I.

Introduction:

a) Origins

Boko Haram is an Islamic militant sect in the Northern regions of Nigeria under the initial

leadership of Muhammad Yusuf in 2002. A part of the greater history of Islamic protest in

Western Africa, Boko Haram broke away from the main Salafi movement in Nigeria and

developed in the remote state of Borno, far from the resources of the oil-producing areas that

fund most of the budget of the federal state (de Montclos, 2014).

The groups origins can be traced as far as the 1980s with the steady rise of religious

fundamentalism and politicisation during the Maitatian uprising which is described as the

first major manifestation of Islamic extremism in the state (Adesoji, 2011). True to its

ancestry, the large majority of the terrorist group follow an extreme form of Islam that

violently rejects Western education and enforcement of colonial social organisation believed

to be the root cause of systemic poverty and political grievances (Isa, 2010 : 332 and Agbiboa

2013:147). Another perspective is that Western education is accused of having failed to

develop the North, thus Boko Haram strives to achieve what Muslim politicians in the North

have promised, but failed to deliver. Despite the decades separating the Maitatian riots and

present day Boko Haram, the similar socio-economic conditions are potentially relevant in

gaining a greater understanding of Boko Harams motivations and its membership consisting

and attracting many who feel an entrenched sense of victimhood by the West.

b) Historically significant events

In 2009, Abudakar Shekau, emerged as Yusufs successor after his extrajudicial killing in

police custody. Subsequently Shekau spearheaded a series of audacious vengeance attacks

outside of strong holds Borno and Yobe. Manifested in the bombing of police headquarters

in June 2011 and the UN offices in the capital of Abuja in August 2011, attacks began to

indicate an increased sophistication and co-ordination impactful enough to spark a large

scale of sectarian conflict that will destabilise the country (Forest 2012: 15). In addition,

tactical suicide attacks modelled by the tactics of the grater jihad community was witnessed

(de Montclos, 2014: 142). The original Boko Harams focus on Muslim targets caused the

rifts within the sect by Abubakar Adam Kambar and a dissident group, Jama'atu Ansarul

Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (The Supporters for the Aid of Muslims in Black Africa) who

disagreed with Abubakar Shekau because he considered that the real enemies of Islam were

essentially Westerners. Before then, Boko Haram exclusively targeted the security forces and

Muslims who did not strictly follow Shariah rules.

The overriding goal of Boko Haram is attaining control from the Nigerian state by

challenging its secularity, the western values of the corrupt ruling elite and to impose Sharia

jurisprudence across the entire country (de Montclos, 2014). In contrast to the charismatic

Yusuf, current leader Shekau has revealed an intense ideological commitment and

ruthlessness in propaganda videos, often aping Osama Bin Laden," says Abubakar Mu'azu

Professor of Mass Communication from the University of Maiduguri (2011). Analysts have

noted under Shekaus leadership, Boko Haram has aligned more closely with the global jihad

movement, gaining the support and approval of Al Qaeda and recently ISIS. Boko Haram

has taken a substantially long time to reach a stage of public consciousness with global

attention peaking with the abduction of the 276 mostly Christian Chibok school girls in April

2014. Approximately 230 students are still missing with some of them used as prisoner

exchanges. International attention compounded pressure for Christian President Goodluck

Johnathan government to call a state of emergency in 2013. The deliberate targeting of non-

combatants, including children matches reflects a notoriety that has taken responsibility for

the deaths of more than 6,644 civilians and members of the state military (2015 Report by

Global Terrorism Index and supported by the Nigeria Security tracker) with a spill-over

effect into neighbouring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.

II. Theories of the persistent operation of Boko Haram

From Mohammed Yusuf to Abubakar Shekau, Prouse de Montclos (2014) argues that the

Boko Haram leadership have never proposed a political programme to reform and govern

Nigeria per Shariah. This may be a clear indication of Boko Harams disengagment in

Nigeria's political system out of an adherence to a fundamentalist form of Islam, which

forbids participation unless the system is based on Sharia, or Islamic law. (Agbiboa 2013:

151)

a) Nigeria as a weak state

A swelling population adversely marred by characteristics of a weak state; poverty,

deteriorating social services and infrastructure, educational backwardness, rising numbers of

unemployed graduates, massive numbers of unemployed youths, dwindling fortunes in

agriculture . . . and the weak and dwindling productive base of the northern economy (Isa

2010: 329) not only creates an environment in which radical extremist groups can thrive but

also legitimizes their actions. (Agbiboa, 2013). Most of the borders in West Africa are porous

with many ungoverned spaces around the vast boundary lines. Like most neighbouring

countries, Nigeria lacks the capacity to effectively monitor the borders and boundary lines

which is an exploited vulnerability for terrorist groups to establish training bases for their

members, and to transport and distribute weapons, across the sub-region. Expansion across
Nigerias borders into Chad and Cameroon in 2014 where it staged 46 attacks witnessed

internal displacement of between 1.6 and 2.2 million people. To compound the situation,

there is compelling speculation of an alliance to ISIS as of 2015 after a long involvement

with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Al-Shabaab that existed between 2010 and 2013.

b) Relative depravation theory between Nigerias Northern and Southern states

Daniel provides the relative depravation theory in answer to the existence and successful

enablement of BH in the North. He underscores the perception that the entrenched inequality

relative to the south and north, exasperated a dominant perception that the wealthy elite

throughout the country tend to be Christian, while the most impoverished communities in the

country [are] primarily Muslim (Forest 2012: 56). The 2010 National Bureau of Statistics

(NBS) data show that the highest poverty rate of 64.8 percent is recorded in the North-East

geo-political zone, followed by 61.2 percent in the North-West. Compared to the lowest rate

of 31.2 percent is recorded in the South-East, followed by 40.2 percent in the South-West

(NBS 2010). Education and the number of children that have been vaccinated are also Commented [MD1]: CHECK AND ADD 2016/17 stats
Compare it to 2010 Daniels review
significantly low, which is possibly an artefact from Yusufs tenure involving targeted attacks

on medical officers, hospitals and clinics. However, that is not to say the uneducated make up Commented [MD2]: Potentially put this para into
another section ????
Threats??
most Boko Haram. In fact, known membership includes a diverse section of society including

former university lecturers, students, bankers, to drug addicts, and generally lawless people.

Religious ideology serves to unify and mobilise the goal to propagate Islamic law. (Michael

and Bwala 2009:3; Olu 2009:9)

III. Threatened targets

a) Nigerian secular government

Boko haram remains a significant problem for the Nigerian government especially with the

force of modern media in their arsenal. Communication channels open to transnational

groups like Al-Qaeda and subsequently for violent jihad to expand into Africa. According to

Muhammed Yusufs sermons, establishing an Islamic State was a prerequisite for Boko

Haram to have the independence to negotiate on equal footing with the infidel Nigerian

government (Mohammad, 2014) . The narrative of the undermining state legitimacy survives

into Shekaus leadership as well as the view of the current status of the state as both the main

persecutor of true Muslims and the major obstacle to true Islamic reform (Thurston, Alex.

2011: 1). Further with the Chibok girls as valuable bargaining chips, militants could demand

territorial concessions from the Nigerian government that would guarantee Boko Haram

sovereignty. Some reports have claimed that Boko Haram controls up to 20 percent of

Nigerian territory (ORegan, 2015).

The effect and damage sustained by Nigerias governance and social infrastructure is

undeniable. Attacks on western outposts (Radin 2012: 1) like police stations and the UN

offices as Boko Harams first distinctly non-Nigerian target, and may indicate a major shift

in its ideology and strategic goals (2012: 81). However, there is not necessarily a threat to

the Western world but rather a threat on the overtones of a Western educated government

could not properly apply Islamic Law.

b) Consequences of an ill-resourced coping mechanisms

Perhaps an under-rated anxiety is that Boko Harams is perceived as an exclusive Nigerian

problem. In combination with the vulnerabilities of other unresolved national issues,

including the weak economy, weak security and intelligence apparatuses, and the failure to

define national culture and identity post-colonisation (Adesoji 2011) state capacity is

profoundly incompetent and ill-resourced to combat Boko Haram. Significant issues also
derive from the culture of impunity that is endemic to governance in Nigeria, fracturing the

integrity of the state executive and validating public distrust that is damaging to the

presidential office especially given the current President Buhari election campaign hinged

utmost priority to the eradication of Boko Haram. It is questionable whether this is

achievable, and the people know it.

IV. Boko Haram structure

Following the 2009 resurgence, Boko Haram went underground with the loss of Yusuf. The

group became highly decentralised with minimal communication between the executive and

soldiers says journalist Ahmed Salkida (2012) who represents one of few with assess to the

sect. More recently, analysts of a 2015 propaganda video featuring Shekau argue that his

trademark grotesque performance distracts from the reality that Boko Haram is a

fragmented, dispersed group with no clear leadership and an agenda that is increasingly

difficult to understand (Downie, 2015).

a) Ties to the global jihad

Boko Harams operations in late 2010 required minimal training, such as drive-by

assassinations of local politicians and religious leaders however, when Boko Haram began

carrying out sophisticated bombings, such as on churches on Christmas Day in 2010, it relied

on Nigerians who received funding or training from abroad with al-Qa`ida in the Islamic

Maghreb (AQIM). For one thing, the groups increasing sophistication of attacks and its

adoption of suicide bombings strengthens the claim that Boko Haram was aligning to a global

jihadist model and perhaps even receiving tactical and operational training from a foreign

militant group. During the month of Ramadan in June 2014, there were six female suicide
bombers, all under 16-years-old, who carried out four attacks at universities and fuel stations

in Kano, a military barracks in Gombe, and a fuel station in Lagos. In addition, one 10-year-

old girl was detected with a suicide vest in Katsina in July 2014 (Dixon, 2014).

b) Behaviour and recruitment

Jacob Zenn (2014) identifies several new trends in the Boko Haram insurgency including

Boko Harams recruitment now includes hundreds, if not thousands, of forcibly conscripted

boys and girls, who are often taken to and re-educated in Cameroon. In addition, Boko

Haram is increasingly launching operations in Cameroons Extreme North Region and

attempting to seize control of Cameroonian border towns to secure supply lines that are

currently more often used for receiving food and fuel than weapons. It appears that Boko

Haram follows a hybrid of Yusufs doctrine of creating a caliphate, as well as a model and

legitimacy from global jihadist community on how to create this Islamic State through

guerrilla warfare and territorial control.

c) Financial sources

Many of financial sources are not yet known, but the example of Alhaji Buji Foi, a former

Commissioner in Borno State, is common knowledge. A 2013 report published by the

InterGovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), a

branch of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), suggested that

funding is received through membership and donations from sympathisers within and outside

of the country including prominent northern religious leaders and businessmen. Motivations

for political patronage to levy war against the state and support could include belief in the

groups cause, given the level of persuasion, the desire to promote religion, and sowing for

future goodwill. More specifically it is clear that in the period shortly after the death of Ysusf,
the extortion of local businessmen and the multiplication of armed robberies since 2011

reveals a reliance on domestic funding.

V. State intervention

The devastating effects of terrorism, including loss of life, destruction of property, insecurity,

underdevelopment, and reputational damage, have attracted the attention of the authorities

and national governments of ECOWAS on the need to act decisively to counter the threat.

The enactment of anti-terrorism and combating terrorist financing (CFT) laws through the

GIABA like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) that has 40 recommendations on money

laundering and terrorist financing (2012) with effectiveness due to the accountability of

participating states to peer review each other in mutual evaluation. Nigeria is yet a

signatory given experts belief the lack of significant changes since 2013 is a representation of

the priority of strengthening democracy rather than addressing the technical issues impeding

Nigerias acceptance of FATF standards.

Federal government established a special joint task force (JTF) in 2012 originally to assigned

to protect oil installations and restore peace in the region but also to eliminate Boko Haram.

However, the effectiveness of the JTF is marred by the extralegal killings and intimidation of

Borno residents: Far from conducting intelligence-driven operations, the JTF simply carried

out house-to-house searches, at times shooting young men in these homes (Solomon

2012:9). Edmond Keller argues that, an overreliance on intimidating techniques not only Commented [MD3]: Find a year

presents the image of a state which is low in legitimacy and desperately struggling to survive,

but also in the long run can do more to threaten state coherence than to aid it.

To this end, potential arrest of major Boko Haram leaders and strategists through the JTF

may significantly weaken its operational capability to mount attacks, but without galvanised
legislation to cut of financing, the destruction of the groups capabilities is a distant fallacy.

On the other hand, concerted action with the international community has been fruitful from

the recent analysis by Davin ORegan suggests that while the sects lethality has increased in

the past year, its operational reach may be contracting to a remote rural stretch of North-

eastern Nigeria, close to the border with Cameroon. Commented [MD4]: FIND A YEAR

VI. Conclusion

Despite the limitations of accurately accessing real time statistics of the illusive nature of

Boko Haram, historical precedent set by the breakdown of the Maitatian threat and the 2009

repression reveals the shortcomings of the military response which triggered a terrorist

reaction and failed to win the hearts and minds of the locals. The extrajudicial kills both of

citizens and Boko Haram affiliate is doing more harm and pushing Boko Haram to establish

terrorist networks with AQIM, Al Shabaab, and Al-Qaeda as a form of survival strategy. It is

undisputed that the solution to the Boko Haram impasse in Nigeria will include a serious

consideration of the pervasive realities of poverty and economic deprivation in the north

where Boko Haram originated. (Agbiboa, 2013). In addition, maiming capacity by

intercepting financial sources is a critical aspect of any terrorist groups operational

capabilities.

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