Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Inc.

Public Management Research Association

Integrating Politics and Organizations: Positive T Author(s): Terry M. Moe

Source:Journal of Public Administration VolResearch.4,Noand.1 Berkeley Symposium on Public Management

(Jan., 199 Published by: OxfordUniversity Press on behalf of the Public ManagemenX

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IntegratingPoliticsandOrganizations:
PositiveTheoryandPublicAdministration
TerryM.Moe

StanfordUniversity

AsIunderstandit,we'vebeengivenabroadmandateheretotalkaboutthestateoftheoryinpublic
administrationandwhereitoughttobeheaded.I'mnotexactlyamainstreammemberofthefield
soIdothiswithabitoftrepidation,knowingthatwhatIhavetosaymaynotsitwellwithsomeof
mycolleagues.Diversityanddebatearehealthyinanyfield,though,andpublicadministrationneeds
alotofthisandmore.Itneedscoherenttheory,rigorousmethods,fargreaterintegrationinto
politicalscienceandconstructivesuggestionsabouthowtoaccomplishallthis.Ouraimshouldbeto
reinvigoratepublicadministrationandseethatitadvancestotheforefrontofmodemsocialscience.

Obviously,Ican'tfurtherthecausetoomuch,ifatall,ina

briefpresentationlikethis.I'llsimplytalkaboutanaspectof

publicadministrationtheorythatIthinkisespeciallyimportant:

thepoliticalfoundationsofbureaucraticorganization.Theissues

havetodowithhowbureaucracyemergesoutofpolitics,howit

getsstructured,andhowallthisshapesitseffectiveness.Thisis

clearlyabigchunkofwhatwewanttoknowaboutbureaucracy.

Yetwehaven'tmademuchprogressovertheyears,andthe

reasons,Iclaim,areduetounderlyingweaknessesinthefield's

theoryandmethodsandtoitsinattentiontopoliticsonmattersof

organization.Inthefewpagesthatfollow,I'llbrieflytryto

explainwhy,andwhatIthinkwemightbeabletodoaboutit.

(Forreaderswhoareinterested,thesethemesaremorefully

exploredinMoe1991.)
THEDICHOTOMYTHATWOULDN'TDIE

Thenaturalbasisforunderstandingpublicbureaucracyis

organizationtheory.Intheearlydays,publicadministration

scholarswereleadersintheorganizationsfield,andtheirconcerns

forunderstandingandimprovinggovernmentorganizationwere

JPART,4(1994):1:1725 wellreflectedinitsresearchagenda.Theyfirmlybelieved,

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TheBerkeleySymposium:PlenaryRoundtable

however,thatgoodgovernmentrequiredtheseparationofpolitics
andadministrationandthatpublicbureaucracywouldworkbestif
itwerestructuredandrunonbusinessprinciples.Theirwaysof
thinkingaboutadministrativeorganizationtheirtheoriesshallwe
sayweredecidedlynonpolitical.

Modempublicadministrationemergedoutofaspiritedrejection
ofthepoliticsadministrationdichotomy.Theinsurgentsargued
thatadministrationisinherentlypoliticalandmustbeunderstood
assuch.Whenitcametotheory,however,theypouredtheir
energiesintoexplaininghowthepoliticalenvironmentshapeswhat
agenciesdoinpoliticsleading,forinstance,totheoriesofcapture
orsubgovernments.Whilethiswascertainlyanimportantmove,
issuesoforganizationwerelargelyshuntedasideintheprocess.
Theycontinuedtoberegardedasnonpoliticalandbestexplained
byreferencetostandardorganizationtheory,which,aspolitical
scientistsbailedouttostudythepoliticsofbureaucracy,wasleftin
thehandsofsociologistsandsocialpsychologists,whose
explanatoryinterestshadnothingtodowithpoliticsorgovernment
perse.

Thus,longafterthepoliticsadministrationdichotomywasdeclared
dead,itlivedoninthebifurcatedstructureofthefieldwith
bureaucraticpoliticsunderstoodinoneway,bureaucraticor
ganizationinanother,andnoclearconnectionbetweenthetwo.

WHYAPOLITICALTHEORYOFORGANIZATION?

Thegreatchallengeforpublicadministrationistointegratepolitics
andorganization.Thefactis,bureaucracyarisesoutofpolitics.
Decisionsaboutwhereagenciesarelocatedorhowtheyare
structured,staffed,andcontrolledarenotmadeinsomeobjective
fashionbyorganizationtheoristsdedicatedtothepublicgoodbut
bypoliticiansandgroupswhoarewellawarethatthedetailsof
organizationareoftencrucialdeterminantsofwhogetswhatin
politics.Publicbureaucracyisorganizedasitisbecausepowerful
playershaveincentivestoorganizeitthatway.

Absentapoliticaltheoryoforganization,allsortsofmiscon
ceptionsgaincurrency.Amongotherthings,thereisacommon
tendencytoassumethat,throughsufficientknowledgeand
appropriatedesign,wecaneventuallyhavethekindofbureauc
racywewant:aneffectiveone.

Astandardargument,forexample,isthatindependentregulatory
commissionsaresusceptibletocapture,soCongressshouldsimply
stopcreatingagenciesofthisform.Yetthisignoresthepossibility
thatthoseagencieswereliterallydesignedtobe

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capturedandthattoday'sCongresses,likeCongressesofthepast,
willcreatewhatevertypesoforganizationstheyareunderpressure
tocreate.Itisnotaquestionofwhatmakesforgoodgovernment.
Itisaquestionofpoliticalincentives(Moe1989).

Andsoforthepresidency.Here,astandardargumentisthat
presidentshaveviolatedtheneutralcompetenceofthebureau
cracybypoliticizingappointmentsandpullingimportantpolicy
issuesintotheWhiteHouseforanalysis,coordination,and
decision.Theargumentisthatpresidentsshouldstopdoingthis,
respectneutralcompetence,andrelymoreheavilyonthebureauc
racy.Butthereisonebigproblem:Presidentsdon'twanttodo
this.Theyareheldresponsiblebyademandingpublicforvirtually
everythingthathappensingovernment,andtheyhavestrong
incentivestotakecontrolintotheirownhands.Theypoliticizeand
centralizebecauseitisadvantageousforthemtodoso.Theywill
stopwhentheirincentiveschange(Moe1985).

Finally,consideranexamplefromalargeportionofourpublic
bureaucracy:thepublicschoolsystem.Thestandardviewamong
educationscholarsisthatschoolswouldperformbetterifthey
weresmaller,moreautonomous,andanchoredinastrongsenseof
community.Thisisprobablytrue.Yetitalsocommonlyisclaimed
thatthesedesirablepropertiescanbeimposedonschoolsthrough
appropriatereformsandthereisnotheoreticalbasisforthis
whatever.Theschoolsdidnotgetthewaytheyarebyaccident.
Theyareproductsofacomplexsystemofpoliticalcontrol,made
upofelectedofficials,administrators,andinterestgroupsatall
levelsofgovernment,inwhichtheincentivesarestackedinfavorof
large,bureaucraticschools.Askingthemembersofthissystemto
createsmall,autonomousschoolswithlotsofcommunityislike
askingmembersofCongresstostoprespondingtoparochial
interestsoraskingpresidentstorespectneutralcompetence.Itisn't
goingtohappen,becausetheyhaveincentivestokeepdoingwhat
they'redoing(ChubbandMoe1990).

Somereadersmaydisagreewithmyjaundicedviewofpolitics.
Nevertheless,itistheoretical,andIhopethegeneralproblemI'm
tryingtounderlineisclear:Manystandardbeliefsabout
bureaucraticorganizationarenotgroundedinpoliticaltheoryat
all.Whentheyaren't,theyeasilycanturnouttobeflatlyincon
sistentwiththerealitiesofpolitics.Tomakeclaimsandoffer
reformproposalsthatmakegoodpoliticalsense,weneedapoli
ticaltheoryoforganization.

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THENEWINSTITUTIONALISM

The"newinstitutionalism"isintheprocessofbringingthisabout.
Forthepasttenyearsorso,scholarsthroughoutthesocial
scienceshaveputmuchgreateremphasisonthestudyofinstitu
tions,andinpoliticalsciencethishastranslatedintoanew
emphasisonseeinggovernmentinstitutionsasendogenous.
Explaininghowpoliticalinstitutionsemergeandwheretheir
formalandinformalpropertiescomefromhastakencenterstage
asthemostexcitingfocusofworkinpoliticalscienceandisclearly
spillingoverintopublicadministration.

Mostofwhatpassesforinstitutionalismishistorical,concerned
withtheidiosyncraciesoftime,culture,andpersonality.This
workisfascinatinganduseful,butitisnottheoretical.Twobroad
approachestoinstitutionaltheoryonesociological,oneeconomic
havestirredupthemostinterestandsupportamongstudentsof
politicalinstitutions.

Thesociologicalapproachisacombinationofgarbagecantheory,
popularizedbyMarchandOlsen(1976,amongmany)andthe
institutionalsociologyofJohnMeyer(forexample,Meyerand
Rowan1977).I'msurethatmostreadersarefamiliarwiththese
theoriessoIwon'tgointotheminanydetail.I'lljustpointout
that,whateverelseonemightthinkoftheirprovocativeaccounts
oforganizationwhichgenerallyinvolveambiguity,randomness,
endogenouspreferences,symbol,myth,legitimacy,andcountless
othercomplexitiesthefactistheirexplanationsarenot
individualistic.Thatis,theydonotaccountfororganizationsby
referencetotheinterestsorstrategiesofindividuals,norcanthey
sayanythingaboutthecoalitionsorconflictsorcollectiveaction
problemsthatanimatepolitics.Politicalscientistswanttoknow
whypoliticalactorsdowhattheydo,andthesociological
approachisnotbuilttoexplainthesethings.

Theeconomicapproachis.Rationalchoicehaslongbeenamajor
theoreticalinfluencewithinpoliticalsciencemuchmoresothan
hassociologynotonlybecauseofitsgreatanalyticpower,butalso
becauseitisperfectlysuitedtoprovidethekindsofexplanations
politicalscientistswant.Twobranchesofpositivetheoryare
especiallyrelevanttothestudyofinstitutions.Thefirstissocial
choice,whichinitiallydevelopedasanelaborate,highly
sophisticatedtheoryofvoting,andthen,withthenewinsti
tutionalism,beganexploringthewayvariousaspectsofinstitu
tionsforexample,agendacontrol,formaldecisionprocedures
conditiontheoutcomesandstabilityofvotingprocesses.The
secondistheneweconomicsoforganization,whichbeganasan

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explicitattemptbyeconomiststoexplainthebasicpropertiesof
organizationhierarchy,authority,control,cooperation,com
pliance,decentralization,andthelikeandhassincebeenapplied
andextendedincreativewaystothestudyofpoliticalinstitutions.

In"TheNewEconomicsofOrganization"(Moe1984),Iargued
thattheneweconomicswaslikelytoprovethesinglemost
importantdevelopmentinthestudyofpoliticalinstitutions.Almost
tenyearslater,Icansaythatitismorethanlivinguptoits
promise.Itisfarmorepowerfulthananythingsociologistshaveto
offer.Throughitscomponenttheoriestransactioncosteconomics,
agencytheory,andthetheoryofrepeatedgamesitbringsthe
methodologyofeconomicssquarelytobearonorganizational
issuesthatuntilrecentlywerenotatallwellexplained.And
becauseitislargelyaboutbargainingandexchange,iteasily
extendstopoliticsand,inparticular,topoliticalinstitutionsthat
donotmakedecisionsprimarilythroughvotingmostimportantly,
thebureaucracy.

Thepositivetheoryofinstitutionsisaproductivemixtureofsocial
choiceandtheneweconomics.Whenthenewinstitutionalismfirst
tookoff,socialchoicewasalreadywelldeveloped,anditnaturally
playedthepredominantrolepromoting,intheprocess,atendency
tofocusonvotingandthusoninstitutionsthatvote,Congress
especially.Butovertimepositivetheoristsbegantoexpand
outwardfromthislegislativebase,takingastheirpointof
departurecongressionaleffortstocontrolthebureaucracy.
Becausepoliticalcontrolhaslittletododirectlywithvoting,
positivetheoristswerethusledtorelymuchmoreheavilyonthe
neweconomics,whichisliterallydesignedforthiskindofanalysis.
Theneweconomics,inturn,trainedtheirattentionontherules,
procedures,andstaffingsystemsthatmakeuptheorganizationof
bureaucracyfortheseverypropertiesoforganizationturnoutto
becrucialmechanismsofpoliticalcontrolandthestrategicmeans,
therefore,bywhichpoliticalactorspursueandpromotetheirown
interest(see,forexample,Moe1990a,1990b;McCubbins,Noll,
andWeingast1987).

Inthisway,andinotherways,theorganizationofbureaucracy
cametohaveadistinctlypoliticalexplanation.Organizationwas
nolongerseenasseparatefrompolitics.Itsformandcontentwere
understoodtoariserightoutofitspolitics,tangiblereflectionsof
thesamestrategies,interests,andresourcesthatdrivethepolitical
processmoregenerally.Forthefirsttime,really,therewasa
coherenttheoreticalfoundationfullycapableofintegratingpolitics
andorganization.

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Asallthiswashappening,thetask,itseemedtome,wastoextend
thislineoftheoryaggressivelytothestudyofpublicbureaucracy
andtogetstudentsofpublicadministration,whotraditionallyhave
notbeenwildlyenthusiasticaboutpositivetheory,torecognizethe
greatpotentialofthiswork,andindeedtoplungeintoit,embraceit
astheirown,andbecomeactivecontributors.Thefactis,most
positivetheoristsdon'tcaremuchaboutbureaucracyasa
substantivetopicofanalysis.Astheorists,theyseektoincorporate
itbecauseit'sthere:newturf,obviouslyimportant,thattheycan
conquer.Thisismostlytothegood.Butifbureaucracyistobewell
understood,theoryneedstobedirectedanddevelopedbythose
withagenuinesubstantiveinterestinitthepeopleinpublic
administration.

MYOWNWORK

Forthemostpart,thisisthewayIseemyownwork.Ihavetriedto
participateactivelyinthisnewliterature,bothasacontributorand
asacritic.Asacritic,Ihavearguedamongotherthings,that(1)
positivetheoryputsfartoomuchemphasisonCongressandthat
weneedabroadertheoryofthe"politicsofstructure"thatshifts
attentionfromthelegislaturetothesystem;

(2)presidents,inparticular,playanenormouslyimportantrolein
shapingpublicorganization,arolepositivetheoryconsistentlyand
misleadinglyoverlooks;(3)becausetheneweconomicsisfounded
onvoluntaryexchangeandgainsfromtrade,applicationstendto
overlookthecoercivepotentialofpublicauthorityanditsprofound
importanceforthepoliticsofstructure;and(4)thereshouldbe
greaterattentiontoissuesthathavelongbeencentraltopublic
administration,especiallyissuesofeffectiveorganizationandgood
government.

Asacontributor,mytheoreticalworkreflectsthesedepartures
fromthepositivetheorymainstream.Butwhilethesedepartures
givemyanalysisadifferentorientationfromthatofmycolleagues,
thereisagooddealofoverlapinwhatwehavetosayandallofus
areprovidingpoliticalexplanationsoforganization.Thisisthekey
point.

Ibeginwithwhatisessentialtopolitics:thestruggletocontroland
exercisepublicauthority.Ithengiveseparateattentiontoall
majorplayersinthepoliticsofstructure,notjustlegislators,and
trytoshowhowthebasicstructureofbureaucracyemergesoutof
allthis,withspecialattentiontoissuesofeffectiveorganization.
Alongtheway,itbecomesclearthatthepoliticallogicthatdrives
thecreationanddesignofAmericanbureaucracyinescapably
subvertstheprospectsforgoodgovernment(Moe1989,1990a,
1990b;MoeandWilsonforthcoming).

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Thewinnersofthepoliticalstruggle,forinstance,wanttobuild
effectiveagenciesforthemselves.Butbecausetheydonotown
publicauthorityandfearitsfuturecapturebyopponents,they
mustalsoprotecttheiragenciesfrompoliticaluncertaintythrough
allmannerofinsulatingdevicesformalprocedures,criteria,
deadlines,decisionrightsthathobbleagencyperformance.Thisis
preciselywhattheenvironmentalistsdidquitepurposelytothe
EPA.Worse,thelosersmustusuallybecompromisedwithifany
legislationistoberealizedatall;theywilloftendemandstructures
thatpromotefragmentation,obstruction,conflict,delay,and
otherwisemaketheagencies'jobmuchmoredifficultonpurpose.
Thisisthebestwaytounderstandtheorganizationalnightmareof
OSHA,whichwasdesignedwiththe"help"ofitsbusiness
opponents.(SeeMoe1989forcasestudiesofboththeEPAand
OSHA.)TheresultoftheseandotherbasicforcesinAmerican
politicsthestrugglebetweenpresidentandCongress,forexample
isacumbersome,complexbureaucracythatishamstrungby
formalismandpoorlybuilttodoitsjob.

ThisisagrimstoryabouthowtheAmericansystemworks.But
notallsystemsworkthisway.Attheheartofmyanalysisisan
attempttoshowthatdifferentinstitutionalsystemsputtheirown
distinctivestampsonthepoliticsofstructureandintheend
produceverydifferentbureaucracies.ThekeytotheAmerican
systemisthatitsmultiplevetopointsmakeitextremelydifficultto
overturnanythingthatbecomeslaw,withtheresultthat
formalizationhasgreatvalueasastrategybywhichvirtuallyall
actorscanprotectandpromotetheirinterests.Hencethecrippling
overformalizationofAmericanbureaucracy.InaWestminster
parliamentarysystem,ontheotherhand,thingsworkvery
differently.

AWestminstersystemconcentratesauthority,makingitrela
tivelyeasyforthemajoritypartytoenactandoverturnlaws.
Anythingthatisformalizedtodaycanreadilybeoverturnedby
whateverpartyholdspowerlateron,andthusithaslittlepro
tectiveorstrategicvalueinthepoliticsofstructure.Bureaucracies
inaWestminstersystemdonot,asaresult,getburiedinexcessive
formalrestrictionsasAmericanbureaucraciesdo;infacttheyare
likelytobegrantedsubstantialdiscretion,organizedforeffective
performance,andcoordinatedthroughacoherentstructureof
democraticcontrol.Astrikingcontrast,allduetothelarger
institutionalsettingandthestampitimposesonthepoliticsof
structure(Moe1990b;MoeandCaldwellforthcoming).

Imayormaynotberightaboutthesethings.ButIbelievethe
thrustofthisworkisintherightdirection:itisanattemptto

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provideapoliticalexplanation,anchoredinthedecisionsofindi
viduals,fortheorganizationofgovernment.Itisanattempt,in
otherwords,tobuildatheorythatintegratespoliticsandorgani
zation.

CONCLUSION

Inmyview,positivetheoryistheonlygameintownforthoseofus
workingtowardacoherenttheoryofpublicadministration.
Sociologicaltheoriescan'tholdacandletoit.Withtheriseofthe
newinstitutionalism,andparticularlytheneweconomicsof
organization,thetoolsitoffersarenotonlyanalyticallypowerful,
theyarealsoperfectlysuitedtothesortsofissuesthatpublic
administrationhaslongsoughttoinvestigateandunderstand.
Muchofthisworkisinformalandnontechnicalandisthus
accessibleasreadersandcontributorstothoseofuswhodon't
haveaPh.D.inmath.

Byinvestingheavilyinpositivetheory,studentsofpublic
administrationwouldnotbesellingouttheirfieldtoaliens.They
wouldsimplybeembracinganewwayofthinkingabout
bureaucracyandgovernmentandthenfindingtheirownwaysto
contributethroughempiricalwork(includinghistoriesandcase

studies),informaltheories,formalmodels,andsoforth.Everyone
hasanimportantroletoplayinthedivisionoflabor.Themodelers
arejustasmallpartoftheenterprise.

Theimportantthingisthatpositivetheoryprovidesacommon
frameworkthatweallcanshareanduse,onethatstructures
everyone'sthinkinginthesameproductiveways.Itisalreadywell
onthewaytoprovidinguswithawelldevelopedtheorythat
successfullyintegratesthetwohistoricallyseparatedsidesofpublic
administration:organizationandpolitics.Inthefuture,itpromises
totiepublicadministrationtoafullrangeofcuttingedge
developmentsinotherareasofpoliticalscienceandeconomicsand
thustointegratethefieldintothemostexcitingtheoreticalworkin
socialscience.

Soundsprettygoodtome.
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Moe,TerryM.

1990b
Chubb,JohnE.,andMoe,TerryM.

"PoliticalInstitutions:The

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