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AristotleMetaphysics
BooksG ,D ,andE

TranslatedwithNotes
by
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SecondEdition

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Pagev

PREFACE
ThetexttranslatedisthatofW.JaegerintheOxfordClassicalTextsSeries(1957).FootnotesinthetranslationmarkthefewplaceswhereIhavedivergedfromit.
MatterenclosedinsquarebracketsinthetranslationiseitherspecificationofAristotle'sreferences,e.g.'[1011a20]',oralternativetranslations,e.g.'origin[principle]',
orwordsnotrepresentedintheGreek,e.g.'original[step]'wheretheGreekhas'origin'.Themarginallineationsinthetranslationareplacedinsuchawaythat,for
instance,theEnglishinthelinemarked1003a35translatesmatterfromlines34and35intheGreektext.Thusthelineationserr,whenatall,onthesideofbeingearly.
Chapterdivisionsaretraditional(thoughnotduetoAristotlehimself)punctuation,parentheses,andparagraphingaremyown.

AmongseveralusefultranslationsoftheMetaphysicsintoEnglishSirDavidRoss'sstillstandsoutasthemostaccurateandperceptive.Sincetherewouldhavebeen
littlepointinattemptingasecondtimewhathehasdonealready,Ihaveaimedatamoreliteralrendering,forwhichthereisagreaterneednowthatmanystudentsof
philosophycometoAristotlewithoutGreek.InpursuitofthisaimIhavetriedtoavoidusingthesameEnglishwordtotranslatetwoGreekwordsso,forexample,the
commonword'phanai'isgivenas'assert',inordertoreserve'say'(amongotherrenderings)fortheequallycommon'legein'.

Igladlyacknowledgemydebttomanyscholarsandcolleagues,andfirsttoSirDavidRoss,notonlyforthemodelwhichhistranslationprovidedbutalsoforthehelp
IhavereceivedfromtheenviablyknowledgeableandsensiblecommentaryinhiseditionoftheMetaphysics.IhaverarelyconsultedotherCommentaries,except
Alexander.Secondly,IthankProfessorJ.L.Ackrill,editorofthisseries,whoseacuteandthoroughcriticismofmytranslationandnoteshas

Pagevi

improvedthematmanyplacesandinmanyways.Ioweagreatdebttohisassistanceandencouragement.Thirdly,Iamgladtorecordmythankstomanyotherswho
havereaddraftsorhelpedmeincorrespondence:toR.J.HawkinswhocheckedtheproofsandmadeanumberofusefulsuggestionstoJ.Barneswhocommented
ondraftsG34andEtoM.ScholarwhoallowedmetoreadhisdetailedessayonG45toW.Charltonwhoseversionof,andnoteson,PhysicsII3Iwasableto
seebeforetheirpublicationtoJ.A.BakerandA.J.P.KennywhoreadandcriticizedthetranslationsofGandDrespectivelyandtoMissW.F.Hickenand
ProfessorP.T.Geach.Last,IowethankstomyCollegeandtheUniversityofMichigan,theoneforgivingmethesabbaticalleaveduringwhichhalfthisbookwas
written,theotherforaffordingmemostcongenialsurroundingsforworkingonitduringpartofthatleave.

CHRISTOPHERKIRWAN
EXTER,COLLEGE,OXFORD
MAY1970

NoteonSecondEdition

Somecorrectionswerealreadymadeinthe1980reprintthissecondeditionintroducesaboutadozenmore.FurtherCommentsareaddedwhichtakeaccountof
workpublishedsince1971.TheBibliographyisenlargedandupdated.AnIndexLocorumisadded.TheSubjectIndexisexpanded.Ihavenottriedtorevisethe
Notes,beyondafewminorchanges(Iwouldaltermanythings,ifIwerenowstartingafresh).

MarginalpagereferencestotheFurtherCommentshavebeenaddedatascoreorsoofplacesintheNotes.

IwishtothankProfessorJ.L.Ackrill,ProfessorM.Frede,andDrR.L.JudsonfortheirkindnessinreviewingtheFurtherComments,whichimprovedthem.

CHRISTOPHERKIRWAN
EXTERCOLLEGE,OXFORD
NOVEMBER1992

Pageix

CONTENTS

Translation

Book 1

Book 27

BookE 66

Notes

General 75

Book 75

Book 122

BookE 183

FurtherComments(1992) 201

Metaphysics 201

Contradiction 203

Identity 208

Being 214

Coincidence 217

Determinism 222

Bibliography 227

Glossary 239

IndexLocorum 241

IndexofNamesandSubjects 251

Page1

MetaphysicsBookGamma

Chapter1

1003a21.Thereisadisciplinewhichstudiesthatwhichis
quathingthatisandthosethingsthatholdgoodofthisinits
ownright.Thisisnotthesameasanyofwhatarecalledthe
specialdisciplines.Fornoneoftheothersexaminesuni
versallythatwhichisquathingthatis,butallselectsome
partofitandstudywhatiscoincidentalconcerningthatas25
forinstancethemathematicaldisciplines.Butsinceweare
seekingorigins,i.e.themostextremecauses,itisplainthat
thesearenecessarilyaparticularnature'sinitsownright.If
thereforetheseoriginswerealsosoughtbythoseseekingthe
elementsofthethingsthatare,theelementstooareneces30
sarilyofthatwhichisquathingthatis,notcoincidentally.
Hencewealsohavetofindthefirstcausesofthatwhichis
quathingthatis.

Chapter2

1003a33.Thatwhichismaybesocalledinseveralways,but
withreferencetoonething,i.e.oneparticularnature,not
homonymously.Justasthatwhichishealthyallhasreference35
tohealth(eitherfromitspreserving,orproducing,orbeing
asignofhealth,orbecauserecipientofit)andthatwhichis1003b
medicalhasreferencetomedical[art](eitheritiscalled
medicalfrompossessingmedical[art],orfrombeingnatur
allysuitedtoit,orfrombeinganexerciseofmedical[art])
andweshallfindotherthingscalled[whattheyare]inways
similartothese:justsothatwhichismayalsobesocalledin5
severalways,butallwithreferencetooneorigin.Forsome
arecalledthingsthatarebecausetheyaresubstancessome
becausetheyareaffectionsofasubstancesomebecause

Page2

theyarearoutetoasubstance,ordestructions,orlacks,or
qualities,orproductive,orgenerativeofasubstanceorof
thingscalled[whattheyare]withreferencetosubstance
10ordenialsofoneoftheseorofasubstance(thatiswhywe
assertthatevenwhatisnotisathingthatisnot).

1003b11.Therefore,justaseverythingthatishealthyFalls
toonediscipline,thisisequallysointheothercasestoo.
Foritfallstoonedisciplinetostudynotonlythingscalled
[whattheyare]byvirtueofonething,butalsothingscalled
[whattheyare]withreferencetoonenatureindeedina
15certainsensethelattertooarecalled[whattheyare]by
virtueofonething.Plainly,therefore,thethingsthatare
alsofalltobestudiedbyonedisciplinequathingsthatare.

1003b16.Ineverycasethefundamentalconcernofa
disciplineiswithitsprimary[object],i.e.thatonwhichthe
othersdependandtowhichtheyowetheirbeingcalled
[whattheyare].Soifthisthingissubstance,thephilosopher
willneedtohavetheprinciplesandcausesofsubstances.

1003b19.Everyonegenusfallstooneperceptionand
20disciplineasforinstanceallspokensoundsarestudiedby
grammar,whichisonediscipline.Henceitalsofallsto
geneticallyonedisciplinetostudyalltheformsofthat
whichisquathingthatis,andtheformsofthoseforms.

1003b22.Supposeittrue,then,thatthatwhichisand
thatwhichisonearethesamethingi.e.onenatureinthat
eachfollowsfromtheotherasoriginandcausedo,notas
25beingindicatedbyoneformula(thoughitmakesnodiffer
enceevenifwebelievethemlikethatindeedithelps).For
onemanandamanthatisandamanarethesamething
andnothingdifferentisindicatedbythereduplicationin
wordingof'heisoneman'and'heisonemanthatis'(itis
plainthatthereisnodistinctionin[theprocessesof]coming
30tobeordestruction)andequallyinthecaseofthatwhich
isone.Itfollowsobviouslythattheadditionindicatesthe
samethinginthesecases,andthatwhichisoneisnothing

Page3

differentapartfromthatwhichis.Again,eachthing'ssub
stanceisonenoncoincidentallyequally,itisalsojustwhat
acertainkindoftilingthatis[is].Itfollowsthatthere
areasmanyformsofthingthatisasofthingthatisone
andwhattheseare(Imeansuchthingsasthesameand35
similarandothersofthatkind)fallstobestudiedbygeneri
callythesamediscipline.Practicallyallcontrariesderive1004a
fromthisoriginbutwemusttakethemashavingbeen
studiedinthe'SelectionofContraries'.

1004a2.Andthereareasmanypartsofphilosophyas
therearesubstancessothatitisnecessarythattherebe
amongthemafirstandanext.Forthatwhichisdivides5
directlyintogenerahencethedisciplinestoowillfollow
these.Forthephilosopherislikethemathematician,asheis
calledforthatalsohasparts,aprimaryandasecondary
disciplineandotherssuccessivelywithinmathematics.

1004a9.Sinceoppositesfalltobestudiedbyonediscipline,
andtheoneisopposedtoplurality(thereasonwhythedenial10
andlackofathingfalltobestudiedbyonedisciplineisthat
theonethingofwhichtheyarethedenialorlackisstudiedin
bothcases.Forweeithersaybaldlythatthatthingdoesnot
holdgood,orofacertaingenusinthelattercase,then,
somedifferentiaisaddedtotheone,apartfromwhatisthere
inthedenial.1Forthedenialisthething'sabsence,butin15
thecaseofthelackacertainnaturecomesintooasthe
subjectofwhichthelackisstated)sincetheoneisopposed
toplurality,2itfollowsthatitalsofallstothedisciplinemen
tionedtomakeintelligibletheoppositesofthethingsmen
tioned,boththatwhichisotheranddissimilarandunequal,and
everythingelsecalled[whatitis]eitherbyvirtueofoneof
theseorbyvirtueofpluralityandtheone.Amongtheseis20
contrariety,sincecontrarietyisakindofdifference,anddiffer
enceisotherness.Itfollowsthatsincetheoneissocalledin
severalways,thesethingsalsowillbecalled[whattheyare]

1KeepthewordsobelizedintheOCT.

2KeepthewordsbracketedintheOCT.

Page4

inseveralways.Neverthelessitfallstoonedisciplinetomake
allofthemintelligibleforitwillfalltoanothernotif[they
arecalledwhattheyare]inseveralwaysbutonlyifthe
25formulaeareconnectedneitherbyvirtueofonethingnorby
areferencetoonething.

1004a25.Sinceeverythingisconnectedtothatwhichis
primary(asforinstance,anythingcalledonetotheprimary
oneandthesamecanbeassertedtoholdalsoofthesame
andotherandcontraries),itfollowsthatafterdividingthe
numberofwaysinwhicheachthingmaybecalled[whatit
is],wehavetodisplay,withreferencetowhatisprimaryin
eachpredication,inwhatwayitissocalledwithreference
30tothatforsomethingswillbesocalledfrompossessingit,
somefromproducingit,othersinothersuchways.

1004a31.Itisobvious,therefore,thatitfallstoonedisci
linetodiscussthesethingsandsubstance(thatwasoneof
theperplexitieswelisted[B1.995b1825])anditfallstothe
1004bphilosophertobecapableofstudyingallofthem.Forifnot
thephilosopher,whowillitbewhoinvestigateswhether
SocratesandSocratessittingdownarethesamething,or
whetheroneiscontrarytoone,orwhatthecontraryisand
inhowmanywaysitissocalledandequallywiththeother
5questionsofthatkind?Therefore,sincethesethingsarein
theirownrightaffectionsofthatwhichisonequaoneandof
thatwhichisquathingthatis,notquanumbersorlinesor
fire,plainlyitfallstothatdisciplinetomakeintelligibleboth
whattheyareandthethingscoincidentaltothemandthose
whoexaminethesequestionsareatfaultnotbecausethey
arenotphilosophizing,butbecausesubstanceisprior,and
10ofsubstancetheyhavenocomprehension.Forjustasthere
areaffectionsdistinctiveofnumberquanumberasfor
instanceoddness,evenness,commensurability,equality,
excess,deficiencyandtheseholdgoodofnumbersbothin
theirownrightandwithreferencetooneanother(and
equallythereareothersdistinctiveofthingssolid,changeless,
15changeable,weightless,andpossessingweight)sotoocertain

Page5

thingsaredistinctiveofthatwhichisquathingthatis,and
thesearethethingsaboutwhichitfallstothephilosopherto
investigatethetruth.

1004b17.Itisasignofthisthatdialecticiansandsophists
assumethesameguiseasthephilosopher.Sophisticisonly
imagined[tobe]science.Everythingisdiscussedbydialec20
ticians,andthatwhichisiscommontoeverythingand
plainlythesethingsarediscussedbythembecausethesethings
arepropertophilosophy.Sophisticanddialecticdoindeed
rangeoverthesamegenusasphilosophy,butdifferfromitin
theonecasebythetypeofcapacity,intheotherbythelife25
chosendialecticprobeswherephilosophyseeksunderstand
ing,andsophisticisimagined[tobescience]butisnotreally.

1004b27.Again,everycontraryononesideofthetableisa
lack,andallofthemreducetothatwhichisandthatwhichis
not,andtooneandplurality(asforinstancekeepingthe
sameisonthesideoftheone,changeonthesideofplurality).
Practicallyeveryoneagreesthatthethingsthatare,andsub
stance,arecomposedoutofcontraries:atanyrate,every30
onedescribestheoriginsofthingsascontraries,whether
oddandevenorhotandcoldorlimitandlimitlessorlove
andstrife,anditisobviousthatalltheothersalsoreduceto
theoneandplurality(wemusttakethereductionfor1005a,
granted),andtheoriginsproposedbyothersalsofindtheir
placewithoutexceptionunderthesegenera.Itistherefore
obviousfromthistoothatitfallstoonedisciplinetostudy
thatwhichisquathingthatis.Forallthingseitherareorare
madeupofcontraries,andcontrariesoriginateintheone
andplurality.Thelatterfalltoonediscipline,whetherornot5
theyarecalledwhattheyarebyvirtueofonething.Doubt
lessthetruthisthattheyarenotnevertheless,evenifthat
whichisoneissocalledinseveralways,theotherswillbeso
calledwithreferencetothefirstandequallysowillcon
traries.(Thisisso,evenifthatwhichis)orthatwhichisone,
isnotuniversal,i.e.thesameineverycase,orseparable10
doubtlesstheyarenot,butsomeofthemarerelatedtoone

Page6

thing,othersformasuccession.)Thisalsoexplainswhyit
doesnotfalltothegeometertostudythequestionwhatisthe
contrary,orcomplete,orone,orthingthatis,orthesame,orother,
exceptonthebasisofahypothesis.

1005a13.Itisthereforeplain:thatitfallstoonediscipline
tostudythatwhichisquathingthatis,andthosethingsthat
holdgoodofitquathingthatisandthatthesamediscipline
15undertakesthestudynotonlyofsubstancesbutofwhatever
holdsgoodofthemalso,boththethingsmentionedandprior
andposteriorandgenusandformandwholeandpartandthe
othersofthatkind.

Chapter3

1005a19.Wehavetosaywhetheritfallstoone,oradifferent,
20disciplinetodealwiththethingswhichinmathematicsare
termedaxioms,andwithsubstance.Itisindeedobviousthat
theinvestigationofthesetoofallstoonediscipline,andthat
thephilosopher'sfortheyholdgoodofeverythingthatis
andnotofacertaingenus,separateanddistinctfromthe
others.Everyoneusesthem,itistruebecausetheyareof
25thatwhichisquathingthatis,andeachgenusisathing
thatis.Buteveryoneusesthemjustsofarasissufficientfor
him,thatis,sofarasthegenusextendsaboutwhichheis
carryingoutdemonstrations.Sinceitisplainthattheyhold
goodofallthingsquathingsthatare(forthatiswhat
theyhaveincommon),itfollowsthattheirstudytoofalls
tohimwhomakesintelligiblethatwhichisquathingthatis.
Thisexplainswhynoneofthosewhoconductspecialized
30investigationsendeavourtosayanythingaboutthem,asto
whetherornottheyaretrue.Geometersandarithmeticians
donotsomestudentsofnaturedo,butthatisnotsurprising,
sincetheyalonehaveconsideredthattheywereinvestigating
thewholeofnature,i.e.thatwhichis.Butsincethereis
someonestillfurtherabovethestudentofnature(fornature
35isoneparticulargenusofthingthatis),theinvestigationof

Page7

thesethingsalsomustfalltohimwhostudieswhatisuni
versal,andprimarysubstance.Thestudyofnatureisalsoa
science,butnotprimary.1005b

1005b2.Theendeavoursofsomeofthosewhodiscuss
[their]truth,astohow[they]oughttobeaccepted,aredue
tolackoftraininginanalytics.Thestudentoughttocome
readyequippedwithknowledgeofthesethings,notseekit5
whilelistening.

1005b5.Plainly,therefore,itfailstothephilosopher,i.e.
thestudentofwhatischaracteristicofallsubstance,alsoto
investigatetheprinciplesoftrainsofreasoning.

1005b8.Itisappropriateforhimwhohasthebestunder
standingabouteachgenustobeabletostatethefirmest
principlesofthatactualsubject,andhence,whenhissubject10
isthethingsthatarequathingsthatare,tostatethefirmest
principlesofeverything:andthismanisthephilosopher.
Aprincipleaboutwhichitisimpossibletobeinerroris
firmestofall.Foraprincipleofthatkindisnecessarilythe
mostintelligible,sinceeveryonemakesmistakesonmatters
aboutwhichhedoesnothaveunderstandingandisnon
hypothetical,sincewhatisnecessarilypartoftheequipment15
ofonewhoapprehendsanyofthethingsthatareisnota
hypothesis,andwhatonenecessarilyunderstandswhounder
standsanythingisnecessarilypartoftheequipmenthecomes
with.Itisplain,then,thataprincipleofthatkindisfirmest
ofall.

1005b18.Wehavenexttostatewhatprinciplethisis.For
thesamethingtoholdgoodandnottoholdgoodsimultaneouslyofthe20
samethingandinthesamerespectisimpossible(givenanyfurther
specificationswhichmightbeaddedagainstthedialectical
difficulties).

1005b22.This,then,isthefirmestofallprinciples,forit
fitsthespecificationstated.Foritisimpossibleforanyoneto
believethatthesamethingisandisnot,assomeconsider25

Page8

Heraclitussaidforitisnotnecessarythatthethingsone
saysoneshouldalsobelieve.Butifitisnotpossiblefor
contrariestoholdgoodofthesamethingsimultaneously
(giventhatthecustomaryspecificationsareaddedtothis
propositiontoo),andtheopinioncontrarytoanopinionis
30thatofthecontradictory,thenobviouslyitisimpossiblefor
thesamepersontobelievesimultaneouslythatthesame
thingisandisnotforanyonewhomadethaterrorwould
beholdingcontraryopinionssimultaneously.Thatiswhy
allthosewhodemonstrategobacktothisopinionintheend:
itis,inthenatureofthings,theprincipleofalltheother
axiomsalso.

Chapter4

351005b35.Therearethosewho,aswesaid,boththemselves
1006aassertthatitispossibleforthesamethingtobeandnottobe,
and[assertthatitispossible]tobelieveso.Manyevenof
writersonnaturemakeuseofthisstatement.Butwehavejust
acceptedthatitisimpossibletobeandnotbesimultaneously,
5andwehaveshownbymeansofthisthatitisthefirmestofall
principles.Some,owingtolackoftraining,actuallyaskthat
itbedemonstrated:foritislackoftrainingnottorecognize
ofwhichthingsdemonstrationoughttobesought,andof
whichnot.Foringeneralitisimpossiblethatthereshouldbe
demonstrationofeverything,sinceitwouldgoontoin
10finitysothatnotevensowoulditbedemonstration.Butif
therearesomethingsofwhichdemonstrationoughtnotto
besought,theycouldnotsaywhattheyregardasaprinciple
morefullyofthatkind.

1006a11.Buteventhiscanbedemonstratedtobeim
possible,inthemannerofarefutation,ifonlythedisputant
sayssomething.Ifhesaysnothing,itisridiculoustolookfora
statementinresponsetoonewhohasastatementofnothing,
15insofarashehasnotsuchaperson,insofarasheissuch,
issimilartoavegetable.By'demonstratinginthemannerof

Page9

arefutation'Imeansomethingdifferentfromdemonstrating,
becauseindemonstratingonemightbethoughttobegthe
original[question],butifsomeoneelseiscauseofsucha
thingitmustberefutationandnotdemonstration.In
responsetoeverycaseofthatkindtheoriginal[step]isnotto
askhimtostatesomethingeithertobeornottobe(forthat20
mightwellbebelievedtobegwhatwasoriginallyatissue),
butatleasttosignifysomethingbothtohimselfandtosome
oneelseforthatisnecessaryifheistosayanything.Forif
hedoesnot,therewouldbenostatementforsuchaperson,
eitherinresponsetohimselfortoanyoneelse.Butifhedoes
offerthis,therewillbedemonstration,fortherewillalready
besomethingdefinite.Butthecauseisnothewhodemon25
stratesbuthewhosubmitsforeliminatingstatementhe
submitstostatement.Again,anyonewhoagreestothishas
agreedthatsomethingistrueindependentlyofdemonstration.

1006a28.First,then,itisplainthatthisatleastisitself
true,thatthenamesignifiestobeornottobethisparticular30
thing,sothatitcouldnotbethateverythingwassoandso
andnotsoandso.
1006a31.Again,if'man'signifiesonething,letthatbe
twofootedanimal.WhatImeanby'signifyingonething'is
this:ifthatthingisaman,thenifanythingisaman,that
thingwillbetobeaman.Butitmakesnodifferenceevenif
someoneweretoassertthatitsignifiedmorethanonething,
providedthattheseweredefiniteforadifferentnamecould1006b
beassignedtoeachformula.(Imean,forinstance,ifsomeone
weretoassertthat'man'signifiednotonebutseveralthings,
ofoneofwhichtheformulawas'twofootedanimal',but
therewasmorethanoneotheraswell,butadefinite
numberforadistinctnamecouldbeassignedinrespectof5
eachoftheformulae.1)Butif,insteadofsoassigning,hewere
toassertthatitsignifiedinfinitelymanythings,itisobvious
thattherewouldbenostatement.Fornottosignifyone
thingistosignifynothing,andifnamesdonotsignify,

1KeepthewordsbracketedintheOCT.

Page10

discussioniseliminatedwithothersand,intruth,evenwith
10oneself,sinceitisnotpossibleeventoconceiveifoneisnot
conceivingonethingand,ifitispossible,onenamecouldbe
assignedtothatactualthing.Letthename,then,aswassaid
originally,signifysomethingandsignifyonething.

1006b13.Thenitisnotpossiblethat'tobeaman'should
signifyjustwhat'nottobeaman'[signifies],if'man'signi
15fiesnotonlyaboutonethingbutalsoonething(forwedonot
countassignifyingonethingthis,viz.signifyingaboutone
thing,sinceinthatway'artistic'and'pale'and'man'would
signifyonething,sothatallwillbeone,becausesynonymous).
Anditwillnotbetobeandnottobethesamethingunless
20homonymously,asifothersweretotermnotmanwhatwe
termman.Butwhatisfoundperplexingisnotwhetheritis
possiblethatthesamethingshouldsimultaneouslybeand
notbeamaninname,butinactualfact.Butif'man'and
'notman'donotsignifysomethingdifferent,itisplainthat
[neither]does'nottobeaman'from'tobeaman',sothatto
25beamanwillbetobeanotmanfortheywillbeonething.
(For'tobeonething'signifiesthis:beinglikemantleand
cloak,iftheformulaisone.)Butiftheyareonething,'tobe
aman'and'notman'signifyonething.Butithadbeen
shownthattheysignifysomethingdifferent.

1006b28.Itisaccordinglynecessary,ifitistrueofanything
30tosaythatitisaman,thatitbeatwofootedanimal(for
thatwaswhat'man'signified)andifthatisnecessary,itis
notpossiblethatthesamethingshouldnotbe,atthattime,
atwofootedanimal(for'tobenecessary'signifiesthis:tobe
incapableofnotbeing).Consequentlyitisnotpossiblethat
itshouldbesimultaneouslytruetosaythatthesamething
isamanandisnotaman.

1007a1006b34.Thesameargumentappliesalsointhecaseof
notbeingaman.For'tobeaman'and'tobeanotman'
signifysomethingdifferent,ifevenbeingpaleandbeinga
manaredifferent.Fortheformerismuchmorestrongly

Page11

opposed,sothatitsignifiessomethingdifferent.Butif[the
disputant]assertsthat'pale'signifiesoneandthesamething5
too,weshallrepeatjustwhatwasstatedbeforealso,that
everything,andnotonlyopposites,willbeone.Ifthatisnot
possible,whatwehavestatedfollows,ifhewillanswerthe
questionasked.Butif,askedthequestionbaldly,heappends
thedenialsalso,heisnotansweringthequestionasked.For10
nothingpreventsthesamethingbeingbothamanandpale
andathousandotherthingsnevertheless,ifoneisasked
whetheritistruetosaythatthisthingisamanornot,the
answeroughttosignifyonething,notappendthatitisalso
paleandtall.Foritiscertainlyimpossibletogorightthrough15
thecoincidentalsofathing,whichareinfinitesolethimgo
througheitherallornone.Soequally,evenifthesamething
isathousandtimesamanandnotaman,oneoughtnotto
append,toone'sanswertothequestionwhetheritisaman,
thatitissimultaneouslynotamanalsounlessoneisto
appendalltheotherthingstoowhichcoincideinit,the
thingsthatitisorisnot.Butifonedoesthat,thereisno20
discussion.

1007a20.Thosewhosaythisentirelyeliminatesubstance
andwhatitistobe.Foritisnecessaryforthemtomaintain
thatallthingsarecoincidencesandthatthereisnosuch
thingasjustwhattobeamanortobeananimal[is].Forif
anythingisjustwhattobeaman[is],thatwillnotbetobea
notmanornottobeaman:yetthoseareitsdenials.For25
whatitsignifiedwasonething,andthatwassomething's
substance,andtosignifyathing'ssubstanceistosignify
that,forit,tobeisnothingelse.Butif,forit,justwhattobea
man[is]shouldbeeitherjustwhattobeanotman[is]or
justwhatnottobeaman[is],itwillbesomethingelseso
thatitisnecessaryforthemtosaythatthiskindofformula30
appliestonothing,andthatallthingsarecoincidentally.
Forthatiswhatdistinguishessubstanceandthecoinciden
tal:thepalecoincidesinamanbecauseheispalebutnot
justwhatpale[is].

Page12
a
1007 33.Butifeverythingissaidcoincidentally,there
willnotbeanythingwhichthingsareinitiallyabout,if
35'coincidental'alwayssignifiesapredicationaboutacertain
1007bsubject.Consequentlyitwillbenecessarytogoontoinfinity.
Butthatisimpossible,fornotevenmorethantwocombine
forthecoincidentalisnotcoincidentalinthecoincidental,
unlessbecausebothcoincideinthesamethingImeanfor
instancethatthepalemaybeartisticandthelatterpale
5becausebothcoincideinaman.ButSocratesisnotartistic
inthatwaythatbothcoincideinsomeotherthing.Ac
cordingly,sincesomethingsarecalledcoincidentalinthe
latterway,someintheformer,thosesocalledinthelatter,as
thepaleisinSocrates,cannotbeaninfiniteupwardseries,
10e.g.someotherthingcoincidentalinSocratesthepalefor
noteverythingmakesupsomeonething.Norindeedwill
therebeanyotherthingcoincidentalinthepale,asfor
instancetheartisticforthelatternomorecoincidesinthe
formerthantheformerinthelatter,andatthesametime
thereisadistinctionbetweenthingsthatcoincideinthisway
andthingsthatcoincideastheartisticinSocrates.Innoneof
15thelattercasesdoesthecoincidentalcoincideinsomething
coincidental,butitdoesinalltheformercasessothatnot
everythingwillbesaidcoincidentally.Consequently,there
willbesomethingsignifyingasubstanceeveninsuchacase.
Andifthatisso,ithasbeenshownthatitisimpossibleto
predicatecontradictoriessimultaneously.

1007b18.Again,ifcontradictoriesareallsimultaneously
20trueofthesamething,itisplainthateverythingwillbeone.
Forthesamethingwillbebothawarshipandawallanda
man,ifitispossibleeithertoaffirmortodenysomethingof
everything,asisnecessaryforthosewhostatethethesisof
Protagoras.Forifamanisthoughtbysomeonenottobea
warship,itisplainthatheisnotawarshipsothathealsois,
25ifthecontradictionisreallytrue.Indeedwealsogetthe
doctrineofAnaxagoras,that'everyarticleismixedtogether'
sothatnothingistrulyone.Thesepeopleseem,therefore,to

Page13

bestatingsomethingindefiniteandwhiletheyconsider
thattheyarestatingthatwhichis,theirstatementisactually
concerningthatwhichisnot(fortheindefiniteiswhatis
potentiallyandnotincompletereality).Ontheotherhand
theirstatements,atleast,mustaffirmordenyeverythingof30
everythingforitwouldbeabsurdifthedenialofitselfheld
goodofeachthing,butthedenialofsomeotherthing,which
doesnotholdgoodofit,didnotholdgoodofit.Imeanfor
instancethatifitistruetosayofamanthatheisnotaman,
plainlyheisalsoeitherawarshipornotawarship.Soifthe
affirmationholdsgoodofhim,necessarilyitsdenialdoestoo.
Butiftheaffirmationdoesnotholdgood,atleastitsdenial35
willholdgoodofhimmorereadilythanhisown.Soifeven1008a
thelatterdoesholdgood,thatofwarshipwilltooandifit
does,itsaffirmationwilltoo.

1008a2.Thisisoneconsequence,then,forthosewhostate
thisthesisanotheristhatitisnotnecessaryeithertoassert
ordeny.Forifitistruethatheisamanandnotaman,5
plainlyalsohewillbeneitheramannornotamanforthe
twohavetwodenials,and,ifbothmakeuptheoneformer,
theremustalsobetheonelatteropposedtoit.

1008a7.Again,eitherthisissoineverycase,i.e.athing
isbothpaleandnotpale,bothathingthatisandnota
thingthatis,andinasimilarwayforallotherassertionsand10
denialsoritissoinsomecasesbutnotinothers.Ifitisnot
soinallcases,thesewouldbeagreed.Butifitissoinall,then
inturneitheranythingassertedmayalsobedeniedand
anythingdeniedalsoassertedorthethingsassertedmay
alsobedeniedbutnoteverythingdeniedalsoasserted.Butif15
thelatter,somethingwouldbesecurelynotathingthatis,and
thatopinionwouldbefirmandifnottobeissomething
firmandcertain,theoppositeassertionwouldbestillmore
certain.Butifanythingdeniedmayequallybeassertedtoo,
necessarilyitiseithertruetostateseparately,forinstance,that
athingispaleandagainthatitisnotpale,ornot.Ifitisnot20
truetostateseparately,thennotonlydoeshenotstatethese

Page14

thingsbutnothingwhateverisandhowcanthingsthat
arenotwalkandtalk?Alsoeverythingwouldbeone,aswe
saidbefore[1007b20],andamanandagodandawarship
25andtheircontradictorieswillbethesamethingforifit
appliesequallytoeachthing,nothingwilldifferfromany
thingelse,since,ifitdiddiffer,thatwouldbetrueanddis
tinctive.Equally,evenifitispossibletohavethetruthin
statingthingsseparately,theresultwehavestatedfollows
andinadditionitfollowsthateveryonewouldhavethetruth
andeveryonewouldbeinerror,and[thedisputant]himself
30isinerrorbyhisownadmission.

1008a30.Atthesametimeitisobviousthatinresponseto
thispersonthereisnothingforaninvestigationtodealwith
forhesaysnothing.Forhesaysneitherthatitissoandso
northatitisnotsoandso,butthatitbothissoandsoand
isnotsoandsoandagainhealsodeniesboththese,saying
thatitisneithersoandsonornotsoandso.Forifhedidnot,
somethingwouldalreadybedefinite.

351008a34.Again,ifwheneveranassertionistrueitsdenial
isfalseandWhenthelatteristrueitsaffirmationisfalse,
therecanbenosuchthingassimultaneouslyassertingand
1008bdenyingthesamethingtruly.However,theywoulddoubt
lessassertthatthisisthequestionoriginallyposed.

1008b2.Again,arewetosaythathewhobelievesthat
thingsareinacertainstate,orarenot,isinerror,whilehe
whobelievesbothhasthetruth?Forifhehasthetruth,
whatcanbemeantbysayingthatthenatureofthingsthat
5areisofthatkind?ifhedoesnothavethetruth,buthas
moretruththantheonewhobelievestheformerway,then
thethingsthatarewouldalreadybeinsomestate,andthat
wouldbetrueandnotsimultaneouslyalsonottrue.Butif
everyoneequallybothisinerrorandstatesthetruth,there
willbenothingforsuchapersontospeakorsayforhe
10simultaneouslysaysthisandnotthis.Andifamanbelieves

Page15

nothing,butconsidersitequallysoandnotso,howwould
hisstatebedifferentfromavegetable's?

1008b12.FromwhichitisalsoquiteObviousthatnobody
actuallyisinthatcondition,neitherthosewhostatethis
thesisnoranybodyelse.Forwhydoesanyonewalkto
Megararatherthanstaywhereheis,whenheconsidersthat15
heshouldwalkthere?Whydoeshenotproceedonemorning
straightintoawelloroveraprecipice,ifthereisoneabout:
insteadofevidentlytakingcaretoavoiddoingso,asonewho
doesnotconsiderthatfallinginisequallyagoodthingand
notagoodthing?Itisconsequentlyplainthathebelieves
thatonethingisbetter,anothernotbetter.Andifso,hemust
alsobelievethatonethingisamanandanothernotaman,
onethingsweetandanothernotsweet.Forheneitherseeks20
norbelieveseverythingindifferentlywhen,consideringthat
itisbettertodrinkwaterandseeaman,hethereupon
seekstodosoandyetheoughtto,ifthesamethingwere
equallyamanandnotaman.Butjustaswesaid,thereis
nobodywhodoesnotevidentlytakecaretoavoidsome25
thingsandnototherssothatitseemsthateveryoneholds
somebeliefsbaldly,ifnotabouteverythingthenaboutwhat
isbetterandworse,Andifthisisnotknowledgebutopinion,
onewouldhavetobeallthemoreanxiousaboutthetruth,
asasickmanismoreanxiousabouthishealththanonewho
ishealthy.Forindeedamanwhoholdsanopinionisinan30
unhealthyconditionwithregardtothetruth,comparedwith
onewhohasknowledge.

1008b31.Again,howevermucheverythingissoandso
andnotsoandso,atleastthemoreandthelessarepresent
inthenatureofthingsthatare.Forwewouldnotassertthat
twoandthreeareequallyeven,orthatonewhoconsidered35
thatfourthingswerefiveandonewhoConsideredthatthey
wereathousandwereequallyinerror.Soiftheyarenot
equally,itisplainthatoneofthemisless,sothathehasmore
truth.Soifwhatismoreisnearer,theremustbesomething1009a
truewhichthemoretrueviewisnearer.Andevenifthatis

Page16

notso,atleastthereisalreadysomethingmorefirmand
moretruthlike,andweshouldberidoftheunadulterated
5thesiswhichwouldpreventusfromhavinganythingdefi
niteinourthinking.

Chapter5

1009a6.Fromthesameopinionalsoderivesthethesisof
Protagoras,anditisnecessarythatbotheitherareorarenot
thecaseequally.Forifeverythingthatisthoughtorimagined
istrue,itisnecessarythateverythingshouldbesimul
10taneouslytrueandfalseformanypeoplehavemutually
contrarybeliefs,andregardthosewhoseopinionsarenot
thesameastheirownasinerror,sothatitisnecessarythat
thesamethingshouldbothbeandnotbe.Andifthelatter,
itisnecessarythatwhatisthoughttobeshouldallbetrue
forthosewhoareinerrorandthosewhohavethetruthhold
mutuallyoppositeopinions,andso,ifthatisthestateof
15thingsthatare,allWillhavethetruth.Itisplain,then,that
boththesesderivefromthesamethinking.

1009a16.Butthewaytoconfronttheirproponentsisnot
alwaysthesame:somerequiretobeconvinced,otherstobe
defeated.Iftheyhavethisbeliefasaresultofperplexity
theirmistakeiseasytoremedy,fortheconflictisnotwith
20theirstatementbuttheirthinking.Butiftheystateitfor
thesakeofstatingit,theremedyistorefutethestatement
whichisintheirspeechandintheirwords.

1009a22.Thosewhofindthemselvesinperplexityderive
thisopinionfromperceptiblethings.Ontheonehand,[they
derivetheopinion]thatcontradictoriesandcontrarieshold
goodsimultaneouslyfromseeingcontrariescomingtobe
25outofthesamething.If,therefore,itisnotpossiblethat
whatisnotshouldcometobe,thatactualthinghasallalong
beenbothequally.ThisisassertedbyAnaxagoras('every
thingismixedineverything'),andbyDemocritus,whosays:

Page17

thevoidandthefullarefoundequallyineverypartwhat
ever,andyettheoneoftheseisthatwhichis,theotherthat
whichisnot.Inresponsetothose,then,whosebeliefderives30
fromthesesources,weshallsaythatinonesensewhatthey
sayiscorrect,butinanothersensetheyaremistaken.For
thatwhichismaybesocalledintwoways,sothatthereisone
senseinwhichitispossibleforsomethingtocometobeoutof
whatisnot(thoughinanothersensethisisnotpossible),and
forthesamethingtobesimultaneouslybothathingthatis
andathingthatisnot(onlynotinthesamerespect)for35
itispossibleforthesamethingsimultaneouslytobecontrary
thingspotentially,thoughnotincompletereality.Again,we
shallrequirethesepeopletobelievethatamongthethings
thatarethereisalsoanotherkindofsubstanceofwhich
neitherchangenordestructionnorcomingtobeholdgood
atall.

1009a38.So,too,fromperceptiblethingssomederivethe1009b
truthofwhatisimagined.Fortheyconsiderthatitisin
appropriatetojudgetruthbylargeorsmallnumbers,but
thesamethingisthoughtsweetbysomewhotasteitand
bitterbyotherssothatifeveryonewereilloreveryonewere5
outofhismindandonlytwoorthreepeoplewerehealthyor
sane,thelatterwouldbethoughtillandoutoftheirminds
andnottheothers.Again,[theysay]thatthesamethingsare
imaginedincontrarywaysbymanyoftheotheranimalsand
byus,andevenasperceivedbyeachpersontheyarenot
alwaysthoughtthesame.Whichkindsofthese,therefore,
aretrueorfalseisunclearfortheseonesarenomoretrue10
thanthose,butequally.ThatiswhyatleastDemocritus
assertsthateitherthereisnotruthoratleasttousitis
unclear.

1009b12.Ingeneralitisbecausetheybelievethatper
ceptioniswisdom,andtheformerismodification,thatthey
assertthatwhatisimaginedinperceptionisofnecessity
true.ForitisforthesereasonsthatbothEmpedoclesand15
Democritusandvirtuallyeveryoneelsehavesuccumbedto

Page18

opinionsofthiskindforEmpedoclesactuallyassertsthat
aperson'swisdomaltersashealtershisstate:

Men'scunninggrowswithwhatispresenttothem.
Andelsewherehesays:

20Andastheymodified,sodidtheirthoughts
Comealwaysmodifiedtomind.

AndParmenidespronouncesinthesamesense:

Foraseachmomentstandhislimbscomposed
Soisman'sthoughtarrayedforwhathasmind
Isnothingbutthenatureofthelimbs
25Ofallofus:wethinkwhatwehavemoreof.

ItisalsorecordedasadictumofAnaxagorasinresponseto
somefriendsthat'thingswillreallybeforthemhowever
theybelieve'.PeopleevenassertthatHomerevidentlyheld
thisopinion,becausehemadeHector,whenhewasun
30consciousfromablow,lie'withotherthingsinmind',asif
eventhosewhoareoutoftheirmindshavesomethingin
mind,thoughnotthesamethings.Soitisplainthatifboth
statesarestatesofwisdom,thingswillreallybesoandsoand
notsoandsosimultaneously.

1009b33.Anditisatthispointthatthemostunfortunate
consequencearisesforifthosewhohaveobservedtheavail
35abletruthsmostcloselyandtheyarethosewhohave
soughthardestforthemandcaredmostaboutthemifthey
holdopinionsofthiskindandmakethesepronouncements
abouttruth,willnotthoseendeavouringtophilosophize
legitimatelyloseheart?Thequestfortruthwouldbeawild
goosechase.

1010a1010a1.Whatcausedthesepeopletoholdtheiropinion
wasthat,insearchingforthetruthaboutthethingsthatare,
theybelievedthatthethingsthatarearemerelypercepti
blesandinthesethenatureofindefiniteness,i.e.ofbeingin
thewaywehavedescribed,isanimportantconstituent.This
5explainswhytheirstatements,thoughplausible,arenottrue

Page19

(anapterwaytoputitthanEpicharmususedaboutXeno
phanes).
1010a7.Again,observingthatallthis[worldof]natureis
inchange,andthatnotruthishadaboutthatwhichisin
[processof]alteration,itwasnotpossibletohavethetruthat
leastconcerningthatwhichisin[processof]everystyleand
mannerofalteration.Thisbeliefblossomedintothemost10
extremeofalltheopinionswehavementioned,thatofthose
whoproclaimedthemselvesHeracliteanssuchasCratylus,
whointheendconsideredthatheoughttosaynothing,and
merelymovedhisfinger.HealsocriticizedHeraclitusfor
sayingthatitisnotpossibletostepintothesamerivertwice:
forhehimselfconsideredthatitisnotpossibleevenonce.15

1010a15.Inresponsetothisargumenttooweshallsaythat
whiletheydohavesomeargumentforconsideringthatatthe
timeofitsalteringathingin[processof]alterationisnot,yet
thatisafteralldisputable.Forsomeofwhatisbeingdis
cardedispossessedbythethingdiscardingit,andsomeof
whatiscomingtobenecessarilyalreadyis.Andingeneral
ifathingisin[processof]destructiontherewillbesomething20
thatis,andifathingisin[processof]comingtobethereis
necessarilysomethingoutofwhichitiscomingtobeandby
theagencyofwhichitisbeinggenerated,andthisdoesnot
goontoinfinity.Butleavingthataside,wemaysaythis,
thatitisnotthesamethingtoalterinquantityandin
qualificationallowing,then,thatathing'squantityisnot
constant,stillweareacquaintedwitheverythingbyits25
form.

1010a25.Again,thosewhoholdthisbeliefcouldlegiti
matelybecriticizedforpronouncingequallytrueofthe
wholeuniversewhattheyobserveonlyinaminorityevenof
perceptiblethings.Foronlytheregionoftheperceptible
aroundusispermanentlyin[processof]destructionand
comingtobeandthatisvirtuallynoportionofthewhole,30
sothatitwouldbejustertoacquitthatportionbecauseofthe
otherthantocondemntheotherbecauseofit.

Page20
a
1010 32.Again,itisplainthatweshallrepeatinresponse
tothesepeoplewhatwassaidpreviously[1009a368]:for
theymustbeshown,andtheymustbeconvinced,thatthere
35isacertainnaturewhichischangeless.Andyettheconse
quenceofmaintainingsimultaneouslythatthingsareand
arenotisreallytoassertthatallareatrest,ratherthan
changingforthereisnothingforthingstoalterinto,for
1010beverythingholdsgoodofeverything.

1010b1.Asfortruth,toshowthatnoteverythingthatis
imaginedistrue:first,evenifperception,atleastofwhatis
special,isnotfalse,stillimaginationisnotthesamethingas
perception.Next,onemaylegitimatelybesurprisedthatthey
5shouldfindperplexingthequestionwhethermagnitudesand
coloursaresuchastheyareimaginedbythosewhoareata
distanceorthosewhoarenear,andbythehealthyorthe
sickorwhetherwhatisimaginedbytheweakorthestrong
isheavierorwhetherwhatisimaginedbythesleepingor
thewakingistrue.Foritisobviousthattheydonotreally
10consideritso:atanyrateifsomeoneinLibyabelieveshimself
onenightinAthens,hedoesnotsetofffortheOdeon.Again,
asforthefuture,asPlatoalsosays,theopinionsofadoctor
andanignorantmanaresurelynotequallyauthoritative,
asforinstanceonthequestionwhethersomeoneisorisnot
goingtobehealthy.

151010b14.Again,inthecaseofourperceptionsthemselves
theperceptionofwhatisalienandspecial,orofwhatis
neighbouringandwhatisitsown,arenotequallyauthori
tative,butinthecaseofcolouritissight,nottaste,andinthe
caseofflavourtaste,notsightandeachofthesenever
assertsaboutthesamethinginthesametimethatitis
simultaneouslysoandsoandnotsoandso.

201010b19.Nor,eveninanothertime,wastheredispute
abouttheaffection,butonlyaboutthatinwhichtheaffection
coincidesImeanforinstancethatthesamewinemightbe
thoughtsweetatonetimeandnotsweetatanother,ifthere

Page21

isanalterationeitherinitorinthebodybutthesweetsuch
asitis,whenitis,hasneveryetaltered,andoneairwayshas
thetruthaboutit,andanythingthatisgoingtobesweetis25
suchofnecessity.Yetthisiseliminatedbyallthesetheses
justasnothinghasasubstance,sotoonothingisofnecessity.
Foritisnotpossiblethatwhatisnecessaryshouldbethusand
otherwise,sothatifanythingisofnecessityitwillnotbe
boththusandnotthus.30

1010b30.Andingeneral,ifinfactonlytheperceptible
exists,nothingwouldexistunlesslivingthingsexistedfor
therewouldbenoperception.Nowitisdoubtlesstruethat
neitherperceptiblethingsnorsenseimpressions(whichare
anaffectionofaperceiver)wouldexistbutthatthesub
jectswhichproduceperceptionwouldnotexist,eveninthe
absenceofperception,isimpossible.Forperceptionisnotof35
itself,butthereissomeotherthingtooapartfromperception,
whichisnecessarilypriortoperceptionforwhatchanges
somethingispriorinnaturetothethingchanged,andthisis1011a
sonolesseveniftheyarecalledthesethingswithreferenceto
oneanother.

Chapter6

1011a33.Some,bothamongthosewhoareconvincedbyall
thisandamongthosewhomerelystatethesethings,are
perplexedbecausetheywanttoknowwhowilljudgewhois5
healthy,andingeneraloneachsubject[whowilljudge]who
willjudgeitcorrectly.Suchperplexitiesaresimilartothe
perplexingquestion'Arewenowasleeporawake?'andthey
allhavethesameforce.Forthosewhoposethemaskforan
argumentforeverythingfortheyseekaprinciple,andthey
seektogetitthroughdemonstrationsinceitisobviousin10
theiractionsthattheyarenotactuallyconvinced.Their
troubleisjustaswehavestated:fortheyseekanargument
forsomethingforwhichthereisnoargument,foraprinciple

Page22

ofdemonstrationisnotademonstration.Thesepeoplemight
easilybeconvincedofthispoint,whichisnotahardthingto
15accept.Butthosewhoseekonlytobedefeatedintheargu
mentseektheimpossiblefortheyaskthatcontrariesbe
stated,forthwithstatingcontraries.

1011a17.Ifnoteverythingisrelativetosomething,i.e.
somethingsarealsothemselvesintheirownright,not
everythingimaginedcanbetrue.Forwhatisimaginedis
imaginedbysomeone,sothatanyonewhosaysthatevery
20thingimaginedistruemakeseverythingthatisrelativeto
something.Hencethosewhoseektobedefeatedinthe
argumentandatthesametimeasktosubjectthemselvesto
argumenthavetobecarefultosaythatitisnotwhatis
imaginedthatisbutwhatisimaginedbyhimwhoimagines
itandatthetimeandinthestyleandmannerthatitis
imagined.Iftheysubjectthemselvestoargumentbutnoton
25theseterms,theywillsoonfindthemselvesmakingcontrary
statements.Foritispossibleforthesamethingtobeimagined
honeytothesightbutnotbythetasteand,sincewehave
twoeyes,nottobeimaginedthesamebythesightofeach,
iftheirsightisdissimilar.Forinresponsetothereasons
mentionedpreviously[5.1009a38b12]formaintainingthat
30whatisimaginedistrue,andthatonthisaccounteverything
isequallyfalseandtrueforthesamethingsarenotalways
imaginedthesamebyeveryone,orevenbythesameman,
butareoftenimaginedcontraryinrespectofthesametime,
astouchsaystherearetwothingswhenthefingersarecrossed
butsightone[thereplyisthattheyareimaginedcontrary]
35notbythesameperceptionandinthesameaspectofitand
1011binthesamewayandinthesametime,sothatthiswouldbe
true.Butdoubtlessitisonthisaccountnecessarythatanyone
whomakesthestatementforthesakeofmakingitandnoton
accountofperplexityshouldstatethatthisis,nottrue,but
truetothisperson.

1011b4.Indeed,aswassaidbefore[1011a20],itisnecessary
5tomakeeverythingrelativetosomething,i.e.toopinionand

Page23

perception,sothatnothingeitherhascometobeorwillbe
withoutsomeonefirsthavingthatopinionandifthings
havecometobeorwillbe,itisplainthatnoteverythingcan
berelativetoopinion.Again,ifathingisone,1itisrelative
toonethingortosomethingdefiniteandifthesamething
isbothahalfandequal,stilltheequalisnotrelativetothe
double.Soif,relativetothatwhichhasanopinion,thesame10
thingisamanandtheobjectofOpinion,theobjectofopin
ion,notthatwhichhasit,willbeaman.Andifeachthing
istoberelativetothatwhichhasanopinion,thatwhichhas
anopinionwillberelativetothingsinfiniteinform.

1011b13.Ithasnowbeenfullyenoughstatedthatthe
opinionthatoppositeassertionsarenotsimultaneouslytrue
isthefirmestofall,andwhataretheconsequencesforthose
whomakethisstatement,andwhytheymakeit.Sinceitis15
impossibleforacontradictiontobetruesimultaneouslyof
thesamething,itisobviouslyimpossibletoothatcontraries
shouldsimultaneouslyholdgoodofthesamething.Forone
ofapairofcontrariesis,inaddition,alackalackof
substanceandalackisadenialaboutsomedefinitegenus.20
Soifitisimpossiblesimultaneouslytoaffirmanddeny
truly,itisimpossiblealsoforcontrariestoholdgoodsimul
taneously,unlesseitherbothholdgoodinacertainway,or
oneinacertainwayandtheotherbaldly.

Chapter7

1011b23.Nor,ontheotherhand,isitpossiblethatthereshouldbe
anythinginthemiddleofacontradiction,butitisnecessaryeitherto
assertortodenyanyonethingofonething.

1011b25.Thiswillbeplainifwefirstdefinewhattruth2
andfalsehoodare:fortosaythatthatwhichisisnotorthat
whichisnotis,isafalsehoodandtosaythatthatwhichisis
andthatwhichisnotisnot,istruesothat,also,heWhosays

1KeepthewordsobelizedintheOCT.

Page24

thatathingisornotwillhavethetruthorbeinerror.Butit
issaidthatneitherthatwhichisnorthatwhichisnoteither
isnotoris.

301011b29.Again,[something]willbeinthemiddleofthe
contradictioneitherinthewayinwhichwhatisgreyisinthe
middlebetweendarkandpale,orinthewayinwhich
whatisneitherofthetwoisinthemiddlebetweenamanand
ahorse.If,then,inthelatterway,itcouldnotalter,fora
thingaltersfromnotgoodintogoodorfromthatintonot
goodbutinfactitevidentlyalwaysdoes,forthereisno
35alterationexceptintooppositesandthingsinthemiddle.
1012aButifitisinthemiddle,thatwaytootherewouldbesome
sortof[processof]comingtobepalewhichwasnotfrom
notpaleandthatisnotinfactobserved.

1012a2.Again,thinkingeitheraffirmsordenieseverything
thoughtofandconceivedthisisplainfromthedefinition
wheneverithasthetruthorisinerror:wheneveritcom
poundsthingsthiswayinanassertionordenialithasthe
5truth,wheneverthisway,itisinerror.

1012a5.Again,theremustbesomethingapartfromevery
contradiction,ifthethesisisnotstatedforthesakeofstating
itsothatsomeonewillneitherhavethetruthnornothave
thetruthandtherewillbesomethingapartfromthatwhich
isandthatwhichisnot,sothattherewillbeakindof
alterationapartfrom[theprocessesof]comingtobeand
destruction.

1012a9.Again,therewillbe[amiddle]eveninthose
10generainwhichthedenialimpliesthecontrary,asforin
stanceamongnumbersanumberwhichisneitheroddnor
notoddbutthatisimpossible,asisplainfromthedefinition.

1012a12.Again,theprocessleadstoinfinity,andthe
thingsthatarewillnotbemerelyhalfasmanyagainbut
evenmore.Foritwillbepossibleinturntodenythisin

Page25

relationtotheassertionanddenial,andthis[denial]willbe
somethingforthesubstanceissomethingelsethanit.15

1012a15.Again,whensomeone,askedwhethersomething
ispale,saysthatitisnot,hehasdeniednothingelsethanits
beinganditsnotbeingisadenial.

1012a17.Somepeoplehavederivedthisopinionasthey
haveothersoftheparadoxes:unabletoresolvecaptious
argumentstheygiveintotheargumentandendorsethe
truthofitsconclusion.Whilesomestatethethesisforreasons20
ofthatkind,othersdosobecauseofseekinganargumentfor
everything.Inresponsetoallthesepeopletheoriginal[step]
isfromadefinition.Definitionarisesfromthenecessitythat
theyshouldthemselvessignifysomething,fortheformulaof
[thethingof]whichthenameisasignwillbeadefinition.

1012a24.ItseemsthatwhileHeraclitus'thesis,whichsays25
thateverythingisandisnot,makeseverythingtrue,thatof
Anaxagoras,thatthereissomethinginthemiddleofacon
tradiction,makeseverythingfalseforwhenthingsaremixed
themixtureisneithergoodnornotgood,sothatthereis
nothingtruetobesaid.

Chapter8

1012a29.Inviewofthesedistinctionsitisobviousthatthe
theseswhichsomepeoplestatesinglyandabouteverything,30
whethermaintainingthatnothingistrue(fortheyassertthat
thereisnothingtopreventeverythingbeinglikethecom
mensurabilityofadiagonal)orthateverythingistrue,
cannotholdgood.Thesethesesarepracticallythesameas
thatofHeraclitus,foranyonewhostatesthateverythingis35
trueandeverythingfalsealsostateseachofthesetheses1012b
separately,sothatiftheformerareimpossibleitisim
possiblealsothatthelattershouldbe.Again,thereare
obviouslycontradictionswhichcannotbesimultaneously
trueorallfalseeither,thoughthatmightindeedbe
thoughtthelikelierpossibilityinviewofwhathasbeensaid.

Page26

5Inresponsetoallsuchthesestherightthing,aswasalso
statedintheargumentsabove[4.1006a18],istobeg,not
thatsomethingisorisnot,butthatsomethingsignifiesso
thatwemustbasediscussiononadefinition,havingtaken
forgrantedwhat'falsehood'and'true'signify.Ifwhatis
truetoassertisnothingelsethanwhatisafalsehoodtodeny,1
10itisimpossibleforeverythingtobefalseforitisnecessary
thatoneportionofthecontradictionshouldbetrue.Again,
ifitisnecessarythateverythingbeeitherassertedordenied,
itisimpossiblethatbothofthetwoshouldbefalseforone
portionofacontradictionisafalsehood.Indeedallsuch
15thesesendupnotoriouslybyeliminatingthemselvesfor
.anyonewhosaysthateverythingistruealsomakesthe.
statementcontrarytohisowntrue,sothathisownisnot
true(forthecontrarystatementassertsthathisisnottrue),
andanyonewhosaysthateverythingisfalsesaysitofhim
self.Butifeachmakesanexceptionofthesecasestheformer
thatthecontrary[ofhisstatement]isalonenottrue,the
20latterthathisownisnotfalsetheywillendupnonetheless
begginganinfinitenumberofstatements,trueandfalse
forthestatementwhichstatesthatthetruestatementistrue
istrue,andthiswillgoontoinfinity.

1012b22.Itisobviousthatthestatementsmadebysome
peoplethateverythingisatrest,andbyothersthatevery
thingischanging,arenottrueeither.Forifeverythingisat
25rest,thesamethingswillalwaysbetrueandfalse,but
evidentlythisaltersforthespeakerdidnotexisthimself
onceandwillnotagain.Andifeverythingischanging,
nothingwillbetrue,andconsequentlyeverythingfalse:but
thathasbeenshowntobeimpossible.Again,itisnecessary
thatthatwhichisalters,sincealterationisfromsomething
intosomething.Ontheotherhanditisnotthecasethat
30everythingisatrestorchangingsometimes,andnothing
alwaysforthereissomethingwhichisalwayschangingthe
thingsthatchange,andthefirstchangerisitselfchangeless.

1Read .

Page27

MetaphysicsBookDelita

Chapter1

1012b34.WecallanORIGINthatpointofanactualthingfrom
whichsomeonewouldmovefirst,asforinstanceofalength35
oraroadthereisthisoriginhere,anotherfromthecontrary1013a
direction

1013a1.andthepointfromwhicheachthingwouldcome
tobemostsatisfactorily,asforinstanceinlearningone
shouldsometimesbeginnotfromwhatisfirst,i.e.theorigin
oftheactualthing,butfromthepointfromwhichitis
easiesttolearn

1013a4.thatconstituentfromwhichathingfirstcomes
tobe,asforinstancethekeelofashipandthefoundationof5
ahouse,andinthecaseofanimalssomebelieveitisthe
heart,somethebrain,otherswhateveritmaybeofthatkind

1013a7.andthatnonconstituentfromwhichathingfirst
comestobeandfromwhichchangeandalteration[init]
characteristicallyfirstbegin,asforinstanceachildcomes
tobeoutofitsfatherandmother,andfightingoutof10
swearing

1013a10.andthatatwhosedecisionthingschangedare
changedandthingsalteredaltered,justastheorigins
[authorities]incities,anddynastiesandkingshipsand
tyrannies,arecalledorigins,andasskillsare,especially
masterskills.

1013a14.Again,thepointfromwhichonefirstgets15
acquaintedwithanactualthingisalsocalledthething's
origin[principle],asforinstancehypothesesofdemon
strations.

Page28
a
1013 16.Causesarealsosocalledinthesamenumberof
waysforeverycauseisanorigin.

1013a17.Itisthereforecommontoeveryorigintobethe
firstpointfromwhichathingis,orcomestobe,orfrom
whichonegetsacquaintedwithitandsomeofthemare
20constituents,othersexternal.Henceanoriginmaybea
nature,anelement,athought,adecision,asubstance,or
whatathingisforforwithmanythingstheoriginbothof
acquaintanceandofchangeiswhatisgoodandwhatis
fine.

Chapter2

1013a24(PhysicsII3.194b23)WecallaCAUSE,inonesense,
25thatconstituentoutofwhichsomethingcomestobe,asfor
instancebronzeofastatueandsilverofabowl,andtheir
genera:
1013a26(PhysicsII3.194b26).inanother,theformand
pattern,thatis,theformulaofwhatitistobe,andits
genera,asforinstancetwotooneandingeneralnumberof
theoctavealsothepartsinaformula:

1013a29(PhysicsII3.194b29).again,thatfromwhichthe
30firstoriginofalterationorrest[proceeds],asforinstanceone
whoplannedsomethingisitscauseandasafatherisofhis
childandingeneralwhatproducesofwhatisproducedand
thealtererofwhatalters:

1013a32(PhysicsII3.194b32).again,asa[thing's]
fulfilment,thatis,whatitisfor,asforinstancehealthof
someone'stakingwalks(whydoeshetakewalks?'inorder
35tobehealthy',weassert,andholdthatinsosayingwehave
displayedthecause):

1013a35.(PhysicsII3.194b35)also,anythingthatcomes
tobeasameanstoafulfilmentwhenwhateffectedthechange

Page29
b
wassomethingelse,asforinstanceofhealthslimmingor1013
purgingormedicinesorinstrumentsforallthesearefor
thesakeofthefulfilment,butdifferfromoneanotherinthat
someareinstruments,othersoperations.

1013b3(PhysicsII3.195a3).Thesethenareprettywell
allthewaysinwhichcausesaresocalled.Fromtheir
beingsocalledinseveralwaysitfollowsboththatthesame5
thingsmayhaveseveralcauses,notcoincidentally,asfor
instanceastatuehasboththeartofstatuemakingand
bronze,notbyvirtueofsomeotherthingbutquastatue,yet
notinthesamesensebuttheoneasmatterandtheotheras
thatfromwhichthechange[proceeds]:andthatthingsmay
becausesofoneanother,asforinstanceexerciseoffitness10
andthelatterofexercise,yetnotinthesamesensebutoneas
fulfilmentandtheotherasoriginofchange.Again,thesame
thingmaybe[cause]ofcontraries,forwhatwhenpresentis
causeofsoandsowesometimesholdresponsiblewhenabsent
forthecontraryforashipwreck,forinstance,theabsence
ofthehelmsmanwhosepresencewascauseofpreservation.
Boththings,presenceandlack,arecauses,aseffectingthe15
change.

1013b16(PhysicsII3.195a15).Allthecausesheremen
tionedfallunderfoursenseswhicharethemostobvious.For
elementsarecausesofsyllables,andmatterofartefacts,and
fireandearthandallsuchthingsofbodies.andparts.of20
wholes,andhypothesesofaconclusion,asbeingthatoutof
which[thelatterproceed]andofthemsome,e.g.parts,
[arecause]assubject,othersthewholeandthecomposition
andtheformaswhatitistobe.Andaseed,adoctor,onewho
planned,andingeneralwhatproducesareallthatfrom
whichtheoriginofalterationorofkeepingthesame[proceeds].25
Andsomethings[arecauses]asfulfilmentsoftheothers,i.e.
astheirgoodforwhatotherthingsareforiswonttobebest,
andtobetheirfulfilment(letusassumethatthereisno
differenceincallingitgoodorimaginedgood).

Page30
b a
1013 28(PhysicsII3.195 26).These,then,arethecauses
andthisisthenumberoftheirforms.Theirsenses,though
30numerous,alsocomeunderquitefewheadings.Forcauses
aresocalledinseveralways,eventhoseofthesameformin
wayspriorandposteriortooneanotherasforinstanceof
healththedoctorandthemanofskill,oftheoctavethe
doubleandnumber,andineverycasewhatincludesanyof
theparticular[causes].

351013b34(PhysicsII3.195a32).Again,asthecoinciden
talandthegeneraofthese:asforinstanceofastatue,in
onewayPolyclitusandinanotherastatuemaker,because
1014abeingPolyclituscoincidesinastatuemakerandwhatin
cludesthecoincidental,asforinstanceamanoralsoin
generalananimaliscauseofastatuebecausePolyclitusis
amanandamanisananimal.Amongcoincidentalsalso
5somearemoreremoteandsomenearerthanothers,asfor
instanceifsomeonepaleandsomeoneartisticwerecalled
causeofastatue,1andnotjustPolyclitusoraman.1

1014a7(PhysicsII3.195b3).Andapartfrom2allthoseso
calledbothproperlyandcoincidentally,somearesocalled
asbeingcapable,othersasactuallyfunctioningofthebuild
ingofahouse,forinstance,thehousebuilderorthehouse
builderhousebuilding.

101014a10(PhysicsII3.195b6).Whatcausesarecausesof
willalsobesocalledinthewaysmentioned,asforinstanceof
thisstatueorastatueoringeneralalikeness,andofthis
bronzeorbronzeoringeneralmatterandinthesameway
inthecaseofcoincidentals.

1014a13(PhysicsII3.195b10).Again,boththeformerand
thelatterwillbesocalledincombination,asforinstancenot
15PolyclitusorstatuemakerbutPolyclitusstatuemaker.

11ThesewordsareomittedintheMSS.ofthePhysicsandbracketedinthe

OGToftheMetaphysics.
2Read .

Page31
a b
1014 15(PhysicsII3.195 12).However,allofthese
amounttosix,socalledintwoways:eitherastheparticular
orasthegenusorasthecoincidentalorasthegenusofthe
coincidentalortheseascombinedorasstatedbaldlyandall
ofthemeitherasactuallyfunctioningorinrespectofcap20
acity.Theydiffertothisextent,thatwhatisactuallyfunc
tioningandwhatisparticularisandisnotsimultaneously
withthethingsitcausesasforinstancethis[man]doctoring
withthis[man]beinghealedandthishousebuilderhouse
building1withthisthingbeingbuiltintoahouse.With
causesinrespectofcapacitythisisnotalwaysthecasefor
thehouseandthehousebuilderarenotdestroyedsimulta25
neously.

Chapter3

1014a26.Theprimaryconstituentofanycompound,when
indivisibleinformintoanotherform,iscalledanELEMENT
asforinstancetheelementsofaspokensoundarethethings
outofwhichthespokensoundiscomposedandintowhich
itdividesultimately,butwhichdonotthemselvesdivide
furtherintospokensoundsthatareotherinformiftheydo30
divide,theirportionsareofthesameform,asaportionof
wateriswater(whichisnottrueofasyllable).Equally,
thosewhospeakoftheelementsofbodiesmeanthethings
intowhichbodiesultimatelydivideandwhichdonotdivide
furtherintootherthingsdifferinginform.Whetherthereis
oneormorethanonesuchthing,thatiswhattheycallan35
element.

1014a35.Theelementsofdiagrams,andofdemonstrations
ingeneral,aresocalledinmuchthesameway.Forthe
demonstrationsthatareprimaryandconstituentsofmore1014b
thanoneotherdemonstrationarecalledelementsofdemon
strationsofthiskindaretheprimarysyllogisms,outof
three[terms]throughonemiddle.

1Read .

Page32
b
1014 3.Bytransferencefromthis,peopletermanelement
anythingwhich,beingoneandsmall,isusefulformany
5purposesthatiswhyWhatissmallandsimpleandindi
visibleisalsocalledanelement.Fromthisitcomesthatthe
mostuniversalthingsareelements,becauseeachofthem,
beingoneandsimple,isaconstituentofmanythings,orof
everything,ornearlyeverythingalsothattheoneandthe
pointarethoughtbysometobeorigins.Therefore,sincethe
10thingstermedgeneraareuniversalandindivisible(forthey
havenoformula),somepeoplecallgeneraelementsand
moresothanthedifferentiabecausethegenusismoreuni
versalforthatofwhichthedifferentiaholdsgoodimplies
thegenus,butnoteverythingofwhichthegenusholdsgood
impliesthedifferentia.

1014b14.Itiscommontoallcasesthatthefirstconstituent
15ofeachthingisanelementofeach.

Chapter4

1014b16.WecallNATURE,inonesense,thecomingtobeof
thingsthatgrow,asifoneweretopronouncetheuin'physis'
long

1014b17.inanother,thefirstconstituentoutofwhicha
growingthinggrows

1014b18.again,whatmakestheprimarychangeinany
naturallyexistingthingaconstituentofthethingquaitself.
20Allthingsaresaidtogrowwhichgainenlargementthrough
anotherthingbycontactandassimilationor(aswithem
bryos)adhesion.Assimilationdiffersfromcontact,forinthe
lattercasethereisnonecessityforanyotherthingapart
fromcontact,whileinthecaseofthingsassimilatedthereis
someonething,thesameinboth,whichmakesthemassimi
25latedinsteadofincontact,andmakesthemoneinrespectof
continuityandquantity,thoughnotinrespectofqualifi
cation.

Page33
b
1014 26.Again,thatoutofwhichanaturallyexisting
thingfirstisorcomestobe,andwhichisunstructuredand
notsubjecttolossofitsowncapacity,iscalledanature,as
forinstancebronzeiscalledthenatureofastatueandof
bronzeartefacts,woodofwoodenones,andequallyinthe30
othercasesforeachismadeoutofthese,thefirstmatter
beingconserved.Itisinthissensethattheelementsof
naturallyexistingthingsarcalsoassertedtobetheirnature
(somementioningfire,someearth,someair,somewater,
otherssomethingelseofthatkind,andotherssomeorallof35
these).

1014b35.Inanothersenseagain,thesubstanceofnaturally
existingthingsiscalledtheirnature,asforinstancethose
whosaythat[athing's]primarycompositionisitsnature,or
asEmpedoclessays:1015a
Nonehasanatureofthethingsthatare
Thereisbutmixtureandexchangeofthings
Mixedbutnature'snamemenfixonthem.

Thisexplainswhy,withthingsthatexistorcometobe
naturally,althoughthatoutofwhichitistheirnaturetobe
orcometobeisalreadypresent,westilldonotassertthat
theypossesstheirnatureiftheydonotpossesstheirformand5
shape.Whatismadeupofbothofthese,then,existsNATUR
ALLY,asforinstanceanimalsandtheirportions.Thenature
isboththefirstmatter(andthisintwoways,eitherfirst
relativetothethingitselforfirstingeneral,asforinstance
withworksofbronzethebronzeisfirstrelativetothemselves
butingeneralitisperhapswater,ifallmeltablesarewater),10
andtheformandsubstance,thatis,thefulfilmentoftheir
comingtobe.

1015a11.Bytransferencefromthiscase,allsubstancein
generalhascometobecallednature,becausenatureisalso
akindofsubstance.

1015a13.Ofallthosementioned,then,thenaturewhich
isprimaryandfundamentallysocalledisthesubstanceof

Page34

15thosethingsthatpossessanoriginofchangeinthemselves
quathemselves.Formatteriscallednaturefrombeing
recipientofthis,andcomingstobeandgrowthfrombeing
changesarisingfromit.Andtheoriginofchangeofnaturally
existingthingsisthis,beingaconstituentinaway(either
potentiallyorincompletereality).

Chapter5

201015a20.WecallNECESSARYthatwithoutwhich,asajoint
cause,itisnotpossibletolive,asforinstancebreathingand
nourishmentarenecessaryforananimal,becauseitis
incapableofexistingwithoutthem:andanythingwithout
whichitisnotpossibleforgoodtoexistorcometobe,orfor
badtobediscardedorgotridof,asforinstancedrinking
25medicineisnecessarysoasnottobeill,andsailingtoAegina
soastogetmoney.

1015a26.Again,thatwhichiscompulsory,andcompulsion
thatis,whatobstructsandthwartsaninclinationorchoice.
Forwhatiscompulsoryiscallednecessary,whichiswhyitis
alsodisagreeable,asEvenusasserts,
Nonecessarydeed
Buthasanirksomenature,
30andcompulsionisakindofnecessity,asSophoclessays,
CompulsiondoesnecessitateIdothis
andnecessity'is,rightly,thoughtofasnotopentopersuasion,
foritiscontrarytothatchangewhichisinaccordancewith
choiceandreasoning.

1015a33.Again,whenitisnotpossibleforathingtobe
otherwise,weassertthatitisnecessaryforittobeso.
35Indeedtheothersareallinsomewaycallednecessaryby
virtueofthis.Forwhatiscompulsoryiscallednecessary
1015beithertodoortosufferwhenitisnotpossibletofollow
inclinationonaccountofthatwhichcompels,necessitybeing

Page35

thatonaccountofwhichitisnotpossibletodootherwise
andthesameistrueinthecaseofthejointcausesofliving
andofgood,forwhenitisnotpossiblethatintheOnecase
goodandintheothercaselivingshouldexistwithoutcertain5
things,thosethingsarenecessaryandthatcauseisakindof
necessity.Again,demonstrationisamongthethingsthatare
necessary,becauseitisnotpossibleforathingtobeotherwise
ifithasbeendemonstratedbaldlythecauseofthisisthe
initial[premisses],ifthethingsfromwhichthereasoning
proceedsareincapableofbeingotherwise.

1015b9.Withsomethings,then,anotherthingisthecause10
oftheirbeingnecessarywithothersnothingis,buton
accountofthemotherthingsareofnecessity.Itfollowsthat
theprimary,andfundamentally,necessarythingisthat
whichissimpleforitisnotpossiblethatthisshouldbein
morethanonestate,northereforethusandotherwisefor
itwouldtherebybeinmorethanonestate.Consequently,
iftherearecertaininvariableandchangelessthings,thereis15
nothingcompulsoryorunnaturalinthem.

Chapter6

1015b16.ThingsarecalledONEeithercoincidentallyorin
theirownright:coincidentallyasforinstanceCoriscusand
theartisticandartisticCoriscus(foritisthesamethingto
say'Coriscusandtheartistic'1and'artisticCoriscus')and
theartisticandthejustandartisticandjustCoriscus.Forall20
thesearecalledonecoincidentally,thejustandtheartistic
becausetheycoincideinonesubstance,theartisticand
Coriscusbecauseonecoincidesintheother.Equallythe
artisticCoriscusisinacertainsenseonewithCoriscus
becauseoneoftheportionsintheformulacoincidesinthe25
other,ImeantheartisticinCoriscusandtheartistic
CoriscuswithjustCoriscusbecauseapartofeachcoincides
inthesameonething.Thesameistrueifthecoincidentalis

1Omit .

Page36

spokenofinthecaseofagenusorinthecaseofthenamesof
30somethinguniversal,asforinstancethatamanandan
artisticmanarethesamethingforitiseitherbecausethe
artisticcoincidesinwhatisonesubstance,theman,or
becausebothcoincideinacertainparticularthing,asfor
instanceCoriscus(exceptthattheydonotbothholdgood
inthesamemannersbutonedoubtlessasagenusandinthe
substance,theotherasastateoraffectionofthesubstance).
35Everythingcalledonecoincidentally,then,issocalledin
thissense.

1015b36.Ofthingscalledoneintheirownright,someare
1016asocalledfrombeingcontinuous,asforinstanceabundle
fromitsticandplanksofwoodfromtheirglueandaline,
evenifbent,iscalledoneifitiscontinuous,asiseachpart
[ofthebody],asforinstancealegandanarm.Butamong
thesewhatisnaturallycontinuousismoreonethanwhatis
5artificiallyso.Wecallcontinuousthatwhosechangeinits
ownrightisoneandcannotbeotherwiseandachangeis
onewhenindivisible,andindivisibleinrespectoftime.
Whateverisonenotbycontactiscontinuousinitsown
rightforifyouputplanksincontactwithoneanotheryou
willnotassertthattheseareoneplankorbodyoranything
elsecontinuous.Continuousthingsingeneral,then,are
10calledoneeveniftheyhaveabendsbutstillmorethosethat
havenobend,asforinstancetheshinorthighmorethanthe
legbecauseitispossibleforachangeofthelegnottobeone
[change].Alsoastraightlineismoreonethanabentline
thelinethatisbentandhasananglewecallbothoneand
15notonesbecauseitispossibleforachangetobemadeinit
bothallatonceandnotallatonce,butthatinastraight
lineisalwaysmadeallatonceandnoportionhavingmagni
tudeisatrestwhileanotherchanges,ashappenswiththe
bentline.

1016a17.Inanothersenseagain,athingiscalledone
fromitssubject'sbeingundifferentiatedinform,anditis
undifferentiatedifitsformisperceptuallyindivisible.And

Page37

thesubjectiseitherthefirstorthelastrelativetothefinal20
stateforwineiscalledoneandsoiswater,inthattheyare
indivisibleinrespectofform,andjuices(asforinstanceoil
andwine)andmeltablesareallcalledonebecausethe
ultimatesubjectofallofthemisthesameforallthese
thingsarewaterorair.

1016a24.Thingsarealsocalledonewhosegenusisone,
beingdifferentiatedbyoppositedifferentiaeandthesearc25
allcalledonebecausethegenuswhichisthesubjectoftheir
differentiaeisone(asforinstanceahorse,aman,andadog
areonesomethingbecauseallanimals)inmuchthesame
sense,indeed,asthethingswhosematterisone.These
thingsaresometimescalledoneinthisway,butsometimes1
thegenusaboveiscalledthesame,iftheyarethelastforms30
ofthegenusthatwhichisfurtherabovethese2asfor
instancetheisoscelesandtheequilateralareoneandthe
samefigurebecausebothtriangles,buttheyarenotthesame
triangles.

1016a32.Again,thingsarecalledonewhentheformula
sayingwhatitistobeisindivisiblerelativetoanother
formulawhichindicatestheactualthing(fortakenbyitself
everyformulaisdivisible).Forinthiswaywhathasgrown35
andisdiminishingisone,becauseitsformulaisone,asisthat
oftheforminthecaseofplanes.Ingeneralwhenthecon1016b
ceptionwhichconceiveswhatitistobecertainthingsis
indivisibleandcannotseparatethemintimeorplaceor
formula,theyaremostofallone,andthosethataresub
stancesmostofallamongthese.(Forwheneverthingsare
withoutdivision,theyareuniversallycalledoneinthat
respectinwhichtheyarewithoutit,asforinstanceiftheyare5
withoutdivisionquamantheyareoneman,ifquaanimalone
animal,ifquamagnitudeonemagnitude).

1016b6.Whilemostthings,then,arecalledonefrom
eitherdoingorpossessingorbeingaffectedbyorbeing

1Omit .
2
Read .

Page38

relatedtosomeotherthingthatisone,thethingscalledone
intheprimarywayarethosewhosesubstanceisone,and
oneeitherincontinuityorinformorinformulaforthings
10whicheitherarenoncontinuousordonothaveoneformor
donothaveoneformulaweinfactreckonasmorethanone
thing.

1016b11.Again,althoughinawayweassertthatany
thingwhateverisonewhichisaquantityandcontinuous,
inawaywedonotifitisnotsomekindofwhole,thatis,if
itdoesnotpossessoneformasforinstanceifweobservedthe
partsofashoeputtogetheranyhowweshouldnotsoreadily
15assertthattheywereone(unlessonaccountoftheircon
tinuity),butonlyiftheywereputtogetherinsuchawayas
tobeashoeandtherebypossesssomeoneform.Thatiswhy
acircularlineisofalllinesmostone,becauseitiswholeand
complete.

1016b17.Tobeoneistobeakindoforiginofnumber1
forafirstmeasureisanorigin,forwhatfirstmakeseach
20genusintelligibletousisitsfirstmeasure.Theorigin,there
fore,ofouracquaintancewitheach[kindof]thingisthat
whichisone.Butthatwhichisoneisnotthesamethingin
everygenusforitmaybehereaquartertone,thereavowel
ormute,andanotherthinginthecaseofweightandsome
thingelseinthecaseofchange.Butineverycasethatwhich
isoneisindivisibleeitherinquantityorinform.Nowwhatis
25indivisibleinrespectofquantityinalldimensionsiscalled
aunitifithasnoposition,apointKithasposition,andwhat
isdivisibleinrespectofquantityinonedimensionisaline,in
twoaplane,inallthreeabody.Inthereverseorder,what
isdivisibleintwodimensionsisaplane,inonedimensiona
line,andwhatisdivisibleinnodimensionsinrespectof
30quantityisapointandunit,theunitbeingwithoutposition,
thepointwithposition.

1Read .

Page39
b
1016 31.Again,somethingsareoneinrespectofnumber,
someinrespectofform,someinrespectofgenus,somein
respectofanalogy:innumberthingswhosematterisone,in
formthingswhoseformulaisone,ingenusthingswhose
figureofpredicationisthesame,inrespectofanalogyany
thingsrelatedasaretwofurtherthings.Ineverycasethe35
earlierimplythelater,asforinstancewhatisoneinnumber
isalsooneinformbutwhatisoneinformisnotallinnum
ber,andwhateverisoneinformisalloneingenusbutwhat1017a
isingenusisnotallinformitis,however,inanalogy,but
whatisinanalogyisnotallingenus.

1017a3.ItisobviousthatwhatisMANYwillbesocalledin
oppositewaystowhatisone.Forsomethingswillbemany
frombeingnoncontinuous,somefrompossessingmatter5
(eitherthefirstorthelast)whichisdivisibleinrespectof
form,somefromhavingmorethanoneformulasayingwhat
itistobe.

Chapter7

1017a7.ThatwhichISmaybesocalledeithercoincidentally
orinitsownright:coincidentally,asforinstanceweassert
someonejusttobeartistic,andamanartistic,andsomeone
artisticamaninmuchthesamewayaswesaythatsomeone10
artisticbuilds,becausebeingartisticcoincidesinahouse
builderorahousebuilderinsomeoneartistic(for'thatthisis
this'signifies'thatinthisthiscoincides').Andsoitisinthe
casesmentionedforwhenwesaythatamanisartisticand
someoneartisticaman,orthatsomeonepaleisartisticorthe15
latterpale,intheonecaseitisbecausebothcoincideinthe
samethingandintheotherbecauseitcoincidesinathing
thatiswhiletheartisticisamanbecausetheartistic
coincidesinthelatter(itisinthiswaythatthenotpaleis
saidtobe,becausewhatitcoincidesinis).Thingssaidtobe

Page40

20coincidentally,then,aresosaidinthisway:eitherbecause
bothholdgoodofthesamethingthatis,orbecausethe
formerholdsgoodofathingthatis,orbecausethething
itself,ofwhichthatofwhichitisitselfpredicatedholds
good,is.

1017a22.Allthingswhichsignifythefiguresofpredication
aresaidtobeintheirownrightfor'tobe'signifiesinthe
samenumberofwaysastheyaresaid.Since,therefore,
25amongthingspredicatedsomesignifywhatathingis,some
aqualification,someaquantity,somearelative,somedoing
orbeingaffected,somewhere,somewhen,'tobe'signifies
thesamethingaseachofthese.Forthereisnodifference
between'amanisonethatkeepshealthy'and'aman
keepshealthy'orbetween'amanisonethatwalks,orcuts'
30and'amanwalks,orcuts',andequallyintheothercases.

1017a31.Again,'tobe'and'is'signifythatathingistrue,
and'nottobe'thatitisnottruebutafalsehood,equallyin
thecaseofaffirmationandofdenialasforinstancethat
Socratesisartistic,thatthisistrue,orthatSocratesisnot
35pale,thatitistrueand'adiagonalisnotcommensurable'
thatitisafalsehood.

1017b1017a35.Again,'tobe'and'thatwhichis'signifythoseof
thethingsmentionedwhicharepotentiallyandthosewhich
areincompleterealityforboththatwhichseespotentially
andthatwhichseesincompleterealityweasserttobea
thingthatsees,andinthesamewayboththatwhichis
5capableofusingknowledgeandthatwhichisusingitwe
asserttoknow,andboththatofwhichrestalreadyholds
goodandthatwhichiscapableofbeingatrestweassert
tobeatrest.Equallyinthecaseofsubstancesalsoforboth
theidolinthestoneandthehalfofalineandthegrainwhich
isnotyetripeweasserttobe.Whenathingisorisnotyet
capablemustbedefinedelsewhere[D12].

Page41

Chapter8

1017b10.WecallaSUBSTANCEbothsimplebodies,asfor10
instanceearthandfireandwaterandeverythingofthat
kind,andbodiesingeneralandthethingsconstitutedoutof
themanimalsanddeitiesandtheportionsoftheseall
thesearecalledsubstancebecausetheyarenotsaidofa
subjectbuttherestaresaidofthem:

1017b14.inanothersense,anyconstituentofsuchthings15
(thethingsnotsaidofasubject)whichiscauseoftheirbeing,
asforinstancethesoulinthecaseofananimal:

1017b17.again,thoseconstituentportionsofsuchthings
whichdefineandsignifyathisandwithwhoseelimination
thewholethingiseliminated,asforinstancethebodywith
theplane's(assomeassert)andtheplanewiththeline'sin20
generalitisthoughtbysomethatnumberisofthiskind,on
thegroundsthatwhenitiseliminatedthereisnothing,and
itdefineseverything.

1017b21.Again,whatitistobe,theformulaofwhichisa
definitionsisalsocalledeachthing'ssubstance.

1017b23.Itfollows,then,thatasubstanceissocalledin25
twosenses:boththeultimatesubject,whichisnotfurther
saidofanythingelseandwhatever,beingathis,isalso
separable(suchiseachthing'sshapeandform).

Chapter9

1017b27.SomethingsarecalledTHESAMEcoincidentally,as
forinstancethepaleandtheartisticarethesamething30
becausetheycoincideinthesamething,andmanandartistic
becauseoneofthemcoincidesintheotherandtheartistic
[is]amanbecauseitcoincidesintheman.Andthelatteris
thesameaseachoftheothertwoandeachofthemasit,for
boththemanandtheartisticareinfactcalledthesame

Page42

thingasthemanwhoisarcticandheasthem.Thisexplains
whyallthesethingsarenotspokenofuniversallyforitisnot
truetosaythateverymanandthearcticarethesame
35thing,foruniversalsholdgoodintheirownrightandthings
1018athatarecoincidentalarenotintheirownright.Butinthe
caseofparticularswedosospeakbaldly,forSocratesand
artisticSocratesarethoughttobethesamething.But
'Socrates'doesnotapplytoanumberofthings,hencewedo
notsay'everySocrates'aswesay'everyman'.

51018a4.Somethings,then,arecalledthesameinthisway
othersintheirownright,inasmanywaysasthatwhichis
one.Forthingswhosematterisone,eitherinformor
number,arecalledthesame,andthingswhosesubstanceis
onesothatitisobviousthatsamenessisakindofoneness,
eitherofthebeingofmorethanonethingorwhenathingis
treatedasmorethanone(asforinstancewhensomeonesays
thatathingisthesameasitself,whichistotreatitastwo
things).

101018a9.WecallthingsOTHERwheneithertheirformsor
theirmatterortheformulaoftheirsubstanceismorethan
oneandingeneralwhatisotherissocalledinoppositeways
towhatisthesame.

1018a12.WecallDIFFERINGanythingswhichareother
whilebeingthesamesomething,notonlyinnumberbut
eitherinformoringenusorinanalogyagain,thingswhose
genusisotherandcontrariesandanythingswhichpossess
othernessintheirsubstance.

151018a15.WecallSIMILARboththingswhoseaffectionsare
thesameineverywayandthingsmoreofwhoseaffections
arethesamethanotherandthosewhosequalityisone.And
whathasthegreaternumberorthemorefundamentalof
thosecontrariesinrespectofwhichitispossibleforsomething
tobemodified,issimilartothatthing.

1018a18.ThingsareDISSIMILARinwaysoppositetothose
inwhichthingsaresimilar.

Page43

Chapter10

1018a20.WecallOPPOSITEScontradiction,andcontraries,20
andrelatives,andlackandpossession,andthe[points]from
whichandtowhichcomingstobeanddestructionsultimately
[lead].Andwheneveritisnotpossibleforthingstobesimul
taneouslypresentinthatwhichisrecipientofbothofthem,
thesearesaidtobeopposed,eitherthemselvesorthethings
theyare[made]outofforgreyandwhitedonotholdgood25
simultaneouslyofthesamething,becausethethingstheyare
[made]outofareopposed.

1018a25.WecallCONTRARIESboththoseamongthethings
thatdifferinrespectofgenuswhicharenotcapableofbeing
presentsimultaneouslyinthesamethingandthethingsthat
differmostamongthoseinthesamegenusandthethings
thatdiffermostamongthoseinthesamerecipientandthe
thingsthatdiffermostamongthoseunderthesamecapacity30
andthethingswhosedifferenceisgreatesteitherbaldlyorin
respectofgenusorinrespectofform.Theremainingcon
trariesaresocalledeitherfrompossessingsuchasthese,or
frombeingrecipientofthem,orfrombeingproductiveofor
affectiblebythem,or[inprocessof]producingorbeing
affectedbythemorarelossesoracquisitionsorpossessions
orlacksofthem.35

1018a35.Sincethatwhichisoneandthatwhichismaybe
socalledinseveralways,theyarenecessarilyfollowedby
theotherthingsthatarespokenofinrespectofthesehence
thatwhichisthesameandthatwhichisotherandthatwhichis
contraryareotherinrespectofeachpredication.

1018a38.WecallOTHERINFORMbothanythingsthatare1018b
ofthesamegenusbutnotsubordinatetooneanotherand
anythingsthatareinthesamegenusbutpossesssome
differenceandanythingsthatpossesscontrarietyintheir
substance.Andcontrariesareotherinformfromoneanother,
eitherallofthemorthosesocalledintheprimarywayalso

Page44

5anythingswhoseformulaeareotherinthelastformoftheir
genus,asforinstanceamanandahorseareinseverablein
genusbuttheirformulaeareotheralsoanythingswhichare
inthesamesubstancebutpossesssomedifference.

1018b7.Thingsspokenofinwaysoppositetothesearethe
sameinform.

Chapter11

1018b9.WecallthingsPRIORandPOSTERIORasfollows.
10Sinceineachgenussomethingisprimaryandtheorigin,a
thingmaybepriorfrombeingneareracertainorigin,
definedeitherbaldlyandbyitsnatureorwithreferenceto
acertainthingorsomewhereorbycertainpeople.Inrespect
ofplace,forinstance,[thingsareprior]frombeingnearerto
someplacedefinedeitherbytheirnature(asforinstancethe
middleortheend)orwithreferencetoachanceobjectand
15whatisfurtherawayisposterior.Inrespectoftime[things
areprior]either,inthecaseofwhathascometobe,from
beingfurtherfromthepresent(fortheTrojanWarsare
priortothePersianbecausetheyarefurtherdistantfromthe
present)or,inthecaseofwhatistocome,frombeingnearer
tothepresent(fortheNemeanGamesarepriortothe
Pythianbecausenearertothepresent,treatedasoriginand
20primary).Inrespectofchange,whatisnearertheprimary
bringerofchangeisprior,asforinstancechildtomanand
thistooisakindoforigin,takenbaldly.Inrespectofcapacity,
thingswhichexceedincapacity,i.e.themorecapable,are
prior.Suchisthatwhosedecisionitisnecessaryfortheother,
25posterior,thingtofollow,sothatthelatterischangedwhen
itchangesitandwhennotnotthedecisionistheorigin.In
respectofarrangement,thatis,wheneverthereisaformula
rankingthingswithreferencetosomeonedefinedthing,a
secondranker,forinstance,ispriortoathirdrankeranda
nexttobottomstringtoabottomonetheoriginbeingin

Page45

theonecasetheleader,intheotherthemiddlestring.These
things,then,arecalledpriorinthissense.30

1018b30.Inanothersense,whatispriorinacquaintanceis
[treated]asalsopriorbaldly.

1018b31.Butamongthesethecasesofaformulaandof
perceptionaredifferent:inrespectoftheformulauniversals
areprior,inrespectofperceptionparticulars.Also,inre
spectoftheformulathecoincidentalispriortothewhole35
thing,asforinstancetheartistictotheartisticmanfor
withouttheparttheformulawillnotbewhole.Andyetit
isnotpossibletobeartisticwithoutbeinganartisticsome
thing.

1018b37.Again,theaffectionsofwhatispriorarecalled
prior,asforinstancestraightnesstosmoothnessfortheone
isanaffectionofalineinitsownright,theotherofasurface.1019a

1019a1.Besidesthingscalledpriorandposteriorinthis
way,athingispriorinrespectofitsnatureandsubstance
whenitispossibleforittobewithoutotherthingsbutnot
themwithoutit:thisdivisionwasusedbyPlato.Butsince
therearemanywaysofbeing,firstly,thesubjectispriorand5
forthatreasonthesubstanceispriorbut,secondly,there
isadifferencebetweenthecasesofcapacityandcomplete
reality,somethingsbeingpriorinrespectofcapacity,somein
respectofcompletereality.Half[ofaline],forinstance,[is
prior]inrespectofcapacitytothewhole[line],andthe
portiontothewhole,andmattertosubstancebutinrespect
ofcompleterealitytheyareposterior,forwhentheothers10
aredissolvedtheywillbeincompletereality.

1019a11.Inacertainsense,everythingcalledpriorand
posteriorissocalledinrespectoftheselastforitispossible
forsomethingstobewithouttheothersinrespectofcoming
tobe,asforinstanceawholewithoutitspartsandforothers
inrespectofdestruction,asforinstanceaportionwithout
thewhole.Equallyintheothercasesalso.

Page46

Chapter12

151019a15.WecallaCAPACITYwhatoriginatesachangeor
alterationeitherinanotherthingorquaother,asforinstance
housebuildingisacapacitywhichisnotaconstituentofthe
thingbeingbuilt,butdoctoring,whichisacapacity,might
beaconstituentofthethingbeingdoctored,butnotofit
quabeingdoctored.

1019a19.Wecallacapacitywhatoriginatesanalteration
20orchangenotonlyinthiswayinanotherthingorquaother,
butalsobytheagencyofanotherthingorquaother.Forinany
respectinwhichathingaffectedisatallaffected,weassertit
tobecapableofbeingaffectedsometimeswhateverthe
affection,sometimesnotinrespectofeveryaffectionbutifit
isforthebetter.

1019a23.Again,thereisthe[capacity]toperformthus
satisfactorilyoratwill.Forthosewhohaveonlygotaboutor
25spoken,butnotsatisfactorilyornotastheychose,wesome
timesassertnottobecapableofspeakingorwalkingand
equallytoointhecaseofbeingaffected.

1019a26.Again,anystateinrespectofwhichathingis
whollyunaffectibleorunalterableornoteasytochangefor
theworseiscalledacapacity.Forthingsgetbrokenand
crushedandbentandgenerallydestroyednotfrombeing
30capablebutfrombeingnotcapableandinsomewayde
ficient.Athingisunaffectiblebysuchtreatmentifowing
toacapacityi.e.frombeingcapableandinsomestateor
otheritdoesnotgetaffectedeasily,orseriously.Thoseare
allthewaysinwhichcapacitiesaresocalled.

1019a33.ThingscalledCAPABLEinonesensewillbethose
35whichoriginatechangeoralteration(forwhatcankeepa
thingthesameisinawayalsocapable)inotherthingsor
1019bquaotherinanothersense,ifsomethingelsepossessessuch
acapacityovertheminanothersense,iftheypossessthe

Page47

capacitytoaltersomehoworother,whetherfortheworseor
forthebetter.(Forathingin[processof]destructionis
thoughttobecapableofbeingin[processof]destructionor
itwouldnotbedestroyed,ifitwereincapable.Asthingsare,
itpossessesacertaindispositionto,andcauseandoriginof,5
thiskindofaffection.Sometimes,then,itisthoughttobe
suchfrompossessingsomething,sometimesfromlacking.
Butifalackisinawayapossession,allwouldbesofrom
possessingsomething,1sothatthingsarecapablebothfrom
possessingasortofpossessionandorigin,andfrompossessing10
thelackofthis,ifitispossibletopossessalackor,ifthatis
notpossible,homonymously.1)[Thingsarecalledcapable]
inanothersenseifneitherotherthingsnor[they]quaother
possessacapacityfor,orwilloriginate,theirdestruction.
Again,allthesethings[arecalledcapable]eithermerely
becausetheymightturnouttocometobeornottocometo
be,orbecausetheymightdososatisfactorily.Forthelatter
kindofcapacityisinherentevenininanimatethings,asfor
instanceininstrumentsforpeopleassertthatonelyreis
capableofsounding,butanothernotatall,ifitisoutof15
tune.

1019b15.INCAPACITYislackofcapacity,i.e.ofthekindof
origindescribed,eitheringeneralorbysomethingwhich
characteristicallypossessesitorevenatatimealready
characteristicofitspossession.Forpeoplewouldnotassert
inthesamewaythataboy,agrownman,andaeunuchare
incapableofbegetting.Again,correspondingtoeachofthe
twocapacities(formerelychangingthings,andforchanging20
themsatisfactorily)thereisanoppositeincapacity.

1019b21.SomethingsarealsocalledINCAPABLEinrespect
ofthisincapacity.

1019b22.Butthereisanothersenseinwhichthingscanbe
bothcapableandincapable[POSSIBLEandIMPOSSIBLE].That
ofwhichthecontraryistrueofnecessityisimpossibleas

1Put attheendofthesentence.

Page48

25forinstancethatadiagonalbecommensurable,because
suchathingisafalsehoodofwhichthecontraryisnotonly
truebutalsoanecessity.1Consequently,thatitiscommen
surableisnotonlyafalsehoodbutalsoafalsehoodofneces
sity.Thecontraryofthis,thepossible,2[occurs]wheneverit
isnotnecessarythatthecontrarybeafalsehoodasfor
instanceitispossiblethatamanbesittingdown,foritisnot
30ofnecessityafalsehoodthatheisnotsittingdown.Inone
sense,then,thepossible,asstated,signifieswhatisnotof
necessityafalsehoodinanotherwhatistrueandinanother
whatadmitsofbeingtrue.

1019b33.Acapacity[POWER]ingeometryissocalledby
transference.

1019b34.Thesethings,then,arecapablenotinrespectofa
35capacity.Thosewhicharesocalledinrespectofacapacity
1020aareallsocalledwithreferencetotheonewhichisprimary,
thatis,theoriginofalterationinsomethingelseorqua
somethingelse.Fortheothersarecalledcapableeitherfrom
somethingelse'spossessingacapacityofthatkindoverthem,
orfromitsnotpossessingit,orfromitspossessingitinapar
ticularwayandequallywiththingswhichareincapable.
5Itfollowsthatthefundamentaldefinitionoftheprimary
capacitymustbe:whatoriginatesalterationinsomething
elseorquasomethingelse.

Chapter13

1020a7.WecallaQUANTITYwhatisdivisibleintocon
stituentseachofwhichhasthenatureofaoneandathis.A
certainquantityisapluralityifitiscountable,amagnitude
10ifitismeasurablethatwhichispotentiallydivisibleinto
noncontinuouspartsiscalledaplurality,intocontinuousa
magnitude.Ofmagnitudesthosewhicharecontinuousin
onedimensionarelengths,intwobreadths,inthreedepths.

1Omit .

2Read .

Page49

Ofthese,limitedpluralityisanumber,lengthaline,
breadthasurface,depthabody.

1020a14.Again,somethingsarecalledacertainquantity15
intheirownright,otherscoincidentally,asforinstancealine
isacertainquantityinitsownright,theartisticcoinciden
tally.

1020a17.Ofthoseintheirownrightsomearesoinrespect
oftheirsubstance,asforinstancealineisacertainquantity
for'acertainquantity'isaconstituentoftheformulawhich
sayswhatitis.Othersareaffectionsandstatesofsucha20
substance,asforinstancethemuchandthelittle,andlong
andshort,andbroadandnarrow,anddeepandshallow,and
theothersofthatkind.Boththelargeandthesmall,and
largerandsmaller,whensocalledbothintheirownright
andwithreferencetooneanother,areaffectionsofaquantity25
intheirownright.However,thesenamesarealsotransferred
tootherthings.

1020a26.Ofthingscalledquantitiescoincidentally,some
aresocalledinthewayinwhichitwassaid[1020a1417]
thattheartisticandthepalearequantities,fromtherebeinga
certainquantityofwhichtheyholdgoodothersaschanges
andtimes,forthesearealsocalledcertainquantitiesand
continuous,fromthosethingsofwhichtheyareaffections30
beingdivisibleImeannotthethingbeingChangedbut
that[amountby]whichitwaschangedforfromthatbeing
aquantitythechangeisaquantityalso,andthetimefrom
itsbeing.

Chapter14

1020a33.WecallaQUALIFICATION,inonesense,thedifferen
tiaofasubstance,asforinstanceamanisananimalqualified
inacertainwaybecauseheistwolooted,ahorsebecause
itisfourfootedandacircleisafigurequalifiedinacertain35

Page50
b
1020 waybecauseitiswithoutanglesthedifferentiainrespectof
substancebeingaquality.Thisisonesenseinwhichaquality
issocalled.

1020b2.Anothersenseisexemplifiedbychangelessthings
andmathematicalobjects,asinthecaseofnumbersbeing
qualifiedincertainways(e.g.composite[numbers]which,
5beingofmorethanonedimension,arerepresentedbyaplane
andasolid,i.e.xtimesyandxtimesytimesz)andingeneral
anyconstituentofthesubstanceapartfromquantity.(For
thesubstanceofeachthingiswhat[it]isonce,asforinstance
whatsixis,nottwoorthreetimes,butonceforsixisonce
six.)

1020b8.Again,anyaffectionsofchangingsubstances,as
10forinstancehotnessandcoldness,andpalenessanddarkness,
heavinessandlightness,andallofthatkind.Bodiesarealso
saidtobemodifiedinrespectofalterationsofthese.

1020b12.Again,[therearequalities]inrespectofexcel
lenceandbadness,andingeneralthebadandgood.

1020b13.Approximately,aqualificationcouldbesocalled
intwosenses,andoftheseoneisthemostfundamental.
15Fortheprimaryqualityisthedifferentiaofasubstance(this
includesthequalityinanumber,forthatisakindof
differentiaofsubstances,butnotofchangeablesornotof
themquachanging).Othersaretheaffectionsofchangeables
quachanging,andthedifferentiaeofchanges.Theaffections
includeexcellenceandbadness,fortheseindicatedifferentiae
20ofchangeandofactualfunctioninginrespectofwhichthings
in[processof]changeactorareaffectedsatisfactorilyornot.
Forwhatiscapableofchangingorfunctioninginthiswayis
goodwhatinthatthecontraryway,evil.Thegoodand
thebadsignifyqualificationinthecaseoflivingthings
especially,andamongthemespeciallyinthecaseofthose
25whichpossess[thepowerof]choice.

Page51

Chapter15

1020b26.SomethingsarecalledRELATIVEasdoubleis
relativetohalfandtriplerelativetoathird,andingeneral
multiplerelativetosubmultipleandexceedingrelativeto
exceededothersastheabletoheatisrelativetotheheatable
andtheabletocutrelativetothecurable,andingeneral30
theabletoactrelativetotheaffectibleandothersasthe
measurableisrelativetothemeasure,andknowablerelative
toknowledge,andperceptiblerelativetoperception.

1020b32.Thefirstkindarecallednumerical[relatives],
eitherbaldlyorinadefiniteway,andrelativetothemselves
ortoone.Forinstance:thedoubleisadefinitenumber
relativetoonethemultipleisrelatedtoonenumerically,35
butnotbyanydeflatenumbersuchasthisorthistheone1021a
andahalfisrelatedtoitsreciprocalbyadeflatenumber
relativetoanumbertheoneandabitisrelatedtoits
reciprocalbyanindefinitenumber,asthemultipleisrelated
toone.Theexceedingisnumericallywhollyindefinite
relativetotheexceededforanumberiscommensurable5
andnumberisnotsaidofthenoncommensurable,butthe
exceedingis,relativetotheexceeded,somuchandsomething
again,andthisisindefiniteforitisaschancehasit,eider
equalornotequal.Theerelatives,then,areallcalled
numericalrelativesandaffectionsofnumber.

1021a9.Soagain,inanothersense,aretheequaland
similarandthesame.Fortheyareallsocalledinrespectof10
theoneforthingsarethesamewhosesubstanceisone,
similarwhinequalityisone,equalwhosequantityisone.
Andtheoneistheoriginandmeasureofanumber,sothat
allthesearecallednumericalrelative,butnotinthesame
sense.

1021a14.Thingsabletoactandaffectible[arerelative]15
inrespectoftheircapacitytoactandbeaffectedandthe
actualfunctioningoftheecapacitiesasforinstancethe

Page52

abletoheatisrelativetotheheatablebecauseitiscapable,
andinturntheheatingisrelativetothebeingheatedandthe
cuttingtothebeingcutinthattheyareactuallyfunctioning.
Numericalrelativesdonothaveactualfunctioningsexcept
20inasensedescribedelsewhereactualfunctioningsinvolving
changedonotholdgoodofthem.Withsomerelativesin
respectofcapacityatemporalreferenceisincludedinthe
statementOftherelation,asforinstancewhathasproduced
relativetowhathasbeenproducedandwhatwillproduce
relativetowhatwillbeproduced.Forafatheriscalled
fatherofhissoninthiswayforoneofthemisathingthat
hasproducedandtheotherathingthathasbeenaffected
25isinacertainway.

1021a25.Again,somethings[arerelatives]inrespectofa
lackofcapacity,astheincapableandanythingelsespoken
ofinthatway,asforinstancetheinvisible.

1021a26.Thingscallednumericalrelativesorrelativesin
respectofcapacityareallrelativesfrombeingcalledjust
whattheyareofsomethingelse,notfromtheotherthing
beingrelativetothem.Butthemeasurableandtheknow
30ableandthethinkablearecalledrelativesfromsomething
elsebeingcalled[whatitis]relativetothem.For'thinkable'
signifiesthatthereexiststhoughtofit,butthethoughtisnot
relativetothatofwhichitisathought(forthenweshould
havesaidthesamethingtwice).Andequally,sightisthe
1021bsightofsomething,notofthatofwhichitisthesight(al
thoughitistruetosaythat)butrelativetocolourorsome
othersuchthing.Theotherwayweshallbesayingthesame
thingtwice:'sightisofthatofwhichsightis.'

1021b3.Ofthingscalledrelativesintheirownright,then,
somearesocalledinthewaysmentionedothersiftheir
5generaareofthosekinds,asforinstancedoctoringisamong
therelativesbecauseitsgenus,knowledge,isthoughttobe
arelative

Page53
b
1021 6.again,allthosethingsinrespectofWhichtheir
possessorsarccalledrelativesasforinstanceequalityisa
relativebecausetheequalisandsimilaritybecausethe
similaris

1021b8.otherthingscoincidentallyasforinstanceaman
isarelativebecausebeingdoublecoincidesinhim,andthat10
isamongtherelativesorthepale,ifbeingdoubleandpale
coincideinthesamething.

Chapter16

1021b12.WecallCOMPLETE,inonesense,thatoutsidewhich
notevenoneportionistobefound,asforinstancethecom
pletetimeofeachthingisthatoutsidewhichthereisnotime
tobefoundwhichispartofthattime:

1021b14.also,thatwhichinrespectofexcellenceand15
goodnesscannotbesurpassedrelativetoitsgenus,asfor
instanceadoctoriscompleteandaflautistiscompletewhen
theyarewithoutdeficiencyinrespectoftheformoftheir
ownproperexcellence.Itisinthiswaythat,transferringitto
thecaseofbadthings,wespeakofacompletescandalmonger
andacompletethiefasindeedweevencallthemgood:
agoodthiefandagoodscandalmonger,Andexcellenceis20
akindofcompletion,foreachthingiscompleteandevery
substanceiscompletewheninrespectoftheformofitsown
properexcellencenoportionofitsnaturalmagnitudeis
deficient.

1021b23.Again,thingswhichhavereachedtheirfulfil
ment,whenitisworthwhile,arecalledcomplete,forthey
arecompletebyvirtueofhavingattainedtheirfulfilment25
sothat,sinceafulfilmentissomethingultimate,wealsosay,
transferringittothecaseofworthlessthings,thatathinghas
beencompletelyspoiltandcompletelydestroyedwhenthere
isnodeficiencyinitsdestructionandbadnessbutithas
reachedtheultimate.(Thatiswhyevenlife'sendisby

Page54

transferencecalledafulfilment,becausebotharcultimate.
30A[thing's]fulfilment,i.e.whatitisfor,isultimate.)

1021b30.This,then,isthenumberofwaysinwhichthings
calledcompleteintheirownrightaresocalled:somefrom
theirbeingwithoutdeficiencyinrespectofgoodnessandnot
tobesurpassedandhavingnothingtobefoundoutside
them,othersinrespectofbeingingeneralnottobesurpassed
1022aintheirvariousgeneraandhavingnothingoutsidethem.
Therestaremadesobyvirtueofthese,fromtheireither
producingorpossessingorfittingsomethingofsuchakind,
orfromtheirbeingsomehoworothersocalledwithreference
tothethingscalledcompleteintheprimaryway.

Chapter17

1022a4.WecallaLIMIT:theterminusofeachthing,i.e.the
5firstthingoutsidewhichthereisnothingtobefoundandthe
firstthinginsidewhicheverythingistobefound

1022a5.andanythingthatistheformofamagnitudeor
of[something]possessingmagnitude

1022a6.andthefulfilmentofeachthing(suchisthat
towardswhichchangeandaction[lead],notthatfromwhich
butsometimesboth,fromwhichandtowardswhich,i.e.
thatforwhich)1

1022a8.andthesubstanceofeachthing,i.e.whatitistobe
10eachthing,forthatisthelimitofacquaintanceand,ifof
acquaintance,oftheactualthingtoo.

1022a10.Itisobviousfromthisthatalimitissocalledin
allthewaysthatanoriginis,andmore:foranoriginisa
kindoflimit,butnoteverylimitisanorigin.

1Closebracketafter .

Page55

Chapter18

1022a14.ThatBYWHICHmaybesocalledinseveralways.
Inonesenseitistheformandsubstanceofeachactualthing,15
asforinstancethatbywhich[amanis]goodisgooditself.
Inanothersenseitistheprimarythinginwhichitischarac
teristicofsomethingtocometobe,asforinstancecolourin
asurface.Whilethatcalledbywhichintheprimarywayis
thustheform,eachthing'smatterandeachthing'sprimary
subjectissocalledinasecondaryway.Ingeneral,thatby
whichwillholdgoodinthesamenumberofwaysascause20
forwesay'bywhatdidhecome?'or'whatdidhecome
for?'and'bywhatdidhemiscalculate,orcalculate?or
'whatisthecauseofhiscalculation,ormiscalculation?'
Again,whatinvolvespositioniscalledbywhich:'bywhich
heisstanding','bywhichheiswalking'forallthese1
signifypositionandplace.

1022a24.ItfollowsthatthatwhichisBYITSELF[INITS25
OWNRIGHT]isnecessarilyalsosocalledinseveralways.For
inone,[athingis]initsownrightwhatitistobeeach
thing,asforinstanceCalliasisinhisownrightCallias,and
whatitistobeCallias

1022a27.inanother,anyconstituentofwhatitis,asfor
instanceCalliasisinhisownrightananimalforanimalisa
constituentofhisformula,forCalliasisacertainanimal

1022a29.againifit,oroneofits[parts],istheprimary30
recipient,asforinstanceasurfaceispaleinitsownrightand
amanisaliveinhisownright(forthesoul,theprimary
recipientoflife,isacertainpartofaman)

1022a32.again,whathasnoothercauseforthereare
severalcausesofamananimal,thetwofootedbut
neverthelessamanisamaninhisownright

1Read (correctingamisprintintheOCT).

Page56
a
351022 35,again,[athingis]initsownrightanythingsthat
holdgoodofitaloneandquaseparatedonitsownaccount
alone.1

Chapter19

1022b,1022b1.WecallaDISPOSITIONthearrangement,eitherby
placeorcapacityorform,ofsomethingpossessingparts.For
itoughttobesomekindofposition,astheveryname
'disposition'indicates.

Chapter20

1022b4.WecallaPOSSESSION,inonesense[wearing],whatis
5asitwereacertainfunctioningofthewearerandworn,like
acertainactionorchange.Forwheneveronethingproduces
andanotherisproduced,thereisproducingbetweenthem
justsothereiswearingbetweenonewhowearsclothesand
theclothesworn.Obviouslyitisnotpossibletopossessthis
kindofpossession,forweshallgoontoinfinityifthereis
10suchathingaspossessingthepossessionofwhatispossessed.

1022b10.Inanothersensewecallpossession[state]a
dispositionbyvirtueofwhichthethingdisposediseither
wellorilldisposed,andeitherinitsownrightorwith
referencetosomethingelseasforinstancehealthisacertain
state,foritissuchadisposition.Again,anythingthatisa
portionofsuchadispositionwecallastatethatiswhythe
excellenceofathing'spartsisacertainstate.

Chapter21

151022b15.WecallanAFFECTION,inonesense,aqualityin
respectofwhichitispossibletobemodified,asforinstance
thepaleandthedark,andsweetandbitter,andheavinessand
lightness,andallothersofthatkind

1Read .

Page57
b
1022 18.inanothersense,thefunctioningsofthese,i.e.
theactualmodifications

1022b19.oftheseagain,mainlyinjuriousmodifications
andchanges,andespeciallypainfulinjuries.20

1022b20.Again,severemisfortunesarecalledaffections.

Chapter22

1022b22.WespeakofaLACK,inonesense,ifathingdoesnot
possesssomethingcharacteristicallypossessed,evenifitis
notcharacteristicofthatthingtopossessitasforinstance
aplantissaidtolackeyes

1022b24.inanothersense,ifathingdoesnotpossesswhat
ischaracteristicallypossessedbyitoritsgenusasfor25
instanceablindmanandamolelacksightindifferentways,
theoneinrespectofitsgenus,theotherinitsownright

1022b27.again,ifathingdoesnotpossesssomething
characteristicevenatthetimewhenitischaracteristicto
possessit(forblindnessisacertainlack,yetoneisnotblind
ateveryagebutonlyifonedoesnotpossess[sight]atanage
atwhichitspossessionischaracteristic)andequallytooifit30
doesnotpossesssomethinginthatwhich,andwithrespectto
thatwhich,andrelativetothatwhich,andinthemanner
which,ischaracteristic.

1022b31.Again,thecompulsoryremovalofeachthingis
calledalack.

1022b32.Lacksaresocalledinthesamenumberofways
asdenialscontaining'un'andthelike.Forathingiscalled
unequalfromnotpossessingitscharacteristicequality,in
visiblefrompossessingcoloureithernotatallorinameagre35
degree,andfootlessfrompossessingeithernofeetatallor
meagreones.

Page58
a b
1023 1022 36.Again,[wespeakofalack]fromathing's
possessinglittle,asforinstancestonelessfruits(thisis,ina
way,possessinginameagredegree)

1023a2.again,fromthething'snotbeingeasyornotbeing
satisfactory,asforinstancetheuncuttablenotjustfromits
notcuttingbutalsofromitsnotcuttingeasilyorsatisfac
torily

1023a4.again,fromnotpossessingatallforaoneeyed
5manisnotcalledblind,butonlyamanwhopossessesno
sightineithereye.Thatiswhynoteveryoneisgoodorbad,
orjustorunjust,butthereisalsothemiddle[state].

Chapter23

1023a8.POSSESSINGissocalledinseveralways.Inonesense
itisdirectingathingaccordingtoone'sownnatureor
10accordingtoone'sowninclination.Thisiswhyfeverissaid
topossessamanandtyrantscitiesandwearerstheirclothes

1023a11.inanothersense,thatofwhich,asarecipient,
somethingisaconstituent,asforinstancebronzepossesses
theformofastatueandabodypossessesdisease

1023a13.inanothersense,asacontaineritscontentsfor
15athingissaidtobepossessedbythecontainerinwhichitis,
asforinstanceweassertthatabucketpossessesliquidanda
citymenandashipseamen.Inthiswayalsoawholepossesses
itsparts.

1023a17.Again,whatpreventssomethingchangingor
actingaccordingtoitsowninclinationissaidtopossessthat
thing,asforinstancecolumnstheiroverlyingweightsandas
20poetsmakeAtlaspossessthesky(asifitwouldcollapseonto
theearth,asevensomeauthoritiesonnatureassert).Thisis
thesenseinwhichwhatfusesthingsissaidtopossessthe
thingsitfuses,asifeachwouldhaveseparatedaccordingto
itsowninclination.

Page59
a
1023 23.BeingINsomethingissocalledinsimilar,and
corresponding,waystopossessing.25

Chapter24

1023a26.WecallbeingOUTOFsomething,inonesense,that
outofwhichasmatterathingis,andthisintwoways,either
inrespectofthefirstgenusorinrespectofthelastformas.
forinstanceinonewayeverythingmeltableisoutofwater
butinanotherwayastatueisoutofbronze

1023a29.inanothersense,asoutofthefirstoriginthat30
effectedchangeasforinstance'Whatdidthefighting
[come]outof?''outoftheswearing'becausethatwasthe
originofthefighting

1023a31,inanothersense,asoutofwhatiscomposedout
ofmatterandshape,aspartsareoutofaWhole,alineoutof
theIliad,andstonesoutofahousefortheshapeisafulfil
ment,andwhathasattainedfulfilmentiscomplete

1023a35.othersastheformisoutofthepart,asfor35
instanceamanisoutofthetwolootedandasyllableoutof
anelement(forthisisdifferentfromthewayinwhichthe1023b
statueisoutofbronzeforacompositesubstanceisoutof
perceptiblematter,butaformisalsooutofthematterofthe
form).

1023b3.Somethings,then,aresocalledintheseways
othersifoneofthesesensesholdsgoodofsomethinginpart,
asforinstanceachildisoutofitsfatherandmother,and
plantsoutofearth,becauseoutofacertainpartofthem5

1023b5.inanothersense,thatafterwhichintime,asfor
instancenightisoutofdayandastormoutofgoodweather,
becauseoneisaftertheother.Andofthese,someareso
calledfromhavingalterationintooneanother,likethose
justmentioned,othersfrombeingmerelysuccessivein

Page60

10respectoftime,asforinstancethevoyagecametobeoutof
theequinoxbecauseitcametobeaftertheequinox,andthe
ThargeliaoutoftheDionysiabecauseaftertheDionysia.

Chapter25

1023b12.WecallaPART,inonesense,theresultofanykind
ofdivisionofaquantityforwhatissubtractedfroma
quantityquaquantityisalwayscalledapartofit,astwois
15calledapartofthreeinaway

1023b15.inanothersense,onlythoseamongsuchparts
whichgivethemeasureofathingthatiswhytwoiscalled
apartofthreeinaway,butinawaynot.

1023b17.Again,theresultsofanynonquantitative
divisionofaformarealsocalleditsportionsthatiswhy
peopleassertthatformsareportionsoftheirgenus

201023b19.again,anythingintowhichawhole,whethera
formorsomethingthatpossessesaform,isdivided,oroutof
whichitiscomposed,asforinstanceboththebronze(thatis,
thematterinwhichtheformis)andtheanglesarepartsof
abronzecube,orabronzeball.

1023b22.Again,whateverisintheformulaindicating
eachthingisalsoaportionofthewholethatiswhyagenus
isalsocalledapartofitsform,althoughinadifferentway
25theformisapartofitsgenus.

Chapter26

1023b26.WecallaWHOLEboththatofwhichnopartis
absentoutofthoseofwhichwecallitawholenaturally
andwhatcontainsitscontentsinsuchamannerthatthey
areonething,andthisintwoways,eitheraseachbeingone
thingorasmakinguponething.Forwhatisuniversaland

Page61

whatissaidtobeasawhole,implyingthatitisacertain30
whole,isuniversalascontainingseveralthings,bybeing
predicatedofeachofthemandbytheiralleachone
beingonethingasforinstanceman,horse,god,because
theyareallanimals.Butwhatiscontinuousandlimited[is
awhole]whenitissomeonethingmadeupofmorethan
onething,especiallywhenthesearepotentialconstituents
ofitbut,ifnot,whentheyareactual.Amongallthese,what35
isnaturallyofsuchakindismore[awhole]thanwhatis
artificially,aswesaidinthecaseofwhatisone[6.1016a4]
wholenessbeingakindofoneness.

1024a1.Again,ofquantitiespossessingabeginning,a1024a
middle,andanend,anyinwhichpositionmakesnodiffer
enceiscalledALL,anyinwhichitdoes,whole.Anythat
admitbotharebothwholesandallsthesearethethings
whosenature,thoughnottheirshape,survivestransposition,5
asforinstancewaxandacloakfortheyarecalledboth
wholeandall,fortheypossessboth.Butwaterandother
liquids,andnumber,arecalledallandwedonotspeakof
thewholenumberorthewholewater,unlessbytransference.

1024a8.WecallEVERYthosethingstowhich'all'isapplied
astoonething,'every'beingappliedtothemastodistinct
things:allthisnumber,every[oneof]theseunits.10

Chapter27

1024a11.NoteverychancequantitymaybecalledTRUN
CATEDitoughttobedivisibleintopartsandalsoawhole.
Fortwoisnottruncatedwhenoneofitsonesissubtracted,
forwhatistakenfromathingbytruncationandwhat
remainsareneverequalbutneither,ingeneral,isany
number,forthesubstanceoughtalsotoremainifacupis15
truncated,itmuststillbeacupthenumberisnotthesame.
Inadditiontothis,noteveneverythingthathasdissimilar
parts[maybecalledtruncated],forinonewayanumber

Page62

alsohasdissimilarparts,e.g.twoandthree.Butingeneral
nothinginwhichpositionmakesnodifference,asforinstance
20waterandfire,canbetruncatedtobesuch,athingoughtto
possessapositionbyvirtueofitssubstance.Again,[itmust
be]continuousforamusicalscaleisoutofdissimilarparts
andpossessesposition,butcannotbecometruncated.In
additiontothis,notevenwholesaretruncatedasaresultof
thelackofanyportionwhateverforitoughtnottobeany
thingfundamentaltotheirsubstance,butneithercanitbe
anywherewhatever.Forinstance,acupinwhichaholehas
25beendrilledisnottruncated,butonlyifahandleorsome
extremity[isremoved]andamannotiffleshorspleen[is
removed],butifsomeextremityisandnotanyextremity,
butonlyonewhichcannotcometoexistoncewhollyremoved:
forthisreasonbaldmenarenottruncated.

Chapter28

1024a29.WespeakofaGENUSeitherifthecomingtobeof
30thingspossessingthesameformiscontinuous,asforin
stance'solongasthegenusofmenis'means'whiletheir
comingtobeiscontinuous'

1024a31.orifpeople[stem]fromsomeonewhofirst
broughtthemintoexistenceforinthiswaysomearecalled
HellenesbygenusandothersIonians,fromtheir[stemming]
fromHellenandIonwhofirstbegotthemandmoreespe
35ciallyfromthebegetterthanfromthematter(forpeople
arecalledbygenusfromthefemaletoo,assomearefrom
Pyrrha)

1024b1024a36.again,astheplaneisthegenusoffiguresthat
areplane,andthesolidofthosethataresolidforeachofthe
figuresiseitheraplaneofsuchandsuchakindorasolidof
suchandsuchakind,thatbeingthesubjectofitsdifferentiae

Page63
b
1024 4.again,asthefirstconstituentinformulaewhichis5
statedin[answertothequestion]whatathingisforthisis
thegenus(anditsqualitiesarecalleddifferentiae).

1024b6These,then,areallthewaysinwhichagenusisso
called:inrespectofthecontinuouscomingtobeofthesame
forminrespectofthefirstthing,havingthesameform,to
effectchangeinathingandasmatterforwhatdifferentiae
andqualitiesareofistheirsubject,whichwecallthematter.

1024b9.ThingsarecalledOTHERINGENUSwhosefirst10
subjectsareother,andwillnotanalyseeitheroneintothe
otherorbothintothesamethingasforinstanceformand
matterareotheringenus

1024b12.alsoanythingsspokenofaccordingtodifferent
figuresinthepredicationofthatwhichis(forofthethings
thataresomesignifywhatathingis,othersacertainquali
fication,othersintheotherwayspreviouslydistinguished)
forthesewillnotanalyseeitherintooneanotherorinto15
someonething.

Chapter29

1024b17.WecallaFALSEHOOD,inonesense,whatisafalse
hoodasanactualthing:andthissometimesfromthething's
beingnotcompounded,orincapableofbeingcompounded,
aswesayofadiagonal'sbeingcommensurableorofyour20
sittingdownforoneoftheseisafalsehoodalways,theother
sometimes(forinthiswaythesethingsarenotthingsthat
are)sometimesanythingwhich,whilebeingathingthatis,
isneverthelesscharacteristicallyimaginedeithernot[tobe]
suchasitisor[tobe]somethingthatisnot,asforinstancea
sketch,anddreamsforthesearesomething,butnotwhat
theyimposeonustoimagine[theyare].These,then,arethe
waysinwhichactualthingsarecalledfalse,eitherfromtheir25
notthemselvesbeingorfromtheirgivingrisetoanimagina
tionofsomethingthatisnot.

Page64
b
1024 26.Afalseformulais,quafalse,ofthingsthatarenot,
andthatiswhyeveryformulaisfalseofsomethingother
thanthatofwhichitistrue,asforinstancethatofacircleis
falseofatriangle.Eachthinghas,inoneway,oneformula,
30thatofwhatitistobe',inanotherwayithasmany,since
bothitanditaffected(asforinstanceSocratesandartistic
Socrates)areinawaythesamething.Afalseformulais,
takenbaldly,theformulaofnothing.ThatiswhyAntisthenes
naivelyconsideredthatnothingcanlegitimatelybedescribed
exceptbyitsownproperformula,onetooneanopinion
fromwhichitresultedthatthereisnosuchthingascontra
diction,norevenpracticallyasfalsity.Butthereissucha
35thingasdescribingeachthingnotonlybyitsownformula
butalsobyanother'sthismaybedonealtogetherfalsely,
1025abutalsoinawaytruly,aseightisdouble,bytheformula
oftwo.

1025a1.Apartfromthesewaysofcallingthingsfalse,a
falsemanisonewhousessuchformulaerecklesslyanddelib
erately,notonanyotheraccountthantheirown,andwho
simposessuchformulaeonotherpeoplejustasweassert
thatactualthingsarefalsewhentheyimposeafalseimagina
tion.Thisexplainswhatismisleadingabouttheargument
intheHippiasthatthesamemanisfalseandtrue.Forit
takesforfalsethemanwhoiscapableoffalsity(andthatishe
whoknows,thewiseman)andagainittakesforbetterthe
10manwhodoeswrongwillingly.Thelatterfalsehoodisgotby
induction:foramanwholimpswillinglyissuperiortoone
whodoessounwillingly(meaningbylimpingpretending,
sinceifhewerewillinglylamehewoulddoubtlessbeinferior,
aswithcharactertraits).

Chapter30

1025a14.WecallCOINCIDENTALwhatholdsgoodofsome
15thingandistruetosay,butneitherofnecessitynorforthe
mostpartas.forinstanceifsomeoneindiggingatrench
foraplantfoundtreasure.Thisthefindingoftreasureis

Page65

accordinglycoincidentalforhimwhoisdiggingthetrench
fortheoneisnotofnecessityoutoforaftertheother,nor
doesoneforthemostpartfindtreasurewhenplanting.And
someoneartisticmightbepale,butsincethiscomestobe20
neitherofnecessitynorforthemostpart,wecallitcoinciden
tal.Hence,sincetherearethingsthatholdgoodandthings
theyholdgoodof,andincertaincasesaplaceandatimeof
holdinggood,whateverholdsgoodbutnotbecauseitisthis
ornoworherewillbecoincidental.Thereisthusnodefinite
causeofthecoincidental,butachanceone,andthatis25
indefinite.ItwasacoincidenceforsomeonetovisitAegina
ifhewenttherenotinordertovisitbuthavingbeenforced
offcoursebyastormorcapturedbypirates.Thecoincidence
hascometobe,oris,butquaanotherthing,notquaitselffor
thestormwasthecauseofhisnotgettingtotheplacehewas
sailingfor.

1025a30.Thingsarecalledcoincidentalinotherwaysalso,30
asforinstancewhateverholdsgoodofeachthinginitsown
rightwithoutbeinginitssubstance,asforinstancepossessing
tworightangles[does]ofatriangle.Theseadmitofbeing
invariable,buttheformerdonot.Thematterisdiscussed
elsewhere.

Page66

MetaphysicsBookEpsilon

Chapter1

1025b3.Weareseekingtheoriginsandthecausesofthe
thingsthatare,andplainlyofthemquathingsthatare.For
5thereisaparticularcauseofhealthandoffitness,andthere
areoriginsandelementsandcausesoftheobjectsofmathe
matics,andingeneraleverythinking,orthoughtpartaking,
disciplinedealswithcausesandorigins,moreorlessprecise.
Butallthesedisciplinesdelimitaparticularthingthatis
aparticulargenusandtreatofit,notofthatwhichis
10baldlyorquathingthatis.Nordotheyproduceanystate
mentofwhatitisbutstartingfromthathavingeither
indicateditbythesensesorfoundahypothesisastowhatit
istheyproceedfromthattodemonstrate,eithermoreor
lessrigorously,thethingsthatholdgoodinitsownrightof
thegenuswithwhichtheyaredealing.Forthatreasonitis
obviousthatfromsuchaninductionthereisnodemonstration
15ofsubstance,i.e.ofwhatathingis,butsomeothermannerof
indicatingit.Equally,neitherisanythingsaidastowhether
thegenusofwhichtheytreatisorisnot,becauseitfallsto
thesamethinkingtoindicatebothwhatathingisandwhether
itis.

1025b18.Butsincephysicsisoneofthedisciplinesdealing
20withaparticulargenusofthingthatis(foritdealswith
thesortofsubstanceinwhichtheoriginofchangeandof
keepingthesameisinitself),itisplainthatthisdiscipline
isneitherpracticalnorproductive.Forinthecaseofthepro
ducibletheoriginisintheproducereitherintelligence
orartorcapacityofsomekindandinthecaseofthedoable
itisinthedoerchoice:forthedoableandthechoosable
25arethesame.Itfollowsthat,ifallthinkingiseitherpractical
orproductiveortheoretical,thatconcernedwithnature

Page67

mustbeofatheoreticalkind,butakindWhichstudiessuch
ofthethingsthatareasarecapableofbeingchanged,and
substanceasinaformulaforthemostpart,yetnotseparable
[substance].

1025b28.Wemustpayattentiontothemannerofathing's
formula,i.e.ofwhatitistobethatthingsincetheinquiry30
willgetnowhereotherwise.Amongthingsdefined,i.e.those
whicharewhatsomethingis,somearelikethesnub,others
liketheconcave,andthedifferencebetweentheseisthatin
thesnubmatterisimplicitforthesnubisaconcavenose
whereasconcavityisindependentofperceptiblematter.Soif
everynaturallyexistingthingiscalled[whatitis]inthe
samewayasthesnub,asforinstancenose,eye,face,flesh,1026a
bone,andanimalasawhole,andleaf,rootbark,andplant
asawholefortheformulaeofnoneofthemareindependent
ofchangebutalwaysincludematterthemannerinwhich
weneedtoinvestigateanddefinewhatathingisinthecaseof
naturallyexistingthingsisplain.

1026a5.[Itisplain]toothatitfallstothestudentofnature5
tostudyacertainkindofsoul,namelyanywhichisnot
independentofmatter.

1026a6.Allthismakesitobvious,then,thatthestudyof
natureistheoretical.Butmathematicsisalsotheoretical.On
theotherhand,itisnotimmediatelyplainwhetherthe
objectsofmathematicsarechangelessandseparable,even
thoughitisplainthatsomemathematicsstudiesitsobjects
quachangelessandquaseparable.However,ifthereisany10
thinginvariableandchangelessandseparable,itisobvious
thatacquaintancewithitfallstoatheoreticaldiscipline,not,
however,tothestudyofnature(whichdealswithcertain
changeablethings)norindeedtomathematics,buttosome
thingpriortoboth.Forthestudyofnaturedealswiththings
thatareseparablebutnotchangeless,whilecertainpartsof
mathematicsdealwiththingswhich,thoughchangeless,are15

Page68

doubtlessnotseparablebutasinmatter.Buttheprimary
disciplinewilldealalsowiththingsseparableandchangeless.

1026a16.Allcausesarenecessarilyinvariablebutthese
areespeciallyso,fortheyarethecausesofthedivinities
obvioustous.

1026a18.Itfollowsthattheremustbethreekindsof
theoreticalphilosophy,mathematical,natural,andtheo
20logicalforitisnothardtoseethatthedivineisaconstituent
ofanatureofsuchakind,ifofanything.Ofthesethemost
estimableoughttodealwiththemostestimablegenus.The
theoreticalaretobepreferred,then,amongtheotherdisci
plines,andthisamongthetheoretical.

1026a23.Foronemightbeperplexedastowhetherthe
primaryphilosophyreallyisuniversal,ordealswitha
25particulargenusandoneparticularnature.Fornoteven
mathematicsisallofapiece.inthisrespect,geometryand
astronomybeingconcernedwithaparticularnature,while
universalmathematicsiscommontoall.Ifthenthereisno
othersubstanceapartfromthoseconstitutednaturally,the
disciplineconcernedwithnaturewouldbeprimary.Butif
30thereissomechangelesssubstance,thisispriorandispri
maryphilosophy,anduniversalinthisway,becauseprimary
anditwouldfalltoittostudythatwhichisquathingthat
is,bothwhatitisandthethingsthatholdgoodofitqua
thingthatis.

Chapter2

1026a33.Butthatwhichis,whenbaldlysocalled,maybeso
calledinseveralways.Oneofthemwasthat[whichis]co
35incidentally,anotherthat[whichis]astrue(andthatwhich
isnot,that[whichis]asfalsehood).Apartfromthesethere
arethefiguresofpredication,asforinstancewhatathingis,
howqualified,ofwhatquantity,where,when,andanything

Page69
b
elsethatsignifiesinthissenseagain.apartfromallthese,1026
that[whichis]potentiallyandactually.

1026b2.Sincethatwhichismaybesocalled,then,in
severalways,it.hasfirsttobestatedthatthereisnostudy
thatdealswiththat[whichis]coincidentally.Asignofthis
isitsneglectineverydiscipline,practical,productive,and5
theoretical.Foronewhoproducesahousedoesnotproduce
allthethingswhichcoincideinthehousethatiscomingto
be,fortheyarcinfinite.Forthereisnothingtopreventthe
househehasproducedbeingpleasingtosome,harmfulto
others,beneficialtoothers,anddifferentfromvirtually
everythingthatisbutthedisciplineofhousebuildingisnot
productiveofanyofthesethings.Inthesamemanner,a10
geometerdoesnotstudywhatisinthiswaycoincidentalto
hisfigures,norwhetheratriangleandatrianglepossess
ingtworightanglesarcdifferent.Thisresultisreasonable,
forthecoincidentalislikeamerename.HencePlatowas
inawaynotwrongtoclassifysophisticasdealingwith15
whatisnot.Forthesophists'argumentsareconcerned,one
mightalmostsay,morethananythingwiththecoinci
dental:whetherartisticandliterate,andartisticCoriscus
andCoriscus,aredifferentorthesamethingandwhether
everythingthatis,butnotalways,hascometobe,sothatif
someone,beingartistic,hascometobeliterate,hehasalso,
beingliterate,[cometobe]artisticwithalltheotherargu20
mentsofthatkind.Forwhatiscoincidentalisobviously
closetowhatisnot,asisplainalsofromargumentssuchas
this:thatwiththingsthatareinanothersensethereis[a
processof]comingtobeanddestruction,butwiththings
[thatare]coincidentallythereisnot.

1026b24.Weoughtneverthelessfurthertostate,asfaras
possible,thenatureofthecoincidentalandthecausewhyit25
isforatthesametimeitwilldoubtlessalsobeplainwhy
nodisciplinedealswithit.Since,then,amongthethings
thataresomeareinthesamestatealwaysandofnecessity
(notnecessityinthesenseofcompulsionbutwhatwecallso

Page70

fromtheimpossibilityofbeingotherwise),othersnotof
30necessityoralwaysbutforthemostpart,thisistheorigin
andthisthecauseoftheexistenceofthecoincidental:for
whatisneitheralwaysnorforthemostpart,thatweassert
tobecoincidentalasforinstanceifthereiscoldstormy
weatherinthedogdays,weassertthatthatisacoincidence,
35butnotifthereisstiflingheat,becausetheoneisalwaysor
forthemostpart,theothernotanditisacoincidencethat
amanispale,forthatisneitheralwaysnorforthemostpart,
butheisnotananimalcoincidentallyanditiscoincidental
1027athatahousebuilderhealssomebody,becauseitischaracter
isticofadoctor,notahousebuilder,todothat,butitwasa
coincidencethatthehousebuilderwasadoctorandacook,
aimingtogivepleasure,mightproducehealthinsome
body,butnotbyvirtueofhisculinary[art]henceitwas
5acoincidence,weassert,andinawayheproducesit,but
baldlynot.

1027a5.Forofsomeofthemotherthingsaresometimesthe
thingsthatproducethem1ofothersthereisnodefiniteartor
capacity.Forofthingsthatareorcometobecoincidentally
thecauseisalsocoincidentally.

1027a8.Itfollowsthatsincenoteverythingisofnecessity
andalwaysathingthatisorathingcomingtobe,mostthings
10beingsoforthemostpart,itisnecessarythattherebethat
whichiscoincidentallyasforinstancesomeonepaleis
neitheralwaysnorforthemostpartartistic,andwhenthis
comestobehewillbesocoincidentallyotherwiseevery
thingwillbeofnecessity.

1027a13.Itfollowsthatthematterthatiscapableof
beingotherwisethanitisforthemostpart,iscauseofthe
coincidental.

151027a15.Wehavetotakethisasouroriginal[question]:
istherenothingwhichisneitheralwaysnorforthemostpart?

1Read .

Page71

oristhisimpossible?Consequentlythereare,apartfrom
these,chance,i.e.coincidental,things.

1027a17.Butdoesitholdgoodofsomethingstobefor
themostpartbutofnonetobealways?Oraresomethings
invariable?Thesethingswillhavetobeinvestigatedlater.

1027a19.Butitisobviousthatnodisciplinedealswith20
thecoincidentalforeverydisciplinedealseitherwiththat
[whichis]alwaysorwiththat[whichis]forthemostpart.
Howelsecouldonelearn,orteachanother?Forathinghas
tobedefinedeitherbythat[whichis]alwaysorbythat
[whichis]forthemostpart:asforinstancethatforthemost
partthefeverpatientbenefitsfromhoneywater.Butthe
exceptionwhenhedoesnot,asforinstanceatnewmoon25
cannotbestatedforthat[whichis]atnewmoonisalso
eitheralwaysorforthemostpart.Butthecoincidentalisan
exceptiontothat.

1027a26.Wehavestated,then,whatthecoincidentalis
andthecausewhyitis,andthatnodisciplinedealswithit.

Chapter3

1027a29.Itisobviousthattherearcoriginsandcausesthat
areabletocometobeandtobedestroyedwithout[beingin30
processof]comingtobeandbeingdestroyed.Forotherwise
everythingwillbeofnecessity,ifwhateveris[inprocessof]
comingtobeandbeingdestroyednecessarilyhassomecause
noncoincidentally.

1027a32.Willthisbeornot?Itwillifthiscomestobe,but
nototherwiseandthatifsomethingelsedoes.Andinthis
wayitisplainthatastimeiscontinuallysubtractedfroma1027b
limitedperiodoftime,weshallcometothepresent.Thus:
thismanwilldiebyviolenceifhegoesout,
andthatifhegetsthirsty,
andthatifsomethingelse.

Page72

Inthiswayweshallcometowhatholdsgoodnow,orto
somethingthathascometobe.Forinstance:
...ifhegetsthirsty,
andthatifheiseatingsomethingsalty,

5Butthislasteitherholdsgoodorelsedoesnotsoofnecessity
hewilldieornotdie.Equally,ifonejumpsovertowhathas
cometobe,thesameargumentappliesforthatImean
whathascometobeisalreadyaconstituentofsomething.
Consequently,everythingthatwillbewillbeofnecessity,
e.g.thathewhoislivingdiesforsomethinghasalready
10cometobe,asforinstanceoppositesinthesamething.But
whetherbydiseaseorviolenceisnotyet[necessary],but
[willbe]ifthiscomestobe.Itisconsequentlyplainthatit
runsasfarassomeorigin,butthisnofurthertoanything
elsethe[origin]ofwhatevermaychancewillthereforebe
this,andnothingelseisthecauseofitscomingtobe.

1027b14.Butwhatkindoforiginandwhatkindofcause
15suchareductionleadsto,whethertomatterortowhata
thingisforortowhateffectsachange,needstobeinvesti
gatedfully

Chapter4

1027b17.Somuchforthatwhichiscoincidentallyithas
beensufficientlydistinguished.Thatwhichisastrueand
thatwhichisnotasfalsehoodareconcernedwithcomposition
20anddivisionand,takentogether,withtheapportionment
ofacontradiction.Frtruthhastheaffirmationinthecase
ofwhatiscompoundedandthedenialinthecaseofwhatis
divided,whileafalsehoodhasthecontradictoryofthis
apportionment.(Howwecometoconceivethingstogether
orseparatelyisanotherquestionbytogetherandsepar
atelyImeannotinsuccessionbutsoas.tomakeupsome
onething.)

Page73
b
1027 25.Forfalsehoodandtrutharenotinactualthings25
(thegood,forexample,beingtrueandthebadeoipsoa
falsehood),butinthoughtthoughinthecaseofsimples,i.e.
whatthingsare,notinthoughteither.Whatneedsstudy
withregardtothatwhichisandisnotinthiswaywillhave
tobeinvestigatedlater.Butsincethecombinationandthe30
divisionareinthought,notinactualthings,andthatwhich
isinthiswayisadifferentthingthatisfromthosewhichare
inthefundamentalway(forthethoughtconnectsordivides
eitherwhatathingis,orhowqualified,orofwhatquantity
orwhateverelseitmaybe),wemayleaveononesidethat
[whichis]ascoincidentalandthatwhichisastrue.Forthe
causeoftheoneisindefiniteandoftheotherisacertainaf
fectionofthought,andbothareconcernedwiththeremain1028a
inggenusofthingthatisanddonotindicatetheexistence
ofanyextranatureofthingthatis.

1028a2.Sowemayleavethemaside,andinvestigatethe
causesandoriginsofthatwhichisitself,quathingthatis.

1028a4.(Inourchaptersdistinguishingthenumberofways5
inwhichvariousthingsarecalledwhattheyare,itwasob
viousthatthatwhichismaybesocalledinseveralways.)

Page75

NOTES

General
ReferencestoAristotle'swritingsaretotheMetaphysicsunlessotherwisestated.ThecommentaryinSirDavidRoss'seditionoftheMetaphysicsisreferredtoas
'Ross'.

ScholarsdesignatebooksoftheMetaphysicssometimes,asinthesenotes,byGreekletters,sometimesbynumbers.BecausethesecondbookiscalledLittleAlpha,
GisbookIV,DbookV,EbookVI.

GandEareepitomizedinchapters38ofbookK,theauthorshipofwhichisdisputed.

Iusetheformula'xisessentiallyF'tomean'ifxexists,itfollowsthatxisF'.

MetaphysicsBookGamma

IntroductoryNote

WearetoldthatthefourteenbooksofMetaphysicswerebroughtintotheirpresentarrangementbyeditorsafterAristotle'sdeath.BookA,whichtheysetatthe
beginning,describestheaimofphilosophyastheremovalofsurpriseandperplexitybysupplying''knowledgeoforiginalcauses'',andassessestheworkofAristotle's
predecessorsinthatfield.Aftertheshortbookdesignateda,Boutlinesasetof"perplexities",mostofwhichgetexamined,moreorlessdirectly,intherestofthe
treatise.Gthusstands,bythetraditionalordering,atthestartofAristotle'smaindiscussionofmetaphysicsitannouncesitssubjectmatterinthefirstchapterandits
argumentishardlymoredependentonwhathasprecededthanonotherpartsofAristotle'sworks.

Thebookfallsintothreeparts:chapter1brieflystatesthenatureofmetaphysicschapters2and3to1005b8defenditsstatusasasinglesubjectofinquiryand
indicateitsscopetherestofthebookfrom3.1005b8consistsofanexaminationofwhatarenowadaysknownastheprinciplesofnoncontradictionandexcluded
middle.

Page76

Chapter1

ThischaptershouldbereadinconjunctionwithE1,whichoutlinesa
classificationof"philosophy",i.e.systematicknowledge.

Afewpreliminaries.ThedescriptionwhichAristotlegivesofthe
"discipline"whoseexistenceheassertsinhisfirstsentenceapplies,and
wouldevidentlyhavebeenappliedbyhim,toeverythinginhisMeta
physicsitmaythereforebetakentodefine'metaphysics'(literally'what
followsphysics'),thenamecoinedforthetreatisebyAristotle'seditors.
Hisownlabelis"primaryphilosophy"(e.g.E1.1026a30).
'Discipline'translates'episteme',traditionallyrendered'knowledge'
'discipline'hasbeenpreferredinthepresenttranslationaspossessinga
plural('science'isnowtoospecialized),butthewordanditscognatesare
translated'knowledge','know',etc.,atG3.1005b5,4.1008b27,30,
D7.1017b3,D15.

'Thatwhichis'(sometimes'whatis')translates'toon',aphrase
consistingoftheneutersingularofthedefinitearticlefollowedbythe
presentparticipleoftheverb'einai',whichmeansboth'tobe'and'to
exist'.Parallelexpressionswithanadjective,e.g.'thebeautiful',occurred
commonlyinGreekwithoutafollowingnoun.'Thebeautiful'could
meaneither'the(mentioned)beautifulthing'or'thatwhichisbeautiful'
andthelatter,inadditiontoitsnaturalmeaning,wasusedevenbynon
philosophicalwriterstodesignatebeauty.Perhapsbyanalogywiththis
lastusage,Aristotle's'toon'hastraditionallybeentranslated'being'
(whichinthesingularmustbeaverbalnoundasSeinnotasubstantive
useoftheparticipledasSeiende)butalthoughGreekadjectivescouldbe
usedintheabstractway,itisdoubtfulwhetherparticiplescouldbe.The
standardGreekfor'being',liketheGerman,isdefinitearticleplus
infinitive,andatZ1.1028a205Aristotlehimselfindicatesadistinction
between'thetowalk'and'thewalking(thing)',i.e.thatwhichwalks.
'Thingthatis'translatestheparticiple'on'withoutarticle.

'Qua'istheliteralLatinequivalentofAristotle's'hei','as'or'inrespect
ofbeing'('insofaras'atG4.1006a14,15).Itsmeaningiswellillustrated
atD12.1019a1718.Asanalternativetosayinge.g.thatadoctorheals
'quadoctor',Aristotleoftenputsitthatheheals'inhisownright',
literally'byhimself'(seeD18)theconnectionismadeexplicitat
PosteriorAnalyticsI4.73b289,"'initsownright'and'quaitself'arethe
samething".'Initsownright'isopposedto'coincidentally'.Clearly,the
questionwhethersomeonehealsquadoctorwillnot,whilethequestion
whetherhehealsinhisownrightorcoincidentallywill,dependonthe
descriptionunderwhichheisidentified.

p.217"Coincidental":Aristotle'sverb'sumbebekenai'istheperfectof'sum
bainein',literally'cometogether',whichinitsothertensesheusesmostly

Page77

withtheseine'turnout','result','follow'.Sumbekotaarethingswhich
mighthavebeenapartbuthavecometogether.Thetraditionaltrans
lation'accident'losesthisetymology,lacksacorrespondingverb,and
obscurestheGreekword'ssuggestion(deniedthoughitisbyAristotle)
thatbeingasumbebekosofisasymmetricalrelation.Ihavetherefore
preferred'coincidental'and'coincide',evenatthepriceofinventingthe
idiom'BcoincidesinA'(e.g.G4.1007b3).Forotherdiscussionsofthe
wordseethenotesonD30,E2,D6,D7.

DoesAristotleconceivethesubjectmatterofmetaphysicsascomprispp.2013
ingeverythingwhatever,oronlysomeamongthethingsthatare?This
ancientdisputeturnsonthepresentchapterandE1.Itwould,ofcourse,
bewrongtotakethephrase"thatwhichis"asdesignatingasingleitem:
althoughgrammaticallysingular,itmeansthesameas'allthethingsthatare'.
Thecrucialquestioniswhether"quathingthatis"restrictsthis
phrase,orgoeswiththeverb"studies''.(1)(i)InE1.1026a2332Aristotle
appearstomaintain,first,thathisinquiryconcernsonly"changeless
substance",andsecondlythatthatsubstanceconstitutes''aparticular
genusandoneparticularnature"andtheauthorofK7,whichepito
mizesE1,describesthedisciplineasconcernedwith"thatwhichis
separableandchangeless"(1064a33).Thesetwopassagestogetherhave
beentakentoshow,first,thatmetaphysicsisconcernedonlywitha
restricted'genus'ofthingsthatareand,secondly,thatthephrase'qua
thingthatis'expressestherestriction.(ii)Somehavethoughtthatthe
phraseissousedatK7.1064a28itisalsousedtoexpressarestriction,
althoughadifferentone,atK3.1061a810.(iii)GI'sdescriptionof
metaphysicsasseekingtheoriginsandextremecauseswhichbelongto
"aparticularnature"(or'somenature')initsownrightmightsimilarly
implyarestrictedsubjectmatter.(2)Ontheotherhand,(iv)E1.
1026a2332arguesthatsuchchangelesssubstance,ifitexists,ispriorto
theotherkindsofsubstancehencethatitsstudyis"primaryphilosophy,
anduniversalinthisway,becauseprimary"(cf.G3.1005a35).Onthis
seenotesonE1.(v)InthepresentchapterAristotlecontrastsmetaphysics
withthespecial(literally'inpart')disciplines,which"selectsomepart
of"thatwhichis"andstudywhatiscoincidentalconcerningthat".(vi)
Itis,inanycase,usuallyeasiertotake'qua'phrasesadverbially.Tosay,
forexample,thatadoctorhasvisitedsomepatientquapatientisnotto
sayanythingaboutthenatureofthepatient,butofthevisitandwhere
nosuitableverbisexpressed,itisoftenpossibletosupplyone(e.g.
1003b21,"tostudyalltheforms[whichholdgood]ofthatwhichisqua
thingthatis").Probablyweshouldconcludethattosaythatmetaphysics
studiesthatwhichisquathingthatisisnottosayanythingaboutthe
natureofthethingsstudiedbymetaphysics,butaboutthenatureofthe
study.

Page78

If,accordingtoG1,metaphysicsdoesstudyeverythingthatis,what
isthespecialnatureofthatstudyconveyedbythephrases"quathing
thatis"and"notcoincidentally"?Evidently,coincidentalknowledgeof
everythingthatiswouldbeexhibitedbytheuniversalpolymath,who
investigatestruthsabouteverythingbutnottruthswhicharetrueabout
everything,whostudiesinterdepartmentallybutdoesnotstudyinter
departmentalquestions.Theutterlyinterdepartmental,orsubject
neutral,questionsaretheprovinceofmetaphysics,whichinthisway
managestobecomprehensiveinsubjectmatterwithoutcomprehending
allotherdisciplines.

TherearethreewaysoftakingthedistinctioninAristotle'sfirst
sentencebetween"thatwhichisquathingthatis"and"thosethings
thatholdgoodofthisinitsownright"(1)Iftheformerexpression
designatestheclassofchangelessandseparablesubstances,Aristotle's
firstquestionmightbetoaskwhetherthingsofsuchakindexist.This
existentialquestionisposedatB2.997a34intheform'aretherenon
perceptiblesubstancesand,ifso,ofhowmanykindsarethey?'and,in
thesameform,lengthilyexaminedinMN.Itisdoubtful,however,
whetherthatquestioncaninpracticebeseparatedfrominquiryasto
'whatholdsgoodof'theclassofthingssoisolated.(2)Thetwoexpres
sionsareequivalent,thelatterbeingintendedtoexplaintheformer.
(3)Studyingthatwhichisquathingthatishastobeunderstoodasinquir
ingwhattruthsholdgoodofeverything"thethingsthatholdgoodof
this"arenottruths,butallpervasiveconceptssuchasthoselistedatG2.
1005a1118.Thusmetaphysicsseeks,first,truthsthatholdgoodofevery
thingthatis,and,secondly,truthsthatholdgoodofconceptsthathold
goodofeverythingthatis.

AtA3.983a56Aristotleassertsthatifweareproperlytoknowa
thingwemustbeconversantwithits"primarycause"(or'reason'
Greekhadthesamewordforboth).Intracing,throughtheremainder
ofthatbook,thecourseofhispredecessors'treatmentofcauses,heac
knowledgesthattheword'cause'hasmorethanonesense(A3983a2632
andD2):theearliest'philosophers',forinstance,wereconcernedwith
thequestion'whatarethingsmadeof?'Aristotle'sownconcernsare
(i)toaccountforthethingsthatareintermsofprimaryorbasicthings,
whichheIdentifiesassubstances(theprimaryobjectofmetaphysics,
G2.1003b16)andinparticularseparableandchangelesssubstances
(E1.1026a16),and(ii)togivereasonsorargumentsinfavourofthe
truthswhicharetrueabouteverything,andtoleadthesebackto"primary"
or"ultimate"reasons,whichhealsocalls"elements"and''origins"(or
principles).ThenotestoG4.1005b35discusswhetherhethinksofthese
principlesasreasonswhichdonotneed,orwhichcannotget,further
justification.

Page79

Chapter2

1003a33.Aristotlenowconsidersanobjectiontometaphysicalinquiry
whichmaybestatedasfollows.Theexistenceofadesignatingexpression,
e.g.acommonnoun,doesnotguaranteetheexistenceoftruthsabout
justthosethingswhichtheexpressiondesignates.Itwouldbeabsurd,
forinstance,tosupposethatthereisabodyoftruthsaboutspills,eachof
whichsayssomethingtrueofbothsplintersandtumblesthestudyof
spillsdoesnotmakeasinglesystemofknowledge,ordiscipline.Ifthe
expression'thingthatis'weresimilarlyhomonymous,therewouldbeno
studywhosesubjectmattercomprisedeverythingthatis,butonlyasetof
studieseachdealingwithsomegenusofthingthatis.Inthewordsof
K3.1060b335,"Ifthatwhichisissocalledhomonymouslyandin
respectofnothingcommon,itisnotunderonediscipline,forthereis
notonegenusofsuchthings".

Thereisevidencethatthisobjectiontotheprogrammeofmetaphysics
hadbeeninvented,oratleastpreviouslyused,byAristotlehimself
(EudemianEthicsI8.1217b34).Whateveritsprovenance,Aristotlecame
tobelievethatitcouldbemet.Inthisparagraphhearguesthat,although
theverb'be'doesindeedhavemorethanonesense(thingsthatareare
not"calledwhattheyarebyvirtueofonething",1003b1213),never
thelessthedifferentsensesareconnected(theyare"calledwhattheyare
withreferencetoonenature",1003b1314).

Thefirstsentenceconcedes,ineffect,thattheverb'be'hasmorethan
onesense.(Ina33itiswrongtotranslate'thewords"thingthatis"...',
because,althoughthesentencebeginswithaneuter'the',whichis
Aristotle'sonlydeviceforindicatingthatheisspeakingofwordsrather
thanthings,sucha'the'doesnot,ofcourse,alwayshavethatforce.In
manyoccurrenceselsewhereofthecommonphrase'iscalledinmany
ways'thecontextmakesitclearthatthings,notwords,arethesubject
seeK3.1060b314,D1.1012b34andofteninD)insupportofthis
thesisAristotlecitesinb6thefactthatwedonotalwayshavethesame
reasonfordescribingsomethingasathingthatis:itmaybesocalled
becauseitisasubstance,orbecauseitisanaffection,andsoon.Heisnot
makingtheabsurdclaimthatwhenevertwoexistentialstatementsare
assertedondifferentgroundstheymustbeunderstoodindifferentsenses.
Thekindofgroundhehasinmindisthatwhichgivesanaccountor
explanationofwhatitisforsomethingtoexist.Heisrighttoimplythat
ifonewereasked,forinstance,whatitisforamantoexistandforthe
man'scouragetoexist,theanswerswouldbeofverydifferentsorts.But
iseventhatenoughtojustifythethesisthat'exist'hasdifferentsensesin
thetwocases?Intheabsenceofaclearcriterionfordifferencesofsense
thequestionisnoteasytoanswerandevenifitwereanswered,we
shouldhavetoallowthatAristotle'sownexpression,heretranslated"in

Page80

severalways",cannotbeheldtoanyrigidinterpretation(seenoteson
D7.1017a22).Nevertheless,itisfairtoaskwhetheranyinterpretation
underwhichitistruetosaythat'exist'hasmanysensesorusesorcriteria
wouldbestrongenoughtosupporttheobjector'scontentionthatno
disciplinecanhaveallexistingthingsasitssubjectmatter.Onesuch
interpretationissuggestedbyananalogybetween'thingthatis'and
'good'whichAristotledrawsatNicomacheanEthicsI6.1096a2934,
wherehearguesagainstPlatoniststhatdifferentkindsofknowledgeor
expertisearerequiredtodiscovere.g.whatisgoodinwarandwhatis
goodinmedicine:therecouldnotbesuchathingasageneralknowledge
ofwhatisgoodwhichwouldshortcuttheseparticularstudies.Butitisa
mistaketosupposethatthisanalogyraisesadifficultyinthewayofthe
inquiryexaminedinMetaphysicsG.Thequestionaboutexistencewhich
parallelstheillicitPlatonicquestion'whatisgood?'is'whatexists?'and,
whileitistruetosaythatthereisnosingledisciplinethatincludes
answerstosuchquestionsas'doelectronsexist?'and'doesconscience
exist?',metaphysics,accordingtoAristotle'sconceptionofit,makesno
claimtobesuchadiscipline.Itseems,then,thatAristotlewastroubled
byaneedlessanxiety.Nodangerlurksinhisconcessionthatthesenses
of'be'aremultiple,ifthatconcessionisbasedontheanalogybetween
'thingthatis'and'good'.

Themultiplesensesoftheword'healthy'(asin'healthyexercise',
'healthyclimate','healthycomplexion','healthyperson')areconnected
aroundthefocus(b6"origin")health.Inthecaseoftheword'be'the
focalconceptis,accordingtoAristotle,substance.Itisnotappropriateto
examinehereAristotle'sviewsaboutsubstance,butthefollowingpoints
maybemade.(i)Heholdsthatastatementoftheform'xisathingthat
is'(ineffect,'xexists')canalwaysbeanalysedintotheform'xisanF',
e.g.'xisaquality'.(ii)Heholdsfurtherthattheexpressionreplacing'F'
willalwaysimplysomereferencetoasubstance,e.g.ifxisaquality,xisa
qualityofsomesubstance(Z1.1028a356).(iii)Inseveralotherplaces
Aristotletellsusthatthesensesof'thingthatis'are"asmanyasthe
categories"(seee.g.D1017a22),butofthesensesgivenhereonly
'substance'and'qualityofasubstance'introduceitemselsewheretreated
ascategories.ForotherdiscussionsofconnectedsensesseeD6.106b611,
Z4.1030a32 b3('medical'),Q1.1046a411,NicomacheanEthicsI6.
1096a239('be'),1096b269,EudemianEthicsI8.1217b2634('be'),VII
2.1236a1632('medical'),1236b1727,TopicsI15,106b29107a2
('healthy'),Categories6.5a38 b10,DeGenerationeetCorruptioneI6.
322b2933.

Aproblemarisesabouttheinclusioninb910ofdenialsamongthe
thingsthatare.Aristotlehasinmindnotnegativestatements(e.g.that
teaisnotalcoholic)butnegativestatesofaffairs(e.g.tea'snotbeing
alcoholic).Forthedistinctionbetweendenialsandlacks(orprivations)

Page81

seeG2.1004 1016andnote.Intheparenthesis,Aristotleassertsthat
a

theexistenceofdenialsexplainswhywecansaythatwhatisnotisa
thingthatisnot.Herelurksthefalseassumptionthatinasentenceofthe
form'xisf thefunctionofthecopulative'is'mustalwaysbetoassertthe
existenceofsomething.Thismisconceptiontemptingbecauseofthedual
useoftheGreek'einai'ascopulativeandexistentialhadprobably
beguiledcertainofAristotle'spredecessorsintoholdingthat'xisf '
entails'xexists'.Aristotleevidentlyrealizesthattheassumptioncannot
becorrect,e.g.when'f 'hasthevalue'nonexistent'.Thustheformof
wordsinhisparenthesisisnotintendedtocoverexampleslike'teaisa
hingthatisnotalcoholic',inwhichitwouldstillbepossibletoexplain
the'is'asassertingtheexistenceofteaitcoversexampleslike'teaisa
thingthatdoesnotexist'or'thealcoholicqualityofteaisathingthat
doesnotexist'.Aristotle'ssolutiontothesupposeddifficultyisthat'xis
nonexistent'entailstheexistence,notofx,butofamoreabstract
entity,thedenialofx'sexistenceinthefirstpartofthesentence,
therefore,"denialsofasubstance"(etc.)mustbedenialsoftheexistence
ofsomesubstance(etc.),notdenialsthatthesubstance(etc.)hassome
property.Sofarthesolution,thoughneedless,isinnocuous.Butit
cannotbecombinedwiththethesisthatina'denialofx'thestatusof
thedenialasathingthatisdependsonthestatusofxasathingthatis
forxisassertedtobeathingthatisnot.Athing'sexistencecouldnotbe
priorinthatwaytotheexistenceofthedenialofitsexistence.

1003b11.TheanalogywithhealthdoesnotseemadequatetoAris
totle'spurposeofvindicatingthepossibilityofmetaphysics.Thedoctor
cantellwhatishealthybecauseheknowsabouthealth,andevery
healthythingissomehowconnectedtohealth.Butthemetaphysician,
eventhoughheknowsaboutsubstance,andthougheveryexistingthing
issomehowconnectedtosubstance,cannotpronounceonthequestion
'Whatexists?'whichisajobformanydifferentspecialists.Nordoeshe
needto,forthenhisstudyofthatwhichiswouldbe"coincidental".
Aristotle'sprogrammeformetaphysicsisacoherentone,butthisargu
mentdoesnotshowittobeso.

1003b16.AristotlenowintimatesforthefirsttimeinGthatsubstances
arepriortotheotherthingsthatare,InZ1hewilldistinguishthree
waysinwhichsubstanceisprimaryinformula,knowledge,andtime.
Onlythefirstismentionedhere:inthewordsofZ1.1028a356,"in
eachthing'sformulatheformulaofasubstanceisnecessarilyacon
stituent".To"havetheprinciples[ororigins]andCausesofsubstances"
isperhapstoknowwhatsubstanceis,thequestiondiscussedinZH
perhapstoknowwhichamongthesubstancesarebasicandprimary(see
G3.1005a35).

Page82
b
1003 19.Thefactthatthingsthataredivideintoseveral"forms"
(eidithetraditionaltranslationsare'form'and'species')doesnotdebar
themfrombeingstudiedbyasinglediscipline,thinksAristotle,provided
thattheformsbelongtoonegenusbutsuchadisciplineisonlygeneri
callysingle,thatis,metaphysicshasparts.Aristotleheretreatsthings
thatareasconstitutingonegenus(cf.G2.1004b22)elsewherehe
repudiatesthatdescription(B3.998b2227,PosteriorAnalytics117.92b14).
Adifferenttranslationofthesecondsentenceispossible:'Henceitalso
fallstogenericallyonedisciplinetostudyalltheformsofthatwhichis
quathingthatis[sc.together],and[falls]totheforms[ofthatdiscipline
tostudyseverally]theforms[ofthatwhichis].'

1003b22.Thisparagraph,withwhichcompareI2.1054a1319,inter
ruptstherunofargument.Theprecedingdivisionofthingsthatareinto
formshasevidentlysuggestedtoAristotleorhiseditortheinsertionofa
sectiondesignedtoshowthatthingsthatareonedivideinthesameway.
Thefirstsentenceproposestentativelythat"thatwhichisandthatwhich
isonearethesamething",andafterargumentthesameclaimisrepeated
inthethirdsentence.Itsmeaningisexplainedinthefirstsentence:
'existent'and'one'havethesametruthconditions("eachfollowsfrom
theother")eveniftheyarenotsynonymous("indicatedbyoneformula").
Isthisso?Itmightbeobjectedthatalthoughe.g.'Lysistrataisawoman'
and'Lysistrataisonewoman'aretrue,'Lysistrataisanexistentwoman'
isfalse.HadAristotlenoticedtheobjection,hecouldplausiblyhave
repliedthatifLysistrataisonewomanshemustexistinsomesenseor
mannerinaplaysincetheabsolutelynonexistentisuncountable
(cf.W.V.Quine,'OnWhatThereIs',4).

Thesecondsentenceofferssupportforthefirst)intwostages:the
additionof'existent'("thatis")toacertainexpressionaddsnothingto
whatitsaysthesameistrue"inthecaseofthatwhichisone".Somuch
isclear)butthedetailsofAristotle'sargumentareobscure,partlybe
causeofcorruptioninthetext.Inb28oneMS.has'heisonemanand
heisaman',others'themanisbothamanandoneman'butthe
examplemustbeintendedtoshowtheredundancyof'thatis',which
Jaeger'semendation,adoptedinthetranslation,rightlyinserts.Given
thatemendation,theword'is'isreduplicatedwithinthesecondsentence
citedandalsobetweenthefirstsentencecitedandthesecondbut(i)no
reduplicationoftheformerkindneedoccurif'one'issubstitutedfor
'thatis',and(ii)thelatterreduplicationdoesnothingtoshowthatthe
nonreduplicatedphrase'thatis'isredundant.Ross'semendationdiffers
fromJaeger'sinomittingthetwooccurrencesof'heis'thetwooccur
rencesof'one'arealsosuperfluous.

Thefourthsentenceisobscure."Eachthing'ssubstanceis...just
whatacertainkindofthingthatisis":i.e.substancesareidenticalwith

Page83

theclassofentitieswhosesubstancestheyare(seeG4.1007 20)."One
a

noncoincidentally":the'parts'ofe.g.paleCalliasareseparable,butthose
ofCallias'substance,viz.twofootedandanimal,ateindissolublyonesee
D6.1015b16.Theargumentseemstobe:substancesareindissolubly
onesubstancesaretobeidentifiedwithcertainthingsthatareso
certainthingsthatareareindissolublyone.Itisnotclearhowthesefacts
advancetheargumentoftheparagraphasawhole.

Thesameandsimilararenotformsofthatwhichisinthewaythatman
isaform(species)ofanimalonlysomeanimalsaremen,buteverything
thatis,orisone,mustbethesame(assomething)andsimilar(tosome
thing)itis,infact,justthisfeature,universalapplicability,which
makesthestudyofsuchconceptsapartofmetaphysics.Aristotle's
meaningisindicatedbyD15.1021a912:'equal','similar',and'the
same'aredefinedintermsof'one'.

Abookoncontraries,whichmaybethe'SelectionofContraries',is
mentionedinsomeancientlistsofAristotle'swritings(seeintroductory
noteonD)accordingtothecommentaryofAlexanderofAphrodisias
(floruitA.D.200)theselectionwasmadefromthesecondbookofalost
workbyPlatoOntheGood.

1004a2.Accordingtothealternativetranslationof1003b212,eachof
the"forms"intowhichthatwhichisdividesisstudiedbya"form"of
metaphysics.The"partsofphilosophy"mentionedheremustbediffer
ent,becausethestudyofaparticularkindofsubstanceisnot,ornot
always,metaphysicsbutmaybee.g.zoologyorgeometryorethics.
Here,therefore,"philosophy''means'knowledge'cf.the"theoretical
philosophies"ofE1.1026a1819.

Althoughbranchesofmathematicsmaybearrangedinaseries,
Aristotledoesnotexplainhowthesamecanbedonefor"philosophy"as
awhole,becauseheFailstotellushowsubstancescanbeorderedin
degreesofpriority.

1004a9.Aristotlenowusesthethesisarguedintheparagraphbegin
ning1003b22thatmetaphysicsstudiestheconceptofunityinorder
toshowthatothernessandseveralrelatedconceptsalsocomewithinits
scope.Twoargumentsareruntogether:(i)pluralityisopposedtounity,
andothernessetc.areformsofplurality(ii)othernessetc.areopposed
tosamenessetc.Thatothernessetc.areformsofpluralityisnotstated,
butcanbeinferredfromconsiderationssimilartothoseusedinD
15.1021a9toshowthatsamenessisaformofunity:e.g.x,y,z,etc.are
otherifandonlyiftheirsubstancesaremorethanone."Oppositesfall
tobestudiedbyonediscipline"becausee.g.thestudyoftheconditions
underwhichxandyarenotthesamebutotheristhestudyofthe
conditionsunderwhichxandyarethesametheonethingofwhich
theyarethedenialorlackisstudiedinbothcases".

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AsAlexandersays,thedifferencebetweenadenialandalack(or
privation)isindicatedatPriorAnalyticsI46.51b2534:"Tobenotequal
andnottobeequalarenot[thesame]eitherforoneofthem,that
whichisnotequal,hasacertainsubject,andthisistheunequal,butthe
otherhasnone.Thatiswhynoteverythingisequalorunequal,but
everythingisequalornotequal....Itisthereforeobviousthat'itis
notgood'isnotthedenialof'itisgood',[but]...mustbesomekindof
affirmation."(ThedistinctionsareindicatedinGreekbywordorder,
nothyphens.)Thereasonwhyathingmaybeneitherequalnornot
equalis,asAlexandersays,thatbothofthesepredicates,unlike'not
equal',imply'capableofbeingequal'andtheyimply'capableof
beingequal'becausetheyimply'quantity'.Quantityisthusthe"cer
taingenus"(a13)andthe''certainnature"(a16)that"comesinasthe
subjectofwhichthelackisstated".SeeD22,whichmakesitclearthatin
thestatementofalackthis"subject"isnotalwaysactuallymentioned:
henceitmightbebettertotranslatea1213'eitherwemeanbaldlythat
thatthingdoesnotholdgood,orofacertaingenus'(cf.D9.1018a4).

"Inthelattercase,then,somedifferentiaisaddedtotheone,apart
fromwhatisthereinthedenial":iftheMS.textofthissentence(re
tainedinthetranslation,butmarkedcorruptbyJaegerandemendedby
Ross)maystand,itssensewillbe:'xisnotone'expressesadenial,but'x
isnotoneF',addinga"differentia",expressesalack.Againstthis
interpretation,(i)itishardfor'differentia'tohavethesamesenseas
'genus'intheprecedingsentence,and(ii)'notoneF'and'notone'failto
markthedistinction(ifitexists)betweenwhatmerelyisnot,andwhatis
notcapableofbeing,one.Severalotherinterpretations,noneofthem
easy,arediscussedbyRoss,whoseowntextomits"totheone".The
MSS.have'thedifferentia',whichperhapsneedsemendation(with
Ross)inordertosecurethesensetranslated.

"Theoneissocalledinseveralways":seeD6.

1004a25.Thedistinctionandclassificationof"ways"orsensesof'be',
'one','thesame',andothersubjectneutralwordsisundertakenmainly
inDandI.

1004a31.Cf.E2.1026b224,E1.1026a2332."Andofsubstancethey
havenocomprehension":theyomitthatpartofmetaphysicswhich
studiesthepriorityofsubstanceoverotherthingsthatare.

1004b17.'Dialectic'canbethegeneralnameoftheactivityofdebat
ingfacetofacewithanopponent,sometimes,asinPlato'sdialogues,in
thepresenceofanaudienceandsometimesapparently,asinthesecond
partofPlato'sParmenides,accordingtosetrules.Suchdebatesmight
serveanumberofdifferentpurposes:theymightbe(i)inquisitorialor
deflationary,asinSocratic'refutations',(ii)sportingcontests,(iii)
'moots',topractisestudentsintheartofdebate,(iv)aimedatthe

Page85

discoveryoftruth.Aristotle'swordfor(i)is'peirastic',whichIhavetrans
lated"probes".(i),(ii),and(iv)aredistinguishedfromdialecticat
DeSophisticisElenchis2.165a38 b7,but(i)isidentifiedwithitinthe
presentpassageandatDeSophisticisElenchis11.171b9,172a36.(ii),(iii),
and(iv)areallincludedunderdialecticatTopicsI2.101a258,(i)and
(iv)atTopicsVIII5.159a2537.Sophistic,otherwiseeristic(DeSophisticis
Elenchis11.171b612),seemstocover(ii)andperhaps(iii),butisalways
opposedtodialecticbyAristotleascontaining"whatareimaginedtobe
reasonings"and"whatareimaginedtobereceivedopinions''eitherin
thesensethatthepremissesandargumentsofsophisticarealwaysfalse
andfallacious(E2.1026b1415),orthatthesophisticalpurposeis
indifferenttotheirtruth.Sophistsaredistinguishedbytheirpurpose
("thelifechosen"),dialecticiansby"thetypeofcapacity",i.e.their
lackofabilitytopursuethehigheraimoftruth(cf.RhetoricI1.
1355b1721).Philosophysticks,ofcourse,topurpose(iv).SinceAris
totle'scomparisonisdesignedtoindicatethewidescopeofmetaphysics,
''philosophy"inthisparagraphhastomean'firstphilosophy'.

1004b27.Aristotlenowoffersanewargumenttoshowthat"itfallsto
onedisciplinetostudythatwhichisquathingthatis":
(a)allthingseitherareorarecomposedoutofcontraries
(b)contrariesoriginateintheoneandplurality
(c)pluralityandtheone,beingopposites,arestudiedbythesamediscipline
(d)sincethesensesof'one',thoughmany,areconnected,whatisonemaybestudiedbyasinglediscipline
(e)thereforeallthingsmaybestudiedbyasinglediscipline.
(b),(c),and(d)aredrawnfromtheparagraphbeginning1004a9.
Aristotleholdsthat,amongthingsthatare,substancesandquantities,at
least,arenotthemselvescontraries(Categories5.3b2432and6.5b11
29)andatL10.1075a2834andN1087a29 b4hecriticizesthe
opinion,heldby"practicallyeveryone"(b29)amonghispredecessors,
thatthephysicalworldiscomposedoutofcontraries.Hisargumenthere
isthereforeapparentlyadhominem.

Theparenthesisata811itnoteasy.(A)NicomacheanEthicsI6.
1096a238assertsthatthegoodcannotbe"anythinguniversallycommon
andone"onthegroundthatit"maybesocalledinasmanywaysasthat
whichis".Denyinguniversalityseems,then,tobeequivalenttoasserting
multiplicityofsenses.(B)"Separable"cannothaveAristotle'stechnical
sense,accordingtowhichsubstances,butnote.g.affectionsormatter,
areseparable(PhysicsI2.185a31,DeGeneration,etCorruptioneI10.327b22,
II1.329a25):themeaningmustbe'havingunconnectedsenses'.Thus
theparenthesisrepeatswhatwassaidintheprevioussentence,andis
doubtlessanintrusion.yandzare"relatedtoonething"xwhenthere

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arerelationsRandSsuchthatRyzandSzxthey"formasuccession"
whenRyzandSzx.

"Exceptonthebasisofahypothesis":RossfollowsAlexanderin
interpreting'buttheyproceedonthebasisofanassumedanswer(sc.
tothequestionwhatisthecontraryetc.)'cf.Plato,RepublicVI510cd.

1005a13.Allthemetaphysicalconceptsmentionedhereandearlierin
thechapteraretreatedinMetaphysicsDorI.

Chapter3

1005a19.ThisparagraphanswersthequestionraisedatB2.996b2633:
"Ontheotherhand,withregardtothedemonstrativeprinciplesitis
disputablewhethertheyfalltoonedisciplineormorethanone.By
'demonstrative'Imeanthecommonopinionsonthebasisofwhichall
mendemonstrateasforinstancethatitisnecessarythateverythingbe
eitherassertedordenied,andthatitisimpossiblesimultaneouslytobe
andnottobe,andallotherpropositionsofthatkind.Doesonediscipline
dealwiththeseandwithsubstance,oradifferentone?Andifthelatter,
whichoughttobeidentifiedwiththedisciplinewearenowseeking?"
Aristotleindicatesthattheword'axiom'(perhapsmeaning'requisite')is
takenfrommathematics,andtheparallelpassageatK4.1061b19refers
tothe"mathematicians'principle","commontoallquantities'',that
"whenequalsaresubtractedfromequalsequalsremain"(cf.Posterior
AnalyticsIso.76a41,b20,11.77a30),whichisthethirdofEuclid's
'commonnotions'(seeHeath,MathematicsinAristotle,2013).Inthe
remainderofGAristotlewilldiscussonlythetwoabsolutely"common''
axiomsmentionedinB,theprinciplesofnoncontradictionandex
cludedmiddle(henceforwardPNCandPEM).Tothesetwoatleasthe
mightapplythedefinitionof'axiom'givenatPosteriorAnalyticsI2.
72a1418:theyare"impossibletoshow"(cf.G4.1006a512)and"itis
necessaryforanyonewhoisgoingtolearnanythingtohave"them(cf.
G3.1005b1617).

InB2Aristotlehadraisedtwoobjectionstoincludingaxiomsunder
thesamedisciplineaseachotherandassubstance.(i)Theyareusedin
alldisciplinesandsocannotbethepeculiarstudyofanyone(996b33
997a2).Aristotlenowanswersthatthough"everyoneusesthem"they
arenotstudiedbyeveryone(a2930):itisinappropriateforageometer
toinvestigatethecredentialsofPNCbecauseitholdsgoodofhissubject
matter,lines,etc.,"quathingsthatare",andsoholdsgoodofevery
thingthatis,whethergeometricalornot.(ii)Theaxiomscannotbe
studiedbyanydisciplinefortheydonotneedtobedefinedand,ifthey
aretobedemonstratedbyadiscipline,everythingelsedemonstratedby
meansofthem(andthatiseverythingwhatever)willfallunderthesame
discipline,whichisabsurd(997a211).Thisobjectionisnotanswered

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explicitlyinG.PerhapsAristotleabandoneditsoddassumptionthatifC
isdemonstratedfromBandBfromA,A,B,andCallbelongtothesame
fieldofstudyorperhaps,asRosssuggests,theabsurdityisthoughtnot
toariseifaxiomsare,strictlyspeaking,indemonstrable.

Ontheerrorsofthestudentsofnature,or'physicists',cf.E1.1025b18
21,1026a2730,L610,Plato,Sophist2467inoneseine'nature'covers
everything(cf.D4.1015a1113),inanothernot(D4.1015a1315).

1005b2.ThequestionwhichAristotledismissesasbelongingto
analytics(i.e.logic)mayconcern(1)axiomsor(2)(Ross)propositionsin
general.Ineithercaseheseemstohaveinmindespeciallythefactthat
onecannotrequireeverypropositiontobedemonstratedfromanother
beforeitisacceptedastrue(seenotesonG4.1005b35).Alexander
suggestsplausiblythatthisparagraphoughttofollowthenext.The
argumentwouldthenbe:metaphysicsstudies(e.g.triestoovercome
objectionsto)theprinciplesofreasoninganalyticsshowsthatprinciples
arenecessarytoreasoning.Thereisstillsomewarrantforthisdivisionof
labour.

1005b5."WhatisCharacteristicofallsubstance":literally'allsub
stanceasitnaturallyis'Aristotleusesaverbcognatewith'phusis'.
"Principlesoftrainsofreasoning":literally'syllogisticalprinciples',
butearlierwriters,andAristotlehimselfintheTopics,used'sullogismos'
('coreckoning')anditscognatesroughlyasweuse'reasoning'.Eventhe
definitioninthePriorAnalytics(I.124b1820)allowsthewordtoapply
toanydeductiveargumentfrommorethanonepremiss.Soitisbestto
avoidthenowtechnicalterm'syllogistic'(atD18.1022a22thetran
slationis'calculation').

1005b8.Havingansweredthequestionsetatthebeginningofthe
chapter,Aristotlenowleavestheexaminationoftheexistenceandscope
ofmetaphysicswhichhasfilledthefirstpartofG.Therestofthebook
consistsofanexerciseinmetaphysics:whatarethe(chief)axioms,and
howcantheirtruthbevindicatedagainstchallenge?PNCoccupieshim
totheendofchapter6PEMismuchmorebrieflytreatedinG7.
Hebeginsbyassertingthatthemetaphysicianmustbeable"tostate
thefirmestprinciplesofeverything",andassumesthatamongtheseis
aprinciple"firmestofall".Inthesecondsentenceletusrefertoitas
(a)theGreekmightmeaneither
(a1)ifxisthefirmestprincipleofall,errorwithregardtoxisim
possible
or
(a2)iferrorwithregardtoxisimpossible,xisthefirmestprinciple
ofall
('x'beinguniversallyquantified).Twothingssupport(a2).(i)1005b2234
willarguethatPNCisthefirmestprincipleofallonthegroundthatits

Page88

contradictoryisbelievedbynoone,i.e.errorwithregardtoitisim
possible,Thisproofisvalidatedby(a2)butnotby(al).(ii)Theproof
of(a)itselfisbymeansoftwolemmatastatedinthethirdsentence:
(b)iferrorwithregardtoxisimpossible,xismostintelligible
(c)iferrorwithregardtoxisimpossible,xisnonhypothetical.
(Thefinalsentenceoftheparagraphshowsthatinb13"ofthatkind"
means'withregardtowhicherrorisimpossible'.)Theselemmatawill
serveinanargumentfor(a2)butnotfor(al).

Intherestofthethirdsentencethetwofurtherpremisseswhich
connect(b)and(c)with(a)arenotstated,butargumentsinsupportof
(b)and(c)areofferedsuccessively.(b)issupportedby
(d)anyonewhodoesnotunderstandxisliabletoerrorwithregard
tox
(c)istobetakenassupportedby
(e)iferrorwithregardtoxisimpossible,xisunderstoodbyanyone
whounderstandsanything
(f)ifthelatter,xisnecessarilyinthatperson'sequipment
(g)ifthelatter,xisnotahypothesis.
(e)isnotstateditappearstoassumethatwhereerrorisimpossibleso
areignoranceandconfusion.In(f)'necessarily'hastogovernthe
consequent(cf.G4.1006b2830,5.1010b25),foritisneededinthe
antecedentof(g).'Intelligible'translates'gnorimos'('certain'atG4.
1008a17)'understand'and'haveunderstanding'translatethecognate
verb'gnorizein',thebasicmeaningofwhichis'makeintelligible'(G
2.1004a20,23,b26,3.1005a28)tooneselforothersAristotle'sstate
mentof(g)substitutesasynonymousverb'xunienai'('apprehend').

For'hypothesis'seePosteriorAnalyticsI10.76b2334:ahypothesisis
provablebutacceptedwithoutproofapostulateisdisbelievedbut
assumedforthesakeofargumentbotharedifferentfromaprinciple
(=axiom)which"isnecessarilysoonitsownaccountandisnecessarily
believed".

1005b18."Dialecticaldifficulties":Platoremarksthataspinningtop
canbemovingandnotmovingindifferentparts(therimmoving,the
axisatrest,Republic436de),andaccordinglyformulatesaprincipleof
contrarietythus:"thesamethingwillnotbewillingsimultaneouslytodo
orsuffercontrariesatleastinthesamerespectandrelativetothesame
thing"(436b89).CompareDeSophisticisElenchis5.167a237,where
Aristotleproposestheguardingformula"ofoneandthesamething,
actualthingnotname....inthesamerespect,relativetothesamething,
inthesamewayandinthesameperiodoftime"alsoDsInterpretatione
6.17a337.ThepresentformulationofPNCcoversonlyunquantified

Page89

subjectpredicatepropositionsanddoesnotruleoutthejointtruthof
complexpropositionssuchas'heiseitherupstairsordownstairsorinmy
lady'schamber'and'heisneitherupstairsnordownstairsnorinmy
lady'schamber'forwhichweneedthemoregeneralmodernformula
'itisimpossiblethatpandnotp'.Sometimes,indeed(e.g.B2.996b30,
G4.1006a1),Aristotleemploysthephrase"forthesamethingtobeand
nottobe",inwhich'tobe'mightmean'tobethecase'(cf.G5.1009a7)
buteventhatphrasemaybeellipticalfortheschema'tobesoandso',
where'soandso'markstheplaceforapredicateexpression(cf.
1006b1820).Otherformulationsoftheprinciplearequitefreelyusedin
someoftheargumentswhichfollow(e.g.1005b29whichintroducesthe
word'contradiction',1005b234wherethemodaloperatorisomitted,
G4.1007b1819,1008a36).

1005b22.AristotlenowseekstoshowthatPNC'fitsthespecification"
offirmestprinciplebybeingaprincipleaboutwhicherrorisimpossible.
TheopinionhecitesaboutHeraclitus(notreliedonbymodernscholars)
isnot
(a) x F(Heraclitussaidthatitispossiblethatsomepeoplebe
lievethatFx&Fx)
but
(b) x F(HeraclitussaidthatFx&Fx).
Aristotlepointsoutthatwecannotinferfrom(b)to
(c) x F(HeraclitusbelievedthatFx&Fx)
northereforeto
(d) x F(itispossiblethatsomepeoplebelievethatFx&Fx)
whichisentailedby(c).Hethengivesaproofofthecontradictoryof(d),
asfollows.
(e)itisimpossibleforcontrariestoholdgoodofthesamething
(b268)
(f) x F(beliefthatFxiscontrarytobeliefthatnotFx)(b289)
(g)therefore x F(itisimpossibleforanyonetobelievethatFxand
believethatnotFx)(b2930).
G6.1011b1522willarguethat(e),hereintroducedwithan'if',
isentailedbyPNCitselfbutAristotlenowheredefendstheotherandmore
dubiouspremiss(f)(DeInterpretatione14.23a32 b7seemsirrelevant).The
restoftheproofisnotexplicit:from(g)Aristotleseemstoinfer,plausibly,
(h) x F(itisimpossibleforanyonetobelievethatFx&Fx)
whichcontradicts(d)thence,fallaciouslyignoringtheintensionalityof
belief,

(i)itisimpossibleforanyonetobelievethatnotPNC
(where'PNC'abbreviates' x F(Fx&Fx)')andso,validlygiven
'necessarilyPNC',to

Page90

(j)ithimpossiblethat(PNCandsomeonebelievesthatnotPNC)and
alsoimpossiblethat(notPNCandsomeonebelievesthatPNC),
i.e.erroraboutPNCisimpossible.(Aristotleeschewsthestrongerclaim,
impliedbyPosteriorAnalysticsI10.76b24,thatPNCmustbebelieved.)
G4.1006a4,"bymeansofthis",showsthatheisawarethatthewhole
proofdependsonPNCasapremiss.Hedoesnotmakeclearwhether(h)
rulesoutthepossibilityofbelievingevenveiledcontradictionssuchas
'Balaamrodeonanassbutnotonadonkey','Menelauswaskingof
SpartabutnotofLacedaemon'.OntheparagraphseeJ.Barnes,
PhilosophicalQuarterly,October1969.

Inb32"thisopinion"isPNC.DoesAristotlemeanthateveryargu
mentreliesonPNC(cf.1005a234),ormerelythatnoargumentques
tionsit?Onlythelatterissupportedorexplainedbythethesisthatit
cannotbedisbelieved.

Chapter4

Thenotesdividethischapterintoanintroductionandsevenarguments
(Rossruns1006a281007b18togetherasthefirst,andseparates1008a27
asthethird),Theargumentsarevariableinqualityandsometimesdraw
onthesamematerial.Thoughtherearesomecrossreferences,itis
possiblethattheywerecollectedandcomposedoveralongperiodof
time.PartofAristotle'spurposemayhavebeentoencouragehispupils
tocompareandgradethem.

G 4:Introduction(1005b351006a28)

1005b35.Both(A)theconclusionand(B)theargumentofthispara
graphareunclear.(A)Theimplicationof1006a11isthatwhatprecedes
hasshownthatdemonstrationofPNCisimpossible,unless"inthemanner
ofarefutation"andtheauthorofK5.1062a24saysexplicitly"on
suchmattersthereisnosuchthingasdemonstration,speakingbaldly"
(becauseno"moretrustworthyprinciple"canbefoundfromwhichto
demonstrateit).Butinthepresentparagraphitselfwearetoldthat"a
demonstrationoughtnottobesought",whichmayconveythatdemon
strationofPNCismerelyneedless.

(B)Aristotle'sargumentisfromtwopremisses:(a)"itisimpossiblethat
thereshouldbedemonstrationofeverything"(b)ifanythingoughttobe
leftundemonstrated,PNCought.Twocriticismsmaybebroughtagainst
theargument.Firstly,(b)isinneedofsupportperhapsAristotleseesthe
restofthechapterasprovidingit.Secondly,(a)isambiguousbetween
(a1)somethingscannotbedemonstrated
and

(a2)itcannotbethateverythingisdemonstrated.
Aristotlemayhaveconfusedthese(seee.g.histreatmentof'alltheairis

Page91
a
breathable'atTopicsV5.135 32b1),andonly(al)couldsupportthe
strongerversionofhisconclusion.Buteven(a2)seemsstrongenoughto
justify

(c)inanygivenargument,itoughttobethatsomethingsareleft
undemonstrated,

which,togetherwith(b),entails

(d)PNCoughtalwaystobeleftundemonstrated.

(a2)butnot(al)isprovedatgreaterlengthinI3ofthePosterior
Analytics,towhichperhapsthosewho"lacktraining"aretobereferred
cf.G3.1005b34.

1006a11.InthiscrypticparagraphAristotlerecommendsastrategypp.2034
againsttheopponentofPNC.What,first,doeshemeanby"demon
stratinginthemannerofarefutation"?(1)AnydemonstrationofPNC
wouldbearefutationofitscontradictory,astheopponentisatthis
stageassumedtoadmit(1006a56).Hencethespecialmethodwhich
Aristotlerecommendsisnotmerely'demonstratingbyrefuting'.(2)K5
doesnotmentionrefuting,butcallsfordemonstrationadhominem
("inresponsetothisperson",1062a3).If'adhominem'means'froma
premissacceptedonlybyyouropponent',someofthelaterarguments
inGfollowthatprocedure,butnothingelseinthisparagraphsuggests
it.(3)K5prescribes,againwithouttheauthorityofG4,"finding
somethingofsuchakindthatitshallbethesame...butnotbethought
tobethesame"asPNC(1062a69).(4)Indemonstration,saysAristotle
ina1617,thedemonstrator"mightbethoughttobegtheoriginal
question",butinrefutation"someoneelseiscauseofsuchathing''.
AccordingtothedefinitionatPriorAnalyticsII16.64b348itisnot
possibletobegselfevidentpropositions,butAristotle'sopponent,
denyingthatPNCisselfevident,mightaccusehimofdemonstrating
fromapremisswhichonlyPNCitselfwouldgiveoneanyreasonto
accept(''ofanaturetobeshownbymeansof"PNC,64b40).Toavoid
theaccusation"someoneelse",sc.theopponenthimself,mustchoose
thepremisswhichisafeatureofrefutationsalso.(Ifthisistheprocedure
recommendedbyAristotle,itexploitsthefactthateverypropositionat
leasteveryonewhichtheopponentislikelytochooseimpliesPNC.)

Whetherornotthefourthsentence(onwhichourMSS.agree,
althoughAlexanderknewsomevariants)furtherelucidates"demon
stratinginthemannerofarefutation",itcertainlyenjoinsmorethan
merelytogivetheopponentchoiceofopeningpremiss.Thesyntax
leavesitdoubtfulwhetherheisrequired(1)tosignifysomething(cf.
K5.1062a1114,makehimselfunderstood)or(2)tostatesomethingto
(i.e.thatsomethingdoes)signify.If(1),wemighttakeitthattherequire
mentistobesatisfiedeither(1a)byutteringasingleword,e.g.'man',

Page92

or(1b)byutteringsuchawordinanswertoaquestionsuchas'IsCallias
aman?'Thedifficultywith(la)isthat'man',notbeingaproposition,
cannotformthepremissofanargument(seealsoa27"hasagreedthat
somethingistrue")nordidAristotlebelievethat'man'implies'thereis
aman'(DeInterpretatione4.16b2830).Ontheotherhand,itispossible
thatAristotletooktheutteranceof'man'toimplytheproposition
'"man"hasasignificance'.If,by(1b),theopponentistosay'man'in
answertoaquestion,thequestionmustbeotherthanonewhich''asks
himtostatesomethingeithertobeornottobe".AtTopicsI4.101b2933
Aristotledistinguishestheform'isitthecasethatpornot?'(a"problem")
fromtheform'isitthecasethatp?'(a''premiss").Conceivablyhis
intentionhereistoprescribepremissquestionsasagainstproblem
questions,perhapsonthegroundthatthelatterexcludethedouble
answer'pandnotp'.Butat1007a714,wherehedoesimaginethe
opponenttohavebeenaskedaquestiontowhich'man'wouldbean
answer,thatquestionisoftheproblemtypeandthedoubleanswertoit
isexplicitlyexcluded.(2)Twolaterpassages,1006b1113andG8.
1012b58,requiretheopponenttosaythatsomewordhassignificance,
andbothreferback,apparentlytothissentence.

Thedemandinthefirstsentencethattheopponentshall"saysome
thing"maybelessinnocentthanitseems.ForAristotle'ssubsequent
glossonitscontradictoryis"hasastatementofnothing",which,likethe
precedingphrase"lookforastatement",employsthenoun'logos'(see
glossary)andwhileinthefirstoftheseoccurrenceslogosisspeechor
statement,inthesecond'hasalogosofsomething'canreadilymean'has
adefinition'(cf.D29.1024b261025a1,butcontrastG2.1004a33where
thesamephraseistranslated'discuss').Furthermore,ata245itis
concludedthatiftheopponentdoeswhatisaskedofhim"therewill
alreadybesomethingdefinite".SoperhapsAristotle,playingonthis
doublemeaningof'logos',requirestheopponentnotonlytostatethat
e.g.'man'hasasignificanceandthereforeadefinition,butalsotostate
thedefinitioncf.G7.1012a214,andG8.1012b58where,however,the
definitionisof'true'and'false'.

"Butthecause...",a256:causeofwhat?IfAristotlemeansthatthe
opponentisresponsibleforthe"originalstep",inthathesayssomething,
nothingisaddedbythewords"eliminatingstatement".Probablythe
meaningisthattheopponentisresponsibleforhisowndownfall(cf.
a1718)forheengagesindiscourse,butsaysthingswhichmakedis
courseimpossible(cf.Sophist252bc).

AttheendofthefinalsentencesomeMSS.add,duplicatinga30,"so
thatitcouldnotbethateverythingwassoandsoandnotsoandso"
othersomitthewholesentence,whichmaythereforebespurious,ora
lateradditionbyAristotle,ormisplaced.Ifitbelongshere,itsforcemay
be:ifsomethingistrue,somethingisfalsesonoteverythingistrue.

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G 4:1stArgument(1006a2831)

1006a28.Thissentencehasbeengivenvariousinterpretations.(1)'The
namechosensignifiese.g."(tobe)man"or"not(tobe)man"butnever
both["or"exclusive]soitisimpossibletobebothmanandnotman.'
Thepremissisfeebleandtheargumentunconvincing.(2)'Onewhosays
thatxise.g.amansignifiesthatxis,orisnot,somethinginparticular
soxisnoteverythingwhatever(whateveryoulike).'Thereisamoder
atelygoodparallelforthisinterpretationof'soandsoandnotsoandso'
atTheaetetus183asbutthesenseisstrainedandtheconclusionnotob
viouslyrelevant.(3)'Thenamechosensignifiesbeingornotbeing
somethingandthatisthestartingpointfromwhichweshallproceedto
provePNC.'Thisgivesaweaksenseto''sothat",andignoresthe
implicationof"again''in1006a31thata2831offersaseparateargument.
(4)'Thenamechosensignifiestobeornottobesomethinganddoesnot
alsonotsignifythatsoatleastonepredicate,"signify",doesnotshare
itscontradictorywithanyofitssubjects.'This,Alexander'sinter
pretation(cf.,forWhatitisworth,K5.1062a1718),attemptstomeet
thedifficultythatalltheothersrequire'anything'ratherthan'every
thing'intheconclusion.Butthatisallthatcommendsitsandinany
caseastrictreadingoftheconclusiongives'atleastonesubjectdoesriot
haveanycontradictorypredicates'.(5)Alexanderalsoconstruesthe
premissdifferently:'thename"tobe"or"nottobe"signifiesthispar
ticularthing'.Thisdoesnotseemtohelphisowninterpretationorto
suggestanotheranditisinconsistentwithDeInterpretatione3.16b225.

G 4:2ndArgument,PartI(1006a31b34)

Beforediscussingthetextofthisextraordinarilymystifyingargument,it
willbeusefultodistinguishingeneraltermsthetwotypesofinter
pretationithasreceived.Accordingtothefirsttype,PartIoftheargu
ment(downto1006b34)seekstoshowthatnopredicatewhatevermay
bepredicatedjointlywithitscontradictoryPartIII(1007a20 b18)
arguesindependentlythatthesamemustbetrueofnecessaryoressential
predicatesinparticular.Accordingtothesecondtype,bothPartshave
thelatter,orasimilarlylimited,aim.Themajorattractionoftype1
interpretationsisthatPartIdoesnotrepresentitselfasamerelypartial
defenceofPNCand,althoughcouchedintermsoftheword'man',gives
noindicationthatthechoiceofanessentialpredicatewordiscrucial.
Ontheotherhand,type2interpretationsclaimtogiveabettersenseto
1006b1314andtoexplainhowb1328connectswithb2834butthere
issomedoubtaboutboththeseclaims.Eveniftype2isright,thereisno
reasontoconcludethatAristotleacceptedonlytherestrictedversionof
PNCindeedheoftenstatesitwithoutanysuchrestriction.

Page94
a
pp.20561006 31.'Inthesamesense'doesnotoccuramongthe"customary
specifications"listedinthestatementofPNCatG3.1005b1920
(contrastDeSophisticisElenchis5.167a4,DeInterpretatione6.17a35).
YetAristotledoubtlessknewthechild'sriddlealludedtoatRepublicV
479c:amanwhowasnotaman(aeunuch)threwastonethatwasnot
astone(apumice)atabirdthatwasnotabird(abat)onatwigthat
wasnotatwig(areed).Inthisparagraphheexplainsanddefendsthe
assumptionthatin'thesamethingcannotbeamanandnotaman''man'
hasjustonesense(orexplication,seebelow).Althoughthisseemsto
betheforceof"signifyonething"(anexpressionnotusedelsewhereby
Aristotle),itmustbeadmittedthatinotherplaces'signify'('semainein')
oftenmeanssomethingmorelike'denote':e.g.iftheword'cloak'isused
asanabbreviationfor'thehorsethatisaman'itsignifiesnothing(De
Interpretatione8.18a25,butcontrast1.16a1618andPosteriorAnalytics
II7.92b58)'every'(DeInterpretatione10.20a13),andperhaps'is'
(ib.3.16b24),donotsignifybut"consignify''"connectives"suchas
particlesandprepositionsare''nonsignificant"(Poetics20.1456b38
1457a10).Inchoosingtoexpresshisassumptionofunivocityinthis
unusualandambiguouswayAristotleisnodoubtinfluencedbythefact
thattheword'signify'hasappearedintheargumentalreadyotherwise
hemighthavewritten'letmanbesaidinoneway'or'letmanbe
synonymous'(Categories1.1a612).

Lackinginvertedcommas,Aristotlereferstothename'man',a
masculine,byprefixingtheneuterformof'the'cf.D7.1017a31,
literally'theissignifies...'.Thedefinition'twofootedanimal',though
repeatedelsewhere,isnotinthepresentargumentrequiredtobecorrect
orcomplete.Aristotle'sexplanationof'signifyonething'isparaphrased
tothefollowingeffectbyAlexanderandRoss:'if(a)[what'man'signifies]
isthat[viz,twofootedanimal],['man'signifiesonethingifandonlyif]
(b)inthecaseofanyman,(c)tobeamanwillbethat[viz.tobeatwo
lootedanimal]'.(a)demands,pacsRoss,thetextualvariantwhichomits
theword'man'thereceivedtextmustmeaneither'ifthat[word]is
"man"'(understandinganeuterarticlebefore'man'),or'ifthat[one
thingwhich'man'signifies]isaman',or'ifthat[viz.atwofooted
animal]isaman'.(b)emphasizesthat'twofootedanimal'mustapplyto
everythingtowhich'man'applies.

"Providedthattheseweredefinite":sc."adefinitenumber"(b4)as
against"infinitelymany"(b6).Aristotle'sargumentdoesnotinfact
requirethatthesignificationsofanamebefinitelymany,butonlythat
therebeunitsignifications,likepointsonaline,notthemselvesfurther
divisible.Thisisshownbythesecondsentenceaftertheparenthesis,which
hastomeannotthatnamessignifyjustonething(adoctrineabsurdin
itselfandcontradictedbya34)but,asindicatedbythereferencetocon
ceiving,thataspeakermustsignifyjustonething,sc.eachtimeheutters

Page95

asinglenamesignificantly.Thustheargumentis:objectsofthought
divideintounitswhichmustbepairablewithnames(b1011)therefore,
ifthereisspeechorthought,namesaresignificant(b89)ifnamesare
significant,eachuseofanamemusthaveunitsignification(b7)ifeach
usehasunitsignification,eachnamemusthavesignificationsthatdivide
intounits(b57).Inclaimingthateveryutteranceofanamesignifiesjust
onething,Aristotleoverlooksthephenomenonofdoubleentendre.Hedoes
notimplythatwhatthenamesignifiesmustbeasimpleentitycf.De
Interpretatione8.18a1827,Z4.1029b278.

"Therewouldbenostatement":or,perhaps,'formula'.

1006b13.Theopeningclauseofthisparagraphisthefirstmajorcrux
intheargument.Threeinterpretationsseempossible.Thefirstdepends
onconstruing'oukestai'atthebeginningofthesecondsentence,literally
(asinthistranslation)'willnotbe',intheequallycommonsense'will
notbepossible'.Theeffectofthisistomakethesecondsentenceantici
patetheconclusionofPartI,whichwillbestatedat1006b334inthe
nextparagraph.Butthesecondsentencebeginsnotwitha'therefore'
butan'and',asifexplainingtheopeningclauseofthefirstsentence.
Thissuggeststhatthatclausealsoanticipatestheconclusionofthe
argumentofPartI,andmeans

(1)'tobeaman'cannotbe[sc.truly]predicatedofanythingof
which'nottobeaman'is[truly]predicated,

i.e.'isaman'and'isnotaman'haveincompatiblemeanings.However,
(1)givesto'signifyx'thesenseabouttobereservedfor'signifyaboutx'.
Infaceofthisitseemsimpossibletosustain(1),andconsequently
necessarytoconstruethesecondsentenceasinthetranslation:'it[sc.to
beaman]willnotbebothtobeandnottobethesamething...'.In
placeof(1),thefinalsentenceoftheparagraphsuggestsasecond
interpretationoftheopeningclause:

(2)'tobeaman'cannotmeanjustwhat'nottobeaman'means,

i.e.'isaman'and'isnotaman'havedifferentmeanings.Butwhyneed
thatbe"shown"(b28)?If'isaman'and'isnotaman'hadthesame
meaning,thesentence'Calliasisamanandnotaman'wouldnotstate
acontradiction,andtheopponentinutteringitwouldsaynothingmore
controversialthanthatCalliasisamanandaman.Thisistheargument
presentedbyAristotlehimselfinthethirdsentence,whenhepointsoutthat
inordertoexpresstheclaimthatthesamethingcan"simultaneously
beandnotbeaman...inactualfact"theopponentmustavoid
speaking"homonymously".Itisatthispointthatchampionsoftype2

Page96

interpretationscomein.Facedwiththeseobjectionsto(1)and(2),they
proposethat"signify"hasasensedistinctfromboth'bepredicatedof'
and'mean',viz.'beexplicatedby':

(3)'tobeaman'cannotbeexplicatedbyjustthatwhichexplicates
'nottobeaman'.

Theindependenceofthissenserequiresexplicationtobedifferentfrom
definitionbysynonym,andG.E.M.Anscombehassuggestedin
illustrationofthedifferencethat'islarge'and'isnotlarge'mightboth
(indifferentcontexts)beexplicatedby'istwofeetlong'.Astheillustra
tionshows,sense(3)callsforacorrespondingadjustmentinthesense
of'signifyonething'for'large'hasperhapsonlyonesense,but
cannotbesubstitutedfor'man'inb13.Accordingto(3),theargument
ofthefirstthreesentenceswillgoasfollows:'isaman'and'isnotaman'
cannothavethesameexplication...i.e.tobeamancannotbe
[omitting'possible']boththatandnottobeaman,exceptintheun
interestingcaseinwhich'man'and'notman'areusedassynonyms.
Thispartofthetype2interpretationis,aswillbeseen,independentof
therest.

Somebriefremarksfollowabouttheremainderofthefirstsentence.
Itisdoubtfulwhether'signifyabout'occurselsewhereinAristotle,
butsimilarexpressions(e.g.Categories2.1a20ff.,G6.1011b16)andthe
exampleintheparenthesisshowthatitmeans'betrulypredicatedof'.
'If"man"signifiesnotonly...':ifthisclauseistobeelucidatedbythe
followingparenthesis,itsforcemustbe:itisnotenoughthat'man'
shouldhavetwoormoresenses(explications)allofwhichare,onsome
occasions,copredicableofthesamesubjectratherallthesenses(ex
plications)of'man',asunderstood,mustbethesamesense(explica
tion).Intheparenthesis"all"maymean'allthese',viz.palethingsand
artisticthingsandmen(asatB4.999b20andD26.1023b32,butnotat
1007a21,or1007a6whichrefersbacktothispassage)otherwisethereis
asuppressedassumptionthatallpredicatesareconnectedbyachainof
copredicability."Becausesynonymous":becauseallwillhavenameand
formulaincommon(Categories1.1a67)theywillalsobemanynamed,
i.e.nameablebydistinctbut(inoursense)synonymousnames,but
thereisnoneedtofollowAlexanderinimportingthisotherwiseun
attestedsenseof'sunonumos'.

ItishardtoseeAristotle'smotiveforintroducingthedistinctionbe
tweensignifyingandsignifyingaboutintheselines.ItseemsthatAlexan
dertookhimtobereplyingtothefollowingargument:amanispaleto
bepaleisnotthesameastobeamanthereforeamanisnotaman.
Thereplygoes:theargumentisvalidonlyifitsfirstpremissmeans'a
manisjustwhatsomethingpaleis'(cf.1007a33)butthatistrueonlyif
Page97

'man'and'pale'signifythesamebutthatistrueonlyif'signifythe
same'isequivalentto'signifyaboutthesame'.However,Aristotleis
attemptingaproofofPNC,notthedemolitionofacounterproof.

Thebafflingsectionfromb22tob28introducestheexpression'tobe
anotman',distinguishedfrom'nottobeaman'bywordorderinthe
Greek.Therearetworeasonsforthinkingthatnothingismeanttoturn
onthedifferenceofthesetwo,althoughAristotleemphasizesitlater
(1007a24,289).(i)b28('tobeaman'and'notman'signifysomething
different)seemstoreferbacktob1314('tobeaman'cannotsignifyjust
what'nottobeaman'signifies).(ii)Aristotlemaintainselsewherethat'to
beaman'and'nottobeaman'arecontradictories,while'tobeaman'
and'tobeanotman'areonlycontrariesandwillbefalsetogetherwhen
predicatedofsomethingnonexistentorofsomethingincapableofbeing
aman(PriorAnalyticsI46.51b3652a14,DeInterpretatione10.19b1930).
Thus,thoughitmaybethat'itisnotpossiblethatxisFandnot G'does
notdemonstrate'itisnotpossiblethatxisandisnotG'neverthelessone
whoconcededtheformerwithoutthelatterwouldbeinanintolerably
strangepositionwhichcansafelybeignored.

b228operateswithfivepropositions:
(a)'man'and'notman'donotsignifydifferentthings
(b)'tobeaman'and'nottobeaman'donotsignifydifferentthings
(c)tobeamanistobeanotman
(d)tobeamanandtobeanotmanareonething
(e)tobeamanandtobeanotmanhaveoneformula.

AtthebeginningAristotlesaysthat(a)implies(b)attheendhesays
that(b)hadbeenrefuted.Thismakesitfairlycertainthatthesection
rejects(a)onthebasisoftherejectionof(b),butitremainsunclear,
first,whatisthepurposeofrejecting(a)and,secondly,howtheother
propositionsfitin.Wecansayatleastthatthepurposeofrejecting(a)
oughtnottobetorefutetheobjectioninb1822,againstwhichthenega
tionof(b)cannotproperlybeassumed.Astotheotherpropositions,
Rossinterpretstheargumentthus:(a)implies(b),which,since(e)is
equivalentto(d),implies(c)and(d)implies(b).Butthismakes(c),(d),
and(e)entirelysuperfluous.Moreprobably(d)ismeanttoshowhowwe
aretogetfrom(a)to(b),which(d)implies,nothowwearetogetfrom(b)
to(c)andifso,the"for"inb25mustexplaintheconditionalinb224,
notthe"sothat"clausewhichitimmediatelyfollows.Sowehave:
because(e)isequivalentto(d)(b257)and(d)implies(b)(b278),
(a)implies(b)(b224).Itistemptingtocompletetheargumentbytaking
(c)asthemeansofgettingfrom(a)to(e),butthatcouldbedoneonly
byexchangingtheconnectivesin"sothattobeamanwillbetobea
notmanfortheywillbeonething".

Page98
b
1006 28.Thisnoteraisesfourquestionsaboutthefinalsectionof
PartI:(A)whatisthescopeofitsmodalwords?(B)canitbemadea
validpieceofreasoning?(C)whyshouldtheopponentacceptit?(D)
howdoesitmakeuseofwhathaspreceded?

(A)Does'necessary'inthefirstsentencegovernthewholeconditional
oronlyitsconsequent?Ifthefirst,theargumentwillgo(using' '='it
isnecessarythat')' '='itispossiblethat','M'='isaman','T'='is
atwofootedanimal')

Ifthesecond,thereisasuppressedstep:

Inthesecondversionthestepfrom(c)to(d)isvalidinanynormalmodal
system,providedthat' 'isreadasasignofstrictimplicationbutin
thatcasepropositionshavingtheformof(a)inthesecondversionwillbe
trueonlyif'Mx'expressesanessentialpredication.Inthatversion,
therefore,'man'cannotbetakenasastandinforanypredicatewhatever,
andtheconclusiondoesnotjustifyanunqualifiedassertionofPNC.For
otherreasonstoothesecondversionislesslikely:Aristotle'swordorder,
thoughnotdecisive(cf.PriorAnalyticsI11.31b78)arguesagainstitsodo
thewords"atthattime"(b31,omittedbyonegoodMS.)and"simul
taneously"(b33),whichitrendersatbestsuperfluous.

(B)Inneitherversiondoes(b)seemtodemonstrate(c),fornotall
twofootedanimalsaremen.Wemustremember,however(andAris
totleremindsus),thattheroleof'twofootedanimal'istoindicate
theonethingthat'man'isbeingtakentosignifyandnofallacyis
committedif'T'means'isamaninthesense"twofootedanimal"'.

(C)Indefendingthestepfrom(a)to(b)Aristotlesaysthat'cannotnot'
iswhat'must'signifies:couldhenothaveavoidedthewholerigmarole
bypointingoutthat'isnotnot'iswhat'is'signifies?Whyshouldthe
opponentnotrejecttheformer,ashewouldthelatter?

(D)(a)refersbacktotheassumptionof1006a31that'man'signifies
twofootedanimalthestepfrom(b)to(c)reliesontheassumptionof
1006a34 b13thatthatisall'man'signifiesbutwhatisthebearingon
thisparagraphof1006b1328?Therestofthisnotesinksthatquestion
intoasurveyofthetwotypesofinterpretationgiventotheargumentasa
whole.Thosewhofavourtype1mustanswerthequestioninoneoftwo
ways:either,theconclusiondrawninb334wasanticipatedat1006b13
oratleast1006b18(thishasbeendiscussed)or,1006b1328isnot

Page99

intendedtoassistthepresentargumentatall,butpreparestheground
forPartIII.TheComparativefeeblenessoftheseanswersgivesthe
openingtothechampionsoftype2,whosecaseisinthreestages.(i)At
1006b13thesenserequiredfor'signify'issuchthatthepropositionthere
statedabouttheword'man'wouldnotbethoughtbyAristotletoapply
toeveryunivocalnounandadjective(seenoteadloc.).(ii)Inb28itis
possible,aswehaveseen,tounderstandAristotletosaythattheex
plicationof'man'belongstomennecessarily,somethingwhichisnot
trueoftheexplicationsofe.g.'pale'and'large',sincenomanisessentially
paleorlarge.(Alternatively,evenifinb28'necessary'governsthewhole
conditional,Aristotlemightstillthinkwhatissaidtherefalseof'pale'
and'large',onthedifferentgroundthatthedefinitionof'pale'isnot
trueofpalethings,butonlyoftheirpallorseeCategories5.2a2934but
contrastG5.1010b256)(iii)Giventheseinterpretationsof1006b13
andb28itispossibletofindaconnectionbetween1006b1328and
thepresentparagraph,viz.thesuppressedimplication:if'man'isex
plicatedby'twofootedanimal'and'notman'cannotbesoexplicated,
itfollowsthatmenarenecessarilytwolootedanimals.Unfortunately
itappearsthat,inwhicheverwayweconstruethe'necessarily'inits
consequent,thissuppressedimplicationoughtnottobeacceptedby
Aristotleastrue.Whatissixfootlongisnot,ineitherway,necessarilya
lengthofsixfeetyet'tobesixfootlong'fitsthetype2interpretationof
1006b13,ashavingnoexplicationwhichalsoexplicates'nottobesix
footlong'.Thetype2interpretationthusappearstoconfusetwodifferent
restrictingconditionsonpredicatesroughlyspeakingthattheybenon
relativeandthattheybeessential.Whetheritcanbepurgedofthiscon
fusion,withoutreducingtothenoncontroversialassertionthatAristotle
doesnotapplyPNCwithoutqualificationtorelativepredicates,isnot
clear,but,evenifnot,itsreadingsof1006b13andb28remainpossible.

G 4:2ndArgument,PartII(1006b341007a20)

1006b34."Thesameargumentapplies"ifAristotleapparentlymeans
onestartsbyassumingasignificationfor'notman'(an"indefinite
name",DeInterpretatione2.16a32).Itishardtoseehowthesecond
sentenceexplainsthiscontention.Itwouldfitbetterwith1006b1318,
towhichitapparentlyrefersback.Butthereferenceisnotwhollyapt,
becausethepreviouspassagearguedtotheconclusion,notthat'man'and
'notman'signifydifferentthings,butthattheirsignifyingdifferent
thingswouldbecompatiblewiththeirsignifying"about"onething.
Atb89theopponentisassumed,inapparentdisregardof1006a1821,
tohavebeenaskedaquestionsuchas'IsCalliasaman?'Aristotle's
objectionstotheanswer'yesandno'arenotquitefair.Theopponent
whoappendedtohisanswer'andheispale'wouldbeaddingsomething
thatdoesnotanswerthequestionput,but'andheisnotaman'does

Page100

constituteanalternativeanswer.Neverthelessitisreasonabletoinsist
ondealingwithalternativeanswersoneatatime.

G 4:2ndArgument,PartIII(1007a20b18)

pp.20681007a20.ThisargumentintroducessomeofAristotle'smoretechnical
metaphysicalnotions.ItsconcludingremarkisilluminatedbyPosterior
AnalyticsI22.83a2432:"Again,thingssignifyingasubstancesignify,
aboutthatofwhichtheyarepredicated,justwhatsoandsoorjust
whatacertainsoandso[is].Anythingsthatdonotsignifyasubstances
butaresaidaboutanothersubjectwhichisnotjustwhatsoandsonor
justwhatacertainsoandso[is],arecoincidental,asforinstancepale
aboutman:foramanisnotjustwhatpalenorjustwhatacertainpale
[is]rather,doubtless,heisananimal,foramanisjustwhatananimal
[is].Anythingsthatdonotsignifyasubstancemustbepredicatedabout
somesubjectandnothingcanbepalewhichisnotacertainotherthing
thatispale."(Cf.PosteriorAnalyticsI4.73b58onelisionoftheverb
after'justwhatcf.1006b13,wheretheelidedwordwastakentobe
'signify'.)InthelastsentenceofthispassageAristotlemeansnotthat
whatispalemusthaveotherpropertiesbesides,forthatistrueofwhat
isamanorananimal,butthatwhatispalecannotbeidenticalwiththe
palethatitis.Aparticularman,therefore,isidenticalwithman,and
with'acertainanimal'(i.e.akindofanimal).Aristotle'stheorythus
distinguishestwotypesofpredication:essentialpredicates,thewords
forwhich"signifyasubstance"('substance'asatD8.1017b213),are
identicalwiththesubjectsofwhichtheyaretrulypredicatedother
predicationsaretrueinvirtueofthefactthattwodistinctitems,e.g.a
substanceandaquality,"coincide".Thistheoryhastheconsequence
thatnothingcanpossessmorethanoneessentialpredicate("forit,to
beisnothingelse"),sothate.g.'man'and'acertainanimal'mustbe
capableofsignifyingthesamething.Aristotleusesthatconsequenceto
arguethatiftwocontradictorypredicatessuchas'isaman'and'isnot
aman'(or'isanotman')areessential,andiftheyaretrulypredicable
ofthesamesubjectssayCallias,thenthethingstheysignifymustbe
identicalwiththatsubjectandsowitheachother.But,aswasstatedat
1006b13,thingssignifiedbycontradictorypredicatesarenotidentical.
Therefore,iftwosuchpredicatesaretrulypredicableofthesamesubject,
theyarenotbothessentialpredicatesofthatsubjectandifnotboth,
then(heassumes)neither.''Justwhattobeaman[is]"etc.:Aristotle's
meaningmustbe'tobejustwhatamanis'buthiswordorderprevents
thattranslationbyseparating'justwhat'from'animal'ata223and
from'man'ata289.''Yetthoseareitsdenials":andsowouldhavetobe
identifiedwithitbytheopponent.

Theargumentseemsvulnerableattwopoints.(i)Itreliesonadubious
theoryofpredicationforevenifitispossibletomakesenseofthe

Page101

distinctionbetweenessentialandcoincidentalpredications,theformer
arenomorestatementsofidentitythanthelatterare(ofttheoriginof
thisconfusionnotmuchhasbeenwritten,butseeG.E.L.Owen,'The
PlatonismofAristotle',15663).(ii)Althoughthepremisscarriedfor
ward,iftakeninsense(2)orsense(3)ofthenoteon1006b13,isextremely
plausible,itdoesnotfollowrigorouslyfromtheopponent'soriginalad
missionthat'man'isbeingusedwithasinglesignification.

1007a33.Theargumentthatnotallpredicationscanbecoincidentalpp.2179
(i.e.here,nonessential)isintwostages:(A)ifeverythingisacoincidence,
"itwillbenecessarytogoontoinfinity"(a33 b1)(B)"butthatis
impossible"(b115).

(A)Itispossibletoformanendlessseriesoftrue'is'sentencesineach
ofwhichthegrammaticalcomplementistheexpressionwhichwas
grammaticalsubjectinthelast:e.g.'amanispale','Calliasisaman',
'thisbodyisCallias'...AccordingtoAristotle'stheoryofpredication,
thefirstoftheseexamplespredicatesoneitem,pale,ofanother,man,
whereasbothoftheotherexamplespredicateanitemofitself.Forthat
reasontheendlessseriesofsentencesdoesnotgenerateanendlessseries
ofthings,butatsomepointwearriveatathingnot"predicatedabouta
certainsubject",i.e.notpredicatedofanythingelse(inAristotle'susage,
thoughnotinours,x'ssubject,ifany,isnecessarilydifferentfromx).
Aristotle'sthesisisthatwithoutessentialpredicationitisnotpossibleto
terminatethisseriesofeverdifferentsubjects,and"therewillnotbe
anythingwhichthingsareinitiallyabout".Inactualfact,ofcourse,its
terminationrequiresonlythatthereshouldbetruestatementsofidentity,
sothatthisstageoftheargumentassumesthatalltruestatementsof
identitypredicateessentially,theconverseoftheassumptionina2033.

(B)Aristotlenextstatesthat,sofarfromanendlessseriesofcoinci
dentalpredications,therecannotbeaserieswitheventwomembers:
giventhatgcoincidesinX,itisnotpossiblethatanyZshouldcoincide
ing.ThisisqualifiedtoallowforthetransitivecaseinwhichZandg
coincidebecausebothcoincideinX.Settingthatcaseaside,Aristotle
considerstwowaysinwhichanontransitiveseriesmightbeconstructed.
(i)g(pale)coincidesinX(Socrates)andZcoincidesinXg(Socratesthe
pale).Thatcannothappen,hesays,becauseXgisnotaunity(cf.De
Interpretatione11.21a714),(ii)gcoincidesinXandZing.Aristotle
baldlyassertsthatthatalsoisimpossible,exceptinthemannersetaside:
apredicateofX'spredicatemustbeapredicateofX.Thisargumentis
unsatisfactorybothbecausethelastassertionisfalse(e.g.paleiscommon,
butSocrateswhoispaleisnotcommon,cf.Soph.El.179a26ff.)and
because,eveniftrue,itwouldnotestablish(B),viz.theimpossibilityofan
infiniteseriesofcoincidentalpredications.Infact,Aristotlehasperceived
correctlythat(B)cannotbeestablishedasinitiallystated,buthehas

Page102

weakeneditsomuchthatitnolongercombineswith(A)toyieldhis
conclusion.Theversionheshouldhavesubstitutedis:anyseriesoftrue
coincidentalpredicationsmusthaveafirstmember(i.e.leadbacktoa
subjectnotpredicatedofanyothersubject).Butthatversion,though
defensible,isnotdefendedbyAristotlehere.

IfthefinalsentencesumsupPartIIIitis,ofcourse,anexaggeration.
Themostthatcouldhavebeenshownisthatessentialpredicatesarenot
copredicablewiththeircontradictories.

G 4:3rdArgument(1007b181008a7)

1007b18.AlthoughthecontradictoryofPNC,asformulatedatG31005b1920,is

Aristotlenow,andfortherestofthechapter,representshisopponentas
assertingsomethingbolder,therefutationofwhichwillnotestablishPNC.
Theversionneededatb245("ifthecontradictionisreallytrue"),and
atb34("iftheaffirmationholdsgoodofhim,necessarilyitsdenialdoes
too")takenwith1008a2("andifitdoes,itsaffirmationwilltoo''),is

From(b)theparagraphdeducesbytwoarguments,b205andb29 a2,
theabsurdconsequencethat"everythingwillbeone".Theformer
argumentappearstobethis.The"thesisofProtagoras"is

Assuming
(d) x F[(someonebelievesthatFx) (someonebelievesthatFx)]
itfollowsthat

But(b)and(e)entail

whichAristotleexpressesintwoways:"thesamethingwillbebotha
warshipandawallandaman"sc.andsoonforeverypredicate,and
''everythingwillbeone"sc.havethesamepredicates("clothingistruly
one"inthedifferentsense:thatnothingiscountableordiscriminable).
Thethirdsentenceillustratesonesideofthedisjunctiveargumentfrom
(d)to(),takingapremissoftheform'someonebelievesthatFx'.
(e)construes"something"and"itispossible"inthesecondsentenceas
'anything'and'itwouldbetrue'.Bothreadingsarerequiredifthe
conclusionistomeanthateverythingwillbeoneactually.Butatb26
AristotleispromptedbyAnaxagoras'dictumtosuggestthathisopponent

Page103

haswithoutrealizingemployed'be'inthe"indefinite"sense'canbe'
(cf.G5.1009a306),sothattheconclusionoughttogo

whichwouldfollowby(b)from

Thisleadstothesecondargument(b29).Theopponentcanbeforcedto
acceptthestrongerproposition(e)rather
than(e'),andso()ratherthan(').ForifthedenialofG( G)holdsgoodofwhatisG,afortiori
thedenialofF( F)holdsgoodofitifitisnotF:

IntheensuingexampleAristotletakes(g)asequivalentto

Heassumesthattheclosureoftheantecedentof(h)canbeasserted
(presumablyonthebasisof(b)),and(e),theclosureofitsconsequent,
accordinglydetached.Inthethreefinalsentences,repeatingthatinthe
exampleeitherFxorFx,heshowsthateachofthesecombinedwith(b)
entailsthatFx&Fx,whichgeneralizesinto().

1008a2.Thepreviousparagraphdisplayedtheopponentascommitted
to(e),aversionoftheprincipleofexcludedmiddle.Itshouldnotbe
surprisingthatAristotlenowrepresentshimascommittedalsotodeny
ingaversionoftheprinciple.Thefourpropositionsare:
(iii)heisnotaman
(i)heisaman
(ii)heisnotaman (iv)heisnotnotaman.

Aristotleargues:if(i)and(ii)"makeuptheoneformer",sc.conjunctive
affirmation,(iii)and(iv)willmakeupanoppositeconjunctivedenial
theformeris,by()ofthepreviousparagraph,truehence,by(b),the
latterisalsotrue.Theargumentoverlooksthefactthatthesetwo
conjunctions,beingoftheform'p&q'and'p&q',arenotcontra
dictoryopposites,astheapplicationof(b)requires.

G 4:4thArgument(1008a734)

1008a27.Threeversionsoftheopponent'sthesisarenowdistinguished.
Theboldestis(b)or(),whichthe3rdargumentdeducedfrom(b)
alternatively,(b)'sdoubleimplicationmaybetakeninonedirection
only,giving

orthirdlythethesismayhold"insomecasesbutnotinothers",which
wouldallowittosayaslittleas

Page104

ItisnotclearwhetherAristotlewoulddistinguish(k)from(a)inany
casehedismissesitfromthediscussionwiththeinadequatecomment
thatitnarrowsthefieldofdispute.(j)is,heargues,untenableforif'xis
notaman'maybe"firmandcertain,theoppositeassertionwouldbe
stillmorecertain".Affirmationsaresaidtobe"priortoandmorecer
tainthan"denialsatPosteriorAnalyticsI25.86b334butthatconten
tionneedstotake'certain'('gnorimos')intheseine'intelligible',which
isnotsuitablehere.

Theargumentofa2830cametobeknownasperitorpeorturningof
thetablescf.Theaetetus17001,G8.1012b1322,K5.1062a36 b7.

1008a30.Thisseemstobelongwith1008a207,andtoargueagainst
theopponentwhosays"itisnottruetostateseparately".If'manand
notman'istobeunderstoodasnotpredicatingtwothings,ithasnot
beenmadeintelligibleatallandnothingis"definite"ifitdoespre
dicatetwothings,theycan(and,by1007a820,should)bepredicated
separately.

G 4:5thArgument(1008a34b2)

10082a34.Here,butnotatG7.1011b25and 8.1012b78,Aristotle
hesitatestoappealtothedefinitionsof'true'and'false'.

G 4:6thArgument(1008b231)

1008b2.Thisargumentcontinuesthediscussionoftruthinitiatedat
1008a18.(Thetwoverbstranslated'beinerror'arefromthesameroot
asthewordmeaning'false'.)Wearetoconsiderthreebeliefs:letA
believethatCalliasispale,BthatCalliasisnotpale,CthatCalliasispale
andnotpale.Aristotleaskshisopponenttochooseamongthreealterna
tivejudgementsonC'sbelief.Thethird,inb7,isthatC,likeAandB,is
inerrorthefirsttherefore,inb3,isthatCisnotinerror,andthesecond,
inb5,thatCislessinerrorthanAandB(thisfollowsRoss'srestoration
ofthecorrupttext,alsoadoptedbytheOCTseeRoss'snotes).Aristotle
proceedstoshowthateachofthethreejudgementsisuntenable.Against
thefirstheobjectsthat'Calliasispaleandnotpale'isunintelligibleifit
doesnotentail'Calliasispale'and'Calliasisnotpale'.Itisnotclear
whyaseparateobjectionshouldbeneededagainstthesecondjudge
ment,orhowAristotle'sobjectionworks(itwouldwork,asanantici
pationof1008b311009a5,ifweadoptedthereadingofsomeMSS.'but
theonewhobelievestheformerwayhasmoretruth'butthatreading,
asRosssays,presentstheopponentwithanalternativehecouldnot
wishtodefend).AgainstthethirdalternativeAristotlemakesthegood
pointthatspeech,andalsobelief,dependsonnoteverythinghavingthe
sametruthvalue.

Page105
b
1008 12.Thediscussionnowtakesanewturn.Aristotlehasalready
arguedapriorithatPNCcannotbedisbelieved(G3.1005b2332)now
heappealstoexperienceasshowingthatatanyratethestrongcontrary
thesis(b),statedat1007b1819,isneverbelieved.Hedoesnotsuggest
thatthisfactissufficienttodisposeofhisopponent.Theexampleof
observingamanindicatesthataperson'sactionsmayvouchforhis
theoreticalaswellashispracticalbeliefsbutthecautiousconclusionat
b267expressesconfidenceonlyaboutsomeofthelatter.Inthetwo
finalsentencesAristotleapparentlyfacesthe(irrelevant)objectionthat
from'everybodybelievessomesimplepropositionsandnottheircontra
dictories'itdoesnotfollowthatanysimplepropositionsaretruefor
beliefs,unlikeknowledge,maybefalse(theanalogywithhealthshows
thatthisistheintendeddistinctionbetweenopinionandknowledge).
WhatistheforceofAristotle'sreply?Ifhemeans'thebelieveroffalse
hoodswillbeanxioustoexchangethemfortruths:sotheremustbe
truthstoexchange',thatisinadequateinthreeways:(i)thepremiss
entailsnottheexistence,butbeliefintheexistence,oftruths(ii)the
analogywithhealthisimperfect,sincethebelieveroffalsehoodsmust
suppose,notthathecanexchangehisconditionforoneoftruebelief,
butthathisconditionisalreadyoneoftruebelief(iii)inAristotle's
strictusagetheattainmentof'knowledge'(episteme)aboutwhatisbetter
andworse,asaboutcontingentmattersingeneral,isimpossible(Nico
macheanEthicsVI3.1136b201)andsonotasubjectofrationalanxiety.

G 4:7thArgument(1008b311009a5)

1008b31.Similarargumentshavebeenbroughtinmoderntimesagainst
thescepticalthesisthateverythingisuncertain.

Chapter5

ThereareechoesinthischapterandthenextofPlato'sTheaetetus151
86,alongercritiqueofthethesisofProtagorasthat"manisthemeasure
ofallthings,ofthosethatarethattheyareandofthosethatarenotthat
theyarenot"(Theatetus152a).Platomorethanoncestatesthethesisin
theform"whatisthoughtby[or,seemsto]eachperson,thatalsois"
(161c)or"...istohimwhothinksits'(170a,177c).Aristotlealso
employstheverb'bethought'('dokein'),butmorefrequently'phainesthai',
oftenrendered'appear'butinthistranslationbytheverb'beimagined',
withwhosewiderangeofusesitcorrespondsquiteclosely.Thenoun
phantasia'(D29.1024b24,26,1025a6)means'imagination')not'appear
ance'.

Thelayoutofthechapterisasfollows.Thefirsttwoparagraphs
introducethethesisofProtagorasanddistinguishtwotypesofresponse

Page106

toit.LeavingthesecondtypetoG6,Aristotlethereafterdeploysthree
scepticalargumentsandattemptstoexposetheirweaknesses'at1009a
2230hestates,andata308respondsto,anargumentfromchangeability
againstPNCat1009a38 b12hestates,andatb1233andmoreespe
cially1010b11011a2respondsto,anargumentfromcontraryappear
ancestoaProtagoreanconclusionandat1010a715hestates,andat
a15 b1respondsto,afurtherargumentfromchangeabilitytothecon
clusionthat"oneoughttosaynothing"(1010a12).

1009a6.Aristotleignoresthefactthat1008a715distinguisheddiffer
entversionsofthe"opinion"thatdeniesPNC.Theversionhenowcites,
"itisnecessarythateverythingshouldbesimultaneouslytrueandfalse",
isequivalenttothestrongdenial()forthereferenceletters,seenotes
to1007b18.Heisclearlyrightinsayingthat()entailsProtagoras'thesis
(c),sinceifeverythingistrue,everythingthatisthoughtistrue.The
converseentailmentneedsafurtherpremiss.Butwhat?Aristotle's
"manypeoplehavemutuallycontrarybeliefs"isineffect

(1) x F(someonebelievesthatFxandsomeonebelievesthatFx),
whichisnotstrongenoughheneeds

(m) x F(someonebelievesthatFxandsomeonebelievesthatFx).
Yetwhobelieves,as(m)requires,thate.g.Socratesisawarship?Itwill
notdotopointtotheopponentofPNChimself,foraccordingtoAristotle
hedoesnotbelievewhathesays(G3.1005b2532)Noris(k),theweak
denialofPNC,equivalenttoProtagoras'thesis(c):given(l),(c)entails(k),
but(k)doesnotentail(c).

1009a16.Aristotlenowintroducestheimportantdistinctionbetween
opponentswhoareingenuineperplexityandthosewhorelishwhatDe
SophisticisElenchis2.165b11calls"combativeanderistic"debates,and
Lookforvictoryordefeatasinamatchcf.G6.1011a317,7.1012a1724,
TopicsI12.105a1619.DeSophisticisElenchisstudiestacticsappropriate
againstthelatter'philosophy'isinterestedonlyintheformer(cf.
G2.1004b256).Togainasportingtriumphitisnecessarytorefute
youropponent'sconclusion,butifyourobjectistoremoveperplexity
youneedonlytacklethe"thinking"thatledtothatconclusion,i.e.
exposetheerrorinhisargument.Youneednotforcehimtoagreewith
youonlytakeawaytheconsiderationswhich,ashethought,forcedhim
todisagreewithyou.Thistherapeuticstyleofphilosophyiswellexempli
fiedintheremainderofthechapter.Thereissomeconflictbetween
Aristotle'spreviousclaim(G3.1005b2532)thatHeracliteansdonot
believewhattheysayandthepresentadmissionthataperplexedop
ponentmay"havethisbelief"cf.G6.1011a10''theyarenotactually
convinced",1011a3"thosewhoareconvinced".Theformerdescription
isshrewder,asHumesaw:amanwithaphilosophicalproblemdoesnot

Page107

reallybelievetheparadoxofwhichhethinkshehasanincontrovertible
proof,butheisstilldifferentfromthedebaterwho"statesitforthe
sakeofstatingit".

1009a22.ThisfirstargumentdoesnotdealwithProtagoras,but
developsthesuggestionmadeatG4.1007b269thatthosewhosaythat
e.g.Calliasissimultaneouslypaleandnotpaledosoonthegrounds,
andinthesense(a32),thatheissimultaneouslycapableofbeingpale
andcapableofbeingnotpale."Contrariescometobeoutofthesame
thing":sc.cometoholdofthesamesubject.Thescepticalconclusionis
extractedbycombiningthisfamiliarfactwiththeambiguousprinciple
that"itisnotpossiblethatwhatisnotshouldcometobe".Aristotleis
clearthathisopponentneedstotaketheprincipletosay,falsely,that
whatisnotFcannotcometobeFfromwhichitisconcludedthatif
Calliascomestobenowpale,nownotpale,hemusthavebeenpaleand
notpaleallalong(thismustbepreferredtothecrassargumentsupplied
inK6.1062b2430).Whatistheinnocuoussenseoftheprinciplein
which"whattheysayiscorrect"?(1)Withoutdoubtthedictumwas
sometimestakentomean'whatisnotanyGcannotcometobeF',which,
ofcourse,lendsnosupporttotheconclusionthatCalliaswaspaleand
notpaleallalong.(2)ThequotationfromAnaxagorassuggestsanother
nterpretation:whatbecomespalemustallalongcontainthematerials
ofpallor,have,asitwere,thepallorinsideitwaitingtobemanifested.
Thisdoctrineneednothavetheexplanatoryscientificflavourwhich
Anaxagorasseemstohavegivenitatitsbaldestitamountstosaying
nomorethanthatifCalliasistobecomepalehemustalreadybecapable
ofbeingpale,bepale"potentially".Butthescientifichypothesislends
plausibility,otherwiselacking,tothedescriptionofCalliasasbeingpale
andnotpaletogether(notpaleoutside,palesomehow'inside').Mostof
Aristotle'sexplicationrefersplainlytothissecondaccount:''thatwhich
is[F]maybesocalledintwoways"'actuallyF'and'potentiallyF'(cf.
D7.1017a35 b9)Butwhenhesays''itispossible...forthesame
thingtobesimultaneouslybothathingthatisandathingthatisnot
(onlynotinthesamerespect)"theobjectionarisesthattherespectneed
notdifferinthecaseofpotentiality:Calliascanbeatoncepotentially
paleandpotentiallynotpale.Doestheparenthesisconfusedlyimportthe
otherpoint,thatCalliascanbeactuallyFandnotGtogetherbutnot
actuallyFandnotFtogether?OrdoesAristotletakethefactthat
Calliasmustbeactuallypaleoractuallynotpaletoimplythathecannot
atonetimebepotentiallyboth?Thisisthefirstattempt,atleastsince
G4.1006a311007a20,toattackthebarecontradictoryofPNCandsoto
defendPNCitself.Ina368Aristotlerevertstohismorecautiouscon
tentionthatsomecontradictionsarefalse,pointingoutthatthatcon
tentionisnottobeoverthrownbyanyargumentbasedonchange,

Page108
a
whichsomethingsdonotundergo(cf.1010 17,2535innoneofthese
placesdoesAristotlesuggestthatPNCappliesonlytochangelessthings).

1009a38.AristotlenowturnstothethesisofProtagoras.Inaccordance
withhisprescriptiontoexaminenotthethesisitselfbutthe"thinking"
whichledtoit,heproceedstodescribewhatistousoneofthemost
familiarargumentsforscepticism,theargumentfromcontraryappear
ances,especiallysenseimpressions(cf.Theaetetus154ab).Thesceptical
conclusion,drawnbymanymodernphilosophersand(asAristotletells
us)byDemocritus,isthatitisimpossibletoknow,andperhapsmeaning
lesstosay,thatsomethingise.g.sweet,andwemustbecontenttosay
e.g.thatittastessweettoSocratesProtagorasconcludeddifferently
that'xissweet'isnotmeaninglessbutellipticalfore.g.'xtastessweet
toSocrates'.

1009b12.Aristotlebeginshisresponsetotheargumentfromcontrary
appearancesat1010b1.Meanwhile,hecommentsnowthattheargu
mentisnourishedbyconfusionbetweentheconceptsofwisdom(phro
nesis,definedatNicomacheanEthicsVI5.1140b56as"atruereasoned
stateconcernedwithactionregardingwhatisgoodandbadforaman",
butheremoregeneral),perception(orsensation,aisthesis),andmodi
fication(alloiosis,changeofquality,traditionallyrendered'alteration').
InDeAnimaAristotlearguesthatperceiving(III7.431a48)andunder
standing(II5.417b216)consistnotinbeingbroughtintonewstates
butinfunctioninginaccordancewithstatesalreadypossessedandin
theTheaetelusperceptionisdefinedinsuchaway(152b11)thathewho
perceives,unlikehimwhoiswise(a313),doesnotnecessarilyhavethe
truth.Aristotledoesnotindicatethereasoningwhichheattributes(not
veryconvincingly,norineverycaseseriously)totheearlierwritershe
mentions.Itmaybethis:ifsomeoneisbroughtintoastateinwhichx
appearsFtohim,thenheperceives(xtobe)anFthingifthelatter,then
heknowsof(x'sbeing)anFthingifthelatter,xisFthereforexisasit
appears.Itisnotclearthatbothofthefirsttwopremissesinthisargu
mentcanbewrongontheotherhanditisenoughforAristotleifoneof
themiswrong,asisobviouslythecase.Perceptionismentionedinnone
ofthesayingshequotesandthetheoriesadumbratedinallbutthatof
AnaxagorasarequiteunProtagoreanunlesscombinedwiththepro
positionthathavingsomethinginmindisa"stateofwisdom",apro
positionwhichistemptingonlybecausethewordsfor'haveinmind',
'beoutofone'smind',and'withotherthingsinmind'sharetheroot
'phron'with'phronesis'.

1009b33.Aristotleisnotthelastphilosophertohaveexpresseddismay
atthelegacyofsomeofhisforerunnersinthesubject.

Page109
a
1010 1.WithadisconcertinglyPlatonicairthisparagraphseemsto
concedethatProtagoraswasrightaboutperceptiblethings.Asthe
referencetoindefinitenessshows,however,Aristotlemeansthathewas
rightonlyintheharmlesswaydiscussedin1009a328.Theallusionto
Epicharmusislost.

1010a7.Ifthingsaretoochangeabletobereidentified(Heraclitus)or
evenidentified(Cratylus),itisimpossibletomaketrueassertionsabout
themorfalseones,asperhapsCratylusrealized.Cf.Theaelelus157bc,
182d183b.Aristotletellsus(A6.987a32)thatPlatowasearlyin
fluencedbyCratylus.ItisquitepossiblethatHeraclitus'viewsare
incorrectlyreportedbybothPlatoandAristotle.

1010a15.Ifthescepticsays,forexample,thatwaterwhilegettinghot
isneitherhotnorcold,Aristotlereplies(i)itstillhassomecoldand
alreadyhassomeheat(cf.PhysicsVI9.240a1926)(ii)itsheat,like
anythingelseinprocessofgeneration,ismadeoutofsomethingelse(the
elementfire)andproducedbysomethingelse(e.g.acook),andthese
causesmustterminateinsomethingnotundergoingchange(a2.994a1
19)(iii)evenachangeablethinghasonefeature,itsform,whichremains
constantthroughoutitsexistence.Itdoesnotfollowfromthislastpoint,
asAristotleoddlyimplies,thatchangeablethingscanchangeonlyin
quantityandnotinqualityformisonekindofqualification(cf.
D1020a33b2),butthatinrespectofwhich"bodiesare...saidtobe
modified"isanother(D14.1020b812).

1010a25.Aristotlebelievedthatbodiesinthecelestialregions,though
plainlysubjecttomotion,areotherwisechangeless.
1010a32.AristotledoesnotexplainwhytheCratyleanshouldbe
disturbedthatthestrongdenialofPNChasaconsequenceinconsistent
withhisassumptionthateverythingischanging.Ross'scommentthat
thisandthetwoprecedingparagraphsfailtoshowthat"changeis
reconcilablewiththelawofcontradiction"misunderstandstheirpur
pose,whichistoreconcilechangewiththepossibilityoftrueassertion
(1010a710).

1010b1.ReturningtothethesisofProtagoras,Aristotlefirstlooksat
anewargumentinitssupport(b23,discussedbelow),andthen(b314)
rebutstheargumentalreadystatedat1009a38 b12.Thebehaviourof
theexpatriatewhodreamsheisinAthensdemonstratesman'sabilityto
gradeappearances.DoesAristotlemeanthatweknowthatthedreamer
isnotinAthens,orthatheknows?Ifthelatter,doesherevealhisknow
ledgebynotstartingfortheOdeonwhenhewakes,orbynotgoing
thereinhisdream(butbehavinginsomelessconsequentialmanner),
orbymakingnoactualbodilymovementswhiledreaming?Theobjec

Page110

tionthattwocontraryappearancesmaybeequallyauthoritativeis
consideredinthenextparagraphandatG6.1011a25 b1."AsPlatoalso
says":Theaetelus178cd.

Againsttheargumentthatwhatisimaginedmustbetruebecause
perceptionistrue,Aristotleanswersinthisparagraph(b23)thatnotall
thatisimaginedisperceived,andinthenext(1010b1419)thatnotall
perceptionistrue.Bothanswersare,onanyreasonableinterpretation,
convincing.Butbothareambiguous,andthesecondraisesconsiderable
problems.Thesenotesdiscussthreeinterpretativequestions:(A)what
kindofimaginationisopposedtoperception?(B)didAristotlehimself
believethatperceptionof"special"objectsistrue?(C)whatdoeshe
meanby"perceptionistrue"?

(A)Atleastthreekindsofimagination(phantasia)differfrompercep
tion.ItisnotclearwhetherAristotlehasinmind:(1)creativeimagina
tion(cf.DeAnimaIII3.427b1621),whetherpictorialaswhenone
imaginesthedeathofHector(DeMemoria1.450a12,DeInsomniis1.
459a14)ornonpictorialaswhenonepretendsorassumesthat is
rationalorgiraffesareextinct(2)theimaginationthatisallegedly
exercisedbysomebodywhenthingshaveacertainappearancetohim,
whetherornottheappearancedoes,orisjudgedbyhimto,corre
spondtoreality(DeAnimaIII3.428a24 b9,whereAristotlecontrasts
suchphantasiaasticklookingbentinwaterwithjudgment,andsee
K.LycosinMind1964,pp.496514)or(3)judgment(DeSophisticis
Elenchis4.165b25,NicomacheanEthicsIII5.1114a32,andseeDeAnima
III10.433b29onthecontrastbetweenratiocinativeandperceptive
phantasia).

(B)ThespecialobjectsoffoursensesarelistedatDeAnimaII6.418a12:
"sightofcolour,hearingofsound,tasteofflavour,whiletouchhasmany
different"objects.DeAnimaIII3.427b12says"perceptionofwhatis
specialisalwaystrue"andIll6.430b29"seeingwhatisspecial[or
"pale"textdoubtful]istrue,butwhetherapalethingisamanornotis
nottrue''.ThisviewismodifiedatDeAnimaIII3.428b18:"perception
ofwhatisspecialistrueorisliabletofalsehoodtotheleastpossible
extent".G6.1011a34mayindicateasAristotle'sopinion(butseenote
adloc.)thatperceptionofwhatisspecialistruewhenthecircumstances
arefavourable.Theevidenceof1010b2itselfisdoubtfulbecauseofthe
text.Thattranslatedsuppliesan'if'anda'not'notintheMSS.
withoutthemthesensewouldbe'noteven(oude)perception,atleastof
whatisspecial,isfalse,but...'.Editorshavenoticedthat'noteven'is
inappropriateinanargumentdesignedtoprovethatimaginationis
sometimesfalse.Tredennickconjectured'oude',givingthesense'ad
mittedlyperception,atleastofwhatisspecial,isnotfalse,but...'.
ButAlexander'scommentsuggeststhereadingtranslated,whichdiffers
fromTredennick'sinleavingAristotleuncommitted.

Page111

(C)'Perceptionistrue'evidentlymeansthesameas'perceptionisnot
mistaken'(DeAnimaII6.418a12,DeSensu442b8).Fiveinterpretations
arepossible.(1)Perceptionisanachievement,intheseinethatifsome
oneperceives(orperceivessomethingtobe)anFthing,itfollowsthat
whatheperceivesreallyhF.However,Aristotle'spreviousdistinc
tionbetweenperceptionandwisdom(1009b12)seemedtoturnonthe
former'snotbeingtrueinthiswaymoreover,'aisthesis'canmean'seine
impression',andsenseimpressionsdonothavetobetrueinthiswayand
finallyallperceptionsaretrueinthisway,notonlythoseofspecial
objects.(2)Senseimpressionsareunmistakable,i.e.noonecanbein
errorastohowthingslook,sound,feel,taste,andsmelltohim.Butimagin
ationhasasstrongaclaimtobeunmistakable.(3)Senseimpressions
areveridicalorincorrigible,i.e.asthingslooketc.sotheyreallyare.
Restrictionofthedoctrine,inthissense,tospecialobjectswouldgiveita
Berkeleianflavour.TheobjectionthatAristotlerejectedtheBerkeleian
proposition(Kenny,Mind1967)tendstoshownotthathedidnotusethe
word'true'hereinthesense'veridical'butthathedidnotaccept
withoutqualificationthedoctrinethatperceptionistrueofitsspecial
objects.(4)Kennysuggeststhatby'perceptionofwhatisspecialistrue'
Aristotlemeant'eachperception,i.e.sense,isthecourtofappealby
whichwejudgeitsproperobjects':amanmaylookpalewhoisnot,but
themistake'sdetectionandcorrectionrestfinallyonfurtherlooking.
Butinthissenseimaginationistruealsoforifsomethingappearsto
amanasitisnot,hismistakeiscorrectedonlywhenthethinga,appears
tohimasitis.InanycasetheProtagoreanthesismustgobeyondthe
unexceptionableclaimthatthoughtandimaginationarearbitersof
truthanditsfalsitycouldnotthereforebeexposedbycontrastwith
adoctrineaboutperceptionsounderstood.(5)AccordingtoHamlyn
(Aristotle's'DeAnima',onII6.418a11),thedoctrineoftheMetaphysics
passageisthat"asensecannotconfuseitsobjectwiththatofanother
sense...apersoncannote.g.bemistakenwhenusinghearingastothe
factthatheishearingsound".Thisparadesasaversionof(3)but,as
Hamlynnotes,dependsontheconceptualpointthatwhatisheardmust
beasoundstrictlyspeaking,Aristotleisnotentitledtotheclaimthat
noonewhohearscanmistakenlybelievehedoesnothearasound,but
onlytotheclaimthatsuchamistakewouldbeconceptualratherthan
perceptual.TheinterpretationmakesgoodsenseofAristotle'scontrast,
forinthecaseofimaginationnothingcorrespondstothefactthat
soundscannotbemisheardascolours.Amongtheseinterpretations(3)
and(5)seemtobethebest,(5)ifb23givesAristotle'sownopinion.

1010b14.Thisparagraphservesadoublepurpose,supporting1010b2
3(notallperceptionistrue)andb314(perceptionsdifferinreliability).
Thesenseof"authoritative"mightbe(4),thatsightisthearbiterof

Page112

colourjudgementsetc.,or(5),thatcolourscannotbemisseenastastes
orsounds,or(3),thatonecolourcannotbemisseenasanother.Thelast
isagrossexaggeration,butissuggestedbytheunrestrictednessof"soandso
andnotsoandso".

1010b19.InthetwofinalparagraphsAristotleonceagain,asat
1009a368and1010a25 b1,endshiscritiquebyinsistingthattheargu
mentfromcontraryappearanceswouldnot,evenifcogent,applyto
everything.Hemakestwoindependentclaims.(i)Thepremissofthe
argument,viz.thatthesamethingmaypresentcontraryappearances,is
trueofsweetwinebutfalse,evenoveraspanoftime,of"thesweet"
whichthewineis.(ii)Theconclusionoftheargument,viz.thatcontrary
propertiesarejointlypredicableofthesamething,islikewisefalseof
"thesweet"which,beingunalterable,cannotpossesscontraryproperties
evenatdifferenttimes("itisnotpossiblethatwhatisnecessaryshouldbe
thusandotherwise").OftheseclaimsthefirstisstatedbyAristotle
withoutevidenceandthesecondhasnoforceagainsttheProtagorean
argument.Moreoveritsimplicitdefinitionofalterationintermsof
contrarypropertiesisonewhichopponentsofPNCwouldhavenoreason
toaccept,sinceaccordingtothemevenunalteredthingspossesscontrary
properties."Inthebody":sc.oftheperceiverAristotleignoresother
affectingcircumstances,suchasthemediumofperception."Anything
thatisgoingtobesweetissuchofnecessity'':thiscanhardlybeintended
torestateAristotle'sclaimthatthesweetisitselfunalterable,forits
subjectmustmean'possessorsofthequalitysweet'itwillsupportthat
claimonlyif''ofnecessity"governsthewholeclause(cf.perhapsPrior
AnalyticsI15.34a7,17,21).

1010b30.Theargumentis:somethingsdonotdependfortheir
existenceontheexistenceofperception(are"priortoperception")
perceptiblesdosodependthereforesomethingsexistwhicharenot
perceptible.WhatAristotleheredistinguishesas"perceptibles"and
"subjectswhichproduceperception"arebothcalledperceptiblesatDe
AnimaIII2.426a234,theformerinthesense'whatisbeingperceived',
thelatterinthesense'whatiscapableofbeingperceived.Thisexplains
(i)howAristotlecandefendthesecondpremissabove(butarethetwo
sensesof'perceptible'trueofdifferentthings?),and(ii)thatthereisnocon
flictbetweenthatpremissandCategories7.76358a12,whicharguesthat
thoughtheperceptibleandperceptionarerelatives(cf."calledwhatthey
arewithreferencetooneanother")theformerisprior(cf.D15.1021a26
b3).ButatthesametimeitmakesAristotle'sconclusionworthlessagainst
theargumentfromcontraryappearances,whichclaimstoapplyto
everythingperceptibleintheCategoriessense'capableofbeingperceived'.
"Senseimpressions":aisthemata.

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Chapter6

G5hasnotattemptedtorefutethethesisofProtagoras,buttounder
minetheargumentsinitsfavour.Aristotlenowexplainshisobjections
toundertakingrefutation(1011a1116)butthereafterundertakesit
(1011a17 b12)cf.therelationofG4.1005b351006a11totherestofthat
chapter.

1011a3.Commentsonthedistinctionbetween"thosewhoarecon
vinced"and"thosewhomerelystatethesethings"willbefoundin
thenotesonG5.1009a16.Aristotle'sresponsetothosewhodesirethe
criteria(Theaetetus178b)ofcorrectjudgementstobenotonlystated,as
atG5.1010b119,butdemonstratedisambiguous:doeshemeanthat
nothinghbothaprincipleanddemonstrable,orthatnothingcanbe
bothaprincipleanddemonstrated?Iseitherresponseadequate,without
anyindicationthatalternativeprinciplesareinferiortothoseordinarily
accepted?Forthequestion'Arcweasleep?'cf.Theaetetus158bc.

Aristotle'sepigrammaticobjectionagainst"thosewhomerelystate
thesethings"hasbeentakeninvariousways.(1)'Theydemandthe
righttocontradictthemselves,whileatthesametimesayingsomething
('refuteme')whichisinconsistentwiththatdemand'(Bullinger).This
makestherightpoint,thatsincetheconjunctionofastatementofthe
form'pandnotp'withitscontradictoryhitselfoftheform'pandnotp',
itscontradictoryisnotinconsistentwithit.Butthepointcomesbetter
from(2)'Theyaskustorefutethembyestablishingthecontradictoryof
whattheysay,buttheirownassertionisaselfcontradiction(which
impliesthatcontradictoriesdonotrefute)'forthesameconstruction
seeG4.1006a5.(3)'Theydemandtherighttocontradictthemselves,a
demandwhichfromtheoutsetcontradictsitself'(Ross)i.e.theyaskfor
alicencewhichifgrantedhnotgranted.

1011a17.Whatfollowshonlyatentativeinterpretationofthisdiffi
cultparagraph.Theargumentstartswithan(invalid)reductio:
(a)everythingimaginedistrue
(b)everythingimaginedisimaginedbysomeone
(c)soeverythingtrueistruerelativetosomeone.
InordertoavoidtheconclusionsAristotlesays,(a)mustbeemendedto
(a1)everythingimaginedbysoandsoetc.istrues
where'etc.'representsaspecificationoftime,tenseorgan,medium,and
thelike(a214).WithoutexplainingwhattheProtagoreanwouldlose
byadoptingtheemendation,Aristotlenextpointsoutthatafurther

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consequenceofnotadoptingit("iftheysubjectthemselvestoargument
butnotontheseterms")istoallowanargumentfrom(a)togetherwith
(d)contrariescanbeimaginedtogether(a258)
to
(e)contrariescanbetruetogether(a245).
Itremainstoshowthatthesamedamagingconsequencedoesnot
followiftheProtagoreanconsentstoreformhispositionbyadoptingthe
emendationof(a),andthisseemstobethepurposeofthepossibly
corruptsentencefroma28tob1.If(a1)istakenasuniversallyquantified,
thengiven(b)itentails(a)andsodoeshavethesameconsequence.Thus
Aristotleseemstoneed,atleastfroma28,theinterpretation

(a2)allthethingsimaginedbyonegivenpersonetc.canbetrue
together

(e.g.ifanythinglooksbothredandroundtooneandthesameeyeatone
andthesametimeetc.,itcanbebothredandroundtogether).Even
(a2)willleadto(e)unlessitcanbeshownthatthecorrespondingly
emendedformof(d)isfalse.a28 b1arguesthatitis:thesamethingsare
noteverimaginedcontrary"bythesameperceptionandinthesame
aspectofitandinthesametime".Thisassertionhasbeenpreviously
used,inG5.1010b1419,todestroytheargumentfor(a)givenin
G5.1009a38 b12andsomecommentatorshavethoughtthatithasthe
samepurposehereandthat,sinceitisnotforProtagoreanstounder
minetheirownposition,a28 b1parentheticallyrepeatsAristotle'sob
jectiontothatposition.Hewouldinthatcasebearguing,first,that
becausetruthisnotrelative(a)hastobeemended(a1728)and,secondly,
thatthedefenceof(a)initsunemendedformisinadequate(a28 b1).
ButthisreversiontoAristotle'searlierargumentisneedless,whereas
thereisneedforthereformedProtagoreantoshowthathisemendation
of(a)doestheworkforwhichitwasdesignedandwhichitwillnotdoif,
as"thereasonspreviouslymentioned"hadindiscriminatelyasserted,
contrariescanbeimaginedbythesameperceptionetc.Theconclusion
"sothatthiswouldbetrue",sc.(a2),isalsomoreappropriatetothe
Protagoreantryingtodefendtheconsistencyofanewfoundposition
thantoAristotleforwhomitwouldbeaparenthesisinanalready
parentheticalargument.

Someremarksmustnowbemadeaboutthetextualproblemraised
bys28 b1.Thewords"thereplyisthattheyareimaginedcontrary",
suppliedinthetranslation,arerepresentedinourtextby"but"('alla'),
whichleavesthesentencewithoutamainverb.Onesolution(Bonitz)
acceptsthisbadgrammarasconveyingthesensegivenbythetrans
lationanother(Alexander)supposesthatwordstothesameeffecthave
droppedoutofthetext,notindeedfromtheplacewherethetranslation

Page115

insertsthem,whichwouldnotaccountforthe"but",butfrom
afterthefirstcomma(a30),giving"[thereplyisthat]evenonthis
account...".Jaegeralsoputsthelacunaina30,butfillsitdifferently:
'[weshallsaythattheirconclusionisthatwhatisimaginedbyeveryone
istrue,]andonthisaccount...'Jaeger'sfillingimposesthe'parentheti
cal'interpretation,discussedabove.Theotherfillingcanbetakeneither
thatway(soAlexanderandRoss,'ourreplywillbe...')ortheother
(Bonitz,'theirreplywillbe...').Amongchampionsofthe'parenthetical'
interpretationthereisdisagreementastowhetherthewords"andon
thisaccounteverythingisequallyfalseandtrue"are(Alexander,Jaeger)
orarenot(Ross)partofthereply.

"Onthisaccountnecessary"(b12):notonaccountoftheemendation
of(a),whichaccordingtoa214avoidsthenecessityofmakingtruth
relative,but(itseems)onaccountoftheunsatisfactorinessofthat
emendationviz.of(a2)toanyonedeterminedtomaintainProtagoras'
thesis.

Therearedifficultiesintheparagraphwhichtheforegoinginterpreta
tionleavesunresolved.WhydoesAristotlepresentwithoutseparation
twodifferentreductionesoftheProtagoreanthesisthateverythingimag
inedistrue,theargumentsfrom(a)and(b)to(c)andfrom(a)and(d)to
(e)?Whydoeshethinktheformerargumentvalid?Whydoeshethink
thatProtagoreanswillfindtheconclusionofthelatterargumentun
acceptable?Clanbl3reallymeanthattheemendedthesis,(a2),istoo
weaktosatisfyProtagoreans?Ifso,whydoesAristotletrouble,ina28 b1,
toabsolveitfromtheconsequenceattendingtheunemended(a)?

Theexperimentwiththecrossedfingersisdescribedanddiscussedin
Ross'seditionoftheParvaNaturalia,onDeInsomniis2.460b202.

1011b4.AristotlenowcompletesthedemolitionofProtagoras'thesis
byrefuting,inthreearguments,itsallegedconsequencethattruthis
relative.(I)Thefirstsentencedrawsfromthatconsequencetheabsurd
conclusionthateverythingtrueisbelieved.(II)Compressionandin
adequateterminologyobfuscatetheargumentinthesecondandthird
sentences,whichmayperhapsbeparaphrasedasfollows.(a)Whatis
e.g.doublecanherelativetomorethanonething,evendoublemorethan
onething,buttherelationbeingdoublehasjustoneconverserelation,
beinghalf("relativeto...somethingdefinite",cf.Categories7.6b28
7b14)itdoesnotalsohavetheconversebeingequal("theequalisnot
relativetothedouble",i.e.'xisequaltoy'and'yisdoublex'arenot
equivalent).Ingeneral,then,everyrelationhasjustoneconverse.
(b)Both'isamanto'(accordingtothedoctrinethattruthisrelative)
and'isthoughttobeamanby'expressrelationswhoseconverseis'thinks
tobeaman'(are"relativetothatwhichhasanopinion").(c)Therefore
'isaman'and'isanobjectof(sucha)thought'expressthesamerelation.

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(d)Thereforemenareessentiallyobjectsofthought.(e)Thereforemen
arenotessentiallythinkers,whichisabsurd.Aristotledoesnotjustifythe
stepfrom(d)to(e).(III)Notonly'isaman'butallotherpredicateswill
expressrelationswith(generically)thesameconverse'thinkstobe(so
andso)'.Sothelatterrelationwillhavenotonebutinfinitelymany
converses.

1011b13.Thediscussionhasindicated:thatPNCisthefirmestopinion
ofall(G3.1005b834),theobjectionsto"makingthisstatement",sc.
rejectingPNC(G4,6),andtheargumentsadducedbyothersforits
rejection(G5).AsatG5.1009a6Aristotleignoresthefactthatthrough
mostofG4andmostofG5hehasaddressedhimselftothesesmore
vulnerablethanthemerecontradictionofPNC.On'contrary','lack',and'denial'seeG10andI4.

Chapter7

Theargumentsindefenceoftheprincipleofexcludedmiddle(PEM)are
statedinsummaryformandoccupylessthanatenthofthespacegiven
toPNCinG36.ThisisnotbecauseAristotlethinksPEMlessdoubtful,
fornothingcanbelessdoubtfulthanPNC(G3.1005b224).Thereason
ispartlythatdoubtaboutPEMhadbeenexpressedbynoneofAristotle's
predecessorsexceptsohethinksAnaxagoras(1012a248)partly
thathisdiagnosisofthePEMsceptic'sstateofmind,at1012a1724,is
thesameasthatofthePNCsceptic's,andsorequiresnonewdiscussion.
Thediagnosisshowsthathedoesnot,either,sharetheinclinationof
somemodernlogicianstoregardPEMasmoredoubtfulthanPNC.

1011b23.TheformulationofPEMisincautious.AlthoughAristotle
saysthat,givenapredicateFandasubjectx,itisnecessaryeitherto
assertFofxortodenyFofxhecannotreallymeantoexcludethefur
therpossibilitiesof(i)makingnojudgementastowhetherxisF,(ii)per
formingsuchnondeclarativeoperationsasaskingwhetherxisFor
requestingthatxbeF.Wemusttakeitthattheselatteroperationsare
not"inthemiddleofacontradiction":thatis,donotfallbetweenapair
offormulaeassertinganddenyingFofx(DeInterpretatione6.17a338).
Whataretheconditionsunderwhichanoperationisinthemiddleof
acontradiction?Theanswerwhichsuggestsitselfis:whenitinvolves
rejectingasfalsebothhalvesofthecontradictorypair.Ifso,Aristotle's
opponentassertsthepossibilityofitsbeingfalseboththat
xisFandthatxisnotF,andthus,byapartofthedefinitionoffalsitywhichnotevenhe
willwishtogiveup,thepossibilitythatxisneitherFnornotF.Whether,
conversely,AristotlewouldacceptthathisversionofPEMentailsthatit
isnecessarythatxiseitherFornotFdependsonhisattitudetothe
principlethatanassertionordenialthatisnotfalsemustbetrue

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accordingtooneinterpretationDeInterpretatione9,whileallowingthat
twosingularcontradictoriesaboutthefuturecannotbothberaise,resists
theconclusionthat(ateverytime)oneofthemmustbetrue.Nevertheless,
itislikelythatAristotlewouldhaveacceptedthenecessityof'xiseither
FornotF'andthestillmoregeneralform'eitherpornotp'isimpliedby
DeInterpretatione9.19a32.

1011b25.Thisfirstargumentcontains(a)adefinitionof'true'and
'false',(b)aninferencefromthedefinition("sothat..."),(c)the
opponent'sassertion,(d)asuppressedconclusion.Eachstepcallsfor
comment.

(a)"Saythatthatwhichisisnot"etc.:i.e.sayofsomethingwhichIS
thatitisnotetc."Is"couldmean'exists','issoandso',or'isthecase'
(and"isnot"similarly)thelastalonemakesthedefinitionscoverall
truthsandfalsehoods,asAristotle'sargumentrequires.

(c)"Butitissaid",sc.bytheopponent.Thesentenceisambiguous
between'hedoesnotsayeitherthatthatwhichisisnotoris,orthatthat
whichisnotisnotoris'and'hedeniesboththatthatwhichisisnotoris,
andthatthatwhichisnotisnotoris',buttheformerisstrongenoughto
yieldAristotle'sconclusion.

(d)Theconclusiontobesuppliedispresumably'whattheopponent
saysisneithertruenorfalse',whichfollowsvalidlyfrom(a)and(c).

(b),whichIassumemeans'...saysofathingthatitisorthatitis.
not...',isproblematical.Itdoesnotseemtoassisttheargument,for(d)
followsfrom(a)and(c)butnotfrom(b)and(c).Moreover(b)doesnot
followfrom(a)withoutthefurtherquestionbeggingassumptionthat
whatgoesforthatwhichisandthatwhichisnotgoesforeverything.For
thesereasonssomeeditorshavepreferredtoadda'this'withAlexander
"sothathealsowhosaysthatthis[sc.whatisinthemiddleofa
contradiction]isornotwillhavethetruthorbeinerror",whichin
additiongivesmoreforceto"also".AgainstthisreadingRossbrought
theobjectionthatitdoesnotfollowfrom(a)thatitmustbetrueorfalse
tosay'is'or'isnot'ofwhatisinthemiddleofacontradiction,sincewhat
isinthemiddleofacontradictionispreciselyneitherwhatisnorwhatis
not.ThisisanobjectionwhichRossshouldhavebroughtagainstthe
MS.reading.AgainstAlexander'sitisnotnecessarilyeffective,because
itassumesthattheword"this"referstothesubjectofthesupposedmiddle
operation,thethingsaidtobeneitherFnornotFwhereasthe
referencemightbetotheoperationitself,whichtheopponentdoessup
poseto'be',i.e.(here)toexist.Ifso,(b)wouldbe,notastepintherefuta
tionoftheopponent,butanasidetotheeffectthathisthesisisrefutable.

Althoughtheargumentasawholeisvalid,itdoesnotdamagethe
positionoftheopponent,whohasachoiceoftworeplies.(A)Accepting
theimplicationthat,ifthereisathirdoperationbetweenassertingand

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denying,theproductsofthatoperationcannotbeeithertrueorfalse,he
mightpostulateathirdtruthvalueforthemtotake.Butthismoveis
plausibleonlyifthethirdtruthvalueis'designated',i.e.ifpredicating
itofapropositionisawayofassentingtothatproposition.(B)Alterna
tively,theopponentmightrejectpremiss(c)onthegroundsthatthe
statementheproducessay'Socratesneitherissicknorisnotsick'
althoughdifferentfromthedenial'Socratesisnotsick'isnevertheless
adenialandsodoessaythatthatwhichisnotisnot.Moreover,this
secondtypeofdenialwouldmeettheconditionforbeinginthemiddle
ofacontradiction,sinceitstruthwouldinvolvethefalsehoodofboth
'Socratesissick'and'Socratesisnotsick'.

AtthispointitmaybeworthindicatinghowAristotlewouldhave
dealtwithexamplesallegedtoillustratethefalsityofPEM.(i)'Socrates
isneithersicknornotsickheisdead':AristotlesaysthatifSocratesdoes
notexistheisnotsick(Categories10.13b2933,butcontrastDeInter
pretations11.21a248).(ii)'Thisstoneisneitherjustnornotjustforitis
Incapableofjustice.'Aristotleagreesthatstonescanneitherhavenor
lackjustice,butheholdsthatthefalseclaimthattheylackjusticemust
bemadeintheform'stonesareunjust'or'stonesarenotjust'.These
claimsarefalseassertions,butthedenial'thisstoneisnotjust'istrue(De
Interpretatione10.19b520a3,PriorAnalyticsI46.51b225).(iii)'The
presentkingofFranceisneitherwisenornotwisefortheexpression
"thepresentkingofFrance"isnotbeing,orontheoccasionofutterance
cannotcorrectlybe,usedtorefertoanyone':Aristotlenowherecomments
onthiskindofcase,buthemighthaveheldthatthesentencemakesno
assertion,orassertsnothing"ofonething",andisthereforenoexception
totherulethatwemustassertordenyonethingofonething(cf.De
Interpretatione8).(iv)'Socratesneitherwillbenorwillnotbesickhis
futurestateofhealthisnotdetermined.'Ononeinterpretation,De
Interpretatione9makesthelackofinevitabilitywhichcharacterizesmost
futureeventsareasonfordenyingpresenttruthtoe.g.'Socrateswillbe
sick'and'Socrateswillnotbesick'.Butwemustnotice,first,thateven
thatconcessionneednotbeincompatiblewiththethesisthatthereis
nothinginthemiddleofacontradiction,ifthatmeansthatthereis
nothingwhosetruthinvolvesthefalsehoodofbothmembersofacontra
dictorypairsincenothingsuggeststhatheheldsuchfuturecontra
dictoriestobealreadyfalseand,secondly,itappearsthat,ifhedidmake
theconcession,hethoughtitcompatiblewiththetruthofthedisjunctive
proposition'Socrateseitherwillbeorwillnotbesick'(DeInterpretatione
9.19a32),eventhoughthesearenotcompatibleaccordingtothedefini
tionoftruthgiveninthepresentchapter.

1011b29.WhataltersinrespectofFnessmustalterfrombeingFtonot
beingF,orviceversa.Aristotledistinguishestwowaysinwhichthe

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relationofbeingFtonotbeingFmightbepicturedsoastoadmitan
exceptiontothisprinciple:astherelationbetweendark(orblack),and
pale(orwhite),whicharecontrarieshaving"somethingintermediate
betweenthem"(Categories10.12a925),orastherelationbetweenaman
andahorse,whicharenotcontraries(Categories5.3b247).Aristotle
arguesthatneitheranalogysecurestheresultwhichhisopponentwants.
Althoughtheintermediatesbetweendarkandpalearepossiblestarting
andstoppingplacesforchange,anyintermediatebetweenpaleandnot
palewouldnotbeandintermediatesbetweennoncontrariesarenever
possiblestartingorstoppingplacesforchange(e.g.nothingcouldchange
intoorfromamule).Aristotleaddsthatintermediatesalwaysarepossible
startingandstoppingplacesforchange("infactitevidentlyalways
does"sc.alter),sothatthemanhorseanalogycannotindicatea"way
inwhich"anythingisinthemiddleofanything.

1012a2.Theargumentis:thinkingsomethingthatistrueorfalseis
assertingordenying[nomiddleoperationisassertingordenying]
thereforenomiddleoperationisthinkingsomethingthatistrueorfalse.
Asin1011b259,itisassumed(A)thatanymiddlepropositionwould
havetobetrueorfalseand(B)thatnomiddlepropositioncanbe
anassertionordenial.Forthedescriptionoftruthsandfalsehoodsas
"compounding"cf.Categories.4.2a410,DeInterpretatione1.16a1218,
E4.1027b1723.

1012a5.Aristotledoesnotmeanthatifanymiddleistrueallmustbe
true,butthatifanymakesseineallmustmakeseine.Hederivestwo
consequences.(i)Itwillmakeseinetosaythatapropositionisneither
truenornottrue,andthatonewhobelievesitisneitherrightnornot
right(Aristotle'sclaimisactuallybolder:thesethingswillsometimes
happen).(ii)Therewillbeamiddlebetweenexistingandnotexisting(the
referencetocomingtobeanddestructionshowsthat"thatwhichis"
mustnowbetakenexistentially).Aristotledoesnotmeantodenythat,
evenasthingsare,thereisa"kindofalterationapartfromcomingtobe
anddestruction",e.g.changeofcolourhemeansthattherewillhave
tobeanewkindinaddition,standinginthesamerelationtocomingto
beanddestructionaschangetoorfromtheintermediatebetweenwhite
andnotwhitestandstoordinarychangesofcolour.

1012a9.Forcontrariesrelatedinsuchawaythatthedenialofone
impliestheother(i.e.contradictoryopposites)seeCategories10.11b38
12a9.Aristotle'sthesisisthatthepropositions:
(a)oddisthecontraryofeven,
(b)'notodd'implies'even',
(c)atleastonenumberisneitheroddnornotodd,

Page120

makeaninconsistenttriad.Thereasoningseemstobe:(a)and(b)show
that'even'maybedefinedas'notoddbythatdefinition(c)isequivalent
to
(d)atleastonenumberisneitheroddnoreven,
whichisinconsistentwith(b)therefore(c)isinconsistentwiththecon
junctionof(a)and
(b).Thisargumentbegsthequestion,because(a)and
(b)entailthat'even'isequivalentto'notodd'onlyontheassumption
that'odd'and'notodd'exhaustthefield.

1012a12.Theinterpretationofthisargumentdependsonthequeer
phrase"todenythis[themiddle]inrelationtotheassertionanddenial".
(l)Bonitzunderstands:todenyboththedisjunctionofmiddleand
assertionandthedisjunctionofmiddleanddenial.Theargumentthen
is:ifbetween'F'and'notF'isthemiddle'G',therewillbefurther
middlesbetween'G'and'F'andbetweenG'and'notF',andsoad
infinitum.(2)Asimpleemendation,adding'to',wouldgive'todenythis
<whichis>inrelationtotheassertionanddenial',forwhichthesense
proposedis:todenythepropositionwhichismiddlerelativetothe
originalassertionanddenial.Theargumentthenis:ifbetween'F'and
'notF'isthemiddle'G',therewillalsobethenewdenial'notG'.(3)A
lesseasyemendationexpands'apophesai'('deny')into'apophenasthai'
('declare'),givingthesense:todeclarethemiddleinbothitsaffirmative
andnegativeforms(cf.PosteriorAnalyticsI2.72a1112).Theargumentis
thenthesameasunder(2).(4)Alexanderunderstands:todenyboththe
middletakenasanassertionandthemiddletakenasadenialthatis,the
denialofthemiddle.Theargumentthenis:ifbetween'F'and'notF'is
themiddle'G',betweenthatand'notG'willbethefurthermiddle'H',
andsoadinfinitum.(4)leadstothesameresultas(2)and(3).Butallfour
oftheseinterpretationsfacelinguisticortextualobjections.
"Forthesubstanceissomethingelsethanit":thenewdenial(whether
'neitherGnorF','notG',or'H')differsinmorethannamefromwhat
itdeniesfor'substance'meaning'being'cf.G4.1007a26.

1012a15.'Socratesisnotpale'(i)deniesonlythatheispale,note.g.
thatheismediumdark,and(ii)saysnomorethanwhatitdenies("its
notbeingisadenial").So'Socratesisnotpale'iscompatiblewith
everythingotherthanSocrates'beingpale.Sotheallegedmiddle
utterancemusteitherbecompatiblewith'Socratesisnotpale'orelse
entail'Socratesispale'.Inneithercasewillitfulfiltheconditionfor
beinginthemiddleofacontradiction.

1012a17.Forthetwo"derivations"oftheopponent'sopinioncf.
G5.1009a1622."Theoriginalstepisadefinition":G4.1006a1826
and8.1012b511.

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a
1012 24.Anaxagoras'allegedthesisisthatitis(notonlypossiblebut)
necessaryneithertoassertnortodeny:'good'isofcoursearepresenta
tiveforallotherpredicates.Againsttheobjectionthat'neithergoodnor
notgood'isitselfsomethingtrue,Aristotlemustreferbackto1011b259.
"Makeseverythingtrue":andfalsetoo,G8.1012a29 b2.

Chapter8

1012a29.Thethesesthateverythingistrueandthatnothingistruehere
appearforthefirsttime"singly",viz.notconjoinedwitheachother,and
"abouteverything",e.g.notlimitedtothings"inprocessofalteration"
(L5.101a8)"Iftheformerareimpossible...":iftheunconjoined
thesesareimpossible,soistheirconjunction.Theargumentof1012b13
18couldbegeneralizedtoprovetheconverseimplication,sojustifying
''practicallythesame".Theconjunctionisequivalentto' x F(Fx&
Fx)',thestrongdenialofPNC(G4.1007b181008a2)itsattribution
toHeraclitusseemsoncemoretoconfuseitwiththeweakdenial(G
3.1005b235).

AgainstthesenewandeasytargetsAristotleaimssomeoftheargu
mentsalreadyusedinG47."Wemustbasediscussiononadefinition",
not,asinG4.1006a31 b34(cf.G7.1012a214),thedefinitionofsome
specimen"name"chosenbytheopponent,butof'true'and'false'.This
wastheprocedureemployedindefenceofPEM(G7.1011b259,
1012a25)indefenceofPNCitwaspreviouslyspurned(G4.1008a34
b2).b1322statestheargumentcalledperitropeG4.1008a2830,
Theaetetus1701.Inb9thetextisuncertain,butnotthesense.

1012b22."Evidentlythisalters":Aristotle'sdoctrineisnotun
reasonableinholdingthattruthvaluescanchange,butisunreasonable
ifitholdsthatanassertionchangesitstruthvaluewhenitsasserterdies.
"Ifeverythingischanging",sc.inallrespectsseeG5.1010a1525."Itis
necessarythatthatwhichitalters",i.e.whataltersmustbesomething
thatisfor,Aristotleargues,ifitaltersfromFtoG,theremustbesome
timeatwhichitisFandsometimeatwhichitisG(cf.PhysicsVI
5.235b630).Buttheargumentfailstoshowthatthesetimesarestretches
oftime,andsodoesnotestablishthatchangeimpliesrest(seealsoPhysics
VIII3.253b6254a1).The"firstchanger"isGod(L7)"whichis
alwayschangingthethingsthatchange"refers,presumably,totheouter
mostsphereoftheheavenswhich,thoughAristotledoesnotheresayso,
isitselfconstantlyinchange(viz.movement,L7.1072a213).

Page122

MetaphysicsBookDelta

IntroductoryNote

Lconsistsofanexaminationofthedifferentsensessomeintechnical
usebyAristotle,somenotofabout34wordsandtheircognates.At
G2.1003b331004a2thestudyofthe"formsof
thingthatis"and"ofthingthatisone",includingsuchconceptsasthesameandsimilar,was
referredtothe"SelectionofContraries".Thisisperhapstobeidentified
withalostbook,AboutContraries,towhichtherearereferencesinthe
ancientcommentators(seeTheWorksofAristotletranslatedintoEnglish,
vol.xii,109114),butsomeofthematerialmaybereusedin 910.
G2.1004a1020mentionedplurality,other,dissimilar,unequal,difference,
andcontrarietyand1005a1217addedcomplete,priorandposterior,genus,
form,wholeandpart.Thediscussionofallthese,aswellasthatwhichis,
one,andsubstance,fallsto"onediscipline'',namelymetaphysics(1004a52
3)andallbuttwoofthemaretreatedintenofL'sthirtychapters.After
theexaminationofaxiomsinG38,Dthuscomesnaturallyasafurtherexercise
inprimaryphilosophy.Nevertheless,manyhavethoughtthat,
inRoss'swords,thebook"isevidentlyoutofplacewhereitis''.There
arethreereasonsforthisuneasiness.(i)ManyofthewordsdiscussedinD
arenotlistedinGasproperto'philosophy',althoughnearlyallseemto
meetitsrequirementofubiquityofapplication.(ii)Aristotle'sreferences
toD,intherestoftheMetaphysicsandelsewhere,areto"thetreatmentof
thenumberofwaysinwhichthingsarecalledwhattheyare"(ora
similarformula,e.g.E4.1028a46)andonelaterwriterlistsanArist
otelianworkunderthesametitle.K18summarizesBGE,inthat
order.Allthissuggestsaseparateoriginforthebook.(iii)Themethodof
askinge.g.'howmanysenseshastheword"falsehood"?',ratherthane.g.
'howisfalsehoodpossible?'mayseemmoreappropriatetothetrainerin
philosophicalnavigationthantotheindependentexplorer.Dmay,then,
beamanualofseparateorigin,incorporatedintothetreatiseon'primaryphilosophy'
byAristotlehimselforaneditor.

SomeofAristotle'sdistinctionsarenotsomuchofsensesasofcriteria,usesorapplications
ofaword(seee.g.D1.1013a1617andnote,D
7.1017a7247andnote).Hisownlabelsforthemareoftwotypes.used
interchangeably:(i)adverbs'manyhow','twohow',etc.,translated'ina
numberofways','intwoways',etc.,(ii)thenoun'tropos',translated
'sense'(but'manner'atD6.1015b33,E1.1025b15,'type'atD2.
1004b24).

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Chapter1

1012b34."Wecallanorigin":literally'originiscalled',cf."Civil
interestsIcalllife,liberty,healthandindolencyofbody"(Locke,
Lettertone.Toleration,ed.Gough,126)."Point":thereisnonounin
theGreek,hereorelsewhere(except1014b8,1916b1731).

1013a1.Cf.PhysicsI1,whereAristotledistinguishesbetweenthose
originsorelementswhichare"clearestandmostintelligibletous",e.g.
(commonplacefactsabout)complexmacroscopicobjects,andthose
whichare"clearestandmostintelligiblebynature",e.g.(descriptionsof)
thecomponentsofsuchobjects.

1013a4."Somebelieveitistheheart":amongthemAristotle,seeDe
GenerationeAnimaliumII4.740a1719.

1013a10.Theword'arche'badtwobroadmeaningsinGreek:'begin
ning','origin','startingpoint',towhichanswersthemiddlevoiceofthe
verb,'archesthai'(translated'begin'ata3andas)and'rule','authority',
'office'andinthepluraloften'officers','authorities'towhichanswers
theactive'archein'.Aristotle'streatmentattemptstorelatethetwo
meanings:rulersareauthorsorinitiatorsofchange.A"dynasty"isa
typeofoligarchy,PoliticsIV5.1292b510.Theplurals'dynasties'etc.
can,like'arche',beusedeitherofatypeofgovernmentorofthegroup
whichsogoverns:cf.ouruseof'thegovernment'.Thelatterbetterfits
"thatatwhosedecision"(or'will','prohairesis'),but,perhapsinfluenced
bytheformer,Aristotleallowshimselftosaythatskillsdecidetoget
thingschanged.

1013a14."Thepointfromwhichonefirstgetsacquainted"withathing
isnotthesameas"thepointfromwhichitiseasiesttolearn"(a34)for
theformeris,butthelatterisnot,"originoftheactualthing".The
referencetodemonstrations,i.e.thingsdemonstrated,showsthat
'gettingacquainted,herehasthesense'proving',not'learning':cf.
A3.983a256.AtPosteriorAnalyticsI10.76b2334aprincipleisun
provable,ahypothesisprovablebutacceptedwithoutproofherethe
wordsareusedindifferentlyofanythingacceptedwithoutproof.

1013a16."Inthesamenumberofways":i.e,overthesamerangeof
application,forAristotledeniesthat'origin'and'cause'are"indicated
byoneformula"(D2.1003b245).Evenso,fromthefactthatevery
causeisanoriginitdoesnotfollowthatthetwowordsapplytothesame
things,andinfactnothingunder'cause'inD2correspondswithe.g.the
secondsenseof'origin'.

1013a17."Thought"belongsunderthefifthsense,formen'sthoughts
(e.g.thatsomethingisattractive)aswellastheirchoicesoriginate

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action."Whatathingisfor":Aristotlemaymeanthatweprovee.g.that
CalliasisinThebesbydiscoveringhispurposethere(demonstrative
'acquaintance'withafact),or,morelikely,thatweunderstande.g.whata
latheisbydiscoveringitspurpose(makingourselvesacquaintedwith
whatathingis)ineithercasethepurposemayoriginatechangeaswell
asknowledgeorunderstandingnotchangesinthelatheorinCallias'
situationinThebes,butthechangeswherebythelathecametoexist(it
asmadetoserveitspurpose)andCalliascametobeinThebes(he
wentthereforapurpose).

Chapter2

Exceptforafewveryminordivergencesthischapterisidenticalwith
PhysicsII3.194b23195b21A3.983a33 b1refersforanadequate
discussionofcauseto"thebooksaboutnature",nottoDPhysicsII
7.198a1416impliesthatanytrueanswertothequestion'why?'gives
acause(aitia,aition).Hence'explanation'or'reason'isoftencloserto
thesenseoftheGreekwordsbutanaitiaoraitionisgenerallyareasonfor
being('ratioessendi')notareasonforthinking('ratiocognoscendi',but
seee.g.E2.1026b2431).

ThetraditionalnamesforAristotle'sfourcausesarematerial,formal,
motive(orefficient),andfinal.Thisfourfoldclassificationreappearsat
A3.983a24 b1.ThematerialcauseisomittedatDeAnimaII4.415b810,
andreplacedatPosteriorAnalyticsII1194a2036by"thatwhichbeing
so,itisnecessaryforthistobe",i.e.anecessitatingcondition(Aristotle's
exampleis'whyistheangleinscribedinasemicirclearightangle?
becauseitishalftworightangles').L4.1070b1130omitsthefinal
causeandsplitstheformalintoformandlack(sc.ofform).AtPhysicsII
7.198a2433itisarguedthatformal,final,andmotivecausesoften
"cometothesamething".WhatmakesSocratestwofootedis(i)his
beingaman(formalcause),(it)hisfather,whomusthavebeenaman
(motivecause)theseare"thesameinform",sc.bothmenalthoughnot
thesameman(cf.D4.1070b305).Formalandfinalcausemaybeeven
numericallythesame,foraccordingtoAristotleanaturalobjecthasits
natureorsubstanceonlywhen'itsdevelopmentiscomplete(seeD
4.1015a35)andnaturaldevelopmentisnotjusttowardsbut'for'
completionorfulfilment(thefullestargumentforthisisPhysicsII8cf.
alsoDeAnimaII4.415b1521,DeGenerationeetCorruptioneII9.335b6,
H4.1044a36 b1).

Aristotle'sdiscussionofcauseisnolongerinfluential,chieflybecause
hedoesnotraiseHume'sproblemastothedifferencebetween'posthoc'
and'propterhoe'.Thatproblemtreatscausesasanteriorevents,but
(i)finalcauses,ifevents,occurlaterthantheireffectsand(ii)although

Page125

afinalcausemaybeaneventoroutcome('forthesakeofhishealth')it
mayalsobeabeneficiary('forhissake'Aristotlemakesthisdistinction
atDeAnimaII4.415b201),andalthoughamotivecausemaybean
event(PosteriorAnalyticsII11.94a36 b1"whydidtheAtheniansget
involvedinthePersianWars?...becausetheyraidedSardiswiththe
Eretrians")itmayalso,asmostlyinthepresentchapter,beanagent.

1013a24(PhysicsII3.194b23)."Constituentoutofwhich"=material
cause.Bronzeisthecauseofastatueinthesenseofbeingcauseofthe
statue'shavingsuchandsuchproperties:cf.Z17.1041a1011'"why?"
isalwayslookedforinthisway,"whydoesonethingholdgoodofsome
otherthing?"'.DeAnimaIII5.430a1025showswhatAristotlehasin
mind:ifastatueisofi.e.manifestsabrownishcolour,thatiscaused
by(a)itsbronze,asmatter,and(b)thelightshiningonit,asexternal
(L4.1070b223)originofchange.Thestatue'smatterhas(Z15.1039b
2930),orevenis(DrAnimaII1.412a9),thecapacitytoacquireand
manifestvaryingpropertiesitisthereforeakindoforiginofchange
(D12.1019a1923),butpassive,inferior,andinternal.Thingsimmaterial
inthemodernsensemaystillhavematter,i.e.subjectmatterormaterials,
asvowelsandconsonants("elements"1013b17)arethematerialsfrom
whichwemakeupsyllables,andhypothesesthematerials(b20)from
whichwegetconclusions.

1013a26(PhysicsII3.194b26)."Formandpattern"=formalcause.
ItisnotuncommonforAristotletowriteasifathing'sformcouldbe
identifiedwiththeformulawhichexpressesit(cf.D6.1015b05).Hehad
twousesforthenotionofformalcause,whichhedidnotdistinguish.
(i)HeappearstohaveassumedthatbeingFcausesathingtobeG
givenonlythatFsarealwaysorusuallyGs,orinotherwordsthatthe
conjunctionofFnessandGnessisnotacoincidence(seenotesonD30.
1025a14)thusPhysicsII3.195b23tellsusthattheintermediatecause
ofsomeparticularman'sbuildingahouseishisbeingahousebuilder.
(ii)Besidescitingformsascausesofthepropertiesofindividualthings,
Aristotlemoreplausiblycaststhemaspossibleanswerstogeneral
questionslike'whydohousebuildersbuildhouses?''whydooctaves
spaneightnotes?'Thefirstoftheseisadmittedlymorelikelytoaskfor
afinalcausebutthesecond,ifaboutsomethingchangeless,canbe
answeredonlybysayingwhatanoctaveis:"'why?',inthecaseof
changelessthings,reducesintheendto'whatisit?'"(PhysicsII7.198a
1618,cf.A3.983a28).

1013a29(PhysicsII3.194b29)."Firstoriginofalterationorrest"=
motivecause."First"suggeststhatAristotledoesnotregardmeansas
motiveceases:cf.ourdistinctionbetweenagentandinstrument,anda36
"whateffectedthechangewassomethingelse",sc.thanthemeans.

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b b
"Originofalterationorrest",cf.1013 25,E1.1025 201:whenaheavy
bodyfalls,its'nature'iscauseofthedownwardmotionwhenitreaches
theground,thegroundcausesittocontinuethereafteratrest.Both
causesmust,accordingtoAristotle'smechanics,beoperativeatevery
momentofthestatetheycause.

1013a32(PhysicsII3.194b32)."Thing'sfulfilment"=finalcause.
Thereisawellknownambiguityinthisnotion,whichAristotlebrushes
asideatb278withtheremark"letusassumethatthereisnodifference
incallingitgoodorimaginedgood".AtPosteriorAnalyticsII11.94b826
heoffers'inordertobehealthy'astheanswertotwoquestions:'why
doesonetakeawalk?'and'whyshouldonetakeawalkafterdinner?'
Butthetruthconditionsoftheseanswersaredifferent:theanswertothe
secondquestionwillbetrueonlyifwalkingisgoodforhealth,theanswer
tothefirstonlyifthewalkerthinks("imagines")itgood.Aristotle
leavesitunclearinwhichofthesesensesitmaybeassertedthat"nature
worksforthesakeofsomething"and''becauseitisbetterso''(Physics
II8.198b17):ontheonehandnaturedoesnotdeliberate(ib.199b268),
butontheothershedoesmakemistakes(ib.199a33 b1).Thedifference
between'good'and'imaginedgood'isdiscussedinNicomacheanEthics
III4.

1013a35(PhysicsII3.194b35).Ata35"asameansto"isliterally'in
themiddleof'(sotranslatedinG7),showingthatAristotlehasinmind
a3termrelationinwhichBisthemeansbitwhichactionorthingA
achievesfulfilmentC.A,then,isthe"somethingelse"whicheffectedthe
change.Adoctor(A),forinstance,employsinstrumentsorperforms
operations(B)inordertosecurehispatient'shealth(G).Inthissituation
itwillbetruetosayboth(i)thatB,aswellasC,isafinalcauseofA
afulfilment,althoughnota"complete"fulfilment(NicomacheanEthicsI
7.1097a258)and(ii)CisthefinalcauseofB,asofA.Evidently
Aristotle'spointis(i).

1013b3(PhysicsII3.195a3)."Notcoincidentally":see1013b28ff.
Aristotle'sassumptionthatthesamethingcannothavemultiplecauses
inthesame"sense"muchunderratesthecomplexityoftheconceptof
cause.Inpracticeheisnotsorigid:see1013b1116andthenotionofa
jointcauseorcontributorycause,e.g.atDeAnimaII4.416a14"Things
mayalsobecausesofoneanother":cf.A3.983a312.

ThelastsentenceoftheparagraphdoesnotillustrateAristotle's
contentionthatthesamethingmaybethecauseofcontraries,forwhich
hemustrelyonthefirsthalfofthepenultimatesentence.Heisreally
makingtwoconcessions:(i)thatonecausecanhavedifferentresultson
differentoccasions,aswhenthehelmsmancausesshipwreckbyhis
absenceornonshipwreckbyhispresenceand(ii)thatoneresultcan

Page127

havedifferentcausesevenonthesameoccasion,aswhenthemotive
causeofshipwreckisalternativelygivenasthehelmsman'sabsenceor
simplyasthehelmsman."Holdresponsible"translatestheverb'aitiasthai',
fromtherootof'aitia'butusuallymeaning'blame'.

1013b16(PhysicsII3.195a15).Thissumsupthefirstfourparagraphs.

1013b28(PhysicsII3.195a26).Therestofthechapterdealswitha
differentclassificationofsensesof'cause',theprevioussenses(b8,b16)
beingnowreferredtoasforms.Aristotle'sprocedureispuzzling.Since
thesameindividualmightbebothdoctorandmanofskill(thelatter
beingwiderthantheformer)andsince,inspiteofthat,theyaresaidto
becausesofhealthindifferentsensesorways,itmustbethattheprimary
casesofcausearekindsofthing.notindividuals,andtheprimarycasesof
causalstatementareclassrelational,notsingular.Evenso,itisoddto
saythat'doctorscausehealth'and'menofskillcausehealth'use'cause'
indifferentways,orevenmentiondifferentkindsofcause.Evidently
Aristotle'smeaningisthatthepredicate'causehealth'(thoughdoubtless
univocal)attachesindifferentwaystothesubjects'doctors'and'menof
skill':forcausinghealthindicateswhatitistobeadoctorbutnotwhatit
istobeamanofskill(seeD18,E2.1026b371027a2).

"Whatincludesanyoftheparticularcauses",i.e.theirgenera(in
D23and26theverbistranslated'contains').Ross'stranslationconstrues
differently:"whatincludessoandso[isCause]oftheparticular[effects]"
andthismustberightifthephraseistohavethesamemeaningasthe
variantGreekatPhysics195a32.ButtakingtheMetaphysicsphraseonits
own,itswordorderfavourstheversionadopted,

1013b34(PhysicsII3.195a32).Bothdoctorsandmenofskillarepp.21819
causesofhealthintheirownright.andsonotcoincidentally(D18.1022a
259).InshowingthatPolyclitusiscoincidentallycauseofastatue
Aristotleusesaformofargumentwhichappearstolicensetheinference
'menarcanimals:beingPolyclitusisacoincidenceforamantherefore
Polyclitusiscoincidentallyananimal'(cf.PriorAnalyticsI11.31b1220).
If,ontheotherhand,hehadarguedfromtheconverseminorpremiss
'beingastatuemakerisacoincidenceforPolyclitus',thatwouldhave
licensedtheequallyunwelcomeinference'statuemakerscausestatues
itisacoincidenceforamanofskilltobeastatuemakertherefore
menofskillcausestatuescoincidentally'(cf.PriorAnalyticsI9.30a37 b1).
Thisdifficultyisnottobeavoidedbyreplacing'Polyclitus'withageneral
termsuchas'thepale'.

Incitingmanandanimalas"including,PolyclitusAristotle(i)over
looksthedifferencebetweenthisrelationship,ofclassmembership,and
thatbetweendoctorandmanofskill,whichisofclassinclusion(cf.the
twousesof'particular'in1014a17and1014a21)and(ii)ignoresthe

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objectionthatmanandanimalincludenotonlythecoincidentalcause
Polyclitusbutalsothenoncoincidentalcausestatuemaker.Thepaleand
theartisticare"moreremote"causesthanPolyclitusevidentlybecause,
unlikehim,theycannotdirectlycoincideinstatuemakercf.G4.1007a33
b18.

1014a7(PhysicsII3.195b3).Theclassificationintoproperandco
incidentalcausesisexhaustive,and"apartfrom"introducesacross
classificationcf.1014a1920,E2.1026b1.Itisnotreallynecessaryto
bringtheMetaphysicstext,asJaegerdoes,intolinewiththePhysicsby
dropping"apartfrom".Ifwedo,thesenseis:'Allofthem,thoseso
calledbothproperlyandcoincidentally,areinsomecasessocalledas
beingcapable,inothersasactuallyfunctioning.'

1014a10(PhysicsII3.195b6).Themakerofbronzecausesmatter
either(Ross)inthesensethathisproductismaterialforsomeoneelse,or
inthesensethatheproducesacertainkindofmatter(outofotherkinds).

1014a15(PhysicsII3.195b12).Itisdifficult,butnotimportant,toget
sixheadingsoutofAristotle'slist(notethathiswordsfor'either'and'or'
arethesame).Thedistinctionbetweenfunctioningandcapacitycannot
applytodescriptionssuchas'Polyclitus'and'man'.Aristotle'spoint
aboutsimultaneityseemstobe:AisdoctoringBjustsolongasBisbeing
healedbyA,butitisnottruethatAisadoctorjustsolongasBisa
patient.Butthiscontrasthasnothingtodowiththedifferencebetween
capacitiesandtheexerciseofcapacities.Ross'sexplanationof'particu
lar'ina21isprobablycorrect:whatisfunctioningisparticular,inthe
sensethatitisalwaysappropriatetoaskthequestion'whichdoctor?'
whensomeonesays'thedoctorishealing'butnotalwayswhensomeone
says'thedoctorisahealer'.Thistakes'particular'inthesense'indi
vidual',buta17(cf.1013b34)useditinthesense'specific'todistinguish
e.g.statuemakersfromthewiderclassofmenofskill.

Chapter3

1014a26.ThematerialsubstanceswhichAristotlebelievedtofithis
firstsenseof'element'.areearth,air,fire,andwater(the"bodily
elements"or"simplebodies"discussedinDeCaeloIIIandIV).The
elementsofmodernchemistrywereoriginallysocalledinthesamesense,
butarenowknown,ofcourse,to"dividefurtherintootherthings
differinginform":e.g.notallpartsofoxygenareoxygen.Elsewhere
(e.g.PhysicsI6.189b16)Aristotlesometimesnamesmatter,form,and
lack(ofaform)astheelementsofsubstances.Elementsmaybedivisible,
asvowels,orindivisible,as(spoken)consonants.

Page129
a
1014 35.The"diagrams"aresolutionstogeometricalproblems,
henceperhapsgeometricaltheoremsingeneral(seeB3.998a25and
Ackrill'snoteonGategories12.14a26)."Syllogismsoutofthreeterms":as
opposedtosorites(PriorAnalyticsI25.42b23).Forthisuseof'element'
seeB3.998a26andRoss'snoteonthatpassagealsoHeath,Mathematics
inAristotle,2056,Proclus,InEuclidemI,ed.Friedlein,72.Euclid'sbook
was,ofcourse,calledElements.

1014b3.RossreferstoTopicsIV1.121b1113,"inallthesecasesthe
elementisthatthegenusisspokenofmorewidelythantheformandthe
differentia":wemightsay'thefundamentalthing'.Fromsuchgeneral
propositionsAristotlepassesto"universalthings",i.e.generalconcepts,
whichareelementsbecausewidelyapplicable.Hismentionofpoints
perhapsadvertstotheview,notsharedbyhimself(PhysicsIV8.215b18
19),thatlines,planes,andsolidsarecomposedoutofpoints."The
thingstermedgenera"areapparentlythecategories(cf.D6.1016b334),
whichareindivisibleandhavenoformulabecausetheycannotbeana
lysedintogenusanddifferentia.Often,ofcourse,Aristotleappliesthe
word'genus'tonarrowerclassessuchasanimal,butevensuchgeneraare
"more''elementarythandifferentiaebecause,asAristotlethinks,a
differentiathatisproperlygiven''impliesthegenus"sothate.g.two
footednonanimalssuchasladderswillhavetobetwolootedina
derivativesense(cf.Categories3.1b1617,TopicsI15.107b1926,VI
6.144b1230).

1014b14.Anelementisanorigin(A3.983b11),butaconstituent,not
external,origin(L4.1070b226).B3.998a20 b14raisesthequestion
whichofthetwokindsofelementsofbodiesdistinguishedinthischap
tergeneraandsimplepartsaretheoriginsofthings.

Chapter4

1014b16.TheLatin'natura'iscognatewith'nasci','tobeborn',butAris
totle'sGreekword'phusis'doesnotusuallymean'birth'("thecoming
tobeofthingsthatgrow").Eventheetymologyheproposesconnects
itratherwithgrowth,hiswordfor'grow'being'phuesthai'which,unlike
'phusis',hasthe'u'long.Modernopinionrejectsthisetymologyand
traces'phusis'fromaroot'phu'meaning'be',asintheLatin'fui'(see
RossalsoC.S.Lewis,StudiesinWords,34).

1014b18.Whenadoctoraltershispatientbycuringhim,thechangeis
notinthedoctor.Whenadoctorcureshimself,thechangeisinhimself
butnotquahimself,sincedoctorsarenotrestrictedtocuringthemselves.

Page130

Growth,ontheotherhand,isachangewhichalivingthingworksin
itselfquaitself(aselfchange).Forinstance,amancangrowhisown
fingernailsbutcannotgrowsomebodyelse'sthegrowthofhisfinger
nailsisa"changeinanaturallyexistingthing)'(heischanged)which
isa"constituentofthething"(heeffectsthechange)"quaitself''(nothing
elsecaneffectthechange).Aristotleconfusinglyusesthesameword"in''
firstgoverningthethingchangedandsecondly,inthephrase'holds
goodin'(hereandelsewheretranslated"isaconstituentof"),governing
thatwhicheffectsthechange(cf.E1.1025b201).Natureis"whatmakes"
itthat(literally'whence')changesareselfchanges:thatis,itisbecause
amanhasanature'andadiarydoesnotthatthemangrowshis
fingernailsbutthediarydoesnotgrowitsdailyentries.Notallchangesin
amanareselfchanges:Aristotledistinguishesthosewhichareas"pri
mary".ThesamesenseisdiscussedmorefullyatPhysicsII1.192b833,
whichconcludes"thethingswhichhavethiskindoforigin(sc.of
change)possessanature".Inb206Aristotleseekstoexplainwhygrowth
isaselfchangeeventhoughsomethingoutsidecontributestoit,e.g.
foodorthepregnantmother.Hissolutionisthatthechangeisduetoa
formwhichiscommontothegrowingthingand(inthecaseoffood,
afterassimilation)theoutsideagent.Hiswordsfor'assimilation'('sum
phusis')and'adhesion'('prosphusis',PhysicsV3.227a17)havetheappear
anceofcompoundsof'phusis',butmaybemorecloselytiedtothenotion
ofgrowththanthatparentagewouldallow.Fortherequirementthat
assimilatedthingsbecontinuous,i.e.mergedorfused,seeK12.1069a
512.

1014b26.Thisisthesenseinwhichathing'snatureisitsmatter.Inb27
oneMS.reads'anotnaturallyexistingthing',whichbetterfitsAristotle's
exampleofthestatue,butisabsurdlyrestrictive.Rosssuggeststhatthe
statueiscountedanaturallyexistingthingbecauseitismadeofnatural
materials.ThespecificationwhichAristotleneedsisnot'naturally
existingthing'but'perceptiblematerialobject'(seenoteon1015a13).
"Unstructured":themeaningmaybe(1)thatbronzeisnotthesort
ofthingtohaveorlackashape,or(2)thatapieceofbronzecanchange
itsshapewithoutlimitandcan.beofanyshapeandsize,or(3)thata
pieceofunworkedbronzecommonlyhasnoveryregularshape(so
Rosscf.'a'shapelesslump').Aristotle'sexampleiswrongifhedenies
thatwoodis"subjecttolossofitsowncapacity",sinceitspowersare
permanentlydestroyedbye.g.burning.Perhapshemeansthatthewood
inawoodenartefactdoes,asamatteroffact,retainthepowersitpossessed
beforebeingworkedcf.b312"thefirst(i.e.initial)matterbeingcon
served".Ifso,hispointwouldbethatwoodisthenatureofe.g.awalking
stickbutnotofe.g.anewspaper.Butinthatcaseitisnot,ashesays,
inthesamesensethatelementsarenaturesfore.g.waterdoesloseits

Page131

powerofquenchingthirstwhencompoundedintosulphuricacid,even
though,asAristotlethinks,thewateritselfis"conserved".

Onthissenseof'phusis'cf.PhysicsII1.193a930.

1014b35.Thesubstanceofathingisitsessence.Aristotletakes
Empedoclestoberejecting,inthemodernempiricistmanner,the
notionof'real'essence.Havingdefinednature(=matter)andnature
(=essence)intermsofnaturallyexistingthings,Aristotlenowdis
concertinglydefines'naturallyexisting'intermsofmatterandform
Thelatterdefinitionisinadequate,sinceevenifnaturallyexistingthings
aretoincludeartefactstheycannotbemeanttoincludee.g.arguments,
whicharenevertheless"madeupof"formand(subject)matter(sce
noteon1015a13).Aristotleshouldhavespecifiedperceptiblematter
(cf.Z,10.1036a9).Forthetwokindsof"firstmatter"see''firstgenus"
and"lastform"atD24.1023a279.

1015a11.ItisnotclearwhetherAristotlemeans(1)inadditiontothe
substances(=essences)ofe.g.men,menthemselves,asbeingsubstances,
arcnaturesor(2)inadditiontosubstanceswhichexistnaturally,arti
ficialsubstancesarcalsocallednaturesor(3)'nature'isalsousedas
acollectivenameforallsubstancestakentogether.

1015a13.At1014b35naturewasthesubstanceof"naturallyexisting
things"nowitis"thesubstanceofthosethingsthatpossessanorigin
ofchangeinthemselvesquathemselves".Thenewlocutionimpliesa
definitionof'naturallyexistingthings'which,thoughplausibleinitself
andinaccordwith1014b19,differsfromthatneededat1014b27(viz.
'perceptiblematerialobject')andfromthatgivenat1015a67('whatis
madeupofmatterandform').InthepenultimatesentenceAristotle
attemptstorelatehisfourthandfirstsensestohisfifth,andinthelast
sentencethefifthandthirdsensesareidentified.

Chapter5

Thischapterdoesnotexplaintheimportantconnectionsbetween
necessityandessence(PosteriorAnalyticsI4.73b2574a3)andbetween
necessityandregularity(E2.1026b2733).Nordoesitaccommodate
theapparentlyAristoteliansense"inevitable'(E3.1027b1011,cf.De
Interpretatione9.19a237).Thereisaninterestingdiscussionofnecessity
atDeGenerationeetCorruptioneII11.

1015a20"Jointcause":i.e.necessarybutnotsufficientcondition.
Aristotlewouldnotdenythate.g.drinkingbadwatermaybenecessary.
(indispensable,needful)forcontractingtyphoid,orsailingtoParosfor

Page132

beingcapturedbypirateshispointisthatneitherofthesebadthings
wouldbecallednecessarytoutcourt.

1015a26.Perhapsitwouldbebettertotranslate'bia'hereby'duress'
forcompulsionisnotcontrarytochangeinaccordancewithchoiceand
inclination,sinceonemaybecompelledtodowhat,giventhechoice,
onewouldanyhowwishtodo.Compulsionandinclinationare,however,
different,whichisenoughtoexplainwhy,althoughamanmaybe
dissuadedfromdoingwhatheisinclinedtodo,hemaynotbedissuaded
fromdoingwhatheiscompelledtodo.

1015a33.Thedefinitionof'necessary'as'notpossible(endechomenon)
thatotherwise'maybecomparedwiththedefinitionof'possible'
(dunaton)as'notnecessarythatnot'atD12.1019b312.Compulsion
requiresnecessity,inthissense,plusacontraryinclination.Inthefirst
senseof'necessary',i.e.'needful',if(i)bringingitaboutthatpisneces
saryinorderthatq,then(ii)itisnotpossiblethat(qandnotp),whichis
equivalentto(iii)itisnotpossiblethatnot(ifq,p).Aristotleomitsthe
laststageinthisanalysis,thusfailingtoexhibithisfirstsenseasacaseof
'notpossiblethatotherwise'.Eventhecompletedanalysisgivesthesense
onlyofexpandedstatementssuchas'itisnecessarytobreatheinorder
tolive'theunexpandedstatement'itisnecessarytobreathe'cannotbe
analysedintermsofpossibility,ifthe'necessary'initmeans'needful'.

Demonstrations,i.e.deducedconclusions,are"demonstratedbaldly"
whendeducedfromnecessarypremissesifthepremissesarenon
necessaryorfalse,theconclusionisdemonstratedadhominem(cf.K
5.1062a23)orhypothetically(cf.PriorAnalyticsI23.40b235,44.
50a1628,PosteriorAnalyticsI3.72b13),anddemonstratedtobe"neces
sarycertainthingsbeingso"not"necessarybaldly"(PriorAnalyticsI
10.30b313,3840,PosteriorAnalyticsII5.91b1419,11.94a217).
Aristotle'sthesisthatwhatfollowsfromnecessarypremissescannotbe
otherwise,i.e.

ispartofeverystandardsystemofmodallogiccomparetherelated
thesesatD12.1019b227,Q4.1047b1416,PriorAnalyticsI15.34a57.

1015b9.Thatsimplescannotbeinmorethanonestatedoesnotprove
thattheyarethefundamentally,necessarythings,foraccordingtoQ
10.1051b917somecompositesalsoare"incapableofbeingotherwise".
Aristotlemustberelyingonhiscontentionthatonlyinthecaseofsimples
isnothingthecauseoftheirnecessity,i.e.istheirnecessityindemonstrable.
Inthelastsentenceheassertsthatwhatisdoneundercompulsionisnot
doneinvariably:theargumentseemstobethatifxiscompelledtodoA,
itispossibleforxtodoAbutalsonaturalandthereforepossibleforxnot
todoA.

Page133

Chapter6

Anotherdiscussionofthesensesof'one'istobefoundinMetaphysicsI1.
SeealsoPhysicsI2.185b5.

1015b16.Thesenoteswillexaminethreequestions:(A)howarethe
itemslistedasexamplesofcoincidentalunitymeanttobedividedup?
(B)inwhatsensearctheyone?(C)inwhatsenseistheirunityco
incidental?(D)discussesthecaseof"somethinguniversal".

(A)b1718donotmeanthat'Coriscusandtheartisticandartisticpp.2212
Coriscus'arcthreeexamplesofcoincidentalunity(forCoriscusatleast
isaunityinhisownright)northattheyarcasingleexample(forthe
subsequentsentencesdealonlywithpairsofexpressions).Thisleaves
threepossibilities.(1)Threepairedexamplesaretobeunderstood,
Coriscusandtheartistic,CoriscusandartisticCoriscus,theartisticand
artisticCoriscus.(2)Sincethelastofthesepairsisnotfurtherdiscussed,
itismorelikelythatonlythefirsttwoarcintended.(3)Itisalsopossible
thatwhile'Coriscusandtheartistic'isthefirstexample,'artistic
Coriscus'onitsownisthesecondorratherarepeatofthefirst.This
seemstobetheinterpretationofAlexander,andisimpliedbythemodern
punctuationoftheOCT.Italsomakesgoodsenseoftheparenthesisat
b1819,whichwouldthenbeellipticalfor'foritisthesamethingtosay
"Coriscusandtheartisticarcone"and"artisticCoriscusisone"'.
(Alexanderexplainsthisparenthesiswiththewords'foritisthesame
thingtosay"Coriscusandartistic[are]one"and"theartisticcoincides
inCoriscus''and''Coriscusisartistic"'andintheOCTJaeger,
presumingthatAristotle'sexplanationwasthesame,insertsthewordfor
'one'afterthefirst'artistic',giving'foritisthesamethingtosay"Coris
cusandtheartistic[are]one"and"Coriscus[is]artistic"'elisionof
theverbswouldberegularGreek.Butitisnotnecessarytosupposethat
Alexanderfound'one'inhistextofAristotleandinanycaseits
presenceislessaptinAristotle'sexplanationthaninAlexander's.)
Againstthisthirdinterpretationstand(i)theoddityofintroducing,
amongstatementsofcoincidentalunityhavingpairedsubjects,one
statementhavinganunpairedsubject,and(ii)thefactthatb23discusses
theunityofartisticCoriscuswithCoriscus.Ontheotherhand,thesecond
interpretationmakestheparenthesisstillmoreelliptical,meaning'forit
isthesamethingtosay"Coriscusandtheartisticareone"and"Coriscus
andartisticCoriscusareone"'.IneithercaseitseemsthatAristotle
givesusfiveexamplesofcoincidentalunity:

(a)Coriscusandtheartistic(?=artisticCoriscus)
(b)CoriscusandartisticCoriscus
(c)theartisticandthejust

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(d)artisticandjustCoriscus(theartisticCoriscusandjustCoriscus)
(e)amanandanartisticman.

pp.20814(B)Ananalysisofunitymayincludeanswerstotwotypesofquestion
(seeK.R.Popper,'ThePrincipleofIndividuation',Proceedingsofthe
AristotelianSociety,supplementaryvolume,1953,1001):type1questions
areoftheform'whataretheconditionsunderwhichxandymakeup
onething,orunderwhichthecombinationofxandyissingularandnot
plural?'type2questionsareoftheform'whataretheconditionsunder
whichxandyareoneandthesamething,andnotdifferentthings?'In
theparagraphfollowingthataboutcoincidentalunityAristotleaddresses
himselftothetype1question:'isz,combinedoutofxandy,onethingor
many?'Itappearsatfirstasifthediscussionofcoincidentalunitydeals
withtype2questions:fore.g.'Coriscus'and'theartistic'canbeused
asdesignationsofthesamething,andAristotleactuallyslipsintotalking
ofsamenessatb27.Buttheappearanceismisleading.b23saysthatthe
artisticandCoriscusareone"becauseonecoincidesintheother"these
items,then,areregardedbyAristotleasdifferentthings,whoserelation
shipofcoincidingcombinesthemintoakindofunity.Inb245the
combineditemsareverbalexpressions,"portionsintheformula",but
Aristotleisbeingcareless:itisprimarilythings,notwords,whichare
saidtocoincide(seee.g.G4.1007a212,''itisnecessaryforthemto
maintainthatallthingsarecoincidences").Thushistheoryisthatjust
astheexpression'theartisticCoriscus'isacomplexofthewords'the
artistic'and'Coriscus',sowhatitdesignatesisacomplexoftwonon
linguisticitems,theartisticandCoriscus.WhenCoriscusisartistic,
theseitemsmakeupasinglecomplexotherwisetheyremaindistinct.
Yetandheretype1andtype2questionsaboutunitybecomecon
fusedtogetherCoriscusandtheartisticcanalsoberegardedasthe
sameitem,owingtotheambiguityoftheexpressionhereliterally
translated'theartistic'.AtZ6.1031b228Aristotletellsusthat"things
spokenofcoincidentallyliketheartisticandpale...signifyintwoways
...boththatinwhichpalecoincidesandthecoincidental...affection".
Coriscusandtheartisticarethesameinthefirstofthesesensesheisan
artistic(thing).Aristotleholdsthatthissamenessistobeexplainedbythe
factthattheartisticinitsothersense,viz.theaffectionorpropertyof
beingartistic,coincidesinCoriscus.Hencehisembarrassmentover
examples(b),(d),and(e),fore.g.thepairofexpressions'Coriscus'and
'artisticCoriscus'cannotbeconstruedaspickingouttwodifferentitems
only''oneportionofthe[latter]formula"designatesaseconditemthe
propertyofbeingartisticcapableofcoincidinginCoriscus.

(C)ByexploitingthisambiguityAristotleisabletomaintainthatthe
artisticCoriscusisaunifiedcomplexinwhichCoriscussomehow
detachedfromhisartistryisasimplepart.Inwhatsenseisthisunity

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b
coincidental?(1)AccordingtotheofficialdefinitionatE2.1026 313
'coincidentallyF'means'FbutneitheralwaysnorusuallyF'.Ifthatis
Aristotle'smeaninghere,hisexamplesareillchosen,for(i)thepale
CoriscusifnotartisticCoriscusmightbeaunitythroughoutCoriscus'
life,and(ii)theunityofe.g.abundle,whichisoneinitsownright
(1016al),mightbetemporary.(2)Thereisnoindicationthatartistic
Coriscusisoneinaderivativesenseof'one'(see1016b68).(3)Heisnot
nonnecessarilyone,if'nonnecessarily'means'nonanalytically'.For
itisananalytictruththatevery(single)thingisonething,andAristotle's
theoryoffersnoreasonfordenyingthattruthinthecaseofnonlinguistic
complexes.(4)Suchcomplexesare,however,nonnecessarilyone,if
'nonnecessarily'means''nonessentially'.Foralthoughtheunityof
artisticCoriscusisaconditionofhisbeingartisticCoriscus,itisnota
conditionofhisexistence.Iftheelementsdesignatedby'artistic'and
'Coriscus'become.dissociated,theartisticCoriscuswillnothimself
ceasetoexist,althoughhewillceasetobeartistic.Thus.theartistic
Coriscusisnonessentially,thoughanalytically,onejustbecausethe
artisticCoriscusisnonessentially,thoughanalytically,artistic.Aristotle
isrighttocontrastthiscasewiththeunityofsuchthingsasabundleand
aleg,whichareessentiallyone.Neverthelesshisreasonsforclassifying
theartisticCoriscusandtherestasnonessentialunitieswouldhave
emergedmoresharplyhadhecontrastedthemwithessentialunitiesalso
designatedbycomplexverbalexpressions,suchas'twofootedanimal',
whosepartsstandforitemsthat"makeuponething"(DeInterpretatione
11.20b2519,cf.G4.1007b10,Z12.1037b1012),

(D)Thecaseof"somethinguniversal".Thetruthconditionsforthe
unityofthejustandtheartisticaxenotthatjusticebeartisticorartistry
justbutthatsomethirdthing(inb22Aristotleassumes,somesubstance)
bebothjustandartistic.Doesthesameapplyto(e)?Aristotleofferstwo
analyses:eithertheartisticcoincidesinman,orbothcoincideinCoriscus.
Ifthelatter,twomodesofcoincidencehavetobedistinguished,for(i)man
isnota"stateoraffection"ofCoriscus,buthisform,and(ii)manco
incidesessentiallyinCoriscus.UsuallyAristotlepreferstheformeralter
native,eventhoughitimpliestheidentityoftheformmanwitheach
individualman(seenotesonG4.1007a20).

1015b36.Apreliminarycomment.Itisanalyticthateverythingisone
something:aplankisoneplank,abundleofplanksisonebundle,a
consignmentofunbundledplanksoneconsignment.Mostthingsare
also(madeupof)morethanonething:oneplankismorethanone
molecule,oneargumentmorethanoneproposition.At1016a14("both
oneandnotone")AristotleseemstoacknowledgethatthesameFcan
beoneFbutmanyGsatI2.1054a1519("beingonedoesnotpredicate
anythingelseinadditiontobeingeachthing")heimpliesalsothat

Page136

everythingisonesomething.Ontheotherhand,thepresentparagraph
tellsusthatacollectionofplanksisoneonlyiftheplanksaretiedor
gluedtogetherorotherwisecontinuous.Aristotlealsosaysthatsome
thingsaremoreonethanothers,e.g.ashinthanaleg.Theseremarks
appearvulnerabletothecriticismofFrege(TheFoundationsofArithmetic,
29):"TheNumberl,or100oranyothernumber,cannotbesaidto
belongtoapileofplayingcardsinitsownright,butatmosttobelongto
itinviewofthewayinwhichwehavechosentoregarditandeventhen
notinsuchawaythatwecansimplyassignthenumbertoitasapre
dicate.Whatwechoosetocallacompletepackisobviouslyanarbitrary
decision,inwhichthepileofplayingcardshasnosay.Butitiswhenwe
examinethepileinthelightofthisdecision,thatwediscoverthatwe
cancallittwocompletepacks.Anyonewhodidnotknowwhatwecalla
completepackwouldprobablydiscoverinthepileanyotherNumber
youlikebeforehittingontwo."

InthisparagraphAristotlementions,perhapsintentionally,morethan
onedefinitionof'continuous'.TheGreekword,literally'fused'(seeD
23.1023a213),isdefinedatPhysicsV3.227a1112:"Isaythatathingis
continuouswhentheboundariesatwhicheachofthetwo[parts]arein
contactbecomeoneandthesameand,asthenameitselfsignifies,fuse".
Thisdefinitionisechoedinthedistinctionat1016a7between'con
tinuousinitsownright'and'incontact'butata1abundle,whoseparts
aremerelyincontact,iscalledcontinuous,a5interposesyetathird
definition:"thatwhosechangeinitsownrightisoneandcannotbe
otherwise".Athingmakes"onechange"(i.e.movement)whenallits
sizedpartsmovesimultaneously(this,not'instantaneous',mustbethe
meaningof''indivisibleinrespectoftime"),i.e.whenithrigid.Accord
ingtoa910somenonrigidthings(which"haveabend")aretobe
includedamongthecontinuous.Hencebeingrestrictedtoonechange,
i.e.beingrigid,mustdifferfrombeingrestrictedtoonechangeinitsown
right,whichisthenewdefinitionof'continuous'.ButAristotlegivesno
rulesfordistinguishingthesecases.Hegoesontopronouncetherigid
''moreone"thantheflexible,andthestraightthanthebent.Itishardto
seewhatargumentswouldcountfororagainsttheseproposals,butwe
cancertainlyobjecttohisconnectionbetweenthemforstraightthings
canbeflexibleandbentthingsrigid.

Withthisparagraphcf.I1.1052a1921.

1016a17.AlthoughAristotledefines,inthisparagraph,asensein
whiche.g.apaneofglassandapondofwaterwouldbeone,hisexamples
predicate'one'ofthematerialsthemselveswater,wine,juice,etc.
Thesearedividedintotwogroups:"first"materialswhichare"per
ceptuallyindivisible",i.e.atthemacroscopiclevelhomogeneous(wine
andwater)andmaterialswhose"last"or"ultimate"subjecthone(the

Page137

repetitionofWineshowsthatatitssecondmentionit,andtherefore
juices,belonginthelattergroupwithmeltables).Athing's'"subject"is
itsmatter(material,substratum),anda"lastsubject"isanelement
(D>3.1014a2635)cf.D24.1023a269where,reversingtherolesof
'first'and'last',Aristotledescribestheelementinanoncompoundbody
(orperhapsinanybody)as"firstgenus"ofthatbody'smatter.Ifweare
totakethedefinitionintheopeningsentencesasapplyingtoboththese
kindsofmatter,firstandlast,Aristotle'scontrastwillbebetweenabody
madeofhomogeneousmaterial,whichisonebecauseitsfirstsubjectis
undifferentiatedinform,andanoncompoundbody,whichisonebecause
itcontainsonlyonelastsubjectorelement,andelementsmustbeun
differentiatedinform.Thelatterofthesesensesof'one'impliesthe
former,butnotviceversa.Thereare,however,twodifficultieswiththis
account.Inthefirstplace,MeteorologicaIV(whichmay,however,not
bebyAristotle)describessomejuicesandmeltablesascompounde.g.
somewinesarcmixturesofwaterandearth(IV7.384a35,10.388a34
bll,butcontrast5.382b13,10.389a10),andoilisamixtureofwaterand
air(IV7.383b23,384a15,10.388a32).Secondly,theword'same'ina23
suggeststhatheissayingthatjuicesandmeltableshavesomeelementin
common,andsoareonecollectively,notseverally.Ifso,theparagraph
shiftsfromatype1toatype2criterionofunity:waterisone(single)
becausehomogeneous,oilandwineareone(thesame)becametheyshare
somethinghomogeneous,viz.anelement.

1016a24.InthetwoprecedingparagraphsAristotlehasmainlydis
cussedconditionsunderwhichxandy,makeuponething.Nowheturns
tothetype2question'arexandyoneandthesamething?'ahorseand
aman,forinstance,areoneandthesamelivingthingbutdonot
necessarilymakeupanysinglething,e.g.anequestrianteam.Onthe
statementthat'oneinmatter'and'oneingenus'are"muchthesame
sense"cf.D28.1024b69.Inthesecondsentencethetextiscorruptbutthe
generalsensecertain."Thegenusaboveiscalledthesame":i.e.xandy
arethesameGifbothareFandGisthegenusofF."Iftheyarethelast
formsofthegenus"seemstostipulate(i)that'x'and'y'markplacesfor
form(i.e.species)descriptionsratherthanpropernamesand(ii)that
thespeciesbetheinfimaespeciesofxandy.Itisnotclearwhyeitherof
theseconditionsisnecessary.''Thatwhichisfurtherabovethese''may
beagloss,andmustinanycaseexplicate"thegenusabove",sc.G.If
"these"arethelastforms,i.e.xandy,"furtherabove"mustmean'at
oneremoveabove'.TheGreekword,thecomparativeof'above',need
notmeansomuch(itcanbeasynonymfor'above'),butRoss'sclaim
thatit"cannotmean"'higherabove'seemsrash.Ifheisright,"these"
mustrefer,ashesays,toFanditscoordinategenera.Ina29"thisway"
is'xandyareoneingenus',thenewway'xandyareoneG'.

Page138
a a
1016 32.Cf.I1.1052 2934.Asindicatedbytheparenthesisin
b36,formulaAisindivisiblerelativetoformulaBwhenAandBarethe
sameformulathatis,whentheysaythesamething.Aristotle'sfirst
exampleappearstobeofasingleindividual,e.g.ananimal,whichcan
growlargerorsmallerandyetremainthesameindividualanimal.The
secondexamplemaybeoftwoplanefigures,e.g.squares,whichhaveone
formorshapeandtherefore,becausetheessenceofafigureisitsshape,
oneformula.Thethirdsentenceineffectdistinguishesthesetwokindsof
case:xandyare"mostofallone"whenindistinguishableinessenceand
timeandplace,buttheywillbelessoneifbothessentiallyhumansbut
notthesamehumancf.thedistinctionbetween'oneinform'and'one
innumber'at1016b31,andI1.1052a29,"otherthingsareonewhose
formulaisone,i.e.theirconceptionisone,i.e.indivisibleanditis
indivisiblewhenthethingisindivisibleinformornumber.Thepar
ticular,then,isindivisibleinnumber..."Forthedistinctionbetween
havinganessentialformulaoressenceandbeingasubstanceoressence
seeZ,4andTopicsI9.Thefinalparenthesis,inequatingbeingonewith
beingwithoutdivision,glossesoverthenumber/formdistinction:ifx
andyare"withoutdivisionquaman''merelyinthesensethatbothhave
theformulaofman,itdoesnotfollowthattheyareoneman(henceRoss's
surelyunjustifiedgloss'onekindofman')whereasiftheyareinthat
sensewithoutdivisionquaanimalorquamagnitudetheywillbeone
animaloronemagnitude(cf.Aristotle'susageof'oneandthesame
figure'at1016a31,and1016b315,D15.1021a11).

1016b6.Thisisapuzzlingparagraph.Hasthedistinctionbetween
beingsomehowrelatedtowhatisoneandhavingonesubstancealready
beendrawn?Ifso,wasthisat1016b3(beingoneman=havingone
substancebeingonemagnitude=beingrelatedtoonequantity)?Or
arethesecondaryunitiesofb68thesameasthecoincidentalunitiesof
thefirstparagraph?ArtisticCoriscuscouldbesaidtobeonefrom"being
relatedtosomeotherthingthatisone",butnothinginthefirstpara
graphanswersto"eitherdoingorpossessingorbeingaffectedby...some
otherthingthatisone".Thesephrasessuggestexampleslikegasand
electricity,whichareheatingagents(doonething),ormoneyand
labour,whichcanbeexpendedorconserved(areaffectedinoneway)
butaresuchpairscalledoneforthesereasons?Inb89'substance'isused
inthethreesensesofH1.1042a315:theprimaryunitiesarethingswhose
bodiesareoneincontinuity,whosematterisoneinformorwhosewhatit
istobeisoneinformula.Thesethreecorrespondwiththesecond,third,
andfifthparagraphs,anddoubtlessAristotlecomprehendsthefourth
paragraphwiththethird,astreatingof"muchthesamesense".

1016b11.Cf.I1.1052a228.Amongcontinuousthingsnotonlythe
straightandtherigid(1016a917)but,Aristotlenowadds,wholesare

Page139

morereadilyassertedtobeone.Awholemust"possessoneform"inthe
sense'haveoneshape',notasin1016a19.ButAristotledoesnotexplain
onwhatgroundsamisassembledshoecouldbedeniedtopossessone
formwoulditmakeadifferenceiftheobjectsoproducedhadaname,
orause?Astraightlineneedbenolesscompletethanacircleinanyof
thesensesof'complete'giveninD16butseePhysicsVIII9.

1016b17.Cf.I1.1052b151053b8.Thesixprecedingparagraphshave
distinguishedanumberofsensesof'one',summedup(allbutthelast)
at1016b611underthetwoheadings'beingrelatedtosomeotherthing
thatisone'and'havingonesubstance'.Thesesensesarederivative
fromthat,orthose,employedintheirdefinitions.Itispresumablythe
nonderivativesensestowhichAristotlenowturnshisattention.The
firstsentenceiscorruptandthetranslationfollowsRoss'sreconstruction.
JaegerintheOCThas'beingoneistheoriginofbeingacertainnumber'
butRoss'sversionrequiresamorenaturalsuppressedpremissinb17,
viz.'tobeoneistobethefirstmeasureofanumber'cf.I6.1057a34.
Oneisthe"measure"ofnumberbecausethepossibilityofcounting
dependsonthepossibilityofcountinginones,cf.PhysicsIII7.207b7,"a
numberisseveralones"(Aristotledidnotreckononeitselfasanumber:
PhysicsIV12.220a27,M9.1085b10).Aristotle'sfurtherstipulation
thattobeoneistobethefirstmeasureofagenusindicatesthat,inthe
strictsensenowunderconsideration,whatisoneinagenusisthe
minimumpartofamemberwhichisitselfamemberofthegenus.This
explains"indivisibleinform"(cf.I1.1052b1627):Aristotlecannot
meanthate.g.onevowelmustbeindivisibleintoparts,forthesounding
ofavowelhastooccupyastretchoftimenorthatonevowelmustbe
indivisibleintoothervowels,formostwordsareindivisibleintowords,
yetawordisnot"thatwhichisone''inthegenusarticulatesoundhis
pointisthatonevowelisindivisibleintootherarticulatesounds.Physics
V4.228a21saysthat''everychangeisdivisible",sc.inquantitya
unitchangemustthereforebeindivisibleinform.Aristotlegivestwo
possiblecriteriaforthis,at1016a6andPhysicsV4.227b20228a23.

"Inalldimensions"etc.:literally'inallways'etc.,seeHeath,Mathe
maticsinAristotle,2067

1016b31.Thisparagraphseemsintrusive.Thesensesitlistsare,
unlikemanywhichhavepreceded,allsensesinwhich'one'means'the
same'(type2),not'single'(type1).Thusthefourthverbandthelast
verbintheforegoingsentenceareoneverbinnumber,eventhoughthat
verbisnotwithoutparts,norevenaunitofarticulatespeech."Onein
genus"repeatsthesameof1016a24,'havingthesamegenus',exceptthat
generaarenowlimitedtothesmallnumberofcategories(seeD28.1024b
12)."Oneinform"seemstoecho1016a32,'havingthesameformula'sbut

Page140

thisparagraphaddsthatthingsnumericallydifferentmaybethesame
inform,whichwaspreviouslyglossedover.Thesensesgivento'onein
form'at1016a17and1016b11arenowinappropriatethelatterwas
contrastedwith'oneinformula'at1016b9,asitwillbeagainat1017a
56."Oneinanalogy"isasensepreviouslyignored.Ananalogyisa
statementthata:b::c:dseeforinstanceN6.1093b1820,"asstraight
isinlengthsoisthelevelinbreadth"thestraightandthelevelareone
andthesameinanalogy.IfxandyareinonegenusG,theyarealsoone
inanalogyinthatx:G::y:G.
1017a3.Thebriefdiscussionof'many'returnstotheclassificationof
1016b611.Forfirstandlastmattersee1016a1724.'Many'isdiscussed
morefullyinI3and6.

Chapter7

pp.21516AsinG2andE2,Aristotleintroduceshisdiscussionofthevarioussenses
oftheverb'tobe'bymeansoftheparticiple'thatwhichis'but1017a22
("aresaidtobe")and1017a31("'tobe'and'is'")showthatwhathe
saysismeanttocoverallpartsoftheverb.Hisfourmainsensesare
examinedatlengthinlaterbooksoftheMetaphysics:coincidentalbeing
inE2and3,beinginitsownrightinZ,andH,beingastruthinE4andQ
10,andbeingasactualityandpotentialityinQ19.Ageneralquestion
aboutthefirsttwosensesiswhethertheyaretobeunderstoodasapply
ingtothecopulative'be',theexistential'be',oronetoeach.Inanswering
thisquestionitismoreconvenienttostartfromthesecondsense,revers
ingtheorderofAristotle'sfirsttwoparagraphs.

1017a22.Aristotletellsusthatthethingsthatareintheirownright
arethose"whichsignifythefiguresofpredication",i.e.predicablessuch
asman,thepale,walking(notthewords'man','pale','walking').He
classifiedallpredicables,togetherwithprimarysubstanceswhichare
"neithersaidofasubjectnorinasubject"(Categories5.2a1213),under
asmallnumberoftypesor"figures'',eightinthischapter,teninthe
longestlistatCategories4.1b252a4.Wecallthemcategories,'kategoria'
beingAristotle'swordfor'predication'.a22mightalternativelybe
construed'allthingssignified[i.e.indicated]bythefiguresofpredica
tion',butthetranslationadoptedismorelikely(cf.a25''signify...a
qualification").Aristotle'sargumentisthatsincee.g.thepale(and,
doubtless,'pale')signifiesaqualification,'tobe'mayalsosignifya
qualification.Theconclusionofthisargumentcanbetakeninanyof
threeways,ofwhichthefirsttwoare:
(1)'somethingispale(haspallor)'signifies'somethingisqualifiedin
acertainway',
(2)'thepale(pallor)exists'signifies'thepalequalifiessomething'.

Page141

Ingeneral,Aristotlemaymeantodistinguishandclassify.(1)different
waysofunderstandingpropositionsoftheform'xisF'or(2)different
seinesoftheword'exist'.

Twothingssupport(1).First,ina2730Aristotleexplainsthatsen
tencesemployingverbsotherthan'tobe'canberephrasedinsuchaway
astoincorporatethatverbasacopula(cf.DeInterpretatione12.21b910
hisdistinctionisliterallybetweene.g.'walks'and'iswalking',butthe
Greekcorrespondingtothelatterisbothlessidiomaticandlessspecial
izedthanourcontinuoustense).Secondly,PriorAnalyticsI37.49a67
impliescategorydistinctionsinthecopulativesenseof'be'byasserting
themofitstechnicalcounterpart'holdgoodof'.Ontheotherhand,ifthe
senseinwhichathingisinitsownrightistobeexemplifiedbysuch
copulativeusesof'is'asin'Coriscusispale',whatistoexemplifythe
coincidentalsensediscussedin1017a722?Forat1017a9Aristotletells
usthatthatwhichisissocalledcoincidentallywhen,forinstance,we
assertamantobeartistic.Rossmeetsthisdifficultybyproposingathird
interpretation,accordingtowhichAristotle'sbeinginitsownrightis
restrictedtothosecopulativeusesinwhichthepredicateistheformor
genusofthesubjectandsonecessarilytrueofit,forexample

(3)'Thepale(pallor)isacolour'signifies'thepaleisacertain
qualification'.

(Anotherexamplemightbe'thiscolourispale',which"sayswhatitis
andsignifiesaqualification",TopicsI9.103b313.)AccordingtoRoss,
thesensesof'be'impliedbythePriorAnalyticspassagearetobetakenas
coincidental,mentionedthoughnotsubdividedin1017a722.ButRoss
doesnotexplainwhy,whenAristotledividesbycategoriesthe'necessary'
sensesofthecopulative'be'heshouldomittodothesameforthe
'coincidental'senses.Further,Rossisforcedtoexplaintheintrusionof
nonnecessaryexamplesina2730(e.g."amanisonethatwalks")as
duetoAristotle'swishtoillustrate,bythereadiestmeansathand,the
generalpoint'that'''is"takesitscolourfromthetermsitconnects',sc.
evenifthosetermsareparticipialandsorendertheverb'is'elidable.But
Rosswouldhavetoadmitthatonhisinterpretationa2730wouldfit
betterinthepreviousparagraph.

Afurtherconsiderationfavours(2)overboth(1)and(3).Thecopula
tire'be'reappears,andaccordingtoa2730mustimplicitlyreappear,
intheanalysisof'somethingispale'as'somethingisqualifiedina
certainway'andof'thepaleisacolour'as'thepaleisacertainquali
fication'.Itfollowsthatthereisnoreasonfortreatingtheseanalysesas
exhibitingdifferentsensesofthecopulative'be'.Inthecaseof(1),for
instance,thethesisthat'somethingispale'signifies'somethingisquali
fiedinacertainway',whereas'somethingisathingthatwalks'signifies
'somethingisactinginacertainway',mayhelptoshowthat'pale'and

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'thingthatwalks'havegenericallydifferentmeanings,butdoesnothing
toshowthat'ispale'and'isathingthatwalks'employdifferentsensesof
'is'andsimilarlyinthecaseof(3).Buttakenasananalysisofexistence,
Aristotle'sthesiswouldhavethemeritofprovidinganaccountofthe
meaningof'exist'whichisnotexpressedintermsof(noncopulative)
existence.If'thepaleexists'signifies'thepaleisaqualificationofsome
thing',whereas'walkingexists'signifies'walkingisanactionofsome
thing',itismorereasonabletoconcludethat'exists'hasdifferentsenses
inthetwocases.ThepassageinthePriorAnalyticsmaythenbeexplained
asofferingaparallelanalysisof'holdsgoodof'(asmeaninge.g.'is
aqualityof','isanactionof')whichisnotmeanttocarryovertothe
copulative'is'.a2730remainpuzzling,butareperhapstomeetthe
objectionthatwedonotcommonlysaysuchthingsas'walkingexists'.
AccordingtoAristotle'walkingexists'isimpliedby'Coriscuswalks'(he
holdsthat'x'swalkingexists'isequivalentto'xiswalking',not,aswe
mightsay,to'itmakessensetosaythatxiswalking',seeL3.1070a223
"for[his]healthexistsjustwhenthemanishealthy...")andthis
implicationmightbethoughttobemademoreobvioustoaGreekby
theconsiderationthat'Coriscuswalks'alreadycontainsahidden'is',
albeitacopulativeandnotexistential'is'.

If,inthesecondparagraphatleast,Aristotleseekstodistinguish
differentsensesof'exist',wemaynowaskwhetherhesucceeds.For
althoughtheavailabilityofdifferentparaphrasesfor'paleexists'and
'walkingexists'mightintelligiblybeurgedasareasonfortreating
'exists'ashomonymous,itdoesnotfollowthatthereasonisagoodone.
Woulditnotbebettertosaythatpallorandwalkingexistinthesame
sensebutunderdifferentsortsofconditions,orbythesatisfactionof
differentcriteria?Isitnotodd,forinstance,totreatadisputebetween
amaterialistanda'realist'overtherequirementsfortheexistenceof
numbersasadisputeaboutthesenseofaword?Aristotle'sparallel
treatmentof'good',which"issaidinthesamenumberofwaysasthat
whichis"(NicomacheanEthicsI6.1096a234,EudemianEthicsI8.1217b
267)isopentothesameobjection.Ontheotherhand,theobjection
employsadistinctionbetweenidentityofsenseandidentityofcriteria
whichisbothdubiousinitselfandunknowntoAristotlesothatit
wouldbereasonabletodeflectitbyinterpretinghisthesisintheway
whichtheobjectionitselfconcedestobeinnocent,construingAristotle's
"manyways"hereas'manycriteria',not'senses'.Butanotherproblem
remains:criteriaofexistencemustbemuchmorenumerousthanthe
eightortencategories.Aristotlehimselfseemstoadmitthisinother
places:forinstance,hisdivisionofwaysofbeingatG2.1003b610
makesnoreferencetocategoriesotherthansubstance,quality,and
action,butaddsmanyothernoncategorialheadingsDeAnimaII
4.415b13saysthat''forlivingthings,tobeistobealive"andthemore

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systematictreatmentinMetaphysicsH2argues,againwithoutreference
tocategories,thatsinceonethingmaybedistinguishedfromanother
eithere.g.bythewayitsmaterialsareputtogether(abundleofplanks
fromawoodenbox)orbyposition(thresholdfromlintel)orbytime
(breakfastfromdinner)"itplainlyfollowsthat'is'isalsosaidinthe
samenumberofwaysforathresholdisbecauseitispositionedinsuch
andsuchaway..."(1042b256).Thelasttextdoes,however,suggest
howAristotlemighthavethoughtthatthewaysofbeingcouldbe
reducedtotheeightorten'figuresofpredication'forbeinginaposition
isamongthetenfigureslistedinCategories4(2a2).Itistruethatthreshold
andlinteldemanddifferentpositions:forthethreshold,toexististobe
positioned"insuchandsuchaway".Butanunqualifiedreferenceto
position,thoughitcannotfullyspecifytheconditionsofathreshold's
existence,willindicateonenecessaryconditionwhichthethresholdhas
incommonwiththelintel.Thecategoriesarethusapparentlyintended
nottoenumeratebuttoclarifythecriteriaofexistence(cf.D2.1013b29
30).Aristotlethoughtthatthenumberoftheeultimatekindscannot
bemuchreducedbelow,andshouldnotbemuchincreasedabove,the
eightortenheusuallylistsanopinionwhichhenowhereattemptsto
justify,butwhichcannotbediscussedhere.NordoesAristotleexplain
howhewoulddealwiththingswhoseexistencedependsoncriteria
fallingundermorethanonecategory,asdinner'sdoesonsizeaswellas
time.

1017a7.Aristotle'sexamplesofcoincidentalbeingaregiveninthe
assertions:
(a)'someonejustisartistic
(b)'amanisartistic'
(c)'someoneartisticisaman'.
Thesubjectofeachoftheseassertionsbeginswithadefinitearticlein
themasculine:literally'thejust...','theman...','theartistic'.Two
mainquestionscallforcogent:(A)isthecoincidentalsenseof'be'a
seineofthecopulativeorexistential'be'?and(B)inwhatseineisit
coincidental?

(A)(1)TherearetwoargumentsinfavouroftheviewthatAristotle's
subjectiscoincidentalcopulativebeing.(i)Hisexamplesareexamplesof
that(e.g.onewhoisjustisnotnecessarilyoralwaysartistic)(ii)the
parenthesisina1213explainsthecopulative'is'intermsoftherelation
coincidence.Ontheotherhand(iii)thesecondparagraphdoesnotseem
torestrictitselftonecessarycopulativebeing,asarguedabove,and(iv)
thisaccountdoesnotprovideanywayofclassifyingfalsepredications.
(2)Ratherthanholdingthatthecopulativesenseof'be'issometimesto
beunderstoodintermsofcoincidence,Aristotlemaymeanthatthe

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copulativesenseof'be'isalwaysacoincidental,i.e.derivative,sense
andthatthesenseorsensesdescribedinthesecondparagraph,inwhich
'be'means,asweshouldsays'exists'areprimary.Thisinterpretation
wouldexplainwhyina202hisanalysisofthecoincidentalthingsthat
arerevealedbyassertionssuchas(a)(c)includesareferenceineach
casetosomeotherthingthatis:thelatterwouldbeanexistentthinge.g.
aman,whoseexistenceaccountedforthenonexistentialbeingofe.g.
theman'sbeingartistic(cf.alsoDeInterpretations11.21a258).(3)How
ever,intheparallellistofsensesof'be'atthebeginningofE2
Aristotleannouncesthatallthesensestheredistinguished,including
thecoincidental,belongto"thatwhichiswhenbaldlysocalled",a
phrasenormallyusedtopickouttheexistential'be'(seenotesadloc.)
andthisfavourstheviewthatAristotle'sdistinctionisbetweenaco
incidentaland,inhissecondparagraph,certainnoncoincidentalsenses
oftheexistential'be'.

(B)Whatdoes'coincidental'meaninthischapter?Therearethree
possibilities,(1)'unusual',(2)'nonessential',(3)'derivative'.(1)E2,
startingfromarepetitionofD7'sfourfolddivisionofsensesof'be',
continueswithanexaminationofcoincidentalbeing,inthecourseof
whichthecoincidentalisdefinedasbeing"whatisneitheralwaysnor
forthemostpart"(1026b312).Thisimpliesthat'coincidentalthing
thatis'means'(comparatively)unusualthingthatis',andwemay
assumethattosaythatanartisticmanisanunusualthingthatisisthe
sameastosaythatitisunusualforartisticmentoexist.Butthereare
difficultieswiththisaccount.(i)inD7coincidentalthingsthatareare
contrastedwiththingsthatareintheirownright.Thisseemsdifferent
fromthecontrastbetweentheusualandtheunusual.(ii)If,asargued
above,thingsthatareintheirownrightincludesuchitemsasCalliasand
pallor,itishardtoseehowthesecouldbesaidtoexistusually.'An
artisticmanisunusual'deniesthattwocomponentsusuallygotogether
'Calliasisunusual'cannotbetakeninthesamesensenortherefore
'Calliasisusual'.(2)If,however,'coincidental'means'nonessential',
thereisagoodcontrastwith'initsownright':forsuchitemsasCallias
andpallorareessentiallythingsthatare,whichmeanstosaytrivially
thattheirbeingthingsthatareisaconditionoftheirexistence.On
theotherhand,itseemsbythesametokencontradictorytoassertof
anythingthatitisnonessentiallyathingthatis.Wecanindeedsaythat
amanisnonessentiallyartistic,forhisexistencedoesnotdependonhis
artistrybutwecannotsaythatanartisticmanisnonessentially
existent.TherearethreereasonswhyAristotlemayhaveoverlookedthis
difference.(i)Itdoesnotoccurwhen'coincidental'hasthesense'unusual':
'itisunusualforamantobeartistic'isequivalentto'itisunusualforan
artisticmantoexist'.AndnowheredoesAristotleclearlyrevealthathe
sawthedifferencebetweenthesetwosensesof'coincidental'.(ii)Word

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orderbeingvariableinGreek,'amanisartistic'couldbewritten,as
Aristotlewritesallhisexamplesinthisparagraph,with'is'atthebegin
ningorend.IdiomaticGreekwouldindeedstilldistinguish'aman
artisticis'ascopulativefrom'anartisticmanis'asnoncopulative,butif
thesignificanceofthatidiomescapedAristotlehehadnootherwayof
distinguishing'amanisnonessentiallyartistic'from'anartisticman
nonessentiallyis,i.e.exists'.(iii)ThenotesonD6.1015b16suggestthat
Aristotleassumedthatcertaincomplexreferringexpressionssuchas'an
artisticman'refertocomplexnonlinguisticentitieswhichwemaycall
statesofaffairs.Hemaythushavebeentemptedtoarguethatthe
existenceofamanwhoisartisticdoesnotdependonthatofthecomplex
stateofaffairsdesignated'artisticman':hencethattheartisticmanis
anonessentialexistent.Butwhateverwethinkofcoincidentalunities,
thisaccountofcoincidentalexistentsmustbeincoherent.Thereisnot
onlythegeneralobjectionthatitiswrongtoregardthestateofaffairs
designated'artisticman'asacombinationoftwoitems,themanandthe
artistic(either'theartistic'means'someoneartistic',inwhichcasethere
isonlyoneitem,oritmeans'artistry',inwhichcasewefacetheimpossible
question'isthemanelementinthecomplexartisticornot?',cf.Plato,
Parmenides142de).Inaddition,thetheorygivessensetotheclaimthat
anartisticman'sexistencedoesnotdependonanartisticman'sexistence
onlyatthecostofmakingtwodistinctitemsmanandstateofaffairs
ofthethingsreferredtobythetwooccurrencesof'artisticman':butof
courseathingisnonessentiallyFonlywhenitsexistencedoesnot
implyitsthesamething'sbeingF.

(3)TheaboveexplanationhasthemeritofreadingAristotle'sdis
tinctionbetween'coincidentally'and'initsownright'inexactlythe
samesenseasinD6andD9.Butitfailstoaccountforafeatureofhis
treatmentofcoincidentalbeingwhichhasnoparallelinthoseother
chapters:thepresenceinthesummaryata1922ofreferencestosome
otherthingthatis.Aristotleholdsthatine.g.thesentence'someonejust
isartistic'wesignifythatthejustandtheartisticcoincideinthesame
thingthatis.Thissuggeststhathetakessuchasentencetouse'is'ina
derivativesense,whichhastobeexplainedbyreferencetothewayin
whichsomethingelse'is':specificallythatthebeing(existence)ofthe
complexitemdesignated'thejustartistic'.hastobeexplainedby
referencetothebeing(existence)ofthemaninwhomtheelementsof
thatcomplexseverallycoincide(fortheuseof'coincidentally'tomean
'inaderivative,orsecondary,sense'seee.g.Categories6.5a38 b4).

Interpretation(2)assertedthattheexistenceofthesimpleitemdesig
natedby'theartisticman'doesnotdependontheexistenceofthecom
plexstateofaffairsdesignatedbythesameexpression.Conversely,(3)
assertsthattheexistenceofthelatterdoesdependonthatoftheformer,
andhastobeexplainedbyreferencetoit.Thesetwodoctrinesarcnot

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antagonisticbutcomplementary.IndeeditmaywellhavebeenAristotle's
viewthattheexistenceofBisderivativefromthatofAonlyifAcan
continuetoexistwhenBdoesnot.Ifso,(3)impliesthesubstanceof(2)
whilealsogivingabetterexplanationofthemeaningof'coincidental'.

Twominorpointsremain."For'thatthisisthis'signifies'thatin
thisthiscoincides'":sc.intheexamplesgiven.Aristotletemporarily
overlooksthecaseallowedina15inwhichtwothingscoincidenotone
intheother,butbothinathirdthing.'Someoneartisticbuilds'isreally
ofthisindirecttype."Thenotpaleissaidtobe"introducesanasser
tionwhich,unlike(a)(c),hasnoteventheappearanceofbeingcopula
tive.Aristotle'spointmaybethatjustas,in(c),'theartistic'designates
somethingessentiallyamanbut'man'designatessomethingnon
essentiallyartistic,soin'thenotpaleis''thenotpale'designatessome
thingessentiallyexistentbut'is'designatessomethingnonessentially
notpale.Ifso,theexample'hasnothingtodowithcoincidentalbeing.

1017a22.Seepp.1403.

1017a31.ItwasacommonGreekidiomtouse'is'and'isnot'inthe
sense'isthecase'and'isnotthecase'(e.g.G5.1009a7).Thusitisthe
possibilityoffalsehoodwhichisatissueinthePlatonicpuzzles,e.g.in
theEuthydemusandSophist,about'sayingthatwhichisnot'.Butthe
phrase'itis(not)that...'regularlymeant'itis(not)possiblethat...'.
ThismayexplainwhytheexampleswhichAristotlegivescontainno
subordinateclausewhereweshouldexpect'itis(thecase)thatSocrates
isartistic'etc.wehavemerely'Socratesisartistic'etc.withthe'is'(or'is
not')emphaticallyplacedatthebeginning.Whatevertheexplanation
ofthisoddity,itseffectistodestroythevalueoftheexamplesasillus
trationsofaseparatesenseof'is'.Forthefactthat'xisF'meansthesame
as'itistruethatxisF',and'xisnotF'as'itisfalsethatxisF',canhave
notendencytoshowthat'is'canmeanthesameas'istrue',or'isnot'as
'isfalse'.

p.2171017a35.Thisparagraphintroduces,notafurthersenseof'be',buta
furtherwayofclassifyingthecasesofbeingalreadygiven(cf.Q10.
1051a35 b1).'Sees'(inEnglish'cansee')isambiguousbetween'has
sight'and'isusingsight'cf.Q6.1048b1214,TopicsI15.106b1518,
andPhilonous'remarkinthefirstofBerkeley'sThreeDialogues"sensible
thingsarethoseonlywhichareimmediatelyperceivedbysense".
Aristotlejustifiablyusesthisfacttoinferthat'isonethatsees'isalso
ambiguousbuthedoesnotexplainhow,inthelattercase,theambiguity
istransferredfrom'sees'to'is'.Thetwosucceedingexamplesdonot
evenemploytheverb'be'('beatrest'isasinglewordintheGreek),but
Aristotlewouldpresumablyargue,asin1017a2730,that'xknows'and
'yisatrest'canalwaysbeparaphrasedinto'xisonethatknows'andy,
isonethatisatrest'.Histreatmentof"thehalfofaline"asasubstance

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maybe,asRosssuggests,aconcessiontomathematicallyminded
Platonists.Orcould'substance'heremean'whatisinitsownright'?If
so,theexamplesofsight,knowledge,andrestwillcorrespondtothe
firstparagraphofthechapter,sothat'Calliasisonethatsees'asserts,
ambiguously,thecoincidentalexistenceoftheseeingCallias.Aristotle's
pointinthepenultimatesentenceisthatafutureidolmustalreadyexist
intheunworkedstone,becausetheverysamestuffwhichwillbecome
theidolexistsalready(oughthenottoaddthatthepastidolmuststill
existinitsdispersedchippings?).

Chapter8

Thischapteristoosketchytogiveasatisfactoryaccountofthedifficult
andimportantnotionofasubstance.MoreistobelearntfromCategories
2and5,andfromAristotle'sdiscussionofthequestion'whichkindsof
thingsaresubstances?'whichtakesupmostofZandH.Athorough
understandingwouldcallforexaminationoftherelatedconcepts.what
itistobe,coincidence,form,subject.

1017b10.Thesimplebodiesaretheelementsearth,air,fire,and
waterseeD3andA3.984a516."Deities":stars(E1.1026a1718).
"Thingsnotsaidofasubject":seenoteon1017b23.Withthispara
graphcf.Z2.1028b815.

1017b14.Itisusuallymatterwhichisdescribedasaconstituentcause
( 2.1013a245),buttheexampleshowsthatAristotle'sreferencehere
istoforms,whicharesometimessaidtobe"in"things(e.g.Z11.1037a
29)althoughnot"inasubject"accordingtotheidiomofCategories2.
1a20 b9(cf.5.3a14).Athing'sformiscauseofits
beingbecauseitsexistenceisdependentonitshavingthatform.AccordingtoCategories
2.1a202formsaresaidofasubject5.2a1419groupsthemwith
generaas"secondarysubstances")butZ7.1032b12makesthempri
mary.Theseinconsistenciesmayreflectambiguityintheword'eidos',
whichintheCategoriesiscloserto'species'thanto'form'.

1017b17.DoesAristotlcthinkthatplanes,lines,andnumbersmeet
theconditionslaiddowninthisparagraphforbeingsubstances?InB
(5.1001b27)oneoftheproblemswas"whetherbodiesandplanesand
pointsarekindsofsubstanceornot?"M21077a31answers"abodyisa
kindofsubstance,forinawayitalreadypossessescompletionbuthow
canlinesbesubstances?"ThelatterchapterisaresponsetoPlatonists
ofaPythagoreanbentthissuggeststhat"assomeassert"and''is
thoughtbysome"refertosuchPlatonistsandconveyAristotle'sdis
sentfromthem.Hehasreasonsfordissenting.Ifbodiesweremadeout
ofnumbers,asthePythagoreanssay,theywouldhavetobewithout

Page148
a a b
weight(N3.1090 305)andPhysicsVI1.231 21 18arguesthat"it
isimpossibleforsomethingcontinuoustobe[made]outofindivisibles,
asforinstancealineoutofpoints".Butthesereasonsseeminsufficient
todenyplanesetc.thestatusofsubstancesunderthecriterionofthis
paragraph.For(i)thoughnotcomposedofplanes,bodiescannotexist
unlessplanesdo.(ii)"Define"mightmean'bound'or'providea
principleofindividuation'.Iftheformer,itisindeedtruethatnotall
"suchthings'',viz.animalsandstarsandsoon,areboundedbyplane
surfaces,but"plane"maywellbeaslipfor'surface'cf.PhysicsIII
5.204b57.Ifthelatter,itseemsneitherfalsenorunhelpfultosaythat
e.g.starAandstarBaretwo''thises"(particulars)justiftheirsurfaces
arediscontinuous,andtheirsurfacesarediscontinuousjustifnoline
formspartofboth.Aristotleisonfirmergroundifhedeniesthatnumbers
definebodies,ineithersense.Inviewoftheseconsiderations,itis
probablyAristotle'sbeliefthattheconditionslaiddowninthepara
grapharenotsufficient,althoughsomehavethoughtthemsufficient,to
makeathingasubstancecf.Z,2,1028b1821.Thesummarybeginning
1017b23doesnotmentionthissense.

1017b21.Thisisthesenseinwhichitisnaturaltotranslate'ousia'as
'essence'ratherthan'substance'.Athing'swhatitistobeisthesame
asitsform(Z7.1032b2andoften),orits"substancewithoutmatter"
(Z7.1032b14).

1017b23.Thesummaryomitsthethirdsenseandidentifiesthesecond
withthefourth,leaving'substance'tomean(A)'body',i.e."theconcrete
wholemadeoutofformandmatter"(Z11.1037a2930)and(B)'form'
Or'essence'.

(A)"Ultimatesubject"picksup1017b1314"theyarenotsaidofa
subjectbuttherestaresaidofthem".Itisnotclearthattheseexpressions
canbeartheweightwhichAristotleputsonthem.Anultimatesubjectis
'saidof'nothingelseandrissaidofnothingelse'appearstomean
'"Xisr"istrueonlyifXandrarethesamething'.Butitseemswe
maysayboththat'thismatterisSocrates'canbetrueandthatSocrates
isnotthesamethingashismatterandifso,(i)Socrateswillnotbean
ultimatesubject,(ii)hismatterwillbe.Aristotlewrestleswiththese
problemsinZ3,insistingat1029a27thatitisimpossiblethatmatter
shouldbesubstance.Furthermore,theremightbeparticularqualities,quantities,
etc.,whicharesaidofnosubject.Aristotleacknowledgesthis
atCategories2.1a239,instancing"theindividualknowledgeofgrammar"
and"theindividualpale".Asaresulthetherestipulatesthatparticular
substancesareneithersaidofasubjectnorinasubject,anddefines'isina
subject'toimply"cannotexistseparatelyfromwhatitisin".Butthe
separabilityrequirementisomittedhere.

Page149

(B)Inthecaseofformsubstancesthepresentpassagedoes,like
Categories2,requireseparability.Buthowcanaformbe"separableanda
this"?Itisseparableinthought(PhysicsII2.193b3334),butseemingly
inseparableintheGategoriessense,sinceItcannotexistorrather,
perhaps,beidentified"apartfromsensiblesubstances"(M1.1076a11).
Usuallytheconcreteparticular,asopposedtowhatissaidofasubject,
isa''this"(Z8.1033b212)butthedescriptionissometimesappliedto
forms(e.g.H1.1042a29),presumablyonthegroundsthatformiswhat
makesmatterintocountableunits(''thecausebywhichmatterisasome
thing",Z17.1041b78).
AtH1.1042a631,DeAnimaII1.412a69,Aristotledividessub
stanceintothreekinds,form,matter,and"whatis[made]outofthese".

Chapter9

Thereareotherdiscussionsof'thesame'atTopicsI7andatI3.1054app.20814
32 b3.Samenessinnumber,form,andgenus(cf.D6.1016b31)are
distinguishedatTopicsVII1.152b303,butnotinthischapter.

1017b27.Whereastwothingscanbeone,viz.makeupaunity,itis
impossiblefortwothingstobethesamething,asAristotleacknowledges
attheendofthenextparagraph.Thereisthereforenoexcuseforhis
sayingthate.g.manandartisticarethesamethingbecauseoneofthem
coincidesintheother.Instead,hisexplanationofcoincidentalsameness
requireshimtodistinguishtwosensesof'theartistic','thepale',etc.(as
inD6).
"Theartistic[is]amanbecauseitcoincidesintheman"contributes
nothingtotheanalysisofsamenessandis,doubtlessforthatreason,
omittedbyonegoodMS.disagreementofgenderforbidsconstruing
"theartisticman"initasasinglephrase,butthatmustbethephraseto
which"thelatter"inthenextsentencepurportstorefer.

Onthemeaningof'coincidental'seenotesonD6.1015b16.

Aristotle'sobjectionto'everymanisthesameastheartistic'shows
thathetakesthatsentencenotinthestrongsense'some(oneandthe
same)artisticthingisthesameaseveryman',whichisfalsebecausethere
ismorethanoneman,butintheweakersense'everymanisthesameas
someartisticthingorother',whichisfalsebecausenoteverymanis
artistic.Hearguesthatifeverymanwereartistic,'artistic'wouldhold
goodofmenintheirownrighthencenomanwouldbecoincidentally
artistichencetheidentityofamanandaparticularartisticthingwould
notbecoincidental.ThisargumentfollowsPosteriorAnalyticsI4.73b26
28inignoringthedistinctionbetween'universal'and'initsownright'
impliedatB4.1000a1,PriorAnalyticsI1.24a18,andib.I8.

Page150

WhatdoesAristotlemeanwhenhesays"inthecaseofparticularswe
dosospeakbaldly"?(1)Thecontrastmaybebetweentheuniversal
proposition'everymanandtheartisticarethesame',whichisfalse,and
theparticularproposition'Socratesandtheartistic(Socrates)arethe
same'which,liketheparticularpropositioninb29'manandartisticare
thesame',couldbetrue.But(i)thisinterpretationdoesnotexplainthe
word"baldly",and(ii)thecontrastitindicatesdoesnotturnonthe
allegedfactthat'wedonotsay"everySocrates"aswedo"everyman"'.
(2)Theword"baldly''suggeststhatAristotle'scontrastisbetweenuni
versalandparticularwords.Wemaysaythatsomemanandtheartis
ticarethesamebutifwospeakbaldly,i.e.withoutsuchanadditional
'some',weshallimplythefalsehoodthateverymanandtheartistic
arethesame.Theimplicationisnotcarriedwhen,insteadof'man',we
usetheparticularword'Socrates'.Theobjectionstothisinterpretation
are(i)thatinb29(''manandartistic")Aristotlehasviolatedhisownban
on'speakingbaldly'(ii)hemaintainselsewherethatindefinite,i.e.
unquantified,propositionsdonotimplytheiruniversalclosure(Prior
AnalyticsI7.29a279,cf.I1.24a1622,DeInterpretatione7.17b8)

ThereisfurtherambiguityinthereasonwhichAristotlegivesforits
beingtruetosaybaldlythatSocratesandtheartisticSocratesarethe
same.(1)Hemightmeanthat"'Socrates'doesnotapplytoanumber
ofthings"atoncethatis,withpropernamesthereisnoidiomcorre
spondingtothatbywhichwemayusethesingularofageneralnameto
speakofmorethanonething,asin'theFrenchmanisexcitable'.Thisis
agoodpoint,butitstruthisindependentofthequestionwhetherwedo
ordonot"say'everySocrates'"ratheritrequiresandthismaybethe
senseoftheGreekthatwenevermean'everySocrates'
by'Socrates'.(2)Aristotlemaybemakingthebolder,andfalse,claimthat'Socrates'
isthenameofjustonethingandtheexpression'everySocrates'hasno
usecf.DeInterpretatione7.17a39 b1.

1018a4."Samenessisakindofoneness"becauseanystatementusing
'same'canberephrasedusing'one'.Aristotleappearstomaintainthat
theconverseisalsotruewhenhesaysthatthingsarecalledthesamein
theirownright"inasmanyways"astheyarecalledone(theword
translated'inasmanyways'isamodernemendation,butthecorrupt
readingsofourMSS.conveythesamesense).Itishardtosee
thejustificationforthelatterclaim.(i)Nothinghereorelsewherecorre
spondstothesenseof'one'atD6.1016b1117.(ii)Thesamenessof
thingswhosematterisoneinformanswerstoD6.1016a1724,butthe
correspondenceisnotexact,becauseatleastpartoftheparagraphin
D6treated'one'asaoneplacepredicate(i.e.gaveatype1criterionof
unityseenoteonD6.1015b16,paragraph(13)).(iii)Thesameobjection
facesRoss'ssuggestionthatthesamenessofthingswhosematterisone

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b a
innumbercorrespondswithonenessincontinuity,D6.1015 36106 17.
"Whosesubstanceisone"answersnottothesamephraseatD6.1016b
89,butto"indivisibleinformula",1016a32 b6.

AttheendoftheparagraphAristotledistinguishestwomaintypesof
sameness.One"saysthatathingisthesameasitself",i.e.uses'same'ina
waywhichimplies'samething':example'sameman'.Theothermaybe
trulypredicatedoftwodifferentthings:example'samecolour'.Eventhe
formertype"treatsonethingasmorethanone"becauseitrequirestwo
subjectexpressionsi.e.'isthesameas',unlike'isone',isalwaysatwo
placepredicate.

1018a9.AsRossnotes,thethreesensesof'other'donotanswer
exactlytothesensesof'thesame'inthepreviousparagraph.Rossis
surelywronginthinkingthatothernessinform"reduces"tootherness
informofmatter:forexample,abronzesphere.andabronzecubeare
otherinformbutthesameinformofmatter.

1018a12.Theparagraphlistsfoursensesof'differing'.Aristotle's
accountofthefirstisobscure.Ifweconstruethephrase"notonlyin
number...analogy"asexplanatoryof"samesomething",wemayeither
(1)followAlexanderandRossinunderstanding"notonly"inthesense
'onlynot',whichisdifficult,or(2)relyonthefactthatitispossiblethat
overanintervaloftimexandyshouldbethesameeveninnumberand
yetothere.g.inquality.(3)Alternatively,thephrasemightbeconstrued
asexplanatoryof"other''.Ifso,"other[innumber]whilebeingthe
samesomething''wouldnotimplythetheorythatidentityisrelative,
sinceaccordingtoAristotle'susageitispermissibletosayoftwomen
thattheyaredifferentmenbut(becausebothmen)thesameanimal(see
D6.1016a2832).Hedoesnotsaywhetheritispossiblefortwothings
tobeotherandnottilesameanything.butprobablyhewouldhavethought
thatthisistrueofitemsindifferentcategories."Othernessintheir
substance":i.e.insomequalityinwhichtheydifferessentiallyadiffer
entiainAristotle'stechnicalsense.

1018a15.Adifferentclassificationofsensesof'similar'isgivenatI3,
1054b313seeRoss.

Chapter10

1018a20.ThefirstfourofAristotle'sfivetypesofoppositesrecurin
Categories10,whichisafullertreatmentofthesamesubject,andelse
where."Thepointsfromwhichandtowhichcomingstobeandde
structionsultimatelylead"mightbeoppositeendsofaprocess,e.g.the
stateofbeing(orstuffwhichis)inaquarryandthestateofhavingbeen

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(orthesamestuffwhichlaterhasbeen)formedintoahouse.Butifso,
whydoesAristotleomitprocessesofnonsubstantialchange?a225do
notintroduceasixthtypeofopposite,butarguethat'xiscapableof
beingFandofbeingGbutnotofbeingbothsimultaneously'isnot,as
wemightsuppose,sufficienttomakeFandGopposites.Forgreyand
whitearesorelated,butgrey,beingmadeoutofthecontrarieswhiteand
black(orpaleanddark),iswhatCategories10.12217callsan"inter
mediate".

1018a25.Contrariesareattributessuchaspalenessanddarkness,not
substancessuchaswhitemenandnegroes(Categories5.3b247)butthe
latterarederivatively"socalledfrompossessing...orfrombeing
recipientof"contraryattributes(a312).I4,afullertreatment,defines
contrarietyas"greatestdifference"(1055a45)or"completedifference"
(1055a16).Theimplicationthat''onethingcannothavemorethanone
contrary"(1055a1920)isallowedtohaveexceptionsatCategories11.
13b3614a6Ofthesensesgivenhere,thefirstisexemplifiedbyjusticeand
injustice(Categories,11.14a223),thesecondbyupanddown(Categories
6.6a17),thefourthbyoneandmany(objectsofthesame"capacity'',
viz.discipline,seeI4.1055a312)Whatisthedifferencebetweenthe
secondandthirdsenses(genusandrecipient)?Therearefourpossi
bilities.(1)Nodifferenceisintended.RossreferstoDeSomno1.453ba79
whichsaysthatallcontrariesareinthesamerecipientbutonany
interpretationtheanalysisinthepresentpassageismorecomplex.(2)
Contrariespresent"inthesamerecipient"havetobecompatible.But
Aristotle'susageelsewheresuggeststhatcontrariesarenecessarilyincom
patiblessothat"inthesamerecipient"cannotimply'simultaneously'
and"differmost"mustimply'incompatible'.(3)Paleanddarkare
capableofbeinginthesamerecipient,butarenotthemostdifferent"in
thesamegenus"becausetheirpossessorsdonothavetobelongtodiffer
entspeciesorforms(Maier,referringtoI9).Ifthisisright,thesecond
senseisnarrower.(4)Oddandevenareinthesamegenus,butnotboth
capableofbeinginthesamerecipient,e.g.inthenumberthirteen
(Alexander).Ifthisisright,thethirdsenseisnarrower.Thefirstsense
isomittedinI4.1055a223andapparentlyexcludedatDeGenratione
etCorruptioneI7.324a2butseeRoss.Rossregardsthefifthsense(a301)
asasummaryofthefirstfour(orratherthree),butneither"things
whosedifferenceisgreatest...baldly"nor"thingswhosedifferenceis
greatest...inrespectofgenus"haveappearedearlier.

1018a35.Cf. 2.1003b341004a2and1004a224."Predication":or
category.

1018238.OthernessinformistreatedatgreaterlengthinI8and9.
"Notsubordinatetooneanother":thesubjecthastobepropertiesor

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kindsofthing,notindividuals.OnlyAristotle'sthirdsenseinentions
contrariety,butdifferentkindsofthingscannotbeinthesamegenus,as
requiredunderthefirsttwoseines,withouteitherbeingcontraries(e.g.
paleanddark)orhavingcontraryproperties"intheirsubstance",i.e.
essentially(Alexandercitesfireandwater):seeI8.105a817.Thethird
senseisneverthelessindependentoftheothertwossincefireandnight
areotherinforminthatsensealone,paleanddarkinthefirsttwosenses
alone.Contrarietyisnolongerrequiredinthelastseine,b67.

Chapter11

Thefirstthreeandthefifthparagraphsanswerroughlytopriorityin
(1)time(comingtobe),(2)acquaintance,(3)formula,and(4)substance
(nature,form),whicharedistinguishedbyAristotleinmanyplaces:Q
8(1,3,4),A8.989a1516(1,4),Z1.1028a31 b2(l,2,3),Z13.1038b
278(1,3),M2.1077a19(l,4)andb24(3,4),PhysicsVIII7.260b1719
(l,4)and261a1314(1,4).Inthediscussionofpriorityandposteriority
inCategories12,thefirsttwosensestheredistinguishedcorrespondto
(1)("time")and(4)("notreciprocatingastoimplicationofexistence").
ForfurtherparallelsseeRoss.

1018b9.Whathpriororposteriormustbeamemberofaseries.
AccordingtoAristotleeveryseriesmusthavean"origin",whichis
eitheritsfirstmemberorsomethingoutsidetheseries(asaparentisthe
originofthedevelopingstagesofhischild).Whattheoriginofamember
ofaseriesiswilldependeitheronthenatureofthememberoronother
things:e.g.thenumber15has1asoriginbyitsnatureasanumber
(D6.1016b1721),butwouldhave'love'asitsorigininagameoftennis,
10asitsorigininthemindofsomeonetestinghowmuchfurtherthan
10feethecouldjump.The"middle"and"end"areperhapsthecentre
andcircumferenceofacircle.Inthetemporalorder,onlythepresent
canfilltheroleoforiginwiththeconsequencethat,toavoidthe
absurdityofcountingthePersianWarsaspriortotheTrojanbecause
nearerAristotle's(orour)present,Aristotleisobligedtomaintainno
lessabsurdlythatwhatispriorintimeisinsomecasefurtherfromits
origin.The''things''arrangedinorderofpriorityinrespectofcapacity
are(althoughAristotleexpresseshimselfintheneuter)moreandless
powerfulmen,asAlexandersays.

1018b30.Priorityinacquaintanceismoreadequatelydiscussedat
Z3.1029b312andPhysicsI1.

1018b31.Thisparagraphmakestwoclaimsaboutpriorityinformula:

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(A)thatuniversalsarepriortoparticularsinformulabutposteriorin
perception,and(B)thate.g.theartisticispriortotheartisticmanin
formulabutnotpriorinsubstanceorbeing.

(A)Priorityinformulaandinperceptionarepresentedasformsof
priorityinacquaintance("amongthese",b31),andsocorrespondtothe
distinctionofPhysicsI1.184a16 b14andPosteriorAnalyticsI2.71b33
72a4betweenwhatismoreintelligibleinitsnatureandwhatismore
intelligibletousthelatterpassagesaysthat"relativetous,things
nearertoperceptionarepriorandmoreintelligible".WhenAristotle
claimsthatthelatterformofprioritybelongstoparticulars,theformer
touniversals,itisunclearwhetherhiscontrastisbetweenspecies(forms)
andgenera,orbetweenindividualsandspeciescumgenera(cf.D2.
1014a17,21).Whathesaysaboutformulaeonlyfitsthecontrastbe
tweenspeciesandgenera:fortheformulaofanindividual,sayCallias,is
thesameas)andsocouldnotbeposteriorto,thatofitsspecies,man
whereastheformulaofthespeciesmanisposteriorto,ascontaining,that
ofitsgenusanimal(cf.Q8.1049b1617).Whathesaysaboutperception,
ontheotherhand)onlyfitsthecontrastbetweenindividualsandspecies
cumgenera:forperceptualdiscriminationofspecificcharacterscomes
withinhumanpowers,hethinks,laterthanperceptualdiscriminationof
genericcharacters,andsocouldnotbeprior(PhysicsI1.184b1214,
childrencallallmendaddies)whereastheobjectsperceivedbymeansof
discriminationofsuchcharacters,whetherspecificorgenericcharacters,
areintheprimarycaseindividuals(DeAnimaII5.417b22,Posterior
AnalyticsII19.100a16 b1,A2.982a25).

(B)Aristotlenextstateswhatisreallythesamesenseof'priorin
formula'intermsnotofprioracquaintancebutofoneformula'sbeing
containedinanothercf.Z1.1028a356"forintheformulaofanything
itisnecessarythattheformulaofasubstancebeaconstituent".This
linguisticformulationinvitesthefurthercontrastconveyedinthefinal
sentence:Whereasthecontainedword'artistic'canexistonitsown,the
nonverbalitemartistry(theartistic)cannot.Analternativetranslation
ofthelastsentenceis"itisnotpossibleforartistictobewithoutsomething
artisticbeing",whichwouldmaketheartisticnotonlynotpriorbut
posteriortotheartisticsomething.

1018b37.Aboxmightbecalledstraight,meaning'straightedged',
butitwouldbethebox'sedge,aline,thatwasstraight"initsown
right"seeD18.1022a2935.ItisnotclearinwhatsenseAristotleholds
thatalineispriortoasurface.'Surface'canbedefinedas'linethathas
moved'(DeAnimaI4.409a4),butequally'line'canbedefinedas'limit
ofasurface'(cf.TopicsVI4.141b22)Linesare"moreintelligible,speak
ingbaldly"thanplanes,TopicsVI4.141b6wearenottoldwhy.Qua
partsofsurfaceslineswouldbeprioraccordingtothenextparagraph,

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buttheyareriotpartswhichsurfacesare"madeoutof"(cf.Physics.VI
1.231a24).

1019a1.ThereferencetoPlatohasnotbeenidentifiedseeRoss.
Asubjectisthatofwhichsomethingelseissaidorpredicated.Accord
ingtoAristotle,apredicateissomethingelsethanitssubjectonlyif
itbelongstothesubjectcoincidentally(see 4.1007a20).'Therefore
subjectsarepriorifandonlyifeverythingispriortoitscoincidental
predicates.Aristotleappearstohaveregardedsuchpredicatesasindi
vidualtotheirsubjects:e.g.'Calliasispale',iftrue,predicatesCallias'
pallorofCallias(seeCategories2.1a20ff.,butthepassageistakenother
wisebyG.E.L.Owen,Phronesis1965).Hence(i)Calliascanexist
withouthispallorand(ii)hispallorcannotexistwithouthim.This
establishesthatsubjectsareprior,andthusthatsubstancesareprior
whentheyaresubjects.But(iii)substancesarealwayssubjects(Categories
5.2a1114,Z3.1029a12,butcontrastZ3.1029a234),and(iv)every
othercategoryofthingisa(possible)predicateof(some)substance
(Z3.1029a234)thereforesubstancesarealwayspriortoeverything
else,i.e.areprimary(Z1.1028a2936).

Theendoftheparagraphisdifficult,chieflybecauseoftheusewhich
Aristotlemakesinitofthethesis(T)thatpartsofathingcansurvive
dissolutionofthething,andthematterofasubstancethedissolutionof
thatsubstance.Accordingtothedefinitionof'priorinnatureandsub
stance',Tshowsthatpartsandmatterareprior.Andsotheyare,Aris
totlesays,butonly"inrespectofcapacity"orpotentiality:forwhen
thewholeexists,thepartsexistonlypotentially(PhysicsVII5.250a245),
andwhenthesubstanceexists,itsmatterexistsonlypotentially.Thus
partsandmatterarepriorinthesensethattheirpotentialoractual
existenceisimpliedby,butdoesnotimply,theexistenceoftheirwholes
andsubstances.SofarthereisnothingpuzzlingexceptthatAristotle
overlooksanequallygoodargumentforsayingthatpartsandmatterare
neitherpriornorposteriorinrespectofcapacity:viz.thatthemerely
potentialexistenceofapartbothimpliesandisimpliedbytheactual
existenceofitswhole.Butnowcomesamajordifficulty:inwhatsense
arepartsposteriortowholes,andmattertosubstance,"incomplete
reality"?InZ10wearetoldthat"partsasmatter,i.e.intowhicha
thingisdividedasintomatter''areposterior(1035b1112)andAristotle
supportsthisassertionbytheclaimthatwhenaman'sfingeriscutoff
themanremainsamanbutthelingerdoesnotremainafingerexceptin
name(1034b2830,1035b235).Thatclaimcannotbeused,however,in
thepresentargumentforitmakestheposteriorityofpartsandmatter
dependonsomethinginconsistentwithT,not,asthepresentargu
mentunexpectedlyasserts,onTitself.Norcan`posterior'here
mean'after'(although''whentheothersaredissolved"translatesaparticipial

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constructionwhichmighthavetemporalforce)forifitdid,(i)sincematter
andatleastcertainpartscanexistincompleterealitynotonlyafterbut
alsobeforethecomingtobeoftheirwholes,theywouldbebothpriorand
posteriorinrespectofcompletereality(ii)Aristotlepresentsposteriority
inrespectofcompleterealityasaspeciesofposteriorityinsubstanceand
nature,but'posterior'inthelattersenseimplies'cannotexistwithout',
whichisincompatiblewith'canexistafter'.Forfurtherdiscussionof
sensesinwhichpartsarepriororposteriortowholesseeZ10.

ThereremainsthequestionwhyAristotlejustifieshiscontentionsin
thisparagraphbyreferencetothedoctrinethat"therearemanywaysof
being"(cf.D7).(1)'Priorinrespectofcapacity'and'priorinrespectof
completereality'aredoubtlesstobeanalysedintermsof'beingpoten
tially'and'beingactually'.(ii)Inconnectionwithsubjectsandsubstances
thepointseemstobethatAcanbepriortoBin"natureandsubstance"
onlyifAandB'are'indifferentwaysi.e.thatpriorityinnatureis
priorityinthemannerofexistence.InthesamespiritZ1tellsusthat
substanceisnotonly''theprimarythingthatis''(1028a14)butalso
"thatwhichisintheprimaryway"(1028a30).Aristotleseemstoinfer
from'B'sexistenceisdependentonA's'to'B'sexistencecannotbeunder
stoodwithoutreferencetoA's'buthedoesnotdefendtheinference.

1019a11.Aparttanbewithoutthewholeinrespectofdestruction,i.e.
whenthereasonfortheabsenceofthewholeisthatthewholehasbeen
destroyed:forinstance,ahalfapplecanbewithouttheotherhalf,when
theotherhalfhasbeeneaten.Awholemustbewithoutitspartsinrespect
ofcomingtobe,becausethe'absence'oftheparts(inthesenseoftheir
notbeingactual)isimpliedbythewhole'shavingcometobe.Thisisa
morepromisingcontrastthanAristotlemadeinthepreviousparagraph,
butstillnotadequatetoshowthatwholesareinanywaypriortotheir
parts.Aristotledoesnotexplainhowtheearliersensesof'prior'aretobe
reducedto"theselast".

Chapter12

Dunamis(capacity)andtodunaton(thecapable,possible)arealsodis
cussedinDeInterpretations12and13,andmorefullyinMetaphysicsQ.
Mostofthepresentchapterexcept1019b2233isconcernedwithcapa
citiestochange(activecapacities,abilities)orbechanged(passive
capacities,liabilities).Aristotlebarelyconsiderscapacitiestofunctionin
particularways,e.g.toleadanarmy(DeAnimaII5.417b32)ortothink
aboutaproblemorviewascene(cf.Q6.1048b1835,wherethese
activitiesaredistinguishedfrom'changes')orcapacitiestobein
particularstates,e.g.tobehealthyornoiseless.Q1.1045b351046a2

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heacknowledgesthattherearemorekindsofcapacitythan"thoseso
calledinrespectofchange",buttreatsthelatteras"mostfundamentally"
socalled.1019a236mentionswalkingandspeaking,whicharenotprop
erlychanges.

Aristotle'schoiceoftheword'arche'(translated"whatoriginates")
isunhelpful.Doubtlessateacher'scapacitytoteachandhispupil'sto
learncanproperlyberegardedasoriginsofchangeinthepupilbutso
equallycouldtheteacherhimself,hiswillingnessordecisiontoteach,
thepupil'swillingnessordecisiontoattend,orthelessonimparted.The
chapterfurnishesanexampleofthelimitedvalueofparaphraseinthe
explanationofmeaningAristotlewouldhavedonebettertobringout
themeaningsof'capacity'merelybygivingexamplesofcapacities,ashe
sawelsewhere(Q6.1048a36 b4).

1019a15."Orquaother":i.e.inthechangerquaother.Thedoctormay
doctorhimself,butnotquahimself.Ishedoctoredquaother(1)because
hispatientdoesnothavetobehimselfor(2)becausehispatientdoesnot
havetobeadoctor?"Quabeingdoctored"suggests(2)butintheplaces
whereAristotlediscussesthekindofcapacityheresetasideheseemsto
haveinmindchangeswhichmustbeworkedonthechangerhimself(see
Q6.1048a2730,8.1049b810).

1019a19."Orquaother"isagainelliptical,initsfirstoccurrencefor'or
inthechangerquaother'sinitssecondfor'orbythechangedthingqua
other'.Thepointofthesecondsentenceisevidentlynottointroducea
senseof'capable'correspondingtopassivecapacities(thatcomesat
1019a35),buttoindicatethateachpassivecapacityismatchedtoan
activeone.Aristotleaddsthatpassivecapacitiessometimesexistonlyif
theaffection"isforthebetter":e.g.flexibilityisadunamisinawatch
springbutnotinapitprop.

1019a26.'Dunamis'canmean'strength','resistancetochange'.Ifa
girderisincapableofbeingbent,orhardtobend,itisnaturaltosaythat
thatis"owingtoacapacity"itsstrengthratherthantoanincapacity.
Twopointsarecompressedintotheparagraph:resistancetochange
isatruecapacityliabilitytoimpairmentisnotatruecapacity.Aristotle
doesnotdenythatliabilitytoimprovementisatruecapacity.

1019a33.Thefivesensesof'capable'correspondtothefirst,second,
secondagain,fourth,andthirdsensesof'capacity'."Whatcankeepa
thingthesame":i.e.preventitchanging.Havingremarkedthatpassive
capacitiesincluderesistancestochange,Aristotleaddsthatthingscanbe
activelycapableinthesamewaye.g.creosotehasthecapacity(notto
improvewoodbut)topreventwoodrotting.Thismightstillberegarded
asacapacitytoeffectchangethecreosotepreventsthewoodfrom
changinginonewaybychangingitinanother.Neverthelessthe

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descriptionofsomethingaspreventingachangedoesnotdescribeitas
changinganything.IfthisisAristotle'sthought,thewordhesubstitutes
for'change',translated'alter'('metaballein',Ross'change'),ishardly
helpful.(Heoftenuses'metaballein'and'kineisthai'assynonymswhenthey
aredistinguished,thelatterusuallyexcludescomingtobeanddestruc
tion,seePhysicsV1.225a34ff.,5.229a31,b14.)

Theparenthesisrevertstothepointmadeat1019a2633thatathing
beingdestroyedordamagedexhibitsaweaknessorincapacityrather
thanacapacity.Thoughweak,suchathingmustbecapableofbeing
destroyed,since'isbeing'implies'canbe'.Twosolutionsareoffered:
eithertobecapableistopossesssomething,beitacapacityoranin
capacity("thelackofthis")or'tobecapable'hastwosenses,'topossess
acapacity'and'tolackacapacity'.

1019b15."Inthesameway":i.e.forthesamereason.Thereasonwhy
theboyandtheeunuchareincapableofbegettingisgivenintheir
descriptionsasboyandeunuchnotsowiththegrownman.Aristotle
thinksthat'boy'and'eunuch'aredifferentsortsofreasontoo:'because
heisaboy'amountsto'becauseofhisage'("time"not"characteristic
ofitspossession'').

1019b21."Inrespectofthisincapacity":orrather'inrespectof
incapacity',see1019b35.

1019b22.OnthissensecomparePriorAnalytics.I13,DeInterpretatione
12,13.The"falsehood"inthesecondsentencemustbethatadiagonalbe
commensurable(sc.withitsside)callitSnotthatitisimpossible
thatS,whichisatruth.What,then,isS'scontrary?AccordingtoDe
lnterpretatione7.17b223and10.20a1619contrariescannotbetrue
togetherbutcanbefalsetogether(letuscallthesestrictcontraries).
Sinceitisnotpossibleforanecessarypropositiontobefalseevenonits
own,itfollowsthatnonecessarypropositioncanbethestrictcontraryof
anypropositionbutAristotlesaysthatthecontraryofSis"notonly
truebutalsoanecessity".Thissuggeststhat"contraries"aretoinclude
contradictoriesaswellasstrictcontraries.Weshouldpresumably
understand''adiagonal"inStomean'any(some)diagonal'not'every
diagonal'(althoughthelattertoowouldmakeSafalsehoodandim
possible).Ifso,SisofaformwhichinanycasehasnoCorrespondingstrict
contrary,buthasacontradictoryin'nodiagonaliscommensurable'.
Aristotleholds,then,thatsincethelatterisnecessary,Sisimpossible.
Hisgeneralclaimisthatifanypropositionsarecontrariesintheloose
sense(cannotbetruetogether),andifoneofthemisnecessary,theother
isimpossiblecf.thethesisatD5.1015b69.Heisnotsettingoutthat
partofthesquareofoppositionformodalwords(seeDeInterpretatione
13.22a2431)whichstatesthatnecessarilypandimpossiblethatpare

Page159

(strict)contrariesforthe(contradictory)contrariesSandnotSdonot
themselvesincludemodalwords,

HavingshownthatthefalsehoodSisimpossible,Aristotledrawsthe
inference(b26)thatitisnecessarilyafalsehood.Inthefourthsentence
"this"isnolongerS,whose(contradictory)contraryhasbeenshownto
be(notonlypossiblebut)necessary,butimpossiblethatS,which
haspossiblethatSforits(againcontradictory)contrary:hereAristotle
makesamodestcontributiontothesquareofoppositionformodal
words.Themainpartofthesentenceisanattempttodefinethepossible
intermsof'necessary','contrary',and'false'.The"contrary"mentioned
secondisnotthecontraryofpossiblethatpbut,asAristotle'sexample
shows,the(contradictory)contraryofp,viz.notp("heisnotsitting
down").Sothedefinitionruns:itispossiblethatpifitisnotnecessary
thatitisfalsethatnotp,thatis,ifitisnotnecessarythatp.Thisdefini
tionisbothincomplete,sincethepossibleincludesalsothenecessary,
andwrong,sincethenonnecessarymaybeimpossible(seediagram).

Aristotle'sexampledoesnomorethanshowthatpossiblethatpandnot
necessarythatparecompatible(theyare,ofcourse,subcontraries
oneofthemmustbetrue).ThesameerroroccursatDeInterpretatione
13.22a27,andiscorrectedat22b1028.IfwesupplementAristotle's
definitionwiththepointmadeinthefirsthalfofthesentence,that
'possible'and'impossible'arecontraries,hiscontentionwillbethat
'possible'isequivalentto'neithernecessarynorimpossible'.Thisisone
oftheseineswhichhegivesto'admissible'atPriorAnalyticsI13.32a18
21itisalsothesensesometimesgiventotheEnglish'contingent'.

Havingwronglydefined'possiblethatp'as'notnecessarythatthe
contraryofp(i.e.notp)isfalse',Aristotlenext(b312)disconcertingly
misreportsandcorrectshisownerror:'possiblethatp'signifies'not
necessarythatpisfalse'."Signifieswhatistrue":asbefore,thisCanbe
defendedonlyifitmeanstoconveythat'possiblethatp'and'truethatp'
arecompatiblecf.De'Interpretatione13.23a79."Andinanotherwhat
admitsofbeingtrue":theparticipletranslated'whatadmitsof'(or
'admissible','endechomenon')iselsewhererenderedby'possible',buthere
averbaldifferenceiscalledfor.DoesAristotlemeanthat'admissible'
sharesthemeaningsof'possible'alreadygivenintheparagraph,orthat
itspecifiesanewone?InthetableatDeInterpretatione13.22a2431the

Page160
a
twowordsaremadeequivalent,andPriorAnalyticsI13.32 1821gives
assensesof'admissible'bothofthesensesof'possible'('notimpossible'
and'neitherimpossiblenornecessary')confusedbyAristotleinthe
presentparagraph.Aristotle'sactualusage,ifitcontrasts'admissible'
with'dunaton'atall,contrastsitwithsensesoutsidetheparagraph(i.e.
with'capable',not'possible').

1019b33.Greekmathematiciansused'dunamis'tomean'square'(of
anumber).ForotherusesseeHeath,MatthematicsinAristotle,2078.

1019b34."Thesethings"arenot,ofcourse,squarednumbers
but'possible'things.Aristotlecontendsthatthesensesof'capable',as
opposedto'possible',allderivefrom'activelycapable'.Tobeliableto
changeistohavesomethingelse(oryourself)capableofchangingyou
toberesistanttochangeistohavenothingcapableofchangingyouatall,
oreasily(butthisequivalencecannotexplaintheexistenceofthesense
'resistanttochange')tobe(wemightsay)amenabletochangeistohave
somethingcapableofchangingyouforthebetter("possessingitina
particularway").Thesummaryomitsthederivativesenseof'actively
capable'givenat1019b1115.

Chapter13

QuantityistreatedmorefullyinCategories6.HereasthereAristotle
employsnottheabstractnouncorrespondingto'quality'butanad
jective(Latin'quantum')whichcanalsomean'howmuch?',andmainly
discussesthepossessorsofquantitativeproperties,nottheproperties
themselves.

1020a7.Theconstituentseraquantitymusthave"thenatureofaone
andathis":hence,asAlexandersays,theydonotincludeforms(the
constituentsofagenus),whicharenotcontinuousandsonotone(D
6.1016b10),norproperties(theconstituentsofastateofaffairs),which
arenot'thises'(cf.D25).

Aristotleproposestwocriteriatodistinguishpluralitiesfrommagni
tudes:theformerare(i)countablei.e.admitpluralsand(ii)indivi
sibleintocontinuousparts.Thesecondofthese(cf.Categories6.
4b205a14)isnothelpful:'continuous'means'havingacommon
boundary'(Categories6.4b256,PhysicsV3.227a22),butwearenot
givenrulesfordecidingwhethere.g.adjoiningroomshaveacommon
boundaryortwoboundarieswhichtouch.Aristotledoesnotacknow
ledge,butneitherdoeshedeny,thatthesamethingmaybebotha
pluralityandamagnitude.

"Breadths...depths":i.e.areasandvolumesAristotlehasno

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separatewords.Sincelengthetc.arebeingtreatedasprossessorsof
quantitativeproperties,itisappropriatetosaythatalinehalength,
etc.Butalengthofwhatsort?(1)Eucliddefines'line'as'lengthwithout
breadth',butAristotle'sdefinitioniscertainlydifferentfromthat.(2)
Alexandertakes'line'etc.simplyasanswerstothequestions'whatisa
length?'etc.(3)Rosssupposesthat'limited'goesnotonlywith'plurality'
butalsowith'length','breadth',and'depth'.Ifso,whatisitsmeaning?
(i)InEuclid,'finite'butitisreasonabletosay'linesmustbefinite,
lengthsneednotbe'onlyiflengthsareregardedaspropertiesoflines,
notitemsofwhichlinesareexamples.(ii)If'limited'means'discrimin
able(sc.notonlyinrespectofquantity)',themeaningmightbethat
e.g.theprimemeridianandthe10'meridianoflongitudearethesame
lengthbutnotthesamelinebutthefactstowhichthisinterpretation
drawsattentionareagoodreasonforrefusingtoidentifyanylengthwith
anyline.

Aseparateproblemarisesoverthedefinitionofanumberasalimited
plurality.(i)Again,thismightmeanthat'infinitenumber'isacontra
diction,while'infiniteplurality'isnot,butsucharuleisnothintedin
anyoftheotherAristoteliandefinitionsofnumbertowhichRossrefers.
(ii)'Twodifferentnumbersmaybethesameplurality.'Thisseems
absurd.(iii)I6.1057a3definesanumberas"apluralitymeasurableby
one"(cf.N1.1088a56,D6.1016b1721).Hencethepointmightbe
thatanumberhastobeaninteger,apluralityneednotbeor(iv)that
e.g.asentencecanbepluralinmorethanonewaysixwords,ten
syllablesbutonlyoneofthesewillbethenumberofthesentence,
dependingwhetherwordsorsyllablesorsomethingelsearetheunits
ofwhichsentencesaremade(cf.D6.1016b1731).(v)Thereisadifference
inmeaningbetween'apluralityofsoandso's'and'nsoandso's',where
nisanumberbutthisofcoursedoesnotestablishadifferencebetween
'apluralityofsoandso's'and'anumberofsoandso's'.

1020a14.Seenoteson1020a26.

1020a17.Largeness,narrowness,etc.,differfromalineintwoways:
(i)theyareaffectionsofalineandsonotsubstances(strictlyspeaking
linesarenotsubstanceseither:M3)(ii)theirdefinitions,althoughin
cludingtheword'quantity'(fortheyare"affectionsofaquantityintheir
ownright"),donotincludethewholeexpression'acertainquantity'.
Aristotledivides"affectionsofaquantityintheirownright"intotwo
types:thoserepresentedbycomparativeadjectives,e.g.'larger',are
"socalled...withreferencetooneanother",thoserepresentedby
positiveadjectives,e.g.'large','broad',are''socalled...intheirown
right''.ThisisverballyinconsistentwithCategories6.5b1618,"nothing
iscalledlargeorsmalljustinitsownright,butwithreferencetosome
thingelse"butAristotle'spointisclearenough'Calliasislarge'is,

Page162

but'Calliasislarger'isnot,intelligiblewithoutknowledgeofcontext
(seeAckrillonCategories7.6a36).UnliketheMetaphysics,theCategories
classifiesboththesetypesasrelativesratherthanquantities,and6.
5b1129defendsthatclassificationofthesecondtype.

Whatarethe"otherthings",sc.thanquantities,towhich"these
namesarealsotransferred"?(l)Theymightbesuchthingsasanagree
ment,towhichwecanapplythepredicate'broad'butwhichisnota
quantitybecausewecannotapplye.g.'twofootbroad','twiceasbroad'
(cf.RossandthecontentioninCategories6.5b1129and6a1925that
quantitativeaffectionshavenocontrariesandadmitofnodegrees,true
of'twofootbroad'butnotof'broad').(2)Aristotlemaysimplymean
thatquantitativeaffectionscanbepredicatedofcoincidentalquantities
('theartistic'),notonlyofquantitiesintheirownright('thebody')this
wouldbetrueofboth'broad'and'twofootbroad'.

1020a26.AnFisaquantitycoincidentallyifeither(i)somebutnotall
Fshavequantitativeproperties(oritispossiblebutnotnecessaryforan
Ftohavesuchaproperty,1020a1417,a268),or(ii),where'Q'isa
quantitativepropertyword,'FsareQ'uses'Q'inaderivativesense
(a2832).(ii)recursatCategories6.5a38 b10,butinthatchaptertimeis
treatedasaprimaryquantity.Theclausebeginning"Imean"explains
"affections".viz.derivatives.Nonderivativequantitiesare''amounts
bywhich"agiventhingischanged:e.g.thetwentymileswhichthe
trainhascovered,thetwentyproblemswhichthecomputerhassolved.
Thetrainsactualmovementorthecomputer'sactivity(change)isa
derivativequantitywhichmustbedefinedintermsoftheseandlengths
oftimemustinturnbedefinedintermsofmovementorchange(seethe
difficultchaptersontimeinthePhysics,IV10,11).

Chapter14

ThemoreambitioustreatmentofqualitiesinCategories8classifiesthem
quitedifferently.

1020a33."Qualification":i.e.(here)quality,butAristotle'swordis
theadjective(Latin'quale')whichatCategories8.10a279hedistinguishes
fromtheabstractnoun(Latin'qualitas'),andIhavefollowedAckrill
inreserving'quality'forthelatter.Althoughdifferentiaeareherede
scribedasqualities,andqualitiesinthe"mostfundamental"sense
(1020b14),Categories5.3a22tellsusthatthey,likesubstances,are"notin
asubject",fromwhichitmightbethoughttofollowthattheyarenot
qualities.Aristotleisinadilemma:differentiaeanswerthequestion
'quails?'butalsoreveal,oratleasthelptoreveal,essence(thusat
Z,12.1038a19hesays"thelastdifferentiaisthesubstanceoftheactual

Page163
b a
thing",butcontrastTopicsIV2.122 16,VI6.143 32).Theright
descriptionis'essentialquality',butthesystemofcategories,withitsodd
contrastbetweensubstance(oressence)andquality,cannoteasily
accommodatethatnotion."Thedifferentiainrespectofsubstance":i.e.
differentiainthetechnicalsense,notmeredifference.

1020b2.InAristotle'sdaynumberswereoftenrepresentedbymulti
dimensionalarrangementsofdots:thus4wasasquareandalsotetra
hedralnumber,6atriangularandalsooblongnumber.Anumberwith
twoprimefactors("xtimesy",literally'somanytimessomuch')could
berepresentedbyarectangle,anumberwiththree("xtimesytimesz")
byarectangularsidedsolidseeHeath,MathematicsinAristotle,2089.
If'withoutangles'statesthedifferentiaof'circle(1020a35),itmightbe
arguedthat'solid'statesthedifferentiaofacertainkindofnumber,and
ingeneralthatallthequalitiesofchangelessthings(secondparagraph)
aredifferentiae(firstparagraph).At1020b1517Aristotleaccepts
theconclusionof'thisargument,butelsewhereheofferstworeplies:
(i)someinvariableconjunctionsofpropertiesdonotdelimitanyform
orspecies,e.g.'malehuman'discussedinI9(thisisoneversionofthe
doctrineofnaturalkinds)(ii)evenif.solidnumbersdidmakeaspecies,
soliditycouldbeacoincident,andsonotadifferentia,of.thatspecies,
justashavingthreesidesisan"invariable"coincidentof.atriangle(D
30.1025a304).Atb6Aristotlegeneralizeshisexamplesintotheclaim
thatany''constituentof.thesubstance",i.e.necessaryproperty,which
likesolidityinnumbersisanonquantitativeproperty,mustbeaquality.
Whathashappenedtotheothercategories?Thefinalparenthesisseems
intendedtoexplainwhythequalification''apartfromquantity"is
necessaryeveninthecaseofnumbers:fornumbersdohavequantitative
properties(e.g.being2x3)distinctfromtheirsubstance(being6).

1020b8."Affection"maybemeanttocoverallthetypesofquality
distinguishedintheCategoriesasstates,dispositions,naturalcapacities,
effectivequalities,affections,figureandshape.Modification(tradition
ally'alteration')isregularlydefinedbyAristotleaschangeofqualityor
affection:e.g.Categories14.15b12.

1020b12.IntheNicomacheanEthics,II5.1106a1112excellenceand
badness(virtueandvice)areclassifiedasstatescf.D20.1022b1012.

1020b13."Affectionsofchangeablesquachanging":i.e.propertiesin
respectofwhichtheydochange."Whatiscapableofchangingor
functioninginthiswayisgood":evenifthispropositionwereananalytic
truthitwouldestablishonlythatexcellenceisacapacity,notanaffec
tion.NicomacheanEthicsII5.1105b191106a13rejectsbothclassifica
tions,taking'affection'inthesense'feeling'.Inthelastsentenceitis

Page164

notclearwhetherAristotlemeansthatthegoodnessofinanimatethings
isnotproperlysaidtobeaquality(Alexander)or(asRossprefers)that
inanimatethingsarenotproperlysaidtobegood.

Chapter15

1020b26.Thischapterhaslittleincommonwiththelongertreatmentof
relativesinCategories7.Thethreefoldclassificationthatitfollowsfailsto
coversomethings,e.g.largeandlarger,acknowledgedasrelativesinthe
Categories.

1020b32.ThisparagraphisdiscussedbyHeath,MathematicsinAristotle,
20911.Aristotle's"numericalrelatives"aretermsofratios.(a)Double
andhalf(sc.itshalf)standintheratio2:l,(b)multipleand(its)sub
multipleintheration:l,(c)oneandahaftanditsreciprocalinthe
ratio3:2and(d)oneandabitanditsreciprocalintheration+1:n.In
(a)and(c)thetermsare"relatedbyadefinitenumber",i.e.theratios
consistofactualnumbersin(b)and(d)theratiosarealgebraic.In(a)
and(b)thetermsarerelatedby''anumberrelativetoone",i.e.bya
ratioexpressibleasanintegerin(c)and(d)theratiosarenotexpressible
asintegersbutarenumbers"relativetothemselves",i.e.tonumbers(one
notbeinganumber,D6.1016b17).

Inthefourthtypeofratiothetermis"relatedtoitsreciprocalbyan
indefinitenumber"(accordingtotheemendationadoptedintheOCT
Ross'salternativeemendationgives"indefiniterelativetoitsreciprocal").
Ata3Aristotleaddsafifthtype(a),inwhichonetermis"numerically
whollyindefiniterelativeto"theother.Thewordssuggestaratioeven
morealgebraicthan(b)and(d),e.g.m:n,butAristotle'sexampleshows
thathehasinmindaquitedifferentpoint:thatwhenonetermexceeds
anotheris"somuchandsomethingagain"thetwomaybein
commensurable.Inwhatsensearesuchrelationsindefinite?Hemay
meanthattheformula'somuchandsomethingagain:somuch'iseven
lessspecificthan'n+1:n',ifthe'somethingagain'neednotbecom
mensurablewiththe'somuch'(ina8"eitherequalorunequal''doesnot
correctlyexpresswhatmustbehismeaning,viz.'eithercommensurable
orincommensurable').Inthatcaseheignoresdefiniteirrationalrelations,
suchas .Orhemaymeanthatirrationalrelationsareindefinite
inthequitenewsense'notnumericallyspecifiable',giventhatirrationals
arenottobedeemednumbers("numberisnotsaidofthenoncommen
surable").Inthatcasethefifthtypeembracesnotonlyindefinitesinthe
firstsense,like .

1021a9.Thingsequal,similar,andthesamearenumericalrelatives
because(i)theirdefinitionsbringintheword'one'and(ii)oneisthe

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b
measureofanumber.ForthelatterseeD6.1016 1731.Equalsstand
intheratio1:1but,sinceoneisnotitselfanumber,thisdoesnotmake
themnumericalrelativesinthefirstsense.

"Whosesubstanceisone"isambiguous(cf.1016b56and89).(1)
Sincethequalityofx:andyisonewhenbotharee.g.pale,itoughttobe
thattheirsubstanceisonewhenbotharee.g.men,evenifnotthesame
man.(2)Butfixandymaycountasthesameevenwhentheyarenotthe
sameinnumber,itisnotclearwhytheirbeinge.g.thesamecolourisnot
allowedtocountasacaseofsameness,butonlyofsimilarity.This
suggeststhat'oneinsubstance'heremeanstoneinnumber'.Cf.B
4.999b202,Z13.1038b910,1415,Z16.1040b17.

1021a14.Thesameverb'poiein'istranslated'act'atthebeginningof
theparagraph(asitwasat1020b30)but'produce'attheend.Thesensein
whichnumericalrelativeshave"actualfunctionings"isnotdescribed
inanyofAristotle'ssurvivingworks.Probablyhemeansthate.g.an
architravewhoselengthstandsintheratio1.618totheheightofa
columndoesnotactonthecolumn(actualfunctioning"involving
change",cf.Q6)butdoesactuallystandinthatratioseeRoss.Itisnot
clearhowfarAristotlewouldwishtoextendtheclassesofcapacity
relativesandfunctioningrelativestocoverexpressionswhich,like
'father',arenotgrammaticallyderivativefromverbs.Howabout'slave',
forinstance?

1021a26Thisisadifficultparagraph.Aristotlestatesfourpropositions
aboutthecorrelativepairsmeasurable/measure,knowable/knowledge,
thinkable/thought,andvisible/sight:
(a)althoughthethinkable(etc.)isarelative,itisnotcalledthink
ablerelativeto,orof,something(a2630)
(b)athoughtiscalledathoughtrelativeto,orof,something(ib.)
(c)'thinkable'signifies'thatofwhichsomethoughtisathought'
(seea3l)
(d)athoughtisnotrelativetothatofwhichitisathought(a32).
Twopreliminaryremarksmaybemade.(A)Categories7agreesthatthe
knowableandtheperceptiblearenot"calledjustwhattheyareof
somethingelse",butoffersadifferentreasonforclassingthemnonethe
lessasrelatives,namelythat"whatisknowableisknowablebyknow
ledge"etc.(6b346),and"wecallrelativesallsuchthingsasaresaid
tobejustwhattheyare,oforthanotherthings,orinsomeotherwayre
lativetosomethingelse''(6a367).(B)Laterinthesamechapter(7b22
8a12)Aristotlemakesthegoodpointthatknowledgeandtheknowable
(andperceptionandtheperceptible)arenot"simultaneousbynature",
thatis,theydonot''reciprocateastoimplicationofexistence"(Categories

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b
13.14 278).Theapplicationofthispointtothepresentparagraphis
unfortunatelyspoiltbyAristotle's(i)definingthethinkableas"thatof
whichthereisthought"(not'canbe'),and(ii)arguingatDeAnimaIII
2.425b26426a26thatinthatsensethevisibleandsightaresimulta
neousbynature,becausewithoutsightthereisnothingwhichisseen
ase.g.paleordark.

Theparagraphraisestwoquestions:whatisthemeaningandjusti
ficationof(d),andhowdoes(d)support(a)?Ifweapplythedefinition
in(c)to(b),wegetthepropositionthat'athoughtiscalledathought
relativetothatofwhichitisathought'.Inspiteof(d),Aristotle'sob
jectiontothispropositionisnotthatitisfalse(seebl)butthatit"says
thesamethingtwice".Evidently,then,thecontentioninexactlycon
veyedby(d)isthatitsdenialisanunhelpfulthingtosay,andcannot
servetoidentifyanythingasathought,sight,etc.Buthowcanthis
contentionsupportorexplainproposition(a)?Itwouldbenolessun
helpfultosay'aslaveistheslaveofthatofwhichheisaslave'yetthat
ofwhichsomethingisaslave,viz.amaster,iscertainlyamasterrelative
to,andof,something.Onedifferencebetweenthesetwocasesisas
follows.IfAisamasterandBhisslave,itispossibletoidentifyAasB's
masterorBasA'sslave(althoughnotatthesametimetoidentifyeach
byhisrelationtotheother).ButifCisathoughtandDitssubject
matter,itisnotpossibletoidentifyDasthesubjectmatterofC,because
itisnecessarytoidentifyCasthethoughtofD.Thoughts,sights,etc.
andmeasures,i.e.unitsofmeasurearethusrelativeinastrongsense:
notjustthatthedescriptionofsomethingasathoughtinvitesthe
question'ofwhat?'butthatanydescriptionofathoughtidentifiesit
onlybyreferencetoadifferententity,itssubjectmatter.Inthisstrong
sensethinkablesetc,arenotrelativesandiftheywere,weshouldbe
condemnedtothehopelesslycircularmethodofidentificationbymeans
ofpropositionssuchasthecontradictoryof(d).

IfAristotlemeanstoconveythisdistinction,hisexpositionofitis
faultyinthreeways.(i)Hedoesnotdistinguishthethesisthatthinkables
etc.arenotrelativesinthestrongsensefromthepurelygrammatical
point,rightlyspurnedintheCategories,thatthinkablesarenotcalled
thinkablesofanything.(ii)Heholdsthatofthefourkindsofrelatives
exemplifiedbythoughts,masters,slaves,andthinkables,onlythelastare
relativesinaspecialway("fromtheotherthingbeingrelativetothem"),
wheninfactitisthefirstkindthatarespecial,beingrelativesina
strongersensethantheotherthree,(iii)Proposition(d)failstobringout
thedifferencebetweenothercorrelativesandthosewithwhichthe
paragraphdeals.

1021b3.Aristotleisnodoubtinfluencedbytheargument:knowledge
isarelativedeotoringisa(formof)knowledgethereforedoctoringis

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a
arelative.ButCategories8.11 2432rejectsthisconclusion:"forknow
ledge,agenus,iscalledjustwhatitis,ofsomethingelse(itiscalledknow
ledgeofsomething)butnoneoftheparticularcasesiscalledjustwhat
itis,ofsomethingelse...Thustheparticularcases[e.g.grammar,
music]arenotamongtherelatives."Aristotleisinadilemma.Onthe
onehand,heoftendescribescategoriesas"generaofthethingsthatare",
andthespeciesofaspeciesmustbeaspeciesofitsgenus(Categories3.
1b1012).Ontheotherhand,hislinguistictestsformembershipofthe
categoryofrelativesresistthistreatment(rendering'xisinthecategory
ofrelatives'areferentiallyopaquecontext,if'x'hastorangeover
thingsratherthanwords).SeeAckrill'snoteonCategories8.11a20.

1021b8.Aristotleimpliesthatpossessorsofdoublenessaredoublein
theirownright(sc.quabeingpossessorsofdoubleness,notessentially).

Chapter16

Thethreesensesof'teleios'correspondprettyexactlytotheEnglish
'entire','perfect',and'complete'.

1021b14.Athingcanheperfect,andthereforegood,ofitskind,yet
badbecauseitskindisbad:itisabadthingtobeagoodthief.

1021b23.Thewordfor"fulfilment"is'telos',fromwhich'teleios'
derives.Thetraditionaltranslation'end'suppressesthisconnection,and
obscuresthepointthatlife'send,ordeath,teleute,isatelosinasubsidiary
senseonly("bytransference"),becauseitisnotcommonlyregardedas
thezenithoflife(atLaws834c2Platospeaksoffullgrownhorsesas
''possessingtheirtelos"cf.thejokeatPhysicsII2.194a303).Onthe
otherhand,Aristotleiswrongtotreattheexpression'completelyde
stroyed'asacaseoftransference:thethingdestroyedh'completed'ina
degeneratesense,butitsdestructioniscompletedinthefullsense.Atask
isnolesscompletedwhenitsfulfilmentisundesirable.

1021b30.InhisrecapitulationAristotleattemptstoreducethethree
senseshehasfoundtotwo,buthisdefinitionsreallyfitnothingbutthe
twosubdivisionsofsense2,'completedoctor'and'completethief'.

"Therestaremadesobyvirtueofthese":Alexanderinstancesa
perfecteducationonethatmakesthepupilperfectacompletebook
onewhosecontentsarecompleteaperfectspearonethatonlythe
perfectAchillescanwield.

Page168

Chapter17

OfthefoursenseslistedbyAristotleonlythefirstandthirdarefoundin
hisownwritings.Thepurportedsense'substance'ispossiblysuggested
byPlato'sdistinctionbetweenlimitandtheunlimited(Philebus23ff.).
The"limitofacquaintance"isperhapsitsorigin(seeD1.1013a1416),
perhapsitscompletion(cf.Z,1,1028a367"weholdthatweknoweach
thingmostofallwhenweareacquaintedwithwhataman,orfire,is").

"I.e.thatforwhich":intheOCTthebracketsclosebeforethisphrase,
makingitexplanatoryof'fulfilment'.

AristotledoesnotattempttojustifyhisprinciplethatifanAisakind
ofBeverysenseof'A'isasenseof'B'.Itisnotinfacttruethatoriginsin
allofthesensesdistinguishedinD1arelimits.

Chapter18

1022a14."By"translatesthepreposition'kata'forthephilosophical
sensesinthefirstparagraph'byvirtueof'or'inrespectof'wouldbemore
naturalEnglish,andthoserenderingshavemostlybeenadoptedelse
whereinthetranslation.Forthesensesof'cause'seeD2.

p.2071022a24.'Initsownright'istherenderingmostlyusedinthetrans
lation,inpreferencetothemoreliteral'byitself'.Thisandthenext
paragraphparallelPosteriorAnalylicsI4.73b510.'"Animal"ispartof
Callias'formula'expressesintheformalmodewhat'animal(i.e.being
ananimal)ispartofCallias'substance'expressesinthematerialmode
(seeD24.1023a356):viz.thatCalliasisessentiallyananimal.The
idiomusedina267,'FiswhatitistobeCallias',conveysthat.F(i.e.
beingF)isthewholeofCallias'essencei.e.thepredicate'F'and
thosewhichitentailsaretheonlyessentialpredicatesofCallias.Evenif
Aristotleisrighttocitethename'Callias'itselfassuchapredicate(a27),
itissurprisingthathedoesnotcite'man',whichinhisopiniongivesa
true,andatthesametimenontrivial,answertothequestion'whatisit
tobeCallias?'"AndwhatitistobeCallias"(a27)maymean'and
anythingelsethatanswersthequestion"whatisittobeCailias?"'
otherwise"and"musthavetheforce'i.e.'.
Thesensesof'initsownright'inthisparagraphandthenextevidently
correspondtothefirstsenseof'by'in1022214.Calliasisgoodby(virtue
of)gooditself,viz.theaffectiongoodnessontheotherhandheisaman
andananimalbyhimself,andso(itisimplied)notbyvirtueofthe
affectionsmanhoodandanirnality.InthisimplieddenialAristotlemay
beinfluencedbythefollowingconsiderations.Because'good'isan

Page169

adjective,Greek'Usagepermitsitsemploymentnotonlytodescribe
possessorsoftheaffectionorpropertygoodnessbutalsoasanameof
goodnessitself(Z6.1031b228).Thisbeingso,itiseasytosupposethat
therelationbetweengoodnessontheonehandandgoodmen,goodapples,good
arguments,etc.,ontheotherhandisarelationbetweentwo
typesofgoodthing,thefirsttypegood'byitself',thesecondtypegood
byhavingthefirstsomehowinit(cf.Categories5.2a29'34inasimilar
wayhewillarguein1022a2932thatamanispalebyhavingapale
surfacesomehowinhim).Thusinplaceoftheanalysisfamiliartous,'an
appleisgoodbybeingsomethingthathasgood(ness)',Aristotle'sanalysis
is'anappleisgoodbyhavingsomethingthatisgood(intheprimary
sense)'.Thisanalysisisnotavailableinthecaseofnounslike'man'and
'apple',whichdonoteverfunctionasnamesofpropertiesandsocannot
bethoughtofasapplyingtoconcreteindividualsinamerelysecondary
sense.Socratesisamannotbyhavingsomethinginhimthatisaman,
butsimplybybeingaman"byhimself".But(i)thisargumentdoes
notproveitfalsetosaythatCalliasisamanby(virtueof)humanity,
sinceitiswrongtosupposethatthatmeans'byvirtueofhumanity's
beingaman'(cf.Locke,EssayII.23.3)and(ii)theargumentdoesnot
leadtotheconclusionthatAristotlewants,foritwouldmakeCallias
e.g.abachelor'byhimself'(since'bachelor'isanoun)althoughheisnot
abacheloressentially:nounpredicatesdonotcoincidewithessential
predicates.Thereseems,therefore,tobeanerrorembodiedinAristotle's
choiceoftheexpression'byitself'or'initsownright'asamarkof
essentialpredication.

1022a27.Seeprecedingnote.

1022a29.ThisparagraphparallelsPosteriorAnalyticsI4.73a37 b3.
Theprimarypalethingis'thepaleitself',i.e.theaffectionpallor(cf.
6.1031b228).Butamongthe"recipients"ofthisaffection,i.e.what
weshouldcallpalethings,someareagainpriortoothersforinstancea
manispale'byvirtueof'hisskinsbeingpale(1022a1617).Thissecond
contrastleadsAristotletosaythattheman'sskin,andingeneralsurfaces,
areinanewsensepale'byvirtueofthemselves'.Thepriorityhere
invokedisconceptual:itisnotpossibletounderstandwhatitisforaman
tobepalewithoutunderstandingwhatitisforasurfacetobepale,but
theconveneispossible.Thissenseof'initsownright'isopposedtothe
senseof'coincidentally'usede.g.atCategories6.5a38 b4.

Aristotle'scontentionthatamanisaliveinhisownrightbecausea
partofhim,hissoul,istheprimaryrecipientoflifeshouldbecontrasted
withPhysicsV1.224a2134andVIII4.254b712,wherehesaysthata
thingwillnotchangeorbechangedinitsownrightifitdoessobyhaving
aportionofitselfdoso,

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a
1022 32.Thereferencetothemultiplicityof'causes'ofamanseems
atoncetodisqualifythatexamplefromdisplayingthesenseof'initsown
right'thattheparagraphdefines.Yetitmustbeintendedtodisplayit
sothemeaningmustbethatalthoughmanycauses(orreasons)canbe
giventoexplainwhysomethingisaman,noreasonneedbegiventoexplain
whyamanisaman.'Whyshouldthetallestanimalonthisfarmbea
man?'makesgoodsense(answer:'it'sapigfarm'),butnot'whyshould
amanbeaman?'nor,lesstrivially,'whyshouldapoetbeaman?'The
latterare,inawaysself.explanatory.Thissenseof'initsownright'is
opposedtothesenseof'coincidentally'discussedatD30.1025a2130.It
reappearsatPosteriorAnalyticsI4.73b1016.

1022a35.Thetextandpunctuationofthisfinalsentencearealtogether
dubious.ThetranslationadoptedfollowsRoss'sreading,thoughwithout
anystrongconvictionthatitcanbearthemeaningthathegivesit,viz.
'anFisinitsownrightwhatholdsgoodofFsalone,andofallFs'.If
thisisright,thesenseof'initsownright'isthatusedatD30.1025a304:
atriangleisinitsownrightafigurewhoseanglesadduptotworight
angles,becauseallandonlytrianglesaresuch(cf.PosteriorAnalyticsI
4.75b2574a3).

Chapter19

ItisdoubtfulwhetherAristotle'sword,anymorethanitsEnglish
equivalent'disposition',necessarilyconnotedanarrangementofparts.
InCategories8Aristotlehimselfusesit(Ackrill'condition')tocoverany
qualitiesthat"areeasilychangedorquicklychanging",andalthough
theexamplesgiventhere,hotnessandchillandsicknessandhealth,
wouldhavebeenthoughtbyhimtoinvolvearrangementsofthepartsof
thebodiesthathavethem,thatfactisnotmentionedinthedefinition.
Anarrangementbycapacityisperhapsanorderingof(nonspatial)
partswithrespecttostrengthorimportance,asinthedispositionsof
democracyanddaydreaming.Rosssuggeststhatanarrangementby
formistheclassificationofformsorspeciesunderagenus,i.e.atreeof
Porphyryifso,thegenuswouldbethewholewhosedispositioncon
sistedofthearrangementofitsspeciesasparts(cf.D25.1023b17).

Chapter20

'Hexis',theverbalnounfrom'echein',tohaveorpossess,hasthreemain
senses,(1)possessions(2)state,(3)wearing.InthischapterAristotle
ignoressense(1),inwhich'hexis'isopposedto'lack'or'privation'(see
Categories10.12a2613a17).Sense(2)arisesfromthecommonGreek

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constructionofthecognateverb'echein'withanadverbswherebyfor
instance'Ihavewell'means'Iaminagoodstate'(cf.Nicomachean
EthicsII5.1105b256).InhissecondparagraphAristotleexplains
sense(2)bymeansoftheword'disposition',althoughinCategories
8.8b269a13statesanddispositionsaredistinguishedasdifferentkindsof
quality,andtheformerincludeknowledge,whichisnotamatterof
beingdisposedwellorill.

Aristotlemayhavebeenpromptedtogiveprominencetothespecial
sense(3)inwhich'hexis'means'wearing'byapassageinPlato'sTheae
titus.BothPlatoandAristotlemakeplaywiththedistinctionbetween
possessingandusing(Plato,Euthydemus280bd,Aristotle,.Nicomachean
EthicsI8.1098b311099a7)andbetweenbeinginacertainstatese.g.
beingvirtuous,andfunctioninginaccordancewiththatstate,e.g.doing
somethingvirtuous(NicomacheanEthicsX6.1176a33 b2).Commonlythe
word'hexis'isusedforthefirstmemberofthispairbutatTheaetetus
197bcthehexisofknowledgeiscomparedwithwearingacoatand
havingholdofbirdsinanaviary,andcontrastedwiththemerepossession
(ktesis)ofthesethings.InhisfirstparagraphAristotledrawsattentionto
thisdeviantsense,inwhich'hexis'goesonthesamesideofthedistinction
as'functioning'.

Whenhesaysthat"itisnotpossibletopossessthiskindofpossession",
heimpliesnotthatother'functionings'canbepossessed,butthatother
kindsofhexiscanbe.Thusonecanspeakofhavingorpossessingastate
ofhealth,butnotofpossessingthewearingofclothesortheexerciseof
sight(orindeedthepossessionofsight).ButthereasonAristotlegives
forthisrestrictionisinadequate,forthepossibilityofpossessingawearing
wouldgeneratearegressonlyifthatpossessionitselfhadthesense
'wearing'yetwedonotwearastateofhealth.Thetruthisthathis
regressargumentexplainsonlytheimpossibilityofpossessingagenuine
possession,acasewhichhedoesnotmention.

Chapter21

Thisbriefchapterdoesnotgiveasatisfactorysurveyofthesensesin
whichAristotleactuallyusestheword'affection'('pathos'),thechiefof
whichare:(1)stateorcondition,(2)property,(3)coincident,i.e.non
essentialproperty,(4)quality,(5)feeling,(6)happening,(7)misfortune.
'Modification'(traditionally'alteration')isdefinedbyAristotleas
"changeinrespectofquality"(PhysicsV2.226a267)andas,"alteration
inrespectofaffection"( 2.1069b912).Qualities"inrespectofwhich
itispossibletobemodified"canbecontrastedstherefore,onlywith
qualitiesinrespectofwhichnochangeispossibleatall.Theseare
differentiae,i.e.essentialqualities(cf.TopicsIV5.128a268,Physics
V2.226a279).InthediscussionofqualityinCatvgorivs8affections

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a
aretreatedasaspeciesofquality(9 289),butlaterdistinguishedfrom
qualities(10a910).

ItischaracteristicofAristotle'sslipshodsemanticsthatheusesthree
differenttypesofexpression,'thepale','sweet','heaviness',asnamesof
qualities.'Thepale'canservetonamethequalitypallor,butalsomeans
'thatwhichhaspallor''pale'and'sweet'ontheirownarenotnamesat
all.

Forthischapter'ssecondsense,"actualmodifications",Aristotle
sometimespreferstheterm'pathesis'(PhysicsIII3.202a224).

Chapter22

'Steresis','lack'(traditionally'privation'),derivesfromaverbwhosemain
passivesenseis'bedeprivedof','lose'butthesense'loss'(1022b31,cf.
D5.1015a24)ismuchlesscommonthan'lack'inAristotle.Possession
andlackarealsodiscussedatCategories10.12a2613a17seealsoQ1.
1046a315.

1022b22. 2.1004a1016describesalack,bycontrastwithadenial,
asimplying"acertainnature[orcharacteristic]...asthesubjectof
whichthelackisstated":i.e.forallFthereissomenatureGwhich
everythinglackingFmustpossess.Thuswhatlackssightmustpossess
(presumably)eyessothatthe 2sensediffersfromthatofthepresent
paragraph,inwhichplantsaresaidtolacksight.Indeed,ifwecan
assumethateverypossessionischaracteristicofsomethingorother,the
sensegiveninthepresentparagraphignoresthedistinctionbetween
lackanddenialaltogether.Unfortunatelyitisnotclearwhetherornot
thatassumptionmaybemade,sinceAristotledoesnotindicatethe
criteriaforbeing"characteristic".Whenhesaysinthenextparagraph,
forinstance,thatsightischaracteristicofthegenuswithinwhichmoles
areaspecies,doeshemeanthatmostmembersofthegenusseeorthatall
membersofthegenushavetheapparatusforseeing,evenifnotinwork
ingorder?

1022b27."Andequallytooif...":doesAristotlemean'onlyif'(e.g.
thatamanwithoutuncharacteristicvisualpowerseyesinthebackofhis
head,theabilitytoseethroughfogortodiscernthestarsindaytimeis
notsaidtolacksight),or'if'(e.g.thatamanwithnoriebutsuchun
characteristicpowersissaidtolacksight)?

1022b32.AccordingtoPriorAnalylicsI46.51b258predicatessuchas
'isinvisible','isfootless',arenotequivalentto'isnotvisible','isnot
footed',sincetheformer"haveacertainsubject",i.e.implysome
positiveproperty.Inthelanguageofthepresentchapter,whatisin
visiblemustbecharacteristicallyvisible,andsounds,forinstance,are
neithervisiblenorinvisible.Cf.I4.1055b811.

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a a
1023 2.Cf.D12.1019 236.

1023a4.ForintermediatestatesseeCategories10.11b3812a25and
12b2613a17.

Chapter23

Thisistheordinarywordfor'have'('echein')itismostlyrenderedby
'possess'inthistranslation.Aristotle'sfourseinesanswerto'control',
'harbour','contain',and'restrain'.Hiswordsfor'wear'('ampechesthai'),
'contain'('periechein'),and'fuse'('sunechein')areallcompoundsof
'echein'.Thingsfusedarecontinuous(suneches,seeD6.1015b36and
PhysicsV3.227a1112).ForthetreatmentoftheAtlasmythby"authori
tiesonnature"seeDeCarloII1.284a206.

WemustunderstandAristotletomeanthatbeinginistheconverse
relationtopossessing:thecityisin(?thepowerof)thetyrant,the
diseaseinthebody,theliquidinthebucket,andtheoverlyingweights
in(?bearingon)thecolumns.Thefirstandlastofthesesensesseem
highlystrained.

Thereisanindependentdiscussionofthesensesof'possessing'in
Categories15.

Chapter24

1023a26."Everythingmeltableisoutofwater":atD4.1015a10thesame
propositionisstatedtentatively,whichencouragestheopinionthatwhat
Aristotlemeansbyitisthatmeltablesarecomposedentirelyofwater.
MeteorologicaIV,possiblynotbyAristotle,holdsthattrueofbronze(IV
10.389a8),butstatesitofthewholeclassofmeltablesonlywithquali
fications(IV8.385a2533)andexceptionse.g.iron,whichismeltable
(IV6.383a2730),iscompoundedofwaterandearth(383a32).Itis
impossibletobesure,then,whetherAristotleissayingthatthe"first
genus"ofathing'smatterisanyelementwhichthemattercontains,or
onlythatelement(ifany)ofwhichthematterissolelycomposedsothat
anironstatueisnot"outof"water,althoughitcontainswater.Ifthe
latteristight,Aristotlemayintendbutthisisalsounclearasimilar
restrictiononthe"lastform"or'infimaspecies'ofathingsmatter,tothe
effectthatapartlyironstatueisnot"outof''iron,althoughitcontains
iron.

1023a31.Aballmaybe(A)madeoutofbronzeinanothersense,not
separatelylisted,itis(B)outofbronzeplussphericity(itsmatterplus
shape).Differentlyagain,thetophalfoftheballis(C)apartoutofwhat

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isitself(B)outofcertainmatterandshape.Havingslippedfromtalking
ofmattertotalkingofmatterplusshape,Aristotlefeelsitnecessaryto
justifyhisimpliedclaimthatonlythelatterisa"whole":theshape
brings"fulfilment"tothematter.

1023a35.Astheword'man'isequivalenttoanexpressioninwhich
'twofooted'isapart,so,accordingtoAristotle'sprimitivetheoryof
meaning,theform(?concept)manhastheconceptstwofootedandanimal
aspartsandtwofootedandanimalarethenonperceptiblematterofthe
formman(cfD25.1023b224).Verbal"elements",i.e.soundedletters,
areboththeperceptibleandthenonperceptiblematterofsyllables:the
elementsthemselvesareconstituentsofthesyllables,andtheword
'element'isaconstituentofthedefinitionof'syllable'(Z10.1034b256).

1023b3.WhydoesAristotlesaythatplantsaremadeoutof"acertain
part"ofearth?Hecannotmeanthatplantsdonot,eitherseverallyor
collectively,useupalltheearththereis,forthatistrueof,say,the
relationofstatuestobronzenorthatplantscontaininthemsomebut
notalloftheelementsofearth,forhebelievesthatearthisitselfan
element.

1023b5.Nightis"outof"daynotonlyinthesenseofsucceedingit
("successiveinrespectoftime")butinthestrongersenseofreplacingit
("havingalterationintooneanother'').

Chapter25

AlthoughAristotleundertakestoexplaintheword'meros','part',he
substitutesintwoplacesadiminutiveform,translated'portion'.

1023b12.'Whatissubtractedfromaquantityquaquantity"isany
thingwhosesubtractioninvolvesadiminutionofsizeAlexanderremarks
thatqualitieslikesweetnessandheatarenotpartsofthingsthough
subtractedfromthings.

1023b15.Theparts"whichsirethemeasureofathing"arethose
whichdivideitwithoutremainder,itsaliquotpartsorfactors.

1023b17.Aristotle'streatmentofgeneraandformsasbothnon
quantitativeandrelatedaswholetopartisindicativeofhisvagueness
abouttheirstatus.Beingnegroisnotapartofbeinghuman,andhumanity
haspartsonlybecausethewordistakentodenotethehumanrace,
whichisaquantitativesetorclass.

1023b19.Thebronzecubeandthebronzeballareexamplesof
"somethingthatpossessesaform".Beingquantities,theywillalsohave

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partsinthefirstsensebutthecube'sbronzematerialandangularshape
are'parts'inanewsense,becausetheycannotbe''subtractedfroma
quantityquaquantity"withoutthemitwouldbe,perhaps,acopper
cubeorabronzepyramid,notasmallerbronzecube.

1023b22.Thedivisionofaformintoparts,mentionedat1023b20,is
notillustrateduntilb22:if'isaG'ispartofthedefinitionof'isanF',
beingaGispartoftheformbeinganF(cf.D24.1023a35 b2).

Chapter26

1023b26.Inthetintclause(b267)Aristotleexplainswhatmoreis
requiredofawholethancontainingparts,viz.thatitcontainallthe
partsofthatwhole.Hemighthaveaddedthatanythingcontaining
partscouldbecalledawholesomething(butnotalways"naturally"?)
e.g.aperiodcontainingninemonthsisawholeninemonththoughnot
awholeyear.

Intherestoftheparagraphfromb27hedistinguishestworelations
thatmayholdbetweenawholeanditsparts.Thefirst(b2932)isthe
relationofaclass("universal")toitsmembers.NothinginD25corre
spondstothissection(1023b1719concernedclassinclusion),inwhich
Aristotleavoidstheword'part'infavourofthevaguer'contents'.The
wordfor'whole'('holos')iscognatewithhistechnicalterm'universal
('katholou').Auniversalwholeisdistinguishedbybeingpredicatedofits
contentsseverally,asthegenusanimalispredicatedofmen,horses,and
gods:theyare"alleachoneonething",i.e.oneandthesame
thing(thewords''eachone"markoffthisrelationshipfromthat
of,say,ashoetoitsparts,whicharecollectivelybutnotseverallya
shoe).

Afterb32Aristotleturnstotherelationmorenaturallydescribedas
thatofwholetopart,andtreatedbrieflyunderthefirstsenseof'part'in
D25.Hisopeningremarkimpliesthathetakesthisnewrelationtobe
confinedtowholesthatare"continuousandlimited".Hemaythink
thatsuchdiscontinuouswholesasthe(unlimited)genusanimalora
(limited)barnfulofanimalshavebeendisposedofintheprecedinglines
butthatisnotso,sincethoselinesexaminedaparticularrelationofsuch
groupsandclasses,viz.totheirmembers,andtheyarcrelatedtotheir
subgroupsinadifferentway(itisnottruethateachkindofanimalisan
animal).Aristotlealsoignoressuchdiscontinuouswholesasthepartsof
anunassembledtoy('doesthatboxcontainthewholeaeroplane?').
Thesecannotbeintendedbythe"potentialconstituents"ofb34,which
hetellsusare(i)theconstituentsofsomethingcontinuousand(ii)the
primecaseofacontinuousandlimitedwhole.Onthecontrary,"potential

Page176

constituents"seemtobepartswhichcouldbebutneverhavebeen
separated:e.g.anislandislessofawholeifanarmoftheseausedto
divideitintotwo.Thatwouldexplainwhyhethinksartefactslessgood
examplesofwholesthanmostnaturalobjects(b346,cf.D6.1016b11).
Itremainspuzzlingthatheconfineshisattentionsinthissectionsto
quantitiesthatarecontinuousandlimited.

1024a1.Thisparagraphtacitlydropstherequirementofcontinuity,
butseemstoimplystillthatwholesmustbelimited(ifAlexanderis
rightinsointerpreting"possessingabeginning,amiddle,andanend").
Atanyratewearenottoldunderwhatconditions,ifany,quantitiesnot
ofthatkindarecalledwholes.Aristotleproceedstodistinguishtwotypes
oflimitedquantity:type1arethoseinwhichposition(sc.oftheparts)
makesnodifference,type2thoseinwhichitmakesadifference.The
clumsyexpression"anythatadmitboth"ineffectsubdividesthelatter
intotype2aquantities,inwhichpositionmakesadifferencetotheshape
butnotthenature,andtype2bquantities,inwhichitmakesadifference
tothenature.Types2aand2bare'wholes',types1and2a'alls'.Thereis
adistinctiondrawninthepassagebetweenthesingularandpluralofthe
Greekwordfor'all'forthesakeofclarityinthetranslation,Aristotle's
singularhasbeenrenderedbythesingular'all'(asin'allthewine'),his
pluralby'every'(asin'everyhouse',i.e.'all(the)houses')butina3the
Greekpluralmeans'instancesof(thesingular)all'shence"alls".In
Englishwemayusethesingular'all'withoutrestriction('allthewine',
'allthehouse'),but'whole'onlyofcountables(not'thewholewine'),
Aristotle'susageis,rightlyorwrongly,different:hedisallowse.g.
'allthehouse'under2bandallows'thewholewax'under2a,and
thedistinctionsthathebasesonthesewordshavenothingtodowith
countability.

Whenhesaysthatpositionmakesadifferencetotheshapeofwaxhe
presumablymeansthattheshapeofapieceofwaxcanbechangedby
rearrangementofitsparts.Type1quantitiesarethereforethosein
whichthisisnotpossible,i.e.fluids.ButAristotle'sexample,water,isan
unlimitedquantity,andshouldbereplacedbyponds,cupfulsofwater,
etc.Type2aquantitiesarehomogeneousnonfluids,but(i)itisa
mysteryhowAristotleimaginesthathissecondexample,acloaksis
somethingwhosenaturewillsurvivetranspositionand(ii)wemight
expect,followingD6.1016b1117,thatnothingwhosenaturesurvives
transpositionwouldbeawhole.Noexamplesaregivenofthethirdtype,
2bapartfromordinaryobjectslikeshoesandhouseswemayinstance,
withRoss,the(discontinuous)musicalscalementionedinthenext
chapter(1024a21).

1024a8.Thepurposeofthefinalsentenceisperhapstosanctionthe
useof'every'('all'plural)withwordsbeforewhich'all'(singular)has

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beendisallowed.itisunclearwhethereverycaseofasingular'all'can,
like'allthisnumber',beparaphrasedintermsof'every'.

Chapter27

Thisword,'kolobos',ishardlyusedbyAristotleoutsidethezoological
works,andthereasonforitsinclusionhereisamystery.Thechapter,
aloneinD,doesnotdistinguishmorethanonesensebutitisanad
mirableexampleofadefinitionbydivision.Perhapsitstartedlifeasan
exercisessetbyortoAristotle,whichwascommendedandpreservedas
amodelanswer.

Akolobosthingistruncated)stunted,lopped,docked,orotherwise
abbreviated.

"Itmuststillbeacup"(a15):orperhaps,astheargumentrequires,
'the[sc.same]cupmuststillbe'.

Chapter28

1024a29.Aristotle'sawkwarddefinitionoftheeverydaysenseinwhich
'genos'means'family'or'clan'isintendedtoconveythatafamilyisan
unbrokensuccessionofoffspringandthate.g.'Hellen'sfamilystill
exists'means'thesuccessionofoffspringisunbrokenfromHellen'stime
tothepresentday'."Thingspossessingthesameform":thusHomerand
theIliaddonotmakeafamily.

1024a31."Broughtthemintoexistence":theverbheretranslated
'bring','kinein',iselsewhere'effectchange',asat1024b8whichsummarizes
thisparagraph.Fortheopinionthatmotherscontributematterandnot
formtotheiroffspringseeDeGenerationeAnimaliumII4.740b245and
otherreferencesinRoss.

1024a36.Thisandthenextparagrapharesummarizedtogetherat
1024b89,whichdefinesinathirdwaythesamesenseastheydefineina
firstandasecond.

1024b6.The"subject"ofadifferentia(e.g.twofooted)iswhatit
divides(animal)ratherthanwhatitconstitutes(man)orisotherwise
predicatedof(Socrates).Aristotleseemstopictureitasthedoughfrom
whichacuttercutsshapes,apicturewhichfitsboththerelationofgenus
todifferentiaandformandtherelationofmattertoformandconcrete
individual.Thissimilaritymaybesufficienttojustifyuseoftheword
'matter'tocovergenus,butgenera(suchasanimal)remainquitea

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a
differentkindofmatterfromstuffs(suchasflesh)cf.Z12.1038 68,
I8.1058a234.

1024b9."Firstsubjects"bothwordsaredifficult.(1)Iftheymean
'highestgenera',i.e.figuresofpredicationorcategories,theproviso
aboutanalysisisredundant(see1024b1516).(2)Iftheymean'last
forms'('infimaespecies'),theprovisoaboutanalysiscannotbesatisfied.
(3)Alexanderplausiblyconstruestheprovisoasapplyingnottoformsor
generabuttokindsofmatter,suchasgoldandsilver,whichhavea
common'analysis'becausebotharecomposedofwater(MeteorologicaIV
10.389a7)hence'lastmatter'.SoRoss,andcomparethefirstofthetwo
sensesof'firstmatter'atD4.1015a710,and'lastmatter'atD6.1016a
1920,1017a5,D24.1023a278.(4)Butsense(3)willnotfitthefirstsub
jectsofformandmatterinthosecases,asAlexandersays,themeaning
mustbe"thepartsoftheirdefiningformulae".

1024b12.Cf.D7.1017a2231.

Chapter29

Aristotlecommonlyprefersthenoun'falsehood'totheneutersingular
adjective'false',althoughsomeofthethingsdiscussedinthischapter
e.g.dreamswouldnotnaturallybecalledfalsehoodsbyus.His
classificationissurprising.Weshouldexpectthemaindistinctiontobe
betweenfalseobjectsoreventsi.e.thingsthatarenotastheyseem,like
dreams,stagescenery,andfalsebeardsandfalsestatementsand
beliefs.Instead,heignoresstatementsandbeliefsinfavourofstatesof
affairs(adiagonal'sbeingcommensurablewithitsside,yoursitting
down),whichhegroups,togetherwiththingsthatarenotastheyseem,
asfalse"actualthings".Inthesecondparagraphhedealsnotprimarily
withfalsestatements(like'acircleisaplanefigurecontainedbythree
straightlines')butwithdescriptions(like'aplanefigurecontainedby
threestraightlines')whicharefalseofonething,trueofanother.The
examinationoftruthandfalsityinQ10likewisepromisesatreatmentof
"actualthings",butinfactdiscussesbeliefsandstatements,with
particularattentiontoaspecialproblemnotraisedinthepresentchapter.
SeealsoE4.

1024b17.Thetreatmentoffalsestatesofaffairsisnotadequate.
Aristotlesaysthatyoursittingdownisfalsewhenitis"notcompounded",
i.e.whenyouandsittingdowndonotcombine.Iftheydonot,thereisno
suchstateofaffairs:afalsestateofaffairsisonethatdoesnotexist("in
thiswaythesethingsarenotthingsthatare").Thisignoresthereal
problem,forfalsestatementsarenotnonexistent.Wemightsaythata

Page179

falsestatementdescribeswhatisactuallynonexistent,ornotcombined,
asexistentorcombined(cf.Q10.1051b35),sorevealingthecrucial
fact,carefullyexpoundedbyPlatointheSophist(260c264b),thatevery
statementmustdescribesomethingassomething,saysomethingabout
something.Butifso,talkofthingscombiningintostatesofaffairsdoes
nothelptoexplainfalsehood.'Youaresittingdown',iffalse,isfalse
notbecauseitdescribesascompoundedwhatisnotcompoundedoras
existentwhatisnotexistentsbutbecauseitdescribesassittingdownwhat
isnotsittingdown.Ifthelatterexplanationisnotalreadyintelligible,
theformerwillnotmakeitso.

1024b26.'Theformula(logos)ofsoandso'iscommonlyusedby
Aristotletomean'thelogosthatsayswhatitistobesoandso'.An
individualsuchasSocratescannothavemorethanonelogosofthiskind,
inthesensethattrueanswerstothequestion'whatisittobe(that)
Socrates?'cannothavemorethanonemeaning.Ontheotherhand,
morethanonenonsynonymousdescriptioncanbetrulygivenofthesame
Socrates.Inthissecond"way"thelogos'artistic'willbetrueofSocrates
providedthat"SocratesandartisticSocratesare...thesame",i.e.
Socratesisartistic.WhydoesAristotlesaythatfalselogoiare"quafalse,
ofthingsthatarenot"and''takenbaldly,thelogosofnothing''?Alogos
maybeacompletestatement,trueorfalse,orapredicativedescription,
trueorfalseofsomething.Aristotleinsistsonbothtakingsomelogoitobe
false,notfalseofsoandso(hencecompletestatements),andtakingall
logoitobelogoiofsomething(asdescriptionsare).Hencefalsestatements
mustdescribefalsestatesofaffairswhich,aswehaveseen,are"things
thatarenot".

TheobjectiontoAntisthenesisabitmuddled.Aristotleattributesto
himtherestrictivetheorythatadescriptionofSocratesmustdescribe
whatitistobeSocrates(cf.Sophist251ac),andclaimsthatthis"results"
indenialofthepossibilityofcontradiction.Buttheresultdoesnotfollow
unlessdescriptionsofwhatitistobeSocrateshavetobecorrectandif
theyhavetobecorrect,itfollowswithouttherestriction,sinceevenif
thereweremanydescriptionsofSocratestheywouldnotcontradictone
anothersolongasnoneofthemwerefalse.Aristotlesees,ofcourse,that
Antisthenes'mistakehadsomethingtodowithconfusionaboutfalse
hood(a32"thatiswhy").Antisthenesmusthavedeniedthepossibility
offalsehood,andhisargumentmusthavebeen:sincefalsedescriptions
describe"thingsthatarenot",thingsthatare,likeSocrates,cannotbe
falselydescribed.Theargument'sfallacydependsontheambiguityof
'describethingsthatarenot':'Socratesishandsome'describesastateof
affairsthatisnot,butalsodescribesSocrates,whois.ButAristotledoes
notcommentonthisambiguity.Instead,hemerelyassertsthatapar
ticularthingmaybedescribed(legesthai)bythelogosof(whatitistobe)

Page180

somethingelse.Iftobetwo(e.g.miles)istobedouble(onemile),tobe
eightorninemilesisnottobedoubleonemilebutwemaydescribe
eightmilesasdouble(truly,foritisdoublefourmiles),andwemay
describeninemilesasdouble(falsely,foritisnotdoubleanywhole
numberofmiles).Itisprobablethat"another'sformula"means'the
expressionthatsays(truly)whatitistobesomethingelse'.Ifso,Aristotle
leavesnoroomforfalsehoodslike'Socratesspeaks'or'Theaetetusflies',
forinhisview'speaks'and'flies'donotexpresswhatitistobeanything
(speechdoesnotspeakatall,andspeakersarenotidentifiedbythe
activity).

1025a1.Aristotle'sfalsemanisnotthemanpronetoerrorbutthe
deceiverorimpostor.InPlato'sHippiasMinorSocratesarguesthatthe
"wily"Odysseusmustbecapableoftruthaswellasfalsity,andsotrueas
wellasfalse(369b37).WithAristotle'sreplyRosscomparesNicomachean
EthicsIV7.1127b14:"itisnotthecapacitythatmakestheboaster,
butthechoice."Hippiasdoubtlesshadthesamepointinmindwhenhe
objectedagainstSocrates(370e89)thatOdysseuswasfalsewillingly
orintentionally(theGreek'hekon'coversboth).Ata8Aristotledigresses
todealwithSocrates'responsetothisobjection.Hiscavilattheexample
oflimpingimpliesthatSocratesisentitledtoconcludeonlythatpretended
failuresarebetterthaninvoluntaryfailures.Thisisunfair,forSocrates'
'induction'usedanumberofexamplesnotinvolvingpretencein
generalSocratesarguedthatexcellenceinanactivityiscompatiblewith
intentional,butnotwithunintentional,miscarriages.

Chapter30

pp.21921On'coincidence'seealsoG1,G4.1007a20 b18,andE2.

1025a14.AtTopicsI5.102b47Aristotledefinesacoincidenceas
"whatisneitheradefinitionnorapeculiaritynoragenus,andyetholds
goodoftheactualthingandwhatadmitsofholdinggoodofanyone
andthesamethingandofnotholdinggoodofit".Thewordswithwhich
'coincidence'iscontrastedinthefirstpartofthisdefinitionapply
primarilytokindsofthingratherthantoindividualse.g.beingrecipient
ofgrammaticalknowledge(102a1820)isapeculiarityofmen,notofany
oneman.Similarlyinthepresentchapter,thefindingoftreasureisa
coincidenceforatrenchdiggerbecausetrenchdiggersasaclassdonot
usuallyfindtreasurewhendiggingitdoesnotmatteriftheparticular
trenchdiggerinquestionhasalwaysorusuallybeensuccessful.Tothat
extenttheexpression'iscoincidentally...'workslike'isinmostcases...'
or'isonaverage...'.Butwhereasthepredicate'hasonaverage2.34
children'cannotintelligiblybeaffirmedordeniedofaparticularparent,

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Aristotleimpliesthat'coincidentallyfoundtreasure'canbeintelligibly
predicatedofaparticulartrenchdigger,notonlyoftheclass.Theprice
ofthisextendedusageistomakethecontext'...iscoincidentallyF'
referentiallyopaque,inthesensethatitmaybeacoincidencethatsome
trenchdiggerfoundtreasurebutnotthatsomearchaeologistdid,even
thoughthetrenchdiggerandthearchaeologistareoneandthesame
person.InAristotle'sownlanguage,itwasacoincidenceforthetrench
digger'quatrenchdigger'or'quahimself'thathefoundtreasure,butnot
quaarchaeologist'.(ThisisnotexactlyAristotle'swayofputtingthe
point:insteadof'xiscoincidentallyFquax'hewouldsaysimply'xis
coincidentallyF',andinsteadof'yisnoncoincidentallyFquay'he
wouldsaysimply'yisFquay,orquahimself'cf.a289.)

Inthischaptercoincidenceisopposedtonecessity(cf.TopicsI
5.102b6"whatadmitsofholdinggood...andofnotholdinggood"),
butinE2thecontrastisalsowithwhathappensalways:seenoteson
E2.1026b24.Anotherinconsistencycallsforcommenthere:inthe
Topicspassageitisimpliedthatanythingthatholdsgoodnonnecessarily
ofitssubjectisacoincidence,buthereandinE2coincidenceisopposed
alsotowhatholdsgoodforthemostpart(orasarule,orusually).The
reasonfortheextrarestrictionseemstobethatAristotlethoughtofa
coincidenceassomethingstandinginneedofexplanation.Thus'the
doctorhealedCoriscus'isselfexplanatory,whereas'thehousebuilder
healedCoriscus'needsextrainformationtoexplainwhyitistrue,e.g.
thatthehousebuilderinquestionisalsoadoctor(E2.1026b371027a2
thisexampleclarifiesthecrypticfourthsentencethathehealedholds
goodofthehousebuilder,butnotbecausethesubject,time,orplaceare
asspecified).Aristotlewassurelyrightinholding,bythetimehecameto
writethischapterandE2,thatoccurrencescanoftenbeexplainedby
referencetousual,thoughnonconstant,conjunctions:doctorsdonot
alwayshealtheirpatients,yetaman'sbeingadoctorexplainshis
successwithCoriscus'illness.Buthewaswronginholdingthatoccur
rencescanalwaysbeexplainedby,andneverwithout,suchusualor
constantconjunctionswhicharecertainlynotsufficient(e.g.sufferers
frommusculardystrophyusuallydiebeforethirty,butthisvictimdiedat
22throughfallingoutofanaeroplane)andprobablynotnecessary(e.g.
victimsofrudenessdonotusuallycommitmurder,butthereasonwhy
thismanmurderedwasthathehadbeenrudelyaddressed),Aristotle
mayhaveconfusedexplanationorgivingthe'ratioessendi'with
confirmationorgivingthe'ratiocognoscendi'.Itispossiblythecasethat,
foreveryx,thetruthof'Fx'issomereasonfortaintingthatGxifandonlyif
FsareatleastusuallyGbutnotthecasethat,foreveryx,thetruthof
'Fx'isthereasonwhyGxeitheriforonlyifFsareatleastusuallyG.

WhenAristotlesays(a245)that"thereisnodefinitecauseofthe
coincidental,butachanceone,andthatisindefinite"hedoesnotmean

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thatitisimpossibletogiveareasonforacoincidentaloccurrence,but
onlythatinthestatementofthecoincidencethereasonisleft"indefinite",
i.e.notspecifiedcf.E2.1027a58.Theexampleofthesailorwhovisited
Aeginaissomewhatpuzzling.VisitstoAeginamaybedividedbetween
theintentionalandtheunintentionalbutthatdivisiondoesnotcorre
spondtoonebetweentheusualandtheunusual,orbetweentheself
explanatoryandthenonselfexplanatory.PerhapsAristotlemeansthat
amonglandfallsingeneraltheintentionalaremoreusualthantheun
intentional,buteventhatmightbefalseoflandfallsonsomebarren
island.Norwouldanintentionalvisitexplainitself,althoughthefact
thatitwasintentionalmightbeheldtoexplainittotheextentofmeeting
thequestion'whydidhelandthere?'withthepartialanswer'becausehe
wanted,ormeant,to'.Aristotle'spointinthelastsentenceisthatthis
unintentionallandfallisusual,orselfexplanatory,onlyunderanother
description("quaanotherthing"),viz.'hewaspreventedbyastormfrom
reachinghisdestination'.

1025a30.Inwhatsensedoesthepossessionoftworightangles(i.e.of
angleshavingthatsum)holdgoodofatriangle"initsownright"?Of
thesensesofthatexpressionlistedinD18thefirsttwo(1022a24,27)are
ruledoutbythequalification"withoutbeinginitssubstance".The
third(1022a29,'asprimaryrecipient')doesnotalwaysdemandanew
senseof'coincidence',formanyprimaryrecipientsofFnessarecoinci
dentallyFinthefirstsensee.g.surfacesarecoincidentallypalebecause
neitheralwaysnorusuallypale.Thefourth(1022a32,'selfevidently')
fitswell,sincewhatisselfexplanatorycannotbecoincidentalinAris
totle'sfirstsenseof'coincidental'andwouldhavetobeaccommodated
underanewsense.Andthefifth(1022a35,seenote),ifindeeditcanbe
extractedfromthecorrupttextofD18,istailormadeforAristotle's
examplehere.

Inanycasethenewsenseof'coincidental'whichtheexampledemands
is'nonessential'.Althoughthisnewsenseapplies,asAristotle'sexample
shows,insomecaseswherethefirstsensedoesnot,italsoappliesinevery
casewherethefirstdoes.ItisoddthatAristotledoesnotmakethisclear,
andthathegivessolittlespacetothenewsense,whichisprominentinhis
ownuseoftheword.

"Elsewhere":forreferencesseeBonitz,IndexAristotelicus713b43
714a3.AmongtheAristoteliansensesof'coincidental'notmentionedin
thischapterthemostimportantis'inaderivativesense'seePosterior
AnalyticsI4.73b45and,forpossibleexamplesofitsuse,Categories
6.5a39D7.1017a722,D13.1020a2632.

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MetaphysicsBookEpsilon

Chapter1

ThischapterhasalwaysgivendifficultytoAristotle'sreaders.LikeG1,
itseekstodefinethescopeofmetaphysics,the"primarydiscipline"of
1026a1516andthe"primary[orfirst]philosophy"of1026a24butit
containstwoatfirstsightincompatibledefinitions,oneofwhichmakes
metaphysicsthenonparticular(1025b710)studyofallthingsthatare
(metaphysicageneralis),whiletheotherrestrictsittothe"mostestim
ablegenus"(1026a21,metaphysicaspecialis).Thelastparagraphofthe
chapterattemptstoreconcilethesetwoConflictingconceptions.

1025b3.InthenotesonG1willbefoundcommentson"originsand
causes","quathingthatis","discipline"and"aparticulargenus".The
disciplineswhicharenot''thinking,orthoughtpartaking''arepresum
ablythehumblerpracticalskillslikeknitting.Aristotleassertsthateven
moreexaltedspecialsciencesdonotattempttosayeither(A)whattheir
subjectmatterisor(B)whetheritis,i.e.exists.

(A)Hedoesnotmeantodenythate.g.zoologistsknowandindicate
thattheirsubjectstudiesanimals,butonlytodenythattheyindicate
whatanimalsare,i.e.definethem.Yetthisisstrange,foritseemsneither
impossiblethatazoologistshould"produceastatementof"whatanimals
are,norparticularlyappropriatethatametaphysicianshoulddoitfor
him(thereisnothingofthesortinAristotle'sMetaphysics)."Thereisno
demonstrationofsubstance"isambiguous.(1)Aristotlemaymeanthat
scientists'attemptstodemonstratedefinitionsareunsuccessful,because
theyrelyon"induction"whichachievesonly"someother"inade
quate"mannerofindicatingit".Induction,inAristotle,isthecitation
ofobservedinstanceseithertoestablishormorecommonlyjusttoillus
trate(PosteriorAnalyticsI1.71a910)anddrawattentiontoageneral
truth.Inotherplaceshecontraststhismethodwithsyllogism(e.g.Prior
AnalyticsI25.42a34)andwithdemonstration(e.g.PosteriorAnalytics
I18.81a40 b1).Wemayagreethatdefinitionscannotbeestablished
byinduction,evenifothertruthscanbe,butthreeproblemsremain:
cananymethoddemonstrateadefinition(seePosteriorAnalyticsII
3.90b245,"theprinciplesofdemonstrationsaredefinitions,andof
themwehavealreadyshownthattherearenodemonstrations")?(ii)If
itcan,whyshouldnotzoologistsandothersadoptit?and(iii)why
shouldmetaphysiciansundertakethetask?(2)Alternativelywemay
takeAristotletomeanthatdemonstrationofdefinitionsisimpossibleand
needstobereplacedby"someothermanner".Somuchismade"ob
vious"bythescientists'actualmethodsyettheirpreliminaryinduction,

Page184

whichindicatestheirsubjectmatterbyperceptionorrenderscredible
somehypothesisastowhatitis,isnotthe"manner"needed:itcannot,
evennondemonstratively,"produceanystatementofwhatthegenus
is".Thissolves(i)butstillfailstoexplainwhyscientistscannot,and
metaphysiciansshould,givedefinitions.PartsofAristotle'sMetaphysics
doexhibitanondemonstrativemethodofarrivingatdefinitions,but
notdefinitionsofthesubjectmatterofthespecialsciences.Aristotleneeds
thedistinctionmadeatPosteriorAnalyticsI9,10betweencommonand
specialprinciples.(3)K7.1064a810glosses"Thatiswhyitisalsoplain
fromsuchaninduction[sc.fromthisreviewofthespecialsciences]that
thereisnodemonstrationofsubstanceandofwhatathingis''.Whether
ornotthisgivesAristotle'sgeneralmeaning,itcertainlymisunderstands,
orchanges,theforceof"fromsuchaninduction''.

(B)Insayingthat"thesamethinkingwillindicatewhatatilingisand
whetheritis",Aristotledoesnotmeanthatthesearethesamequestion
(seePosteriorAnalyticsI1.71a1117andII7.92b411),butthatthe
answerstobothquestionsareprinciples(cf.PosteriorAnalyticsI10.76a
316,whereitisinferredthatneitherkindcanbe"shown").

1025b18.Thedivisionof"thinking"anddisciplinesintotheoretical,
practical,andproductiverecursatTopicsVI6.145a15.Theoretical
questionsareoftheform'isthisthecase?'practicalquestionsofthe
form'shouldthisbedone,orhowshouldthisbedone?'andproductive
questionsoftheform'howshouldthisbemade?'Practicalknowledge
isnot,forAristotle,thesameasusefulknowledgewhereaswemightsay
nowadaysthatknowledgeofFrenchismorepracticalthanknowledge
ofLatin,andofFrenchhistorythanRomanhistory,inAristotle'susage
bothofthefirsttwoarepractical,bothofthelasttwotheoretical.
Furthermore,histheoreticalstatementsincludetheparticularand
descriptiveaswellasexplanatorygeneralizations.Thecognateverb
'theorein'isrendered'study'inthistranslation.Ross,inhisbookAristotle
(p.62),seemstointerpretthethreefoldschemedifferently:

Aristotle'sclassificationofthesciences...dividesthemintothetheoretical,
whichaimatknowledgeforitsownsake,thepractical,whichaimatknow
ledgeasaguidetoconduct,andtheproductive,whichaimatknowledgeto
beusedinmakingsomethingusefulorbeautiful.

Thesewordsimplythatthesameitemofknowledge,e.g.howthePolish
borderranin1740,couldbetheoreticalforoneman(theacademic
historian),practicalforanother(thediplomatwhowishestoavoidold
mistakes),andproductiveforathird(themakerofahistoricalatlas).On
theotherinterpretationthatitemofknowledgeistheoreticalhowever
itisused,andevenpracticalandproductiveknowledgemaybepursued
fortheirownsakes,inthesensethatonemaye.g.decidewhattodo

Page185

merelyinordertodoit(butnotmerelyinordertoknowwhattodo,see
A2.982b278,a 1.993b201).

Aristotlearguesthat(a)physicsstudiesthings"inwhichtheoriginof
changeandofkeepingthesameisinthemselves"(i.e.selfchanging
thingsforthedoubleuseof"in"cf.D4.1014b1820andnote)(b)acts
andproductshavetheiroriginsinthedoerandtheproducer(c)
thereforephysicsdoesnotdealwithactsandproducts(d)therefore
physicsistheoretical.Theargumentisweak,becausethereisnothing
tostopadisciplinewhichdealswithselfchangingsubstancesdealing
eoipsowiththeactsandproductsofthosesubstances.Aristotlehasnot
demonstratedthetheoreticalstatusofe.g.anthropology,whichstudies
humanbehaviourbutisnotpracticalonthefirstinterpretation,
becauseitanswersquestionsoftheform'whatisthecase?'onthesecond
becauseitneednotbestudiedasaguidetoconduct.The"since''clause
inb1820doesnotsupportAristotle'sclaimthatphysicsistheoretical,
butperhapsismeanttoexplainwhythequestionisraised.

"Substanceasinaformula":i.e.form,for,accordingtoAristotle,the
formulasayingwhataparticularthingiscanspecifyonlyofwhatsort
thethingisandcannotmentionthematterwhichindividuatesthething
fromothersofthesamesort(cf.D6.1016b323).Therearethustwo
kindsofsubstance:"oneistheform"(Z11.1037a29)orformula(Z
15.1039b20cf.D2.1013a267forthelaxidentificationofthesetwo)
theotheristheconcretething,"formulatakenwithmatter"(Z15.
1039b212)."Yetnotseparablesubstance"isdifficult.Inonesense
(employedintheparagraphbeginning1026a6)noforms,butonly
concretethings,areseparable,viz.separatelyidentifiable.Athing's
formisoften,however,''separableinrespectofformula",PhysicsII
1.193b45,i.e.adefinitionwillmentionitalone.Thethesisis,then,that
althoughphysicsdealswithformsorsortsofthingsasrevealedindefini
tions(Z11.1037a1617),thereisawayexplainedinthenextpara
graphinwhichmatterusuallyalsofeaturesinthosedefinitions.(An
alternativereading,'onlyasnotseparable',isadoptedbyRoss,giving
muchthesamesense.TheGreekisawkwardineithercase.)

1025b28.Althoughdefinitionscannotmentionindividuatingmatter,
theycan"includematter"inadifferentway.Thedefinitionofanose
orananimalwill,ifcomplete,specifythekindofmatterwhichtheform
mustinform:thenose,forinstance,mustamongstotherthingsbemade
offlesh.Thesameistrueof"thesnub"becauseonlynosesaresnub.
WhenAristotlesaysthat,bycontrast,"concavityisindependentof
perceptiblematter"itisunclearwhetherhemeans(1)concaveobjects
donothavetobeofanyparticularkindofmatter,(2)concaveobjectsdo
nothavetobematerialatall,sincetheymaybegeometricalfigures(cf.
Z10.1036a35),(3)thepropertyconcavityisnotmaterial(DeGeneratione

Page186
a
etCorruptioneI4.320 25).Thelastwouldrequire"thesnub"tobe
understoodinthesense'snubness',butsincesnubnessisnotmadeof
flesh,thewayinwhichsnubnesscontainsmatterinitsdefinitionisquite
differentfromthewayinwhichnoses,flesh,oranimalsdo(andcon
cavitydoesnot).FromconfusionofthesetwowaysAristotleelsewhere
developedanargumentthatthesnubcannotbedefinedatall,since,ifit
were,itsdefinitionwouldbe'concavenose',and'snubnose'would
accordinglyhavetomean'concavenosenose'(Z5.1030b291031a1).In
DeSophisticisElenchis(31.182a46)hecametoseethatthisargumentis
wrong'snub'means,not'concavenose'but'(having)concavityofthe
nose',sothat'snubnose'means'nosehavingconcavityofthenose'
whichis"notintheleastabsurd".

Aristotleconcludesthat"themannerinwhichweneedtoinvestigate
anddefinewhatathingisinthecaseofnaturallyexistingthingsis
plain".Itisnot,however,plainwhetherallnaturallyexistingthings
need,asnosesdo,definitionsthatmentionaparticularkindofmatter,
ormerely,asperhapsdoestheconcave,definitionsthatmakethemout
tobechangeableandsomaterial(cf.Z11.1036b37).

1026a5.SeeDeAnimaI1.403a1625andIII4.429a247.

1026a6.Thetinttwoparagraphsofthechapterappearedtoarguefor
adifferencebetweenphysicsandmetaphysicsonthegroundthat
physicsdealswithagenusorpartofwhatis.Yetnowthesearchisfor
anotherpartofwhatistobethesubjectmatterofmetaphysics.Two
solutionsseempossible:(1)thatthechapterisaclumsyrecensionof
materialcomposedatdifferentperiodsinAristotle'slife,andreflectsa
changeinhisconceptionofmetaphysicsor(2)thathewasawarethat
theargumentimpliedin1025b1819isinadequateandneedsreplacing
if,as1026a2332willcontend,thesamedisciplinecanhavebothapart
andthewholeofwhatisforitsprovince(seenoteson1026a23)hence,
thatthisparagraphshouldbereadassayingthatmetaphysicsincludes,
butisnotconfinedto,thestudyofthechangelessandseparable(thiswas
thesolutionofNatorp,whostressedthe"also"ina16whereothershave
moreawkwardlytranslated'dealwiththingsbothseparableandchange
less'inadditionNatorpinterpreteda1011'itfallstoatheoretical
disciplinetoascertainwhetherthereisanything...',andexcisedthe
laterreferencestotheology,theformeranotimpossibleproposal,the
latter,asRosssays,"violent").

Somemathematicsstudiesitsobjects"quaseparable"thatis,although
numbersandlinesandthelikecannotbedetachedfromchangeable
things(andsoarenotsubstances),theyareabstractedbythemathema
tician(PhysicsII2.193b334,"theyareseparablefromchangein
thought").Aristotledoesnotherecommithimselfonthequestionwhether
theobjectsofmathematicsareactuallyseparable,althoughhecontends

Page187
a
at 1415thatthosestudiedby"certainpartsofmathematics"arenot
(doeshemean,arenotevenabstracted,incontrastwith"somemathe
matics"?).Mightnotmetaphysics,then,beidentifiedwithanyremaining
partofmathematicswhichdoesstudychangelessandseparableobjects?
Aristotle'sanswer,notgivenuntilM2.1076b113.1078a9,isthatthere
isnosuchfurtherpart:allmathematicsdealswiththeperceptiblequa
lengths,planes,etc.,andsowiththechangelessonlybyabstraction.

"Ifthereisanythinginvariableandchangelessandseparable"(a10
11):aproofisofferedatD6.1071b59:ifallsubstancesweredestruc
tible,everythingwouldbedestructiblebuttimeandchangeareinde
structible.

Wearenottoldwhythedisciplinewhoseobjectsarechangelessand
separablemustbepriortoallothers.Itispriorbecauseitsobjectsare
prioritsobjectsarepriorbecause(i)onlyconcretesubstancesare
separable(PhysicsI2.185a31),(ii)substancesarepriortoallotherthings
(Z1.1028a29 b2),and(iii)changelesssubstancesarepriortoother
substances(changer,arepriortothethingstheychange,therefore
changelesschanger,toeverythingelse,D8.1073a2336).

Ata1314theMSS.read"thestudyofnaturedealswiththingsthat
areinseparablebutnotchangeless".Thesurroundingusesof'separable'
requirethistomean,not'inseparablefrommatter',i.e.concrete,which
wouldinanycasedemand"andnotchangeless",but'notseparately
identifiable',i.e.nonconcrete.Physicswasdescribedasthestudyof
nonconcreteformsat1025b278(cf.Z11.1037a1617),butformscannot
beintendedhere,becausetheyarechangelesshencetheemendation
'separable',adoptedinthetranslation.

Thedifferencebetweenmathematicsandphysicsisalsodiscussedat
PhysicsII2.193b22194a12,DeAnimaIII
7.431b1216,DeCaeloIII1.299a1117,K3.1061a28 b4.

1026a16."Invariable"translatestheadjectivefrom'always'andmay
thereforemeaneither'everlasting'or'alwaysthesame'(cf.E2.1027a19).
TheformermakesAristotle'sremarkabsurd(althoughhedidbelieve
thatsomecausesareeverlasting,forotherwisetherewouldbeeithera
beginningoftime,deniedatPhysicsVIII1.251b1923,oraninfinite
chainofcauses,deniedata 2.994a1 b27).Thelattercreditshimwiththe
opinionthatcausationisuniversalizable,perhapsinthesensethatifA
causesEandBdoesnottheremustbesomefurtherdifferencebetween
them(fortheconnectionbetweencauseanduniversalitycf.A1.981a
2430withB6.1003a1415).The"divinitiesobvioustous"arethe
heavenlybodies(PhysicsII4.196a334),caused,i.e.moved,bythe
spheres(L7.1072a198.1073b3).

1026a18.Theclaimthat"thedivineisaconstituent"ofallchangeless
substances,ifofanything,explainswhythestudyofthemiscalled

Page188

theology(adescriptionusedonlyhereandinthecorrespondingpassage
atK7.1064b3),butisnotitselfanywherejustifiedbyAristotle.Theoreti
caldisciplinesarethemostestimablebecausephilosophy,sc.theoretical
philosophy,"aloneexistsforitsownsake"(A2.982b278:wewantto
knowwhattodoinordertodoit,butwewantorcanwanttoknow
whatisthecasejustinordertoknowit).

pp.20131026a23.Aristotlenowattemptstoresolvetheconflictbetweenthe
conceptionofmetaphysicsasuniversalinsubjectmatter(onwhichsee
notesonG1)andtheconceptionofitasconfinedtothestudyofchange
lesssubstances.Can'metaphysicageneralis'beidentifiedwith'meta
physicaspecialis'?(i)Thecomparisonwithmathematicsspeaksonlyfor
theexistenceofgeneralmetaphysics(morefullyarguedinG2on
universalmathematicsseeK7.1064b89,M21077a910,b1722,
PosteriorAnalyticsI5.74a1725,Heath,MathematicsinAristotle,2224).
(ii)InhisnextsentenceAristotlepleadsfortherecognitionofchangeless
substances,butthis,whiletellingagainsttheidentificationofspecial
metaphysicswithphysics,doesnothingtosupporttheidentificationof
specialwithgeneralmetaphysics.(iii)Alltheworkofreconcilingthese
twoconceptionsislefttothewords"that[sc.thestudyofchangeless
substances]is...universalinthisway,becauseprimary".Spacepermits
onlyabriefanddogmaticexplicationofthesemuchdiscussedwords.
Metaphysicsisprimary,orfirst,philosophybecauseitstudieschangeless
substances,theprimaryexistentsastudyofprimaryexistentswillalso
beuniversal,i.e.astudyofallexistents,ifitaimstoestablishpropositions
whichrevealthewaysinwhichotherexistentsdependon,and"owe
theirbeingcalledwhattheyare"(G2.1003b1617)to,primaryexistents.
Suchpropositionsconstitutewhatwemaycallanontology.Sofaras
metaphysicsisontology,itisthereforebothgeneralandspecial.How
ever,Aristotlemakeshismetaphysicsseemwiderthanontologyinone
way,anditiswiderinanother.Hemakesitseemwiderwhenheimplies
thatanytruthaboutprimaryexistentswillbe"universal"andsopartof
metaphysicsyetsuchtruthswillcontributetoontologyonlywhenthey
areinvestigatedforthepurposeofrelatingtheprimaryexistentstoother
existents.Thewords''universal...becauseprimary"ignorethisre
strictingcondition,buttheactualdiscussionsofsubstanceinZHandof
changelesssubstancesinL410maybethoughttosatisfyit.Aristotle's
metaphysicsis,however,widerthanontologyinanotherwaysbecameit
embracesthediscussionofconceptslikeunity,inDandI,andofthe
principlesofnoncontradictionandexcludedmiddle,inG38.Heseems
tohavebeenawarethatthesetopicsdonotgiveanyspecialplaceto
substance(seeG'2.1004b69),letalonechangelesssubstance.Onone
interpretation(seenotesonG1),thephrase"thatwhichisquathingthat

Page189

is"ismeanttocoverthisnonontologicalpartofthesubjectbutifso,
itcoverstheontologicalpartalso,forbothpartsare"universal".
Iftherewerenochangelesssubstances,physicswouldbetheprimary
disciplineandthereforeuniversal:i.e.ontologywouldbecountedasa
partofphysics.Evenasitis,Aristotleseemscontenttoincludewithin
physicsmuchthatwewouldregardasphilosophical.

Chapter2

Thedivisionofsensesof'be'differsintwowaysfromthatgivenin
G2.1003a33 b10:thekindsofbeingdistinguishedinG2arehere
collectedtogetherundertheheading"figuresofpredication"and
separatedfromthreefurtherkinds,asinD7andthepurposeofthenew
divisionisnot,asinG2,toraiseapossibleobjectiontothestudyofmeta
physicsbuttodelimititsscope.Thispurposewassharedbythelatter
partofG2buttheconclusionsofthetwochaptersareinconflictatone
point,andtheyhavethegeneraldifferencethatwhereasG2arguedfor
inclusions,E2demandsexclusions.
1026a33.Forcommentsonthefourfolddivisionofsensesof'be'seepp.21415
notesonD7"was"ina34mayreferbacktothatchapter.Thepresent
passageaddstoD7thepointthatallfourwaysarewaysofsayingthat
athingis"baldly".Thiswordcanmean'withoutqualification'(cf.
1027a5)or'withoutaddition'(TopicsII11.115b2935)thelattersense
occurselsewherewith'be'asawayofdistinguishingexistencefrom
copulativebeing(PosteriorAnalyticsII1.89b33,"Imeanwhetheritisor
isnotbaldly,notwhether[itis]paleornot''cf.II2.90a34).Thatthe
wordismeanttodistinguishexistenceherehasbeendoubtedontwo
grounds.(i)Aristotleelsewhereasserts(Z1.1028a301)thatonlysub
stancescan'be'baldly.Itishardtoseehowthisobjectionworks,since
thatassertionisinanycasecontradictedinthepresentpassage.The
truthisthatAristotlehadnosettledopinionastowhether'xis'mustbe
ellipticalwhenxisanonsubstance:seeZ4.1030a32 b4,whichfirst
suggeststhatweassertbeingofnonsubstances"withanadditionand
[ofsubstances?]withasubtraction'',butthensubstitutesas"correct"
thealternativetheoryadumbratedinG2.1003a33 b10thatthebeing
ofnonsubstancesisnotellipticalbutderivative.(ii)Ithasalsobeen
objectedthatAristotle'sseconddivisionofbeing,beingastruth,isnota
typeofexistence.ButinD29Aristotletreatsfalsehoodasapropertynot
ofpropositionsorsentencesbutof"actualthings",sc.statesofaffairs,
andinfersthatafalsestateofaffairsisonethat'isnot'.Thisdoctrine
doesineffectproposethattruthandfalsehoodareformsofexistenceand

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nonexistence.Wemayconcludethatevenifthereareplacesinwhich
Aristotlerestricts'beingbaldly'tosubstanceshedoesnotdosoinE2
andthatinE2'isbaldly'means'exists'.

1026b2.Thisparagraphisdiscussedundersixheadings:(A)the
exampleofhousebuilding(B)theconflictbetweenb1024andG2
(C)theexampleofthetriangle(D1),(D2)thesophisticpuzzles(E)the
coincidentalandwhatisnot.

(A)Aristotlecanhardlymeantodenyeitherthathousebuilderscan
producepleasinghouses,orthattheycandosodeliberatelyhiscon
tentionseemstobethatsuchoutcomesandsuchaimsarenotattributable
totheirowners'knowledgeorskillashousebuilders.Wemayagreethat
the'discipline'ofhousebuildingissimplytheabilitytobuildhouses,not
housesofanyparticularkind.But(i)Aristotle'schoiceof'pleasing'and
'beneficial'isunfortunate,foralthoughtheseareexamplesofcoinci
dentalpredicatesofahouse,sothatitispossibletobuildhouseswithout
buildingpleasingorbeneficialones,wemightstillbeinclinedtosaythat
amandoesnothavetheknowledgehowtobuildhousesuntilheknows
howtomakethempleasingorbeneficialoratanyrateinsomewaygood.
(ii)Ahousemayhaveothercoincidentalproperties)e.g.curvature,the
abilitytoproducewhichisapart,althoughnotanecessarypart,ofthe
housebuilder'sskill.Theconstructionof,forexample,bowwindowsis
not"neglected"inthedisciplineofhousebuilding.(iii)Othercoinciden
talpropertiesofhouses,suchastheirlocation,althoughnotstudiedin
theartofhousebuilding,comewithinthescopeofdifferentdisciplines
thoseofthelandscapeartistandthezoningofficer.ThusAristotle
entirelyfailstoshowthatnostudydealswithwhatiscoincidentaltoa
house.

(B)Theexampleofgeometryisnomoreconvincinginadditionit
contradictswhatAristotlesayselsewhere.Thequestionreservedfrom
treatmentbygeometers,"whetheratriangleandatrianglepossessing
tworightangles(i.e.angleshavingthatsum)aredifferent"isonewhose
answerturnsontheconditionsofapplicationofthequitegeneralconcept
ofdifference,InthisrespectitislikethequestionmentionedatG2.
1004b23"whetherSocratesandSocratessittingdownarethesame"
which,becauseitsanswerdemandsexaminationofthegeneralconcept
ofsameness,isthereincludedwithinthesphereofmetaphysics.Yet
accordingtothepresentpassageitwouldbeexcludednotonlyfrom
geometrybutbyimplicationfrommetaphysicsandeveryotherdiscipline.
Thiscontrastisheightenedinthelinesthatfollow.G2.1004b223
assertedthat"sophistic...rangesoverthesamegenusasphilosophy''
sc.thatwhichis,butat1026b1415wearetoldthat"inaway"sophistic
dealswithwhatisnotandthesophisticalquestionslistedatb1621are
evenclosertothoseincludedwithinmetaphysicsatG2.1004b24.The

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thoughtwhichfindsnoconnectionbetweensophisticandmetaphysics
seems,likemuchofE,moreprimitiveandmuddledthanthatofG2.

(C)AlthoughAristotledoesnottelluswhatsenseof'coincidental'
heisemploying,wearepresumablytounderstandhimwithreference
tothedefinitioninthenextparagraph("thisway":sc.incontrastto
D30.1025a30).YetonthatdefinitionitturnsoutpaceRossthatbeing
thesameasatrianglewithtworightanglesisnotacoincidentalprop
ertyofatriangleforalltrianglesarelikethat.Wehavetoapplythe
definitioninanotherwayandtheallegedfactwhichAristotleseemsto
haveinmindisthatthepredicates'triangle'and'trianglewithtworight
angles',althoughequivalent,arenotfreelysubstitutableforoneanother
sincetheoccurrenceof'triangle'withinthelongerphrasecannotbe
replacedbythelongerphrasewithoutrepetition,andsuchrepetition,or
"babbling",seemedtohimnonsensical(cf.DeSophisticisElenchis,
chapters13,whichstates,and31,whichsolves,similarproblems
concernedwithbabblingbutnotpreciselythisone).Aristotletakes
thisallegedrestrictiononsubstitutingtheoneexpressionfortheotheras
areasonforsayingthatthethingsdesignatedbytheexpressionsarenot
thesame.Butsincethesubstitutionisnotalwaysbarred,wecansaythat
thethingsaresometimesthesame,thoughsometimesdifferenthence
coincidentallythesameandcoincidentallydifferent.

(Dl)Itisrathersimplertoexplainwhatiscoincidentalaboutthe
differencebetween"artisticandliterate,andartisticCoriscusand
Coriscus".Whereasthesubstitutionof'trianglehavingtworight
angles'for'triangle'willsometimes,accordingtoAristotle'sdoctrineof
babbling,producenonsense,thesubstitutionof'artistic'for'literate'
willsometimesproducefalsehood.IntheexampleinventedbyAlexander
andrepeatedbyRoss,itisassumedthatSocratesisbothliterateand
artistic,Aristarchusliteratebutnotartistic.Thentheartisticisthesame
astheliteratei.e.theoneexpressioncanbesubstitutedfortheother
inreferencetoSocratesbutnottoAristarchus.Thetwoaresometimes
thesame,sometimesdifferent,hencecoincidentallythesameanddif
ferent.'ArtisticCoriscus'and'Coriscus'mayfailofsubstitutabilityin
eitherofthetwoprecedingways.IfCoriscuschangesfrominartisticto
artisticorviceversa,'artisticCoriscus'willsometimesbeandsometimes
notbeacorrectvariantfor'Coriscus'.Evenifhedoesnotchange,
'artisticCoriscus'cannotwithoutbabblingbesubstitutedfor'Coriscus'
inthephrase'artisticCoriscus'itself.

(D2)Theargumentreferredtoinb1820musthavesoughttoprovepp.21112
anabsurdimplicationbymeansoftheprinciplethatwhat"isbut[was]
notalways,hascometobe".Ross'sspeculativebutelegantreconstruc
tionmaybeparaphrasedthus:
(1)Someone,beingartistic,hascometobeliterate
(2)so,beingartistic.heisliterate

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(3)so,beingliterate,heisartistic
(4)butitwasnotalwaysthecasethat,beingliterate,hewasartistic
(5)so,beingliterate,hehascometobeartistic.
RossdoesnotexplainsoclearlyhowAristotlewouldhaveussolvethe
puzzle.TheactualfallacyisofatyperecognizedinDeSophisticisElenchis
4.166a2232underthetitle'composition',i.e.bracketing:line(5)ought
toread'hehascometobe,beingliterate,artistic'.ButinDeSophisticis
ElenchisAristotlerightlydistinguishedthattypefromthepuzzlesabout
referencewhichheputundertheheading'coincidence'(ib.,chapters5
and24).Here,itseems,hiseagernesstodisplaythevagariesofsophistic
argumentshasledhimawayfromthethesiswhichthosearguments
weresupposedtoillustrate.

(E)Aristotle'sassimilationofhisownviewthatsophisticdealswiththe
coincidentaltoPlato'sthatitdealswithwhatisnot(i.e.thatitspro
positionsarefalse,Sophist254a,cf.N2.1089a201)canbeexplainedas
follows:ifthesophistmaintains,withoutqualification,thate.g.the
literateandtheartisticarethesame(oraredifferent),whathemaintains
isbothfalseandsometimes,i.e.coincidentally,true."Whatiscoinci
dentalisclosetowhatisnot"inthesensethatbeingthecasejustsome
timesisawayofnotsc.notalwaysbeingthecase.Thepointturns
onthefactthatasophistwhosaidthatpwouldbetaken,inthe
absenceofexplicitqualification,tomeanthatpalwaysandinallcases.
"Likeamerename"emendstheMSS.readingwhich,ifitmeansany
thing,means'thecoincidentalexistsasitwereinnameonly'.The
referencetonamesisnotpursued,andmaybeduetocorruption.The
emendationadoptedcanhardly,asRosssupposes,conveythesensethat
puzzlesaboutcoincidencesdependuponambiguitiesoflanguage,a
suggestionwhichisinanycasenotborneoutbyAristotle'sexamples
themeaningiseither'xisFcoincidentally'islike'xisFinnameand
notinfact'or'coincidentalpropertiesattachnomorecloselythan
names'."Morethananything":theGreekcouldmean'morethanany
one's'.

Forthecontentionthatthingsthatarecoincidentallyareneverin
processofcomingtobeorofdestructionseenotesonE3.

1026b24.ThedefinitionwhichAristotlenowgivesof'coincidental'
('nonregular')ismorefullydiscussedinthenotesonD30.1025a14,a
chapterinwhichitappearsalongsideanotherdefinition('nonessential',
1025a30).ItwasinthelatterofthesesensesthatAristotledistinguished
coincidentalbeingatthebeginningofE2wemaythereforecomplain
attherevelationthathiscaseagainstascienceofcoincidentalbeing
assumestheformersense,forifthereisnoscienceofthenonregularit
doesnotfollowthatthereisnoscienceofthenonessential.

When,inthisandthefollowingchapter,hesaysthatsomething'is'

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coincidentally,oralways,orofnecessity,orforthemostpart,heshould
beunderstoodtospeakofthemannerofexistenceofsomestateofaffairs.

The"cause"inb26andthe"originandcause"inb31aretheproof
thatcoincidentalstatesofaffairsoccur:viz.ifitisonlyinmostcasesthat
p,itmustbetrueinsomebutlessthanmostcasesthatnotp.Theproof
isrepeatedat1027a813and1027a1517.(In1027a1315,however,
"cause"seemstomean'explanation'.)

Fortheconjunctionof'always'with'ofnecessity'seeDeGeneratione
etCorruptioneII11.337b35338a2b32willdefine'coincidence'interms
of'always',butD30used'ofnecessity'.BythisequationAristotleseems
toleavenoroomforcontingentregularities,suchasmightbeexpressed
inthebeliefthathoneywateralwaysbenefitsthebilioustheomission
doubtlesshelpedhisassimilationofthetwosensesinwhich'coinciden
tal'means'nonessential'and'nonregular'.Thetemporalelementin
'always'shouldnotbestressedAristotlequiteoftenusesthewor'dto
mean'inallcases'(asin'flowersalwaysdieintheend',cf.D2.1013b33,
D6.1016b35,butcontrastPosteriorAnalyticsI4.73a2834).Onsensesof
'necessary'seeD5.

AmongAristotle'sexamplesoftheCoincidental,thelasttwodonot
obviouslyillustratehisdefinition.Arewetoinferthatahousebuilder
healshispatientscoincidentallyevenifhousebuildersdosoforthemost
part(itisnotrelevanttoaskwhethertheparticularhousebuilderdoesso
forthemostpartornotseenotesonD30.1025a14),orwouldtheir
havingsuchregularsuccessbeenoughtomakehealing"characteristic"
ofhousebuilders?Aristotleseemstowaverbetweenacriterionbased
purelyonfrequenciesandonebasedonconsiderationsastowhatitisto
beadoctorandahousebuilderthelatterwouldallowustosayapriori
thatthehousebuilder'ssuccesswasacoincidence,arguingfromthe
conceptualtruththatnobodyhealsquahousebuilder.Aristotlemakeshis
healinghousebuilderadoctoralsobutitcannotbeatruth,eithercon
ceptualorempirical,thatallwhohealaredoctors.Whenhesaysata5
thatthecookproduceshealth"inaway",hemeans'withaquali
fication',viz.coincidentallyor(perhaps)quadietician.

1027a5.BothRossandJaegeramend,butthetextadopted,which
followstwogoodMSS.,seemstomaketolerablesense."For"introduces
adivisionofcoincidentalproducts:someofthemarelikehealth,which
issometimescoincidentallyproducedbycookery,sometimesnon
coincidentallyproducedbymedicalartothersarelikepleasantness
(1026b7),neverproducedexceptcoincidentally.

1027a13.Thethoughtseemstobe:inlookingfortheexplanationofa
coincidentalstateofaffairssuchasastormydogdayorarestorative
cook,wemustexaminethatclassofthings,dogdaysormen,whichare

Page194

capableofbeingstormyorrestorativealthoughtheyarenotsousually.
Aristotledoesnotmeanthatacoincidentalstateofaffairsisamaterial
thingits"matter"isthekindofthingitistheclassdeterminedbythe
propertieswhichitmustretainthrougheverychange,asthedogday
mustremainadogdayevenifceasingtobestormycf.D28.1024b8.
Fortheideathatmattercanactuallybeanexplanationor"cause"see
D2.1013b18.

1027a15.Thisreadslikeamarginalglossona813,theargumentof
whichitrepeats.Anegativeanswertothe"originalquestion"(literally
'origin')providesthepremissfordeducingthatcoincidentalstatesof
affairsoccur.

1027a17."Invariable",i.e.invariablyconnectedGewirth,Philo
sophicalReview1953,585n.20.Theforwardreferenceisapparentlyto
theproofofchangelesssubstancesin 68.

1027a19.Thisparagraphgivesanewandbetterbutcryptic
defenceofthethesisalreadyarguedforat1026b224.Theargumentis
this.Iftheproposition'feverpatientsbenefitfromhoneywater'isto
contributetothe"discipline"offevers,andif,inparticular,itistobe
usedinteachingsomebodyhowtocurefeverpatientsorwhentoexpect
cures,itmustbeunderstoodasapropositionabout(a)allor(b)most
cases.Asanexampleofapropositionnotmeetingtheseconditions
Aristotletakes"theexception"tothelatter,viz.(c)'injustafewcases
feverpatientsdonotbenefitfromhoneywater'.Theexampleisun
fortunate,for(asAristotleknew)knowledgeof(b)impliesknowledgeof
(c).Buthisgeneralpointisthatpropositionsoftheform'insomecases
(atleastafewcases)itistruethatp'fail,byreasonofindefiniteness,tobe
contributionstoscience.Theexceptioncanbe"defined"orspecifiedby
putting'atnewmoon'inplaceof'insomecases'but"thatwhichisat
newmoonisalsoeitheralwaysorforthemostpart''bywhichAristotle
meansnotthattherearenoirregularitiesatnewmoon,northatthe
unqualifiedproposition'atnewmoonfeverpatientsdonotbenefitfrom
honeywater'necessarilyimplies'inallormostcases',butthattheun
qualifiedpropositionmustbeunderstoodwiththatimplicationifitistobe
usedinlearningorteaching."Theexception...cannotbestated",sc.
withoutabandoningindefiniteness.

Thisargumentcallsforfourcomments.(A)Itsacceptabilitydepends
onconstruing"discipline"inanarrowersensethan'knowledge'.Itis
possibletoknowbothparticularandindefinitetruths,asthathoney
waterhasbenefitedthispatientandthatitsometimesbenefitssomepatients.
AtA1.981a729Aristotledescribestheformerkindofknowledgeas
"experience"butheconcedesthatitisaformofknowledgewhen
headds(usingtheordinaryGreekverbfor'know','eidenai')"menof

Page195

experienceknowthat,butdonotknowwhy".Knowledgeintheseineof
disciplineorscience('episteme'),ontheotherhand,haswbeknowledge
ofcauses(E1.1025b57)andofuniversals(sc.universaltruths,B
6.1003a1415).
(B)Therequirementthatthetruthsofascienceordisciplinebeuni
versalisnormally,ashere,relaxedbyAristotle,whosawthatpartial
generalizationsoftheform'itisforthemostpartthecasethatp'(cf.
PosteriorAnalyticsI30.87b1922)canbebothexplanatoryandpre
dictive.
(C)Truthsoftheform'theF'sbeingGisacoincidentalthingthatis',
i.e.'itisjustsometimesthecasethananFisG',donotfeatureasthe
establishedpropositionsofanydiscipline,butthatdoesnotmeanthat
theyarenotstudiedbyanydiscipline.Foralthoughthestudentwillnot
learnfromtheproposition'itissometimesthecasethatp',hewilllearn
bystudyingthequestionwhichthatpropositionraises,viz.'whenisitthe
casethatp?'Intheparagraphbeginningat1026b2Aristotleoverlooked
thisdistinction.Itisacoincidencethatahouseispleasing,because
housesaresoonlysometimesitfollowsthatthehousebuilder'sartwill
notteachhimthathousesaresometimespleasingbutitwillteachhim
whentheyare,i.e.underwhatproducibleconditions.Similarly,itisa
coincidencethattheartisticandtheliteratearethesame,becausethese
expressionsareonlysometimesinterchangeablesalvaveritatebutwhat
makesthesophistunscholarlyisnothisattentiontothisfactbuthis
inattentiontothefurtherquestion'underwhatconditionsarethey
(always)interchangeable?'Thefailureofsophistictobeadisciplineis
duenot,as1026b224claimed,tothenatureofthesophist'sproblems,but
tohisnotattemptingallegedlytosolvethem.
(D)Commentingon1027a256Rosswritesthat"itisperhapsthe
onlyplaceinwhichAristotleimpliestheviewthatthereisnothingwhich
isobjectivelyaccidental".Aristotlemakestwopoints:thatthefactof
honeywater'sbeingonlysometimesbeneficialtofeverpatientsis
compatiblewiththerebeingcertainconditionsunderwhichitisnever
(orrarelyoralwaysorusually)soandthathewhowishestolearnmust
seektospecifythoseconditions.Rosswouldaddathird,thatfailureto
specifythemmustbeduetosubjectivecauseshumanobtuseness
nevertotheirnonexistencebutnothinginthepassagerequiresusto
attributethisextrapointtoAristotle.

Chapter3

Thedistinctionbetweencomingtobe,orbeingdestroyed,andbeinginpp.21112
processofcomingtobe,orofbeingdestroyed,ispartofamoregeneral
distinctionbetweenchangesthatareinstantaneousandthosethattake
time(botharedifferentfromexercisesoractivitiesthatlastforatime

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butcannotstopwithoutfinishingseeQ6.1048 1836).Althoughthis
b

distinctionadmitsofnointermediatedegrees,itsapplicationisnot
alwaysclear.Learningthealphabetisobviouslyatimeconsuming
change,finishinglearningthealphabetaninstantaneousonebutwhat
ofmasteringthealphabet?Isamanborn,anddoeshediesoveraperiod
orataninstant?Aristotle'sapplicationsofthedistinctioninEaretwo.
AtE2.1026b224hesaysthattheonsetandcessationofacoincidental
stateofaffairsmustbeinstantaneous.Thisseemsfalse.Itisacoincidence,
wearetold(E2.1026b356),thatamanispale,yetheprobablytook
timetobecomeso.Aristotleshouldhaverestrictedhimselftothenarrower
claim,appropriateintheimmediatecontextinE2,thatcoincidental
identitieshaveaninstantaneousonsetforalthoughCoriscuscanbein
courseofbecomingpaleitseemsunnaturaltosaythatheisincourseof
becomingthesameasthepaleCoriscus.Secondly,Aristotlenowadds
thatoriginsandcausescancometobeandceasetobeinstantaneously.

pp.2225ThepurposeofE3istoprovethissecondcontention,butitsargument
isveryobscure.Wemaybeginwithapointofsomecertainty:Aristotle
usesthenotionofnecessityinsuchawaythatitmakessensetosayofan
individualstateofaffairsthatitbecomesnecessaryor"isnotyet"necessary
(b1011).Itfollowsthatinthischapter'necessary'isnotalwaysopposed
to'coincidental',andastateofaffairsmightbecoincidentallynecessary
i.e.sometimesorinsomecasesunavoidableandwhenAristotle
acceptsasadatumthatnoteverythingisnecessary(b1011),heprob
ablymeansthat
(a)noteverythingisnecessaryallthetime.
NextwemustdetermineAristotle'sviewabouttheconnectionbetween
necessityandcausation.Inthesecondparagraphheassumesthatcauses
precedetheireffectsintimethusifwetracethecausallineageofa
finitelyfuturestateofaffairs"weshallcometothepresent"(b1)or"to
somethingthathascometobe"(b34).Inb510heseemstoacceptthat
anyfuturestateofaffairswhosecausallineagedoesinthiswaystretch
backtothepresentorpastisalreadynecessaryatanyrate,ifeverything
issuch,"everythingthatwillbewillbeofnecessity"(cf.RhetoricIII
17.1418a5''forwhathascometobepossessesnecessity").Thefollowing
linesthenconcedethatevenastateofaffairswhichis''notyet"necessary,
forinstancethedeathofamanbydiseases"runsasfarassomeorigin".
Ifthisorigin(say,theeatingofatoadstool)isnottomakethedeathby
diseasealreadynecessary,itmust,seemingly,beinthefuture.Since
Aristotleaddsthattheoriginruns"nofurthertoanythingelse",it
followsthatthewholecausallineageofthedeathbydiseaseisinthe
futuresi.e.thatthatmannerofdeathhasasyetnocause.Thuswhatisnot
yetnecessaryhasasyetnocause,andingeneral
(b)whathasacauseatanytimeisnecessaryatthattime.

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b
Aristotlegoesontosayat 1213thatthefuture'origin'(theeatingof
thetoadstool)is"theoriginofwhatevermaychance",whichappearsto
contradict(b)byassertingthatthedeathbydiseasewillstillbe'chance',
i.e.notnecessary,whenitgetsitsoriginorcause.Thecontradictionis
avoidedifwetakeAristotletomeanthatthetoadstooleatingwillbethe
originofwhatisuntilthenachanceoutcome.From(a)and(b)itfollows
that
(c)somethingsatsometimeshavenocause.
Moreover,thefutureoriginofasometimechancestateofaffairsmust
itselfbeuncausedatalltimesbeforeitsonset(otherwiseitwillnotrun
"nofurthertoanythingelse")thisisperhapsconveyedbyb1314''and
nothingelseisthecauseofitscomingtobe".Hence,bytheassumption
thatcausesmustprecedetheireffects,itfollowsthat
(d)somecausesatnotimehaveanycause.
Wemustnowreturntothefirstparagraphofthechapter.Ata312
Aristotlehypothesizesthatanythingwhosecomingtobetakestime"has
somecausenoncoincidentally".Itseemsonthewholeeasiestifwetake
thishighlyambiguousphrasetomean
(e1)anythingwhosecomingtobetakestimehasacauseatalltimes
('noncoincidental'meaning'necessary'inthesense'always',not
'unavoidably').(e1)willimplythatthecausallineageofahome,for
instance,goesbackintimewithoutlimit.Themeritofthisinter
pretationisthat(d)and(e1)immediatelyentail
(f)therearesomecauseswhosecomingtobedoesnottaketime
which,withthefurtherassumptionthatthesecausesarenoteternal(cf.
E1.1026a16andnote),inturnentailsthattheircomingtobeisinstan
taneous,thethesisofthechapter.Buttheinterpretationhasitsdiffi
culties.First,thequalification"noncoincidentally''isredundantifthe
argumentdependson(d),whichsays,ineffect,thatsomecauseshavenot
evencoincidentalcauses.If,ontheotherhand,wetakeAristotletohave
reliedon(c)ratherthan(d),thatwouldjustifytheconclusionthatthere
aresomethingswhosecomingtobedoesnottaketime,butnotsome
causes.TheseconddifficultyisthatitisunclearwhyAristotleshouldhave
thought(e1)true.

Alternatively,then,theambiguoussentenceata312mightbetaken
tomean
(e2)anyxwhosecomingtobetakestimehasacauseofasortwhich
always(ornecessarily)causesthingsofx'ssort.
or
(e3)...Whichalwayscausesthingsofx'ssort,ornothing.
OneorotherofthesesensesseemsintendedbyRoss'sparaphrase

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"necessarilyproduces"butthepassageswhichRosscitesdonotsupport
theviewthatAristotlebelievedeither(e2)or(e3).Moreover,inorderto
makeeitherofthemfitintotheargumentasawhole,weshouldhaveto
readthesecondparagraphasdistinguishingnecessitatingfromnon
necessitatingcauseswhereas,asRossadmits,a32 b10aremostnatur
allytakenascommittingAristotletotheopinionthatallcausesnecessitate,
i.e.to(b).Thechapterhasnotyetreceivedasatisfactoryinterpreta
tion.(OtherrelevantpassagesareDeInterpretatione9,K8.1065a621,
DePartibusAnimaliumI1.640a19,DeGenerationeetCorruptioneII
11.337a34338a4.)

Atb5,"ofnecessityhewilldieornotdie"isambiguous.DeInter
pretatione9,whichexaminestherelationbetweennecessityandthe
futureinfargreaterdetail,employsasimilarphraseexplicitlywiththe
force'necessarily(pornotp')(19a30).Butherethecontextdemands
'(necessarilyp)or(necessarilynotp)':thepresentfactscomparethe
pastfactsinb610necessitateafutureoutcome,butwhichoutcome
dependsonwhicharethepresentfacts.Althoughthisiscertainly
Aristotle'smeaning,itismorethanheshouldhavesaid,forevenifthe
exampleshowsthattheman'seatingsomethingsaltynecessitateshis
deathbyviolence,itisfarfromshowingthathisnoteatingitnecessitates
hisnotdyingbyviolence.

1027b14.The"reduction"leadstoanoriginalcausewhichruns"no
furthertoanythingelse".Aristotle'somissionofformalcausessuggests
thatheregardsstillavoidablestatesofaffairsasexamplesofcoincidental
beings,whichhavenoformoressenceinthefullsense(Z4).Butthe
generalconnectionbetweenthischapterandthelastisobscure.

Chapter4

1027b17.Aristotle'sclaimthat,takentogether,atruthandafalsehood
are"concerned...withtheapportionmentofacontradiction"seemsto
implythatifAandBarethemembersofacontradictorypair,onemust
betrueandtheotherfalseathesisexaminedindetailinDeInter
pretatione711andtherefoundtohaveatleastoneexception.G7.
1011b267indicateshowtheapportionmentismade.Theotherhallof
Aristotle'sclaimabouttruthandfalsehood,thatthey"areconcerned
withcompositionanddivision",isrepeatedatDeInterpretatione1.
16a918inthesamewords(translatedbyAckrill'combinationand
separation')andthereexplainedbydistinguishingtrueandfalse
thoughts(e.g.thethoughtorbeliefthatCalliasispale)fromthoughts
''thatarewithoutcompositionanddivision"(e.g.thethoughtorcon
ceptionofCallias).Here,however,itisnotthoughtsorwordsbut

Page199

things(e.g.Calliasandpallor)whichareorarenotcompoundedcf.
D29.1024b1819.

Theproblemraisedintheparenthesisisnothowtodistinguish
(a)athoughtofpallorsucceededbyathoughtofCallias
from
(b)athoughtofpaleCallias,
buthowtodistinguish(a)from
(c)thethoughtthatCalliasispale.
Aristotle'smodeofexpressioninvitesaconfusionbetween(b)and(c)
fromwhich,perhaps,hewasnothimselffree.(Thissentenceshowsthat
thewordsrendered'think'and'conceive'inthepresenttranslationdo
notmarkourdistinctionbetweenbeliefandconception).Another
confusingfeatureoftheparenthesisisitsuseof'together'(theGreek
wordis'hama',elsewhereinthistranslationrendered'simultaneously')
incontrastwith'separately,'whichmakesitseemasifonewhothought
twothingsseparatelywouldhavetothinktheminsuccession.Infact,of
course,bythinkingseparatelyAristotleheremeanshavinganegative
belief,e.g.
(d)thethoughtthatCalliasisnotpale,
which,like(c),contrastswith(a).Aristotlefailstomakeitclearthathe
hastwocontrastsonhishands,thatbetweenaffirmativeandnegative
beliefsandthatbetweenbeliefsandconceptions.Evennegativebeliefs
andstatements"involvecombination"(Categories2.1a16)inthesense
thattheyconnectthoughtsandwordsinamoreunifyingwaythando
thoughtorspokenlistslike'man,pale'(cf.Categories4.2a810,10.
13b1011,DeInterpretatione4.16b267,TopicsI4.101b238)butthey
"areconcernedwithdivision"inthedifferentsensethattheydeclare
thethingssignifiedbythosethoughtsandwordstobedisjoined.The
differencebetweenbeliefandconceptionisdiscussedinDeAnimaIII
chapters2,6,and7.

1027b25.Aristotle'sexampleshowswhyhesaysthatfalsehoodand
truthare"notinactualthings".Butarethey"inthought"?Wemight
agreethatbeliefs(andstatements)aretheprimaryrecipientsofthe
predicates'true'and'false',butinD29Aristotlefirmlydescribesas
falsehoodsanotherkindof"actualthing",viz.statesofaffairslikeCallias'
beingpale(aresultwhichwillfollowifwetake'Callias'beingpale'as
equivalentto'thatCalliasispale'andconstruethelatterassubjectof
'itisfalsethatCalliasispale').NeverthelessAristotleoffersonegood
reasonfordismissingtruthsandfalsehoodsasless''fundamental"(con
trastQ10.1051b1)thansubstances,qualities,andthemembersof
theothercategories:Callias'beingpaleisastateofaffairswhich

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connects,andhisnotbeingpaleastateofaffairswhichdivides,two
simpleitems,Calliasandpallortheexistenceoftheformeristhustobe
explainedintermsofthatofthelatter,andtruthsandfalsehoods"donot
indicatetheexistenceofanyextra(sc.independent)natureofthing
thatis"."Thecauseoftheotherisacertainaffectionofthought":
Aristotledoesnotmeanthatbeliefscausefacts(seeQ10.1051b69)but
thatbeliefsaretherecipients(subjectmatter)oftruth.Onsimplessee
Q10.

1028a2."Thatwhichisitself":i.e.thatwhichisinitsownrightcf.
D7.1017a22."Quathingthatis"shouldbetakenasmodifyingtheverb
"investigate",notasaglosson''itself"seenotesonG1.

1028a4.Thesentencewouldbemoreappropriateasanintroduction
tothefollowingbookZ,whichinourMSS.beginswithsimilarwords.
ThereferenceistoD7.

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FURTHERCOMMENTS(1992)
THEappearanceofasecondeditionofthisvolumeoffersmeanopportunity
ofcommentingonsomeoftheextensiveliteratureaboutAristotle's
metaphysicsthathasbeenpublishedinrecentyears,andofusingthat
literaturetodrawtogether,andsometimesreassess,theviewsexpressed
intheNotesonissuesthatareparticularlypervasiveorcontentiousin
booksG,D,andE.InsomeplacesIshallquotefromtheNotes,inorder
toreaffirmwhatstillseemstomeimportantlyrightorwithdrawwhat
seemsimportantlywrong,lookingbackfrom1992to1971.Indefault
ofacompletelynewcommentarywhichinanycasewouldhave
comebetterfromanotherpenIhopethatnewreaderswillfindthis
retreatmenthelpful.NumbersinsquarebracketsrefertotheBibliogra
phy.

G1,E1:Metaphysics
WhataccordingtoAristotleismetaphysics?Thequestionisambiguous.
Itmightmean,'HowdoesorwouldAristotlecharacterizetheinquir
iesgatheredinthefourteenbookswhichweknowundertheancientbut
apparentlynonAristoteliantitleMetaphysics?'Oritmightmeantoask
aboutAristotle'scharacterizationofwhathecallsthe"primary[or:first]
philosophy"(1026a24),the"primarydiscipline"(episteme,1026a1516,
29)orthe"primaryscience"(sophia,1005b1).Perhapsthetwoquestions
arethesame:ifthecollectionofourfourteenbooksintoasingletreatise
wasAristotle'sownwork,orwastheworkofeditorsfollowinghiswishes,
oratleastwouldhavebeenapprovedbyhim,perhapsitsrationaleisthat
allthesebooksdealwithFirstPhilosophy.Butwehavenostatementof
thatview,onlyevidenceforit.Theevidenceiscontainedchieflywithinthe
groupofbookstranslatedinthepresentvolume,andisasfollows.(i)E1.
1026a1829claimsthatFirstPhilosophyisTheology,thatis,thestudyof
changelesssubstances,ofwhich"thedivineisaconstituent''.(ii)BookG
beginsbyarguingfortheexistenceof"adisciplinewhichstudiesthatwhich
isquathingthatis[toonheion,traditionally'beingquabeing']andthose
thingsthatholdgoodofthisinitsownright"(1003a12).(iii)Thelatter
partofbookG,whichinvestigatestheprinciplesofnoncontradictionand
excludedmiddle,mightbeexpectedtobeanexerciseinthisdiscipline,and
issorepresentedintheNoteon1005b8.(iv)ThefinalhalfsentenceofE1
makesTheologyembracethedisciplinewhoseexistencewasdefendedinG:
''anditwouldfallto[thestudyofchangelesssubstance]tostudythatwhich
isquathingthatis,bothwhatitisandthethingsthatholdgoodofitqua
thingthatis"(1026a312).

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Thisevidencebearsontwoquestions:wouldAristotlewishtobringall
thefourteenbooksunderhisconceptionofTheologyandifso,wouldhe
berighttodoso?OnbothquestionsthefinalhalfsentenceofE1is
crucial.Itcouldbeaninterpolation,introducedbyaneditorinorderto
makeaconnnexionnotelsewhereexplicitinAristotle'stext.Ifso,the
editorwasintelligentforAristotle'simmediatelyprecedingremarkis
thatTheologyis"universalinthisway,becauseprimary"(1026a301,
of.G3.1005a35),andthe"discipline"ofGhadbeensuspect,andsoin
needofdefence,preciselybecauseofitsclaimtoacertainsortof
universality.Assumingthenthatthehalfsentenceisnotaninterpolation,
AristotleseesthesciencedescribedinbookFasfallingunderTheology.
HowmuchmatterfromtheMetaphysicscomesintoTheologyunderthis
rubric?(Verylittlecomesinwithoutit,perhapsonlyD610on'un
movedmovers',i.e.changelesschangers.)TheintroductoryNoteonp.
122arguesthatDearnsitsadmissiontothe"discipline"definedinG1.
Asimilarcasecouldbemade,Ithink,formostoralloftheothersofour
fourteenbooks,andtheNotespresumesomethinglikethiscaseby
denominatingthe''discipline''metaphysics.

Continuingtheassumption,isAristotlerighttoassertthehalf
sentencetoassert,thatis,thatTheology,theseeminglydepartmental
studyofchangelesssubstances,embracestheuniversalstudyenvisaged
bytheopeningsentenceofG1,of"thatwhichisquathingthatis"?At
thispointthecurious'qua'phraseneedsinterpretation.Onedefenceof
Aristotle([34])beginsbyinterpretingitinawayaKantianway
whichmakestheenvisagedstudydepartmentaltoo:thatwhichisqua
thingthatis,'beingquabeing',isachunkorgenusofwhatthereis,a
chunkwhichE1willlaterinviteustoidentifywithchangelesssubstances.
Thedefencethenproceedsbyarguingthatakindofuniversalityis
conferredonthestudyofthatgenusbytherelationshipofitsmembersto
everythingelse([34]),orofthestudyofittoeveryotherstudy([7],
[49]).TheauthorofMetaphysicsK,whomayormaynotbeAristotle
himself,seemstojointhispartywheninhisepitomeoreIheparaphrases
thequestion"whethertheprimaryphilosophyreallyisuniversal"
(1026a234)inthewords"whetheronereallyshouldcountthediscipline
concernedwith[literally:of]thatwhichisquathingthatisasuniversal
ornot"(K7.1064b78).Againsttheseproposalstherearcnowpowerful
objectionsinThorp[51],whorejectstheirjustificationsof'universal'
(pp.11321),andStevenson[46](seealsotheNotesonpp.778),who
showsthattheymisunderstandthesyntaxofthe'qua'phrase,which
restrictsthekindofstudy,notthesubjectstudied.Adifferentsuggestion,
closeto[44]and[50],issupportedintheNoteon1026a23:thatthe
primarysubstances,whatevertheyarechangelessinAristotle'sopinion,
butthesamewouldbetrueiftheywerethechangeablethingsof
'nature',sothat"thedisciplineconcernedwithnature",i.e.physics,

Page203
a
"wouldbeprimary",(1026 289)theseprimarysubstancesexplain
everything,andaccordinglyunderstanding(episteme)ofthemdelivers
understandingofeverything.Suchaprojectofexplainingeverythingby
referencetobasicexistentsiswhattheNoteon1026a23callsontology.

Theword'ontology'hasothersensesaswell(see[49])buteveninthe
Note'ssenseitcontainsanindeterminacy,forunderstandingandexplana
tionofathingcanbeofwhatthethingis,itsnature,orofwhyitexists,its
cause.BothofthesecomeunderAristotle'sconception,broaderthan
ours,ofcauseandwhenhesaysat1003b1617thatthe"primary
[object]"ofadisciplineis"thatonwhichtheothersdependandto
whichtheyowetheirbeing[literally:thatbecauseofwhichtheyare]
called[whattheyare]",heappearstoleaveitopenwhichofthesetwo
kindsofexplanationistobederivedfromthestudyofprimarysub
stances.

Thesuggestionis,then,thatAristotleidentifiesTheologywiththe
"discipline"ofG1byidentifyingeachofthemwithontology,inthe
indeterminatesenseof'understandingeverythingbyreferencetobasic
existents'.IfthisisAristotle'smanuvre,however,itcanbecriticizedin
thewaysuggestedintheNote,onthegroundthatneitheridentification
isjustified.OntheonehandTheologywillembracesomequestionsas
inD610whicharcnotontological.Ontheotherhandmuchof
Aristotle's'universal'inquiryintheMetaphysics,forexamplehisexamina
tionofthelogicalprinciplesinG38,andtheconceptualanalysisofD
andIifthosebookscountunderG'srubric,isnotontologicaleither.

G4:Contradiction
AspartofthestudyenvisagedinG1"wealsohavetofindthefirst
causesofthatwhichisquathingthatis"(1003a312).Thesefirstcauses
areorincludearchai,whichtheTranslationgivessometimesas'origins',
sometimesas'principles'.Thefirmestprincipleofallis:"forthesame
thingtoholdgoodandnottoholdgoodsimultaneouslyofthesame
tilingandinthesamerespectisimpossible..."(1005b1922).The
Notescallthistheprincipleofnoncontradiction(PNC)Aristotle'sown
word'antiphasis',meaning'contradictorypair',isusedintheformulation
at1011b16.Aristotlearguesthatsuchaprinciplecannotbedemonstrated
(see[85]p.21n.1)butitcanbe"demonstratedinthemannerofa
refutation"(1006a1012)againstanopponentwhoiswillingtostart
discussiongoing.Themethodistofindsomethingwhichshallbe
demanded,or'begged',fromtheopponentashisinitialcontribution
(nottoasktheopponentto"choosethepremiss",astheNotessayon
p.91).Inallsuchdialecticitisafaulttobegwhatis''originallyatissue''
(traditionallytranslated'beggingthequestion'butnotallcommentators

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noticethatbeggingthequestionisnotthesameasassumingwhatisat
issueAristotle'sopponentcanassumewhatisatissuebutcannotbegthe
question,forhebegsnothing).Inthepeculiarcircumstancesofthe
permittedmannerofdemonstratingPNCtheonlysafewayofavoiding
thatfault,Aristotlethinks,istobegnomorethanthattheopponent
"signifysomethingbothtohimselfandtosomeoneelse"(1006a212)so
muchcanproperlybebegged,sincewithoutsignifyingtherewillbeno
sayingorstatement(logos,1006a223).Fromthisstartingpointitwould
seemthatAristotleproposestoarguetranscendentally,demonstrating
notthetruthofPNC,butthatwithoutitstruththeopponentcouldnot
bedoingwhatheisdoinginaccedingtowhatisbeggedofhimandthis
methodisperhapsmorenaturallycalledarefutationthanademonstra
tion,asAristotlewishesatanyrateitisnotademonstrationofPNC
(forotherwaysofunderstanding'inthemannerofarefutation'see[85]
p.75,[36]p.144,[87]n.25).

ThePosteriorAnalyticstellsusthatonlywhatcanbedemonstratedis
episteton,i.e.canbeunderstood,i.e.ispartofa"discipline"orscience
(71b1619with100b1011),andthisraisesthequestion:ifPNCcannot
bedemonstrated,whatarethesechaptersaboutitdoinginatreatiseon
the"discipline"ofmetaphysics?Therearcthreemainpossibilities.(i)
PerhapsbythetimehewroteMetaphysicsFAristotlehadabandonedhis
earlierviewthatonlywhatcanbedemonstratedisepisteton,andhad
cometobelievethat'objectivity'isalsoattainablebyakindofdialectic.
Thisisthethesisof[37]andtheunifyingthemeof[38].(ii)Aristotle
hadnotabandonedhisviewthatsciencesmustproceedbydemonstra
tionsosincetheprinciplesofnoncontradictionandexcludedmiddleare
indemonstrable,Aristotle'streatmentoftheminG38isnotanexercise
inthescienceofmetaphysicsastheNoteon1005b8asserts,buta
prolegomenonoradigression.(iii)G38aimatdemonstration,but
whattheyaimtodemonstrateisthesesabouttheprinciplesofnon
contradictionandexcludedmiddle,notthoseindemonstrableprinciples
themselvessee[39].Itwillbeclearthattheprecedingparagraphadopts
(iii)assolvingtheproblembuttwofurthercommentsareinorder.
First,thissolutionwouldnotprevent(i)andtheconclusionof(ii)from
beingtruealso.Secondly,itisimportanttonoticethatG38are
exceptionalwithintileMetaphysicsindeedwithintheAristotclian
corpusinaimingatdemonstration,oratleastsketchingamethodof
demonstration.Aristotle'susualprocedure,whichisnottoofferdemon
strationsbutrathertoinvitehisaudiencetojoinhimininquiry,isquite
compatiblewithhisbelievingthattheresultsofsuccessfulphilosophical
inquirycanbesetoutindemonstrations,soqualifyingasscienceseven
accordingtothecanonsofthePosteriorAnalytics.

Aristotle'sattemptsinG46toapplyhisprocedureagainstthe
opponentsofPNCcontainmuchthatisdifficult,andIshallnotoffer

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anygeneralsurveyofthemhere.1proposeonlytoselecttwoparticular
passagesforfurtherComment,namely(accordingtothewaythechapter
isdividedupintheNotes)parts1andIIIofthesecondargumentin
G4.

2ndargument,PartI(1006a31b34).Eventhestructureofthispassageis
unclear,buthereisapossibleoutlineofthestagesinitbywhich
AristotlehopestobringhisopponenttogivewayonPNC.(1)Ifyou
(useawordto)signify,yousignifyadeterminatenumberofthings(2)
eachtilingyousignify(e.g.man)isthebeingofcertainthings(men)(3)
ifyousignifysomethingwhichisthebeingofcertainthings,theymustbe
asintheformulaofthatsomething(menmustbebipedanimals)(4)if
so,theycannotalsonotbesuch(mencannotalsonotbebipedanimals)
therefore(5)ifyousignify,thereissomethingyousignify(man)and
somethingsofwhichthatisthebeing(somemen)suchthatitcannotbe
truetosaythatthelatter<<areandarenotasintheformulaofthe
former,northereforethatthey)areandarenottheformer.

IwishtomakesixcommentssupplementingtheNoteonpp.939.(i)
Iftheargumentworks,itshowsthatsignifyingrequiresthetruthnotof
PNCbutonlyofaninstanceofit.Threeverdictsarcpossible:thisisa
fault([81])or,PNCcanbereachedfromtheinstancebyuniversal
generalization([85]pp.11214)or,Aristotle'sprojectisnottoreach
PNC,butonlytodefeatanopponentwhomaintainsthatallcontradic
tionsarctrue,oratleastmaintains(b)onp.102oftheNotes.Thelastis
widelyimpliedelsewhereinG4(1006a301,1007b18,1008a36,b1011,
b312)andapparentlydefendedasadequateat1008a712(see[85]pp.
5961).IfAristotle'sprojectisthislimitedone,the"majorattractionof
type1interpretations"(Notesp.93)fallsaway.

(ii)Code([36]p.144,following[87]p.104)saysthat"Aristotle's
intentistoshowthatadherencetothePNCisaprerequisitefor
significantthoughtanddiscourse",andtherebytoexplainwhyevery
bodydoesadheretoit([39]P.356)butiftheargumentistranscendental
asIhavesuggested,'adherenceto'shouldbereplacedby'thetruthof'.

(iii)1nowhavenodoubtthatAristotle's'signify','semainein',doesnot
mean'mean'or'beexplicatedby'butexpressesarelationwhichwords
beartothings,bettertranslated'signify'or'indicate'than'denote'(p.
94)see[90],and[64]pp.18690whichshowshowthetype2interpreta
tionisnotkilledbythisChange.

(iv)TheTranslationof1006a324has:"WhatImeanby'signifying
onething'isthis:ifthatthingisaman,thenifanythingisaman,that
thingwillbetobeaman."Amongtheinterpretationsofthisthatare
canvassedintheNoteonp.94themostlikelyis'iftheonethingthat
"man"signifiesis[a]man,then,ifanythingisaman,theonethingthat
"man''signifiesistobeaman'.Ifthatistherightinterpretation,then

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Aristotleidentifiestheonesignificationof'man'intwodifferentways,as
man,andastobeamanandaccordinglythesetwoarethesameasone
another:manistobeaman.Butnowwefacetwoproblemsnot
satisfactorilyaddressedintheNote:(i)whatcouldbemeantby'manis
tobeaman'?and(ii)whatisthepurposeofthesecondconditioninthe
sentence,"ifanythingisaman"?Theseproblemscanbesolvedtogether
ifthetranslationofthelastfourwordsinthesentenceisrevisedfrom"to
beaman"into'foramantobe'.In[76]thislatterisurgedasthe
correctrenderingoverarangeofAristotelianconstructionsincludingthe
onehere,'toanthropoieinai'andalthoughIamnotconvincedthat
Aristotleseparatedthetwoalternativesinhisownmind,itmakesbetter
sensehere.Accordingtotherevision,thetwothingsidentifiedasthesole
significationof'man',andthereforeineffectidentifiedwitheachother,
aremanand,foraman,tobeandthatistosaythat,formen,theirbeing
isorconsistsintheirbeingmen."Ifanythingisaman"nowemphasizes
thatthisaccountofbeingappliestoeverythingthatisaman.

(v)1006b1328,ignoredintheaboveoutline,arguesfrom'"man"
signifiesonething'to'"man"and"notman"donotsignifythesame'.
(D)onpp.989commentsinadequatelyonthepurposeofthissection,
whichInowthinkrepliestoanunseatedobjectionoftheformindicated
by[10]sec.621(quotedin[86]p.169)and[85]pp.501.

(vi)Theformulationaboveof(4)preservesthescopeambiguity
discussedin(A)onp.98.HereAristotleappliestherule'isnecessarilyf '
'can'tbe
andnotbef '(Iuse'f 'and'y 'henceforwardasschematiclettersopento
replacementbycommonnouns,withorwithoutanindefinitearticlein
English,andadjectives).Bothmovesraisethesuspicionthathehas
overlookedthefactthatinferencerides,aswellasstartingpoints,canbe
improperlybeggedinademonstration.

2ndargument,PartIII(1007a20 b18).TheNoteon1007a20(p.100)
adoptsaninterpretationwhichnowseemstomemistakenofAristotle's
distinctionbetweenwhatitcallsessentialpredicationasin'Calliasisa
man'andcoincidentalpredicationasin'Calliasispale'.Aristotle's
conclusioninPartIIIisthattheformer"kindofformula"(a30)willnot
beavailabletoopponentswho"predicatecontradictories"(b18).For
"it",sc.'man'or'isaman',signifies,forCallias,thathisbeingis
''nothingelse"(a27),sc.thanbeingamanyet"its''denials,sc.'isanot
man'and'isnotaman',wouldsignifythathisbeingissomethingelse.
Sotheargumentis:(1)eachof'man'and'notman'givesacomplete
accountofthebeingofwhatevertheyapplyto(2)theygivedifferent
accountsthereforetheycannotapplytothesamethings.(2)appearsto
relyon1006b13,whichshouldnow,perhaps,betranslated"itisnot
possiblethat'tobe'foramanshouldsignifyjustwhat'nottobe'

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[signifies]foraman".Butwhy(1)?Whyareessentialpredications
exclusive?TheNoteseeksilluminationfromPosteriorAnalyticsI22.
83a2432,whichends:"nothingcanbepalewhichisnotacertainother
tilingthatispale",meeinaitileukonhoouchheterontionleukonestin.By
glossingthis"whatispalecannotbeidenticalwiththepalethatitis",
i.e.subjectsoftruecoincidentalpredicationaredifferentfromtheir
predicates,theNotearrivesatthedoctrinethat"aparticularman...is
identicalwithman'',i.e.essentialpredicationsarestatementsofidentity.
Inthatway(1)issustained,butatthepriceofa"dubioustheoryof
predication''(p.100).

ThedubioustheorywasascribedtoAristotlebyOwen[54]aspartofan
explanationofAristotle'smannerofevadingtheThirdManobjectionto
Plato'sTheoryofForms.Infacthowever(thoughIcannotargueithere),
theevasiondoesnotrequirethattheformmanshouldbeidenticalwith
particularmensuchasCallias,butonlythatbeingamanshouldapplyto
particularmendirectlyandnotbyvirtueof,orthrough,itsapplyingto
somethingelse.TheNoteonp.168proposesthislatterasthefirstsensewhich
AristotlegivesinD18to'initsownright'(or'byvirtueofitself'):according
tothisinterpretationCalliasispalenotinhisownrightbutthroughhaving
something,thepaleinhim,thatispaleandonlythelatterispaleinitsown
right.Thedistinctionemployedherebetweenthetworelationsofhavingand
beingishelpfullyassociatedbyrecentcommentators([64]pp.1823,[75]p.
103)withtwoconverserelations,beinginandbeingsaidof,distinguishedby
AristotleatCategorics2.1a20 b9andappliedat5.2a1934:inthat
terminology,paleisnotsaidofCallias,butissaidofsomethingthatisinhim.
SuchisthedoctrineascribedtoAristotle(andcriticized)intheNotestoD18.

ItispossibletointerpretthesentencealreadycitedfromthePosterior
Analyticsasbearingasimilar,butunfortunatelynotthesame,sense.
First,wemusttakeitasimportingthegeneralideathataparticular
suchasCalliasispaleindirectlyorderivatively,throughsomething:this
evencreepsinto[16]'stranslationofthesentence:"therecannotbe
anything<PSle>whichisnot<PSle>throughbeingsomethingdiffer
ent",sc.frompale.Secondly,weshouldunderstand'[is]differentfrom
pale'asascribingsomethingotherthanpaleratherthan,asintheNotes,
ascribingothernessthanpale.Thisfurther'something'willdoubtlessbe
asubstantialformsuchasman,whichaccordingtothelanguageofthe
CategoriesissuitabletobesaidofCallias.Puttingthetworesultstogether
weget:paleisnotsaidofCallias,butisinsomethingthatissaidofhim.

Fromallthisthreerivalaccountsemergeofthedistinctionbetween
whattheNotescallessentialandcoincidental(traditionally'accidental')
predication,thatis,betweentwowaysinwhichoneitemcanbe(truly)
predicatedof,orholdsgoodof,anotheritemoritself.Accordingtothe
firstoftheseaccounts,whenpaleholdsgoodofCalliasitholdsgoodof
himinthesecondway(thatis,coincidesinhim)because

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(a)Calliasispalebutisdifferentfromthatpale.
Accordingtotheothertwo,theexplanationisthatheispalenotinhis
ownright,whichmaymeaneitherthat

(b)Calliasispalethroughhavingsomething(hispale)thatispale,
orthat

(c)Calliasispalethroughbeingsomething(aman)thathaspale.

(a),(b),and(c),therefore,areaccountsofwhatAristotlemeansby'pale
coincidesinCallias'.(a)nowseemstomeimplausible.Between(b)and
(c)weneednotchooseatpresentIreturntothemlater.Noticetoothat
(b)and(c)couldbecombined,giving'Calliasispalethroughbeing
something(aman)thathassomething(thepale)thatispale'.

Thereis,however,apricetobepaidforthisdeparturefromthe
Notes.TheNotesinvokeaccount(a),the"dubioustheoryofpredica
tion",forthepurposeofdefending(1)inPartIIIofAristotle'ssecond
argumentindefenceofPNC,viz.'eachof"man"and"notman"givesa
completeaccountofthebeingofwhatevertheyapplyto'.Itisnotclear
tomehow(1)canbesustainedoneitheroftheothertwoaccounts,
althoughWeidemannin[76]thinksthatithis''firstpremiss"onp.79
canbe.

(Thelabels'essentialpredication'and'accidental(orcoincidental)
predication'comefromthetradition,butAristotlehimselfusuallymeans
somethingdifferentby'predicatecoincidentally'.Inthetradition,aswe
haveseen,apredicationiscoincidentalwhenitspredicatecoincidesinits
subject,therebyaffordingthesubjectonlyaderivativetitletobetailedby
thatpredicate.InAristotle,apredicationiscoincidentalwhenithasonlya
derivativetitletobecalledapredicationseePriorAnalyticsI27.43a336,
PosteriorAnalyticsI22.83a1417,[16]pp.11617.Thesamepredication
mightofcoursebecoincidentalinbothsenses.)

D6,9E2:Identity
IshallnextlookatAristotle'sviewsonidentity,which,althoughthey
arenotverypervasiveinbooksG,D,andEoftheMetaphysics,have
attractedcommentintherecentliteraturethathasspreadout,aswe
shallsee,overneighbouringrelevanttopics.Icentremydiscussionona
questiontowhichIshalleventuallygivetheanswer'No'.Itis:

DidAristotlerejecttheLawoftheIndiscernbilityofIdenticals?Let
ushenceforwarduse'a','b',etc.asschematiclettersopentoreplacement
byanyofthetypesofexpressionthatAristotle,inhisrelaxedway,allows
himselfasgrammaticalsubjectsofunquantifiedsentences,e.g.'Coriscus',
'man','theman','thepale','thepaleCoriscus','paleman',andsoon.

Page209

ThentheLawstatesthatifaandbareidentical,everythingtrueofais
trueofbtheysharethesamepropertiesandhistory.Itmustbe
distinguishedfromtheSubstitutivityLaw,thatiftwoexpressions'a'and
'b'refertothesamething,eithercanbereplacedbytheotherwithout
affectingtruthvalue,salvaveritate.TheSubstitutivityLawmakesaclaim
aboutlanguage,whichmightbetrueofonelanguagebutnotof
another.Asstated,itisnottrueofEnglishorGreeksee[105].

ButtheLawoftheIndiscernibilityofIdenticals,whichfollowing
currentphilosophicalusageIshallcallLeibniz'sLaw(Leibnizhimself
mayratherhaveintendedsomequalifiedversionofSubstitutivity)isnot
aboutexpressionsofalanguagebutaboutidentity.Ithasgenerallybeen
regardedasanalytic,constitutiveoftheconceptofidentity(thus[101]
and[104]seethequestionwhetherAristotleacceptsLeibniz'sLawas
thequestionwhetherhe'hastheconceptofidentity').Initsformulation
theword'identical'couldbereplacedby'thesame'foritisanillusion
tosupposethatstandardEnglish,evenscholarlyEnglish,firmlydistin
guishestheseLatinateandAngloSaxonadjectivescertainlytheearliest
writersofphilosophicalEnglish,slowlylearningnottothinkinLatin,
choseeitherexpressionindifferently.However,itiswellknownthatcare
ofadifferentkindisneededininterpreting,orapplying,theLaw.We
arenotmeanttosupposethatifaandbare,forexample,thesameage,
orcompositioni.e.identicalinageorcompositionthentheymust
shareallthesamepropertiesandhistory.TheLawappliesonlywitha
certainrangeofqualificationsafter'same',suchas'man'or'table'or,
definitively,'thing'.Thisdistinction,familiarthoughnotmarkedbyany
simplelinguistictest,wehavelearnttolabelasthedistinctionbetween
qualitativeandnumericalidentity,usingterminologyinheritedulti
matelyfromAristotlehimself.Onceweareequippedwiththeterminol
ogywecanexpressLeibniz'sLawunambiguouslyintheform:ifaandb
arenumericallythesame(ornumericallyidentical),aandbshareallthesame
propertiesandhistory.

AlthoughAristotleintheTopicsmorethanoncerecommendsuseofa
principleatleastsimilartoLeibniz'sLaw,apparentexceptionstothe
Lawwerewellknowntohim.AnexampleistheroadfromThebesto
AthensandtheroadfromAthenstoThebes,presentedatPhysicsIII3.
202b1316asnothaving"allthesamethingsholdinggoodofthem".
Aristotle'scommentisthat"onlyinthecaseofthingswhosebeingisthe
same(hoistoeinaitoauto),notthingsthatarethesameinanyoldway,do
allthesamethingsholdgoodofthem"(comparethesomewhatsimilar
formulationatDeSophisticisElenchis24.179a3840),fromwhichhemust
inferthatthebeingoftheroadsisnotthesame.Somecommentatorssee
thisasimplyingarestrictiononLeibniz'sLaw([19]pp.6671,[101]
pp.17980),butAristotle'sexamplewillnotadmitarealexceptionto
theLawunlessheregardstheroadsasnumericallythesameeven

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thoughtheirbeingisnotthesame.Couldhesupposethattobepossible?
Insomeplaces'sameinbeing'isreplacedbytheapparentlysynonymous
'sameinformula,logos',here"...intheformulasayingwhatitisto
be"(202b12).Itistruethateachoftheroadsinquestionhasadifferent
formula,itsown.Yetiftheywerenumericallythesame,theywouldalso
haveeachother'sformula,andsonotdifferinbeing.Wehavetoassess
theprobabilitythatAristotlerecognizedthisinferenceorthefeasibility
ofhiscarryingonwithoutit.CertainlyatD6.1016b911(citedby[110]
p.71)hesaysthat"thingswhich...donothaveoneformulawein
factreckonasmorethanonething"andseeDeSophisticisElenchis24.
179bl4.OntheotherhandDeGenerationeetCorruptioneI5.320b1314
contrasts'oneinformula'with'oneinnumber'.Thematterremains
controversial(seeBibliography)butitispossibletoarguethatAristotle
dealswithallapparentexceptionstotheLawbydenyingthattheyare
realexceptions,andinparticularthathisregularsolutionisthatpurport
edlyidenticalitemswhosepropertiesdifferareidenticalinsomeother
waythannumerically([110]pp.6674).

WhatmightbeasuitablewayfortheroadsfromThebestoAthens
andAthenstoThebestobethesame,yetnotnumericallythesame?We
caneasilysuppose,althoughthePhysicsdoesnottellus,thattheroads
areexamplesofwhatMetaphysicsD9callscoincidental(or'accidental')
samenessandthereissomeevidencethatcoincidentalsamenessfillsthe
bill.ForinthesamechapterofDAristotlesaysthat"manandartistic
[arethesamecoincidentally,t'autakatasumbebekos]becauseoneofthem
coincidesintheother"(1071b29).TheremarkmakesitlooklikeAristotc
liandoctrinethattwothingscanbethesamecoincidentally.

TheNoteon1017b27dismissesthisputativedoctrineasaninexcusable
errorbutmoreneedstobesaid.Whateverwethinkaboutmanand
artistic(mousikosotherstranslate'musical'or'educated'or'cultivated')
beingtwoandyetalsothesame,thereisnodifficultyinunderstanding
howthingsmightbetwoandyetalsoonefortheymightbetwoelements
whichmakeupasinglecomposite,asforexampletwo(ormore)flowers
maymakeupasinglebunch.InD6Aristotlegivesexamplesofthistype
ofunity,whichtheNotescalltype1.TheNotesarguethathetreats
coincidentalunityasoftype1forexample,heseesmanandartistic,or
CoriscusandartisticCoriscus,astwoitemsthatarccoincidentallyone
becausetheymakeuponecomposite,inthelattercasebythepeculiarprocess
ofoneofthembeingincludedintheother.

TheNotesonD6proposethatAristotleusesthistheoryofcomposition
toexplainamannercoincidentalsamenessinwhichitemssuchas
CoriscusandartisticCoriscusarenumericallythesame,andthathe
exploitsforthepurposearegularGreekambiguitybywhichexpressions
like'theartistic'canrefereithertoartistry(an'affection')ortoits
bearers.TheexplanationisthatCoriscusisnumericallythesameasthe

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artistic,sc.somebearerofartistry,byreasonofhavingtheartistic,sc.
artistry,coincidinginhimthisisfurtherdevelopedby[101].Insupport
oftheviewthatcoincidentalidentityis,afterall,akindofnumerical
identitywemayadduceTopicsI7.103a2431,whereAristotlespeaksof
whatisthesame"fromacoincidence",apotousumbebekotos,asbeing
"oneinnumber".

TheNotesfindthisdoctrineconfused(p.134butsomethingonthe
samelinesisdefendedin[57]pp.3678and[111]).Wemighthopeto
absolveAristotleoftheconfusionbysubstitutingthedifferentinterpreta
tionofthispartofD6whichhasbeenproposedbyCode[103]and
Matthews[104],andwhichmightbecalledinflationistontheground
thatithastheappearance,atleast,ofmakingAristotlepostulateextra
entitiesthat"bloat"hisontology(thoughboth[103]p.178and[104]p.
237thinktheycanacquithimofbloating).AtPhysicsI7.190a1920
Aristotlesaysthatwhenamanbecomesartistic,"theinartisticdoesnot
persist".Sinceitisclearthatinartistrymaypersist,insomeotherman,
"theinartistic"oughtheretorefereithertothisman'sinartistryortothe
bearerofitwhichexistedwhilethismanwasinartistic.Supposeitrefers
tothelatterthenAristotle'stheoryseesthebearerasastageorspace
timepart([103]).Theinartisticandthemanareonethinginthesense
ofmakinguponethingbuttheonethingismadeupnotbythe
inherenceofaffections,astheNotessuggest,butbytheconcurrenceof
suchparts.Whenthemanbecomesartisticonesuchpart,abearerof
inartistry,goesoutofexistenceandanother,abearerofartistry,comes
intoexistencewhileathird,theman,persists.Yetthelastoftheseparts
willbethesameasoneoftheothersoverthetimeofitsconcurrencewith
thatother,muchastwomergingroadscanbethesameovertheir
commonstretch.

Opinionsmaydifferastothemeritsofthisontology:[103]ishappy
withtemporalstages,whereas[104]p.224callsaccidentalunities
"kookyobjects".Onevirtuetheinterpretationdoeshoweverpossess:itis
abletoreconcileAristotle'sapparentlyconflictingclaimsthatcoinciden
talidentityis(TopicsI7.103a2431)andisnot(MetaphysicsD9.1017b29)
akindofnumericalidentity.Itbothisandisnot.Absolutelyspeaking,
artisticandmanaretwo,becauseoneofthemcoincidesintheotherbut
theyareoneforatime,thetimeoftheirconcurrence.Weareshowna
wayinwhichtwothingscanbenumericallythesamething.

Thecaseforinflationismin[103]and[104]restsheavilyonacertain
readingofAristotle'saccountofchangeinPhysicsI7.Inowturnto
MetaphysicsE2.1026b1524,whereaninterpretationhasbeenofferedby
Williams[126]whichseemstomesuperiortowhatisproposedinthe
Notes(asalsotothatin[103]and[104])andwhichwould,ifcorrect,
underminethatreading.

E2.1026b1820reportssophistsasposingtheconundrum"whether

Page212

everythingthatis,butnotalways,hascometobe,sothatifsomeone,
beingartistic,hascometobeliterate,hehasalso,beingliterate,[come
tobe]artistic".Williamsproposesthefollowingreconstruction:suppose
anartisticpersonhascometobeliteratethenthereisanartisticliterate
personbutthathasnotalwaysbeensothereforetheartisticliterate
[person],whichisthesameastosaytheliterateartistic[person],has
cometobethereforealiteratepersonhascometobeartistic.(The
authorofK'sreportat1064b236isquiteclosetothis.)Thesolutionin
theNotes,drawnfromDeSophisticisElenchis,isnolongerappropriate.
WilliamsfindsAristotle'ssolutioninthelinesofE2whichfollow,
1026b214,wheretheTranslationhas,"Forwhatiscoincidentalis
obviouslyclosetowhatisnot,asisplainalsofromargumentssuchas
this:thatwiththingsthatareinanothersensethereis[aprocessof]
comingtobeanddestruction,butwiththings[thatare]coincidentally
thereisnot."PointingoutthatAristotle'stexthas'forwiththingsthat
are...',Williamstakes'such'torefertotheprecedingsophisticargu
ments,andthesecond'for...'clausetoexplainwhatiswrongwiththe
argumentinb1820bycontestingitsuseoftheassertionthat"everything
thatis,butnotalways,hascometobe".Theassertionwasusedtoinfer
thattheartisticliteratehascometobe,speakingbaldly(haplos,tradition
ally'simapliciter',heremeaningwithoutacomplementafter'be')butthe
artisticliterateiscoincidentally,andwhatiscoincidentallydoesnot
cometobe,speakingbaldaly.AccordinglyWilliamsamplifiestheGreekof
1026b23into'comingtobe[baldly]...',not'[aprocessof]comingto
be...'.

Thisisanimprovement.ItpresentsAristotlewithaunified,ifunder
standablyhesitant,doctrineaboutthingsthatarecoincidentally,suchas
literateCoriscusortheliterateartistic:namelythat(i)theydonotcome
orceasetobe,speakingbaldly(ii)theynotevenartcentrally,butare
"closetowhatisnot"and(iii)theyare"likemerenames"inthattheir
nameshardlysucceedinreferringtoanything.Bycontrastthereis,as
theNotescomplain(p.196),noplausibilityinthethoughtimputedby
theTranslationthatcoincidencestakenotimeincomingandceasingto
be.

ButtheresultaltersourreadingofAristotle'saccountofchangein
PhysicsI7.Theinartisticwhich"doesnotpersist"whenamanbecomes
artisticiscoincidentally.Thereforeitdoesnotceasetobe,speaking
baldly,whenthemanceasestobeartisticandsimilarlytheartisticdoes
notcometobe,speakingbaldly"doesnotpersist"isshorthandfor'does
notremaininartistic'.Asimilardeflationistreadingrevising[18]pp.
1002maybepossibleatDeGenerationeetCorruptioneI4.319b259.
Matthews'kookyobjectsandCode'stemporalstagesarenotyetonthe
scene.

Plentyofobstaclesremain,however,inthewayofattempts(suchas

Page213

thatoutlinedbyWilliamsin[106])topurgeAristotleoftheseexcres
cences.Iendthissectionbydrawingonthesomewhatdifferentinflation
istinterpretationinLewis[109]andMatthen[72]inordertoamplify
andamendtheNoteonD6.1015b16ff.

DeSophisticisElenchis24presentssolutionstofallaciousrefutations
dependingoncoincidence.At179b24Aristotlehasthiscommentonone
suchfallacy:"soitisnotthecasethatifIknowCoriscusbutam
ignorantofthe[man]approaching,Iknowandamignorantofthesame
[man]."ItissupposedthatthethingapproachingisCoriscus.But
Aristotleproposestoescapeinferenceto'IamignorantofCoriscus'by
meansofthefollowingprinciple:"itisnotnecessarythatwhatistrue
ofwhatcoincidesbetruealsooftheactualthing[itcoincidesin]"
(179a367).ThisisnotarestrictiononSubstitutivity(pace[108]p.145
perhapsitshouldbe),becauseforAristotlethings,notwords,are'true
of'.NorisitarestrictiononLeibniz'sLaw,fortheexampleshowshim
denyingthattheapproaching[man]"whatcoincides"and
Coriscus''theactualthing"arethesame.Hisdiagnosisisthatan
apparentexceptiontoLeibniz'sLawisnotarealexceptionbecause(1)
Coriscusand(2)theapproaching[man]aretwo.Itisashortstepfrom
thistowhat[109]callsAccidentalCompounds,suchas(3)approaching
Coriscus.Aristotle's"theoryisthatjustastheexpression'theartistic
Coriscus'isacomplexofthewords'theartistic'and'Coriscus',sowhat
itdesignatesisacomplexoftwononlinguisticitems,theartisticand
Coriscus"(Notesp.134artisticmaniscalleda''whole"atD11.
1018b345).Yetthetwoitems(1)and(2)andthetwoitems(1)and(3)
eachhaveacertainkindofsameness,coincidentalsameness,whichholds
when(3)exists,i.e.whenCoriscusisapproaching(seeMetaphysicsZ12.
1037b1417,[72]p.124).Matthen[72]makescomparisonswithPlato
andperhapsParmenides,andLewis[109]worksoutthelogicofsuch
relationships(notquitetheseones,becauseLewisidentifies(2)and(3),
andtakes(3)ascompoundingCoriscuswiththeaffectionofapproaching,
notwith(2),itsbearer).Lewisalsoshowshowthetheorymakessenseof
G4.1007a33 b18,onwhichIshalloffermyownfreshcommentsbelow.

Whatshouldwesayofsuchatheory?(i)Ittreatscoincidental
samenessasnotakindofnumericalsameness,despiteTopicsI7.103a24
31andcontrarytotheNoteOnD9.1017b27.Henceifallapparent
exceptionstoLeibniz'sLawarecasesofcoincidentalsameness,then
Leibniz'sLawhasnoexceptions.(ii)Thereisagoodchanceofrepresent
ingAristotleasholdingthatallapparentexceptionstoLeibniz'sLaware
casesofcoincidentalsamenessforexample,theroadfromThebesto
Athenswillbeacompoundconsistingoftheroadandthe[thing]
leadingfromThebestoAthens(orif[109]isright,consistingoftheroad
andthedirectionfromThebestoAthens).(iii)Thetheoryissurely
vulnerabletothecriticismonp.145oftheNotes:"itiswrongtoregard

Page214

the[compound]designated'artisticman'asacombinationoftwoitems,
themanandtheartistic(either'theartistic'means'someoneartistic',in
whichcasethereisonlyoneitem,oritmeans'artistry',inwhichcasewe
facetheimpossiblequestion'isthemanelementinthecomplexartistic
ornot?')"accidentalcompoundsareindeedkooky.(Laterancient
ScepticsprovedtheKookinessofasimilarAristotelianexcrescence,
relativessee[98]butthecomplaintasawholeisrejectedin[72]
p.125andn.24.)(iv)The.solutionintowhich,if[126]isright,Aristotle
wasgoadedbythesophisticconundrumofE2.1026b1820,offers
promiseofadifferent,deflationistaccountofthesecompounds,agreeable
tothosewholiketheirAristotletobecommonsensical(somethingI
hankeredafterwhenIwrotetheNotes).ButAristotledidnotworkit
outandhadhedoneso,atleastmanyofhisproblemsaboutidentity,
mostofwhichIhavenottouchedon,wouldhaveneedednew
solutionsperhapsthroughthedistinction,stilltodaynotfirmlygrasped
byallcommentators,betweenLeibniz'sLawsocalledandtheLawof
Substitutivity.

D7,E2:Being
Aristotlesays,"Butthatwhichis,whenbaldly(haplos)socalled,maybe
socalledinseveralways.Oneofthesewasthat[whichis]coincidentally,
anotherthat[whichis]astrue...Apartfromthesearethefiguresof
predication...againapartfromallthese,that[whichis]potentially
andactually"(E2.1026a33 b2).Discussingtheword'baldly'theNote
on1026a33concludesthat"inE2'isbaldly'means'exists'".

Butthatwon'tdo.Inthefirstplace,'isbaldly'isnotsomethingthat
getssaidorwrittenonesays'is'baldly,not'isbaldly'.Secondly,the
Englishverb'exist'mustbesaidbaldlyitadmitsnocomplementbut
thereisnoevidencethatAristotle,oranyotherancientGreekthatI
knowof,perceivedasenseoftheverb'einai'inwhichitmustbesaid
baldly.Whentheyheardabalduse,as'Socratesis',theyhearditalways
asadmitting,thoughnotnecessarilyinviting,acomplementtheyheard
itaswehear'childrenlearn'notaswehear'childrengrow'(inlearning,
childrenlearnthings,butingrowingtheydonotgrowthingsIowe
theexampleandthepointitmakestoBrown[80]).Admittedlythe
Greek'einai'getsusedbaldlynotonly,aswithEnglish'be',whena
particularcomplementisunderstoodfromthecontext,typicallyin
answertoaquestionasin'Yes,heis',butalsowhereEnglishwoulduse
'exist',forwhichtheancientlanguageshadnoseparateword(thislatter
iswhattheNotemeansbynonellipticalbeing).Butthesyntacticalfact
thatitalwaysadmitsacomplementdebars'einai'fromevermeaningthe
sameas'exist',whichdoesnotadmitacomplement.

Page215

Despitethissyntacticaldifferencetherearefairlyclosesimilaritiesin
thelogicalbehaviourof'exist'andof'einai'usedbaldly.1countthese
three:eachimplies'issomething'itisadefensiblephilosophicalthesis
thatinanyoccurrenceofeachthereissomef suchthattheoccurrence
implies'isf 'butneitherofthereverseimplicationsholdswithout
restriction(however,therestrictionsmaywelldivergesee[71]).Ifwe
addthatAristotle'sphrase"thatwhichis,whenbaldlysocalled"is
presumablyintendednottocoveroccurrenceswherethecontextsupplies
acomplement,Ithinkwecansavethesubstanceoftheconclusioninthe
Notes,viz.thatthephraseindicatescasesinwhichEnglish'exist'would
beafairlynaturalparaphraseoftheGreek'einai'and,onemightadd,
inwhichEnglish'be'withoutsupplementwouldnotbenaturalatall.

ThesamefourfolddivisionappearsinD7,butappliedto"thatwhich
is"withoutexplicitrestrictiontowhatis"socalledbaldly".TheNotes
arguethattherestrictionisalreadyimplicitthere,atleastinthe
treatmentofwhatisinitsownright(interpretation(2),pp.1413),
probablyinthetreatmentofwhatiscoincidentally(interpretation(3),
p.144).Theseconclusionshavenotfoundfavour.Botharerejectedin
[71],andalsobyThorpin[69],whoissatisfiedthat''thereisnothingin
thedeploymentofthefourusesofeinaiinD7whichlooksremotelylike
theexistentialuse''(p.254)accordingtoThorp'whatisbaldly'doesnot
"mean'existentialbeing'"inE2either,thoughitdoesinsomeother
places(p.255).Gricetakesthesameviewabout1017a2730("atleastat
<<t>hispoint",[64]p.180).

Itmayneverthelessbeworthwhiletodrawoutsomefurtherconse
quencesofthisdisfavouredinterpretation,whichgetsitselfor
AristotleintoamajordifficultynotacknowledgedintheNotes.

Coincidentalbeing.AccordingtotheNotesAristotlemeansustofind
coincidentalbeingbyreadinghisG7examplesinawaythatdemands
theEnglishwordorderin'thejustartisticis','themanartisticis',and
'theartisticmanis'andhemeansustoaccountforitasderivativefrom
thebeingofsomethingelsehereamaninwhomtheartistic,orthe
justandtheartistic,coincide.ThestatementintheNotesofthis
interpretation,"'coincidental'means'derivative'"(p.144)issloppy,if
notworserather'iscoincidentally'means'is,byacoincidenceofitself
oritspartsoroneofitspartsinsomethingelsethatis'.Aristotle's
parentheticalexampleofthenotpale,sofarfrom"havingnothingtodo
withcoincidentalbeing"asthetortuousNoteonp.146complains,fits
theinterpretationwithoutdifficulty(andcouldbeattachedtothe
generalaccountofbeing,saidbaldly,in[71],ason[71]p.431).

Beinginitsownright.Thethings"saidtobeintheirownfight"are"all
thingswhichsignifythefiguresofpredication",exemplifiedamongst
othersbywhatsignifies"aquantity"and"aqualification"(1017a226).
AstheNoteslaterexplain(pp.160,162),thesetranslationsfollow[13]

Page216

inusingabstractnounswhereAristotlehastwoadjectives,'poson'and
'poion'.Themeaningoftheadjectivesmaybeinterrogative('ofwhat
amount','howqualified')orindefinite('ofsomeamount','qualified').
Aristotle'schoiceofthemisnostylisticquirk,forhepossessesabstract
nouns'posotes'and'poiotes'(fromwhichdescendour'quantity'and
'quality')andmeanssomethingdifferentbythem:thusD14.1020bb17
24tellsusthatwhilepoiotetesincludesuchthingsasexcellenceand
badness,andingeneralaffections,"thegoodandthebadsignifyqualifica
tion(topoion)"instancesofapoiotesareatbestwhatCategories1.1a12
15hascalledparonymsofinstancesof(orofanswerstothequestion)
poion,thatis,thingswhosenamesarederivedfromtheirnamese.g.
hotnessisaparonymofthehot.Weshouldinferthatthethingssaidtobe
intheirownrightaresuchthingsasthegoodandthejustandthepale
andthebig,notsuchthingsasexcellenceandjusticeandpallorandsize.
Awholenewarmyofkookyobjectsseemstoloom.

Imakenocommentonthisapparition,butturninsteadtoaparticular
consequentialdifficultythattheNotesdonotaddress.1017a1819has
justtoldusthatthenotpaleiscoincidentally,notinitsownrightandif
theinterpretationpreferredintheNotesisright,thesameappliestothe
justartistic,andtheartisticman.Whythenshouldthepale,andother
thingssignifyingpoionetc.,beintheirownright?Categories4.1b25offersa
clue,byspecifyingthe"thingswhichsignify...poson...poion..."etc.
as"saidwithoutanycombination".InD7wearegivenadifferent
specification,"thingspredicated'',butperhapsitmeansthesame:per
hapsthingspredicatedhavetobesaidinsinglewords,notinphraseslike
'notpale'('meleukon')or'paleman'.

Thisisnotveryconvincing,becauseitishardtoseehowtheexistence
ofaoneworddesignationshouldmakethedifference,amongthingsthat
coincideinsubstances,betweenthosethatareintheirownrightand
thosewhoseverybeingiscoincidental.Butletussupposethedifference
doesexist,howeveritismadethentwodogmasoftraditionalAristotelian
ismdisappearfromtheMetaphysicsofAristotlehimself.Oneisthedogma
thataccidents,inthesenseofthingsthatarecoincidentally,arethesame
asaccidentsofasubstance,inthesenseofthingsthatcoincideina
substance.Ontheaboveinterpretationthisiswronginanycase,because
thingsthatarecoincidentallyincludeitemssuchasartisticman,only
partofwhichcoincidesinasubstance(theotherpart)itwillnowbe
wrongintheotherdirectiontoo,becausethingsthatsignifyposon,poion,
etc.willcoincideinasubstancewithoutbeingcoincidentally.Theother
dogmaisthatAristotle'scategoriescomprisesubstancesandaccidents.
Onthecontrary,ifby'categories'wemean(astraditionally)the"things
saidwithoutanycombination"ofCategories4.1b25,whichsurelyareor
atleastincludethe"thingswhichsignifythefiguresofpredication"inD
7,thesethingsexcludesomeaccidentsofsubstances,suchasthe

Page217

notpale,andtheyexcludeallotheraccidentalbeings,suchasartisticman.

Itisoftentakenthatthecategoriescomprisebesidessubstances
quantities,qualities,relations,andsoon.Thattooisruledoutby
Aristotle'sdistinctionbetweenpoionetc.andpoiotesetc.andhedoesnot
evenhaveawordfor'relation'.Qualities,poiotetes,areamongthethings
mentionedinG2.1003a33 b10asbeingcalledthingsthatarebecause
theyaresomethingorotherofasubstancetheyaresocalled"with
referenceto"that"oneparticularnature".Accidentsinthesenseof
accidentalbeings,thethingsthatarecoincidentally,mustnotbecounted
inthisgroup,becauseE2.1026b24willexcludethemfromthediscipline
whosesubjectmatterthegroupdelimits.)

TheNoteon1017a35agreeswithAristotlethat'sees',andhence'is
onethatsees',arcambiguousbutcomplainsthat"hedoesnotexplain
how,inthelattercase,theambiguityistransferredfrom'sees'to'is'"
(p.146).Forapossibleexplanationsee[62].

D30:Coincidence
Thenotionofcoincidence,traditionally'accident',pervadeseverypart
oftheAristoteliancorpus.InthesebooksoftheMetaphysicsitplaysa
role,aswehaveseenabove,inAristotle'sattackinGontheopponents
ofPNCseveralchaptersof.D,especially6,7,and9,invokeitinmaking
theirmaindivisionamongthevarious"waysofbeingcalled"whatever
thatparticularchapterisaboutD30hascoincidenceasitsownsubject
matterandE2arguesthat"thereisnostudythatdealswiththat
[whichis]coincidentally"(1026b34).ThemeaningofAristotle'sverb
'sumbebekenai'isdiscussedonpp.767oftheNotes,andthereareother
relevantNotesonpp.1012,1335,1436,1802,and1905.HereI
shalltrytodrawsomethreadstogether.(Aristotle'streatmentinTopicsI
5ispuzzlinglydifferent,andpuzzlinginitselfbut,asintheNotes,Iwill
continuetoignoreit,despitethejustcomplaintin[117]n.6.)
Therearethreeconstructionstoconsider:

(1)acoincidesinb(lodetoidesumbebeke)
(2)aiscoincidental,oracoincidence(sumbebekos)
(3)aisfcoincidentally(katasumbebekos)

Letusfirstlookat(1)(2)and(3)willbedefinableintermsofit.
Throughoutitisimportanttorememberthat(i)somecommentatorson
Aristotle,notablySorabjiin[112]ch.l,use'coincidence'nottotranslate
'sumbebekos'butinitsmodernEnglishsense,and(ii)manyuseother
wordstotranslate'sumbebekos',e.g.'accident','incidental','concurrence',
'concomitant'.

(1)WelearnagooddealabouttherelationofcoincidinginfromG4.

Page218
a b a b
1007 33 18. 34 1says:"'coincidental'alwayssignifiesapredication
aboutacertainsubject".InAristotle'susagesubjects,hupokeimena,must
beotherthanwhatispredicatedofthem:thereforecoincidinginisan
irreflexiverelation.b24continues:"thecoincidentalisnotcoincidental
inthecoincidental,unlessbecausebothcoincideinthesamething".
Thismaylooklikeastatementoftransitivity(theNoteonp.101
nonsensicallyreferstoitas"thetransitivecase"),butAristotle'smeaning
isdifferent.Ashisfollowingexampleshows,hehasinmindthecasein
whichaandbcoincideinoneanotherthiscanhappen,butonlyifand
becauseeachcoincidesinsomethirdthingc.(Iamafraidthatthe
sameNotemisrepresentsthisas"apredicateofX'spredicatemustbea
predicateofX",adifferentandcontentiousthesisonwhichseeespecially
[57].)Sincemutualcoincidenceofaandbispossible,therelationisnot
asymmetricalandsinceitisirreflexive,itfollowsthatitcannotbe
transitive.b56thendistinguishestwo''ways"ofcoinciding,onetheway
inwhichthepalecoincidesintheartistic,theotherthatinwhichthe
palecoincidesinSocrates.Theformeroccurs''becausebothcoincidein
thesame"thirdthing,andisthereforethoughAristotledoesnotsay
soasecondarywayofcoinciding,explainedthroughtheotherprimary
way(inthelanguagedevelopedunder(3)below,hecouldhavesaidthat
thepalecoincidescoincidentallyintheartistic).Nextwearetold(b910)
thattherecannotbe"someotherthing",sc.thanthepale,coinciding
inthepaleSocrates.Theupshotisthatthepalecancoincide,inthe
primaryway,onlyinasubstance(b17).Sincecoincidingis"predication
aboutacertainsubject",itmightseemthatsubstancescannotthemselves
coincide,unlessperhapsinmatter.ButAristotledoesnotsticktothis.
ForexampleMetaphysicsZ5.103b201speaksof"...[a]whitein
whichbeingamancoincides"andD2.1013b361014a1(=PhysicsII3.
195a345)saysthatwhenPolyclitusmakesastatue,thatisbecause
"beingPolyclituscoincidesina[literally:the]statuemaker".(Wemay
notethat,becausetheconversealsoholds,viz.statuemakercoincidesin
Polyclitus,thisisanotherproofthatAristotlecannotallowtherelationof
coincidingintobebothirreflexiveandtransitive.)

Ontheotherhand,weneverhearofmancoincidinginCallias,or
animalinman.TheNoteonp.101explainsthisasrestingonAristotle's
doctrinethat'Calliasisaman'and'manisananimal'expressidentities
butsinceInowthinkAristotleheldnosuchdoctrine,wemustlookfor
anotherexplanation.Ithasalreadybeenoffered.Manholdsgoodof
Callias"inhisownright(kath'hauton)",whereaswhatcoincidesina
thingholdsgoodofitderivatively,inthesense:
(C)f (equivalentlythef ,orbeingf )coincidesinbwhenbisf
throughsomethingelsebeingf .
EarlierIelaborated(c)intermsofAristotle'sdistinctionintheCategories

Page219

betweenbeingsaidofbeingin:thusf wouldcoincideinbwhenbis
eitherthroughf 'sbeinginsomethingsaidofb,orthroughf 'sbeing
saidofsomethinginbor(combiningthem)throughf 'sbeingsaidof
somethinginsomethingsaidofb.Butthiselaborationwillnotfit
untypicalexamplessuchasthatofPolyclitusinD2,becausebeing
Polyclitusisnotinanything,norisitsaidofanythinginthestatuemaker
(itispresumablysaidofman,whichissaidof,notin,thestatuemaker).
SoInowsuggestthebroaderandlesstechnicalformula(C).Evenso,of
course,quiteastrangeresultfollowsforPolycliuts,namelythatthe
statuemakerisPolyclitusthroughsomethingelsebeingPolyclitus.Yet
thisstrangenessisexactlywhatAristotle'sentanglementwithkooky
objectswilldeliver:beingPolyclitusholdsprimarilyofacertainsub
stance,acertainmanthestatuemakerissomethingelsethanonly
coincidentallythesameasthatman.(Thefactthat(C)makes
acontrastwithwhatholdsgoodofathinginitsownrightisperhaps
sufficienttojustifytheNotesingivingthecorrespondingsenseof'coinci
dental'as"nonessential".)

(2)'aiscoincidental',or'...acoincidence'(bothwordstranslatesumbebe
kos')issometimesfollowedby'forb'inthatcaseitsimplymeans'a
coincidesinb'.Ifthecontextsuppliesnob,themeaningmaybe'a
coincidesinx'withthecontextsupplyingsomequantifierin'x'(e.g.
acoincidesinsomething')butmoreusuallyandindeedmostusually
aisacoincidence'hasanabsolutemeaning,whichcouldlooselybe
expressedas'aistheresultantofsomeccoincidinginsomed'.Inthis
senseacoincidenceisakindofcomplexentity,composedoftwo
elementsoneofwhichcoincidesintheother.

Wehavealreadyidentifiedsomeofthesecomplexentitiesas[109]'s
AccidentalCompounds:theartisticCoriscus,theartisticman,theartistic
pale.D30bringsusfourmoreexamples,andatthesametimeoffers,in
effect,twofurtheraccountsofwhatacoincidenceis.Thefirstexamplein
D30isarelativecasewhere'iscoincidentalfor'canbeunderstood
withoutdifficultyasmeaning'coincidesin':"thefindingoftreasureis
...coincidentalforhimwhoisdiggingthetrench"(1025a1617).The
secondisintroducedbymeansofacompletesentence,ineffect'the
artisticispale',whichgivestheimpressionthattheitemreferredto("this
comestobe...wecallitcoincidental",1025a21)isaconjunctiveevent
orstateofaffairs,thatofsomething'sbeingbothartisticandpale,rather
thananAccidentalCompound,theartisticpale.Inthethirdexample
thisimpressionisstrengthened.Thecaseisagainarelativeoneindeed
theTranslation,"itwasacoincidenceforsomeonetovisitAegina"(a256),
masksthefactthatAristotleactuallyusesthefiniteverb'coincided
in',albeitintheaorist(sunebe)andnot,asusually,theperfecttense.But
thisexampledoesnotidentifyforusthetwoelementswhich,according

Page220

totheaccountofcoincidencesofargiven,combinetogethertoproduce
anAccidentalCompound.Weshouldexpectsomethinglike'visiting
AeginacoincidedinPlato'or'...inthetravellertoPiraeus'theyvisited
Aeginathroughsomething(allegedly)'else',thecaptiveofAeginetan
piratesorthehuggerofanAeginetanleeshore,visitingtheplace
whereaswhatAristotleactuallysaysisthatvisitingAeginacoincidedin
"someone".Perhapswecansupplytheextraelementforourselvesbut
becauseofAristotle'smannerofexpressionitisonceagainrathermore
naturaltothinkofthecoincidenceinvolvedasalesskookyoratany
rateamorefamiliarkindofentity,aconjunctiveevent(seealsothe
exampleatPosteriorAnalyticsI4.73b1112,"itlightenedwhenhewent
forawalk").

Aristotlecommentsonhisfirstthreeexamplesthatthereis"no
definitecauseofthecoincidental,butachanceone"(1025a245)and
thislookslikeanewaccountofwhatitisforonething,thef ,tocoincide
inanotherthing,b,sothattheirresultantisacoincidence:thathappens
not,ornotonly,whenbisf becausesomethingelseisf ,butalsowhenb
isf becauseofachancecause.

SinceAristotle'sviewsaboutchancecausesbelongtoPhysicsbookII
(see[15],[120]),onlythreefurtherremarksareinplacehere.(i)Itmay
havebeenlesscleartoAristotlethanitistousthatthereisadifference
betweenanAccidentalCompoundsuchasthePiraeusboundAegina
stranded,andaconjunctiveeventsuchasitshappeningthatsomeoneis
bothboundforPiraeusandstrandedinAegina.(ii)The'new'account
ofcoincidencesisnotsodifferentfromtheoldonethattheymightnotbe
workedintosomesortofunity.(iii)Thereisafurther'new'accountof
coincidencesinD30'sinitialstatementofwhat"wecallcoincidental",
viz."whatholdsgoodofsomething...butneitherofnecessitynorfor
themostpart".Itseemsbesttoregardthisofficialstatementasderived
fromthefirst'new'account,bymeansofthefollowingthreefurther
assumptions:(a)whenbisf notbecauseofachancecause,itisf because
itisb,i.e.b'sbeingf iswhattheNotecalls"selfexplanatory"(p.181)
(b)causescanalwaysbegivenby,andneverwithout,citing"usualor
constantconjunctions"(ibid.)and(c)whathappensconstantlyhappens
necessarily.TheNoteon1025a14makessomecriticalremarksabout
theseassumptionsseefurther[119]and[120].

InD30'sfourthexampleofacoincidence,1025a302,Aristotlesays
that"possessingtworightangles"isacoincidencebecauseitholdsgood
ofatriangle"in[thetriangle's]ownrightwithoutbeingin[thetri
angle's]substance".Herewearemeanttounderstand'coincidencefor
thetriangle'(indeed"[does]for"mightbebetterthantheTranslation's
"[does]of"at1025a32,makingussupply"isacoincidence''rather
than''holdsgood"astheunexpressedverb)sothesenseisoncemore
'coincidesin'"nonessential"astheNotehasit.Ontheotherhanda

Page221

newkindofcoincidenceappearsinthisexample,aninitsownright
coincidence,traditionally'perseaccident'.Thiskindisimportantto
AristotleaswhatBarnescalls"thestapleofdemonstration"([16]
p.115)forintheconclusionofanydemonstrationthepredicate(i)holds
goodofthesubjectinitsownright(becauseunderstanding,episteme,is
alwaysofwhatholdsgoodofsomethinginitsownright,andwhatis
demonstratedisunderstood)and(ii)coincidesinthesubject(becauseit
holdsgoodofitthroughsomethingelse,viz.amiddleterm).Thesense
of'initsownright'hereismoredifficultsee[118].

(3)'Coincidentally'isusedintheTranslationtorendertheadverbial
phrase'katasumbebekos',moreliterally'by,orinvirtueof,acoincidence'
(traditionally'peraccidens'),forasAristotletellsusatD18.1022a1920
kata'indicatessomekindofcause.Whenaisf byvirtueofacoincidence,
thecoincidence'causes'atobef bybeingthemediumthroughwhicha's
beingf isderivedfromsomethingelse'sbeingf .Thecoincidencethus
explainsa'sbeingf ,andcontrastswiththecasewherea'sbeingf "can
notbemadeplainseparately",sc.froma(MetaphysicsZ5.1030b245).
Thesimplestkindofderivationoccurswhenaisf throughcoinciding
insomebthatisf buttwocomplicationsmayarise,individuallyor
together.f mayberelational,i.e.y tosomec:thisaddsthefurther
possibilitiesthataisy toccoincidentallythroughbeingy tosomedthat
ccoincidesin,or(combiningthetwo)thataisy tocthroughcoinciding
insomebthatisy tosomedthatccoincidesin.Theothercomplication
isthataitselfmaybeacoincidence,callita1a2:thena1a2maybef
througha1'scoincidingina2anda2'sbeingf ,orconversely,orthrough
eachofa1anda2'scoincidinginsomebthatisf andofcoursethesame
thingcanhappenwithc,orwithbothaandc.

ThesebooksoftheMetaphysicspresentuswithfourchiefinstancesof
beingf coincidentally:(a)being,(b)unity,(c)identity,and(d)causa
tion.(a)InthesimplecaseaccordingtotheNotesaiscoincidentally
whenacoincidesinsomebthatis.Theremaybethecomplicationthata
isitselfacoincidence.(b)Coincidentalunityintroducesbothofthe
complications,forastheNoteshows(p.133)Aristotle'sexamplesseem
toincludecaseswherethepredicateisrelational(aisonewithc),cases
wherethesubjectisacoincidence(abisone),andcaseshavingboth
features(abisonewithc).Ithastobeadmittedthatincopingwiththese
exampleshedoesnotalwaysexplaincoincidentalunitythroughcoinci
denceinsomethingthatisone.(c)Coincidentalsamenesswilladmitmany
ofthesameanalysesascoincidentalunitysince,iftheremarksaboveare
correct,wecanapplytothiskindofsameness,andtorelationaloneness,
Aristotle'scontentionthat"samenessisa...oneness...ofthebeingof
morethanonething"(D9.1018a78).(d)Coincidentalcausation
exhibitsasimilarvariety(see[120]p.79).Forexamplethestatuemaker

Page222

PolyclituscoincidentallymadeaneyesoreifbeingPolyclituscoincidesin
astatuemakerwhomadeastatueinwhichaneyesorecoincides.Itis
worthnoticingthattheseaccountsofAristotle'smeaningwouldpermit
himtosaythatthepale,orthepaleSocrates,iscoincidentallya
substancebutheneversayssuchthings.

E3:Determinism
MetaphysicsEchapter3isshort,difficult,andnotclearlyconnectedtoits
context.Itdealswith,orisrelevantto,determinisminallthecommon
acceptationsofthatname(oftenassumedwithoutargumenttobe
equivalent),viz.'thethesisthateverythingisalwaysnecessary(itwas
neverpossiblethatitshouldhavebeenotherwise)','thethesisthat
everythinghasanantecedentcause',and'thethesisthateverythinghas
anantecedentnecessitatingcause(whichmakesitnecessaryfromthe
timewhenthecauseisnecessary)'.TheNotesconclude(p.198)that
"thechapterhasnotyetreceivedasatisfactoryinterpretation"and
despitetheappearanceofmanynewstudies(seeBibliography)since
thosewordswerewritten,Ibelievetheyarestilltruein1992.

RecentworkhastendedtoagreewiththeNotestotheextentof
favouringaninterpretationoftheargumentwhichembodies(e)below
butIamnowmoresceptical.AccordingtotheNotes,the"thesisofthe
chapter"(p.197)isthattherearecausesthattakenotimeincomingandceasing
tobeandthechapter'sfirstparagrapharguesthatotherwise,since
(e)everythingthatdoestaketimeincomingandceasingtobeisitself
noncoincidentallycaused,
indeterminisminthesense
(a)noteverythingisnecessaryallthetime(p.196)
wouldberuledout,i.e.determinisminthesenseofthenegationof(a)
wouldfollow.Althoughallthatwouldfollowdirectlyisthateverycause
isitselfnoncoincidentallycaused,theNotesshowhowtodistilfromthe
secondparagraphafurtherpremiss
(b)everythingisnecessaryfromthetimewhenitiscaused,
whichpermitsanonwardsteptowardsdeterminism.Itmaydosoin
eitheroftwoways:if,astheNotessuggest,'noncoincidentally'in(e)
means'atalltimes',then(e)and(b)yieldthateverythingcausedwould
benecessaryatalltimesperhapsmoreplausibly,thesameresultcanbe
reachedif(b)isreplacedby
(b1)everythingisnecessaryfromthetimewhenithasacausal
ancestor,

Page223

whichlike(b)followsfromprinciplesthatAristotlemayaccept('every
thingisnecessaryfromthetimeithappens',and'causesnecessitate',i.e.
anynecessitytheypossessatatimeistransmittedtotheireffectsatthat
sametime).Althoughthisresultisstillnottheuniversaldeterminism
whichAristotleclaimstoextract,andrejectsasabsurdby(a),itisat
leastuncomfortablyclosetothatabsurdity.Fortheshapeoftheargu
mentsee[127]pp.4950.

Morepressingthanquibblesaboutthemeritsofthisproof,more
pressing,initially,eventhandoubtswhetheritcapturesAristotle'smea
ning,isthequestionwhatitspointis.Manycommentatorshavediscerned
ahiddenmessageinthechapter,differentfromthe'thesis'itannounces.
TheauthorofK8,admittedlyaflounderinginterpreterofE3asa
whole,beginshissummarybyrepresentingthe"originsandcauses"
underexaminationascausesof"whatiscoincidentally"(K8.1065a6,cf.
[123]p.129)andthishasgeneratedthesuggestion([7]453.1213)
thatthechapter'sbusinessistoproveAristotle'sstatementinE2.
1027a78that''ofthingsthatareorarecomingtobecoincidentallythe
causeisalsocoincidentally''.AccordingtoSorabjihowever,"thepromise
madeatthebeginning"ofthechapteris"toshowthataccidentscan
serveascauses"([112]p.9)whileWilliams([126]p.183)sees"the
chapterasawhole[as]concernedtorefute"causaldeterminism,i.e.
"everyeventisdeterminedbysomepriorcause."Thesejudgements
share,iflittleelse,anurgetoplaydownthenotionoftakingtimetocomeor
ceasetobe.Yetthechapter'sthesisappearstoembodythatnotion.

ThisdifficultyindiscerningapurposeforE3hashelpedtomotivate
severaldifferentinterpretationsonwhichInowcomment.
First,somehavepointedoutthat(b)iswhatmakes(a)hardto
sustain,and,theysay,(b)isnotAristotelian([124]).ButIstickbythe
claimintheNotesthat(b)ispresentinthischapter,howeversuccessful
Aristotlemayhavebeeninresistingitsseductionselsewhereinhisworks
(seee.g.[112]ch.2).

Secondly,(e)isahypothesisofuncertainstatus,introducedby'if'but
expressingnomoodbecausecontainingnofiniteverb.Insteadofassum
ing,astheNotesdo,thatAristotleendorsesit('if,assurelyisthecase'),
wemightthereforeconstrueitasaconsequenceofrejectingthechapter's
thesis('if,aswouldthenbethecase'),yieldingthestructure:otherwise
(e)wouldfollow,anddeterminisminthesenseofdenying(a)would
followfromthat(see[123]).Ofthetwoinferencestherebyseparated,the
secondcomeseasilyvia(b1),if(e)amountstosayingthateverything
(interesting)hassomeantecedentcausebutitisquiteunclearhowthis,
assertingtheexistenceofcauses,couldbeimaginedtofollowfrom
rejectionofthechapter'sthesis,whichitselfassertstheexistenceofcertain
kindsofcause.

Thirdly,then,wemightfollowWilliams[126]indenyingthatthe

Page224

chapterdealswiththenotionoftakingtimeorbeinginprocess.Williams'
assaultonthistradition(atraditionalsoaffectinge.g.MetaphysicsZ15.
1039b234,H3.1043b1416)isinthreemovements.(l)Heisable,as
wehaveseen,toofferanattractivealternativeinE2.1026b214.(2)
Hypothesis(e),ifAristotleendorsesit,mustsomehowrestrictthethings
thathaveacause,since(a)and(b1)togetherentailthatnotalldo.But
therestrictionneednotbe,as(e)assumes,tothingsthattaketimein
comingorceasingtobeforAristotle'swordorderallowsorevenfavours
adifferenttranslation,whichputs"noncoincidentally"withthesubject,
giving
(e4)everythingthatcomesandceasestobenoncoincidentallyhasa
cause

(whatthesethingsarethatcomeandceasetobenoncoincidentallywe
donotknow,butpossiblythesameasE2'sitemsthatcomeandceaseto
be,speakingbaldly).(3)If(e)intheformof(e4)werestilltojoinwith(a)
and(b1)inprovingAristotle'sthesisinthechapterbytheroutesofar
defended,thatthesismustnowassertthatsomecausescomeandceaseto
beonlycoincidentally.Williams'readingofthechapter'sfirstsentenceis
notthis,however,but,ineffect,'somecausescomeandceasetobe'.
Stressingthe"able"inmytranslationoftheGreekadjectives'ableto
cometobe'and'abletobedestroyed',afeaturewhichneednotberead
intotheirmeaningandwhichtheNotesintheeventignore,Williams
takesthesentencetoassertthattherearecauseswhich,atsometimes,
aremerelypotentialandnotactualized.Aristotle'sroutetothechapter's
thesis,sounderstood,willnowbeasfollows:otherwise,sinceeverything
isnecessaryfromthetimeithappens,allcauseswouldbenecessaryatall
times,whenceby(b)everythingcausedwouldbenecessaryatalltimes,
whenceby(e4)everythingthatcomestobenoncoincidentallywould
benecessaryatalltimes,which,ifstillnotexactlythedeterminismthat
Aristotleclaimstoextract,isoncemorecloseenoughtoittobe
thoroughlyembarrassing.

What,then,isthemessageofthechapter?(b1)commitsAristotleto
theviewthattherearetimeswhencontingenciesImean,whateveris
notalwaysnecessarydonotyethavecausalancestorsand(a)commits
himtotheexistenceofcontingencies.Thusalthoughacontingencyisnot
debarredfromhavingacauseorachainofcauses,neverthelessbecause
everycauseacquiresnecessityatthetimeitoccurs,andatthesame
time,by(b1),transmitsthatnecessitytoitsfuturedescendants,any
chainleadingtoacontingencymusthaveafirstmember,itselfuncaused,
andthefirstmember(liketheothers)mustatsomeearliertimehave
beenpotentialbutnotactual,i.e.musthavecometobe.Moreover,if
(e4)isright,alluncausedthingsthatcomeandceasetobemustdoso
coincidentallysocontingencies,ifcausedatall,musthaveastheirfirst

Page225

causesomethingthatcomesandceasestobecoincidentally.Pseudo
Alexander'sdiscussionoftheexampleofthirstleadingtoviolentdeathin
Aristotle'ssecondparagraphalludestooneNicostratuswhofellinto
enemyhandswhenhewentoutoftowntogetadrink([7]454.358).It
mayberighttousethisasgroundsforimputingtoE3itselftheview
thatonlychancehappeningsliketheencounterwithenemysoldierscan
bethefirstcausesofcontingentoutcomes,andthatthethinkerwho
tracedNicostratus'deathbacktoadecisiontoeatsaltyfoodispresented
byAristotleasmistaken.Coincidentalcausesplaynopartintheargument
sointerpreted,althoughitisdoubtlesstemptingtoconcedeonAristotle's
behalfthatNicostratus'decisiontoeatsaltyfooddidcausehisdeathina
way,viz.coincidentally,inthesensethatitcausedsomething,his
presenceoutsidethetown,whichbycoincidencewithsomethingelse
causedhisdeath.Allthisdeservesthecomment,however,thatifitis
Aristotle'sview,heneedstoponderfurtherforsomeeventscanbetraced
backtoanagent'searlierdecisiontobringthemabout,yettheseevents
arecontingenttoo(see[112]pp.2289,238)indeedtheyarenot
necessaryevenafterthetimeofthedecisionwhichcausesthem,contrary
to(b).Thereareobjectionsofadifferentkindin[125]pp.31416.

InanycaseIinclinetoagreewiththosecommentatorswhosaythat
themainlessonofthechapteristhatuncausedcausesmustexist,ifthereis
tobeanescapefromdeterminism:"it[sc.thecausalancestryofthe
specimendeath]runsasfarassomeorigin,butthisnofurtherto
anythingelse"(1027b1112).Thethesisofthechapterwillembodythis
resultif"origin"initmeans'uncausedcause'.Tobesure,thethesisgoes
further,initsobscurecharacterizationoftheseorigins.Wewishthe
characterizationeithertomakethemimpermanent,havingtheirown
coming(andceasing)tobe,or,inparticular,tomakethemthingsthat
comeandceasetobecoincidentallyandperhapsitcanbeinterpreted
soastoimportoneorbothofthosefeatures.Atanyrate,theformerat
leastofthemisinfact,onAristotle'sassumptionsinthechapter,partof
thepriceofescape.

Page227

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Thislist,revisedandenlargedforthesecondcdition,retainsmostoftheitemsintheBibliographyofthefirstedition,includingallworksreferredtointheNotes.

TextsandTranslations

Thetexttranslatedisin:

[1]W.Jaeger(ed.),AristotelisMetaphysica,OxfordClassicalTexts,ClarendonPress,Oxford,1967.

SirDavidRoss'sedition,containingintroduction,text,analysis,andcommentary,isindispensable:

[2]W.D.Ross(ed.),Aristotle'sMetaphysics,ClarendonPress,Oxford,1stedn.1924,corrected1953.

RosshimselftranslatedtheMetaphysicsinvol.viii(2ndedn.1928)of:

[3]J.A.SmithandW.D.Ross(edd.),TheWorksofAristotletranslatedintoEnglish,ClarendonPress,Oxford,191052.

Ross'stranslationisreissuedwithrevisionsinvol.iiof:

[4]J.Barnes(ed.),TheCompleteWorksofAristotle,PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton,1984.

AlthoughRosshasnotbeensuperseded,agoodalternativetranslationis:

[5]H.G.Apostle,Aristotle'sMetaphysics,trans.withcommentariesandglossary,IndianaUniversityPress,BloomingtonandLondon,1966.

Commentaries

Theancientcommentatorsonthesebooksareeditedin:

[6]CommentariainAristotelemGraeca,Reimer,Berlin,18821909,whichcontains:

Page228

[7]AlexanderofAphrodisias(ADc.200),InAristotelisMetaphysicsCommentaria,ed.M.Hayduck,[6]vol.i,1891

[8]Asclepius(AD6thcent.),InAristotelisMetaphysicorumLibrosAZCommentaria,ed.M.Hayduck,[6]vol.vi.2,1888

[9]Syrianus(d.AD437),InAristotelisMetaphysicaCommentaria,ed.J.Kroll,[6]vol.vi.1,1902.

TranslationsintoEnglishoftheportionsofAlexander'scommentaryonGDareinprogressundertheeditorshipofR.R.K.Sorabji.Translationsof[8]and[9]are
plannedinthesameseries.

ThecommentaryorThomssAquinas(c.122574)isavailablein:

[10]Aquinas,InxiiLibrosMetaphysicorumAristotelisExpositio,ed.M.R.CathalaandR.M.Spiazzi,Marietti,Turin,1950

andistranslatedas:

[11]Aquinas,CommentaryontheMetaphysicsofAristotle,trans.J.P.Rowan,HenryRegneryCo.,Chicago,1961.

Ofmoderncommentariesapartfrom[2],arecentappearanceis:

[12]B.CassinandM.Narcy,Ladcisiondusens:lelivreGammadelaMtaphysiqued'Aristote:introduction,texte,traductionetcommentaire,Vrin,Paris,
1989.

ThereisrelevantmaterialinsomeothervolumesoftheClarendonAristotleSeries:

[13]J.L.Ackrill,Aristotle'sCategoriesandDeInterpretatione,trans.withnotes,ClarendonPress,Oxford,1963

[14]D.W.Hamlyn,Aristotle'sDeAnimaBooksHandIII,trans.withintroductionandnotes,1968,reissuedwithadditionalmaterialbyC.Shields1993

[15]W.Charlton,Aristotle'sPhysicsBookslandII,trans.withintroductionandnotes,1970,reissuedwithadditionalmaterial1992

[16]J.Barnes,Aristotle'sPosteriorAnalytics,trans.withnotes,1975,2ndedn.1993

[17]J.E.Annas,Aristotle'sMetaphysicsBooksMandN,trans.withintroductionandnotes,1976

[18]C.J.F.Williams,Aristotle'sDeGenerationeetCorruptione,trans.withnotes,1982

[19]E.L.Hussey,Aristotle'sPhysicsBooksIIIandIV,trans.withintroductionandnotes,1983

[20]D.Bostock,Aristotle'sMetaphysicsBooksZandH,trans.withintroductionandcommentary,forthcoming.

Page229

General

AmonggeneralbooksonAristotle,consultespecially:

[21]J.L.Ackrill,AristotlethePhilosopher,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,1981

[22]J.Barnes,Aristotle,PastMasters,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,1982.

Anolderbookis:

[23]W.D.Ross,Aristotle,Methuen,London,5thedn.1949.

IndispensableforthestudentofAristotlewhohasGreek:

[24]H.Bonitz,IndexAristotelicus,Berlin,1870,reissuedDarmstadt,1955.

Collections

CollectionscontainingimportantarticleswhichbearonGDEinclude:

[25]J.Barnes,M.Schofield,andR.R.K.Sorabji(edd.),ArticlesonAristotle,i.Science,Duckworth,London,1975

[26]J.Barnes,M.Schofield,andR.R.K.Sorabji(edd.),ArticlesonAristotle,iii.Metaphysics,Duckworth,London,1979

[27]D.J.O'Meara(cd.),StudiesinAristotle,CatholicUniversityofAmericaPress,WashingtonDC,1981

[28]M.SchofieldandM.C.Nussbaum(edd.),LanguageandLogos,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,1982

[29]F.J.PellctierandJ.KingFarlow(edd.),NewEssaysonAristotle,CanadianJournalofPhilosophy,suppl.vol.x,UniversityofCalgaryPress,Calgary,
1984

[30]J.Wiesner(ed.),Aristoteles:WerkundWirkung,i.AristotelesundseineSchule,deGruyter,BerlinandNewYork,1985

[31]G.E.L.Owen,Logic,ScienceandDialectic,Duckworth,London,1986

[32]M.Frede,EssaysinAncientPhilosophy,ClarendonPress,Oxford,1987

[33]R.L.Judson(ed.),Aristotle'sPhysics:ACollectionofEssays,ClarendonPress,Oxford,1991.

TheNatureandScopeofMetaphysics

OnthenatureofAristotelianmetaphysicssee:

[34]P.Merlan,'OntheTerms"Metaphysics"and"Beingquabeing"',

Page230

TheMonistlii,1968,pp.17494repr.inhisKleinephilosophischeSchriften,Hildesheim,1976,pp.23858

[35]C.H.Kahn,'OntheIntendedInterpretationofAristotle'sMetaphysics',in[30]

[36]A.Code,'MetaphysicsandLogic',inM.Matthen(ed.),AristotleToday:EssaysonAristotle'sIdealofScience,AcademicPrintingandPublishing,
Edmonton,1987.

Thestatusofmetaphysicsasa'science'("discipline")isexaminedin:

[37]T.H:Irwin,'Aristotle'sDiscoveryofMetaphysics',ReviewofMetaphysicsxxxi,19778,pp.21029,

andfurtherinch.8of:

[38]T.H.Irwin,Aristotle'sFirstPrinciples,ClarendonPress,Oxford,1988.

Irwin's[37]ledto:

[39]A.Code,'Aristotle'sInvestigationofaBasicLogicalPrinciple:WhichScienceInvestigatesthePrincipleofNonContradiction?',CanadianJournalof
Philosophyxvi,1986,pp.34157

[40]S.M.Cohen,'AristotleonthePrincipleofNonContradiction',CanadianJournalofPhilosophyxvi,1986,pp.35970

[41]M.Furth,'ANoteonAristotle'sPrincipleofNonContradiction',CanadianJournalofPhilosophyxvi,1986,pp.37181.

Recentdebateoninterpreting'beingquabeing'canbefollowedin[34]and:

[42]J.Owens,TheDoctrineofBeingintheAristotelian'Metaphysics':AStudyintheGreekBackgroundofMediaevalThought,PontificalInstituteof
MediaevalStudies,Toronto,1951,2ndedn.revised1963

[43]P.Merlan," :PostskriptzueinerBesprechung",PhilosophischeRundschauvii,1959,PP.14853

[44]G.Patzig,'TheologieundOntologieinder"Metaphysik"desAristoteles',KantStudienlii,19601,pp.185205trans.J.M.andJ.Barnesas'Theologyand
OntologyinAristotle'sMetaphysics',withpostscript,in[26]

[45]W.Leszl,Aristotle'sConceptionofOntology,Antenore,Padua,1975

[46]J.G.Stevenson,'BeingquaBeing',Apeironix,1975,pp.4250

[47]K.Brinkmann,AristotelesAllgemeineundSpezielleMetaphysik,deGruyter,Berlin,1979

[48]G.Reale,TheConceptofFirstPhilosophyandtheUnityoftheMetaphysicsofAristotle,trans.J.R.Catan,SUNYPress,Albany,1980

[49]J.Owens,'IsthereAnyOntologyinAristotle?',Dialoguexxv,1986,pp.697707

Page231

[50]M.Frcde,'TheUnityofGeneralandSpecialMetaphysics:Aristotle'sConceptionofMetaphysics',in[32],pp.8195

andcspccially:

[51]J.W.Thorp,'DoesPrimacyConferUniversality:LogicandTheologyinAristotle',Apeironxxii,1989,pp.10125.

TheThingsThatAreandTheirInterrelations

ImportantcontributionstounderstandingAristotle'smetaphysicalviewsinGarecontainedin:

[52]G.E.L.Owen,'LogicandMetaphysicsinSomeEarlierWorksofAristotle',inI.DringandG.E.L.Owen(edd.),AristotleandPlatointheMidfourth
Century,Gteborg,1960repr.in[26]and[31]

[53]G.E.L.Owen,'AristotleontheSnaresofOntology',inR.Bambrough(ed.),NewEssaysonPlatoandAristotle,Routledge&KeganPaul,1965repr.in
[31]

[54]G.E.L.Owen,'ThePlatonismofAristotle',ProceedingsoftheBritishAcademyli,1965repr.inP.F.Strawson(ed.),StudiesinthePhilosophyof
ThoughtandAction,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,1968,andin[25]and[31]

anddevelopedin:

[55]G.H.Kahn,'WhyExistencedoesnotEmergeasaDistinctConceptinGreekPhilosophy',ArchivfrGeschichtederPhilosophiclviii,1976,Pp.32334

[56]M.T.Ferejohn,'AristotleonFocalMeaningandtheUnityofScience',Phronesisxxv,1980,pp.11728

[57]R.M.Dancy,'OnSomeofAristotle'sFirstThoughtsaboutSubstances',PhilosophicalReviewlxxxiv,1975,pp.33873.

SomefoundationshadbeenlaidinthepresumablyearlierCategoriesandDeInterpretatione,onwhichsee[13].Forthelinguisticbackgroundasseenbya
philosopher:

[58]C.H.Kahn,TheVerb'Be'inAncientGreek,partviofJ.W.M.Verhaar(ed.),TheVerb'Be'anditsSynonyms,Reidel,Dordrecht,1973.

Ontheseveralsensesof'being':

[59]F.Brentano,VondermannigfachenBedeutungdesSeiendennachAristoteles,Freiburg,1862,trans.R.GeorgeasOntheSeveralSensesofBeingin
Aristotle,UniversityofCaliforniaPress,BerkeleyandLosAngeles,1975

Page232

[60]M.J.Loux,'AristotleontheTransccndentals',Phronesisxviii,1973,pp.22539

[61]D.W.Hamlyn,'FocalMeaning',ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSocietylxxviii,19778,pp.118

[62]M.Matthen,'Aristotle'sSemanticsandaPuzzleconcerningChangc',in[29]

[63]D.R.Morrison,'TheEvidenceforDegreesofBeinginAristotle',ClassicalQuarterlyxxxvii,1987,pp.382401

[64]H.P.Grice,'AristotleontheMultiplicityofBeing',PacificPhilosophicalQuarterlylxix,1988,pp.175200,

thelastmarredbyannoyingmisprints.MoregenerallyonAristotclianhomonymy:

[65]K.J.J.Hintikka,'AristotleandtheAmbiguityofAmbiguity',Inquiryii,1959,PP.13751repr.withrevisionsasch.1ofhisTimeandNecessity:Studiesin
Aristotle'sTheoryofModality,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,1973

[66]T.H.Irwin,'HomonymyinAristotle',ReviewofMetaphysicsxxxiv,198o1,pp.52344.

Differentviewsof 7,especially1017a30,areputforwardin:

[67]R.A.Cobb,'ThePresentProgressivePeriphrasisandtheMetaphysicsofAristotle',Phronesisxviii,1973,pp.8090

[68]R.K.Sprague,'AristotelianPeriphrasis:AReplytoMrCobb',Phronesisxx,1975,pp.756

[69]J.W.Thorp,'Aristotle'sUseofCategories',Phronesisxix,1974,PP.23856

[70]M.Frede,'CategoriesinAristotle',in[27],pp.124,repr.in[32],pp.2948:seepp.1519(414)

[71]R.M.Dancy,'AristotleandExistence',Syntheseliv,1983,pp.40942.

Seealso[64]pp.1801,andcompareDeGenerationeetCorruptioneI34andthenotesadloc.in[18].

Onbeingastruth(D7.1017a315andE4)see:

[72]M.Matthen,'GreekOntologyandthe"Is"ofTruth',Phronesisxxviii,1983,pp.11335

[73]J.W.Thorp,'AristotleonBeingandTruth',DePhilosophiaiii,1982,pp.19.

TheviewthatAristotleregardedessentialpredicationsasstatementsofidentitycomesfrom[54]andisdefendedintheNoteonP4.1007a20andin:

Page233

[74]M.J.Woods,'SubstanceandEssenceinAristotle',proceedingsoftheAristotelianSocietylxxv,19745,pp.16780

butseethenoteson73a24ff.and83b37ff.in[16],andthedissentin:

[75]A.Code,'OntheOriginsofSomeAristotelianThesesaboutPredication',inJ.BogenandJ.E.McGuire(edd.),HowThingsAre:StudiesinPredicationand
theHistoryofPhilosophyandScience,Reidel,Dordrecht,1985

[76]H.Weidemann,'InDefenceofAristotle'sTheoryofPredication',Phronesisxxv,1980,pp.7687.

Otherarticlesreferredto:

[77]W.V.Quine,'OnWhatThereIs',inFromaLogicalPointofView,HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,Mass.,1953

[78]A.Gewirth,'Aristotle'sDoctrineofBeing',PhilosophicalReviewlxii,1953,PP.57789

[79]G.E.L.Owen,'Inherence',Phronesisx,1965,pp.97105repr.in[31]

[80]L.Brown,'BeingintheSophist:aSyntacticalInquiry',OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophyiv,1986,pp.4970.

ThePrincipleofNonContradiction

Anearlymoderntreatmentis:

[81]J.Lukasiewicz*,'berdenSatzdesWiderspruchsbeiAristotelcs',Bulletininternationaldel'AcadmiedesSciencesdeCracovie,1910,pp.1538trans:
V.Wedinas'OnthePrincipleofContradictioninAristotle',ReviewofMetaphysicsxxiv,1971,pp.485509retrans.J.Barnesas'AristotleontheLawof
Contradiction'in[26].

OnG3seethegroupofarticles[37],[39][41],andfromanearlierdate:

[82]J.Barnes,'TheLawofContradiction',PhilosophicalQuarterlyxix,1969,pp.3029,

whichiscriticizedin:

[83]J.Nuttall,'Belief,OpacityandContradiction',PhilosophicalQuarterlyxxviii,1978,pp.2538.

The'type2'interpretationwasputforwardbyAnscombein:

[84]G.E.M.AnscombeandP.T.Geach,ThreePhilosophers,Blackwell,Oxford,1961,pp.3945.

ForacarefulandsensitivetreatmentofG4.1005b111007b18,withtextandtranslation,see:

Page234

[85]R.M.Dancy,SenseandContradiction,Reidel,Dordrecht,1975.

Thesamepassageisalsoexaminedin[36],[38]ch.9,and:

[86]H.W.Noonan,'AnArgumentofAristotleonNonContradiction',Analysisxxxvii,19767,PP.1639repr.inThePhilosopher'sAnnual,vol.ii,Blackwell,
Oxford,1978,pp.10715

[87]J.Lear,AristotleandLogicalTheory,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,1980,ch.6

[88]M.V.Wedin,'AristotleontheRangeofthePrincipleofNonContradiction',Logiqueetanalysexxv,1982,pp.8792

[89]E.Halper,'AristotleontheExtensionofNonContradiction',History,ofPhilosophyQuarterlyi,1984,pp.36980.

Thenatureofsignificationisexploredin:

[90]T.H.Irwin,'Aristotle'sConceptofSignification',in[27].

ThatAristotle'sarmourwithstandstheblowsofmoderncriticsisarguedin:

[91]T.V.Upton,'PsychologicalandMetaphysicalDimensionsofNonContradiction',ReviewofMetaphysicsxxxvi,19823,pp.591606.

ScepticismandRelativism

OnG5scech.9of[38]and:

[92]J.D.G.Evans,'AristotleonRelativism,'PhilosophicalQuarterlyxxiv,1974,pp.193203

[93]A.J.P.Kenny,'TheArgumentfromIllusioninAristotle'sMetaphysics(G100910)',Mindlxxvi,1967,pp.18497,

onwhichtherearecommentsin:

[94]M.C.Scholar,'AristotleMetaphysicsIV1010b13',Mindlxxx,1971,pp.2668.

Secalso[14]and:

[95]K.Lycos,'AristotleandPlatoon''Appearing''',Mindlxxiii,1964,pp.496514.

ThescepticswhoareAristotle'stargetareidentifiedasMegarianprecursorsofPyrrhoin:

[96]E.Berti,'LacriticaalloScetticismonelIVLibrodellaMetafisica',inG.Giannantoni(ed.),LoScetticismoantico,Bibliopolis,Naples,1981,vol.i,pp.6179

andAristotle'sinfluenceonlaterGreekscepticismistracedin:

Page235

[97]A.A.Long,'AristotleandtheHistoryofGreekScepticism',in[27].

AgainstAristotelianrelatives(D15)seepp.1931of:

[98]J.Barnes,'ScepticismandRelativism',PhilosophicalStudiesxxxii,198890,pp.131.

Number,Unity,Identity

Onnumbering:

[99]G.Frege,DieGrundlagenderArithmetik,Koebner,Breslau,1884repr.withEnglishtrans.byJ.L.AustinasTheFoundationsofArithmetic,Blackwell,
Oxford,2ndedn.1953

[100]K.R.Popper,'ThePrincipleofIndividuation',ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,suppl.vol.xxvii,1953,pp.97120.

Onnumericalrelatives(D15)therearereferencesonp.4oof[17].RejectionoftheLawoftheIndiscernibilityofIdenticals(seepp.20814),andtherebyinfirm
grasponthenotionofidentity,areimputedtoAristotlein:

[101]N.P.White,'AristotleonSamenessandOneness',PhilosophicalReviewlxxx,1971,pp.17797,

whichiscriticizedin:

[102]F.D.Miller,Jr.,'DidAristotleHavetheConceptofIdentity?',PhilosophicalReviewlxxxii,1973,PP.48390

[103]A.Code,'Aristotle'sResponsetoQuine'sObjectionstoModalLogic',JournalofPhilosophicalLogicv,1976,pp.15986

[104]G.B.Matthews,'AccidentalUnities',in[28]

towhichusefulbackgroundis:

[105]R.Cartwright,'IdentityandSubstitutivity',inM.K.Munitz(ed.),IdentityandIndividuation,NewYorkUniversityPress,NewYork,1971repr.inhis
PhilosophicalEssays,MITPress,Cambridge,Mass.,1987,

and[57]PP.3618.Russellisrecruitedagainsttheimputationin:

[106]C.J.F.Williams,'Aristotle'sTheoryofDescriptions',PhilosophicalReviewxciv,1985,pp.6380,

andtosimilarpurposethedistinctionin[105]isinvokedin:

[107]F.J.Pelletier,'SamenessandRefcrentialOpacityinAristotle',Nosxiii,1979,PP.283311

[108]I.Angelelli,'FriendsandOpponentsoftheSubstitutivityofIdenticalsintheHistoryofLogic',inM.Schirn(ed.),StudienzuFrege,

Page236

ii.LogicundSprachphilosophie,Frommann,StuttgartBadCannstatt,1976,pp.14166(seep.146)

whileaninterpretationnearerto[103]and[104]isfavouredin:

[109]F.A.Lewis,'AccidentalSamenessinAristotle',PhilosophicalStudiesxlii,1982,pp.136.

Closetextualanalysisisdeployedagainsttheimputationin:

[110]M.Mignucci,'PuzzlesaboutIdentity:AristotleandhisGreekCommentators',in[30].

AnattempttoexplainanddefendrejectionoftheLawoftheIndiscernibilityofIdenticalsanditsconverseismadein:

[111]L.Spellman,'ReferentialOpacityinAristotle',HistoryofPhilosophyQuarterlyvii,1990,pp.1732.

Causation,Necessity,Coincidence

OnD2seetheparallelnotesin[15],andonAristoteliancausationmoregenerally:

[112]R.R.K.Sorabji,Necessity,CauseandBlame:PerspectivesonAristotle'sTheory,Duckworth,London,1980,esp.ch.2

[113]D.O.M.Charles,Aristotle'sPhilosophyofAction,Duckworth,1984,esp.pp.4455

[114]M.J.White,'CausesasNecessaryConditions:Aristotle,AlexanderofAphrodisiasandJ.L.Mackie',in[29],pp.15789

[115]J.M.E.Moravcsik,'WhatMakesRealityIntelligible?ReflectionsonAristotle'sTheoryofAitia',in[33],PP.3147

[116]C.A.Freeland,'AccidentalCausesandRealExplanations',in[33],PP.4972.

OnAristotle'streatmentofcoincidenceintheTopics,see:

[117]T.Ebert,'AristotelischerundtraditionellerAkzidenzbegriff',inG.Patzig,E.Scheibe,andW.Wieland(edd.),Logik,Ethik,Theorieder
Geisteswissenschaften,FelixMeinerVerlag,Hamburg,1977

andonD30.1025a30:

[118]J.E.Tiles,'WhytheTrianglehasTwoRightAnglesKath'Hauto',Phronesisxxviii,1983,pp.116.

OnE2see[16]p.127,and:

[119]M.Mignucci,"' etncessairedanslaconception

Page237

aristotliciennedelascience",inE.Berti(ed.),AristotleonScience:ThePosteriorAnalytics,Antenore,Padua,1981

[120]R.L.Judson,'Chanceand"alwaysorforthemostpart"',in[33],PP.7399.

AnumberofattemptshavebeenmadetounderstandE3.Besides[112]ch.l,and[116],see:

[121]K.J.J.Hintikka,withU.RemesandS.Knuuttila,AristotleonModalityandDeterminism,ActaPhilosophicaFennicaxxix,1977,esp.pp.10117

[122]G.Fine,'AristotleonDeterminism:AReviewofRichardSorabji'sNecessity,Cause,andBlame',PhilosophicalReviewxc,1981,pp.56179

[123]A.Madigan,'MetaphysicsE3:AModestProposal',Phronesisxxix,1984,pp.12336

[124]D.Frede,'AristotleontheLimitsofDeterminism:AccidentalCausesinMetaphysicsE3',inA.Gotthelf(ed.),AristotleonNatureandLivingThings,Bristol
ClassicalPress,1985,pp.20725

[125]R.E.Heinaman,'AristotleonAccidents',JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophyxxiii,1985,pp.31124

[126]C.J.F.Williams,'SomeCommentsonAristotleMetaphysicsE2,3',IllinoisClassicalStudiesxi,1986,pp.18192

[127]H.Weidemann,'AristotelesunddasProblemdeskausalenDeterminismus(Met.E3)',Phronesisxxxi,1986,pp.2750

[128]P.L.Donini,Ethos:Aristoteleeildeterminismo(Cultureantiche,Studictcsti2),Edizionedell'Orso,Alessandria,1989,ch.2.

Other

TheplaceofD8inAristotle'sthinkingaboutsubstanceischartedin:

[129]R.Polanski,'Aristotle'sTreatmentofousiainMetaphysicsV8',SouthernJournatofPhilosophyxxi,1983,pp.5766.

OnD11see:

[130]J.J.Cleary,AristotleontheManySensesofPriority,SouthernIllinoisUniversityPress,Carbondale,1988

andonD27:

[131]R.K.Sprague,'AristotleonMutilation',SyllectaClassica2,1990,pp.1722.

Otherworksreferredto:

[132]T.L.Heath,MathematicsinAristotle,ClarendonPress,Oxford,1949

Page238

[133]C.S.Lewis,StudiesinWords,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,1960

[134]J.Locke,EssayconcerningHumanUnderstanding,London,1690ed.P.H.Nidditch,ClarendonPress,Oxford,1975

[135]J.Locke,EpistoladeTolerantia,1689trans.Wm.PoppleasALetterconcerningToleration,London,1689inTheSecondTreatiseofCivil
Government,andALetterconcerningToleration,ed.J.W.Gough,Blackwell,Oxford,1948.

Page239

GLOSSARY
etc.:bemistakenetc.,ignorant1010b13

always,ineverycase.

:invariable,seep.187.

,etc.:perceive,perceptible,etc.,seepp.108,111.

:cause,reason,seep.124.

etc.:trueetc,

etc.:modificationetc.,seep.108.

etc.:beopposed,opposite,seep.151.

,etc.:contradictetc.

:legitimateask(for),count.

:simple,baldly.

etc.:denyetc.

:countable1020a9).

:origin,beginning,principle,seep.123.

:subtract,remove.

:firm.

,etc.:cometobe,(processof)comingtobe,etc.

etc.:recognize,beacquaintedwith.

understand,(make)intelligible,certain,seep.88.

:disposition,beinacondition,seep.170.

etc.:thought,thinking,etc.

etc.:difference,differentia,etc.

etc.:specify,distinguish.

:bethought.

etc.:opinionetc.

etc.:becapable,bepossible,capacity,etc.,haveforce1011a7cf.

seepp.156,159,160

:incapacity,potentially.

:form.

:outof,from,madeupof,seeP.173.

etc.:contraryetc.,seep.152.

:actually.

incompletereality.

:state,possession,seepp.1701.

etc.:discipline,knowledge,etc.,seep.76.

:other,different.

:possess,have,attain,beinastate,include1026a3,beequippedwith1005b15,17,seep.173.

:qua,seep.76.

:rest,beatrest.

:study,theoretical.

:distinct,distinctive,special.

:universal(ly).

kal:and,i.e.

etc.:affirmetc.

etc.:bepredicatedetc.

,etc.:(effect)changeetc.,move1010a13,1012b35.

:fundamental,authoritative.

:call,socall,say,state,speakof,describe,mean.

:formula,statement,thesis,argument,seepp.92,179.

,etc.:part,portion,etc.,seep.174.

etc.:alteretc.,seep.158.

:inthemiddle(of,between),between,asameansto.

fetc.:conceiveetc.,seep.199.

Page240

:intelligence

:besane.

:consider.

:proper,ownproper.

:whole,wholly,ingeneral,seep.175.

,etc.:define,definite,etc.

:substance,seepp.1479.

etc.:affectionetc.,seep.P171.

:productive.

:qualification,quality,seep.162.

:quantity,seep.160.

:actualthing(subject,fact),object.

etc.:decision,choice

deliberately.

:relativeto,withreferenceto,inrelationto,inresponseto

relative.

:first,primary,initial.

:signify,seep.94.

,etc.:examine,investigate,etc.

:science.

etc.:keepingthesameetc.

:lack,seep.172.

etc.:reasoning,calculation,etc.,seep.87.

etc.:coincidence,coincidental,etc.,seepp.767.

,etc.:combineetc.

etc.:continuousetc.,seepp.136,173.

,etc.:becomposed,becompounded,composition,etc.

:complete,seep.167.

:fulfilment,finalstate1016a20,seep.167.

:skill,manofskill.

:sense,manner,seep.122.

:matter.

:beaconstituentofsomething.

:subject,seep.101.

:believe.

etc.:assertetc.

etc.:beimaginedetc.,evident(ly),seep.105.

:bedestroyed,(processof)destruction.

:wisdom,seep.108.

etc.:natureetc.,seep.129

etc.:characteristic(ally),seep.87.

:separable.

etc.:false,beinerror,seepp.104,178.

:forthemostpart.

Page241

INDEXLOCORUM
Thisisanindex,bypage,topassagesofAristotlereferredtointheNotesandFurtherComments.ItexcludesthemaincommentintheNotesoneachpassagein
MetaphysicsbooksG,D,andE.

Categories
la612 94
1
67 96
1215 216
2 16 199
20ff. 96,155
b
20 9 147,207
239 148
3 b 1012 167
1617 129
4 252a4 140
25 216
2a2 143
4 10 119
810 199
5 1114 155
1213 140
1419 147,148
1934 207
2934 99,169
3a14 147
22 162
312 152
b 2432 85
247 119,152
6 160
b
4 205 14 a 160
256 160
a
5 38 10 b 80,162
38 b4 145,169
39 182
1129 85,162
1618 161
6 17a 152
1925 162
7 164
367 162,165
b 287b14 115
346 165
7b228a12 165
358 112
8 162,170
8b269a13 171
a
9 289 172
10a910 172
279 162
a
11 20 167
2432 167
10 151
11b3812a25 173
b
11 3812 9 a 119
a
12 925 119
17 152
2613 17 a 170,172
b
2613a17 173
b
13 1011 199
2933 118
11 3614 6 a 152
14 223 a 152
12 153
26 129
14 15b 163
15 173

DeInterpretatione
16a918 198
1
1218 119
1618 94
2 32 99
b
3 225 93
24 94
4 267 199
2830 92
a
6 17 337 88
35 94
711 198
b
7 39 1 150
150
223 158
8 118
a
18 1827 95
25 94
9 117,118,198
19 237 a 131
32 117,118

Page242
b
520a3 118
10
1930 97
a
20 13 94
1619 158
11 b 1519 135
21a714 101
248 118
258 144
12 156,158
b
910 141
13 156,158
a
22 2431 158,159
27 159
b
1028 159
a
23 79 159
b
14 32 7 89

PriorAnalytics
24a1622 150
I1
18 149
b
1820 87
a
7 29 279 150
8 149
a b
9 30 37 1 127
b
10 313,3840 132
b
11 31 78 98
1220 127
13 158
a
32 1821 159,160
15 34a57 132
7,17,21 112
23 40b235 132
a
25 42 34 183
b 23 129
27 43a336 208
a
37 49 67 141
44 50a1628 132
b
46 51 225 118
2534 84
258 172
3652 14 a 97
II16 64b348,40 91

PosteriorAnalytics
71a910 183
I1
1117 184
b
2 71 1619 204
3372 4 a 154
a
72 1112 120
1418 86
b
3 13 132
4 73a2834 193
b
37 3 169
b 4 5 182
510 168
58 100
1016 170
1112 220
a
2574 3 131,170
268 149
289 76
9 184
10 184
a
10 76 316 184
41 86
b
20 86
2334 88,123
24 90
a
11 77 30 86
a
18 81 40b1 183
a
22 83 1417 208
2432 100,207
25 86 334b 104
30 87b1922 195
II1 89b33 189
a
2 90 34 189
b
3 245 183
b
5 91 1419 132
b
7 92 58 94
14 82
11 94a2036 124
36 b1 125
b
826 126
19 100 16 1 a b 154
b
1011 204

Topics
101b238 199
I4
2933 92
5 217
102a1820 180
b
4 7 180
6 181
7 149
a
103 2431, 211,213
9 138
b
313 141
b
15 106 1518 146
20107a2 80
b
107 1926 129
II11 115 2935 b 189
IV1 121b1113 129

Page243
122b16 163
2
5 128a268 171
a b
V5 135 32 1 91
VI4 141 6,22b 154
6 143a32 163
b
144 1230 129
145a15 184
b
VII1 152 3033 149
a
VIII5 159 2537 85

DeSophisticisElenchis
165a238 b7 85
2
b
11 106
4 25 110
166 2232a 192
5 167a7 94
237 88
b
11 171 512 85
9 85
a
172 258 85
13 191
a
24 179 26ff. 101
367 213
b
3840 209
b14 210
24 213
31 191
a
182 46 186

Physics
153
I1
184a16 b14 154
b
1214 154
a
2 185 31 85,187
b
5 133
6 189b16 128
7 212
190a1920 211
220
1 192b833 130
193 930 a 131
b 45 185
2 22194a12 187
334 149,186
194a303 167
b b
3 23195 21 2831,1248
195 345 a 218
b
23 125
a
4196 334 187
7198a1416 124
1618 125
2433 124
8 124
b
17 126
a b
199 33 l 126
b 268 126
a
III3 202 224 172
b
12 210
1316 209
b
5 204 57 148
7 207b7 139
IV8 215 1819b 129
10 162
11 162
a
V1 224 2134 169
225a34ff. 158
a
226 267,279 171
3 227a1112 136,173
17 130
22 160
4 227b20228a23 139
a
228 21 139
5 229a31,b14 158
a b
VI1 231 21 18 148
24 155
b
5 235 630 121
9 240 1926a 109
VII5 250a245 155
b
VIII1 251 1923 187
3 253b6254a1 121
4 254 712 b 169
7 260 1719b 153
261a1314 153
9 139

DeCaelo
284a206 173
II1
III 128
1 299a1117 187
IV 128

DeGenerationeEtCorruptione
319b259 212
I4
320a25 186
b
5 1314 210
b
6 322 2933 80
7 324 2 a 152
10 327b22 85

Page244
329a25 85
II1
9 335b6 124
11 131
a
337 34338 4 a 198
337b35338a2 193

Meteorologica
382b13 137
IV5
6 383a2730,32 173
7 383 23 b 137
a
384 35 137
15 137
a
8 385 2533 173
10 388a32 137
34 11 b 137
389a7 178
8 173

DeAnima
403a1625 186
I1
4 409a4 154
a
II1 412 6 9 149
9 125
4 415b810 124
13 142
1521 124
201 125
a
416 14 126
5 417b216 108
22 154
32 156
6 418 12 a 110,111
III2 199
425b26426a26 166
b
3 427 12 110
1621 110
a b
428 24 9 110
b 18 110
4 429a247 186
5 430 1025a 125
6 199
b 29 110
7 199
431a48 108
b 1216 187
10 433b29 110

DeSensu
442b8 111
4

DeMemoria
450a12 110
1

DeSomno
453b279 152
1

DeInsomniis
459a14 110
1

DePartibusAnimalium
640a19 198
I1

DeGeneratione
Animalium
740a1719 123
II4
b245 177

Metaphysics
981a729 194
A1
2430 187
2 982 25 a 154
b
278 185,188
a b
3 983 24 1 124
256 78,123
25 125
312 126
.33 b1 124
b 11 129
984a516 147
a
6 987 32 109
a
8 989 1516 153
a1 993b201 185
a b
2 994 1 27 187
B2 996b2633 86
30 89
a
33997 2 86
997a211 86
34 78
3 998a20 b14 129
b
227 82
b
4 999 22 165
20 96
1000 1 a 149
6 1003a1415 187,195

Page245
180,183,188,200,2013
G1
1003a212 201
312 203
2 140,188
33 10 b 189,217
b 610 142
1213 79
1314 79
1617 78,188,203
21 77
245 123
a
331004 2 122,152
a
1004 1020 122,172
20,23 88
224 152
323 122
b 69 92
188
223 82,190
24 122
256 106
26 88
a
1005 1118 78
3 2058
1217 122
234 90
28 88
35 77,81,202
b 1 201
34 91
5 76
834 116,201
8 204
1617 86
1922 203
1920 94,102
224 116
2532 105
235 121
234 89
2532 106
29 89
4 116,2038,217
351006 11 a 113
35 78,87
1006 1 a 89
512 86
5 113
56 91
1012 203
14,15 76
1826 120
1821 99
212,223 204
301 205
311007a20 107
31 b34 121,205
31 98
32.4 205
b
34 13 98
b
1113 92
1328 98,206
13 100,206
1820 89
2830 88
a
1007 6 96
714 92
820 104
2o 18 b 180,206
20 83,135,155
212 134
21 96
24 97
26 120
27 206
289 97
30 206
33 b18 128,213,218
33 96
34 l b 218
b
24 218
3 77
910 218
10 135
17 218
181008a2 121
1819 89,105
18 106,205,206
269 107
a
1008 715 106
712 205
17 88
18 104
2830 121
34 b2 121
36 89,205
b
1011, 205
27,30 76
5 116
311009a5 104
312 205
1009a6 116
710 109
7 89,146
0622 120

Page246
113
16
2230 106
308 106
328 109
368 112
b
38 12 106,109,114
b
1233 106
12 111
a
1010 715 106
8 121
b
15 1 106
25 b1 112
b 11011 2 a 106
119 113
1419 110,114
256 99
25 88
6 106,116
1011a317 106
3,10 106
1116 113
17 b12 113
b
25 1 110
34 110
b 16 96,203
87,126
25 9 121
25 104
267 198
1012a25 121
1724 106,116
214 92,121
248 116
b
8 29 2 121
b
58 92,120
78 104
1322 104
D 84,86,122
1 168
34 79
1013a1416 168
1617 122
2 78,123,168,219
245 147
267 185
b 1116 126
17,20 125
18 194
25,27ff. 126
2930 143
33 193
34 128
361014al 218
3 147
1014a17,21 127,154
1920 128
2635 137
b 8 123
4 1820 185
19,27,35 131
a
1015 35 124
67 131
710 178
10 173
1113 87
1315 87
13 130,131
5 193
24 172
b
6 9 158
6 77,84,145,149,20814,
217
16 83,145,149,150
25,33 122
a
361016 17 151
36 173
a
1016 6 139
917 138
14 135
1724 140,150
1920 178
24,32 139
2832 151
31 138
32 b6 151
b
56,89 165
611 80
68 135
8 9 151
911 140,210
10 160
1117 150,176
1731 123,161,165
1721 153,161
17 164
315 138
31 149
323 185
334 129
35 193
1017a56 140,178
7 77,156,189,
21417,
215,217
722 141,182

Page247
216
1819
2231 178
226 215
22 80,200
247 122,215
2730 146,215
31 94,140
b
35 9 107,217
3
b 76
8 1314 148
213 100
23 147
9 145,20814,217
a
271018 24 210,213
29 210,211
a
1018 78 221
10 114
b
11 345 213
12 1019a1718 76
1923 125
236 157
35 157
b 2233 156
227,312 132
35 158
a
13 1020 2632 182
33 b2 109
b 812 109
1724 216
30 165
15 76
1021a912 83
30 138
26 b3 112
16 139
18 76,127,207
1022a1920 221
22 87
24,27 182
29,32,33 182
259 127
2935 154
20 b 1012 163
22 84
23 127
1023a213 136
24 267 137
279 131,178
35 b2 175
356 168
25 160
b 17 170
224 174
26 127
32 96
27 1024a21 176
28 8 194
9 137
12 139
29 189,199
1516 178
1819 199
24,26 105
261025a1 92
1025 6 a 105
30 77,193,21722
1430 125,192,193,220
1617 219
2130 170
21 219
24 5 220
256 219
304 170
302 220
30 191,192
32 220
E1 76,77,2013
b
57 195
710 183
15 122
1821 87
1819 186
201 126,130
278 187
a
1026 6 185
1516 183,201
16 78,197
1718 147
1829 201
1819 83
21 183
2332 77,84,186,202,203
234 202
24 183,201
2730 87
289 203
29 201
3o1 76,202
312 201
2 77,140,144,180,20814,
21417
33 b2 214
b1 128
224 84,194,195

Page248
217
24
34 217
1415 85
1524 211
1820 211,214
214 212,224
224 196
23 212
2431 124
24 181
2733 131
312 144
356 196
a
371027 2 127,181
1027a58 182
78 223
813 193
1517 193
19 187
3 140,192,2225
b
1011 131
1112 225
4 140,178
1723 119
a
1028 46 122
Z 81,140,147,188,200
1 14,30 156
205 76
292 187
2936 155
301 189
367 168
b
31 2 153
356 80,81,154
b
2 815 147
1821 148
3 1029a12 155
234 155
27 148
4 138
b
212 53
278 95
a b
1030 32 4 80,189
5 b 201 218
245 221
291031a1 186
6 1031b228 134,169
7 1032 12 b 147
2,14 148
8 1033 212 b 149
10 156
b
1034 256 174
2830 155
1035b1120,23 5 155
a
1036 35 185
9 131
b
11 37 186
a
1037 1617 185,187
2930 147,148,185
b
12 1012 135
1417 213
1038a68 178
19 162
13 b 910,1415 165
278 153
b
15 1039 20,212 185
234 224
2930 125
16 1040b17 165
a
17 1041 1011 125
b
78 149
H 81,140,147,188
1 1042 315 a 138
2631 149
b
2 256 143
b
3 1043 1416 224
4 1044a36 b1 124
156
19 140
1 1045b35 1046 2 a 156
1046a411 80
315 172
b
4 1047 1416 132
6 165
1048 2730a 157
36 b4 157
b
1214 146
1836 156,196
8 153
b
1049 810 157
1617 154
10 140,178,200
b
1051 1 199
35 179
69 200
917 132
I 84,86,188
1 133
1052a1921 136
228,2934 138
b 151053b8 139
1627 139

Page249
1054a1319 82,135
2
3 32 b3 149
b 313 151
4 116
1055a45 151
16,1920 151
223,312 152
b 811 172
a
6 1057 34 139
3 161
8 152
1058a817 153
234 178
9 152
K18 122
b
3 1060 314 79
335 79
a
1061 810 77
28 b4 187
a
5 1062 24 90,132
3 91
69 91
1114 91
1718 93
36 7 b 104
b
6 2430 107
7 1064a810 184
28,33 77
b
3 188
78 202
89 188
8 236 212
a
1065 621 198
6 223
a
12 1069 512 130
b
L2 912 171
410 188
4 b
1070 1130,305 124
226 129
610 87,202,203
68 194
61071b59 187
7 121
1072a198.1073b3 187
213 121
81073 2336 a 187
101075a2834 85
M 78
1 1076a11 149
b a
2 113.1078 9 187
1077 910 a 188
19 153
31 147
b 24 153
1722 188
3 161
N 78
a b
1 1087 29 4 85
1088a56 161
2 1089 201 a 192
3 1090a305 148
6 1093 1920 b 140

NicomachanEthics
61096a239 80,85
I1
234 142
2934 80
b 269 80
a
7 1097 258 126
b a
8 1098 311099 7 171
II5 1105b191106a13 163
256 171
1106a1112 163
III4 126
a
5 1114 32 110
IV7 1127b14 180
b
VI5 1140 56 108
X5 1176a33b2 171

EudemianEthics
1217b2634 80
I8
267 142
34 79
VII2 1236 1632 a 80
b
1727 80

Politics
1292b510 123
IV5

Rhetoric
1355b1721 85
I1

Poetics
1456b381457a10 94
20

Page251

INDEXOFNAMESANDSUBJECTS
ReferencesaretopagesoftheNotesandFurtherComments,exceptthatthoseinsquarebracketsaretonumbersintheBibliography,andthefewinparenthesesare
topagesoftheTranslation.BoldfaceindicatesthesubjectsofthechaptersofD.

accident,seecoincidence

A
Ackrill,J.L.[13],[21],162,167,170,198

affection112,163,1712

Alexander,pseudoAlexander[7],83,84,86,87,110,114,115,117,120,151,152,153,160,161,164,191,225

alteration,seechangeandmodification

analytics87

Anaxagoras102,107,108,121

Angelelli,I.[108]

Annas,J.E.[17]

Anscombe,,G.E.M.[84],96

Antisthenes17980

Apostle,H.G.[5]

appearance,seeimaginationAquinas[10],[11]

Aristotle,seeIndexLocorum

Asclepius[8]

axiom86,88,91,93,94,96

B
Barnes,J.[4],[16],[22],[25],[26],[82],[98],90,221

beggingthequestion912,203,206

being,thatwhichis,whatis76,77,78,79,117,122,1407,183,189,90,2013,21417,221

sensesof'b'(' ')81,84,1023,1407,156

beingbaldly144,18990,212,21415

Berkeley,G111

Berti,E.[96]

Bonitz,H.[24],114,120,182

Bostock,D.[20]

Brentano,F.[59]

Brinkmann,K.[47]

Brown,L.[80],214

by,byvirtueof16870

byvirtueofitself136,1402,1501,1689,181,182

C
capacity,capable,seepossibility

Cartwright,R.[105]

Cassin,B.[12]categories80,1403,152,189,21517

cause78,1248,1312,170,1812,183,187,193,1968,203,220,2212,2225

final,seefulfilment

formal,seeform

material,seematter

motive(efficient),seeprinciple

certain88,104,105,123,154

chance220

change1078,109,11819,121,1512,1568,163 4,1956,21112

changelessthings1078,109,121,125,1869,2013

Charles,D.[113]

Charlton,W.[15]

choice1234,180,190

Cleary,J.J.[130]

Cobb,R.A.[67]

Code,A.[36],[39],[75],[103],205,211,212

Cohen,S.M.[40]

coincidence,coincidental767,100,101,1267,1334,1436,162,16970,1802,1905,198,2068,210,212,213,215,21722,2225

complete139,167

contingency2245

continuous1356,1756,177

contradiction,seenoncontradiction

contradictory97,203

Page252

contrary85,97,112,116,119,152,158

Cratylus109

D
Dancy,R.M.[57],[71],[85]

definition92,104,120,121,148,183,1856

Democritus108

demonstration86,90,91,113,123,132,183,2034

denial80,84,103,116,118,172,199

determinism2225

ialectic84 5,88,204

differentia84,151,1623,1778

discipline(science,knowledge,understanding)76,83,86,122,183,1845,1945,2013,204

disposition170

Donini,P.L.[128]

dreaming10910,113

E
Ebert,T.[117]

element1289,1367,147,174

Empedocles(18),131

Epicharmus109

essence,essentialpredication75,1001,131,135,148,168,182,193,2068,21819,220

Euclid86,161

Evans,J.D.G.[92]

Evenus(34)

excludedmiddle,principleof(PEM)75,86,87,11621,188,204

existence7980,82,1412,1789,18990,21415

F
falsehoood104,117,119,121,17880,189,198200

Ferejohn,M.T.[56]

Fine,G.[122]

firm878,8990,116

forthemostpart1802,195,220

Frede,D.[124]

Frede,M.[32],[50],[70]

Freeland,C.A.[116]

Frege,G[99],136

form79,82,83,124,125,131,1389,139401478,174

formula,see'logos'

fulfilment124,126,167,1734

Furth,M.[41]

G
Geach,P.T.[84]

genus137,13940,174,1756,1778

geometry129,190

Gewirth,A.[78],194

God,divinities121,147,1878,2013

Grice,H.P.[64],215

H
Halper,E.[89]

Hamlyn,D.W.[14],[61],111

Heath,T.L.[132],86,139,160,163,164,188

Heinaman,R.E.[125]

Heraclitus89,106,109,,121

Hintikka,K.J.J.[65],[121]

holdgood78

Homer(18)

homonymy7980,95,122

Hume,D.106

Hussey,E.L.[19]

hypothesis88

I
identity,seesame

imagination105,110,11315

individual,seeparticular

inferencerules206

initsownright,seebyvirtueofitself

intelligible,seecertain

Irwin,T.H.[37],[38],[66],[90]

J
Jaeger,W.[1],84,115,139,193

Judson,R.L.[33],[120]

justwhat96,100

K
Kahn,C.H.[35],[55],[58]

Kenny,A.J.P.[93],111

KingFarlow,J.[29]

knowledge105,165andseediscipline

Knuuttila,S.[121]

L
lack801,84,116,170,1723

Lear,J.[87]

Leibniz,G.W.20910,213,214

Leszl,W.[45]

Lewis,C.S.[133],129

Page253

Lewis,F.A.[109],213

limit168

Locke,J.[134],[135],123,169

'logos'81,92,95,97,134,138,13940,1534,168,17980,1834,185,204,210

Long,A.A.[97]

Loux,M.J.[60]

Lukasiewicz*,J.[81]

Lycos,K.[95],110

M
Madigan,A.[123]

Maier,H.152

mathematics83,1869

matter124,125,1301,1367,148,155,174,1856

Matthen,M.[62],[72],213

Matthews,G.B.[104],211,212

means126

Merlan,P.[34],[43]

metaphysics75,76,77,78,79,82,84,1839,2013,204

Mignucci,M.[110],[119]

Miller,F.D.[102]

modification1712

Moravcsik,J.M.E.[115]

Morrison,D.R.[63]

N
Narcy,M.[12]

Natorp,P.186

nature87,12931

necessity98,99,112,1312,135,15960,193,1968,220,2225

noncontradiction,principleof(PNC)75,86,87116,188,2038

Noonan,H.W.[86]

notbeing,thatwhichisnot801,117,1789,18990,192,215,216

notman,notequal,etc.84,97,99

number120,136,139,161,163,1645

Nussbaum,M.C.[28]

Nuttall,J.[83]

O
O'Mcara,D.J.[27]

one82,83,84,85,101,13340,1501,165,188,210,221

opposite83,1513

origin,seeprinciple

outof1734

Owen,G.E.L.[31],[53],[54],[55],[79],101,155,207

Owens,J.[42],[49]

P
Parmenides(18)

part,portion155,156,169,174,1745,1757,211

particular128,148,150,154

Patzig,G.[44]

Pelletier,F.J.[29],[107]

perception108,110,112,165

philosophy83,85,122,1889

primary(first)philosophy76,188,2013

physics,physicists87,1859,2023

Plato,Platonists83,84,109,147,155

Euthydemus171

HippiasMinor180

Laws167

Philebus168

Republic86,88,94

Sophist87,92,179,192

Theaelelus93,104,105,108,109,110,113,171

Polanski,R.[129]

Popper,K.R.[100],134

possession,posscss1701,173

possibility,potentiality103,107,128,132,1467,15660,165

principle86,87,88,113,1234,1256,153,183,193,1968,201,203,225

priorandposterior81,112,1536,187,1889

privation,seelack

Protagoras102,10516

Pythagoreans1478

Q
quality,qualification80,1624,1712,21517

quantity138,1602,21517

Quine,W.V.[77],82

R
Reale,G.[48]

refutation91,113,121,2034

relative11516,1647,214

Remes,U.[121]

Page254

Ross,W.D.[2],[3],[23],75,84,86,87,90,94,104,109,113,115,117,122,128,129,130,139,147,151,152,153,155,161,162,164,170,176,178,
180,185,186,191,193,195,1978

S
same83,84,134,13940,14951,190,2078,20814,221

scepticism105,108

Schofield,M.[25],[26],[28]

Scholar,M.C.[94]

science,seediscipline

sense(ofanexpression)79,122

separable85,149,185,1867,199200

signify938,140,204,2056

Smith,J.A.[3]

sophist,sophistic85,1902

Sorabji,R.R.K.[25],[26],[112],217,223

Spellman,L.[111]

Sprague,R.K.[68],[131]

statement,see'logos'

stateofaffairs80,1789

Stevenson,J.G.[46],202

subject1367,147,148,178

subjectneutral78

substance78,100,147,1479,155,165,185,18990,201

syllogism87

synonymy94,96

Syrianus[9]

T
thatwhichis,thingthatis,seebeing

thatwhichisnot,seenotbeing

theology1869,2013

Thorp,J.W.[51],[69],[73],202,215

Tiles,J.E.118

transcendentalargument204,205

Tredennick,H.110

true104,117,119,121,146,189,198200

truncated177

U
understanding,seediscipline

unity,seeone

universal,all135,150,1757

Upton,T.V.[91]

W
Wedin,M.V.[88]

Weidemann,H.[76],[127],208

whatis,seebeing

White,M.J.[114]

White,N.P.[101]

whole1757

Wiesner,J.[30]

Williams,C.J.F.[18],[106],[126],21112,2234

Woods,M.J.[74]

X
Xenophanes(19)