CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
Right-- entitlement ; that which ought to be given to a person
by reason of being a human.
Life, Liberty, and Property.
Bill of Rightsself-executory; demand for reparation of
damages; can be immediately invoked.
Why some rights are not self-executory?
- issue of money; State cannot afford to provide some of the
rights because it needs appropriation of money.
Article 3 most of the rights are prohibitory and fundamental;
no need to appropriate money.
Article 2 mere principles; most are not self-executory;
-- section 4 is self-executory (duty to defend the country)
-- section 16 is self-executory (right to healthful and balanced
ecology)
Article 3 enforceable against the State only; prohibit or
regulate the State in relation to its people
CASES:
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
1.) Self-executory, distinguished from article XIII
2.) Enforceable against the State
a.) People v Marti
- Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed
offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional
rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and
therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in
evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the
evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and
obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and
without the intervention and participation of State authorities.
May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of
appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State. (The search and seizure
clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not
upon private individuals.) The contraband in the case at bar
having come into possession of the Government without the
latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable
search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the
same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of
the offense charged. The mere presence of the NBI agents did
not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a
warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution.
Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not
a search. Having observed that which is open, where no
trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search.
Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass
on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that
is prohibited by the constitution. The protection of fundamental
liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection
against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights
governs the relationship between the individual and the state.
Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a
private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights
does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere
inaccessible to any power holder. The constitutional
proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore
applies as a restraint directed only against the government and
its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint
against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to
pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is
made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case
at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the
right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law
enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to
acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the
ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
b.) Atienza v. COMELEC
Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the
party is not a simple issue of party membership or discipline; it
involves a violation of their constitutionally-protected right to
due process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the
NECO should have first summoned them to a hearing before
summarily expelling them from the party. According to Atienza,
et al., proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of
administrative proceedings and are, therefore, covered by the
due process requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations. But the requirements of administrative due
process do not apply to the internal affairs of political parties.
The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only
administrative bodies created by the state and through which
certain governmental acts or functions are performed. The Bill
of Rights, which guarantees against the taking of life, property,
or liberty without due process under Section 1 is generally a
limitation on the states powers in relation to the rights of its
citizens. The right to due process is meant to protect ordinary
citizens against arbitrary government action, but not from acts
committed by private individuals or entities. In the latter case,
the specific statutes that provide reliefs from such private acts
apply. The right to due process guards against unwarranted
encroachment by the state into the fundamental rights of its
citizens and cannot be invoked in private controversies
involving private parties. Although political parties play an
important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary
between the state and its citizens, it is still a private
organization, not a state instrument. The discipline of members
by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or
property within the meaning of the due process clause. An
individual has no vested right, as against the state, to be
accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only
rights, if any, that party members may have, in relation to other
party members, correspond to those that may have been freely
agreed upon among themselves through their charter, which is
a contract among the party members. Members whose rights
under their charter may have been violated have recourse to
courts of law for the enforcement of those rights, but not as a
due process issue against the government or any of its
agencies.
c.) Yrasuegui v. PAL
Petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty86 of
the Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked.87 Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not
meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. The
equal protection erects no shield against private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful. Private actions, no matter
how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee.
d.) People v. Domantay
Philippine National Police (PNP) picked up accused-appellant
and took him to the police station where accused-appellant,
upon questioning by SPO1 Antonio Espinoza, confessed to
killing Jennifer Domantay.Celso Manuel testified that he is a
radio reporter of station DWPR. Manuel interviewed th
accused-appellant who was then detained in the municipal jail.
Manuel explained that the interview was conducted in the jail,
about two to three meters away from the police station. An
uncle of the victim was with him and the nearest policemen
present were about two to three meters from him, including
those who were in the radio room. There was no lawyer
present. Before interviewing accused-appellant, Manuel said
he talked to the chief of police and asked permission to
interview accused-appellant. Accused-appellant contends that
his alleged confessions to SPO1 Antonio Espinoza and Celso
Manuel are inadmissible in evidence because they had been
obtained in violation of Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution and
that, with these vital pieces of evidence excluded, the
remaining proof of his alleged guilt, consisting of circumstantial
evidence, is inadequate to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Art. III, sec. 12 of the Constitution applies to
the stage of custodial investigation, that is, "when the
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect."
R.A. No. 7438 has extended the constitutional guarantee to
situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested
but has merely been "invited" for questioning. For an
extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the
following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be
made with the assistance of competent and independent
counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. In
the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the i
police station in the evening, he was already a suspect, in fact
the only one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer Domantay. He
was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the
rights guaranteed in Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution applied
to him. But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the
waiver was neither put in writing nor made in the presence of
counsel. For this reason, the waiver is invalid and his
confession is inadmissible. SPO1 Espinoza's testimony on the
alleged confession of accused-appellant should have been
excluded by the trial court. So is the bayonet inadmissible in
evidence, being, as it were, the "fruit of the poisonous tree."
However, that accused-appellant's confession to the radio
reporter, Celso Manuel, is admissible. [A]ppellant's [oral]
confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12(1)
and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does
not concern itself with the relation between a private individual
and another individual. It governs the relationship between the
individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily
addressed to the State and its agents. Celso Manuel admitted
that there were indeed some police officers around because
about two to three meters from the jail were the police station
and the radio room. We do not think the presence of the police
officers exerted any undue pressure or influence on accused-
appellant and coerced him into giving his confession. Indeed,
there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting for the
police or that the interview was conducted under
circumstances where it is apparent that accused-appellant
confessed to the killing out of fear. (exception: if the one who
obtained the admission, whether private individual, is under the
instruction of the police).
e.) Serrano v. National Labor Relations Commission
Violation of Notice Requirement Not a Denial of Due Process:
The first is that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a
limitation on governmental powers. It does not apply to the
exercise of private power, such as the termination of
employment under the Labor Code. This is plain from the text
of Art. III, 1 of the Constitution, viz.: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. .
. ." The reason is simple: Only the State has authority to take
the life, liberty, or property of the individual. The purpose of the
Due Process Clause is to ensure that the exercise of this
power is consistent with what are considered civilized
methods.The second reason is that notice and hearing are
required under the Due Process Clause before the power of
organized society are brought to bear upon the individual. This
is obviously not the case of termination of employment under
Art. 283. Here the employee is not faced with an aspect of the
adversary system. The purpose for requiring a 30-day written
notice before an employee is laid off is not to afford him an
opportunity to be heard on any charge against him, for there is
none. The purpose rather is to give him time to prepare for the
eventual loss of his job and the DOLE an opportunity to
determine whether economic causes do exist justifying the
termination of his employment. The third reason why the notice
requirement under Art. 283 can not be considered a
requirement of the Due Process Clause is that the employer
cannot really be expected to be entirely an impartial judge of
his own cause. This is also the case in termination of
employment for a just cause under Art. 282. with respect to Art.
283 of the Labor Code, the employer's failure to comply with
the notice requirement does not constitute a denial of due
process but a mere failure to observe a procedure for the
termination of employment which makes the termination of
employment merely ineffectual. Failure to send notice of
termination to Serrano is not tantamount to violation of his
constitutional right to due process but merely constitutes non-
compliance with the provision on notice under Art. 283 of the
Labor Code.
- Due process under Labor Law is not covered by Art. 3, sec. 1.
It is mandated only by the Labor Code
f.) DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and
PEDRO A. TECSON vs. GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES,
INC
Involves the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company
prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any
competitor company. No reversible error can be ascribed to the
Court of Appeals when it ruled that Glaxos policy prohibiting
an employee from having a relationship with an employee of a
competitor company is a valid exercise of management
prerogative.
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing
formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs
and information from competitors, especially so that it and
Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive
pharmaceutical industry. The prohibition against personal or
marital relationships with employees of competitor companies
upon Glaxos employees is reasonable under the
circumstances because relationships of that nature might
compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the
assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its
interests against the possibility that a competitor company will
gain access to its secrets and procedures. That Glaxo
possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be
denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of
enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its
right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion
and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the
constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of
labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided
in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that
management has rights which are also entitled to respect and
enforcement in the interest of fair play.
The challenged company policy does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously
suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal
protection clause are addressed only to the state or those
acting under color of its authority. Corollary, it has been held in
a long array of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the equal
protection clause erects no shield against merely private
conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful. The only
exception occurs when the state in any of its manifestations or
actions has been found to have become entwined or involved
in the wrongful private conduct. Obviously, however, the
exception is not present in this case. Significantly, the company
actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the
employee to comply with the policy. Indeed, the application of
the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner,
with due regard for the lot of the employee.
3.) Primacy of human rights over property rights
a.) Philippine Blooming Mills Labor Organization v. PBMC
While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the
primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized.
Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well
as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to
survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow
specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human
rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of
Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government
and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of
officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of
oligarchs political, economic or otherwise. In the hierarchy
of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions;
and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." The superiority of
these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact
that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means
employed by the law and its object or purpose that the law
is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive would
suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property
rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement
of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive
evil which the State has the right to prevent.
The primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of
peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances
over property rights has been sustained. The respondent
company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the
refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its
employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against
alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the
eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression,
freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of
grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor
practice. Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of
free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for
redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the
eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the
demonstration and consequently being absent from work,
constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the
fundamental law to these lowly employees. Management has
shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a
complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its
laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities
by the local police, It was more expedient for the firm to
conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in
their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty
tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism.
Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by the
respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of
its employees. It was pure and implement selfishness, if not
greed.
4.) No retroactive application
Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution is prospective in nature. It is
not retroactive in application because it is not a penal statute.
*Section 1, Article 3- prohibition in the provision applies to all
State organs
Deprive- to take away; restraint
Life: integrity of ones body; capacity to perform any act.
Life begins at conception
Liberty: freedom to do anything that is not prohibited by the
law.
right to contract, to labor, of locomotion
Property: that which can be appropriated: tangible and
intangible (rights)
Exceptions: 1.) Franchise mere privilege; can be revoked
2.) Public office - public trust; governed by law (except salary,
especially if it is already earned. If it is already earned, you are
entitled to due process)
DUE PROCESS
- safeguard against arbitrariness (lack of reason/basis)
- law itself must not be arbitrary, and so as its application
- sporting the idea of fair-play; there is fairness
- no definite definition stated in the constitution, to give room
for interpretation by Supreme Court and to make the meaning
dynamic, to be able to adapt through time
Due process is comprised of two components :
1.) Substantive due process which requires the intrinsic validity
of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life,
liberty, or property
2.) Procedural due process which consists of the two basic
rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being
heard by an impartial and competent tribunal
2 types of due process:
1.) SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: intrinsic; deals with the
content of the law
2.) PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: deals with the application
of the law; before imposing proper penalty, observe proper
procedure. There must be Notice and Hearing.
Laws must be intrinsically valid (substantive due process)
- whether or not there is sufficient justification in the deprivation
of life, liberty, property of persons
2 elements must be present. Test in determining whether it
complies with substantive due process:
1.) LAWFUL SUBJECT: Law must have valid governmental
objective that is if the interest of the public in general, as
distinguished from a particular class, require interference.
It must be for the benefit of all, not just a particular class. It
must be for the general welfare.
2.) LAWFUL METHOD: Objective must be achieved in a lawful
manner, that the means employed are necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive.
This is usually used in the cases decided by the Supreme
Court.
Inherent powers of the State:
1.) Police power: Power to promote general welfare of the
community (for public morals, public order, health, safety, to
promote economy). Power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
the general welfare of the people. Also exercised by local
government. It is the most limitable power.
2.) Tax power: power to create revenue to support government.
Levy tax. Must be uniform and equitable (same to the same
class and based on their ability to pay)
3.) Eminent domain: power to expropriate (private) property in
exchange of just compensation
The word "regulate" is interpreted to include the power to
control, to govern and to restrain.
CASES:
VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER
a.) Chavez v. Romulo
The right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is
subject to regulation. The maintenance of peace and order and
the protection of the people against violence are constitutional
duties of the State, and the right to bear arms is to be
construed in connection and in harmony with these
constitutional duties. The right to bear arms is a mere
statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. It is a mere
statutory creation. A license authorizing a person to
enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what
otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a
vested right. All licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a
property right protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution. A licensee takes his license subject to such
conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the
statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by
the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a
contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant
of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of
these words in the Declaration of Rights. The correlative
power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary
consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is
always revocable. All property in the state is held subject to its
general regulations, necessary to the common good and
general welfare. Test to determine the validity of a police
measure, thus: (1) The interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
exercise of the police power; and
(2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.
Deeper reflection will reveal that the test merely reiterates the
essence of the constitutional guarantees of substantive due
process, equal protection, and non-impairment of property
rights. It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis
for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the
society. In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not
entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is
merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However,
those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their
residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This we believe
is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is
regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed.
Notably, laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns
have frequently been upheld as reasonable exercise of the
police power.
b.) ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC. v. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF
MANILA
The mantle of protection associated with the due process
guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular
manifestation of a police power measure being specifically
aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such
imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise
would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police
power which has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending
as it does "to all the great public needs." It would be, to
paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very
purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to
be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public
morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put,
police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society. There is no question but that the
challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. The alarming
increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in
Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which
"provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry,
presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for
prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then
proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and
guests of these establishments by requiring these transients
and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the
purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by
introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to
shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of
transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed
fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind
from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same
time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would
appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from
sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance,
argues eloquently for it.
To satisfy the due process requirement, official action must not
outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression.
Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack
of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom
from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of
fair play. Taxation may be made to implement the
state's police power. Public welfare, then, lies at the
bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty,
with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state. The policy of laissez faire has to
some extent given way to the assumption by the government
of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected
with public interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that
if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person,
the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more
rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at
the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measure is wider.
c.) Ericta vs. City of Quezon
The City Government of Quezon was not exercising police
power when they required private cemetery owners to reserve
6% of the burial lots for paupers burial ground. The SC held
that in police power, the property taken is to be destroyed. The
6% are private property of the cemetery owners. This is taking
of private property. Section 9 of Article 3 states that Private
property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. Clearly, this is an invalid exercise of police
power. The City was made to pay the owners just
compensation.
d.) DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS (DECS) v. SAN DIEGO
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is
whether there is some reasonable relation between the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission
to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the
health and safety of the general community, on the other hand.
This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling
that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches
has long been recognized as a reasonable method of
protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to
regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the
power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to
practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation
and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to
practice medicine first to take and pass medical board
examinations have long ago been recognized as valid
exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment
of minimum medical educational requirements-i.e., the
completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical
school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been
sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of
the state. The government is entitled to prescribe an
admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its
stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into
[our] medical schools" and of "improving the quality of medical
education in the country." Given the widespread use today of
such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the
United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test
[MCAT] and quite probably, in other countries with far more
developed educational resources than our own, and taking into
account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt
to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is
reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of
legislation and regulation in this area. Police power of
the State is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State, and (b) the means
employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the
object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. In other words, the proper exercise
of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject
and a lawful method. The subject of the challenged
regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is
the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure
that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to
whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is
not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or
oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the
medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the
intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. While every
person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a
constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other
calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer
the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has
the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to
it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all.
These resources must be applied in a manner that will best
promote the common good while also giving the individual a
sense of satisfaction. The right to quality education
invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The
Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to
choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements. The contention that the challenged rule violates
the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A law does not
have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. There
would be unequal protection if some applicants who have
passed the tests are admitted and others who have also
qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal
protection requires is equality among equals.
e.) FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order, or safety, and the general
welfare of the people. To determine the validity of a police
measure, two questions must be asked: (1) Does the interest
of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the exercise of police power? and (2)
Are the means employed reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals? A close examination of the assailed
provision reveals that its primary objectives are to prohibit
premature campaigning and to level the playing field for
candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between
popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or
poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from
enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on
account of their resources and popularity. The latter is a valid
reason for the exercise of police power as held in National
Press Club v. COMELEC, wherein the petitioners questioned
the constitutionality of Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646,
which prohibited the sale or donation of print space and air
time "for campaigning or other political purposes," except to
the COMELEC. The obvious intention of this provision is to
equalize, as far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor
candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue
advantage offered by huge campaign "war chests." This Court
ruled therein that this objective is of special importance and
urgency in a country which, like ours, is characterized by
extreme disparity in income distribution between the economic
elite and the rest of society, and by the prevalence of poverty,
with so many of our population falling below the poverty line.
Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject
billboards are purely product endorsements and do not
announce nor solicit any support for his candidacy. Under the
Omnibus Election Code, "election campaign" or "partisan
political activity" is defined as an act designed to promote the
election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a
public office. It is true that when petitioner entered into the
contracts or agreements to endorse certain products, he acted
as a private individual and had all the right to lend his name
and image to these products. However, when he filed his
certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his
name and image assumed partisan political character because
the same indirectly promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the
COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers when it
required petitioner to discontinue the display of the subject
billboards. If the subject billboards were to be allowed,
candidates for public office whose name and image are used
to advertise commercial products would have more opportunity
to make themselves known to the electorate, to the
disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same
chance of lending their faces and names to endorse popular
commercial products as image models. Similarly, an individual
intending to run for public office within the next few months,
could pay private corporations to use him as their image model
with the intention of familiarizing the public with his name and
image even before the start of the campaign period.
he non-impairment clause of the Constitution must
yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government.5
Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without
regard to the level of financial resources one may have at his
disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the public. The State has
the duty to enact and implement rules to safeguard this
interest. Time and again, this Court has said that contracts
affecting public interest contain an implied reservation of the
police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This
power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of
the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or
protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate
against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited
by the paramount police power.
f.) CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP v. DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL WELFARE and DEVELOPMENT (DSWD)
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar
to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its
object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but
has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits.
Accordingly, it has been described as "the most essential,
insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does
to all the great public needs." It is "the power vested in the
legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to
the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the
same." For this reason, when the conditions so demand as
determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the
primacy of police power because property rights, though
sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common
good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of
petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the
questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence
of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of
the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in
view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its
favor. Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that
the grant of the senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to
their business, because petitioners have not taken time to
calculate correctly and come up with a financial report, so that
they have not been able to show properly whether or not the
tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their
disadvantage. Moreover, the right to property has a social
dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution provides the
precept for the protection of property, various laws and
jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and the
regulation of contracts and public utilities, continuously serve
as a reminder that the right to property can be relinquished
upon the command of the State for the promotion of public
good.
g.) BELTRAN v. THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the
statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left
the hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the
judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee or
delegate of the Legislature. Except as to matters of detail that
may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be
adopted or promulgated by executive officers and
administrative boards, an act of the Legislature, as a general
rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any
rule or definite standard by which the administrative board may
be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers
delegated to it. Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood
Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the
provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to
safeguard the health of the people and has mandated several
measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out
of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has
sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the
Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the
promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate
supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. By its
provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the
Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised under
and in pursuance of the law. Congress may validly
delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate
rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies. What may be regarded as a denial
of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always
easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be
formulated. Class legislation, discriminating against some and
favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable
basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The
classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must
be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each
member of the class. The above study led to the passage
of Republic Act No. 7719, to instill public consciousness of the
importance and benefits of voluntary blood donation, safe
blood supply and proper blood collection from healthy donors.
To do this, the Legislature decided to order the phase out of
commercial blood banks to improve the Philippine blood
banking system, to regulate the supply and proper collection of
safe blood, and so as not to derail the implementation of the
voluntary blood donation program of the government. In lieu of
commercial blood banks, non-profit blood banks or blood
centers, in strict adherence to professional and scientific
standards to be established by the DOH, shall be set in place.
The Legislature never intended for the law to
create a situation in which unjustifiable discrimination and
inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate its policy, a
classification was made between nonprofit blood banks/centers
and commercial blood banks. We deem the classification
to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons:
One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The
former operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a
medical service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also,
while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood donation,
the latter treats blood as a sale of commodity. Two, the
classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial
blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law, that is, to
provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by
promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood
transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a
commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out of
commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as
a business enterprise, and they source their blood supply from
paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared to
voluntary blood donors as shown by the USAID-sponsored
study on the Philippine blood banking system. Three,
the Legislature intended for the general application of the law.
Its enactment was not solely to address the peculiar
circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only
to the existing conditions. Lastly, the law applies
equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.
Having said that, this Court comes to the inquiry as to
whether or not Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes a valid
exercise of police power. The promotion of public health is a
fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is
a primordial governmental concern. Basically, the National
Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the States
police power in order to promote and preserve public health
and safety. Police power of the state is validly exercised
if (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, requires the interference of the
State; and, (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary
to the attainment of the objective sought to be accomplished
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In the
earlier discussion, the Court has mentioned of the avowed
policy of the law for the protection of public health by ensuring
an adequate supply of safe blood in the country through
voluntary blood donation. Attaining this objective requires the
interference of the State given the disturbing condition of the
Philippine blood banking system. In serving the
interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the
law, the Legislature deemed it necessary to phase out
commercial blood banks. This action may seriously affect the
owners and operators, as well as the employees, of
commercial blood banks but their interests must give way to
serve a higher end for the interest of the public. The
Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a valid
exercise of the States police power. Therefore, the Legislature,
under the circumstances, adopted a course of action that is
both necessary and reasonable for the common good. Police
power is the State authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare. It is in this regard that the Court
finds the related grounds and/or issues raised by petitioners,
namely, deprivation of personal liberty and property, and
violation of the non-impairment clause, to be unmeritorious.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare,
may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Thus, persons may be subjected to
certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general welfare of the State and to this fundamental aim of
government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated.
h.) SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA
The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of
Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur
in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. No
reason exists why such a protective measure should be
delayed.
i.) ROMEO P. GEROCHI v. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited
in its range, acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that
security against its abuse is to be found only in the
responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the
constituency that is to pay it. It is based on the principle that
taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and their prompt and
certain availability is an imperious need. Thus, the theory
behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from
necessity; without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate
of promoting the general welfare and well-being of the people.
On the other hand, police power is the power of the
state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating
the use of liberty and property. [33] It is the most pervasive, the
least limitable, and the most demanding of the three
fundamental powers of the State. The justification is found in
the Latin maxims salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of
the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas (so use your property as not to injure the property
of others). As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which
virtually extends to all public needs, police power grants a wide
panoply of instruments through which the State, as parens
patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers. We have
held that the power to "regulate" means the power to protect,
foster, promote, preserve, and control, with due regard for the
interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and
of its patrons. The conservative and pivotal distinction
between these two powers rests in the purpose for which the
charge is made. If generation of revenue is the primary
purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a
tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that
revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a
tax. The assailed Universal Charge is not a tax, but an
exaction in the exercise of the State's police power. Public
welfare is surely promoted. Moreover, it is a well-
established doctrine that the taxing power may be used as an
implement of police power.
INVALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER:
a.) Balacuit v. Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte
and Butuan City
It is already settled that the operation of theaters,
cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are
subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of
delegated police power by the local government. The City of
Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact
the ordinance in question under its power to regulate embodied
in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as delegated to
it under the general welfare clause to justify the enactment of
said ordinance.
To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear
that the interest of the public generally requires an interference
with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not,
under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily
interfere with private business, or impose unusual and
unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other
words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its
police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the
supervision of the courts. We must bear in mind that there
must be public necessity which demands the adoption of
proper measures to secure the ends sought to be attained by
the enactment of the ordinance, and the large discretion is
necessarily vested in the legislative authority to determine not
only what the interests of the public require, but what
measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.
The methods or means used to protect the public health,
morals, safety or welfare, must have some relation to the end
in view, for under the guise of the police power, personal rights
and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to
be arbitrarily invaded by the legislative department. The
ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public
interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded
on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must
exist between purposes and means. The evident purpose of
the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of
parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear
the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only make
the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise
penalizes them for failure to comply with it. The ordinance is
clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the
business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible
relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public
health, safety, morals and the general welfare. In no sense
could these businesses be considered public utilities. The
State has not found it appropriate as a national policy to
interfere with the admission prices to these performances.
As to the question of the subject ordinance being a
valid exercise of police power, the same must be resolved in
the negative. While it is true that a business may be regulated,
it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds
of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be
reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting
to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject
of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the
guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by
the exercise of police power. 33 A police measure for the
regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business
should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by
the citizens of their property rights. 34 The right of the owner to
fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an
inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the
protection of the due process clause."" Hence, the proprietors
of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own
way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their
own advantage, and that any person who did not approve
could stay away. Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the
personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We could
assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from
the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it is
an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and
personal rights of citizens. (The ordinance is unduly oppressive
because it denies theatre owners the right to manage their own
business)
b.) Ynot v. Court of Appeals
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function
of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by
due process. The police power is simply defined as the power
inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the
promotion of the general welfare. By reason of its function, it
extends to all the great public needs and is described as the
most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of
the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation
and eminent domain. To justify the State in thus
interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require such interference; and
second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. In this case, the reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing. We do not
see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of
carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less
difficulty in one province than in another. To sum up then,
we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of
the police power because the method employed to conserve
the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the
law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated
because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the
right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned
and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities
of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against
the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an
invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these
reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional.
c.) DEL ROSARIO v. BENGZON
The Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in
the Generics Act. It, on the contrary, implements the
constitutional mandate for the State "to protect and promote
the right to health of the people" and "to make essential goods,
health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost" (Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII,
1987 Constitution). The prohibition against the use by
doctors of "no substitution" and/or words of similar import in
their prescription, is a valid regulation to prevent the
circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the right to
choose between the brand name and its generic equivalent
since his doctor is allowed to write both the generic and the
brand name in his prescription form. If a doctor is allowed to
prescribe a brand-name drug with "no substitution," the
patient's option to buy a lower-priced, but equally effective,
generic equivalent would thereby be curtailed. The law aims to
benefit the impoverished (and often sickly) majority of the
population in a still developing country like ours, not the
affluent and generally healthy minority.
d.) HON. RENATO C. CORONA v. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on
the nature of a property right. Even petitioner Corona
recognized this when he stated in his March 17, 1993, decision
that the exercise of ones profession falls within the
constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or
interference with, property rights without due process. He
merely expressed the opinion that in the limited context of this
case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful
interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the
property rights of those affected thereby, and that PPA-AO 04-
92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by
harbor pilots of their profession. As will be presently
demonstrated, such supposition is gravely erroneous and
tends to perpetuate an administrative order which is not only
unreasonable but also superfluous.
Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by
duly licensed individuals. Licensure is the granting of license
especially to practice a profession. It is also the system of
granting licenses (as for professional practice) in accordance
with established standards. A license is a right or permission
granted by some competent authority to carry on a business or
do an act which, without such license, would be illegal.
Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their
profession, they literally have to pass through the proverbial
eye of a needle by taking, not one but five examinations, each
followed by actual training and practice.
e.) PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. v. FERTIPHIL
CORPORATION
Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of
the State. These powers are distinct and have different tests
for validity. Police power is the power of the State to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare, while the power of
taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for public
purpose. The main purpose of police power is the regulation of
a behavior or conduct, while taxation is revenue generation.
The lawful subjects and lawful means tests are used to
determine the validity of a law enacted under the police power.
The power of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by
inherent and constitutional limitations. The imposition of
the levy was an exercise by the State of its taxation power.
While it is true that the power of taxation can be used as an
implement of police power, the primary purpose of the levy is
revenue generation. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if
revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial purposes,
then the exaction is properly called a tax. The P10 levy
under LOI No. 1465 is too excessive to serve a mere
regulatory purpose. The levy, no doubt, was a big burden on
the seller or the ultimate consumer. It increased the price of a
bag of fertilizer by as much as five percent. A plain reading of
the LOI also supports the conclusion that the levy was for
revenue generation. The LOI expressly provided that the levy
was imposed until adequate capital is raised to make PPI
viable. Even if We consider LOI No. 1695 enacted under the
police power of the State, it would still be invalid for failing to
comply with the test of lawful subjects and lawful means.
Jurisprudence states the test as follows: (1) the interest of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of particular class,
requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. For the
same reasons as discussed, LOI No. 1695 is invalid because it
did not promote public interest. The law was enacted to give
undue advantage to a private corporation. When a statutes
public purpose is spoiled by private interest, the use of police
power becomes a travesty which must be struck down for
being an arbitrary exercise of government power.
IN VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
a.) WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION v. CITY OF MANILA
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be
unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable. Police power is based upon the concept of
necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect
itself and its people. Police power has been used as
justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.
These range from the regulation of dance halls, movie
theaters, gas stations and cockpits. The awesome scope of
police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its
hundred or so years of presence in our nations legal system,
its use has rarely been denied. The apparent goal of the
Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.
These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly
fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for
their achievement. Those means must align with the
Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its
guarantees to the people.
Due process evades a precise definition. The purpose of the
guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment
against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due
process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary
regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are
protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is
concerned. The due process guaranty has traditionally
been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct
restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and
"substantive due process." Procedural due process refers to
the procedures that the government must follow before it
deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due
process concerns itself with government action adhering to the
established process when it makes an intrusion into the private
sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the
level of formality of a hearing. If due process were
confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise
absurd situation of arbitrary government action, provided the
proper formalities are followed. Substantive due process
completes the protection envisioned by the due process
clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient
justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.
The question of substantive due process, more so
than most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in
progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of
fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as
it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of
analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality though of
constitutional due process has not been predicated on the
frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal
result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield
to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process
clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated
methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes
and bounds for its application. That the Ordinance
prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a
product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with
another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the
Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require an interference with private rights
and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of
private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative
for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private
rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes of the measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those
pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these
requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc,
the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when
life, liberty or property is affected. However, this is not in any
way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police
power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.
Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring
newspapers to donate advertising space to candidates, this
Ordinance is a blunt and heavy instrument. The Ordinance
makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons
engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate
actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit
activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section
3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places
of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage
and subject them without exception to the unjustified
prohibition. We reiterate that individual rights may be
adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required
by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from
needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-
intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary
and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as
well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the
operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as
restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient
justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and
renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality
without accommodating innocuous intentions. The
promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among
citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided
that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to
protect. The judiciary would defer to the legislature
unless there is a discrimination against a "discrete and insular"
minority or infringement of a "fundamental right." Consequently,
two standards of judicial review were established: strict
scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting
the political process, and the rational basis standard of review
for economic legislation.
b.) REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
A review center is not an institution of higher learning as
contemplated by RA 7722. It does not offer a degree-granting
program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED.
Thus, programs given by review centers could not be
considered "programs of higher learning" that would put them
under the jurisdiction of the CHED. The President has no
inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions
of the CHED under RA 7722. Legislative power is the authority
to make laws and to alter or repeal them, and this power is
vested with the Congress. Police power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good
order or safety, and the general welfare of the people flows
from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex the
welfare of the people is the supreme law. Police power
primarily rests with the legislature although it may be exercised
by the President and administrative boards by virtue of a valid
delegation. Here, no delegation of police power exists under
RA 7722 authorizing the President to regulate the operations of
non-degree granting review centers. (it is unduly oppressive
because students are prevented from enrolling to review
centers)
c.) LUPANGCO v. COURT OF APPEALS
Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review
that review schools and centers believe would best enable
their enrollees to meet the standards required before becoming
a full-fledged public accountant. Unless the means or methods
of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or
riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be
stopped from helping out their students. The enforcement
of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged
leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at
least minimized. By all means the right and freedom of the
examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the
examinations should not be curtailed. Resolution No.
105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on
the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution.
Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees
as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure
examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the
lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to
become public accountants. They have every right to make
use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors.
They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire
useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth. As
defined in a decision of the United States Supreme Court:
The term "liberty" means more than mere freedom
from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It means
freedom to go where one may choose and to act in such a
manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as his
judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness, to
pursue such callings and vocations as may be most suitable to
develop his capacities, and give to them their highest
enjoyment.
d.) KWONG SING v. THE CITY OF MANILA
The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of
the Administrative Code, means and includes the power to
control, to govern, and to restrain; but "regulate" should not be
construed as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit."
Consequently, under the power to regulate laundries, the
municipal authorities could make proper police regulations as
to the mode in which the employment or business shall be
exercised. And, under the general welfare clause (subsection
[ee], section 2444 of the Manila Charter), the business of
laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments could be
regulated, as this term is above construed, by an ordinance in
the interest of the public health, safety, morals, peace good
order, comfort, convenience, prosperity, and the general
welfare. The purpose of the municipal authorities in
adopting the ordinance is fairly evident. Ordinance No. 532
was enacted, it is said, to avoid disputes between laundrymen
and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who
are not able to decipher Chinese characters from being
defrauded. The object of the ordinance was, accordingly, the
promotion of peace and good order and the prevention of
fraud, deceit, cheating, and imposition. The convenience of the
public would also presumably be served in a community where
there is a Babel of tongues by having receipts made out in the
two official languages. Reasonable restraints of a lawful
business for such purposes are permissible under the police
power. The legislative body is the best judge of whether or not
the means adopted are adequate to accomplish the ends in
view. Not only must it appear that the interest of the public
generally require an interference with private rights, but the
means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. If the ordinance appears to the judicial mind
to be partial or oppressive, it must be declared invalid. The
presumption is, however, that the municipal authorities, in
enacting the ordinance, did so with a rational and
conscientious regard for the rights of the individual and of the
community. Our view, after most thoughtful
consideration, is, that the ordinance invades no fundamental
right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of
police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal
property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor
unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries
without distinction, whether they belong to Americans,
Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without
exception, and each every one of them without distinction,
must comply with the ordinance. There is no privilege, no
discrimination, no distinction. Equally and uniformly the
ordinance applies to all engaged in the laundry business, and,
as nearly as may be, the same burdens are cast upon them.
The oppressiveness of the ordinance may have been
somewhat exaggerated. The printing of the laundry receipts
need not be expensive. The names of the several kinds of
clothing may be printed in English and Spanish with the
equivalent in Chinese below. With such knowledge of English
and Spanish as laundrymen and their employees now
possess, and, certainly, at least one person in every Chinese
laundry must have a vocabulary of a few words, and with ability
to read and write Arabic numbers, no great difficulty should be
experienced, especially after some practice, in preparing the
receipts required by Ordinance No. 532. It may be conceded
that an additional burden will be imposed on the business and
occupation affected by the ordinance. Yet, even if private rights
of person or property are subjected to restraint, and even if
loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the
ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the
hands of the legislative body. The very foundation of the police
power is the control of private interests for the public welfare.
the government of the city of Manila had the power to enact
Ordinance No. 532 and that as said ordinance is found not to
be oppressive, nor unequal, nor unjust, it is valid.
e.) YU CONG ENG, ET AL. vs. W. TRINIDAD
The police power exists in the Philippine Islands in about the
same form and to the same extent as in a State of the
American Union. Under the general police power, persons and
property in the Philippines have been subjected to various
kinds of restrictions and burdens, in order to secure the
general health, comfort, and prosperity of all. The police power
is not limited to regulations necessary for the preservation of
good order or the public health and safety, but the prevention
of fraud, cheating, and imposition is equally within its scope.
Large discretion is necessarily vested in the
legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the
public require, but what measures are necessary for the
protection of such interests. To justify the state in thus
interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require such interference; and,
second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of
protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private
business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions
upon lawful occupations. The power of taxation is the
strongest of all the powers of government, practically absolute
and unlimited. The power to tax involves the power to destroy.
It is a legislative power. All its incidents are within the control of
the legislature. It is the Legislature which must questions of
state necessarily involved in ordering a tax, which must make
all the necessary rules and regulations which are to be
observed in order to produce the desired results, and which
must decide upon the agencies by means of which collections
shall be made. The petitioners are Chinese subjects. The
treaty rights accorded the Chinese are those of the most
favored nation. Their constitutional rights are those accorded
all aliens, which means that the life, liberty, or property of these
persons cannot be taken without due process of law, and that
they are entitled to the equal protection of the laws, without
regard to their race. The rights of these Chinese aliens are not
less than the rights of Philippine citizens, nor more. The
Chinese will not be singled out as a special subject for
discriminating and hostile legislation. There will be no arbitrary
deprivation of liberty or arbitrary spoliation of property. There
will be no unjust and illegal discrimination between persons in
similar circumstances. The law will prove oppressive to the
extent that all tax laws are oppressive, but not oppressive to
the extent of confiscation. The means to accomplish a
necessary interference with private business are no more
oppressive upon individuals than is necessary to maintain the
State. The law is not intended for the convenience of the trader
or the protection of the creditors, but has relation to the public
welfare, to the power of taxation, to the right of the government
to exist. The Chinese must bear their just proportion of the tax
burden, however unwelcome it may be, without flinching.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: Its essence is the
opportunity to be heard; notice and hearing (basic the relief granted by the court must be limited to such as can
requirement); observing judicial hearing.
Procedural due process:
1.) JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS/ JUDICIAL DUE PROCESS:
Jurisdiction: power to act with authority
Summon: to acquire jurisdiction over a person
Subpoena: compulsory process to appear before the court or
to bring evidence
a.) Service of summons
b.) Voluntary appearance
CASE:
EL BANCO ESPAOL-FILIPINO vs. VICENTE PALANCA,
The word "jurisdiction," as applied to the faculty of exercising
judicial power, is used in several different, though related,
senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the
court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a
particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court
over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to
the litigation. The sovereign authority which organizes a
court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general
and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to
the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the
voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to
its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal
process exerted over the person. Jurisdiction over the
property which is the subject of the litigation may result either
from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it
is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result
from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special
provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is
recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property,
though at all times within the potential power of the court, may
never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the
jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment
proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of
the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held
to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what
we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the
proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the
registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual
physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of
some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in
rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the
petitioner against all the world. Jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, if acquired at all in such an action, is
obtained by the voluntary submission of the defendant or by
the personal service of process upon him within the territory
where the process is valid. If, however, the defendant is a
nonresident and, remaining beyond the range of the personal
process of the court, refuses to come in voluntarily, the court
never acquires jurisdiction over the person at all. Here the
property itself is in fact the sole thing which is impleaded and is
the responsible object which is the subject of the exercise of
judicial power. It follows that the jurisdiction of the court in such
case is based exclusively on the power which, under the law, it
possesses over the property; and any discussion relative to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant is
entirely apart from the case. The jurisdiction of the court over
the property, considered as the exclusive object of such action,
is evidently based upon the following conditions and
considerations, namely: (1) that the property is located within
the district; (2) that the purpose of the litigation is to subject the
property by sale to an obligation fixed upon it by the mortgage;
and (3) that the court at a proper stage of the proceedings
takes the property into custody, if necessary, and expose it to
sale for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt. An
obvious corollary is that no other relief can be granted in this
proceeding than such as can be enforced against the property.
We may then, from what has been stated, formulated
the following proposition relative to the foreclosure proceeding
against the property of a nonresident mortgagor who fails to
come in and submit himself personally to the jurisdiction of the
court: (I) That the jurisdiction of the court is derived from the
power which it possesses over the property; (II) that jurisdiction
over the person is not acquired and is nonessential; (III) that
be enforced against the property itself. The proposition
that jurisdiction over the person cannot be thus acquired by
publication and notice is no longer open to question; and it is
now fully established that a personal judgment upon
constructive or substituted service against a nonresident who
does not appear is wholly invalid. This doctrine applies to all
kinds of constructive or substituted process, including service
by publication and personal service outside of the jurisdiction in
which the judgment is rendered; and the only exception seems
to be found in the case where the nonresident defendant has
expressly or impliedly consented to the mode of service.
In proceedings in rem or quasi in rem against a
nonresident who is not served personally within the state, and
who does not appear, the relief must be confined to the res,
and the court cannot lawfully render a personal judgment
against him. Therefore in an action to foreclose a mortgage
against a nonresident, upon whom service has been effected
exclusively by publication, no personal judgment for the
deficiency can be entered. The requirement of due
process is satisfied if the following conditions are present,
namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2)
jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant or over the property which is the subject of the
proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to
be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful
hearing. It will be observed that this mode of
notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the
absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The
periodical containing the publication may never in fact come to
his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice
may often be very slight. Even where notice is sent by mail the
probability of his receiving it, though much increased, is
dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it is
forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security of the
mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of
our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely
require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every event,
but only in the case where the defendant's residence is known.
In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to
the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be
considered absolutely necessary. The idea upon which the
law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of
notification which may fall short of actual notice is apparently
this: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its
owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under
certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that
proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and
sale. It will be observed that in considering the effect of this
irregularity, it makes a difference whether it be viewed as a
question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due
process of law. In the matter of jurisdiction there can be no
distinction between the much and the little. The court either
has jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to the
mailing of notice should be considered as a step antecedent to
the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no escape from the
conclusion that the failure to take that step was fatal to the
validity of the judgment. In the application of the idea of due
process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to
be so rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that
due process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity for the
defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in
the newspaper, it would seem highly unreasonable to hold that
failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in applying the
requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect
upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have
been violated and the principle underlying the exercise of
judicial power in these proceedings. Judge in the light of these
conceptions, we think that the provision of Act of Congress
declaring that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law has not been infringed.
2.) ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS
- No trial-type hearing (through papers or memoranda; position
papers)
- No requirement of furnishing copy of the investigation, what
should be given is the final decision.
Administrative bodies quasi-judicial function; part of the
executive branch but they exercise quasi-judicial and quasi-
legislative functions.
Quasi-judicial to resolve issues in the process of
implementing or executing laws; applicable only to specific
people
Quasi-legislative applicable to all
Civil case v. Administrative case
Civil case Rules of Court will be applied; quantum of
evidence needed is Preponderance of evidence (whose
evidence is better or heavier)
Administrative case Trial-type proceedings are dispensed
with; quantum of evidence needed is substantial evidence
(such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.)
CASES:
a.) ANG TIBAY v. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose
functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
(Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than
a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not
intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government.
Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting
only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases
that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the
Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its
organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only
exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees
but its functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle
any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between,
and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and
regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103
(section 1). The Court of Industrial Relations is not
narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the
Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities
or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or
legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of
legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it
may deem just and equitable. The fact, however, that the
Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that
it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard
the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in
trials and investigations of an administrative character. There
are primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:
(1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. "The liberty and property of the
citizen shall be protected by the requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present
his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights
which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented. "The right to adduce evidence, without the
corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is
vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons
to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without
notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation
to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached." This principle emanates
from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of
unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation
upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding
or conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial." It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." The rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.'
The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free
administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so
that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed
incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility
in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having rational probative force.
Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute
substantial evidence.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected. Only by confining the administrative
tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter
be protected in their right to know and meet the case against
them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to
see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the
authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing
itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards
of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating
and determining the facts in any given case, but their report
and decision are only advisory.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
b.) MOLLANEDA vs. UMACOB
The matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is
best performed by trial courts or administrative bodies rather
than by appellate courts, this Court merely recognizes that the
trial court or the administrative body as a trier of facts is in a
better position to assess the demeanor of the witnesses and
the credibility of their testimonies as they were within its
proximal view during the hearing or investigation. At any rate, it
cannot be gainsaid that the term "administrative body or
agency" includes the subordinate officials upon whose hand
the body or agency delegates a portion of its authority.
Included therein are the hearing officers through whose eyes
and ears the administrative body or agency observes the
demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses and listens to
their testimonies. The appointment of competent officers to
hear and receive evidence is commonly resorted to by
administrative bodies or agencies in the interest of an orderly
and efficient disposition of administrative cases. While
the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency
vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power
to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the
administrative agency will be made. The rule that
requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment
and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter
of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to
investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which
the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment
and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer
authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the
requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of
testimony be before the same officer who will make the
decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his
right to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the
record, there is no question that the requirements of due
process and fair trial are fully met. In short, there is no
abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned
as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer.
It is, however, required that to "give the substance of a hearing,
which is for the purpose of making determinations upon
evidence the officer who makes the determinations must
consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.
Under our jurisprudence, an administrative agency
may employ other persons, such as a hearing officer, examiner
or investigator, to receive evidence, conduct hearing and make
reports on the basis of which the agency shall render its
decision. Such a procedure is a practical necessity. Corollarily,
in a catena of cases, this Court laid down the cardinal
requirements of due process in administrative proceedings,
one of which is that "the tribunal or body or any of its judges
must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views
of a subordinate." Thus, it is logical to say that this mandate
was rendered precisely to ensure that in cases where the
hearing or reception of evidence is assigned to a subordinate,
the body or agency shall not merely rely on his
recommendation but instead shall personally weigh and
assess the evidence which the said subordinate has gathered.
In the case at bar, it is evident that the Commission itself
evaluated in detail the evidence of both parties as reported by
Atty. Buena. A respondent in an administrative case is not
entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendation of
any investigating committee created to inquire into the charges
filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative
decision based on substantial evidence made of record and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence
presented against him during the hearing. Besides, Atty.
Buena's findings and recommendation are internal
communications between him and the Commission and,
therefore, confidential. Petitioner cannot find solace in the
dismissal of the criminal case against him. Long-ingrained in
our jurisprudence is the rule that the dismissal of a criminal
case against an accused who is a respondent in an
administrative case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
does not foreclose the administrative proceeding against him
or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. In dismissing
the case, the court is simply saying that the prosecution was
unable to prove the guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable
doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction because of the
presumption of innocence which the Constitution guarantees
an accused. However, in administrative proceedings, the
quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
3.) DISCIPLINE OF STUDENTS
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY v. CAPULONG
Requirements of due process in the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions in academic institutions: (1) the students must be
informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if
desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against
them (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their
own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case. Respondent
students may not use the argument that since they were not
accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written
statements which became the basis of petitioners' February 14,
1991 order, they were denied procedural due process.
Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same
may not be said to detract from the observance of due
process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not
necessarily include the right to cross examination. An
administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students'
participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the
attributes of a judicial proceeding. It cannot be
overemphasized that the charge filed before the Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee and
the Disciplinary Board is not a criminal case requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt but is merely administrative in
character. As such, it is not subject to the rigorous
requirements of criminal due process, particularly with respect
to the specification of the charge involved. As we have had
occasion to declare in previous cases a similar nature, due
process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings identical to those prescribed for
actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Accordingly,
disciplinary charges against a student need not be drawn with
the precision of a criminal information or complaint. The
essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic freedom":
(1) who may teach: (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be
taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study.
Early cases on this individual aspect of academic freedom
have been stressed the need for assuring to such individuals a
measure of independence through the guarantees of autonomy
and security of tenure. The components of this aspect of
academic freedom have been categorized under the areas of:
(1) who may teach and (2) how to teach. As corporate
entities, educational institutions of higher learning are
inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies,
academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or
pressure. In the Frankfurter formulation, this is articulated in
the areas of: (1) what shall be taught, e.g., the curriculum and
(2) who may be admitted to study. Admission to an
institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the
same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a
right. While under the education Act of 1982,
students have a right "to freely choose their field of study,
subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein
up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the
established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by
the academic institution. Hazing, as a ground for
disciplining a students, to the extent of dismissal or expulsion.
4.) DEPORTATION
Deportation- removal of undesirable alien
Extradition- process whereby a person is removed from the
country by the request of another country (they must have
extradition treaty)
CASES:
a.) GO v. RAMOS
Deportation proceedings are administrative in character,
summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in
accordance with the rules of ordinary court proceedings. The
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard,
or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are
given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered,
the demands of due process are sufficiently met. Although
Jimmy was not furnished with a copy of the subject Resolution
and Charge Sheet as alleged by him, the trial court found that
he was given ample opportunity to explain his side and present
controverting evidence.
b.) Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan
Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process
and to fundamental fairness. The doctrine of right to due
process and fundamental fairness does not always call for a
prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity to be
heard is enough. He will be given full opportunity to be heard
subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for
Extradition. Indeed, available during the hearings on the
petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to
enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the
summary nature of extradition.
c.) LAO GI v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act
by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police
measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the
country is found to be injurious to the public good and domestic
tranquility of the people. Although a deportation proceeding
does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however,
considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative
proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the
constitutional right of such person to due process should not
be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the
Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to
deportation proceedings. Under Section 37(c) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, it is provided:
No alien shall be deported without being informed of the
specific grounds for deportation nor without being given a
hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the
Commissioner of Immigration.
Hence, the charge against an alien must specify the acts or
omissions complained of which must be stated in ordinary and
concise language to enable a person of common
understanding to know on what ground he is intended to be
deported and enable the CID to pronounce a proper judgment.
d.) SECRETARY OF JUSTICE vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION
Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
The time for the extraditee to know the basis of the
request for his extradition is merely moved to the filing in court
of the formal petition for extradition. The extraditees right to
know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process to accommodate the more compelling
interest of the State to prevent escape of potential extraditees
which can be precipitated by premature information of the
basis of the request for his extradition. In sum, we rule
that the temporary hold on private respondents privilege of
notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process
which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he
decide to resist the request for his extradition to the United
States. There is no denial of due process as long as
fundamental fairness is assured a party. An extradition
proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which
will call into operation all the rights of an accused as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The process of extradition
does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of
an accused.
5.) SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF POLICE OFFICERS
DILG ACT: Police must be informed of the charges, time to
answer, opportunity to present evidence. Does not mean
dismissal can be given effect immediately, there must be due
process. They have the option to cross-examine witness
against him; akin to trial-type proceedings.
a.) PAT. EDGAR M. GO, INP vs. NATIONAL POLICE
COMMISSION
While 8-A of the Decree authorizes summary dismissals
"without the necessity of a formal investigation" of members of
the INP "when the charge is serious and the evidence is
strong," the Decree and the implementing rules nonetheless
give the respondent the right to be furnished a copy of the
complaint and to file an answer within three (3) days. The
filing of charges and the allowance of reasonable opportunity
to respondent to answer the charges constitute the minimum
requirements of due process. In summary dismissal
proceedings, unless other fully effective means for
implementing the constitutional requirement of notice and
hearing are devised, it is mandatory that charges be specified
in writing and that the affidavits in support thereof be attached
to the complaint because these are the only ways by which
evidence against the respondent can be brought to his
knowledge. They take the place of direct examination of
witnesses. The formal investigation, which is dispensed with in
summary dismissal proceedings, refers to the presentation of
witnesses by their direct examination and not to the
requirement that the respondent in the administrative case be
notified of the charges and given the chance to defend himself.
Petitioner might have been told what the
charge or charges against him were, but not the details
thereof, and, certainly, not what the alleged witnesses against
him might have said because, as already stated, the record of
the INP simply did not contain their alleged testimonies.
The INP record of this case does not show that a
formal complaint was ever filed against petitioner. Nor are
there attached to such record supporting affidavits of
witnesses, if any, against him. Neither the decision of the
board, nor that of the Director General of the PC/INP denying
reconsideration, nor the decision of the NAPOLCOM on appeal
contains reference to any written complaint with supporting
affidavits filed against petitioner.
Petitioner was denied the due process of law and that not even
the fact that the charge against him is serious and evidence of
his guilt is in the opinion of his superiors strong can
compensate for the procedural shortcut evident in the record of
this case.
b.) THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD vs. C/INSP.
LAZARO TORCITA
Summary dismissal proceedings are governed by specific
requirements of notification of the charges together with copies
of affidavits and other attachments supporting the complaints,
and the filing of an answer, together with supporting
documents. It is true that consistent with its summary nature,
the duration of the hearing is limited, and the manner of
conducting the hearing is summary, in that sworn statements
may take the place of oral testimonies of witnesses, cross-
examination is confined only to material and relevant matters,
and prolonged arguments and dilatory proceedings shall not be
entertained. However, notification of the charges contemplates
that respondent be informed of the specific charges against
him. Torcita was entitled to know that he was being charged
with being drunk while in the performance of duty, so that he
could traverse the accusation squarely and adduce evidence in
his defense. Although he was given an opportunity to be heard
on the multiple and broad charges initially filed against him, the
absence of specification of the offense for which he was
eventually found guilty is not a proper observance of due
process. There can be no short-cut to the legal process.
6.) PUBLICATION
- essence of publication is to inform the public of the law that
they are about to obey
- conclusive presumption that the person knows the law, as
long as the law is published
CASES:
a.) TAADA v. TUVERA
The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date
of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every
case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.
7.) VAGUE LAWS
- violate due process for lack of fair notice of the conduct to
avoid
- leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle
CASES:
a.) As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it
cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction.
Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or
more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct
themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by."
Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at all "because
one may never know in advance what 'annoys some people
but does not annoy others.' " Coates highlights what has
been referred to as a "perfectly vague" act whose obscurity is
evident on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from
legislation couched in imprecise language but which
nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively phrased
in which case, it may be "saved" by proper construction.
It must further be distinguished from statutes that are
apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of
activities. In that event, such statutes may not be challenged
whenever directed against such activities.
b.) Coates v. City of Cincinnati
We are thus relegated, at best, to the words of the ordinance
itself. If three or more people meet together on a sidewalk or
street corner, they must conduct themselves so as not to
annoy any police officer or other person who should happen to
pass by. In our opinion, this ordinance is unconstitutionally
vague because it subjects the exercise of the right of assembly
to an unascertainable standard, and unconstitutionally broad
because it authorizes the punishment of constitutionally
protected conduct. Conduct that annoys some people
does not annoy others. Thus, the ordinance is vague not in the
sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an
imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather
in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all. As a
result, "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning." Laws so vague that a person of common
understanding cannot know what is forbidden are
unconstitutional on their face.
8.) REVOCATION OF PERMITS/LICENSES
- business permit; mayor can refuse issuance of permit if
requirements are not complied with; but if complied with, you
cannot refuse arbitrarily
- mayor cannot just revoke or cancel permit just based on mere
report or rumors; must give fair notice and opportunity to be
heard; conduct investigation; unless there is a clear violation of
conditions; right to rebut allegations
- notice and hearing
CASES:
a.) LIM v. CA
The power of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits
necessarily includes the corollary power to suspend, revoke or
even refuse to issue the same. However, the power to suspend
or revoke these licenses and permits is expressly premised on
the violation of the conditions of these permits and licenses.
The laws specifically refer to the violation of the condition(s) on
which the licenses and permits were issued. Similarly, the
power to refuse to issue such licenses and permits is premised
on non-compliance with the prerequisites for the issuance of
such licenses and permits. The mayor must observe due
process in exercising these powers, which means that the
mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and
opportunity to be heard. True, the mayor has the power to
inspect and investigate private commercial establishments for
any violation of the conditions of their licenses and permits.
However, the mayor has no power to order a police raid on
these establishments in the guise of inspecting or investigating
these commercial establishments. Lim acted beyond his
authority when he directed policemen to raid the New Bangkok
Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant. Lim has no
authority to close down Bistros business or any business
establishment in Manila without due process of law. Lim cannot
take refuge under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
and the Local Government Code. There is no provision in
these laws expressly or impliedly granting the mayor authority
to close down private commercial establishments without
notice and hearing, and even if there is, such provision would
be void. The due process clause of the Constitution requires
that Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the
allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses and
permits.
The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must
always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and
equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised
whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. In the instant case, we
find that Lims exercise of this power violated Bistros property
rights that are protected under the due process clause of the
Constitution. Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific
violation of the conditions of its business license or permits.
Still, Lim closed down Bistros operations even before the
expiration of its business license on December 31, 1992. Lim
also refused to accept Bistros license application for 1993, in
effect denying the application without examining whether it
complies with legal prerequisites.
9.) IMPOSITION OF PROVISIONAL RATES
- can grant rates without much formalities, but there must be
publication of proposed rates so that people will be informed;
ERC must entertain comments from the public
CASES:
a.) NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ELECTRICIY
CONSUMERS FOR REFORMS, INC. (NASECORE) v.
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC)
The lack of publication of respondent MERALCOs amended
application for the increase of its generation charge is thus
fatal. By this omission, the consumers were deprived of the
right to file their comments thereon. Consequently, the assailed
Order dated June 2, 2004 issued by the ERC, approving the
increase of respondent MERALCOs generation charge from
P3.1886 to P3.3213 per kWh effective immediately, was made
without giving the consumers any opportunity to file their
comments thereon in violation of Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the
IRR of the EPIRA. Indeed, the basic postulate of due
process ordains that the consumers be notified of any
application, and be apprised of its contents, that would result in
compounding their economic burden. In this case, the
consumers have the right to be informed of the bases of
respondent MERALCOs amended application for the increase
of its generation charge in order to, if they so desire, effectively
contest the same. The requirement of publication in
applications for rate adjustment is not without reason or
purpose. It is ancillary to the due process requirement of notice
and hearing. Its purpose is not merely to inform the consumers
that an application for rate adjustment has been filed by the
public utility. It is to adequately inform them that an application
has been made for the adjustment of the rates being
implemented by the public utility in order to afford them the
opportunity to be heard and submit their stand as to the
propriety and reasonableness of the of the rates within the
period allowed by the Rule. Without the publication of the
application, the consumers are left to second-guess the
substance and merits of the application.
b.) RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Well-settled is the rule that the Public Service Commission now
is empowered to approve provisionally rates of utilities without
the necessity of a prior hearing. NTC can fix a provisional
amount for the subscriber's investment to be effective
immediately, without hearing. Further, the Public Service Act
makes no distinction between initial or revised rates. These
rates are necessarily proposed merely, until the Commission
approves them. Moreover, the Commission can hear and
approve revised rates without published notices or hearing.
The reason is easily discerned from the fact that provisional
rates are by their nature temporary and subject to adjustment
in conformity with the definitive rates approved after final
hearing. As to the required notice, it is impossible for
the respondent (commission to give personal notice to all
parties affected, not all of them being known to it. More than
that, there is no dispute that the notice of hearing was
published and as admitted by petitioners, one of them received
the notice which in turn informed the others. In fact, the
petitioners have timely opposed the petition in question, so that
lack of notice was deemed cured. Under the circumstances,
the Commission may be deemed to have substantially
complied with the requirements.
10.) APPEAL
Right to appeal is a statutory right.
11.) ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE PER SE
Nuisance per accident- you need to file a case before the court
for abatement
Nuisance per se- abatable at once no need for proceedings
CASES:
a.) ESTATE OF GREGORIA FRANCISCO vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS
Respondents cannot seek cover under the general welfare
clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial
proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se or one
which affects the immediate safety of persons and property
and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of
necessity. The storage of copra in the quonset building is a
legitimate business. By its nature, it cannot be said to be
injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the
community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so
proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se
a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial
intervention. (The provincial governor, district engineer or
district health officer is not authorized to destroy private
property consisting of dams and fishponds summarily and
without any judicial proceedings whatever under the pretense
that such private property constitutes a nuisance. A dam or a
fishery constructed in navigable rivers is not a nuisance per se.
A dam or fishpond may be a nuisance per accidens where it
endangers or impairs the health or depreciates property by
causing water to become stagnant.) While the
Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a
nuisance, it cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per
se and order its condemnation. The nuisance can only be so
adjudged by judicial determination. Petitioner was in
lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by virtue of a
permit from the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga)
when demolition was effected. It was not squatting on public
land. Its property was not of trifling value. It was entitled to an
impartial hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide
whether the quonset building did constitute a nuisance in law.
There was no compelling necessity for precipitate action. It
follows then that respondent public officials of the Municipality
of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in abating
summarily petitioner's quonset building. They had deprived
petitioner of its property without due process of law. The fact
that petitioner filed a suit for prohibition and was subsequently
heard thereon will not cure the defect, as opined by the Court
of Appeals, the demolition having been a fait accompli prior to
hearing and the authority to demolish without a judicial order
being a prejudicial issue.
12.) PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
- To pave way to investigation, he might tamper evidence or
commit the same act while he is still in office. Pending
investigation, no payment will be given.
CASE:
a.) GEORGE I. RIVERA vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer
might not turn out to be a farce, then reviewing officer must
perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under
review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there
would be no real review of the case. The decision of the
reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be
the same view since being human, he would not admit that he
was mistaken in his first view of the case. Given the
circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved
Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any
participation in resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to
give full meaning and consequence to a fundamental aspect of
due process. The argument that Commissioner Gaminde did
not participate in MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990 is
unacceptable. It is not denied that she did participate, indeed
has concurred, in MSPB's resolution of 03 March 1994,
denying the motion for reconsideration of MSPB's decision of
29 August 1990.
13.) QUASI-LEGISLATIVE/ RULE-MAKING POWER
Quasi-legislative power authority delegated by the law-
making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and
regulations intended to carry out the provisions of a law and
implement legislative policy. APPLIES TO PEOPLE OF THE
SAME CLASS.
Quasi-Judicial Power power of administrative authorities to
make determinations of facts in the performance of their official
duties and to apply the law as they construe it to the facts so
found. The exercise of this power is only incidental to the main
function of administrative authorities, which is the enforcement
of the law. APPLIES TO SPECIFIC PERSON;
General Rule: no notice needed.
Exception: when the law requires it
CASES:
a.) HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY v. SOUTHWING HEAVY
INDUSTRIES, INC.
Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within
constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health,
morals, and general welfare of society. It is lodged primarily
with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative
power, it may also be exercised by the President and
administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all
municipal levels, including the barangay. Such delegation
confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which
may be defined as the authority delegated by the law-making
body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations
intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement
legislative policy. To be valid, an administrative issuance, such
as an executive order, must comply with the following
requisites:
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed
procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the
legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.
The general rule is that, the promulgation of administrative
issuances requires previous notice and hearing, the only
exception being where the legislature itself requires it and
mandates that the regulation shall be based on certain facts as
determined at an appropriate investigation. This exception
pertains to the issuance of legislative rules as distinguished
from interpretative rules which give no real consequence more
than what the law itself has already prescribed; and are
designed merely to provide guidelines to the law which the
administrative agency is in charge of enforcing. A legislative
rule, on the other hand, is in the nature of subordinate
legislation, crafted to implement a primary legislation.
When an administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for
the means that can facilitate or render less cumbersome the
implementation of the law and substantially increases the
burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at
least to those directly affected a chance to be heard and,
thereafter, to be duly informed, before the issuance is given the
force and effect of law. In the instant case, EO 156 is
obviously a legislative rule as it seeks to implement or execute
primary legislative enactments intended to protect the domestic
industry by imposing a ban on the importation of a specified
product not previously subject to such prohibition. The due
process requirements in the issuance thereof are embodied in
Section 401of the Tariff and Customs Code and Sections 5 and
9 of the SMA which essentially mandate the conduct of
investigation and public hearings before the regulatory
measure or importation ban may be issued.
b.) PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE
CORPORATION vs. JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ
It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of
the administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not
required by due process of law. If the nature of the
administrative agency is essentially legislative, the
requirements of notice and hearing are not necessary. The
validity of a rule of future action which affects a group, if vested
rights of liberty or property are not involved, is not determined
according to the same rules which apply in the case of the
direct application of a policy to a specific individual. Aside from
statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative
proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and
the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is
possible in view of the great variety of administrative
proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and
hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action
where the administrative body acts in the exercise of
executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a
public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial
matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than
general and prospective, the person whose rights or property
may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing.
The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz
no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial
adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains
exclusively to petitioner and to no other. We are, therefore,
inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination
that an immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect
its operations and the quality of its service to the public
considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still
has to undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably,
petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-
examine the inspector who issued the report on which
respondent NTC based its questioned order.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no
authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a
hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it
is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a
summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion
as in the present case. That such a hearing is required is
evident in respondents' order of September 16, 1987 in NTC
Case No. 87-94 which granted PHILCOMSAT a provisional
authority "to continue operating its existing facilities, to render
the services it presently offers, and to charge the rates as
reduced by them "under the condition that "(s)ubject to hearing
and the final consideration of the merit of this application, the
Commission may modify, revise or amend the rates ..."
While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing
respondents may have other sources of information or data,
still, since a hearing is essential, respondent NTC should act
solely on the basis of the evidence before it and not on
knowledge or information otherwise acquired by it but which is
not offered in evidence or, even if so adduced, petitioner was
given no opportunity to controvert.
14.) OTHER CASES
a.) HON. ARMAND FABELLA vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
Due process of law requires notice and hearing. Hearing, on
the other hand, presupposes a competent and impartial
tribunal. The right to be heard and, ultimately, the right to due
process of law lose meaning in the absence of an independent,
competent and impartial tribunal. In administrative
proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the
following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the
institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal
rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in
one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested
with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a
person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of
honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said
tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted
for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records
or made known to the parties affected.
Every teacher shall enjoy equitable safeguards at
each stage of any disciplinary procedure and shall have:
a: the right to be informed, in writing, of the charges;
b. the right to full access to the evidence in the case;
c. the right to defend himself and to be defended by a
representative of his choice and/or by his organization,
adequate time being given to the teacher for the preparation of
his defense; and
d. the right to appeal to clearly designated authorities. No
publicity shall be given to any disciplinary action being taken
against a teacher during the pendency of his case.
In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS
to hear the administrative charges against private respondents
did not include "a representative of the local or, in its absence,
any existing provincial or national teacher's organization" as
required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these
committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction.
Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily
void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or
dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a
representative of a teachers' organization in these committees
was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this
requirement that would have given substance and meaning to
the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence
of procedural due process is embodied in the basic
requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.
The aforementioned Section 9 of RA 4670, therefore,
reflects the legislative intent to impose a standard and a
separate set of procedural requirements in connection with
administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers.
Clearly, private respondents' right to due process of law
requires compliance with these requirements laid down by RA
4670. Indeed, in the case at bar, neither the DECS secretary
nor the DECS-NCR regional director personally conducted the
investigation but entrusted it to a committee composed of a
division supervisor, secondly and elementary school teachers,
and consultants. But there was no representative of a teachers
organization. This is a serious flaw in the composition of the
committee because the provision for the representation of a
teachers organization is intended by law for the protection of
the rights of teachers facing administrative charges.
b.) QUISUMBING vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
(MERALCO)
These testimonies clearly show that at the time the alleged
meter tampering was discovered, only the Meralco inspection
team and petitioners' secretary were present. Plainly, there
was no officer of the law or ERB representative at that time.
Because of the absence of government representatives, the
prima facie authority to disconnect, granted to Meralco by RA
7832, cannot apply.
The presence of government agents who may authorize
immediate disconnections go into the essence of due process.
Indeed, we cannot allow respondent to act virtually as
prosecutor and judge in imposing the penalty of disconnection
due to alleged meter tampering. That would not sit well in a
democratic country. After all, Meralco is a monopoly that
derives its power from the government. Clothing it with
unilateral authority to disconnect would be equivalent to giving
it a license to tyrannize its hapless customers.
- Quisimbing, consumer of meralco, cannot invoke due process
because meralco is not part of government. However, there is
exception because meralco is a public utility so there is
monopoly. There should be due process before disconnecting
electric service.
c.) CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO
The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the
fiat No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law. There is no controlling and
precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a
standard to which governmental action should conform in order
that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate
case, be valid. This standard is aptly described as a
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice, and as such it is a limitation upon the
exercise of the police power.
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental
encroachment against the life, liberty and property of
individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise
of the powers of the government, unrestrained by the
established principles of private rights and distributive justice;
to protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments,
from seizure, forfeiture, and destruction without a trial and
conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and to
secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit
of the general law. The guaranty serves as a protection
against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and
partnerships are "persons" within the scope of the guaranty
insofar as their property is concerned. This clause has
been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on
government, usually called "procedural due process" and
"substantive due process." Procedural due process,
as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the
government must follow before it deprives a person of life,
liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are
concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing
the government must provide when it takes a particular action.
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes,
asks whether the government has an adequate reason for
taking away a person's life, liberty, or property. In other words,
substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient
justification for the government's action. Whether there is such
a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used.
For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis
review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as
the law is rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used, such
as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will
meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law
is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.
The police power granted to local government units must
always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of
the people to due process and equal protection of the law.
Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or
despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification,
limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard
due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly
those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it
bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent
that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public
interest or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic
validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to
his life, liberty and property. To successfully invoke the
exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of
the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights, but
the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for
the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private
rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the police measure and the means employed for
its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police
measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights a violation of the due process clause.
It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of
Manila to make all reasonable regulations looking to the
promotion of the moral and social values of the community.
However, the worthy aim of fostering public morals and the
eradication of the community's social ills can be achieved
through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be
attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute
prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or
their conversion into businesses "allowed" under the
Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment
of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the
enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote
the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in
itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery,
fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in
Manila.
d.) COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS vs. CONRADO CRUZ
The closest the issue of retroactivity of laws can get to a
genuine constitutional issue is if a laws retroactive application
will impair vested rights. Otherwise stated, if a right has already
vested in an individual and a subsequent law effectively takes
it away, a genuine due process issue may arise. What should
be involved, however, is a vested right to life, liberty or
property, as these are the ones that may be considered
protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Congress exercises the power to prescribe the
qualifications for SK membership. One who is no longer
qualified because of an amendment in the law cannot complain
of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK membership.
Only those who qualify as SK members can contest, based on
a statutory right, any act disqualifying them from SK
membership or from voting in the SK elections. SK
membership is not a property right protected by the
Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by
law. Congress may amend at any time the law to change or
even withdraw the statutory right. A public office is not a
property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a Public
office is a public trust." No one has a vested right to any public
office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a
public office. Again, for this petition to come under the due
process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider
an office a "property." It is, however, well settled x x x that a
public office is not property within the sense of the
constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a
public trust or agency. x x x The basic idea of the government x
x x is that of a popular representative government, the officers
being mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no
one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to
an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the
provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the
people he represents. Petitioners, who apparently desire
to hold public office, should realize from the very start that no
one has a proprietary right to public office. While the law
makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a local
government legislative council, the law does not confer on
petitioners a proprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy
to sit in local legislative councils. The constitutional principle of
a public office as a public trust precludes any proprietary claim
to public office. Even the State policy directing "equal access to
opportunities for public service" cannot bestow on petitioners a
proprietary right to SK membership or a proprietary expectancy
to ex-officio public offices.
e.) AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
This Court finds Pimentels argument of deprivation of due
process problematic since he has not established what he is
being deprived of: life, liberty, or property. He was a candidate
in the senatorial elections. At the time he filed the instant
Petition, he might have been leading in the canvassing of
votes, yet the canvass proceedings were still ongoing, and no
winner for the twelfth and last senatorial post had been
proclaimed. May he already claim a right to the elective post
prior to the termination of the canvass proceedings and his
proclamation as winner, and may such a right be considered a
property right which he cannot be deprived of without due
process? These were clearly substantial and weighty issues
which Pimentel did not address. Unfortunately, this Court
cannot argue and settle them for him. Pimentel only
made a sweeping claim that in the canvass proceedings of the
Maguindanao votes before the NBC and the SPBOC-
Maguindanao, he was deprived of his constitutional right to due
process, both procedural and substantive. After going over his
allegations, however, and the definition of substantive due
process, this Court finds that Pimentel cannot invoke denial of
substantive due process because he is not assailing any law,
which, arbitrarily or without sufficient justification, supposedly
deprived him of life, liberty, or property. At most, Pimentel
can claim that he was denied procedural due process when he
was not allowed by the NBC and the SPBOC-Maguindanao to
propound questions to certain election officials. But even on
this point, Pimentel fails to convince this Court. Asking election
officials questions and confronting them with evidence are not
part of the canvass proceedings. There is no statute or
regulation expressly providing for such a procedure. And as a
final observation on the matter of due process, this Court notes
that although Pimentel was not able to propound questions to
the election officials involved in the preparation and canvassing
of the Maguindanao MCOCs and PCOC, he was still able,
through his counsel, to state his observations, manifestations,
and objections regarding the said certificates, which were duly
noted. He may not have received the response or action that
he wanted with respect to his observations, manifestations,
and objections, but Pimentel cannot deny that these were
heard and presented in the canvass proceedings.
ELEMENTS OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE FOR A LAW
TO BE VALID:
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of
due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a
separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific
guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from
the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on
the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act
assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the
sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is
to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the states duly constituted authorities. In other words,
the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective.
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions,
not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the
departments of the government including the political and
executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state
denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency
or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply
requires is equality among equals as determined according to
a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid
must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites or elements: (1) The classification rests or must be
based on substantial distinctions which makes real difference;
(2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
members of the same class. Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty
of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the
state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man,
woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality
of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation
on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not
identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things
which are different in fact be treated in law as though they
were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
1.) SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTION
a.) MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS vs. HIU CHIONG TSAI
PAO HO
While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien
shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves
the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and
approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits
and therefore is regulatory in character the second part which
requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not
regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or
justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been
cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the
ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is
excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial
differences in situation among individual aliens who are
required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that
the classification should be based on real and substantial
differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being
collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or
permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly
employee or a highly paid executive.
The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and
equal protection rule of the Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit
from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at
will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people
in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is
true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit
aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot
be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee
includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection
under the due process and equal protection clause is given to
all persons, both aliens and citizens.
b.) RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives
undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones
and violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is
tenuous. The equal protection of the law clause in the
Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be
treated and regulated differently from the other. The Court has
explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this
manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor
and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended
to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials
and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue
of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office
for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon
stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials
hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office
in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure
while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials
is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil
Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers
and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from
engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any
election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective
officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are
obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and
electoral activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to
treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the
effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates
of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by
them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass
upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is
anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the
persons belonging under the same classification are similarly
treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus,
not infringed.
c.) JAMES MIRASOL vs. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
A police power measure may be assailed upon proof that it
unduly violates constitutional limitations like due process and
equal protection of the law. Petitioners attempt to seek
redress from the motorcycle ban under the aegis of equal
protection must fail. Petitioners contention that AO 1
unreasonably singles out motorcycles is specious. To begin
with, classification by itself is not prohibited. A classification
can only be assailed if it is deemed invidious, that is, it is not
based on real or substantial differences. We find that it is
neither warranted nor reasonable for petitioners to say that the
only justifiable classification among modes of transport is the
motorized against the non-motorized. Not all motorized
vehicles are created equal. A 16-wheeler truck is substantially
different from other light vehicles. The first may be denied
access to some roads where the latter are free to drive. Old
vehicles may be reasonably differentiated from newer models.
We find that real and substantial differences exist between a
motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to justify its
classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways.
Amongst all types of motorized transport, it is obvious, even to
a child, that a motorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus or
a truck. The most obvious and troubling difference would be
that a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily
overturned than a four-wheeled vehicle. A classification
based on practical convenience and common knowledge is
not unconstitutional simply because it may lack purely
theoretical or scientific uniformity. Moreover, we take note that
the Philippines is home to a host of unique motorized modes
of transport ranging from modified hand-carts (kuliglig) to
bicycle "sidecars" outfitted with a motor. To follow petitioners
argument to its logical conclusion would open up toll ways to
all these contraptions. Both safety and traffic considerations
militate against any ruling that would bring about such a
nightmare. Petitioners complain that the prohibition on
the use of motorcycles in toll ways unduly deprive them of
their right to travel. We are not persuaded. A toll
way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote
the fastest access to certain destinations, its use, operation,
and maintenance require close regulation. Public interest and
safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on toll ways
that do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it
is but reasonable that not all forms of transport could use it.
The right to travel does not mean the right to choose any
vehicle in traversing a toll way. The right to travel refers to the
right to move from one place to another. Petitioners can
traverse the toll way any time they choose using private or
public four-wheeled vehicles. Petitioners are not denied the
right to move from Point A to Point B along the toll way.
Petitioners are free to access the toll way, much as the rest of
the public can. The mode by which petitioners wish to travel
pertains to the manner of using the toll way, a subject that can
be validly limited by regulation.
d.) 2nd LT. SALVADOR PARREO vs. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT
The constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is not
absolute but is subject to reasonable classification. To be
reasonable, the classification (a) must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane
to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (d) must apply equally to each member of
the class.
There is compliance with all these conditions. There is a
substantial difference between retirees who are citizens of the
Philippines and retirees who lost their Filipino citizenship by
naturalization in another country, such as petitioner in the case
before us. The constitutional right of the state to require all
citizens to render personal and military service necessarily
includes not only private citizens but also citizens who have
retired from military service. A retiree who had lost his Filipino
citizenship already renounced his allegiance to the state. Thus,
he may no longer be compelled by the state to render
compulsory military service when the need arises. Petitioners
loss of Filipino citizenship constitutes a substantial distinction
that distinguishes him from other retirees who retain their
Filipino citizenship. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class
may be treated and regulated differently from another.
There was no denial of due process in this case. When
petitioner lost his Filipino citizenship, the AFP had no choice
but to stop his monthly pension in accordance with Section 27
of PD 1638, as amended. Petitioner had the opportunity to
contest the termination of his pension when he requested for
reconsideration of the removal of his name from the list of
retirees and the termination of his pension.
e.) Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words,
should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to
some and unjustly discriminate against others. The guarantee
means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the
same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or
other classes in like circumstances. The equal protection of the
laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. It limits
governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause
extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is
concerned. In the Courts view, there are no substantial
distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition,
all are commercial establishments providing lodging and
usually meals and other services for the public. No reason
exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The
classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects
are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on
substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the
purpose of the Ordinance. The Court likewise cannot
see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of
motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A
noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if
located outside the area.
The standard where women are used as tools for
entertainment is also discriminatory as prostitution, one of the
hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banish is not a profession
exclusive to women. Both men and women have an equal
propensity to engage in prostitution. It is not any less grave a
sin when men engage in it. And why would the assumption that
there is an ongoing immoral activity apply only when women
are employed and be inapposite when men are in harness?
This discrimination based on gender violates equal protection
as it is not substantially related to important government
objectives. Thus, the discrimination is invalid.
f.) CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS
Equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature from
establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which
different rules shall operate - so long as the classification is not
unreasonable. The guaranty of equal protection of the laws
is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon
all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in
order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality,
that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a
statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on
persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution
does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal
protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things
that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited
either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is to operate. The equal protection of the
laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge
or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A
law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying
that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the
matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences, that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member
of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if
the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class
may be treated and regulated differently from another. The
classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law
and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative
deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above)
from the SSL was intended to address the BSPs lack of
competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and
executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the
rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of
treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of
salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a
rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary
in the legislative sense.
That the provision was a product of amendments introduced
during the deliberation of the Senate Bill does not detract from
its validity. As early as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent
cases, this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an
enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a provision of law, on the
ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such
provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral conference
committee of both Houses. Moreover, it is a
fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.
An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is
presumed to be within constitutional limitations. To justify the
nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal
breach.
g.) NUEZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
The Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of
a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a
problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely,
dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may
thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as
far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution
came into force, that a different procedure for the accused
therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public
official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. Petitioner, moreover, cannot be
unaware of the ruling of this Court in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno, a
1949 decision, that the general guarantees of the Bill of Rights,
included among which are the due process of law and equal
protection clauses must "give way to a specific provision, " in
that decision, one reserving to "Filipino citizens of the operation
of public services or utilities." The scope of such a principle is
not to be constricted. It is certainly broad enough to cover the
instant situation. Favoritism and undue preference
cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection
and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be
looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall
within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the
rest.
h.) GUTIERREZ v. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT
The Court is not persuaded that the continued grant of COLA
to the uniformed personnel to the exclusion of other national
government officials run afoul the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. The fundamental right of equal protection of
the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be
treated and regulated differently from another. The
classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law
and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.
To be valid and reasonable, the classification must
satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose
of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
It is clear from the first paragraph of Section 11 that
Congress intended the uniformed personnel to be continually
governed by their respective compensation laws. Thus, the
military is governed by R.A. 6638, as amended by R.A. 9166
while the police is governed by R.A. 6648, as amended by R.A.
6975. Certainly, there are valid reasons to treat the
uniformed personnel differently from other national government
officials. Being in charge of the actual defense of the State and
the maintenance of internal peace and order, they are
expected to be stationed virtually anywhere in the country.
They are likely to be assigned to a variety of low, moderate,
and high-cost areas. Since their basic pay does not vary based
on location, the continued grant of COLA is intended to help
them offset the effects of living in higher cost areas.
i.) TIU vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Said Order is not violative of the equal protection clause;
neither is it discriminatory. Rather, we find real and substantive
distinctions between the circumstances obtaining inside and
those outside the Subic Naval Base, thereby justifying a valid
and reasonable classification. The fundamental right of
equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class
may be treated and regulated differently from another. The
classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law
and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.
The equal protection of the law clause is against
undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended
to prohibit legislation which is limited either by the object to
which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to
operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies
only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not. Certainly, there
are substantial differences between the big investors who are
being lured to establish and operate their industries in the so-
called secured area and the present business operators
outside the area. On the one hand, we are talking of billion-
peso investments and thousands of new jobs. On the other
hand, definitely none of such magnitude. In the first, the
economic impact will be national; in the second, only local.
Even more important, at this time the business activities
outside the secured area are not likely to have any impact in
achieving the purpose of the law, which is to turn the former
military base to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine
economy. There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to
extend to them the benefits and incentives accorded in RA
7227. Additionally, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, it will
be easier to manage and monitor the activities within the
secured area, which is already fenced off, to prevent fraudulent
importation of merchandise or smuggling.
It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not
require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual
and material differences between territories, there is no
violation of the constitutional clause. And of course, anyone,
including the petitioners, possessing the requisite investment
capital can always avail of the same benefits by channeling his
or her resources or business operations into the fenced-off free
port zone. We believe that the classification set forth by
the executive issuance does not apply merely to existing
conditions. As laid down in RA 7227, the objective is to
establish a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and
investment center in the area. There will, therefore, be a long-
term difference between such investment center and the areas
outside it. Lastly, the classification applies equally to all
the resident individuals and businesses within the secured
area. The residents, being in like circumstances or contributing
directly to the achievement of the end purpose of the law, are
not categorized further. Instead, they are all similarly treated,
both in privileges granted and in obligations required. All told,
the Court holds that no undue favor or privilege was extended.
The classification occasioned by EO 97-A was not
unreasonable, capricious or unfounded. To repeat, it was
based, rather, on fair and substantive considerations that were
germane to the legislative purpose.
j.) PHILIPPINE RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES
ASSOCIATION, INC. (PHILRECA) vs. THE SECRETARY
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that
no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and in like circumstances. Thus, the
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
law based on reasonable classification. Classification, to be
reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members
of the same class. We hold that there is reasonable
classification under the Local Government Code to justify the
different tax treatment between electric cooperatives covered
by P.D. No. 269, as amended, and electric cooperatives under
R.A. No. 6938. First, substantial distinctions exist between
cooperatives under P.D. No. 269, as amended, and
cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938. These distinctions are
manifest in at least two material respects which go into the
nature of cooperatives envisioned by R.A. No. 6938 and which
characteristics are not present in the type of cooperative
associations created under P.D. No. 269, as amended.
k.) MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v.
OLONGAPO MAINTENANCE SERVICES, INC.
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this
jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for
equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal
qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to
the School, its "international character" notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced
evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-
hires. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an
employer accords employees the same position and rank, the
presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This
presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the
employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for
that employee to explain why he receives less or why the
others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The
employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the
employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this
burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform
25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both
groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they
perform under similar working conditions.
The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to
leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates
without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.
l.) GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v.
MILAGROS O. MONTESCLAROS
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements.
The proviso discriminates against the dependent spouse who
contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before
the pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the proviso,
even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than
three years before the pensioners death, the dependent
spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the
marriage took place within three years before the pensioner
qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition is vague.
There is no reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not
provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the
purpose of the proviso is to prevent deathbed marriages, then
we do not see why the proviso reckons the three-year
prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for pension
and not from the date the pensioner died. The classification
does not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the
classification lumps all those marriages contracted within three
years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having
been contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of
pension benefits. Indeed, the classification is
discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the reason
Congress deleted the proviso in Republic Act No. 8291 (RA
8291), otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance
Act of 1997, the law revising the old charter of GSIS (PD
1146). Under the implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving
spouse who married the member immediately before the
members death is still qualified to receive survivorship pension
unless the GSIS proves that the surviving spouse contracted
the marriage solely to receive the benefit. Thus, the present
GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted within
three years before retirement or death of a member are sham
marriages contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. The
present GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the
survivorship pension of the surviving spouse who contracted
marriage to a GSIS member within three years before the
members retirement or death. The law acknowledges that
whether the surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly
to receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The
law no longer prescribes a sweeping classification that unduly
prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and defeats the
purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation.
m.) ELENA P. DYCAICO v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
The legislative history of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not bear out
the purpose of Congress in inserting the proviso as of the date
of his retirement to qualify the term primary beneficiaries in
Section 12-B(d) thereof. To the Courts mind, however, it
reflects congressional concern with the possibility of
relationships entered after retirement for the purpose of
obtaining benefits. In particular, the proviso was apparently
intended to prevent sham marriages or those contracted by
persons solely to enable one spouse to claim benefits upon the
anticipated death of the other spouse.
This concern is concededly valid. However, classifying
dependent spouses and determining their entitlement to
survivors pension based on whether the marriage was
contracted before or after the retirement of the other spouse,
regardless of the duration of the said marriage, bears no
relation to the achievement of the policy objective of the law,
i.e., provide meaningful protection to members and their
beneficiaries against the hazard of disability, sickness,
maternity, old age, death and other contingencies resulting in
loss of income or financial burden." The nexus of the
classification to the policy objective is vague and flimsy. Put
differently, such classification of dependent spouses is not
germane to the aforesaid policy objective. For if it were the
intention of Congress to prevent sham marriages or those
entered in contemplation of imminent death, then it should
have prescribed a definite duration-of-relationship or durational
period of relationship as one of the requirements for
entitlement to survivors pension. For example, in the United
States, a provision in their social security law which excludes
from social security benefits the surviving wife and stepchild of
a deceased wage earner who had their respective
relationships to the wage earner for less than nine months prior
to his death, was declared valid. Thus, nine months is
recognized in the United States as the minimum duration of a
marriage to consider it as having been contracted in good faith
for the purpose of entitlement to survivorship pension.
In contrast, the proviso as of the date of his retirement
in Section 12-B(d) in Rep. Act No. 8282 effectively disqualifies
from entitlement to survivors pension all those dependent
spouses whose respective marriages to retired SSS members
were contracted after the latters retirement. The duration of
the marriage is not even considered. It is observed that, in
certain instances, the retirement age under Rep. Act No. 8282
is sixty (60) years old. A marriage contracted by a retired SSS
member after the said age may still last for more than ten
years, assuming the member lives up to over seventy (70)
years old. In such a case, it cannot be said that the marriage
was a sham or was entered into solely for the purpose of
enabling one spouse to obtain the financial benefits due upon
the death of the other spouse. Nonetheless, the said surviving
spouse is not entitled to survivors pension because he or she
is not a primary beneficiary as of the date of retirement of the
SSS member following Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282.
Further, the classification of dependent spouses on
the basis of whether their respective marriages to the SSS
member were contracted prior to or after the latters retirement
for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension does not
rest on real and substantial distinctions. It is arbitrary and
discriminatory. It is too sweeping because the proviso as of the
date of his retirement, which effectively disqualifies the
dependent spouses whose respective marriages to the retired
SSS member were contracted after the latters retirement as
primary beneficiaries, unfairly lumps all these marriages as
sham relationships or were contracted solely for the purpose of
acquiring benefits accruing upon the death of the other spouse.
The proviso thus unduly prejudices the rights of the legal
surviving spouse, like the petitioner, and defeats the avowed
policy of the law to provide meaningful protection to members
and their beneficiaries against the hazards of disability,
sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies
resulting in loss of income or financial burden
2.) GERMANE TO THE PURPOSE OF LAW
- There can be valid distinction if it will serve the purpose of the
law.
a.) ISHMAEL HIMAGAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
The legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a
member of the PNP charged with grave felonies where the
penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and
which suspension continues until the case against him is
terminated. The reason why members of the PNP are
treated differently from the other classes of persons charged
criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the
rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen
carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to
harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly
brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended
policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is
reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and
the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant
threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that
the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of
preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of
R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. The
equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or
privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and
oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of
real differences among men, the equal protection clause does
not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not
absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists
in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and
substantial differences; is germane to the purpose of the law;
applies to all members of the same
class; and applies to current as well as future conditions, the
classification may not be impugned as violating the
Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction based
on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper
legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither
unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.
b.) AGRIPINO A. DE GUZMAN vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
The "equal protection clause" of the 1987 Constitution permits
a valid classification under the following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the
law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the
same class.
After a careful study, the ineluctable conclusion is that the
classification under Section 44 of RA 8189 satisfies the
aforestated requirements. The singling out of election
officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election officials
by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people
of their place of assignment" does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Moreover, to
require the COMELEC to reassign all employees (connected
with the registration of voters) who have served at least four
years in a given city or municipality would entail a lot of
administrative burden on the part of the COMELEC.
Neither does Section 44 of RA 8189 infringe the security of
tenure of petitioners nor unduly deprive them of due process of
law. As held in Sta. Maria vs. Lopez. "xxx the rule that
outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of
tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed - not merely
assigned - to a particular station. Such a rule does not
pr[o]scribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that
empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the
employees and officers in order to improve the service of the
agency. xxx"
The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is
not a guarantee of perpetual employment. It only means that
an employee cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the
service for causes other than those provided by law and after
due process is accorded the employee. What it seeks to
prevent is capricious exercise of the power to dismiss. But,
where it is the law-making authority itself which furnishes the
ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such
capriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy
proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purposes
of the law. Untenable is petitioners contention that
Section 44 of RA 8189 undermines the authority of COMELEC
to appoint its own officials and employees. As stressed upon
by the Solicitor General, Section 44 establishes a guideline for
the COMELEC to follow. Said section provides the criterion or
basis for the reassignment or transfer of an election officer and
does not deprive the COMELEC of its power to appoint, and
maintain its authority over its officials and employees. As a
matter of fact, the questioned COMELEC resolutions and
directives illustrate that it is still the COMELEC which has the
power to reassign and transfer its officials and employees. But
as a government agency tasked with the implementation and
enforcement of election laws, the COMELEC is duty bound to
comply with the laws passed by Congress.
c.) TIU vs. COURT OF APPEALS
We believe it was reasonable for the President to have
delimited the application of some incentives to the confines of
the former Subic military base. It is this specific area which the
government intends to transform and develop from its status
quo ante as an abandoned naval facility into a self-sustaining
industrial and commercial zone, particularly for big foreign and
local investors to use as operational bases for their businesses
and industries. Why the seeming bias for big investors?
Undeniably, they are the ones who can pour huge investments
to spur economic growth in the country and to generate
employment opportunities for the Filipinos, the ultimate goals
of the government for such conversion. The classification is,
therefore, germane to the purposes of the law. And as the legal
maxim goes, The intent of a statute is the law.
Certainly, there are substantial differences between
the big investors who are being lured to establish and operate
their industries in the so-called secured area and the present
business operators outside the area. On the one hand, we are
talking of billion-peso investments and thousands of new jobs.
On the other hand, definitely none of such magnitude. In the
first, the economic impact will be national; in the second, only
local. Even more important, at this time the business activities
outside the secured area are not likely to have any impact in
achieving the purpose of the law, which is to turn the former
military base to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine
economy. There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to
extend to them the benefits and incentives accorded in RA
7227. Additionally, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, it will
be easier to manage and monitor the activities within the
secured area, which is already fenced off, to prevent fraudulent
importation of merchandise or smuggling. It is well-settled
that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial
uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual and material
differences between territories, there is no violation of the
constitutional clause. And of course, anyone, including the
petitioners, possessing the requisite investment capital can
always avail of the same benefits by channeling his or her
resources or business operations into the fenced-off free port
zone. We believe that the classification set forth by the
executive issuance does not apply merely to existing
conditions. As laid down in RA 7227, the objective is to
establish a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and
investment center in the area. There will, therefore, be a long-
term difference between such investment center and the areas
outside it. Lastly, the classification applies equally to all the
resident individuals and businesses within the secured area.
The residents, being in like circumstances or contributing
directly to the achievement of the end purpose of the law, are
not categorized further. Instead, they are all similarly treated,
both in privileges granted and in obligations required.
All told, the Court holds that no undue favor or
privilege was extended. The classification occasioned by EO
97-A was not unreasonable, capricious or unfounded. To
repeat, it was based, rather, on fair and substantive
considerations that were germane to the legislative purpose.
3.) NOT LIMITED TO EXISTING CONDITIONS ONLY
- Laws must go beyond particular situations.
a.) ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC. vs. THE TREASURER
OF ORMOC CITY
the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things
identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification
of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable
where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make
real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions
but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to
those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those
who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the
questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only
centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing
ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true,
was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the
classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable
to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be
singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the
coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar
company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the
ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar
Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
b.) CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be
determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with
applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may
be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and
invalid in its application to another.
A statute valid at one time may become void at another time
because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its
practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its
validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open
to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute
equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and
undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that
equal protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If
law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that
fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion;
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is equally
binding on the rest. In light of the lack of real and
substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment
between the rank-and-file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it
is clear that the enactment of the seven subsequent charters
has rendered the continued application of the challenged
proviso anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the
same should be declared as an outlaw.
c.) League of Cities v. Comelec
The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress
limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time
of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never
happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid
classification must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4.) MUST APPLY EQUALLY TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE
SAME CLASS
a.) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO G.
JALOSJOS
The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of laws." This simply means that all
persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of
government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to
any person. Neither partiality not prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial
distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all
persons validly confined under law? The performance
of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The
duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to
legislative ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the
Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress
continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a
few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government
that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court
can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The
importance of a function depends on the need to its exercise.
The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling
under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty
to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective
governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer
must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification
from those others who are validly restrained by law. A strict
scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise,
insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups
or types of individuals. The Court cannot validate badges
of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests
are disregarded. Therefore, the election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the
same class.
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
- This is a negative right imposed against the State in
interfering with the life to life, liberty, and property of the
people, and the right to privacy and security of persons
- Inviolable: should not be violated
Section 2: warrant clause prohibits unreasonable search
and seizure. Protect security and privacy of persons from
arbitrary interference of the State. Fundamental right against
unreasonable and searches and seizures and the basic
conditions for the issuance of a search warrant.
Section 3: exclusionary clause (poisonous tree doctrine)
Any evidence obtained in an invalid search and seizure shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
RULE 126
Search and Seizure
Section 1. Search warrant defined. A search warrant is an
order in writing issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property described
therein and bring it before the court. (1)
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be
filed. An application for search warrant shall be filed with the
following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was
committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court
within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the
place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court
within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the
application shall only be made in the court where the criminal
action is pending. (n)
Section 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant
may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the
offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense. (2a)
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines. (3a)
Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge
must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the
form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under
oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on
facts personally known to them and attach to the record their
sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted. (4a)
Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the
judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the
application is based or that there is probable cause to believe
that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be
substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules. (5a)
Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search.
The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed
search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may
break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or
any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant
or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when
unlawfully detained therein. (6)
Section 8. Search of house, room, or premise to be made in
presence of two witnesses. No search of a house, room, or
any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the
lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the
absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. (7a)
Section 9. Time of making search. The warrant must direct
that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts
that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be
searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be
served at any time of the day or night. (8)
Section 10. Validity of search warrant. A search warrant
shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date. Thereafter it shall
be void. (9a)
Section 11. Receipt for the property seized. The officer
seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt
for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose
presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence
of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the
seized property. (10a)
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court;
return and proceedings thereon. (a) The officer must
forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued
the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified
under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the
issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made, and
if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was
issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If
the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether
section 11 of this Rule has been complained with and shall
require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge
shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied
with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by
the custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall
enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other
actions of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.
(11a)
Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant. (12a)
Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress
evidence; where to file. A motion to quash a search warrant
and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in
and acted upon only by the court where the action has been
instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion
may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the
search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the
motion and a criminal case is subsequent filed in another court,
the motion shall be resolved by the latter court.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE (Section 2, Article 3)
SCOPE OF PROTECTION
- Search and seizure are reasonable if theres a warrant
- Available to all persons, aliens included, whether accused of
a crime or not
- Right is personal to the person subjected to invalid
search/arrest, it can only be waived by them
- Waiver must be made by the person whose right is invaded
- Can only be invoked against the government and its
agencies; cannot invoke unreasonable search and seizure
against private persons (under this section)
- Not applicable if the discovery was made by security officer of
a vessel
- What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and
seizure in any particular case is a judicial question,
determinable from the circumstances involved
- Objections to the warrant of arrest must be made before the
accused enters his plea, Failure to do so constitutes a waiver.
- Invoke right under section 2 prior to arraignment, otherwise it
is deemed waived. With regard to question on the jurisdiction
of the court, when you plead guilty, you waive your right to
question it.
- If you did not question the validity of your arrest, you cannot
bring it up during the trial, but you can still assail the
admissibility of the evidence.
- The filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of arrest
against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that
detention, or at least deny him the right to be released.
- The illegality of the arrest cannot affect the jurisdiction of the
trial court, when the persons submits himself to arraignment
without objection. Questioning admissibility of evidence, not
waived.
- If you do not question the jurisdiction before, you cannot
anymore file a motion to quash on the lack of jurisdiction.
- Only a judge may issue a warrant.
Exception (where warrant is not issued by the judge):
1.) Warrant of arrest issued by Customs
a.) Orders of arrest may be issued by administrative authorities
but only for purposes of carrying out a final finding of a
violation of law, e.g. an order of deportation or an order of
contempt, but not for the sole purpose of investigation and
prosecution.
2.) Bureau of Immigration may issue a warrant of arrest only
for the purpose of carrying out a final decision of deportation or
where there is sufficient proof of the guilt of the alien.
(Administrative agencies cannot issue warrant on the basis
solely of the complaint filed)
Warrant issued by court: to gather evidence
Warrant issued by administrative agencies: once there is a
finding of violation of law
Search warrant mode of discovery
Probable cause used in different ways
- Fiscal: executive in nature
- Judge: judicial in nature. Existence of facts and
circumstances
Search warrant more stringent/strict than arrest warrant
Judge ask probing questions to witnesses or complainants
or applicants of search warrant
Procedures in obtaining a Search Warrant:
1.) Judge should issue a warrant based on probable cause.
(Judge is the only one who can issue a warrant)
2.) Judge must examine the witness personally.
3.) Examination must be by means of searching questions.
4.) Warrant must entertain specific descriptions as to object, as
to place.
- The absence of any of these requisites will cause the
downright nullification of the search warrants.
Essential requisites for a valid warrant:
1.) It must be issued upon probable cause;
2.) Probable cause must be determined personally by the
judge;
3.) Judge must examine under oath or affirmation the
complaint and the witnesses he may produce
4.) Warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
1. Probable cause in filing of an information
> Such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance
of a warrant that are in themselves sufficient to induce a
cautious man to rely upon them
> Facts and circumstances that would engender a
well-grounded belief that a crime has been committed and
the person to be charged is probably guilty thereof
2. Probable cause in the issuance of a search warrant
> Such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched
3. Probable cause in the issuance of a warrant of arrest
> Such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed by the person sought to be arrested
> Such facts and circumstances which would engender
a well-grounded belief that a crime has been committed
and the person to be arrested committed it
FIRST REQUISITE:
a.) PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. JUDGE MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION
To preserve and to uphold the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the requisites for the
issuance of search warrant must be followed strictly. Where the
judge fails to personally examine the applicant for a search
warrant and the latter's witnesses, or where the witnesses
testify on matters not of their own personal knowledge, the
search warrant must be struck down. The requisites of
a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2)
such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are
personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or
affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts
personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically
describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. In the present case, the search warrant is
invalid because (1) the trail court failed to examine personally
the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero
Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance or
the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners
were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the
place to be searched was not described with particularity.
Chief Inspector Pascua was asked nothing else, and
he said nothing more. In fact, he failed even to affirm his
application. Contrary to his statement, the trial judge failed to
propound questions, let alone probing questions, to the
applicant and to his witnesses other than Bacolod . Obviously,
His Honor relied mainly on their affidavits. Mere affidavits of
the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the
complainant and the witnesses he may procedure and attach
them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in
order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the
existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable
for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false. It is axiomatic that the examination
must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-
forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The
examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of
the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application. Bacolod appeared during
the hearing and was extensively examined by the judge. But
his testimony showed that he did not have personal knowledge
that the petitioners, in violation of PD 1866, were not licensed
to possess firearms, ammunitions or explosives. In view
of the manifest objective of the against unreasonable search,
the Constitution to be searched only to those described in the
warrant. Thus, this Court has held that "this constitutional right
is the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to value
the privacy of home and person and to afford it constitutional
protection against the long reach of government is no less than
to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then
only under stringent procedural
safeguards." Additionally, the requisite of particularity is
related to the probable cause requirement in that, at least
under some circumstances, the lack of a more specific
description will make it apparent that there has not been a
sufficient showing to the magistrate that the described items
are to be found in particular place. In the present case, the
assailed search warrant failed to describe the place with
particularly. It simply authorizes a search of "the
aforementioned premises," but it did not specify such
premises. The warrant identifies only one place, and that is the
"Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at
PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur."
The PICOP compound, however, is made up of "200
offices/building, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3
piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service
outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structures, all of which
are spread out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares." 36
Obviously, the warrant gives the police officers unbridled and
thus illegal authority to search all the structures found inside
the PICOP compound. (The place to be searched, as set out in
the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers'
own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they
adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a
change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter
alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be
searched as well as the persons or things to be seized.)
b.) THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO
SALANGUIT y KO
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with
the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid
of the process when an officer undertakes to justify its
issuance. Nothing can justify the issuance of the search
warrant unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled.
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to
support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia
does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is
void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was
in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by
virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the
search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure
of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was
presented showing probable cause as to its existence.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant,
which was issued on probable cause and particularly
describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be
invalidated in toto because the judge erred in authorizing a
search for other items not supported by the evidence.
Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search warrant,
authorizing the search of accused-appellant's house for an
undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the
second part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia,
is not. Thus, only one warrant was necessary to cover the
violations under the various (or many) provisions of one
specific law. The rule is that a description of the place to
be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to
be searched. For example, a search warrant authorized a
search of Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant
Street, Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned out, there
were five apartments in the basement and six apartments on
both the ground and top floors and that there was an
Apartment Number 3 on each floor. However, the description
was made determinate by a reference to the affidavit
supporting the warrant that the apartment was occupied by the
accused "Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro
Mass." In this case, the location of accused-appellant's house
being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no
doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched with
sufficient particularity. In sum, we hold that with respect to
the seizure of shabu from accused-appellant's residence,
Search Warrant No.160 was properly issued, such warrant
being founded on probable cause personally determined by the
judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things
to be seized. Position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented in evidence. For this doctrine to
apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b ) inadvertent
discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality
of the evidence before the police.
SECOND REQUISITE:
- There must be record or transcript or stenographic notes of
the judge.
THIRD REQUISITE:
- Searching Question: question that can illicit personal
knowledge of facts that can help the judge in determining
probable cause
- Court should refrain from asking leading questions because it
suggest the answer
FOURTH REQUISITE:
General warrants: the descriptions therein of the objects to be
seized are so broad and all-encompassing as to give the
implementing officers wide discretion over which articles to
seize. General warrants are prohibited.
Scatter-shot warrants: those which are issued for more than
one specific offense. It is also prohibited. It is void for the law
requires that a warrant of arrest should only be issued in
connection with one specific offense.
Exceptions:
1.) When related offenses are punished by the same
law. (if an act constitute several violation of laws)
2.) When there are several counts of one specific
offense. (if an act constitute several counts)
- Objects to be taken must be specified.
- Minor discrepancies do not render a warrant void.
- As long as the thing can be separated from the others.
- It will not invalidate the warrant if object cannot be quantified
or if the quantity is not stated.
- Applicant must present factual allegations.
- Describe the place to be searched and things to be seized
- in possession of illegal firearms, there must be a certificate
showing it to be unlicensed or illegal
- Police officer conducting search has no discretion, they
should be guided by the warrant. Not necessary that the
person written in the warrant is the owner of the thing, he may
only possess it
- general warrant includes other legal things that should not be
included on the warrant
- a search warrant is severable; the invalid part may be
severed and the valid part can remain, not affecting the part
with valid probable cause
- personal knowledge of the witnesses: Test whether the
witness can be charged of perjury. Test whether the witness
can be charged of perjury. Test in determining whether the
witness is telling the truth. Cannot go after the judge who
based his decision on the personal knowledge of the
witnesses.
- in a writing; disposition question
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENHUR MAMARIL
The issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a
finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has
been defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. In determining the existence of probable cause, it is
required that: (1) the judge must examine the complainant and
his witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under
oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced in writing in the
form of searching questions and answers. The prosecution
failed to prove that Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos put
into writing his examination of the applicant and his witnesses
in the form of searching questions and answers before
issuance of the search warrant. The search warrant is
tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with
the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and
attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant
invalid. In this case, the police authorities presented a search
warrant to appellant before his residence was searched. At that
time, appellant could not determine if the search warrant was
issued in accordance with the law. It was only during the trial of
this case that appellant, through his counsel, had reason to
believe that the search warrant was illegally issued causing
appellant to file a motion with memorandum objecting to the
admissibility of the evidence formally offered by the
prosecution. In this case, we construe the silence of
appellant at the time the policemen showed him the search
warrant as a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the
law. Moreover, appellant seasonably objected on constitutional
grounds to the admissibility of the evidence seized pursuant to
said warrant during the trial of the case, after the prosecution
formally offered its evidence. Under the circumstances, no
intent to waive his rights can reasonably be inferred from his
conduct before or during the trial. Thus, in issuing a search
warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of
the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal
construction should be given in favor of the individual to
prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation
of the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumption of
regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an
officer undertakes to justify it. The requirement
mandated by the law that the examination of the complainant
and his witnesses must be under oath and reduced to writing in
the form of searching questions and answers was not complied
with, rendering the search warrant invalid. Consequently, the
evidence seized pursuant to said illegal search warrant cannot
be used in evidence against appellant.
Why the thing and place must be specified:
1.) To readily identify the properties to be seized and thus
prevent them from seizing the wrong items;
2.) Leave said police officers with no discretion regarding the
articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches
and seizures.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MODESTO TEE
Appellant avers that the phrase "an undetermined amount of
marijuana" as used in the search warrant fails to satisfy the
requirement of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution that the
things to be seized must be particularly described. Appellants
contention, in our view, has no leg to stand on. The
constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of
description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to
enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily
identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from
seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with
no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus
prevent unreasonable searches and seizures. What the
Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or
general characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will
authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition to
seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles
relating to an offense. However, it is not required that technical
precision of description be required, particularly, where by the
nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be
rather general, since the requirement of a technical description
would mean that no warrant could issue.
Thus, it has been held that term "narcotics paraphernalia" is
not so wanting in particularity as to create a general warrant.
Nor is the description "any and all narcotics" and "all
implements, paraphernalia, articles, papers and records
pertaining to" the use, possession, or sale of narcotics or
dangerous drugs so broad as to be unconstitutional. A search
warrant commanding peace officers to seize "a quantity of
loose heroin" has been held sufficiently particular. Tested
against the foregoing precedents, the description "an
undetermined amount of marijuana" must be held to satisfy the
requirement for particularity in a search warrant. Noteworthy,
what is to be seized in the instant case is property of a
specified character, i.e., marijuana, an illicit drug. By reason of
its character and the circumstances under which it would be
found, said article is illegal. A further description would be
unnecessary and ordinarily impossible, except as to such
character, the place, and the circumstances. Thus, this Court
has held that the description "illegally in possession of
undetermined quantity/amount of dried marijuana leaves and
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of
paraphernalia" particularizes the things to be seized.
The search warrant in the present case, given its nearly similar
wording, "undetermined amount of marijuana or Indian hemp,"
in our view, has satisfied the Constitutions requirements on
particularity of description. The description therein is: (1) as
specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; (2)
expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the
peace officers may be guided in making the search and
seizure; and (3) limits the things to be seized to those which
bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued. Said warrant imposes a meaningful restriction upon the
objects to be seized by the officers serving the warrant. Thus, it
prevents exploratory searches, which might be violative of the
Bill of Rights. The personal examination must not be
merely routinary or pro forma, but must be probing and
exhaustive. Substantial basis means that the questions of the
examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and the objects in
connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the
place sought to be searched. Appellant argues that the
address indicated in the search warrant did not clearly indicate
the place to be searched. The OSG points out that the address
stated in the warrant is as specific as can be. The NBI even
submitted a detailed sketch of the premises prepared by
Abratique, thus ensuring that there would be no mistake. A
description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places
in the community. A designation or description that points out
the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on
inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness.
- A scatter-shot warrant that is issued for more than one
offense. It is void for the law requires that a warrant should
only be issued in connection with one specific offense.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. JOSE
RUBIO
It is also contended that the application and the warrant did not
particularly describe the things to be seized. The verified
statements of the two internal revenue agents and the warrant
issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila all describe the
property sought to be seized as "fraudulent books, invoices
and records". While it is true that the property to be seized
under a warrant must be particularly described therein and no
other property can be taken thereunder, yet the description is
required to be specific only in so far as the circumstances will
ordinarily allow. It has been held that, where, by the nature of
the goods to be seized, their description must be rather
general, it is not required that a technical description be given,
as this would mean that no warrant could issue. Appellant has
not shown that the internal revenue agents exceeded their
powers under the warranty by seizing property other than that
described in the warrant question. The list of books, invoices,
and records seized by said officers is the best evidence to
show that they strictly obeyed the command of their warrant by
seizing those things, and only those described in the search
warrant.
- Or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact, not of
law, by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the
search and seizure; or when the things described are limited to
those which bear direction relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued.
The place to be searched has to be described
particularly
 - Their only guide in conducting the search
- Cannot be amplified nor modified
- If the place is different, they should first ask for
connection before it can be validly implemented.
a.) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS,
JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA
The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers'
own faulty depiction of the premises to be searched. For in
their application and in the affidavit thereto appended, they
wrote down a description of the place to be searched, which is
exactly what the Judge reproduced in the search warrant:
"premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207. Area-F,
Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte,
Bulacan." And the scope of the search was made more
particular and more restrictive by the Judge's admonition
in the warrant that the search be "limited only to the premises
herein described." Now, at the time of the application
for a search warrant, there were at least five (5) distinct places
in the area involved: the store known as "Abigail's Variety
Store," and four (4) separate and independent residential
apartment units. These are housed in a single structure and
are contiguous to each other although there are no connecting
doors through which a person could pass from the interior of
one to any of the others. Each of the five (5) places is
independent of the others, and may be entered only through its
individual front door. Admittedly, the police officers did not
intend a search of all five (5) places, but of only one of the
residential units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store: that
immediately next to the store (Number 1). However, despite
having personal and direct knowledge of the physical
configuration of the store and the apartments behind the store,
the police officers failed to make Judge Bacalla understand the
need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in the warrant. Even after
having received the warrant which directs that the search be
"limited only to the premises herein described," "Abigail Variety
Store Apt 1207" thus literally excluding the apartment units
at the rear of the store they did not ask the Judge to correct
said description. They seem to have simply assumed that their
own definite idea of the place to be searched clearly
indicated, according to them, in the sketch they claim to have
submitted to Judge Bacalla in support of their application
was sufficient particularization of the general identification of
the place in the search warrant. There was therefore in this
case an infringement of the constitutional requirement that a
search warrant particularly describe the place to be searched;
and that infringement necessarily brought into operation the
concomitant provision that "(a)ny evidence obtained in violation
** (inter alia of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The
place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be
amplified or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge
of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of
their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed
by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant
to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the
persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police
officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even
if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide
the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers
executing a search warrant that discretion which the
Constitution has precisely removed from them. The
particularization of the description of the place to be searched
may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the
warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police
officers conducting the search. The Government alleges
that the officers had satisfactorily established probable cause
before Judge Bacalla for the issuance of a search warrant.
While this may be conceded, the trouble is, to repeat, that the
place described in the search warrant which, of course, is
the only place that may be legitimately searched in virtue
thereof was not that which the police officers who applied
for the warrant had in mind, with the result that what they
actually subjected to search-and-seizure operations was a
place other than that stated in the warrant. In fine, while there
was a search warrant more or less properly issued as regards
Abigail's Variety Store, there was none for Apartment No. 1
the first of the four (4) apartment units at the rear of said store,
and precisely the place in which the private respondents were
then residing.
- different place, tho adjacent
BURGOS vs. THE CHIEF OF STAFF
Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to
search two distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the
execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address
on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one
place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping
and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error.
Precisely, two search warrants were applied for and issued
because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct
premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent
judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the
same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be
searched were specifically set forth in the application, and
since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which
executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have
arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent
than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant
No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address
appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant.
Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge had in
mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b]. In the
determination of whether a search warrant describes the
premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been
held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the
place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to
be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on
whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows
that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building
described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the
executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file
to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be
searched."
Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the
fact that although the warrants were directed against Jose
Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners
Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media
Services, Inc. were seized. The above rule does not require
that the property to be seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not
be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-
quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is
stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by
one other than the person in whose possession it may be at
the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of
no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against
whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the
property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
was alleged to have in relation to the articles and property
seized under the warrants.
b.) FRANK UY vs. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE
Petitioners observe that the caption of Search
Warrant A-1 indicates the address of Uy Chin Ho alias Frank
Uy as Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City while the body of the same
warrant states the address as Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue
City. Parenthetically, Search Warrants A-2 and B consistently
state the address of petitioner as Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue
City. The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search
warrant, that there be a particular description of the place to be
searched and the persons of things to be seized. The rule is
that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the
officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain
and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other
places in the community. Any designation or description known
to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all
others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement. Thus, in Castro vs.
Pabalan, where the search warrant mistakenly identified the
residence of the petitioners therein as Barrio Padasil instead of
the adjoining Barrio Maria Cristina, this Court "admitted that the
deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its
invalidation." In this case, it was not shown that a street
similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found in Cebu City.
Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any
difficulty in locating the premises of petitioner corporation. That
Search Warrant A-1, therefore, inconsistently identified the city
where the premises to be searched is not a defect that would
spell the warrants invalidation in this case.
Petitioners also find fault in the description of the
names of the persons in Search Warrants A-1 and A-2. Search
Warrant A-1 was issued solely against Uy Chin Ho alias Frank
Uy. Search Warrant A-2, on the other hand, was directed
against UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, and Unifish Packing
Corporation. These discrepancies are hardly relevant.
It does not require the warrant to name the person
who occupies the described premises. Where the search
warrant is issued for the search of specifically described
premises only and not for the search of a person, the failure to
name the owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit
and search warrant does not invalidate the warrant; and where
the name of the owner of the premises sought to be searched
is incorrectly inserted in the search warrant, it is not a fatal
defect if the legal description of the premises to be searched is
otherwise correct so that no discretion is left to the officer
making the search as to the place to be searched. Since, in
the case at bar, the warrant was issued not for search of the
persons owning or occupying the premises, but only a search
of the premises occupied by them, the search could not be
declared unlawful or in violation of the constitutional rights of
the owner or occupants of the premises, because of
inconsistencies in stating their names. Two warrants
issued at one time for one crime and one place: In any
event, Search Warrant A-1 should be deemed superseded by
Search Warrant A-2. Two warrants, Search Warrants A-1
and A-2, were actually issued by the trial court for the same
crime (violation of SEC. 253 of the National Internal Revenue
Code). It appears, however, that Search Warrant A-2 was
issued merely to correct the inconsistencies in the address in
Search Warrant A-1, as well as to include Unifish Packing
Corporation as a party against whom the warrant was issued.
Search Warrant A-2 was evidently an attempt by the issuing
judge to be more precise in the names of the persons against
whom the warrant was issued and in the description of the
place to be searched. Indeed, it would be absurd for the judge
to issue on a single occasion two warrants authorizing the
search of a single place for a single offense. Inasmuch as the
apparent intent in issuing Search Warrant A-2 was to
supersede Search Warrant A-1, the latter should be deemed
revoked by the former.
Note:
- One warrant, one offense only. Apply warrant for each
offense.
Exceptions:
1.) When related offenses are punished by the same
law.
2.) When there are several counts of one specific
offense.
a.) HARRY S. STONEHILL vs. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO
Two points must be stressed in connection with this
constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein
named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been
alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with
respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the
same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts,
or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of
our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved
in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications
without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question
would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental
rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion
of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be
remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted to
outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to
imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife,
when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest
it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in
connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court
deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former
Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the
Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue
but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added
thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall
issue for more than one specific offense." The grave
violation of the Constitution made in the application for the
contested search warrants was compounded by the description
therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to
wit: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement
receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements. Thus, the warrants authorized the search for
and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were
legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all
records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be
particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major
objective: the elimination of general warrants.
b.) VICENTE DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
With respect to the .22 caliber revolver with Serial No. 48673,
that the police raiding team found in a drawer at the kitchen of
petitioners house, suffice it to say that the firearm was not
mentioned in the search warrant applied for and issued for the
search of petitioners house. Seizure is limited to those
items particularly described in a valid search warrant.
Searching officers are without discretion regarding what
articles they shall seize. Evidence seized on the occasion of
such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and
excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In
the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In this
case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view.
It was found as a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of
petitioners house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not
mentioned in the search warrant. Hence, the seizure was
illegal. The seizure without the requisite search warrant was in
plain violation of the law and the Constitution. True that as an
exception, the police may seize without warrant illegally
possessed firearm or any contraband for that matter,
inadvertently found in plain view. However, the seizure of
evidence in plain view applies only where the police officer is
not searching for evidence against the accused, but
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
Specifically, seizure of evidence in plain view is justified when
there is: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent, and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search.
Hence, the petitioner rightly rejected the firearm as planted and
not belonging to him. The prosecution was not able to prove
that the firearm was in the effective possession or control of
the petitioner without a license. In illegal possession of
firearms, the possessor must know of the existence of the
subject firearm in his possession or control. In People v. de
Gracia, we clarified the meaning of possession for the purpose
of convicting a person under P. D. No. 1866, thus: x x x In the
present case, a distinction should be made between criminal
intent and intent to possess. While mere possession without
criminal intent is sufficient to convict a person for illegal
possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was
animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the
accused. x x x x Hence, the kind of possession punishable
under P. D. No. 1866 is one where the accused possessed a
firearm either physically or constructively with animus
possidendi or intention to possess the same. That is the
meaning of animus possidendi. In the absence of animus
possidendi, the possessor of a firearm incurs no criminal
liability.
The same is true with respect to the 5.56 cal. magazine found
in the bedroom of petitioners daughter. The seizure was invalid
and the seized items were inadmissible in evidence. As
explained in People v. Doria, the plain view doctrine applies
when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement
officer is in a position where he has a clear view of a particular
area or has prior justification for an intrusion; (2) said officer
inadvertently comes across (or sees in plain view) a piece of
incriminating evidence; and (3) it is immediately apparent to
such officer that the item he sees may be evidence of a crime
or a contraband or is otherwise subject to seizure.
With particular reference to the two 2-way radios that the
raiding policemen also seized in the bedroom of petitioners
daughter, there was absolutely no reason for the seizure. The
radios were not contraband per se. The National
Telecommunications Commission may license two-way radios
at its discretion. The burden is on the prosecution to show that
the two-way radios were not licensed. The National
Telecommunication Commission is the sole agency authorized
to seize unlicensed two-way radios. More importantly,
admittedly, the two-way radios were not mentioned in the
search warrant. We condemn the seizure as illegal and a plain
violation of a citizens right. Worse, the petitioner was not
charged with illegal possession of the two-way radios.
Consequently, the confiscation of the two 2-way radios was
clearly illegal. The possession of such radios is not even
included in the charge of illegal possession of firearms
(violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended) alleged in the
Information.
(Moreover, the presumption of regularity cannot prevail over
the Constitutional presumption of innocence.)
c.) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORMANDO DEL
ROSARIO
Neither can accused-appellant be convicted of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition. The search warrant
implemented by the raiding party authorized only the search
and seizure of ". . . the described quantity of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu
and its paraphernalia" (Exh. O, p. 50, original record). Thus,
the raiding party was authorized to seize only shabu and
paraphernalia for the use thereof and no other. A search
warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party
to undertake a finishing expedition to seize and confiscate any
and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The
Constitution itself (Section 2, Article III) and the Rules of Court
(Section 3, Rule 126) specifically mandate that the search
warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized.
Thus, the search warrant was no authority for the police
officers to seize the firearm which was not mentioned, much
less described with particularity, in the search warrant. Neither
may it be maintained that the gun was seized in the course of
an arrest, for as earlier observed, accused-appellant's arrest
was far from regular and legal. Said firearm, having been
illegally seized, the same is not admissible in evidence
(Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 [1967]). The Constitution
expressly ordains the exclusion in evidence of illegally seized
articles. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. With the exclusion in evidence of the illegally
seized firearm, there is, therefore, a total absence of evidence
to support the charge of illegal possession of firearm, against
accused-appellant.
- If evidence is obtained after purposeful search, it cannot be
considered as inadvertent and it cannot be admissible.
- However, if the firearm was inadvertently seen during the
search it can be considered under the plain view doctrine
(when for example they entered the house and they
immediately saw the gun on the table)
d.) ARIEL C. VALLEJO vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
The Search Warrant in Question is Constitutionally Infirm; Void
for Lack of Particularity
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly
comply with the foregoing constitutional and statutory
requirements; failure to comply therewith constitutes grave
abuse of discretion. The things to be seized must be described
with particularity. Technical precision of description is not
required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable
particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be
searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a
mere roving commission. Indeed, the law does not require that
the things to be seized must be described in precise and
minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the
searching authorities. If this were the rule, it would be virtually
impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would
not know exactly what kind of things to look for. Any description
of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer
making the search with reasonable certainty to locate such
place or thing is sufficient. However, the requirement that
search warrants shall particularly describe the things to be
seized makes general searches under them impossible and
prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing
another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the
discretion of the officer executing the warrant. Thus, the
specific property to be searched for should be so particularly
described as to preclude any possibility of seizing any other
property. A perusal of the tenor of the search warrant in
question readily shows that it failed to pass this test of
particularity. The questioned warrant directed the peace
officers to search and seize the following in the petitioners
office at the Register of Deeds of Isabela: 4. Undetermined
number of Fake Land Titles, Official Receipts in the Cashiers
Office, Judicial Form No. 39 known as Primary Entry Book
under No. 496 and other pertinent documents related
therewith; 5. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the
drawers of every table of employees of the Registry of Deeds;
6. Undetermined number of land Transfer transactions
without the corresponding payment of Capital Gains Tax and
payment of Documentary Stamps.
As correctly pointed out by the petitioner and the OSG, the
terms expressly used in the warrant were too all-embracing,
with the obvious intent of subjecting all the records pertaining
to all the transactions of the petitioners office at the Register of
Deeds to search and seizure. Such tenor of a seizure warrant
contravenes the explicit command of the Constitution that there
be a particular description of the things to be seized.[24] The
executing officers sole function is to apply the description to its
subject matter, which function may frequently involve the
exercise of limited discretion in identifying the property
described. A description of such generality, however, as to
lodge in the executing officer virtually unlimited discretion as to
what property shall be seized, is repugnant to the Constitution.
The Search Warrant Must Be Issued for One Specific Offense
The questioned warrant in this case is a scatter-shot warrant
for having been issued for more than one offense - Falsification
of Land Titles under Article 171 and Article 213 of the Revised
Penal Code, and violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. A warrant
must be issued upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense. In fact, a careful perusal of the application for
the warrant shows that the applicant did not allege any specific
act performed by the petitioner constituting a violation of any of
the aforementioned offenses.. Thus, the questioned
warrant must be struck down for having been issued in
contravention of the 1987 Constitution, the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and existing jurisprudence. As the Court, through
Justice Concepcion held in the landmark case of Stonehill v.
Diokno:
To uphold the validity of the warrant in question would be to
wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of
the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice, or passion
of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be
remedied by the constitutional provision above-quoted to
outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to
imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife,
when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest
it, even though by legal means.
e.) People v. Veloso
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of
the constitutional and statutory provisions under which it was
issued. Otherwise, it is void. The proceedings upon search
warrants, it has rightly been held, must be absolutely legal, for
there is not a description of process known to law, the
execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps
there is none which excites such intense feeling in
consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect. The
warrant will always be construed strictly without, however,
going into the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No
presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the
process when an officer undertakes to justify under it.
Note:
Probable Cause signifies reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES: (Exceptions to requiring search
warrant)
1.) Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest (item was
within the arrestees custody; search was contemporaneous to
the arrest)
2.) Consented warrantless search/ waiver
3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view
4.) Stop and frisk
5.) Search of a moving vehicle
6.) Customs search or seizure of goods concealed to avoid
duties
7.) Exigent and emergency circumstances
8.) Airport Security
9.) Relative to jail safety
10.) Search and seizure by private person
1.) Requisites in SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO LAWFUL
ARREST
a.) There must be a valid arrest.
b.) The search must be limited to space and time
Requirement: Lawful arrest first before a search can be made
General Rule: Arrest is legitimate if effected with a valid
warrant of arrest
TIME: Made at the earliest possible opportunity after the arrest;
there must be a considerable lapse of time.
SPACE: Made on the person arrested or the immediate vicinity
where he has the effective control to cart away evidence or get
weapons.
General rule: arrest must precede search. Search was made
on the occasion of arrest (whether with warrant or without)
Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an
arrest can precede arrest if police have probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the search.
Requisites:
a.) Search must be at the place of immediate control or vicinity
of the accused (pocket, underwear, wallet)
- to determine whether the person is in possession of other
contraband
b.) Search must be contemporaneous to or at the same time
with the arrest
- either simultaneous or immediately after
- search cannot be made prior to arrest
- presupposes a situation that the arrest must be valid
- arrest first before search can be made
A search incident to an arrest may extend to those areas under
the control of the defendant and where items subject to
constitutional seizure may be found. Applying this
reasonableness test to the area of searches incident to arrests,
one thing is clear at the outset. Search of an arrested man and
of the items within his immediate reach must, in almost every
case, be reasonable. There is always a danger that the
suspect will try to escape, seizing concealed weapons with
which to overpower and injure the arresting officers, and there
is a danger that he may destroy evidence vital to the
prosecution. Circumstances in which these justifications would
not apply are sufficiently rare that inquiry is not made into
searches of this scope, which have been considered
reasonable throughout.
2.) CONSENTED SEARCH
Rights may be waived, provided that:
- The right is existent.
- He is aware of the existence of the right.
- The person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right.
Waiver must be expressed by act or words
Failure to object does not mean consent
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPPINES vs.BASILIO DAMASO
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is
enshrined in the Constitution (Article III, Section 2). The
purpose of the law is to prevent violations of private security in
person and property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of
the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or
judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpations
when attempted. However, such right is not absolute. There
are instances when a warrantless search and seizure becomes
valid, namely: (1) search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of a
moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view.
The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures, being personal one, cannot be waived by anyone
except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is
expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. In the case
at bar, the records show that appellant was not in his house at
that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper,
allowed the authorities to enter it. We Find no evidence that
would establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed the
appellant's helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that
the appellant had given her authority to open his house in his
absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz
Tanciangco has such an authority. Without this evidence, the
authorities' intrusion into the appellant's dwelling cannot be
given any color of legality. While the power to search and seize
is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and
the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights
of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government. We Find no evidence that would establish the fact
that Luz Morados was indeed the appellant's helper or if it was
true that she was his helper, that the appellant had given her
authority to open his house in his absence. The prosecution
likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority.
Without this evidence, the authorities' intrusion into the
appellant's dwelling cannot be given any color of legality. While
the power to search and seize is necessary to the public
welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government does not
grant them the license to go inside his house.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO ASIS y
FONPERADA
Appellants were collared without any arrest warrant. Neither
was there any valid search warrant obtained against them.
Primarily, the constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be
waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded
or who is expressly authorized to do so on his or her behalf In
the present case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
show that at the time the bloodstained pair of shorts was
recovered, Appellant Formento, together with his wife and
mother, was present. Being the very subject of the search,
necessarily, he himself should have given consent. Since he
was physically present, the waiver could not have come from
any other person. To constitute a valid
waiver, it must be shown that first, the right exists; second, the
person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such a right; and third, the person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right. How could Appellant Formento
have consented to a warrantless search when, in the first
place, he did not understand what was happening at that
moment? The prosecution witnesses themselves testified that
there was no interpreter to assist him -- a deaf-mute -- during
the arrest, search and seizure. Naturally, it would seem that he
indeed consented to the warrantless search, as the
prosecution would want this Court to believe. In the present
case, in which appellant is a deaf-mute, and there was no
interpreter to explain to him what was happening. His seeming
acquiescence to the search without a warrant may be
attributed to plain and simple confusion and ignorance.
3.) PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a
prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by
the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view"
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
a.) Law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a
prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which
he can view a particular area.
b.) The discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent.
c.) It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure.
FIRST REQUISITE: (there must be a valid reason why the
officer is there)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO PASUDAG y
BOKANG
SPO2 Pepito Calip of the PNP Sison, Pangasinan, went to Brgy. Artacho to
conduct anti-jueteng operations. He urinated at a bushy bamboo fence behind
the public school. About five (5) meters away, he saw a garden of about 70
square meters. There were marijuana plants in between corn plants and
camote tops. He inquired from a storekeeper nearby as to who owned the
house with the garden. The storeowner told him that Alberto Pasudag owned
it. SPO2 Calip went to the Police Station and reported to Chief of Police
Romeo C. Astrero. The latter dispatched team (composed of SPO2 Calip,
SPO3 Fajarito, SPO3 Alcantara and PO3 Rasca) to conduct an investigation.
At around 2:30 in that same afternoon, the team arrived at Brgy; Artacho and
went straight to the house of accused Pasudag. SPO3 Fajarito looked for
accused Pasudag and asked him to bring the team to his backyard garden
which was about five (5) meters away. Upon seeing the marijuana plants, the
policemen called for a photographer, who took pictures of accused Pasudag
standing beside one of the marijuana plants.They uprooted seven (7)
marijuana plants. The team brought accused Pasudag and the marijuana plants
to the police station.
As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is
required before a law enforcer may validly search or seize the
person, house, papers or effects of any individual. The
Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, x x x." Any evidence
obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible. In the
case at bar, the police authorities had ample opportunity to
secure from the court a search warrant. SPO2 Pepito Calip
inquired as to who owned the house. He was acquainted with
marijuana plants and immediately recognized that some plants
in the backyard of the house were marijuana plants. Time was
not of the essence to uproot and confiscate the plants. They
were three months old and there was no sufficient reason to
believe that they would be uprooted on that same day.
"The Court is not unmindful of the difficulties of law
enforcement agencies in suppressing the illegal traffic of
dangerous drugs. However, quick solutions of crimes and
apprehension of malefactors do not justify a callous disregard
of the Bill of Rights. We need not underscore that the
protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally
mandated and only under specific instances are searches
allowed without warrants." "The mantle of protection extended
by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike
against any form of high handedness of law enforcers,
regardless of the praise worthiness of their intentions."With the
illegal seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case, the
seized plants are inadmissible in evidence against accused-
appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZENAIDA BOLASA Y
NAKOBOAN
An anonymous caller tipped off PO3 Dante Salonga and PO3 Albert Carizon
in the early evening of 11 September 1995 that a man and a woman were
repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house. PO3 Salonga and PO3 Carizon
together with SPO1 Fernando Arenas immediately proceeded to the house of
the suspects and parked their car some three hundred (300) meters away. They
walked towards their quarry's lair accompanied this time by their unnamed
informer. When they reached the house they "peeped (inside) through a small
window and . . . saw one man and a woman repacking suspected marijuana."
They entered the house and introduced themselves as police officers to the
occupants and thereupon confiscated the tea bags and some drug
paraphernalia. They arrested the two (2) who turned out to be the accused
Zenaida Bolasa y Nakoboan and Roberto delos Reyes. Subsequent
examination of the tea bags by NBI Forensic Chemist Rubie Calalo confirmed
the suspicion that the tea bags contained marijuana.
The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended
does not fall under any of the above-enumerated categories.
Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the arresting officers had
no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-
appellants had just committed, were committing, or were about
to commit a crime. Second, the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they
have any reasonable ground to believe that accused-
appellants committed it. Third, accused-appellants were not
prisoners who have escaped from a penal establishment.
Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain
view. First, there was no valid intrusion. As already discussed,
accused-appellants were illegally arrested. Second, the
evidence, i.e., the tea bags later on found to contain marijuana,
was not inadvertently discovered. The police officers
intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw
and ascertained the activities of accused-appellants inside the
room. In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a
search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a
customs search, or a stop and frisk; it cannot even fall under
exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence at
hand is bereft of any such showing.
On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers
should have conducted first a surveillance considering that the
identities and address of the suspected culprits were already
ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining
the existence of probable cause for arresting accused-
appellants, they should have secured a search warrant prior to
effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab
initio, the accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every
evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be
used against accused-appellants; 9 hence, their acquittal must
follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law.
SECOND REQUISITE
- Searching officer came across the place or evidence
inadvertently
THIRD REQUISITE
- Illegality of object is apparent
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANTIAGO EVARISTO
On the day in question, a contingent composed of Romeroso and Vallarta,
together with a Sgt. Daniel Maligaya, also of the Philippine Constabulary, and
two (2) members of the Integrated National Police, were on routine patrol
duty in Barangay III, Mendez, Cavite. At or about 5:50 in the afternoon,
successive bursts of gunfire were heard in the vicinity. Proceeding to the
approximate source of the same, they came upon one Barequiel Rosillo who
was firing a gun into the air. Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby
house of appellant Evaristo prompting the lawmen to pursue him. Upon
approaching the immediate perimeter of the house, specifically a cement
pavement or porch leading to the same, the patrol chanced upon the slightly
inebriated appellants, Evaristo and Carillo. Inquiring as to the whereabouts of
Rosillo, the police patrol members were told that he had already escaped
through a window of the house. Sgt. Vallarta immediately observed a
noticeable bulge around the waist of Carillo who, upon being frisked,
admitted the same to be a .38 revolver. After ascertaining that Carillo was
neither a member of the military nor had a valid license to possess the said
firearm, the gun was confiscated and Carillo invited for questioning.
As the patrol was still in pursuit of Rosillo, Sgt. Romeroso sought
Evaristo's permission to scour through the house, which was granted. In the
sala, he found, not Rosillo, but a number of firearms and paraphernalia
supposedly used in the repair and manufacture of firearms, all of which,
thereafter, became the basis for the present indictment against Evaristo.
For a search to be reasonable under the law, there must, as a
rule, be a search warrant validly issued by an appropriate
judicial officer. Yet, the rule that searches and seizures must be
supported by a valid search warrant is not an absolute and
inflexible rule, for jurisprudence has recognized several
exceptions to the search warrant requirement. Among these
exceptions is the seizure of evidence in plain view. The records
in this case show that Sgt. Romerosa was granted permission
by the appellant Evaristo to enter his house. The officer's
purpose was to apprehend Rosillo whom he saw had sought
refuge therein. Therefore, it is clear that the search for firearms
was not Romerosa's purpose in entering the house, thereby
rendering his discovery of the subject firearms as inadvertent
and even accidental. With respect to the firearms seized
from the appellant Carillo, the Court sustains the validly of the
firearm's seizure and admissibility in evidence, based on the
rule on authorized warrantless arrests. For purposes of
the present case, the second circumstance by which a
warrantless arrest may be undertaken is applicable. For, as
disclosed by the records, the peace officers, while on patrol,
heard bursts of gunfire and this proceeded to investigate the
matter.
4.) STOP and FRISK
a.) Police must be acting on his suspicion that the person he is
frisking has committed or about to commit a crime. The person
must be dangerous or poses threat to the police.
b.) Police is still guided by probable cause supported by his
suspicion that the person is dangerous or is about to commit
an offense.
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was
a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to
protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested
may be armed and might attack them unless he is first
disarmed. "The individual being arrested may be frisked for
concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting
officer and all unlawful articles found his person, or within his
immediate control may be seized."
In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was
defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police
officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat
him for weapon(s):
Where a police officer observes an unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom
he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in
the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself
as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel
his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled
for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly be
introduced in evidence against the person from whom they
were taken.
In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court
held that the interest of effective crime prevention and
detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in
appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is
insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. This was
the legitimate investigative function which Officer McFadden
discharged in that case, when he approached petitioner and
his companion whom he observed to have hovered alternately
about a street corner for an extended period of time, while not
waiting for anyone; paused to stare in the same store window
roughly 24 times; and conferred with a third person. It would
have been sloppy police work for an officer of 30 years'
experience to have failed to investigate this behavior further.
In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop-and-
frisk, the US Supreme Court held that what justified the limited
search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in
taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he
was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.
It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must,
whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of
searches and seizures through the warrant procedure,
excused only by exigent circumstances.
ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS
On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio
Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of the Integrated National
Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task
Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City.
While they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they
spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting
suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as
members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away
was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance. They then checked
the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith &
Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196 two (2) rounds of live ammunition
for a .38 caliber gun a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions
for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the police station for
further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to
show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions
found in his possession but he failed to do so.
An arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer
or private person, among others, when in his presence the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in
fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it.
At the time the peace officers in this case identified
themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to
flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually
committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding
something in the buri bag. They did now know what its
contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest
without a warrant. However, there are many instances where a
warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and
search" without a search warrant at military or police
checkpoints. Thus, as between a warrantless search and
seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the
search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that,
indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in
the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause.
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was
a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in
the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to
inspect the same. It is too much indeed to require the police
officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner
only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the
purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and
much too late.
ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in
the city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure an arrest or a
search warrant, policemen should employ limited, flexible responses like
"stop-and-frisk" which are graduated in relation to the amount of
information they possess, the lawmen being ever vigilant to respect and not to
violate or to treat cavalierly the citizen's constitutional rights against
unreasonable arrest, search and seizure.
The search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In
Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and
seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial
warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional
and subject to challenge. In the case at hand, Patrolman
Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance
that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk
along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police
information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his
experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the
Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was
characteristic of drug addicts who were "high." The policemen
therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate
if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation,
they found marijuana in petitioner's possession. In such a
situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a
suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or
to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information,
rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to
occur. Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another
exception to the general rule against a search without a
warrant. Petitioner effectively waived the
inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he failed
to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial.
5.) Search of a moving vehicle
- considered because of the nature of the crime being in
motion.
- for practical purposes
- an example is in conducting checkpoints
Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity;
VALMONTE vs. DE VILLA
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he
had been stopped and searched without a search warrant by
the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e.,
without stating the details of the incidents which amount to a
violation of his light against unlawful search and seizure, is not
sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a
violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and
seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those
which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search
is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case. Petitioners' concern
for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning
the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se
illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the
course of their routine checks, the military indeed committed specific
violations of petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or other
rights.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain
of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds,
or simply looks into a vehicle or flashes a light therein, these
do not constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela
(and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security
measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace
and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also
be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the
government in the interest of public security. In this connection,
the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers
and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly
reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military
men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and
violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in
media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic
conditions which all sum up to what one can rightly
consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the
inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote
public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless
search which is however reasonably conducted, the former
should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible
of abuse by the men in uniform in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay
for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
6.) CUSTOM LAW ENFORCEMENT
- Must be exercised by persons with authority to enforce
customs law.
- Not included: house, warehouse
- with probable cause
- illegal firearms
- Exception: in the house or warehouse, there must be warrant.
- Search and seizure of dutiable itmes.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is
such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized
training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies,
relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding
before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if the matter
may well be within their proper jurisdiction. It applies where a
claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of
issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed
within the special competence of an administrative agency. In
such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be
enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the
parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case
without prejudice.
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide
the court in determining whether it should refrain from
exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency
has determined some question or some aspect of some
question arising in the proceeding before the court.
General rule: only judges can issue warrant
Exception: 1.) Those by Customs; 2.) Those issued by the
President in deportation cases.
7.) EXIGENCIES (in cases of emergency)
- If it is so important.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO DE GRACIA
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the
Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at
that time. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence
reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the
RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on
the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a
group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the
military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof
refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so,
thereby compelling the former to break into the office. The
Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is
definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual
depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and
solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an
unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives
could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition,
there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of
simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office
and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by
rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were
obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses
therein were deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion
that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the
prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the
military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in
this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was
being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient
probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the
situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to
apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial
judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the
raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency
and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully
be dispensed with.
Umil, et al., vs. Ramos
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its
fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but
in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them
in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than
for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a
statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the
usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires
the determination by a judge of the existence of probable
cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and
the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously the
absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of
violence against government forces, or any other milder acts
but really in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest
or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation
that involves the very survival of society and its government
and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of
violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of
armed hostilities which (are) of the essence of waging a
rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion,
merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of
these contingencies continues cannot be less justified.
8.) AIRPORT SECURITY
a.) Privacy in the airport is minimal.
b.) Gravity of public interest.
c.) There is a reduced expectation of privacy.
DON DJOWEL SALES y ABALAHIN vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure
clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in
a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy,
which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security
procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking
and terrorism has come increased security at the nations
airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely
pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well
as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans.
Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious
objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what
the objects are. There is little question that such searches are
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the
safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations
associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often
notified through airport public address systems, signs, and
notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search
and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such
would be subject to seizure. These announcements place
passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections
against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to
routine airport procedures.
9.) JAIL SAFETY
- Any person who comes inside to visit the inmates must be
searched thoroughly.
10.) SEARCH AND SEIZURE BY PRIVATE PERSON
- Example: search made by security guard.
WARRANTLESS ARREST
1. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense; (in flagrante delicto) [the crime was committed in
the presence of the police]
2. When an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; [the police is nowhere to be
found in the crime scene]
3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another
4. Hot pursuit
a.) An offense has in fact been committed.
b.) Arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested committed the offense.
In flagrante delicto:
a.) The person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit a crime;
b.) Such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer.
WHAT IS A WARRANT OF ARREST?
> Legal process issued by a competent authority, directing
the arrest of a person or persons upon grounds stated therein
WHEN MAY A WARRANT OF ARREST BE ISSUED?
> If issued by the RTC,
1. Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint
or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.
2. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.
3. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of
arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already
been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the MTC judge
who conducted the preliminary investigation or when
the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section
7 of this Rule.
Pangay v. Ganay modified this rule by providing that
investigating judges power to order the arrest of the
accused is limited to instances where there is
necessity for placing him in custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice
4. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause,
the judge may order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the
issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from
the filing of the complaint of information.
5. If the warrant of arrest is issued by the MTC and if
the preliminary investigation was conducted by the
prosecutor, the same procedure as above is followed
WHEN IS A WARRANT OF ARREST NOT NECESSARY?
> A warrant of arrest is not necessary in the following
instances:
1. When the accused is already in detention issued by the
MTC;
2. When the accused was arrested by virtue of a lawful
arrest without warrant;
3. When the penalty is of a fine only;
4. Those covered by a summary procedure .
WHAT ARE THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE FINDING
OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
WARRANT OF ARREST?
> There is a distinction between the objective of
determining probable cause as done by the prosecutor
and that done by the judgethe prosecutor determines it
for the purpose of filing the complaint or information; while
the judge determines it for the purpose of issuing a warrant
of arrest to determine whether there is a necessity of placing
the accused under immediate custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice.
> Since the objectives are different, the judge shouldn't rely
solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause
to justify the issuance of warrant of arrest.
> He must decide independently and must have supporting
evidence other than the prosecutors bare report.
Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
clearly provides:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional
Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint
or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of
the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has
already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge
who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint
or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case
of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order
the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days
from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within
thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
Pursuant to the aforementioned provision, the RTC judge, upon
the filing of an Information, has the following options: (1) dismiss
the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish
probable cause; (2) if he or she finds probable cause, issue a
warrant of arrest; and (3) in case of doubt as to the existence of
probable cause, order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five days from notice, the issue to be resolved by
the court within thirty days from the filing of the information.
It bears stressing that the judge is required to personally evaluate
the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He
may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
fails to establish probable cause.
Section 1. Definition of arrest. Arrest is the taking of a person
into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. (1)
Section 2. Arrest; how made. An arrest is made by an actual
restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his submission to the
custody of the person making the arrest. No violence or
unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person
arrested shall not be subject to a greater restraint than is
necessary for his detention.
Section 3. Duty of arresting officer. It shall be the duty of the
officer executing the warrant to arrest the accused and to deliver
him to the nearest police station or jail without unnecessary delay.
ARREST WARRANT
PROCESS:
- Fiscal will conduct preliminary investigation (complainant will
file a complaint with evidence)
- Probable cause in preliminary investigation is determined by
the fiscal (whether an offense has been committed and the
accused has committed it)
- After fiscal finds probable cause he will submit report or
information to the judge
- Judge will determine whether there is probable cause to issue
warrant (whether or not a crime has been committed, and the
accused should be arrested or taken into custody)
- Personal determination of judge, should not rely based on the
information or report of prosecutor
Instances where warrant is not judicial (issued by judge)
1.) issued by Customs
2.) Deportation cases
- Its necessary that during determination of probable cause the
judge should issue an order (judge must state that he made
personal determination of probable cause)
MAYOR BAI UNGGIE D. ABDULA and ODIN ABDULA, vs.
HON. JAPAL M. GUIANI
A complaint or information can only be filed if it is approved or
authorized by the provincial or city fiscal or chief state
prosecutor. Petitioner points to the fact that the
information was filed at around 4:00 p.m. of the January 2,
1995 and the order of arrest was immediately issued the
following day or on January 3, 1995. Moreover, petitioner
argues, respondent judge did not even issue an order stating
that there is probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of
arrest. It must be stressed that the 1987 Constitution requires
the judge to determine probable cause "personally," a
requirement which does not appear in the corresponding
provisions of our previous constitutions. This emphasis evinces
the intent of the framers to place a greater degree of
responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under
previous Constitutions. What the Constitution underscores
is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge
to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required
to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate
the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving
at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
In the case at bench, respondent admits that he issued the
questioned warrant as there was "no reason for (him) to doubt
the validity of the certification made by the Assistant
Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was conducted and
that probable cause was found to exist as against those
charged in the information filed." The statement is an
admission that respondent relied solely and completely on the
certification made by the fiscal that probable cause exists as
against those charged in the information and issued the
challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the
prosecutor's findings and recommendations. He adopted the
judgment of the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable
cause as his own. Although the prosecutor enjoys the
legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official
duties, which in turn gives his report the presumption of
accuracy, nothing less than the fundamental law of the land
commands the judge to personally determine probable cause
in the issuance of warrants of arrest. A judge fails in this
constitutionally mandated duty if he relies merely on the
certification or report of the investigating officer. To be
sure, we cannot determine beforehand how cursory or
exhaustive the respondent's examination of the records should
be. The extent of the judge's examination depends on the
exercise of his sound discretion as the circumstances of the
case require. In the case at bench, the respondent had before
him two different informations and resolutions charging two
different sets of suspects. In the face of these conflicting
resolutions, it behooves him not to take the certification of the
investigating prosecutor at face value. The circumstances thus
require that respondent look beyond the bare certification of
the investigating prosecutor and examine the documents
supporting the prosecutor's determination of probable cause.
The inordinate haste that attended the issuance of the warrant
of arrest and respondent's own admission are circumstances
that tend to belie any pretense of the fulfillment of this duty.
Clearly, respondent judge, by merely stating that he
had no reason to doubt the validity of the certification made by
the investigating prosecutor has abdicated his duty under the
Constitution to determine on his own the issue of probable
cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. Consequently, the
warrant of arrest should be declared null and void.
Ho vs. People
First, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a
purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether
there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor
passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether
there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order
not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base their
findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be
no confusion as to their distinct objectives.
Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely
solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to
justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and
understandably, the contents of the prosecutor's report will support his
own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused for an
offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide
independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than
the prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own
findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue
an arrest order. This responsibility of determining personally and
independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is
lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of the land.
Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge and
speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the
information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so
much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable the His
Honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding on whether to
issue a warrant of arrest.
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case
during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by
the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging
them to examine the complete records of every case all the time simply
for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required,
rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents
(such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements
of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to
make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to
verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable
cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the
prosecutor's recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case.
Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in
the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives
his report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat,
commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the
issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a
judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or
the report of the investigating officer.
ATTY. EDGAR H. TALINGDAN vs. JUDGE HENEDINO P.
EDUARTE
Interpreting the words "personal determination" we said that it
does not thereby mean that judges are obliged to conduct the
personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses
themselves. To require thus would be to unduly laden them
with preliminary examinations and investigations of criminal
complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before them. Rather what is emphasized merely is
the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself as to the existence of probable cause. To this
end he may: (a) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding
the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis thereof he finds
no probable cause, disregard the prosecutor's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to
aid him in determining its existence. What he is never allowed
to do is follow blindly the prosecutor's bare certification as to
the existence of probable cause. Much more is required by the
constitutional provision. Judges have to go over the report, the
affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes if any, and other
documents supporting the prosecutor's certification. Although
the extent of the judge's personal examination depends on the
circumstances of each case, to be sure, he cannot just rely on
the bare certification alone but must go beyond it. This is
because the warrant of arrest issues not on the strength of the
certification standing alone but because of the records which
sustain it. He should even call for the complainant and the
witnesses to answer the court's probing questions when the
circumstances warrant.
In the case at bench respondent Judge not only failed to follow
the required procedure but worse, was negligent enough not to
have noticed that there was not even a prosecutor's
certification to rely upon since no information had even been
filed yet in court, and that Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1373 was
merely docketed as such on the strength of a mere complaint
filed by the private complainant Leoncio Dalin Sr. himself.
Respondent Judge admitted that he signed the Warrant of
Arrest against complainant and the latter's client simply
because it was presented to him for signature by the Criminal
Docket Clerk. There was thus a total and unwarranted
abdication of a judicial function. Respondent cannot exculpate
himself from administrative liability by contending that the
mistake was entirely attributable to the Criminal Docket Clerk
who failed to faithfully comply with her "duty" of going over the
records of criminal cases and ensuring first that an information
had already been filed in court before preparing the warrant of
arrest. As we have already repeatedly said, a judge cannot
take refuge behind the inefficiency of his court personnel for
they are not guardians of his responsibilities. More importantly
the responsibility delegated by respondent was clearly
unauthorized and unwarranted, as already explained above.
He cannot without abandoning his judicial obligation just
instruct the Criminal Docket Clerk, through the much vaunted
Check List for Criminal Cases that he had prepared for her to
follow, to automatically prepare warrants of arrest simply
because informations have been filed against the accused.
Although respondent's purpose in preparing the Check List,
i.e., to help him comply with RA 8493 otherwise known as the
Speedy Trial Act of 1998, may be considered laudable, we
have already said that shortcuts in judicial processes are to be
avoided when they impede rather than promote a judicious
dispensation of justice. Much more when, as in the instant
case, the shortcut amounted to a violation of a constitutional
provision.
A judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the
certification of the investigating officer as to the existence of
probable cause making him administratively liable. We can do
no less in the case of herein respondent who issued the
subject warrant of arrest without even such certification to rely
upon, and worse, merely at the instance of the Criminal Docket
Clerk who mechanically typed the Warrant of Arrest for his
signature.
VICENTE LIM, SR. and MAYOR SUSANA LIM vs. HON.
NEMESIO S. FELIX
Warrant of arrest, when issued. If the judge be satisfied from the
preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer that
the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant
or order for his arrest.
Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the
information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. This
has been the rule since U.S. v. Ocampo (18 Phil. 1) and Amarga v. Abbas (98
Phil. 739). And this evidently is the reason for the issuance by respondent of
the questioned orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982. Without
the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a
matter of long-standing practice had been attached to the information filed in
his sala, respondent found the informations inadequate bases for the
determination of probable cause. For as the ensuing events would show, after
petitioners had submitted the required affidavits, respondent wasted no time in
issuing the warrants of arrest in the case where he was satisfied that probable
cause existed.
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not
for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to
ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the
Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The
Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself,
the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report,
the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other
supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are
material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.
And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary
inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the
offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are
conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no
confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the
warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper
whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be
subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the function
of the Prosecutor.
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as
in this case where all the records of the investigation are in
Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable
cause. The determination is made by the Provincial
Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been
satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent
Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued
the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no
basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal
determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the
Constitution. He could not possibly have known what
transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification.
Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners'
motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the
mere certification and recommendation of the respondent
Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue
a warrant of arrest.
We reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Makasiar that the Judge
does not have to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as
a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there
should be a report and necessary documents supporting the
Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the
Judge.
The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report
and its annexes depends on the circumstances of each case.
We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive
the Judge's examination should be. The Judge has to exercise
sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is
vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as
detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be
sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification
and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call
for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the
court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case
so require. It is worthy to note that petitioners Vicente
Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim presented to the respondent Judge
documents of recantation of witnesses whose testimonies were
used to establish a prima facie case against them. Although,
the general rule is that recantations are not given much weight
in the determination of a case and in the granting of a new trial,
the respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest
should, at the very least, have gone over the records of the
preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the
evidence now presented by the concerned witnesses in view of
the "political undertones" prevailing in the cases. In
making the required personal determination, a Judge is not
precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by
responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the
circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's
sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion
when having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of
arrest. Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave
error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certification and
issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having
before him any other basis for his personal determination of
the existence of a probable cause.
Hot pursuit: the policeman should have personal
knowledge that the suspect committed the crime. The test is
probable cause, which is defined as "an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion."
Under this rule, the policeman does not need to actually
witness the execution or acts constituting the offense. But he
must have direct knowledge, or view of the crime, right after its
commission.
Policeman must have personal knowledge that a crime has
been committed, either by report or other information
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO SINOC y
SUMAYLO
As regards Sinoc's claim of illegal arrest, the law provides that
an arrest without warrant may be licitly effected by a peace
officer, inter alia, "When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it."
There is no question that the police officers in this
case were aware that an offense had just been committed: i.e.,
that some twelve hours earlier, a "Pajero" belonging to a
private company had been stolen ("carnapped") and its driver
and passenger shot, the former having died and the latter
being on the verge of death. Nor is there any doubt that an
informer ("asset") had reported that the stolen "Pajero" was at
the Bliss Housing Project at Moncayo. It was precisely to
recover the "Pajero" that a team composed of SPO1 Michael
Aringo and "joint elements of 459 PNP MFC and Monkayo
Police Stn led by Insptr Eden T. Ugale," went to that place and,
on taking custody of the "Pajero," forthwith dispatched a radio
message to "Higher Headquarters" advising of that fact.
There is no question either that when SPO1 Aringo
and his companions reached the place where the "Pajero" was
parked, they were told by Paulino Overa, owner of the
apartment behind which the vehicle was parked, that the man
who had brought the "Pajero" would be back by 12:00 noon;
that the person thus described did in fact show up at about
10:00 A.M., and was immediately identified by Overa as "the
one who rode on that car 'pajero;'" just as there is no question
that when the police officers accosted him, Sinoc had the key
to the stolen "Pajero" and was in the act of moving toward it
admittedly to take possession of it (after having arrived by bus
from Tagum together with another suspect, "Ram"). Sinoc's link
to the stolen vehicle (and hence to the kidnapping and killing
accompanying its asportation) was thus palpable.
The foregoing circumstances left the police officers no
alternative save to arrest Sinoc and take possession of the
"Pajero." His arrest without warrant was justified; indeed, it was
in the premises the officers' clear duty to apprehend him; their
omission to do so would have been inexcusable. Sinoc's
assault against the propriety of his interrogation after his
warrantless arrest, because conducted without advice to him of
his constitutional rights, is pointless. It is true that, as candidly
admitted by the arresting officers, their initial interrogation of
Sinoc was made without his first being told of his
corresponding rights. This is inconsequential, for the
prosecution never attempted to prove what he might have said
on that occasion.
- There was probable cause that the person to be arrested was
the actual driver of the pajero because he (Sinoc) had the key,
this was enough basis.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO MANLULU
Certainly, the police authorities should have first obtained a
warrant for the arrest of accused Rolando Manlulu, and for the
search and seizure of his personal effects. The killing took
place at one o'clock in the morning. The arrest and the
consequent search and seizure came at around seven o'clock
that evening, some nineteen hours later. This instance cannot
come within the purview of a valid warrantless arrest.
Paragraph (b), Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that the arresting officer must have
"personal knowledge" of an offense which "has in fact just
been committed." In the instant case, neither did Pat. Perez
have "personal knowledge," nor was the offense "in fact just
been committed." While Pat. Perez may have personally
gathered the information which led to the arrest of Manlulu,
that is not enough. The law requires "personal knowledge."
Obviously, "personal gathering of information" is different from
"personal knowledge." The rule requires that the arrest
immediately follows the commission of the offense, not some
nineteen hours later.
- In invalid arrests, police must release the arrested person but
the police can still file a case against the said suspect.
- Police must determine whether there are witnesses.
- In arresting, the police must have probable cause (that the
person to be arrested has committed the crime).
- Police officer must be guided by probable cause.
- Police cannot just arrest, he must have additional basis that
the person to be arrested in deed committed the crime. He
must have factual basis and conduct further research.
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without
warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days after
the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus,
petitioner argues, the crime had not been "just committed" at
the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police
officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the
shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal
knowledge" required for the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest.
The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon
Umil v. Ramos is, in the circumstances of this case, misplaced.
In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court sustained
the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioners made from
one (1) to fourteen days after the actual commission of the
offenses, upon the ground that such offenses constituted
"continuing crimes." Those offenses were subversion,
membership in an outlawed organization like the New People's
Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner
was arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously
commenced and completed at one definite location in time and
space. No one had pretended that the fatal shooting of
Maguan was a "continuing crime." Petitioner's
"arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan.
The "arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the
meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly
shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days
after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when
[the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the
meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting"
officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The
information upon which the police acted had been derived from
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting
one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to
take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which
turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That
information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge."
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest
of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too
that Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:
Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. When a
person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable
by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by
the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit
of the offended party or arresting office or person
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person
arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in
accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the
assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a
responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may
apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its
inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation
having been first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from
the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the
manner prescribed in this Rule. (Emphasis supplied)
is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When
he walked into San Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2)
lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police
authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all
probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain
Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the
police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the
latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to
determine whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in
court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the
Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of
Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out
a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner
was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have
been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner
had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled
to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary
investigation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after
Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in
the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they
found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow
block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-
witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen
and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under
those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of
the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two
others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a
warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a
warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.
In Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the arrest of the accused without a
warrant was effected one (1) day after he had shot to death two
Capcom soldiers.
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched
for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to
leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the
most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their
escape in many instances."
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARMANDO
ALVARIO
Alvario consistently protested his warrantless arrest. Suffice it to say
that his arrest falls within the purview of Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, viz.:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
xxx
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; x x x.
The personal knowledge of the arresting officers in the case at bar was
culled from the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed
to Alvario as the man who raped her at the time of his arrest.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WENCESLAO JAYSON
With respect to the arrest, SPO1 Loreto Tenebro testified that at
around 10:00 in the evening of March 16, 1991, while he and
Patrolmen Camotes and Reinerio Racolas were patrolling in their car,
they received a radio message from their camp directing them to
proceed to the Ihaw-Ihaw on Bonifacio Street where there had been a
shooting. Accordingly, they proceeded to the place and there saw the
victim, Nelson Jordan. Bystanders pointed to accused-appellant as the
one who had shot Jordan. They then arrested accused-appellant.
Seized from him was a .38 caliber revolver with serial number 91955.
The firearm was covered by a mission order and memorandum receipt.
Considering these facts, we hold that the warrantless arrest and
search were valid.
Rule 113, 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: . . . .
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it.
In the case at bar there was a shooting. The policemen summoned to
the scene of the crime found the victim. Accused-appellant was pointed
to them as the assailant only moments after the shooting. In fact
accused-appellant had not gone very far (only ten meters away from
the Ihaw-Ihaw), although he was then fleeing. The arresting officers
thus acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the
victim and of facts indicating that accused-appellant was the assailant.
This Court has upheld a warrantless arrest under analogous
circumstances. In People v. Tonog, Jr., the police found the lifeless
body of a person with several stab wounds. An informer pointed to the
accused as the person who had killed the victim. That afternoon, police
officers arrested the accused. On their way to the police station, a
policeman noticed bloodstains on the accuseds pants which, when
examined, was found to be the same blood type O found on the fatal
knife. The Court upheld the warrantless arrest and ruled that the blood-
stained pants, having been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest,
was admissible in evidence.
In People v. Gerente, the police arrested the accused three hours after
the victim had been killed. They went to the scene of the crime where
they found a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block used by the
killers in bludgeoning the victim to death. A neighbor of the accused
who witnessed the killing, pointed to him as one of the assailants. The
warrantless arrest was held valid under Rule 113, 5(b).
In People v. Acol, a group held up a passenger jeepney. Policemen
immediately responded to the report of the crime. One of the victims
saw four persons walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was
wearing his jacket. He pointed them to the policemen. When the group
saw the policemen coming, they ran in different directions. Three were
caught and arrested. Each was found in possession of an unlicensed
revolver and charged with illegal possession of firearms. The accused
claimed that the warrantless seizure of firearms was illegal. The Court
rejected their plea and held that the search was a valid incident of a
lawful arrest.
The subsequent search of accused-appellants person and the seizure
from him of the firearm was likewise lawful.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TIRSO ACOL Y BARNUBAL
With respect to the so-called warrantless arrest of accused--appellant,
we are of the view that the search falls within the purview of Section
5(b) of Rule 113 which serves as an exception to the requisite warrant
prior to arrest: When an offense has in fact been committed, and
the has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; Inasmuch as the police team was formed
and dispatched to look for the persons responsible for the crime on
account of the information related by Percival Tan and Rene Araneta
that they had just been robbed. And since accused-appellant's arrest
was lawful, it follows that the search made incidental thereto was
valid . Moreover, the unlicensed firearms were found when the police
team apprehended the accused for the robbery and not for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition. The principle imparted by
Justice Padilla in Cruz was based on the ruling of this Court in
Magoncia vs. Palacio that:. . . When, in pursuing an illegal action or in
the commission of a criminal offense, the offending police officers
should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any
person, they are not precluded from performing their duties as police
officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the
corpus delicti.
UMIL vs. RAMOS
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural
(G.R. No. 81567) without warrant is justified it can be said that, within
the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was committing an
offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a
member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where
membership penalized, and for subversion which, like rebellion is,
under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing offense, thus:
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses
committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion thereof, or incident
thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No.
2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart
from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a
massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. . . .
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which
includes armed struggle for the overthrow of organized government,
Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, FOR
PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of
arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was identified as one
of several persons who the day before his arrest, without warrant, at
the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their
patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City
as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there
and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would
shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of
organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion
(or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other
so-called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which
generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are
anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the
same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of
overthrowing organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion
by the arresting officers of his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest
was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts that will
be shown hereafter.
Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said,
under the facts of the Umil case, that the arrest of Dural falls under
Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which
requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first, that
the person to be arrested has just committed an offense, and second,
that the arresting peace officer or private person has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one
who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted,
refers to arrests without warrant, based on "personal knowledge of
facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person.
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without
warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to
be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on
actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. 10 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FIDEL ABRENICA
CUBCUBIN, JR
Accused-appellant contends that his arrest, effected on August 26,
1997 without a warrant, was illegal. On this point, Rule 113, 5(b) of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
Under 5(b), two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest
to be valid: first, the offender has just committed an offense
and, second, the arresting peace officer or private person has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it. It has been held that personal
knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion.
In this case, the arrest of accused-appellant was effected
shortly after the victim was killed. The question, therefore, is
whether there was probable cause for PO3 Rosal and SPO1
Malinao, Jr., the arresting officers, to believe that accused-
appellant committed the crime. We hold that there was none.
The two did not have personal knowledge of facts indicating
that accused-appellant had committed the crime. Their
knowledge of the circumstances from which they allegedly
inferred that accused-appellant was probably guilty was based
entirely on what they had been told by others, to wit: by
someone who called the PNP station in San Antonio, Cavite
City at about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997 and
reported that a man had been killed along Julian Felipe
Boulevard of the said city; by an alleged witness who saw
accused-appellant and the victim coming out of the Sting Cafe;
by Danet Garcellano, waitress at the Sting Cafe, who said that
the man last seen with the victim was lean, mustachioed, dark-
complexioned and was wearing a white t-shirt and a pair of
brown short pants; by a tricycle driver named Armando Plata
who told them that the physical description given by Garcellano
fitted accused-appellant, alias Jun Dulce and who said he
knew where accused-appellant lived and accompanied them to
accused-appellants house. Thus, PO3 Rosal and SPO1
Malinao, Jr. merely relied on information given to them by
others.
In an analogous case, the police was informed that the
accused was involved in subversive activities. On the basis of
this information, the police arrested the accused and, in the
course of the arrest, allegedly recovered an unlicensed firearm
and some subversive materials from the latter. This Court held
that the arresting officers had no personal knowledge since
their information came entirely from an informant. It was
pointed out that at the time of his arrest, the accused was not
in possession of the firearm nor engaged in subversive
activities. His arrest without a warrant could not be justified
under 5(b).
In another case, the accused, in a case of robbery with rape,
were arrested solely on the basis of the identification given by
one of the victims. This Court held the arrest to be illegal for
lack of personal knowledge of the arresting officers.
CHECKPOINTS requisites:
1.) Involves only a brief detention.
2.) Vehicle should not be searched; limited to ocular search
only.
3.) Location of the checkpoint (should be blatant or can easily
be seen, with enough lighting; should not be in the dark)
Section 3.
1. The privacy of communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the
court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law.
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
- Right to privacy is inviolable.
Exception: 1.) upon lawful order of the court; 2.) when public
safety or order requires otherwise; 3.) as provided by law.
Distinguish Section 3 from Anti-wiretapping act
AWTA prohibits recording of conversation in telephones.
Exception: 1.) Human Security Act (government is allowed to
eavesdrop or record conversation to prevent terrorism)
AWTA it is a penal law. It punishes wiretapping
Section 3: not a penal provision. If you violate this, the
evidence obtained cannot be used. If you violate this, you
cannot file for injunction and damages (a.k.a. independent civil
action)
AWTA only covers oral communication
Section 3: includes both oral and written communication
R.A. 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Act)
1. The law does not distinguish between a party to the
private communication or a third person. Hence, both
a party and a third person could be held liable under
R.A. 4200 if they commit any of the prohibited acts
under R.A. 4200 (Ramirez v. Ca)
1. The use of a telephone extension to overhear a
private conversation is not a violation of R.A. 4200
because it is not similar to any of the prohibited
devices under the law. Also, a telephone extension is
not purposely installed for the purpose of secretly
intercepting or recording private communication.
(Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112)
Types of communication protected:
Letters, messages, telephone calls, telegrams and the like.
Exclusionary rule:
Any evidence obtained shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. However, in the absence of governmental
interference, the protection against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals.
TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed a complaint for
annulment of marriage. Among the exhibits offered by private
respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone
conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
These tape recordings were made and obtained when private
respondent allowed his friends from the military to wiretap his
home telephone. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit
and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the
Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly
makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the
telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same,
the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under
Rep. Act No. 4200.
CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo
Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her
husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a
driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers
and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting
of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized
for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed
against her husband.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible
in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy
of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a
"lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any
one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other
and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between
the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife
may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one
thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the
other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.
BRICCIO "Ricky" A. POLLO vs. CHAIRPERSON KARINA
CONSTANTINO-DAVID
This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a
government employee who was charged administratively and
eventually dismissed from the service. The employees personal files
stored in the computer were used by the government employer as
evidence of misconduct.
Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which
contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a
separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that
his office was always locked and not open to other employees or
visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any
means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files.
On the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance office of
the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like
friends, associates and even unknown people, whom he even allowed
to use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request. He
described his office as "full of people, his friends, unknown people" and
that in the past 22 years he had been discharging his functions at the
PALD, he is "personally assisting incoming clients, receiving
documents, drafting cases on appeals, in charge of accomplishment
report, Mamamayan Muna Program, Public Sector Unionism,
Correction of name, accreditation of service, and hardly had anytime
for himself alone, that in fact he stays in the office as a paying
customer."46 Under this scenario, it can hardly be deduced that
petitioner had such expectation of privacy that society would recognize
as reasonable.
The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees
on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they
create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the
CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both
automated or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections
may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for
such legitimate business purposes. The search of petitioners
computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-
related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint
addressed to Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-
ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na
division is supposedly "lawyering" for individuals with pending cases in
the CSC.
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative
policy, there is no doubt in the mind of the Commission that the search
of Pollos computer has successfully passed the test of
reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as
enunciated in the above-discussed American authorities. It bears
emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its capacity
as a government employer and that it was undertaken in
connection with an investigation involving a work-related
misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted from the warrant
requirement. At the inception of the search, a complaint was received
recounting that a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was
"lawyering" for parties having pending cases with the said regional
office or in the Commission. The nature of the imputation was
serious, as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC
employee was found to be furtively engaged in the practice of
"lawyering" for parties with pending cases before the Commission
would be a highly repugnant scenario, then such a case would have
shattering repercussions. It would undeniably cast clouds of doubt
upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial
agency, and in the process, render it less effective in fulfilling its
mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of administrative
justice. It is settled that a court or an administrative tribunal must not
only be actually impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the
general public would not have any trust and confidence in it.
Petitioners claim of violation of his constitutional right to
privacy must necessarily fail. His other argument invoking the
privacy of communication and correspondence under Section
3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable
considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate
intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government
workplace under the aforecited authorities. The search of
petitioners computer was justified there being reasonable
ground for suspecting that the files stored therein would yield
incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation being
conducted by CSC as government employer of such
misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. The
computer from which the personal files of herein petitioner
were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence
government property the use of which the CSC has absolute
right to regulate and monitor.
VALMONTE v. BELMONTE, JR.
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to access to the
documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS.
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and
the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the
information sought clearly a matter of public interest and
concern.
Respondent however contends that in view of the right to
privacy which is equally protected by the Constitution and by
existing laws, the documents evidencing loan transactions of
the GSIS must be deemed outside the ambit of the right to
information.
When the information requested from the government intrudes
into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the
rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the
competing interests of these rights need not be resolved in this
case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the Court
in Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in
his private capacity, and not to public and governmental
agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked
by juridical entities like the GSIS. As held in the case of Vassar
College v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co., a corporation has no right of
privacy in its name since the entire basis of the right to privacy
is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a
corporation would have no such ground for relief.
Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the
respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The
right is purely personal in nature, and hence may be invoked
only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.
It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the
concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they
choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public
offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to
have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the
interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures,
most especially those holding responsible positions in
government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared
to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer
public scrutiny.
ALEJANO vs. CABUAY
Petitioners also point out that the officials of the ISAFP
Detention Center violated the detainees right to privacy of
communication when the ISAFP officials opened and read the
personal letters of Trillanes and Capt. Milo Maestrecampo
("Maestrecampo"). Petitioners further claim that the ISAFP
officials violated the detainees right against cruel and unusual
punishment when the ISAFP officials prevented the detainees
from having contact with their visitors. Moreover, the ISAFP
officials boarded up with iron bars and plywood slabs the iron
grills of the detention cells, limiting the already poor light and
ventilation in the detainees cells. Pre-trial detainees do not
forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement. However,
the fact that the detainees are confined makes their rights
more limited than those of the public. RA 7438, which specifies
the rights of detainees and the duties of detention officers,
expressly recognizes the power of the detention officer to
adopt and implement reasonable measures to secure the
safety of the detainee and prevent his escape. Any
security officer with custodial responsibility over any detainee
or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as
may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his
escape. The regulations governing a detainees confinement
must be "reasonable measures x x x to secure his safety and
prevent his escape." Thus, the regulations must be reasonably
connected to the governments objective of securing the safety
and preventing the escape of the detainee. The law grants the
detention officer the authority to "undertake such reasonable
measures" or regulations.
Petitioners argument that the officials of the ISAFP Detention
Center violated the detainees right to privacy when the ISAFP
officials opened and read the letters handed by detainees
Trillanes and Maestrecampo to one of the petitioners for
mailing. Petitioners point out that the letters were not in a
sealed envelope but simply folded because there were no
envelopes in the ISAFP Detention Center. Petitioners contend
that the Constitution prohibits the infringement of a citizens
privacy rights unless authorized by law. The Solicitor General
does not deny that the ISAFP officials opened the letters.
While persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many protections of
the Constitution, it is also clear that imprisonment carries with it
the circumscription or loss of many significant rights. These
constraints on inmates, and in some cases the complete
withdrawal of certain rights, are "justified by the considerations
underlying our penal system." The curtailment of certain rights
is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad
of "institutional needs and objectives" of prison facilities, chief
among which is internal security. Of course, these restrictions
or retractions also serve, incidentally, as reminders that, under
our system of justice, deterrence and retribution are factors in
addition to correction. The letters were not in a sealed
envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid
measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of
sealed letters for the inspection of contraband.
Human Security Act of 2007
SEC. 7. Surveillance of Suspects and Interception and Recording
of Communications. -The provisions of Republic Act No. 4200 (Anti-
Wire Tapping Law) to the contrary notwithstanding, a police or law
enforcement official and the members of his team may, upon a written
order of the Court of Appeals, listen to, intercept and record, with the
use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other surveillance
equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any
other suitable ways and means for that purpose, any communication,
message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words
between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization, association, or group of persons or of any person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism. Provided, That surveillance, interception
and recording of communications between lawyers and clients, doctors
and patients, journalists and their sources and confidential business
correspondence shall not be authorized.
Exclusionary Rule:
- Case should not be immediately dismissed if there are other
evidences; but if there are no other valid evidences, case may
be dismissed.
- Exclusionary rule is applied only to searches, not arrest
- Right to question admissibility of evidence may be waived.
Question must be raised as early as pre-trial, but the proper
time is during the presentation of evidence.
- Objection must be made known as early as possible.
- Illegality of arrest must be raised before entering plea;
otherwise, it is deemed waived.
- Waiver of illegality of arrest does not carry with it the waiver of
inadmissibility of evidence, you can still question the evidence.

The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities

were not confidential letters between the detainees and their
lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees
Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the
detainees personal courier and not as their counsel when he
received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the
letters were not confidential communication between the
detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP
Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are
marked confidential communication between the detainees and
their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters
but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of
the detainees. That a law is required before an executive
officer could intrude on a citizens privacy rights is a guarantee
that is available only to the public at large but not to persons
who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those
detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the
limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the
very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted
prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights.
(Communications that cant be read are those coming and
going to lawyers; protected by attorney-client confidentiality)

The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person

whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

- Prerogative writ issued by the courts

- Remedy of person whose right to privacy has been violated
- Right to privacy must be in connection to right to life, liberty,
or security.