Apfelbaum - Some Problems in Contemporary Ego Psychology

(1962).
Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 10:526-

537
Some Problems in Contemporary Ego Psychology
Bernard Apfelbaum, Ph.D.
THE ESSENTIAL feat which contemporary ego theorists claim to have
accomplished is to have provided the ego with additional motive power
without effecting a corresponding diminution in the role of the instinctual
drives (6). The popularity of this theoretical innovation rests on the belief that
it takes account of increased clinical emphasis on ego functioning while
leaving fundamental assumptions regarding instinctual drives intact. This
paper presents the proposition that contemporary ego psychology has not
accomplished this end.
The Ego and Id in Freud's Work
In the context of Freud's early, provisional theoretical model, the ego was
an inherently potent force in psychic functioning. It was conceived as an
autonomous structure, operating with power provided by its own energy
source (the self-preservation instinct) (2), (13). Freud's later emphasis on
aggression eclipsed the role of the ego instincts (3), (8). The ego became a
system established through experience, with no primary motive power of its
ownthe rider who must hold the superior strength of the horse (id) in check,
often obliged to guide it where it wants to go (and unable to dismount) (3).
The ego also had to contend with the superego, a system originally developed
by the ego as an aid to repression which exacts its cost through lifelong
domination of the ego.
The ego generated by the tripartite model in The Ego and the Id is
dramatically weak, so much so that it becomes difficult to provide sufficient
motive power for this structure to account for

Submitted November 3, 1959
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nonpathological goal-directed (and goal-conscious) striving. While Freud
recognized this as one of the facets of the theory which would require further
conceptualization, he essentially left the ego in this state, although he spoke of
the possibility of a "neutral displaceable energy, " perhaps desexualized
libido, which could drive the ego (3).
In The Ego and the Id, Freud had indicated the dependence of the ego on
the superego and the id and "revealed how powerless and apprehensive it
was in regard to both and with what an effort it maintained its superiority
over them." In Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety Freud observed that
because of his previous statement this view "has been widely echoed in
psychoanalytic literature" and "a great deal of stress has been laid on the
weakness of the ego in relation to the id " (4p. 28). Wishing to correct this
impression, Freud stressed the ego's "astonishing power" over the id, pointing
out that it controls access to consciousness and the pathways to action.
However, further conceptual provision for the sources of energy required for
the ego to perform these functions did not fall within the scope of this work.
Freud briefly returned to this problem in his last papers. Here he raised the
possibility of primary autonomous energy accruing to the ego as a
consequence of basic structural dispositions such as the synthetic function
(11). However, this possibility was not systematically developed by Freud,
perhaps because he believed that when biologically given energies which are
independent of drive are assigned to the ego, the distinction between ego and
id begins to diminish in significance: "When we recognize that the
peculiarities of the ego which we detect in the form of resistances may be not
only acquired in defensive conflicts but determined by heredity, the
topographical differentiation between ego and id loses much of its value for
our investigations" (5p. 344). Thus, in effect, Freud cautions those who would
provide the ego with first-order energy that to do so may correspondingly
diminish the role of instinctual drive as a psychic determinant.
The Ego and The Id in Contemporary Ego Theory
Contemporary ego theorists have been well aware of this problem, and
consequently have stressed their desire to preserve the
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role of instinctual drive without modification. Their solution rests on the two
basic constructs of primary and secondary ego autonomy.
Secondary Ego Autonomy
Secondary ego autonomy represents a reaffirmation of sublimatory
processes and a systematic development of Freud's suggestions regarding the
desexualization of libido for the use of the ego. Although this is a relatively
direct derivation from the basic model, its very emphasis on the displacement
of motive power would seem to divert the focus from instinctual energies.
Gill makes this point by stating that "If a good deal of normal behavior is
ascribed to derivative semiautonomous motivations which can be conscious,
by just that much is unconscious motivation shorn of its significance in
normal behavior [italics mine]." However, he adds: "Yet there has not been
any diminution in psychoanalysis of emphasis on unconscious motivation"
(6pp. 4-5). He calls this a "seeming paradox, " believing that the
contradiction disappears when it is recognized that semiautonomous
motivations are derivative. Nevertheless, his first comment portends a shift in
emphasis, although the possibilities of such a shift are more apparent in
connection with the construct of primary ego autonomy.
Primary Ego Autonomy
This construct was presaged by Freud's suggestion, in Inhibibitions,
Symptoms and Anxiety, that the ego is not solely dependent on sublimated
energy, but is capable of acting in harmony with the drives and thus
harnessing primary energy: " if a real split has occurred between the two
[ego and id], the weakness of the ego becomes apparent. But if the ego
remains bound up with the id and indistinguishable from it, then it displays its
power" (4p. 31). The current construct of primary ego autonomy is intended to
provide the ego with primary energy which is continuously available and
relatively independent of vicissitudes in the relationship between ego and id.
While this is by no means an exhumation of the "ego drives, " the route to such
a development is not adequately blocked off. This proposition may be
clarified
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by a summary of the thinking which gave rise to the concept of primary ego
autonomy.
Rapaport points out that in The Ego and the Id Freud "assumed that the ego
and the id conflicted, and yet we learn that the ego itself was born out of
conflict." He then asks, "how are we to conceive of the participants of this
original conflict? Note the circularity: The ego is both born out of the conflict,
and party to the conflict. How can we explain this seeming contradiction?"
(18pp. 249, 252).
Rapaport proposes to resolve the dilemma he raised by positing inborn
ego factors, claiming kinship for this notion with Freud's remarks regarding
the possibility of inherited ego functions in "Analysis Terminable and
Interminable." Here Rapaport turns to Hartmann's conception of ego and id
developing out of a previously undifferentiated matrix (9), (12). Contained
within this undifferentiated nucleus are the inborn structural dispositions
which grow into the ego. These dispositions are primary and autonomous, and
thereby the ego is seen as having antecedents which exist before the
appearance of conflict between ego and id. However, it is also in "Analysis
Terminable and Interminable" that Freud voices the caution (quoted above)
that assignment of primary energy to the ego weakens the basic conception of
the relationship between ego and id.
A further threat to the positions of ego and id in the psychoanalytic model
is posed by the lack of meaningful limits on the construct of primary ego
autonomy. This construct, unlike "secondary ego autonomy, " is a potentially
radical innovation. As suggested above, it leaves the way open for
formulations which are reminiscent of the discarded "ego drives" but which
do not depart from the logic of ego theory.
An extension of the scope of primary ego autonomy. An example of
such a development is provided by Grauer (7). He readily accepts the notion
that ego and id develop out of a previously undifferentiated common matrix.
Taking the next logical step, he wonders why it cannot be assumed that the
ego derives all of its autonomous motive power from this source. Since both
ego and id develop out of a common source from which both derive their
energy, it seems unnecessary to construct additional sources of

1 Grauer adds that "a process of neutralization could still occur under
certain conditions, as in situations where drives are 'sublimated'." However,
Hartmann uses the terms "sublimation" and "neutralization" essentially
synonymously, restrained in this usage principally by the fact that
"sublimation" as used by Freud referred only to the neutralization of libido,
a usage which is still dominant in analytic literature, whereas
"neutralization" is meant to refer to the deinstinctualization of both
aggression and libido (10p. 18). What Grauer apparently means to suggest
here is that the concept of neutralization could still be used in his conceptual
scheme, but it would be seen primarily as a disguised mode of instinctual
expression, rather than as a process by which energy is provided for the
implementation of autonomous ego aims.
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energy for the ego, just as it is unnecessary to do so for the id. Consequently,
Grauer finds the construct of secondary ego autonomy unwarranted: "Can we
then not assume that the energy with which the ego operates stems from this
common source without hypothesizing a prior process of neutralization? Why
is one compelled to postulate that the undifferentiated energy is first
transformed into drive cathexis and then neutralized before the ego can utilize
it, when a more direct route is available? It would seem that a better case for
ego autonomy can be made if autonomous ego operations are considered as
dependent on the ego's own energies rather than on those transferred to it from
the drives" (7p. 506). Thus, Grauer would dispose of the construct of
secondary ego autonomy, making all "autonomous ego operations" dependent
on "the ego's own energies, " that is, on primary autonomous ego energies. He
sees no need for postulating a derivative process such as "neutralization"
whereby instinctual energies can become autonomous, although he agrees that
Freud's original conception of the relationship between ego and id does
require such a process since it provides for only one energy source, and this
lies within the id.1
Grauer also asserts that Rapaport's exposition of primary ego autonomy is
incomplete because "the emphasis appears to be exclusively on the defensive
and inhibiting aspects of ego functioning, " and then asks: "can one not
formulate a more satisfactory explanation of ego autonomy by including its
more positive features?" (7p. 507). He goes on to declare that "this line of
thinking leads us into a field of inquiry that Hartmann's concept of primary
ego autonomy has uncovered but which, it seems to the writer, has not been
pursued to its logical conclusion" (7p. 512). Grauer
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attempts to accomplish this latter end both by proposing that the concept of
secondary ego autonomy be dropped and also by proposing that the ego's
"more positive" and "constructive" activities be seen as primary and
autonomous. To implement the latter proposal he recommends that the
"essential core" of "altruism" be considered one of the ego's primary and
autonomous functions.
Thus, in pursuing Hartmann's constructions to their logical conclusion,
Grauer is led to the formulation of primary ego traits, thereby deriving a
conception of the ego which begins to resemble Freud's discarded model for
the ego, and which may not be easy to distinguish from revisionist models.
Clearly, such a conception leaves the way open for a decentralization of the
position of the instinctual drives.
It might be argued that Rapaport (and Hartmann) limit the scope of inborn
ego factors to structural characteristics, the "apparatuses": motor, perceptual,
memorial, as well as thresholds for affect expression, and the stimulus
barrier. Grauer himself suggests this in his assertion that Rapaport places
exclusive emphasis on the inhibiting aspects of primary ego functions. Hence,
Grauer's extension of these functions may not be defensible. Two lines of
thought are pertinent here. The first is Grauer's fundamental point that it is not
inconsistent with Hartmann's formulations to apportion a larger share of the
original undifferentiated energy to the ego. The second is to be found in
Rapaport's own evaluation of the implications of Hartmann's work: Rapaport
states that the ego apparatuses of primary autonomy in coordination with the
average expectable environment create a state of adaptedness "which is prior
to conflict and not a product of conflict solution, and thus is not wrung from
the instinctual drives by the exigencies of reality. Thus he [Hartmann]
provided a conceptual explanation of the relatively autonomous and adaptive
character of the secondary process." Continuing in this vein, Rapaport adds
that "the crucial characteristic of this psychosocial theory of ego development
[here he has reference to Erikson's work], and of Hartmann's adaptation
theory is that they offer a conceptual explanation of the individual's social
development by tracing the unfolding of the genetically social character of
the human individual
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[italics Rapaport's]. Thus it is not assumed that societal norms are grafted
upon the genetically asocial individual by 'disciplines' and 'socialization' "
(19pp. 12, 15). This assumption of inborn social trends (which, to be sure,
are seen as molded by socialization) demonstrated by Rapaport for
Hartmann's theory suggests the type of extension of the theory which Grauer
has constructed. Indeed, the conception of the "genetically social character of
the human individual" makes appropriate Grauer's choice of altruism as an
example of a primary ego trait.
The foregoing suggests the conclusion that, as Freud predicted, the
construct of primary ego energy diminishes the significance of the id as a
source of motive power. This effect can also be seen in the renewed emphasis
on energies which can become remote from their origins in drive energy
(secondary ego energy). Further, the potential for expansion of the scope of
the conception of primary ego energy poses an additional threat to
fundamental assumptions regarding the instinctual drives. Hence, the claim
that these fundamental assumptions remain unthreatened by such conceptions
would seem to reflect a wish which has not yet found adequate expression in
the constructions of ego psychology.
The Conceptual Framework of Ego Theory
It is possible that a source of difficulty inherent in the efforts of Hartmann,
Kris, Rapaport, et al., lies in their conceptual framework. Their theoretical
model is built along the lines of the familiar thermodynamic energy analogue,
thereby giving rise to a level of terminological complexity and abstraction
which can become progressively more removed from clinical experience.
The Energy Analogy
Any attempt to reason analogically is based on the assumption that when
the phenomenon to be explained or ordered is translated into the terminology
of an analogue, the principles which apply to the analogue will then apply to
the original phenomenon. Once this translation is accomplished, it is then
necessary to retranslate the now transformed material so as to apply it back to
the original phenomenon to be explained or ordered. This requires
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fluency both in the original realm of discourse and in the analogous realm, not
only to carry out effectively the continuous operation of translation and
retranslation, but also to avoid forcing material in the original realm to fit
principles indigenous to the analogous realm which do not applysince no
analogy is perfect. In this instance the original realm consists of psychic
phenomena and the realm presumed to be analogous is that of thermodynamics
the fluid energy model. The act of translation from one to the other is based
on the assumption that the logic of the fluid energy model can meaningfully
order psychic phenomena. To achieve this translation, ego theory concerns
itself with the origins, transformations, transfers, distributions, and relative
strengths of a variety of energy constructs. As Pumpian-Mindlin has put it,
"Hartmann, Hartmann et al., and Kris have elaborated more on the theoretical
aspects of psychic structure than anyone since Freud. However, it appears to
me that they have encountered methodological problems by retaining the fluid
energy analogy. This has led Hartmann to postulate a number of different
forms of drive energy which have resulted in an increasingly complex and
cumbersome theoretical structure" (17pp. 1049-1050). While conceptions of
this type undoubtedly spring from clinical experience, the act of translation
into a metaphorical framework borrowed from physics can defeat efforts to
apply the measure of clinical experience against such conceptions. The more
the corrective influence of close contact with clinical material is attenuated,
the more theory construction can proliferate, constrained in the end only by
the laws of logic. (Thus, Grauer's extension of the domain of primary ego
autonomy rests primarily on an attempt to pursue Hartmann's thinking to its
logical conclusion.)
Quantitative Explanation
Another source of difficulty inherent in this conceptual framework is the
stress on quantitative as opposed to qualitative forms of explanation. Energy
constructs, when used in the attempt to understand psychic activity, naturally
emphasize hypothetical quantitative variations in the intensities of different
elemental forces. These energies can vary either as a consequence of
biological givens (primary autonomy) or developmental sequences
(secondary
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autonomy); in addition, energic variations made up of sexual, aggressive, and
neutral components can be seen to underlie any complex shifting pattern of
behavior (Kris's concept of "energy flux" [14]). Pumpian-Mindlin, following
his observations quoted above on the use of different forms of drive energy as
an explanatory device in contemporary ego theory, went on to advise "a
careful examination of our use of quantitative concepts of energy , "
supporting this assertion with a statement by Kubie which is strongly critical
of this approach: "It is my thesis that the easy assumption of quantitative
variables as the only ultimate explanation of every variation in behavior is
one of the seductive fallacies to which all psychological theorizing is prone"
(17p. 1050).
An example of the use of quantitative explanation can be found in the
discussion of altruism by Grauer (mentioned above) and by Rapaport.
Rapaport states that "we have known from reconstructions in psychoanalysis
for many years that many altruistic, aesthetic, and anti-violence motivations
are somehow related to reaction formations against impulses of the anal-
sadistic phase. We have all seen that though we could analyze the
reaction formation and its interferences with adjustment, altruism as a
motivating value though it arose as a reaction formation or an altruistic
denialneed not be lost, and mostly is not lost, in successful analyses. To
generalize this point: What came about as a result of conflict, sooner or later
may become independent of the conflict, may become relatively autonomous"
(18p. 255). Hence, for Rapaport this is an example of secondary autonomy.
Grauer, disagreeing with this interpretation of the same example, asks: "But
must one regard all phases of altruistic behavior as the product of reaction
formation against sadism? May not analysis have resolved the excesses and
exaggerations of altruism, leaving an essential core of this tendency, which
may actually be a function of the ego's primary autonomy, rather than a
secondary phenomenon?" (7p. 512).
Both arguments rest on the quantitative aspects of this example. Both
consider a "quantity" of altruism which was "excessive" or "exaggerated" or
which was part of a defensive pattern, but which continues minus pathological
contaminations. However,
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genuine altruism is qualitatively different from defensive altruism, although
superficial similarities between the two may make it possible to use the same
trait name for both. In other words, genuine kindness never kills. This is to
say that pharisaical altruism, or disguised sadism, is the resultant of a quite
different psychic pattern than the genuine altruism to which it may sometimes
achieve a passing likeness. Clearly, the most dynamic explanation of the
transformation of one into the other would focus on the qualitative differences
between the two apparently similar behaviors. However, it is only on this
superficial similarity that ego theory brings to bear its complex explanatory
apparatus.
Freud's purpose in developing the energy analogue was, as Erikson has
characterized it, to link psychic events either with known physiochemical
forces or to assume new forces "equal in dignity" to those inherent in matter
(1). Current extrapolations from this analogue have placed a strain on its
explanatory power in the purely psychic realm. Conceptions of relatively
neutral forms of energyadaptive, even "social"make the potentially
constructable energizing sources so various that the energy analogue may
become as easy a device for pseudo explanation as was the concept of "need"
in early twentieth-century psychology. Kubie asserts that the use of the fluid
energy analogy has led "to the illusion that we have explained a behavioral
phenomenon when in fact we have merely described it in terms of a metaphor
derived from another science" (16p. 996). He also has remarked that "to talk
of hypothetical and unmeasured quantitative variations gives us a feeling of
scientific maturity which may in fact be premature and illusory" (15p. 511).
Formulations employing the mechanics of energy transfer may be
appropriate for the attempt to understand why an instinctual aim can be
satisfied by a variety of modes and objects. However, as Kubie indicates,
undue emphasis on this conceptual device can result merely in the translation
of descriptions of psychic activity into another terminology, with a consequent
loss of explanatory power. The bases of such equivalences among modes and
objects might be explored further through investigations of symbolic
processing, as recommended by Kubie. Additional studies of the basic
processes underlying countercathexis and reaction formation
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could also help to clarify issues regarding the relative influences of ego and
id on psychic activity. Enterprises of this nature are necessarily more
explicitly clinical and hence more subject to the checks and balances of
clinical experience. When appropriate, this approach is more immediately
explanatory.
The foregoing suggests that the problems in contemporary ego psychology
to which this paper is addressed may be partly a consequence of the
properties of the conceptual framework in which they appear. This framework
offers the reward of being able to encompass large masses of material through
the use of broad organizing constructs. However, when the logical
implications of such constructs lead away from generally accepted clinical
principles, it may then become necessary to return to lower-order
propositions. This is to say that, in order to resolve the problems which ego
theory has now raised, it may be necessary to investigate more specific
issues, issues which have a more immediate relationship to clinical
experience, before returning to higher-order theoretical efforts.
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1959
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Article Citation [Who Cited This?]
Apfelbaum, B. (1962). Some Problems in Contemporary Ego Psychology. J.
Amer. Psychoanal. Assn., 10:526-537

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(1962).

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