September 3, 1966
per cavan.
Although ordinarily, an owner of a property
ARTICLE 474: One who in good faith employs the would be entitled to any accession thereto, the
material of another in whole or in part in order to make rule is different where the works or
a thing if a different kind, shall appropriate the thing improvements or the accession was made on
thus transformed as his own, indemnifying the owner the property by one who acted in good faith.
of the material for its value. The governing provision is Art. 474.
If the material is more precious than the
transformed thing or is more value, its owner may, at FACTS
his option, appropriate the new thing to himself. After
 In 1954, Vicente and Aldaba sold to petitioner
JESUS AGUIRRE a circular bolted steel tank with
a capacity of 5,000 gallons, for the sum of P900.00.
AGUIRRE, however, failed to take physical
possession of the tank, having been prevented
from doing so by the municipal authorities of Los
Baos, Laguna (where the tank was located), in
view of the claim of ownership being made by the
Bureau of Public Highways.
However, 6 months after the tank was sold to
AGUIRRE, Vicente and Teresa Aldaba again sold
the same tank on to Zosimo Gabriel, for P900.00.
Gabriel, in turn, sold it to the LEONORA &
COMPANY on for P2,500.00. After some
alterations and improvements made on the tank,
Leonora & Company was able to sell the tank to
National Shipyard & Steel Corporation
(NASSCO), for P14,500.00.
AGUIRRE immediately filed with NASSCO a
formal notice of his claim of ownership of the
tank. As a consequence, NASSCOs payment of
the purchase price to LEONORA & COMPANY
was suspended.
Then, AGUIRRE instituted a civil case against
VICENTE PHENG, in his capacity as General
Manager of LEONORA & COMPANY and the
ALDABAS, for delivery to him of the tank, with
damages.
On the other hand, because of the suspension
of payment of the purchase price, LEONORA &
COMPANY filed a civil case against NASSCO,
praying for the delivery of the purchase price of
P14,500.00, or the reimbursement of the sum of
P12,229.00 allegedly representing the actual
investment and expenses made and incurred to
put the tank in usable condition. AGUIRRE
intervened in said proceeding.
These two cases were jointly heard by the trial
court. The court then declared AGUIRRE as the
absolute owner of the tank and that the
subsequent sales were declared null and void and
of no effect.
Aldaba and Leonora and Co. and the National
Shipyards and Steel Corporation were ordered:
1. to deliver AGUIRRE the tank wherein
the latter would have to pay Leonora and
Co. P11,299.00 which it spent for the
improvement of the tank.
2. in case that delivery is impossible, to
pay AGUIRRE P900, the original purchase
price of the tank, or
From this decision, AGUIRRE appealed to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the same.
Hence, this appeal. AGUIRRE alleged that he
should not only be paid P900 but P14,500, which
was the value of the tank at the time of its
delivery to NASSCO. He also contended that
under Art. 440 of the Civil Code, his ownership of
the property entitled him to everything that is
produced thereby, or is incorporated or attached
thereto, either naturally or artificially.
ISSUE
(1) Whether or not AQUIRRE, as owner of the
tank, would be entitled to any accession thereto.
(2) Whether the value for indemnifying
AGUIRRE should be P900, which was its original
value or P14,500, which was its present value
then.
RULING
(1) NO. Although ordinarily, an owner of a
property would be entitled to any accession
thereto, the rule is different where the works or
improvements or the accession was made on the
property by one who acted in good faith. And it is
not contended that the making of the
improvements and incurring of expenses
amounting to P11,299.00 by Leonora & Company
was done in bad faith. The governing provision is
Art. 474 (then Art. 466) of the Civil Code.
(2) The reimbursement should be P900, the
original value of the tank when it was bought by
AGUIRRE.
It was clear that there was an accession by
specification: LEONORA AND COMPANY, as
purchaser acting in good faith, spending
P11,299.00 for the reconditioning of the tank
which was later adjudged to belong to AGUIRRE.
Furthermore, to uphold AGUIRRE's
contention that he was entitled to the sum of
P14,500 for the price of the tank in its present
condition, would be to allow him to enrich
himself at the expense of another. The lower
courts, therefore, acted correctly in ordering the
reimbursement to LEONORA & COMPANY for
the expenses it made on the tank.
ARTICLE 475: In the preceding articles, sentimental
value shall be duly appreciated.
QUIETING OF TITLE
ARTICLE 476: Whenever there is a cloud on title to
real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth
and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, unenforceable,
and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be
brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a
cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any
interest therein.
WHEN IS THERE A CLOUD IN THE TITLE?
1) There is an instrument (deed or contract) or
record or claim or encumbrance or
proceeding;
2) Which is APPARENTLY valid or effective;
3) But in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, or extinguished or
barred by extinctive prescription;
4) And may be prejudicial to the title.
What would be the test? If proof is
essential, the cloud exists. If proof is not
needed, cloud is not present.
The rule merely refers to immovable or
real property or any interest therein. But
by analogy, the principle may also apply
 to personal property particularly the
vessels which partake the nature of real
property.
Nature of the action:
a) This is an action in personam because it is
directed against the defeated party or
privies.
b) It may also be considered quasi in rem
since it involves interest in a real
property.
c) An action to quiet title against a co-owner
is not res judicata as to the other co-
owners if they were not made parties
thereto
WHEN DOES THE ACTION TO QUIET THE
TITLE PRESCRIBE?
a. If the plaintiff is in POSSESSION
of the property, the action does
not prescribe. He may wait until
his possession is disturbed or his
title is attacked before taking
steps to vindicate his right.
b. If the plaintiff is not in possession
of the property, the action may
prescribe. Moreover, if the action
is brought within the period of
limitation, it may be barred by
laches where there is no excuse
offered for the failure to assert the
title sooner. If somebody else has
possession, the period of
prescription for the recovery of
land is either 10 yrs (GF) or 30 yrs
(BF). But as a GENERAL RULE, it
is settled that the action to quiet
title does not prescribe.
SECUYA vs. VDA. DE SELMA
GR No. 136021. February 22, 2000
In an action to quiet title, the plaintiffs or
complainants must demonstrate a legal or an
equitable title to, or an interest in, the subject
real property. Likewise, they must show that
the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
that purportedly casts a cloud on their title is
in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. If
the title is not valid on its face, an action for
quieting of title cannot be given due course.
FACTS
A parcel of land was originally sold, and the
covering patent issued, to Maxima Caballero Vda.
de Cario. During her lifetime, she entered into an
Agreement of Partition with Paciencia Sabellona,
whereby the former bound herself and parted 1/3
portion of said lot in favor of the latter.
Sabellona took possession and occupation of
that 1/3 portion of said lot adjudicated to her. In
1953, Sabellona sold 3,0000 sq. m. portion thereof
to Dalmacio Secuya for P1,850 by means of a
private document which was lost. Such sale was
admitted and confirmed by Ramon Sabellona,
only heir of Paciencia Sabellona in a Deed of
Confirmation of Sale.
In 1972, defendant-respondent GERARDA
SELMA bought a parcel of land, which embraced
the 3,000 sq. m. portion of land possessed by the
SECUYAS. SELMA lodged a complaint against
the SECUYAS, asserting ownership over the land
inherited by plaintiffs-petitioners from Dalmacio
Secuya of which they had long been in possession
in concept of owner. SECUYA claimed that she
was the registered owner of said lot having bough
it from one Cesaria Caballero and had been in
possession of the same since then.
An action for quieting of title was filed by the
SECUYAS against VDA. DE SELMA. They
anchored their claim of ownership on two
documents: the Agreement of Partition executed
by Maxima Caballero and Paciencia Sabellona and
the Deed of Confirmation of Sale executed by
Ramon Sabellona.
The appellate court debunked the SECUYAS'
claim of ownership of the land, affirming the trial
court's ruling, and upheld VDA. DE SELMAs title
thereto, since the latter's title can be traced to a
valid TCT.
Hence, this appeal by the HEIRS OF
SECUYAS.
ISSUE
Whether or not the HEIRS OF SECUYAS had
the requisite title to pursue an action for quieting
of title.
RULING
NO. Under Art. 476, in an action to quiet title,
the plaintiffs or complainants must demonstrate a
legal or an equitable title to, or an interest in, the
subject real property. Likewise, they must show
that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
that purportedly casts a cloud on their title is in
fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
The HEIRS OF SECUYA insisted that they had
been occupying the disputed property for 47
years before they filed their Complaint for
quieting of title. However, there was no proof that
they had exercised their rights and duties as
owners of the same. They argue that they had
been gathering the fruits of such property; yet, it
would seem that they had been remiss in their
duty to pay land taxes. If petitioners really
believed that they owned the property, they
should have been more vigilant in protecting their
rights thereto. As noted earlier, they did nothing
to enforce whatever proprietary rights they had
over the disputed parcel of land.
The HEIRS OF SECUYA relied their
ownership on the Agreement of Partition
executed by Maxima Caballero and Paciencia
Sabellona and the Deed of Confirmation of Sale
executed by Ramon Sabellona.
The Agreement of Partition was a mere
Express Trust was because there was no property
to partition and the parties were not co-owners.
Being that there was a repudiation of the express
trust when the heirs of Maxima Caballero failed to
deliver or transfer the property to Paciencia
Sabellona, and instead sold the same to a third
person not privy to the Agreement., all, the
subsequent sales transactions involving the land
in dispute and the titles covering it must be
upheld, in the absence of proof that the said
transactions were fraudulent and irregular.
Although there was a Deed of Confirmation of
Sale executed by Ramona Sabellona, there was an
absence of the Deed of Sale itself. Moreover, the lot,
including the disputed portion, had been the
subject of several sales transactions. The title
thereto had been transferred several times,
without any protestation or complaint from the
HEIRS OF SECUYA.
In any case, VDA. DE SECUYAs title was
amply supported by clear evidence, while
SECUYA's claim was barren of proof.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST
COMPANY vs. ALEJO
GR No. 141970 . September 10, 2001
What was asked by Metrobank was for relief
from the peremptory declaration of nullity of
the TCT covering the mortgaged land, which
had been issued without first giving
METROPOLITAN BANK an opportunity to
be heard. Filing an action for quieting of title
will not remedy what it perceived as a
disregard of due process; it is therefore not an
appropriate remedy.
FACTS
In 1995 and 1996, Spouses Raul and Cristina
Acampado obtained loans from
METROPOLITAN BANK, & TRUST COMPANY
in the amounts of P5,000,000 and P2,000,000,
respectively. As security for the payment of these
credit accommodations, the Acampados executed
in favor of METROPOLITAN BANK, a real estate
mortgage over a registered parcel of land in
Valenzuela City.
Later, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
the TCT of said lot was filed by Respondent SY
TAN SE against Spouses Acampado. Despite
being the registered mortgagee of the real
property covered by the title sought to be
annulled, METROPOLITAN BANK was not made
a party thereto nor was it notified of the pending
case.
Because the spouses defaulted in the payment
of their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings
over the mortgaged property were initiated in
1997. During the public auction,
METROPOLITAN BANK was the highest bidder.
A Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor.
When the redemption period lapsed exactly a
year after, METROPOLITAN BANK executed an
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership for the
issuance of a new TCT in its name. However, the
Register of Deeds informed of the existence of the
civil case filed by Respondent SY TAN SE against
Spouses Acampado, where the RTC declared that
the TCT of the Spouses Acampado were null and
void since it was proceeded from an illegitimate
source.
METROPOLITAN BANK then filed a petition
for the annulment of the RC decision with the
Court of Appeals. The same was however denied
because there were other different remedies
available but they were not resorted to by
petitioner. It ruled that petitioner ought to have
filed, instead, a petition for relief from judgment
or an action for quieting of title.
Hence, this petition by METROPOLITAN
BANK.
ISSUE
Whether or not METROPOLITAN BANK
should have instead filed an action for quieting of
title.
RULING
NO. An action for quieting of title was not an
appropriate remedy.
It should be stressed that this case was
instituted to ask for relief from the peremptory
declaration of nullity of the TCT covering the
mortagged land, which had been issued without
first giving METROPOLITAN BANK an
opportunity to be heard. METROPOLITAN
BANK focused on the judgment in the civil case
between Respondent SY TAN SE against Spouses
Acampado which adversely affected it, and which
it therefore sought to annul. Filing an action for
quieting of title will not remedy what it perceived
as a disregard of due process; it is therefore not an
appropriate remedy.
Equally important, an action for quieting of
title is filed only when there is a cloud on title to
real property or any interest therein. As defined, a
"cloud on title is a semblance of title which
appears in some legal form but which is in fact
unfounded." In this case, the subject judgment
cannot be considered as a cloud on petitioners
title or interest over the real property covered
bysaid TCT, which does not even have a
semblance of being a title.
It would not be proper to consider the subject
judgment as a cloud that would warrant the filing
of an action for quieting of title, because to do so
would require the court hearing the action to
modify or interfere with the judgment or order of
another co-equal court. Well-entrenched in our
jurisdiction is the doctrine that a court has no
power to do so, as that action may lead to
confusion and seriously hinder the administration
of justice. Clearly, an action for quieting of title is
not an appropriate remedy in this case.
ARTICLE 477: The plaintiff must have legal or
equitable title to, or interest in the real property which
is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in
possession of said property.
ARTICLE 478: There may also be an action to quiet
title or remove a cloud therefrom when the contract,
instrument or other obligation has been extinguished
or has terminated, or has been barred by extinctive
prescription.
There are 2 INSTANCES where the action
may be used:
a) when the contract etc has ended;
b) when the action is barred by extinctive
prescription.
ARTICLE 479: The plaintiff must return to the
defendant all benefits he may have received from the
latter, or reimburse him for expenses that may have
redounded to the plaintiffs benefit.
ARTICLE 480: The principles of the general law on
the quieting of title are hereby adopted insofar as they
are not in conflict with this Code.
ARTICLE 481: The procedure for the quieting of title
or the removal of a cloud therefrom shall be governed
by such rules of court as the Supreme Court shall
promulgate.
ARTICLE 482: If a building, wall, column, or any
other construction is in danger of falling, the owner
shall be obliged to demolish it or to execute the
necessary work in order to prevent it from falling.
If the proprietor does not comply with the
obligation, the administrative authorities may order the
demolition of the structure at the expense of the owner,
or take measures to insure public safety.
ARTICLE 483: Whenever a large tree threatens to fall
in such a way as to cause damage to the land or
tenement of another or to travellers over public or
private road, the owner of the tree shall be obliged to
fell and remove it; and should he not do so, it shall be
done at his expense by order of the administrative
authorities.
SAPTO vs. FABIANA
GR No. L-11285. May 16, 1958
The court will treat an action for
reconveyance as an action to quiet title
provided that it has all the requisites of the
latter.
Actions to quiet title to property in the
possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
But if he is not in possession thereof, the right
may as well prescribe and barred by
acquisitive prescription.
FACTS
Vicente Sapto was the registered owner of a
parcel of land located in Toril, Davao. When he
died, he left his children Samuel, Constancio, and
Ramon as heirs of the property in question.
Ramon pre-deceased his two brothers, leaving no
other heirs. In 1931, Samuel and Constancio Sapto
executed a Deed of Sale of a portion of 4 hectares
of the said land in favor of defendant APOLONIO
FABIANA, in consideration of the amount of
P245.00. The sale was duly approved by the
Provincial Governor of Davao, but was never
registered. Possession of the land conveyed was
however, transferred to FABIANA, who had been
in the possession thereof from 1931 up to the
present.
Thereafter, Constancio Sapto died without
any issue. When Samuel Sapto died, he was
survived by his wife DORA BAGOBA and two
children, LAUREANA and VICENTE SAPTO. In
1954, DORA BAGOBA and LAUREANA and
VICENTE SAPTO, filed an action in court for the
recovery of the parcel of land sold by their
predecessors to FABIANA in 1931.
After trial, the lower court held that although
the sale between Samuel and Constancio Sapto
and defendant in 1931 was never registered, it
was valid and binding upon the parties and the
vendors' heirs. It also ordered the plaintiffs to
execute the necessary deed of conveyance in
defendant's favor and its annotation in the
certificate of title.
From this judgment, DORA BAGOBA and
LAUREANA and VICENTE SAPTO appealed.
They cited several cases wherein the court has
held that under the martens system, registration is
the operative act that gives validity to the transfer
or creates a lien upon the land. The also averred
that it was error to require them to execute a deed
of conveyance in favor of FABIANA since the
latter's action to obtain it had long prescribed, 20
years having elapsed since the original sale.
ISSUE
(1) Whether or not registration is the operative
act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a
lien upon the land.
(2) Whether or not the right of FABIANA to
obtain a deed of conveyance has already
prescribed since 20 years had already elapsed
since the original sale.
RULING
(1) NO. No enforcement of the contract was in
fact needed, since the delivery of possession of the
land sold had consummated the sale and
transferred title to the purchaser, registration of
the contract not being indispensable as between
the parties. Actually the action for reconveyance
was one to quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud cast
upon appellee's ownership by the refusal of the
appellants to recognize the sale made by their
predecessors. This action accrued only when
appellants initiated their suit to recover the land
in 1954.
In this case, the sale entered into was valid
and binding upon the vendors, one of whom was
Samuel Sapto and is equally binding and effective
against his heirs, DORA BAGOBA and
LAUREANA and VICENTE SAPTO. To hold
otherwise would make of the martens system a
shield for the commission of fraud by the vendors
or his heirs, who would then be able to reconvey
the same property to other persons.
(2) NO. Actions to quiet title to property in the
possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
Art. 480 of the Civil Code, states that the
principles of the general law on the quieting of
title are hereby adopted insofar as they are not in
conflict with this Code. The general law referred
to is American jurisprudence. Under American
jurisprudence, actions to quiet title to property in
the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
The prevailing rule is that the right of a
plaintiff to have his title to land quieted is not
barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in
actual possession of the land, claiming to be
owners thereof. But the rule that the statute of
limitations is not available as a defense to in
action to remove a cloud from title can only be
invoked by a complaint when he is in possession.
If the plaintiff is not in possession of the property,
the action to quite title may also prescribe.
BUCTON vs. GABAR
GR No. L-36359. January 31, 1974
The court will treat an action for specific
performance as an action to quiet title
provided that it has all the requisites of the
latter.
Actions to quiet title to property in the
possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
But if he is not in possession thereof, the right
may as well prescribe and barred by
acquisitive prescription.
FACTS
In 1946, defendant JOSEFINA LLAMOSO
GABAR bought a parcel of land from the spouses
Villarin on installment basis. JOSEFINA entered
into a verbal agreement with her sister-in-law,
plaintiff NICANORA GABAR BUCTON, that the
latter would pay of the purchase price (P1000)
and would then own of the land. Then,
NICANORA gave JOSEFINA the initial amount
of P1,000 and a receipt was issued. NICANORA
also paid P400 and P1,000 respectively on
successive dates, for which, receipts were also
issued.
Afterwards NICANORA and her husband
FELIX BUCTON took possession of the portion of
the land indicated to them by defendants and
built a modest nipa house therein. 2 years after,
they built another house for rent behind the nipa
house. Later, they demolished the nipa house and
in its place constructed a house of strong
materials, with three apartments in the lower
portion for rental purposes. They occupied the
upper portion of this house as their residence
until 1969, when they moved to another house,
converting and leasing the upper portion as a
dormitory.
In 1947, the spouses Villarin executed the
deed of sale of the land abovementioned in favor
of JOSEFINA. Hereafter, NICANORA and FELIX
BUCTON sought to obtain a separate title for their
portion of the land in question. But despite
several demands, JOSEFINA and his husband
ZOSIMO GABAR declined to accommodate them
on the excuse that the entire land was still
mortgaged with the Philippine National Bank as
guarantee for their loan of P3,500. Nevertheless,
NICORA still paid JOSEFINA P400 and P1,000
respectively, as payment for the remaining
balance for their half of the land. For said
payment, separate receipts were also issued.
NICANORA and FELIX BUCTON continued
enjoying their portion of the land, planting fruit
trees and receiving the rentals of their buildings.
In 1953, with the consent of defendants JOSEFINA
and ZOSIMO GABAR, they had the entire land
surveyed and subdivided preparatory to
obtaining their separate title to their portion.
Upon demand for their separate title to the
property, however, JOSEFINA and ZOSIMO
GABAR still refused, giving the same excuse.
Despite the employment of 2 lawyers, the same
title was not issued.
Hence, NICANORA and FELIX BUCTON
filed in court an action for specific performance to
compel JOSEFINA and ZOSIMO GABAR to
execute in a deed of sale of the western half of a
parcel of land in their favor. The lower court,
ordered the execution of a deed of conveyance in
favor of NICANORA and FELIX BUCTON. The
Court of Appeals however, reversed the judgment
of the lower court on the premise that
NICANORA and FELIX BUCTONS right of
action had already prescribed being that 22 years
and 26 days had already elapsed from the time
the receipt in 1946 was issued until 1968 when
they filed the action for specific performance. It
was then barred by Art. 1144 of the Civil Code,
which provides that an action arising from a
written contract prescribes after 10 years.
Hence, this appeal by NICANORA and FELIX
BUCTON.
ISSUE
Whether or not the right of NICANORA and
FELIX BUCTON for specific action for the
execution of a deed of conveyance has already
prescribed.
RULING
NO. Actions to quiet title to property in the
possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
The real and ultimate basis of petitioners'
action is their ownership of one-half of the lot
coupled with their possession thereof, which
entitles them to a conveyance of the property.
Under the circumstances no enforcement of the
contract is needed, since the delivery of
possession of the land sold had consummated the
sale and transferred title to the purchaser, and
that, actually, the action for conveyance is one to
quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud upon the
appellee's ownership by the refusal of the
appellants to recognize the sale made by their
predecessors.
Art. 480 of the Civil Code, states that the
principles of the general law on the quieting of
title are hereby adopted insofar as they are not in
conflict with this Code. The general law referred
to is American jurisprudence. Under American
jurisprudence, actions to quiet title to property in
the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
The prevailing rule is that the right of a
plaintiff to have his title to land quieted is not
barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in
actual possession of the land, claiming to be
owners thereof. But the rule that the statute of
limitations is not available as a defense to in
action to remove a cloud from title can only be
invoked by a complaint when he is in possession.
If the plaintiff is not in possession of the property,
the action to quite title may also prescribe.
By the delivery of the possession of the
land, the sale was consummated and title was
transferred to NICANORA and FELIX BUCTON.
The action was actually not for specific
performance, since all it sought is to quiet title, to
remove the cloud cast upon their ownership as a
result of JOSEFINA and ZOSIMO GABAR's
refusal to issue the deed of conveyance. Being that
NICANORA and FELIX BUCTON was in
possession of the land, the action is
imprescriptible. Only in a case that the buyer did
not possess the land, that their right may be
subject to prescription.
CORONEL vs. IAC
GR No. L-70191. October 29, 1987
The court will treat an action for recovery of
possession of land as an action to quiet title
provided that it has all the requisites of the
latter.
Actions to quiet title to property in the
possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible
and are not barred by laches. But if he is not
in possession thereof, the right may as well
prescribe and barred by acquisitive
prescription and laches as well.
FACTS
Petitioner RODOLFO CORONEL filed a
complaint for recovery of a registered possession
of a parcel of land, situated in Naic, Cavite. The
complaint was filed against the ELIAS MERLAN,
BRIGIDO MERLAN, JOSE MERLAN,
TEODORICO NOSTRATES, SEVERO JECIEL,
SANTIAGO FERNAN and FORTUNATO
OCAMPO (PRIVATE RESPONDENTS).
CORONEL alleged that at the time he purchased
the subject parcel of land, the PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS were already occupying a
portion thereof as "tenants at will" and that
despite demands to vacate the premises, the
defendants failed and refused to move out from
the land.
The PRIVATE RESPONDENTS denied that
CORONEL was the owner of the whole parcel of
land and alleged that:
the lots occupied by them form part of a 1/3
undivided share of brothers Brigido
Merlan and Jose Merlan which they
inherited from their deceased father,
the 3 heirs never sold their undivided 1/3
share of the lot to anybody,
it was actually their other co-heirs who sold
their undivided portions,
plaintiff's claim of ownership of the whole
parcel of land, if ever it has basis, was
fraudulent, void, and without effect,
that the Merlans have always been in open
and peaceful possession of their
undivided share of the lot throughout the
years from the first sale by their co-heirs,
the other defendants were legitimate tenants
and
the plaintiff should respect their rights over
1/3 of the land.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS included as third-
party defendant, Mariano Manalo whom they
charged might have connived with others
including CORONEL to deprive them of their
share in the subject parcel of land. During trial,
the court found that the co-owners of PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS sold to Ignacio Manalo their 2/3
share of the same lot; and that Ignacio Manalo
sold only the 2/3 share to third-party defendant
Mariano Manalo, the predecessor-in-interest of
CORONEL. Consequently, there was a mistake
when the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued
to Mariano Manalo since it covered not only the
2/3 portion sold but the whole area of the land.
The lower court dismissed the complaint of
CORONEL and ruled in favor of PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
On appeal, CORONEL contended that the
claim of the private respondents over their 1/3
undivided portion of the land, 25 years after the
registration of the deed of sale in favor of Ignacio
Manalo in 1950 and more than five (5) years after
the registration of the deed of sale in favor of
Mariano Manalo is barred by prescription or
laches.
ISSUE
Whether or not the claim was barred by
prescription or laches.
RULING
NO. The claim was neither barred by
prescription nor laches.
The claim was not barred by prescription. As
lawful possessors and owners of the lot in
question, PRIVATE REPSPODNENTs cause of
action fell within the settled jurisprudence that an
action to quiet title to property in one's possession
is imprescriptible. Their undisturbed possession
over a period of more than 25 years gave them a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to determine the nature of the adverse
claim of a third party and the effect of his own
title. If at all, the PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' right
to quiet title accrued only in 1975 when they were
made aware of a claim adverse to their own, it
was only at that time that the statutory period of
prescription may be said to have commenced to
run against them.
The claim was not also barred by laches.
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect,
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which by exercising due diligence
could or should have been done earlier, it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
it or declined to assert it. The facts of the case
show that the private respondents have always
been in peaceful possession of the 1/3 portion of
the subject lot, exercising ownership thereto for
more than 25 years disrupted only in 1975, when
the petitioner tried to remove them by virtue of
his title. It was only at this point that private
respondents knew about the supposed sale of
their 1/3 portion of Lot 1950-A of the Naic Estate
and they immediately resisted.
FERNANDEZ vs. CA
GR 83141. September 21, 1990
The court will treat an action for
reconveyance as an action to quiet title
provided that it has all the requisites of the
latter.
Actions to quiet title to property in the
possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
But if he is not in possession thereof, the right
may as well prescribe and barred by
acquisitive prescription.
FACTS
In 1966, SPOUSES FLORENTINO and
VIVENCIA FERNANDEZ and SPOUSES
ZENAIDA and JUSTIANO FERNANDEZ,
purchased in common a parcel of land in Pag-asa
Subdivision, Quezon City. The parcel of land was
purchased for P15,500. SPOUSES FLORENTINO
and VIVENCIA advanced the downpayment of
P5,500 to the vendors. A Deed of Conditional Sale
was executed by the vendors in favor of the two
couples.
In 1967, the vendors executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of SPOUSES ZENAIDA and
JUSTINIANO only. When SPOUSES
FLORENTINO and VIVENCIA learned that the
Absolute Deed of Sale did not include their names
as vendees, they confronted SPOUSES ZENAIDA
and JUSTIANO. Hence, the latter spouses
executed an affidavit in which they acknowledged
the sale to petitioners SPOUSES FLORENTINO
and VIVENCIA.
A duplex building was constructed on the
subject land. The 2 units were occupied by the 2
couples. In 1970, SPOUSES ZENAIDA and
JUSTINIANO caused the issuance of a certificate
of title only in their names.
In 1976, SPOUSES ZENAIDA and
JUSTINIANO filed a Petition for voluntary
dissolution of their conjugal partnership. In the
petition, the couple prayed for judicial approval
of their compromise agreement wherein
Justiniano waived all his rights to the conjugal
properties including the subject parcel of land.
The court awarded said land to ZENAIDA. In
1977, ZENAIDA demanded that SPOUSES
FLORENTINO and VIVENCIA vacate the
premises of the lot awarded to her.
In 1981, SPOUSES FLORENTINO and
VIVENCIA filed an action to quiet title and
damages against ZENAIDA. The Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of JUSTIANA on the
ground that the cause of action of SPOUSES
FLORENTINO and VIVENCIA had already
prescribed in view of the issuance in 1970 of a
certificate of title in the name of the Spouses
JUSTINIANO and ZENAIDA FERNANDEZ.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the right of SPOUSES
FLORENTINO and VIVENCIA had already
prescribed in view of the issuance in 1970 of a
certificate of title in the name of the SPOUSES
JUSTINIANO AND ZENAIDA.
RULING
NO. Actions to quiet title to property in the
possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
The issuance of a certificate of title in the
name appearing therein did not preclude
SPOUSES FLORENTINO and VIVENCIA from
asserting their right of ownership over the land in
question. Time and again it has been ruled that
the torrens system should not be used as a shield
to protect fraud. Moreover, prescription could not
be considered against SPOUSES FLORENTINO
and VIVENCIA who had been in possession of
subject premises from the time it was purchased
from the vendors in 1967 and continue to possess
the same under claim of ownership.
Prescription cannot be invoked in an action
for reconveyance, which is, in effect an action to
quiet title against the plaintiff therein who is in
possession of the land in question. As lawful
possessor and owner of the disputed portion, her
cause of action for reconveyance which, in effect,
seeks to quiet title to property in one's possession
is imprescriptible.
While the owner in fee continues liable to an
action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse
claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a
court of equity to ascertain and determine the
nature of such claim and its effect on his title, or to
assert any superior equity in his favor. He may
wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right.
But the rule that the statute of limitations is not
available as a defense of an action to remove a
cloud from title can only be invoked by a
complainant when he is in possession.
MAMADSUAL vs. MOSON
GR No. 92557. September 27, 1990
Actions to quiet title to property in the
possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
But if he is not in possession thereof, the right
may as well prescribe and barred by
acquisitive prescription.
It is not necessary that the person seeking
to quiet his title is the registered owner of the
 property in question because the law embraces
both legal and equitable owners.
FACTS
In 1988, SPOUSES HADJI ALI and HADJI
SALIKA MAMADSUAL filed a complaint against
SPOUSES KAGUI ABDULA and KAGUI RAKMA
MACARAPAN for Quieting of Title To Property
and Annulment of Original Certificate of Title, with
the Shari'a District Court in Cotabato City. They
claimed that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land
since time immemorial in the concept of owners
though the same was registered in the name of
SPOUSES MACARAPAN.
The SPOUSES MACARAPAN, on the other
hand, prayed that the case be dismissed because:
SPOUSES MAMADSUAL had no title to the
property,
they were not the proper parties to ask for
the annulment or cancellation of the
Certificates of Title of SPOUSES
MACARAPAN and
the action, being based on an implied trust,
had already prescribed and could not
therefore be maintained.
SPOUSES MAMADSUAL rebutted that:
1. the title referred to by them in the
complaint meant the legal title or
ownership or dominion over the land in
dispute acquired by them from their
ancestors by operation of the law on
succession;
2. they are real party in interest because they
will be benefited by the judgment or
entitled to the avails of the suit in their
own right, independent of any other
interest, but with the authority of the law;
and
3. since they are in possession of the land,
an action to quiet title does not prescribe.
The lower court dismissed the complaint on
the ground that the action had prescribed. It also
held that in an action to quiet title the plaintiff
must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in
the real property which is the subject matter of the
action. It interpreted legal title to mean registered
ownership and equitable title to mean beneficial
ownership.
ISSUE
(1) Whether or not the right of SPOUSES
MAMADSUAL had already prescribed.
(2) Whether or not the person seeking to quiet
his title must be the registered owner of the
property in question.
RULING
(1) NO. An action to quiet title is
imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in possession
of the property.
It is an established rule of American
jurisprudence (made applicable in this jurisdiction
by Art. 480 of the New Civil Code) that actions to
quiet title to property in the possession of the
plaintiff am imprescriptible.
The prevailing rule is that the right of a
plaintiff to have his title to land quieted as against
one who is asserting some adverse claim thereon,
is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors
remain in actual possession of the land, claiming
to be owners thereof. The reason for this rule
being that while the owner in fee continues liable
to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse
claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a
court of equity in his favor to ascertain and
determine the nature of such claim and its effect
on his title, or to assert any superior equity in his
favor. He may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking
steps to vindicate his right. But the rule that the
statute of limitations is not available as a defense
to an action to remove a cloud from title can only
be invoked by a complainant when he is in
possession. One who claims property which is in
the possession of another must, it seems, invoke
his remedy within the statutory period.
(2) NO. It is not necessary that the person
seeking to quiet his title is the registered owner of
the property in question.
Thus, "title'' to property does not
necessarily mean the original transfer certificate of
title. It can connote acquisitive prescription by
possession in the concept of an owner thereof.
Indeed, one who has an equitable right or interest
in the property may also file an action to quiet
title under the law.
Since the action in this case is one to quiet
title to property whereby petitioners claim to have
acquired title to the same by prescription, the
property was thereby effectively withdrawn from
the public domain and became property of private
ownership. Thus, the ruling of the trial court that
the action being one for reversion only the
Solicitor General can institute the same has no
cogent basis.
PINGOL vs. CA
GR No. 102909. September 6, 1993
The court will treat an action for specific
performance as an action to quiet title
provided that it has all the requisites of the
latter.
Actions to quiet title to property in the
possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
But if he is not in possession thereof, the right
may as well prescribe and barred by
acquisitive prescription.
FACTS
VICENTE PINGOL was the owner of a
registered land in Caloocan City. In 1969, he
executed a Deed of Sale of of an undivided
portion of said land in favor Francisco N. Donasco
which was acknowledged before a notary public.
The agreed price was P25,000 where P2,000 shall
be paid as advance payment and the remaining
balance, on equal installment basis for 6 years.
 Thereafter, Donasco immediately took
possession of the subject lot and constructed a
house thereon. In January 1970, he started paying
the monthly installments but was able pay only
up to 1972. When Donasco died in 1984, he left an
unpaid balance of P10,161 for the contract price of
said land. But the possession thereof, still
remained with DONASCOs HEIRS, MELINDA
D. PELAYO, MARIETTA D. SINGSON, MYRNA
D. CUEVAS, NATIVDAD D. PELAYO,
YOLANDA D. CACERES and M ARY
DONASCO.
In 1988, the HEIRS OF DONASCO filed an
action for Specific Performance to compel
VICENTE PINGOL to accept their offer to pay the
balance of P10,161 plus the stipulated legal rate of
interest thereon and to execute the final deed of
sale on the portion of the lot. It was alleged that
VICENTE PINGOL rebuffed their offer and had
been demanding for a bigger and unreasonable
amount, in complete variance to what was
lawfully due and payable. VICENTE PINGOL
however claimed that the HEIRS OF DONASCO's
cause of action had already prescribed.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
HEIRS OF DONASCO and ordered VICENTE
PINGOL to accept the payment of P10,161 and to
execute the final deed of sale on the portion of
the lot. It also ruled that THE HEIRS OF
DONASCOs action was imprescriptible since it
was akin to an action to quiet title to property in
one's possession.
Hence, this appeal by SPOUSES VICENTE
and LOURDES PINGOL.
ISSUE
Whether or not the action of the HEIRS OF
DONASCO had already prescribed being based
upon a written contract, has prescribed since it
was brought only in 1988 or more than ten years
from the time when the latter could have lawfully
demanded performance.
RULING
NO, the action had not prescribed. Although
the private respondents' complaint before the trial
court was denominated as one for specific
performance, it is in effect an action to quiet title.
The real and ultimate basis of the HEIRS OF
DONASCOs' action was their ownership of one-
half of the lot coupled with their possession
thereof, which entitled them to a conveyance of
the property. That a cloud has been cast on the
title of the HEIRS OF DONASCOs was
indubitable. Despite the fact that the title had been
transferred to them by the execution of the deed
of sale and the delivery of the object of the
contract, the SPOUSES PINGOL adamantly
refused to accept the tender of payment by HEIRS
OF DONASCO and steadfastly insisted that their
obligation to transfer title had been rendered
ineffective.
Prescription thus could not be invoked against
the HEIRS OF DONASCO for it is aphoristic that
an action to quiet title to property in one's
possession is imprescriptible. The owner of real
property who is in possession thereof may wait
until his possession is invaded or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right.
A person claiming title to real property, but not in
possession thereof, must act affirmatively and
within the time provided by the statute.
Possession is a continuing right as is the right
to defend such possession. So it has been
determined that an owner of real property in
possession has a continuing right to invoke a
court of equity to remove a cloud that is a
continuing menace to his title.
Such a menace is compared to a continuing
nuisance or trespass which is treated a successive
nuisances or trespasses, not barred by statute until
continued without interruption for a length of
time a sufficient to affect a change of title as a
matter of law.
HEIRS OF OLVIGA vs. CA
GR No. 104813. October 21, 1993
The court will treat an action for
reconveyance as an action to quiet title
provided that it has all the requisites of the
latter.
Actions to quiet title to property in the
possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
But if he is not in possession thereof, the right
may as well prescribe and barred by
acquisitive prescription.
FACTS
In 1950, a parcel of land was still forest land
when Eutiquio Pureza, then only twelve years
old, and his father cleared and cultivated it. In
1954, they introduced improvements such as fruit
trees thereon. When the area was released for
disposition, the Bureau of Lands surveyed the
same in 1956 in the name of Pureza and since
then, the land had been known as Lot 13.
In 1960, Pureza filed a homestead application
over Lot 13. Without his application having been
acted upon, he transferred his rights in said lot to
CORNELIO GLOR in 1961. Neither the
homestead application of Eutiquio nor the
proposed transfer of his right to GLOR was acted
upon by the Director of Lands.
GLORs neighbor was JOSE OLVIGA.
OLVIGA occupied Lot 12 while GLOR occupied
Lot 13. In 1967, OLVIGA obtained a registered
title for said lot in a cadastral proceeding when he
claimed both Lots 12 and 13, in fraud of the rights
of GLOR and family, who were the real and actual
occupants of the land. As a result, both Lots 12
and 13 were declared as uncontested in the name
of OLVIGA.
Then, THE HEIRS OF GLOR, Angelita Glor
and her children, filed a case for reconveyance of
said land against the HEIRS OF OLVIGA. The
HEIRS OF OLVIGA contended that the right of
action by the HEIRS OF GLOR had already been
barred by prescription. The appellate court ruled
in favor of the HEIRS OF GLOR and declared that
such action was really one for quieting of title.
Thus, it did not prescribe.
Hence,this appeal by the HEIRS OF OLVIGA.
ISSUE
Whether or not the action of the HEIRS OF
OLVIGA had already prescribed.
RULING
NO. An action for reconveyance of a parcel of
lands based on implied or constructive trust
prescribed in ten years, the point of reference
being the date of registration of the deed or the
date of the issuance of the certificate of title over
the property. But this rule applies only when the
plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since
if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in
actual possession of the property, the right to seek
reconveyance which in effect seeks to quiet title to
the property, does not prescribe.
In the case at bar, the HEIRS OF OLVIGA and
their predecessors-in-interest were in actual
possession of the property since 1950. Their
undisturbed possession gave them the continuing
right to seek the aid of a court of equity to
determine, the nature of the adverse claim of
petitioners, who in 1988 disturbed their
possession.
CO-OWNERSHIP
ARTICLE 484: There is co-ownership whenever the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to
different persons.
In default of contracts, or special provisions,
co-ownership shall be governed by the provisions of
this Title.
Co-ownership - state where an undivided thing or
right belongs to two or more persons. A co-
ownership is not a juridical person, nor is it
granted any form of juridical personality.
WHAT GOVERNS CO-OWNERSHIP?
1) Contracts
2) Special legal provisions
3) Provisions of the title on co-
ownership
SOURCES OF CO-OWNERSHIP
a. by law Art. 144 of the New Civil
Code where marriage that is
void;
b. by contract stipulation of the
parties;
c. by chance commixtion,
confusion, hidden treasure
d. by occupation
e. by succession or will in case of
interests of heirs before partition.
KINDS OF OWNERSHIP
From the viewpoint of the subject matter:
(1) Co-ownership of an undivided
thing;
(2) Co-ownership of an undivided
right.
From the viewpoint of source:
(1) Contractual co-ownership
(stipulation not to divide the
property for 10 yrs)
(2) Non-contractual co-ownership (if
the source is not a contract)
From the viewpoint of the rights of the co-
owners:
(1) Tenancy in common
(2) Joint tenancy
Characteristics:
1. plurality of subjects: Undivided thing owned
by several persons.. lets say A B C: 1/3 interest
each but there is no boundary, no division only
undivided interest. Unidentified noh.. hindi alam
ang metes and bounds.
2. singularity of object or unity of object. Only
one object: undivided thing
3. recognition of ideal shares : A recognizes B
and C as the co-owners; B recognizes A and C as
co-owners and C recognizes A and B as co-
owners. If one does not recognize the ideal shares
of the other co-ownership. as a matter of fact, if he
repudiates their shares, then there is no co-
ownership, because of the characteristic of ideal
shares.
Rules regarding ideal shares
1. Each co-owner has full ownership of his part
and to the fruits of that ideal shares. So that if he
owns 1/3, he would also share 1/3 of the
proceeds.
2. The co-owner may alienate, assign or encumber
his ideal share even without consent of other co-
owners. Of course this is the general rule, there
are exceptions like when personal rights are
involved.
SPOUSES SI vs. CA
GR No. 122047. October 12, 2000
After the physical division of the lot among
the brothers, the community ownership
terminated, and the right of preemption or
redemption for each brother was no longer
available.
Co-owners with actual notice of the sale are
not entitled to written notice.
FACTS
Escolastica, wife of Severo Armada, Sr.
originally owned a 340-sq. m. of land situated in
San Jose District, Pasay City. This was covered by
a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). In 1954,
during the lifetime of the spouses, Escolastica,
with the consent of her husband, transferred the
property to their children. She executed 3 separate
deeds of sale conveying 113.34 square meters of
the property to and Dr. Severo R. Armada, and
113.33 square meters each to Crisostomo R.
Armada and JOSE R. ARMADA. Thereafter, the
Registry of Deeds issued another TCT in the
names of the three sons. Also in the title is an
annotation for the cancellation of said title by
virtue of the Deed of Sale dated 1979. It was
executed by Cresenciana V. Alejo, as attorney-in-
fact of Crisostomo R. Armada, conveying 113.34
sq. m. of his inherited portion of the property in
favor of ANITA BONODE SI, married to Serafin
D. Si for the sum of P75,000. The Registry of
Deeds then issued another TCT in lieu of the
other.
In 1980, spouses JOSE ARMADA and
REMEDIOS ALMANZOR (SPOUSES ARMADA)
filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Sale
and Reconveyance against ANITA and SERAFIN
SI (SPOUSES SI). Conrado Isada, brother-in-law of
Cresenciana was also included in the complaint as
he brokered the sale.
The complaint alleged when the SPOUSES SI
registered the deed of absolute sale, they inserted
the phrase that the co-owners were not interested
in buying the same in spite of notice to them
when in fact, the other co-owners, JOSE and
Severo, Jr., had no written notice of the sale.
The SPOUSES SI on the other hand, alleged
that in 3 deeds of sale excuted by the 3 sons
mother Escolastica, it particularly described the
portion conveyed to each son in metes and
bounds. They contended that that since the
property was already 3 distinct parcels of land,
there was no longer co-ownership among the
brothers. Hence, Jose and Severo, Jr. had no right
of redemption when Crisostomo sold his share to
the SPOUSES SI.
The trial court ruled for the SPOUSES SI and
dismissed the complaint. On appeal with the
Court of Appeals, said court reversed the decision
of the trail court and ruled for SPOUSES
ARMADA. It ruled that there was still co-
ownership between the 3 brothers since the TCT
issud by Escolastico to his 3 sons did not indicate
the particular area sold. The court also stated that
what was then sold to the SPOUSES SI were still
undetermined and unidentifiable, as the area sold
remains a portion of the whole. The brothers JOSE
and SEVERO, who were co-owners were not
informed of the notice and are then entitled to
redeem the sold property.
Hence, this appeal by the SPOUSES SI.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not co-ownership existed
between the brothers SEVERO JR., CRISOSTOMO
and JOSE.
(2) Whether or not SEVERO has the right of
redemption.
RULING
(1) NO, the co-ownership did not exist.
Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code, there is
co-ownership whenever the ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons. There is no co-ownership when the
different portions owned by different people are
already concretely determined and separately
identifiable, even if not yet technically described.
In the present case, the lot in question had
already been partitioned extrajudicially when
their parents executed 3 deeds of sale in favor of
Jose, Crisostomo and Severo. The disputed land
was not part of an undivided estate. The portion
sold to SPOUSES SI by Crisostomo and
Cresenciana Armada was concretely determined
and identifiable. The following facts support such
claim:
(1) the 3 deeds of absolute sale
technically described the portion
sold to each son,
(2) the portions belonging to the 3 sons
were separately declared for
taxation purposes, and
(3) JOSE's wife testified that they had
been receiving rent from the
property specifically allotted to Jose.
The fact that the three portions are
embraced in one certificate of title did not make
said portions less determinable or identifiable or
distinguishable, one from the other, nor that
dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their
respective owners.
(2) NO, they did not have the right of
redemption. After the physical division of the lot
among the brothers, the community ownership
terminated, and the right of preemption or
redemption for each brother was no longer
available.
Moreover, JOSE ARMADA was well-
informed of the impending sale of Crisostomo's
share in the land when the latter sent the former a
letter. Co-owners with actual notice of the sale are
not entitled to written notice. A written notice is a
formal requisite to make certain that the co-
owners have actual notice of the sale to enable
them to exercise their right of redemption within
the limited period of thirty days. But where the
co-owners had actual notice of the sale at the time
thereof and/or afterwards, a written notice of a
fact already known to them, would be
superfluous. The statute does not demand what is
unnecessary.
MERCADO-FEHR vs. FEHR
GR No. 122047. October 12, 2000
A man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry but are living together under a
marriage declared as void ab initio by the
court for the husbands psychological
incapacity,shall be coverned by co-ownership
as to the properties they acquired during the
cohabitation. As regards the settlement of the
common properties, the Civil Code provisions
on co-ownership should apply.
FACTS
 ELNA MERCADO-FEHR filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage against
respondent BRUNO FRANZ FEHR on the ground
of psychological incapacity to comply with the
essential marital obligations under Article 36 of
the Family Code. After due proceedings, the trial
court declared the marriage between petitioner
and respondent void ab initio under Article 36 of
the Family Code. The court also ordered the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of
property and in lieu thereof, a regime of complete
separation of property between the said spouses
was established. The custody over the 2 minor
children, MICHAEL BRUNO MERCADO FEHR
and PATRICK FRANZ FEHR was hereby
awarded to ELNA MERCADO-FEHR, she being
the innocent spouse.
ELNA MERCADO-FEHR then filed a motion
for reconsideration of said Order. She alleged that
Suite 204 was purchased on installment basis at
the time when she and BRUNO FRANZ FEHR
were living exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Hence the rules on co-ownership should apply in
accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code
and not the complete separation of property. She
also proposed that the Upper Basement and the
Lower Ground Floor of the LCG Condominium
be adjudicated to her so that she could use the
income from the lease of said premises for the
support of the children, for the latters best
interest.
The trial court held that since the marriage
between petitioner and respondent was declared
void ab intio, the rules on co-ownership should
apply in the liquidation and partition of the
properties they own in common pursuant to
Article 147 of the Family Code. The court,
however, affirmed its previous ruling that Suite
204 of LCG Condominium was acquired prior to
the couples cohabitation and therefore pertained
solely to BRUNO FRANZ FEHR. On appeal with
the Court of Appeals, ELNA MERCADO-FEHRs
petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
Hence, this appeal. She contended that the
trial courts order was erronoeous when it held
that Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium was the
exclusive property of BRUNO FRANZ FEHR,
although it was established that they lived
together as husband and wife beginning March
1983, before the execution of the Contract to Sell
on July 1983.
BRUNO FRANZ FEHR however claimed that
Suite 204 of LCG Condominium to be his
exclusive property as it was acquired on July
1983, prior to their marriage on March 1985.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not Suite 204 of LCG
Condominium was exclusively owned by BRUNO
FRANZ FEHR.
(2) Being that the marriage of ELNA
MERCADO-FEHR and BRUNO FRANZ FEHR
were declared to be void ab initio for the latters
psychological incapacity, what economic regime
of property shall govern them?
RULING
(1) NO, it was not exclusively owned by BRUNO
FRANZ FEHR.
It appears from the facts, as found by the trial
court, that in March 1983, after two years of long-
distance courtship, petitioner left Cebu City and
moved in with respondent in the latters residence
in Metro Manila. Their relations bore fruit and
their first child, Michael BRUNO FRANZ FEHR,
was born in 1983. The couple got married on
March 14, 1985. In the meantime, they purchased
on installment a condominium unit, Suite 204, at
LCG Condominium, as evidenced by a Contract
to Sell dated 1983 executed by respondent as the
buyer and J.V. Santos Commercial Corporation as
the seller. Petitioner also signed the contract as
witness, using the name Elna Mercado Fehr.
Upon completion of payment, the title to the
condominium unit was issued in the name of
petitioner.
Hence, Suite 204 was acquired during the
parties cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article
147 of the Family Code, said property should be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
(2) What shall govern them is co-ownership.
Article 147 applies to unions of parties who
are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but without the
benefit of marriage, or whose marriage is
nonetheless void, as in the case at bar. This
provision creates a co-ownership with respect to
the properties they acquire during their
cohabitation.
Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall
still be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family household.
The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG
Condominium, was purchased on installment
basis on July 26, 1983, at the time when petitioner
and respondent were already living together.
Hence, it should be considered as common
property of petitioner and respondent.
The property regime of the parties should be
divided in accordance with the law on co-
ownership. As regards the settlement of the
common properties of petitioner and respondent,
the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership should
apply. Under Art. 484, in default of contracts or
special provisions, co-ownership shall be
governed by the provisions of Title III of the Civil
Code.
ARTICLE 485: The share of the co-owners, in the
benefits as well as in charges, shall be proportional to
their respective interests. Any stipulation in contract
to the contrary shall be void.
RULES IN BENEFITS AND SHARES:
1. The share in the benefits and charges is
proportional to interest of each. Hence, if one
 co-owner owns 2/3, he shares 2/3 of the
taxes.
2. Contrary stipulation is void. To do so would
be to run against the nature of co-ownership.
3. Each co-owner share proportionally in the
accretion or alluvium of the property. This is
because an increase in the area benefits all.
JIMENEZ vs. FERNANDEZ
GR No. L-46364. April 6, 1990
A property held in common, upon the death of
a co-owner who died without any issue or heir
shall be owned by the other co-owner. The
portions belonging to each are presumed to be
equal.
FACTS
Fermin Jimenez owned a parcel of residential
land in Pangasinan. Fermin Jimenez had 2 sons
named Fortunato and Carlos Jimenez. This
Fortunato Jimenez who predeceased his father
had only one child, petitioner SULPICIA
JIMENEZ. After the death of Fermin Jimenez, the
entire parcel of land was registered under Act 496
in the name of Carlos Jimenez and SULPICIA
JIMENEZ (uncle and niece) in equal shares pro-
indiviso. As a result, an OCT was issued in their
names.
Later, Carlos Jimenez and his illegitimate
daughter, Melecia Cayabyab, also known as
Melecia Jimenez, took possession of the eastern
portion of the property consisting of 436 sq. m.
Melecia Jimenez sold said portion of the property
to Edilberto Cagampan. The latter also sold the
same property to respondent TEODORA
GRADO, who has been in occupation since.
Subsequently, petitioner SULPICIA JIMENEZ
executed an affidavit adjudicating unto herself the
other half of the property appertaining to Carlos
Jimenez, upon manifestation that she is the only
heir of her deceased uncle. Consequently a TCT
was issued in her name alone. Then, SULPICIA
JIMENEZ and her husband, TORIBIO MATIAS
instituted an action for the recovery of the eastern
portion of the property consisting of 436 square
meters occupied by respondent TEODORA
GRADO and her son.
The trial court dismissed said complaint and
held TEODORA GRADO as the absolute owner of
the property. On appeal with the Court of
Appeals, the same decision was affirmed in toto.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the disputed portion of the
property was owned by SULPICIA JIMENEZ as a
co-owner.
RULING
YES. SULPICIA JIMENEZ's title over her 1/2
undivided property remained good and
continued to be good when she segregated it into
a new title. She should be entitled for the relief of
recovery of the disputed property and be declared
as its sole and absolute owner with right to its
possession and enjoyment. Since her uncle Carlos
Jimenez died in 1936, his pro-indiviso share in the
properties then owned in co-ownership with his
niece Sulpicia descended by intestacy to Sulpicia
Jimenez alone because Carlos died without any
issue or other heirs.
Melecia Jimenez, who sold the property in
question to TEODORA GRADO was not the
daughter of Carlos Jimenez and therefore, had no
right over the property in question. Melecia
Cayabyab in the absence of any voluntary
conveyance to her by Carlos Jimenez or Sulpicia
Jimenez of the litigated portion of the land could
not even legally transfer the parcel of land to
Edilberto Cagampan who accordingly, could not
also legally transfer the same to herein private
respondents HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ and
TEODORA GRADO.
ARTICLE 486: Each co-owner may use the thing
owned in common, provided he does so in accordance
with the purpose for which it is intended and in such
way as not to injure the interest if the co-ownership or
prevent the other co-owners from using it according to
their rights. The purposes of the co-ownership may be
changed by agreement, express or implied.
4. This article grants each co-owner the right to
use the property for the purpose intended
(said purpose being alterable by express or
implied agreement). But:
1) the interest of the co-ownership must
not be injured or prejudiced;
2) and the other co-owners must not be
prevented from using it.
ARTICLE 487: Any one of the co-owners may bring an
action in ejectment.
5. It is believed that ejectment covers the
following actions:
a) forcible entry
b) unlawful detainer
c) accion publicianca
d) accion reinvindicatoria
e) quieting of title
f) replevin
PUNSALAN vs. BOON LIAT
GR No. 18009. January 10, 1923
Co-owners file an action for recover not only
against strangers but also against a co-owner,
when the latter performs with respect to the
thing held in common, acts for their exclusive
benefit, or of exclusive ownership, or which
are prejudicial to, and in violation of, the right
of the community.
FACTS
In 1920, TAMSI saw from the Cawit-Cawit
shores in the Province of Zamboanga, a big bulky
object in the distance which attracted his
attention. Thereupon, together with BAYRULA,
he went in a small boat to investigate and found it
to be a large fish. They then returned to shore and
requested others to held them catch the fish. 22
people rode in 3 small boats to catch said fish,
among them was respondent AHAMAD. After
having arrived at the place where the fish was,
which was found to be a whale, they proceeded to
pull it toward the shore up to the mouth of the
river, where they quartered it. They found in its
abdomen a great quantity of ambergris, which
was placed in 3 sacks, 2 of which were full and the
other half full. It was then taken to the house of
Maharaja Butu, where they left it to the care of
AHAMAD.
All of these twenty-two persons made an
agreement that they were to be the sole owners of
this ambergris and that none of them could sell it
without the consent of the rest. The contents of the
2 full sacks were placed in three trunks. As to the
half sack of ambergris they agreed that some of
them should take it to Zamboanga to sell for the
purpose of ascertaining the market price of the
ambergris, in order that they might dispose of the
rest accordingly.
TAMSI, together with some of the co-owners
went to Zamboanga to sell the half sack of
ambergris where they disposed of it to Chinamen
Lim Chiat and Cheong Tong. They also offered to
sell the rest of the ambergris to them. After the
Chinamen agreed so, they back to Cawit-Cawit to
get the ambergris so sold.
It appeared however that HENRY E. TECK
also knew of the existence of the ambergris in the
house of Maharaja Butu. Knowing that some of
the co-owners were away, he proposed to the
master of the revenue cutter Mindoro to go to
Cawit-Cawit to seize some supposedly
contraband opium. They then immediately
proceeded to Cawit-Cawit, among them were
HENRY E. TECK, Chinamen C. BOON LIAT,
ONG CHUA and GO TONG, and some others
who were to assist in the arrest of the smugglers.
Upon arrival in the house of Maharaja Butu,
the master proceeded to search the house. He
found 3 large trunks containing a black substance
which had a bad odor, stating that it was opium.
When he asked the owner of the house to whom
those trunks belonged to, the latter pointed to
AHAMAD. The latter stated that the contents
came from the abdomen of a large fish but the
master, however insisted that it was opium and
told AHAMAD that he would take the 3 trunks
on board the ship to Zamboanga. AHAMAD and
others asked permission of the master to
accompany him on the voyage to Zamboanga, to
which the master consented.
When already on board and during the
voyage, the master became convinced that the
contents of the three trunks were not opium.
During the voyage, HENRY E. TECK offered to
purchase the ambergris contained in the 3 trunks,
but AHAMAD refused to sell it for the reason that
he was not the sole owner thereof, but owned it in
common with other persons who were in
.Zamboanga. However, upon telling AHAMAD
that he would answer whatever might happen,
AHAMAD sold the ambergris to HENRY E.
TECK and the Chinamen C. BOON LIAT, ONG
CHUA and GO TONG. He received down
payment immediately and the remaining balance
was paid later.
When the other co-owners arrived at the
house of Maharaja Butu, together with the
Chinamen buyers LIM CHIAT and CHEONG
TONG, they found out that the ambergris was no
longer there. The 21 plaintiffs who had caught the
whale (PUNSALAN ET AL.) and the Chinamen
buyers, Lim Chiat and Cheong Tong, who had
purchased from Tamsi the ambergris filed an
action against C. BOON LIAT, ONG CHUA, GO
TONG, HENRY E. TECK and AHAMAD. They
claimed the 801 kilos of ambergris contained in
the 3 trunks or its value in the amount of P60,000
and damages in the sum of P20,000.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the action was barred
because one of the respondents AHAMAD was a
co-owner.
(2) Whether or not the sales made by TAMSI
and AHAMAD were valid.
RULING
(1) NO. It was no bar to the bringing of this
action that the respondent AHAMAD is one of the
co-owners. The action for recovery which each co-
owner has, derived from the right of ownership
inherent in the co-ownership. The right may be
exercised not only against strangers but also
against co-owners themselves, when the latter
perform with respect to the thing held in
common, acts for their exclusive benefit, or of
exclusive ownership, or which are prejudicial to,
and in violation of, the right of the community.
In this case, the selling of the ambergris by the
respondent AHAMAD as his exclusive property
and his attitude in representing himself to be the
sole owner thereof placed him in the same
position as the stranger who violated any right of
the community. Hence, he was not sued as a co-
owner for the cause of action is predicated upon
the fact that he has acted not as a co-owner but as
an exclusive owner of the ambergris sold by him.
(2) NO. The sales were not valid. The ambergris
in question was the undivided common property
of the plaintiffs and the respondent AHAMAD.
This common ownership was acquired by
occupancy, so that neither TAMSI, IMAM
LUMUYOD, or IMAM ASAKIL had any right to
sell it, as they did, to LIM CHIAT and CHEONG
TONG, nor had the Moro Ahamad any right to
sell this same ambergris, as he did, to C. BOON
LIAT, ONG CHUA, GO TONG, and HENRY E.
TECK. There was an agreement between the
coowners not to sell this ambergris without the
consent of all. Both sales having been made
without the consent of all the owners, the same
have no effect, except as to the portion pertaining
to those who made them.
Note: An ambergris is a solid, opaque, waxy,
ash-colored secretion from whales, which is
used in perfumery.

DE GUIA vs. CA
GR No. 120864. October 8, 2003
Art. 487 covers all kinds of actions for the
recovery of possession. A co-owner may file an
action for recovery of possession against a co-
owner who takes exclusive possession of the
entire co-owned property. However, the only
effect of such action is a recognition of the co-
ownership.
Before partition, co-owners have joint right of
dominion over property.
FACTS
2 parcels of land covering a fishpond with a
total area of 79,220 sq. m., situated in Meycauayan,
Bulacan was equally owned by Primitiva Lejano
and Lorenza Araniego. The property was
registered in both their names.
In 1974, the whole fishpond was the subject of
a Salin ng Pamumusisyong ng Palaisdaan executed
by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano in favor of one
Aniano Victa and petitioner MANUEL DE GUIA.
Said Lease Contract was with the knowledge and
consent of Teofilo Abejo, sole heir of Lorenza
Araniego. The contract provided that the period of
lease shall be until 1979.
Later, Teofilo Abejo acquired Lorenza
Araniego Abejos undivided share in the
FISHPOND by intestate succession. In 1983, of
the undivided portion owned by Araniego
corresponding to 39,611 sq. m. was later
purchased by JOSE ABEJO from his father Teofilo
Abejo.
When the contract expired and DE GUIA
failed to surrender the fishpond, written demands
were made for him to pay back rental and to
vacate the premises in question. However, DE
GUIA refused to deliver possession and also to
pay the rentals due.
In anticipation, however, that DE GUIA
wouldl vacate the fishpond, JOSE ABEJO in 1983
entered into a 2-year Kasunduan ng Buwisan ng
Palaisdaan with Ruperto C. Villarico for P50,000.
This contract had to be cancelled and the
consideration was also returned because DE GUIA
refused to vacate the fishpond.
Hence, in 1986 ABEJO filed an action for
recovery of possession of of his share of the said
fishpond with damages against DE GUIA.
On the other hand, DE GUIA contended that
ABEJO was not the owner of the entire
FISHPOND but one Maxima Termulo who died
intestate with Primitiva Lejano as her only heir.
The entire fishpond with an area of 79,200 sq. m.
was leased to him by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano.
Subsequently, he became the absolute owner of
of the undivided area of the fishpond from the
heir of Lejano and he questioned ABEJOs
ownership of the other half as void and
fraudulent. As to the area pertaining to ABEJO,
DE GUIA claimed that he introduced
improvements worth P500,000 and being a builder
in good faith, he asked that he should be
reimbursed by ABEJO.
The court rendered judgment in favor of
ABEJO and ordered DE GUIA to return to the
former, the undivided portion of the 79,200 sq.
m. fishpond and to equally enjoy its benefits and
fruits until such time that partition of the property
be effected. On appeal, with the Court of Appeals,
the court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Agrrieved, DE GUIA petitioned the Supreme
Court for review. He claimed that an action for
recovery of possession and turn-over of the
undivided portion of a common property is not
proper before partition and that the recovery of
rent was also erroneous since the exact identity of
the portion in question had not yet been clearly
defined and delineated.
ISSUES
(1) Whether an action for recovery of possession
and turn-over of the undivided portion of a
common property is proper before partition.
(2) Whether or not the recovery of rent is proper
even if the exact identity of the portion in question
had not yet been clearly defined and delineated.
RULING
(1) NO, partition is necessary to effect physical
division of the FISHPOND between ABEJO and
DE GUIA.
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides, [a]ny
one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions
for the recovery of possession. Article 487
includes forcible entry, unlawful detainer,
recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and
recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion).
A co-owner may file an action for recovery of
possession against a co-owner who takes
exclusive possession of the entire co-owned
property. However, the only effect of such action
is a recognition of the co-ownership. The courts
cannot proceed with the actual partitioning of the
co-owned property.
Thus, judicial or extra-judicial partition is
necessary to effect physical division of the
FISHPOND between ABEJO and DE GUIA. An
action for partition is also the proper forum for
accounting the profits received by DE GUIA from
the FISHPOND.
However, as a necessary consequence of such
recognition of co-ownership, ABEJO shall exercise
an equal right to possess, use and enjoy the entire
FISHPOND. Hence, ABEJO and DE GUIA had
become owners of the whole and over the whole,
they exercise the right of dominion. However,
they were at the same time individual owners of a
portion, which is truly abstract because until
there is partition, such portion remains
indeterminate or unidentified. As co-owners,
ABEJO and DE GUIA may jointly exercise the
right of dominion over the entire FISHPOND
until they partition the FISHPOND by identifying
or segregating their respective portions.
(2) YES, recovery of rent is proper even if the
exact identity of the portion in question had not
yet been clearly defined and delineated was
proper.
The Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to
lease the entire FISHPOND to DE GUIA. After
DE GUIAs lease expired in 1979, he could no
longer use the entire FISHPOND without paying
rent. To allow DE GUIA to continue using the
entire FISHPOND without paying rent would
prejudice ABEJOs right to receive rent, which
would have accrued to his share in the
FISHPOND had it been leased to others.
Since ABEJO acquired his undivided share
in the FISHPOND on 22 November 1983, DE
GUIA should pay ABEJO reasonable rent for his
possession and use of ABEJOs portion beginning
from that date.
ARTICLE 488: Each co-owner shall have the right to
compel the other co-owners to contribute o the expenses
of preservation of the thing or right owned in common
and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt
himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of
his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share
of the expenses and taxes, no such waiver shall be made
if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership.
ARTICLE 489: Repairs for preservation may be made
at the will of one of the co-owners, but he must, if
practicable, first notify his co-owners of the necessity
for such repairs. Expenses to improve or embellish the
thing shall be decided upon by a majority as
determined in Article 492.
Two (2) kinds of repair:
(1) repair for the preservation of the
thing;
o These are necessary expenses to
preserve the thing owned in
common.
o They may be made by the will of
one of the co-owners. A co-owner
can actually go ahead and repair
the thing owned in common but
he must notify his co-owners of
the necessity for such repairs. So
he does not need to acquire the
consent.
(2) Repair for improvement or
embellishment.
These are not necessary
repairs but repairs to improve
the thing co-owned.
REQUIREMENT: It must be made by the
financial majority, as determined under Art. 492.
o Financial majority - co-owners who
represent the controlling interest of
the object of the co-ownership.
o Rule if notification was practicable
but not made:
o The other co-owners may claim that
had they been notified they could
have found cheaper materials and
therefore they should pay less than
what is being charged. But because of
Art 488, they still have to reimburse.
The co-owner who failed to make
notification has the burden of proof to
prove the reasonableness of the
expenses. And if he failed to prove
the reasonableness of the expenses
then he must take care of the
difference, he must take care of the
excess.
ADILLE vs. CA
GR No. 44546. January 29, 1988
When a co-owner has repurchased a property
held in common with his own funds alone, it
did not terminate the co-ownership. The
expenses he incurred shall be subject to
reimbursement from the remaining co-
owners.
FACTS
Leliza Alzul originally owned a lot of the
Cadastral Survey of Albay in Legaspi City,
containing an area 11,325 sq. m. Alzul married
twice in her lifetime. The first, marriage was with
one Bernabe Adille, with whom she had as an
only child, herein petitioner RUSTICO ADILLE.
The second, was with one Procopio Asejo, with
whom she has 5 children, herein respondents
EMETERIA ASEJO, TEODORICA ASEJO,
DOMINGO ASEJO, JOSEFA ASEJO, and
SANTIAGO ASEJO (ASEJOs).
In 1939, Alzul sold the property in pacto de
retro to certain 3rd persons with a period of 3
years for repurchase. She died in 1942 without
being able to redeem said property. However,
after her death, but during the period of
redemption, RUSTICO ADILLE repurchased by
himself alone said property. In 1955, he executed a
deed of extra-judicial partition representing
himself to be the only heir and child of his mother
that he was able to secure a title, transferring the
said property registered in the name of his
mother, in his name alone.
After some efforts of compromise had failed,
ADILLEs half-brothers and sisters, the ASEJOs
filed an action for partition with accounting on
the position that he was only a trustee on an
implied trust when he redeemed said property.
ADILLE also filed a counterclaim against her half-
sister and one of the defendants herein
EMETERIA ASEJO, who was found to be in
possession of a portion of said property to vacate
the premises.
The trial court declared ADILLE as absolute
owner of the property in question and
condemned EMETRIA ASEJO to vacate the
property. The Court of Appeals though, ruled in
favor of the ASEJOs. Aggrieved, ADILLE file this
petition. He contended that the property subject
of dispute devolved upon him upon the failure of
his coheirs to join him in its redemption within
the period required by law.
ISSUE
Whether or not a ADILLE who was a co-
owner may acquire
exclusive ownership over the property he held in
common with the ASEJOs?
RULING
NO. The right of repurchase may be exercised
by a co-owner with respect to his share alone.
While the records show that the petitioner
redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering
the expenses therefore, that did not make him the
owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to
end the existing state of co-ownership.
There is no doubt that redemption of property
entails a necessary expense. Necessary expenses
then may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to
his right to collect reimbursement from the
remaining co-owners under Art. 488.
The redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of
the property in its totality does not vest in him
ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-
owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to
retain the property and consolidate title thereto in
his name. But the provision does not give to the
redeeming co-owner the right to the entire
property. It does not provide for a mode of
terminating a co-ownership.
Neither does the fact that the petitioner had
succeeded in securing title over the parcel in his
name terminate the existing co-ownership. While
his half-brothers and sisters are, as we said, liable
to him for reimbursement as and for their shares
in redemption expenses, he cannot claim
exclusive right to the property owned in common.
Registration of property is not a means of
acquiring ownership
ARTICLE 490: Whenever the different stories of a
house belong to different owners, if the titles of
ownership do not specify the terms under which they
should contribute to the necessary expenses and there
exists no agreement on the subject, the following rules
shall be observed:
(1.) The main and party walls, the roof and the
other things used in common, shall be
preserved at the expense of all the owners in
proportion to the value of the story belonging
to each;
(2.) Each co-owner shall bear the cost of
maintaining the floor of his story; the floor of
the entrance, front door, common yard and
sanitary works common to all, shall be
maintained at the expense of all the owners
pro rata.
(3.) The stairs from the entrance to the first story
shall be maintained at the expense of all the
owners pro rata, with the exception of the
owner on the ground floor, the stairs from the
first to the second story shall be preserved at
the expense of all, except the owner of the
ground floor and the owner of the first story,
and so on successively.
Art. 490 talks about perpendicular co-
ownership.
Condominium Act, RA 4726.
Condominium - It is an interest in a real
property consisting of:
Separate interest in a unit of a building as
sole ownership. Sole ownership with
respect to the unit.
An individual interest with respect to the
common areas like the land, stairs, beams,
elevators, and other common areas. And,
this is co-ownership.
In condominium, there is sole ownership
and co-ownership at the same time.
A condominium is actually a corporation.
When you a buy a unit in a condo, you
become a member of the condominium
corporation.
A condominium is the exception to the
constitutional provision that aliens
cannot own properties in the Philippines.
Condo units can be sold to aliens
provided that 60% of the condo is owned
by Filipinos
SUNSET VIEW vs. CAMPOS
GR Nos. 52361 & 52524. April 27, 1981
Ownership over a condominium unit is
acquired by the buyer only after he had paid
the purchase price. The ownership of the unit
is what makes the buyer a shareholder in the
condominium.
FACTS
The petitioner SUNSET VIEW
CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION was a
Condominium Corporation within the meaning of
The Condominium Act (RA 4726). It filed 2
separate cases against private respondents
AGUILAR-BERNARES REALTY and LIM SIU
LENG. The court consolidated the 2 cases being
that it involved similar facts and raised identical
questions of law.
GR No. 52361
Private respondent AGUILAR-BERNARES
REALTY was a registered business owned and
operated by the spouses Emmanuel and Zenaida
B. Aguilar. It was the assignee of a unit, "Solana",
in the SUNSET VIEW CONDOMINIUM PROJECt
with LA PERLA COMMERCIAL
INCORPORATED, as assignor. LA PERLA
bought the "Solana" unit on installment from the
Tower Builders, Inc. In 1979, SUNSET VIEW
CONDO, filed for the collection of assessments
levied on the unit against AGUILAR REALTY.
The latter filed a motion to dismiss.
GR No. 52524
In 1977, Private respondent LIM SIU LENG
was assigned a unit called "Alegria" of the Sunset
View Condominium Project by Alfonso Uy who
had entered into a "Contract to Buy and Sell" with
Tower Builders, Inc. over the said unit on
installment basis. In 1979, SUNSENT VIEW
CONDO filed an action for the collection of
overdue accounts on assessments and insurance
premiums and the interest thereon from LIM. LIM
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that by
having purchased the condominium unit, she has
automatically become a stockholder of SUNSET
VIEW CONDO, pursuant to Sec. 2 of The
Condominium Act. Hence, the dispute being
intra-corporate should have been under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities & Exchange
Commission as provided in Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-
A.
The respondent JUDGE JOSE C. CAMPOS
dismissed the 2 cases and opined that AGUILAR
REALTY and LIM, respectively were holders of a
separate interest pursuant to Sec. 2 of The
Condominium Act. Thus, being a shareholder of
SUNSET VIEW CONDO, the case should have
been filed with the Securities & Exchange
Commission which had exclusive original
jurisdiction on controversies arising between
shareholders of the corporation. A motion for
reconsideration was also denied.
Aggrieved, SUNSET VIEW CONDO filed a
petition to review with the Court of Appeals. In
both cases, private respondents therein AGUILAR
REALTY and LIM argued that every purchaser of
a condominium unit, regardless of whether or not
he has fully paid the purchase price, is a "holder of
a separate interest" mentioned in Sec. 2 of The
Condominium Act and is automatically a
shareholder of the Condominium Corporation.
ISSUE
Whether or not AGUILAR REALTY and LIM,
who had not yet fully paid the purchase price of
the condominium units they respectively bought
from SUNSET VIEW CONDO had automatically
become a stockholder of the Condominium
Corporation.
RULING
NO. Sec. 5 of The Condominium Act (RA
4726) expressly provides that the shareholding in
the Condominium Corporation will be conveyed
only in a proper case. It is clear then that not
every purchaser of a condominium unit is a
shareholder of the Condominium Corporation.
The court held that a purchaser of a
condominium unit shall only become a
shareholder of the Condominium Corporation.
The court premised it on the Master Deed of the
condominium, the deed of conveyance and The
Condominium Act itself.
First. The Condominium Act leaves to the
Master Deed the determination of when the
shareholding will be transferred to the purchaser
of a unit. The Master Deed states that the
shareholding in the Condominium Corporation is
inseparable from the unit to which it is only
appurtenant, and that only the owner of a unit is a
shareholder in the Condominium Corporation.
Second. In both deeds of conveyance entered
into by AGUILAR REALTY and LIM, it was
provided that only after the full payment of the
purchase price shall the buyer of the
condominium unit be granted shares of stocks.
Consequently, even under the contract, it is only
the owner of a unit who is a shareholder of the
Condominium Corporation. Hence, a purchaser
of a unit who has not paid the full purchase price
thereof is not the owner of the unit and
consequently is not a shareholder of the
Condominium Corporation.
Third. Under The Condominium Act,
ownership of a unit is a condition sine qua non to
being a shareholder in the Condominium
Corporation. It follows that a purchaser of a unit
who is not yet the owner thereof for not having
fully paid the full purchase price, is not a
shareholder. By necessary implication, the
"separate interest" in a condominium, which
entities the holder to become automatically a
shareholder in the Condominium Corporation, as
provided in Sec. 2 of the Condominium Act, can
be no other than ownership of a unit. This is so
because nobody can be a shareholder unless he is
the owner of a unit and when he ceases to be the
owner, he also ceases automatically to be a
shareholder.
The private respondents, therefore, who have
not fully paid the purchase price of their units and
are consequently not owners of their units are not
members or shareholders of the petitioner
Condominium Corporation. Being that they were
not shareholders in the Condominium
Corporation, the Securities and Exchange
Commission did not have jurisdiction over the
case.
Art. 491: None of the co-owners shall, without the
consent of the others, make alterations in the thing
owned in common, even though benefits for all would
result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the
consent by one or more of the co-owners is clearly
prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may
afford adequate relief.
Act of alteration is an act of ownership,
not merely an act of administration.
there is a need for the unanimity of
consent
Consent here may be tacit or express
Effect of a tacit consent:
the co-owner who is deemed to have tacitly
consented to the alteration cannot ask for
its demolition, neither can he be held
liable to answer for any part of the
expenses incurred therein because the
obligation to pay such expenses cannot be
deemed to be the subject of his tacit
consent, unless he wants or if he derives
benefit out of the new undertaking, then
the other co-owners may compel him to
contribute.
Alteration: Characteristics:
1) Alteration is a change which is
more or less permanent in
character.
 2) It changes the use of the thing
owned in common.
3) It prejudices the condition of co-
ownership or the enjoyment by
others.
Examples of alteration:
sale, donation, mortgage, voluntary easement
When is the alteration illegal?
1. When the co-owner does not ask
for the consent of the other co-
owners;
2. when he asks for the consent of
the other co-owners but they
object;
3. When he proceeds with the
alteration even though the other
c0-owners object.
So, what is the effect of illegal alteration
without the consent? The co-owner
responsible may lose what has spent; the
demolition may be compelled; the co-
owner responsible will be liable for losses
and damages to the other co-owners.
But whatever benefits the co-ownership
derives belong to it. For example, the
house has already been built, B and C
were abroad, they were not informed
about the construction and when they
came back, they saw the house, can B and
C benefit? YES.
In case a house is constructed on a
common lot, all the co-owners will be
entitled to a proportionate share of the
rent.
Take note of the unanimity of consent. If
it involves acts of ownership, there must
be unanimity of consent. If it merely
involves acts of administration, then
majority may suffice.
THE FF. ARE ACTS OF
ADMINISTRATION:
1) They are those that do not involve an
alteration;
2) Those that maybe renewed from time to time.
What are the acts of administration which
may be renewed from time to time? For
example, the co-ownership, A and B own a
hotel and they want to change the manager,
thats an act of administration.
3) Those that have transitory effect, that is, do
not bind the co-ownership for a long time in
the future;
4) Those that do not give rise to a real right over
the thing owned in common;
5) Those, which even if called an alteration, do
not affect the substance or nature of the thing.
JAVIER vs. JAVIER
GR No. 2812. October 18, 1906
The ownership of a house by one person, and
of the land on which it stands by another, does
not create a community of property.
If a co-owner has constructed an improvement
on the land without the consent of the other
co-owners, he shall have no right of
reimbursement.
FACTS
Since 1860, a parcel of lot locate in Malate,
Manila was owned by Manuel Javier, father of
petitioner LONGINOS JAVIER and respondent
SEGUNDO JAVIER. Since then, it had been
occupied by his children and that no one of these
children ever made any claim to the ownership
thereof, and no one of them ever occupied the
property as owner. Thereon, SEGUNDO and his
wife ISABEL HERNANDEZ constructed a house
thereon.
Subsequently, LONGINOS, as administrator
of the estate of his father filed an action in court
contesting ownership over the house and lot. The
lower court ruled that the land belonged to
LONGINOS as administrator of the estate of his
father while the house was owned by respondents
ISABEL HERNANDEZ and her son MANUEL
RAMON JAVIER. Judgment was rendered in
favor of LONGINOS for the possession of the
property but SEGUNDO ET AL. were given a
reasonable opportunity to remove the house.
On appeal, SEGUNDO ET AL. contended that
the case should be decided by an application of
the principles of law relating to the community of
property because a community of property
existed as the house was owned by them while
the land by the LONGINOS. They also declared
that they were possessors in good faith and that
they should be reimbursed for the construction of
the house.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not there is a co-ownership
when the house and the land are owned by
different persons.
(2) Whether or not SEGUNDO ET AL. was
entitled for reimbursement for the construction of
the house.
RULING
(1) NO. The ownership of a house by one
person, and of the land on which it stands by
another does not create a community of property
Such a condition of affairs did not create a
community of property. If, on the other hand, it
was meant that community of property existed
because the land itself belonged to the heirs of
Manuel Javier, and that two of the respondents
were such heirs, it can be said that the decision of
the court below was fully as favorable to the
appellants as it could be.
(2) NO, he should not be entitled for
reimbursement of the house he constructed
thereon.
SEGUNDO could not claim for
reimbursement a builder in good faith since he
was in bad faith as he and his wife had always
believed that the land did not belong to them but
belonged to the estate of Manuel Javier.
 He could not also be reimbursed under Art.
491 (then Art. 397) of the Civil Code, which relates
to improvements made upon the common
property by one of the co-owners. The burden of
proof was on SEGUNDO ET AL. to show that the
house was built with the consent of their co-
tenants. According to Manresa, Even if a tacit
consent was shown, this would not require such
co-tenants to pay for the house.
ARTICLE 492: For the administration and better
employment of the thing owned in common, the
resolutions of the majority of the co-owners shall be
binding.
There shall be no majority unless the
resolution is approved by the co-owners who represent
the controlling interest in the object of the co-
ownership.
Should there by no majority, or should the
resolution of the majority be seriously prejudicial to
those interested in the property owned in common, the
court, at the instance of an interested party, shall order
such measures as it may deem proper, including the
appointment of an administrator.
Whenever a part of the thing belongs
exclusively to one of the co-owners and the remainder
is owned in common, the preceeding provisions shall
apply only to the part owned in common.
The phrase "administration and better
enjoyment" contemplates acts or decisions
for the common benefit of all the co-
owners and not for the benefit of only one
of the co-owner or some of them.
Financial majority refers to those who
represent a controlling interest in the
object of co-ownership. So you look at the
percentage of ownership of the particular
co-owner.
The general rule is a financial majority's
decision is sufficient, only that it requires
notice to such minority. Exception, in
cases of extreme urgency and the
impracticability of giving notice, as one of
the co-owners is nowhere to be found.
Now, when may the court interfere
with the division spend for improvement
or embellishment?
1. when there is no financial
majority or according to
provision; or
2. even if there is financial
majority, if the resolution
of the majority is seriously
prejudicial to those
interested in the property
owned in common.
However, the court cannot interfere motu
propio without any case filed by an
interested party.
ARTICLE 493: Each so-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part, and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto and he may therefore alienate,
assign, or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when the personal
rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which maybe allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
What are the rights of the co-owner
with respect to his ideal share?
1. He has full ownership of his part.
2. He has full ownership of the fruits of their
part and the benefits.
3. Each co-owner may alienate, assign, or
mortgage his undivided share. When a
co-owner alienates his undivided share to
a stranger, the other co-owner has the
right of legal redemption.
4. He may even substitute another person in
its enjoyment except when personal rights
are involved. For example, my 1/3 share
shall be given to my son, I can do that.
5. He may exempt himself from necessary
expenses and taxes by renouncing part of
his interest in the co-ownership.
Each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he
may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.
MERCADO vs. LIWANAG
GR No. L-14429. June 30, 1962
What a co-owner may dispose of under Article
493 is only his undivided aliquot share, which
shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him upon the termination of the co-
ownership. He has no right to divide the
property into parts and then convey one part
by metes and bounds.
FACTS
Petitioner RAMON MERCADO and his wife,
BASILIA MERCADO, as co-owners, owned a
parcel of land in Quezon City, with an area of
4,392 sq. m. Said land was registered in both their
names. In 1956, without the consent of his wife,
RAMON MERCADO sold half of the said land
with an area of 2,196 sq. m. at P70 per sq. m. to
respondent PIO D. LIWANAG. A Deed of Sale was
subsequently executed which described the sold
property in metes and bounds.
When LIWANAG registered the Deed of Sale,
he found out that out of the total area of 4,392 sq.
m., an area consisting of 391 sq. m. was
expropriated by the National Power Corporation
sometime in 1953 at a price of P10 per sq. m.
Pursuant to the Deed of Sale, aTCT was issued in
the name of LIWANAG and BASILIA
MERCADO.
Later, RAMON and BASILIA MERCADO
filed an action in court to annul the Deed of Sale
based on Art. 493 of the Civil Code. For his part,
LIWANAG submitted a receipt of a check signed
by RAMON MERCADO and a promissory note.
However, RAMON MERCADO disclaimed
payment and receipt of such check and
promissory note, the check being un-encashed
and is still in the possession of one Atty. de
Gracia.
The trial court however, held that under Art.
493 of the Civil Code, the sale in question was
valid and so it dismissed the complaint.
Hence, this appeal. SPOUSES MERCADO
alleged that the Deed of Sale sought to be annulled
because RAMON MERCADO disposed of a
divided and determinate half of the land under
co-ownership when in the TCT, only stated that
what was merely sold was an undivided half-
share of the property
ISSUE
Whether or not a Deed of Sale may be validly
annulled.
RULING
NO, the Deed of Sale may not be validly
annulled.
What a co-owner may dispose of under
Article 493 is only his undivided aliquot share,
which shall be limited to the portion which may
be allotted to him upon the termination of the co-
ownership. He has no right to divide the property
into parts and then convey one part by metes and
bounds.
In the deed of sale, MERCADO transferred and
conveyed to LIWANAG his title and interests on
half of the portion of said property in metes ad
bounds. Nevertheless, upon registration of the
sale, the new TCT did not reproduce the
description in the instrument but carried the
names of PIO D. LIWANAG and BASILIA
MERCADO as co-owners pro-indiviso.
As far as Basilia Mercado is concerned she
retained in all their integrity her rights as co-
owner which she had before the sale, and
consequently she had no cause to complain. Much
less has Ramon Mercado, for it was he who was
responsible for whatever indicia there may be in
the deed of sale that a determinate portion of the
property was being sold.
The title is the final and conclusive repository
of the rights of the new co-owners. The question
of whether or not the Deed of Sale should be
annulled must be considered in conjunction with
the title issued pursuant thereto. Since, according
to the title, what LIWANAG acquired by virtue of
the sale is only an undivided half-share of the
property, which under the law the vendor
RAMON MERCADO had the absolute right to
dispose of, the trial court committed no error in
dismissing the action. The end-result of the
transaction is in accordance with Article 493 of the
Civil Code.
ACEBEDO vs. ABESAMIS
GR No. 102380. January 18, 1993
It is within the jurisdiction of the probate
court to approve the sale of properties of a
deceased person by his prospective heirs before
final adjudication.
An heir can sell his ideal share including the
rights, interests, or participation he may have
in the property held in common under
administration.
FACTS
The late Felix Acebedo left an estate consisting
of several real estate properties located in Quezon
City and Caloocan City, with a conservative
estimated value of about P30 million. His estate
has several unsettled claims. He was succeeded
by eight heirs. Two of whom, were petitioners
HERODOTUS (administrator) and
DEMOSTHENES (PETITIONER HEIRS) and the
others, private respondents MIGUEL,
ALEXANDER, NAPOLEON, RIZALINO,
REPUBLICA and FILIPINAS (RESPONDENT
HEIRS), all of whom were surnamed ACEBEDO.
In 1989, due to the prolonged pendency of the
settlement of the estate of the deceased before the
respondent court under JUDGE BERNARDO P.
ABESAMIS for 16 years, RESPONDENT HEIRS
filed a Motion for Approval of Sale. The said sale
involved the properties, which formed part of the
estate. The consideration for said lots was twelve
P12 million and by that time, they already had a
buyer. In the motion, it was also alleged by the
RESPONDENT HEIRS that they had already
received their proportionate share of the P6
million paid by the buyer, YU HWA PING, as
earnest money. They also averred that the
remaining balance of P6 million was more than
enough to pay the unsettled claims against the
estate. Thus, they prayed for the Court to direct
the administrator, HERODOTUS ACEBEDO to
sell the properties, to pay all the claims against the
estate with the balance of P6 million, and to
distribute the residue among the Heirs in final
settlement of the Estate.
However, Petitoner-administrator
HERODOTUS ACEBEDO, interposed an
Opposition to Approval of Sale, wherein he
contended that some of the real properties left by
their father was sold at a shockingly low price
without the consent of the court. PETITIONER
HEIRS also moved that they be given 45 days to
look for a buyer who was willing to pay the
properties at a price higher than P12 million.
However, during hearing, the PETITIONER
HEIRS did not find any buyer offering better
terms that they asked for a 30-day extension.
After having miserably failed to find a better
buyer for 7 months, Petitoner-administrator
HERODOTUS ACEBEDO filed another Opposition
to Approval of Sale. The court issued an order
denying the petition of the RESPONDENT HEIRS
to sell the properties in favor of YU HWA PING.
Later, the court issued an order resolving to
call the parties to a conference but during the
conference, still, the parties were unable to arrive
at an agreement. Later, it was agreed by the he
parties that the heirs be allowed to sell their
shares of the properties to YU HWA PING for the
price already agreed upon while herein
PETITIONER HEIRS negotiated for a higher price
with YU HWA PING.
Subsequently, PETITIONER HEIRS instead
filed a Supplemental Opposition to the approval of
the Deed of Conditional Sale. However, the Court in
its decision, approved the Conditional Sale
executed by the REPONDENT HEIRS in favor of
YU HWA PING, pertaining to their respective
shares in the properties. Petitioner-administrator
Herodotus Acebedo was then ordered to sell the
remaining portions of the said properties also in
favor of Yu Hwa Ping at the same price.
Pending resolution the Motion for Execution
of the Order filed by RESPONDENT HEIRS,
PETITIONER HEIRS filed a petition for certiorari.
They maintained that said Conditional Sale was
null and void for lack of prior court approval.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the lower court acting as a
probate court may validly issue an order
approving the Deed of Conditional Sale executed
by RESPONDENT HEIRS without prior court
approval and to order PETITIONER-
ADMINISTRATOR to sell the remaining portion
of said properties.
(2) Whether or not an heir can sell whatever
right, interest, or participation he may have in the
property under administration r
RULING
(1) YES. it is within the jurisdiction of the
probate court to approve the sale of properties of
a deceased person by his prospective heirs before
final adjudication. This authority is necessarily
included in its capacity as a probate court.
Therefore, it is clear that the probate court in the
case at bar, acted within its jurisdiction in issuing
the Order approving the Deed of Conditional
Sale.
The position maintained by herein petitioners
that said conditional sale is null and void for lack
of prior court approval was erroneous. The sale
precisely was made conditional, the condition
being that the same should first be approved by
the probate court.
This is a matter, which comes under the
jurisdiction of the probate court.
(2) YES, an heir can sell whatever right, interest,
or participation he may have in the property
under administration. The right of an heir to
dispose of the decedent's property, even if the
same is under administration, is based on the
Civil Code provision stating that the possession of
hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the
heir without interruption and from the moment of
the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance
is accepted. Where there are however, two or
more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is,
before its partition, owned in common by such
heirs.
The Civil Code, under the provisions on co-
ownership, further qualifies this right. Although it
is mandated that each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and thus may alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, the effect of the alienation
or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. In other words,
the law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling,
alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the
property held in common.
BAILON vs. CA
GR No. L-18178. April 15,1988
Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property
by one co-owner without the consent of the
other co-owners is not null and void.
However, only the rights of the co-owner-
seller are transferred, thereby making the
buyer a co-owner of the property.
FACTS
A parcel of land with an area of 48,849 square
meters was covered by an OCT in the names of
Rosalia, Gaudencio, SABINA, Bernabe, Nenita
and Delia Bailon, as co-owners, each with a 1/6
share. Gaudencio and Nenita were then dead, the
latter being represented in this case by her
children Luz, Emma and Nilda. Bernabe went to
China in 1931 and had not been heard from since
then.
In 1948, Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon sold a
portion of the said land consisting of 16,283
square meters to Donato Delgado. A year after,
Rosalia alone sold the remainder of the land
consisting of 32,566 square meters to Ponciana V.
Aresgado de Lanuza. On the same date, Lanuza
acquired from Delgado the 16,283 sq. m. of land,
which the latter had earlier acquired from Rosalia
and Gaudencio. In 1975, John Lanuza, acting
under a special power of attorney given by his
wife, Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza, sold the
two parcels of land to CELESTINO AFABLE.
In all these transfers, it was stated in the
deeds of sale that the land was not registered
under the provisions of Act No. 496 when the fact
was that it was.
In 1981, petitionners DELIA BAILON-
CASILAO, LUZ PAULINO-ANG, EMMA
PAULINO-YBANEZ, NILDA PAULINO-
TOLENTINO, and SABINA BAILON (BAILONs)
filed a case for recovery of property and damages
with notice of lis pendens herein private
respondent, CELESTINO AFABLE.
 In his defense, AFABLE claimed that he had
acquired the land in question through
prescription and contended that the BAILONs
were guilty of laches. He later filed a third-party
complaint against Rosalia for damages allegedly
suffered as a result of the sale to him of the land.
After trial, the lower court declared AFABLE
as a co-owner of the land, having validly bought
2/6 respective undivided shares of Rosalia and
Gaudencio. It also ordered the termination of the
co-ownership and the delineation of the specific
part of each owner though a Geodetic Engineer.
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the sale of the entire property
made by 2 co-owners Rosalia and Gaudencio was
invalid beause it was made without the consent of
the other co-owners.
RULING
NO. The rights of a co-owner of a certain
property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the
Civil Code.
Even if a co-own sells the whole property as
his, the sale will affect only his own share but not
those of the other co-owners who did not consent
to the sale. This is because under Art. 493, the sale
or other disposition affects only his undivided
share and the transferee gets only what would
correspond to his grantor in the partition of the
thing owned in common.
Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by
Rosalia and Gaudencio, which were valid with
respect to their proportionate shares, and the
subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale
to private respondent AFABLE, the latter thereby
became a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land.
The sales produced the effect of substituting the
buyers in the enjoyment thereof.
Hence, since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by
one co-owner without the consent of the other co-
owners is not null and void. However, only the
rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred,
thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property.
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate
recourse of co-owners in cases where their
consent were not secured in a sale of the entire
property as well as in a sale merely of the
undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an
action for partition. Neither recovery of
possession nor restitution can be granted since the
defendant buyers are legitimate proprietors and
possessors in joint ownership of the common
property claimed.
SPOUSES CRUZ vs. LEIS
GR No. 125233. March 9, 2000
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a
co-owner with respect to his share alone.
Although Gertrudes redeemed the property in
its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor,
that did not make her the owner of all of it.
FACTS
Adriano Leis and Gertrudes Isidro were
married in1923. In 1955, Gertrudes acquired from
the then Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (DANR), a parcel of land with an area
of 100 sq. m. situated in Marikina, Rizal. The Deed
of Sale, Gertrudes was described as a widow.
Hence, a TCT was issued in her name, which
described her as a widow.
In 1973, Adriano died intestate. In 1985,
Gertrudes obtained a P15,000 loan from
petitioners SPOUSES ALEXANDER AND
ADELAIDA CRUZ at 5% interest. The loan was
secured by the a mortgage over the Rizal
property. Gertrudes however, failed to pay the
loan on the due date.
Unable to pay her obligation, Gertrudes in
1986 executed 2 contracts in favor of
ALEXANDER CRUZ. The first was a Kasunduan,
which the parties conceded was a pacto de retro
sale, granting Gertrudes 1 year within which to
repurchase the property. The was a Kasunduan ng
Tuwirang Bilihan, a Deed of Absolute Sale covering
the same property for the price of P39,083, the
same amount stipulated in the Kasunduan. For
failure of Gertrudes to repurchase the property,
ownership thereof was consolidated in the name
of ALEXANDER CRUZ. In 1987, A TCT was
issued in his name, canceling the TCT in the name
of Gertrudes.
In 1987 Gertrudes died. Thereafter, her heirs,
herein private respondents, ELEUTERIO LEIS,
RAYMUNDO LEIS, ANASTACIO L. LAGDANO,
LORETA L. CAYONDA (LEIS ET AL.) received
demands from SPOUSES CRUZ to vacate the
premises as they were already new owners of the
property.
In response, LEIS ET AL. filed an action
seeking the nullification of the contracts of sale
executed by their mother Gertrudes in favor of
petitioner ALEXANDER CRUZ, as well as the
TCT subsequently issued in the name of the latter.
They claimed that the contracts were vitiated by
fraud as Gertrudes was illiterate and already 80
years old at the time of the execution of the
contracts. They also contended that the price for
the land was insufficient as it was sold lower than
its fair market value. They added that the
property subject of the sale was conjugal and,
consequently, its sale without the knowledge and
consent of private respondents was in derogation
of their rights as heirs.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of
LEIS ET AL. It concluded that the land was
conjugal property thus Gertrudes could only sell
to SPOUSES CRUZ her one-half share in the
property. However, it also ruled that there was no
fraud in the execution of the contract but nullified
the same because the SPOUSES CRUZ failed to
comply with certain procedural requirements in
its registration. The same decision was affirmed
when the case was appealed with the Court of
Appeals.
 Hence, the SPOUSES CRUZ filed a petition
for review with the Supreme Court. They alleged
that the property was not conjugal but was owned
exclusively by Gertrudes as described in the TCT.
They also averred that assuming the property was
conjugal, the same became exclusive since
Gertrudes mortgaged the same property but
redeemed the same in 1983.
ISSUE
Whether or not the property was exclusively
owned by Gertrudes since she redeemed the
property over the exclusion of her co-owners.
RULING
NO. The redemption of the land by Getrudes
did not terminate the co-ownership nor give her
title to the entire land subject of the co-ownership.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a
co-owner with respect to his share alone.
Although Gertrudes redeemed the property in its
entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that
did not make her the owner of all of it. In other
words, it did not put to end the existing state of
co-ownership. Under Art. 493, a co-owner such as
Gertrudes could only dispose of her share in the
property owned in common.
However, being that neither Gertrudes nor
her co-owners, LEIS ET AL. were able to redeem
the same within the one-year period stipulated in
the Kasunduan, ownership then remained with the
SPOUSE CRUZ. The essence of a pacto de retro
sale is that title and ownership of the property
sold are immediately vested in the vendee a retro,
subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase
by the vendor a retro within the stipulated period.
Failure thus of the vendor a retro to perform said
resolutory condition vests upon the vendee by
operation of law absolute title and ownership
over the property sold.
SPOUSES DEL CAMPO vs. CA
GR No. 108228. February 1, 2001
A co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided
share in the property held in common.
However, a co-owner cannot alienate more
than his share in the co-ownership.
If a co-owner had an undisturbed possession
for a considerable number of years, it had the
effect of a partial partition of the co-owned
property, which entitled the possessor to the
definite portion which he occupies.
FACTS
Lot 162 of the Cadastral Survey in
Pontevedra, Capiz, consisting of 27,179 sq. m.
were co-owned by the 8 Bornales brothers and
sisters, the same registered in their names. Said
lot was divided in aliquot shares among them.
In 1940, SALOME, one of the co-owners sold
part of her 4/16 share in for P200.00 to Soledad
Daynolo. In the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by
SALOME and two other co-owners, CONSORCIA
and ALFREDO, the portion of the sold lot was
delineated in metes and bounds.
Thereafter, Soledad immediately took
possession of the land and built a house thereon.
A few years later, she and her husband, Simplicio
Distajo, mortgaged the property as security for a
P400 debt to respondent JOSE REGALADO, SR.
In 1948, 3 of the 8 co-owners, specifically
SALOME, CONSORCIA and ALFREDO sold
24,993 sq. m. of Lot 162 to REGALADO, SR.
In 1951, Simplicio Distajo, heir of Soledad
Daynolo who had since died, paid the mortgage
debt and redeemed the mortgaged portion the lot
from REGALADO, SR. The latter, in turn,
executed a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage in favor of
Soledads heirs. On same date, the heirs of
Soledad sold the redeemed portion for P1,500 to
herein petitioners, SPOUSES MANUEL DEL
CAMPO AND SALVACION QUIACHON
(SPOUSES DEL CAMPO).
Meanwhile, REGALADO, SR. caused the
transfer of the title in his name and subdivided
the entire property into smaller lots, each covered
by a respective title in his name. One of these
small lots is Lot No. 162-C-6 with an area of 11,732
sq. m.
In 1987, the SPOUSES DEL CAMPO brought
a complaint for repartition, resurvey and
reconveyance against the heirs of the now
deceased REGALADO, SR. They claimed that
they owned an area of 1,544 square meters located
within Lot 162-C-6, which was erroneously
included in the issued in the name of Regalado.
They alleged that they occupied the disputed area
as residential dwelling ever since they purchased
the property from the Distajos way back in 1951.
They also declared the land for taxation purposes
and paid the corresponding taxes.
In 1990, however, the trial court dismissed
the complaint. It held that while Salome could
alienate her pro-indiviso share in Lot 162, she could
not validly sell an undivided part thereof by
metes and bounds to Soledad, from whom
petitioners derived their title. The trial court also
reasoned that petitioners could not have a better
right to the property even if they were in physical
possession of the same and declared the property
for taxation purposes, because mere possession
cannot defeat the right of the Regalados who had
a Torrens title over the land. The same judgment
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on appeal.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not a sale by co-owner Salome
of a portion of an undivided property held in
common in favor of Soledad was valid.
(2) Whether or not co-owners Salome,
Consorcia and Alfredo could validly sell the
shares of the common property pertaining to
Soledad.
(3) Whether or not the SPOUSES DEL CAMPO
may rightfully claim the specific 1,544 sq. m.
located within Lot 162-C-6.
RULING
(1) NO. The mere fact that Salome purportedly
transferred a definite portion of the co-owned lot
by metes and bounds to Soledad, did not per se
render the sale a nullity. This much is evident
under Article 493 of the Civil Code and pertinent
jurisprudence on the matter.
Salomes right to sell part of her undivided
interest in the co-owned property is absolute in
accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a
co-owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso
share and has the right to alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and substitute another person in its
enjoyment. Since Salomes clear intention was to
sell merely part of her aliquot share in Lot 162, no
valid objection can be made against it and the sale
can be given effect to the full extent.
In the case at bar, the transaction entered into
by Salome and Soledad could be legally
recognized in its entirety since the object of the
sale did not even exceed the ideal shares held by
the former in the co-ownership. In such sale,
Soledad stepped into the shoes of the Salome as
co-owner and acquired a proportionate abstract
share in the property held in common.
(2) NO. Based on the principle that no one can
give what he does not have, Salome, Consorcia
and Alfredo could not legally sell the shares
pertaining to Soledad since a co-owner cannot
alienate more than his share in the co-ownership.
Being that the sale entered into by Salome and
Soledad did not even exceed the ideal shares held
by the former in the co-ownership, it was deemed
valid. It follows then that Salome, Consorcia and
Alfredo could not have sold the entire Lot 162 to
Jose Regalado, Sr. in 1948 because at that time, the
ideal shares held by the three co-owners/vendors
were equivalent to only 10/16 of the undivided
property less the aliquot share previously sold by
Salome to Soledad.
Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as
his, the sale will affect only his own share but not
those of the other co-owners who did not consent
to the sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by
one co-owner will only transfer the rights of said
co-owner to the buyer, thereby making the buyer
a co-owner of the property.
In this case, Regalado merely became a new
co-owner of Lot 162 to the extent of the shares
which Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could
validly convey. Soledad retained her rights as co-
owner and could validly transfer her share to her
heirs in 1951.
(3) YES. The area subject matter of this petition
had already been effectively segregated from the
mother lot even before title was issued in favor
of REGALADO.
The SPOUSES DEL CAMPO enjoyed
uninterrupted possession thereof for a total of 36
years until the complaint was filed. Prior to that,
at no instance did REGALADO nor his HEIRS
question the SPOUSES DEL CAMPOs right over
the land in dispute.
Such undisturbed possession had the effect of
a partial partition of the co-owned property,
which entitled the possessor to the definite
portion which he occupies. Conformably,
petitioners are entitled to the disputed land,
having enjoyed uninterrupted possession thereof
for a total of 49 years up to the present.
SANCHEZ vs. CA
GR No. 152766. June 20, 2003
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract
part of the property, the metes and bounds of
LILIANs lot has not been designated. As she
was not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale
voluntarily entered into by the other co-
owners, her right to 1/6 of the property must
be respected.
FACTS
Petitioner LILIAN SANCHEZ, constructed a
house on a 76-square meter lot owned by her
parents-in-law. The lot was registered in the name
of 6 co-owners: Eliseo, Sanchez, LILIAN, Nenita,
Susana and Felipe, all surnamed Sanchez.
In 1995, the lot was registered in the name of
private respondent VIRGINIA TERIA by virtue of
a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have been
executed by all 6 co-owners in her favor.
However, LILIAN claimed that she did not affix
her signature on the document. For her
subsequent refusal to vacate the said lot, TERIA
filed an action for recovery of possession of the
said lot.
The MeTC ruled in favor of TERIA declaring
that the sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of
the lot and the other 1/6 remaining as the
property of LILIAN, on account that her signature
in the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged.
In 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the
issuance of a writ of execution in favor of TERIA
as the buyer of the property. A year later, a Notice
to Vacate was served by the sheriff upon LILIAN
who however refused to heed the Notice. In 1999,
TERIA demolished LILIANs house without any
special permit of demolition from the court. Due
to the demolition of her house, LILIAN was
forced to inhabit the portion of the premises that
used to serve as the houses toilet and laundry
area.
LILIAN filed her Petition for Relief from
Judgment with the RTC on the ground that she
was not bound by the inaction of her counsel who
failed to submit petitioners appeal memorandum.
However, the RTC denied the Petition and the
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. She
subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals but it was denied, the same
with a following Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not LILIAN SANCHEZ could
validly claim ownership over her 1/6 undivided
share in the property.
RULING
 YES. Being that LILIAN was not a part of the
Deed of Sale, she was not bound by it. Hence her
1/6 share should be respected.
In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-
owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in
character and attribute. Whether established by
law or by agreement of the co-owners, the
property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed
with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner
becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners
and he may not do any act prejudicial to the
interest of his co-owners.
Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to
preserve the properties in co-ownership is to
create an express trust among the heirs as co-
owners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form
of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the
others.
Before the partition of a land or thing held in
common, no individual or co-owner can claim
title to any definite portion thereof. All that the
co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the entire land or thing.
Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner
of an undivided interest in the property the right
to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided
interest. He may validly lease his undivided
interest to a third party independently of the other
co-owners. But he has no right to sell or alienate a
concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing
owned in common because his right over the
thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion
without any physical adjudication.
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part
of the property, the metes and bounds of
LILIANs lot has not been designated. As she was
not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily
entered into by the other co-owners, her right to
1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition
needs to be effected to protect her right to her
definite share and determine the boundaries of
her property. Such partition must be done
without prejudice to the rights of TERIA as buyer
of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.
Note:
Definitions of Co-ownership
Sancher Roman: It is the right of
common dominion which two or more
persons have in a spiritual part of a thing,
not materially or physically divided.
Manresa: It is the manifestation of the
private right of ownership, which instead of
being exercised by the owner in an exclusive
manner over the things subject to it, is
exercised by two or more owners and the
undivided thing or right to which it refers is
one and the same.
The characteristics of co-ownership are:
(a) plurality of subjects, who are the
co-owners,
(b) unity of or material indivision,
which means that there is a single
object which is not materially
divided, and which is the element
which binds the subjects, and
(c) the recognition of ideal shares,
which determines the rights and
obligations of the co-owners.
DE GUIA vs. CA
GR No. 120864. October 8, 2003
(refer to Page 3)
HEIRS OF SPOUSES BALITE vs. LIM
GR No. 152168. December 10, 2004
When a co-owner sold a concrete portion of an
undivided property held in common, it did not
per se render the sale void. The sale is valid,
but only with respect to the aliquot share of
the selling co-owner.
FACTS
The spouses Aurelio and Esperanza Balite
were owners of a registered parcel of land,
located at Catarman, Northern Samar, with an
area of 17,551 sq. m. In 1985, Aurelio died
intestate. Hence, by inheritance, said property
was then co-owned by his wife Esperanza and
their children, herein petitioners ANTONIO
BALITE, FLOR BALITE-ZAMAR, VISITACION
BALITE-DIFUNTORUM, PEDRO BALITE,
PABLO BALITE, GASPAR BALITE, CRISTETA
(TITA) BALITE and AURELIO BALITE, JR.
(HEIRS OF BALITE). Each of then inherited an
undivided share of 9,751 sq. m.
Later, Esperanza became ill and was in dire
need of money for her hospital expenses. She,
through her daughter, CRISTETA, offered to sell
to respondent RODRIGO LIM, her undivided
share for the price of P1 million. A Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed, wherein it was stated
therein that the property sold to LIM was an area
of 10,000 sq. m. A Joint Affidavit was also
executed, wherein it was agreed that P30,000
should be paid by LIM and the remaining
purchase price be paid in installments. Only
Esperanza and two of her children, namely,
ANTONIO and CRISTETA knew about the said
transaction.
A Geodetic Engineer conducted a subdivision
survey of the property and prepared a Sketch
Plan. Said Sketch Plan was signed by LIM and
Esperanza. Thereafter, LIM took actual
possession of the property and introduced
improvements thereon.
When the other heirs, GASPAR,
VISITACION, FLOR, PEDRO and AURELIO, JR.
learned of the sale, they wrote a letter to the
Register of Deeds saying that they were not
informed of the sale of a portion of the said
property by their nor did they give their consent
thereto. They then requested that the registration
of the property in the name of LIM be held in
abeyance until the validity of the sale had already
been cleared.
Later, ANTONIO received from LIM, the
amount of P30,000 in partial payment of the
property and signed a Receipt for the said
amount. Esperanza signed a letter addressed to
LIM informing the latter that her children did not
agree to the sale of the property to him and that
she was withdrawing all her commitments until
the validity of the sale is finally resolved.
However, a few days later, Esperanza died
intestate and was survived by her children.
In 1997, the HEIRS OF BALITE filed a
complaint against Rodrigo for the Annulment of
Sale, Quieting of Title, Injunction and Damages.
In the meantime, the Registry of Deeds had
issued a TCT under the name of LIM over said
property as LIM had been granted a writ of
mandamus against the former for its refusal to
register the property in his name. Subsequently,
LIM secured a loan from the Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation in the amount of P2 million
and executed a Real Estate Mortgage over the
subject property as security therefor.
The trial court dismissed the Complaint filed
by the HEIRS OF BALITE. It held that, pursuant
to Art. 493 of the Civil Code, a co-owner has the
right to sell his/her undivided share. The sale
made by a co-owner is not invalidated by the
absence of the consent of the other co-owners.
Hence, the sale by Esperanza of the 10,000-sq. m.
portion of the property was valid; the excess from
her undivided share should be taken from the
undivided shares of Cristeta and Antonio, who
expressly agreed to and benefited from the sale.
On Appeal, with the court of Appeals,
judgment was still unfavorable to them. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Deed of Sale executed by
co-owner Esperanza was valid despite absence of
consent of some of the other co-owners.
RULING
YES, it was valid but only insofar as the pro
indiviso share of Esperanza was concerned.
Art. 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of
an undivided interest in the property the right to
freely sell and dispose of such interest. The co-
owner, however, has no right to sell or alienate a
specific or determinate part of the thing owned in
common, because such right over the thing is
represented by an aliquot or ideal portion without
any physical division. Nonetheless, the mere fact
that the deed purports to transfer a concrete
portion does not per se render the sale void. The
sale is valid, but only with respect to the aliquot
share of the selling co-owner. Furthermore, the
sale is subject to the results of the partition upon
the termination of the co-ownership.
Hence, the transaction between Esperanza
and LIM could be legally recognized only in
respect to the formers pro indiviso share in the co-
ownership. As a matter of fact, the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed between the parties
expressly referred to the 10,000-square-meter
portion of the land sold to respondent as the share
of Esperanza in the conjugal property. Her clear
intention was to sell merely her ideal or
undivided share in it. No valid objection can be
made against that intent. Clearly then, the sale
can be given effect to the extent of 9,751 square
meters, her ideal share in the property as found
by both the trial and the appellate courts.
ARTICLE 494: No co-owner shall be obliged to remain
in the co-ownership. Each co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing
undivided for certain period of time, not exceeding ten
years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a
new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for
a period which shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is
prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-
heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
What is the rationale behind the general
rule?
1) The law discourages co-
ownership;
2) To avoid conflicts in
management; and
3) More significantly the disposition
or enjoyment of the thing owned
in common is subject to the
desires of all the co-owners
GENERAL RULE: No co-owner shall be obliged
to remain in the co-ownership. He may demand
that his share may be taken out from the co-
ownership. Any co-owner may demand partition
anytime.
EXCEPT:
1. If there is a contract prohibiting partition
for a certain period of time. It is the
contract which shall prevail under Art.
494, upon the expiration of the period,
partition may be demanded
The law allows non-partition not
exceeding 10 years but this can be
extended for another 10 years upon the
expiration of the period.
NB: there is no automatic renewal.
If the agreement is more than 10 years,
then the agreement is void as to the
excess.
If the agreement is perpetual, valid only
up to 10 years.
If the agreement is subject to a resolutory
condition, the agreement ends upon the
fulfillment of the condition provided it
does not exceed 10 years
2. By the existence of a will, in cases of
donation or a testamentary succession.
 3. When the prohibition is prohibited by
law.
4. Physical partition would render the
property unserviceable. Physical partition
is not allowed but there are ways of
dividing the property.
5. Legal nature of the common property
does not allow partition. But this is not
absolute because there are ways of
dividing the property.
Prescription:
GR: prescription against a co-owner does not lie.
Ceniza vs. CA 181 SCRA 552
Exceptions:
1) When a co-owner gives notice to
the co-owners that he is
repudiating the co-ownership and
that he is claiming ownership of
the entire property.
2) The requirement of the open,
continuous, public and adverse
possession for a period of time
required by law must be met. (30
years). So there must first be
repudiation and the prescriptive
period is met.
REQUISITIES OF REPUDIATION:
1. He must make known to the other co-
owners that he is definitely repudiating
the co-ownership. He is claiming
complete ownership over the entire
property. He does not recognize co-
ownership. Hence, he must make it
known to the other co-owner.
2. There must be evidence of repudiation by
the owner and knowledge on the part of
the other co-owners.
3. The other requirements of prescription
must exist. OCEAN (open, continuous,
exclusive, adverse, notorious) possession
over the property.
4. The period of prescription starts to run
from the time of repudiation.
When there is repudiation, it means that
he is no longer recognizing the co-
ownership and he is claiming ownership
over the entire property and so that his
possession must be adverse.
Adverse means that he does not recognize
ownership in somebody else, particularly
the co-owners.
Notorious, open: making known to the
public that he is the owner of the property
to the exclusion of the other co-owners
Aguilar vs. CA 227 SCRA 470
Fx: In 1969, Brothers Virgilio and Semen
purchased a house and lot where his father would
live for the rest of his years in a peaceful
environment. They signed a memorandum
agreeing that their shares are equal and that
Semen could live in the house as long as he would
take care of the needs of his father. In 1974, their
father died. Consequently, in 1975 Virgilio
demanded from Semen to vacate the premises so
that the property could be sold to third parties
and the proceeds divided between them in
accordance with their respective shares. S refused,
so in '79, Virgilio instituted an action against S to
compel the sale, praying for the payment of
monthly rentals beginning 1975. The court
rendered judgment ordering S to vacate the house
so that the same may be sold, and ordered to him
to pay rentals from 1975 upto the date of the
decision.
Issue: W/N court was correct in ordering Semen
to vacate the property and the payment of rents.
Held: SC said lower court was correct except as to
the payment of rents (kailangan mag start). Art.
494 corollary to this rule is Art. 498. Being a co-
owner of the property, S is entitled to use the
house without paying any rent to V as he may use
the property owned in common so long as it is in
accordance with the purpose for which it was
intended and in a manner not injurious to the
interest of the other co-owners. Each co-owner of
the property held pro indiviso exercises his right
over the whole property and may use and enjoy
the same with no other limitation than that he will
not injure the rights of the co-owners. The reason
being that until a division is made, the respective
shares of each cannot be determined and each co-
owner exercises together with his co-participants
joint ownership over the pro-indiviso property in
addition to his use and enjoyment of the same. In
fairness, S should pay a rental of Php 1,200.00 per
month with legal interest from the time the lower
court ordered him to vacate for his use and
enjoyment of the other half of the property
pertaining to V. When petitioner (V) filed an
action to compel the sale of the property, and trial
court granted the petition and ordered the
ejectment of respondent (S), the ownership was
deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the
property jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the
continued stay of S in the house prejudiced the
interest of V as the property should have been
sold and the proceeds divided equally between
them.
ARTICLE 495: Notwithstanding the provisions of the
preceding article, the co-owners cannot demand a
physical division of the thing owned in common, when
to do so would render it unserviceable for the use for
which it is intended. But the co-ownership may be
terminated in accordance with Article 498.
ARTICLE 496: Partition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings.
Partition shall be governed by the Rules of Court
insofar as they are consistent with this Code.
2 KINDS OF PARTITION:
1. EXTRA-JUDICIAL PARTITION
2. JUDICIAL PARTITION
FABIAN vs. FABIAN
GR No. L-20449. January 29, 1968
GEN. RULE: An action for partition among
co-owners does not prescribe. EXCEPTION:
If a co-owner had
(1) adverse claim in the concept of an owner,
(2) in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and (3) in the span of
more than 10 years, he had acquired the
property by prescription against all the other
co-owners.
FACTS
In 1909, Pablo Fabian bought from the
Philippine Government, Lot 164 of the Friar
Lands Estate in Muntinlupa, Rizal. The lot had an
area 1 hectare, 42 ares and 80 centares and the
consideration for the sale was P112, which was
agreed to be paid in installments. He was able to
pay 5 installments. By virtue of this purchase, a
Sale Certificate was issued in Pablo Fabians
favor. In 1928, Pablo Fabian died and was
survived by 4 children, namely Esperanza, Benita
I, Benita II and Silbina.
In 1928, respondents SILBINA (daughter)
TEODORA FABIAN (niece) executed an Affidavit.
In said document, it was stated therein that
SILBINA was the only daughter of the deceased
Pablo Fabian and that she and TEODORA, as
niece were his only heirs. On the strength of this
Affidavit, the Sale Certificate previously issued to
Pablo Fabian was assigned to them. Thereafter,
the Director of Lands sold Lot 164 to SILBINA
(married to FELICIANO LANDRITO) and
TEODORA (married to FRANCISCO DEL
MONTE) for the price of P120.
In 1929, RESPONDENTS SPOUSES then took
physical possession of Lot 164, cultivated it and
appropriated the produce therefrom. Since 1929,
they has been paying the real estate taxes thereon.
In 1937, the Register of Deeds issued a TCT over
Lot 164 in their names. In 1945, after they have
caused the subdivision of the lot into 2 equal
parts, Lot A and Lot B. 2 separate TCTs were
subsequently issued in the names of SILBINA and
TEODORA.
In 1960, petitioners ESPERANZA, BENITA
and DAMASO FABIAN filed an action for
reconveyance against the RESPONDENTS
SPOUSES. They averred that SILBINA and
TEODORA perpetrated fraud in the Affidavit as
what was contained therein was a false narration
of facts. It was because SILBINA knew that she
was not the only daughter and heir of the
deceased Pablo Fabian and TEODORA likewise
knew all along that, as a mere niece of the
deceased, she was precluded from inheriting from
him in the presence of his 4 surviving daughters.
Because of said Affidavit, the Sale Certificate was
assigned and transferred to them, which
thereafter caused the issuance of certificate of
titles in their favor.
RESPONDENTS SPOUSES on the other hand
claimed that Pablo Fabian was not the owner of
Lot 164 at the time of his death because he had not
paid in full the amortizations on the lot. They
alleged that it was them who were the absolute
owners thereof, having purchased it from the
Government for the sum of P120, and from that
year having exercised all the attributes of
ownership thereof up to the present. They alleged
that the action for reconveyance filed against
them had long prescribed.
The trial court dismissed their action for
reconveyance. Hence, PETITIONER FABIANS
appealed for review.
ISSUE
Whether or not RESPONDENTS SPOUSES as
co-owners of the land had acquired it through
prescription against the PETITIONERS FABIANS,
the other co-owners.
RULING
YES, they had acquired the land against the
co-owners through prescription.
The Court concluded that Lot 164 was the
property of Pablo Fabian. When he died intestate
in 1928, his 4 daughters had acquired said
property by succession and they commonly
owned the property under the principle of co-
ownership.
General Rule & Exception. Although, as a
general rule, an action for partition among co-
heirs does not prescribe. As an exception, this is
true only as long as the respondents do not hold
the property in question under an adverse title.
REQUISITES FOR A CO-OWNER TO
ACQUIRE A PROPERTY OWNED IN
COMMON BY PRESCRIPTION:
(1) Co-owner has made known to the other co-
owners that he has: repudiated the co-ownership and
claimed complete ownership over it. SILBINA, one of
the co-owners had repudiated the co-ownership
by executing the Affidavit with TEODORA, which
bore that they were the sole heirs of the late Pablo
Fabian. SILBINA claimed complete ownership
over it by securing title in her name to the
exclusion of the other 3 sisters.
(2) There is evidence of repudiation and knowledge
on the part of other co-owners. The evidence of the
repudiation was the Affidavit, which excluded all
the other co-owners as to ownership over the
property. Upon the registration of the Affidavit
and the issuance of the title, already served as a
constructive notice to the whole world.
(3) There is an open, continuous, exclusive,
adverse and notorious possession of the property.
RESPONDENT SPOUSES occupied the property
in the concept of owners since 1929 since they
took physical possession of the land up to 1960.
They had cultivated it, harvested and
appropriated the fruits for themselves. Such acts
logically meant the adverse character of the
possession they exercised.
 (4) Possession of the Property has started from the
time of repudiation until the filing of the action in
court should be at least 10 years. It was in 1928 when
SILBINA executed the Affidavit which made
possible the issuance of title in her favor. The
action for reconveyance was only made in 1960 or
32 big years later after. Said 32 years is even
beyond the 10-year requirement under the law.
Hence, acquisitive prescription of ownership
acquired by one of the co-owners, co-heirs, and
administrator, depositary, or lessee by means of
an adverse possession under claim of title and
after the lapse of the time fixed by law can
completely extinguish the right of the other co-
owners, co-heirs, or owners of the property in the
possession of the one claiming ownership by
prescription.
CENIZA vs. CA
GR No. 46345. January 30, 1990
In a case where the co-owners had agreed that
the title to the property be named after only
one of them, there existed a trust relation.
Thus, prescription could not run in favor of
the co-owner in whose name the title was
registered to except from the time that he
repudiated the co-ownership and made the
repudiation known to the former.
FACTS
Petitioners RESTITUTO and JESUS CENIZA
were the descendants of Manuel Ceniza.
Respondents on the other hand, MAGNO,
VICENTA, TERESITA, EUGENIA and TOMAS
DABON were the descendants of Vicente Dabon.
Hacienda de Mandaue of the Seminario de
San Carlos de Cebu was located in Madaue, Cebu
City. In 1929, it was subdivided for resale to the
occupants therein. Jose Ceniza and Vicente
Dabon, who were residing in the hacienda, jointly
purchased Lot 627 on installment basis and they
agreed for convenience, to have the land
registered in the name of Dabon. Since then, Jose
Ceniza, Vicente Dabon and their heirs had
possessed their respective portions of the land,
declared the same for taxation, paid real estate
taxes on their respective shares, and made their
respective installment payments to the Seminario
de San Carlos de Cebu. In 1939, a title was issued
in the name of Vicente Dabon.
In 1957, Vicente Dabon died and heirs
continued to remain in possession of the property.
In 1961, a private land surveyor, on the
request of Jacinta Dabon and Restituto Ceniza
who jointly defrayed the cost, divided Lot 627 into
three parts, Lot A to Marcelo Ceniza, Lot B to
Restituto Ceniza and Lot C to Nemesis Ceniza
Albina, who later bequeathed her share to her
brother, Jesus Ceniza.
The DABONs refused to convey Lots B and C
to the CENIZAs. They claimed that their
predecessor-in-interest Vicente Dabon was the
sole and exclusive owner of Lot 627.
Hence, in 1967, RESTITUTO and JESUS
CENIZA filed an action for recovery of their title
to Lots B and C. The DABONs on the other hand,
alleged that the CENIZAs right of action had
already prescribed. However, the CENIZAs
alleged that Vicente Dabon held the property in
trust for them, as co-owners, hence, their action
for reconveyance was imprescriptible.
In 1970, the trial court rendered judgment for
the CENIZAs. It found that there existed a co-
ownership among the parties and ordered the
DABONs the B to execute deeds of conveyance of
Lots B -C in favor of CENIZAs. On appeal of the
DABONs, the Court of Appeals reversed that
decision of the trial court. It ruled that the
petitioners' right of action had prescribed after the
lapse of 20 years from the date of registration of
the land in 1939 in Vicente Dabon's name.
Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the DABONs has acquired
the property by prescription against the other co-
owners, the CENIZAS.
(2) Whether or not the registration of the title
of the land in the name of one of Vicente Dabon
constituted a repudiation of the co-ownership for
purposes of acquisitive prescription.
RULING
(1) NO, the action of the CENIZAs had not
prescribed.
Since a trust relation and co-ownership were
proven to exist between the predecessors-in-
interest of both the CENIZAs and DABONs,
prescription did not run in favor of the latter
except from the time that they repudiated the co-
ownership and made the repudiation known to
the former.
Paragraph 5 of Article 494 of the Civil Code
provides:
"No prescription shall run in favor of
a co-owner or co-heir against his co-
owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly
or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership."
The registration of Lot No. 627 in the name of
Vicente Dabon created a trust in favor of his co-
owner Jose Ceniza, and the latter's heirs.
Article 1452 of the Civil Code states:
"If two or more persons agree to purchase
property and by common consent the legal title is
taken in the name of one of them for the benefit of
all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of the
others in Proportion to the interest of each.
As a general rule, the trustee's possession is
not adverse and therefore cannot ripen into a title
by prescription. Adverse possession requires the
concurrence of the following circumstances:
a) that the trustee has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting
to the ouster of the cestui que trust;
b) that such positive acts of repudiation
have been made known to the cestui que
trust; and
 c) that the evidence thereon should be
clear and conclusive.
The above elements were not present here for
the co-owners CENIZAs had not been ousted
from the land. They continued to possess their
respective shares of Lot 627 and they had been
paying the realty taxes thereon. In fact,
RESTITUTO CENIZA's house stands on his
portion of the land.
Where title to land was issued in the name of
a co-heir merely with the understanding that he
would act as a trustee of the other co-owners, and
there is no evidence that this trust relation had
ever been repudiated by said trustee, the relation
then cannot be barred by prescription, despite the
lapse of a big number of years from the date of
registration of the land in the trustee's name.
The courts have the duty to shield fiduciary
relations "against every manner of machinery or
fiduciary design cloaked by legal technicalities
and to guard against misuse of the Torrens system
"to foment betrayal in the performance of a trust."
(2) NO, the registration was not a repudiation of
the co-ownership. Assuming that the DABONs
rejection of the subdivision plan for the partition
of the land was an act of repudiation of the co-
ownership, prescription had not yet set in when
the petitioners instituted the action for
reconveyance.
In this case, since the statutory period of
limitation within which to file an action for
reconveyance, after the defendants had
repudiated the co-ownership in 1961, had not yet
run its course when the petitioners filed said
action in 1967, the action was not barred by
prescription.
BICARME vs. CA
GR No. 51914. June 6, 1990
The right of a co-owner for partition against
another co-owner, who holds a common
property in trust may be barred by
prescription provided that it is being held in
trust. In the case at bar, MARIA had not
proved her adverse claim over the property
against her co-owner CRISTINA that the
existence of the co-ownership was sustained.
FACTS
Spouses Juan Bicarme and Florencia Bidaya
were the original co-owners of two parcels of
land: a cornland and a riceland, both in Benguet,
Abra. The spouses died intestate and were
survived by 3 children, Victorina, Sebastian and
petitioner MARIA BICARME. Sebastian Bicarme
died when he was a little boy and without any
issue. Later, Victorina Bicarme died intestate,
survived by her only daughter, respondent
CRISTINA BICARME.
CRISTINA claimed that upon the death of her
grandparents, Spouses Juan and Florencia, her
mother Victorina and her aunt, MARIA, became
co-owners or co-heirs of the litigated parcels of
land. Upon the death of her mother Victorina, she
became co-heirs with MARIA, having inherited
the share and interest of her mother
corresponding to of the 2 parcels of land.
MARIA however refused to share with CRISTINA
the yearly fruits of the 2 parcel of lands. Hence, in
1974, CRISTINA filed an action for partition
against her aunt MARIA.
Maria, however, maintained that she acquired
these 2 parcels of land from the deceased spouses
Placido Bidays and Margarita Bose, the cornland
in 1925 and the riceland in 1926. She averred that
since then, she had been in open, public, peaceful,
continuous, adverse possession and enjoyment
and in the concept of absolute owner thereof. She
further claimed that Cristina, her niece, never
shared or contributed to the payment of taxes of
said 2 parcels of land and that CRISTINA was
presumed already dead.
The trial court ruled that MARIAN and
CRISTINA were co-heirs. It held that MARIA was
as trustee with respect to CRISTINA's share. As
such, prescription, as a mode of acquiring title,
could not apply. It also added that co-
owners/trustees even if they possess the land
held in common could never acquire the property
through prescription because of the presence of a
trust relation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
same decision. Hence, this petition.
MARIA alleged that assuming that CRISTINA
was indeed a co-heir, her rights over the 2 parcels
of land had already prescribed. She alleged that
from the moment she ignored and repudiated
CRISTINA's hereditary rights in 1940, the latter's
right of action already accrued and the period of
prescription began to run. CRISTINAs action for
partition was only filed in 1974 or 34 years after.
CRISTINAs action then was barred by
prescription as she slept on her rights.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not MARIA and CRISTINA
were indeed co-owners.
2. Whether or not the lower court erred in
stating that MARIA and CRISTINA were co-
owners because the right of a co-owner for
partition against another co-owner, who holds a
common property in trust with adverse
possession cannot be barred by prescription.
3. Whether or not the MARIA acquired the
property by prescription.
RULING
(1) YES, they were co-owners.
The trial court theorized that Victorino and
MARIA Bicarme never partitioned even orally the
two parcels of lands which were then owned in
common by them. It remained undivided even
after the death of Victorino. Without the
knowledge of CRISTINA, MARIA sold the
cornland and executed 3 Deeds of Sales in favor of
3 third persons.
In these 3 Deeds of Sale, MARIA admitted that
she inherited and acquired the lands from his late
father Juan Bicarme. Said provision in the Deeds of
Sale was in the nature of a trust provision in favor
of Cristina as a co-owner/co-heir.
 (2) YES, the lower court erred as in such case,
the right to partition may still be barred by
prescription.
An action for partition implies that the thing is
still owned in common. If a co-owner or co-heir
holds the property in exclusive adverse
possession as owner, asserting sole and exclusive
dominion for the required period, he can acquire
sole title to it as against the co-heirs or co-owners.
The imprescriptibility of an action for partition
cannot thus be invoked when one of the coowners
has possessed the property as exclusive owner,
and for a period sufficient to acquire it by
prescription. From the moment one of the co-
owners claims that he is the absolute and
exclusive owner of the properties and denies the
others any share therein, the question involved is
no longer one of partition, but of ownership. In
this sense, the trial court erred in saying that there
can be no prescription (as a mode of acquiring
title) in favor of a co-owner/ trustee.
(3) NO, she had not acquired the property by
prescription.
Acts which are adverse to strangers may not
be sufficiently adverse to the co-owners. A mere
silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of
rents, fruits or profits from the property, the
erection of buildings and fences and the planting
of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes,
cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it
is not borne out by clear, complete and conclusive
evidence that he exercised acts of possession
which unequivocally constituted an ouster or
deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners.
MARIA had not complied the requisites for a
co-owner to own a common property held in
common through prescription.
REQUISITES FOR A CO-OWNER TO
ACQUIRE A PROPERTY OWNED IN
COMMON BY PRESCRIPTION:
(1) Co-owner has made known to the other co-
owners that he has: repudiated the co-ownership and
claimed complete ownership over it. [not complied]
In the present case, MARIA disclaimed the co-
ownership by denying that subject properties are
the inherited properties. Although MARIA paid
land taxes, it did not constitute sufficient
repudiation of the co-ownership, as it was not an
act adverse to CRISTINA's rights. Her refusal to
share with CRISTINA the yearly profits merely
stemmed from CRISTINA's failure to share in the
yearly taxes. Moreover, CRISTINA, being a minor
until she claimed her rights, was not even aware
thereof. Neither did MARIA made known her
repudiation to CRISTINA, because all along,
Maria presumed her to be dead.
(2) There is evidence of repudiation and knowledge
on the part of other co-owners. [not complied] There
was no evidence of the repudiation. Other than
the tax declarations in MARIAs name, there was
no written evidence that the 2 parcels of land
were acquired/purchased from Spouses Placido
Biduya and Margarita Bose as she insisted on.
Payment of land taxes was not sufficient evidence
of repudiation.
(3) There is an open, continuous, exclusive,
adverse and notorious possession of the property. [not
complied] Although MARIA was in possession of
the property, she merely held the property in trust
in favor of CRISTINA.
(4) Possession of the property has started from the
time of repudiation until the filing of the action in
court should be at least 10 years. [not complied]
Being that her possession of the property was by
reason of a trust relationship, MARIA could not
have acquired the property no matter how long
she occupied it.
DE LIMA vs. CA
GR No. 46296 September 24, 1991
A co-owner had registered a property held in
common only in his name and possessed it in
the concept of an owner. After the lapse of 10
years, without action from the other co-
owners, he could then acquire it through
acquisitive prescription.
FACTS
During his lifetime, Lino Delima acquired Lot
No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands
Estate in Cebu by sale on installments from the
government. He later died in 1921 and was
survived by his only heirs, 3 brothers and a sister
namely: Eulalio, Juanita, Galileo and Vicente
Delima. After his death, in 1953, the title of the
property was issued in the name of The Legal Heirs
of Lino Delima, deceased, represented by Galileo
Delima.
Later, Galileo Delima, who was substituted by
RESPONDENTS FLAVIANA VDA. DE DELIMA
ET AL., executed an affidavit of Extra-judicial
Declaration of Heirs. Based on this affidavit, the
title over the lot was cancelled and another title
was issued in 1954 but only in the name of Galileo
Delima to the exclusion of the other heirs.
Thereon, Galileo Delima declared the lot for
taxation purposes and paid the taxes thereon from
1954 to 1965.
In 1968, PETITIONERS EPITACIO DELIMA
ET AL. who were the surviving heirs of Eulalio
and Juanita Delima, filed an action for
reconveyance and/or partition of property and
for the annulment of the title issued only in the
name of Galileo Delima. Vicente Delima, who was
1 of the 4 original heirs of Lino Delima was joined
as party-defendant by the PETITIONERS for his
refusal to join the latter in their action.
In 1970, the trial court held that the 4 original
heirs of Lino Delima should be entitled to of the
property. It also declared null and void the title in
the name of Galileo Delima only.
Not satisfied with the decision,
RESPONDENTS HEIRS appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which revered the decision of the trial
court and upheld the claim of Galileo Delima that
all his 3 other siblings had already relinquished
and waived their rights to the property in his
favor considering that he (Galileo Delima) alone
paid the remaining balance of the purchase price
of the lot and the realty taxes thereon.
Aggrieved, PETITIONERS filed this instant
petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not PETITIONERS' action for
partition was already barred that Galileo Delima
had perfected his claim of ownership by
acquisitive prescription over the disputed lot.
RULING
YES, prescription had already set in.
As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not
be presumed to be adverse to the others, but will
be held to benefit all. It is understood that the co-
owner or co-heir who is in possession of an
inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in
representation of his co-owners or co-heirs, if, as
such owner, he administers or takes care of the
rest thereof with the obligation of delivering it to
his co-owners or co-heirs, is under the same
situation as a depository, a lessee or a trustee.
Thus, an action to compel partition may be filed at
any time by any of the co-owners against the
actual possessor. In other words, no prescription
shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-
owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
However, from the moment one of the co-
owners claims that he is the absolute and
exclusive owner of the properties and denies the
others any share therein, the question involved is
no longer one of partition but of ownership. In
such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for
partition can no longer be invoked or applied
when one of the co-owners has adversely
possessed the property as exclusive owner for a
period sufficient to vest ownership by
prescription.
It is settled that possession by a co-owner or
co-heir is that of a trustee. When a co-owner of the
property in question executed a deed of partition
and on the strength thereof obtained the
cancellation of the title in the name of their
predecessor and the issuance of a new one
wherein he appears as the new owner of the
property, thereby in effect denying or repudiating
the ownership of the other co-owners over their
shares, the statute of limitations started to run for
the purposes of the action instituted by the latter
seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-
ownership and of their rights thereunder. Since an
action for reconveyance of land based on implied
or constructive trust prescribes after ten (10)
years, it is from the date of the issuance of such
title that the effective assertion of adverse title for
purposes of the statute of limitations is counted.
The requisites for a co-owner to own a
common property held in common through
prescription had been complied with by
RESPONDENTS.
REQUISITES FOR A CO-OWNER TO
ACQUIRE A PROPERTY OWNED IN
COMMON BY PRESCRIPTION:
(1) Co-owner has made known to the other co-
owners that he has: repudiated the co-ownership and
claimed complete ownership over it. [complied]
Evidence showed that the title in the name of the
legal heirs of Lino Delima, represented by Galileo
Delima, was cancelled by virtue of an affidavit
executed by Galileo Delima. In 1954, Galileo
Delima obtained the issuance of a new title in his
name to the exclusion of his co-heirs. As the
certificate of title was notice to the whole world of
his exclusive title to the land, such rejection was
binding on the other heirs and started as against
them the period of prescription.
(2) There is evidence of repudiation and knowledge
on the part of other co-owners. [complied] The
issuance of the new title in the name of Galileo
Delima only constituted an open and clear
repudiation of the trust or co-ownership. Upon
registration of the title, it already served as a
constructive notice to the other heirs.
(3) There is an open, continuous, exclusive,
adverse and notorious possession of the property.
[complied] Galileo Delima and his heirs had been
in possession of the land after Lino Delima died.
(4) Possession of the property has started from the
time of repudiation until the filing of the action in
court should be at least 10 years. [complied] It was
in February 4, 1954 that Galileo Delima obtained
the issuance of a new title in his name. Hence,
when petitioners filed their action for
reconveyance and/or to compel partition on
February 29, 1963, such action was already barred
by prescription. The lapse of ten (10) years of
adverse possession by Galileo Delima from
February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title in him
by prescription. Hence, whatever claims the other
co-heirs could had validly asserted before could
no longer be invoke by them at this time.
TRINIDAD vs. CA
GR No. 118904. April 20, 1998
A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the
share of the other co-owners absent a clear
repudiation of co-ownership duly
communicated to the other co-owners.
FACTS
Patricio Trinidad, married to Anastacia
Briones, was the original owner of 4 parcels of
land located in Kalibo, Aklan. He later died in
1940 and was succeeded by his 3 children:
Inocentes and private respondents LOURDES and
FELIX, all surnamed TRININDAD.
In 1970, Petitioner ARTURIO TRINIDAD,
born in 1943, claimed that he was the son of the
late Inocentes Trinidad with his mother Felicidad
Molato. He then demanded from private
respondents FELIX and LOURDES TRINIDAD to
partition the land into 3 equal shares and to give
him the 1/3 individual share of his late father but
the FELIX and LOURDES TRINIDAD refused.
Hence, in 1978, ARTURIO TRINIDAD filed a
complaint for partition and damages against
FELIX and LOURDES TRINIDAD. The latter
however denied that ARTURIO was the son of the
late Inocentes Trinidad as he was still single when
he died in 1941, before ARTURIO 's birth in 1943.
FELIX and LOURDES also denied that ARTURIO
had lived with them and claimed that the 4
parcels of land had been in their possession since
the death of their father in 1940 and that they had
not given ARTURIO a share in the produce of the
land. Later, FELIX died without issue and he was
survived by his only sister, LOURDES, who
claimed exclusive ownership over the 4 parcels of
land.
In 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in
favor of ARTURIO and held that he was a co-
owner with FELIX and LOURDES.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of FELIX
and LOURDES, contending that ARTURIO was
not a recognized legitimate child of Inocentes. It
also states that the 4 parcels of land had already
been acquired by FELIX and LOURDES by
acquisitive prescription. The 2 had been in
possession of the property since 1940 when their
father died. Even if possession be counted from
1964, when ARTURIO attained the age of
majority, still, FELIX and LOURDES TRINIDAD
possessed the land for more than 10 years.
ISSUE
Whether or not ARTURIOs action for
partition had already prescribed that FELIX and
LOURDES had acquired the property through
acquisitive prescription.
RULING
NO, it had not prescribed. FELIX and
LOURDES did not acquire the property through
acquisitive prescription.
The partition of the late Patricio Trinidads
real properties required preponderant proof that
ARTURIO was a co-owner or co-heir of the
decedent's estate. His right as a co-owner would,
in turn, depend on whether he was born during
the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage
between his mother Felicidad Molato and his
putative father Inocentes Trinidad. In the present
case, ARTURIO had proved by preponderant
evidence that he was the legitimate son of
Felicidad and Inocentes as the two were married.
Hence, he had right to claim ownership by
inheritance as to the 4 parcels of land.
The trial court found out that ARTURIO, after
the death of his father and mother, had lived with
FELIX nad LOURDES and enjoyed the status of
being their nephew. When ARTURIO had gotten
married and had a family of his own, he started to
demand for the partition of the share of his father,
Inocentes. His demand provoked the ire of the
FELIX and LOURDES, thus, they disowned him
as their nephew.
FELIX and LOURDES TRINIDAD did not
acquire ownership of the property in question by
acquisitive prescription. Under Art. 494 of the
Civil Code, in a co-ownership, the act of one
benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former
repudiates the co-ownership. Thus, no
prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as
he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.
A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the
share of the other co-owners absent a clear
repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated
to the other co-owners.
In the case at bar, FELIX and LOURDES had
not complied the requisites for a co-owner to own
a common property held in common through
prescription.
REQUISITES FOR A CO-OWNER TO
ACQUIRE A PROPERTY OWNED IN
COMMON BY PRESCRIPTION:
(1) Co-owner has made known to the other co-
owners that he has: repudiated the co-ownership and
claimed complete ownership over it. [not complied]
Prior to his demand for partition, ARTURIO, in
the concept of a co-owner, was receiving from
FELIX and LOURDES his share of the produce of
the land in dispute. Until such time, recognition of
the co-ownership by FELIX and LOURDES
TRINIDAD was beyond question. There was no
evidence, either, of their repudiation, if any, of the
co-ownership of petitioner's father Inocentes over
the land. Although FELIX and LOURDES had
possessed these parcels openly since 1940 and had
not shared with petitioner the produce of the land
during the pendency of this case, still, they
manifested no repudiation of the co-ownership.
FELIX nad LOURDES did not even register the
property in their names.
(2) There is evidence of repudiation and
knowledge on the part of other co-owners. [not
complied] There was no evidence of repudiation.
In fact, the title over the 4 parcels of land was still
in the name of the oririginal owner, Patricio
Trinidad.
(3) There is an open, continuous, exclusive,
adverse and notorious possession of the property. [not
complied] Although FELIX and LOURDES had
been in possession of the property since 1940,
prescription did not run against ARTURIO with
respect to the filing of the action for partition
because the former had not expressly or impliedly
repudiated the co-ownership. In the other words,
prescription of an action for partition does not lie
except when the co-ownership is properly
repudiated by the co-owner.
(4) Possession of the property has started from the
time of repudiation until the filing of the action in
court should be at least 10 years. [complied] It is
undisputed that FELIX and LOURDES had been
in possession of the property since 1940 when
their father died. Even if possession be counted
from 1964, when ARTURIO attained the age of
majority, still, FELIX and LOURDES TRINIDAD
possessed the land for more than 10 years.
However, even so, prescription could not still run
in the absence of repudiation.
TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE vs.
CA
GR No. 124262. October 12, 1999
 An action for partition is imprescriptible. It
cannot be barred by prescription.
FACTS
In 1993, private respondents CRISANTA,
ELPIDIA, EFRINA, IRENEO DE CASTRO and
ARTEMIO DE CASTRO ADRIANO, filed an
action for partition against petitioner TOMAS
CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, INC. They
alleged:
1. that their father and predecessor-in-
interest, Juan De Castro owned a parcel of
land located at Morong, Rizal with an area
of 2,269 sq. m.
2. that Juan De Castro died intestate in
1993 and they are his only surviving and
legitimate heirs
3. that in 1979, without their knowledge
and consent, said lot was sold by their
brother Mariano to TOMAS CLAUDIO
MEMORIAL COLLEGE, INC. when
Mariano represented himself as the sole heir
to the property.
4. that the said sale affected only
Marianos undivided share to the lot in
question but not the shares of the other co-
owners equivalent to 4/5 of the property.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
ruled against TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL
COLLEGE, INC. that it filed a petition via
certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the right of the DE CASTROs
for partition had already prescribed.
RULING
NO, it had not prescribed.
Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as
his, the sale will affect only his own share but not
those of the other co-owners who did not consent
to the sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by
one co-owner without the consent of the other co-
owners is not null and void. However, only the
rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred,
thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property.
The proper action in a case like this, is not for
the nullification of the sale, or for the recovery of
possession of the property owned in common
from the third person, but for division or partition
of the entire property if it continued to remain in
the possession of the co-owners who possessed
and administered it. Such partition should result
in segregating the portion belonging to the seller
and its delivery to the buyer.
In the light of the foregoing, TOMAS
CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, INC.'s
defense of prescription against an action for
partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article
494 of the Civil Code, "no co-owner shall be
obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-
owner may demand at anytime the partition of
the thing owned in common, insofar as his share
is concerned." In Budlong vs. Bondoc (1977), the
Supreme Court had interpreted said provision of
law to mean that the action for partition is
imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by
prescription.
SANTOS vs. SANTOS
GR No. 139524. October 12, 2000
A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the
share of the other co-owners absent a clear
repudiation of co-ownership duly
communicated to the other co-owners.
Exclusive possession of a co-owner of a
property owned in common by mere tolerance
of the other co-owner did not amount to a
repudiation. It must be understood that by
culture, Filipino family ties are close and well-
knit and that the tolerance was natural.
FACTS
Bonifacio Santos was the owner of a property
located in San Mateo, Rizal. He died intestate and
was survived by his 3 children: petitioner
LADISLAO, respondent ELISEO and their sister
Isidra. In 1964, during a cadastral survey, the said
property, with an area of 6,340 square meters was
identified as Lot 1522.
In 1967, LADISLAO and his wife, Leonila
Mateo executed a Deed of Absolute Conveyance with
Right of Way over the southwestern portion of Lot
1522, with an area of 3,000 square meters, in favor
of his brother, ELISEO for the price of P500.00,
with a provision for a right of way.
In the same year of 1967, Isidra died intestate
and was survived by her 2 brothers: LADISLAO
and ELISEO. AFTER THE DEATH OF Isidra, it
was Virgilio Santos, son of ELISEO who
possessed the property.
In 1969, LADISLAO and ELISEO and their
respective Spouses executed a Combined Deed of
Partition covering the Lot 1522 and the Isidra
Property, wherein it was covenanted that the
Isidra Property was deeded to ELISEO.
In 1969, the Provincial Assessor issued a tax
declaration, over the Isidra property, under the
name of Virgilio (son of ELISEO) and Virginia
Santos, thereby canceling the one under the name
of Isidra. In 1972, 1974 and 1980, tax declarations
were also issued in the names of the said spouses.
In 1980, Virgilio executed Deed of Absolute
Sale of Unregistered Residential Land in favor of his
brother, PHILIP over the Isidra property in
exchange of another property owned by the latter.
On the basis of said deed, in 1981, a tax
declaration under the name of PHILIP was issued.
Since then, PHILIP occupied the Isidra property
and had his shop constructed thereon and he had
been paying the realty taxes therefor. In 1984,
VIRGILIO Santos died intestate and was survived
by his wife Virginia.
In the meantime, LADISLAO and PHILIP left
the Philippines and resided in the USA.
Despite the Deed of Absolute Conveyance With
Right of Way executed by LADISLAO in favor of
ELISEO, the latter and the children of the
LADISLAO signed an Application and sought in
court for the registration of their title over Lots
1522 and 2433. The application alleged that Lot
1522 was occupied by the heirs of LADSILAO
(3,430 sq. m.) and ELISEO (3,000 sq. m.), as a site
of cockpit building. In 1986, the court granted the
application. Later, a title was issued in their
names.
Later, the children of LADISLAO and
ELISEO executed a Partition Agreement where Lot
1522 was subdivided into 2 lots, Lot A (3,000 sq.
m. in favor of Eliseo) and Lot B (3,387 sq. m. in
favor of the children of LADILAO).
In 1993, LADISLAO had discovered that the
Isidra property he and ELISEO inherited had been
declared, for taxation purposes, under the name
of PHILIP, on the basis of a Deed of Sale executed
by Virgilio Santos.
In the same year, LADISLAO filed an action
for the judicial partition of the Isidra property
against ELISEO and the latters son, PHILIP. The
trial court dismissed the petition on the ground of
acquisitive prescription. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals declared that LADISLAO and ELISEO
were co-owners and hence entitled to pro
indiviso shares in the Isidra.
Hence, this petition. It was alleged by
petitioners PHILIP and the HEIRS OF ELISEO the
right of action of LADISLAO has already
prescribed.
ISSUE
Whether or not the action for partition was
already barred by acquisitive prescription against
LADISLAO.
RULING
NO, it had not prescribed.
Considering that ELISEO and PHILIP
disputed the status of LADISLAO as co-owner on
the ground that the brothers entered into a
Combined Deed of Partition wherein the entire
Isidra property was conveyed to ELISEO, It was
then incumbent upon them to present the best
evidence obtainable to prove the same. However,
the claim of a subsisting co-ownership by
LADISLAO over the Isidra property has not been
effectively refuted by ELISEO and PHILIP, and
that ELISEO and his successors-in-interest
(Virgilio and PHILIP) did not acquire exclusive
title over the entire Isidra property.
Considering that there was no proof that
LADISLAO executed any Combined Deed of
Partition in tandem with ELISEO, co-ownership
still subsisted between the brothers over the Isidra
property. This being the case, Article 494 of the
Civil Code should be applied which states that,
prescription does not run in favor of a co-owner
or co-heir against his co-owners or his co-heirs so
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the
co-ownership.
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a
relation of co-ownership must have been
preceded by repudiation of the co-ownership.
There was no showing that ELISEO had complied
with the following requisites.
REQUISITES FOR A CO-OWNER TO
ACQUIRE A PROPERTY OWNED IN
COMMON BY PRESCRIPTION:
(1) Co-owner has made known to the other co-
owners that he has: repudiated the co-ownership
and claimed complete ownership over it. [not
complied] ELISEO had not repudiated the co-
ownership, and even if he did, there is no
showing that the same had been clearly made
known to LADISLAO. Indeed, Filipino family ties
being close and well-knit as they are, and
considering that Virgilio was the ward of Isidra
Santos ever since when Virgilio was still an infant,
it was but natural that the LADISLAO did not
interpose any objection to the continued stay of
Virgilio and his family on the property and even
acquiesce thereto. LADISLAO must have
assumed too, that his brother, ELISEO, allowed
his son to occupy the property and use the same
for the time being. Hence, such possession by
Virgilio Santos and Philip Santos of the property
does not constitute a repudiation of the co-
ownership by the Appellee Eliseo Santos and of
his privies for that matter.
It is probable that said conduct was
simply tolerated by the plaintiffs on account of his
being their uncle, and they never thought that by
said conduct the defendant was attempting to
oust them forever from the inheritance, nor that
the defendant would have so intended in any
way, dealing as we do here with the acquisition of
a thing by prescription, the evidence must be so
clear and conclusive as to establish said
prescription without any shadow of doubt. This
does not happen in the instant case, for the
defendant did not even try to prove that he has
expressly or impliedly refused plaintiffs right
over an aliquot part of the inheritance.
(2) There is evidence of repudiation and
knowledge on the part of other co-owners. [not
complied] There was no evidence of the
repudiation. There was no proof that LADISLAO
executed any Combined Deed of Partition in
tandem with ELISEO. Also the evidence
consisting of the tax declarations in Virgilios
name and then in Philips name were not
conclusive and indisputable evidence to show
that the lot in question was conveyed to Virgilio
Santos, Philips predecessor-in-interest. A mere
tax declaration does not vest ownership of the
property upon the declarant. Neither do tax
receipts nor declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes constitute adequate evidence of
ownership or of the right to possess realty.
(3) There is an open, continuous, exclusive,
adverse and notorious possession of the property.
[complied] It was Virgilio Santos (son of ELISEO)
who was in possession of the subject property
since after the death of Isidra Santos in 1967.
Thereafter, PHILIP took possession of the subject
property in 1980 upon its sale even until the
action for partition filed by LADISLAO. Despite
this, prescription did not commence in the
absence of repudiation.
(4) Possession of the property has started from the
time of repudiation until the filing of the action in
court should be at least 10 years. [complied] PHILIP
and the HEIRS OF ELISEO reasoned out that
more than 13 years had lapsed from 1967 when
Isidra died, to 1980 when PHILIP took possession
of the property. In fact, they also argued that more
than 12 years had lapsed from the time PHILIP
took possession of the property in 1980 up to the
time LADISLAO filed the action for partition in
1993. They concluded that the action of
LADISLAO was already barred by ordinary
acquisitive prescription of 10 years. Further, it is
argued that the possession of Virgilio Santos
could be tacked with the possession of Philip
Santos bringing to a total of 26 years the time that
elapsed before the filing of the case in 1993.
However, being that there was no repudiation,
prescription did not run.
ARTICLE 497: The creditors or assignees of the co-
owners may take part in the division of the thing
owned in common and object to its being effected
without their concurrence. But they cannot impugn
any partition already executed, unless there has been
fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding a formal
opposition presented to prevent it, without prejudice to
the right of the debtor or assignor to maintain its
validity.
2 RIGHTS OF THE CREDITOR
1. To take part in the
partition;
2. To object to the partition
being affected without
their concurrence
The creditors cannot impugn the partition
that has already been executed, except:
1) if there has been fraud on the part
of the co-owners;
2) despite the formal opposition
made by them to prevent it, the
partition was still made.
ARTICLE 498: Whenever the thing is essentially
indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be
allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others,
it shall be sold and its proceeds distributed.
What is the SITUATION in Art. 498?
1. the thing owned in
common is essentially
indivisible; and
2. the owners cannot agree
that it may be allotted to
one of them who shall
indemnify the others.
AGUILAR vs. CA
GR No. 76351. October 29, 1993
Art. 498 of the Civil Code states that
whenever the thing is essentially indivisible
and the co-owners cannot agree that it be
allotted to one of them who shall indemnify
the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds
accordingly distributed.
Rental for the exclusive use and enjoyment of
a co- owner which is not necessarily
prejudicial to the interests of the other co-
owners should only be ordered after partition
because prior to partition, the former has the
right to use and enjoy the entire property as a
co-owner.
FACTS
Petitioner VIRGILIO AGUILAR and
respondent SENEN AGUILAR were brothers. In
1969, they purchased a house and lot in
Paraaque where their father, Maximiano
Aguilar, could spend and enjoy his remaining
years in a peaceful neighborhood. Initially, the
brothers agreed that VIRGILIO's share in the co-
ownership was 2/3 while that of SENEN was 1/3.
In 1970, the brothers executed a Memorandum
wherein it was agreed upon that their interests in
the house and lot should be equal. It was also
stated therein that in exchange for SENENS
possession and enjoyment of the house together
with their father, he should assume the remaining
mortgage obligation of the original owners with
the Social Security System (SSS).
Also, since VIRGILIO was then disqualified
from obtaining a loan from SSS, the brothers
agreed that the Deed of Sale would be executed
and the title registered in the meantime in the
name of SENEN. It was further agreed that Senen
would take care of their father and his needs since
Virgilio and his family were staying in Cebu.
In 1974, their father Maximiano Aguilar died.
Afterwards, VIRGILIO demanded from SENEN
that the latter should vacate the house and that
the property be sold and proceeds thereof be
divided among them. However, SENEN refused
to do so.
Because of the refusal of SENEN to give in to
VIRGILIO's demands, in 1979, the latter filed an
action to compel the sale of the house and lot so
that they could divide the proceeds between
them. In his complaint, he prayed that the
proceeds be divided in the following manner: 2/3
in his favor and 1/3 in favor of SENEN. He also
prayed that SENEN be ordered to pay for
monthly rentals for his use of the house after their
father died. He claimed that SENEN's continued
stay in the property hindered its disposal to his
prejudice.
SENEN on the other hand alleged that he had
no objection to the sale as long as the best selling
price could be obtained. He also prayed that
should the sale would be effected, the proceeds
thereof should be divided equally. He further
added that his use and enjoyment of the house
was lawful since he was co-owner than he should
not be ordered to pay monthly rentals.
The trial court ordered that SENEN should
vacate the property so that it could be sold to
third persons and that the proceeds of the sale be
divided equally between him and VIRGILIO. It
also ordered that SENEN should pay monthly
rentals, which should be counted after the death
of their father.
 The Court of First Instance reversed the
decision. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed A co-owner has no the preemptive right to
the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition purchase the pro indiviso share being offered
by VIRGILIO. for sale by another co-owner. What he has is
the right of redemption which must be
ISSUES exercised for a span of period after the sale to a
1. Whether or not it was proper for SENEN to 3rd person by the other co-owner involving the
vacate the property so that it could be sold to latters share was made.
third persons.
2. Whether or not SENEN should pay rentals Under Art. 498, the sale of the property held
after the time his father died. in common referred to in the above article is
resorted to when: (1) the right to partition
RULING the property among the co-owners is invoked
(1) YES, SENEN should vacate the property so by any of them but because of the nature of the
that it could be sold to third persons. property, it cannot be subdivided or its
Art. 498 of the Civil Code states that subdivision would prejudice the interests of
whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners and (2) the co-owners are not
in agreement as to who among them shall be
the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to
allotted or assigned the entire property upon
one of them who shall indemnify the others, it
reimbursement of the shares of the other co-
shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly
owners.
distributed.
This is resorted to when:
FACTS
(1) the right to partition the property is
Peitioners MARINA REYES, AUGUSTIN
invoked by any of the co-owners but
ZABALLERO and SOCORRO FRANCISCO
because of the nature of the property it
(REYES ET AL.) and private respondents
cannot be subdivided or its subdivision
SOCORRO MARQUEZ VDA. DE ZABALLERO,
would prejudice the interests of the co-
EUGENIA ZUNA, LEONARDO ZABALLERO
owners, and
and ELENA FRONDA ZABALELRO (VDA. DE
(b) the co-owners not in agreement as to
ZABALLERO ET AL.) were pro indiviso co-owners
who among them shall be allotted or
of 8 parcels of land totaling to 9 hectares located
assigned the entire property upon proper
in the province of Cavite.
reimbursement or the co-owners.
In 1980, REYES ET AL. received a written
In the present case, the right to partition of the
notice from VDA. DE ZABALLERO ET AL. that
property was invoked by VIRGILIO but SENEN
VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-
refused to vacate it. The only recourse then is to
BUSINESS CORP. offered to buy their share in the
sell the property and the proceeds of the sale be
properties and that they had agreed thereto. The
distributed to the both of them in equal shares.
terms stated that VOLCANO SECURITIES was
(2) NO, SENEN should not start paying rentals
also willing to purchase not only the aliquot
after the death of their father but only after the
shares of VDA. DE ZABALLERO ET AL. but also
trial court ordered him to vacate the property
that of REYES ET AL. for the price of P12.50 per
until he should actually vacate.
sq. m.
SENEN was a co-owner. Hence, under Article
In the same year, REYES ET AL. filed a case in
486 of the Civil Code, he had the right to use the
court seeking to enjoin VDA. DE ZABALLERO ET
house and lot without paying any compensation
AL. from selling their pro indiviso shares as co-
to VIRGILIO, as he may use the property owned
owners of the property. They also claimed:
in common so long as it is in accordance with the
1. that the subject property was
purpose for which it is intended and in a manner
incapable of division,
not injurious to the interest of the other co-
2. that as co-owners, they had a
owners.
preferential right to purchase the shares
However, since VIRGILIO had decided to effect
of VDA. DE ZABALLERO ET AL. for a
partition of the house and lot in court. After the
reasonable price, and
trial court granted the petition for partition and
3. that P12.50 per sq. m. was grossly
ordered the ejectment of SENEN, the co-
excessive being that they have a
ownership was deemed terminated and the right
preemptive right to purchase the
to use and enjoy the possession jointly ceased.
property, it was unreasonable.
Thereafter, the continued stay of SENEN and his
VDA. DE ZABALLERO ET AL. refuted said
family in the house was prejudicial to the interest
allegations. Later, they alleged that they did not
of VIRGILIO as the property should have been
know any other party who was willing and able
sold and the proceeds divided equally between
to purchase the property under a more favorable
them. To this extent and from then on respondent
condition than offered by VOLCANO
should be held liable for monthly rentals until he
SECURITIES. They however, also expressed that
and his family vacate.
they were willing to sell the property to REYES
ET AL. at the same rate of P12.50 per sq. m. as
offered by VOLCANO SECURITIES.
REYES vs. CONCEPTION
GR No. 56650. October 1, 1990
 The trial court ruled that REYES ET AL. as co-
owners did not have a preemptive right to
purchase VDA. DE ZABALLERO ET AL.s
property. Pursuant to Art. 498, it also ordered a
public sale of the entire property as it was
indivisible.
Hence, this present action.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not a co-owner has the
preemptive right to purchase the pro indiviso share
being offered for sale by another co-owner.
2. Whether or not the property should be sold
to third persons.
RULING
(1) NO, a co-owner has such no right. The legal
provisions on co-ownership do not grant to any of
the owners of a property held in common a
preemptive right to purchase the pro indiviso
shares of his co-owners.
Art. 1620 of the Civil Code only allows a co-
owner to exercise a right of redemption should
the other co-owner sell his share in the property to
a third person. However, it could not be applied
in the present case. This is not present in the case
at bar since no sale of VDA. DE ZABALLERO ET
AL.s pro indiviso shares had been made yet. It
only applies should a sale had been made.
Neither did REYES ET AL. had the legal right
to enjoin VDA. DE ZABALLERO ET AL. from
alienating their pro indiviso shares to a third party.
The law does not prohibit a co-owner from
selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in
the property held in common. The law merely
provides that the alienation or mortgage shall be
limited only to the portion of the property which
may be allotted to him upon termination of the
co-ownership. The only remedy of the remaining
co-owners then is to exercise their right to redeem,
within a specified period, the shares which may
have been sold to the third party.
(2) YES, under Art. 498 of the Civil Code, it
should be.
Under Art. 498, the sale of the property held
in common referred to in the above article is
resorted to when:
1. the right to partition the property
among the co-owners is invoked by any of
them but because of the nature of the
property, it cannot be subdivided or its
subdivision would prejudice the interests of
the co-owners and
2. the co-owners are not in agreement as
to who among them shall be allotted or
assigned the entire property upon
reimbursement of the shares of the other co-
owners.
In the present case, it was VDA. DE
ZABALLERO ET AL. who invoked the partition
of the property although the property was
indivisible and it was not agreed upon that it
should be sold to REYES ET AL. since there was a
more favorable offer from VOLCANO
SECURITIES. Hence, under the provision, as a last
resort, the property must be sold in a public sale
and that distribution of the proceeds thereof
should be made among the co-owners afterwards.
ARTICLE 499: The partition of a thing owned in
common shall not prejudice third persons, who shall
retain the rights of mortgage, servitude, or any other
real rights belonging to them before the division was
made. Personal rights pertaining to third persons
against co-ownership shall also remain in force,
notwithstanding the partition.
ARTICLE 500: Upon partition, there shall be mutual
accounting for benefits received and reimbursements
for expenses made. Likewise, each co-owner shall pay
for damages caused by reason of his negligence or
fraud.
ARTICLE 501: Every co-owner shall, after partition,
be liable for defects of title and quality of the portion
assigned to each of the other co-owners.
THE FOLLOWING ARE THE EFFECTS OF
PARTITION:
1. mutual accounting of
benefits received;
2. mutual reimbursement;
3. indemnity for damages
caused by reason of his
negligence or fraud;
4. reciprocal warranty in case
of eviction or loss of
quality or hidden defects.
EXCEPT:
1) when there is contrary
stipulation;
2) when the eviction is due to
subsequent partition to one
evicted
3) the co-owner has exclusive
possession of the part allotted to
him from the entire period during
which possession lasted.
o There is retroactive effect.
4) they have exclusive title over
their respective share under Art.
1091.
EXTINGUISHMENT OF CO-OWNERSHIP:
1. By partition (judicial or extra judicial);
2. If the co-owner acquires ownership of the
whole property thru acquisitive
prescription and all the requisites are
complied with (Art. 494);
3. When a stranger acquires by prescription
of the thing that is owned in common (10
to 30 years, good faith or bad faith
respectively) after repudiation;
4. Merger in one co-owner (when on
acquires the share of another like by
renouncing his share for the expenses
incurred for the preservation until theres
no more to renounce);
5. loss or destruction of the thing owned in
common;
6. Expropriation by the government.
POSSESSION

ARTICLE 523: Possession is the holding of a thing or
the enjoyment of a right.
2 KINDS:
1. the holding of a thing
2. the enjoyment of a right
the holding of a thing is possession proper
The exercise of a right or enjoyment of a right
is quasi-possession
Is Possession a Fact or a Right?
It is really a fact (since it exists); but from the
moment it exists, certain consequences follow,
thus making possession also a right.
What is the relationship between
ownership and possession?
As a gen. rule, possession is an element of
ownership; however this rule is not absolute
because there are circumstances or instances
where the owner of the thing does not posses
the thing.
Right to Possession
Right to possession is merely an incident
of ownership.
This is independent of ownership
whereby a person is placed in possession
of a thing by virtue of a right but not of
ownership.
He is not the owner but he has the right to
possess. This is an independent right of
ownership
REQUISITES OF POSSESSION:
1. There must be a holding or control (this
holding may be actual or constructive;
holding here means occupancy or seizure
of a thing);
2. There is intent to hold or the animus or
desire;
3. The possession must be by virtue of one's
own right.
CLASSES OF POSSESSION
a. possession in ones own name or
possession in the name of another
(art. 524)
b. Possession in the concept on an
owner or possession in the
concept of a holder (art. 525)
c. Possession in good faith or in bad
faith (art. 526)
DEGREES OF POSSESSION:
1. The mere holding or having, without any
right whatsoever.
ex: possession of a thief
2. Possession with juridical title but not that
of ownership. This is called juridical
possession.
Examples: that of a lessee,
pledgee, usufructuary.
3. Possession with just title but not from the
true owner. This is called real possessory
right.
Example: a vendee who
purchases a car from another
(vendor) who merely pretended
to be the owner of a car. So there
is transfer but this is not sufficient
to transfer ownership because
there is a defect in the title of the
vendor in that he is not the owner
thereof
4. Possession with title of dominion. This is
really ownership or possession that
springs from ownership
VIEWPOINT OF POSSESSION:
1) jus possidendi the right to
possess. This is a right or incident
of ownership.
Example: I own a house; therefore I
am entitled to posses it.
2) jus possessionis this is right of
possession. This is an
independent right of itself,
independent of ownership.
Example: the lessee renting an
apartment. Although he is not the
owner, still by virtue of the lease
contract, he is entitled to possess.
CLASSES OF POSSESSION:
1. In ones own name or in that of another
(Art 524)
2. In the concept of owner (en concepto de
duento) and in the concept of holder. (Art
525)
3. In good faith (bona fide) or in bad faith
(mala fide)
ARTICLE 524: Possession may be exercised in ones
own name or in that of another.
Possession may be exercised in ones own
name or name of another.
Possession in Anothers Name:
1) Voluntary as when the agent
possesses for the principal
2) Necessary as when a mother
possesses for a child still in
maternal womb
3) Unauthorized this will become
the principals possession only
after there has been a ratification
w/o prejudice to the effects of
negotiorum gestio)
DE LUNA vs. CA
GR No. 94490. August 6,1992
 Possession of a lessor redounds to the benefit
of the owner since possession may be exercised
in one's own name or in that of another. The
owner then may file an action for forcible
entry against a usurper.
FACTS
Since 1932, petitioner JOSE DE owned an
unregistered parcel of land with an area of 30,856
square meters, located in Botolan, Zambales. In
1971, defendants Octavio Daclison, Oscar Crispin,
and private respondents JUAN DIMAANO, JR.
and GERINO DOBLE entered the land. Despite
DE LUNAs objections, they began plowing the
land, fenced it with barbed wire and began
planting sugar cane thereon.
In 1972, DE LUNA LUNA filed a complaint in
court for forcible entry. He prayed that
DIMAANO, JR. and DOBLE be ordered to vacate
the land and pay him the amount of P45 monthly
per hectare until possession thereof would be
transferred to him.
DIMAANO, JR. and DOBLE on the other
hand denied the material allegations of the
complaint.
Crispin and DOBLE alleged that they have not
entered nor occupied the disputed property.
DIMAANO, JR. stated that DE LUNA was not
the owner of the property. He alleged that the
owner of it was his uncle Agustin Dequia, Sr.,
who possessed it from 1945 to 1972, having
acquired it from his mother Agustin Dequia, Jr.,
who originally owned it since 1906.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
DE LUNA. On appeal, the RTC reversed the
decision and concluded that Agustin Dequia, Jr.
was the owner of the property. The same was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Aggrieved, DE LUNA elevated the case to the
Supreme Court. He contended that the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Court erred in
determining the ownership of the disputed
property in an action for ejectment and concluded
that Agustin Dequia, Jr. was the owner of the
property.
ISSUES
Whether or not DE LUNA had prior
possession of the property.
RULING
YES, he had prior possession of the property.
In ejectment cases, the only issue to be
resolved therein is who is entitled to the physical
or material possession of the premises, or
possession de facto, independent of any claim of
ownership that either party may set forth in their
pleadings.
If petitioner can prove prior possession in
himself, he may recover such possession from
even the owner himself. Whatever may be the
character of his prior possession, if he has in his
favor priority of time, he has the security that
entitles him to stay on the property until he is
lawfully ejected by a person having a better right
by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
However, where the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the question
of ownership, an inferior court has the power to
resolve the question of ownership but only insofar
as to determine the issue of possession.
In the case at bar, the inferior court acted
correctly in receiving evidence regarding the
ownership of the disputed property, inasmuch as
respondent DIMAANO, JR. claimed to possess
the property by virtue of a lease agreement with
the alleged owner thereof, AGUSTIN DEQUIA,
JR.
However, the Court of Appeals erred in
upholding the Regional Trial Court regarding the
conclusion that the subject property was owned
by Agustin Dequia, Jr. and therefore respondent
DIMAANO, JR. was entitled to possess the same.
DE LUNA had shown that he had prior
possession of the property. This was established
by the testimony of his witnesses, notably that of
his tenant Epigenio Dilag and Victor dela Cruz:
1. In 1938, the property was delivered to DE
LUNA and his mother Apolonia Dequa
by Agustin Dequia, Sr. when they and
their brothers and sisters partitioned
among themselves the properties of their
deceased parents.
2. From 1938 to 1941, DE LUNA and his
mother cultivated the land.
3. From 1944 to 1952, the witness, dela Cruz,
leased the land from DE LUNA and his
mother.
4. From 1953 to 1972 (until DIMAANO, JR.
entered the property), the property was
leased to Dilag.
While petitioner admitted that he declared the
property for taxation purposes only in 1957, he
had possessed the property beginning 1953 at the
very latest, when he leased the same to Epigenio
Dilag. Moreover, there was evidence to the effect
that DE LUNA possessed the property even
earlier than 1953.
The possession of the property by Dilag since
1953 and dela Cruz, redounded to the benefit of
DE LUNA, since possession may be exercised in
one's own name or in that of another.
On the other hand, DIMAANO, JR. had failed
to prove that Agustin Dequia, Jr. possessed the
property prior to his possession, much less the
ownership of the latter over said property. The
mere fact that Agustin Dequia, Sr. had declared
the subject property for taxation purposes from
1908 up to 1945 did not constitute possession
thereof nor was it proof of ownership in the
absence of DEQUIA, JR.'s actual possession of
said property.
However, it goes without saying that this case
did not bar DE LUNA and Agustin Dequia, Jr.
from resolving the issue of ownership over the
disputed property in an appropriate proceeding.
ARTICLE 525: The possession of things or rights may
be had in one of two concepts: either in the concept of
an owner, or in that of the holder of the thing or right
to keep or enjoy it, the ownership pertaining to another
person.

The possession of things or rights may be
had in one of 2 concepts:
1) either in the concept of an owner;
or
2) in that of a holder of the thing or
right to keep it or enjoy it, the
ownership pertaining to another
person
Example:
A purchased a land from X knowing him not to
be the owner. But he exercises acts of ownership
over it and his friend believes that he is the
owner. In time, thru prescription, A becomes the
owner because his possession is in concepto de
dueno. If a tenant leases the land from A, he
possesses the land in the concept of holder.
Possession in the concept of holder. The
possession is of the property concerned.
Regarding their respective rights (the lease right,
the usufruct, the right to safeguard the thing, the
right to use the thing), all are possessed by them,
respectively, in the concept of owner. Hence, the
possession of the THING itself is distinguished
from the possession of the RIGHT TO ENJOY the
thing ( or benefit from it)
GARCIA vs. CA
GR No. 133140. August 10, 1999
The records show that GARCIA occupied the
property not in the concept of an owner for his
stay was merely tolerated by his parents. An
owner's act of allowing another to occupy his
house, rent-free does not create a permanent
and indefeasible right of possession in the
latter's favor.
FACTS
Atty. Pedro V. Garcia with the consent of his
wife Remedios sold their registered lot situated at
Bel Air II Village in Makati in favor of private
respondents their daughter MA. LUISA
MAGPAYO and her husband LUISITO
MAGPAYO.
In 1981, SPOUSES MAGPAYO mortgaged the
land to the Philippine Bank of Communications
(PBCom) to secure a loan, P564,000 according to
them, P1,200,000according to PBCom. Title in the
name of Atty. Pedro V. Garcia was cancelled and
a new one was issued in the name of SPOUSES
MAGPAYO. In the title, the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage was annotated on it.
However, SPOUSES MAGPAYO failed to pay
their loan upon its maturity, hence, the mortgage
was extrajudicially foreclosed. During the public
auction sale, PBCom, which was the highest
bidder bought the land. After the 1 year
redemption period expired without the SPOUSES
MAGPAYO redeeming the same, the latters title
was cancelled and title over the land was
consolidated in favor of PBCom.
1985, the SPOUSES MAGPAYO filed a
complaint seeking the nullification of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, public
auction sale, and PBCom's but it was dismissed.
Later, PBCom filed a petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession over the land, which was
granted.
However, petitioner JOSE MA. T. GARCIA,
the brother of MA. LUISA MAGPAYO was the
one in possession of the land and he refused to
honor the writ of possession. Then, GARCIA filed
against PBCom, the SPOUSES MAGPAYOS and
the RTC Sheriff an action for recovery of realty
and damages wherein he alleged that he inherited
the land as one of the heirs of his mother
Remedios T. Garcia and that PBCom acquired no
right thereover.
PBCom averred, however that GARCIA's
claim over the land was belied by the fact that it
was not among the properties owned by his
mother listed in the Inventory of Real Estate.
The SPOUSES MAGPAYOS, on the other
hand, asserted that title over the land was
transferred to them by MA. LUISA MAGPAYOS
parents, Atty. Pedro and Remedios Garcia, to
enable them to borrow money from PBCom.
The court held that the mortgage executed by
the MAGPAYO SPOUSES in favor of PBCom was
void. It found that the mortgage was executed on
March 5, 1981 but the new Torrens title was
issued to the MAGPAYO SPOUSES was only on
March 9, 1981. It held that the MAGPAYO
SPOUSES could not have acquired the said
property merely by the execution of the Deed of
Sale because the property was in the possession of
GARCIA. It then invalidated the foreclosure sale
and nullified the title issued to PBCom.
Dissatisfied, PBCom appealed. The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this appeal by GARCIA.
ISSUE
Whether or not GARCIAs ownership was in
the concept of an owner.
RULING
NO, his ownership was in the concept of a
holder.
GARCIA's possession as found by the trial
court, started only at the time of the filing of the
complaint. Assuming that to be true, his
possession which started only in 1986 could not
ripen into ownership. He had no valid title
thereto. His possession in fact was that of an
intruder, one done in bad faith (to defeat PBCom's
Writ of Possession). His possession was certainly
not in the concept of an owner. This is so because
as early as 1981, title thereto was registered in the
name of the SPOUSES MAGPAYO which title
was subsequently cancelled when the property
was purchased by PBCom in a public auction sale
resulting in the issuance of title in favor of the
latter in 1985.
Possession and ownership are distinct legal
concepts. Ownership exists when a thing
pertaining to one person is completely subjected
to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and
consistent with the rights of others. Ownership
confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is
the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale.
Atty. Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios
exercised their right to dispose of what they
owned when they sold the subject property to the
SPOUSES MAGPAYO.
On the other hand, possession is defined as
the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right.
Literally, to possess means to actually and
physically occupy a thing with or without right.
Under Art. 542 of the Civil Code, possession may
be had in one of two ways: possession in the
concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A
possessor in the concept of an owner may be the
owner himself or one who claims to be so. On the
other hand, one who possesses as a mere holder
acknowledges in another a superior right which
he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be
right or wrong.
The records show that GARCIA occupied the
property not in the concept of an owner for his
stay was merely tolerated by his parents. An
owner's act of allowing another to occupy his
house, rent-free does not create a permanent and
indefeasible right of possession in the latter's
favor. Consequently, it was of no moment that
GARCIA was in possession of the property at the
time of the sale to the SPOUSES MAGPAYO. It
was not a hindrance to a valid transfer of
ownership. On the other hand, GARCIA's
subsequent claim of ownership as successor to his
mother's share in the conjugal asset was belied by
the fact that the property was not included in the
inventory of the estate submitted by his father to
the intestate court. This buttresses the ruling that
indeed the property was no longer considered
owned by petitioner's parents.
The mortgage to PBCom by the SPOUSES
MAGPAYO was valid notwithstanding that the
transfer certificate of title over the property was
issued to them after the mortgage contract was
entered into. Registration does not confer
ownership, it is merely evidence of such
ownership over a particular property. The deed of
sale operates as a formal or symbolic delivery of
the property sold and authorizes the buyer to use
the document as proof of ownership.
MANGAHAS vs. CA
GR No. 95815. March 10, 1999
Acquisition of ownership under the law on
prescription cannot be pleaded in support of
MANGAHAS' submission that subject land
has ipso jure become his private property.
FACTS
Since 1955, the spouses Severo and Caridad S.
Rodil, occupied and possessed an agricultural
land with an area of 15.0871 hectares. Petitioner,
SERVANDO MANGAHAS, had been in
possession thereof by virtue of the agreement
between him and the spouses Rodil, allowing him
to occupy and cultivate the said parcel of land.
In the Kasulatan ng Pagtanggap ng Salapi,
MANGAHAS paid the amount of P7,000 to the
spouses Rodils for allowing him to occupy and
cultivate the same. 12 hectares of the property
were then developed into a fishpond, 2 hectares
were planted with rice and 1 hectare was used as
"tumana" with a house erected thereon.
In 1971, the spouses Rodil decided to sell the
said piece of land. MANGAHAS approached
private respondent SPOUSES PABLO SIMEON
AND LEONORA CAYME to offer to them the
property for sale. The SPOUSES CAYME agreed
to purchase the property for P7,000 and
MANGAHAS was the broker of such sale. An
Affidavit of proof to such was executed by the
Spouses Rodil in favor of the SPOUSES CAYME
in the presence of the herein MANGAHAS. The
SPOUSES CAYME, on the same day, filed a free
patent application for the land, which was later
approved. Later, title in their names was issued.
The SPOUSES CAYME permitted
MANGAHAS to continue possessing and
working on the same land, even after the sale,
upon the request of the former themselves
because they were then busy in their palay
business. The SPOUSES CAYME did not get any
share in the fruits or harvest of the land except on
one occasion, when MANGAHAS gave them 1/2
"tiklis" (big basket) of "tilapia".
Later, the SPOUSES CAYME had demanded
from MANGAHAS the return of the premises in
question but the latter refused to vacate the place.
In 1985, the SPOUSES CAYME commenced an
action for recovery of ownership and the
possession of real property.
MANGAHAS theorized that he entered into
the possession of the land under controversy in
1969 by virtue of a prior sale he inked with the
spouses Rodil in 1969. He averred that he had
been in continuous occupation and possession in
concepto de dueo, enjoying the fruits thereof to the
exclusion of all others, his right thereto being
evidenced by the Kasulatan ng Pagtangap ng Salapi
dated 1969. He also denied that he brokered the
sale between the spouses Rodil and SPOUSES
CAYME.
The trial court ruled against MANGAHAS. It
held that the SPOUSES CAYME WERE the
absolute and registered owners of the land in
question. It also ordered MANGAHAS to remove
his house constructed thereon and deliver the
possession to the SPOUSES CAYME. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the same decision.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not MANGAHAS possessed the
property in the concept of an owner.
RULING
NO, MANGAHAS only possessed it in the
concept of a holder for the following proofs:
1. the spouses Rodil only allowed him to
occupy and cultivate the said parcel of
land by lease werein MANGAHAS paid
P7,000 as evidenced by the Kasulatan ng
Pagtanggap ng Salapi,
 2. MANGAHAS was the one who offered
the property for sale to the SPOUSES
CAYME when the spouses Rodil decided
to sell it. In fact, he was the broker of the
sale, and
3. on one occasion, MANGAHAS gave the
SPOUSES CAYME 1/2 "tiklis" (big basket)
of "tilapia".
Prescription did not run in favor of Mangahas
MANGAHAS's grantor or predecessor in
interest spouses RODIL took possession of the
property, subject matter of the litigation in 1955.
Since the complaint in the case at bar was filed in
1985, the requirement of at least 30 years
continuous possession has not been complied
with even if we were to tack Rodil's period of
possession.
MANGAHAS could not now feign ignorance
of such judicial admission which he had
resolutely repudiated in his present petition.
Acquisition of ownership under the law on
prescription cannot be pleaded in support of
MANGAHAS' submission that subject land has
ipso jure become his private property.
MAGLUCOT-AU vs. MAGLUCOT
GR No. 132518. March 28, 2000
RESPONDENTS only possessed Lot D in the
concept of a holder for the reason that they
had been paying rent as lessees thereon. Had
they been of the belief that they were co-
owners of the entire Lot 1639, they would not
have paid rent. One who possesses as a mere
holder acknowledges in another, a superior
right which he believes to be ownership,
whether his belief be right or wrong.
FACTS
Lot No. 1639 was co-owned by 6 persons. In
1927, a title in their names was issued. In 1952,
Tomas Maglucot, one of the registered owners
and RESPONDENTS' predecessor-in-interest,
filed a petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639.
Consequently, it was divided into 6 portions.
After partition, Lot D was awarded to Roberto
Maglucot, predecessor-in-interest of
PETITIONERS GAVINA MAGLUCOT-AW ET
AL. while Lot F was awarded to Tomas Maglucot,
predecessor-in-interest RESPONDENTS
LEOPOLDO MAGLUCOT.
In 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion
of Lot D. Subsequently, respondents LEOPOLDO
and SEVERO MAGLUCOT, rented portions of the
same lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and each
paying rentals therefor. They built houses on their
corresponding leased lots and paid the rental
amount of P100 per year to Mrs. Ruperta Salma,
who represented the heirs of Roberto Maglucot.
In 1992, however, said respondents stopped
paying rentals claiming ownership over the
subject lot.
Hence, an action for recovery of possession
and damages was filed by PETITIONERS against
RESPONDENTS. The latter however contended
that no partition was effected and hence, they
were co-owners of Lot D.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment
in favor of PETITIONERS and ordered
RESPONDENTS to demolish their respective
houses and vacate the premises. Although there
was an order for partition but there was no proof
that the sketch/subdivision plan was submitted to
court for its approval or that a decree or order was
registered in the Register of Deeds. It based its
decision on the tax declarations by the original co-
owners as to their respective shares after partition.
In fact, the tax declarations over the houses of
RESPONDENTS, expressly stated that the same
are constructed on the lot of Roberto Maglucot. It
then constitutes a conclusive admission by them
of the ownership of the subject lot by the latter. It
also added that RESPONDENTS were estopped
by the fact that it was their predecessor-in-
interest, Tomas Maglucot, who commenced the
action for partition and took active part in the
process.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled
that the sketch plan and tax declarations relied
upon by PETITIONERS were not conclusive
evidence of partition. It thus declared that there
was no partition of Lot No. 1639.
Hence, this appeal by PETITIONERS. They
contended that Lot 1639 was mutually partitioned
and physically subdivided among the co-owners
and that majority of them participated in the
actual execution of the subdivision. They opined
that in 1952, it was Tomas Maglucot, predecessor-
in-interest of RESPODENTS, who initiated a court
proceeding for a formal subdivision of Lot 1639.
Further, the co-owners accepted their designated
shares in 1946 as averred by Tomas Maglucot in
his petition for partition. Thus, RESPONDENTS
were estopped from asserting that there was no
partition made. PETITIONERS further contend
that respondents admitted in their tax
declarations covering their respective houses that
they are "constructed on the land of Roberto
Maglucot."
RESPONDENTS rebutted firstly that
PETITIONERS failed to show that the interested
parties were notified of the tentative subdivision
contained in the sketch and that the CFI
subsequently confirmed the same. Second, they
point to the fact that petitioners were unable to
show any court approval of any partition. Third,
they maintained that Lot 1639 remained
undivided since to date, its title contained no
annotation of partition or whatsoever.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not there was partition.
2. Whether or not the RESPONDENTS
possessed Lot D in the concept of an owner since
they argued that they were co-owners of the lot.
RULING
(1) YES, there was partition.
 The records of the case show that sometime in
1946 there was a prior oral agreement to
tentatively partition Lot 1639. By virtue of this
agreement, the original co-owners occupied
specific portions of Lot 1639. It was only in 1952
when the petition to subdivide Lot 1639 was filed
because two of the co-owners, namely
Hermogenes Olis and heirs of Pascual Olis,
refused to have said lot subdivided and have
separate certificates of title. Significantly, after the
1952 proceedings, the parties in this case by
themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-
interest occupied specific portions of Lot 1639 in
accordance with the sketch plan. Such possession
remained so until this case arose, or about 40
years later.
Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected
to take under partition, and who took possession
of the portion allotted to them, are estopped to
question title to portion allotted to another party.
A person cannot claim both under and against the
same instrument. In other words, they accepted
the lands awarded them by its provisions, and
they cannot accept the decree in part, and
repudiate it in part. They must accept all or none.
Parties who had received the property assigned to
them are precluded from subsequently attacking
its validity of any part of it.
Here, RESPONDENTS, by themselves and/or
through their predecessors-in-interest, already
occupied of the lots in accordance with the sketch
plan. This occupation continued until this action
was filed. They cannot now be heard to question
the possession and ownership of the other co-
owners who took exclusive possession of Lot D
also in accordance with the sketch plan.
(2) NO. RESPONDENTS only possessed Lot D
in the concept of a holder for the reason that they
had been paying rent as lessees thereon. Had they
been of the belief that they were co-owners of the
entire Lot 1639, they would not have paid rent.
The payment of rentals by RESPONDENTS
reveal that their possession of over Lot D was that
of a holder and not in the concept of an owner.
One who possesses as a mere holder
acknowledges in another a superior right which
he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be
right or wrong. Since the possession of
RESPONDENTS were found to be that of lessees
of PETITIONERS, it goes without saying that the
latter were in possession of Lot No. 1639-D in the
concept of an owner from 1952 up to the time the
present action was commenced.
To bolster the fact that they possessed the
land in the concept of a holder, RESPONDENTS
Wilfreda Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio Alejo
offered to buy the share of Roberto Maglucot.
However, this did not prosper as PETITIONERS
refused to sell it.
Moreover, no evidence was ever presented to
show that a tax declaration for the entire Lot 1639
has ever been made. In fact, after partition, tax
declarations were made for every specific lot by
each owner thereof. In fact, Lot D, where
RESPONDENTS houses were built thereon were
declared for tax purposes in the name of Roberto
Maglucot.
2 phases in an action for partition;
1. an order for partition which determines
whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and
whether partition is proper, and
The first phase of a partition and/or
accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-
ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise
legally proscribed) and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties
interested in the property. This phase may end
with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled
to have a partition either because a co-
ownership does not exist, or partition is
legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other
hand, with an adjudgment that a co-
ownership does in truth exist, partition is
proper in the premises and an accounting of
rents and profits received by the defendant
from the real estate in question is in order. In
the latter case, the parties may, if they are able
to agree, make partition among themselves by
proper instruments of conveyance, and the
court shall confirm the partition so agreed
upon. In either case - i.e., either the action is
dismissed or partition and/or accounting is
decreed - the order is a final one, and may be
appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.
2. a decision confirming the sketch or
subdivision submitted by the parties or the
commissioners appointed by the court, as the
case may be.
The second phase commences when it
appears that "the parties are unable to agree
upon the partition" directed by the court. In
that event, partition shall be done for the
parties by the court with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissioners. This
second stage may well also deal with the
rendition of the accounting itself and its
approval by the court after the parties have
been accorded opportunity to be heard
thereon, and an award for the recovery by the
party or parties thereto entitled of their just
share in the rents and profits of the real estate
in question. Such an order is, to be sure, final
and appealable.
ARTICLE 526: He is deemed a possessor in good faith
who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
He is deemed a possessor in bad faith, who
possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.
Mistake upon doubtful or difficult
question of law may be the basis of good faith
Awareness of any flaw is the question of
knowledge. So that if he is not aware, he
is in good faith. If he is aware then he is in
bad faith
SC said where a party's mere refusal to
believe that a defect exists or his willful
closing of his eyes to the possibility of a
vendor's defect to his title will not make
 him an innocent purchaser for value if it
afterwards develop that the title was in
fact defective. Hence if circumstances
exist that requires a prudent man to
investigate, he will be in bf if he does not
investigate. (Rep. vs. CA (102 Scra 331 in
relation to Wong vs. Carprio 203 Scra 118)
Possessor in Good Faith. One who is not aware
that there exists in his TITLE or MODE of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
While the possessor in good faith is one
who BELIEVES he is the owner, the
possessor in the concept of owner is one
who ACTS as if he is the owner.
Possessor in Bad Faith. One who is not in good
faith. (Hence, if circumstances exist that require a
prudent man to investigate, he will be in bad faith
if he does not investigate.
The ff. may be the basis of good faith:
1. Error in the application of the law, in
legal solutions that arise from that
application ( the error is not gross and
therefore excusable)
2. error in the appreciation of the legal
consequences of certain acts
3. errors in the interpretation of
doubtful provisions or doctrines
ARTICLE 527: Good faith is always presumed, and
upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a
possessor rests the burden of proof.
There is a presumption that where one is in possession
of the property, there is a presumption that the
possession is in good faith. And upon him who alleges
bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of
proof.
ARTICLE 528: Possession acquired in good faith does
not lose this character except in the case and from the
moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not
unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or
wrongfully.
If one is in possession and his possession is in good
faith, he will remain in good faith until such time when
bad faith begins.
When Possession in Good Faith is
Converted to Possession in Bad Faith:
a. From the moment facts exist showing
the possessors knowledge of the
flaw; from that time should he be
considered a possessor in bad faith.
b. It does not matter whether the facts
were caused by him or by some other
person.
When Bad Faith Begins:
From the moment facts exist which
show that the possessor is aware that
he possesses the thing improperly or
wrongfully.
The reckoning period is not the
knowledge itself but when the facts
would show that the possessor has
evident knowledge of the flaw.
When would the facts exist? When
someone produces evidence.
What is the significance of good faith
and bad faith with respect to the
owner of the property? No
significance because he is already the
owner of the property.
EMBRADO vs. CA
GR No. 51457. June 27, 1994
The rule is settled that a buyer of real
property which is in the possession of persons
other than the seller must be wary and should
investigate the rights of those in possession.
Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer
can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good
faith.
FACTS
Juan, Pastor and Matias Carpitanos originally
owned a 366-square meter lot in Dipolog City.In
1946, a Venta Definitiva, a notarized document
written entirely in Spanish, was executed by the
Carpitanos whereby they sold said lot to
petitioner LUCIA C. EMBRADO, who was
referred to as single. The document provided
that even though the Deed was prepared and
signed in 1946, the effects of the document would
retroact to the date the lot and its improvements
were actually sold to EMBRADO in 1941.
Thereafter, the sale was registered and a title
was issued in the name of LUCIA EMBRADO
alone. Later, the word single in the title was
cancelled and was replaced by married to
ORESTE TORREGIANI", the latter, who was
LUCIA EMBRADOs husband since 1943. The
TORREGIANIs then constructed their conjugal
abode on the lot and in 1958 constructed a
residential/commercial building thereon.
In 1971, EMBRADO sold the land for P1,000 to
her adopted daughter, herein private respondent
EDA JIMENEZ, who was married to SANTIAGO
JIMENEZ. In the Absolute Deed of Sale, the
property was referred to as EMBRADOs "own
paraphernal property".
In 1972, EDA sold 65 sq. m of the lot to private
respondent MARCOS SALIMBAGAT for P6,500,
and 301 sq. m. of the same lot to private
respondent PACIFICO CIMAFRANCA for
P30,000. Both sales were duly annotated on the
title.
In the same year, the TORREGIANIs
instituted an action for declaration of nullity of
contract, annulment of sales, reconveyance and
damages against the private respondent SPOUSES
JIMENEZ, MARCOS SALIMBAGAT and
PACIFICO CIMAFRANCA. They alleged that the
sale that the sale of the lot by LUCIA to EDA was
void not only for lack of consideration but also
because ORESTE TORREGIANI did not consent
to the sale, which consent was necessary because
the lot was conjugal property. They also claimed
that that LUCIA was misled into signing the Deed
of Sale on the belief that the lot was merely
intended as security for a loan that the SPOUSES
JIMENEZ spouses were then negotiating. Since
the SPOUSES JIMENEZ did not acquire valid title
to the land, the subsequent sales in favor of
SALIMBAGAT and CIMAFRANCA were without
legal effect.
The TORREGIANIs were sustained by the
trial court, which held that the sale of Lot 564 to
EDA and its subsequent transfers to
SALIMBAGAT and CIMAFRANCA, who were
declared buyers in bad faith, were void and of no
effect.
The Court of appeals reversed the said
judgment. It held that since LUCIA actually
agreed with Juan, Pastor and Matias Carpitanos,
the original owners, to the purchase of Lot 564 in
1941 when she was not yet married, then the lot
was her paraphernal property. In addition, the
respondent court declared SALIMBAGAT and
CIMAFRANCA were buyers in good faith since
the contrary was not proved.
ISSUE
Whether or not SALIMBAGAT and
CIMAFRANCA were buyers in good faith for
purposes of protection under the Torrens system
of registration.
RULING
NO, they were not. They were buyers in bad
faith. Hence, they were not entitled to protection
under the Torrens system of registration.
Lot 564 was the conjugal property of the
TORREGIANI since LUCIA purchased it from the
Capitranos in 1946 when her marriage to ORESTE
was already subsisting.
The Sale in favor of EDA was void because it
was made with fraud and that if indeed it was
sold, it was made without the consent of LUCIAs
husband, the property being a conjugal one.
SALIMBAGAT and CIMAFRANCA were buyers
in bad faith
SALIMBAGAT and CIMAFRANCA had not
proven that they were purchasers in good faith.
The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in
good faith and for value lies upon him who
asserts that status.* In discharging the burden, it is
not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of
good faith, i.e. that everyone is presumed to act in
good faith. The good faith that is here essential is
integral with the very status which must be
proved.
We agree with the trial court when it found
that SALIMBAGAT and CIMAFRANCA
purchased the disputed lot from EDA and
SANTIAGO JIMENEZ with knowledge of facts
and circumstances which should have put them
upon such inquiry and investigation as might be
necessary to acquaint them with the defects in the
title of their vendor. A purchaser cannot close his
eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man
on his guard and then claim that he acted in good
faith under the belief that there was no defect in
the title of the vendor. His mere refusal to believe
that such defect exists, or his willful closing of his
eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect
in the vendor's title will not make him an innocent
purchaser for value if afterwards it develops that
the title is in fact defective, and it appears that he
had such notice of the defect as would have led to
its discovery had he acted with the measure of
precaution which may reasonably be required of a
prudent man in like situation.
CIMAFRANCA was a close relative of
SANTIAGO and at the same time godfather to
one of his children. It would be impossible for
CIMAFRANCA not to know that SANTIAGO
was only 22 years old, a working student earning
P6 per day with a wife and three children to
support. With these facts, there is every reason for
him to inquire further as to how EDA came up
with the sum of P1,000 to buy the property, when
she was unemployed.
On the part of SALIMBAGAT, he has a
daughter renting a portion of the building with
her husband for more than a year prior to the sale
by EDA to him. During the time that
SALIMBAGAT was already interested in buying
the property, it would have been usual and part of
ordinary human nature for him to inquire about
the property from his daughter who was living
very near the supposed owners. SALIMBAGAT
had some knowledge of the financial status of the
supposed vendors which should have put him on
guard before buying the property and would
have known that at the time of the sale to him and
CIMAFRANCA, the TORREGIANIs had already
been in continuous possession of the property for
14 years since 1958.
Before buying the property, SALIMBAGAT
and CIMAFRANCA allegedly inquired from the
office of the Register of Deeds concerning the
genuineness of the certificate of title of EDA, and
from the court as to whether the property was
involved in any litigation. However, they failed to
inquire from petitioners as to why they were the
ones in actual possession of the property.
The rule is settled that a buyer of real property
which is in the possession of persons other than
the seller must be wary and should investigate the
rights of those in possession. Otherwise, without
such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as
a buyer in good faith. When a man proposes to
buy or deal with realty, his first duty is to read the
public manuscript, i.e., to look and see who is
there upon it, and what are his rights. A want of
caution and diligence which an honest man of
ordinary prudence is accustomed to exercise in
making purchases is, in contemplation of law, a
want of good faith. The buyer who has failed to
know or discover that the land sold to him is in
the adverse possession of another, is a buyer in
bad faith.
* This is in contrast to Art. 527 of the Civil
Code which states that upon him who
 alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor
rests the burden of proof.
ALVIOLA vs. CA
GR No. 117642. April 24, 1998
There was bad faith on the part of the
SPOUSES ALVIOLA when they constructed
the copra dryer and store on the disputed
portions since they were fully aware that the
parcels of land belonged to Victoria Tinagan.
(refer to Page 17)
DBP vs. CA
GR No. 111737. October 13, 1999
Good faith of the possessor ceases when an
action to recover possession of the property is
filed against him and he is served summons
therefore. In the present case, DBP was served
summons in 1982. By that time, it was no
longer in possession of the disputed land as
possession thereof was given back to the
PIEDAS after the foreclosure of DBP was
declared null and void.
FACTS
Respondent SPOUSES TIMOTEO and
SELFIDA S. PIEDA were registered owners of a
parcel of land in Dumarao, Capiz containing an
area of 238,406 sq. m, which was covered by a
homestead patent.
In 1972, the PIEDAS mortgaged said land to
petitioner DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES (DBP) to secure their P20,000-
agricultural loan. Later, The PIEDAS failed to
comply with the terms and conditions of the
mortgage that DBP extrajudicially foreclose it in
1977. In the foreclosure sale, DBP was the highest
bidder and a Sheriff Certificate of Sale was executed
in its favor. In Said Certificate, it was indicated
therein that the redemption shall be within 5
years from the date of the registration of the title.
This Certificate was later registered in the Registry
of Deeds.
In 1978, after the expiration of the 1-year
redemption period under Section 6 of Act 3135,
DBP consolidated its title over the foreclosed
property by executing an Affidavit of Consolidation
of Ownership. Subsequently, a Final Deed of Sale
was executed in DBP's favor, which was
registered together with the Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership. A new title was
thereafter issued to DBP and it took possession of
the foreclosed property and appropriated the
produce thereof.
1978, the Ministry of Justice opined that as the
mortgage had ceased to exist upon the transfer of
title to the tenant by virtue of the promulgation of
P.D. No. 27 in 1972, there could be no mortgage to
foreclose and therefore no subject for the
foreclosure proceedings.
In 1981, the PIEDAS offered to redeem the
foreclosed property by offering P10,000 as partial
redemption payment. This amount was accepted
by DBP, which conditionally approved the offer
of redemption.
However, DBP sent another letter to the
PIEDAS informing them that pursuant to P.D.
27, their offer to redeem and/or repurchase the
subject property could not be favorably
considered for the reason that said property was
tenanted. DBP later filed an action in court to to
nullify the foreclosure proceedings which was
favorably acted upon.
Later, the PIEDAS filed an action against
DBP for the cancellation of certificate of title
and/or specific performance, accounting and
damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction. It contended that DBP
was in evident bad faith as it caused the
consolidation of its title to the parcel of land in
question in spite of the fact that the 5-year
redemption period expressly stated in the Sheriff's
Certificate of Sale had not yet lapsed and that their
offer to redeem the foreclosed property was made
well within said period of redemption.
RTC ruled in favor of the PIEDAS stating
that DBP violated the stipulation in the Sheriff's
Certificate of Sale which provided that the
redemption period is 5 years from the
registration.
DBP appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the decision of the RTC. The Court of
Appeals stated that being that DBP was in evident
bad faith when it unlawfully took possession of
the property and defied what was written on the
Sheriff's Certificate of Sale, the PIEDAS should be
entitled to recover the fruits produced by the
property or its equivalent for the 3-year period.
Hence, this appeal by DBP. It alleged that the
mere fact that DBP took possession and
administration of the property did not warrant a
finding that DBP was in bad faith:
1. the PIEDAS consented to and approved
the takeover of DBP;
2. that Sec. 717 of Act No. 3135 allows the
mortgagee-buyer to take possession of the
mortgaged property even during the redemption
period;
3. that DBP's act of consolidating the title of
the property in its name did not constitute bad
faith as there was no law which prohibits the
purchaser at public auction from consolidating
title in its name after the expiration of the 1 year
redemption period reckoned from the time the
Certificate of Sale was registered; and neither was
there any law or jurisprudence which prohibits
the PIEDAS from exercising their right of
redemption over said property within 5 years
even if title is consolidated in the name of the
purchaser; and
4. that when it denied the PIEDAS' offer to
redeem the property, it was merely premised on
the Opinion of the Minister of Justice which stated
that said land was covered under P.D. 27 and
could not be the subject of foreclosure
proceedings. For this reason, DBP immediately
filed a petition to nullify the foreclosure
proceedings which was favorably acted upon. If
DBP was really in bad faith, it would not have
filed said petition for said petition was against its
own interests.
ISSUE
Whether or not DBP was in bad faith.
RULING
NO, it was not. It was a possessor in good
faith.
A possessor in good faith is one who is not
aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw, which invalidates it. Good
faith is always presumed, and upon him who
alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests
the burden of proof. It was therefore incumbent
on the PIEDAS to prove that DBP was aware of
the flaw in its title i.e. the nullity of the
foreclosure. This, they failed to do.
The PIEDAS argued that DBP's bad faith
stemmed from the fact that DBP consolidated title
over the disputed property despite the statement
in the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale to the effect that
said land was subject to a 5-year redemption
period.
The period of redemption of extrajudicially
foreclosed land is provided under Section 6 of
ACT No. 3135 which states that if no redemption
is made within 1 year, the purchaser is entitled as
a matter of right to consolidate and to possess the
property. Accordingly, DBP's act of consolidating
its title and taking possession of the subject
property after the expiration of the period of
redemption was in accordance with law.
Moreover, it was in consonance with Section 4 of
the mortgage contract between DBP and the
PIEDAS where they agreed to the appointment
of DBP as receiver to take charge and to hold
possession of the mortgage property in case of
foreclosure. DBP's acts cannot therefore be tainted
with bad faith.
The right of DBP to consolidate its title and
take possession of the subject property is not
affected by the PIEDAS' right to repurchase said
property within 5 years from the date of
conveyance granted by Section 119 of CA No. 141.
In fact, without the act of DBP consolidating title
in its name, the PIEDAS would not be able to
assert their right to repurchase granted under the
aforementioned section.
It may be argued that P.D. 27 was already in
effect when DBP foreclosed the property.
However, the legal propriety of the foreclosure of
the land was put into question only after the
Opinion of the Ministry of Justice declared that
said land was covered by P.D. 27 and could not be
subject to foreclosure proceedings. The Opinion
was issued almost 2 months after DBP
consolidated its title to the property. By law and
jurisprudence, a mistake upon a doubtful or
difficult question of law may properly be the basis
of good faith.
Good faith of the possessor ceases when an
action to recover possession of the property is
filed against him and he is served summons
therefore. In the present case, DBP was served
summons in 1982. By that time, it was no longer in
possession of the disputed land as possession
thereof was given back to the PIEDAS after the
foreclosure of DBP was declared null and void.
Therefore, any income collected by DBP after it
consolidated its title and took possession of the
property in 1978 up to 1982 belonged to DBP as a
possessor in good faith since its possession was
never legally interrupted.
ARTICLE 529: It is presumed that possession
continues to be enjoyed on the same character in which
it was acquired, until the contrary is proved.
If one is in actual possession of the
property under the claim of
ownership, there is a disputable
presumption of ownership.
REQUISITES:
a. one is in actual possession;
b. and he is claiming ownership
ARTICLE 530: Only things and rights which are
susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of
possession.
What may be possessed? Only things
and rights which are susceptible of
being appropriated
What may not be possessed?
a. property of public domain;
b. res communes
c. easements ( if discontinuous or
non- apparent);
d. things specifically prohibited by
law
Res Nullius. Res nullius (abandoned or ownerless
property) may be possessed, but cannot be
acquired by prescription.
Reason: prescription presupposes prior
ownership in another. However, said res nullius
may be acquired by occupation.
DBP CASE.
Pineda mortgaged the property and then it was
foreclosed. Foreclosure normally under the law is
1 yr period (extra judicial). If the mortgagor does
not redeem, mortgagee will consolidate the title
and after that, title is transferred to the mortgagee
(DBP). But what happened here was that the
foreclosure was in 1977. In 1978, there was an
opinion given by the Ministry of Justice declaring
that there are some properties that may not be the
object of foreclosure proceeding. And the
properties of Pineda were covered by the opinion
but DBP did not know or did not have any idea
about it. In 1981, Pineda decided to redeem, did
DBP refuse? NO, in honor of the agreement with
Pineda that the latter can redeem the property
within 5 years and DBP already initiated the
cancellation of the certificate of its own title. It
gave up the possession over the property. In truth
and in fact, DBP was merely a possessor in good
faith because it was not aware of the flaw inside,
that the property was not subject of the
foreclosure proceeding. DBP would become in
bad faith if it is aware of it and it still has the
possession of the property. But before it learned
about the opinion, it already initiated the
cancellation so that it will be returned the
property of Pineda. There was no really
interruption to put DBP in bad faith. It was no
longer in possession of the lot when it found out
the opinion that the property should not be a
subject of the foreclosure proceeding.
Presumptions that may arise from possession:
1. Ownership. Art. 433: Actual possession
with bona fide claim of ownership is
presumed ownership.
2. Good Faith. GF is always presumed. This
presumption continues to be so until the
contrary is proved. There is continuity of
presumption of good faith.
3. Presumption of just title. A person who
is believed to be the owner by the
community has the legal presumption
that he possesses it with just title and he is
not required to show proof of ownership
or to show support of his claim of
ownership.
4. Possession of movables. If you posses a
real property, the law presumes that all
the accessories therein are also under
your possession.
5. Non-interruption of possession. When a
person is in possession of a property now
and he loses it tomorrow but recovers it
the ff. day, the law presumes that he
possesses the same continuously without
any interruption.
6. Possession during intervening period.
You are in possession of a real property
now. You have been in possession of the
same property 10 years ago. But there is
no proof of possession during the
intervening period. The law still
presumes that you are in possession
between or during the intervening period.
ARTICLE 531: Possession is acquired by the material
occupation of a thing or the exercise if a right or by the
fact that it is a subject to the action of our will, or by
the proper acts and legal formalities established for
acquiring such right.
HOW IS POSSESSION ACQUIRED?
1. By the material occupation
(detention) of a thing or the exercise of
a right (quasi-possession). This
includes constitutom possessorium or
traditio brevi manu).
2. By the fact that it is subject to the
action of our will. This includes
tradition longa manu (by mere
agreement) or tradition simbolico.
Hence, it does not require actual
physical detention or seizure.
3. By constructive possession or proper
acts and legal formalities
MODES OF POSSESSION
1) MATERIAL OCCUPATION. Holding,
apprehension, arrest or occupancy. The word
occupation is used in its ordinary sense which
means the holding of a thing which
necessarily is physical. When it is in the
exercise of a right, this is quasi-possession.
A. Forms of delivery or tradition that can
give rise to possession through material
occupation:
o Actual or real
o Constructive delivery.
B. Kinds of constructive delivery that may
give rise to possession through material
occupation:
o Symbolic deliver or by execution
or delivery of the public
documents;
o Longa manu meaning pointing by
long hand.
C. To be valid there must be concurrence of
the ff:
o The one delivering must have the
actual physical control of the
thing;
o The thing pointed to must be
visible from where the parties are
found;
o brevi manu
Example:
1) Possession by the lessee who acquires
ownership of the leased premises. So his
actual possession constitutes constructive
delivery.
2) When the owner who is in actual possession
of the house, sells the house but still has
possession of the same, this time as a lessee as
when he enters into a contract of lease with
the buyer of the house. Now he is still in
possession of the house but not as the owner
thereof but as the lessee.
2) BY ACTION OF OUR WILL
Under this mode there is no actual or
physical detention or seizure but the agreement
between the parties constitutes the fact of
possession.
3) PROPER ACTS AND FORMALITIES
PRESCRIBED BY LAW
Under this mode, these are certain
documents which ordinarily gives rise to
possession because of legal fiction. The moment
the document takes effect, automatically the
person in whose favor the document is executed
is deemed to have acquired possession of that
property
 For example: donation, succession
EQUATORIAL REALTY vs. MAYFAIR
THEATER
GR No. 133879. November 21, 2001
Although there was a constructive delivery of
the property through a Deed of Sale in favor of
EQUATORIAL, it was not consummated
since MAYFAIR, which was in control and
actual possession of it, impugned the sale in
court. Hence, no back rentals in favor of
EQUATORIAL may be granted.
FACTS
CARMELO & BAUERMANN, INC. owned a
registered parcel of land at Claro M. Recto
Avenue, Manila on which 2 2-storey buildings
were constructed.
CARMELO entered into 2 Contracts of Lease
with petitioner MAYFAIR THEATER INC. One
was entered into in 1967 for a period of 20 years.
MAYFAIR used the leased premises as a movie
house known as Maxim theater. The second was
entered into in 1969 for another 20 years. The
rented premises became the site for the Marimar
Theater. Both Contracts had a provision therein,
granting MAYFAIR a right of first refusal to
purchase the subject properties.
However in 1978, within the 20-year-lease
term, the subject properties were sold by
CARMELO to petitioner EQUATORIAL REALTY
DEVELOPMENT, INC. for P11,300,000 without
first being offered to MAYFAIR. As a result then,
MAYFAIR filed a complaint in court, praying that
the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of EQUATORIAL
be annulled and as to CARMELO, he demanded
specific performance plus damages.
The trial court did not grant the petition of
MAYFAIR. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
completely reversed and set aside the judgment of
the lower court. It ordered that the Deed of Sale be
rescinded and ordered CARMELO to allow
MAYFAIR to purchase the property.
However, Carmelo could no longer be
located. Thus, following the order of execution of
the trial court, MAYFAIR deposited with the clerk
of court a quo its payment to CARMELO in the
sum of P11,300,000. The lower court issued a Deed
of Reconveyance in favor of CARMELO and a Deed
of Sale in favor of MAYFAIR. A title over the land
was subsequently issued to MAYFAIR.
In 1997, EQUATORIAL filed an action for the
collection of a sum of money against MAYFAIR. It
claimed that MAYFAIR should pay rentals or
reasonable compensation for its use of the subject
premises after its lease contracts had expired. It
alleged that the Lease Contract covering the
premises occupied by Maxim Theater expired in
1987 while the Lease Contract covering the
premises occupied by Miramar Theater lapsed in
1989. Representing itself as the owner of the
subject premises by reason of the Deed of Sale
issued by CARMELO in his favor, he was entitled
to the rentals arising from MAYFAIRs occupation
thereof.
The trial court dismissed the case and so as to
the motion for reconsideration. It debunked the
claim of EQUATORIAL for unpaid back rentals,
holding that the rescission of the 1978 Deed of
Absolute Sale in the mother case did not confer on
EQUATORIAL any vested or residual proprietary
rights, even in expectancy.
Hence, this present recourse.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not EQUATORIAL had
acquired ownership over the property by virtue of
the sale made by CARMELO in the formers
favor.
2. Whether or not EQUATORIAL was entitled
for back rentals from the time MAYFAIRs Lease
Contracts expired.
RULING
(1) NO, it had not. It was because even there
was proper a act and legal formalities in the form
of a Deed of Absolute Sale in its favor, there was
however, no delivery of the property as it was
then still MAYFAIR which was in actual
possession of it.
By a contract of sale, one of the contracting
parties obligates himself to transfer ownership of
and to deliver a determinate thing and the other
to pay therefor a price certain in money or its
equivalent.
The Deed of Sale as a form of constructive
delivery did not transfer ownership
Ownership of the thing sold is a real right,
which is not transferred by the contract alone but
the buyer acquires only upon delivery of the thing
to. Delivery may be actual or constructive.
Although it could be argued that there was
constructive delivery of the property in favor of
EQUATORIAL because of the Deed of Sale, the
same was not considered.
However, it has been held that the execution
of a contract of sale as a form of constructive
delivery is a legal fiction. It is only a prima facie
presumption of delivery. It holds true only when
there is no impediment that may prevent the
passing of the property from the hands of the
vendor into those of the vendee. When there is
such impediment, fiction yields to reality - the
delivery has not been effected.
From the peculiar facts of this case, it is clear
that EQUATORIAL never took actual control and
possession of the property sold, in view of
MAYFAIRs timely objection to the sale and the
continued actual possession of the property. The
objection took the form of a court action
impugning the sale which, as we know, was
rescinded by a judgment rendered by this Court
in the mother case.
Hence, MAYFAIRs opposition to the
transfer of the property by way of sale to
EQUATORIAL was a legally sufficient
impediment that effectively prevented the passing
of the property into the latters hands. Because
MAYFAIR was in actual possession of the
property, the sale could not be considered
consummated.
The fact that MAYFAIR paid rentals to
EQUATORIAL during the litigation should not be
interpreted to mean either actual delivery or ipso
facto recognition of EQUATORIALs title.
EQUATORIAL, as alleged buyer of the
disputed properties and as alleged successor-in-
interest of CARMELOs rights as lessor -
submitted two ejectment suits against MAYFAIR.
The first in 1987 and the second in 1990.
MAYFAIR eventually won them both. However,
to be able to maintain physical possession of the
premises while awaiting the outcome of the
mother case, it had no choice but to pay the
rentals.
The rental payments made by MAYFAIR
should not be construed as a recognition of
EQUATORIAL as the new owner. They were
made merely to avoid imminent eviction.
(2) NO, it was not entitled to back rentals not
because it did not acquire ownership over the
property in the absence of delivery.
The sale to EQUATORIAL may have been
valid from inception, but it was judicially
rescinded before it could be consummated.
EQUATORIAL never acquired ownership, not
because the sale was void, as erroneously claimed
by the trial court, but because the sale was not
consummated by a legally effective delivery of the
property sold.
Furthermore, assuming for the sake of
argument that there was valid delivery,
EQUATORIAL was not entitled to any benefits
from the rescinded Deed of Absolute Sale because
of its bad faith. It admitted that its lawyers had
studied the Contract of Lease between CARMELO
and MAYFAIR prior to the sale and knew of the
stipulations therein. It only then proved that the
sale was entered into with knowledge that it
would be in violation of the rights of and to the
prejudice of MAYFAIR.
EQUATORIALs claim of reasonable
compensation for respondents use and
occupation of the subject property from the time
the lease expired could not be countenanced. If it
suffered any loss, it must bear it in silence, since it
had wrought that loss upon itself. Otherwise, bad
faith would be rewarded instead of punished.
WONG vs. CARPIO
GR No. 50264. October 21, 1991
Although a person purchased the land and
was in actual possession thereof, the sale could
not have been consummated by reason of a
prior deed of sale over the property in favor of
another. Said prior sale was an impediment
for the consummation of the sale since
delivery of the property was impossible.
FACTS
In 1972, Private respondent MANUEL
MERCADO acquired a land in Colongan, Sta.
Maria, Davao del Sur from William Giger by
virtue of a Deed of Sale with right to repurchase for
a consideration of P3,500. In 1973, William Giger
again asked an additional amount of P2,500 from
MERCADO and he acceded so. But he required
William Giger to sign a new deed of Pacto de Retro
Sale, which the latter executed.
Since he purchased the land in 1972,
MERCADO began paying the real estate taxes of
the land for William Giger and began harvesting
only the coconut fruits thereon. He went
periodically to the land to make copra but he
never placed any person on the land in litigation
to watch it. Neither did he reside on the land as he
was a businessman and storekeeper by
occupation and resides at Lower Sta. Maria,
Davao del Sur while the land in litigation is at
Colongan, Sta. Maria. Neither did he put any sign
or hut to show that he was in actual possession.
As early as 1976, MERCADO knew that
IGNACIO WONGs laborers were on his land and
that they had a hut there but he did not do
anything to stop them. Instead MERCADO was
happy that there were people and a hut on the
land therein.
A month after, WONG went to the land to
find out if there were other people residing there
or claiming it besides the owner and he found
none. So WONG bought the parcel of land in
litigation from William Giger and his wife Cecilia
Valenzuela. Thenon, WONG declared the land in
suit for taxation purposes in his name. However,
when he tried to register the pacto de retro sale with
the Register of Deeds, it could not be registered.
Nevertheless, WONG placed laborers on the
land in suit, built a small farm house after made
some clearings and fenced the boundaries. He
also placed signboards.
In 1976, MERCADO again went to the land in
suit to make copras. When he learned that WONG
occupied the land, he had the latter entered in the
police blotter. Despite of this, 2 months after,
WONG ordered the hooking of the coconuts from
the land in litigation and nobody disturbed him.
Later, MERCADO filed a case for forcible
entry against WONG. During the pendency of
said complaint, spouses William Giger and Cecilia
Valenzuela filed a case for reformation of
instrument with the court against MERCADO.
The MTC held that WONG had prior, actual
and continuous physical possession of the
disputed property and dismissed both the
complaint and the counter-claim by MERCADO.
On appeal with the CFI, it reversed said decision.
It held that it was MERCADO who had taken
possession of the property earlier in point of time
and WONG was an intruder and must return, the
possession of the land in question to the former.
WONG was also ordered to pay rental after from
the time his possession was contested until he the
time he would return the property to MERCADO.
Hence, this appeal. WONG contended that
MERCADO had not established prior possession
because the latters periodic visit to the lot to
gather coconuts may had been consented to and
allowed or tolerated by the owner thereof.
MERCADO could also had been a hired laborer
who entered the premises every harvest season to
comply with the contract of labor with the true
owner of the property.
ISSUE
Whether or not WONG acquired the property by
reason of the pacto de retro sale executed by the
original owner William Giger in his
favor.
RULING
NO. Although there was a proper act and
formality in the form of a pacto de retro sale
executed by the original owner William Giger in
WONGs favor, there was nevertheless delivery.
The execution of a sale thru a public instrument
shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing,
unless there is stipulation to the contrary. If,
however, notwithstanding the execution of the
instrument, the purchaser cannot have the
enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and
make use of it herself, because such tenancy and
enjoyment are opposed by another, then delivery
has not been effected.
Possession by William Giger was passed to
MERCADO by virtue of the first sale a retro, thus,
the sale a retro in favor of WONG failed to pass the
possession of the property because there was an
impediment the possession exercised by
MERCADO. Possession as a fact cannot be
recognized at the same time in two different
personalities except in the cases of co-possession.
Under Art. 538, should a question arise regarding
the fact of possession, the present possessor shall
be preferred; if there are two possessions, the one
longer in possession, if the dates of possession are
the same, the one who presents a title; and if these
conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in
judicial deposit pending determination of its
possession or ownership through proper
proceedings.
In fact, it was MERCADO who had material
possession of the land and had subjected it in his
will he went there occasionally to make copra.
There was also a proper act and formality in his
favor, that was the Pacto de Retro Sale executed by
William Giger in his favor.
Wongs entry to the property was characterized
by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth
The court also held that WONGs entry into
the property was and excluding MERCADO as
the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies
the exertion of force over the property, and this is
all that is necessary to prove forcible entry. Under
the rule, entering upon the premises by strategy
or stealth is equally as obnoxious as entering by
force. The foundation of the action is really the
forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a
person who has entered without right. The words
"by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth"
include every situation or condition under which
one person can wrongfully enter upon real
property and exclude another who has had prior
possession therefrom.
The award of rentals was affirmed
It also sustained the award of rentals since
WONGs possession in good faith ceases from the
moment defects in the title were made known to
the him, by extraneous evidence or by suit for
recovery of the property by the true owner. Such
interruption took place upon service of summons.
SOMODIO vs. CA
GR No. 82680. August 15, 1994
Possession in the eyes of the law does not
mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before it can be said
that he is in possession. It is sufficient that the
possesor was able to subject the property to
the action of his will i.e. planting trees and
constructing a house though was unfinished.
FACTS
In 1974, Jose Ortigas conveyed to Wilfredo
Mabugat the possession of a residential lot
situated in Raja Muda, General Santos City. Half
of the purchase price thereof, was contributed by
petitioner NICANOR SOMODIO. Later, Mabugat
caused the partition of the property into 2
portions. SOMODIO took the western part, which
was known as Lot 6328-X. After the partition,
SOMODIO took possession of his portion and
planted thereon ipil-ipil trees, coconut trees and
other fruit-bearing trees.
In 1976, SOMODIO began construction of a
house thereon. However, this structure was left
unfinished as his employment took him to
Kidapawan, North Cotabato. He then asked his
uncle to take care of the structure. Then on he
would visit the property every 3 months or on
weekends when he had time.
In 1977, SOMODIO allowed respondent
FELOMINO AYCO to transfer his hut in Lot 6328-
X. 6 years later, SOMODIO demanded that AYCO
vacate the premises but such demand proved
futile. Hence, he filed an action for unlawful
detainer with damages against respondent AYCO.
In 1983, respondent EBENECER PURISIMA
also entered the land and constructed a house
thereon. 4 days later, SOMODIO also filed a
complaint for forcible entry against PURISIMA.
PURISIMA contended that the lot was a
portion of the land subject of his application for
miscellaneous sales patent with the Bureau of
Lands. He added that his father, who was a
geodetic engineer, surveyed the parcel of land for
the Small Farmers Fishpond Association, Inc.
Such survey plan was approved by the Director
of Lands in 1960. AYCO, on the other hand, did
not present any evidence but merely anchored his
right to possess the property on the evidence of
PURISIMA.
The trial court held that SOMODIO was the
actual possessor of Lot No. 6328-X. It declared
that PURISIMA built his house "almost on the
spot where SOMODIO's unfinished house" stood
"thru stealth and strategy," not knowing that the
house was built on Lot No. 6328X and not on Lot
No. 6328-Y. It held that being that PURISIMA was
a frequent visitor in Rajah Muda and had
sometimes stayed with Mrs. Maturan in Judge
Purisima's house on the adjoining lots, he could
not have remained unaware of the possession of
SOMODIO. The court further stated that Lot No.
6328-X was not included in the survey pan made
by PURISIMAs father. Hence, the court ordered
PURISIMA and AYCO to remove their repective
houses and to deliver the land to SOMODIO.
The RTC affirmed such decision in toto.
However, on appeal with the CA, it reversed the
said decision. It held that SOMODIO had not
"clearly and conclusively established physical,
prior possession over Lot No. 6328-X." A motion
for reconsideration with the same court was also
denied.
Hence, this appeal by SOMODIO.
ISSUE
Whether or not SOMODIO had enjoyed
priority of possession over Lot No. 6328-X.
RULING
YES. Under Art. 531, SOMODIO had
possessed the property through material
occupation and having subjected it under his will.
SOMODIO took possession of the property
sometime in 1974 when he planted the property to
coconut trees, ipil-ipil trees and fruit trees. In
1976, he started the construction of a building on
the property. It was immaterial that the building
was unfinished and that he left for Kidapawan for
employment reasons and visited the property
only intermittently. Possession in the eyes of the
law does not mean that a man has to have his feet
on every square meter of ground before it can be
said that he is in possession. It was sufficient that
SOMODIO was able to subject the property to the
action of his will.
PURISIMA on the other hand, did not present
proof that between 1958, when his father
allegedly took possession of the land, and 1983,
when said he himself entered the land, his father
ever exercised whatever right of possession he
should have over the property. Under these
circumstances, priority in time should be the
pivotal cog in resolving the issue of possession.
Besides, it was found by two ocular inspections,
that what PURISIMA was claiming was
possession over Lot No. 6328-Y. SOMODIOs land
on the other hand, was adjacent to it, Lot No.
6328-X. It was also in SOMODIOs area where
PURISIMA and AYCO built their houses.
The SC also held that although SOMODIOs
prior possession over the property was proven, it
was however, not synonymous with his right of
ownership over the same. The resolution of the
issue of possession is far from the resolution of
the issue of ownership. Forcible entry is merely a
quieting process and never determines the actual
title to an estate.
DELA ROSA vs. CARLOS
GR No. 147549. October 23, 2003
The law does not require one in possession of
a house to reside in the house to maintain his
possession. It is enough that the possessor
subjects it to the action of his will
i.e.,renovating and furnishing the house and,
constructing a perimeter fence on the
property.
FACTS
The Petitioner SPOUSES JESUS AND
LUCILA DELA ROSA were the owners of a house
and lot in Bulacan. They acquired it from
Leonardo Carlos under an Absolute Deed of Sale in
1966. Thereafter, they had it registered.
Afterwards, they renovated the house, furnished
and occupied the same since 1966. They also had a
perimeter fence built to separate the Property
from the municipal road and to protect it from
trespassers. They had been paying taxes on the
land (1966-1997) and the house (1966-1993).
Since the SPOUSES DELA ROSA worked
and their children studied in Manila, they resided
in the Property only during weekends and
holidays. However, they padlock the house on
the property while they were away and instructed
relatives who lived nearby to watch over the
property.
In 1997, the SPOUSES DELA ROSA
discovered that through stealth and without their
knowledge and consent, respondent SANTIAGO
CARLOS had built a house of strong materials on
a vacant lot of the Property. They also found that
respondent TEOFILA PACHECO had also been
transferring furniture to the house and sleeping
there. They then demanded, through their
counsel, that CARLOS and PACHECO demolish
the house, remove their furniture and vacate the
premises within 10 days. However, Santiago
CARLOS and PACHECO did not heed the
SPOUSES DELA ROSAs demand.
So, in 1998, the SPOUSES DELA ROSA filed
a complaint for forcible entry against CARLOS
and PACHECO.
CARLOS and PACHECO on the other hand,
alleged that they were the surviving heirs of the
Spouses Leonardo and Benita Carlos. Hence,
together with LUCILA DELA ROSA, they were
co-owners of the property. They also contended
that the SPOUSES DELA ROSA obtained the Deed
of Sale through fraud and undue influence and
that their mother did not consent to the sale of the
property which they claimed as conjugal. They
maintained that the SPOUSES DELA ROSA were
never in possession of the Property because the
latter only went there to visit their parents, and
not as owners. Insisting that they had been
occupying the Property since birth, SANTIAGO
claimed that he constructed the house on the
Property in the concept of a co-owner.
The MTC declared that the SPOUSES DELA
ROSA were entitled to the possession of the
property. It ordered CARLOS and PACHECO to
vacate the premises. The same decision was
affirmed by the RTC. The CA on the other hand,
reversed it. Hence, this petition for review by the
SPOUSES DELA ROSA.
ISSUE
 Whether or not the SPOUSES DELA ROSA
had acquired prior possession over the property.
RULING
YES. They had prior possession.
In a forcible entry case, the principal issue for
resolution is mere physical or material possession
(possession de facto) and not juridical possession
(possession de jure) nor ownership of the property
involved. In the present case, both parties claimed
prior possession of the Property.
The Spouses Dela Rosa claimed that they had
been in possession of the Property since 1966
upon the execution of the Deed of Sale by
Leonardo in their favor. On the other hand,
CARLOS and PACHECO claimed that they had
been continuously occupying the Property since
birth and the SPOUSES DELA ROSA were never
in possession of the Property.
While admitting that CARLOS and
PACHECO used to reside in the Property since
birth, the SPOUSES DELA ROSA contended that
the two moved out when they married in 1961
and 1959, respectively.
The SPOUSES DELA ROSA had material
possession over the property.
Their act of visiting the Property on weekends
and holidays was evidence of actual or physical
possession. Even if the SPOUSES DELA ROSA
were already residing in Manila, it did not mean
that they could not continue possessing the
Bulacan property. The fact of their residence in
Manila, by itself, did not result in loss of
possession of the Bulacan property. The law does
not require one in possession of a house to reside
in the house to maintain his possession.
The SPOUSES DELA ROSA also subjected the
property to the action of their will.
They renovated the house, furnished the same
and constructed a perimeter fence around the
Property. Possession in the eyes of the law does
not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before it can be said that
he is in possession. It is sufficient that the
SPOUSES DELA ROSA were able to subject the
property to the action of their will.
The SPOUSES DELA ROSA had a proper act and
legal formality in their favor
They had an Absolute Deed of Sale dated 1966
in their favor when they acquired the Bulacan
property from Leonardo Carlos.
The question of the validity of the Deed of Sale
could not be questioned in a forcible entry case.
CARLOS and PACHECO claimed that the
Deed of Sale was executed without the consent of
Benita, Leonardos spouse. They also added that
the Deed of Sale was executed through fraud and
undue influence. However, these issues could not
properly be addressed in the present action for
forcible entry. These issues could only be resolved
in a separate action specifically for the annulment
of the Deed of Sale.
ARTICLE 532: Possession may be acquired by the
same person who is to enjoy it, by his legal
representative, by his agent, or by any person without
any power whatever; but in the last case, the possession
shall not be considered as acquired until the person in
whose name the act of possession was executed has
ratified the same, without prejudice to the juridical
consequences of negotiorum gestio in a proper case.
6. Who may acquire possession? One who is in
full possession of his civil capacity can
acquire full possession over a thing or right to
any of the three ways of acquiring possession:
1) the person who is to enjoy it;
2) legal representative or an agent of the
person
3) any person without any power
whatever (negotiorum gestio)
1) REQUISITES:
a) for personal acquisition
i) intent to possess
ii) capacity to possess
iii) object must be capable of being
possessed
b) thru an authorized person
i) intent to possess for principal
ii) authority or capacity to possess for
another
iii) principal has intent and capacity to
possess
c) thru an unauthorized person (as in
negotiorum gestio)
i) intent to possess for another
ii) capacity of principal to possess
iii) ratification by principal.
7. The possession although cured only by the
express or implied ratification should be
regarded as having Retroactive.
8. The possession in negotiorum gestio, under
Art. 532, is reckoned from the time of the
ratification of the owner of the thing. There is
possession from the time the principal ratifies
the acts of the unauthorized agent.
9. May minors and incapacitated persons
acquire possession? Minors and incapacitated
persons may acquire possession in those
matters where they have the capacity to act
like the physical seizure of a res nullius or on
donation of movable property where the
object or subject matter of the donation is
simultaneously delivered to the minor
children.
ARTICLE 533: The possession of hereditary property is
deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption
and from the moment of death of the decedent, in case
the inheritance is accepted.
One who validly renounces an inheritance is
deemed never to have possessed the same.
Time of Acquisition of Possession by the
Heir:
a. If the heir accepts from the
moment of death since there is no
interruption. The possession of
the deceased should be added to
the possession of the heir.
 b. if heir refuses or incapacitated to
inherit he is deemed Never to
have possessed.
ARTICLE 534: One who succeeds by hereditary title
shall not suffer the consequences of the wrongful
possession of the decedent, if it is not shown that he
was aware of the flaws affecting it; but the effects of
possession in good faith shall not benefit him except
from the date of death of the decedent.
Reason for Art 534: Accdg to the SC in
the case of Escritor Jr. vs. Iya (155 s 577),
the reason for Art. 534 is that bad faith,
which is a state of mind is personal to the
person who acted so, hence it is
intransmissible. Its effect must be suffered
only by the person who has acted as such.
The heirs should not be saddled with the
consequences of the wrongful possession
of the predecessor.
If the father or decedent was in BF, it does
not necessarily mean that the son was also
in BF. The son is still presumed to be in
GF. Since the father was in BF, the
consequences of the GF of the son should
be counted only from the date of
decedents death.
If the father was in Good Faith, the article
is inapplicable. In such case, the
possession of the father in GF is added to
the possession of the son in GF.
ARTICLE 535: Minors and incapacitated persons may
acquire the possession of things; but they need the
assistance of their legal representatives in order to
exercise the rights which from the possession arise in
their favor.
ARTICLE 536: In no case may possession may be
acquired thru force or intimidation as long as there is a
possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he
has an action or a right to deprive another of the
holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent
court if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.
Circumstances that cannot give rise to
possession:
a. Force, violence and intimidation.
The law shall not consider you as
the possessor of the thing if you
acquire it through force, violence
and intimidation;
b. Mere tolerance of the owner.
c. Clandestine acts or secret
possession cannot give rise to
possession, for possession must
be open. Possession which is not
public.
How to Recover Possession:
The SC said possession cannot be acquired
through force or intimidation even by the owner
of the property. If by force or intimidation he
succeeded in evicting the possessor of the
property, he can be compelled by the court to
restore the possession which he has wrested from
the possessor. Thus an action for forcible entry or
illegal detainer may be filed even against the
owner who took possession of the property from
the holder without due process
ARTICLE 537: Acts merely tolerated, and those
executed clandestinely and without the knowledge of
the possessor of a thing, or by violence, do not affect
possession.
1. Force, intimidation, violence or acts
merely tolerated do not affect possession.
2. Violence - exertion of force, either actual
or threatened.
3. If the property was not forcible taken, can
it give rise to possession through force or
violence? The SC in the case of
Bishop vs. Municipality of San Jose (27 Phil
571),
said there is force and violence in the
acquisition even if the property was not
forcibly taken away from the owner if the
intruder occupied it during the absence of the
owner and commits acts which repel the
return of the owner.
BENEFITS OF A POSSESSOR:
a) He has the benefit of prescription whether
GF/BF. So in other words, of he is in
possession of the whole property in the
concept of an owner for 10 or 3- yrs., he
may acquire the entire property thru
prescription.
b) He is entitled to the fruits, if he is the
possessor in GF. If violence will be used,
the possession previously enjoyed shall
not be affected. Meaning also whoever
entered this part shall not acquire the
property thru prescription.
ARTICLE 538: Possession as a fact cannot be
recognized at the same time in 2 different personalities
except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question
arise regarding the fact of possession, the present
possessor shall be preferred; if there are 2 possessors,
the one longer on possession; if the dates of possession
are the same, the one who presents a title, and if all
these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in
judicial deposit pending determination f its possession
or ownership thru proper proceedings.
GR: Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at
the same time in 2 different personalities
Exceptions:
1. when there are co-possessors;
2. when the possession are of two different
degrees. One is possessing in a concept of
an owner and the other is possessing in
the concept of a holder.
RULES under Art 538, Preferred Possessor:
1. In cases for recovery of possession, it is
the present possessor;
2. If there are 2 possessors, the one longer in
possession;
 3. If both began to possess at the same time,
then the one who possesses the title.
4. If both present a title, the court will
determine
As to MOVABLE PROPERTY
preference is given to the person who first
possessed the thing in good faith
EDCA PUBLISHING VS SANTOS [184 scra 614]
Fx: On 10/5/91, a person identifying himself as a
professor of De La Salle University.(dela Cruz)
ordered several books from EDCA. EDCA
prepared the corresponding receipts and
delivered the books as ordered for which dela
Cruz issued a check in payment of the same. After
several days, he ordered again for several books.
EDCA became suspicious because the check was
not yet cleared and here comes dela Cruz
ordering another set of books, so it inquired from
DLSU of the existence of Dela Cruz and found out
that he was a bogus person. So EDCA went to the
police and set a trap to arrest Dela Cruz. Upon
inquiry of the first set of books delivered to Dela
Cruz, EDCA found out that the same were
already sold to a certain Santos. With the aid of
police, EDCA went to Santos and confiscated the
books. EDCA contended that Santos did not
acquire the books in good faith and did not show
receipt to prove that Santos bought them from
Dela Cruz.
Issue: w/n Santos was in good faith
Held: SC said that the contention of EDCA is
unacceptable, precisely the first sentence of Art.
559 provides that the possession of movable
property acquired in good faith is equivalent to
title (rule of reinvindicability), therefore there is
no need of showing further proof. Santos acquired
the books in good faith, she accepted the
ownership of the books from the EDCA invoice
saying that it was sold to DC, who said he was
selling them for a discounted price as he was in
financial need. Surely Santos did not need to go
beyond that invoice to satisfy herself that the
books sold by DC belonged to him, which she did.
Although the title of Dela Cruz was being
presumed under Art. 559, these being movable
properties, Santos nevertheless demanded proof
before deciding to buy them.
By contrast, EDCA was less than cautious, in fact
too trusting in dealing with the impostor. It
would certainly be unfair now to make Santos
bear the prejudice sustained by EDCA as a result
of its own negligence. We cannot agree that justice
is transferring such loss to the Santoses who had
acted in good faith and with proper care when
they brought the goods from DC.
IMMOVABLE
Preference is given to the first who
registered his right in good faith with the
registrar of deeds. In the absence of
registration, then to the person who first
possessed it in good faith. If there is no
possession, then to the person who
presents the oldest title in good faith.
MARCELO V CA 305S800
Where the SC said acquisitive prescription is a
mode of acquiring ownership by a processor
through the requisite lapse of time. In order to
ripen into ownership, possession must be in the
concept of an owner. It must be public, peaceful
and uninterrupted.
CEQUENA vs. BOLANTE
GR No. 137944. April 6, 2000
If there are 2 possessors of the land, the
preferred possessor shall be the one longer in
possession. Possession here shall include not
only the actual possession made by the present
possessor but also the possession made by her
predecessor-in-interest.
FACTS
Prior to 1954, a land located in the Province of
Rizal, having an area of 1,728 sq. m. was
originally declared for taxation purposes in the
name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of respondent
HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE. In 1930,
Sinforoso Mendoza died.
Margarito Mendoza was the brother of
Sinforosao Mendoza and also the father of
petitioners FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA
and RUPERTA MENDOZA, LIRIO. After
Sinforosa Mendoza died, Margarito Mendoza
took possession of the land and cultivated it with
his son Miguel. On the basis of an affidavit,
Margarito Mendoza caused the cancellation of the
tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza
on the contested lot and subsequently declared it
in his name. Later, Margarito Mendoza also
passed away.
The occupant of the land however, since 1985,
was BOLANTE, the only daughter of Sinforoso
Mendoza. Earlier, in 1979, BOLANTE and Miguel
Mendoza, another brother of CEQUENA and
LIRIO, during the cadastral survey had a dispute
on the ownership of the land.
The trial court declared that the land, which
was covered by a tax declaration in favor of
Margarito Mendoza belonged to him and his
heirs, petitioners CEQUENA and LIRIO.
BOLANTE was also ordered to vacate the
premises.
The Court of Appeals however, reversed the
trial court decision and ruled that the affidavit
allegedly signed by the BOLANTE and her
mother had not been sufficiently established. The
notary public, nor any witness and expert
testimony ever attested to the genuineness of the
questioned signatures. It also ruled BOLANTEs
mother, never having attended school, could
neither read nor write and that BOLANTE was
referred to as Leonor in the affidavit, which was
a name she had never been called. Hence, it
concluded that although tax declarations were
presented by CEQUENA and LIRIO, it could not
overthrow BOLANTEs proof of ownership of the
disputed parcel by actual, physical, exclusive and
continuous possession since 1985, which indeed
gave her a better title under Article 538 of the
Civil Code.
Hence, this appeal. CEQUENA and LIRIO
contended that BOLANTE could not have been
the preferred possessor since she came into
possession through force and violence, contrary to
Article 536 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE
Whether or not BOLANTE was a preferred
possessor under Article 538 of the Civil Code
because she was in notorious, actual, exclusive
and continuous possession of the land since 1985.
RULING
YES she was the preferred possessor under
Article 538.
The court held that despite their
dispossession in 1985 by BOLANTE, CEQUENA
and LIRIO did not lose legal possession because
possession cannot be acquired through force or
violence. To all intents and purposes, a possessor,
even if physically ousted, is still deemed the legal
possessor. Indeed, anyone who can prove prior
possession, regardless of its character, may
recover such possession.
However, despite so, the possession by
CEQUENA and LIRIO did not prevail over that of
the BOLANTE. Possession by the former before
1985 was not exclusive, as the latter also acquired
it before 1985. The records show that the
CEQUENA and LIRIO's father and brother, as
well as the BOLANTE and her mother were
simultaneously in adverse possession of the land.
Before 1985, the subject land was occupied
and cultivated by the Sinforoso, BOLANTE's
father. When Sinforoso died in 1930,
MARGARITO took possession of the land and
cultivated it with his son Miguel. At the same
time, BOLANTE and her mother continued
residing on the lot.
When BOLANTE came of age in 1948, she
paid realty taxes for the years 1932-1948.
Margarito declared the lot for taxation in his name
in 1953 and paid its realty taxes beginning 1952.
When he died, Miguel continued cultivating the
land. As found by the CA, BOLANTE and her
mother were living on the land, which was being
tilled by Miguel until 1985 when he was
physically ousted by the respondent.
Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code,
BOLANTE was the preferred possessor because,
benefiting from her father's tax declaration of the
subject lot since 1926, she has been in possession
thereof for a longer period. On the other hand,
petitioners' father acquired joint possession only
in 1952.
EFFECTS OF POSSESSION
ARTICLE 539: Every possessor has a right to be
respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed
therein he shall be protected in or restored to said
possession by the means established by the laws and the
Rules of Court.
A possessor deprived of his possession through
forcible entry may within 10 days from the filling of the
complainant present a motion to secure from the
competent court, in the action for forcible entry, a write
of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in
his possession. The court shall decide the motion within
30 days from the filing thereof.
EVERY POSSESSOR HAS A RIGHT:
1) To be respected in his possession. Even if
he is not the owner he has the right to be
respected;
2) Should he be disturbed therein, he shall
be protected in or restored to said
possession.
3) To be restored to said possession by the
means established by the laws and the
rules of court.
RATIONALE: (Yuson vs. Guzman 42 Phil. 22)
a. In order to prevent positive against
public order;
b. In order to avoid disturbance in the
community;
c. To prevent deprivation of property
without due process of law'
d. To prevent a person from taking the
law in his own hands.
REMEDIES in case of disturbance and/or
dispossession?
Action for forcible entry, unlawful
detainer, accion publiciana and accion
reinvindicatoria.
ARTICLE 540: Only the possession acquired and
enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as a title for
acquiring dominion.
REQUISITES FOR ACQUIRING DOMINION
OR OWNERSHIP:
1. Possession must be actual or
constructive.
2. It must be in the concept of an owner, in
concepto de dueno.
The following cannot acquire ownership
thru prescription because they are merely
possessors in the concept of a holder:
1. lessees
2. trustee
3. husband and wife if the property is
conjugal
4. agents
5. attorneys
6. co-owners
The following are instances of conclusive
presumptions:
 1) Whenever a party has, by his own
declaration, act, or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular
thing true, and to act upon such
belief, he cannot, in any litigation
arising out of such declaration,
act or omission, be permitted to
falsify it:
2) The tenant is not permitted to
deny the title of his landlord at
the time of the commencement of
the relation of landlord and
tenant between them.(3a)
CEQUENA vs. BOLANTE
GR No. 137944. April 6, 2000
Possession acquired and enjoyed in the
concept of a holder despite 32 years, could not
ripen into ownership.
FACTS
- See facts on this previous page -
ISSUE
Whether or not CEQUENA and LIRIO
acquired possession of the land in the concept of
an owner so as to acquire it by prescription.
RULING
NO. It was BOLANTE who had acquired
ownership over the land by prescription, prior to
the possession of CEQUENA and LIRIO.
Under Art. 540 of the Civil Code, "Only the
possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of
owner can serve as a title for acquiring dominion."
Although CEQUENA and LIRIO farmed the
property for 32 years, they could not have
acquired ownership over it through prescription.
It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by
mere occupation. Unless coupled with the
element of hostility toward the true owner,
occupation and use, however long, will not confer
title by prescription or adverse possession.
Moreover, CEQUENA and LIRIO could not claim
that their possession was public, peaceful and
uninterrupted. Although their father and brother
arguably acquired ownership through
extraordinary prescription because of their
adverse possession for 32 years (1953-1985), this
supposed ownership could extend to the entire
disputed lot, but must be limited to the portion
that they actually farmed.
It was BOLANTE who had acquired the land
by prescription. Being the sole heir of her father,
BOLANTE showed through his tax receipt that
she had been in possession of the land for more
than 10 years since 1932. When her father died in
1930, she continued to reside there with her
mother. When she got married, she and her
husband engaged in kaingin inside the disputed
lot for their livelihood.
BOLANTE's possession was not disturbed
until 1953 when CEQUENA and LIRIOS father
claimed the land. But by then, her possession,
which was in the concept of owner -- public,
peaceful, and uninterrupted -- had already
ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself,
after her father's demise, declared and paid realty
taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation, when
coupled with proof of actual possession of the
property, can be the basis of a claim for
ownership through prescription.
SPOUSES RECTO VS. REPUBLIC
GR No. 160421. October 4, 2004
Before one can register his title over a parcel
of land, the applicant must show that (a) he,
by himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest, has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier; and (b) the land subject of the
application is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.
FACTS
In 1997, petitioner SPOUSES PHILIP and
ESTER RECTO filed an application for
registration of title over a 23,209 square meter lot,
known as Lot 806 of the Sto. Tomas Cadastre in
Batangas under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree. They also prayed in the
alternative that their petition for registration be
granted pursuant to Commonwealth Act (C.A.)
No. 141, or the Public Land Act.
The SPOUSES RECTO alleged that they
purchased said property in 1996 from sisters
Rosita Medrana Guevarra and Maria Medrana
Torres for the amount of P6,943,534.40. The two,
in turn, inherited the lot from their deceased
parents, Vicente and Eufemia Medrana. Maria,
born in 1917, declared that since 1945, her father
was already the owner of Lot 806. She became
aware of her fathers possession of the subject lot
in the concept of owner in 1930 when she was 13
years of age. The possession of the subject lot by
the Medrana family prior to 1945 was
corroborated by Rosita, who testified that in 1935
when she was 13 years of age, she first came to
know that her father was the owner of Lot 806.
The sisters added that during the lifetime of
Vicente, he planted rice and corn on the lot with
the help of their tenant. After his demise, they
continued to plant the same crops through hired
farmers.
There being no opposition to the petition
from any private individual, an Order of General
Default was issued by the trial court.
In 1998, the court a quo rendered a decision
granting the petition for registration.
The Republic, represented by the Solicitor
General appealed to the Court of Appeals
contending that petitioners failed to (1) offer in
evidence the original tracing cloth plan of the
land; (2) prove possession of the lot for the period
required by law; and (3) overthrow the
presumption that subject property forms part of
the public domain.[19]
In 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court on the sole ground of
failure to offer in evidence the original tracing
cloth plan of the land. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Medranas possessed the
property in the concept of an owner so as to have
acquired title over it.
RULING
YES. The Medranas possessed the property in
the concept of an owner so as to have acquired
title over it. Hence, their successor-in-interest, the
petitioners SPOUSES RECTO had been benefited
by such possession.
Before one can register his title over a parcel
of land, the applicant must show that (a) he, by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest,
has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the land
subject of the application is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
In the instant case, Rosita and Maria the
predecessors-in-interest of the SPOUSES RECTO,
categorically testified that they, and prior to them
their father, had been cultivating and possessing
Lot 806 in the concept of owners. Maria, having
been born on in 1917, and Rosita in 1922, were 13
years of age when they became aware of their
familys possession of Lot 806 in 1930 and 1935,
respectively. At 13, they were undoubtedly
capable and competent to perceive their fathers
possession of Lot 806 in the concept of owner.
The fact that the earliest Tax Declaration of
the subject lot was for the year 1948 will not
militate against petitioners. Note that said 1948
Tax Declaration cancels a previous Tax
Declaration, thus substantiating petitioners
possession of Lot 806 through their predecessor-
in-interest even prior to said date.
So also, there is no doubt that Lot 806 is an
alienable land of the public domain having been
released and certified as such on in 1925. As
further certified by the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office of the DENR, the
entire area of Lot 806 is an agricultural land;
within an alienable and disposable zone; not
within a reservation area nor within a forest zone;
and does not encroach upon an established
watershed, riverbed, and riverbank protection.
The SPOUSES RECTO were thus able to
successfully meet the requisite for original
registration of title, to wit: open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of an alienable and disposable land
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
HEIRS OF GAMOS vs. HEIRS OF FRANDO
GR No. 149117. December 16, 2004
The mere application for a patent, coupled
with the fact of exclusive, open, continuous
and notorious possession for the required
period is sufficient to vest in the applicant the
grant applied for.
FACTS
Juliana Frando, predecessor-in-interest of
respondents HEIRS OF FRANDO, was in
possession of a parcel of agricultural land located
in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon. Since 1925, Frando
had planted several trees and other plants
thereon, including coconuts, pili, bananas and
cacao.
In 1946, the property was traversed by a
national road that effectively divided it into 2
portions, Lot Nos. 7 and 1855.
In 1952, Frando filed for an Insular
Government Property Sales Application for the
2nd lot, Lot No. 1855, which was the subject of a
controversy later on. Upon inspection of the area
by a representative of the Bureau of Lands, it was
found to be inside an agricultural zone, free from
private claims and conflicts. In 1955, during the
bid of the property, which was apprised at P240,
Frando was the only bidder. Frando then
deposited P24, which represented 10% of the
appraised value. The land was fully paid a year
later in 1956, when Frando paid the balance of
P216. On the same day, an Order/Award was
made in Frandos favor.
One of Frandos two children, Paciencia
Gallanosa-Fuellas, chose to settle in Manila. The
other child, Salvacion Gallanosa who was married
to Abdon Gimpes (Gimpes spouses), however,
continued possession of the property. Sometime
in 1940, The Gimpes spouses constructed their
house on the southwestern portion thereof. The
couple also helped Frando in the administration
of the land. The Gimpes spouses children were
also born on the property, where they also grew
up. After their parents death, they continued
possession of the land; and harvested and
received the fruits of the improvements for
themselves and on behalf of their grandmother,
Juliana Frando, even after her death in 1971.
Purportedly unknown to the HEIRS OF
FRANDO, in 1958, a cadastral survey of the
Municipality of Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon, was
conducted. Lot No. 1855 became the subject of a
case and as a result, in 1969, a free patent was
awarded to Cerila Gamos. On the basis of the free
patent, an OCT was also issued in her name. It
was only in 1981 however that the HEIRS OF
GAMOS took possession of the property through
entry, gathered its produce and built their houses
thereon.
In 1988, the HEIRS OF FRANDO filed with
the RTC a Complaint against Cerila Gamos and
the director of the Bureau of Lands. They
challenged the validity of the free patent and OCT
issued to Cerila Gamos. They alleged that the
Bureau of Lands had no authority to award the
patent covering an area it had earlier awarded to
Juliana Frando.
Cerila Gamos on the other hand, together
with the HEIRS OF GAMOS alleged that they had
been in actual and open possession of the land as
early as 1952. They also averred that the free
patent title issued in their favor, which was the
basis of the subsequent issuance of the OCT was
valid and lawful.
The Bureau of Lands however, rebutted that
Juliana Frando failed to pay the balance price of
P216. Thus, she had not perfected the title over
the land that the patent was not issued in her
favor.
In 1998, the RTC rendered judgment in favor
of the HEIRS OF FRANDO. The HEIRS OF
GAMOS then, appealed to the CA, which also
affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not the HEIRS OF FRANDO
possessed the property in the concept of an
owner.
RULING
YES. The HEIRS OF FRANDO had possessed
the property in the concept of an owner.
Juliana Frando had acquired the land through
purchase from the government
The allegation of the Bureau of Lands that
Juliana Frando Clearly failed to pay the P216
balance of the sale price was disproved by the
Order/Award issued in her favor in 1956, which
stated that she had completed payment of the
land.
Given the full payment of the purchase price
as well as the compliance with all the
requirements for the grant of a sales patent, the
Bureau had no reason to deny the issuance of
such patent to Juliana Frando. Her compliance
with all the requirements effectively vested in her
and her successors-in-interest an equitable title to
the property applied for.
Even without a patent, a perfected
homestead is a property right in the fullest sense,
unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to
the land is still in the Government. Thus, when
the cadastral survey was subsequently conducted
in Sta. Magdalena in 1958, the disputed property -
- already held in private ownership -- was no
longer part of the public domain. The director of
lands had no more authority to grant to a third
person a patent covering the same tract that had
already passed to private ownership. Thus, the
issuance of the free patent to Cerila Gamos,
insofar as it encroached the portion already
granted to Frando, had no legal basis at all.
Notwithstanding the denial of the sales patent in
favor of Juliana Frando, she had nevertheless
acquired the property by prescription
The denial of the sales patent
notwithstanding, Juliana Frando is deemed to
have acquired equitable title to the property
through open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the property, which was a
disposable land of the public domain.
In 1906, a Declaration of Real Property
covering the property was issued to Basilio
Frando, father of Juliana Frando. Witness
accounts of long time residents of the adjoining
properties confirmed her possession for a period
not later than 1925; and her introduction thereon
of various trees and other plants, including
bananas, cacao, pili and coconuts.
They also attested to the continued
possession of the property by Frandos daughter,
Salvacion Gimpes; and subsequently by her
children, herein private respondents HEIRS OF
FRANDO. Aside from showing the
Order/Award, the children bolstered their claim
by introducing in evidence several Tax
Declarations, sketch plans, survey returns and the
reports of the court-appointed commissioner.
While asserting possession of the property as
early as 1952, petitioners had not presented any
document or witness to prove their bare claim.
Moreover, Ambrosio Guatno -- one of herein
petitioners -- testified that he had entered the
property upon the permission of Ricardo Galag,
an heir of Gamos; later, he admitted that its true
owner was Juliana Frando.
Clearly, the mere application for a patent,
coupled with the fact of exclusive, open,
continuous and notorious possession for the
required period is sufficient to vest in the
applicant the grant applied for. In sum, the
application by Juliana Frando for a sales patent,
coupled with her open, exclusive, uninterrupted
and notorious possession of the land applied for
is, for all purposes, equivalent to a patent already
perfected and granted.
The subsequent entry of petitioners and their
occupation of the property in question was in bad
faith, given the prior possession thereof by private
respondents.
ARTICLE 541: A possessor in the concept of owner has
in his favor the legal presumption that he possessed
with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or
prove it.
Possession is presumed ownership. This
is a disputable presumption.
What is the reason for the presumption?
Because every possessor is presumed to
be in good fatih. More importantly,
because of the inconvenience of carrying
proof of ownership.
KINDS OF TITLES:
a) True and valid title title which by itself
is sufficient to transfer ownership without
the necessity of letting the prescriptive
period elapse.
b) Colourable title that title where,
although there was a mode of transferring
ownership, still something is wrong,
because the grantor is NOT the owner;
this is the kind of title that the possessor
in the concept of an owner has. He can
 acquire property thru acquisitive
prescription title.
c) Putative title that title where although a
person believes himself to be the owner,
he nonetheless is not, because there was
no mode of acquiring ownership.
IN POSSESSION IN PRESCRIPTION
(ART. 541)
a. just title is a. the person possessing in
presumed if he is the concept of an owner must
possessing in the prove that he has just title;
concept of an b. just title here is not
owner; sufficient to transfer
b. just title is ownership right there and
sufficient to then because he still has to go
transfer thru the period. The period
ownership if has to lapse before one can
nobody acquire ownership on
questions. prescription.
CEQUENA vs. BOLANTE
GR No. 137944. April 6, 2000
The prohibition against burdening a possessor
in the concept of an owner to show or prove
his possession with just title only does not
apply if he is also claiming ownership over the
land through acquisistive prescription.
FACTS
- See facts on previous page -
BOLANTE argued that she was legally
presumed to possess the subject land with a just
title since she possessed it in the concept of
owner. Under Article 541 of the Code, she could
not be obliged to show or prove such title.
ISSUE
Whether of not BOLANTE could be obliged to
show or prove such title.
RULING
YES. She should be obliged to show or prove
such title because she was also claiming to have
acquired the property through prescription. The
prohibition against burdening a possessor in the
concept of an owner to show or prove his
possession with just title only applies when there
is an adverse claim over the property. In the
present case however, both parties claimed
possession in the concept of an owner. After
CEQUENA and LIRIO had proved their claim
over the property, it was up to BOLANTE to
controvert their contentions through adducing
evidence in her favor.
TITONG vs. CA
GR No. 137944. April 6, 2000
Titong did not acquire just title over the
property because he was in bad faith. His acts
of converting the boundary line (Bugsayon
River) into a ricefield and thereafter claiming
ownership thereof were acts constituting
deprivation of the rights of others and
therefore "tantamount to bad faith."
FACTS
In 1960, petitioner MARIO TITONG sold a
5.5-hectare parcel of land to Conception Verano
vda. de Cabug. He was able to purchase the said
land though in 1962. After 4 days, he sold it to
Pablo Espinosa, who had it declared under his
name for taxation purposes. When Espinosa died,
it became a part of the estate of Segundia Liao,
Espinosas late wife. In 1981, her heirs sold the
property to private respondent VICTORICO
LAURIO for P5,000. Thereafter, a tax declaration
was issued in the name of LAURIO. In all these
conveyances, the area and boundaries of the
property remained exactly the same.
Later, TITONG filed an action for quieting of
title against private respondents VICTORICO and
ANGELES LAURIO. He alleged that he was the
owner of a 3.2800-hectare parcel of unregistered,
which he declared for taxation purposes in his
name. He claimed that on 3 separate occasions in
1983, the LAURIOs, with their hired laborers,
forcibly entered a portion of the land containing
an area of approximately 2 hectares, and began
plowing the same under pretext of ownership.
TITONG identified Espinosa as his adjoining
owner. He asserted that no controversy had
sprouted between them for 20 years until the
latter sold said lot to VICTORICO LAURIO. The
boundary between the land sold to Espinosa and
what remained of TITONG's property was the old
Bugsayon river. When TITONG employed
Bienvenido Lerit as his tenant in 1962, he
instructed Lerit to change the course of the old
river and direct the flow of water to the lowland
at the southern portion of TITONG's property,
thus converting the old river into a riceland.
The LAURIOs denied this allegation and
averred that the disputed property formed part of
the 5.5-hectare agricultural land which they had
purchased in 1981 from their predecessor-in-
interest, Pablo Espinosa.
It was proved at the proceedings in the court
a quo that two (2) surveys were made of the
disputed property. The first survey was made for
TITONG, while the second was the relocation
survey ordered by the lower court. As anticipated,
certain discrepancies between the two surveys
surfaced. Thus, contrary to TITONG's allegation
in his complaint that he was the owner of only
3.2800 hectares, he was actually claiming 5.9789
hectares. On the other hand, the lot pertaining to
Espinosa, was left with only an area of 4.1841
hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares sold by
TITONG to him.
LAURIO testified that TITONG was one of
the four heirs of his mother, Leonida Zaragoza. In
the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of Estate of the
deceased Leonida Zaragoza, the heirs adjudicated
unto themselves the 3.6-hectare property of the
deceased. However, instead of reflecting only
.9000 hectare as his rightful share in the
extrajudicial settlement TITONG's share was
bloated to 2.4 hectares. It was therefore appeared
to LAURIO that TITONG encroached upon his
property and declared it a part of his inheritance.
LAURIO LAURIO accordingly denied that
TITONG had diverted the course of the Bugsayon
River after he had repurchased the land from
Conception Verano vda. de Cabug because the
land was immediately sold to Espinosa shortly
thereafter.
In short, TITONG, in bad faith,
surreptitiously, maliciously and fraudulently had
the land in question included in the survey of his
land which extends to the south only as far as the
Bugsayon River which is the visible and natural
and common boundary between the properties.
Moreover, during the hearing of the case,
TITONG proved that it was actually a boundary
dispute by evidence showing what he considered
as the boundary of his property which LAURIO
perceived as actually encroaching on their
property.
The lower court rendered a decision in favor
of LAURIO, declaring him as the true and
absolute owner of the litigated property and
ordering TITONG to respect private LAURIOs'
title and ownership over the property and to pay
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, costs and
moral damages. The same was affirmed by the
CA. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether of not TITONG possessed the
property with a just title in his favor.
RULING
NO. He had no just title in his favor.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription of things
requires possession in good faith and with just
title for the time fixed by law. Hence, a
prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by
mere possession thereof under claim of ownership
for a period of ten years unless such possession
was acquired with color of title and good faith.
The good faith of the possessor consists in the
reasonable belief that the person from whom he
received the thing was the owner thereof, and
could transmit his ownership. For purposes of
prescription, there is just title when the adverse
claimant came into possession of the property
through one of the modes recognized by law for
the acquisition of ownership or other real rights
but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right.
TITONGs had not satisfactorily met the
requirements of good faith and just title. As aptly
observed by the trial court, the plaintiff's admitted
acts of converting the boundary line (Bugsayon
River) into a ricefield and thereafter claiming
ownership thereof were acts constituting
deprivation of the rights of others and therefore
"tantamount to bad faith." To allow TITONG to
benefit from his own wrong would run counter to
the maxim no man can be allowed to found a
claim upon his own wrongdoing.
MARCELO vs. CA
GR No. 131803. April 14, 1999
There is, upon the other hand, just title when
the adverse claimant comes into possession of
the property through any of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights, but that the
grantor is neither the owner nor in a position
to transmit the right. The possessor only had
to prove colorable title.
FACTS
A parcel of land located in Sta. Lucia, Angat,
Bulacan was originally owned by spouses Jose
Marcelo and Sotera Paulino and they had been in
continuous possession of said property since 1939.
Following the death of Jose Marcelo in 1965, his
heirs, petitioners SOTERA PAULINO MARCELO
ET AL. discovered in 1967 that a portion of said
property had been encroached by respondent
FERNANDO CRUZ.
Earlier in 1960, CRUZ purchased a 6,000-sq.
m. property from Engracia dela Cruz and Vicente
Marta and Florentino all surnamed Sarmiento,
pursuant to a Kasulatan ng Partisyon sa Labas ng
Hukuman at Bilihang Patulayan . As soon as the
said property was sold to Fernando Cruz, the
adjoining property described and classified as
parang with an area of 7,856 sq. m. was declared
by said CRUZ in his name which circumstance,
increased his landholding to 13,856 sq. m. In 1968,
he sold this 13,856 sq. m.-property to respondent
SERVANDO FLORES pursuant to a deed of sale
(Kasulatan ng Bilihan). The said sale included the
encroached portion of 7,540 sq.m. of MARCELO
ET AL.s property.
In 1968, MARCELO ET AL. attempted to
cultivate the disputed portion but were barred
from doing so by respondent FLORES who
claimed that the area was part of the land he
bought from co-respondent CRUZ. Hence, in
1982, MAR CELO ET AL filed an action for the
recovery of a portion of unregistered land.
CRUZ and FLORES, on the other hand,
contended that the portion sought to be recovered
by MARCELO ET AL. was part of the land which
CRUZ acquired in 1960 from the Sarmientos. They
also averred that the land sold to CRUZ contained
6,000 sq. m. of palayero or riceland and 7,856 sq.
m. of parang or pasture land. It was added that in
1967, CRUZ caused the survey of the property
and had it declared for taxation in 1968. It was
further alleged that CRUZ sold the same property
to FLORES in 1968.
The trial court found that the issue revolved
on the so-called pasture land or parang. It
concluded that the parang belonged to
MARCELO ET AL. and that it was merely
encroached upon by CRUZ. It was proven that the
tax declaration of the Sarmientos, from whom
CRUZ purchased the property, did not include
the parang and it was only began to be declared
for taxation purposes in the name of CRUZ in
1961. On the other hand, the said parang was a
part and parcel of MARCELO ET AL. property to
which they had been in possession thereof prior to
World War II. Because of such encroachment, the
landholding of CRUZ of 6,000 sq. m. was
increased to 13,856 square meters. The court then
ordered CRUZ and FLORES to return the
ownership and possession of the parang to
MARCELO ET AL.
On appeal to the CA, the decision of the
lower court was reversed. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether of not FLORES had in his favor just
title.
RULING
YES. FLORES had just title in his favor
because he acquired the property in good faith.
The bad faith of CRU
The Kasulatan ng Partisyon sa Labas ng
Hukuman at Bilihang Patuluyan. executed in 1960
by the Sarmientos, pertained not only to the
palayero but also to the parang as well. Shortly
after the execution of the deed of sale in his favor,
CRUZ declared both parcels, i.e., the palayero and
the parang, for taxation purposes in 1960 in the
Office of the Provincial Assessor and forthwith a
new tax declaration was issued in his name for the
entire 13,856 sq. m. property. In turn, respondent
CRUZ sold in 1968, the 13,856 square meters of
land to respondent Flores under a Kasulatan ng
Bilihan. FLORES immediately took possession of
the property to the exclusion of all others and
promptly paid the realty taxes thereon. From that
time on, FLORES had been in possession of the
entire area in the concept of an owner and holding
it in that capacity for almost 14 years before
petitioners initiated their complaint in 1982.
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of
acquiring ownership by a possessor through the
requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into
ownership, possession must be in the concept of
an owner, public peaceful and uninterrupted.
Possession, to constitute the foundation of a
prescriptive right, must be en concepto de dueno, or,
to use the common law equivalent of the term,
that possession should be adverse; if not, such
possessory acts, no matter how long, do not start
the running of the period of prescription.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription demands, as
aforesaid, that the possession be in good faith
and with just title. The good faith of the
possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the
person from whom the thing is received has been
the owner thereof and could thereby transmit that
ownership. There is, upon the other hand, just title
when the adverse claimant comes into possession
of the property through any of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights, but that the
grantor is neither the owner nor in a position to
transmit the right.
In the instant case, FLORES took possession
of the controverted portion in good faith and with
just title. This is so because the said portion of
7,540 sq. m. was an integral part of that bigger
tract of land which he bought from CRUZ under
public document. As explicitly mentioned in the
document of sale executed in 1968, the disputed
portion referred to as parang was included in
the sale to FLORES. Parenthetically, at the time of
the sale, the whole area consisting of the riceland
and pasture land was already covered by a tax
declaration in the name of CRUZ and further
surveyed in his favor. Hence, FLORES
possession of the entire parcel which included the
portion sought to be recovered by MARCELO ET
AL. was not only in the concept of an owner but
also public, peaceful and uninterrupted. While it
is true that the possession of the entire area by his
predecessor-in-interest CRUZ may not have been
peaceful as it was indeed characterized with
violence which resulted in the death of Jose
Marcelo, this could not be said of FLORES
possession of the property, in respect of which no
evidence to the contrary appears on record.
ARTICLE 542: The possession of real property
presumes that of the movables therein, so long as it is
not shown or proved that they should be excluded.
ARTICLE 543: Each one of the participants of a thing
possessed in common shall be deemed to have
exclusively possessed the part which may be allotted to
him upon the division thereof, for the entire period
during which the co-possession lasted. Interruption in
the possession of the whole or a part of a thing
possessed in common shall be to the prejudice of all the
possessors. However, in case of civil interruption, the
Rules of Court shall apply.
ARTICLE 544: A possessor in good faith is entitled to
the fruits received before the possession is legally
interrupted.
Naturally and industrial fruits are considered
received form the time they are gathered or severed.
Civil fruits are deemed to accrue daily and
belong to the possessor in good faith on that proportion.
The possessor in good faith (PGF) is
entitled to the fruits received before the
possession is legally interrupted.
Right of PBF with respect to the
gathered fruits:
Entitled to payment for production,
gathering and preservation expenses of
the crops. (If the fruits have not been
gathered, he loses everything with respect
to the fruits. But he can get the payment
of expenses for the preservation of the
land.)
ARTICLE 545: If at the time the good faith ceases,
there should be any natural or industrial fruits, the
possessor shall have a right to a part of the expenses of
cultivation, and to a part of the net harvest, both in
proportion to the time of the possession.
The charges shall be divided on the same basis
by the two possessors.
The owner of the ting may, should he so
desire, give the possessor in good faith the right to finis
the cultivation and gathering if the growing fruits, as
an indemnity for his part of the expenses of cultivation
and the net proceeds; the possessor in good faith who
for any reason whatever should refuse to accept this
concession, shall loss the right to be indemnified in any
other manner.
The situation is, X possesses in GF the
land of B. The possession of X has been
legally interrupted, and therefore his
possession in GF ceases. What are the
rights of X?
1. right to part of the expenses of
cultivation;
2. right to a part of the net harvest (both
in proportion to the time of the
possession, 1st par. of 545.
POSSESSOR
GOOD FAITH BAD FAITH
Owns them (Art. - Return the value of
544) fruits which owner
could have received
(Art. 549)
- Liable for damages
EXCEPT articles 443 and
546
Pro-rating of net - No rights at all (Art.
harvest (Art. 545) 449)
- Liable for damages
(Art. 452)
Pro-rating, how determined: The
possessor was already in possession for
two months before his possession in good
faith was legally interrupted through the
serving of judicial summons. The crops
are pending and it would take about 4
months before it could be harvested. So
before interruption, possession is in good
faith, after interruption, possession is in
bad faith.
Judicial summons
2 months 4 months
= 2:4 pro-rata
good faith bad faith
1. Necessary Expenses are those without
which the thing would physically
deteriorate or be lost, expenses for the
preservation of the thing. They do not
increase the things value; they merely
prevent the thing from being useless.
Rights of a Possessor (in the concept of owner) as
to the necessary expenses
a. If in good faith entitled to:
1. refund
2. retain premises until paid
b. If in bad faith entitled ONLY to a refund (no
right of retention, as penalty)
2. Useful Expenses they are those that:
i. add value to the property
ii. or increase the objects
productivity
iii. or useful for the
satisfaction of spiritual
and religious yearnings
or give rise to all kinds of
fruits
Rights of a Possessor (in the concept of
owner) as to the Useful Expenses:
If in good faith
1) Right to REIMBURSEMENT (of
either the amount spent or the
increase in value;
2) Right of RETENTION (till paid)
While waiting to be reimbursed, he is not
obliged to pay rental to the owner. The
right of retention is an absolute right,
thus, he can occupy or possess the
premises for free until he is reimbursed.
But during his retention of the premises,
he introduces improvements; he has no
right of removal if the improvements are
introduced during the retention period.
During the time of retention, he is already
in bad faith. PBF under useful expenses
has no right whatsoever.
3) Right of REMOVAL (provided no
substantial damage or injury is
caused to the principal, reducing
its value. Unless the winner
(lawful owner or possessor)
exercises the option in Art 547, 1
If in bad faith
1. Not entitled to any right regarding the
useful expenses or reimbursements for
expenses incurred;
2. he may REMOVE the objects (repairs on
building) provided the things suffer NO
INJURY thereby;
3. If the lawful possessor does not prefer to
retain them by paying the value they may
have at the time he enters into possession.
PADA- KILARIO V CA
They are PBF and the kind of expenses they
incurred here is useful. Improvements are
considered as useful expenses. So what are they
entitled to? They are entitled to nothing.
CHUA V CA
Under Art 547 on useful expenses only apply to
PGF, and since Chua, who is a lessee, he is not
entitled to the benefits of 546 and 547. There is no
provision which grants a lessee a right of
retention until reimbursed.
3. Luxurious Expenses, Art 548 are those
which add value to the thing only for
certain determinate persons in view of
their particular whims. They are neither
essential for preservation nor useful to
everybody in general

ARTICLE 546:
PADA-KILARIO vs. CA
G.R. No. 134329. Jan. 19, 2000.
If a possessor were in possession of the
property without paying any rental as they
only relied on the liberality and tolerance of
the landowner are not possessors nor builders
in good faith because they know that their
occupation of the premises may be terminated
any time. Hence, they are not entitled to
reimbursement of useful expenses.
FACTS
Jacinto Pada owned a parcel of land of
residential and coconut land in Leyte
denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 5581. During
his lifetime, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada,
obtained permission from him to build a house on
the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581.
When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued
living in said house. Petitioner Verona Pada-
Kilario, one of Pastor's children, had been living in
that house since 1960.
Later, Jacinto Pada died intestate. His 6
children, 1 personally and others through their
children, entered into an extra-judicial partition of
his estate, which included Cadastral Lot No. 5881.
One of the sons of Jacinto Pada was Marciano
Pada. The latters daughter, Maria Pada, sold the
co-ownership right of his father to respondent
SILVERIO PADA, who was also a first cousin.
Thereafter, SILVERIO demanded that spouses
VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO
KILARIO vacate the northern portion of Cadastral
Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the said area.
Unable to settle for an amicable settlement,
SILVERIO instituted a complaint for ejectment
with prayer for damages against spouses
KILARIO.
Later, heirs of Amador Pada, also a son of
Jacinto Pada, executed a Deed of Donation,
transferring to petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario,
their respective shares as co-owners of Cadastral
Lot No. 5581. Hence, the SPOUSES KILARIO
averred that the northern portion of Cadastral Lot
No. 5581 had already been donated to them by the
heirs of Amador Pada. Hence, they were virtually
converted as standing co-owners of the land
under controversy and became the undivided
owners of the whole estate. Their possession then
in the northern portion was being lawful. They
also contended that they had been occupying the
subject property since 1960 without ever paying
any rental.
The RTC ordered the SPOUSES KILARIO to
vacate the premises in issue and return peaceful
possession to SILVERIO being the lawful
possessor in concept of owner. When the
SPOUSES KILARIO appealed with the CA, the
same was denied. Hence, this petition
ISSUE
Whether or not the SPOUSES KILARIO were
entitled to full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made.
RULING
NO, they were not because they were builders
in good faith.
Considering that SPOUSES KILARIO were in
possession of the subject property by sheer
tolerance of its owners, they knew that their
occupation of the premises may be terminated any
time. Persons who occupy the land of another at
the latter's tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that they will vacate the same
upon demand, failing in which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
Thus, they could be considered possessors nor
builders in good faith.
It is well-settled that both Article 448 and
Article 546 of the New Civil Code which allow full
reimbursement of useful improvements and
retention of the premises until reimbursement is
made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e.,
one who builds on land with the belief that he is
the owner thereof. Verily, persons whose
occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its
owners are not possessors in good faith.
Neither did the donation by some of the heirs,
convert SPOUSES KILARIO into builders in good
faith for at the time the improvements were built
on the premises, such promise was not yet
fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere expectancy of
ownership that may or may not be realized. More
importantly, even as that promise was fulfilled,
the donation was void for the donors were not the
owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. As such,
petitioners could not be said to be entitled to the
value of the improvements that they built on the
said lot.
CHUA vs. CA
GR No. 109840. January 21, 1999
Reimbursement applies only to a possessor in
good faith, i.e., one who builds on a land in
the belief that he is the owner thereof. This
right does not apply to a mere lessee,
otherwise, it would always be in his power to
"improve" his landlord out of the latter's
property.
FACTS
Petitioners JOSE L. CHUA and CO SIO ENG
were lessees of a commercial unit in Baclaran,
Paraaque, Metro Manila, which was owned by
respondent RAMON MARRA. The lease was for a
period of 5 years, from 1985 to 1989. The contract
expressly provided for the renewal of the lease at
the option of CHUA and ENG in accordance with
the terms of agreement and conditions set by the
MARRA.
Prior to the expiration of the lease, the parties
discussed the possibility of renewing it. They
exchanged proposal and counterproposal, but
they failed to reach agreement. The dispute was
referred to the barangay captain for conciliation
but still no settlement was reached by the parties.
Hence, in 1990, MARRA filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer against CHUA and ENG with
the MTC. The court extended the lease for another
2 years. CHUA and ENG were also ordered to
pay MARRA back rentals until they vacate the
premises.
The RTC however, modified said decision. It
ruled that after the expiration of the 5-year lease
period, CHUA and ENGs continued stay were
already illegal. It also held that the period fixed by
the MTC was not proper as the power of the
courts to fix the period of lease is limited only to
cases where the period has not been fixed by the
parties themselves. CHUA and ENG were also
ordered then, to vacate the premises and pay back
rentals until they vacate the same.
The CA affirmed the RC decision. The
appellate court found petitioners guilty of bad
faith in refusing to leave the premises.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
UY and ENG contended that they acted in good
faith under the belief that they were entitled to an
extension of the lease because they had made
repairs and improvements on the premises.
ISSUE
Whether or not the useful improvements
made by UY and ENG on the leased premises
entitled them to reimbursement from MARRA.
RULING
NO. They should not be entitled to
reimbursement.
The fact that, UY and ENG allegedly made
repairs on the premises in question is not a reason
for them to retain the possession of the premises.
There is no provision of law which grants the
lessee a right of retention over the leased premises
on that ground.
Art. 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Art.
546, which provides for full reimbursement of
useful improvements and retention of the
premises until reimbursement is made, applies
only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who
builds on a land in the belief that he is the owner
thereof. In a number of cases, the Court has held
that this right does not apply to a mere lessee, like
the petitioners, otherwise, it would always be in
his power to "improve" his landlord out of the
latter's property.
Art. 1678 merely grants to such a lessee
making in good faith useful improvements the
right to be reimbursed one-half of the value of the
improvements upon the termination of the lease
or in the alternative, to remove the impovements
if the lessor refuses to make reimbursement.
ARTICLE 547:
ARTICLE 548:
ARTICLE 549: The possessor in bad faith shall
reimburse the fruits received and those which the
legitimate possessor should have received, and shall
have a right only to the expenses mentioned in par. 1 of
article 546 and in article 443. the expenses incurred in
improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall
not be refunded to the possessor in bad faith; but he
may remove the objects for which such expenses have
been incurred, provided that the thing suffers no injury
thereby, and that the lawful possessor does not prefer to
retain them by paying the value they may have at the
time he enters into possession.
ARTICLE 550: The costs of litigation over the property
shall be borne by every possessor.
ARTICLE 551: Improvements caused by Nature or
time shall always inure to the benefit of the person who
has succeeded in revering possession.
ARTICLE 552: A possessor in good faith shall not be
liable for the deterioration or loss of the thing
possessed, except in cases in which it is proved that he
has acted with fraudulent intent or negligence, after
the judicial summons.
A possessor in bad faith shall be liable for
deterioration or loss in every case, even if caused by a
fortuitous event.
ARTICLE 553: One who recovers possession shall not
be obliged to pay for the improvements which have
ceased to exist at the time he takes possession of the
thing.
ARTICLE 554: A present possessor who shows his
possession at some previous time, is presumed to have
held possession also during the intermediate period, in
the absence of proof to the contrary.
ARTICLE 555: A possessor may lose his possession:
1. By the abandonment of the thing;
2. By an assignment made to another either by
onerous pr gratuitous title;
3. By the destruction or total loss of the thing, or
because it goes out of commerce;
4. By the possession of another, subject to the
provisions of Article 537, if the new
possession has lasted longer that one year. But
the real right of possession is not the lost till
after the lapse of 10 years.
Instances when a possessor may lose
possession:
1) By the abandonment of the thing
o Abandonment is the voluntary
renunciation of a thing or right.
o The abandonment must be true
abandonment in the sense that
both possession de facto and
possession de jure are lost.
o This is the abandonment that
converts the thing into res nullius,
meaning ownership of which
may be ordinarily acquired
through occupation. But this does
not apply to land. Because under
Art. 714, which provides that the
ownership of a piece of land
 cannot be acquired by
occupation. So, ordinarily it refers
to movables.
REQUISITES:
1. That the abandoner must have been a
possessor in the concept of an owner;
2. The capacity to renounce; there must be
physical relinquishment of the thing;
3. No expectancy of recovery or no intent to
return; and
4. The abandoner must have knowledge of
the loss of his possession or the thing.
(US vs. Ray 8 Phil 500)
Effect of temporary ignorance:
4. There is no abandonment of movables
even if there is temporary ignorance so
long as they remain under the control of
the possessor.
Effect of tolerance
5. There is no abandonment if the owner
merely tolerated another's possession, nor
if that possessor acquired it through
stealth, or effected the same through force
or intimidation
1. Assignment, either by onerous (in case of
sale) or gratuitous title (in case of
donation).
- Assignment here is the complete
transmission of ownership rights to
another person onerously or gratuitously.
2. By the destruction or total loss of the
thing, or because it goes out of commerce.
- A thing is lost when it perishes, or goes
out of commerce, or disappears in such a
way that its existence is unknown and
there is no recovery at all.
3. Accdg to Mr. Paras, the possession of
movables is not deemed lost as long as
they remain under the control of the
possessor even though for the time being
he does not know their whereabouts.
- Possession that is lost for one year is
possession de facto, but not legal right of
possession because it is lost after the lapse
of 10 years. Possession as a fact, if you
lose it for more than 1 year, then you may
file a case for recovery for possession.
- By the possession of another, subject to
the provisions of Article 537, if the new
possession has lasted longer that one
year. But the real right of possession is not
the lost till after the lapse of 10 years.
U.S. vs. REY
G.R. No. 3326. September 7, 1907
Property can not be considered abandoned
under the law if the possessor did not know
that the thing was lost until the spes
recuperand (hope of recovery)i is gone and the
animus revertendi (intention to return) is
finally given up.
FACTS
On September 19, 1905, the steamer Cantabria
sailed from the port of Manila, destined for the
pueblo of Tabaco, Albay. The ship had on board,
as a part of her cargo, 3 boxes containing silver
and paper money amounting to P25,000. This
money was shipped by the firms of Urrutia & Co.
(P20,000) and Muoz & Co. (P5,000)
After the Cantabria remained in quarantine at
the quarantine station of Mariveles, she continued
the journey September 24. On September 26, said
ship was totally wrecked off the small Island of
Mababuy and all its officers and passengers were
drowned, the cargo including the money were
lost as it sunk with the ship.
On September 28, the defendant LAURENTE
REY with several others, after having discovered
the existence and location of the wrecked steamer
Cantabria, took two boxes , which contained
P15,000, one containing P10,000 and the other
P5,000. Being that the sum was packed in boxes,
which were reinforced with iron straps and nails,
said boxes were broken by the accused in order to
take possession of the said sum of money. A part
of which was distributed among his companions,
the largest portion of which was retained by REY.
The trial court convicted REY for the crime of
robbery. On appeal, REY alleged that the said
property which was sunk with the wrecked
steamer Cantabria, was abandoned property and
therefore, granting that he had taken possession
of said property and appropriated it to his own
use, he was not guilty of the crime of robbery.
ISSUE
Whether or not the boxes containing the
money were abandoned property.
RULING
NO. Said boxes were not abandoned property
because of the absence of knowledge of the
possessor that the thing was lost and there was
still intent on the part of the possessor to recover
it.
Art. 555 (then Art. 460) provides that one of
the ways in which a possessor may lose
possession of a property is through abandonment
of a thing.
There was absence of knowledge of the possessor
that the thing was lost
The sinking of the Cantabria was relayed to the
firms only after more than 6 weeks after the
cyclone. Certainly the owner of property can not
be held to have abandoned the same until at least
lie has some knowledge of the loss of its
possession or of the loss of the thing.
There was still intent on the part of the firms to
recover the money.
Property can not be considered abandoned
under the law and the possession left vacant for
the finder until the spes recuperandi (hope of
recovery) is gone and the animus revertendi
(intention to return) is finally given up.
The theory of abandonment on the part of the
owners of the money stolen was fully refuted by
the fact that some weeks after the wreck of the
said ship they sent men to the place of the wreck
for the purpose of recovering the property which
belonged to them, which was on board the ship at
the time of her sinking. The mere fact that cargo
was sunk with a ship wrecked at sea by no means
deprives the owner of said cargo of his property
therein. The owner certainly still has the right to
reclaim such property and to recover the same if
possible. If it should be recovered by others, the
real owner would be entitled to recover its value
less the necessary expense of recovering the same
and carrying it ashore by the most approved
appliances for that purpose by others.
YU vs. DE LARA
G.R. No. L-16084 November 30, 1962
Land can never be an abandoned thing,
especially registered land.
FACTS
Lot No. 14, block No. 51-C of the Gram Park
subdivision, which was a 682.5-meter property,
was originally registered in 1916. Subsequently, it
was acquired by the Philippine Realty
Corporation.
In 1945, several persons settled on the
property and constructed houses thereon without
permission from the Philippine Realty
Corporation. On various dates thereafter, between
1947 and 1952, respondents MAXIMO DE LARA,
JUAN PANLILIO, LUCIA RIVERO,
FLORENTINO ROQUE and DOMINGO
SAMSON bought the houses of those settlers and
continued in occupancy thereof without paying
any rents to the owner of the land.
Later in 1956, Philippine Realty Corporation
sold said property to petitioner JOHN O. YU, who
later obtained a TCT in his name. In 1957, YU
advised DE LARA ET AL. to vacate the property
within 30 days. Because of the latters refusal, UY
filed a complaint of unlawful detainer.
The lower court ordered DE LARA ET AL. to
vacate the premises and to pay monthly rentals
from the time the action was filed until they
vacate the premises.
On appeal, DE LARA ET AL. contended that
Philippine Realty Corporation had lost possession
of the property by abandonment, in failing to take
action against them and showing lack of interest
in said property since they started their
occupancy.
ISSUE
Whether or not the property was abandoned
by Philippine Realty Corporation.
RULING
NO. It was not abandoned. The circumstances
adverted to are insufficient to constitute
abandonment, which requires not only physical
relinquishment of the thing but also a clear
intention not to reclaim or reassume ownership or
enjoyment thereof.
Indeed, abandonment which according to
converts the thing into res nullius, ownership of
which may be acquired by occupation, can hardly
apply to land, as to which said mode of
acquisition is not available, let alone to registered
land, to which "no title in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession".
No possessory rights whatsoever can be
recognized in favor of appellants, because they
are in fact nothing but squatters, who settled on
the land without any agreement with the owner,
paying neither rents to him nor land taxes to the
government, and who impliedly recognized their
squatters' status by purchasing only the houses
built by the original settlers. Their occupancy of
the land was at the owner's sufferance, and their
acts were merely tolerated which could not affect
the owner's possession.
ARTICLE 556: The possession of movables is not
deemed lost as long as they remain under the control of
the possessor, even though for the time being hew may
not know their whereabouts.
RULE WHEN POSSESSION NOT
DEEMED LOST: (Movable):
1. under the control of another;
2. no idea of the whereabouts
ARTICLE 557: The possession of immovables and of
real rights is not in deemed lost, or transferred for
purposes of prescription to the prejudice of 3rd persons,
except in accordance with the provisions of the
Mortgage Law and the Land Registration laws.
ARTICLE 558: Acts relating to possession executed or
agreed to by one who possesses a thing belonging to
another as a mere holder to enjoy or kept it, in any
character, do not bind or prejudice the owner unless he
gave said holder express authority to do such acts, or
ratifies them subsequently.
ARTICLE 559: The possession of movable property
acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been
unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the
person in possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or which the
owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in
good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its
return without reimbursing the price paid therefore.
Art. 559 is known as the rule on
irreinvindicability.
"Aquired in good faith" here means that
the possessor is of the belief that the
person from whom he received the thing
 was the owner and who could transfer
valid title thereto.
Requisites for title:
1. That the possession is in good faith;
2. That the owner has voluntarily parted
with the possession of the thing;
3. And the possession is in the concept of an
owner.
GR: Possession in good faith in the concept of an
owner is equivalent to title. If the owner wants to
get the thing back, he must REIMBURSE the
possessor
Exceptions NO REIMBURSEMENT by the
owner is required when:
a. when the owner has lost the thing;
b. when the owner has been unlawfully
deprived of the thing;
Exception to the exception the owner shall
REIMBURSE the price paid when the possessor
had acquired the thing in good faith at a public
auction.
SUMMARY:
Owner may recover without
reimbursement:
1. From possessor in bad faith;
2. From possessor in good faith (if owner
had lost the property or been unlawfully
deprived of it) (the acquisition being from
a private person)
Owner may recover but should reimburse
if possessor acquired the object in good
faith at a public sale or auction.
Owner cannot recover even if he offers to
reimburse (WON the owner had lost or
been unlawfully deprived):
1) If possessor had acquired it in good faith
by purchase from a merchants store or in
fairs, or markets in accordance with the
Code of Commerce and special laws.
2) If owner is by his conduct precluded from
denying the sellers authority to sell.
3) If possessor had obtained the goods
because he was innocent purchaser for
value and holder of a negotiable
document of title to the goods.
4) When acquisitive prescription has set in
except if possessor is a criminal.
DEL ROSARIO vs. LUCENA
G.R. No. 3546. September 13, 1907
A jewelry owner whose jewelries were pawned
without her consent cannot be compelled to
reimburse the person to whom it is pawned in
order to acquire possession of the jewelries.
FACTS
Petitioner PIA DEL ROSARIO owned certain
jewelries. She delivered said jewelries to
respondent PRAXEDES FLORES for sale on
commission for the term of 2 months, after which,
if not sold, they should be returned to her.
Without her consent, the respondent JUAN
LUCENA and his wife, PRAXEDES FLORES
pawned them to co-respondent TERESA
VERCHES for P500.
DEL ROSARIO filed a complaint against the
SPOUSES LUCENA and VERCHES. The principal
object of the complaint was to obtain from the
court a declaration that the jewels were the
property of DEL ROSARIO.
The court rendered judgment in favor of the
DEL ROSARIO and against VERCHES for the
possession of the jewels. However, DEL
ROSARIO could only possess the jewelries after
she pays P500 to VERCHES with interest. Should
the jewels could not be returned, the SPOUSES
LUCENA shall jointly and severally pay DEL
ROSARIO P500 and VERCHES P1,555 less P500.
DEL ROSARIO appealed this decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not DEL ROSARIO was under
obligation to reimburse VERCHES in order to
repossess the jewelries.
RULING
NO. DEL ROSARIO should not be obliged to
reimburse VERCHES.
VERCHES accepted the jewels as a pledge
constituted by FLORES in the name' of DEL
ROSARIO, without ascertaining whether the
latter had given the former any order or authority
for the pledging of her jewelries. VERCHES must
stand the risk arising from her acceptance of the
pledge, even if when relying upon her judgment
she was improperly or falsely informed; and it
would not be just nor logical that the
consequences of her deception, due to her own
mistake, or to deceit employed by a stranger,
should fall on the owner of the jewelries who,
without having taken any part in the transaction,
became the victim of a crime.
The conflict between the right of the owner of
movable property who has either lost it or been
illegally deprived thereof and that of the creditor
who has loaned money thereon and holds it in
pledge can not be decided against the owner, to
whom the Civil Code grants a right of action to
recover the property from whoever may be in
possession.
The exceptions to Art. 559 (then Art. 464) are
therein contained, namely:
(1) If the possessor of personal property,
lost or stolen, has acquired it at a public
sale;
(2) in favor of Montes de Piedad
established under authorization of the
Government; and
(3) with regard to things acquired on
exchange, or at fairs or markets, or
from a merchant lawfully engaged in
similar business.
The defendant was not within any of the
exceptions under which she could refuse to make
restitution of the property without reimbursement
of the amount advanced upon the pledge.
 Therefore the decision which provides for
such reimbursement before the return of the
jewels is not based on any law whatever. On the
contrary, it is in violation of Art. 559 of the Civil
Code.
It was improper to compel DEL ROSARIO to
reimburse VERCHES in the sum P500, which
PRAXEDES FLORES obtained through the
commission of an unlawful act, but that it is
proper and in accordance with the law to compel
VERCHES to return to the DEL ROSARIO,
absolutely and unconditionally, the jewels in
question.
VARELA vs. FINNICK
G.R. No. 3890. January 2, 1908
A pawnshop does not enjoy the privilege
established by Art. 559.The owner of a
pawnshop, notwithstanding the fact that he
acted in good faith, did not acquire the Jewels
at a public sale. Neither does, a pawnshop
enjoy the privilege granted to a Monte de
Piedad. The owner of the jewels who was
deprived of the same in consequence of a crime
is entitled to the recovery thereof.
FACTS
In 1905, Nicolasa Pascual received from
petitioner JOSEFA VARELA several jewels, some
of which were owned by ARELA herself and
some belonged to strangers. The jewelries were
delivered to Pascual to be sold on commission,
with the obligation on the part of the latter to pay
to the former the proceeds of the sale of said
jewels, or to return them if unsold.
Pascual, however, pawned the said jewels at
various dates with H. J. Finnick's pawnshop,
where the jewels had been pledged. The jewels
were thus misappropriated and the amount of the
loan granted thereon embezzled, to the prejudice
of Josefa VARELA.
In 1906, VARELA claimed, in writing, the
return of the jewels from H. J. Finnick's
pawnshop. It also filed a case against said
pawnshop and its manager, respondent
JOSEPHINE FINNICK. FINNICK alleged that the
jewels pledged at the pawnshop were not the
subject of any other crime committed by Pascual.
It was further alleged that the pawnshop accepted
the said jewels in good faith. Hence, the
pawnshop was entitled to their possession.
ISSUE
Whether or not VARELA should be entitled to
the possession of the jewelries.
RULING
YES, she should be entitled to the possession
the jewelries.
Nicolasa Pascual was convicted of estafa of
the jewels in question, and as the sentence became
final, so much so that she was now undergoing or
term of imprisonment, the balance of the
judgment must be complied with that is, the
restitution of the jewels misappropriated because
they are at hand and have not disappeared. This
restitution must be made even if the jewels are in
the possession of a third party, such as a
pawnshop, and notwithstanding the fact that they
were lawfully acquired by it, its right to institute
proceedings against whoever may be liable
therefor being reserved as provided by article 120
of the Penal Code.
The exception contained in paragraph 3 of
said article is not applicable to the present case
because a pawnshop does not enjoy the privilege
established by Art. 559 (then Art. 464), of the Civil
Code. The owner of the pawnshop of Finnick
Brothers, notwithstanding the fact that he acted in
good faith, did not acquire the Jewels at a public
he sale. Neither does, a pawnshop enjoy the
privilege granted to a Monte de Piedad therefore,
VARELA, who lost said jewels and was deprived
of the same in consequence of a crime is entitled
to the recovery thereof from the pawnshop of
Finnnick Brothers, where they were pledged.
The provisions of Art. 559 (then Art. 464) shall
be observed with regard to the rights of the owner
to recover the personal property lost or of which
he may have been illegally deprived, and also
with regard to those acquired at an auction, on
exchanges, at fairs or markets, or from a merchant
legally established or customarily engaged in the
traffic of similar objects.
In the present case not only has the ownership
and the origin of the jewels misappropriated been
unquestionably proven also that the accused,
acting frandulently and in bad faith, disposed of
them and pledged them contrary agreement, with
no right of ownership, and to the prejudice of the
injured party, who was thereby illegally deprived
of said jewels. Therefore, in accordance with the
provisions of Art. 559 (then Art. 464), the owner
an absolute right to recover the jewels from the
possession of whosoever holds them in
accordance with the judgment entered in the
aforesaid cause for estafa wherein, the accused
having been found guilty the right of Josefa
Varela to recover jewels in question is expressly
acknowledged.
ARENAS vs. RAYMUNDO
G.R. No. 5741. March 13, 1911
Because of the fact that Perello was not the
legitimate owner of the jewelry which she
pledged to the Raymundo, the contract of
pledge entered into by both is, of course, null
and void. hence, the jewelry so pawned could
not serve as security for the payment of the
sum loaned, nor can the latter be collected out
of the value of the said jewelry.
FACTS
In 1908, petitioner ESTANISLAUA ARENAS
delivered to Elena de Vega to sell on commission
several pieces of jewelry. De Vega, in turn,
delivered it to Concepcion Perello, likewise to sell
on commission. However, Perello, instead of
fulfilling her trust, pledged the jewelry in the
pawnshop of defendant FAUSTO O.
RAYMUNDO. Perello appropriated to her own
use the money thereby obtained.
Later, Perello was prosecuted for estafa,
convicted, and the judgment became final. The
jewelries however were still under the control and
in the possession of RAYMUNDO. The latter
refused to deliver the jewelries to ARENAS, the
owner thereof.
Hence, ARENAS filed an action against
RAYMUNDO to recover possession of said
jewelries.
Later, after a writ of seizure was issued for the
said jewelry the sheriff took it out of the
RAYMUNDDO's control and held it in his
possession during the 5 days prescribed by law.
After 5 days without the delivery of bond by
RAYMUNDO, the sheriff delivered it to the
counsel for ARENAS.
RAYMUNDO on the other hand, contended
that the jewelry was pledged to the pawnshop by
Perello as a security for a P1,524 loan with the
knowledge, consent, and mediation of Gabriel La
O, a son of the ARENAS. Hence, it was alleged
that the latter were estopped from disavowing the
action of Perello. RAYMUNDO then prayed that
the complaint be dismissed and that the jewelry
seized be returned to the pawnshops possession.
The lower court ordered RAYMUNDO to
restore to ARENAS. the jewelry. Hence, this
appeal by RAYMUNDO.
ISSUE
Whether or not RAYMUNDO should be
entitled to possession of the jewelry.
RULING
NO. Instead of Raymundo, the rightful
possessor of the jewelry was ARENAS, who was
the owner thereof.
Article 1857 of the Civil Code prescribes as
one of the essential requisites of the contracts of
pledge and of mortgage, that the thing pledged or
mortgaged must belong to the person who
pledges or mortgages it.
Because of the fact that Perello was not the
legitimate owner of the jewelry which she
pledged to the RAYMUNDO, the contract of
pledge entered into by both is, of course, null and
void. Hence, the jewelry so pawned could not
serve as security for the payment of the sum
loaned, nor can the latter be collected out of the
value of the said jewelry.
In the case at bar, it was not proven that
ARENAS authorized Perello to pawn the jewelry
given to her by Arenas to sell on commission.
Because of the mere fact of Perello's having been
convicted and sentenced for estafa, the rest of the
dispositive part of the said sentence must be
complied with, that is, the jewelry
misappropriated must be restored to its owner,
which was in possession of the pawnshop of
RAYMUNDO, who acquired it by legal means.
Even supposing that RAYMUNDO had acted
in good faith in accepting the pledge of the
jewelry in litigation, even then he would not be
entitled to retain it until the owner thereof
reimburse him for the amount loaned to the
embezzler.
Between the supposed good faith of
RAYMUNDO and the undisputed good faith of
the ARENAS, the owner of the jewelry, neither
law nor justice permit that the latter, after being
the victim of embezzlement, should have to
choose one of the two extremes of a dilemma.
Both of which, without legal ground or reason,
are injurious and prejudicial to her interests and
rights, that is, she must either lose her jewelry or
pay a large sum received by the embezzler as a
loan from the defendant, when ARENAS is not
related to the latter by any legal or contractual
bond out of which legal obligations arise.
AZNAR vs. YAPDIANGCO
G.R. No. L-18536. March 31, 1965
If the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been
unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to
recover it, not only from the finder, thief or
robber, but also from third persons who may
have acquired it in good faith from such
finder, thief or robber.
FACTS
In 1959, intervenor TEODORO SANTOS
advertised the sale of his FORD FAIRLANE 500.
A certain L. De Dios, claiming to be a nephew of
Vicente Marella, went to the Santos residence to
answer the ad. During the transaction, Marella
agreed to buy the car for P14,700 on the
understanding that the price would be paid only
after the car had been registered in his name.
After a Deed of Sale was executed by the
parties, they then proceeded to the Motor Vehicles
where the registration of the car in Marella's name
was effected. Up to this stage of the transaction,
the purchased price had not been paid.
TEODORO SANTOS gave the registration
papers and a copy of the deed of sale to his son,
Irineo Santos, and instructed him not to part with
them until Marella shall have given the full
payment for the car. When Irineo demanded the
payment from Marella, the latter said that the
amount he had on hand then was short by some
P2,000 and begged off to be allowed to secure the
shortage from a sister. Thereafter, he ordered L.
De Dios to go to the said sister and suggested that
Irineo go with him. At the same time, he
requested the registration papers and the deed of
sale from Irineo Santos on the pretext that he
would like to show them to his lawyer. Trusting
the good faith of Marella, Irineo handed over the
same to the latter and thereupon, proceeded to the
alleged house of Marella's sister.
When they reached the alleged house of
Marellas sister, Irineo and L. De Dios entered the
house while their unidentified companion
remained in the car. Once inside, L. De Dios asked
Irineo to wait at the sala while he went inside a
room. However, time passed but L. De Dios did
not return. Irineo then found out that L. De Dios
and his unidentified companion were no longer
there anymore and that nobody in the house
knew L. De Dios. When Irineo went to the house
of Marella, he found it closed and Marella was
gone. Finally, he reported the matter to his father
who promptly advised the police authorities.
On the very same day, Marella was able to sell
the car for P15,000 to petitioner JOSE B. AZNAR,
who acquired the said car in good faith, for a
valuable consideration and without notice of the
defect appertaining to the vendor's title. While
AZNAR was attending to the cars registration,
agents of the Philippine Constabulary headed by
respondent CAPT. RAFAEL YAPDIANGCO,
seized and confiscated the same in consequence of
the report to them by TEODORO SANTOS that
the said car was unlawfully taken from him.
AZNAR then filed a complain for replevin
YAPDIANGCO. Claiming ownership of the
vehicle, he prayed for its delivery to him. In the
course of the litigation, however, TEODORO
SANTOS was allowed to intervene by the lower
court.
The lower court awarded the car to SANTOS,
as it found that he had been unlawfully deprived
of his personal property by Marella, from whom
the AZNAR traced his right. Hence, SANTOS was
entitled to its recovery on the mandate of Article
559 of the Civil Code.
From this decision, Aznar appealed. He
contended that the applicable provision of the
Civil Code is Article 1506 and not Article 559.
Article 1506 provides:
ART. 1506. Where the seller of goods
has a voidable title thereto, but his, title
has not been voided at the time of the
sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the
goods, provided he buys them in good
faith, for value, and without notice of the
seller's defect of title.
ISSUE
Whether or not AZNAR had a better right to
acquire possession of the car.
RULING
NO. The reliance of AZNAR on Art. 1506 was
unmeritorious. The car should be warded to
TEODORO SANTOS instead.
Under the aforequoted provision, it is
essential that the seller should have a voidable
title at least. It is very clearly inapplicable where,
as in this case, the seller had no title at all.
Vicente Marella did not have any title to the
property under litigation because the same was
never delivered to him. He sought ownership or
acquisition of it by virtue of the contract. Vicente
Marella could have acquired ownership or title to
the subject matter thereof only by the delivery or
tradition of the car to him.
For the legal acquisition and transfer of
ownership and other property rights, the thing
transferred must be delivered, inasmuch as,
according to settled jurisprudence, the tradition of
the thing is a necessary and indispensable
requisite in the acquisition of said ownership by
virtue of contract.
The lower court was correct in applying
Article 559 of the Civil Code to the case at bar, for
under it, the rule is to the effect that if the owner
has lost a thing, or if he has been unlawfully
deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not only
from the finder, thief or robber, but also from
third persons who may have acquired it in good
faith from such finder, thief or robber. The said
article establishes two exceptions to the general
rule of irrevindicability, to wit, when the owner
(1) has lost the thing, or (2) has been unlawfully
deprived thereof. In these cases, the possessor
cannot retain the thing as against the owner, who
may recover it without paying any indemnity,
except when the possessor acquired it in a public
sale.
Under Article 559 of the new Civil Code, a
person illegally deprived of any movable may
recover it from the person in possession of the
same and the only defense the latter may have is
if he has acquired it in good faith at a public sale,
in which case, the owner cannot obtain its return
without reimbursing the price paid therefor. In
the present case, TEODORO SANTOS had been
illegally deprived of his car through the ingenious
scheme of Marella to enable the latter to dispose
of it to AZNAR, as if he were the owner thereof.
TEODORO SANTOS, therefore, could still recover
possession of the car even if it is in the possession
of AZNAR who had acquired it in good faith
from Marella. The maxim that "no man can
transfer to another a better title than he had
himself" obtains in the civil as well as in the
common law.
EDCA vs. SANTOS
G.R. No. 80298. April 26, 1990
EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the
books because it was the one which made the
delivery to the impostor Cruz. The latter then
acquired ownership over it, which was
subsequently transferred to the buyers, the
SPOUSES SANTOS, who purchased said
books in good faith and diligence as to
ascertain the invoice issued by EDCA to
Cruz.
FACTS
In 1981, a person identifying himself as
Professor Jose Cruz as dean of De La Salle Collge,
placed an order by telephone with EDCA
PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP. for 406
books, payable on delivery.
EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice
and delivered the books as ordered, for which
Cruz issued a personal check covering the
purchase price of P8,995.65.
Later, Cruz sold 120 of the books to private
respondent LEONOR SANTOS who, after
verifying the seller's ownership from the invoice
he showed her, paid him P1,700.00.
Meanwhile, EDCA having become suspicious
over a second order placed by Cruz even before
clearing of his first check, made inquiries with the
De la Salle College but it was informed that there
was no such person in its employ. Further
verification revealed that Cruz had no more
account or deposit with the Philippine Amanah
Bank, against which he had drawn the payment
check.
EDCA then went to the police, which set a
trap and arrested Cruz, whose real name was
Tomas de la Pena.
On the night of the same date, EDCA sought
the assistance of the police, which forced their
way into the store of the SPOUSES LEONOR and
GERARDO SANTOS and threatened them with
prosecution for buying stolen property. They
seized the 120 books without warrant, loading
them in a van belonging to EDCA, and thereafter
turned them over to the EDCA.
The SPOUSES SANTOS demanded for the
return of said books but it was rejected. Hence,
the SPOUSES SANTOS sued EDCA for the
recovery of the books. A writ of preliminary
attachment was issued and the EDCA finally
surrendered the books to the SPOUSES SANTOS.
The MTC recognized the ownership of the
books in the SPOUSES SANTOS. The same was
sustained by both the RTC and CA. Hence, this
appeal.
EDCA contended that because the impostor
Cruz acquired no title to the books, the latter then
could not have validly transferred it to the
SPOUSES SANTOS. Its reason is that as the
payment check bounced for lack of funds, there
was a failure of consideration that nullified the
contract of sale between it and Cruz.
ISSUE
Whether or not EDCA was entitled to
possession of the property.
RULING
NO. The SPOUSES SANTOS had a better right
to possess said books.
The impostor Cruz acquired ownership over the
books because they were delivered to him
The contract of sale is consensual and is
perfected once agreement is reached between the
parties on the subject matter and the
consideration. Ownership in the thing sold shall
not pass to the buyer until full payment of the
purchase price only if there is a stipulation to that
effect. Otherwise, the rule is that such ownership
shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the
actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold
even if the purchase price has not yet been paid.
Non-payment only creates a right to demand
payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal
prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But
absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the
thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to
the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.
Actual delivery of the books having been
made, CRUZ acquired ownership over the books
which he could then validly transfer to the private
respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for
them to EDCA was a matter between him and
EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the
private respondents to the books.
Unlawfully deprived
One may well imagine the adverse
consequences if the phrase "unlawfully deprived"
were to be interpreted in the manner suggested by
EDCA. A person relying on the seller's title who
buys a movable property from him would have to
surrender it to another person claiming to be the
original owner who had not yet been paid the
purchase price therefor. The buyer in the second
sale would be left holding the bag, so to speak,
and would be compelled to return the thing
bought by him in good faith without even the
right to reimbursement of the amount he had paid
for it.
LEONOR SANTOS took care to ascertain first
that the books belonged to CRUZ before she
agreed to purchase them. The EDCA invoice
CRUZ showed her assured her that the books had
been paid for on delivery. By contrast, EDCA was
less than cautious-in fact, too trusting-in dealing
with the impostor. Although it had never
transacted with him before, it readily delivered
the books he had ordered (by telephone) and as
readily accepted his personal check in payment. It
did not verify his identity although it was easy
enough to do this. It did not wait to clear the
check of this unknown drawer. Worse, it
indicated in the sales invoice issued to him, by the
printed terms thereon, that the books had been
paid for on delivery, thereby vesting ownership in
the buyer.
Surely, the SPOUSES SANTOS did not have to
go beyond that invoice to satisfy herself that the
books being offered for sale by Cruz belonged to
him; yet she did. Although the title of Cruz was
presumed under Article 559 by his mere
possession of the books, these being movable
property, LEONOR SANTOS nevertheless
demanded more proof before deciding to buy
them.
It would certainly be unfair now to make the
the SPOUSES SANTOS bear the prejudice
sustained by EDCA as a result of its own
negligence. There could be no the justice in
transferring EDCA's loss to the Santoses who had
acted in good faith, and with proper care, when
they bought the books from Cruz.
LEDESMA vs. CA
G.R. No. 86051. September 1, 1992
The sale entered by CITIWIDE and the
impostor was valid. CITIWIDE was not
illegally deprived of the car simply because the
check in payment therefor was subsequently
dishonored. Hence, the transfer of ownership
from the impostor to LEDESMA was valid as
well. LEDESMA had a better right to possess
the vehicle because he was a purchaser in good
faith and for value.
FACTS
 In 1977, a person representing himself to be
Jojo Consunji, purchased purportedly for his
father, a certain Rustico T. Consunji, 2 brand new
motor vehicles from respondent CITIWIDE
MOTORS, INC. Thereafter, CITIWIDE delivered
said vehicles to the person representing himself to
be Jojo Consunji. The latter issued a managers
check worth P101,000 was full payment of the
value of the vehicles.
However, when CITIWIDE deposited the said
check, it was dishonored by the bank on the
ground that it was tampered with, the correct
amount of P101.00 having been raised to P101,000.
Hence, CITIWIDE reported said criminal act to
the Philippine Constabulary, which found out
that the real identity of the impostor was
Armando Suarez who had a long line of criminal
cases against him for estafa using his similar
modus operandi.
Later, CITIWIDE was able to recover one of
the vehicles, which was found abandoned. It also
found out that the possession of the other vehicle
was transferred to petitioner JAIME LEDESMA.
LEDESMA, however claimed that he
purchased said vehicle and paid for it in good
faith from its registered owner, one Pedro Neyra.
After posting the necessary bond, CITIWIDE was
able to recover possession of the vehicle in
possession of LEDESMA.
The lower court ruled in favor of LEDESMA.
It ruled that LEDESMA was a buyer in good faith
and for valuable consideration.
On appeal with the CA, said decision was
reversed. LEDESMA was ordered to return the
possession of said vehicle to CITIWIDE. It held
that where the owner has lost the thing or has
been unlawfully deprived thereof, the good faith
of the possessor is not a bar to recovery of the
movable unless the possessor acquired it in a
public sale of which there is no pretense in this
case. Contrary to the court's assumption, the
issues not primarily the good faith of LEDESMA,
for even if this were true, this may not be invoked
as a valid defense if it be shown that CITIWIDE
was unlawfully deprived of the vehicle.
Hence, this appeal by LEDESMA.
ISSUE
Whether or not CITIWIDE was entitled to
repossess the vehicle.
RULING
NO. LEDESMA had a better right to possess
said vehicle.
It was therefore erroneous for the CA to
declare that CITIWIDE was illegally deprived of
the car simply because the check in payment
therefor was subsequently dishonored. It also
erred when it divested the LEDESMA, a buyer in
good fait,h who paid valuable consideration
therefor, of his possession thereof.
It is quite clear that a party who (a) has lost
any movable or (b) has been unlawfully deprived
thereof can recover the same from the present
possessor even if the latter acquired it in good
faith and has, therefore, title thereto for under the
first sentence of Article 559, such manner of
acquisition is equivalent to a title. There are three
(3) requisites to make possession of movable
property equivalent to title, namely: (a) the
possession should be in good faith; (b) the owner
voluntarily parted with the possession of the
thing; and (c) the possession is in the concept of
owner.
Undoubtedly, one who has lost a movable or
who has been unlawfully deprived of it cannot be
said to have voluntarily parted with the
possession thereof. This is the justification for the
exceptions found under the second sentence of
Article 559 of the Civil Code.
In the present case, there was a perfected
unconditional contract of sale between CITIWIDE
and the original vendee impostor. The former
voluntarily caused the transfer of the certificate of
registration of the vehicle in the name of the first
vendee even if the said vendee was represented
by someone who used a fictitious name--and
likewise voluntarily delivered the cars and the
certificate of registration to the vendee's alleged
representative. Title thereto was forthwith
transferred to the vendee. The subsequent
dishonor of the check because of the alteration
merely amounted to a failure of consideration
which does not render the contract of sale void,
but merely allows the prejudiced party to sue for
specific performance or rescission of the contract,
and to prosecute the impostor for estafa under
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
The contract of sale is consensual and is
perfected once agreement is reached between the
parties on the subject matter and the
consideration. From that moment, the parties may
reciprocally demand performance, subject to the
provisions of the law governing the form of
contracts. Ownership in the thing sold shall not
pass to the buyer until full payment of the
purchase price only if there is a stipulation to that
effect. Otherwise, the rule is that such ownership
shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the
actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold
even if the purchase price has not yet been paid.
Non-payment only creates a right to demand
payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal
prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But
absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the
thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to
the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.
The failure of the buyer to make good the price
does not, in law, cause the ownership to revest in
the seller until and unless the bilateral contract of
sale is first rescinded or resolved pursuant to
Article 1191 of the new Civil Code.
ARTICLE 560: Wild animals are possessed only while
they are under ones control; domesticated or tamed
animals are considered domestic or tame, if they retain
the habit of returning to the premises of the possessor.
ARTICLE 561: One who recovers, according to law,
possession unjustly lost, shall be deemed for all
purposes which may redound to his benefit, to have
enjoyed it without interruption.

When is a person deemed to have been
unlawfully deprived of a thing:
EDCA PUBLISHING V SANTOS
Facts:
A person identifying himself as Prof. Cruz of DE
la Salle College placed an order via telephone for
406 books with EDCA Publishing payable on
delivery (COD).
EDCA prepared the corresponding
invoice and delivered the books as ordered, for
which Cruz issued a personal check covering the
purchase price of P8, 995.65. Cruz sold 120 books
to Leonor Santos who, after verifying the sellers
ownership from the invoice Cruz showed her,
paid him P1, 700.
Meanwhile, EDCA having became
suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz
even before clearing of his first check, made
inquiries with Della Sale College where he had
claimed to be dean and was informed that there
was no such person in its employ.
Further verification revealed that Cruz
had no more account or deposit with the
Philippine Amanah Bank, against which he had
drawn the payment check. EDCA then went to the
police, whch set a trap and arrested Cruz.
That night, EDCA sought the assistance of
the police which forced their way into the store of
Santos and threatened her with prosecution for
buying stolen property. They seized the 120 books
without warrant, loading them in a van belonging
to EDCA, and thereafter, turned them over to
EDCA.
Santos sued for the recovery of the books.
EDCA contended that it can recover the books
from Santos considering that EDCA was
unlawfully deprived thereof since the check
issued by Cruz was dishonored thus, nullifying
the contract of sale between EDCA and Cruz.
Issue: W/N Santos was a possessor in good faith.
Held: Yes. The contention of EDCA is
unacceptable. The first sentence of Art. 559
provides that the possession of movable
property acquired in good faith is equivalent to
title, thus dispensing with further proof. Leonor
Santos acquired the books. She ascertained the
ownership of the books from EDCA invoice
showing that they had been sold to Cruz, who
said he was selling them for discount because he
was in financial need. Surely, Santos did not have
to go beyond the invoice to satisfy herself that the
books being offered for sale by Cruz belonged to
him; yet she did. Although the title of Cruz was
presumed under Art 559 by his mere possession
of the books, these being movable property,
Santos nevertheless demanded proof before
deciding to buy them. By contrast, EDCA was less
than cautious in fact, too trusting. It would
certainly be unfair now to make Santos bear the
prejudice sustained by EDCA as a result of its
own negligence. We cannot agree the justice in
transferring EDCAs loss to the Santoses who had
acted in good faith, and with proper care, when
they bought the books from Cruz.
Issue: W/N EDCA was unlawfully deprived of
the books
Held: No. Art 1477 provides that the ownership of
the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee
upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof.
Art 1478 also provides that ownership in the thing
sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment
of the purchase price ONLY if there is a
stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is
that such ownership shall pass from the vendor to
the vendee upon the actual or constructive
delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase
price has not yet been paid. Non-payment creates
a right to demand payment or to rescind the
contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of
bouncing checks. But absent any stipulation,
delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer
ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it
to another.
USUFRUCTUARY
ARTICLE 562: Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the
property of another with the obligation of preserving its
form and substance, unless the title constituting it or
the law otherwise provides.
The usufruct gives the usufructuary a
certain right and obligation.
A usufruct is a real right. A real right of
temporary nature which authorizes its
holder to enjoy all the benefits which
result from the normal enjoyment or
exploitation of anothers property, with
the obligation to return, at the designated
time, either of the same thing or in special
cases, its equivalent
Characters in the contract of usufruct:
o naked owner
o usufructuary
In the contract of usufruct, the right to the
fruits and the right to use are given to the
usufructuary but the right to dispose will
remain with the owner. The right to
recover, however, may belong either to
the usufructuary or to the naked owner.
Formula here when there is usufruct
full ownership = naked ownership + usufruct
naked ownership = full ownership usufruct
usufruct = full ownership naked ownership
ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS
1) it is a real right
2) It is of temporary nature or duration.
Even if it is constituted for the whole
lifetime of the usufructuary, it is still
temporary because everybody dies. So it
cannot be perpetual. Its purpose is to
enjoy the benefits and derive all
advantages from the object as
 consequences of normal use of
exploitation
Natural characteristic or element is
ordinarily present, but contrary
stipulation can eliminate it because it is
not essential)
Accidental characteristics or elements are
those which may be present or absent
depending upon the stipulation of the
parties)
Examples:
1. whether it be pure or conditional
2. the number of years it will exist
3. whether it is in favor of one person or
several etc.
Objects of the usufruct:
1. may be real or personal property
2. may be sterile or productive
3. may be created over a ------. It is not
necessary a thing. But there is a
requirement that such right is not strictly
personal and intransmissible and as long
as it has an independent existence.
ARTICLE 563: Usufruct may be constituted by law, by
the will of private persons expressed in acts inter
How usufruct is created:
1) by law
o Art. 225-226 in relation to Art. 321
of the CC. by 225 and 226 of the
Family Code, wherein the
parental usufruct is limited only
to the fruits of the property
owned by the minor child. So that
the minor child shall own
exclusively his property, only that
the fruits derived, the parents
may have usufruct over them. But
then this parental usufruct is
limited only to the child's support
and the collective daily needs of
the family.
2) by the will of the private person
3) by prescription
ARTICLE 564: Usufruct is constituted on the whole or
a part of the fruits of the thing, in favor of one or more
persons, simultaneously or successively, and in every
case from or to a certain day, pure or conditionally. It
may also be constituted on a right, provided it is not
strictly personal or intransmissible.
10. Classification of usufruct according to
quantity or extent (of fruits or object):
1) as to fruits total or partial
(depending on whether all the fruits
are given or not)
2) as to object universal (if over the
entire patrimony); singular or
particular (if only an individual thing
is included)
11. Classification of Usufruct as to number of
persons enjoying the right:
1) simple if only one usufruct
2) multiple if several usufructuaries
enjoy multiple usufruct could be:
simultaneous which
means at the same
time
successive one after
another
12. Classification of usufruct as to the quality or
kind of objects involved:
1) usufruct over rights. Remember, that
the right must not be strictly personal
or intransmissible. A usufruct over a
real right is also by itself a real right.
2) usufruct over things:
o normal usufruct this involves non-
consumable things where the form
and substance are preserved.
o Abnormal this involves consumable
things.
13. Classification of Usufruct according to terms
and conditions:
1) pure usufruct here there is no term
or condition
2) with term or period:
o ex die from a certain day
o in diem up to a certain day
o ex die in diem from a certain day up
to a certain day with a condition
ARTICLE 565: The rights and obligations of the
usufructuary shall be those provided in the title
constituting the usufruct; in default of such title, or in
case it is deficient, the provisions contained in the two
following chapters shall be observed.
14. Rules governing a usufruct:
1) agreement by the parties
2) civil code
15. Rule in case of conflict:
In case of conflict between the rights
granted, a usufructuary by virtue of a will,
and codal provisions, the former, unless
repugnant to the mandatory provisions of the
civil code, should prevail.
ELEIZEGUI vs. MANILA LAWN TENNIS
CLUB
GR No. 967. May 19, 1903.
Usufruct is a right of superior degree to that
which arises from a lease. It is a real right and
includes all the jus utendi and jus fruendi.
Nevertheless, the utmost period for which a
usufruct can endure, if constituted in favor of
a natural person, is the lifetime of the
usufructuary; and if in favor of a juridical
person, it can not be created for more than
thirty years.
FACTS
On January 25, 1980 petitioners DARIO and
GAUDENCIO ELEIZEGUI entered into a contract
of lease of its land with the respondent MANILA
LAWN TENNIS CLUB through its secretary Mr.
Williamson.
 By the contract of lease the lessee is expressly
authorized to make improvements upon the land,
by erecting buildings of both permanent and
temporary character, by making fills, laying pipes,
and making such other improvements as might be
considered desirable for the comfort and
amusement of the members. It was also stipulated
that the lease for all the time and that the
members of the said club may desire to use it.
Also, Mr. Williamson or whoever may succeed
him as secretary of said club may terminate the
lease whenever desired without other formality
than that of giving a month's notice. It was also
specified that the ELEZEGUIs as owners of the
land would undertake to maintain the club as
long as the tenant, the MANILA LAWN TENNIS
CLUB should see fit without altering in the
slightest degree the conditions of this contract,
even though the estate be sold. The rent of the
said land is fixed at P25 per month.
On August 8, 1980, the ELEZEGUIs
terminated the contract of lease by the notice
given to the MANILA LAWN TENNIS CLUB.
The latter however, refused to accede and vacate
the leased land.
On the ground that the lease was already
terminated, the ELEZEGUIs filed an action for
unlawful detainer.
With respect to the term of the lease the
present question has arisen. In its discussion 3
theories have been presented:
1. the duration depends upon the will of the
lessor, who, upon one month's notice
given to the lessee, may terminate the
lease so stipulated;
2. the duration makes it dependent upon the
will of the lessee, as stipulated in the
contract; and
3. the right is reserved to the courts to fix the
duration of the term.
The first theory is that which has prevailed in
the judgment below. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the contract of lease was
perpetual since in the contract, the duration
thereof as left to the will of the lessee alone.
RULING
NO, it was not perpetual. Although the
contract left to the will of the lessee the duration
of the lease, it could not be understood to be a life
tenancy nor a perpetual lease. If the lease could
last during such time as the lessee might see fit,
because it has been so stipulated by the lessor, it
would last, first, as long as the will of the lessee
that is, all his life; second, during all the time that
he may have succession, inasmuch as he who
contracts does so for himself and his heirs.
Being a lease, it then it must be for a
determinate period. By its very nature it must be
temporary just as by reason of its nature a
emphyteusis must be perpetual or for an
unlimited period. If the lease was intended to be
perpetual, they should have not merely entered
into a contract of lease but either contract for a
usufruct or an emphyteusis. Why should the
lessee have a greater right than the usufructuary,
as great as that of an empbyteuta, with respect to
the duration of the enjoyment of the property of
another?
Usufruct is a right of superior degree to that
which arises from a lease. It is a real right and
includes all the jus utendi and jus fruendi.
Nevertheless, the utmost period for which a
usufruct can endure, if constituted in favor of a
natural person, is the lifetime of the usufructuary;
and if in favor of a juridical person, it can not be
created for more than thirty years.
Hence, the term of the lease could not be left
to the will of the lessor, the MANILA LAWN
TENNIS CLUB alone. The proper remedy was the
ask the court to fic the duration of the lease and
not the action for unlawful detainer.
ALUNAN vs. VELOSO
GR No. 29158. December 29, 1928
It is incorrect to say that there can be no
usufruct of money, because it is a fungible
thing.
FACTS
Petitioner RAFAEL ALUNAN was the judicial
administrator of the estate of the deceased
Rosendo Alunan. The settlement of deceaseds
estate was approved by the court below. Jose
Hernaez, one of the heirs interested in this
proceeding, assigned the whole of his portion to
respondent ELEUTERIA CH. VELOSO and the
latter objects to some of the items of the account
filed.
VELOSO alleged that the lower court erred in
admitting the partition proposed by the
administrator in his account. According to this
account, the total amount to be partitioned among
the heirs is P88,979.08, which the administrator
distributed equally among all the heirs, including
the widow, each one receiving P11,122.38. This
partitionwas objected to with respect to the
widow.
It was alleged that the distributable amount is
in money, and since the widow's right is only a
usufruct, and as there can be no usufruct of
money, since it is a fungible thing, the
adjudication made to the widow was erroneous.
ISSUE
Whether or not there could be a usufruct of
money.
RULING
YES, there could be. It is incorrect to say that
there can be no usufruct of money, because it is a
fungible thing.
The widow, according to the law, only has a
right to a portion of the estate equal to that of the
legitime of each of the children without
betterment. In the instant case none of the
children received a betterment. Consequently, the
widow should receive a portion equal to the share
of each in the two-thirds of the distributable
amount making up the legitime, to be taken from
the one-third forming the betterment. Then, the
other free third, which the decedent failed to
dispose of, must be partitioned among the heirs to
the exclusion of the widow, as an addition to their
legitime. Working out the computations on this
basis, the widow should receive only P8,474.19.
ARTICLE 566: The usufructuary shall be entitled to
all natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the property
in usufruct. With respect to hidden treasure which may
be found on the land or tenement, he shall be
considered a stranger.
The usufructuary is entitled to all the
natural, industrial and civil fruits of the
property in usufruct, but with respect to
hidden treasure, the usufructuary is
considered a stranger.. unless of course he
is the finder. If he is the finder, then he is
entitled to 50%.
BACHRACH vs. SEIFERT
GR No. L-2659. October 12, 1950
Shares of stocks dividends are civil fruits. The
usufructuray then, being entitled to civil
fruits other than natural and industrial fruits
shall be entitled to shares of stocks dividends
as well.
FACTS
The deceased E. M. Bachrach, left no forced
heir except his widow, petitioner MARY
MCDONALD BACHRACH.
In his last will and testament, the deceased
bequeath and devised to his wife BACHRACH for
life all the fruits and usufruct of the remainder of
his estate after payment of the legacies, bequests,
and gifts; and she may enjoy said usufruct and
use or spend such fruits as she may in any
manner wish. The will further provided that upon
the death of BACHRACH, one-half of all his
estate shall be divided share and share alike by
and between his legal heirs respondents SOPHIE
SIEFERT and ELISA ELIANOFF, to the exclusion
of his brothers.
The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of
108,000 shares of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge
Mining Co., Inc., received from the latter 54,000
shares representing 50% stock dividend on the
said 108,000 shares.
On July 10, 1948, BACHRACH, as
usufructuary or life tenant of the estate, petitioned
the lower court to authorize the Peoples Bank and
Trust Company, as administrator of the estate of
E. M. Bachrach, to transfer to her the said 54,000
shares of stock dividend by indorsing and
delivering to her the corresponding certificate of
stock, claiming that said dividend, although paid
out in the form of stock, is fruit or income and
therefore belonged to her as usufructuary or life
tenant.
Respondents SIEFERT and ELIANOFF, as
legal heirs of the deceased, opposed said petition
on the ground that the stock dividend in question
was not income but formed part of the capital and
therefore belonged not to the usufructuary but to
the remainderman.
The lower court granted the petition of
BACHRACH. HENCE, this appeal. While
appellants admitted that a cash dividend is an
income, they contend that a stock dividend is not,
but merely represents an addition to the invested
capital.
ISSUE
Whether or not the 54,000 shares of stock
dividends belong to the the usufructuary MARY
MCDONALD BACHRACH.
RULING
YES, the shares belong to the usufructuary.
There are two rules applicable in the present
case: the Massachussetts rule and the
Pensylvannia rule. The Massachusetts supports
SEIFERT and ELIANOFF 's contention. The
Pennsylvania rule on the other hand, supports the
contention of BACHRACH.
The Massachusetts rule regards cash
dividends, however large, as income, and stock
dividends, however made, as capital. It holds that
a stock dividend is not in any true sense any
dividend at all since it involves no division or
severance from the corporate assets of the subject
of the dividend; that it does not distribute
property but simply dilutes the shares as they
existed before; and that it takes nothing from the
property of the corporation, and adds nothing to
the interests of the shareholders.
The Pennsylvania rule declares that all
earnings of the corporation made prior to the
death of the testator stockholder belong to the
corpus of the estate, mid that all earnings, when
declared as dividends ill whatever form, made
during the lifetime of the usufructuary or life
tenant are income and belong to the usufructuary
or life tenant.
The Supreme Court thought that the
Pennsylvania rule was more in accord with our
statutory laws than the Massachusetts rule. Under
section 16 of our Corporation Law, no corporation
may make or declare any dividend except from
the surplus profits arising from its business. Any
dividend, therefore, whether cash or stock,
represents surplus profits. Article 566 (then
Article 471) of the Civil Code provides that the
usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all the
natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the property
in usufruct.
The 108,000 shares of stock were part of the
property in usufruct. The 54,000 shares of stock
dividend were civil fruits of the original
investment. They represented profits, and the
delivery of the certificate of stock covering said
dividend is equivalent to the payment of said
profits. Said shares may be sold independently of
the original shares, just as the offspring of a
domestic animal may be sold independently of its
mother.
OROZCO vs. ALCANTARA
GR No. L-3691. November 21, 1951
A dividend, whether in the form of cash or
stock, is income and, consequently, should go
to the usufructuary, taking into consideration
that a stock dividend as well as a cash
dividend can be declared only out of profits of
the corporation, for if it were declared out of
the capital it would be a serious violation of
the law.
FACTS
In 1922, Eugenio del Saz Orozco died, leaving
a will which he had executed in 1921. It was
afterwards duly admitted to probate. The
pertinent clause of that will provided that certain
properties should be given in life usufruct to his
son petitioner JACINTO DEL SAZ OROZCO Y
MORTERA, with the obligation on his part to
preserve said properties in favor of the other heirs
who were declared the naked owners thereof.
Among these properties were 5,714 shares of
stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company and 94 shares of stock of the Manila
Electric Company, according to the project of
partition executed pursuant to said will and duly
approved by the court.
In 1934, the Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company declared and distributed stock
dividends out of its surplus profits, the petitioner
OROZCO received his proportionate portion of
11,428 shares. In 1939, said Mining Company
again declared stock dividends out of its surplus
profits, of which the OROZCO received 17,142
shares, making a total of 28,570 shares.
ISSUE
Whether the stock dividends should be
preserved in favor of the owners or an income or
fruits of the capital which should be given to and
enjoyed by the life usufructuary as his own
exclusive property.
RULING
The stock dividends were income or fruits of
the capital which should be given to and enjoyed
by the life usufructuary, OROZCO as his own
exclusive property.
Citing the case of Bachrach vs. Seifert, a
dividend, whether in the form of cash or stock, is
income and, consequently, should go to the
usufructuary, taking into consideration that a
stock dividend as well as a cash dividend can be
declared only out of profits of the corporation, for
if it were declared out of the capital it would be a
serious violation of the law.
Respondents SALVADOR ARANETA ET AL.
attempted to differentiate the present case from
the Bachrach case, contending that, while the
doctrine in that case effected a just and equitable
distribution, the application of it in the present
case would cause an injustice, for, quoting Justice
Holmes, "abstract propositions do not decide
concrete cases."
One of the differences pointed out is that by
the declaration of stock dividends the voting
power of the original shares of stock is
considerably diminished, and, if the stock
dividends are not given to the remaindermen, the
voting power of the latter would be greatly
impaired. Bearing in mind that the number of
shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated
Mining Company is so large, the diminution of
the voting power of the original shares of stock in
this case cannot possibly affect or influence the
control of the policies of the corporation which is
vested in the owners of the great block of shares.
This would not be a sufficient reason for
modifying the doctrine of the Bachrach case.
These remarks were made in answer to the
argument of the appellees in this particular case,
but they do not imply that if the diminution of the
voting power were considerable the doctrine
should be modified.
ARTICLE 567: Natural or industrial fruits growing at
the time the usufruct begins, belong to the
usufructuary.
Those growing at the time the usufruct
terminates, belong to the owner.
In the proceeding cases, the usufructuary at
the beginning of the usufruct, has no obligation to
refund to the owner any expenses incurred; but the
owner shall be obliged to reimburse at the termination
of the usufruct, from the proceeds of the growing fruits,
the ordinary expenses of cultivation, for seed, and other
similar expenses incurred by the usufructuary.
The provisions of this article shall not
prejudice the rights of 3rd persons, acquired either at
the beginning or at the termination of the usufruct.
16. Rules to pending natural and industrial fruits:
1. Those pending at the time usufruct
begins-- belong to usufructuary, with no
obligation to refund.
2. Those pending at the end of the usufruct--
belong to the naked owner but with
obligation to make refunds for obligations
incurred for the growing and other
similar expenses which must be taken
from the proceeds of the fruits.
ARTICLE 568: If the usufructuary has leased the lands
or tenements given in usufruct, and the usufruct
should expire before the termination of the lease, he or
his heirs and successors shall receive only the
proportionate share of the rent that must be paid by the
lessee.
[Civil Fruits] covered by Art. 470: The
rule is that they are deemed to accrue
PROPORTIONATELY to the naked
owner and the usufructuary for the time
the usufruct lasts.
So they shall divide the proceeds
proportionately for the time the usufruct
lasts.
Illustration: There is a contract between A and B
wherein A gave B in usufruct the profits of a
certain building for 5 years.
YR 1- 10,000 ratio is 3:2, thus:
YR 2- 20,000 3 (P120,00)/5 = P72,000 -
B 2) lease the thing to another even
YR 3- 30,000 2(P120,000)/5 = P48,000 -
A owner. It does not need consent. It is
YR 4- 20,000
YR 5- 40,000
------------
P120,000.
ARTICLE 569: Civil fruits are deemed to accrue daily,
and belong to the usufructuary in proportion to the
time the usufruct may last.
ARTICLE 570: Whenever a usufruct is constituted on
the right to receive a rent or periodical pension.
Whether in money or in fruits, or in the interest on
bonds or securities payable to bearer, each payment due
shall be considered as the proceeds or fruits of such
right.
Whenever it consists in the enjoyment of
benefits accruing from a participation in any industrial
or commercial enterprise, the date of the distribution of
which is not fixed, such benefits shall have the same
character.
In either case they shall be distributed as civil
fruits and shall be applied in the manner prescribed in
the preceding article.
The object of the usufruct here is the right.
o The right to receive a rent or
periodical pension, whether in
money or in fruits, or in the
interest on bonds or securities
payable to bearer.
o The right to x x x enjoy benefits
accruing from a participation in
any industrial or commercial
enterprise, the date of the
distribution of which is not fixed.
RULES under 570:
a) Each payment shall be considered as the
proceeds or fruits of such right;
b) They shall be distributed as civil fruits;
c) It shall be applied in the manner prescribe
in 569. What do we mean by that? They
are deemed to accrue daily.
d) They shall belong to the usufructuary at
the time the usufructuary may last.
ARTICLE 571: The usufructuary shall have the right
to enjoy any increase which the thing in usufruct may
acquire thru accession, the servitudes established in its
favor, and, in general, all the benefits inherent therein.
ARTICLE 572: The usufructuary may personally
enjoy the thing in usufruct, lease it to another, or
alienate his right of usufruct, even by gratuitous title,
but all the contracts he may enter into as such
usufructuary shall terminate upon the expiration of the
usufruct, saving leases of rural lands which shall be
considered as subsisting during he agricultural year.
SUMMARY:
17. What the usufructuary may do with respect to
the thing subject of usufruct?
1) may personally enjoy the thing
himself or thru another;
without the consent of the naked
his right to lease it to another. The
lease should not extend longer than
the period of usufruct. But if there is a
rural lease it shall be subsisting
during the agricultural year. Until the
harvest.
GR: There is no necessity for getting the consent
of the naked owner.
EXCEPTIONS:
1) caucion juratoria because the very essence
of the grant of usufructuary is the very
[need of the] person or usufructuary;
2) Legal usufruct [parental usufruct]; and
3) A usufruct made in consideration of the
existence of that person, because to do so
would defeat the very intention of the
parties.
ARTICLE 573: Whenever the usufruct includes things
which, without being consumed, gradually deteriorate
thru wear and tear, the usufructuary shall have the
right to make use thereof in accordance with the
purpose for which they are intended, and shall not be
obliged to return them at the termination of the
usufruct except in their condition at that time, but he
shall be obliged to indemnify the owner for any
deterioration they may have suffered by reason of his
fraud or negligence.
18. Effect of deterioration:
1. If due to normal use, usufructuary is not
liable; he can return them in the condition
that they may be at the termination of the
usufruct. There is no necessity for him to
make the necessary reparations to restore
them to their former condition.
2. If due to fortuitous event: usufructuary is
obliged to make the necessary and
ordinary repairs.
3. If due to fraud: responsible for the
damages caused by reason of his
fraudulent action, but the damages may
be offsetted against improvements under
Art. 580.
Effect of failure to return the thing
constituted in usufruct: Accdg. to Paras,
usufructuary must pay for their value.
Value at the time the usufruct is
terminated.
ARTICLE 574: Whenever the usufruct includes things
which cannot be used without being consumed, the
usufructuary shall have the right to make use of them
under the obligation of paying their appraised value at
the termination of the usufruct, if they were appraised
when delivered. In case they were not appraised, he
shall have the right to return the same quantity and
quality, or pay their current price at the time the
usufruct ceases.
This is called abnormal usufruct on
consumable things. What are the rules?
The usufruct can use them as if he is the
owner. Ex. rice, one can eat rice
But at the end of the usufruct, he must:
1. pay the appraised value (appraised when
the 1st delivered);
2. if there was no appraisal, return the same
kind, quality, and quantity or pay the
price current at the termination of the
usufruct.
ARTICLE 575: The usufructuary of fruit-bearing trees
and shrubs may make use if the dead trunks, and even
if those cut off or uprooted by accident, under the
obligation to replace them with new plants.
ARTICLE 576: If in consequence of a calamity or
extraordinary event, the trees or shrubs shall have
disappeared in such considerable number that it would
not be possible or it would be too burdensome to replace
them, the usufructuary may leave the dead, fallen or
uprooted trunks at the disposal of the owner, and
demand that the latter remove them and clear the land.
ARTICLE 577: The usufructuary of woodland may
enjoy all the benefits which it may produce according
to its nature.
If the woodland is a corpse or consists of
timber for building, the usufructuary may do such
ordinary cutting or felling as the owner was in the
habit of doing, and in default of this, he may do so in
accordance with the custom of the place, as to the
manner, amount and season.
In any case the felling or cutting of trees shall
be made in such manner as not to prejudice the
preservation of the land.
In nurseries, the usufructuary may make the
necessary thinnings in order that the remaining trees
may properly grow.
With exception of the provisions of the
preceding paragraphs, the usufructuary cannot cut
down trees, unless it be to restore or improve some of
the things in usufruct, and in such case he shall first
inform the owner of the necessity for the work.
Special usufructuary in woodland
General right: may enjoy all the benefits
which it may produce according to its
nature.
Specific rights:
1. If the woodland is a corpse (in the
thicket of small trees) or consists
of timber for building he may do
such ordinary cutting or felling as
the owner was in the habit of
doing. He does not have
generally the right to cut timber,
but if the owner did it he can do
what the owner did. Thats it.
In default of this, he may
do so in accordance with
the custom of the place,
as to the manner, amount
and season.
2. If there is nursery, the
usufructuary may make the
necessary thinnings in order that
the remaining trees may properly
grow.
577 provides for the prohibition:
1. With the exception of the specific
rights, he cannot cut down trees
unless it be to restore or improve
some of the things in usufruct,
and in such case he shall first
inform the owner of the necessity
for the work;
2. He cannot alienate the trees.
Remember in the usufruct of
woodland the trees are not
considered the fruit.
ARTICLE 578: The usufructuary of an action to
recover real property or a real right, or movable
property, has the right to bring the action and to oblige
the owner thereof to give him the authority for this
purpose and to furnish him whatever proof he may
have. If in consequence of the enforcement of the action
he acquires the thing claimed, the usufruct shall be
limited to the fruits, the dominion remaining with the
owner.
This is a special usufruct of an action to
recover thru the courts or legal processes.
What is supposed to be recovered here?
1. recovery of real property
2. recovery of movable property
The right to file a case for accion
publiciana, forcible entry, replevin.
What are the rights of the usufructuary if
the right is given to him to recover?
1. The right to bring the action. Meaning he
will be the one to file the action
2. To oblige the owner thereof to give him
the authority for this purpose. (so you
need an SPA);
3. To furnish him whatever proof needed for
the action (any evidence or proof should
be passed on to the usufructuary).
19. Lets go to procedure here. How is the action
instituted, under whose name? In the name of
the usufructuary. What does the authority
require?
1. If it is for the recovery of
property, he is still required of
SPA under 578;
2. If it is only to object or prevent
disturbance over the property, no
need.
20. What happen if there is judgement? Na-
recover na nila ang propertynaked
ownership will belong to the owner; the
usufruct to recover will be transformed over
the thing recovered. The usufruct will now be
over the thing acquired.
ARTICLE 579: The usufructuary may make on the
property held in usufruct such useful improvements or
expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem proper,
provided he does not alter its form or substance; but he
shall have no right to be indemnified therefore. He may,
however, remove such improvements, should it be
possible to do so without damage to the property.
ARTICLE 580: The usufructuary may set off the
improvements he may have made on the property
against any damage to the same.
Requisites before set off can be made:
1. damage must caused by the
usufructuary;
2. The improvements must have
augmented the value of the
property.
ARTICLE 581: The owner of the property the usufruct
of which is held by another, may alienate it, but he
cannot alter its form and substance or do anything
thereon which may be prejudicial to the usufructuary.
ARTICLE 582: The usufructuary of a part of a thing
held in common shall exercise all the rights pertaining
to the owner thereof with respect to the administration
and the collection of fruits or interest. Should the co-
ownership cease by reason of the division of the thing
held in common, the usufruct of the part allotted to the
co-owner shall belong to the usufructuary.
Effect of partition: The usufructuary shall
continue to have usufruct over the part
allotted to the co-owner concerned. His
rights as a usufructuary are not affected.
OBLIGATIONS OF THE
USUFRUCTUARY
ARTICLE 583: The usufructuary, before entering upon
the enjoyment of the property is obliged:
To make, after notice to the owner or his legitimate
representative, an inventory of all the property, which
shall contain an appraisal of the movables and a
description of the condition of the immovables;
To give security, binding himself to fulfill the
obligations imposed upon him in accordance with this
Chapter.
When is the inventory required?
1. When no one will be injured
thereby (ex: to collect periodic
pension);
2. when there is stipulation to the
usufruct agreement
3. if it is not in the will
ARTICLE 584: The provisions of No.2 of the preceding
article shall not apply to the donor who has reserved
the usufruct of the property donated, or to the parents
who are usufructuaries of their childrens property,
except when the parents contract a second marriage.
ARTICLE 585: The usufructuary, whatever may be the
titled of the usufruct, may be exercised from the
obligation of making an inventory or of giving
security, when no one will be injured thereby.
Exceptions to the giving of security:
1. shall not apply to the donor who
has reserved the usufruct of the
property donated.
Ex. A will donate the ownership of a building to
his son, but he will reserve the usufruct to himself
so he still can collect rent.
2. To the parents who are
usufructuaries of their childrens
property except when the parent
contracts 2nd marriage
3. When there is caucion juratoria.
ARTICLE 586: Should the usufructuary fail to give
security in the cases in which he is bound to give it, the
owner may demand that the immovables be placed
under administration, that the movables be sold, that
the public bonds, instruments of credit payable to order
or to bearer be converted into registered certificates or
deposited in a bank or public institution, and that the
capital or sums in cash and the proceeds of the sale of
the movable property be invested in safe securities.
The interest on the proceeds of the sale of the
movables and that in public securities and bonds, and
the proceeds of the property placed under
administration, shall belong to the usufructuary.
Furthermore, the owner may, if he so prefers,
until the usufructuary gives security or is excused
from so doing, retain in his possession the property in
usufruct as administrator, subject to the obligation to
deliver to the usufructuary the net proceeds thereof,
after deducting the sums which may be agreed upon or
judicially allowed him for such administration.
Effect of failing to give security unless
exempted:
- On the part of the naked owner, he may
still opt:
a. to transfer the property to the
usufructuary despite failure to give
required security;
b. but even if delivery is made, the
naked owner may still later demand
the required security, unless he has
waived his right.
c. He may also demand that the
immovable be placed under
administration in favor of another
person.
d. He may demand that all the movables
be sold.
e. He may opt to retain the property
until after the security required is
posted.
- On the part of the usufructuary:
a. He cannot enter into the enjoyment of
the property. 2. He cannot posses, he
cannot enjoy, until he gives the
security.
 b. He cannot compel the naked owner Should the usufructuary fail to make them after
that he be appointed as administrator demand by the owner, the latter may make them at the
in the meantime he cannot post the expense of the usufructuary.
security.
c. He cannot collect maturing credits or Repairs must be ordinary.
make investments per securities or
credits without the consent of the REQUISITES FOR REPAIR:
naked owner. 1. must be required by wear and tear due to
the natural use of the thing;
Caucion juratoria. This is a special usufruct, a 2. must be indispensable for its
promise under oath, a sworn duty to take good preservation;
care of the property and return the same at the 3. must have occurred during the usufruct
end of the usufruct. This promise will take the
place of the security. It is based on necessity and 593: Extraordinary repairs shall be at the expense of
humanity. the owner. The usufructuary is obliged to notify the
owner when the need for such repairs is urgent.
Caution Juratoria
A sworn duty to: ARTICLE 594: If the owner should make the
- take good care of the property and extraordinary repairs, he shall have a right to demand
- return the same at the end of the usufruct of the usufructuary the legal interest on the amount
expended for the time that the usufruct lasts.
Caucion Juratoria only applies to: Should he not make them when they are
1. furniture necessary for the use of indispensable for the preservation of the thing, the
the usufructuary; usufructuary may make them; but he shall have a right
2. the house which his family may to demand of the owner, at the termination of the
live; usufruct, the increase in value which the immovable
3. tools and implements and other may have acquired by reason of the repairs.
movables necessary for an
industry or vocation which the ARTICLE 595: The owner may construct any works
and make any improvements of which the immovable in
usufructuary is engaged.
usufruct is susceptible, or make new plantings thereon
if it be rural, provided that such acts do not cause a
ARTICLE 588: After the security has been given by
diminution in the value of the usufruct or prejudice the
the usufructuary, he shall have right to all the proceeds
right of the usufructuary.
and benefits from the day on which in accordance with
the title constituting the usufruct, he should have
21. KINDS OF EXTRAORDINARY REPAIRS:
commenced to receive them.
1) Those caused by NATURAL use but
NOT NEEDED for preservation by
ARTICLE 589: The usufructuary shall take case of the
implication.
things given in usufruct as a good father of a family.
2) Those caused by ABNORMAL or
ARTICLE 590: A usufructuary who alienates or EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
leases his right if usufruct shall answer for any damage and NEEDED for preservation (as
which the things in usufruct may suffer thru the fault when as earthquake renders the stairs
or negligence of the person who substitutes him. of a house unsafe).
3) Those caused by ABNORMAL or
ARTICLE 591: If the usufruct be constituted on a EXCEPTIONAL but are NOT
flock or herd of livestock, the usufructuary shall be NEEDED for preservation.
obliged to replace with the young thereof the animals
that die each year from natural causes or lost due to the 22. REQUISITES BEFORE USUFRUCTUARY
rapacity of beasts of prey. IS ALLOWED TO MAKE
If the animals on which the usufruct is EXTRAORDINARY REPAIRS:
constituted should all perish, without the fault if the 1) There must be due notification to
usufructuary, on account of some contagious disease or naked owner of urgency.
any other uncommon event, the usufructuary shall 2) The naked owner failed to make
fulfill his obligation by delivering to the owner the them.
remains which may have been saved from the 3) The repair is needed for preservation.
misfortune.
Should the usufruct be on sterile animals, it 23. RIGHTS OF USUFRUCTUARY WHO HAS
shall be considered, with respect to its effects, as though MADE EXTRAORDINARY REPAIRS
constituted in fungible things. 1) Get increase in value or
reimbursement of expenses
ARTICLE 592: The usufructuary is obliged to make 2) Right of retention until paid;
the ordinary repairs needed by the thing given in reimbursement is to be made only at
usufruct. the end of the usufruct.
By ordinary repairs are understood such as
are required by the wear and tear due to the natural use RULES:
if the thing and are indispensable for its preservation.
 1. If caused by ordinary repairs but not
needed for preservation, the naked owner
shall bear the expenses, but then the
usufructuary may not compel the naked
owner to make them.
2. Abnormal/exceptional circumstances but
needed for preservation-- borne by the
naked owner.
abnormal/exceptional
circumstances but is not needed
for preservation: again it is borne
by the naked owner, and he may
not be compelled to make them.
ARTICLE 596: The payment of annual charges and
taxes and those considered as a lien on the fruits shall
be at the expense of the usufructuary for all the time
that the usufruct lasts.
Although the property is in the
possession of the usufructuary, the naked
owner may still
1. construct works
2. make improvements
3. make new plantings
PROVIDED:
The value of the usufruct is not
diminished; or
The right of the usufructuary is not
prejudiced
EFFECT OF INCREASE IN THE VALUE
OF THE USUFRUCT:
1. The usufructuary profits be said increase
(for he will still be entitled to the use and
fruits thereof).
2. The usufructuary does not have to pay
legal interest on the improvement.
Reason: this was a voluntary act of the
naked owner.
ARTICLE 597: The taxes which, during the usufruct
may be imposed directly on the capital, shall be at the
expense of the owner.
If the latter has paid them, the usufructuary
shall pay him the proper interest on the sums which
may have been paid in that character, and if the said
sums have been advanced by the usufructuary, he shall
recover the amount thereof at the termination of the
usufruct.
WHAT CHARGES OR TAXES THE
USUFRUCTUARY MUST PAY:
The usufructuary should pay for:
1. the annual charges on the fruits
2. the annual taxes on the fruits
3. annual taxes on the land.
The SC had ruled that taxes and charges
should be paid by the usufructuary only
when they can be considered as liens on
the fruits. It is a well-settled rule that real
property tax, being a burden upon the
capital, should be paid by the owner of
the land, and not by a usufructuary.
ARTICLE 598: If the usufruct be constituted on the
whole patrimony, and if at the time of its constitution
the owner has debts, the provisions of Art. 758 and 759
relating to donations shall be applied, both with respect
to the maintenance of the usufruct and to the obligation
of the usufructuary to pay such debts.
The same rule shall be applied in case the
owner is obliged at the time the usufruct is constituted
to make periodical payments, even if there should be no
known capital.
This article deals with universal usufruct.
SITUATION:
The usufruct is constituted on the whole
patrimony;
The naked owner has debts or is required
to make periodic payments
If there is a stipulation, the usufructuary
shall pay the debts but only those debts
incurred prior to the constitution of
usufruct and up to the value of the
property.
If there being no stipulation regarding the
payment of debts, the usufructuary shall
be responsible only when the usufruct has
been made in fraud of the creditors.
When the usufruct imposes upon the
usufructuary the obligation to pay the
debts of the usufruct, if the clause does
not contain any declaration to the
contrary, the former is understood to be
liable to pay only the debts which appear
to have been previously contracted. In no
case shall the usufructuary be responsible
fro debts exceeding the value of the
property, unless the contrary intention
appears.
ARTICLE 599: The usufructuary may claim any
matured credits which from part of the usufruct if he
has given or gives the proper security. If he has been
excused from giving security or has not been able to
give it, or if that given is not sufficient, he shall need
the authorization of the owner, or of the court in
default thereof, to collect such credits.
The usufructuary who has given security may
use the capital he has collected in any manner he may
deem proper. The usufructuary who has not given
security shall invest the said capital at interest upon
agreement with the owner; in default of such
agreement, with judicial authorization; and, in every
case, with security sufficient to preserve the integrity of
the capital in usufruct.
RULES ON USUFRUCT OF A MATURED
CREDIT:
If usufruct has given security, collection
and investment can be done without the
approval of the court or of the naked
owner.
If usufructuary has not given security, or
when he is exempted, or when there is
only caucion juratoria, a collection and
 investment can be done only with the
approval of the court or the naked owner.
ARTICLE 600: The usufructuary of a mortgaged
immovable shall not be obliged to pay the debt for the
security of which the mortgage was constituted.
Should the immovable be attached or sold
judicially for the payment of debt, the owner shall be
liable to the usufructuary for whatever the latter may
lose by reason thereof.
ARTICLE 601: The usufructuary shall be obliged to
notify the owner of any act of a 3rd person, of which he
may have knowledge, that may be prejudicial to the
rights of ownership, and he shall be liable should he not
do so, for damages, as if they had been caused thru his
own fault.
NOTIFICATION. The usufructuary should notify
the owner of any acts of 3rd person which is
prejudicial to ownership if he has knowledge.
Failure to do so, he shall be liable for damages as
if it is his fault.
WHEN NOTIFICATION BY THE
USUFRUCTUARY IS REQUIRED:
1. If a 3rd party commits acts prejudicial to
the rights of ownership;
2. If urgent repairs are needed;
3. If an inventory at the beginning of the
usufruct is to be made.
ARTICLE 602: The expenses, costs, liabilities is suits
brought with regard to the usufruct shall be borne by
the usufructuary.
ARTICLE 603: Usufruct is extinguished:
1. By the death if the usufructuary, unless a
contrary intention clearly appears;
2. By the expiration of the period for which it
was constituted or by the fulfilment of any
resolutory condition provided in the title
creating the usufruct;
3. By merger if the usufruct and ownership in
the same person;
4. By renunciation of the usufructuary;
5. By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
6. By the termination of the right of the person
constituting the usufruct;
7. By prescription.
Instances of Extinguishment:
a. Death of the usufructuary except:
1. Art. 611 A usufruct constituted in
favor of several persons living at
the time of its constitution shall
not be extinguished until the
death of the last survivor.
2. ARTICLE 606: A usufruct
granted for the time that may
elapse before a 3rd person attains
a certain age, shall subsist for the
number of years specified, even if
the 3rd person shou;d die before
the period expires, unless such
usufruct has been expressly
granted only in consideration of
the existence of such person.
b. Expiration of the period or fulfilment
of any resolutory condition;
c. Merger of the usufruct and ownership
in the same person. (Chinguen case);
d. renunciation of the usufructuary;
e. merger of the usufruct and the naked
owner in one person;
f. renunciation or waiver by the
usufructuary;
g. total loss of the thing in usufruct;
h. prescription; acquisition by a stranger
[through acquisitive prescription, the
rights either of the usufruct or the
naked ownership;
i. annulment, rescission, mutual
waiver/withdrawal;
j. in cases of parental usufruct ends
when the minor child reaches the age
of majority. Automatically the parents
cease to become the usufructuary of
the minor child's properties.
ARTICLE 604: If the thing given in usufruct should
be lost only in part, the right shall continue on the
remaining part.
ARTICLE 605: Usufruct cannot be constituted in
favor of a town, corporation, or association for more
than fifty years. If it has been constituted, and before
the expiration of such period the town is abandoned, or
the corporation or association is dissolved, the usufruct
shall be extinguished by reason thereof.
ARTICLE 606: A usufruct granted for the time that
may elapse before a 3rd person attains a certain age,
shall subsist for the number of years specified, even if
the 3rd person shou;d die before the period expires,
unless such usufruct has been expressly granted only
in consideration of the existence of such person.
ARTICLE 607: If the usufruct is constituted in
immovable property of which a building forms part,
and the latter should be destroyed in any manner
whatsoever, the usufructuary shall have a right to make
use of the land and the materials.
The same rule shall be applied if the usufruct
is constituted on a building only and the same should
be destroyed. But in such case, if the owner should
wish to construct another building, he shall have a
right to occupy the land and to make use of the
materials, being obliged to pay to the usufructuary,
during the continuance of the usufruct, the interest
upon the sum equivalent to the value of the land and of
the materials.
Usufruct constituted over the land and
the building and usufruct constituted
over the building alone.
Usufruct constituted over both the
building and the land, and the
building is destroyed before the
usufruct end, With respect to the
 building, the usufruct is
extinguished [total loss] but with
respect to the land, the usufruct
continues over the same, and the
usufructuary is even entitled to the
use of whatever materials is left of
the building.
In case of rebuilding, the naked
owner wants to construct, to rebuild,
but the usufructuary refuses, The
usufructuary's decision prevails
because he has still the right to make
use of the land and the enjoyment
thereof for the remainder of the
period
If a new building is constructed
with the consent of the usufructuary,
In the absence of any agreement, the
reconstruction alone of the building
does not gives rise to a continued
usufruct over the new building since
the former usufruct has been
extinguished, and the same cannot
be revived by mere reconstruction.
But then the usufructuary is entitled
to legal interest for the use of the
land, because the usufruct still
continues with respect to the land,
for the remainder of the period.
If the usufruct is constituted on
the building alone, and the building
is destroyed, the usufruct over the
building is extinguished but the
usufruct may still continue with
respect to the land. Although there is
no usufruct over the land, you
cannot erase the fact that when the
usufruct was constituted over the
building, automatically he is entitled
to the use and enjoyment of the land
on which the building has been
constructed. So he [usufructuary] has
the right to continue with the
enjoyment of the land.
The difference is that the naked
owner may construct a new building
on the land with or without the
consent of the usufructuary. But the
naked owner is obliged to pay the
usufructuary interest upon the sum
equivalent to the value of the land
and the materials.
ARTICLE 608: If the usufructuary shares with the
owner the insurance if the tenement given in the
usufruct, the former shall, in case of loss, continue in
the enjoyment of the new building, should one be
constructed, or shall receive the interest on the
insurance indemnity if the owner does nit wish to
rebuild.
Should the usufructuary have refused to
contribute to the insurance, the owner insuring the
tenement alone, the latter shall receive the full amount
of the insurance indemnity in case of loss, saving
always the right granted to the usufructuary in the
preceding article.
ABSENCE OF SHARING OF INSURANCE
PREMIUM:
Building alone:
1. Naked owner is entitled to the
full proceeds of the insurance
indemnity.
2. Naked owner may rebuild w/ or
w/o consent of usufructuary.
3. No usufruct over the new
building, but usufructuary is
entitled to interest on the value of
the land and materials.
Building and land:
1. usufruct continues with respect to
the land and materials;
2. Naked owner cannot rebuild over
the objection of the usufructuary.
3. if naked owner rebuilds w/ or
w/o consent of usufructuary,
there is no usufruct over the new
building but he is liable to pay the
usufructuary over the land and
materials.
SHARING OF INSURANCE PREMIUM
[in case of REBUILDING]:
Building alone:
1. usufruct as to the new building
continues;
2. if the naked owner wants to
rebuild and the usufructuary
objects, the naked owner prevails
bec. there is no usufruct over the
land;
Building and land:
1. usufruct as to the new building
continues;
2. if the naked owner wants to
rebuild and the usufructuary
objects, the naked owner prevails
bec. there is no usufruct over the
land;
[in case of NO REBUILDING]:
Building alone:
1. Naked owner receives the
proceeds of the insurance but
should pay the usufructuary
interest for the remainder of the
period.
Building and land:
1. Naked owner receives the
proceeds of the insurance but
 usufruct continues over the land
and the materials left.
2. Naked owner gets the proceeds of
the insurance, but should pay the
usufructuary interest.
ARTICLE 609: Should the thing in usufruct be
expropriated for public use, the owner shall be obliged
either to replace it with another thing of the same value
and if similar conditions, or to pay the usufructuary
the legal interest on the amount if the indemnity fir the
whole period of the usufruct. If the owner chooses the
latter alternative, he shall give security for the payment
of the interest.
Rules in Cases of Expropriation
1. if the naked owner ALONE was
given the indemnity, he has the
option to:
a. replace the
expropriated thing w/
an equivalent thing
b. pay the usufructuary
legal interest on the
indemnity. But this
option requires that the
naked owner give
security for the
payment of the interest
2. If BOTH the naked owner and the
usufructuary were separately
given indemnity:
each owns the indemnity
given to him
the usufruct being
extinguished
3. If the usufructuary ALONE was
given indemnity:
a. he must give it to the
naked owner and compel
the naked owner to pay
him interest or replace
the property
b. he may even deduct the
interest himself if the
naked owner fails to
object.
ARTICLE 610: A usufruct is not extinguished by bad
use if the thing in usufruct; but if the abuse should
cause considerable injury to the owner, the latter may
demand that the thing be delivered to him, binding
himself to pay annually to the usufructuary the net
proceeds of the same, after deducting the expenses and
the compensation which may be allowed him for its
administration.
- Effects of Bad Use:
1. If it does Not cause considerable injury to
naked owner:
a. the usufruct continues
b. the naked owner cannot demand
administration by himself
2. If it causes considerable injury to the
naked owner:
a. the usufruct continues;
b. the naked owner can demand
deliver to him or administration
by him;
c. but naked owner is obliged to pay
the net proceeds to usufructuary;
d. naked owner gets the
administration fee and expenses.
ARTICLE 611: A usufruct constituted in favor of
several persons living at the time of its constitution
shall not be extinguished until the death of the last
survivor.
Rules in Case of Multiple Usufruct
a. If constituted simultaneously the
death of the last survivor terminates
the usufruct;
b. If constituted successively the death
of the last survivor terminates the
usufruct.
ARTICLE 612: Upon the termination of the usufruct,
the thing in usufruct shall be delivered to the owner,
without prejudice to the right of retention pertaining to
the usufructuary or his heirs for taxes and
extraordinary expenses which should be reimbursed.
After the delivery had been made, the security or
mortgage shall be cancelled.
Rights and Obligations at the Termination of the
USUFRUCT
1. Usufructuary
a. must return the property to the naked
owner
b. but he has rights:
a. To retain the property until he
has been reimbursed for the taxes
on capital advanced by him
and/or for the extraordinary
repairs and expenses insofar as
there has been an increase in the
value.
b. To remove improvements or to
set-off against the damage.
2. Naked Owner Must:
a. cancel the security or mortgage
provided the usufructuary has
complied with his obligations;
b. in case of rural leases, respect the
leases made by the usufructuary
until the end of the agricultural
year;
c. make reimbursements to the
usufructuary in the proper cases.
EASEMENTS
- There are two (2) general kinds of
easements under the first 2 provisions.
Easement and servitude under the civil
codethey are one and the same. There is
a difference with respect to common law
civil law but thats not our concern.
 DIFFERENT KINDS OF EASEMENT
ARTICLE 613: An easement or servitude is an
encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the
benefit of another immovable belonging to a different
owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement
is established is called the dominant estate; that which
is subject thereto, the servient estate.
- It is an encumbrance imposed on an
immovable.
- There is no easement imposed upon
immovables belonging to the same
person.
- The dominant estate and the servient
estate are owned by different persons.
- The term immovables must be construed
in its common and not legal sense.
- Two estates involved:
o The servient estate, which is
burdened by the easement;
o The dominant estate, which is the
one benefited as a result of an
easement.
- If the beneficiary is a community or one
or more persons, the easement is called
personal easement, if the beneficiary is
another immovable it is called a real
easement.
CHARACTERISTICS
1. Real right;
2. Imposable only in another's property and
never in one own's property;
3. It is a form of limitation of ownership.
[Why: because it imposes a restriction in
the enjoyment of one's property.. if you
are the owner of a property, a land for
example and it is burdened by a road
right of way, it is in effect a limitation on
the enjoyment of your property because
you will be allowing somebody else to be
passing on your property. It is a form of
limitation because your enjoyment of
your property is no longer exclusive.]
4. It is inseparable and indivisible, meaning
it cannot be separated from the
immovable on which it is attached. It
cannot be sold separately from the
property;
5. It is intransmissible as a general rule,
unless the tenement affected is also
transmitted or alienated;
6. It is perpetual until extinguished.
ARTICLE 613
BORBAJO vs. HIDDEN VIEW
HOMEOWNERS INC. ET AL.
GR No. 152440. January 31, 2005
The dominant estate cannot be the servient
estate at the same time. One of the
characteristics of an easement is that it can be
imposed only on the property of another,
never on ones own property. An easement
can exist only when the servient and the
dominant estates belong to different owners.
FACTS
Jose C. BONTUYAN together with Lucy,
Georgina, Helen and Vicente Solon, Jr. (the
SOLONs) were the registered owners of a parcel
of agricultural land, covering an area of 13,910 sq.
m. situated at Barangay Bacayan, Cebu City. In
1991, at the instance of BONTUYAN, the property
was surveyed to convert it into a subdivision.
Later, the corresponding subdivision plan, which
showed 3 road lots was submitted to the Cebu
Office of the DENR. The DENR thereafter,
approved the subdivision plan. Meanwhile,
BONTUYAN, in his own behalf and as attorney-
in-fact of the SOLONs and following the
subdivision scheme in the plan, sold the resulting
lots to different individuals, as evidenced by the
Deed of Absolute Sale.
Among the lots sold are the ones which later
became the subject of this case, the three (3) road
lots. The road lots were sold to petitioner
FELICITACION B. BORBAJO and Prescillana B.
Bongo (Bongo). However, they obtained the titles
to the lots more than a month later on 30 July
1991.
Using the advance payments of his lot
purchasers, BONTUYAN proceeded to develop a
subdivision which was later named Hidden View
Subdivision I by its residents and homeowners.
Later, he applied for and secured from the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) a License to Sell.
BORBAJO also decided to develop into a
subdivision the other properties adjacent to
Hidden View Subdivision I which she acquired.
Thus, she applied for and received SSA 674-5-94
issued by the Cebu City Planning and
Development Department covering the adjacent
land to be subdivided into 23 lots. She named this
new subdivision ST Ville Properties. In 1994, she
secured Certificate of Registration for the ST Ville
Properties project and a License to Sell the same
from the HLURB. She also secured a Certificate of
Registration dated for another subdivision project
called Hidden View Subdivision II from the HLURB,
with the corresponding License to Sell issued for
it. The two new subdivision projects were located
at the back of Hidden View Subdivision I.
The residents and homeowners of Hidden
View Subdivision I heard reports to the effect that
BORBAJO had purchased the entire subdivision
from BONTUYAN through an oral agreement.
They also heard that they have no right to use the
road lots, since the lots have already been
registered in BORBAJOs name. As a
consequence, the Hidden View Homeowners, Inc.
invited BORBAJO to a meeting. When confronted
by the homeowners about her claim that she had
bought the subdivision from BONTUYAN,
BORBAJO confirmed her claim of ownership over
the subdivision and the road lots. She also told
them that they have no right regarding the road
right-of-way.
In 1997, the homeowners caused the
construction of a guardhouse at the entrance of
Hidden View Subdivision I and hired the services of
a security guard to prevent unauthorized persons
and construction vehicles from passing through
their subdivision. The measures adversely
affected the residents of the subdivisions at the
back, as well as BORBAJO herself since her
delivery trucks and heavy equipment used in the
construction of her housing projects then on-
going had been effectively prevented from
passing through the road lots.
Then, BORBAJO filed before the RTC of
Cebu City an action for damages and injunction
against respondents HIDDEN VIEW
HOMEOWNERS, INC. ET AL for the latters acts
of preventing her delivery trucks and other
construction vehicles, and her construction
workers, from passing through the road lots.
The trial court ruled in favor of BORBAJO.
On appeal however by HIDDEN VIEW
HOMEOWNERS INC. ET AL with the Court of
Appeals, the decision of the RC was reversed for
lack of legal and factual bases. It held that
BORBAJO had not complied with the requisites of
a compulsory easement of right-of-way and
pointed out the general rule that mere
convenience for the dominant estate is not what is
required by law as the basis for setting up a
compulsory easement.
Hence, this appeal by BORBAJO. BORBAJO
contended that she was entitled to the injunctive
relief considering that she was the registered
owner of the road lots in question and hence, she
had a right in esse which deserves legal
protection.
On the other hand, HIDDEN VIEW
HOMEOWNERS INC. ET AL. contended that
BORBAJO fraudulently obtained her titles to the
road lots through a falsified deed of sale which
was the document presented to the Office of the
Register of Deeds. They also averred that
notwithstanding the registration of the subject
road in BORBAJOs name, her title thereto was
tainted by the discovery of fraud she allegedly
perpetrated in securing the questioned titles.
ISSUE
Whether or not HIDDEN VIEW
HOMEOWNERS INC. ET AL. had the right to
close the road.
RULING
NO, they did not have the right to do so.
As a registered co-owner of the road lots,
BORBAJO is entitled to avail of all the attributes
of ownership under the Civil Codejus utendi,
fruendi, abutendi, disponendi et vindicandi. Article
428 of the New Civil Code is explicit that the
owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a
thing, without other limitations than those
established by law. A co-owner, such as
BORBAJO, is entitled to use the property owned
in common under Article 486 of the Civil Code.
Therefore, respondents cannot close the road
lots to prevent BORBAJO from using the same.
As to the alleged perpetration of BORBAJO
in securing the questioned titles, the court upheld
the efficiency value of said titles for purposes of
the present petition, without prejudice to any
future determination by appropriate forum on the
legality of BORBAJOs titles over the road lots.
Verily, a separate case for annulment of titles over
the road lots was then pending before the court.
There were serious allegations that the issuance of
the TCTs over the road lots was tainted with
fraud as evidenced by alterations made on the
face of the certificates and discrepancies in the
records of the contract of absolute sale filed before
the Office of the Register of Deeds and the
Notarial Division of the RTC of Cebu City. If the
court finds that the titles of BORBAJO were
obtained fraudulently, her right to the road lots
ceases as well as her right-of-way by virtue of said
titles.
In the meantime, however, we are bound by
the value in law and the evidentiary weight of the
titles in the name of BORBAJO. As long as the
titles are not annulled, BORBAJO remains
registered a co-owner and therefore her right to
use the road lots subsists.
Likewise, with BORBAJO as a registered co-
owner of the road lots, it is utterly pointless to
discuss whether she is entitled to the easement of
right of way. Both from the text of Article 649 of
the Civil Code and the perspective of elementary
common sense, the dominant estate cannot be the
servient estate at the same time. One of the
characteristics of an easement is that it can be
imposed only on the property of another, never
on ones own property. An easement can exist
only when the servient and the dominant estates
belong to different owners.
BORBAJO, being a registered co-owner of the
3 road lots, is entitled to the injunctive relief.
ARTICLE 614: Servitudes may also established for the
benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to
whom encumbered estate does not belong.
Personal easement only the servient estate is
involved
ARTICLE 615: Easements may be continuous or
discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent.
Continuous easements are those the use of
which are or may be incessant, without the
intervention of any act of man.
Discontinuous easements are those which are
used at intervals and depend upon the acts of man.
Apparent easements are those which are made
known and are continually kept in view by external
signs that reveal the use and enjoyment of the same.
Non-apparent easements are those which show
no external indication of their existence.
CLASSIFICATION OF EASEMENT
I. Accdg. to the Manner by which they are
exercised:
 a. Continuous: the use or exercise of
the easment is or may be
incessant [Incessant meaning
unceasing or without any
interruption], or without the
intervention of any act of man.
EXAMPLE:
Easement of drainage OR Easement of aqueduct.
The fact that water flows into the drainage system
signifies usage of the drainage. But it does not
mean that if there is no water that flows into the
drainage system it is not continuous.
b. Discontinuous: those that are
used at intervals and depend
upon the acts of man.
Example:
Easement of right of way because it can be
exercised only when a man passes or puts his feet
on somebody else's property.
II. According to EXISTENCE (according to
whether or not their existence is indicated)
1. APPARENT: are those which are made known
and are continually kept in view by external signs
that reveal the use and enjoyment of the same.
There are signs that indicate the use and
enjoyment of the easements.
Examples: a dam, a window in a party wall, a
road right of way if there is an alley or a
permanent path.
2. NON APPARENT: opposite of apparent
easements. They show no indication or apparent
sign or indication of their existence.
Example: negative easements like easement of not
building more than a certain height, it may be a
right of way if there is no visible path or alley.
ARTICLE 616: Easements are also positive or
negative.
A positive easement is one which imposes
upon the owner of the servient estate the obligation of
allowing something to be done or of doing it himself,
and a negative easement, that which prohibits the
owner of the servient estate from doing something
which he could lawfully do if the easement did not
exist.
III. According to PURPOSE or the nature of the
limitation:
1. POSITIVE: this is also known as servitude of
sufferance. In positive easements, the owner of
the servient estate allows something to be done on
his property or to do something himself on his
property.
Ex: the duty to cut of the branches of his tree that
extend to another's property. Under the law, he
has the duty to cut off the branches in so far as
they extend to another's property. That is a
positive easement because the law obliges you to
cut them off.
2. NEGATIVE: The owner of a servient estate is
prohibited from doing something which he could
lawfully do where it not for the existence of the
easement.
Example: Easements of light and view or
openings made in one's own wall.
- How to acquire a negative easement? BY
notarial prohibition.
- The easement is acquired 10 years from
the date of notarial prohibition.
IV. ACCORDING TO SOURCE OR ORIGIN
1. voluntary when the parties agree to
create an easement;
2. mixed when partly by agreement and
partly by law;
3. legal when constituted by law
ARTICLE 617: Easements are inseparable from the
estate to which they actively or passively belong.
Consequences of inseparability of easements
1. Easement cannot be sold or donated or
mortgaged independently of the real
property.
2. Registration of the dominant estate under
the Torrens system without the
registration of the voluntary easement in
its favor, does not extinguish the
easement; but registration of the servient
estate w/o the registration of the
easements burdening it extinguishes said
voluntary easements
CASE OF PURGANAN V PAREDES
Purganan owns the servient estate; Paredes owns
the dominant estate. There was an annotation in
the title of the servient estate that Paredes has an
easement of drainage. Since there was an
annotation, the buyer has to recognize the
easement
SOLID MANILA CORP. vs. BIO HONG TRAD.
GR No. 90596. April 8, 1991.
The sale of the property in favor of BIO
HONG did include the alley because it cannot
be separated from the tenement and maintain
an independent existence. Servitudes are
merely accessories to the tenements of which
they form part. Although they are possessed of
a separate juridical existence, as mere
accessories, they cannot, however, be alienated
from the tenement, or mortgaged separately.
FACTS
 Petitioner MANILA SOLID MANILA CORP.
was the registered owner of a parcel of land
located in Ermita, Manila. The same lies near
another parcel of land, registered in the name of
private respondent BIO HONG TRADING CO.,
INC.
BIO HONG's title came from a prior owner
and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto
reserved as an easement of way the following: (1)
914 sq. m. of which was converted into a private
alley for the benefit of neighboring estates and (2)
179 sq. m. had actually been expropriate, and
developed by the City Government pursuant to
the beautification drive of the Metro Manila
Governor.
As a consequence, an annotation was entered
in BIO HONG's title concerning the construction
of a private alley from Concepcion Street to the
interior of the aforesaid property with the plan
and specification duly approved by the City
Engineer subject to several conditions. One of the
conditions was that the owner of the lot on which
the alley has been constructed shall allow the
public to use the same.
SOLID MANILA claimed that ever since, it
and as well as other residents of neighboring
estates, had made use of the above private alley
and maintained and contributed to its upkeep,
until sometime in 1983, when, and over its
protests, BIO HONG constructed steel gates that
precluded unhampered use. Hence, in 1984,
SOLID MANILA commenced suit for injunction
against BIO HONG, to have the gates removed
and to allow full access to the easement.
The court a quo shortly issued ex parte an
order directing BIO HONG to open the gates.
Later, the trial court rendered judgment against
BIO HONG.
Thereafter, BIO HONG appealed to the
respondent COURT OF APPEALS, which
reversed the trial court decision. In favoring BIO
HONG, it held that an easement is a mere
limitation on ownership and that it does not
impair BIO HONG's title, and that since BIO
HONG had acquired title to the property,
"merger" brought about an extinguishment of the
easement.
Hence, this appeal by SOLID MANILA. The
corporation submitted that the very deed of sale
executed between BIO HONG and the previous
owner of the property "excluded" the alley in
question, and that in any event, the intent of the
parties was to retain the "alley" as an easement
notwithstanding the sale.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the alley in question was
excluded from the sale of the property to BIO
HONG.
(2) Whether or not there was a merger in the
person of BIO HONG. [applicable to Articles 614
and 631]
RULING
(1) No, it was not excluded. The sale of the
property in favor of BIO HONG did include the
alley because it cannot be separated from the
tenement and maintain an independent existence.
Article 617 states that Easements are inseparable
from the estate to which they actively or passively
belong.
Servitudes are merely accessories to the
tenements of which they form part. Although they
are possessed of a separate juridical existence, as
mere accessories, they cannot, however, be
alienated from the tenement, or mortgaged
separately.
The fact, however, that the alley in question,
as an easement, is inseparable from the main lot is
no argument to defeat SOLID MANILA's claims,
because as an easement precisely, it operates as a
limitation on the title of the owner of the servient
estate, specifically, his right to use (jus utendi).
As SOLID MANILA indeed hastens to point
out, the deed itself stipulated that a portion
thereof of the tenement measuring 914 sq. m. had
been converted into a private alley for the benefit
of the neighboring estates. Precisely because of
this, the former owner, in conveying the property,
gave the BIO HONG a discount on account of the
easement, that the purchase price was lowered
from P3,790,440 to P3,503,240.
Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit BIO HONG
did acquire ownership over the property-
including the disputed alley-as a result of the
conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close
that alley or otherwise put up obstructions
thereon and thus prevent the public from using it,
because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to be
open to the public.
(2) NO, there was no genuine merger that
took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of
BIO HONG. Under Article 631 of the Civil Code, a
merger exists when ownership of the dominant
and servient estates is consolidated in the same
person. Merger then, as can be seen, requires full
ownership of both estates.
One thing ought to be noted here, however.
The servitude in question is a personal servitude,
that is to say, one constituted not in favor of a
particular tenement (a real servitude) but rather,
for the benefit of the general public.
Personal servitudes are referred to in Article
614 of the Civil Code, which states that
Servitudes may also be established for the
benefit of a community, or of one or more persons
to whom the encumbered estate does not belong.
In a personal servitude, there is therefore no
"owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and
the easement pertains to persons without a
dominant estate, in this case, the public at large.
Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence
of a prior servient-dominant owner relationship,
and the termination of that relation leaves the
easement of no use. Unless the owner conveys the
property in favor of the public if that is possible
no genuine merger can take place that would
terminate a personal easement.
ARTICLE 618: Easements are indivisible. If the
servient estate is divided between two or more persons,
the easement is not modified, and each of them must
bear it on the part which corresponds to him.
If it is the dominant estate that is divided
between two or more persons, each of the may use the
easement in its entirety, without changing the place of
its use, or making it more burdensome in any other
way.
How are easement established?
ARTICLE 619: Easements are established either by or
by the will of the owners. The former are called legal
and the latter voluntary easement.
SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ vs. RAMISCAL
GR No. 137882. February 04, 2005
Voluntary easements are established by the
will of the owners. In the present case, it was
not proven that RAMISCAL, the owner,
voluntarily granted a right of way in favor of
the SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ.
FACTS
Respondent OLGA RAMISCAL was the
registered owner of a parcel of land located at the
corner of 18th Avenue and Boni Serrano Avenue,
Murphy, Quezon City. Petitioner SPOUSES
ELIZABETH and ALFREDO DE LA CRUZ were
occupants of a parcel of land, with an area of 85
sq. m., located at the back of RAMISCALs
property, which was registered in the name of
Concepcion de la Pea, mother of petitioner
ALFREDO DE LA CRUZ.
RAMISCAL owned a 1.10-meter wide by
12.60-meter long strip of land, which was being
used by the SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ as their
pathway to and from 18th Avenue, the nearest
public highway from their property. SPOUSES
DE LA CRUZ had enclosed the same with a gate,
fence, and roof.
In 1976, RAMISCAL leased her property,
including the building thereon, to Phil. Orient
Motors, which also owned a property adjacent to
that of RAMISCALs. In 1995, Phil. Orient Motors
sold its property to San Benito Realty. After the
sale, Engr. Rafael Madrid prepared a relocation
survey and location plan for both contiguous
properties of RAMISCAL and San Benito Realty.
It was only then that RAMISCAL discovered that
the aforementioned pathway being occupied by
SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ was part of her property.
Immediately, RAMISCAL through a letter,
demanded that SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ demolish
the structure constructed by them on said
pathway without her knowledge and consent.
However, the letter was unheeded by the
SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ. RAMISCAL the former
referred the matter to the Barangay for conciliation
proceedings, but the parties arrived at no
settlement.
Hence, RAMISCAL filed a complaint with
the RTC for the demolition of the structure
allegedly illegally constructed by SPOUSES DE
LA CRUZ on her property. RAMISCAL asserted
that SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ had an existing right
of way to a public highway other than the current
one they were using, which she owns.
On the other hand, SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ
admitted having used a 1.10-meter wide by 12.60-
meter long strip of land on the northern side of
RAMISCALs property as their pathway to and
from 18th Avenue, the nearest public highway
from their property, but claimed that such use
was with the knowledge of RAMISCAL.
The SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ averred that
they were made to sign a document stating that
they waived their right to ask for an easement
along the eastern side of RAMISCALs property
towards Boni Serrano Avenue, which document
was among those submitted in the application for
a building permit by a certain Mang Puling, the
person in charge of the construction of the motor
shop. That was why, according to SPOUSES DE
LA CRUZ, the perimeter wall on RAMISCALs
property was constructed at a distance of 1.10-
meters offset and away from RAMISCALs
property line to provide a passageway for them to
and from 18th Avenue. They maintained in that
RAMISCAL knew all along of the 1.10-meter
pathway and had, in fact, tolerated their use
thereof.
In 1997, the RTC ruled in favor of
RAMISCAL. The appeal of the SPOUSES DE LA
CRUZ with the Court of Appeals was also
dismissed. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE
Whether or not RAMISCAL voluntarily
accorded SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ to an easement
of right of way.
RULING
NO, RAMISCAL did not accord SPOUSES DE
LA CRUZ a right of way. Under Article 619 of the
Civil Code, Easements are established either by
law or by the will of the owners. The former are
called legal and the latter voluntary easements.
RAMISCAL did not make a voluntary easement
in favor of SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ.
The SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ failed to show by
competent evidence other than their bare claim
that they and their tenants, spouses Manuel and
Cecilia Bondoc and Carmelino Masangkay,
entered into an agreement with RAMISCAL,
through her foreman, Mang Puling, to use the
pathway to 18th Avenue, which would be
reciprocated with an equivalent 1.50-meter wide
easement by the owner of another adjacent
estate. The Court did not give credence to such
self-serving claim that such right of way was
voluntarily given them by RAMISCAL for the
following reasons:
First, SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ were unable to
produce any shred of document evidencing such
agreement. The Civil Code is clear that any
transaction involving the sale or disposition of
real property must be in writing. Thus, the dearth
of corroborative evidence opens doubts on the
veracity of the naked assertion of SPOUSES DE
LA CRUZ that indeed the subject easement of
right of way was a voluntary grant from
RAMISCAL.
 Second, as admitted by the SPOUSES DE LA
CRUZ, it was only the foreman, Mang Puling,
who talked with them regarding said pathway on
the northern side of RAMISCALs property.
Thus, petitioner Elizabeth de la Cruz testified that
she did not talk to RAMISCAL regarding the
arrangement proposed to them by Mang Puling
despite the fact that she often saw RAMISCAL. It
is, therefore, foolhardy for SPOUSES DE LA
CRUZ to believe that the alleged foreman of
RAMISCAL had the authority to bind the
RAMISCAL relating to the easement of right of
way.
Third, their explanation that said Mang Puling
submitted said agreement to the Quezon City
Engineers Office, in connection with the
application for a building permit but said office
could no longer produce a copy thereof, does not
inspire belief. As correctly pointed out by the trial
court, SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ should have
requested a subpoena duces tecum from said court
to compel the Quezon City Engineers Office to
produce said document or to prove that such
document is indeed not available.
The fact that the perimeter wall of the
building on RAMISCALs property was
constructed at a distance of 1.10 meters away from
the property line, does not by itself bolster the
veracity of SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ story that
there was indeed such an agreement. Further, as
noted by the trial court, it was Atty. Federico R.
Onandia, counsel of Phil. Orient Motors, who
wrote SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ on 25 August 1994
advising them that his client would close the
pathway along 18th Avenue, thereby implying
that it was Phil. Orient Motors, RAMISCALs
lessee, which tolerated SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ
use of said pathway.
MODES OF ACQUIRING EASEMENT
ARTICLE 620: Continuous and apparent easements
are acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription
of ten years.
Modes of acquiring easements:
1. Continuous and apparent easements are
acquired either by virtue of a title or by
prescription of ten years. Good faith or
bad faith is insignificant
2. Title here means any kind of juridical act
or law sufficient to create the
encumbrance. Example: contract,
donation, testamentary succession
RONQUILLO vs. ROCO
GR No. L-10619. February 28, 1958
The easement of right of way may not be
acquired through prescription.
(NOTE: under Art. 620 of the Civil Code,
continuous and apparent easements may be
already acquired by virtue of prescription of
10 years)
FACTS
Petitioners LHOGARIO RONQUILLO, ET
AL., had been in the continuous and
uninterrupted use of a road or passage way in
going to Igualdad Street and the market place of
Naga City, from their residential land and back,
for more than 20 years. Said road or passage way
traversed the land of VICENTE ROCO Y
DOMINGUEZ, ET AL.
The DEFENDANTS, who were the successors-
in-interest of the late VICENTE ROCO, together
with the latters tenants had long recognized and
respected the private legal easement of road right
of way of RONQUILLO, ET AL. However, in
1953, respondent JOSE ROCO thru his co-
respondent RAYMUNDO MARTINEZ and their
men with malice and with a view to obstructing
the RONQUILLO, ET AL.'s private legal easement
over the property of the late VICENTE ROCO,
started constructing a chapel in the middle of the
said right of way construction. The construction
actually impeded, obstructed and disturbed the
continuous exercise of the rights of the
RONQUILLO, ET AL. over said right of way
In 1954, respondent NATIVIDAD ROCO and
GREGORIO MIRAS, JR. with the approval of
JOSE ROCO and with the help of their men and
laborers, by means of force, intimidation, and
threats, illegally and violently planted wooden
posts, fenced with barbed wire and closed
hermitically the road passage way and their right
of way in question against their protests and
opposition of RONQUILLO, ET AL. The latter
were thereby prevented from going to or coming
from their homes Igualdad Street and the public
market of the City of Naga.
RONQUILLO, ET AL. then filed a complaint
with the CFI. But the said complaint was
dismissed.
Hence, this appeal. RONQUILLO, ET AL.
alleged that they had acquired the easement of
right of way over the land of the DEFENDANTS
and the latter's predecessors in interest, the late
VICENTE ROCO, through prescription by their
continuous and uninterrupted use of a narrow
strip of land of the ROCO as passage way or road
in going to Igualdad Street and the public market
of Naga City, from their residential land or
houses, and return for a period of 20 years.
ISSUE
Whether RONQUILLO, ET. AL. had acquired
the easement of right of way through prescription.
RULING
NO, they have not acquired the easement of
right of way through prescription.
An easement of right of way though it may be
apparent is, nevertheless, discontinuous or
intermittent and, therefore, cannot be acquired
through prescription, but only by virtue of a title.
Under the Old as well as the New Civil Code,
easements may be continuous or discontinuous
(intermittent),apparent or non-apparent,
discontinuous being those used at more or less
long intervals and which depend upon acts of
man (then Articles 532 and 615 of the Old and
New Civil Codes, respectively). Continuous and
apparent easements are acquired either by title or
prescription, continuous non-apparent easements
and discontinuous ones whether apparent or not,
may be acquired only by virtue of a title (then
Articles 537 and 539, and 620 and 622 of the Old
and New Civil Codes, respectively).
Both Manresa and Sanchez Roman are of the
opinion that the easement of right of way is a
discontinuous one. Under the provisions of the
Civil Code, old and new, particularly the articles
thereof aforecited, it would therefore appear that
the easement of right of way may not be acquired
through prescription. Even Article 1959 of the Old
Civil Code providing for prescription of
ownership and other real rights in real property,
excludes therefrom the exception established by
Article 622 (then Article 539), referring to
discontinuous, easements, such as, easement of
right of way.
It is evident, therefore, that no vested right by
user from time immemorial had been acquired by
RONQUILLO, ET AL. at the time the Civil Code
took effect. Under Article 622 of the Code, (then
Article 539) no discontinuous easement could be
acquired by prescription in any event.
However, in the case of Municipality of
Dumangas vs. Bishop of Jaro, this same Tribunal
held that the continued use by the public of a path
over land adjoining the Catholic church in going
to and from said ,Church through its side door,
has given the church the right to such use by
prescription, and that because of said use by the
public, an easement of right of way over said land
has been acquired by prescription, not only by the
church, but also by the public, which without
objection or protest on the part of the owner of
said land, had continually availed itself of the
easement.
The minority of which the writer of this
opinion is a part, believes that the easement of
right of way may now be acquired through
prescription, at least since the introduction into
this jurisdiction of the special law on prescription
through the Old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No.
190. Said law, Particularly, Section' 41 thereof,
makes no distinction as to the real rights which
are subject to Prescription, and there would
appear to be no valid reason, at least to the writer
of this opinion, why the continued use of a path
or a road or right of way by the party, specially by
the public, for 10 or more, not by mere tolerance
of the owner of the land, but through adverse use
of it, cannot give said party a vested right to such
right of way through prescription.
However, the opinion of the majority must
prevail, and it is held that under the present law,
particularly, the provisions of the Civil Code, old
and new, unless and until the same is changed or
clarified, the easement of right of way may not be
acquired through prescription.
Note: Today, under Art. 620 of the Civil
Code, continuous and apparent
easements may be already acquired by
virtue of prescription of 10 years.
ARTICLE 621: In order to acquire by prescription the
easements referred to in the preceding article, the time
of possession shall be computed thus: in positive
easements, from the day on which the owner of the
dominant estate, or the person who may have made use
of the easement, commenced to exercise it upon the
servient estate; and in negative easements, from the
day on which the owner of the dominant estate forbade,
by an instrument acknowledged before a notary public,
the owner of the servient estate, from executing an act
which would be lawful without the easement.
- Only continuous and apparent can be
acquired by prescription. A continuous
and apparent easement may be negative
or positive.
- Rules:
1. If the easement is positive begin counting
the period from the day the dominant
estate began to exercise it.
Example:
A window in a partywall, from the day
the opening or window was built.
2. If negative, from the time NOTARIAL
PROHIBITION was made on the
SERVIENT ESTATE.
3. Who makes the notarial prohibition or
who should commence the exercise of the
easement? The dominant estate, thru its
owner or usufructuary or possessor or
legal representative
Example:
A and B are neighbors. On his bldgs wall, A
opened a window beneath the ceiling joists to
admit light in 2002. Even after 10 years (2012), B
may still obstruct the light by constructing on his
own lot a building higher that As unless A makes
a Notarial Prohibition prohibiting B from making
the obstruction. If in 2002, A makes the
prohibition, may B still make the obstruction in
2009?
Ans: Yes, because it is only in 2012 (10 yrs after
the notarial prohibition) when A may be said to
have acquired this NEGATIVE easement of light
and view. If after 2012, B may no longer obstruct.
Bar Questions:
- Is the easement of light and view positive
or negative? Ans. It depends:
- If made on ones own wall and the wall
does not extend over the neighbors land,
easement is negative. To create an
easement, a prohibition is required.
- If made on ones own which extends over
the neighboring land or if made on a
partywall, the easement is created
because of an act of SUFFERANCE or
ALLOWANCE, thus the easement is
positive.
 - May the Easement of Right of Way be
acquired by Prescription? No, because it
is discontinuous or intermittent.
CID vs. JAVIER, ET AL.
GR No. L-14116. June 30, 1960
Negative easements can not be acquired by
less formal means. Hence, the requirement
that the prohibition (the equivalent of the act
of invasion) should be by "a formal act", "an
instrument acknowledged before a notary
public."
FACTS
Respondents IRENE P. JAVIER, ET AL., were
registered owners of a building standing on their
lot with windows overlooking the adjacent lot
owned and registered in the name of petitioner
LAUREANA A. CID. In a case between the two
parties, JAVIER, ET AL. contended that they had
acquired by prescription an enforceable easement
the view and light arising from a verbal
prohibition made by CIDs predecessor-in-interest
to obstruct such view and light, as owner of the
adjoining lot.
The windows in question were admittedly in
JAVIER, ET AL.s own building erected on their
own lot. The easement, if there was any, was
therefore a negative one. Under the then Article
538 (now Art. 621), In order to acquire by
prescription the easements..., the time of the possession
shall be computed, in negative easements, from the
day on which the owner of the dominant estate has, by
a formal act, forbidden the owner of the servient estate
to perform any act which would be lawful without the
easement."
As may be seen, the only question hinges on
the interpretation of the phrase "a formal act". The
lower court and the Court of Appeals considered
any prohibition made by the owner of the
dominant estate, be it oral or written, sufficient
compliance with the law. Both courts so declared
that JAVIER, ET AL. did acquire such easement.
Hence, this appeal by CID.
ISSUE
Whether or not a formal act contemplated by
law may be either written or verbal.
RULING
Neither. The formal act contemplated by law
is not one that is merely written but that which is
notarized.
The law is explicit. It requires not any form of
prohibition, but exacts, in a parenthetical
expression, for emphasis, the doing not only of a
specific, particular act, but a formal act.
"Formal or pertaining to form, characterized
by one due form or order, done in due form or
with a solemnity regular; relating to matters of
form."
"Act In civil law, a writing which states in
legal form that a thing has been done, said or
agreed.
From these definitions, it would appear that
the phrase "formal act" would require not merely
any writing, but one executed in due form and/or
with solemnity. That this is the intendment of the
law although not expressed in exact language is
the reason for the clarification made in Article 621
of the New Civil Code, which specifically
requires the prohibition to be in "an instrument
acknowledged before a notary public". This is as it
should be.
Easements are in the nature of an
encumbrance on the servient estate. They
constitute a limitation of the dominical right of the
owner of the subjected property. Hence, they can
be acquired only by title and by prescription, in
the case of positive easement, only as a result of
some sort of invasion, apparent and continuous,
of the servient estate. By the same token, negative
easements can not be acquired by less formal
means. Hence, the requirement that the
prohibition (the equivalent of the act of invasion)
should be by "a formal act", "an instrument
acknowledged before a notary public."
The Court of Appeals found as undisputed
the fact CID' lot (dominant) as well as JAVIER, ET
AL.'s lot (servient) were covered by OCTs
respectively, both issued by the Register of Deeds
of Ilocos Norte, in pursuance of the decrees of
registration issued in 1937, in Cadastral Case No.
51 of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. In the certified copies of
these certificates of title, no annotation appeared
with respect to the easement supposedly acquired
by prescription which, counting the 20 years from
1913 or 1914, would have already ripened by
1937, date of the decrees of registration.
Consequently, even conceding arguendo that
such an easement had been acquired, it had been
cut off or extinguished by the registration of the
servient estate under the Torrens System without
the easement being annotated on the
corresponding certificate of title, pursuant to
Section 39 of the Land Registration Act.
ARTICLE 622: Continuous and non-apparent
easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent
or not may be acquired only by virtue of title.
Example: A RRW is a discontinuous easement
although it may be said to be apparent if there is a
path or alley or any sign that would indicate its
existence. But since it is discontinuous, it cannot
be acquired by prescription.
VELASCO vs. HON. CUSI
GR No. L-33507. July 20, 1981
Whether the mode of acquisition of the
easement that Bolton Street is, would be only
by virtue of title was not material. It remained
as such legal encumbrance, as effectively as if
it had been duly noted on the certificate of
title, by virtue of the clear and express
provision of Section 39 of Act 496, it being
admitted that at the time of the registration of
Lot 77, the public highway was already in
existence or subsisting.

FACTS
Petitioner FE VELASCO alleged when she
bought Lot 77-B2 from the original owner in 1956.
Then, Bolton Street was already existing. Without
ascertaining the monuments along Bolton Street,
she had her house constructed on her said lot and
built a fence along said Bolton Street which she
believed to be the boundary between her lot and
said street and in line with other fences already
existing when she bought said lot.
In 1970, after a relocation of the monuments of
her lot, VELASCO discovered that the Bolton
Street of the respondent CITY OF DAVAO had
encroached at least 25 sq. m. with dimension of
2.5 meters by 10 meters, making her actual
occupation of her lot 10 meters by 47.5 meters.
She also had just discovered that the width of
the Bolton Street is only 9 meters and since the
CITY OF DAVAO was then asphalting the said
street, VELASCO had filed a complaint with the
CFI of Davao in order to quiet her title to the said
portion of 2.5 meters by 10 meters. She alleged
that because the continued illegal occupation of
said portion by the CITY OF DAVAO, it had cast
a cloud of doubt on the title over the portion of
her lot being occupied by Bolton Street, which
was valued at P400 per square meters.
THE CITY OF DAVAO filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the complaint stated
no cause of action. The CFI, presided over by
public respondent JUDGE HON. VICENTE CUSI
JR., dismissed the case in 1970. The court held that
the allegations in the complaint that the Bolton
Street encroached on the lot of VELACO and that
the CITY OF DAVAO had continuously occupied
the portion so encroached upon do not, contrary
to the conclusion of VELASCO, cast a cloud of
doubt on her title, which would justify this action.
Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking a
review of the order of dismissal. VELASCO
contended that the CFI erred in declaring that
Bolton Street was an easement and must remain a
burden on Lot 77-b2 (lot in question) pursuant to
section 39 of act 496 on the ground that it was
subject to easement of public highway. VELASCO
also stated that Bolton Street could not be a
discontinuous easement as she claimed it to be,
which may not be acquired by prescription. She
contended that the mode of acquisition of the
easement that Bolton Street is, would be only by
virtue of title.
ISSUE
(1) Whether or not Bolton Street was subject of
an easement of public highway.
(2) Whether or not the mode of acquisition of
the easement that Bolton Street is, would be only
by virtue of title.
RULING
(1) YES, it was subject of an easement of
public highway.
It appears on the face of the complaint that
Bolton Street has been where it is from time
immemorial. When the mother title of petitioner's
TCT, which was an OCT issued in 1911, it was
issued subject to the provisions of Section 39 of
Act 496 which reads:
Section 39. Every person receiving a certificate
of title in pursuance of a decree or registration, and
every subsequent purchasers of registered land
who takes a certificate of title for value in good
faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrances,
except those noted on said certificate, and any of
the following encumbrances which may be
subsisting namely:
"Third. Any public highway, way, private
way, or any government irrigation, canal, or
lateral thereof . . . ."
From the foregoing provision, Bolton Street
which is a public highway, was already subsisting
when said OCT was issued in 1911. This fact was
deemed to have attached as a legal encumbrance
to the lot originally registered, Lot No. 77-b2,
notwithstanding the lack of an annotation thereof
in the OCT. VELASCO, therefore, could not rely,
as she almost entirely did for the relief she sought,
on the aforequoted provision, which she had
repeatedly cited but without making mention,
perhaps conveniently, of the exception as
expressly provided in the later part of the legal
provision invoked (Sec. 39, Act 496).
If from the undisputed fact when Lot 77 was
registered, Bolton Street had already been a legal
encumbrance on said lot, pursuant to Section 39 of
Act 496, contrary to VELASCO's theory based on
the same legal provision, but omitting the portion
pertinent to the instant case, there can be no
gainsaying the fact that petitioner's lot, Lot No.
77-B-2, which admittedly was originally a part of
Lot No. 77, must have to remain subject to the
same legal encumbrance of a public highway.
(2) Whether the mode of acquisition of the
easement that Bolton Street is, would be only by
virtue of title, as VELASCO contended, this is not
material or of any consequence, in the present
proceedings.
Once it indubitably appears as it does, from
the allegations of the complaint itself, that Bolton
Street constituted an easement of public highway
on Lot No. 77, from which VELASCO's lot was
taken, when the said bigger lot was originally
registered. It remained as such legal
encumbrance, as effectively as if it had been duly
noted on the certificate of title, by virtue of the
clear and express provision of Section 39 of Act
496, it being admitted that at the time of the
registration of Lot 77, the public highway was
already in existence or subsisting.
This fact erases whatever cause of action
petitioner may have to bring the complaint she
filed in the court a quo for quieting of title on a
portion of the street which she claimed to be part
of her lot, free from encumbrance of any kind. The
Order complained of has only this legal postulate
as its basis. Nothing had been mentioned therein
on the acquisition by the CITY OF DAVAO of the
lot in question by prescription, and a discussion of
this matter as is found in petitioner's brief would
be entirely irrelevant.

BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING vs. CA, ET AL.
GR No. 124699. July 31, 2003
The presence of railroad tracks for the passage
of petitioners trains denotes the existence of
an apparent but discontinuous easement of
right of way. And under Article 622 of the
Civil Code, discontinuous easements, whether
apparent or not, may be acquired only by title
and not by prescription.
FACTS
Magdaleno Valdez, Sr., father of herein
private respondents, Sergio Valdez, Angelina
Valdez-Novabos, Teresita Argawanon-Mangubat
and Daylinda Argawanon-Melendres (HEIRS OF
VALDEZ), purchased from Feliciana Santillan in
1935, a parcel of unregistered land covered by a
tax declaration with an area of 1 hectare, 34 ares
and 16 centares, located in Barrio Dayhagon,
Medellin, Cebu. He took possession of the
property and declared it for tax purposes in his
name.
Prior to the sale, however, the entire length of
the land from north to south was already
traversed in the middle by railroad tracks owned
by petitioner BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO.,
INC. (BOMEDCO). The tracks were used for
hauling sugar cane from the fields to
BOMEDCOs sugar mill.
When Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. passed away in
1948, private respondents HEIRS OF VALDEZ
inherited the land. However, unknown to them,
BOMEDCO was able to have the disputed middle
lot which was occupied by the railroad tracks
placed in its name in the Cadastral Survey of
Medellin, Cebu in 1965. The entire subject land
was divided into 3, namely, Cadastral Lot Nos.
953, 954 and 955. The 1st and 3rd lots remained in
the name of the HEIRS OF VALDEZ while the
2nd however, the narrow lot where the railroad
tracks lay, was claimed by BOMEDCO as its own
and was declared for tax purposes in its name.
It was not until 1989 when the HEIRS OF
VALDEZ discovered the aforementioned claim of
BOMEDCO on inquiry with the Bureau of Lands.
Through their lawyer, they immediately
demanded the legal basis for BOMEDCO's claim
over Cadastral Lot No. 954 but their letter of
inquiry addressed to petitioner went unheeded, as
was their subsequent demand for payment of
compensation for the use of the land.
Hence, the HEIRS OF VALDEZ filed a
Complaint for Payment of Compensation and/or
Recovery of Possession of Real Property and Damages
with Application for Restraining Order/Preliminary
Injunction against BOMEDCO before the RTC of
Cebu. They alleged that, before Santillan sold the
land to VALDEZ, SR. in 1935, Santillan granted
BOMEDCO, in 1929, a railroad right of way for a
period of 30 years. When Valdez, Sr. acquired the
land, he respected the grant. The right of way
expired sometime in 1959 but respondent heirs
allowed BOMEDCO to continue using the land
because one of them was then an employee of the
company.
On the other hand, BOMEDCOs principal
defense was that it was the owner and possessor
of Cadastral Lot No. 954, having allegedly bought
the same from Feliciana Santillan in 1929, prior to
the sale of the property by the latter to
MAGDALENO VALDEZ, SR. in 1935. It also
contended that the HEIRS OF VALDEZs claim
was already barred by prescription and laches
because of BOMEDCOs open and continuous
possession of the property for more than 50 years.
The trial court rejected BOMEDCO's defense
of ownership on the basis of a prior sale citing
that its evidence a xerox copy of the Deed of Sale
dated 1929 was inadmissible and had no
probative value. Nonetheless, the trial court held
that BOMEDCO had been in possession of
Cadastral Lot No. 954 in good faith for more than
10 years, thus, it had already acquired ownership
of the property through acquisitive prescription
under Article 620 of the Civil Code. It declared
that in view of the BOMEDCOs uninterrupted
possession of the strip of land for more than 50
years, there was clear continuity of defendants
possession of the strip of land it had been using as
railway tracks. Thus, BOMEDCOs apparent and
continuous possession of said strip of land in
good faith for more than ten (10) years had made
defendant owner of said strip of land traversed by
its railway tracks.
The HEIRS OF VALDEZ elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals which found that
BOMEDCO did not acquire ownership over the
lot. It consequently reversed the trial court. In its
decision dated 1995, the appellate court held that
BOMEDCO only acquired an easement of right of
way by unopposed and continuous use of the land,
but not ownership, under Article 620 of the Civil
Code.
Hence, this appeal. BOMEDCO contended
that, even if it failed to acquire ownership of the
subject land, it nevertheless became legally
entitled to the easement of right of way over said
land by virtue of prescription under Article 620 of
the Civil Code:
Continuous and apparent easements are
acquired either by virtue of a title or by
prescription of ten years.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not BOMEDCO acquired the
easement of right of way by prescription under
Article 620 of the Civil Code. [also applicable to
Article 622]
(2) Whether or not BOMEDCO was entitled to
a conferment of a legal easement of right of way.
[applicable to Article 649]
RULING
(1)NO, it had not because it was a
discontinuous easement and under Article 622 of
the Civil Code, discontinuous easements, whether
apparent or not, may be acquired only by title and
not by prescription.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals both
upheld this view for the reason that the railroad
right of way was, according to them, continuous
and apparent in nature. The more or less
permanent railroad tracks were visually apparent
and they continuously occupied the subject strip of
land from 1959 (the year the easement granted by
Feliciana Santillan to petitioner expired). Thus,
with the lapse of the 10-year prescriptive period
in 1969, BOMEDCO supposedly acquired the
easement of right of way over the subject land.
Following the logic of the courts a quo, if a
road for the use of vehicles or the passage of
persons is permanently cemented or asphalted,
then the right of way over it becomes continuous
in nature. The reasoning is erroneous.
Under civil law and its jurisprudence,
easements are either continuous or discontinuous
according to the manner they are exercised, not
according to the presence of apparent signs or
physical indications of the existence of such
easements. Thus, an easement is continuous if its
use is, or may be, incessant without the
intervention of any act of man, like the easement
of drainage; and it is discontinuous if it is used at
intervals and depends on the act of man, like the
easement of right of way.
The easement of right of way is considered
discontinuous because it is exercised only if a
person passes or sets foot on somebody elses
land. Like a road for the passage of vehicles or
persons, an easement of right of way of railroad
tracks is discontinuous because the right is
exercised only if and when a train operated by a
person passes over another's property. In other
words, the very exercise of the servitude depends
upon the act or intervention of man which is the
very essence of discontinuous easements.
The presence of more or less permanent
railroad tracks does not in any way convert the
nature of an easement of right of way to one that
is continuous. It is not the presence of apparent signs
or physical indications showing the existence of an
easement, but rather the manner of exercise thereof,
that categorizes such easement into continuous or
discontinuous. The presence of physical or visual
signs only classifies an easement into apparent or
non-apparent. Thus, a road (which reveals a right
of way) and a window (which evidences a right to
light and view) are apparent easements, while an
easement of not building beyond a certain height
is non-apparent.
In Cuba, it has been held that the existence of
a permanent railway does not make the right of way a
continuous one; it is only apparent. Therefore, it
cannot be acquired by prescription. In Louisiana,
it has also been held that a right of passage over
another's land cannot be claimed by prescription
because this easement is discontinuous and can be
established only by title.
In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for
the passage of petitioners trains denotes the
existence of an apparent but discontinuous
easement of right of way. And under Article 622 of
the Civil Code, discontinuous easements, whether
apparent or not, may be acquired only by title.
Unfortunately, BOMEDCO never acquired any
title over the use of the railroad right of way
whether by law, donation, testamentary
succession or contract. Its use of the right of way,
however long, never resulted in its acquisition of
the easement because, under Article 622, the
discontinuous easement of a railroad right of way
can only be acquired by title and not by
prescription.
To be sure, beginning 1959 when the original
30-year grant of right of way given to petitioner
BOMEDCO expired, its occupation and use of
Cadastral Lot No. 954 came to be by mere
tolerance of the HEIR OF VALDEZ. Thus, upon
demand by said heirs in 1989 for the return of the
subject land and the removal of the railroad
tracks, or, in the alternative, payment of
compensation for the use thereof, petitioner
BOMEDCO which had no title to the land should
have returned the possession thereof or should
have begun paying compensation for its use.
(2) NO, it was not entitled for a conferment of
a legal easement.
But when is a party deemed to acquire title
over the use of such land (that is, title over the
easement of right of way)? In at least two cases,
we held that if: (a) it had subsequently entered
into a contractual right of way with the heirs for
the continued use of the land under the principles
of voluntary easements or (b) it had filed a case
against the heirs for conferment on it of a legal
easement of right of way under Article 629 of the
Civil Code, then title over the use of the land is
deemed to exist. The conferment of a legal
easement of right of way under Article 629 is
subject to proof of the following:
(1) it is surrounded by other immovables
and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway;
(2) payment of proper indemnity;
(3) the isolation is not the result of its
own acts; and
(4) the right of way claimed is at the
point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and, insofar as consistent with
this rule, the distance from the
dominant estate to the highway is the
shortest.
None of the above options to acquire title over
the railroad right of way was ever pursued by
petitioner despite the fact that simple
resourcefulness demanded such initiative,
considering the importance of the railway tracks
to its business. No doubt, it is unlawfully
occupying and using the subject strip of land as a
railroad right of way without valid title yet it
refuses to vacate it even after demand of the heirs.
Furthermore, it tenaciously insists on ownership
thereof despite a clear showing to the contrary.
ARTICLE 623: The absence of a document or proof
showing the origin of an easement which cannot be
acquired by prescription may be cured by a deed of
recognition by the owner of the servient estate or by a
final judgment
ARTICLE 624: The existence of an apparent sign of
easement between two estates, established or
maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered,
should either of them be alienated, as a title in order
that the easement may continue actively and passively,
unless at the time the ownership of the two estates is
divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of
conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid
should be removed before the execution of the deed.
This provision shall also apply in case of the division of
a thing owned in common by two or more persons.
- Apparent sign of easement, NOT
EXISTING SIGN, but a sign of an existing
easement. What exists here is not a sign
but an easement. Sign that an easement is
being exercised.
- Apparent Signs of an Easement that
Apparently Exists:
a. Originally (before alienation) no
true easement exists here because
there is only one owner;
b. The article speaks of apparent
visible easements;
c. Sign of the easement means an
outward indication that the
easement exists. Examples: a
road, the existence of windows
Rules:
1. before the alienation, there is no true
easement;
2. after alienation:
a. There arises an easement IF the
sign continues to remain there
UNLESS there is a contrary
agreement.
b. There is no easement if the sign is
REMOVED or if there is an
agreement to that effect.
Example:
A owns Estate 1 and Estate 2 and there
exists a road or passageway allowing passage
from Estate 1 thru Estate 2. If estate 1 is sold to B
and estate 2 is sold to C, the easement exists if the
road still exists, unless the contrary has been
provided in the deed of conveyance of either of
them. If the deed be silent, the easement exists
unless the sign be removed.
Juan Gargantos vs. Tan Yanon
Facts: Francisco Sanz owned a parcel of land with
some buildings. He subdivided the property into
3 portions each of which was sold to a different
person. One of the house with door and windows
overlooking another portion. In 1955, the buyer of
the latter portion, Gargantos, applied for a permit
to construct a building on his lot. The buyer of the
1st portion opposed approval of the application
unless Gargantos would respect the easement of
light and view, and would observe the 3-meter
requirement under art 673 of the NCC. Gargantos
alleged however, that no easement had ever been
acquired in view of the lack of a notarial
prohibition.
Held: Garagantos should not construct, unless he
observed the 3meter rule. No notarial prohibition
was required, fro the proper Article to apply is
Art 624 regarding the existence of the apparent
sign of an easement: the existence of doors and
windows.
Inapplicability of the article
- In case either estates or both portions are
alienated to the SAME owner, for then
there would be no true easement unless
there Is a further alienation, this time, to
Different owners.
GARGANTOS vs. TAN YANON
GR No. L-14652. June 30, 1960
The existence of an apparent sign of easement
between two estates, established by the
proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one
of them is alienated, as a title(i.e. doors and
windows) so that the easement will continue
actively and passively unless at the time the
ownership of the two estates is divided, the
contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of
either of them, or the sign is made to
disappear before the instrument is executed.
FACTS
The late Francisco Sanz was the former owner
of a parcel of land containing 888 square meters,
with the buildings and improvements thereon,
situated in the poblacion of Romblon. He
subdivided the lot into 2 and then sold each
portion to different persons. One portion was
purchased by Guillermo Tengtio, who
subsequently sold it to Vicente Uy Veza. Another
portion, with the house of strong materials
thereon, was sold in 1927 to respondent TAN
YANON. This house has on its northeastern side,
doors and windows overlooking the third portion,
which, together with the camarin and small
building thereon, after passing through several
hands, was finally acquired by petitioner JUAN
GARGANTOS.
In 1955, GARGANTOS applied to the
Municipal Mayor of Romblon for a permit to
demolish the roofing of the old camarin. The
permit having been granted, GARGANTOS tore
down the roof of the camarin. Later,
GARGANTOS asked the Municipal Council of
Romblon for another permit, this time in order to
construct a combined residential house and
warehouse on his lot. TAN YANON opposed
approval of this application.
Later, the permit to build by GARGANTOS
was granted. TAN YANON then filed an action
with the CFI to restrain GARGANTOS from
constructing a building as should the construction
proceed, the building would prevent TAN
YANON from receiving light and enjoying the
view through the windows of his house, unless
such building was erected at a distance of not less
than 3 meters from the boundary line between the
2 lots. The case as against the members of the
Municipal Council was subsequently dismissed
with concurrence of plaintiff's council.
The CFI dismissed the complaint. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Romblon and enjoined
defendant from constructing his building unless
he erects the same at a distance of not less than
three meters from the boundary line of his
property, in conformity with Article 673 of the
New Civil Code.
So, GARGANTOS filed this petition for
review of the appellate Court's decision.
GARGANTOS argued that TAN YANON has not
acquired an easement by prescription because he
has never formally forbidden TAN YANON from
performing any act which would be lawful
without the easement, hence the prescriptive
period never started.
ISSUE
Whether or not the property of TAN YANON
has an easement of light and view against the
property of GARGANTOS.
RULING
YES, the property of TAN YANON had
acquired an easement of light and view against
the property of GARGANTOS.
The two estates, now owned by
GARGANTOS and TANYANON, were formerly
owned by just one person, Francisco Sanz. It was
Sanz who introduced improvements on both
properties. On that portion presently belonging to
respondent, he constructed a house in such a way
that the northeastern side thereof extends to the
wall of the camarin on the portion now belonging
to GARGANTOS. On said northeastern side of the
house, there are windows and doors which serve
as passages for light and view. These windows
and doors were in existence when TAN YANON
purchased the house and lot from Sanz. The deed
of sale did not provide that the easement of light
and view would not be established.
This then is precisely the case covered by 624,
which provides that the existence of an apparent
sign of easement between two estates, established
by the proprietor of both, shall be considered, if
one of them is alienated, as a title so that the
easement will continue actively and passively
unless at the time the ownership of the two estates
is divided, the contrary is stated in the deed of
alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to
disappear before the instrument is executed.
The existence of the doors and windows on
the northeastern side of the aforementioned
house, is equivalent to a title, for the visible and
permanent sign of an easement is the title that
characterizes its existence.
It should be noted, however, that while the
law declares that the easement is to "continue" the
easement actually arises for the first time only
upon alienation of either estate, inasmuch as
before that time there is no easement to speak of,
there being but one owner of both estates (Article
613).
TAN YANON's property has an easement of
light and view against GARGANTOS's property.
By reason of this easement, GARGANTOS cannot
construct on his land any building unless he
erects it at a distance of not less than 3 meters
from the boundary line separating the two estates.
TAEDO vs. HON. BERNAD, ET AL.
GR No. L-66520. August 30, 1988
In the instant case, no statement abolishing or
extinguishing the easement of drainage was
mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot A to
Taedo. Nor did Cardenas stop the use of the
drain pipe and septic tank by the occupants of
Lot A before he sold said lot to Taedo. Hence,
the use of the septic tank was continued by
operation of law.
FACTS
Private respondent ANTONIO CARDENAS
was the owner of 2 contiguous parcels of land, Lot
A (140 sq. m.) and Lot B (612 sq. m.) situated in
Cebu City which he had inherited from Lourdes
Cardenas.
On Lot A, an apartment building was
constructed. On the other hand, the
improvements on Lot B consisted of (1) a 4-door
apartment of concrete and strong materials, (2) a
2-storey house of strong materials, (3) a bodega of
strong materials and (4) a septic tank for the
common use of the occupants of Lots A and B. A
small portion of the apartment building on Lot A
also stands on Lot B.
In 1982, CARDENAS sold Lot A to herein
petitioner EDUARDO C. TAEDO. CARDENAS,
on that same day, also mortgaged Lot B to
TAEDO as a security for the payment of a loan
in the amount of P10,000.00.
CARDENAS further agreed that he would sell
Lot B only to TAEDO in case he should decide
to sell it, as the septic tank in Lot B services Lot A
and the apartment building on Lot A has a part
standing on Lot B. CARDENAS, however, sold
Lot B to the co-private respondent SPOUSES
ROMEO AND PACITA SIM.
Upon learning of the sale, TAEDO offered to
redeem the property from ROMEO SIM but the
latter refused. Instead, ROMEO SIM blocked the
sewage pipe connecting the building of TAEDO
built on Lot A, to the septic tank in Lot B. He also
asked TAEDO to remove that portion of his
building encroaching on Lot B.
As a result, TAEDO, invoking the
provisions of Art. 1622 of the Civil Code, filed an
action for legal redemption and damages, with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, before the RTC of Cebu against the
SPOUSES ROMEO and PACITA SIM, ANTONIO
CARDENAS and his wife MAE LINDA
CARDENAS, the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CEBU
CITY, and BANCO CEBUANO, CEBU CITY
DEVELOPMENT BANK.
Answering, the SPOUSES ROMEO and
PACITA SIM claimed that they are the absolute
owners of Lot B and that TAEDO had no right
to redeem the land under Art. 1622 of the Civil
Code as the land sought to be redeemed is much
bigger than the land owned by Taedo.
 CARDENAS, upon the other hand, admitted
that he had agreed to sell Lot B to Eduardo
TAEDO and claimed by way of cross-claim
against the SPOUSES ROMEO and PACITA SIM,
that the Deed of Sale he had executed in favor of
said spouses was only intended as an equitable
mortgage, to secure the payment of amounts
received by him from said spouses as petty loans.
In answer to the cross-claim, the SPOUSES
ROMEO and PACITA SIM insisted that the sale
executed by CARDENAS of Lot -B in their favor
was an absolute one. In 1983, the SPOUSES
ROMEO and PACITA SIM filed motions to
dismiss the complaint and the cross-claim, for lack
of cause of action.
Acting upon these motions and other
incidental motions, the respondent judge HON.
JUANITO BERNAD dismissed both the complaint
and cross-claim.
Hence, the present recourse by TAEDO.
ISSUE
Whether or not easement in favor of
TAEDO ceased.
RULING
NO, it did. The use of the easement was
continued by operation of law. Article 624 of the
Civil Code provides:
The existence of an apparent sign of
easement between two estates, established or
maintained by the owner of both, shall be
considered should either of them be alienated,
as a title in order that the easement may
continue actively and passively, unless, at the
time the ownership of the two estates is
divided, the contrary should be provided in
the title of conveyance of either of them, or the
sign aforesaid should be removed before the
execution of the deed. This provision shall also
apply in case of the division of a thing owned
in common by two or more persons.
In the instant case, no statement abolishing or
extinguishing the easement of drainage was
mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot A to
TAEDO. Nor did CARDENAS stop the use of
the drain pipe and septic tank by the occupants of
Lot A before he sold said lot to TAEDO. Hence,
the use of the septic tank was continued by
operation of law. Accordingly, the SPOUSES
ROMEO and PACITA SIM, the new owners of the
servient estate (Lot B), cannot impair, in any
manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude."
ARTICLE 625: Upon the establishment of an
easement, all the rights necessary for its use are
considered granted.
ARTICLE 626: The owner of the dominant estate
cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the
immovable originally contemplated. Neither can he
exercise the easement in any other manner than that
previously established.
Easements Appurtenant and Easements in Gross
- Art 626 presuposes the existence of course
of a dominant estate, otherwise the
Article cannot apply. Easements with a
dominant estate are called easement
appurtenant, without the dominant
estate, they are purely personal, and may
thus be referred to as easements in gross.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE
OWNERS OF THE DOMINANT AND
SERVIENT ESTATE
ARTICLE 627: The owner of the dominant estate may
make, at his own expense, on the servient estate any
works necessary for the use and preservation of the
servitude, but without altering it or rendering it more
burdensome.
For this purpose he shall notify the owner of
the servient estate, and shall choose the most
convenient time and manner so as to cause the least
inconvenience to the owner of the servient estate.
- The rights of dominant estate:
1. Exercise the easement and all necessary
rights for its use including accessory
easements. So the principal easement
carries with it the accessory easements.
The right to exercise accessory easements
under Art. 625.
So if the easement is for drawing water it carries
with it the accessory of easement of right of way.
2. To make on the servient estate all works
necessary for the use and preservation of
the servitude, including repair and
maintenance. However, these must be at
his own expense, he must notify the
servient owner, select convenient time
and place, and he must not alter easment
or render it more burdensome.
3. To ask for mandatory injunction to
prevent impairment or obstruction in the
exercise of the easement. Leading case of
Resolme vs. Lazo 27 Phil 416;
4. To renounce totally, if he desires
exemption from contribution to expenses
under Art. 628. If he does not wish to
contribute [if there are several dominant
estates] for the maintenance and repair of
the easement, then he may renounce his
rights totally.
Obligations of the dominant estate:
1. He cannot alter the easement;
2. He cannot make it more burdensome.
(Art. 627)
3. He cannot use the easement except for the
immovable originally contemplated.
4. In the easement of right of way, he cannot
increase the agreed width of path or
deposit soil or materials outside the
boundaries agreed upon, for doing so
 would increase the burden of
easement. .
Valderama vs. North Negros Sugar Co.
Wherein the dominant estate is allowed to pass
the property of the servient estate through a path
or alley. Accdg to the SC, if the dominant estate is
allowed to pass over another's property, he may
also allow neighbors to pass over the same
property. But accdg. to some authors, Capistrano
of the Code Commission, said that this decision is
erroneous. To correct the said injustice of this
decision, the Code commission included Art. 626.
So he cannot use the easement except for
immovable originally contemplated. Because
allowing somebody else to pass through another's
property would increase the burden (of the
easement).
VALDERRAMA vs. NORTH NEGROS SUGAR
GR Nos. L-23810, L-23811 & L-23812. December
18, 1925
Under Article 627 of the Civil Code, the
owner of the dominant estate, in making on
the servient estate the necessary works for the
use and preservation of the easement, cannot
alter it, nor make it more burdensome but this
does not mean that NORTH NEGROS could
not transport in the wagons passing upon the
railroad other cane that of VALDERRAMA,
RODRIGUEZ and URRA, ET AL because
the railroad continued to occupy the same area
on the servient estates and the encumbrance
resulting from the easement continued to be
the same, whether the tractors traverse the
line 10, 20 or 30 times a day transporting
cane for the central.
FACTS
In 1916, several hacienda owners in Manapla,
Occidental Negros entered into a contract with
Miguel J. Osorio, known as milling contract,
wherein Osorio agreed to install in Manapla a
sugar central of a minimum capacity of 300 tons,
for grinding and milling all the sugar cane to be
grown by the hacienda owners, who in turn bound
themselves to furnish the central with all the cane
they might produce in their estates for 30 years
from the execution of the contract, all in
accordance with the conditions specified therein.
Later on, respondent NORTH NEGROS
SUGAR CO., INC., acquired the rights and
interest of Miguel J. Osorio in the milling contract
aforesaid.
In 1919 petitioners CATALINO
VALDERRAMA (case No. 23810) and EMILIO
RODRIGUEZ (case No. 23811) and SANTOS
URRA, IGNACIO BENITO HUARTE, ADOLFO
HUARTE AND PEDRO AUZMENDI (case No.
23812) made with NORTH NEGROS other milling
contracts identical with the first one dated 1916
with some new conditions. URRA thereafter
transferred to one Pedro Auzmendi, and the latter
to Lorenzo Echarri, their interest in the milling
contract executed by them.
the In view of the fact that the hacienda owners,
who were up to that time customers of the central,
could not furnish sufficient cane for milling, as
required by the capacity of said central, NORTH
NEGROS made other milling contracts with
various hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental
Negros, in order to obtain sufficient cane to
sustain the central.
This gave rise to VALDERRAMA,
RODRIGUEZ and URRA, ET AL.s filing of their
respective complaints with the CFI, alleging that
the easement of way, which each of them had
established in his respective hacienda, was only for
the transportation through each hacienda of the
sugar cane of the owner thereof. Also, while
NORTH NEGROS maintained that it had the right
to transport to its central upon the railroad
passing through the haciendas of VALDERRAMA,
RODRIGUEZ and URRA, ET AL., not only the
sugar cane harvested in said haciendas, but also
that of the hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental
Negros.
VALDERRAMA, RODRIGUEZ and URRA,
ET AL.prayed that it be held that NORTH
NEGROS had no right, under the easement or
otherwise, to cause its locomotives and wagons to
run across the estates of the plaintiffs for the
purpose of transporting sugar cane of any
agriculturist of Cadiz, Occidental Negros.
On the other hand, NORTH NEGROS alleged
that VALDERRAMA, RODRIGUEZ and URRA,
ET AL. respectively granted it for the period of 50
years from the date of the aforesaid contracts, an
easement of way 7 meters wide upon the lands of
the plaintiffs for the construction and operation of
a railroad for the transportation of sugar cane. It
added that said easement of way was established
without any restriction whatsoever, as regards the
ownership of the cane to be transported over the
said railroad.
After hearing the 3 cases, the trial court
entered held that NORTH NEGROS had no right
to pass through the lands of VALDERRAMA,
RODRIGUEZ and URRA, ET AL. for the
transportation of sugar cane not grown from any
of the latters haciendas.
From this judgment NORTH NEGROS
appealed. Another reason advanced by
VALDERRAMA, RODRIGUEZ and URRA, ET
AL. in support of their theory is that by
transporting upon the road, through the servient
estates, the cane of the planters of Cadiz, it would
alter the easement, making it more burdensome.
ISSUE
Whether or not NORTH NEGROS could
transport on its railroad passing through the
haciendas of VALDERRAMA, RODRIGUEZ and
URRA, ET AL. where it had an easement of way
established in its favor, the cane not grown in the
haciendas of the latter, to be milled in the central of
the NORTH NEGROS because it made the
easement more burdensome.
RULING
 YES, NORTH NEGROS could still transport
so.
It is true that Under Article 627 (then Article
543) of the Civil Code that the owner of the
dominant estate, in making on the servient estate
the necessary works for the use and preservation
of the easement, cannot alter it, nor make it more
burdensome. But this does not mean that NORTH
NEGROS could not transport in the wagons
passing upon the railroad other cane that of
VALDERRAMA, RODRIGUEZ and URRA, ET
AL.
What is prohibited by the legal provision
above cited is that NORTH NEGROS in
excavations or building materials outside of the
area of 7 meters, because in the first case, the
easement will be altered, and in the second it
would become more burdensome. But nothing of
the kind happened when NORTH NEGROS
transported on the railroad, crossing the servient
estates, the cane of the planters of Cadiz. The
railroad continues to occupy the same area on the
servient estates and the encumbrance resulting
from the easement continues to be the same,
whether the tractors traverse the line 10, 20 or 30
times a day transporting cane for the central.
Furthermore, the record showed
circumstance indicating that at the time of the
execution of the milling contracts above referred
to, there was no intention of the part of the
contracting parties to limit the use of the railroad
to the transportation of cane grown by the
plaintiffs in their respective haciendas, and that is
because, while the duration of the milling
contracts is fixed at 30 years that of the easement
was at 50. So that if at the end of 30 years
VALDERRAMA, RODRIFUEZ and URRA, ET
AL. or their successors should no longer desire to
furnish canes for milling in the central of NORTH
NEGROS, the latter shall still have the right to the
easement for the remaining period, but without
transporting on the railroad any cane for the
central. An interpretation of the clause in question
leading to such a result is untenable.
In the respective contracts VALDERRAMA,
RODRIGUEZ and URRA, ET AL. with NORTH
NEGROS in 1919, there appeared: "6th. That in
order to have the obligations herein entered into
by Mr. Valderrama duly registered, in regard to
the rural estates belonging to him and which are
described hereinafter, an easement of way 7 meter
wide and for the period of 50 years from the date hereof
is hereby created in favor of the 'North Negros Sugar
Co., Inc., ' upon his property hereinafter described, at
such place as said corporation may see fit for the
construction of a railroad."
Had the clause mentioned only an "easement
of way," there might be a doubt as to whether or
not the easement of way was for pedestrians,
horsemen or carriages. But when the clause says:
"easement of way 7 meters wide for the period of
50 years for the construction of the railroad," there
could be no doubt about what the contracting
parties have agreed upon, to wit, that
VALDERRAMA, RODRIGUEZ and URRA, ET
AL. had created upon their respective haciendas at
a suitable place an easement of way 7 meters wide
and for a period of fifty years, in order to enable
NORTH NEGROS to build and maintain a
railroad for the transportation of sugar cane to the
central. It was clear that the cane of
VALDERRAMA, RODRIGUEZ and URRA, ET
AL. was to be transported upon the railroad to the
central. But to limit the use of the road exclusively
to the cane of the plaintiffs and within their
respective haciendas would make the contract in
question ineffective, except as to the hacienda
which is contiguous or nearest to the central. If
VALDERRAMA, RODRIGUEZ and URRA, ET
AL. do not produce sufficient cane to cover the
capacity of the central, it would be unjust to
impose upon the NORTH NEGROS the burden of
maintaining a central, prohibiting it to obtain
from another source sufficient cane with which to
maintain its business. Besides, in the milling
contract, there was nothing to prohibit NORTN
NEGROS from making milling contracts with
other planters, and obtain in that way all cane
necessary to cover the capacity of the central.
It is against the nature of the easement to
pretend that it was established in favor of the
servient estates, because it is a well-settled rule
a that things serve their owner by reason of
ownership and not by reason of easement.
This was a case of an easement for the benefit
of a corporation, voluntarily created by
VALDERRAMA, RODRIGUEZ and URRA, ET
AL. upon their respective estates for the
construction of a railroad connecting said estates
with the central of the defendant. But as the
easement was created for the benefit of the
corporation, owner of the central, it may cause its
wagons to pass upon the road as many times as it
may deem fit, according to the needs of the
central.
ARTICLE 628: Should there be several dominant
estates, the owners of all of them shall be obliged to
contribute to the expenses referred to in the preceding
article, in proportion to the benefits which each may
derive from the work. Any one who does not wish to
contribute may exempt himself by renouncing the
easement for the benefit of the others.
If the owner of the servient estate should make
use of the easement in any manner whatsoever, he shall
also be obliged to contribute to the expenses in the
proportion stated, saving an agreement to the contrary.
ARTICLE 629: The owner if the servient estate cannot
impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the
servitude.
Nevertheless, if by reason of the place
originally assigned, or of the manner established for the
use of the easement, the same should become very
inconvenient to the owner of the servient estate, or
should prevent him from making any important works,
repairs or improvements thereon, it may be changed at
his expense, provided he offers another place or manner
equally convenient and in such a way that no injury is
caused thereby to the owner of the dominant estate or
to those who may have a right to use of the easement.
RIGHTS OF THE SERVIENT ESTATE:
1. To retain possession and ownership of the
portion of his land affected by the
easement. So would the owner of the
servient estate lose possession or
ownership of his property? No, he retains
possession or ownership, except that it is
burdened by an encumbrance.
2. To make use of the easement.. Generally,
unless deprived under the terms and
conditions of the contract. Now, if he
makes use of the easement, he has to
contribute for the expenses for the
maintenance thereof.
3. Has the right to change the location of a
very inconvenient easement, provided
that an equally convenient substitute is
made without injury on the part of the
dominant estate. (the change in location
would not result to injury on the part of
the dominant estate)
OBLIGATIONS OF THE SERVIENT ESTATE
1. He cannot impair the use of the easement.
For example, he blocks the flow of water;
2. He must contribute to the expenses in
case he uses the easement;
3. In case of impairment, he has the
obligation to restore the easement to its
original location;
4. If he wishes to change the location of the
easement, the change must be done at his
own expense. (Art. 629).
ARTICLE 630: The owner of the servient estate
retains ownership of the portion in which the easement
is established, and may use the same in such a manner
as not to affect the exercise of the easement.
MODES OF EXTINGUISHMENT OF
EASEMENTS
ARTICLE 631: Easements are extinguished:
1. By merger in the same person of the
ownership of the dominant and servient
estates;
2. By non-use for ten years; with respect to
discontinuous easements, this period shall be
computed from the day on which they ceased
to be used; and, with respect to continuous
easements, from the day on which an act
contrary to the same took place;
3. When either or both of the estates fall into
such condition that the easement cannot be
used; but it shall revive if the subsequent
condition of the estates or either of them
should again permit its use, unless when the
use becomes possible, sufficient tome for
prescription has elapsed, in accordance with
the provisions of the preceeding number;
4. By the expiration of the term or the fulfilment
of the condition, if the easement is temporary
or conditional;
5. By the renunciation of the owner of the
dominant estate;
6. By the redemption agreed upon between the
owners of the dominant and servient estates.
Modes of extinguishment of easement
1. merger of the dominant and the servient estate
into one. A merger must be absolute complete. If
there are conditions or merely partial, then there
is no extinguishment.
Ex: Sale a retro
2. non user for 10 years. This presupposes that an
easement has been used before and later it is no
longer used for 10 years. Non user here is
voluntary abstention and not due to some kind of
fortuitous event. The 10 year period is counted
from the time the easement is no longer used
If it is a continuous easement like a canal, then the
period is counted from the time an act contrary to
the use of easement is occurred
3. by impossibility of use or bad condition by the
tenement. But some authors would say that this
does not really extinguish the easement but
merely suspends the use until after the situation
improves,
Except if has been non used for 10 years.
4. By expiration of the term or fulfillment of the
condition. For example the easement was created
to last upon until the owner of the servient estate
becomes a lawyer. If he becomes a lawyer, the
condition is fulfilled and the easement
extinguished.
5. waiver or renunciation of the owner of the
dominant estate. As a general rule, the
renunciation must be express, clear and specific.
Otherwise it will be confused with non user.
Nonetheless, it may be tacit for as long as there
are acts that clearly reveal the renunciation
beyond doubt.
6. Other causes: Expropriation, annulment,
rescission, cancellation, abandonment of the
servient estate, and resolution of the right of the
grantor to create the easement.
CABACUNGAN vs. CORRALES
GR N. L-6629. September 30, 1954
Under Article 631 of the Civil Code, the
easement is not extinguished by the
acquisition of a share in property held in
common.
FACTS
Petitioners EUFROCINA HIDALGO
CABACUNGAN, AURELIA HIDALGO
ROLDAN, and TERESA HIDALGO IGLESIAS,
together with 3 other sisters were co-heirs and co-
owners of a parcel of land. In 1952, 2 of their
sisters, as co-heirs and co-owners, Sofia Hidalgo
Soria and Carmen Soria Abad had sold their
undivided shares in said land to respondent
QUINTIN CORRALES, an outsider.
CABACUNGAN, ET AL. wished to redeem
said property in accordance with Article 1088 of
the Civil Code. Hence, they approached
QUINTIN CORRALES and his wife and co-
respondent CATALINA V. CORRALES and
tendered them P600 for that purpose, but the
tender was refused.
CABACUNGAN, ET AL. then filed an action
with the CFI of Ilocos Sur, praying that
CORRALES be ordered to allow them to exercise
their right of legal redemption. The complaint set
up three causes of action. CABACUNGAN, ET
AL. alleged that in 1950, CORRALES, being
owners of a lot contiguous to the land here in
question, constructed a building on said lot with
balcony and windows less than 3 meters distant
from said land and with roof that drains rain
water into it in violation of Article 670 and 674,
respectively, of the New Civil Code. They
therefore prayed that the said balcony and
windows be ordered closed and the roofs
constructed in such a way that rain water would
not fall on CABACUNGAN, ET AL.'s land.
Taking the view that, with the acquisition by
CORRALES of a share in the land in question, the
easement of light, view and drainage was
extinguished "by merger in the same person of the
ownership of dominant and servient estates"
pursuant to Article 631 of the New Civil Code, the
lower court ruled out this cause of action.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not with the acquisition by
CORRALES of a share in the land in question, the
easement of light, view and drainage was
extinguished "by merger in the same person of the
ownership of dominant and servient estates"
pursuant to Article 631 of the New Civil Code.
RULING
NO, there was no merger. As CORRALES
had not become sole owners of the servient
estate, for they have acquired only a part interest
therein, it could not be said that in this case
ownership of the dominant and servient estates
has been merged in the same person for the
purposes of Article 631 of the Civil Code. Thus,
commenting on the corresponding article of the
Spanish Civil Code (Art. 546), Manresa observed
that under that article the easement is not
extinguished by the acquisition of a share in
property held in common.
And as to the matter of drainage, Article 674
of the New Civil Code specifically provides "that
the owner of a building shall be obliged to
construct its roof or covering in such a manner
that the rain water shall fall on his own land or
on a street or public place, and not on the land of
his neighbor, even though the adjacent land may
belong to two or more persons, one of whom is
the owner of the proof."
BENEDICTO vs. CA
GR N. L-22733. September 25, 1968
In the present case, there was no indubitable
proof of non-user. BENEDICTO merely
assumed that the passageway in question had
not been in use since 1941 because the
property of Heras has since gained direct
access to San Marcelino street with the
demolition of his house.
FACTS
Miriam R. Hedrick owned several parcels of
land. In 1917, Hedrick sold a portion of such
property to Claro M. Recto as proven by a Deed of
Sale in the latters favor. At the time of the sale,
some buildings were located on the respective
properties of Clara M. Recto and Miriam R.
Hedrick. Later, by virtue of the Deed of Sale in
favor of Recto, a separate TCT was issued in his
name. In line with this, Hedrick also asked for a
separate new title based on the new survey in the
cadastral survey of 1917. In 1924, a new TCT was
issued in her name.
The property purchased by Recto from
Hedrick became the subject of a series of transfers.
It was sold by Recto to one Emmanuel Ty (TCT
issued in 1924), who later sold in petitioner
SALVADOR BENEDICTO. BENEDICTO was
issued a TCT in 1934.
On the other hand, the remaining property of
Hedrick also became the subject of a series of
transfers. Hedrick sold it to one Chow Kwo Hsien
(TCT issued in 1924), who sold it to General
Security and Investment Co. (TCT issued in 1936),
who eventually sold it to respondent VICENTE A.
HERAS. A TCT in favor of HERAS was issued in
1941.
The properties of BENEDICTO and HERAS
were adjoining each other as it formerly belonged
to one property owned by Hedrick.
In 1941, HERAS demolished the entire
building situated on his property.
IN 1955, HERAS filed an action in court
seeking to recover a portion of land enclosed and
waited by the BENEDICTO, and to demand the
reopening of an easement of way between his real
property and that of the petitioner.
The trial court found that after selling potions
of his lot, Hedrick obtained a separate title for the
remaining 2 lots, with an area of only 540.4 square
meters. But in the new TCT issued to Hedrick,
their total area was made to appear to be 681.30
square meters. The increase in area was due to the
fact that the technical description used in the new
title was based on a cadastral survey. Since
HERAS, as successor-in-interest of Hedrick,
owned no more than 540.4 square meter, the court
held that no portion of his property had been
encroached upon by the BENEDICTO.
The trial court likewise found that the
easement of way was found entirely within the
property of BENEDICTO, contrary to the
stipulation in the deed of sale between Miriam R.
Hedrick and Claro M. Recto that it should be
between their properties, with each contributing
an equal portion of his property. According to the
court, this was the reason why Recto,
BENEDICTO's predecessor-in-interest, who had
earlier asked for a resurvey in accordance with the
deed of sale, subsequently withdrew his motion,
after finding that the passageway was located
entirely within his property.
Accordingly, the court directed both parties to
contribute equally to the maintenance of a three to
four-meter-wide passageway between their
properties, with the property line running at the
middle of the passageway. It rejected
BENEDICTO's claim that the easement had been
extinguished by nonuser and by the cessation of
the necessity for a passageway.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals.
SALVADOR BENEDICTO, who in the meantime
died, was substituted by the judicial administrator
of his estate, ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO. In 1964,
the Court of Appeals rendered affirned in toto the
decision of the trial court.
Hence, this appeal by BENEDICTO.
According to him, the easement was originally
constituted because the buildings then erected on
the respective properties of Miriam R. Hedrick
and Claro M. Recto so adjoined each other that the
only way the back portions of the properties could
be reached by their owners from San Marcelino
street was through the passageway. He claimed
that when the HERAS had his building
demolished in 1941 the property gained direct
access to San Marcelino street with the result that
since then there has been no need for the
passageway. He argued further that it could be
assumed that since 1941 the passageway ceased to
be used for certainly BENEDICTO could not be
expected to be making 'detours' to reach San
Marcelino Street when the very frontage of his
property was now open in its entirety to San
Marcelino Street.
ISSUE
Whether or not the easement was already
extinguished by nonuser.
RULING
NO, it was not extinguished by nonuser.
Article 631 of the Civil Code provides in part:
Art. 631. Easements are extinguished:
(2) By nonuser for ten years; with
respect to discontinuous easements,
this period shall be computed from
the day on which they ceased to be
used; and, with respect to
continuous easements, from the day
on which an act contrary to the same
took place;
(3) When either or both of the estates
fall into such condition that the
casement cannot be used; but it shall
revive if the subsequent condition of
the estates or either of them should
again permit its use; unless when
the use become possible, sufficient
time for prescription has elapsed, in
accordance with the provisions of
the preceding number; ...
This provision was taken from article 546 of
the Civil Code of 1889, with the modification that
the period of nonuser was reduced from 20 to 10
years.
BENEDICTO argued at length that this case is
governed by the present Code, and that since 14
years had elapsed from the time the building on
HERAS' property was demolished in 1941 to 1955
when this action was begun (during which period
he assumes that the passageway ceased to be used
because HERAs' property had direct access to the
street), the easement must be deemed to have
been extinguished.
The court did not find it necessary to
determine whether the appropriate period of
nonuser in this case is 20 or 10 years. For one
thing, there is no indubitable proof of non-user.
BENEDICTO merely assumed that the
passageway in question had not been in use since
1941 because the property of HERAS has since
gained direct access to San Marcelino Street with
the demolition of his house.
For another, even if it be assumed that the
period of prescription based on nonuser is 10
years, the very testimony of the BENEDICTO
showed that it was only in 1946 that he had the
passageway walled in by constructing a fence,
and since the present action was filed in 1955,
granting that article 631 of the Civil Code is
applicable, the prescriptive period has not yet
elapsed.
Nor can presumptive renunciation by HERAS
of the use of the said passageway be inferred. It
would appear from the record that HERAS
started the construction of an apartment building
on his parcel of land after the demolition of his
house in 1941, and that although interrupted by
World War II, construction was continued in 1955.
Since it was patent from the stipulation of facts
that the easement in question is mainly a
vehicular passageway, the obvious need for such
passageway to the rear portion of the projected
apartment building negates any presumptive
renunciation on the part of HERAS.
Moreover, the easement in this case is
perpetual in character and was annotated on all
the TCTs issued in the series of transfers from
Hedrick through to the HERAS, and in the TCTs
issued in the series of transfers from Recto to
BENEDICTO. Since there was nothing in the
record that would point to a mutual agreement
between any of the predecessors-in-interest of the
petitioner and any of the predecessors-in-interest
of the respondent nor between the petitioner and
the respondent themselves with respect to the
discontinuance or obliteration of the easement
annotated on the titles, the continued existence of
the easement must be upheld and respected.
The fact that the easement here was one of
necessity did not detract from the conclusion
reached. For even assuming that with the
demolition of the house on HERAS' property the
necessity for the passageway ceased (a point
traversed by HERAS who claims that he
demolished his house precisely in order to build
an apartment building in its place), still, as held in
one case, the fact that an easement [by grant]
may have also qualified as an easement of
necessity does not detract from its permanency as
a property right, which survives the termination
of the necessity." Indeed, when the easement in
this case was established, the parties
unequivocally made provisions for its observance
by all who in the future might succeed them in
dominion, and this was the reason the permanent
character of the easement was annotated on each
and all of the TCTs.
TAEDO vs. HON. BERNAD, ET AL.
GR No. L-66520. August 30, 1988
The alienation of the dominant and servient
estates to different persons is not one of the
grounds for the extinguishment of an
easement.
FACTS
Private respondent ANTONIO CARDENAS
was the owner of 2 contiguous parcels of land, Lot
A (140 sq. m.) and Lot B (612 sq. m.) situated in
Cebu City which he had inherited from Lourdes
Cardenas.
On Lot A, an apartment building was
constructed. On the other hand, the
improvements on Lot B consisted of (1) a 4-door
apartment of concrete and strong materials, (2) a
2-storey house of strong materials, (3) a bodega of
strong materials and (4) a septic tank for the
common use of the occupants of Lots A and B. A
small portion of the apartment building on Lot A
also stands on Lot B.
In 1982, CARDENAS sold Lot A to herein
petitioner EDUARDO C. TAEDO. CARDENAS,
on that same day, also mortgaged Lot B to
TAEDO as a security for the payment of a loan
in the amount of P10,000.00.
CARDENAS further agreed that he would sell
Lot B only to TAEDO in case he should decide
to sell it, as the septic tank in Lot B services Lot A
and the apartment building on Lot A has a part
standing on Lot B. CARDENAS, however, sold
Lot B to the co-private respondent SPOUSES
ROMEO AND PACITA SIM.
Upon learning of the sale, TAEDO offered to
redeem the property from ROMEO SIM but the
latter refused. Instead, ROMEO SIM blocked the
sewage pipe connecting the building of TAEDO
built on Lot A, to the septic tank in Lot B. He also
asked TAEDO to remove that portion of his
building encroaching on Lot B.
As a result, TAEDO, invoking the
provisions of Art. 1622 of the Civil Code, filed an
action for legal redemption and damages, with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, before the RTC of Cebu against the
SPOUSES ROMEO and PACITA SIM, ANTONIO
CARDENAS and his wife MAE LINDA
CARDENAS, the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CEBU
CITY, and BANCO CEBUANO, CEBU CITY
DEVELOPMENT BANK.
Answering, the SPOUSES ROMEO and
PACITA SIM claimed that they are the absolute
owners of Lot B and that TAEDO had no right
to redeem the land under Art. 1622 of the Civil
Code as the land sought to be redeemed is much
bigger than the land owned by Taedo.
CARDENAS, upon the other hand, admitted
that he had agreed to sell Lot B to Eduardo
TAEDO and claimed by way of cross-claim
against the SPOUSES ROMEO and PACITA SIM,
that the Deed of Sale he had executed in favor of
said spouses was only intended as an equitable
mortgage, to secure the payment of amounts
received by him from said spouses as petty loans.
In answer to the cross-claim, the SPOUSES
ROMEO and PACITA SIM insisted that the sale
executed by CARDENAS of Lot -B in their favor
was an absolute one. In 1983, the SPOUSES
ROMEO and PACITA SIM filed motions to
dismiss the complaint and the cross-claim, for lack
of cause of action.
Acting upon these motions and other
incidental motions, the respondent judge HON.
JUANITO BERNAD dismissed both the complaint
and cross-claim.
Hence, the present recourse by TAEDO.
ISSUE
Whether or not easement in favor of
TAEDO was extinguished.
RULING
NO, it was not extinguished.
The finding of the trial court that TAEDO's
right to continue to use the septic tank, erected on
Lot B, ceased upon the subdivision of the land
and its subsequent sale to different owners who
do not have the same interest," also appears to be
contrary to law. Article 631 of the Civil Code
enumerates the grounds for the extinguishment of
an easement. Said article provides:
Art. 631. Easements are extinguished:
(1) By merger in the same person of the
ownership of the dominant and
servient estates;
(2) By non-user for ten years; with
respect to discontinuous easements,
this period shall be computed from
the day on which they period to be
used; and, with respect to
continuous easements, from the day
on which an act contrary to the
same took place;
(3) When either or both of the estates
fall into such condition that the
easement cannot be used; but it
shall revive if the subsequent
condition of the estates or either of
them should again permit its use,
unless when the use becomes
possible, sufficient time for
prescription has elapsed, in
accordance with the provisions of
the preceding number;
 (4) By the expiration of the term or the
fulfillment of the condition, if the
easement is temporary or
conditional;
(5) By the renunciation of the owner of
the dominant estate;
(6) By the redemption agreed upon
between the owners of the
dominant and servient estates."
As can be seen from the above provisions, the
alienation of the dominant and servient estates to
different persons is not one of the grounds for the
extinguishment of an easement.
ARTICLE 632: The form or manner of using the
easement may prescribe as the easement itself, and in
the same way.
Easement may be extinguished thru prescription.
It may be 10 years after non-use or 10 yrs after
impossibility of use
ARTICLE 633: If the dominant estate belongs to
several persons in common, the use of the easement by
any one of them prevents prescription with respect to
the others.
LEGAL EASEMENTS
ARTICLE 634: Easements imposed by law have for
their object either public use or the interest of private
persons.
Legal easements are those imposed by law and
which have for their object public use or the
interest of private persons. With respect to public
use, they are governed by special laws like law on
waters, irrigation laws and more particularly
now, the water code. With respect to the interest
of private persons, they are governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code, the agreement of the
parties, or general or local laws.
Under 636, easements for private interest are
governed by:
the agreement of the parties provided not
prohibited by law nor prejudicial to 3rd person;
in default of general or local laws and ordinances
for general welfare may govern;
In default, the civil code.
ARTICLE 635: All matters concerning easements
established for public or communal use shall be
governed by the special laws and regulations relating
thereto, and, in the absence thereof, by the provisions of
this Title.
ARTICLE 636: Easements established by law in the
interest of private persons or for private use shall be
governed by the provisions of this Title, without
prejudice to the provisions of general or local laws and
ordinances for the general welfare.
These easements may be modified be
agreement of the interested parties, whenever the law
does not prohibit it or no injury is suffered by a 3rd
person
Kinds of legal easements
1) EASEMENTS PERTAINING TO WATERS:
A) easement of natural drainage (Art. 637);
B) natural drainage of buildings (Art. 674)
C) EASEMENTS ON RIPARIAN BANKS
FOR NAVIGATION, FLOATAGE AND
SALVAGE (638)
D) EASEMENT OF A DAM (639, 647)
E) EASEMENT FOR DRAWING WATER OR
FOR WATERING ANIMALS (640, 641)
F) EASEMENT OF AQUEDUCT (643, 646)
G) EASEMENT FOR THE CONSTRUCTION
OF STOP LOCK OR SLUICE GATE
2) EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY. Now for
purposes of your bar exam, the easement of
right of way is a perennial source of bar
questions.
3) EASEMENT OF PARTY WALL
4) EASEMENT OF LIGHT AND VIEW
5) EASEMENT OF DRAINAGE
6) EASEMENT OF INTERMEDIATE DISTANCE
7) EASEMENT AGAINST NUISANCE
8) EASEMENT OF LITORAL OR SUBJACENT
SUPPORT.
EASEMENTS RELATING TO WATERS
ARTICLE 637: Lower estates are obliged to receive the
waters which naturally and without the intervention of
man descend from the higher estates, as well as the
stones or earth which they carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot
construct works which will impede this easement;
neither can the owner of the higher estate works which
will increase the burden.
- The owner of the lower estate cannot
prevent the flow of water by erecting a
wall at the boundary line to prevent the
flow of water. He cannot enclose his lands
with ditches and fences which would
impede the flow of water. But then he can
make some kind of constructions in order
to control the descent of the water. He
cannot also construct works that would
impede the easements such as blocking
dams which would divert the flow of
water to another tenement or estate.
- On the other hand, the dominant estate
cannot also make works or constructions
that would increase the velocity of the
waters, or make the grounds more
impervious. That's the duty on the part of
the dominant estate.
ARTICLE 638: The banks of the rivers and streams,
even in case they are of private ownership, are subject
throughout their entire length and within a zone of
three meters along their margins, to the easement of
public use in the general interest of navigation,
floatage, fishing and salvage.
Estates adjoining the banks of navigable of
floatable rivers are, furthermore, subject to the
easement of towpath for the exclusive service of river
navigation and floatage.
If it be necessary for such purpose to occupy
lands of private ownership, the proper indemnity shall
first be paid.
- Estates adjoining the banks of navigable
or floatable rivers are, furthermore,
subject to the easement of towpath for the
exclusive service of river navigation and
floatage.
- The width between the high water level
and the low water level is called the shore
line or litoral line
- If the land is public ownership, there is no
indemnity. If the land is private
ownership, there is indemnity
ARTICLE 639: Whenever for the diversion or taking
of water from a river or brook, or for the use of any
other continuous or discontinuous stream, it should be
necessary to build a dam, and the person who is to
construct it is not the owner of the banks, or lands
which must support it, he may establish the easement
of abutment of a dam, after payment of the proper
indemnity.
Abutment of a dam simply means to support a
dam. If you want to draw water from a river and
there is a need to construct a dam but you are not
the owner of that land where the support of the
dam will be constructed, you may petition for an
easement of abutment of a dam
ARTICLE 640: Compulsory easements for drawing
water or for watering animals can be imposed only for
reasons of public use in favor of a town or village, after
payment of the proper indemnity.
ARTICLE 641: Easements for drawing water and for
watering animals carry with them the obligation of the
owners of the servient estates to allow passage to
persons and animals to the place where such easements
are to be used, and the indemnity shall include this
service.
- 2 easements under 640 and 641:
1. Principal easement - easement for
drawing water and for watering animals;
2. accessory easement - easement of a road
right of way
REQUISITES for the principal easement
1. It must be for public use. Here it must be
for public use and not for private interest.
2. It must be in favor of a town or village.
3. Proper indemnity shall be paid to the
servient owner.
- What are the REQUISITES for the
accessory easement?
a. for public use
b. in favor of a town or village
c. the right must be sought not by
one individual but by the town
d. payment of the proper indemnity
- The right of way should have a maximum
width of 10m which cannot be altered by
the owners of the servient estates
although the direction of the path may
indeed be changed, provided the use of
the easement is not prejudiced.
- VIP: An easement of a road right of way
does not carry with it the easement of
aqueduct. The right granted is merely that
of ingress and egress, not the right to
draw water from a water source.
EASEMENT OF AQUEDUCT
ARTICLE 642: Any person who may wish to use
upon his own estate any water of which he can dispose
shall have the right to make it flow thru the
intervening estates, with the obligation to indemnify
their owners, as well as the owners of the lower estates
upon which the waters may filter or descend.
ARTICLE 643: One desiring to make use of the right
granted in the preceding article is obliged:
To prove that he can dispose of the water and that it is
sufficient for the use for which it is intended.
To show that the proposed right of way is the most
convenient and the least onerous to 3rd persons.
To indemnify the owner of the servient estate in the
manner determined by the laws and regulations.
- REQUISITES how one can acquire an
easement of aqueduct:
1. He must prove that he can dispose of the
water. So it means that he really needs the
water;
2. The water is sufficient to which it is
intended;
3. To show that the proposed right of way is
the most convenient and the least onerous
to 3rd persons;
4. To indemnify the owner of the servient
estate.
BANZON vs. BANZON
GR No. 27296. October 8, 1927
Mariano undoubtedly had a right to a
compulsory easement of aqueduct, upon
payment of indemnity, since, although he was
not the owner of the waters of the Talisay
River, he could dispose of 50 liters of the same
per second, by virtue of the grant from the
Director of Public Works.
FACTS
Petitioner TRINIDAD GONZALEZ was the
judicial administratrix of the INTESTATE
ESTATE OF JOSE B. BANZON.
In 2 occasions, respondents B. BANZON,
URSULA BANZON and the latter's husband,
ALBERTO AQUINO, without the knowledge or
consent of TRINIDAD, opened 2 irrigation canals
crossing the land belonging to the INTESTATE
ESTATE OF JOSE B. BANZON.
 The first was in 1919, when MARIANO, ET
AL. opened a canal 1,000 meters long, 2 meters
wide, and 2 meters deep across said land, from
east to west, for the purpose of drawing water
from the Talisay River to irrigate their lands.
The second was in 1988, when MARIANO, ET
AL. opened another canal almost parallel to the
former, 1,000 meters long, 3 meters wide, and 2
meters deep, on the same land on the north side of
the former one, to irrigate their lands with water
from the aforesaid Talisay River.
As a consequence of the opening of said
canals, TRINIDAD filed an action against
MARIANO, ET AL. She claimed that she had
suffered damages from loss of crops,
disintegration and unleveling of land and
therefore prayed that MARIANO, ET AL. be
ordered to close and refill skid canals and to
indemnify her for damages.
On the other hand, MARIANO, ET AL.
denied TRINIDADs allegations. They claimed
that JOSE B. BANZON had aided in the
construction of the first canal in the year 1905, as
well as in the maintenance of the same, as an
integral part of an irrigation system connected
with his land and that he benefited therefrom
during his life and after his death, by his children,
including TRINIDAD. They also averred that the
second canal was built by respondent MARIANO
B. BANZON, brother of JOSE B. BANZON, with
the knowledge and consent of the latter and his
wife. MARIANO then prayed that he be awarded
the right to maintain and preserve the aforesaid
second canal, upon paying the proper indemnity.
The trial court ruled in favor of MARIANO,
ET AL. Hence, this petition by TRINIDAD.
TRINIDAD argued that inasmuch as the two
canals in question did not appear in the OCT of
the land belonging to the INTESTATE ESTATE
OF JOSE B. BANZON, said lot was free of said
easements and the defendants hd no right to
continue using them
As to the second canal, however, MARIANO
filed a counterclaim alleging that he has obtained
from the Director of Public Works a grant to use
50 liters of water per second from the Talisay
River to irrigate his lands, and, in accordance with
the provision, of Article 642 (the Article 557) in
connection with Article 643 (then Article 558) of
the Civil Code, he asked that he be authorized to
open, maintain and preserve a canal similar to the
second one mentioned on TRINIDADs land upon
payment of the proper indemnity, alleging that
the place where said canal passed was the most
convenient and least onerous to third parties, and
that there was no other place more appropriate
and less prejudicial.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the right of voluntary
easement of aqueduct in the property belonging
to the INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE BANZON in
favor of the MARIANO, E TAL. before its
registration under the Torrens system had been
extinguished by such registration.
(2) Whether or not MARIANO had the right,
after paying the proper indemnity, to conduct
water from the Talisay River through the land
belonging to the INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE
B. BANZON, by opening up a canal similar to
the second one here in question.
RULING
(1) YES, it had already been extinguished.
According to Sec. 39 of Act No. 496, as
amended by Act No. 2011, the registration of a
servient estate under the Torrens system
extinguishes all easements to which it is subject
and which have not been noted on the certificate
of title issued in accordance with the proper
decree of registration.
It will be noted that the law mades no
distinction as to the kind of easement and it is
well known that there are two kinds of easements-
legal and voluntary.
The two canals in question were opened by
the defendants across JOSE BANZON's and with
his knowledge and consent, and are therefore
voluntary easements. And as their existence
didnot appear in the OCT of the property
belonging to the INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE
BANZON, these easements were extinguished
and MARIANO, ET AL. had lost their right to the
use of said canals.
(2) YES, MARIANO had such right.
The text of Article 642 (then Article 557) of the
Civil Code is as follows:
ART. 642. Any person who wishes to use
upon his own land any water of which he may
have the control is entitled to take it through
the intervening estates, subject to the
obligation of indemnifying the owners thereof,
as well as the owners of any lower estates
upon which the water may filter or descend.
MARIANO undoubtedly had a right to a
compulsory easement of aqueduct, upon payment
of indemnity, since, although he was not the
owner of the waters of the Talisay River, he could
dispose of 50 liters of the same per second, by
virtue of the grant from the Director of Public
Works. This may be inferred from the provision of
article 125 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866,
which authorizes the owner, of the land on which
it is sought to impose the compulsory easement of
aqueduct, to object when the applicant is not the
owner or grantee of the water.
To enjoy the right granted by the above
quoted Article 642 (then Article 557) of the Civil
Code, the requisites established in Article 643
(then Article 558) of the same Code must be
complied with, which are as follows:
Any person desiring to make use of the
right granted in the foregoing article shall be
obliged
1. To prove that he has a right to dispose
of the water, and that it is sufficient for the
use to which it is destined;
2. To show that the right of way he
requests is the most convenient and least
onerous to third persons;
 3. To indemnify the owner of the servient
estate in the manner prescribed by the laws
and regulations.
MARIANO had complied with these
requirements. It had been proved that he was
granted the use of 50 liters of water per second
from the Talisay River, a sufficient amount to
irrigate his land. He also had proved that the
passage opened by him was the most convenient
and least onerous to third parties, and that he
wais willing to indemnify the INTESTATE
ESTATE OF JOSE B. BANZON, owner of the
servient estate, as the courts may determine.
The trial court had fixed the sum of P36.72 as
the indemnity to be paid by the MARIANO to the
INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE B. BANZON.
GONZALES vs. DE DIOS
GR No. L-3099. May 21, 1951
Under Article 642, he phrase "of which he
may have the control" should be interpreted
in connection with article 643(l) which means
that he has a right to dispose of the water.
This was interpreted to mean one who has
obtained from the government a grant to use
water from a river.
FACTS
Petitioner CIPRIANA GONZALES was the
owner of a fishpond situated in the barrio of
Bambang in Bulacan. Said fishpond was also
adjacent to the fishpond of respondents
PURIFICACION, GUITTERMO, EUSTACIO and
FAUSTINA DE DIOS.
The only source of water of GONZALES
fishpond was the Kay Pateng River, to which it
had neither ingress nor egress, because it had
been completely cut off from it by the fishpond of
the DE DIOS. After the several attempts made by
her to obtain from the DE DIOS a right of way to
and from said river to furnish a source of water to
her fishpond proved futile, she filed the present
action in the CFI of Bulacan.
Upon agreement of the parties, the court
designated one Felipe Asuncion, a surveyor, to
investigate the premises and study the most
convenient place through which an aqueduct may
be constructed for the supply of water needed by
the fishpond of GONZALES, who accordingly
investigated the property and submitted his
report.
The CFI rendered judgment in favor of
GONZALES. It declared that GONZALES had a
right of passage for water from the river Kay
Pateng to her fishpond, on the northwest side of
the dyke by constructing a canal 8t meters wide
and about 100 hundred meters long alongside the
old dike at her expense and upon payment of
P798.16 as just compensation including
consequential damages.
Aggrieved, DE DIOS appealed to the Court of
Appeals which also affirmed the CFI decision. It
held that the claim of GONZALES found support
in the provisions of articles 118 to 125 of the Law
of Waters of 1966 and Article 642 (then Article
557) and Article 643 (then Article 558) of the Civil
Code, which were also relied upon by the court a
quo. There was nothing in the Law of Waters and
the Civil Code, which prohibited the use of water
for purposes other than those mentioned in said
laws. GONZALES had proven that she had the
right to draw water from Kay Pateng River to
make her fishpond as productive as the other
surrounding fishponds.
Hence, this appeal by DE DIOS.
ISSUE
Whether or not GONZALES was entitled to a
right of voluntary easement of aqueduct.
RULING
YES, she was. The Court of Appeals was
correct in stating that Articles 642 and 643 of the
Civil Code could be invoked in support of the
claim of GONZALES.
Article 642 provides that "any person who
wishes to use upon his own land any water of
which he may have the control is entitled to take
it through the intervening estates, subject to the
obligation of indemnifying the owners thereof."
The phrase "of which he may have the control"
should be interpreted in connection with article
643(l) which means that he has a right to dispose
of the water. This was interpreted to mean one
who has obtained from the government a grant to
use water from a river. The use to which the
water may be applied must also be interpreted in
the same way: that the water be sufficient for the
use intended (643[l]).
To enjoy the right granted by article 642 of
the Civil Code, the requisites established in
article 643 of the same code must be complied
with.
If a person who has obtained from the
Government a grant to use water from a river for
irrigation was given the right to construct a canal
over the intervening lands of other private
owners upon payment of indemnity, no valid
reason is seen for not granting the same privilege
to the GONZALES who desired to draw water
from a river for the use of her fishpond.
A fishpond comes within the classification of
agricultural land and is regarded as an important
source of revenue. It is generally constructed in
low lands or swampy places and draw its
breadth of life from brooks and rivers. It is just as
rich and valuable as any piece of agricultural
land and in some regions it is regarded as the
main source of wealth. It is an undertaking to be
encouraged and promoted, for it contributes to
the economic development of the people. Our
law should be interpreted in a sense that may
give it life if it can be done without doing
violence to reason or to any rule of statutory
construction.
There can, therefore, be no doubt with regard
to the right of GONZALES to draw the water she
needed for her fishpond through the land of DE
DIOS if she has obtained the necessary permit to
use the water from the Government. The law
requires that this permit be obtained from the
Director of Public Works. While there was no
proof to this effect, at least this matter was not an
issue in this case. This point was not disputed.
ARTICLE 644: The easement of aqueduct of private
interest cannot be imposed in buildings, courtyards,
annexes, or outhouses, or on orchards or gardens
already existing.
ARTICLE 645: The easement of aqueduct does not
prevent the owner of the servient estate from closing or
fencing it, or from building over the aqueduct in such
manner as not to cause the latter any damage, or
render necessary repairs and cleanings impossible.
ARTICLE 646: For legal purposes, the easement of
aqueduct shall be considered as continuous and
apparent, even though the flow of the water may not be
continuous, or its use depends upon the needs of the
dominant estate or upon a schedule of alternate days of
hours.
1. Easement of aqueduct the right to make
water flow thru intervening estates in
order that one may make use of said
waters.
2. The existence of Right of Way does not
necessarily include the easement of
aqueduct.
SUMMARY: AQUEDUCT
1. Indemnity in aqueduct It must be paid
to the owners of intervening estates and
to the owners of lower estates;
2. If for private interest, the easement cannot
be imposed on existing bldgs., courtyards,
annexes, outhouses, orchards, or gardens.
3. There must be proof that:
4. He can dispose of the water;
5. That the water intended is sufficient;
6. That the proposed course is the most
convenient and least onerous;
7. Permission from proper administrative
agencies
8. Payment of indemnity.
ARTICLE 647: One who for the purpose if irrigating
or improving his estate, has to construct a stop lock or
sluice gate in the bed of the stream from which the
water is to be taken, may demand that the owners of the
banks permit its construction, after payment of
damages, including those caused by the new easement
to such owners and to the other irrigators.
CONSTRUCTION OF A STOP LOCK OR
SLUICE GATE:
REQUISITES:
1. purpose must be for irrigation or
improvement;
2. the construction must be on the estate of
another;
3. damages must be paid;
4. 3rd persons should not be prejudiced.
ARTICLE 648: The establishment, extent, form and
conditions of the servitudes of waters, to which this
section refers, shall be governed by the special laws
relating thereto, insofar as no provisions therefore is
made in this Code.
VASLINO vs. ADRIANO
GR No. L-37409 May 23, 1988.
Water rights, such as the right to use a
drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which
are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with
the conveyance of the land, although not
specifically mentioned in the conveyance.
FACTS
In 1960, the petitioner NICOLAS VALISNO-
appellant file against the ADRIANO-appellee an
action for damages docketed as Civil Case No.
3472 in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
The complaint alleged that the
Petitioner NICOLAS VALISNO was the
registered owner and actual possessor of a
557,949-square-meter parcel of land in La Fuente,
Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija. VALISNO bought the
land from the respondent FELIPE ADRIANOs
sister, Honorata ADRIANO Francisco in 1959. The
land sold to VALISNO, which was planted with
watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco, and other
vegetables, adjoined the land of ADRIANO on the
bank of the Pampanga River. Both parcels of land
had been inherited by Honorata and ADRIANO
from their father, Eladio Adriano. At the time of
the sale of the land to VALISNO, the land was
irrigated by water from the Pampanga River
through a canal about seventy (70) meters long,
traversing the appellee's land.
In 1959, ADRIANO leveled a portion of the
irrigation canal so that VALISNO was deprived of
the irrigation water and was prevented from
cultivating his 57-hectare land.
VALISNO then filed in the Bureau of Public
Works and Communications a complaint for
deprivation of water rights. A decision was
rendered in 1960, ordering ADRIANO to
reconstruct the irrigation canal. However, Instead
of restoring the irrigation canal, the ADRIANO
asked for a reinvestigation of the case by the
Bureau of Public Works and Communications. A
reinvestigation was granted.
In the meantime, VALISNO rebuilt the
irrigation canal at his own expense because his
need for water to irrigate his watermelon fields
was urgent.
Thereafter, VALISNO filed a complaint for
damages in the CFI claiming that he suffered
damages when he failed to plant his fields that
year (1960) for lack of irrigation water and for the
expenses he made to reconstruct the canal on
ADRIANO's land.
ADRIANO, in his answer to the damage suit,
admitted that he leveled the irrigation canal on his
land, but he averred: that neither his late father
nor his sister Honorata possessed water rights for
the land which she sold to the VALISNO. He
averred that he applied for water rights for his
land in 1956 and obtained the same in 1958; and
that he had a perfect right to level his land for his
own use because he merely allowed his sister to
use his water rights when she still owned the
adjacent land. He set up a counterclaim damages.
In 1961, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications reversed the Bureau's decision
by issuing a final resolution dismissing
VALISNO's complaint. The Secretary held that
Eladio Adriano's water rights, which had been
granted in 1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in
1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed.
His non-use of the water right since then for a
period of more than 5 years extinguished the
grant by operation of law, hence the water rights
did not form part of his hereditary estate which
his heirs partitioned among themselves.
VALISNO, as vendee of the land which Honorata
received from her father's estate did not acquire
any water rights with the land purchased.
In 1966, as to the case for damages filed by
VALISNO, the claim for damages and
counterclaim was dismissed. The CFI held that
the VALISNO had no right to pass through the
ADRIANO's land to draw water from the
Pampanga River. Under Section 4 of the Irrigation
Law, controversies between persons claiming a
right to water from a stream are within the
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works and
his decision on the matter is final, unless an
appeal is taken to the proper court within 30 days.
The court may not pass upon the validity of the
decision of the Public Works Secretary
collaterally. Furthermore, there was nothing in the
VALISNOs evidence to show that the resolution
was not valid.
Hence, this appeal. VALSINO argued that
while the trial court correctly held that the
Secretary of Public Works may legally decide who
between the parties is entitled to apply for water
rights under the Irrigation Act, it erred in ruling
that the Secretary has authority to hear and decide
the VALISNOs claim for damages for the
ADRIANO's violation of his right to continue to
enjoy the easement of aqueduct or water through
the ADRIANO's land under Articles 642, 643, and
646 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE
Whether or not ADRIANO should grant
VALISNO the continued and unimpeded use of
the irrigation ditch traversing his land in order to
obtain water from the Pampanga River to irrigate
VALISNO's land.
RULING
YES, VALISNO was entitled to said right.
Under Article 648 of the new Civil Code, the
establishment, extent and consitions of the
servitudes of waters, shall be governed by the
special laws relating thereto (the irrigation law
and the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866,
specifically Article 122 thereof) insofar as no
provision is made in the Civil Code.
The existence of the irrigation canal on
ADRIANO's land for the passage of water from
the Pampanga River to Honorata's land prior to
and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land to
the VALISNO was equivalent to a title for the
vendee of the land to continue using it under
Article 624, which provides that:
Article 624. The existence of an apparent
sign of easement between two estates,
established or maintained by the owner of
both shall be considered, should either of
them be alienated, as a title in order that the
easement may continue actively and
passively, unless at the time the ownership of
the two estates is divided, the contrary
should he provided in the title of conveyance
of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should
be removed before the execution of the deed.
This provision shall also apply in case of the
division of a thing owned in common by two
or more persons.
This provision was lifted from Article 122 of
the Spanish Law of Waters which provided:
Article 122. Whenever a tract of irrigated
land which previously received its waters
from a single point is divided through
inheritance, sale or by virtue of some other
title, between two or more owners, the
owners of the higher estates are under
obligation to give free passage to the water as
an easement of conduit for the irrigation of
the lower estates, and without right to any
compensation therefore unless otherwise
stipulated in the deed of conveyance." (Art.
122, Spanish Law of Waters of August 3,
1866.)
No enlightened concept of ownership can
shut out the idea of restrictions thereon, such as
easements. Absolute and unlimited dominion is
unthinkable, inasmuch as the proper enjoyment of
property requires mutual service and forbearance
among adjoining estates.
The deed of sale in favor of VALISNO
included the "conveyance and transfer of the
water rights and improvements" appurtenant to
Honorata's property. By the terms of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, the vendor Honorata sold, ceded,
conveyed and transferred to Dr. Nicolas
VALISNO all "rights, title, interest and participations
over the parcel of land above-described, together with
one Berkely Model 6 YRF Centrifugal Pump G"
suction, 6" discharge 500-1500 GPM, with Serial No.
5415812 and 1 set of suction pipe and discharge of pipe
with elbow, nipples, flanges and foot valves," and the
water rights and such other improvements
appertaining to the property subject of this sale.
According to VALISNO, the water right was the
primary consideration for his purchase of
Honorata's property, for without it the property
would be unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to use a
drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the
conveyance of the land, although not specifically
mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's
easement of necessity in a water ditch running
across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even
if the water is supplied by a third person. The fact
that an easement by grant may also have qualified
as an easement of necessity does not detract from
its permanency as property right, which survives
the determination of the necessity.
As an easement of waters in favor of
VALISNO has been established, he is entitled to
enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or
wrongful interference, such as the ADRIANO's
act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him
of the us of water from the Pampanga River.
EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY
ARTICLE 649: The owner, or any person who by
virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any
immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables
pertaining to other persons and without adequate
outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand d a
right if way thru the neighboring estate, after payment
of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a
manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs
of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent
passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the
land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to
the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the
necessary passage for the cultivation of the estate
surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops
thru the servient estate without permanent way, the
indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage
caused by such encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the
isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietors
own acts.
- Easement of right way is an easement or
privilege by which one person or a
particular class of persons is allowed to
pass over anothers land, usually thru one
particular path or line.
REQUISITES:
1. property is surrounded by the estates of
others;
2. there is no adequate outlet to a public
highway;
3. there must be payment of proper
indemnity;
4. it must be established at a point least
prejudicial for the servient estate;
5. the isolation must not be due to the
proprietor's own acts (Dionisio case)
6. demandable by the owner or one with a
real right like a usufructuary.
- If these requirements; if these are not
present, there could be no establishment
of easement of right of way.
- Remedy of the owner of an estate which
is isolated to a public highway.
- To file a petition for an easement of right
of way.
- If none of the circumstances are present,
easement may be created through a
contract between the parties for the
establishment of a RRW.
ARTICLE 650: The easement of right of way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.
ARTICLE 651: The width of the easement of right of
was shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the
dominant estate and may accordingly be changed from
time to time.
ARTICLE 652: Whenever a piece of land acquired by
sale, exchange or partition, is surrounded by other
states of the vendor, exchanger, or co-owner, he shall be
obliged to grant a right of way without indemnity.
In case of a simple donation, the donor shall be
indemnified by the donee for the establishment of the
right of way.
ARTICLE 653: In the case of the preceding article, if it
is the land of the grantor that becomes isolated, he may
demand a right of way after paying an indemnity.
However, the donor shall not be liable for indemnity.
RULES IF GRANTORS OR GRANTEES
LAND IS ENCLOSED
1. If the ENCLOSING estate is that of the
grantor (seller or co-owner but not
donor), the grantee does nor pay
indemnity for the easement.
2. If the ENCLOSED estate is that of the
grantor (seller, co-owner but not donor),
the grantor must indemnify.
Problems:
A sold to B a parcel of land
surrounded by other estates owned by A (Estate
1, 2, and 3). A gave B an outlet thru Estate 1
without indemnity since the purchase price
presumably already included in the right to the
easement. Later, the outlet thru Estate 1 became
useless because the highway to which it led was
closed. If B demands another outlet, is he allowed
to get one? If so, must he pay indemnity? Yes, he
can demand another outlet under 649 and must
therefore pay. He cannot take advantage of Art
652 because after all, the outlet had already been
granted once, that is, when the sale was made.
This time, the necessity arises not because of the
sale but because of necessity itself.
A owns 2 estates. He sold the first
(having access to the highway) to B. later, he sold
the 2nd (without access) to C. So that C can again
access, he must pass thru Bs land. Does C have to
pay indemnity to B? Yes because after all, B did
not sell the land to C, and clearly Art. 652 cannot
apply.
COSTABELLA vs. CA
GR No. 80511. January 25,1991
 Hence, when there is already an existing
adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a
public highway, even if the said outlet, for one
reason or another, be inconvenient, the need
to open up another servitude is entirely
unjustified. For to justify the imposition of an
easement or right of way, "there must be a
real, not a fictitious or artificial necessity for
it."
FACTS
Petitioner COSTABELLA CORP. owned real
estate properties in Lapu-Lapu City, on which it
had constructed a resort and hotel. Adjoining to
this land, were the lots of private respondent
KATIPUNAN LUMBER CO., INC., ET AL.
Before COSTABELLA CORP. began the
construction of its beach hotel, KATIPUNAN
LUMBER, ET AL., in going to and from their
respective properties and the provincial road,
passed through a passageway which traversed
COSTABELLA CORP.'s property.
In 1981, the COSTABELLA CORP. closed the
passageway when it began the construction of its
hotel but nonetheless opened another route across
its property through which the KATIPUNAN
LUMBER, ET AL., as in the past, were allowed to
pass.
In 1982, when COSTABELLA CORP.
undertook the construction of the second phase of
its beach hotel, it fenced its property thus closing
even the alternative passageway and prevented
KATIPUNAN LUMBER, ET AL. from traversing
any part of its lot.
Hence, KATIPUNAN LUMBER, ET AL filed
an action for injunction with damages was filed
against the COSTABELLA CORP. before the CFI
of Cebu for the latters deprivation of the former
of the road right of way. They alleged that the
passage way was an "ancient road right of way"
that had been existing before World War II and
since then had been used by them, the
community, and the general public, either as
pedestrians or by means of vehicles, in going to
and coming from LapuLapu City and other parts
of the country.
KATIPUNAN LUMBER, ET AL. likewise
alleged that the COSTABELLA CORP. had
constructed a dike on the beach fronting the
latter's property without the necessary permit,
obstructing the passage of the residents and local
fishermen, and trapping debris and flotsam on the
beach. They also claimed that the debris and
flotsam that had accumulated prevented them
from using their properties for the purpose for
which they had acquired them. The complaint this
prayed for the trial court to order the re-opening
of the original passageway across the
COSTABELLA CORP.'s property as well as the
destruction of the dike.
On the other hand, COSTABELLA CORP.
denied the existence of an ancient road through its
property and counter-averred, among others, that
it and its predecessors-in-interest had permitted
the temporary, intermittent, and gratuitous use of,
or passage through, its property by KATIPUNAN
LUMBER CO., INC., ET AL. and others by mere
tolerance and purely as an act of neighborliness.
At any rate, COSTABELLA CORP. alleged that
KATIPUNAN LUMBER, ET AL. were not entirely
dependent on the subject passageway as they had
another existing and adequate access to the public
road through other properties. With respect to the
dike it allegedly constructed, the COSTABELLA
CORP. stated that what it built was a breakwater
on the foreshore land fronting its property and
not a dike as claimed by the KATIPUNAN
LUMBER, ET AL. Moreover, contrary to the
KATIPUNAN LUMBER, ET AL.' accusation, the
said construction had benefitted the community
especially the fishermen who used the same as
mooring for their boats during low tide. The
quantity of flotsam and debris which had formed
on the KATIPUNAN LUMBER, ET AL.'s beach
front on the other hand were but the natural and
unavoidable accumulations on beaches by the
action of the tides and movement of the waves of
the sea.
In 1984, the CFI ruled in favor of
KATIPUNAN LUMBER, ET AL. It held that
KATIPUNAN LUMBER, ET AL. had acquired a
vested right over the passageway in controversy
based on its long existence and its continued use
and enjoyment not only by the KATIPUNAN
LUMBER, ET AL., but also by the community at
large. The COSTABELLA CORP. in so closing the
said passageway, had accordingly violated the
private respondent's vested right. Thus, the trial
court ordered the COSTABELLA CORP. to open
the disputed passage way and make it available to
KATIPUNAN LUMBER, ET AL. and the general
public at all times free of any obstacle thereof,
unless the it shall provide another road equally
accessible and convenient.
Both parties elevated the trial court's decision
to the Court of Appeals, with COSTABELLA
CORP. questioning the alleged "vested right" of
the KATIPUNAN LUMBER, ET AL. over the
subject passageway, and KATIPUNAN LUMBER,
ET AL. assailing the dismissal of their complaint
insofar as their prayer for the demolition of the
COSTABELLA CORP.'s "dike" is concerned.
The Court of Appeals found that the trial
courts decision finding KATIPUNAN LUMBER,
ET AL. to had acquired a vested right over the
passageway in question by virtue of prescription
was without legal basis. It pointed out that an
easement of right of way is a discontinuous one
which, under Article 622 of the New Civil Code,
may only be acquired by virtue of a title and not
by prescription. Nevertheless, the court ruled that
in the interest of justice and in its exercise of its
equity jurisdiction, it found no reason for not to
treat the easement sought by KATIPUNAN
LUMBER, ET AL. , as one that is not dependent
upon the claims of the parties but a compulsory
one that is legally demandable by the owner of
the dominant estate from the owner of the
servient estate. Thus, it granted KATIPUNAN
LUMBER, ET AL. the right to an easement of way
on the COSTABELLA CORP.'s property,using the
passageway in question, unless the
COSTABELLA CORP. should provide another
passageway equally accessible and convenient as
the one it closed.
Hence, COSTABELLA CORP. filed a petition
for review with the Supreme Court. It argued that
the appellate courts decision was contrary to the
provisions of Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil
Code on easements and the prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter.
ISSUES
Whether or not the right of voluntary
easement of aqueduct in the property belonging
to the INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE BANZON in
favor of the MARIANO, E TAL. before its
registration under the Torrens system had been
extinguished by such registration.
RULING
It is already well-established that an easement
of right of way, as is involved here, is
discontinuous and as such can not be acquired by
prescription. Insofar therefore as the appellate
court adhered to the foregoing precepts, it stood
correct. Unfortunately, after making the correct
pronouncement, the respondent Appellate Court
did not order the reversal of the trial court's
decision and the dismissal of the complaint after
holding that no easement had been validly
constituted over the COSTABELLA CORP.'s
property. Instead, the Appellate Court went on to
commit a reversible error by considering the
passageway in issue as a compulsory easement
which the KATIPUNAN LUMBER, ET AL., as
owners of the "dominant" estate, may demand
from the COSTABELLA CORP. the latter being
the owner of the "servient" estate.
Under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code
that, the owner of the dominant estate may
validly claim a compulsory right of way only after
he has established the existence of four requisites,
to wit:
(1) the (dominant) estate is
surrounded by other immovables and is
without adequate outlet to a public
highway;
(2) after payment of the proper
indemnity,
(3) the isolation was not due to the
proprietor's own acts; and
(4) the right of way claimed is at a
point least prejudicial to the servient
estate.
Additionally, the burden of proving the
existence of the foregoing pre-requisites lies on
the owner of the dominant estate.
Here, there was absent any showing that
KATIPUNAN LUMBER, ET AL. had established
the existence of the 4 requisites mandated by law.
For one, they failed to prove that there is no
adequate outlet from their respective properties to
a public highway highway. On the contrary, as
alleged by the COSTABELLA CORP. in its answer
to the complaint, and confirmed by the appellate
court, there was another outlet for KATIPUNAN
LUMBER, ET AL. to the main road."18
Thus, the respondent Court of Appeals
likewise admitted that "legally the old road could
be closed." Yet, it ordered the re-opening of the
old passageway on the ground that "the existing
outlet (the other outlet) was inconvenient to the
plaintiff." On this score, it is apparent that the
Court of Appeals lost sight of the fact that the
convenience of the dominant estate has never
been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right
of way. To be sure, the true standard for the grant
of the legal right is "adequacy." Hence, when there
is already an existing adequate outlet from the
dominant estate to a public highway, even if the
said outlet, for one reason or another, be
inconvenient, the need to open up another
servitude is entirely unjustified. For to justify the
imposition of an easement or right of way, "there
must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial
necessity for it."
Further, the KATIPUNAN LUMBER, ET AL.
failed to indicate in their complaint or even to
manifest during the trial of the case that they were
willing to indemnify fully the COSTABELLA
CORP. for the right of way to be established over
its property. Neither have the KATIPUNAN
LUMBER, ET AL. been able to show that the
isolation of their property was not due to their
personal or their predecessors-ininterest's own
acts. Finally, the KATIPUNAN LUMBER, ET AL.
failed to allege, much more introduce any
evidence, that the passageway they sought to be
reopened was at a point least prejudicial to the
COSTABELLA CORP.
Considering that the COSTABELLA CORP.
operates a hotel and beach resort in its property, it
must undeniably maintain a strict standard of
security within its promises. Otherwise, the
convenience, privacy, and safety of its clients and
patrons would be compromised. That indubitably
will doom the COSTABELLA CORP.'s business. It
is therefore of great importance that the claimed
right of way over the COSTABELLA CORP.'s
property be located at a point least prejudicial to
its business.
Servitudes of right of way are an ancient
concept, which date back to the iter, actus, and via
of the Romans. They are demanded by necessity,
that is, to enable owners of isolated estates to
make full use of their properties, which lack of
access to public roads has denied them. Under
Article 649 of the Civil Code, they are compulsory
and hence, legally demandable, subject to
indemnity and the concurrence of the other
conditions above-referred to.
As also earlier indicated, there must be a real
necessity therefor, and not mere convenience for
the dominant estate. Hence, if there is an existing
outlet, otherwise adequate, to the highway, the
"dominant" estate can not demand a right of way,
although the same may not be convenient. Of
course, the question of when a particular passage
may be said to be "adequate" depends on the
circumstances of each case.
The isolation of the dominant estate is also
dependent on the particular need of the dominant
owner, and the estate itself need not be totally
landlocked. What is important to consider is
whether or not a right of way is necessary to fill a
reasonable need therefor by the owner.
But while a right of way is legally
demandable, the owner of the dominant estate is
not at liberty to impose one based on arbitrary
choice. Under Article 650 of the Code, it shall be
established upon two criteria:
(1) at the point least prejudical to the servient
state; and
(2) where the distance to a public highway
may be the shortest. According, however, to one
commentator, "least prejudice" prevails over
"shortest distance."29 Yet, each case must be
weighed according to its individual merits, and
judged according to the sound discretion of the
court. "The court," says Tolentino, "is not bound to
establish what is the shortest; a longer way may
be established to avoid injury to the servient
tenement, such as when there are constructions or
walls which can be avoided by a roundabout way,
or to secure the interest of the dominant owner,
such as when the shortest distance would place
the way on a dangerous decline.
ENCARNACIO vs. CA
GR No. 77628. March 11, 1991
Under the Art. 651, it is the needs of the
dominant property which ultimately
determine the width of the passage and these
need, may vary from time to time.
Since the easement to be established in favor
of ENCARNACION is of a continuous and
permanent nature, the indemnity shall consist
of the value of the land occupied and the
amount of the damage caused to the servient
estate pursuant to Article 649 of the Civil
Code.
FACTS
Petitioner TOMAS ENCARNACION and
private respondent HEIRS OF THE LATE
ANICETA MAGSINO VIUDA DE SAGUN were
the owners of 2 adjacent estates situated in Buco,
Talisay, Batangas
ENCARNACION owned the dominant estate
which has an area of 2,690 square meters. HEIRS
OF VIUDA DE SAGUN co-owned the 405-square
meter servient. In other words, the servient estate
stood between the dominant estate and the
national road.
Prior to 1960, when the servient estate was not
yet enclosed with a concrete fence, persons going
to the national highway just crossed the servient
estate at no particular point. However, in 1960
when HEIRS OF VIUDA DE SAGUN constructed
a fence around the servient estate, a road path
measuring 25 meters long and about a meter wide
was constituted to provide access to the highway.
One-half meter width of the path was taken from
the servient estate and the other one-half met"
portion was taken from another lot owned by one
Mamerto Magsino. No compensation was asked
and none was given for the portions constituting
the pathway.
It wan also about that time that
ENCARNACION started his plant nursery
business on his land where he also had his abode.
He would use said pathway as passage to the
highway for his family and for his customers.
ENCARNACION's plant nursery business
through sheer hard work flourished and with
that, it became more and more difficult for
ENCARNACION to haul the plants and garden
soil to and from the nursery and the highway
with the use of pushcarts In January, 1984,
ENCARNACION was able to buy an owner-type
jeep which he could use for transporting his
plants However, that jeep could not pass through
the road path and an he approached the servient
estate owners (Aniceta Vda. de Sagun and Elena
Romero Vda de Sagun) and requested that they
sell to him one and onehalf (1 1/2) meters of their
property to be added to the existing pathway an
as to allow passage for his jeepney. To his utter
consternation, his request was turned down by
the two widows and further attempts at
negotiation proved futile.
Thhereafter, ENCARNACION then instituted
an action with the RTC of Batangas to seek the
issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way
over an additional width of at least 2 meters over
the DE SAGUNA's 406-square-meter parcel of
land.
In 1985, the lower court dismissed the
complaint of ENCARNACION. It held that it was
clear that ENCARNACION had 2 outlets to the
highway one through DE SEGUNAs land on a
one meter wide passageway, which was bounded
an both sides by concrete walls and second,
through the dried river bed eighty meters away. It
ruled that ENCARNACION had an adequate
outlet to the highway through the dried river bed
where his jeep could pass.
ISSUE
Whether or nor ENCARNACION was entitled
to an additional easement of right of way.
RULING
YES, he was entitled to an additional
easement of right of way of twenty five (25)
meters long by one and one-half (1) meters ande
over the servient estate or a total area of 62.5
square meters after payment of the proper
indemnity.
While there was a dried river bed less than
100 meters from the dominant tenement, that
access is grossly inadequate. Generally, the right
of way may he demanded when: (1) when there is
absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2)
when, even if there is one, it is difficult or
dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient.
In the present case, the river bad route is
traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there was
no ingress nor egress from the highway. For the
jeep to reach the level of the high-way, it must
literally jump 4 to 5 meters up. Moreover, during
the rainy season, the river bed was impassable
due to the floods. Thus, it can only he used at
certain times of the year. With the inherent
disadvantages of the river bed which make
passage difficult, if not impossible, it in if there
were no outlet at all.
Where a private property has no access to a
public road, it has the right of easement over
adjacent servient estates as a matter of law.
With the non-availability of the dried river
bed as an alternative route to the highway, we
transfer our attention to the existing pathway
which straddles the adjoining properties of the DE
SAGUN HEIRS and Mamerto Magsino.
The courts below have taken against
ENCARNACION his candid admission in open
court that he needed a wider pathway for the
convenience of his business and family. We
cannot begrudge ENCARNACION for wanting
that which is convenient but certainly that should
not detract from the more pressing consideration
that there in a real and compelling need for such
servitude in his favor Article 651 of the Civil Code
provides that
"(t)he width of the easement of right of
way shall be that which is sufficient for the
needs of the dominant estate, and may
accordingly be changed from time to time."
This is taken to mean that under the law, it is
the needs of the dominant property which
ultimately determine the width of the passage and
these need, may vary from time to time.
When ENCARNACION started out as a plant
nursery operator, he and his family could easily
make do with a few pushcarts to tow the plants to
the national highway but the business grew and
with it, the need for the use of modern meant of
conveyance or transport. Manual hauling of
plants and garden mail and use of pushcarts have
become extremely cumbersome and physically
taxing. To force ENCARNACION to leave his
jeepney in the highway, exposed to the elements
and to the risk of theft simply because it could not
pass through the improvised pathway, is sheer
pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate
and can only be counter productive for all the
people concerned. ENCARNACION should not
be denied a passageway wide enough to
accomodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable
and necessary aspect of the plant nursery
business.
We are well aware that an additional one and
me-half (1 ) meters in the width of the pathway
will reduce the servient estate to only about 342.5
square meters But ENCARNACION has
expressed willingness to exchange an equivalent
portion of his land to compensate HEIRS OF
VIUDA DE SAGUN for their loss. Since the
easement to be established in favor of
ENCARNACION is of a continuous and
permanent nature, the indemnity shall consist of
the value of the land occupied and the amount of
the damage caused to the servient estate pursuant
to Article 649 of the Civil Code.
FRANCISCO vs. IAC
GR No. 63996. September 15, 1989
But the law makes it amply clear that an
owner cannot, as RAMOS has done, by his
own act isolate his property from a public
highway and then claim an easement of way
through an adjacent estate.
FACTS
Private respondent CRESENCIO RAMOS Lot
860-A used to be a part of Lot 860 of the Malinta
Estate, which was owned by Cornelia and Frisca
Dila and had a frontage along Parada Road
measuring 51.90 meters. Adjoining Lot 860 was
Lot 226, owned by petitioner EUSEBIO
FRANCISCO, which also had a frontage along
Parada Road of 62.10 meters.
In 1947, Cornelia and Frisca Dila executed a
deed by which each of the 3 undivided 1/3
portion of the land was given to:
1. Epifania Dila, a niece
2. children of a deceased sister, Anacleta
Dila,
3. Cornelia Dila.
Then, the parties agreed to partition the
property, as follows:
1. to Epifania Dila Lot 860-B (5,291 sq. m.)
2. to the heirs of Anacleta Dila Lot 860-D
(5,291 sq. m.)
3. to Cornelia Dila Lot 860-A (2,204 sq. m.)
and Lot 860-C (3,086 sq. m.)
The former co-owners evidently overlooked
the fact that, by reason of the subdivision, Lot 860-
B of Epifania Dila came to include the entire
frontage of what used to be Lot 860 along Parada
Road, and thus effectively isolated from said road
the other lots, i.e., Lots 860-A and 860-C of
Cornelia Dila, and Lot 860-D of the children of
Anacleta Dila.
Later, Cornelia sold Lot 860-A to the sisters
Marcosa, Margarita, and Irinea Eugenio and in
1971, the Eugenio Sisters sold the land to private
respondent CRESENCIO J. RAMOS.
In 1972, after having set up a piggery on his
newly acquired property, RAMOS had his lawyer
write to FRANCISCO, owner of the adjoining lot,
Lot 266-to ask for a right of way through the
latter's land. Negotiations thereafter had however
failed to bring about a satisfactory arrangement.
FRANCISCO's proposal for an exchange of land
at the rate of one (1) square meter from him to
three (3) square meters from RAMOS, as was
supposedly the custom in the locality, was
unacceptable to RAMOS.
Later that year, RAMOS succeeded through
the intercession of Councilor Tongco of
Valenzuela in obtaining a three meter wide
passageway through Lot 860-B of Epifania Dila.
Yet in August, 1973, he inexplicably put up a ten-
foot high concrete wall on his lot and thereby
closed the very right of way granted to him across
Lot 860-B. It seemed that what he wished was to
have a right of passage precisely through
FRANCISCO's land, considering this to be more
convenient to him, and he did not bother to keep
quiet about his determination to bring suit, if
necessary, to get what he wanted.FRANCISCO
learned of RAMOS' intention and reacted by
replacing the barbedwire fence on his lot along
Parada Road with a stone wall.
As a result, RAMOS filed a complaint against
FRANCISCO with the CFI of Bataan, praying that
the latter be ordered to remove his stone fence
and keep his lot open for RAMOS' use.
The court appointed a commissioner who
conducted an ocular inspection of the lots in
question. On the basis of the commissioner's
report, the Court granted RAMOS a temporary
right of way over FRANCISCOs property,
ordering the latter to immediately remove all
obstructions existing in order that RAMOS may
have a free access to his property.
Later, the Court rendered a decision adversely
against FRANCISCO. It granted RAMOS the right
of way he prayed over FRANCISCOs property
upon the payment of indemnity. The same
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this appeal. FRANCISCO argues that
under Art. 649 of the Civil Code, RAMOS was not
entitled for the easement of right of way because
1. FRANCISCO's Lot 266 may not be
considered a servient estate subject to a
compulsory easement of right of way in
favor of Ramos' Lot 860-A; and
2. Courts are not empowered to establish
judicial easements.
ISSUE
Whether or not RAMOS was entitled to a legal
easement of a right of way under Article 649.
RULING
NO, he was not entitled to a legal easement.
In Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. Capital
Subdivision Inc., the Supreme Court held that a
compulsory easement of way cannot be obtained
without the presence of four (4) requisite
provided for in Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil
Code, which the owner of the dominant tenement
must establish, to wit:
1. That the dominant estate is surrounded by
other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par.
1)
2. After payment of proper indemnity (Art.
649, par. 1, end);
3. That the isolation was not due to acts of
the proprietor of the dominant estate; and
4. That the right of way claimed is at the
point least prejudicial to the servient
estate; and insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may
be the shortest. (Art. 650)
In the present case, RAMOS had already been
granted access to the public road (Parada Road)
through the other adjoining Lot 860-B owned by
Epifania Dila and this, at the time he was
negotiating with petitioner for the similar
easement over the latter's Lot 266 that he now
claims-inexplicably gave up that right of access by
walling off his property from the passageway
thus established.
That there was such a passageway was also
confirmed by another witness, Parada Barrio
Captain Fausto Francisco, one of those who had
earlier tried to bring FRANCISCO and RAMOS to
an agreement about the proposed right of way
through the property of the former. This witness
declared, as already stated, that after the
negotiations had been stalled by the failure of the
parties to agree on the terms of a proposed land
exchange that would have given Ramos access to
Parada Road, RAMOS had been able to obtain
right of passage to the same public road over a 3-
meter wide portion of Lot 860-B owned by
Epifania Dila through the intercession of
Councilor Tongco of Valenzuela. The presence of
the tire marks indicating that the portion of Lot
860-B where they were found had been used as a
passageway was also brought to the attention of
the Trial Court at the ocular inspection conducted,
with the parties present or duly represented.
The evidence, also uncontradicted, is that
said passageway was 2.76 meters wide, or wide
enough to accommodate a truck. The surveyor
who at the instance of petitioner made a survey of
the premises, shortly after RAMOS had filed his
complaint, verified the existence of said
passageway from the presence of tire marks
found on the scene and indicated on the sketch
plan he prepared the path that it took from said
RAMOSt's Lot 860-A through Lot 860-B to Parada
Road.2
The evidence is, therefore, persuasively to the
effect that the RAMOS had been granted an
adequate access to the public highway (Parada
Road) through the adjacent estate of Epifania Dila
even as he was trying to negotiate a satisfactory
agreement with FRANCISCO for another
passageway through the latter's property. If at the
time he filed suit against the FRANCISCO, such
access (through the property of Epifania Dila)
could no longer be used, it was because he himself
had closed it off by erecting a stone wall on his lot
at the point where the passageway began for no
reason to which the record can attest except to
demonstrate the isolation of his property alleged
in his complaint.
But the law makes it amply clear that an
owner cannot, as RAMOS has done, by his own
act isolate his property from a public highway
and then claim an easement of way through an
adjacent estate. The third of the cited requisites:
that the claimant of a right of way has not himself
procured the isolation of his property had not
been met-indeed the respondent had actually
brought about the contrary condition and thereby
vitiated his claim to such an easement. It will not
do to assert that use of the passageway through
Lot 860-B was difficult or inconvenient, the
evidence being to the contrary and that it was
wide enough to be traversable by even a truck,
and also because it has been held that mere
inconvenience attending the use of an existing
right of way does not justify a claim for a similar
easement in an alternative location.

FLORO vs. LLENADO
GR No. 75723. June 2, 1995
Failing to establish the existence of the
prerequisites under Articles 649 and 650 of
the Civil Code, private respondent Llenado's
bid for a compulsory easement of right of way
over Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park
Subdivision must fail.
FACTS
Petitioner SIMEON FLORO was the owner of
a piece of land known as the Floro Park
Subdivision situated in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
The subdivision has its own egress and ingress to
and from the MacArthur Highway by means of its
Road Lot 4 and the PNR level crossing.
Private respondent ORLANDO A.
LLENADO, on the other hand, was the registered
owner of 2 parcels of land, known as the Llenado
Homes Subdivision. Prior to its purchase by
LLENADO from the owner Francisco de Castro,
the land was known as the Emmanuel Homes
Subdivision, a duly licensed and registered
housing subdivision in the name of Soledad
Ortega. It was bounded on the South by the 5 to 6
meter-wide Palanas Creek, which separated it
from the Floro Park Subdivision, and on the west
by ricelands belonging to Marcial Ipapo, Montaos
and Guevarra
LLENADO HOMES did not have any existing
road or passage to the MacArthur Highway.
However, a proposed access road traversing the
idle riceland of Marcial Ipapo had been
specifically provided in the subdivision plan of
the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision, which was
duly approved by the defunct Human Settlement
Regulatory Commission (now Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board).
In 1983, the LLENADO sought and were
granted permission by the FLORO to use Road
Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision as
passageway to and from MacArthur Highway.
Later, however, FLORO barricaded Road Lot 5
with a pile of rocks, wooden posts and adobe
stones, thereby preventing its use by LLENADO.
Their request for the reopening of Road Lot 5
having been denied, LLENADO instituted in 1983
a complaint before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan,
against FLORO for Easement of Right of Way.
After hearing and ocular inspection, the trial
court granted a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction in favor of LLENADO. The court also
ordered FLORO to open the road by removing the
rocks and wooden posts and/or to remove the
barricade on the subject road of the Floro Park
Subdivision. He was also prohibited from doing
or performing any act or acts which would
prevent LLENADO from passing through the
subject subdivision road.
In the meantime, LLENADO died and was
substituted by his wife Wenifreda T. Llenado as
administratrix of his estate and as legal guardian
of their 4 minor children.
In 1984, the trial court dismissed the case and
lifted the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction previously issued. It held that
LLENADO was not entitled to an easement of
right of way. On appeal to the Court of Appeals,
the appellate court reversed the decision of the
lower court. It granted the easement for a right of
way in favor of LLENADO.
Hence, this appeal by FLORO.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not FLORO granted
LLENADO a voluntary easement of right of way
when the former granted the latter passage
through his property for a limited time, without
compensation.
(2) Whether or not LLENADO can demand a
compulsory easement of right of way over the
existing roads of the adjacent subdivision instead
of developing his subdivision's proposed access
road as provided in his duly approved
subdivision plan.
RULING
(1) NO, LLENADO was not granted a
voluntary easement for a right of way.
It is not disputed that sometime in March
1983, FLORO granted the LLENADOS verbal
permission to pass through the Floro Park
Subdivision in going to and from the MacArthur
Highway. Whether such permission, as claimed
by Floro, was for the month of March only,
without compensation and as a neighborly
gesture for the purpose merely of enabling the
Llenados to install stone monuments (mojones) on
their land, or was in relation to the easement of
right of way granted in their favor, as insisted by
the Llenados, the fact remains that no such
contract of easement of right of way was actually
perfected between FLORO and LLENADO. Both
ORLANDO and WENIFREDA LLENADO
testified that the conditions of the easement of
right of way were still to be drawn up by
FLORO's lawyer. Thus, no compensation was
agreed upon, and none was paid, for the passage
through Floro's property during the month of
March.
However, when WENIFREDA saw FLORO in
the evening of April 1983 to negotiate for the
reopening of Road Lot 5 and FLORO laid down
his conditions for the requested reopening and
presumably for the requested easement of right of
way, ORLANDO rejected said conditions for
being onerous.
The use of Road Lots 4 and 5 by the
LLENADOS during the month of March was by
mere tolerance of FLORO pending the negotiation
of the terms and conditions of the right of way.
This is evident from the testimony of
WENIFREDA that "they said to us to go on while
they are preparing for the papers" and that "We
can use that for a while, while they were making
for the papers." Although such use was in
anticipation of a voluntary easement of right of
way, no such contract was validly entered into by
reason of the failure of the parties to agree on its
terms and conditions. Thus, LLENADOS cannot
claim entitlement to a right of way through the
Floro Park Subdivision on the basis of a voluntary
easement.
(2) NO, LLENADO was not entitled to a
compulsory easement.
For the Llenados to be entitled to a
compulsory servitude of right of way under the
Civil Code, the preconditions provided under
Articles 649 and 650 thereof must be established.
These preconditions are:
1. that the dominant estate is surrounded by
other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par.
1);
2. after payment of proper indemnity (Art.
649, par. 1);
3. that the isolation was not due to acts of
the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art.
649, last par.); and,
4. that the right of way claimed is at the
point least prejudicial to the servient
estate; and insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may
be the shortest (Art. 650).
The burden of proving the existence of the
prerequisites to validly claim a compulsory right
of way lies on the owner of the dominant estate.
We find that the LLENADOS have failed in this
regard. Failing to establish the existence of the
prerequisites under Articles 649 and 650 of the
Civil Code, private respondent Llenado's bid for a
compulsory easement of right of way over Road
Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision must
fail.
Requisite #1 was absent: that it is surrounded by
other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway.
Significantly, when Orlando Llenado filed the
complaint for legal easement under Articles 649
and 650 of the Civil Code, he focused his
argument on the absence of any road, other than
the closed road of the Floro Park Subdivision, as
his means of ingress and egress to and from his
property. However, he omitted to state that there
is a proposed access road through the lpapo
property.
There being an existing right of way over the
lpapo property, the first requirement for a grant
of a compulsory easement of right of way over the
Floro Park Subdivision has not been met.
Requisite #2 was absent: that there must be
payment of proper indemnity
Prepayment, as we used the term means the
delivery of the proper indemnity required by law
for the damage that might be incurred by the
servient estate in the event the legal easement is
constituted. The fact that a voluntary agreement
upon the extent of compensation cannot be
reached by the parties involved, is not an
impediment to the establishment of such
easement. Precisely, the action of the dominant
estate against the servient estate should include a
prayer for the fixing of the amount which may be
due from the former to the latter."
In the case at bench, no proof was presented
by private respondent LLENADO that he
complied with this requirement. The complaint
for easement of right of way filed by him in the
lower court did not contain a prayer for the fixing
of the amount that he must pay FLORO in the
event that the easement of right of way be
constituted. Thus, the existence of the second
requisite has likewise not been established.
Requisite #3 was absent: that the isolation is not
the result of its own acts;
There can be no denying that the isolation of
the Llenado Homes Subdivision is the doing of its
owner/developer/applicant. It appears that the
access road indicated in the Plan of the Emmanuel
Homes Subdivision and the Llenado Homes
Subdivision for which a right of way over the
Ipapo property was procured, was merely for the
sake of securing an approval of the proposed
development plan. There were no proofs of actual
work having been done to construct a road, even
just a dirt road, over the right of way that would
connect Road Lot 3 of the Llenado Homes
Subdivision to the MacArthur Highway.
LLENADo admitted that the Ipapo riceland was
no longer being cultivated and there was already
a fence made of adobe wall constructed on it.
Indications are that it has already been abandoned
as a ricefield. There was no reason for private
respondent's failure to develop the right of way
except the inconvenience and expenses it would
cost him. Hence, the third requisite has not been
met.
Requisite #4 was absent: that the right of way
claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate
The Court takes cognizance of the fact that,
instead of developing the proposed access road,
LLENADO applied for the conversion of Lot 14 of
Block 6 into a road lot to connect it with Road Lot
5 of the Floro Park Subdivision, citing as reason
therefor, that the amendment sought would create
a "more adequate and practical passage" from the
Llenado Homes Subdivision to the MacArthur
National Highway and vice-versa. The
"convenience" of using Road Lots 4 and 5 of the
Floro Park Subdivision will not suffice, however,
to justify the easement in favor of private
respondent.
In order to justify the imposition of the
servitude of right of way, there must be a real, not
a fictitious or artificial necessity for it. Mere
convenience for the dominant estate is not what is
required by law as the basis for setting up a
compulsory easement.
 Even in the face of a necessity, if it can be
satisfied without imposing the servitude, the
same should not be imposed.
This easement can also be established for the
benefit of a tenement with an inadequate outlet,
but not when the outlet is merely inconvenient.
Thus, when a person has already established an
easement of this nature in favor of his tenement,
he cannot demand another, even if the first
passage has defects which make passage
impossible, if those defects can be eliminated by
proper repairs.
QUIEMEN vs. CA
GR No. 112331. May 29, 1996
IN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY that
easement where the way is shortest and will
cause least prejudice shall be chosen.
However, if the two circumstances do not
concur in a single tenement, the way where
damage will be least shall be used even if not
the shortest route. This is so because least
prejudice prevails over shortest distance. This
means that the court is not bound to establish
what is the shortest distance; a longer way
may be adopted to avoid injury to the servient
estate, such as when there are constructions
or walls which can be avoided by a round
about way, or to secure the interest of the
dominant owner, such as when the shortest
distance would place the way on a dangerous
decline.
FACTS
Petitioner ANASTACIA QUIMEN together
with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and
sister Rufina inherited a piece of property situated
in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the
property equally among themselves, as they did,
with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and
Rufina abutting the municipal road.
The share of ANASTACIA, located at the
extreme left. Behind ANASTACIAs lot was the
lot of her brother Antonio.
In 1982, private respondent YOLANDA
OLIVEROS purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from
her uncle Antonio through her aunt ANASTACIA
who was then acting as his administratrix.
According to YOLANDA, when ANASTACIA
offered her the property for sale she was hesitant
to buy as it had no access to a public road. But
ANASTACIA prevailed upon her to buy the lot
with the assurance that she would give her a right
of way on her adjoining property for P200.00 per
square meter.
Thereafter, YOLANDA constructed a house
on the lot she bought using as her passageway to
the public highway a portion of ANASTACIA's
property. But when YOLANDA finally offered to
pay for the use of the pathway ANASTACIA
refused to accept the payment. In fact she was
thereafter barred by ANASTACIA from passing
through her property.
In 1986, YOLANDA purchased the other lot of
Antonio, located directly behind the property of
her parents who provided her a pathway gratis et
amore between their house, extending about
nineteen (19) meters from the lot of YOLANDA
behind the sari-sari store of Sotero, and
ANASTACIA's perimeter fence. The store is made
of strong materials and occupies the entire
frontage of the lot measuring four (4) meters wide
and nine meters (9) long. Although the pathway
leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for
ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be
reached with facility because the store itself
obstructs the path so that one has to pass through
the back entrance and the facade of the store to
reach the road.
In 1987, YOLANDA filed an action against
ANASTACIA, praying that she be given a right of
way. In 1991, the court dismissed the complaint
for lack of cause of action, explaining that the
right of way through Sotero's property was a
straight path and to allow a detour by cutting
through ANASTACIA's property would no
longer make the path straight. Hence the trial
court concluded that it was more practical to
extend the existing pathway to the public road by
removing that portion of the store blocking the
path as that was the shortest route to the public
road and the least prejudicial to the parties
concerned than passing through ANASTACIA's
property.
On appeal by YOLANDA, the Court of
Appeals granted her a right of way over
ANASTACIAs property because it would cause
the least damage and detriment to the servient
estate.
Hennce, this appeal by ANASTACIA.
Incidentally, ANASTACIA denied having
promised private respondent a right of way She
alleged that in holding that the one-meter by five-
meter passage way proposed by private
respondent is the least prejudicial and the shortest
distance to the public road was wrong. She
insisted that passing through the property of
YOLANDA's parents was more accessible to the
public road than to make a detour to her property
and cut down the avocado tree standing thereon.
She strongly maintained that the proposed right
of way was not the shortest access to the public
road because of the detour and that moreover, she
wass likely to suffer the most damage as she
derives a net income of P600.00 per year from the
sale of the fruits of her avocado tree, and
considering that an avocado has an average life
span of seventy (70) years, she expects a
substantial earning from it.
ISSUE
Whether or not YOLANDA was entitled to a
right of way through ANASTACIAs property.
RULING
YES, she was. The voluntary easement in
favor of YOLANDA, which petitioner now denies
but which the court is inclined to believe, has in
fact become a legal easement or an easement by
necessity constituted by law.
As defined, an easement is a real right on
another's property, corporeal and immovable,
whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from
doing or allowing somebody else to do or
something to be done on his property, for the
benefit of another person or tenement. It is jus in
re aliena, inseparable, indivisible and perpetual,
unless extinguished by causes provided by law. A
right of way in particular is a privilege constituted
by covenant or granted by law to a person or class
of persons to pass over another's property when
his tenement is surrounded by realties belonging
to others without an adequate outlet to the public
highway. The owner of the dominant estate can
demand a right of way through the servient estate
provided he indemnifies the owner thereof for the
beneficial use of his property.
The conditions sine qua non for a valid grant
of an easement of right of way are:
1. the dominant estate is surrounded by
other immovables without an adequate
outlet to a public highway;
2. the dominant estate is willing to pay the
proper indemnity;
3. the isolation was not due to the acts of the
dominant estate; and,
4. the right of way being claimed is at a point
least prejudicial to the servient estate.
A cursory examination of the complaint of
respondent Yolanda for a right of way13 readily
shows that--
[E]ven before the purchase of the said parcels
of land the plaintiff was reluctant to purchase the
same for they are enclosed with permanent
improvements like a concrete fence and store and
have (sic) no egress leading to the road but
because of the assurance of the defendant that
plaintiff will be provided one (1) meter wide and
five (5) meters long right of way in the sum of
P200.00 per square meter to be taken from
Anastacia's lot at the side of a concrete store until
plaintiff reach(es) her father's land, plaintiff was
induced to buy the aforesaid parcels of land x x x.
That the aforesaid right of way is the shortest,
most convenient and the least onerous leading to
the road and being used by the plaintiff's
predecessors- in- interest from the very inception
x x x.
The evidence clearly shows that the property
of private respondent is hemmed in by the estates
of other persons including that of petitionerthat
she offered to pay P200.00 per square meter for
her right of way as agreed between her and
petitioner: that she did not cause the isolation of
her property; that the right of way is the least
prejudicial to the servient estate.14 These facts are
confirmed in the ocular inspection report of the
clerk of court, more so that the trial court itself
declared that "[t]he said properties of Antonio
Quimen which were purchased by plaintiff
Yolanda Quimen Oliveros were totally isolated
from the public highway and there appears an
imperative need fior an easement of right of way
to the public highway."
Petitioner finally insists that respondent court
erroneously concluded that the right of way
proposed by private respondent is the least
onerous to the parties. We cannot agree. Article
650 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that
the casement of right of way shall be established
at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate
and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. The criterion of
least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail
over the criterion of shortest distance although
this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While
shortest distance may ordinarily imply least
prejudice, it is not always so as when there are
permanent structures obstructing the shortest
distance; while on the other hand, the longest
distance may be free of obstructions and the
easiest or most convenient to pass through. In
other words, where the easement may be
established on any of several tenements
surrounding the dominant estate, the one where
the way is shortest and will cause the least
damage should be chosen.
However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2)
circumstances do not concur in a single tenement,
the way which will cause the least damage should
be used, even if it will not be the shortest.16
This is the test.
The trial court found that Yolanda's property
was situated at the back of her father's property
and held that there existed an available space of
about nineteen (19) meters long which could
conveniently serve as a right of way between the
boundary line and the house of Yolanda's father;
that the vacant space ended at the left back of
Sotero's store which was made of strong
materials; that this explained why Yolanda
requested a detour to the lot of Anastacia and cut
an opening of one (1) meter wide and five (5)
meters long to serve as her right of way to the
public highway. But notwithstanding its factual
observations, the trial court concluded, although
erroneously, that Yolanda was not entitled to a
right of way on petitioner's property since a
detour through it would not make the line
straight and would not be the route shortest to the
public highway.
In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code,
respondent Court of Appeals declared that the
proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is one
(1) meter wide and five (5) meters long at the
extreme right of petitioner's property, will cause
the least prejudice and/or damage as compared to
the suggested passage through the property of
Yolanda's father which would mean destroying
the sari-sari store made of strong materials.
Absent any showing that these findings and
conclusion are devoid of factual support in the
records, or are so glaringly erroneous, this Court
accepts and adopts them. As between a right of
way that would demolish a store of strong
materials to provide egress to a public highway,
and another right of way which although longer
will only require an avocado tree to be cut down,
the second alternative should be preferred. After
all, it is not the main function of this Court to
analyze or weigh the evidence presented all over
again where the petition would necessarily invite
calibration of the whole evidence considering
primarily the credibility of witnesses, existence
and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances, their relation to each other, and the
probabilities of the situation. In sum, this Court
finds that the decision of respondent appellate
court is thoroughly backed up by law and the
evidence.
SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ vs. RAMISCAL
GR No. 137882. February 04, 2005
Voluntary easements are established by the
will of the owners. Additionally, the burden of
proving the existence of the foregoing pre-
requisites lies on the owner of the dominant
estate. In the present case, it was not proven
that RAMISCAL, the owner, voluntarily
granted a right of way in favor of the
SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ.
FACTS
Respondent OLGA RAMISCAL was the
registered owner of a parcel of land located at the
corner of 18th Avenue and Boni Serrano Avenue,
Murphy, Quezon City. Petitioner SPOUSES
ELIZABETH and ALFREDO DE LA CRUZ were
occupants of a parcel of land, with an area of 85
sq. m., located at the back of RAMISCALs
property, which was registered in the name of
Concepcion de la Pea, mother of petitioner
ALFREDO DE LA CRUZ.
RAMISCAL owned a 1.10-meter wide by
12.60-meter long strip of land, which was being
used by the SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ as their
pathway to and from 18th Avenue, the nearest
public highway from their property. SPOUSES
DE LA CRUZ had enclosed the same with a gate,
fence, and roof.
In 1976, RAMISCAL leased her property,
including the building thereon, to Phil. Orient
Motors, which also owned a property adjacent to
that of RAMISCALs. In 1995, Phil. Orient Motors
sold its property to San Benito Realty. After the
sale, Engr. Rafael Madrid prepared a relocation
survey and location plan for both contiguous
properties of RAMISCAL and San Benito Realty.
It was only then that RAMISCAL discovered that
the aforementioned pathway being occupied by
SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ was part of her property.
Immediately, RAMISCAL through a letter,
demanded that SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ demolish
the structure constructed by them on said
pathway without her knowledge and consent.
However, the letter was unheeded by the
SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ. RAMISCAL the former
referred the matter to the Barangay for conciliation
proceedings, but the parties arrived at no
settlement.
Hence, RAMISCAL filed a complaint with
the RTC for the demolition of the structure
allegedly illegally constructed by SPOUSES DE
LA CRUZ on her property. RAMISCAL asserted
that SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ had an existing right
of way to a public highway other than the current
one they were using, which she owns.
On the other hand, SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ
admitted having used a 1.10-meter wide by 12.60-
meter long strip of land on the northern side of
RAMISCALs property as their pathway to and
from 18th Avenue, the nearest public highway
from their property, but claimed that such use
was with the knowledge of RAMISCAL.
The SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ averred that
they were made to sign a document stating that
they waived their right to ask for an easement
along the eastern side of RAMISCALs property
towards Boni Serrano Avenue, which document
was among those submitted in the application for
a building permit by a certain Mang Puling, the
person in charge of the construction of the motor
shop. That was why, according to SPOUSES DE
LA CRUZ, the perimeter wall on RAMISCALs
property was constructed at a distance of 1.10-
meters offset and away from RAMISCALs
property line to provide a passageway for them to
and from 18th Avenue. They maintained in that
RAMISCAL knew all along of the 1.10-meter
pathway and had, in fact, tolerated their use
thereof.
In 1997, the RTC ruled in favor of
RAMISCAL. The appeal of the SPOUSES DE LA
CRUZ with the Court of Appeals was also
dismissed. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE
Whether or not SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ was
entitled to a legal easement of a right of way
under Article 649.
RULING
NO, they were not entitled to a legal
easement. Under Art. 649. The owner, or any
person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate
or use any immovable, which is surrounded by
other immovables pertaining to other persons,
and without adequate outlet to a public highway,
is entitled to demand a right of way through the
neighboring estates, after payment of the proper
indemnity.
The conferment of a legal easement of right
of way under Article 649 is subject to proof of the
following requisites:
1. it is surrounded by other immovables and
has no adequate outlet to a public
highway;
2. payment of proper indemnity;
3. the isolation is not the result of its own
acts;
4. the right of way claimed is at the point
least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
5. to the extent consistent with the foregoing
rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may
be the shortest.
The first 3 requisites were not obtaining in the
instant case.
Requisite #1 was absent: that it is surrounded by
other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway.
The trial court found from the records that
Concepcion de la Pea had provided SPOUSES
DE LA CRUZ with an adequate ingress and
egress towards Boni Serrano Avenue.
During trial, RAMISCAL presented a TCT
covering the property denominated as Lot 1-B in
the name of Concepcion de la Pea, mother of
petitioner herein ALFREDO DE LA CRUZ. The
TCT revealed that a portion of Lot 1-B, consisting
of 85 sq. m. and denominated as Lot 1-B-2, is
being occupied by SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ. To
prove that SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ had an
existing right of way to a public highway other
than the pathway which RAMISCAL owns, the
latter adduced in evidence a copy of the plan of a
subdivision survey for Concepcion de la Pea and
Felicidad Manalo prepared in 1965 and
subdivision plan for Concepcion de la Pea
prepared in 1990. These documents establish an
existing 1.50-meter wide alley, identified as Lot 1-
B-1, on the lot of Concepcion de la Pea, which
serves as passageway from the lot being occupied
by SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ (Lot 1-B-2), to Boni
Serrano Avenue.
In fact, petitioner ELIZABETH DE LA CRUZ
herself admitted knowledge of the existence of the
subdivision plan of Lot 1-B prepared for
Concepcion de la Pea by Engr. Julio Cudiamat in
1990. The Subdivision Plan subdivided Lot 1-B
into three portions, namely:
(1) Lot 1-B-1, which is an existing alley,
consisting of 59.60 square meters,
towards Boni Serrano Avenue;
(2) Lot 1-B-2, consisting of 85.20
square meters, which is being
occupied by SPOUSES DE LA
CRUZ; and
(3) Lot 1-B-3, consisting also of 85.20
square meters, which is being
occupied by the sister of petitioner
Alfredo dela Cruz.
From petitioner Elizabeth de la Cruzs own
admission, Lot 1-B-1 was intended by the owner,
Concepcion de la Pea, to serve as an access to a
public highway for the occupants of the interior
portion of her property.
Requisite #2 was absent: that there must be
payment of proper indemnity
Inasmuch as SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ have an
adequate outlet to a public highway (Boni Serrano
Avenue), they have no right to insist on using a
portion of RAMISCALs property as pathway
towards 18th Avenue and for which no indemnity
was being paid by them.
Requisite #3 was absent: that the isolation is not
the result of its own acts;
Petitioner Elizabeth de la Cruz claimed before
the trial court that although there was indeed a
portion of land allotted by Concepcion de la Pea
to serve as their ingress and egress to Boni
Serrano Avenue. However, they stated that they
can no longer use the same because de la Pea
had constructed houses on it. As found by the
trial court, the isolation of SPOUSES DE LA
CRUZ property was due to the acts of
Concepcion de la Pea, who is required by law to
grant a right of way to the occupants of her
property.
Article 649 of the Civil Code provides that the
easement of right of way is not compulsory if the
isolation of the immovable is due to the
proprietors own acts. To allow defendants access
to plaintiffs property towards 18th Avenue simply
because it is a shorter route to a public highway,
despite the fact that a road right of way, which is
even wider, although longer, was in fact provided
for them by Concepcion de la Pea towards Boni
Serrano Avenue would ignore what jurisprudence
has consistently maintained through the years
regarding an easement of right of way, that mere
convenience for the dominant estate is not enough
to serve as its basis.
To justify the imposition of this servitude,
there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial
necessity for it. In Francisco vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 527, it was likewise
held that a person who had been granted an
access to the public highway through an adjacent
estate cannot claim a similar easement in an
alternative location if such existing easement was
rendered unusable by the owners own act of
isolating his property from a public highway,
such as what Concepcion de la Pea allegedly did
to her property by constructing houses on the 1.50
meter wide alley leading to Boni Serrano Avenue.
And, if it were true that defendants had already
bought Lot 1-B-2, the portion occupied by them,
from Concepcion de la Pea, then the latter is
obliged to grant defendants a right of way
without indemnity.
We hasten to add that under the above-quoted
Article 649 of the Civil Code, it is the owner, or any
person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or
use any immovable surrounded by other
immovable pertaining to other persons, who is
entitled to demand a right of way through the
neighboring estates. In this case, SPOUSES DE
LA CRUZ fell short of proving that they are the
owners of the supposed dominant estate. Nor
were they able to prove that they possess a real
right to use such property. The SPOUSES DE LA
CRUZ claim to have acquired their property,
denominated as Lot 1-B-2, from Concepcion de la
Pea, mother of defendant Alfredo de la Cruz,
who owns Lot 1-B-3, an adjacent lot. However, as
earlier noted, the trial court found that the title to
both lots is still registered in the name of
Concepcion de la Pea under TCT No. RT-56958
(100547). Neither were SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ
able to produce the Deed of Sale evidencing their
alleged purchase of the property from de la Pea.
Hence, by the bulk of evidence, de la Pea, not
SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ, is the real party-in-
interest to claim a right of way although, as
explained earlier, any action to demand a right of
way from de la Peas part will not lie inasmuch
as by her own acts of building houses in the area
allotted for a pathway in her property, she had
caused the isolation of her property from any
access to a public highway.
ARTICLE 654: If the right of way is permanent, the
necessary repairs shall be made by the owner of the
dominant estate. A proportionate share of the taxes
shall be reimbursed by the said owner to the proprietor
of the servient estate.
1. Eventhough permanent, the path belongs
to the servient estate, and he pays all the
taxes.
2. But the dominant estate:
a. Should pay for the repairs;
b. Should pay proportionate share
of the taxes to the servient estate.
ARTICLE 655: If the right of way is granted to a
surrounded estate ceases to be necessary because its
owner has joined it to another abutting on a public
road, the owner of the servient estate may demand that
the easement be extinguished, returning what he may
have received by way of indemnity. The interest on the
indemnity shall be deemed to be in payment of rent for
the use of the easement.
The same rule shall be applied in case a new
road is opened giving access to the isolated estate.
In both cases, the public highway must
substantially meet the needs of the dominant estate in
order that the easement may be extinguished.
. ordinances and customs insofar as they do not conflict
CAUSES FOR EXTINGUISHMENT OF THE
EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY:
1. opening of a new road;
2. joining the dominant estate to another
(that is the latter becomes also the
property of the dominant owner) which
abuts, and therefore has access to the
public highway. But the new access must
be adequate and convenient.
3. The extinguishment is not automatic
because the law says that the servient
owner may demand. It follows that if he
chooses not to demand, the easement
remains and he has no duty to refund the
indemnity.
4. This rule applies only to the legal or
compulsory easement of right of way,
NOT to a voluntary one.
ARTICLE 656: If it be indispensable for the
construction, repair, improvement, alteration or
beautification of a building, to carry materials thru the
estate of another, or to raise thereon scaffolding or other
objects necessary for the work, the owner of such estate
shall be obliged to permit the act, after receiving
payment of the proper indemnity for the damage caused
him.
TEMPORARY EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF
WAY:
- The easement here is necessarily only
temporary; nonetheless proper indemnity
must be given.
- Indispensable is not to be construed
literally. The causing of great
inconvenience is sufficient.
- The owner or the usufructuary can make
use of Art. 656.
ARTICLE 657: Easements of the right of way for the
passage of livestock known as animal path, animal trail
or any other, and those for watering places, resting
places and animal folds, shall be governed by the
ordinances and regulations relating thereto, and, in the
absence thereof, by the usage and customs of the place.
Without prejudice to rights legally acquired,
the animal path shall not exceed in any case the width
of 75 m, and the animal trail that of 37m and 50cm.
Whenever it is necessary to establish a
compulsory easement of the right of way or for a
watering place for animals, the provisions of this
section and those of Articles 640 and 641 shall be
observed. In this case, the width shall not exceed 10m.
Cross references to Art. 640 and 641 relate to: a.)
indemnity payment; b) the fact that the easement
for drawing water or for watering animals can be
imposed only for reasons of public use in favor of
a town or village.
EASEMENT OF A PARTY WALL
ARTICLE 658: The easement of a party wall shall be
governed by the provisions of this Title, by the local
the same, and by the rules of co-ownership.
PARTY WALL. This is a wall at the dividing line
of the estates. Co-ownership shall govern the wall
hence, the party wall is necessarily a common
wall. However, not all common walls are party
walls.
The easement of a party wall is a
compulsory kind of co-ownership (FORGED
INDIVISION) where the shares of each owner
cannot be separated physically (otherwise the
wall would be destroyed), although said shares
may in a sense be materially pointed out.
ARTICLE 659: The existence of an easement of party
wall is presumed, unless there is a title, or exterior
sign, or proof to the contrary:
In dividing walls of adjoining building up to the point
of common elevation;
In dividing walls of gardens or yards situated in cities,
towns, or in rural communities.
In fences, walls and live hedges dividing rural lands.
- The presumption that a wall is a party
wall may be rebutted by:
1. title to the contrary;
2. exterior signs to the contrary;
3. proof to the contrary.
A title conferring (expressly) ownership in one co-
owner prevails over a mere exterior sign (from
which, there is merely an inference).
ARTICLE 660: It is understood that there is an
exterior sign, contrary to the easement of party wall:
1. Whenever in the dividing wall of buildings
there is a window or opening;
2. Whenever the dividing wall is, on one side,
straight and plumb on all its facement, and on
the other, it has similar conditions on the
upper part, but the lower part slants or
projects onward;
3. Whenever the entire wall is built within the
boundaries of one of the estates;
4. Whenever the dividing wall bears the burden
of the binding beams, floors and roof frame of
one of the buildings, but not those of the
others;
5. Whenever the dividing wall between the
courtyards, gardens, and tenements is
constructed in such a way that the coping
sheds the water upon only one of the estates;
6. Whenever the dividing wall, being built of
masonry, has stepping stones, which at
certain intervals project from the surface on
one side only, but not on the other;
7. Whenever lands enclosed by fences or live
hedges adjoin other which are not enclosed.
In all these cases, the ownership of the walls, fences or
hedges shall be deemed to belong exclusively to the
owner of the property or tenement which has in its
favor the presumption based on any one of these signs.
- This article enumerates, by way of
illustration, exterior signs rebutting the
presumption of there being an easement
of party wall (thus, instead of a party
wall, we have a wall exclusively owned
by a single owner).
- If one owner has signs in his favor, and
some against him, they generally cancel
each other, unless it can be shown from
the purpose of the wall that it had been
made for the exclusive benefit of one.
ARTICLE 661: Ditches or drains opened between two
estate are also presumed as common to both, if there is
no title or sign showing to the contrary.
There is a sign to the contrary to the part-
ownership whenever the earth or dirt removed to open
the ditch or to clean it is only on one side thereof, in
which case the ownership of the ditch shall belong
exclusively to the owner of the land having this exterior
sign in its favor.
- There is a sign contrary to the part-
ownership whenever the earth or dirt
removed to open the ditch or to clean it is
only on one side thereof, in which case
the ownership of the ditch shall belong
exclusively to the owner of the land
having this exterior sign in its favor.
ARTICLE 662: The cost of repairs and construction of
party walls and maintenance of fences, live hedges,
ditches, and drains owned in common, shall be borne
by all the owners of the lands or tenements having the
party wall in their favor, in proportion to the right of
each.
Nevertheless, any owner may exempt himself
from contributing to this charge by renouncing his
part-ownership, except when the party wall supports a
building belonging to him.
- Proportionate contribution to repairs and
construction.
- Renunciation of share of one owner in the
party wall may be made, in order to free
himself from the above mentioned
contribution unless
o The repair had already been
contracted for and made (for
here, he would still be liable for
the repairer).
o He still used the wall (as when it
supports his building). If the
building is demolished
renunciation can be made.
REQUISITES FOR THE RENUNCIATION OF
SHARE:
1. Must be total or complete. Thus, if a
person owns of the wall, he must
renounce all his share. He cannot
insist on paying of his share for
expenses by renouncing of his
share in the wall.
2. Must be made voluntarily and with full
knowledge of the facts.
3. Must be made before the expenses
incurred;
4. Is made with the implied condition
that the other owner should make or
pay for the repairs. (Thus, if repairs
are not made, it is as if no
renunciation had been done, and the
co-ownership remains. Thus, also if
neglect to make the repairs makes the
wall fall, co-ownership remains with
the felled or destroyed wall, each
owner being entitled to his share of
the materials).
5. Must be both the share in the wall and
the share in the land, for the wall
cannot be used without the land. (If
however the wall is to be removed to
some other place, there need not be a
renunciation of the land originally
used).
ARTICLE 663: If the owner of a building supported
by a party wall desires to demolish the building, he
may also renounce his part-ownership of the wall, but
the cost of all repairs and work necessary to prevent
any damage which the demolition may cause to the
party wall, on this occasion only, shall be borne by him.
ARTICLE 664: Every co-owner may increase the
height of the party wall, doing so at his own expense
and paying got any damage which may be caused by
the work, even though such damage be temporary.
The expenses of maintaining the wall in the
part newly raised or depend at its foundation shall also
be paid for by him; and in addition, the indemnity for
the increased expense which may be necessary for the
preservation of the party wall by reason of the greater
height or depth which has been given it.
If the party wall cannot bear the increased
height, the owner desiring to raise it shall be obliged to
reconstruct it at his own expense and of for this
purpose it be necessary to make it thicker, he shall give
the space required from his own land.
- This deals with the right to increase the
height of the party wall. He who desires
this:
1. Must do so at his own expense.
2. Must pay the necessary damages caused,
even if the damage be temporary.
3. Must bear the costs of maintenance of the
portion added.
4. Must pay for the increased cost of
preservation.
5. Must reconstruct if original wall cannot
bear the increased height.
6. Must give the additional space (land)
necessary, if wall is to be thickened.
ARTICLE 665: The other owners who have not
contributed in giving increased height, depth, or
thickness to the wall may, nevertheless, acquire the
right of part-ownership therein, by paying
proportionally the value of the work at the time of the
acquisition and of the land used for its increased
thickness.
ARTICLE 666: Every part-owner of a party wall may
use it in proportion to the right he may have in the co-
ownership, without interfering with the common and
respective uses by the other co-owners.
EASEMENT OF LIGHT AND VIEW
- This section deals with 2 kinds of
easements:
1. the easement of LIGHT jus luminum ( as
in the case of small windows, not more
than 30cm square, at the height of the
ceiling joist, the purpose of which is to
admit light and a little air, but not VIEW).
2. The easement of VIEW servidumbre
prospectus (as in the case of full or
regular windows overlooking the
adjoining estate. Although the
purpose here is view, the easement of
light is necessarily included, as well
as the easement of not to build higher
for the purpose of obstruction).
ARTICLE 667: No part owner may, without the
consent of others open thru the party wall any window
or aperture of any kind.
Example: A and B are co-owners of a party wall.
A can not make an opening on the wall without
the permission of B. If A were allowed to do this
without Bs consent, there is a distinct possibility
that A will later claim the whole wall as his in
view of the exterior sign. It is as if A is allowed to
use the whole thickness of the wall.
Suppose in the preceding example, A makes the
opening without Bs consent, what will Bs right?
B can order that the opening be closed unless of
course a sufficient time for prescription has
elapsed 10 yrs from the opening of the window.
ARTICLE 668: The period of prescription for the
acquisition of an easement of light and view shall be
counted:
From the time of the opening of the window, if it is
thru a party wall; or
From the time of the formal prohibition upon the
proprietor of the adjoining land or tenement, if the
window is thru a wall on the dominant estate.
1. The easement for light and view is either
positive or negative:
a. Positive if the window is thru a
party wall. The period for
prescription commences from the
time the window is opened. The
mere opening of the window
does not create the easement; it is
only when after a sufficient lapse
of time, the window still remains
open that the easement of light
and view is created.
b. Negative if the window id thru
ones own wall, that is thru a wall
of the dominant estate. Therefore,
the time for the period of
prescription should begin from
the time of notarial prohibition
upon the adjoining owner. Formal
or notarial prohibition means not
merely any writing, but one
executed in due form and/or
with solemnity a public
instrument.
ARTICLE 669: When the distances in Article 670 are
not observed, the owner of a wall which is not a party
wall, adjoining a tenement or piece of land belonging to
another, can make in it openings to admit light at the
height of the ceiling joints or immediately under the
ceiling, and of the size of 30 cm square, and, in every
case, with an iron imbedded in the wall and with a wire
screen.
Nevertheless, the owner of the tenement or
property adjoining the wall in which the openings are
made can close them should he acquire part ownership
thereof, if there be no stipulation to the contrary.
He can also obstruct them by constructing a
building on his land or by raising a wall thereon
contiguous to that having some openings, unless an
easement of light has been acquired.
a. The opening of the window referred to in
this article is for the light and NOT for
view. There restrictions themselves are:
1. maximum size- 30cm/sq;
 2. here must be iron grating imbedded in
the wall;
3. wire screen;
4. the opening must be at the height of the
ceiling joists or immediately under
the ceiling.
b. Unless the easement of light has been
acquired, the light of such restricted
windows may still be obstructed.
Example: A has made restricted window
on his own wall for light. What can the
adjoining or abutting owner do?
He can obstruct the light:
o By constructing a higher building
on his own land.
o Or by raising a blocking wall (in
both cases he cannot make the
obstruction if the easement of
light has been acquired 10 yrs.
after notarial prohibition.
o If the wall becomes a party wall,
he can close the window, unless
there is a stipulation to the
contrary.
ARTICLE 670: No windows, apertures, balconies, or
other similar projections which afford a direct view
upon or towards an adjoining land or tenement can be
made, without leaving a distance of 2m between the
wall in which they are made and such contiguous
property.
Neither can side or oblique views upon or
towards such conterminous property be had, unless
there be a distance of 60m.
The non-observance of these distances does not
give rise to prescription.
ARTICLE 671: The distances referred to in the
preceding article shall be measured in cases of direct
views from the outer line of the wall when the openings
do not project, from the outer line of the latter when
they do, and in cases of oblique views from the dividing
line between the 2 properties.
RULES FOR REGULAR WINDOWS:
Arts. 670 and 671 deal with regular full
windows (as distinguished from the
restricted windows referred to in 669).
Regular windows can be opened
provided that the proper distances are
followed.
THE PROPER DISTANCES:
1) For windows having direct views,
observe at least 2m distance between the
wall having the windows and the
boundary line.
2) For windows having side or oblique
views (that is one must turn his head to
the right or to the left to view the
adjoining land), observe a distance of at
least 60cms between the boundary line
and nearest edge of the window.
3) If these distances are not observed, the
owner cannot acquire the same by
prescription.
ARTICLE 672: The provisions of Article 670 are not
applicable to buildings separated by a public way or
alley, which is not less than 3 m wide, subject to special
regulations and local ordinances.
ARTICLE 673: Whenever by any title a right has been
acquired to have direct views, balconies or belvederes
overlooking an adjoining property, the owner of the
servient estate cannot build therein at less than a
distance of 3m to be measured in the manner provided
in Article 671. Any stipulation permitting distances
less than those prescribed in Article 670 is void.
ARTICLE 674: The owner of a building shall be
obliged to construct its roof or covering in such
manner that the rain water shall fall on his own land or
on street of a public place, and not on the land of his
neighbour, even though the adjacent land may belong
to two or more persons, one of whom is the owner of the
roof. Even if it should fall on his own land, the owner
shall be obliged to collect the water in such a way as
not to cause damage to the adjacent or tenement.
The article speaks that:
1. A person should let rain water FALL on his
own land, and not on the adjacent land, even
if he be a co-owner of the latter.
2. Rain water must be COLLECTED instead of
just being allowed to drift to the adjacent or
lower land.
3. Art. 674 does not really create an easement,
for it merely regulates the use of a persons
property insofar as rain water is concerned.
ARTICLE 675: The owner of a tenement or a piece of
land, subject to the easement of receiving water falling
from roofs, may build in such manner as to receive the
water upon his own roof or give it another outlet in
accordance with local ordinances or customs, and in
such a way as not to cause any nuisance or damage
whatever to the dominant estate.
ARTICLE 676: Whenever the yard or court of a house
is surrounded by other houses, and it is not possible to
give an outlet thru the house itself to the rain water
collected thereon, the establishment of an easement of
drainage can be demanded, giving an outlet to the
water at the point of the contiguous lands or tenements
where its egress may be the easiest, and establishing a
conduit for the drainage in such manner as to cause the
least damage to the servient estate, after payment of the
proper indemnity.
CONDITIONS:
1. Because of enclosure, there is no adequate
outlet for the rainwater (or similar things).
2. The outlet must be at the point of easiest
egress (going out).
3. Least possible damage.
4. Payment of proper indemnity.
 INTERMEDIATE DISTANCES AND WORKS
FOR CERTAIN CONSTRUCTIONS AND
PLANTINGS
ARTICLE 677: No constructions can be built or
plantings made near fortified places or fortresses
without compliance with the conditions required in
special laws, ordinances, and regulations relating
thereto.
ARTICLE 678: No person shall build any adequate,
well, sewer, furnace, forge, chimney, stable, deposit of
corrosive substances, machinery, or factory which by
reason of its nature of products is dangerous or
noxious, without observing the distances prescribed by
the regulations and customs of the place, and without
making the necessary protective works, subject, in
regard to the manner thereof, to the conditions
prescribed by such alterations. These prohibitions
cannot be altered or renounced by stipulation on the
part of the adjoining proprietors.
In the absence of regulations, such precautions
shall be taken as may be considered necessary, in order
to avoid any damage to the neighboring lands or
tenements.
ARTICLE 679: No trees shall be planted near a
tenement or piece of land belonging to another except
at the distance authorized by the ordinances or customs
of the place, and in the absence thereof, at a distance of
at least 2m from the dividing line of the estate if tall
trees are planted and at a distance of at least 50cm if
shrubs or small trees are planted.
Every landowner shall have the right to
demand that trees hereafter planted at a shorter
distance from his land or tenement be uprooted.
The provisions of this article also apply to
trees which have grown spontaneously.
At least 2 meters - to be observed with
respect to tall trees
50cm or half meter distance - with respect
to small trees or shrubs
ARTICLE 680: If the branches of any trees should
extend over a neighboring estate, tenement, garden or
yard, the owner of the latter shall have the right
demand that they be cut off insofar as they may spread
over hi property, and, if it be the roots of a neighboring
tree which should penetrate into the land of another,
the latter may cut them off himself within his property.
Q: Is the right limited to demand the cutting of
branches only?
A: Yes. He cannot cut the branches himself
because doing it would be putting the law into his
own hands.
1. Branches adjacent owner has the right to
DEMAND that they be cut off (in so far as
they spread over his property).
2. Roots he may cut them off himself (because
by ACCESSION or INCORPORATION) he
has acquired ownership over them.
3. Prescription:
1) Of the right to demand the cutting off
of the branches this does not
prescribe of tolerated by invaded
owner; if demand is made,
prescription runs from the date of
said demand.
2) Of the right to cut off the roots this
is imprescriptible unless a notarial
prohibition is made.
o A notarial prohibition can be made
even of the intruding roots are
already owned by the invaded owner,
precisely because an easement
(easement of restraint) is made on
somebody else or his property.
ARTICLE 681: Fruits naturally falling upon adjacent
land belong to the owner of said land.
RULES AS TO FRUITS:
1. If the fruits still hang on to the tree, they are
still owned by the tree owner.
2. It is only after they have NATURALLY fallen
(not taken down by poles or shaken) that they
belong to the owner of the invaded land.
3. The rule is based not on accession for they
were not grown or produced by the land nor
added to it (naturally or artificially); nor on
occupation (for they are not res nullius) but to
avoid disputes and arguments between the
neighbours. The mode of acquisition may be
said to be the LAW.
VOLUNTARY EASEMENTS
ARTICLE 688: Every owner of a tenement or piece of
land may establish thereon the easements which he may
deem suitable and in the manner and form which he
may deem best, provided he does not contravene the
laws, public policy or public order.
The easement established may be predial
(for the benefit of an estate) or personal.
Only the owner or someone else inn the
name of and with the authority of the
owner, may establish a voluntary predial
servitude on his estate, for this is an act of
ownership. (However, so as not prejudice
the usufructuary, the usufructuarys
consent is needed to create a perpetual,
voluntary easement.
If a person is an owner with a resolutory
title or an annullable one, he can create an
easement over the property. But it is
deemed extinguished upon resolution or
annulment of the right.
A voluntary easement is not contractual
in nature because it may be imposed
unilaterally.
If fee is imposed, anybody can make use
of the easement upon payment of the said
fee. In this sense, and only in this, may the
easement be said to partake of the nature
of a contract.
ARTICLE 689: The owner of a tenement or piece of
land, the usufruct of which belongs to another, may
impose thereon, without the consent of the
usufructuary, any servitude which will not injure the
right of usufruct.
ARTICLE 690: Whenever the naked ownership of a
tenement or piece of land belongs to one person and the
beneficial ownership to another, no perpetual voluntary
easement may be established thereon without consent of
both owners.
RULES WHEN USUFRUCT EXIST:
The beneficial owner (as distinguished
from the naked owner) may by himself
create a temporary easement compatible
with the extent of his beneficial dominion.
If the easement is perpetual (like the
permanent easement of right of way) both
the naked and the beneficial owners must
be consent.
ARTICLE 691: In order to impose an easement on an
undivided tenement, or piece of land, the consent of all
the co-owners shall be required.
The consent given by some only, must be held
in abeyance until the last one of all the co-owners shall
have expressed his conformity.
But the consent given by one of the co-owners
separately form the others shall bind the grantor and
his successors not to prevent the exercise of the right
granted.
Reason for requiring unanimous consent
on the part of all co-owners: The creation
of the voluntary easement is an act of
ownership (the alienation not of any
aliquot part but of a qualitative part of the
enjoyment of the whole premises).
ARTICLE 692: The title and, in a proper case, the
possession of an easement acquired by prescription
shall determine the rights of the dominant estate and
the obligations of the servient estate. In default thereof,
the easement shall be governed by such provision of
this title as are applicable thereto.
GOVERNING RULES FOR VOLUNTARY
EASEMENTS:
1. If created by title (contract, will, etc) the title
governs. The Civil Code is suppletory.
2. If created by prescription, the form and
manner in which it had been acquired.
3. If created by prescription in a proper case
(that is, may have been a contract initially, but
the form and manner may have been
extended or decreased by prescription), the
way the easement has been possessed, that is,
the manner and form of possession.
ARTICLE 693: If the owner of the servient estate
should have bound himself, upon the establishment of
the easement, to bear the cost of the work required for
the use and preservation thereof, he may free himself
from this obligation by renouncing his property to the
owner of the dominant estate.
NUISANCE
ARTICLE 694: A nuisance is any act, omission,
establishment, condition of property, anything else
which:
1. Injures or endangers the health or safety of others;
or
2. Annoys or offends the senses; or
3. Shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality;
or
4. Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any
public highway or street, or any body of water; or
5. Hinders or impairs the use of property.
1. injures or endangers the health or safety of
others; ex. a house in danger of falling; fireworks
or explosives factory
2. annoys or offends the senses; ex videoke,
chimney or too much horn blowing
3. shocks or defies or disregards decency or
morality;
4. Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of
any public highway or street, or any body of
water, ex. Houses constructed on public streets.
5. Hinders or impairs the use of property; ex.
squatting because they hinder or impairs the use
of property by the owner.
ARTICLE 695: Nuisance is either public or private. A
public nuisance affects a community or neighbourhood
or any considerable number or persons, although the
extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon
individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is one
that is not included in the foregoing definition
Public nuisance: The doing of or the failure to do
something that injuriously affects the health,
safety or morals of the public or works such
substantial annoyance, inconvenience or injury to
the public. It affects a community or
neighborhood or any considerable number of
persons, although the extent of damage or
annoyance upon the people may be unequal.
Private nuisance when it violates only private
rights and produces damage to but one or few
persons and cannot be said to be public
The yardstick in determining whether the
nuisance is private or public is the extent of those
affected by such injury or inconvenience.
Old classifications of nuisance
1 .nuisance per se- a nuisance at all times under all
circumstances
2. nuisance per accidence- nuisance only under
certain circumstances or condition
Attractive nuisance. It is any contrivance which is
very attractive to children but very dangerous to
them. An attractive nuisance is a dangerous
 instrumentality or appliance which is LIKELY TO
ATTRACT CHILDREN AT PLAY.
An attractive nuisance is NOT illegal per se but
because of its nature, it can easily injure children.
So that if you are the owner of an attractive
nuisance, the law requires that you take extra care
of the said contrivance or tool to prevent injury to
the children. The best example here is a firearm.
He is required to exercise the highest degree of
diligence.
HIDALGO ENTERPRISES vs. BALANDAN (91
Phil 488)
F: 8-yr old boy drowned in a tank maintained by
an ice-plant factory; parents of the boy filed an
action for damages against the factory alleging
that the tank full of water was an attractive
nuisance and yet the factory did not provide any
precaution.
H: tank was not an attractive nuisance. Water in any
form is not an attractive nuisance. Nature in itself
created streams, lakes, and pools which attract
children. Lurking in their waters is always the
danger of drowning. Against this danger, children
are to know the danger.
The tanks filled with water are not an attractive
nuisance. Any imitation of nature, like a
swimming pool, is not an attractive nuisance. So,
if the owner of a private property creates an
artificial pool on his own property, merely
duplicating the work of nature without adding
any new danger, he is not liable.
The factory owner need not exercise the highest
degree of diligence since it is not an attractive
nuisance.
ARTICLE 696: Every successive owner or possessor of
property who fails or refuses to abate nuisance in that
property started by a former owner or possessor is
liable therefore in the same manner as the one who
created it.
Now who should be liable?
a. the one who creates the nuisance;
b. the one who participates in the creation of
the nuisance;
c. the one who adopts the nuisance;
d. the one who continues the nuisance;
e. the one who refuses to abate the nuisance;
f. the successor of the property shall be held
liable if he knowingly fail or refuse to
abate the nuisance.
ARTICLE 697: The abatement of a nuisance does not
preclude the right of any person injured to recover
damages for its past existence.
If a property which has already caused
nuisance is removed, is it a defense?
Ans: (Art 697) No, the abatement of a
nuisance does not preclude the right of
any person injured to recover damages
for its past existence.
ARTICLE 698: Lapse of time cannot legalize any
nuisance, whether public or private.
May an action for abatement of a nuisance
prescribe? No, an action for abatement of
a nuisance is one which is imprescriptible.
A nuisance can be abated anytime.
ARTICLE 699: The remedies against a public
nuisance are:
a. A prosecution under the Penal Code or any
local ordinance; or
b. A civil action; or
c. Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
If it is a PRIVATE NUISANCE, there are 2
possible remedies:
1) a civil action, or
2) abatement, without judicial proceedings
(Article 705)
Article 703 and 704 on the requisites for
extra judicial abatement of nuisance
REQUISITES:
1. There must be showing that the nuisance is
specially injurious to the person seeking the
abatement of nuisance (Article 703), [injury
sustained]
2. That demand be first made upon the owner or
possessor of the property to abate the
nuisance; [prior demand]
3. That such demand has been rejected or
ignored;
4. That the abatement must be approved by the
City Engineer in Manila and other chartered
cities, and in the provinces, by the Provincial
Health Officer and executed with the
assistance of or attended by a member of the
local police force; [approval by the proper
government officers];
5. That the abatement must be done in such a
way that it does not breach public peace, or
do unnecessary injury; and
6. That the value of the thing to be abated does
not exceed P3,000. (The amount is not realistic
noh because the amount is only 3K).
Criminal prosecution is not mentioned,
nonetheless if there is a crime committed,
then that would be an added liability.
ARTICLE 707: A private person or a public official
extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable for
damages:
a. If he causes unnecessary injury; or
b. If an alleged nuisance is later declared by the
courts to be not a real nuisance.
Note that the person liable for damages in case of
extrajudicial abatement may be:
(1.) a private person
 (2.) a public official
DONATION
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
DONATION:
(1) It is essentially gratuitous
because it is an act of liberality.
The consideration here is an act of
liberality.
(2) It is by itself a mode of acquiring
ownership. Tradition is not
required. The moment the
donation is perfected the donee is
deemed the owner of the
property.
- NOTE: Do not confuse yourself with
succession because the latter takes effect
from the moment of death.
ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
DONATION.
1. consent, subject matter, consideration;
2. There is a required form to some
particular donation;
3. Donations are generally irrevocable.
4. There is intent to benefit the donee,
animus donandi.
5. There is a resultant decrease of the assets
or patrimony of the donor.
6. There is a necessity of acceptance by the
donee.
- Upon acceptance, the donee becomes the
absolute owner of the property donated.
This is an ideal donation inter vivos.
CLASSIFICATIONS:
a. from the viewpoint of motive, purpose or
cause: (Art 726)
1. simple
2. remuneratory
3. modal or conditional
4. onerous
b. from the viewpoint of time of taking
effect (Art 728-729)
a) inter vivos
b) mortis causa
c. from the viewpoint of occasion
1. ordinary donation
2. donation propter nuptias
d. from the viewpoint of object donated
1. corporeal property real property or
personal property
2. incorporeal property a right that is
not purely personal. It should be
alienable rights.
KINDS:
1. Simple donation Art. 725
2. Remuneratory donation Art. 726
(1st part)
3. Modal or conditional Art. 726 (2nd
part)
4. Onerous
ARTICLE 725: Donation is an act of liberality
whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thong or
right in favor of another, who accepts it.
SIMPLE DONATION. Art. 725 pertains to simple
donation.
REQUISITES:
(1) an act of liberality on the part of
the donor
(2) increase in the patrimony of the
donee
(3) corresponding decrease in the
patrimony of the donor
Example:
- A bought an insurance policy. He paid
the premium for the insurance. Then he
named B as the beneficiary. When A died
B got P10M. Is there a donation? Based on
the provision, there is no donation with
respect to the entire P10M. There is no
decrease of P10M from the patrimony of
the donor. However the premium paid,
which for example was worth P50T is a
form of donation because there was a
decrease with respect the property of the
policyholder.
ARTICLE 726: When a person gives to another a
thing or right on account of the latters merits or of the
services rendered by him to the donor, provided they do
not constitute a demandable debt. Or when the gift
imposes upon the donee a burden which is less than the
value of the thing given, there is also a donation.
REMUNERATORY. When a person gives to
another a thing or right on account of the latters
merits or of the services rendered by him to the donor x
x x.
Meaning it is a donation to reward past
services which do not constitute a
demandable debt. Ito yung donation
where the cause is gratitude or utang na
loob. Because you saved the life of the son
of your neigbor, your neighbor gifted you
a brand new honda civic. That is a
donation and it is classified as
remuneratory donation.
What do you understand by the phrase
"do not constitute a demandable debt"?
This means that the service which was
rendered did not produce an obligation
demandable against the donor. The
purpose is to reward past services with no
strings attached. These services do not
constitute recoverable debts. Meaning, it
is not in payment of a debt. He has no
right to demand from you because it is
out of your own liberality.
Example:
Like you were crossing the street, and didnt
know that there is a vehicle that is going to hit
you and somebody saves your life, and because
you are very rich, you decided to give the person
a car. That is a remuneratory donation, on account
of the latter merits.
MODAL OR CONDITIONAL. 2nd sent: Or when
the gift imposes upon the donee a burden which is less
than the value of the thing given, there is also a
donation.
Under this donation, you give something
but you have a condition.
This is an exchange of future services. But
the services expected is less than the value
of the thing given.
Example: I will give you my car but you have to
be the driver. Ex. Danna will give Mitos a
cellphone worth P50T. The condition is that she
will have a dancing lesson. The value of the
dancing lesson is P30T. So P20T was donated to
Mitos.
Modal or conditional donation is partly
onerous and partly simple. The simple
donation here is P20T in excess of the
value of the services. The P30T is onerous.
Therefore, it is not pure anymore.
ONEROUS DONATION. It is not really a
donation. Like the example about dancing lesson.
If the dance lesson is worth P50T, equal to the
amount of the donation, then it is not true
donation anymore. It is onerous and is governed
by the provisions of contracts. It is now a contract.
An onerous donation is one that the charges of
future services are equal to the thing donated.
ARTICLE 727: Illegal or impossible conditions in
simple and remuneratory donations shall be considered
as not imposed.
If the condition of the contract is illegal,
such contract is VOID.
But in donation if there is a condition that
is illegal, the condition is disregarded and
the donation remains to be valid.
Donation will become simple.
ARTICLE 728: Donations which are to take effect
upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of
testamentary provisions, and shall be governed by the
rules established in the Title on Succession.
Art. 728 talks about mortis causa which
partakes of the nature of testamentary
provisions, and are covered in the rules
on succession.
It takes effect from the death of the donor.
ARTICLE 729: When the donor intends that the
donation shall take effect during the lifetime of the
donor, though the property shall not be delivered until
after the donors death, this shall be a donation inter
vivos. The fruits of the property from the time of the
acceptance of the donation, shall pertain to the donee,
unless the donor provides otherwise.
When we talk of donation inter vivos, it
takes effect during the lifetime of the
donor.
What are the REQUISITES of
DONATION PRAESENTI?
a) Intent by the donor that donation
shall take effect during the lifetime of
the donor.
b) The property subject to donation is
not yet delivered. In donation,
delivery is not required before the
owner can acquire the property. So if
it is a donation in praesenti, the
property even if not yet delivered is
already owned by the donee.
Q: What happens to the fruits of the property?
A: By GR: The fruits of the property although not
delivered will go to the donee. Exception: Unless
the donor provides otherwise.
Example:
A donated to B a house on January 10, 2000. B
accepted on the same day. The donation provides
that A donates the house to B now, but while A is
alive, A will remain in the possession of the
house. And the house shall only be delivered to B
after the death of A. What is the significance?
What are the CONSEQUENCES?
(1) Beginning January 10, 2000, the donee is now
the owner of the house upon acceptance. He
is also entitled to the fruits unless the contrary
is provided.
(2) A cannot revoke the donation without a
valid cause. (For me, that is one of the most
important distinction because when you go to
Succession, you will learn that the testator can
change his will everyday if he wants. If you
are the donee, you cannot complain because
you have no right to tell the testator what he
wills or donates, even if it is already
notarized. The latest will is the valid will.)
Now, in donation inter vivos is not easy to
revoke. If I give my pen to Blithe, I cannot
take it back anymore unless I have a valid
ground. What is a valid ground? If I have a
child that comes out. But we will take that up
later.
(3) Even if the house that was donated (earlier
example) was no yet delivered, B can already
dispose it because we know very well that he
is already the owner.
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN INTER VIVOS
AND MORTIS CAUSA:
(1) As to effectivity. Inter vivos takes effect
during the lifetime of the donor, mortis
takes effect only after the death of the
donor;
(2) As to the formalities. Inter vivos will
follow the formalities under this title;
mortis causa to be valid should follow the
formalities required under the provisions
on Succession. So form should be in the
form of a will;
(3) As to its revocability. Inter vivos cannot
be revoked as a GR, except for the
grounds provided by law; in mortis causa
YES, it can be revoked anytime for any
reason provided that the donor is still
alive. Of course, when he dies he can no
longer revoked, unless there is another
 will that he executed while he was still
alive (like it was found out after his death,
it is still ok for as long as he revoked the
earlier will.)
(4) As to the impairment of legitime.
Donations mortis causa will be reduced
ahead from the donations inter vivos to
accommodate the legitime; donation inter
vivos are preferred to donation mortis
causa (Priority in time is Priority in right).
They wont be touched until donations
mortis causa are not enough to cover the
legitime.
(5) As to the right to dispose. Inter vivos can
be disposed of upon acceptance because
there is already transfer of ownership
although there may be a reservation to
deliver it after the death of the donor;
mortis causa, no, until the donor dies;
(6) As to acceptance. In inter vivos, acceptance
must be made during the lifetime of the
donor and the donor must know of the
acceptance; in mortis causa, it can only be
done after the donors death. He cannot
accept it in advance.
ARTICLE 730: The fixing of an event or the
imposition of a suspensive condition, which may take
place beyond the natural expectation of life of the
donor, does not destroy the nature of the act as a
donation inter vivos, unless a contrary intention
appears.
This is one situation where the donation
is considered as donation inter vivos
notwithstanding the fact that the
happening of the event or the fulfilment
of the condition transpires after the death
of the donor.
ILLUSTRATION: So if A gives B a car, but A said
that you have to pass the bar exam. Is that a
donation inter vivos? YES, because it takes effect
right away if B says I accept it. Then B is already
the owner of the car. Even if B only passes the bar
after the death of the donor, it is still a donation
inter vivos. Unless A says, but if you do not pass
at all, you will have to return the car. That will
become a resolutory condition. A suspensive
condition that is becoming a resolutory condition
because you have to terminate the obligation. So,
remember that it will not destroy the act as
donation inter vivos, unless a contrary intention
appears.
ARTICLE 731: When a person donates something,
subject to the resolutory condition of the donors
survival, there is donation inter vivos.
Even if the donation is subject to a
resolutory condition of the donors
survival, there is still a donation inter
vivos.
On the other hand, Art. 731 gives us also
the effect of the fulfillment of a resolutory
condition: When a person donates
something subject to the resolutory
condition of the donor's survival, there is
a donation inter vivos.
Example:
A is going to undergo a heart transplant and he
will give to B a car on the condition that if he will
survive, the ownership of the car will go back to
A. B accepts it and the donation is effective. If he
survives, then it will revert to A, but if A dies,
then B is the owner. But it does not mean that it
took effect after the death of A because B already
accepted it earlier. It was just subject to the
resolutory condition of the donors survival.
ARTICLE 732: Donations which are to take effect
inter vivos shall be governed by the general provisions
on contracts and obligations in all that is not
determined in this Title.
The governing laws when it comes to
donations are the provisions of this title.
And if it is not determined by the
provisions of this title, then the general
provisions on Oblicon such as onerous
donations.
What are the governing laws when it
comes to onerous donations? Art. 733 of
NCC, with respect to remuneratory
donations with respect to the donation
(the P20T example earlier) it will be
govern by the provisions on donation but
with respect to onerous part (P30T) that
will govern by the law on contract.
ARTICLE 733: Donations with an onerous cause shall
be governed by the rules on contracts, and
remuneratory donations by the provisions of the
present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the
value of the burden imposed.
ARTICLE 734: The donation is perfected from the
moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the
donee.
This is COGNITION THEORY under
your lessons in Oblicon.
So donation is not perfected the moment
the donee accepts, but the moment the
donor KNOWS/LEARNS of the
acceptance by the donee. In relation to
this, refer to Art. 745 and 746: the
acceptance may be made through an
agent and MUST be made during the
lifetime of the donor and the donee.
Donor A donates a car to B in January 1,
2006. He accepted it thru a letter in
February 1, 2006. But on February 2, A
dies and the letter reaches As house on
February 5. So, A does not know that B
accepted the donation, so the donation is
not valid. Acceptance must be made
during the lifetime of the donor and he
must know of the acceptance while he is
still alive.
Q: So what shall the donor do before he knows
that the donee accepted the donation?
A: He can dispose the property because the
donation has not yet taken effect. That is not
tantamount to revocation because the donation
has not yet taken effect. Thats why, usually now,
the donation and the acceptance are in the same
instrument. Both singled by the donor and the
donee.
PAJARILLO vs. IAC
GR No. 72908. August 11, 1989
FACTS
The mother was Juana Balane de Suterio, who
had a brother named Felipe Balane and a sister
named Perfecta Balane de Cordero. Perfecta died
in 1945 leaving inter alia a registered tract of land
consisting of about 28 hectares in the barrio of
Luctol, Municipality of Macalelon in Quezon
Province. In 1946, Juana and Felipe, as the only
brother and sister respectively and forced heirs of
Perfecta, executed a public instrument entitled
"Extra-judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
Deceased Perfecta Balane de Cordero."
In the agreement, Juana and Felipe, in
consideration of love and affection agreed in
carrying out the antemortem wish of Pefecta by
donating to private respondent SALUD SUTEXIO
DE MATIAS (only niece) the 28-hectare land
Perfecta owned. It also conditioned that SALUD
must assume the P1,000 obligation or debt of
Perfectas estate with the Philippine National
Bank. It was also stated therein that SALUD
accepted the said donation and expressed her
gratitude for the kindness and liberality of Juana
and Felipe.
Later, SALUD executed a public instrument
accepting the donation made by Felipe and Juana.
Therein, she expressed her gratitude for the
kindness and liberality of Juana and Felipe. One
of the witnesses, who signed in this document
was petitioner EUFEMIA PAJARILLO.
These instruments were never registered nor
was title transferred in SALUD's name although
she said she immediately took possession of the
land. Meantime, intestate proceedings were
instituted on the estate of Perfecta and the said
land was among those included in the inventory
of the properties belonging to the decedent.
SALUD interposed no objection to its inclusion
nor did she oppose its subsequent adjudication to
her mother Juana in the project of partition.
It was not clear if the land was ever registered
in Juana's name. However, there is evidence that
Juana confirmed the earlier donation of the land to
SALUD but requested that she be allowed to
possess the same and enjoy its fruits, until her
death. It has also not been controverted that Salud
paid the P1,000.00 loan for which the land was
mortgaged.
In 1951, acceding to this request, she
transferred the possession of the land to her
mother, who was then staying with petitioner
CLAUDIO SUTERIO, SR. and his family. During
the period they were occupying the land,
CLAUDIO paid the realty taxes thereon. In 1956,
Juana executed a deed of absolute sale conveying
the land to CLAUDIO for the declared
consideration of P12,000.00. In 1958, Claudio had
the land registered in as name and was issued a
TCT.
CLAUDIO died in 1961 and his mother in
1963. In 1965, private respondents spouses
SALUD and PEDRO MATIAS filed a complaint
for the reconveyance of the property on the
ground that the deed of sale in favor of CLAUDIO
was fictitious and its registration in his name was
null and void.
SALUD alleged that she was unaware until
later of the supposed sale of the land to
CLAUDIO. She faulted it as having been procured
through fraud and improper influence on her sick
and aged mother. She claimed that no
compensation was actually paid by CLAUDIO
and that the transaction was deliberately
concealed from her by her brother and the
defendants.
For their part, the respondents EUFEMIA
PAJARILLO, CLAUDIO SUTERIO, JR., NYMIA
SUTERIO and MARILYN SUTERIO, widow and
children of CLAUDIO, assailed the donation to
SALUD as legally inefficacious and defective and
contended that her complaint was barred by
prescription, estoppel and res judicata.
In 1979, the CFI of Quezon upheld the
donation to SALUD and annulled the deed of sale
and the registration of the land in favor of
CLAUDIO. The defendants were required to
reconvey the land to SALUD as a result. On
appeal, the decision was affirmed in toto.
Hence, this appeal by EUFEMIA, ET. AL.
The petitioners assailed the intrinsic validity
of the extrajudical settlement and submit that it
was not really a donation as conceptually
understood in civil law. Their argument was that
the real donor of the property was Perfecta, the
deceased sister, who, however, could no longer
bestow the intended gift. For their part, Felipe and
Juana could not have made the donation either
because they were not moved by the same
sentiments Perfects had for her niece SALUD.
That feeling would have provided the required
consideration if Perfecta herself had made the
donation, but not the other two.
ISSUE
Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement
was really a donation since the donor of the
property who was Perfecta, as she was already
deceased, could no longer bestow the intended
gift and that Felipe and Juana could not have
made the donation either because they were not
moved by the same sentiments Perfecta had for
her niece SALUD.
RULING
YES, it was a donation. The argument
aappeared to be too much nitpicking, if not
sophistry. Felipe and Juana had declared
themselves the heirs of Perfecta and the owners of
the property in question. As such, they were free
to give the land to whomever they pleased and for
whatever reason they saw fit. Hence, if they chose
to respect Perfecta's wishes and carry out her
intentions by donating the land to SALUD, there
was no legal impediment to their doing so. In fact,
that was not only the legal but also the moral
thing to do.
There is no question that Felipe and Juana
could have simply disregarded their sister's
sentiments and decided not to donate the
property to SALUD, keeping the same for
themselves. The fact that they did not do this
speaks well indeed of their integrity and their
loyalty as well to their deceased sister. The
extrajudicial settlement also reflected their own
affection for SALUD which constituted the valid
consideration for their own act of liberality.
Notably, in her acceptance of the donation,
SALUD referred to the donors Felipe and Juana,
and not Perfecta.
DE LUNA vs. Hon. ABRIGO
GR No. No. L-57455. January 18, 1990
articles 733
The prescriptive period of 4 years provided under
Article 764 is not applicable to onerous donations.
Under Article 733, onerous donations shall be
governed by the rules on contract. Hence, for
purposes of prescription of onerous donations, it
shall be governed by Art. 1144, which provides
that an action to enforce a written contract
prescribes in 10 years. In the present case, the
action filed by the DE LUNAs was well within the
10-year period.
FACTS
In 1965, Prudencio de Luna donated a portion
of 7,500 square meters of his registered lot in
Lucena to the Luzonian Colleges, Inc., (now
private respondent LUZONIAN UNIVERSITY
FOUNDATION, INC). The donation, which was
embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos was
subject to certain terms and conditions and
provided for the automatic reversion to the donor
of the donated property in case of violation or
non-compliance. The FOUNDATION failed to
comply with the conditions of the donation.
But in 1971, Prudencio de Luna "revived" the
said donation in favor of the FOUNDATION, in a
document entitled "Revival of Donation Intervivos"
subject to terms and conditions which among
others, required the construction of the following:
a Chapel, a Nursery and a Kindergarten School, to
be named after St. Veronica. It also conditioned
that the plan must be in accordance with the one
prepared by the O.R. Quinto & Associates
provided that the flooring of the Altar and parts
of the Chapel shall be of granoletic marble. It also
stipulated that the 3 constructions must be at least
70% finished, 3 years from the date of donation
and must be completed within 5 years, though
extensions may be granted by Prudencio de Luna
in writing. As in the original deed of donation, the
"Revival of Donation Intenrivos" also provided for
the automatic reversion to the donor of the
donated area in case of violation of the conditions
thereof.
The FOUNDATION, through its president,
accepted the donation in the same document,
subject to all the terms and conditions stated in
the donation. In 1971, the donation was registered
and annotated in the memorandum of
encumbrances.
In the same year of 1971, Prudencio de Luna
and the FOUNDATION executed a 'Deed of
Segregation" whereby the area donated was
adjudicated to the FOUNDATION. As a result, a
TCT was issued in the name of the
FOUNDATION while the remaining portion of
the lot was retained by Prudencio de Luna.
In 1980, Prudencio de Luna died. As a result,
in the same year, his children and only heirs,
petitioners EVELYN, ROSALINA, PRUDENCIO,
JR., WILLARD, ANTONIO and JOSELITO filed a
complaint with the RTC of Quezon alleging that
the terms and conditions of the donation were not
complied with by the FOUNDATION. They
stated that camE 1976 but the 3 constructions
were not yet completely built by the
FOUNDATION. Among others, they prayed for
the cancellation of the donation and the reversion
of the donated land to them.
On the other hand, the FOUNDATION
claimed that it had partially and substantially
complied with the conditions of the donation and
that the donor has granted the FOUNDATION an
indefinite extension of time to complete the
construction of the chapel. It also invoked the
affirmative defense of prescription of action and
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
The CFI of Quezon dismissed the case on the
ground of prescription. It applied Article 764 of
the Civil Code which provides that an action to
enforce a revocation of a donation due to non-
compliance with conditions prescribes in 4 years.
Since the complaint was brought in 1980 or more
than 5 months beyond the prescriptive period, it
was already barred by prescription.
Hence, this appeal by the DE LUNAs. The
alleged that the action they filed before the CFI of
Quezon is not one for revocation of the donation
under Article 764 of the New Civil Code which
prescribes in 4 years, but one to enforce a written
contract which prescribes in 10 years under
Article 1144.
ISSUE
Whether or not the applicable law is Article
764, which states that an action for revocation of a
donation for non-compliance with the condition
prescribes in 4 years or Article 1144, which states
that an action to enforce a wriiten contract
prescribes in 10 years.
RULING
The applicable law is Article 1144, which
states that an action to enforce a wriiten contract
prescribes in 10 years because the donation made
was an onerous donation.
From the viewpoint of motive, purpose or
cause, donations may be 1) simple, 2)
remuneratory or 3) onerous. A simple donation is
one the cause of which is pure liberality (no
strings attached). A remuneratory donation is one
where the donee gives something to reward past
or future services or because of future charges or
burdens, when the value of said services, burdens
or charges is less than the value of the donation.
An onerous donation is one which is subject to
burdens, charges or future services equal (or
more) in value than that of the thing donated.
It is the finding of the trial court, which is not
disputed by the parties, that the donation subject
of this case is one with an ONEROUS CAUSE. It
was made subject to the burden requiring the
donee to construct a chapel, a nursery and a
kindergarten school in the donated property
within 5 years from execution of the deed of
donation.
Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule
that donations with an onerous cause are
governed not by the law on donations but by the
rules on contracts. On the matter of prescription
of actions for the revocation of onerous donation,
it was held that the general rules on prescription
applies. The same rules apply under the New
Civil Code as provided in Article 733 thereof
which provides:
Art. 733. Donations with an onerous
cause shall be governed by the rules on
contracts, and remuneratory donations by
the provisions of the present Title as
regards that portion which exceeds the
value of the burden imposed.
It is true that under Article 764 of the New
Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a
donation must be brought within 4 years from the
non-compliance of the conditions of the donation.
However, it does not apply to onerous donations
in view of the specific provision of Article 733
providing that onerous donations are governed
by the rules on contracts.
The trial court was therefore not correct in
holding that the complaint in the case at bar is
barred by prescription under Article 764 of the
New Civil Code because Article 764 does not
apply to onerous donations.
As provided in the donation executed in 1971,
complaince with the terms and conditions of the
contract of donation, shall be made within 5 years
from its execution. The complaint which was filed
on in 1980 was then well within the 10 year
prescriptive period to enforce a written contract
under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, counted
from 1976.
The validity of the stipulation in the contract
providing for the automatic reversion of the
donated property to the donor upon non-
compliance cannot be doubted. It is in the nature
of an agreement granting a party the right to
rescind a contract unilaterally in case of breach,
without need of going to court. Upon the
happening of the resolutory condition of non-
compliance with the conditions of the contract,
the donation is automatically revoked without
need of a judicial declaration to that effect.
LAGAZO vs. CA
GR No. 112796. March 5, 1998
Articles 733
A donation is simple when although the
donee in reality paid for the installments in
arrears and for the remaining balance of the
lot in question, no burdens, charges or
conditions imposed upon such was stated on
the deed of donation itself. Being a simple
donation, acceptance must be in a public
instrument and that the donor must be
formally notified thereof.
FACTS
Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a widow and
grandmother of petitioner TITO R. LAGAZO was
awarded in 1975, a 60.10-square meter lot which is
a portion of the Monserrat Estate located at 3320
2nd St., V. Mapa, Old Sta. Mesa, Manila. The
Monserrat Estate was a public land owned by the
City of Manila and distributed for sale to bona fide
tenants under its land-for-the-landless program.
Catalina constructed a house on the lot.
In 1977, or shortly before she left for Canada
where she was a permanent resident at that time,
Catalina executed a special power of attorney in
favor of her son-in-law Eduardo B. Espaol
authorizing him to execute all documents
necessary for the final adjudication of her claim as
awardee of the lot.
In 1984, due to the failure of Eduardo B.
Espaol to accomplish the purpose of the power
of attorney granted to him, Catalina revoked said
authority in an instrument executed in Canada.
Simultaneous with the revocation, Catalina
executed another power of attorney of the same
tenor in favor of petitioner TITO R. LAGAZO.
In 1985, Catalina executed in Canada a Deed
of Donation over the lot in favor of LAGAZO.
Following the donation, LAGAZO checked with
the Register of Deeds and found out that the
property was in the delinquent list, so that he paid
the installments in arrears and the remaining
balance on the lot and declared the said property
in the name of Catalina.
In 1986, LAGAZO sent a demand letter to
respondent ALFREDO CABANLIT asking him to
vacate the premises of the lot. A similar letter was
also sent afterwards. However, CABANLIT
refused to vacate the premises claiming
ownership thereof. Hence, LAGAZO instituted a
complaint for recovery of possession and
damages against CABANLIT. LAGAZO claimed
ownership over the house and lot by virtue of the
Deed of Donation in his favor executed by his
grandmother Catalina, the real awardee of the lot
in question.
Opposing LAGAZO's version, CABANLIT
claimed ownership over the house and lot in
controversy through purchase from Eduardo
Espaol in 1982. He argued that it was Espaol
who was the owner of the house and lot by virtue
of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Catalina
in 1977 over the house and a Deed of Assignment
over the lot in 1980, in favor of Espaol.
After trial, the RC of Manila decided in favor
of LAGAZO and against CABANLIT, It
thereafter, ordered the reconveyance of the
property to LAGAZO.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the
appellate court reversed the decision of the RTC.
It anchored its ruling upon the absence of any
showing that LAGAZO accepted his
grandmother's donation of the subject land. It also
struck down LAGAZO 's contention that the
formalities for a donation of real property should
not apply to his case since it was an onerous one
he paid for the amortizations due on the land
before and after the execution of the deed of
donation reasoning that the deed showed no
burden, charge or condition imposed upon the
donee; thus, the payments made by LAGAZO
were his voluntary acts.
Hence, this appeal by LAGAZO.
He contended that the burdens, charges or
conditions imposed upon a donation need not be
stated on the deed of donation itself. Thus,
although the deed did not categorically impose
any charge, burden or condition to be satisfied by
him, the donation was onerous since he in fact
and in reality paid for the installments in arrears
and for the remaining balance of the lot in
question. Being an onerous donation, his
acceptance thereof may be express or implied, as
provided under Art. 1320 of the Civil Code, and
need not comply with the formalities required by
Art. 749 of the same code. His payment of the
arrearages and balance and his assertion of his
right of possession against private respondent
clearly indicate his acceptance of the donation.
ISSUE
Whether or not the donation made by
Catalina to LAGAZO was an onerous one
eventhough it did not expressly impose any
burden in the deed of donation but in reality,
LAGAZO actually paid charges imposed on the
property like land taxes and installment
arrearages.
RULING
NO, it was not an onerous obligation. It was a
simple donation rather.
A simple or pure donation is one whose
cause is pure liberality (no strings attached), while
an onerous donation is one which is subject to
burdens, charges or future services equal to or
more in value than the thing donated. Under
Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an
onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on
contracts; hence, the formalities required for a
valid simple donation are not applicable.
Even conceding that LAGAZO's full payment
of the purchase price of the lot might have been a
burden to him, such payment was not however
imposed by the donor, Catalina, as a condition for
the donation. Rather, the deed explicitly stated
that Catalina donated to LAGAZO said property
as an act of liberality and generosity and
considering that the latter is her grandson, said
land and all its improvements, free from all liens
and encumbrances and charges whatsoever.
It is clear that the donor did not have any
intention to burden or charge LAGAZO as the
donee. The words in the deed are in fact typical of
a pure donation. The payments made by
LAGAZO, as found by the Court of Apepals were
merely his voluntary acts. This much can be
gathered from his testimony in court, in which he
never even claimed that a burden or charge had
been imposed by his grandmother.
The payments even seem to have been made
pursuant to the power of attorney executed by
Catalina in favor of LAGAZO, her grandson,
authorizing him to execute acts necessary for the
fulfillment of her obligations. Nothing in the
records showed that such acts were meant to be a
burden in the donation.
As a pure or simple donation, the following
provisions of the Civil Code are applicable:
Art. 734. The donation is perfected from
the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee.
Art. 746. Acceptance must be made
during the lifetime of the donor and the
donee.
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an
immovable may be valid, it must be made in
a public instrument, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the
charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the
same deed of donation and in a separate
public document, but it shall not take effect
unless it is done during the lifetime of the
donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor shall be notified
thereof in authentic form, and this step shall
be noted in both instruments.
Like any other contract, an agreement of the
parties is essential. The donation, following the
theory of cognition, is perfected only upon the
moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the
donee." Furthermore, if the acceptance is made in
a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified
thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be
noted in both instruments.
Acceptance of the donation by the donee is,
therefore, indispensable; its absence makes the
donation null and void. The perfection and the
validity of a donation are well explained by
former Sen. Arturo M. Tolentino in this wise:
. . . Title to immovable property does not
pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of
a deed of donation until and unless it has
been accepted in a public instrument and the
donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance
may be made in the very same instrument of
donation. If the acceptance does not appear in
the same document, it must be made in
another. Solemn words are not necessary; it is
sufficient if it shows the intention to accept.
But in this case it is necessary that formal
notice thereof be given to the donor, and the
 fact that due notice has been given must be
noted in both instruments (that containing
the offer to donate and that showing the
acceptance). Then and only then is the
donation perfected. If the instrument of
donation has been recorded in the registry of
property, the instrument that shows the
acceptance should also be recorded. Where
the deed of donation fails to show the
acceptance, or where the formal notice of the
acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is
either not given to the donor or else not noted
in the deed of donation and in the separate
acceptance, the donation is null and void.
The deed of donation did not show any
indication that LAGAZO accepted the gift or
donation. It was only after the Court of Appeals
had rendered its decision, when he submitted an
affidavit dated 1990, manifesting that he
"wholeheartedly accepted" the lot given to him by
his grandmother, Catalina. This is too late,
because arguments, evidence, causes of action and
matters not raised in the trial court may no longer
be raised on appeal.
True, the acceptance of a donation may be
made at any time during the lifetime of the donor.
And granting arguendo that such acceptance may
still be admitted in evidence on appeal, there is
still need for proof that a formal notice of such
acceptance was received by the donor and noted
in both the deed of donation and the separate
instrument embodying the acceptance. At the
very least, this last legal requisite of annotation in
both instruments of donation and acceptance was
not fulfilled by LAGAZO. For this reason, the
subject lot cannot be adjudicated to him.
Hence, on the basis of the alleged donation,
LAGAZO cannot be considered the lawful owner
of the subject property. However, this did not
necessarily mean that CABANLIT is
automatically the rightful owner.
GESTOPA vs. CA
GR No. 111904. October 5, 2000
An acceptance clause is a mark that the
donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a
requirement for donations inter vivos.
Donations mortis causa, being in the form of
a will, are not required to be accepted by the
donees during the donors' lifetime.
FACTS
Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the
owners of 6 parcels of unregistered lands. They
executed three deeds of donation mortis causa, in
favor of private respondent MERCEDES
DANLAG-PILAPIL. The first deed pertained to
parcels 1 & 2 while the second deed pertained to
parcel 3. The third deed pertained to parcel 4. All
deeds contained the reservation of the rights of
the donors (1) to amend, cancel or revoke the
donation during their lifetime, and (2) to sell,
mortgage, or encumber the properties donated
during the donors' lifetime, if deemed necessary.
In 1973, the Danlags, executed a deed of
donation inter vivos covering the aforementioned
parcels of land plus two other parcels,
respectively, again in favor of MERCEDES. This
contained two conditions, that (1) the Danlags
shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land
during their lifetime, and that (2) the MERCEDES
cannot sell or dispose of the land during the
lifetime of the said spouses, without their prior
consent and approval. MERCEDES caused the
transfer of the parcels' tax declaration to her name
and paid the taxes on them.
In 1979 and 1979, respectively, the Danlags
sold parcels 3 and 4 to herein petitioners spouses
AGRIPINO and ISABEL GESTOPA. Later, the
Danlags executed a deed of revocation recovering
the 6 parcels of land subject of the aforecited deed
of donation inter vivos.
In 1983, MERCEDES filed with the RTC a
petition against the GESTOPAs and the Danlags,
for quieting of title over the above parcels of land.
She alleged that she was an illegitimate daughter
of Diego Danlag; that she lived and rendered
incalculable beneficial services to Diego and his
mother, Maura Danlag, when the latter was still
alive. In recognition of the services she rendered,
Diego executed a Deed of Donation in 1973,
conveying to her the 6 parcels of land. She
accepted the donation in the same instrument,
openly and publicly exercised rights of ownership
over the donated properties, and caused the
transfer of the tax declarations to her name.
Through machination, intimidation and undue
influence, Diego persuaded the husband of
MERCEDES, Eulalio Pilapil, to buy 2 of the 6
parcels covered by the deed of donation. Said
donation inter vivos was coupled with conditions
and, according to Mercedes, since its perfection,
she had complied with all of them; that she had
not been guilty of any act of ingratitude; and that
respondent Diego had no legal basis in revoking
the subject donation and then in selling the two
parcels of land to the GESTOPAs.
In their opposition, the GESTOPAs and the
Danlags averred that the deed of donation dated
1973 was null and void because it was obtained
by MERCEDES through machinations and undue
influence. Even assuming it was validly executed,
the intention was for the donation to take effect
upon the death of the donor. Further, the
donation was void for it left the donor, Diego
Danlag, without any property at all.
In 1991, the trial court rendered a decision
against MERCEDES. It revoked the donations
mortis cause and intervivos. It declared Diego as
the absolute and exclusive owner of the 6 parcels
of land mentioned in the Deed of revocation. It
also ruled that the Deeds of Sale executed by
Diego in favor of the GESTOPAs were valid and
enforceable. The trial court found that the
reservation clause in all the deeds of donation
indicated that Diego did not make any donation;
that the purchase by MERCEDES of the two
parcels of land covered by the Deed of Donation
Inter Vivos bolstered this conclusion; that
MERCEDES failed to rebut the allegations of
ingratitude she committed against Diego Danlag;
and that MERCEDES committed fraud and
machination in preparing all the deeds of
donation without explaining to Diego their
contents.
On appeal by MERCEDES to the Court of
Appeals, the appellate court reversed the decision
of the trial court. It held that the deed of donation
dated 1973 be not revoked and that the deed of
revocation be null and void. It declared
MERCEDES as the absolute and exclusive owner
of the 6 parcels of land specified in the deed of
donation inter vivos. It then declared the sale by
Diego to the GESTOPAs as null and void. It
further ordered reconveyance of the parcels of
land to MERCEDES.
Hence, this appeal by the Gestopas. They
argued that the donor, Diego, did not only reserve
the right to enjoy the fruits of the properties, but
also prohibited the donee, MERCEDES, from
selling or disposing the land without the consent
and approval of the Danlags. This then implied
that the donor still had control and ownership
over the donated properties. Hence, the donation
was post mortem.
ISSUES
1. Whether the donation was inter vivos or
mortis causa.
2. Whether or not the revocation of the
donation by the donor, Diego was valid.
RULING
(1) The donation was intervivos.
Crucial in resolving whether the donation
was inter vivos or mortis causa is the determination
of whether the donor intended to transfer the
ownership over the properties upon the execution
of the deed. In ascertaining the intention of the
donor, all of the deed's provisions must be read
together.
The deed of donation dated 1973 showed
that Diego donated the properties out of love and
affection for the donee. This is a mark of a
donation inter vivos. Second, the reservation of
lifetime usufruct indicated that the donor
intended to transfer the naked ownership over the
properties. Third, the donor reserved sufficient
properties for his maintenance in accordance with
his standing in society, indicating that the donor
intended to part with the 6 parcels of land. Lastly,
the donee accepted the donation. An acceptance
clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos.
Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter
vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of
a will, are not required to be accepted by the
donees during the donors' lifetime.
The right to dispose of the properties then,
belonged to the donee, MERCEDES. The donor's
right to give consent was merely intended to
protect his usufructuary interests.
The attending circumstances in the execution
of the subject donation also demonstrated the real
intent of the donor to transfer the ownership over
the subject properties upon its execution. Prior to
the execution of donation inter vivos, the Danlag
spouses already executed 3 donations mortis causa.
If they did not intend to donate inter vivos, they
would not again donate the 4 lots already donated
mortis causa.
(2) NO, it was not valid.
A valid donation, once accepted, becomes
irrevocable, except on account of officiousness,
failure by the donee to comply with the charges
imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The
donor-spouses did not invoke any of these
reasons in the deed of revocation.
The GESTOPAs cited Mercedes' vehemence
in prohibiting the donor to gather coconut trees
and her filing of instant petition for quieting of
title. There is nothing on record, however,
showing that MERCEDES prohibited the donors
from gathering coconuts. Even assuming that
MERCEDES prevented the donor from gathering
coconuts, this could hardly be considered an act
covered by Article 765 of the Civil Code which
provides that
Art. 765. The donation may also be revoked
at the instance of the donor, by reason of
ingratitude in the following cases:
(1) If the donee should commit some
offense against the person, the honor or the
property of the donor, or of his wife or
children under his parental authority;
(2) If the donee imputes to the donor any
criminal offense, or any act involving moral
turpitude, even though he should prove it,
unless the crime or the act has been
committed against the donee himself, his wife
or children under his authority;
(3) If he unduly refuses him support
when the donee is legally or morally bound
to give support to the donor. (648a)
Nor does this Article cover MERCEDES's
filing of the petition for quieting of title, where
she merely asserted what she believed was her
right under the law.
Finally, the records do not show that the
Danlags instituted any action to revoke the
donation in accordance with Article 769 of the
Civil Code, which provides that
Art. 769. The action granted to the donor
by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced
in advance. This action prescribes within one
year, to be counted from the time the donor
had knowledge of the fact and it was possible
for him to bring the action.
Consequently, the supposed revocation in
1979 had no legal effect.
PERSONS WHO MAY GIVE OR RECEIVE A
DONATION
ARTICLE 735: All persons who may contract and
dispose of their property may make a donation.
It is required that the person has the
capacity to contract. Who has the capacity
to contract?
1. anybody who is not a minor;
2. anybody who is not insane or not
imbecile;
3. anybody who is not a deaf-mute;
 4. anybody who is not prodigal;
5. those who are not in civil interdiction.
Now who can dispose the property? The
owner because it is only the owner who
has the right to dispose (jus disponendi),
not the possessor, not the usufructuary,
not the lessee.
Q: Can the husband and wife donate?
A: GR: They cannot donate to each other.
EXCEPT: Moderate donation on occasion of
family rejoicing only.
Q: Can the husband donate his capital property
without the consent of the wife?
A: YES. He can donate his capital property to his
children (whether legitimate or illegitimate) and
to 3rd persons (to the driver, friend etc) but not to
his wife. The wife can also with respect to her
paraphernal properties donate it even without the
consent of the husband.
Q: What about the conjugal property?
A: It can be disposed of as long as there is consent
from both.
Q: Can one spouse donate without the consent of
the other with respect to the conjugal property?
A: GR: NO. Exceptions:
a) Moderate donation given for charity;
b) On occasion of family rejoining; or
c) On occasion of family distress.
ARTICLE 736: Guardians and trustees cannot donate
the property entrusted to them.
The kind of donation that is being
referred to here is simple donation. So
that onerous donations may be made by
the trustee provided that the donation is
beneficial to the ward. In case of onerous
donations, the trustee may donate if the
donation will benefit the donee.
This provision refers only to simple
donation.
However, if you look in the laws of
guardianship, trustees and guardians are
allowed to sell the properties of their
wards or the beneficiaries where the
properties can be subject to levy or
execution due to non-payment of taxes or
debts. The trustees or the guardians are
allowed to pay taxes, or debts of the
minor.
ARTICLE 737: The donors capacity shall be
determined as of the time of the making of the donation.
Art. 737 is related to 734. When we talk of
making of donation, we are referring to
the perfection of the contract.
So when you talk of the capacity of the
donor, the donor must be capacitated to
make a donation at the time of the
perfection.
Example:
A donates to B on May 1; B accepts on May 5; A,
the donor dies on May 8. The acceptance was
made known to A on May 10? Was the donation
perfected? No because at that time the acceptance
was made known, the donor no longer has the
capacity to donate.
Insane people who have lucid intervals
can donate during their lucid moments.
Insane people who do not have lucid
moments cannot donate.
Example:
A donated on May 1 to B at that time he was
insane; B accepts on May 5 at the time A was sane,
is the donation valid? Yes. Because if you look at
the provision, the capacity is determined at the
time he knows of the acceptance not at the time he
made the donation.
ARTICLE 738: All those who are not specially
disqualified by law therefore may accept donations.
We have disqualifications which we will
take up under 739 and under the laws on
Succession. There are also those who are
incapacitated to inherit.
ARTICLE 739: The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the
same criminal offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife,
descendants and ascendants, by reason of his
office.
In the case referred to in #1, the action for declaration
of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or
donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be
proved by preponderance of evidence in the same
action.
1st: Those made between persons who were guilty
of adultery or concubinage at the of the donation;
If you look at the provisions, it says
guilty. Does that mean that they have to
be proven guilty beyond reasonable
doubt? NO. The adultery or concubinage
need not be proven in criminal action. It is
enough that there is a donation given by a
man on his mistress. How can we prove?
When his wife files in court for the
declaration of nullity of the donation. In
that case, there can be evidence already
that they have been sleeping together in
the same house, etc. Preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to show that there
was concubinage or adultery.
If the donation took place after the
commission of the adultery, meaning
naghiwalay na sila, it is said to be valid
according to some legal commentaries
because it says here, who were guilty at
the time of the donation. So if the
donation was made after the affair, it does
not anymore fall under the special
disqualification, unless the consideration
of the donation is the commission of the
act.
 EX: H and W are husband and
wife. H2 and W2 are also husband
wife. H had carnal knowledge with
W2. H2 accused W2 of adultery. H
and W2 are convicted. H previously
gave a gift to W2. May W file a case
that the donation is void? Yes because
at the time of the donation they were
both guilty of adultery.
- Who can raise the nullity of the donation?
It is The spouse of the donor or the donee
(last par 739). Not the donee ha himself.
The donor and the donee do not have
cause of action. You cannot revoke the
donation if you are the guilty party
himself. You must come to court with
clean hands. This also applies to persons
who do not have the benefit of marriage.
LIGUEZ V CA
The old man donated a parcel of land to a 15-yr
old girl in order to induce her to live with him.
The SC said that the donation is void because it is
violative of Art. 739 but this old man can no
longer recover the property donated because he
was the one who filed the case of illegal
transaction.
2nd: Those made between persons found guilty of
the same criminal offense, in consideration
thereof;
This particular disqualification requires
conviction.
It is made by those persons found guilty
of the same criminal offense, in
consideration thereof.
They are two parties: the donor and the
donee and they are both found guilty of
the same criminal offense. So how can
that happen in relation to your criminal
law, in consideration thereof? It is thru
principal by inducement and principal by
direct participation.
Example:
A is the wife and then she hires B to kill her
husband. The donor is the wife and the donee is
the killer. A gives B P1M in consideration of the
commission of the crime. This kind of donation is
void because of moral consideration. This
provision requires that they have to be found
guilty of the same crime.
If a person insists that a donation be given
so that he would, for example, not to kill
the giver or any other person, this would
tantamount to extortion or black mail.
The consent of the donor is being given
only because of force, intimidation, fear,
or undue influence. Hence the donation is
voidable.
However, if the donation is made to
prevent the commission of the crime, then
it is valid.
Another thing to remember, whether the
donation transpired before the
commission of the offense, or during or
after, the donation is void, for as long as it
was done in consideration of the
donation. Unlike in the first instance.
3rd. Those made to a public officer or his wife,
descendants and ascendants, by reason of his
office.
The purpose for this disqualification is to
prevent bribery. However, this is case to
case basis because not all gifts given to the
official fall under the disqualification.
ARTICLE 740: Incapacity to succeed by will shall be
applicable to donations inter vivos.
If you are incapacitated to receive by will
or incapacitated to be as heir, then you are
also incapacitated to become a donee.
There are 2 KINDS of INCAPACITY to
inherit:
(1) absolute incapacity. Where in no
case can there be a transmission
of the inheritance. Like an infant
that is abortive cannot be a donee.
(2) relative incapacity. Where under
certain conditions, particular
person cannot inherit from a
particular decedent (donor).
Article 1027 also enumerates the
following disqualification as applied to
this chapter.
The following are disqualified under Art.
1027:
1. The priest who heard the confession of the
donor during his last illness. The priest must
have heard the confession of the donor and it
must be during his last illness in order for the
priest to be incapacitated but if the donor
does not die right away or dies 5 days later,
then the priest is not incapacitated.
2. The minister of the gospel who extended
spiritual aid to the donor during his last
illness. The same thing because he extended
spiritual aid and then the donor must die.
3. The relative of the priest or the minister of the
gospel within the 4th degree. They cannot
receive some from that particular person to
whom the minister extended spiritual aid or
who confessed to the priest. So the relative of
the priest and the minister cannot also receive
from that particular donor.
4. The church order chapter, community,
organization or institution to which such
priest or minister may belong.
5. The guardian with respect to testamentary
disposition given by a ward in his favor
before the final accounts of the guardianship
have been approved even if the testator
should die after the approval thereof;
nevertheless, any provision made by the ward
in favor of the guardian when the latter is his
ascendants, descendant, brother, sister, or
spouse, shall be valid. While he is still the
guardian of the ward, he cannot receive or
 cannot be a donee but after the final account
of the guardianship has been approved, so
pwede na maging donee. But if the guardian is
the ascendant, descendant, brother or sister of
the ward, of course he can be a donee.
6. Physician, nurse, surgeon, health officers or
druggist who took care of the testator during
his last illness. Why is it that these people are
not allowed to receive donation? They are
incapacitated because of undue influence. But
of course if the physician, nurse, surgeon, etc.
is a relative, he is allowed kc entitled naman
ang relative to receive.
ARTICLE 1032. Relative incapacity by reason of
unworthiness.
The unworthiness of the donee. The
donee is unworthy; he has no right to
receive from the donor.
1. Any person who has been convicted of an
attempt against the life of the donor, his/her
spouse, ascendants or descendants. So if you
are convicted for attempted homicide or
attempted murder, then you cannot receive
from that particular donor but even if it is not
an attempt against the life of the donor but to
his/her spouse, ascendants or descendants,
you are still unworthy to become a donee.
2. Any person who has accused the donor of a
crime for which the law prescribes an
imprisonment for six years or more. If the
accusation has been found groundless.
What are the REQUISITES here?
a. If the donee accused the donor of the
crime and the crime must have a
penalty of more than 6 yrs of
imprisonment.
b. The accusation was found to be
groundless.
3. Any heir of full age who having knowledge of
the violent death of the testator should fail to
report it to an officer of the law.
4. Any person who has been convicted of
concubinage or adultery with the spouse of
the donor.
So as mentioned earlier, if the confession
or the extended spiritual aid or the taking
care by the doctor or the nurse and the
donor survives, then the priest, minister,
doctor, nurse is not disqualified.
What if the donee tried to kill the donor
and later the donor forgave the donee.
After forgiving the donee, the donor
donated something to the donee. Is the
donee capacitated to receive? Yes, because
there has been condonation.
ARTICLE 741: Minors and others who cannot enter
into a contract may become donees but acceptance shall
be done thru their parents or legal representatives.
MINORS.
- They can become donees but they cannot
become donors. A donation made to a
minor is valid provided that the
acceptance must be done thru their
parents or legal representative.
Q: May minors accept by themselves?
A: Yes, if the donation is simple except if formal
acceptance is required. If the donation is onerous
and conditional, they cannot accept it by
themselves because of the burden imposed on the
donation. If that would be the case, the parents
and legal representatives must intervene. But if
the minor accepts the onerous donation, the
donation is considered voidable.
- Parents cannot receive a donation in favor
of their children if the value of the
donation is more than P50K unless there
is an approval from the court.
ARTICLE 742: Donations made to conceived and
unborn children may be accepted by those persons who
would legally represent them if they were already born.
Relate this to Article 40 of the NCC. When
does the person acquire juridical
personality? For the unborn child to
receive a donation, the child must be born
alive if it has a normal intrauterine life but
if it has an intrauterine life of 7 months, it
has to be alive for 24 hours. The child
must at least have some kind of juridical
personality before a donation can be
accepted in his behalf.
ARTICLE 743: Donations made to incapacitated
persons shall be void, through simulated under the
guise of another contract or thru a person who is
interposed.
What do you mean by the incapacitated
here? Incapacitated because of 739; Art.
1027 because of undue influence and Art.
1032 due to unworthiness. If you made
donations to these people, the donation
shall be void even though simulated
under the guise of another contract like
contract of sale or use of another person.
The law will be frustrated if you go thru
another person or if you use another
contract. Remember, if it is illegal to
donate something to your mistress it is
also illegal to sell something to her.
EXAMPLE:
A and B were paramours convicted of adultery. A
donated to X, a mutual friend thru a previous
understanding that X shall donate the same thing
to B. Are the donations valid? NO, because it
circumvents the law.
ARTICLE 744: Donations of the same thing to two or
more different donees shall be governed by the
provisions concerning the sale of the same thing to two
or more different persons.
This is in cross reference to Art. 1544 of
double sale.
- The rule on movable property in case of
double sale is that if the same thing
should have been sold to different
 vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have
first taken possession thereof in good
faith.
- If it be immovable property, the
ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith recorded it
in the Registry of Property. If theres no
inscription, the ownership shall pertain to
the person who in good faith was first in
the possession and in the absence thereof,
to the person who presents the oldest
title, provided there is good faith.
ILLUSTRATION:
What if A donated to B (January 5, 2005) and
then A sold the same property to C (January 10,
2005) but C registered it on January 11, 2005, who
is the owner of the property? It is B. The donee
already owns the property donated even though
the property is not yet delivered. The rule on
double sale will not apply in donation because the
two are different contracts.
A sold the property first to B and then
donated it to C. Will the law on sales apply? It
depends. If the property is already delivered to B,
then B is the owner. A cannot donate something
that is no longer owned by him. But if it is not yet
delivered to B, A can donate to C because A is still
the owner.
ARTICLE 745: The donee must accept the donation
personally, or thru an authorized person with a special
power for the purpose, or with a general and sufficient
power, otherwise, the donation shall be void.
Q: How do you accept donation?
A: Normally, you accept the donation personally.
Q: What if the donee is not around or a minor?
A: Thru an authorized person.
Q: How do you authorize this person to accept a
donation?
A: He should be given either a special power of
attorney for that particular purpose to accept the
donation; or a general and sufficient power of
attorney, that is all encompassing powers. This
authorization to accept for the donee must be
made in public instrument. So if you are an
ordinary agent, meaning youre not somebody
who has special power or somebody with general
or sufficient power authorized thru a public
instrument, you cannot accept on behalf of the
donee. The donation shall be void.
What is the status of the contract accepted
by an unauthorized agent? It is
unenforceable.
ARTICLE 746: Acceptance must be made during the
lifetime of the donor and of the donee.
ARTICLE 747: Persons who accept donations in
representation of other who may not do so by
themselves shall be obliged to make notification and
notation of which Art. 749 speaks.
This article refers to incapacitated persons
not those incapacitated because of
unworthiness or by moral considerations.
So in case of donation, notification shall
be made by the representative of the
incapacitated upon his acceptance.
ARTICLE 748: The donation of a movable may be
made orally or in writing.
An oral donation requires the simultaneous
delivery of the thing or of the document representing
the right donated.
If the value of the personal property donated
exceeds Five thousand pesos, the donation and the
acceptance shall be made in writing. Otherwise, the
donation shall be void.
The formalities in this article are very
important. Without them, the donation is
not only voidable but completely void.
FORMALITIES FOR THE DONATION
OF MOVABLE PROPERTY
If the value of the donated movable is
more than P5000, it should always be in
writing. The acceptance must also be in
writing. Hence, if the donation is made in
an affidavit and the donee merely
signifies his acceptance orally, the
donation shall be null and void.
If the value of the donated movable is P5
000 or less:
a) Can be made orally but there
must be:
1. simultaneous delivery of a
thing; or
2. simultaneous delivery of the
document representing the
right donated.
(Acceptance may be oral or in
writing, express or implied.)
b) can be made in writing
PROBLEM:
A writes a letter to B on June 1, 2003 in which the
former states that he makes to the latter a
donation or gift of a certain sum of money (P800)
which he may collect from the BPI on June 20,
2003 in order to celebrate his birthday. B receives
the letter but does not answer. On June 20, 2003, B
goes to the bank which hands him the P800
donated as the Bank has orders from A to that
effect. Does the donation produce legal effects?
YES, the donation was perfected since there was
implied acceptance on Bs part. While the
donation was in writing, still his acceptance does
not have to be in writing since the donation does
not exceed P5000. Had it exceeded, acceptance in
writing would have been required.
ARTICLE 749: In order that the donation of an
immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public
document specifying therein the property donated and
the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed
of donation or in a separate public document, but it
shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime
of the donor.
 If the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an
authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both
instruments.
If the deed of donation and the
acceptance are in the same instrument:
a. The instrument must be in a public
document.
b. The document must specify the
property donated and the charges if
any.
If the deed of donation and the
acceptance are NOT in the same
instrument:
a. The donation must be in a public
instrument or document.
b. The document must specify the
property donated and the charges,
c. The acceptance in a separate
instrument must be in a public
instrument.
d. The donor shall be notified in
authentic form of the fact that
acceptance is being made or has been
made in a separate public document.
e. The fact that there has been a
notification must be noted in both
instruments.
CHARGES refers to:
a. Conditions or burdens imposed if any
(but which should not be equal in
value to the realty donated)
b. Encumbrance on the property such as
lease, usufruct, or mortgage.
PAJARILLO vs. IAC
GR No. 72908. August 11, 1989
article 749
Under Art. 749, when the acceptance by the
donee is made in a separate instrument, the
acceptance must be noted both in the deed of
fonation and instrument of acceptance. Its
purpose it to ensure that the acceptance of the
donation was duly communicated to the
donor. This requirement may be dispensed
with if the donor was actually informed. In
this case, Juana, the donor, was aware of such
acceptance (though not noted), as she
confirmed it later and requested Salud, the
donee, not to register the property during her
lifetime.
FACTS
The mother was Juana Balane de Suterio, who
had a brother named Felipe Balane and a sister
named Perfecta Balane de Cordero. Perfecta died
in 1945 leaving inter alia a registered tract of land
consisting of about 28 hectares in the barrio of
Luctol, Municipality of Macalelon in Quezon
Province. In 1946, Juana and Felipe, as the only
brother and sister respectively and forced heirs of
Perfecta, executed a public instrument entitled
"Extra-judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
Deceased Perfecta Balane de Cordero."
In the agreement, Juana and Felipe, in
consideration of love and affection agreed in
carrying out the antemortem wish of Pefecta by
donating to private respondent SALUD SUTEXIO
DE MATIAS (only niece) the 28-hectare land
Perfecta owned. It also conditioned that SALUD
must assume the P1,000 obligation or debt of
Perfectas estate with the Philippine National
Bank. It was also stated therein that SALUD
accepted the said donation and expressed her
gratitude for the kindness and liberality of Juana
and Felipe.
Later, SALUD executed a public instrument
accepting the donation made by Felipe and Juana.
Therein, she expressed her gratitude for the
kindness and liberality of Juana and Felipe. One
of the witnesses, who signed in this document
was petitioner EUFEMIA PAJARILLO.
These instruments were never registered nor
was title transferred in SALUD's name although
she said she immediately took possession of the
land. Meantime, intestate proceedings were
instituted on the estate of Perfecta and the said
land was among those included in the inventory
of the properties belonging to the decedent.
SALUD interposed no objection to its inclusion
nor did she oppose its subsequent adjudication to
her mother Juana in the project of partition.
It was not clear if the land was ever registered
in Juana's name. However, there is evidence that
Juana confirmed the earlier donation of the land to
SALUD but requested that she be allowed to
possess the same and enjoy its fruits, until her
death. It has also not been controverted that Salud
paid the P1,000.00 loan for which the land was
mortgaged.
In 1951, acceding to this request, she
transferred the possession of the land to her
mother, who was then staying with petitioner
CLAUDIO SUTERIO, SR. and his family. During
the period they were occupying the land,
CLAUDIO paid the realty taxes thereon. In 1956,
Juana executed a deed of absolute sale conveying
the land to CLAUDIO for the declared
consideration of P12,000.00. In 1958, Claudio had
the land registered in as name and was issued a
TCT.
CLAUDIO died in 1961 and his mother in
1963. In 1965, private respondents spouses
SALUD and PEDRO MATIAS filed a complaint
for the reconveyance of the property on the
ground that the deed of sale in favor of CLAUDIO
was fictitious and its registration in his name was
null and void.
SALUD alleged that she was unaware until
later of the supposed sale of the land to
CLAUDIO. She faulted it as having been procured
through fraud and improper influence on her sick
and aged mother. She claimed that no
compensation was actually paid by CLAUDIO
and that the transaction was deliberately
concealed from her by her brother and the
defendants.
For their part, the respondents EUFEMIA
PAJARILLO, CLAUDIO SUTERIO, JR., NYMIA
SUTERIO and MARILYN SUTERIO, widow and
children of CLAUDIO, assailed the donation to
SALUD as legally inefficacious and defective and
contended that her complaint was barred by
prescription, estoppel and res judicata.
In 1979, the CFI of Quezon upheld the
donation to SALUD and annulled the deed of sale
and the registration of the land in favor of
CLAUDIO. The defendants were required to
reconvey the land to SALUD as a result. On
appeal, the decision was affirmed in toto.
Hence, this appeal by EUFEMIA, ET. AL.
They pointed out that the donation was
defective in form because of non-compliance with
the requirements of the law regarding its
acceptance. They stated that SALUDs acceptance
did not comply with Article 749 (then Article 633)
of the Civil Code. Being that the acceptance was
made in a separate instrument, her acceptance
was not "noted in both instruments," meaning the
extrajudicial partition itself and the instrument of
acceptance, as required by the Civil Code.
ISSUE
Whether or not the acceptance made by
SALUD was defective in form because being that
it was made in a separate instrument, it was not
noted not "noted in both instruments," that is, in
the extrajudicial partition itself and the
instrument of acceptance, as required by the
Article 749 Civil Code.
RULING
NO, it was not defective. The court sustained
the validity of the donation though there was an
absence of the required notation in both
instruments (the deed of donation and the
instrument of acceptance) as under the
circumstances of the present case, a literal
adherence to the requirement of the law might
result not in justice to the parties but conversely a
distortion of their intentions.
Article 749 of the Civil Code provides that
Art. 749. x-x-x
If the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in
an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in
both instruments.
There is no question that the donation was
accepted by SALUD in a separate public
instrument and that it was duly communicated to
the donors, Juana and Felipe. Even EUFEMIA, ET.
AL. could not deny this. But what they contended
was that such acceptance was not "noted in both
instruments," meaning the extrajudicial partition
itself and the instrument of acceptance, as
required by the Civil Code.
That is perfectly true. There was nothing in
either of the two instruments showing that
"authentic notice" of the acceptance was made by
SALUD to Juana and Felipe. And while the first
instrument contains the statement that "the donee
does hereby accept this donation and does hereby
express her gratitude for the kindness and liberality of
the donor," the only signatories thereof were Felipe
and Juana. That was in fact the reason for the
separate instrument of acceptance signed by
SALUD a month later.
A strict interpretation of Article 749 can lead
to no other conclusion than the annulment of the
donation for being defective in form as urged by
EUFEMIA, ET. AL. This would be in keeping with
the unmistakable language of the above-quoted
provision. However, we find that under the
circumstances of the present case, a literal
adherence to the requirement of the law might
result not in justice to the parties but conversely a
distortion of their intentions. It is also a policy of
the Court to avoid such an intepretation.
The purpose of the formal requirement is to
insure that the acceptance of the donation is duly
communicated to the donor. In the case at bar, it
was not even suggested that Juana was unaware
of the acceptance for she in fact confirmed it later
and requested that the donated land be not
registered during her lifetime by SALUD. Given
this significant evidence, the Court could not in
conscience declare the donation ineffective because
there was no notation in the extrajudicial
settlement of the donee's acceptance. That would
be placing too much stress on mere form over
substance. It would also disregard the clear reality
of the acceptance of the donation as manifested in
the separate instrument dated and as later
acknowledged by Juana.
Hence, it was clear that Juana had no right to
sell the subject land to CLAUDIO because she was
no longer its owner, having previously donated it
to her daughter SALUD., When Claudio
registered the land in his name knowing there
was a flaw in his title, an implied trust was
created in favor of Salud as the real owner of the
property in accordance with Article 1456 of the
Civil Code. As trustor, SALUD had every right to
sue for the recovery of the land in the action for
reconveyance against Claudio's heirs.The record
showed that while the land was registered in the
name of CLAUDIO in 1958, the complaint for
reconveyance was filed by SALUD in 1965, or still
within the ten-year prescriptive period.
ARTICLE 750: The donation may comprehend all the
present property of the donor, or part thereof provided
he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient
means for the support of himself, and of all relatives
who, at the time of the acceptance of the donations, are
by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without
such reservation, the donation shall be reduced on
petition of any person affected.
What can the donor donate? All present
property of the donor which refers to
those in which the donor can dispose of at
the time of the donation.
Provided: He reserved something for the
support of himself and for his relatives
WHO CAN BE AFFECTED IF NO
RESERVATION:
a. The donor
b. Those entitled for support
c. Creditors
DONATIONS NOT INCLUDED:
 a. Onerous donation
b. Donation mortis causa
c. Donation propter nuptias
ARTICLE 751: Donations cannot comprehend future
property.
By future property is understood anything
which the donor cannot dispose of at the time of the
donation.
The law defines future property as
anything which the donor cannot dispose
of at the time of the donation. Future
inheritance cannot be the object of a
donation.
In the law of conditional obligations,
when the suspensive condition is fulfilled,
the effects retroact to the date of
constitution of the obligation. Thus, if a
person is promised with a car if he passes
the bar, may he right now donate the car
to somebody else? YES, because although
right now the car may be as to him still
future property, still when he passes the
bar, the ownership retroacts to the day the
obligation was constituted.
ARTICLE 752: The provisions of Article 750
notwithstanding, no person may give or receive, by
way of donation, more than he may give or receive by
will.
The donation shall be inofficious in all that it
may exceed this limitation.
This article means that:
1. A person may not give by donation
more than what he can give by will;
2. A person may not receive by way of
donation more than what the giver
may give by virtue of a will.
3. The limitation of this provision
naturally applies only to persons who
have compulsory heirs at the time of
his death.
4. PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD: The action
to revoke or reduce the inofficious
donation must be brought by the
donors compulsory heirs, within 5
years after the donors death.
ARTICLE 753: When a donation is made to several
persons jointly, it is understood to be in equal shares,
and there shall be no right of accretion among them,
unless the donor has otherwise provided.
The preceding paragraph shall not be
applicable to donations made to the husband and wife
jointly, between whom there shall be a right of
accretion, if the contrary has nor been provided by the
donor.
INSTANCES WHEN ACCRETION IS
PROPER:
1. In case of predecease (donee dying
ahead of donor before perfection);
2. In case of incapacity (of donee);
3. In case of refusal or repudiation (by
donee).
ARTICLE 754: The donee is subrogated to all the
rights and actions which in case of eviction would
pertain to the donor. The latter, on the other hand, is
not obliged to warrant the things donated, save when
the donation is onerous, in which case the donor shall
be liable for eviction to the concurrence of the burden.
The donor shall also be liable for eviction or
hidden defects in case of bad faith on his part.
This article pertains to Subrogation.
Upon the perfection of donation, all the
rights of the donor to the thing donated
shall be transmitted to the donee.
If the donation is simple, and there is a
hidden defect on the thing donated, the
donee shall not be entitled to any
indemnity. But if the donation is onerous,
the donor shall be liable for eviction.
Examples:
1. X donated to Y a parcel of land. B
claimed to be the owner and filed for
ejectment. Whatever right that X has
to the parcel of land is transmitted to
Y (the donee).
2. X bought a car from Y and donated it
to R but it has hidden defect, the right
of the buyer (X) to sue the seller (Y)
for breach of warranty would
appertain not to X but to R. In other
words, R would step into the shoes of
X.
3. A donated to B a piece of land, which
A thought belonged to him. If the real
owner should oust or evict B, will A
be responsible to B? NO, because the
donation is simple and made in good
faith. But if A knew that he did not
own the land, A would be liable
because of bad faith.
4. A donated to B a piece of land worth
1M with the condition that B would
pay him only P200 000. If the land
really belongs to another (R) and A
really thought he (A) was the owner,
and B is evicted, would A be
responsible? YES, even though he
was in good faith, but only up to P200
000 which was the amount of the
burden, the donation being in part
onerous.
WHEN WARRANTY EXISTS:
a.) If donor is in bad faith;
b.) If donation is onerous;
c.) If warranty is expressly made;
d.) If donation is propter nuptias unless the
contrary is stipulated.
ARTICLE 755: The right to dispose of some of the
things donated, or of some amount which shall be a
charge thereon, may be reserved by the donor; but if he
should die without having made use of this right, the
property or amount reserved shall belong to the donee.
ARTICLE 756: The ownership of property may also be
donated to one person and the usufruct to other/s,
provided all the donees are living at the time of
donation.
When one person receives the usufruct, it
is understood that the other donee receive
only the naked, not the full ownership.
The term living includes conceived
children provided that they are later born
with the requisites mentioned in Arts. 40
and 41 respectively.
ARTICLE 757: Reversion may be validly established
in favor of only the donor for any case and
circumstances, but not in favor of other persons unless
they are all living at the time of the donation.
ILLUSTRATION:
- A donated a car to Blithe, and it stated in
the donation that after 5yrs, Blithe will
return the car to A. Is that a valid
condition? Is that allowed? That is an
example of reversion.
REVERSION. You donate something to another
under a stipulation that the thing donated will go
back to you.
- What if A donated a car to Blithe and then
it was stipulated that the car will go to
Joyce after 10 yrs, is that valid? Yes. But if
the reversion will go to the person who is
not yet living, it is void because it is
violation of what is provided in the
preceding paragraph shall be void.
- The stipulation is void but the donation is
still valid. Blithe will still validly receive
the donation. Its just that the reversion
stipulation is void.
GR: Reversion may be validly established in favor
of only the donor for any case and circumstances.
EXCEPTION: Reversion may be made to a 3rd
person provided they are living at the time of the
donation.
EFFECT: Donation is valid but reversion is
disregarded.
ARTICLE 758: When the donation imposes upon the
donee the obligation to pay the debts of the donor. If the
clause does not contain any declaration to the contrary,
the former is understood to be liable to pay only the
debts which appear to have been previously contracted.
In no case shall the donee be responsible for debts
exceeding the value of the property donated, unless a
contrary intention clearly appears.
When is the donee liable to pay for the
debt of the donor? Only when there is
stipulation.
Limit: It should not exceed the value of
the property donated and only to debts
contracted prior to the donation.
ARTICLE 759: There being no stipulation regarding
the payment of the debts, the donee shall be responsible
therefore only when the donation has been made in
fraud of creditors.
The donation is always presumed to be in
fraud of creditors, when at the time thereof the donor
did not reserve sufficient property to pay his debts
prior to the donation.
GR: When there is no stipulation, the donee is not
obliged to pay the debts of the donor.
EXCEPTION: When the donation was made in
fraud of creditors. There is a presumption here.
Q: When is donation made in fraud of creditors?
A: When at the time thereof the donor did not
reserve sufficient property to pay his debts prior
to the donation.
Q: What is the remedy?
A: The donation may be rescinded by the
defrauded creditors. But only up to the extent of
the debts.
The following are the instances where the
donation can be REVERTED back to the
donor:
- Under Articles 739, 1027, 1031.
- But there should be a proper action for
the declaration of nullity because the
donation is voidable or rescission.
REVOCATION AND REDUCTION OF
DONATIONS
ARTICLE 760: Every donation inter vivos, made by a
person having no children or descendants, legitimate,
or legitimated by subsequent marriage, or illegitimate
may be revoked or reduced as provided in the next
article, by the happening of any of these events:
1. If the donor, after the donation, should
have legitimate or legitimated or
illegitimate children, even though they be
posthumous;
2. If the child of the donor, whom the latter
believed to be dead when he made the
donation, should turn out to be living.
3. If the donor should subsequently adopt a
minor child.
REQUISITES for a valid
REVOCATION:
a. The situation is that there is donation
made inter vivos.
b. The status of the donor who made the
donation is that he does not have any
children or descendants, legitimate,
illegitimate or legitimated.
c. After the donation, a child is born
either to his wife or to his mistress, or
if she is a woman, she delivered, a
child whom he believed to be dead
when he made the donation turns out
 to be alive or, after the donation the
donor adopts a minor child. (The
acronym is BRA, birth, reappearance,
adoption.)
If the court makes the decision, it is
merely a declaratory act and not
revocatory because as [I've] said, the
moment the incidents enumerated
happen, the donation is deemed revoked
or reduced accordingly.
ARTICLE 761: In the cases referred in the preceding
article, the donation shall be revoked or reduced insofar
as it exceeds the portion that may be freely disposed of
by the will, taking into account the whole estate of the
donor at the time of the birth, appearing or adoption of
a child.
INOFFICIOUS DONATION. What will take into
account here? The estate of the donor at the time
of the BRA.
Example:
In 1990, X gave to Y 1M. X does not have any
children. In 1995, X married A and they had B. At
the time B was born, the estate of X is only P500T.
How do you determine the value of his estate at
the time of the birth of B?
- The birth of B is the reckoning period. You add
the present property of
500 000
+ 1M (the donated amount)
1.5 M
Then you go back to 752. In other words he
cannot donate more than the free portion of his
estate. If the estate is 1.5M, the legitime should be
750T, that is 1.5M/2. Meaning he cannot donate
more than P750T. If the free portion is 750 000 and
the donation made to Y was 1M, donation is in
excess of 250T. In other words, the donation can
be reduced by 250T. That is what 761 means
taking into account the whole estate of the donor
at the time of BRA. How much was the estate at
the time of birth of B? 500T and you have to
collate everything that was donated. That is the
whole estate of the donor at the time of birth. That
is the estate which the free portion shall be based.
What if Y, the donee refuses to return the
donation? X can file a case for reduction
of donation. That is the cause of action,
reduction of donation.
But for example, at the time of birth of B,
the estate of X is zero. In this case, it can
be revoked because there is nothing to
dispose. Normally, it is the reduction
under this provision. That is the 1st
ground for reduction of donation,
inofficious donation under 760.
Remember under the adoption, in the 3rd
par, the child must be a minor child. And
it musts be judicially approved adoption.
Art. 760 applies only to donation inter
vivos.
Donation propter nuptias cannot be
included here in the computation of the
estate because they can only be revoked
under the conditions mentioned in Art.
132.
Onerous donation shall not also be
included in the computation of the net
estate because they are not really
donation per se. They are contracts.
Donations mortis causa is also included
but only when the donor dies. But they are
not effective if the donor is still alive.
ARTICLE 762: Upon the revocation of reduction of
the donation by the birth, appearance or adoption of a
child, the property affected shall be returned, or its
value if the donee has sold the same.
If the property cannot be returned, it shall be
estimated at what it was worth at the time of the
donation
.
This will only be applied if the donation is
in the form of property.
What should the donee do if the donation
is reduced because of 760? The donee
must return the property, or if the
property has been sold he must return the
price. Meaning the value of the sale.
If it has been mortgaged, the donor may
pay off the debts but the donor can
recover reimbursement from the donee. If
the property cannot be returned, like it
was lost or destroyed, the donee must
return its value at the time of perfection of
the donation.
ARTICLE 763: The action for revocation or reduction
on the grounds set forth in this Article 760 shall
prescribe after four years from the birth of the first
child, or from his legitimation, recognition or adoption,
or from the judicial declaration of filiation, or from the
time information was received regarding the existence
of the child believed dead.
This action cannot be renounced, and is
transmitted, upon the death of the donor, to his
legitimate and illegitimate children and descendants.
Q: Can this action for revocation or reduction be
renounced?
A: NO. According to the provision, it cannot be
renounced because the legitime is really entitled
to . So, if the donor dies within the prescriptive
period, the action is transmitted to his children.
ARTICLE 764: The donation shall be revoked at the
instance if the donor, when the donee fails to comply
with any of the conditions which the former imposed
upon the latter.
In this case, the property donated shall be
returned to the donor, the alienations made by the
donee and the mortgages imposed thereon by him being
void, with the limitations established, with regard to 3 rd
persons, by the Mortgage Law and the Land
Registration Laws.
This action shall prescribe after four years
from the noncompliance with the condition, may be
transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may be
exercised against the donees heirs.
This provision is the 2nd ground for
revocation because the ground here is
non-compliance by the donee of the
conditions imposed by the donor.
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD: 4 years from
the date of non-compliance.
The action may be transmitted to his heirs
and may be exercised against the donees
heirs provided, it falls within the 4yr
prescriptive period.
A donation may be revoked at the
instance of the donor when the donee fails
to comply with any of the conditions
which the former imposed upon the
latter. Exception dito when the condition
is immoral, illegal or impossible. Actually,
another remedy dito is an action for
specific performance, because when the
donee accepts a donation with a
condition, he is bound by such condition.
So the donor may either revoke the
donation or seek its performance.
ELEMENTS:
a. There is a donation inter vivos;
b. There is a stipulation in the deed of
donation that certain conditions have
to be met.
c. The donee fails to comply.
d. There is a period for the compliance
of the obligation.
EFFECTS OF NON-COMPLIANCE.
1. The property donated shall be returned to the
donor.
2. Any encumbrance made shall be void, as a
general rule. But, you have to take into
account the provisions on the Mortgage Law
and Land Reg Law, like innocent purchaser
for value. Perhaps, the property can no longer
be returned if it was sold to an innocent
purchaser for value, so the value of the
amount of the property shall be retuned to the
donor.
ARTICLE 765: The donation may also be revoked at
the instance of the donor, by reason of ingratitude in
the following cases:
1. If the donee should commit some offense against
the person, the honor or the property of the donor,
or of his wife or children under his parental
authority.
2. If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal
offense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even
though he should prove it, unless the crime or the
act has been committed against the donee himself,
his wife or children under his authority.
3. If he unduly refuses him support when the donee
id legally or morally bound to give support to the
donor.
This is the 3rd ground for revoking a
donation. And this is acts of ingratitude
by the donee. When we took up the acts
of unworthiness, under the provision of
Succession, we also have provisions in
donation for acts of ingratitude.
According to some authors, these acts are
exclusive. If they are not included in this
provision, they are deemed excluded.
1st act: If the donee should commit some offense
against the person, the honor or the property of
the donor, or of his wife or children under his
parental authority.
Do not relate this to the crimes in the RPC, like
crimes against honor, against person, and against
property otherwise, you may conclude that only
those RPC crimes are included. You treat the 1st as
offense against the donor, or to his wife or
children under parental authority.
Example:
When the donee commits acts of lasciviousness
against the donor. What if the donee attempts to
rape the married daughter of the donor? Does it
fall under 765? No, because children referred to
here are those under parental authority.
2nd act, the donee imputes to the donor any
criminal offense.
GR: The donation shall be revoked if the donee
imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any
act involving moral turpitude, even though he
should prove it.
Exception: Unless the crime or the act has been
committed against the donee himself, his wife, or
children under his authority.
3rd act, if he unduly refuses him support when the
donee is legally or morally bound to give support
to the donor.
Q: What do you mean by legally or morally bound?
A: There is a court order, after the case for support
is filed, the court orders the donee to give
support. The law always says morally. The
donor is old, he cannot work anymore, he has no
capacity to do any kind of work, of course if you
are the daughter or son of the donor, you are
morally obliged to support him. According to the
provision the refusal of the support must be
unduly unjustified. Like, what if the donee has no
money also, he has no job, or he is also
handicapped that cannot be considered an act of
ingratitude.
ARTICLE 766: Although the donation is revoked on
account of ingratitude, nevertheless, the alienation and
mortgages effected before the notation of the complaint
for revocation in the Registry of Property shall
subsists.
Later ones shall be void.
If the act of ingratitude is committed
before the donation and the donor knows
about it, and still the donor donates then
its an implied forgiveness. Then, he can
no longer revoke it.
Q: What happens if the property donated has
been alienated by the donee and the donee
commits an act of ingratitude?
Example:
 - X is the donor. He donates a parcel of
land to Y and then Y sells the land to B in
1990. And then in 1992, Y commits an act
of ingratitude against X, kunyari Y tries to
rape the daughter of X. 1994, X filed a
case for revocation. What happens to the
property? According to the provision,
alienation and mortgage effected before
the notation of the complaint for
revocation in the Registry of Property
shall subsist.
- What if X donates a parcel of land to Y
and then there was act of ingratitude
committed by Y against X. And then in
1994, X files a case for revocation, but in
1995 Y sold the property to B. The sale or
alienation is void. That is the effect.
ARTICLE 767: In the case, referred to in the first
paragraph of the preceding article, the donor shall have
a right to demand from the donee the value of the
property alienated which he cannot recover from the
third persons, or the sum for which the same has been
mortgaged.
The value of the said property shall be fixed as
of the time of the donation.
767 refers to 766, if there is an alienation
made and it is valid because it was
effected before the complaint for
revocation. Then the donor can no longer
recover the property from the buyer of
the donee. What can be done? The donor
has the right to demand the value of the
property alienated at the time of the
donation or the sum for which the same
has been mortgaged. He still has the right
to demand the value of the property.
ARTICLE 768: When the donation is revoked for any
of the causes stated in Article 760, or by reason of
ingratitude, or when it is reduced because it is
inofficious, the donee shall not return the fruits except
from the filing of the complaint.
We know that when the donation is
revoked the donee has to return the
property itself. But 768 also provides that
the fruits also have to be returned.
If the donation was revoked on the
ground of failure to fulfill the conditions,
then all the fruits from the time of failure
must be returned to the donor.
If it is based on BRA under 760, or
ingratitude under 765, or under 771
inofficiousness, then only the fruits from
the time the action are filed, fruits
accruing from the action is filed. Not from
the time of birth, not from the time of
ingratitude. So that is the reckoning
period.
ARTICLE 769: The action granted to the donor by
reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance.
This action prescribes within one year, to be counted
from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and
it was possible for him to bring the action.
The right to revoke cannot be renounced
in advance.
It says here, the action to revoke
prescribes within 1 yr. This is different
from the other grounds which are 4 yrs.
But with respect to the acts of ingratitude,
it is 1 yr from the time the donor has
knowledge of the fact and provided it was
possible for him to bring the action.
ARTICLE 770: This action shall not be transmitted to
the heirs of the donor, if the latter did not institute the
same, although he could have done so, and even if he
should die before the expiration of one year.
Neither can this action be brought against the
heir of the donee, unless upon the latters death the
complaint has been filed.
If you look at the other grounds,
inofficiousness, failure to comply with the
conditions, can the action be transmitted?
YES. It can be transmitted from the donor
to his heirs and the case can be filed
against the donee and can be transmitted
to the donee.
GR: With respect to the acts of ingratitude, the
right to revoke cannot be transmitted because this
right is purely personal to the donor. Even if the
act was committed against his wife, his children
under parental authority, it is still the donor who
has the right to revoke the donation.
EXCEPTIONS:
1. The heirs of the donor are allowed to continue
the suit for as long as it is within the
prescriptive period of 1 yr and the donor has
already instituted the action but he dies
before the termination of the case. That is
called substitution of party under the Rules of
Court.
2. If the donee kills the donor, of course he can
no longer file an action to revoke, then the
heirs of the donor can file a case for
revocation.
3. If the donor dies without knowing that an act
of ingratitude was committed.
4. If circumstances clearly manifest that the
donor intended to revoke the donation but he
was prevented by sickness or insanity or
fortuitous event.
ARTICLE 771: Donations which in accordance with
the provisions of Article 752, are inofficious, bearing in
mind the estimated net value of the donors property at
the time of his death, shall be reduced with regard to
the excess; but this reduction shall not prevent the
donations from taking effect during the life donor, nor
shall it bar the donee from appropriating the fruits.
For the reduction of donations, the provisions
of this Chapter and of Articles 911 and 912 of this Code
shall govern.
771 talks about 752, estate of the donor.
771 in relation to 752 will only apply
when the donee dies.
 The value of the estate at the time of the
donor's death. So net estate = property
left at the time of death less debts and
charges plus value of donations.
COLLATION. Everything that he
donated while he was alive will have to
be taken into account in determining the
net estate upon his death. You do not
return the property. You just include
whatever has been donated inter vivos in
the inventory so that the net estate of the
donor can be determined. If it was found
that the donor actually donated more
than the free portion of his estate at the
time of his death, then those donations
are inofficious and they have to be
reduced. But this reduction shall not
prevent the donations from taking effect
during the life of the donor, nor shall it
bar the donee from appropriating the
fruits. So the donations are effective even
if they are found later to be inofficious.
Example:
X has 3 children when he died, and the value of
his estate is 600T at the time of his death. He died
in 2000. In 1990, X donated to A 1M. What do we
do when he dies, we collate the property. So:
600 000
+ 1M
1.6M
The free portion is 800T, and so the inofficious
donation is 200T. Therefore, A has to return 200T
to the estate.
6. The rule in this provision is similar to
760 but remember 760 only applies
when the donor has no children or
descendants at the time of the
donation. Here, the donor has
children.
Example:
1. In 1990, X donated 1M to B. At the time of the
donation, Y the son of X was already
conceived but not yet born. What article
should be applied?
Should we compute at the time of the birth or at
the time the donor dies?
Answer: It depends.
- If the donor did not know that Y was
already conceived and he made the
donation, then 761 applies. Meaning at
the time of birth of the child, there must
be computation of his estate and there
must be reduction of the donation if it is
found to be inofficious.
- But if he knew already that he is going to
have a child, and just the same he
donated, then that falls under 771. There
will no longer be computation of his
estate when the child is born. It will be
made upon his death and if the donation
of 1M is found to be inofficious then that
is the only time that it will be reduced. So
the difference here is, when will the
donation be reduced. The computation is
similar but you have to determine
whether it is to be at the time of the BRA
or at the time of death.
2. B is the son of X. G is the son of B. So
grandfather, father, and grandson. B
disappears for a long time and when he
disappeared he had G. X did not know that he
has a grandson. X thought that B was dead, so
he donated 500T to A. Later X finds out that
he had a grandson. And when he found out,
he was already a pauper. He has 1,000 and the
only property that he can run after is the
donation made to A. Can the donation made
to A be reduced? If it can be reduced, when?
A: Under the rules of Succession, B is the
compulsory heir of X. If B dies then G represents
B. And therefore G is entitled to the legitime.
Definitely the donation must be reduced because
it impairs the legitime of B. The reappearance of G
will not affect donation made to A, hence 760 will
not apply. But 752 in relation with 771 will apply
because G is the compulsory heir. If you look at
this how much is the estate? 500,000. So the
legitime is 250 500. So you just deduct the 250 500
from the 500 000 = 250 000 is the inofficious
donation and should be given to G. So take note
of the every word in 760.
- In the 1st paragraph of 760, it says no
children or descendant.... what if the donor
already has a grand child existing at the
time of donation? Then if he donates
something to a stranger then there will be
no reduction or revocation because the
grand child is already there. It is only the
birth, reappearance of a child, or adoption
which will give rise to the computation of
his estate at that time and then the
donation will be reduced. But a reduction
will be done at the time of his death na.
Q/A: Again if the donees refuses to return the
donation, who can file a case under 752 in relation
to 771, inofficious donation? The compulsory
heirs, the legitime.
Q/A: Can a donor file a case for reduction under
752 in relation to 771? NO because hes already
dead. Take note for this particular provision,
inofficious donation under 752 in relation to 771,
the donor is dead.
Q/A: Now, when we talk of adoption under 760,
adoption of a minor child. If the person being
adopted is a minor, there shall be reduction. But
no donation shall be reduced if the person
adopted is no longer a minor because he can
already take care of himself.
Q/A: What does 771 last par. means? Art. 911
simply says that donation inter vivos are preferred
over donation mortis causa. Meaning if there is
reduction, uunahin ang mortis causa. Meaning the
provision in the will that are not given to the
legitime. Like, I will give 1M to my loyal friend, I
will give 500T to my driver, or teacher. Those are
the ones that must be reduced first. The last to be
reduced are the donations inter vivos. Those given
last shall be reduced first, those given first shall be
the last.
ARTICLE 911: After the legitime has been determined
in accordance with the three preceeding articles, the
reduction shall be made as follows:
1. Donations shall be respected as long as the
legitime can be covered, reducing or annulling, if
necessary, the devises or legacies made in the will;
2. The reduction of the devices or legacies shall be
pro-rata, without any distinction whatever;
3. If the testator has directed that a certain devise or
legacy be paid in preference to others, it shall not
suffer any reduction until the latter have been
applied in full to the payment of the legitime;
4. If the devise or legacy consists of a usufruct or life
annuity, whose value may be considered greater
than that of the disposable portion, the compulsory
heirs may choose between complying with the
testamentary provision and delivering to the
devisee or legatee the part of the inheritance of
which the testator could freely dispose.
ARTICLE 912: If the devise subject to reduction
should consist of real property, which cannot be
conveniently divided, it shall go to the devisee if the
reduction does not absorb of its value; and in a
contrary case, to the compulsory heirs; but the former
and the latter shall reimburse each other in cash for
what respectively belongs to them.
The devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the
entire property, provided its value does nor exceed that
of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to
him as legitime.
The rule is that if the reduction is less
than 60%, the property will remain with
the donee. The donee will just pay in
cash. If the reduction is more than 60%,
the property will go back to the estate and
then the estate will pay the donee the
balance.
Example:
Here, kunyari 70% that is inofficious. What is 70%
of 500T? 350T db? So, the property will go back to
the estate and the estate will pay 150T to the
donee. If what is inofficious is only 150T then the
property will remain with the donee and he just
have to pay the estate 150T. That is 912.
ARTICLE 772: Only those who at the time of the
donors death have a right to the legitime of the donor,
either by express declaration, or by consenting to the
donation.
Those referred to in the preceeding paragraph
cannot renounce their right during the lifetime of the
donor, either by express declaration, or by consenting
to the donation.
The donees, devisees and legatees, who are not
entitled to the legitime and the creditors of the deceased
can neither ask for the reduction nor avail themselves
thereof.
ARTICLE 773: If, there being two or more donations,
the disposable portions is not sufficient to cover all of
them, those of the more recent dates shall be suppressed
or reduced with regard to the excess.
CASES
ABELLO CASE.
FACTS:
1. It is a case concerning one of the senior partners
of ACRA, Manuel Abello. Some partners of
ACRA law firm contributed P800K to the
campaign fund of Angara. Angara is the founding
partner of ACRA.
2. The BIR assessed each of them, divided the
P800K among them. They questioned the
assessment of BIR alleging that political
contributions or electoral contributions are not
considered as gifts under the NIRC, therefore, not
liable to tax. Angara said that the contributions
cannot be considered as donations because there
was no increase on his patrimony, the
contributions went to the campaign.
ISSUE: Should the contribution for the campaign
fund be considered donation?
HELD: There is still a donation although it did
not go directly to the patrimony of the donee but
the fact remains that it was made in his favor. The
SC considered the contributions as donations
because there was increase in his pocket for him
to spend in any he wanted to whether for his
campaign or whatever. It was definitely an
addition to his patrimony and therefore,
considered a donation.
Further, one of the requisites of
donation is that the intention must be the
liberality on the part of the donor. The ACRA
lawyers argued that it is important to look at the
intention of the giver to determine if the political
contribution is a gift. But the SC said NO. The
donative intent is the feature of the mind, it
cannot be perceived except by the material and
tangible act which manifests its presence. The
intent is presumed present when it becomes a part
of ones patrimony. Theres a presumption of
intention. The court is not convinced the seemed
purpose of the contribution which was to help
elect a candidate and with that there was no
donative intent. So it doesnt mean just because
your work was to help him with the election
theres no donative intent. The SC said that it is
animus donandi. The fact that their purpose for
donating was to aid the election of the donee does
not imply the absence of the donative intent.
PAJARILLO CASE.
Felipe and Juana are the donors. The donee is
Salud. Is the donation inter vivos or Mortis causa?
The donation is inter vivos. What about the issue
on sale? The sale is not valid. The naked
ownership was transferred already to Salud. The
right to dispose belongs to Salud. What was the
issue on the acceptance? The lack of notification.
You have to note that in the acceptance of the
deed of donation, the donor has to be notified;
and that the acceptance must be in the separate
instrument. In this case, that particular
requirement was missing. What does the SC say?
Is it a valid acceptance? YES, it is valid. What kind
of interpretation did the SC give to the provision
as to the required formality? Liberal interpretation
is needed. According to the SC, do not place too
much stress on mere formality. The fact is Juana,
the donor, already knew of the acceptance. So the
notification is unnecessary.
DELGADO CASE.
The issue is WON the donation is simple
or onerous because the donee had paid the taxes.
The donation is simple. How can a donation
become onerous? It becomes onerous when there
is a condition which is equivalent to the donation.
In this case, was there a condition here that he
must pay the taxes? None. For the donation to be
onerous, the condition or burden must be
imposed by the donor. In this case, there was no
imposition on the part of the donor. It was the
donee himself who decided to pay for the taxes.
Q: What is the important in the determination
WON it is onerous or simple?
A: If is onerous, the formality required is in the
form of contract. But if it is a donation of
immovable property, the formality under 749 has
to be complied with.
In this case, the formality was not
complied with. There was no acceptance. What do
you mean by no acceptance? The law provides
that the acceptance must be in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the
value of the charges which the donee must
specify. The acceptance may be made in the same
deed of donation or in a separate public
document, but it shall not take effect unless it is
done during the lifetime of the donor. If the
acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the
donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic
form, and this step shall be noted in both
instruments. In this case, the donee actually
informed the donor that he accepted the donation
but he did not go to the formalities required. In
the case of Pajarillo, there was liberal
interpretation. But in this case, strict
interpretation. You have to look at the
circumstances, the donor in this case is out of the
country, and the SC said that she should be
notified.
MAGLASANG CASE.
ISSUE: WON the donation is mortis causa or inter
vivos.
HELD: The deed is very clear that the donation
will only become effective upon the death of the
donor. Hence, it is donation mortis causa. The SC
enumerated the characteristics of donation mortis
causa:
(1) conveys no title or ownership to the
transferee before the death of the
transferor;
(2) before his death, the transfer is revocable
by the transferor at will;
(3) that the transfer would be void if the
transferor should survive the transferee.
If any of these stipulations exist in the deed, it is a
donation mortis causa. And if it is a donation
mortis causa, the formalities of the will are
required. In this case, the formalities of the will
were not complied with, therefore, the donation is
void.
DE LUNA CASE (?)
FACTS:
1. The donation was made on April 9, 1971. It was
agreed upon that the donees should build a
chapel within 5 yrs from the date of donation that
is until 1976, otherwise there shall be reversion.
2. However, the donees did not build any chapel
within the 5yr period. The donor now is claiming
back the property. Donees contended that the
prescription of 4 yrs had already lapsed; hence the
action for revocation is barred. The case was filed
in 1981.
3. The donors insist that the law on contracts
should be applied. If the alleged donation should
be considered as contract, you will not look at the
revocation anymore. The cause of action was an
action for specific performance because of the
agreement.
HELD: The SC here said that if the donation is
onerous, it does not fall under 764. The difference
here is that there was an agreement and therefore,
the donors could actually use that agreement. If
all donations with conditions are considered
onerous, there is no longer revocation; the
prescription of 4 yrs does not apple.
VALENCIA CASE
ISSUE: WON the donation propter nuptias was
valid. Valencia alleged that the donation was not
valid because there was no acceptance. What kind
of acceptance does she want? Valencia wanted
that the acceptance must be made in a public
instrument and other requirements prescribed by
764 must be complied with. In this case, how was
the acceptance made? The acceptance was made
in writing by the happening of the marriage.
HELD: The SC said that in case the marriage
happens, then the donation is impliedly accepted.
So what is the rule in case of donation propter
nuptias? Under the NCC, donation propter
nuptias falls under the Statute of Frauds, meaning
it must be made in writing otherwise, it would be
unenforceable but it is still valid between the
donor and the donee. Further, implied acceptance
is sufficient. In other words, if it is a donation
propter nuptias, it is not covered by the
provisions of donation. Donation propter nuptias
has its own provisions. The requirement of
acceptance in a separate instrument is not
required.
CRUZ CASE
The donor is childless; has no heirs, so she
donated to her grandnieces (not her compulsory
heirs) and then she adopted. In this case, after
computation, it was found out that she still has
enough property. The value of the donation given
to the grandnieces did not exceed the free portion
of the property at the time of the adoption.
According to the SC, the burden proof is on the
donor. If the donor wants to revoke or reduce a
donation made because of adoption, the donor
has to prove that he donated more than what he is
allowed to give by will meaning he donated more
than the free portion of her property at the time of
the adoption.
EDUARTE V CA
What was the act of ingratitude in this case? The
falsification of public documents. The donor
wanted to revoke the donation. Can the donation
be revoked? YES. Crimes committed by the donee
against the person, the property of the donor does
not need to fall under the RPC so as to make the
donation revocable as long as the crime
committed which offends the donor, then that is
considered as an act of ingratitude. All crimes
which the donor showing ingratitude are causes
of revocation. Can the donor forgive the donee?
YES, here if the ground is an act of ingratitude,
the donor can forgive the donee. But if it is a
crime against the RPC, even if the donor forgives
the donee, and gives the donation, it does not
mean that the donee cannot be convicted because
the crime will still remain.
OCCUPATION
Article 712. Ownership is acquired by occupation and
by intellectual creation.
Ownership and other real rights over property
are acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by
testament and intestate succession, and in consequence
of certain contracts, by tradition.
They may be acquired by means of
prescription.
2 MODES OF ACQUIRING PROPERTY.
a) Original modes - ownership is acquired
by:
1. occupation hunting, fishing, hidden
treasures
2. intellectual creation books,
copyrights, patents and letters.
- These are independent of any pre-existing
rights or titles by another.
- They are ownership acquired for the first
time.
b) Derivative modes there was already a
previous owner of the property and it was
acquired and transmitted by law, by:
1. Succession
2. Donation
3. Prescription under Art. 1106
4. Law, examples Articles 153, 445, 461,
465, 466, 681, 1434, 1456. Yang 445, 461
and 466 yan yung accession noh,
abandoned river beds, formation of
island, adjunction. 681 falling fruits. 1434,
estoppel, 1456 on implied trust.
5. Tradition meaning legal delivery,
actual or constructive, as a consequence of
other contracts, example sale, barter,
assignment and simple loan.
MODE vs TITLE
a. Mode is the process of acquiring or
transferring ownership. Title is that
which gives juridical justification for
mode.
- Why did you deliver this particular thing
to B? Because I sold it. That is the
justification, the sale. But the sale itself is
not sufficient to convey ownership. There
has to be a title.
b. The proximate cause of ownership is
the mode; the remote cause is the
title.
c. And a mode directly produces a real
right. So when the mode is complied
with, the person to whom the thing
has been delivered has a real right
over the property. But, a title merely
gives an opportunity for the existence
of real right.
Article 713. Things appropriate by nature, which are
without an owner, such as animals that are the object
of hunting and fishing, hidden treasure and abandoned
movables are acquired by occupation.
When we say "acquired by occupation"
there is seizure of corporeal things that
have no owner, with the intention of
acquiring them. Abandoned movables,
res derelicta and all res nullius, there
must be no intent to recover or no intent
to return. Otherwise, it will not be
considered res derelicta.
Occupation is a mode of transferring
ownership.
Also, one thing that you have to
remember is that occupation refers to
personal property. You cannot acquire
ownership of real property through
occupation.
So according to 713, what are the things
acquirable through occupation? Things
without an owner, i.e. fish in the ocean,
hidden treasure.
But if you look at 718, He who by chance
discovers hidden treasure in anothers
property shall have the right granted him in
Article 438 of this Code. How does the
owner acquire the treasure? Is accession a
mode of acquiring ownership? No.
Accession is not a mode of acquiring
ownership, but as the owner of the land,
you acquire the treasure through
occupation. But if you are the finder, you
also acquire it through occupation but
you only get half of it if you are not a
trespasser or a stranger then.
Abandoned movables movables in
which there are no more expectation to
recover them. You want to get rid of your
car, then you abandon it on the road, with
no more expectation to get back, that
could be considered abandoned. So, car,
which has been abandoned, may be
acquired through occupation.

REQUISITES FOR OCCUPATION:
1. There must be a seizure or apprehension do
you have to hold or physically possess the
particular property? No. As long as you have
the right to dispose then that is considered
seizure and apprehension.
2. The property seized must be a personal
property;
3. The property seized must be susceptible of
appropriation Those within the commerce
of man.
4. There must be intent to appropriate
5. The requisites and condition of the law must
be complied with, i.e. acquire it in BF or GF,
etc.
Art. 714. The ownership of a piece of land cannot be
acquired by occupation.
It is very clear that a piece of land cannot
be acquired through occupation, it is
never ever res nullius. If it is not privately
owned, it is owned by the State. So how
do you acquire a piece of land? Normally,
you buy, pay then it is delivered or you
can own by prescription.
OCCUPATION V PRESCRIPTION
1. In occupation, the property (because it is
original mode) has no owner; in prescription,
it is already owned by somebody else.
2. Occupation is an original mode;
prescription is a derivative mode.
3. In occupation, the periods are very short;
in prescription, the periods are no longer.
4. You can also own personal property
through prescription. You can also acquire
ownership of movables or personal property
through prescription. What are the periods? 4
years and 8 years because in these cases, there
is an original owner.
Art. 715. The right to hunt is regulated by special
laws.
Art. 716. The owner of bees shall have a right to pursue
them to anothers land, indemnifying the possessor of
the latter for the damage. If the owner has not pursued
the swarm, or ceases to do so within two consecutive
days, the possessor of the land may occupy or retain the
same. The owner of domesticated animals may also
claim them within twenty days to be counted from
their occupation by another person. This period having
expired, they shall pertain to him who has caught and
kept them.
Who is the owner of the swarm of bees?
The owner of the land where the beehive
is located. So if they go to the land of
another, you have the right to pursue
them. But if you manage to get back your
bees, you need to indemnify the owner of
the other land, i.e. kinagat yung anak, you
never know this might be asked in the bar
exam.
2 KINDS OF ANIMALS:
a.) wild animals
b.) Domesticated animals under 716 -
animals that were once wild. So if you
acquire occupation of a wild animal
and you put in your house, then it
becomes domesticated. If it goes of
your property, you are still the owner
of that animal within 20 days from
the time that the animal has been
occupied by another person. After the
expiration of the 20 days, the person
who has caught the animal shall be
considered the new owner thereof.
Some author say that tamed pets
cannot be acquired by occupation
because pets are owned unless it is
clear that they are abandoned, then
they may be acquired through
occupation.
Art. 717: Pigeons and fishes which from their
respective breeding places pass to another pertaining to
an different owner shall belong to the latter, provided
they have not been enticed by some article or fraud.
So here, once the fish goes to the property
of another, for example there is a stream,
then the ownership should pass to
another. Exception there, it will not
belong the other person if the fish or
pigeon has been enticed or acquired
through fraud.
Art. 718. He who by chance discovers hidden treasure
in anothers property shall have the right granted him
in article 438 of this Code.
The finding shall be publicly announced
by the mayor for two consecutive weeks
in the way he deems best.
If the movable cannot be kept without
deterioration, or without expenses which
considerably diminish its value, it shall be
sold at public auction eight (8) days after
the publication.
Six (6) months from the publication
having elapsed without the owner having
appeared, the thing found, or its value,
shall be awarded to the finder The finder
and the owner shall be obliged, as the
case may be, to reimburse the expenses.
Art. 719. Whoever finds a movable, which is not
treasure, must return it to the previous possessor. If the
latter is unknown, the finder shall immediately deposit
it with the mayor of the city or municipality where the
finding has taken place.
VIP favorite bar question!!!
So there are no such things as finders
keepers. If you keep something that is
owned by another, a criminal case of theft
can be filed against you. Now, if you find
something that is not a treasure, then you
must return it to the owner, if the owner
is known. But if he is unknown, the finder
 should deposit it to the Mayor. I dont
know if it is still applicable nowadays.
There must be an announcement by the
Mayor for 2 consecutive weeks in
newspaper or like Gikan sa Masa Para sa
Masa he can do that or in a public
announcement.
If the item is perishable, it has to be sold
at the public auction within 8 days after
publication. I dont know how it should
be done, maybe freeze it or so.
Now, 6 months after publication and
theres no owner will appear, then it shall
be awarded to the finder. If there is an
owner, then the finder must be
reimbursed the expenses or the Mayor.
Bar Question: Somebody found a wallet
and gave it to the Mayor or the Chief of
Police, but the Mayor of the Chief of
Police kept it. Then he is liable for theft.
Art. 720. If the owner should appear in time, he shall
be obliged to pay, as a reward to the dins, one-tenth of
the sum or the price of the thing found.
Finders fee is 10% of the price of the sum of
money of the thing found.
INTELLECTUAL CREATION
Art. 721. By intellectual creation, the following
persons acquire ownership:
1) The author with regard to his literary,
dramatic, historical, legal, philosophical, scientific or
other work;
2) The composer; as to his musical composition;
3) The painter, sculptor, or other artist, with
respect to the product of his art;
4) The scientist or technologist or any other
person with regard to the discovery or invention.
Intellectual creation is the product of
mental labor embodied in writing or some
other material form.
The author, composer, painter, sculptor
and other artists are under the copyright
law. In general, intellectual creation is the
product of mental labor, because he
creates his composition, his arts, then he
becomes the owner thereof.
The scientist or technologist is under
patent law as to their discovery or an
invention.
4 KINDS OF PEOPLE who can acquire
ownership by INTELLECTUAL
CREATION.
1) the author
2) the composer
3) the painter, sculptor, or other artist
4) the scientist or technologist
If you have a short story, and you publish
it in a newspaper, the one who bought the
newspaper can get a copy of that then
convey it to another. You are still the
owner of the story but no more exclusive
ownership. Because whoever reads your
publication can exercise acts of ownership
over that particular work already.
But the moment I disseminate it, I
publish it to the public, my exclusive
ownership over the said work ceases to
exist. Except when I have it copyrighted.
But mere circulation among close friends,
few selected people, however is not
considered publication.
Art. 722. The author and the composer, mentioned in
Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article, shall have the
ownership of their creations even before the publication
of the same. Once their works are published, their
rights are governed by the Copyright laws.
The painter, sculptor or other artist shall
have dominion over the product or his art
before it is copyrighted.
The scientist or technologist has the
ownership of his discovery or invention
before it is patented.
Q/A: When shall they have ownership of their
creation? With respect to the author and the
composer, it says even before the publication.
Art. 724. Special laws govern copyright and patent.
RA 6293 The Intellectual Property Code of the
Philippines
1. What are included in the term intellectual
property rights?
Section 4. Definitions The term intellectual
property rights consist of:
a) Copyright and Related Rights
b) Trademark and Service Marks
c) Geographic Indications
d) Industrial Designs
e) Patents
f) Lay-out Designs (Topographies) of Integrated
Circuits and
g) Protection of Undisclosed Information
Section 3. International Convention and
Reciprocity Any person who is a national or who is
domiciled or has a real and effective industrial
establishment in a country which is a party to any
convention, treaty or agreement relating to intellectual
property rights or the repression of unfair competition,
to which the Philippines is also a party, or extends
reciprocal rights to nations of the Philippines by law,
shall be entitled to benefits to the extent necessary to
give effect to any provision of such convention, treaty
or reciprocal law, in addition to the rights which any
owner of an intellectual y property right is otherwise
entitled by this Act.
Who are protected by this law?
a.) This law is made available to any
person who is a national or who is
domiciled or has a real and effective
industrial establishment in a country
which is also a party to a Convention
 or a treaty or agreement relating to
intellectual property rights to which
the Philippines is also a party, i.e. the
Vienna Convention of 1951, the
Stockholm Act of 1967, the Tariff Act
of 1971 and exchange notes between
US and the Philippines in 1948.
b.) Any person whose national extends
reciprocal rights to nationals of the
Philippines by law.
What is this person entitled to?
- This person is entitled to benefits to any
provision of such treaty convention or reciprocal
law. It is also extended to foreign nationals for as
long as the 2 requirements or either of the 2 is
present.
Governing Body of the Intellectual Property
Law:
Section 5. Functions of the Intellectual Property
Office (IPO).
Section 6. The Organizational Structure of the
IPO.
1. The Bureau of Patents in charge of search
and examination of patent applications and the grant of
patents.
2. The Bureau of Trademarks search and
examination of the applications for the registration of
marks, geographic indications and other marks of
ownership and the issuance of the certificates of
registration (9.1); and conduct studies and researches
in the field of trademarks in order to assist the Director
General in formulating policies on the administration
and examination of trademarks (9.2).
3. The Bureau of Legal Affairs hear and
decide opposition to the application for registration of
marks; cancellation of trademarks; subject to the
provisions of Section 64, cancellation of patents, utility
models, and industrial designs; and petitions for
compulsory licensing of patents; exercise original
jurisdiction in administrative complaints for violations
of laws involving intellectual property rights:
Provided, That its jurisdiction is limited to complaints
where the total damages claimed are not less than two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000) (10.2).
Bar question: So if it is less than P200,000.00
and it is an administrative complaint involving
intellectual property rights, jurisdiction is with the
Bureau of Legal Affairs of the IPO.
If the damage is more than P200, 000.00 RTC
has jurisdiction.
COPYRIGHT
It is the exclusive right secured by law to
an author or his assigns to multiply and
dispose of copies of an intellectual or
artistic creation. It is a protection of your
work. Its not a mode of acquiring
ownership but it is an intellectual
creation.
So this is just a reiteration and this is
emphasized from the fact the ownership
is acquired through intellectual creation
and not through copywriting or
patenting.
Objectives: To encourage individuals to
intellectual labor by ensuring them
protection and just rewards, and to secure
the society of the largest benefit of their
products.
With respect to the sculptor, painter or
other artist, he should have dominion
over the product of his and even voice
copyrighted. So also whenever his
artwork is done or completed, he is
already the owner.
Art. 723. Letters and other private communications in
writing are owned by the person to whom they are
addressed and delivered, but they cannot be published
or disseminated without the consent of the writer or his
heirs. However, the court may authorized their
publication or dissemination if the public good or the
interest of justice so requires.
So when we talk about letters and other
private communication, there are actually
2 OWNERS:
a. The OWNER of the letter
itself he is the recipient.
b. The WRITER or SENDER
the owner of the thoughts
and ideas in the letter.
Example:
Blithe is the recipient of the letter, hence, the
owner of the letter. She may throw it away or
pick it or burn it, but she cannot publish it
because the thought and ideas belong to A, if
A was the writer.
EXCEPTIONS:
a. Consent of the writer or his heirs;
b. The court authorizing its
publication if the public good or
the interest of justice so requires.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCEPTION:
1. The publication is necessary for the
vindication of the character of the person
to whom the letter is addressed;
2. The letter is produced as evidence in
court in the course of the administration
of justice, except when the letter
constitutes a privilege communication
and cannot be admitted in evidence
without the consent of the writer.
Remember: Concepts, theories, speculations,
abstract of ideas, however original they may be
are not covered by the protection. Why? Because
there is no such thing as monopoly of theories of
the author. He may transfer these theories or
ideas into an intellectual creation like books, etc.
These are exclusively his.
Example:
Einstein is known for the theory of relativity. He
writes a book regarding his theory, yung kanyang
form, style andun sa kanyang libro. Now another
scientist would make the same dissertation on the
theory of relativity of matter. Do you think he
would infringe on the right of Einstein?
A: If you write on something affecting the same
theory or idea, there is no infringement. Kasi sabi
nga there is no monopoly of idea. Ideas are there,
it is up to you to create something out of the said
idea.. but the moment you copy the form, the
substance, the style of the work of an author, then
you are liable for infringement. But ideas,
concepts and speculations alone, no infringement.
NB: Copyright does not extend to format of a
dating game show.
Copyright extends to adaptations of the
original work. The author has the right to
make a translation, adaptation,
abridgement, illustration, etc. and these
may be covered by another copyright. So
that these may be copyrighted. But a
copyright given to these abridgement, etc
may refer only to those things not covered
by the original work. Kunwari may
humingi ng permiso sa kanya na gumawa
ng translation ng work. So he (the
translator) is given a copyright of the
translated work, but does his copyright
include those which are covered by the
original copyright? No, dun lang sa bago.
Only those parts that are new are the ones
protected by the new copyright.
LIMITATIONS ON COPYRIGHT:
1. Presentation or performance, if done
privately free of charge or for charitable
or religious institutions or society, no
infringement;
2. Making of quotations for a book report,
no infringement, provided you have to
place the name of the author;
3. The reproduction and communication to
the public by mass media of articles and
other current political, social or economic,
religious topic for information purposes --
again you have to name your sources.
4. Reports of current events;
5. Educational purposes, teaching purposes;
6. The recording in schools and the use of
such broadcast for the use of the school;
7. Making of a temporary recordings;
8. Criticisms, comments, research, etc.
9. Private reproduction of a single copy for
research and private study.
10. Archival purposes;
11. Computer program and one back up copy
for archival purposes (requisites: one
copy is made; that such copy is made by
the owner of the program or item, or at
least you are authorized to make
computer; the purpose of the
reproduction is legal.)
So if you are an author and it is published
in a journal (law journal, etc), once it is
published there you are open to criticism.
So if they use your work to prove their
point, would there be an infringement of
copyright? No. Criticisms are meant to
balance the monopoly being enjoyed by
the authors with interest of the public and
society.
Commissioned work: I ask you to make a
novel, who owns the work? The work
belongs to the person who commissioned.
The copyright belongs to the person who
commissioned and the creator. Of course
this is subject to the agreement between
the parties.
THE LAW ON PATENTS
PATENT is a grant made by the government to an
inventor conveying and securing to him the
exclusive right to make use of his invention for a
given limited period.
REQUISITES:
1. new (prior art)
2. involves an inventive step,
3. industrially applicable (capable of some
beneficial use)
Example:
If you are an inventor and you know how to turn
water into gasoline, you can have that patented
but only for a limited period. What you get is the
exclusive right to use your invention.
What is patentable? (bar question) Sec. 21.
Section 21. Patentable Inventions. Any technical
solution of a problem in any field of human activity
which is new, involves an inventive step and is
industrially applicable shall be patentable. It may be or
may relate to, a product, or process, or an improvement
of any of the foregoing.
Section 23. Novelty An invention shall not be
considered new if it forms part of a prior art.
When is an invention considered new?
First, when it is novel, meaning bago. It is
novel when it does not form part of a prior
art.
- What is prior art?
Sec. 24. Prior art is everything which has been made
available to the pubic anywhere in the world, before the
filing date or the priority date of the application
claiming the invention.
Example:
So if you invent a robot and you want to apply
patent for your robot but if that particular robot
has already been available to the public in Japan
or in the US, then that is not considered new, that
is already considered prior art.
If it is already known, publicly used,
already patented, described, identified,
registered somewhere else, that is already
 prior art. And therefore it is not new and
not patentable.
MAGUAN V. CA
According to SC, for an invention to be
patentable, it must possess the following:
c. novelty;
d. originality
e. and precedence.
A patent issued for powder puffs lacks novelty.
Powder puffs are used since time immemorial. SO
it lacks novelty and this patent may be cancelled
in an action for infringement thereof. The burden
of proving novelty is on him who avers it.
MANZANO V CA
Who has the burden of proving the novelty? The
person who is against the application has the
burden of proof.
What is INVENTIVE STEP?
Section 26. Inventive Step An invention involves
an inventive step if, having regard to prior art, it is not
obvious to a person skilled in the art at the time of the
filing date or priority date of the application claiming
the invention.
An inventive step can refer to a prior art,
but you are actually improving on a prior
art, so it involves an inventive step if it is
not obvious to the person skilled in the
art.
Example:
Inventive step is the making of an improvement
on the invention. An improvement that is
patentable, if that particular step is not obvious to
the person who makes robots, so that is really an
inventive step because it is not common among
robot-makers, i.e. robot which flies, something
like that.
Can you actually patent a discovery?
According to Art. 722 Yes the scientist
or technologist has the ownership of his
discovery or invention even before it is
patented.
You discover a new element or a planet,
can you be the owner? No. According to
Sec. 22 discoveries, scientific theories, and
mathematical methods cannot be registered
(Sec. 22.1).
THE FF. CANNOT BE PATENTED/GROUNDS
FOR THE CANCELLATION:
1. Sec. 22.2. Schemes, rules and methods of
performing mental acts, playing games or doing
business, and programs for computers.
2. Sec. 22.3. Methods for treatment of the human or
animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic
methods practiced on the human or animal body.
This provision shall not apply to products and
composition for use in any of these methods
i.e. how to treat a kidney failure or operate.
But if you have products like medicines, they
are patentable, i.e. needles for sewing the
needle is patentable but the process on how to
sew, it is not patentable.
3. Sec. 22.4. Plant varieties or animal breeds or
essentially biological process for the production of
plants or animals. This provision shall not
apply to micro-organisms and non-biological
and microbiological processes. Provisions
under this subsection shall not preclude
Congress to consider the enactment of a law
providing sui generis protection of plant
varieties and animal breeds and a system of
community intellectual rights protection.
4. Sec. 22.5: Aesthetic creations; and
5. Sec. 22.6: Anything which is contrary to public
order or morality.
Bar Question 1989: X invented a bogus-coin
detector which can be used exclusively on self-
operating gambling devices otherwise known as
the one-armed bandit. Can X apply a patent?
The invention cannot be patented being one
against public policy.
Bar question 1992: In an action for infringement
of patent, the alleged infringer, Y, defended
himself, by saying:
1. That the patent issued by the patent office
was not really an invention patentable. Is that
a defense? Yes. Because this patented by Y is
not patentable so wala syang na-infringe.
2. That there is no intent to infringe. No, it is not
a valid defense. Intent does not matter.
3. That there was no exact duplication of the
patentees existing patent but only a minor
infringement.
Who has the right to a patent?
Sec. 28 the inventor, his heirs, or assignees.
What if 2 or more persons made the
invention?
Section 29. First to File Rule. If two (2) or more
persons have made the invention separately and
independently of each other, the right to the patent
shall belong to the person who filed an application for
such invention, or where two or more applications are
filed for the same invention, to the applicant who has
the earliest filing date or, the earliest priority date. (3rd
sentence, Sec. 10, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 20. Inventions Created Pursuant to a
Commission The person who commissions the work
shall own the patent, unless otherwise provided in the
contract.
What is the earliest priority rule?
Sec. 31. Right of Priority An application for patent
filed by any person who has previously applied for the
same invention in another country which by treaty,
convention, or law affords similar privileges to Filipino
citizens, shall be considered as filed as the date of filing
the foreign application.
Example:
If an application for patent was filed in the US on
Jan. 1, 05. The inventor also applied for
application of patent in the Phil, let's say Jan. 1, 06.
The IPC considers the filing date as the filing date
in the foreign country, provided the local
application has taken priority (meaning may tatak
na priority).
But what are the CONDITIONS?
1. You have to state in your local application
that you have filed ahead in a foreign country;
2. It is filed within 12 months from the date the
earliest foreign application was filed;
3. A certified copy of the foreign application
together with an English translation is filed
within 6 months from the date of filing in the
Philippines.
Who shall own the patent of commissioned
works?
Sec. 30. Inventions Created Pursuant to a
Commission The person who commissions the work
shall own the patent, unless otherwise provided in the
contract.
Sec. 30.2. In case the employee made the invention in
the course of his employment contract, the patent shall
belong to:
a) The employee, if the inventive activity is not a
part of his regular duties even if the employee uses the
time, facilities, and materials of the employer.
b) The employer, if the invention is the result of
the performance of his regularly-assigned duties,
unless there is an agreement, express or implied, to the
contrary.
In case the employee has invented
something in the course of his
employment contract, the patent shall
belong to him if the inventive activity is
not part of his regular duties even if the
employee uses the time given to him by
his employer. But if the invention is a
result of his performance of duty to
invent something like that, then the
patent should belong to the employer.
The right to a patent belongs to the
inventor, his heirs or assigns. If two or
more persons make the invention
together, co-ownership will govern. If two
person make the same invention
independent of each other, the right
belongs to the first to apply for the patent
since we are now following the first to file
rule. The person commissioning shall
own the patent.
NB: In copyright, the person
commissioning shall own the work, but
the copyright shall be co-owned by the
creator and the commissioning person. In
patents, the person who commissioned
the work owns the patent.
Section 32. The Application. The patent application
shall be in Filipino or English and shall contain the
following:
a) A request for the grant of a patent;
b) A description of the invention;
c) Drawings necessary for the understanding of
the invention;
d) One or more claims; and
e) An abstract.
The 6th is the name of the inventor.
If the applicant is not the inventor, the
IPO may require him to submit authority
to apply. So he becomes the inventor
himself.
When shall a patent take effect? Sec. 50
It is not the date of application, not the
date of approval, but the date of
publication of the grant of the patent in
the IPO Gazette.
TERM OF THE PATENT: 20 years from
the filing of the application.
GROUNDS FOR CANCELLATION:
Sec. 61:
a) That what is claimed as the invention is not
new or patentable;
b) That the patent does not disclose the invention
in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be
carried out by any person skilled in the art; or
c) That the patent is contrary to public order or
morality.
Who may file a case for cancellation?
Any person Section 61.1.
If the patent is cancelled, what is the effect of
the cancellation?
Sec. 66. Effect of Cancellation of Patent or Claim
The rights conferred by the patent for any specified
claim or claims cancelled shall terminate. Notice of the
cancellation shall be published in the IPO Gazette.
Unless restrained by the Director General, the decision
or order to cancel by Director of Legal Affairs shall be
immediately executory even pending appeal.
- You remember what is the rights of
patentee? To use his invention. So, what is
the exception of the cancellation? A: If it
is restrained by the Director-General.
Section 67. Patent Application by Persons Not
Having the Right to a Patent. If a person conferred
to in Section 29 other than the applicant, is declared by
final court order or decision as having the right to the
patent, such person may, within 3 months after the
decision has become final:
a) Prosecute the application as his own
application in place of the applicant;
b) File a new patent application in respect of the
same invention;
c) Request that the application be refused; or
d) Seek cancellation of the patent, if one has
already been issued.
Ang nangyari dito, the application was
filed under the first to file rule, but it was
discovered that there was an earlier filing
abroad made by another. So, if the person
referred to in Section 29, who have filed in
earlier priority date, shall be declared by
 final order as having the right of patent
and within 3 months after the decision
has become final, prosecute the
application as his own application in
replace of the applicant because so pwede
na.
Section 68. Remedies of the True and Actual
Inventor If a person, who was deprived of the patent
without his consent or through fraud is declared by
final court order or decision to be the true and actual
inventor, the court shall order for his substitution as
patentee, or at the option of the true inventor, cancel
the patent, and award actual and other damages in his
favor if warranted by the circumstances. (Sec.33, RA
No. 165a)
Section 69. Publication of the Court Order The
court shall furnish the Office a copy of the order or
decision referred to in Section 67 and 68, which shall
be published in the IPO Gazette within three (3)
months from the date such order or decision became
final and executory, and shall be recorded in the
register of the Office.
Section 70. Time to File Action in Court The
actions indicated in Section 67 and 68 shall be filed
within one (1) years from the date of publication made
in accordance with Sections 44 and 51, respectively.
Section 71.1 Rights Conferred by Patent A patent
shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights:
a) Where the subject matter of a patent is a
product, to restrain, to prohibit and prevent any
unauthorized person or entity from making, using,
offering for sale, selling or importing that product;
b) Where the subject matter of a patent is a
process to restrain, prevent or prohibit any
unauthorized person or entity from using the process,
and from manufacturing, dealing in, using, selling or
offering for sale, or importing any product obtained
directly or indirectly from such process.
Sec. 71.2. Patent owners shall have the right to assign,
or transfer by succession the patent, and to conclude
licensing contracts for the same.
These are the rights conferred by patent
and these are the same rights removed if
the patent is being cancelled under
Section 60.
Sec. 73.1. Rights of Prior user. Any prior user, who,
in good faith was using the invention or has
undertaken serious preparations to use the invention in
his enterprise or business, before the filing date or
priority date of the application on which a patent is
granted, shall have the right to continue the use thereof
as envisaged in such preparations within the territory
where the patent produces its effect.
So far if you are the user of a particular
invention before it was registered, you
have to right to continue using it under
Section 73.
Section 76.1: Infringement the making, using,
offering for sale, selling, or importing a patented
product or a product obtained directly or indirectly
from a patented process, or the use of a patented
process without the authorization of the patentee
constitutes patent infringement.
Favorite bar question!
Infringement: use one's invention w/o the
inventor's authority.
Who has jurisdiction over actions for
infringement? Section 76.2. So
infringement cases falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
REMEDIES in case the RIGHTS of the patentee
who have been infringed:
1. The court may also secure an injunction for
the protection of his rights.
2. To receive reasonable royalty if the damage is
inadequate or cannot be ascertained. So paano
kung maraming benta yung infringer? You can
ask for royalty.
3. To have the infringing goods, materials and
implements predominantly used in the
infringement be disposed of outside the
channels of commerce or destroy it without
compensation
4. And to hold the contributory infringer jointly
and severally liable with the infringer. So
merong mga factory dyan na gumagawa, they can
be held jointly and severally liable with the
infringer.
Duration of the protection: As to
Original and Derivative works, the
duration is during the lifetime of the
author and for 50 years after his death. If
there are multiple creators, it would last
during the lifetime of the last surviving
creator and 50 years after his death.
Photographic and Audio Visual works: 50
years.
TEST AS TO INFRINGEMENT: THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENCE
- This is a test to determine infringement of
patents that may have substantial identity
between patented product and the other
product.
- They are considered identical if:
a.) They perform substantially the same
functions;
b.) Substantially the same way to obtain the
same result even if they differ in name,
form, shape or dimension.
What the law requires is merely
substantial identity, not exact identity
between the two devices.
Sec. 72: These are not infringements:
1. When the original machinery is improved by the
use of different form or combination;
2. When the single elements in the original device is
left out;
3. When the making or using of a patented invention
 is not conducted for profit and solely for the
purpose of research and experiments or for
instructions;
4. Preparation of medicines for individual cases in a
pharmacy, so like the doctors prescription;
5. When used in a foreign ship or vessel or aircraft;
6. Any prior user who in GF was using the invention
(Sec. 73);
7. Used by the government or third person
authorized by the government when required by
public interest such as national security, health or
development by other sectors, or used by the
government or third person when determined by
judicial or administrative body, by exploitation by
the owner of the patent or licensee, as anti-
competitive.
On whom does the burden of proof lies?
Sec. 78 on the patent holder who alleges
that this product is similar to yours.
What are the DEFENSES in
infringement?
a. the patent is invalid;
b. the invention is not new or not
patentable, etc.
CRIMINAL CASE:
Can you file a criminal action right away?
No, because the ground for filing a
criminal case has to be repeated
infringement, that is, Sec. 84: If the
infringement is repeated by the infringer after
the finality of the judgment of the court. X
infringed the patent of Y, if X repeats,
then a criminal case may be brought.
Prescriptive Period: 3 years from the
commission of the crime.
(1st offense, 1-3 years; 2nd offense 3-6
years, 3rd 6-9 years).
Bar 1985/1997: Basilio invents and secures
registration of a mini-threshing machine. Rudy,
his employee, assisted him in the actual making of
the machine. Later, after resigning, Rudy bought
tools and equipment to manufacture similar mini-
threshing machines for his own benefit.
Q: What legal steps would you take as counsel of
Basilio?
A: File a civil action in court for the following
purposes:
a. Section 76;
b. Damages
c. Secure an injunction
d. Receive royalty
e. To have the goods, materials
destroyed
f. To hold the contributory infringer
jointly and severally liable.
g. Or after final judgment, file a
criminal action for repeated
infringement.
1993 Bar Question: Ferdie is a patent owner of his
invention. He discovered that his invention was
infringed by Joan. What are the remedies
available to him?
A: Same.
Q: If you are the lawyer of Joan, the infringer,
what are your defenses?
A: Sec. 61, 22, 21.
TRADEMARK
TRADEMARKS: Anything which is adapted and
used to identify source or origin of goods, and
which is capable of distinguishing them from
goods emanating from a competitor.
SERVICE MARK: Used to identify or distinguish
the service or an enterprise
COLLECTIVE MARK: It is a mark being used by
different enterprises.
TRADE DRESS: Refers to the total image of the
product, like the size, the shape or color
combinations, texture or graphics
Section 138. Certificate of Registration. When you
are granted with the certificate of registration,
according to 138, a certificate of registration of a mark
shall be prima facie evidence of the:
(1) Secure validity of the registration;
(2) Registrants ownership of the mark.
Meaning, if you have the certificate, then
you are the owner of the mark.
(3) The registrants exclusive right to use the
same in connection with the goods or
services and those related thereto
specified in the certificate.
- HOW MARKS ARE CREATED:
1. Use;
2. registration.
Before, we are using the First to use policy. kung
sinong nakauna, sya ang pwedeng magregister.
But now, we use the FIRST TO REGISTER
POLICY.
Registration is a proof of ownership but it
is not a requirement of ownership.
What do you mean by USE? When a
person has identified in the mind of the
public the goods he manufactures or
builds in his business or services from
those of others, such person has a
property right in the goodwill of such
goods or services which should be
protected.
Assuming that his mark is not registered,
definitely he cannot sue for infringement
of trademarks, but he can sue for unfair
competition.
BADGES OF PRIOR USE:
1. The use must be public so as to allow a
segment of the public to identify the
 mark with the goods or services (alam
ng public na pagmark na yan, ang
may-ari ay si ABC enterprise)
2. The distibution of the goods must be to
the public, meaning alam ng
customers, hindi lang purchasers ng
malalaking companya;
3. The mark must have been made
closely associated to goods that a
prospective purchaser viewing the
display would immediately associate
the mark with the goods.
What cannot be registered in general:
Immoral, scandalous, deceptive, or
contemptous, contrary to public order
and morality.
Surnames: Surname per se, kunwari dela
Cruz, Dela Cruz brand for a dress, can
that be registered? No, generally names,
surnames cannot be registered because
everybody has a right to use his/her
name/surname. However, while a
name/surname cannot be reserved to the
exclusion of another, a combination of
surname which is distinctive, there is no
hindrance to its registration. Example,
Johnson&Johnson, Proctor&Gamble,
Batacan,Montejo&Vicencio (harhar)
CANON KABUSHIKI KAISHA
The SC said that the certificate of registration
confers upon the trademark owner the exclusive
right to use its own symbol only to those goods
specified in the certificates, subject to the
conditions and limitations stated therein. In this
case, Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, its registration
covers paints, chemicals, toner, and dyestuff. So it
cannot oppose. Canon is also used in sandals.
Since sandals are not related to paints, chemicals,
toner and dyestuff which are the goods specified
in the certificate of registration of Canon
Kabushiki Kaisha, it does not have the exclusive
use of the same trademark.
FABERGE, INC. V IAC
FACTS:
Co Beng Key wanted to register the trademark
Brute to the manufactured briefs. Petitioner
opposed the petition for registration by Co Beng
Key on the ground that said trademark was
similar to the symbol Brut which it previously
registered for after-shave lotion, shaving cream,
deodorant, talcum powder and toilet soap.
ISSUE: Should the Director of Patents deny the
petition for registration by Co Beng Kay?
HELD: NO!!! The petitioner has not ventured into
the production of briefs, an item not listed in its
certificate of registration; hence, it would have no
cause of action. So, the Director of Patents can
confer upon petitioner the exclusive right to use
its own symbol only to those goods specified in
the certificate. So. Co Beng Kay is allowed to use
Brute for the briefs.
The EXCEPTION to such rule is when the
trademark is a WELL-KNOWN MARK.
- Even though the goods are not similar,
the owner of the well-known can prevent
third parties from using that particular
mark or any identical or similar mark in
any goods. Provided:
a. That the use of that mark in
relation to those goods and
services indicate a connection
between those goods or services
and the owners of the registered
mark;
b. That the interests of the owner of
the registered mark are likely to
be damaged by such use.
- If you use Palmolive for bra, then there
will be an indication that the Palmolive
for bra is the same for Palmolive for
shampoo. The interest of the owner of
Palmolive would slightly be damaged.
You will buy the Palmolive bra thinking
that it is produced by the manufacturer of
the Palmolive shampoo.
Section 145: The duration of trademark is 10 years,
provided that within one year from the 5th anniversary
of the date of registration of the mark, file a declaration
of use and evidence to that effect.
Prior use is not required to apply for
registration for trademark but after the
registration is granted, the registrant has
to file a declaration of actual use of the
trademark or service mark that it is
actually being used, otherwise, the mark
should be removed from the register by
the IPO.
Does the certificate of registration may
be renewed? Yes, it may be renewed for
the period of 10 years at its expiration
upon payment of the prescribed fee and
upon filing a request. You will not go thru
the procedure anymore.
Section 147. RIGHTS CONFERRED BY THE
TRADEMARK:
The owner of a registered mark shall have
the exclusive right to prevent third parties
not having the owners consent from
using in the course of trade identical or
similar sings or containers for goods or
services which are identical or similar to
those in respect of which the trademark is
registered.
Take note: where such use of
unregistered mark would result in a
likelihood of confusion gives right to one
to prevent other parties from using
similar or identical signs to those in
respect to the trademarks which are
registered.
The mark may be cancelled within 5 years
from the date of the registration.
Section 148. Use of Indication by third parties for
purposes other than those for which marked is used.
Example:
Paterno is the registered mark under the name of
X, Y cannot be prevented from using Paterno if
Paterno is his name. But the other party cannot
register it but he can use it. The owner of the mark
cannot prevent, there is no infringement of the
part of Paterno (the 3rd party). If he wants to put
up coffee shop under the name of Paterno, he
cannot be prevented from using it.
CANCELLATION
- The trademark may be cancelled within 5
years from the date of the registration.
- A petition to cancel a registration of a
mark may be filed with the Bureau of
Legal Affairs by any person who believed
that he will be damaged by the
registration of a mark.
- Any person who will be damaged by the
registration of a mark may file the
cancellation.
- The reckoning point for the filing of a
petition for cancellation of certificate of
registration of trademark is not from the
alleged date of use but from the date the
certificate of registration was published in
the Official Gazette and issued to the
registrant 5 years from the date of
publication in the IPO Gazette and
issuance to the registrant.
- However, at any time, any person may
file a petition for cancellation, if the
registered mark:
1. Becomes a generic name for the goods or
services, or a portion thereof for which it
is registered. Diba marami ng trademarks
na parang generic na like Band-Aid.
Everybody knows what band-aid is, but it
is actually a mark. A registered mark shall
not be deemed to be the generic name of
goods or services solely because such
mark is also used as a name of or identify
a unique product.
o TEST AS TO THE GENERIC
NAME: The primary significance
of the registered mark to the
relevant public rather than
purchase motivation shall be the
test for determining whether the
registered mark has become the
generic name of goods or services
on or in connection with which it
has been used. So, it is not for us
to say that what is generic or not.
o But if the court decided that it is
generic, then, it should be
cancelled at any time.
2. The mark has been abandoned.
3. Its registration was obtained fraudulently
or contrary to the provisions of the code.
4. If the registered mark is being used by, or
which the permission of, the registrant so
as to misrepresent the source of the goods
or services on or in connection with which
the mark is used.
If the owner of the mark failed to use the
mark for 3 years uninterrupted, a case
may be filed for cancellation but this has
to be proven.
BETA INDUSTRIES, LRD.
The SC said that the exclusive right to trademarks
may be lost by non-use but a petition for
cancellation must be filed. When non-use of the
mark is excused? You look at Section 152. Non-
use of a mark may be excused if caused by
circumstances arising independently of the will of
the trademark owner. So if it is proven that there
are other circumstances independent of the will of
the trademark owner, then, it would be excused.
Lack of funds shall not excuse non-use of a mark.
SEC. 155. Remedies; Infringement.
What is infringement?
In general, it is the used of others by a
mark without the registrants consent for
the purpose of a reproduction or colorable
imitation off a registered mark. So, it has
to be reproduction or colorable imitation
of a registered mark, service mark, trade
name with the purpose of causing
confusion, to cause mistake or to deceive
or to mislead or misleading the public
that such goods or services are those of
the registrant.
Bar Question 1990: What constitutes an
infringement? To answer that properly,
you go to see 155.
CASES ON COLORABLE IMITATION
AMIGO
The SC said a person could not be guilty of
infringement on the basis alone of the similarity in
the sound of petitioners Gold Top with that of
respondents Gold Toe. Admittedly, the
pronunciations of the two do not, by themselves
create confusion. However, the Bureau of Patents
did not rely on the idem sonans test alone. The
Bureau considered the drawings and the labels,
the appearance of the labels, the lettering, and the
representation of a mans foot wearing a sock.
You have to look at the whole package and not
only on the sounds alone.
SOCIETY DE PRODUITS NESTLE V CA
HELD: Colorable imitation denotes such a close
or ingenious imitation as to be calculated to
deceive an ordinary purchaser as to cause him to
purchase the one supposing it to be the other. So,
it is something that would confuse an ordinary
person.
It was claimed that Master Roast and Master
Blend should not be registered because of the
generic word MASTER. Sabi ng SC, generic
terms are those which constitute the common
descriptive name of an article or substance, like
Verbana flower.
- What kind of term is Master? Master is a
suggestive term brought about by the
advertising scheme of Nestle.
- Suggestive terms are those which, in the
phraseology of one court, require
imagination, thought and perception to
reach a conclusion as to the nature of the
nature of the goods.
- So, master can be registered because it is
neither generic nor descriptive.
- According to the SC, there are 2 TESTS to
determine WON there is a colorable
imitation:
a. The Dominancy Test
b. The Holistic Test
DOMINANCY TEST focuses on the similarity of
the prevalent features of the competing
trademarks which might cause confusion or
deception and thus continue infringement. In
dominancy test, you have to look at the dominant
features only.
HOLISTIC TEST mandates that the entirety of
the marks in question must be considered in
determining confusing similarity. You have to
look at the entirety or every feature to determine
if there is colorable imitation.
ASIA BREWERY CASE
The SC used the test of dominancy.
Two kinds of violations:
1. Unfair competition - selling goods and giving
them the general appearance of another
manufacturer.
2. violation of trademarks
COLUMBIA PICTURES V CA
FACTS
Complainants COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC.,
ET. AL. filed a complaint with the NBI for
violation of PD No. 49 and sought its assistance in
their anti-film piracy drive. Agents of the NBI and
private researchers made discreet surveillance on
various video establishments in Metro Manila
including private respondent corporation
SUNSHINE HOME VIDEO INC., owned and
operated by private respondent DANILO A.
PELINDARIO.
NBI conducted a search on December 14, 1987
in the premises of SUNSHINE. They seized
various video tapes of duly copyrighted motion
pictures/films owned or exclusively distributed
by private complainants and other implements.
A trial commenced afterwards. During trial,
the following facts have been established:
(1) the seized copyrighted video tapes
bearing were being sold, leased,
distributed or circulated, or offered for
sale, lease, distribution, or transferred or
caused to be transferred by SUNSHINE at
their video outlets, without the written
consent of the private complainants or
their assignee;
(2) the video tapes originated from spurious
or unauthorized persons; and
(3) said video tapes were exact reproductions
of the films listed in the search warrant
whose copyrights or distribution rights
were owned by complainants.
The RTC of Makati ruled against COLUMBIA,
ET AL. for the reason that the search warrant
issued was a general warrant. The same decision
was sustained by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this appeal. In its defense, SUNSHINE
contended that PD 49 (Decree on the Protection of
Intellectual Property) covers only producers who
have complied with the requirements of deposit
and notice (in other words registration) under
Sections 49 and 50 thereof. Absent such
registration, as in this case, there was no right
created, hence, there was no infringement. They
further maintained that the complainants and
their witnesses led the Court to believe that a
crime existed when in fact there was none.
SUNSHINE presented the certifications from the
Copyright Section of the National Library, to
show non-registration of some of the films of
petitioners, assume no evidentiary weight or
significance, whatsoever.
ISSUE
Whether or not COLUMBIA, ET AL. has the
right to file an action for infringement against
SUNSHINE when the latter sold various video
tapes of their duly copyrighted motion
pictures/films they owned or exclusively
distributed, given the fact that they (COLUMBIA,
ET AL.) failed to comply with the requirements of
registration under PD 49.
RULING
YES, they have the right.
The Department of Justice has resolved this
legal question as far back as December 12, 1978 in
its Opinion No. 191 of the then Secretary of Justice
Vicente Abad Santos which stated that Sections 26
and 50 do not apply to cinematographic works
and PD No. 49 "had done away with the
registration and deposit of cinematographic
works" and that "even without prior registration
and deposit of a work which may be entitled to
protection under the Decree, the creator can file
action for infringement of its rights." He cannot
demand, however, payment of damages arising
from infringement. The same opinion stressed
that "the requirements of registration and deposit
are thus retained under the Decree, not as
conditions for the acquisition of copyright and
other rights, but as prerequisites to a suit for
damages." The statutory interpretation of the
Executive Branch being correct, is entitled to
weight and respect.
PD 49 does not require registration and
deposit for a creator to be able to file an action
for infringement of his rights. These conditions
are merely pre-requisites to an action for
damages. So, as long as the proscribed acts are
shown to exist, an action for infringement may
be initiated.
Furthermore, a closer review of Presidential
Decree No. 49 reveals that even with respect to
works which are required under Section 26
thereof to be registered and with copies to be
deposited with the National Library, such as
books, including composite and cyclopedic works,
manuscripts, directories and gazetteers; and
periodicals, including pamphlets and newspapers;
lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations
prepared for oral delivery; and letters, the failure
to comply with said requirements does not
deprive the copyright owner of the right to sue for
infringement Such non-compliance merely limits
the remedies available to him and subjects him to
the corresponding sanction.
The reason for this is expressed in Section 2 of
the decree which prefaces its enumeration of
copyrightable works with the explicit statement
that "the rights granted under this Decree shall,
from the moment of creation, subsist with respect
to any of the following classes of works." This
means that under the present state of the law, the
copyright for a work is acquired by an
intellectual creator from the moment of creation
even in the absence of registration and deposit.
As has been authoritatively clarified:
The registration and deposit of 2
complete copies or reproductions of the
work with the National Library within 3
weeks after the first public dissemination
or performance of the work, as provided
for in Section 26 (PD 49), is not for the
purpose of securing a copyright of the
work, but rather to avoid the penalty for
non-compliance of the deposit of said two
copies and in order to recover damages in
an infringement suit.
In the case at bar, SUNSHINE could not show
proof of their authority or that there was consent
from the copyright owners for them to sell, lease,
distribute or circulate petitioners' copyrighted
films. That private respondents are licensed by the
Videogram Regulatory Board does not insulate
them from criminal and civil liability for their
unlawful business practices.
The essence of intellectual piracy should be
essayed in conceptual terms in order to
underscore its gravity by an appropriate
understanding thereof. Infringement of a
copyright is a trespass on a private domain
owned and occupied by the owner of the
copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and
infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a
synonymous term in this connection, consists in
the doing by any person, without the consent of
the owner of the copyright, of anything the sole
right to do which is conferred by statute on the
owner of the copyright.
A copy of a piracy is an infringement of the
original, and it is no defense that the pirate, in
such cases, did not know what works he was
indirectly copying, or did not know whether or
not he was infringing any copyright; he at least
knew that what he was copying was not his, and
he copied at his peril. In determining the question
of infringement, the amount of matter copied
from the copyrighted work is an important
consideration. To constitute infringement, it is not
necessary that the whole or even a large portion of
the work shall have been copied. If so much is
taken that the value of the original is sensibly
diminished, or the labors of the original author
are substantially and to an injurious extent
appropriated by another, that is sufficient in point
of law to constitute a piracy. The question of
whether there has been an actionable
infringement of a literary, musical, or artistic
work in motion pictures, radio or television being
one of fact, it should properly be determined
during the trial.
GODINESS V CA
FACTS
On July 15, 1976, the Philippine Patent Office
issued a patent to one Magdalena S. Villaruz for a
utility model for a hand tractor or power tiller.
This patent was acquired by private respondent
SV-AGRO INDUSTRIES ENTERPRISES, INC.,
from Magdalena Villaruz, its chairman and
president, by virtue of a Deed of Assignment
executed by the latter in its favor.
In accordance with the patent, private
respondent manufactured and sold the patented
power tillers with the patent imprinted on them.
In 1979, SV-Agro Industries suffered a decline of
more than 50% in sales in its Molave, Zamboanga
del Sur branch. Upon investigation, SV-AGRO
discovered that power tillers similar to those
patented by it were being manufactured and sold
by petitioner PASCUAL GODINES.
Consequently, SV-AGRO notified GODINES
about the existing patent and demanded that the
latter stop selling and manufacturing similar
power tillers but he failed to comply with the
demand. Thereafter, SV-AGRO filed before the
RTC a complaint for infringement of patent and
unfair competition.
GODINES contended, in contrast, that he did
not manufacture or make imitations or copies of
plaintiffs turtle power tiller as what he merely did
was to fabricate his floating power tiller upon
specification and designs of those who ordered
them but no document was presented showing
such job orders
After trial, the court held GODINES liable for
infringement of patent and unfair competition. It
ordered GODINES to pay damages to SV-AGROs
business reputation and goodwill and for
unrealized profits during the period defendant
was manufacturing and selling copied or
imitation floating power tiller. It held that it was
rather unusual for defendant to manufacture
something without the specification and designs,
considering that he is an engine, by profession
and proprietor of the Ozamis Engineering shop.
On the other hand, it is also highly unusual for
buyers to order the fabrication of a power tiller or
hand tractor and allow defendant to manufacture
them merely based on their verbal instructions.
This was contrary to the usual business and
manufacturing practice.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the
same decision was affirmed.
Hence, this petition. GODINES maintained
that he was not engaged in the manufacture and
sale of the power tillers as he made them only
upon the special order of his customers who gave
their own specifications. Hence, he averred, that
he could not be liable for infringement of patent
and unfair competition and that those made by
him were different from those being
manufactured and sold by SV-AGRO.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was infringement of
patent and unfair competition since the turtle
power of GODINES was similar in form and
function with that of that floating power tiller of
SV-AGRO.
RULING
YES, there was.
Tests have been established to determine
infringement. These are: (a) LITERAL
INFRINGEMENT; and (b) THE DOCTRINE
EQUIVALENTS.
In using literal infringement as a test, resort
must be had, in the first instance, to the words of
the claim. If accused matter clearly falls within the
claim, infringement is made out and that is the
end of it. To determine whether the particular
item falls within the literal meaning of the patent
claims, the Court must juxtapose the claims of the
patent and the accused product within the overall
context of the claims and specifications, to
determine whether there is exact identity of all
material elements.
The trial court found that in appearance and
form, both the floating power tillers of the
defendant and the turtle power tiller of the
plaintiff are virtually the same. Viewed from any
perspective or angle, the power tiller of the
defendant is identical and similar to that of the
turtle power tiller of planitiff in form,
configuration, design and appearance. The parts
or component., thereof are virtually the same. In
operation, the floating power tiller of the
defendant operates also in similar manner as the
turtle power tiller of plaintiff. This was admitted
the defendant himself in court that they are
operating on the same principles.
Moreover, it also observed that petitioner also
called his power tiller as a floating power tiller.
The patent issued by the Patent Office referred to
a "farm implement but more particularly to a
turtle hand tractor having a vacuumatic housing
float on which the engine drive is held in place,
the operating handle, the harrow housing with its
operating handle and the paddy wheel protective
covering."
Recognizing that the logical fullback position
of one in the place of defendant is to aver that his
product is different from the patented one, courts
have adopted the doctrine of equivalents which
recognizes that minor modifications in a patented
invention are sufficient to put the item beyond the
scope of literal infringement. Thus, according to
this doctrine, an infringement also occurs when a
device appropriates a prior invention by
incorporating its innovative concept and, albeit
with some modification and change, performs
substantially the same function in substantially
the same way to achieve substantially the same
result.
The reason for the doctrine of equivalents is
that to permit the imitation of a patented
invention which does not copy any literal detail
would be to convert the protection of the patent
grant into a hollow and useless thing. Such
imitation would leave room for indeed encourage
the unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant
and insubstantial changes and substitutions in the
patent which, though adding nothing, would be
enough to take the copied matter outside the
claim, and hence outside the reach of the law.
In infringement of patent, similarities or
differences are to be determined, not by the
names of things, but in the light of what elements
do, and substantial, rather than technical, identity
in the test. More specifically, it is necessary and
sufficient to constitute equivalency that the same
function can be performed in substantially the
same way or manner, or by the same or
substantially the same, principle or mode of
operation; but where these tests are satisfied,
mere differences of form or name are immaterial.
To establish an infringement, it is not
essential to show that the defendant adopted the
device or process in every particular. Proof of an
adoption of the substance of the thing will be
sufficient. It may be said that no device can be
adjudged an infringement that does not
substantially correspond with the patent. But
another construction, which would limit these
words to exact mechanism described in the
patent, would be so obviously unjust that no court
could be expected to adopt it.
The law will protect a patentee against
imitation of his patent by other forms and
proportions. If two devices do the same work in
substantially the same way, and accomplish
substantially the same result, they are the same,
even though they differ in name, form, or shape.
HENG AND DEE V WELLINGTON
FACTS
Since 1938, plaintiffs ANG SI HENG and
SALUSTIANA DEE were engaged in the business
of manufacturing shirts, pants, drawers, and other
articles of wear for men, women, and children.
They had obtained the registration for the said
articles, the trademark of "Wellington." In the year
1940, they registered the business name
"Wellington Company," and this registration of
the name was renewed on June 11, 1946. Their
invoices, stationery, and signboard bore the trade
name "Wellington Company," and in newspaper
advertisements they described their business as
"Wellington Shirt Factory." But their trademark
for their articles of wear was never again
registered after August 27, 1938, neither was their
trade name registered after 1946.
On May 7, 1946, defendant Benjamin Chua
applied for the registration of the business name
"Wellington Department Store". His application
was approved by the Bureau of Commerce and a
certificate issued in his favor. On June 8, 1946, this
business name was transferred to Wellington
Department Store, Inc., of which he was the
president. But CHUAs application with the
Bureau of Commerce for the registration of the
business name "Wellington Department Store"
and the business name "Wellington Company"
applied for by plaintiffs had been renewed.
HENG and DEE filed an action in the CFI of
Manila to enjoin defendants from using the
business name "Wellington Department Store"
and the corporate name "Wellington Department
Store, Inc.". They alleged that the use of the words
"Wellington Department Store" as a business
name and as a corporate name by the defendants
deceived the public into buying defendant
corporation's goods under the mistaken belief that
the names were the plaintiff's or, have the same
source as plaintiffs' goods, thereby resulting in
damage to them.
WELLINGTON DEPARTMENT STORE,
INC., and BENJAMIN CHUA alleged that
plaintiffs were engaged in the manufacture or
production of clothing and keep a dry goods store
for the sale of the same. They averred that they on
the other hand were keeping a store for articles
such as shoes, hats, toys, perfumes, bags,
apparels, and the like, most of which are different
from those manufactured and sold by plaintiffs.
The CFI ruled in favor of defendants. It held
that the corporate name "Wellington Department
Store, Inc.," has not been previously acquired and
appropriated by any person or corporation.
Hence, this appeal by HENG and DEE. They
contended the following:
1. that defendants business was similar and
identical to theirs and that the use of the
business name "Wellington Department
Store, Inc., misled and confused the
public;
2. that they had acquired a property right in
the name "Wellington;" and
3. that if the defendants were not liable for
any infringement of tradename, at least
they were liable for unfair competition.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not there is deception when
there is a similarity of trademark or tradename
between a clothing manufacturer named
Wellington Company and a department store
named Wellington Department Store.
(2) Whether or not the similarity of said
trademark or tradename resulted into unfair
competition.
RULING
(1) NO, there is no deception.
While there is similarity between the
trademark or tradename, "Wellington Company
and that of "Wellington Department Store,"
confusion or deception can possibly result or arise
from such similarity because the latter is a
"department store," while the former does not
purport to be so. The name "Wellington" is
admittedly the name of the trademark on the
shirts, pants, drawers, and other articles of wear
for men, women and children, whereas the name
used by the defendant indicates not these
manufactured articles or any similar merchandise,
but a department store. Neither can the public be
said to be deceived into the belief that the goods
being sold in defendant's store originate from the
plaintiffs, because the evidence shows that
defendant's store sells no shirts or wear bearing
the trademark "Wellington but other trademarks.
Neither could such deception be by any
possibility produced because defendant's store is
situated on the Escolta, while plaintiffs' store or
place of business is located in another business
district far away from the Escolta. The mere fact
that two or more customers of the plaintiffs
thought of the probable identity of the products
sold by one and the other is not sufficient proof of
the supposed confusion that the public has been
led into by the use of the name adopted by the
defendants. No evidence has been submitted that
customers of the plaintiffs had actually been
misled into purchasing defendant's articles and
merchandise, for the very witnesses who have
supposedly noted the use of plaintiffs' tradename
do not claim to have actually purchased any
articles from defendant's store.
(2) NO, there was no unfair competition.
Even a name or phrase not capable of
appropriation as trademark or tradename may, by
long and exclusive use by a business with
reference thereto or to its products, acquire a
proprietary connotation, such that the name or
phrase to the purchasing public becomes
associated with the business or the products and
entitled to protection against unfair competition.
But in the case at bar, the principle therein
enunciated cannot be made to apply because the
evidence submitted by the appellants did not
prove that their business has continued for so
long a time that it has become of consequence and
acquired a goodwill of considerable value, such
that its articles and products have acquired a well-
known reputation, and confusion will result by
the use of the disputed name by the defendants'
department store.
It is true that appellants' business appears to
have been established a few years before the war
and appellees' after liberation, yet it seems
appellees' business and goodwill are the products f once
e copyrighted,
of their own individual initiative, not wrested by
c it is governed
unfair competition from appellants' business and t by copyright
goodwill. i laws.
v
i
PATENT TRADEMARK COPYRIGHT
t
N A grant made by the Any sign, word, Intangible
y
A government to an or symbol right.
T inventor conveying adopted and Effective from
R 1. civil action for Damages: Same with
U and securing to him used by the moment of
e damages ; measured by: unfair
R the exclusive right manufacturer to creation. m 2. injunction 1. reasonable competition:
E to make use of his identify his e 3. receive royalty profit 1. injunction
invention for a goods and d 4. disposition 2. actual profit 2.
given period. distinguish them i outside the made by impounding
from those e commerce defendant 3. destruction
manufactured, s 5. solidary liability 3. reasonable 4. actual
sold, and dealt
6. criminal case for percentage based damages
by others.
repeated one (3yrs) on the amount of exemplary
W Bureau of Patents Bureau of gross sales of damages/mor
h Trademark defendant. al
e
5. criminal
r
case
e
I The making, using, Used of others An act of
t n offering a product or w/o the copying, in
o f process without registrants whole or in
r authorization from consent of part, a
f i the patentee causing reproduction or copyrightable
i n damage. colourable material
l g imitation of a without
e e registered mark authority that
m which would would cause
C Technical solutions, Goods/services Books, letters,
e cause confusion. substantial
o novelty, inventive lectures,
n damage.
v step, industrially cinematograp
t
e applicable hy,
d
r photography, e
e designs, f
d drawings i
N Methods, plants, 1. immoral; works of the n
o animal breeds, 2. insignia of government; e
t aesthetic, contrary to Philippines ideas, d
c public policy 3. name, principles, T Doctrine of 1. Dominancy Doctrine of
o portrait, methods, e equivalence- test- focuses on equivalence
v signature of processes; s substantial identity; similarity of the
e person new or t substantial function; prevalent
r 4. identical miscellaneous o substantial results of features of the
e registered facts that f the patented and competing
d mark merely forms i infringing trademarks w/c
a. same part of news; n might cause
goods/closely official texts f confusion or
related of r deception
b. cause deceit admin/legisla i 2. Holistic test-
and confusion tive n mandates
c. exclusive g entirety of the
indications e marks.
generally m
commonly used e
W Inventor, assignees The owner n
h t
o C Can be filed 1 yr. Filed within For criminal
a from effectivity 5 yrs from action 1 yr
c n Grounds: the time of from
a c 1. against public publication commission
n e policy (effectivity)
l 2. unclear disclosure Grounds:
f l not new or anytime
i a patentable 1. generi
l t c name
e i 2. aband
? o oned
D 20 yrs from 10 years from Moral right is n 3. obtain
u application effectivity protected ed
r provided that 1 during the fraudu
a yr from the 5th yr lifetime of the lently
t anniversary of author and 50 misrepresent
i the date of yrs after death D 1. patent invalid Creates no
o registration, file e 2. item not confusion to
n declaration of f patentable or new general public
actual use. e
E From the date of the From the date of From the date n
f cre,ation publication of creation but s
e found can use it for domestic purposes
J Bureau of legal Bureau of legal without securing the permit.
u affairs: affairs:
r 1. opposition to the 1. opposition to When will the use of water for domestic
i application for the application purposes be regulated?
s registration of for registration a. Wastage
d marks of marks
i b. in cases of emergency
2. cancellation of 2. cancellation of
c marks marks
t 3. cancellation of 3. cancellation of Article 7 of the Water Code. Subject to the
i patents patents provisions of this Code, any person who captures or
o 4. violations of laws 4. violations of
n collects water by means of cisterns, tanks or pools, shall
provided damages laws provided
asked less than P200 damages asked have exclusive control over such water and the right to
In cases of less than P200 dispose of the same.
Infringement: RTC In cases of
Infringement:
So in this provision even though, the
RTC
W Anyone Anyone person cannot be considered as the owner
h of the water, he has the right to dispose of
o the water and control the same.
c
It emphasized in Article 3 that all waters
a belong to the State. If you look at Article
n 3, Section B, it cannot be a subject to
prescription. Then therefore, Article 100
c
a of the Water Code repeals the provisions
n on the Civil Code of ownership of waters
c and easement relating to waters.
e
l
Article 8: Water legally appropriated shall be subject
LAW ON WATERS to the control of the appropriator.

Article 503. The following are of private ownership:
1. Continuous or intermittent waters rising on
lands of private ownership, while running
through the same;
2. Lakes and lagoons, and their beds, formed by
nature on such lands;
3. Subterranean waters found on the same;
4. Rain waters falling on said lands, as long as
they remain within their boundaries;
5. The beds of flowing waters, continuous or
intermittent, formed by rain water and those
of brooks, crossing lands which are not of
public dominion.
In every rain or aqueduct, the water bed,
banks and floodgates shall be considered
as an integral part of the land or building
for which the waters are intended. The
owners of lands, though which are along
the boundaries of which the aqueduct
passes, cannot claim ownership over it, or
any right to the use of its bed or banks,
unless the claim is based on the titles of
ownership specifying the right or
ownership claimed.
Do you agree with Article 503,
paragraphs 1, 3, 4? Do you recall the
provision with Article XII Section 2 of the
Constitution? All waters of the
Philippines belong to the State. If you
read the water code, you will find out that
Article 503 has counterpart in the water
code that is in Art. 6 of the Water Code:
The following waters found in private lands
also belong to the State.
And what can the private person do? The
owner of the land where the water is
A person can actually build an aqueduct
from the water of the river. Now this
(river) is owned by the State so that must
be appropriated.
In the requisites, it must go through
formalities required. So this is one of the
formalities, appropriation. From the
moment it reaches the appropriators
canal or aqueduct leading to the place
where the water will be used or stored.
What is appropriation?
Article 9. Appropriation is the acquisition of rights
over the use of waters or taking or diverting of water
from its natural source.
So again as I have told you, you can use
the water from the river but in the
aqueduct, there is a need of appropriation
or for any purposes allowed by law.
So when is water appropriated?
Article 10. Provides:
1. for domestic use washing, bathing and
cooking;
2. for municipal use
Article 11: The State may declare the waters
not previously appropriated be exempt of appropriation
for any or other purposes.
- And one of the reasons is public policy,
by reason of public policy.
Article 12. Waters appropriated for a particular
purpose may be applied for another purpose only upon
approval of the Council and on condition that the new
use does not unduly prejudice the rights of other
permits or require an increase in the volume of water.
Article 13. Except as otherwise provided, no person
including government instrumentalities or
government-owned or controlled corporation, shall
appropriate water without a water right, which shall be
evidenced by a document, known as water permit.
So if you apply for appropriation in
Article 9, what do you have to get? Water
permit in evidence that you have a water
right. It is a privilege granted by the
government to use the water.
So is there such a thing as water permit
that is oral? No. There must be an
evidence of a document not verbal or oral
permit. There must be a document.
Article 14. Subject to the provisions of this Code,
concerning the control, protection, conservation, and
regulation of the appropriation and use of waters, any
person may appropriate or use natural bodies of water
without securing a water permit for any of the
following:
1. Appropriation of water by means of
handcarried receptacles; and
2. Bathing or washing and other objects of
flotation.
a. First, is to bind the whole
world.
b. Second, so that you have a
right as to any transactions
pertaining to your property.
c. Third, to prevent the coalition
of frauds; if you dont have
registration then anybody can
sell without being caught.
Article 709. Titles of ownership and other rights over
immovable property which are not duly inscribed or
annotated in the registry of property shall be prejudice
third persons.
H, the husband, donated a parcel of land to his
mistress by way of a simulated sale. Now the wife
is suing for nullity of that particular sale. If she
does not have that deed annotated that she is
suing, then the mistress can sell it to somebody
and the third person shall be considered an
innocent purchaser for value for the purpose of
registration is served when there is actual
knowledge or notice.
Article 710. All documents in the Registry of Property
are public documents.

GR: A water permit is required if you want to

appropriate a water or use natural bodies of water
whether the come from the river of the bay or the
sea
EXCEPTION: Article 14 provides the exception. If
you just want to get a water by means of a balde,
planggana, whatever, there is no need. But if it is
for irrigation, there should be permit.

And who are qualified to exploit water

natural resources permit? Article 15
which provides that only citizens of the
Philippines of legal age as well as juridical
persons.
If you are a natural person, you must be a
Filipino.
But if you are a juridical person, there is
no saying that you are a Filipino.
So basically, these are what we should
take up. You just have to remember that
water can no longer be subject to private
ownership based on the Constitution.

REGISTRY OF PROPERTY

What is the object of Registry of

Property? According to Article 708, it is
the inscription or annotation of acts or
contracts relating to the ownership of
immovable property.
So when we talk about registry of
property, take note that it refers to
immovable.
What is Registration of Property here?
The Register of Deeds.
What is the reason of registration?