Hoang Anh Tuan. Silk For Silver PDF

Silk for Silver
TANAP Monographs
on the History of
Asian-European Interaction
Edited by
Leonard Bluss and Cynthia Viall
VOLUME 5
Silk for Silver
Dutch-Vietnamese Relations, 1637-1700
By
Hoang Anh Tuan
LEIDEN BOSTON
2007
The TANAP programme is funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research
(NWO).
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
ISSN 1871-6938
ISBN 978 90 04 15601 2
Copyright 2007 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing,
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printed in the netherlands

contents v
This book is dedicated to my mentors: Professor Femme Gaastra

Professor Leonard Bluss
Professor Nguyn Quang Ngc
vi contents
series editors foreword vii
SERIES EDITORS FOREWORD
Probably nowhere in the world have such profound changes in his-

toriography been occurring as in the nation states of Monsoon Asia
that gained independence after the conclusion of the Pacific War in
1945. These traditionally outward-looking countries on the rims of
the Indian Ocean and the Eastern Seas have been interacting with
each other through maritime transport and trade for more than two
millennia, but the exigencies of modern nation-building have tended
to produce state-centred historical narratives that emphasize a distinc-
tive heritage and foster cultural pride and identity on the basis of such
heroic themes as anti-colonial resistance. No one will deny the need for
and utility of such nation-building agendas, but an inward-directed
national historiography does not necessarily prepare ones citizens for
our present age of regional co-operation and globalization.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the coastal societies of
Monsoon Asia witnessed the entry of European traders, the emergence
of global maritime trading networks, and the laying of the foundations
of colonial empires that reached their apogees in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. The difficulties of studying this pre-colonial and
early colonial past should not be underestimated. Local sources are
often rare because of wars and the frequent changes of both indig-
enous and colonial regimes. The hot and humid tropical climate is
also unkind to the preservation of manuscripts. The mass of west-
ern-language data preserved in the archives of the former East India
Companies and those of the Spanish and Portuguese empires in Asia
often have an undeniably Europe-centred character and bias. Thus we
face not only a highly imbalanced supply of source material, but also
the very complex problem of how to decode the hidden agendas that
often colour these primary materials.
Over the past fifty years there has been a pronounced effort in aca-
demic circles in North America, Australia and the former European
colonial nations to decolonize historical writing on Asian-European
interaction, albeit for reasons totally different from those in their Asian
counterparts. Increasingly doubt has been cast on such longstanding
paradigms as the superiority of the dynamic West over static Asian
societies. Historians of international trade such as the late Holden
viii series editors foreword
Furber, whose description of this period as The Age of Partnership

inspired the name of the TANAP programme, have taken an interest
in the various ways and means by which Asian-European interaction
began in various kinds of competition, collaboration, diplomacy, and
military confrontation. This approach has forced historians to return
to the archival sources and the places where these events unfolded
with the result that new frontiers of research have opened up in which
close partnerships between Asian and European historians, with their
specific cultural tool kits and linguistic backgrounds, are now starting
to bear fruit.
In anticipation of the four hundredth anniversary of the establish-
ment of the Dutch East India Company in 1602, members of the
History Department of Leiden University proposed the establishment
of an international research programme aimed at training a new gen-
eration of Asian historians of Asian-European interaction in the early
modern period. It was taken for granted that any such drive towards
international educational co-operation should be carried out in care-
fully planned collaboration with the National Archives in The Hague,
the Arsip Nasional of the Republic of Indonesia in Jakarta and the
archives of Cape Town (South Africa), Colombo (Sri Lanka) and
Chennai (India), which together hold several kilometres of archival
records from the former Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie. The
TANAPTowards a New Age of Partnershipeducational and archi-
val preservation programme was started in 2000 thanks to generous
grants from the Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands Organization for Scientific
Research (NWO), the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of
Tropical Research (WOTRO), the Netherlands UNESCO Commission,
and Leiden University. Twelve universities in Asia sent some thirty
young lecturers to Leiden during 2001-2003. Under the auspices of the
Research Institute for Asian-African and Amerindian Studies (CNWS),
these historians participated in an advanced masters programme that
included intensive courses on historiography, palaeography and the
old Dutch written language.
With additional funding from several Asian foundations, in 2002
seventeen of the TANAP graduates from Sri Lanka, India, Singapore,
Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Japan, South Africa and
the Netherlands began working towards a PhD degree at Leiden. Three
others went on to pursue their doctorates at universities elsewhere in
series editors foreword ix
the world. The TANAP Monographs on the History of Asian-Euro-

pean Interaction, which includes two studies on early modern South
African society, are the offspring of their doctoral theses defended at
Leiden.
Leonard Bluss
Leiden University
x series editors foreword
contents xi
CONTENTS
Preface and Acknowledgements xvii

Abbreviations xxi
Explanation for units of measurement xxiii
Glossary xxv
Maps xxx
INTRODUCTION
The subject 1
Tonkin in the intra-Asian trade of the VOC 3
Source materials and analytical framework 5
PART ONE: THE SETTING
Introduction 9
Chapter One: Political background 11

1. Vietnamese maritime trade prior to 1527 11
The Hundred Vits and the Vietnamese 11
The Chinese colonization of northern Vietnam,
179 BCAD 905 12
Independent i Vit and the state monopoly of foreign
trade, 10101527 16
2. Incessant conflicts and political schisms, 15271672 19
Chapter Two: Economic background 26

1. Handicraft industries and export commodities 26
Raw silk and piece-goods 27
Ceramics 30
Other miscellaneous exports 31
2. New trends in foreign trade 33
A more open trend in foreign trade, the 1500s 33
The birth of the seventeenth-century commercial
system 36
Complicated trading conditions 39
3. Foreign merchants 44
xii contents
The Chinese 44
The Japanese 48
The Portuguese 50
The Dutch 52
The English 52
Other foreign merchants 55
Concluding remarks 57
PART TWO: THE POLITICAL RELATIONS
Introduction 59
Chapter Three: Intimate phases 61

1. The abortive Dutch trade with Quinam, 16011638 61
2. The Dutch arrival in Tonkin, 1637 66
3. Ideological struggles and belligerent decisions,
16371643 70
Military or peaceful involvement, 16371641? 70
Tension escalating in Quinam, 1642 74
The Dutch military defeats, 16421643 77
4. The Quinam interlude and frigid relations with
Tonkin, 16441651 83
The VOCs unilateral war with Quinam, 16441651 83
The peace agreement with Quinam, 1651 86
Frigid relations with the Trnh, 16441647 88
The relationship deteriorated, 16471651 91
Chapter Four: Vicissitudes, decline and the final end 96

1. Revival of the relationship, 16511660 96
Verstegens commission to Tonkin, 1651 96
A short-lived permanent factory, 1651 98
The first phase of decline, the 1650s 99
2. Attempts to expand the Tonkin trade, 16601670 103
The decline in the Tonkin-China border trade and the
loss of Formosa 104
The VOCs Tinnam strategy, 16611664 106
Tonkin as a permanent factory, 1663 110
Continued decline, the 1660s 111
3. Towards the final end, 16701700 115
The eventful 1670s 115
contents xiii
Decline intensified, 16801690 118

The last ship, 1699/1700 121
PART THREE: THE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS
Introduction 125
Chapter Five: The import trade 127

1. Silver 127
2. Japanese copper zeni 133
The Vietnamese monetary system prior to the
seventeenth century 133
The cash shortage in the 1650s and the VOCs import
of Japanese copper zeni into Tonkin 134
3. The arms trade and the import of other miscellaneous
items 139
Chapter Six: The export trade (i): Tonkinese silk for Japan 143
1. The Far Eastern silk trade prior to the early 1630s 143
2. The period of experiment, 16371640 146
3. The period of high profit, 16411654 148
Silk trade under military alliances, 16411643 149
Decline of Formosa and rise of Tonkin, 16441654 150
4. The period of decline, 16551671 156
5. On the capital and profit 160
Chapter Seven: The export trade (ii): Other products 165

1. Tonkinese products for the Netherlands 165
Silk piece-goods 165
Musk 168
2. Gold for the Coromandel Coast 171
3. Tonkinese ceramics for the insular South-East Asian
markets 176
xiv contents
PART FOUR: DUTCH-VIETNAMESE INTERACTIONS
Introduction 187
Chapter Eight: The Dutch East India Company trade and

its impact on seventeenth-century Vietnamese society 189
1. Dutch residents and local society 189
Factories and factors 189
The directorship: the need for Vietnamese learning
and diplomatic activities 191
Religious practices and anti-Christian sentiments in
Tonkin 194
Paid company and sentimental attachment: foreign
merchants and Vietnamese women 196
2. The impact of the VOC trade on Tonkins economy 198
The VOCs import of monetary metals and its impact
on the silver/cash ratio 198
Impact on prices 202
Impact on labour 204
The commercial centres and the commercial system 206
Were the first seeds of capitalism sown? 208
3. The Dutch catalyst in the Tonkin-Quinam conflict 210
4. Miscellaneous issues 212
CONCLUSION
Conflicting interests and the political vicissitudes 216
The intra-Asian trade and varying commercial trends 218
Trade as a bridge for Dutch-Vietnamese interactions 219
APPENDICES
1. Vua (Emperors) L and Cha (Kings) Trnh in
seventeenth-century Tonkin 223
2. GovernorsGeneral and Chief Factors of the Dutch factory
in Tonkin in the seventeenth century 224
3. Dutch shipping in Tonkin, 16371699 225
4. Foreign shipping in Tonkin, 16371699 228
5. Intended division of the Tonkin cargo for Japan, 1645 230
6. Tonkinese silk exported to Japan by the VOC, 16351697 231
contents xv
7. Silk prices as recorded by the Deshima factory,

16361668 233
8. Tonkinese ceramics exported to Batavia and other places,
16631681 234
9. Re-shipments of Tonkinese ceramics, 16701681 235
10. Ceramics imported into Tonkin, 16371681 236
11. Porcelain the VOC ordered in Japan for the Trnh rulers,
16661681 238
Notes 239
Bibliography 275
Index 287
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
1. Letter of Cha Trnh Cn to Governor-General Willem
van Outhoorn, 16 Dec. 1699, VOC 1623 xxxiv
2. Tonkinese boats in the Hng River (Baron, Description
of Tonqueen, seventeenth century) 14
3. A Tonkinese warship in the Hng River (Baron, Descrip-
tion of Tonqueen, seventeenth century) 20
4. Tonkinese elephant troops and infantrymen (Baron,
Description of Tonqueen, seventeenth century) 20
5. Tonkinese soldiers practising sword fighting (Baron,
Description of Tonqueen, seventeenth century) 22
6. Detailed drawing of a Dutch cannon currently preserved
at the ancient capital of Hu (BAVH 1916, 390) 22
7. Vua (Emperor) L at his court (Baron, Description of
Tonqueen, seventeenth century) 23
8. Cha (King) Trnh at his court (Baron, Description of
9. A part of Thng Long, the capital of Tonkin, showing the
Dutch and English factories (Baron, Description of
10. The Thi Bnh estuary or the main entrance of the River
of Tonkin (VOC Map, Nationaal Archief, The Hague.
Indications highlighted by the author) 40
xvi contents
11. The Japanese genho tsuho minted for export during the
1659-1685 period (Luc Duc Thuan, Japan Early Trade
Coins) 137
LIST OF FIGURES
1. The commercial system of seventeenth-century Tonkin 36
2. The VOCs import and export trade with Tonkin in the
seventeenth century 126
3. Division of the capital sent to Tonkin for the 1644/5
trading Season 128
4. Intended division of the Tonkinese silk cargo, 1645 145
5. Intended division of the Tonkinese goods for Japan, 1645 152
6. Silk exported to Japan by the VOC, 16371697 156
7. Purchase and sales prices of Tonkinese raw silk,
16361668 161
8. Division of silk imported into Japan by the VOC,
16361668 163
9. Division of profits from silk imported into Japan by the
VOC, 16361668 163
10. Division of the Tonkin cargoes, 16451695 167
11. Tonkinese ceramics exported to Batavia, 16631681 180
12. Ceramics exported to the South Seas, 16631682 180
13. Division of ceramics exported to the South Seas, 1663
1682 181
14. Ceramics exported by the VOC, 16021682 182
15. The VOCs import of silver and copper zeni and the
fluctuation of the silver/cash ratio in Tonkin, 16371697 200
LIST OF TABLES
1. The VOCs import of silver into Tonkin, 16371668 129
2. Re-export of Japanese silver from Batavia to Tonkin,
16561663 131
3. The VOCs import of Japanese copper zeni into Tonkin,
16601679 136
4. Goods ordered by Cha Trnh Tc, 1668 140
5. Composition of the Tonkinese silk cargo for Japan, 1644 152
6. The VOCs export of musk from Tonkin, 16531681 170
7. The prices of several Tonkinese commodities, 1642 203
preface and acknowledgements xvii
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The writing of this monograph has a rather complicated history and

the Sino-Vietnamese term Duyn Phn (fortune) seems most
appropriate to describe my five years of work to accomplish it. When
people all over the world were happily welcoming the new millennium,
I started my career as a lecturer in Maritime Archaeology at the Fac-
ulty of History, Vietnam National University, Hanoi. Just one month
after the beginning of my academic life, in the spring of 2000, I was
invited by a group of Japanese archaeologists to join in the excava-
tions of the remains of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) factory
in Ph Hin. Many a cold winter night lying in the only guest-house
in this historical town and staring at the Dutch compound indicated
on a nineteenth-century French map of Ph Hin, I often dreamt that
one sunny, lucky day I would lay my hands on such objects for the
daily use of the Dutch factors as tobacco pipes and drinking glasses.
Alas, the days passed without bringing any significant results and the
excavation ended after just one and a half months. The soil was not
willing to tell us the forgotten story of the Dutch merchants in Ph
Hin, a Japanese archaeologist tried to cheer me up at the farewell
party, adding that perhaps the VOC archives in The Hague might
be more yielding if one would give it a try. How the well-preserved
Dutch documents would be induced to speak was nonetheless a big
enigma for me at the time.
Just half a year after my unsuccessful attempt in Ph Hin, Dr
Hendrik E. Niemeijer visited Hanoi to interview potential Vietnamese
students for the TANAP project (Towards A New Age of Partnership:
A Dutch-Asian-South African Historical Research Project). Exchang-
ing spade for notebook and instead of digging soil, leafing through
huge VOC bundles, I started my VOC study in the framework of
the Advanced Masters Programme (2002) and then of the PhD Pro-
gramme (20032006) at Leiden University, aiming to interrogate the
priceless holdings of the VOC archive on Vietnam and making my
discoveries known to my readers.
Khng thy my lm nn (Without your teachers, you can
achieve nothing) is a saying that we Vietnamese students all learn by
heart from an early age. I owe a debt of gratitude to my promotors,
Professor Femme Gaastra and Professor Leonard Bluss. Professor
xviii preface and acknowledgements
Gaastra, despite his tight timetable, unfailingly would spend every

Wednesday morning of the working week to help me get through the
intricacies of seventeenth-century Dutch and bring to light the vital
sources of information on the Tonkin trade which were long buried in
the vast VOC records. Professor Bluss took great pains in scrutinizing
the various drafts and unceasingly offered valuable comments right
up to the last moment before this work was published. Without their
guidance and support, this project could not have come to a fruitful
end. Special thanks are also due to my supervisor Professor Nguyn
Quang Ngc, who from the outset has stirred in me a lasting interest in
early modern Asian history, and who has given me thoughtful advice
and constant support on the home front at the National University
of Vietnam in Hanoi over the past five years.
I would like to express my thanks to other teachers, scholars, and
friends, whose assistance and advice were of great importance in many
ways at various stages during my research: Arano Yasunori, Felipe
Fernndez Armesto, P. Borschberg, J. R. Bruijn, Cao Xun T, A.
Farrington, John Guy, A. J. E. Harmsen, Kawakatsu Heita, Els M.
Jacobs, J. Kleinen, G. Knaap, J. T. Lap, Adrian Lapian, T. J. Lindblad,
Li Tana, Bruce Lockhart, Yoko Nagazumi, Nara Shuichi, Ng T. T.
Lm, Nguyn Tha H, Nguyn Hi K, Nguyn Th Anh, Nguyn
Vn Kim, Phan Huy L, Dhiravat na Pombejra, Om Prakash, A. Reid,
Shiba Yoshinobu, Hugo sJacob, Yumio Sakurai, Oscar Salemink, G.
B. Souza, Yolande Spaans, K. W. Taylor, Paul A. Van Dyke, L. Wage-
naar, R. Wezel, J. E. Wills Jr., Yao Keisuke, and Zhuang Guotu.
My five-year research in the Netherlands and England was financed
by the TANAP Research Programme, the Research School of Asian,
African, and Amerindian Studies (CNWS), Netherlands Organization
for Scientific Research (NWO), and Netherlands Foundation for the
Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO). I would like to thank
Dr Hendrik E. Niemeijer, coordinator of the TANAP programme, Mrs
Marijke van Wissen-van Staden, and CNWS office manager Mrs Ilona
Beumer, for facilitating the institutional needs in these years.
I am grateful to Mrs Rosemary Robson for her whole-hearted assis-
tance in correcting and improving my English, and to Cynthia Viall
for her unreserved help in checking my translations of the seventeenth-
century Dutch quotations and reading the final manuscript. Special
thanks also go to my fellow participants in the TANAP Research
Programme, the friendly staff of the Nationaal Archief of the Nether-
lands in The Hague and the British Library in London, the members
preface and acknowledgements xix
of the Institute for the History of European Expansion and Global

Interaction (IGEER) of Leiden University, and to my colleagues at the
Faculty of History in Hanoi, who have been taking over my teaching
duties the past five years, thus enabling me to concentrate fully on
my research in Leiden.
I owe a lifelong debt of love and gratitude to my father, who, despite
the serious illness he has been suffering over the past ten years, has
never failed to encourage his son to pursue his protracted study in
Leiden. I thank my wife, Thy Linh, for shouldering all the laborious
work at home and taking care of our little son, Hong L Phong, when
I am away doing research. Their love and yearning have greatly fired
me to complete my research on time.
xx preface and acknowledgements
contents xxi
ABBREVIATIONS
BAVH Bulletin des Amis de Vieux Hue

BEFEO Bulletin de lcole Franaise dExtrme-Orient
BL British Library, London
DHQGHN Vietnam National University, HanoiPublishing
House
EIC English East India Company
KCH Journal of Archaeology, Hanoi
KHKT Sciences and Technologies, Hanoi Publishing House
NA Nationaal Archief (National Archive of the Netherlands
in The Hague)
NCLS Journal of Historical Studies, Hanoi
NFJ Archief van de Nederlandse Factorij in Japan (Dutch
factory in Japan), NA
OIOC Archive of the English East India Company preserved at
the Oriental and Indian Office Collection, BL
OBP Overgekomen brieven en papieren: Letters and papers
received from Asia, NA
TCKH Journal of Science, Hanoi
VHTT Culture and Information, Hanoi Publishing House
VOC (Archive of the) Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie,
the Dutch East India Company, NA
XN Past and Present Magazine, Hanoi
xxii contents
explanation for units of measurement xxiii
EXPLANATION FOR UNITS OF MEASUREMENT
Currencies
1 tael = 10 maas = 100 conderin

= 3 guilders 2 stivers (before 1636)
= 2 guilders 17 stivers (16361666)
= 3 guilders 10 stivers (16661743)
1 rixdollar = 48 stivers (up to 1665)
(rijksdaalder) = 60 stivers (after 1666)
1 quan = 10 tin (short string)
(long string) = 600 cash (kasjes)
1 tael = c. 2,000 cash (before the 1650s)
= c. 6700 cash (during the 1650s and 1660s)
= c. 2,200 cash (during the 16701700 period)
Weights
1 picul = 100 catties

= 125 Dutch pounds
= c. 60 kg
1 catty = 16 taels
= 600 gr
1 tael = 37.5 gr
= 0.0759 Dutch pound
= 0.0827 English pound
1 Dutch pound = 494 gr
= 13.17 taels
faccaar a unit of weight used in the Tonkin silk trade. The
calculation was one tael of fine silver for some taels
of raw silk. For instance, the silk price of 15 faccaar
means one tael of fine silver (c. 2.17 guilders) for 15
taels of raw silk (c. 1.13 Dutch pounds).
xxiv explanation for units of measurement
glossary xxv
GLOSSARY
C.: Chinese; D.: Dutch; H.: Hindi; J.: Japanese; M.: Malay; P.: Por-
tuguese; V.: Vietnamese.
Bakufu (J. ) the Shogunate Government.

bariga (P.) belly, used to designate second quality goods. See
also: cabessa and pee.
baa(s) silk textile from Tonkin.
bogy (J.) yellow (raw) silk.
burgemeester (D.) mayor, for instance, of Nagasaki.
cabessa (P.) head, used to designate the first quality goods,
especially silk. See also: bariga and pee.
calambac resin from the finest kind of aloeswood, with a strong,
pleasant scent, used in medicine and fragrance. Or the
dried root of the Chinese rhubarb used as laxative.
capado also capada: eunuch.
chio(s) silk textile from Tonkin.
Cha (V.) Lord, but actually King (vng: )in the context
of seventeenth-century Tonkin. See also: Vua.
calico all-cotton fabric woven in plain or tabby weave and
printed with simple designs in one or more colours,
originally from Calicut (India).
catty (M. kti) a unit of weight. 100 catties = 1 picul (c. 60
kg). See: Explanation for Units of Measurement.
chious silk textile from Tonkin.
chiourons also chiouronghs, chouwerons: silk textile from
Tonkin.
chop (H. chhp) an official stamp or permit, by extension
any official document bearing a seal-impression or
stamp.
eiryaku sen (J.) coin minted in Nagasaki for the Restored Ming in
southern China and the Zheng in Formosa prior to the
early 1680s.
galiot(a) small ship which could both be sailed and rowed.
genho tsuho (J.) coin minted in Nagasaki for export, mainly to
Quinam and Tonkin, between 1659 and 1685.
xxvi glossary
hockiens (V. hong quyn?) (also hockingh, hockins) yellow

silk textile.
itowappu (J.) a system in which Chinese silk imported to Japan
was purchased by Japanese merchants at prices fixed
by the Japanese authorities, namely the heads of the
five shogunal cities (Miyako, Edo, Osaka, Sakai, and
Nagasaki) in order to prevent rising prices as a result
of competition. This system was first applied to the
Portuguese in 1604, to the Chinese in 1633, and then
to the Dutch in 1641. It was annulled in 1654 and was
re-applied from 1685.
kaikin (J.) the maritime prohibition policy of the Japanese
Tokugawa.
kanme (J.) a monetary unit. One kanme = 100 taels of silver.
kasjes (D.) coins made of copper, zinc, or spelter with a
hole in the centre. Kasjes circulated in Tonkin in the
seventeenth century could either be locally minted or
imported from China or Japan. See: Explanation for
Units of Measurement.
koban (J.) small gold coin in Japan, weighing 18 gr., valued
at six rixdollars. See also: oban.
kroon (D.) coin used in the Indies, also called leeuwendaalder,
valued at 39 stivers (1615) and at 48 stivers (1639).
kruisdaalder (D.) silver coin minted in Holland, valued at c. 3.60
guilders.
lb Dutch pound (pond), 0.495 kg.
leeuwendaalder (D.) see: kroon.
lings (V. lnh?) (also: linghs, langhs, pelings, pelangs) silk
textile from Tonkin.
loas (V. la?) silk textile from Tonkin.
maas (also: mas, maes) a unit of weight. 10 maas = 1 tael.
See: Explanation for Units of Measurement.
Mexicanen Mexican silver coins.
musk a substance with a strong, penetrating odour obtained
from a small sac under the skin of the abdomen of
the male musk deer, used in perfume and medici-
nally.
nachoda (Persian: na-khuda) (also anachoda, annakhoda) cap-
tain of an Asian vessel, especially Chinese junk.
glossary xxvii
navet (P. naveta) small sea-sailing ship.

oban (J.) gold coin only in use among the daimyo (lords of
domains), worth 7 koban and c. 4550 taels of silver.
See also: koban.
Ongia (V. ng gi?) mister, sir, nobleman.
opperhoofd (D.) chief of the Dutch factory in Tonkin (and in other
Dutch trading-places in Asia) with the VOC rank of
senior merchant (opperkoopman) or merchant (koop-
man).
pagoda coin used popularly in Coromandel (worth 120 stiv-
ers).
pancado (P.) see: itowappu.
pee (P.) foot, term used to designate the lowest quality
of goods, especially silk. See also: bariga and ca-
bessa.
pelings (also pelangs), see: lings.
perpetuaan (also pepertuana) durable woollen fabric from Eng-
land.
picul (M.) a unit of weight. One picul = c. 60 kg. See: Expla-
nation for Units of Measurement.
provintin- (D.) silver coin minted in Holland, worth 2 guilders 8
daalder stivers (1606), 2 guilders 10 stivers (after 1606).
putchuck (H. pachak) dried, fragrant, spicy root of Saussurea
costus, a species of thistle, used for burning as incense
or in medicine as a stomach tonic, diuretic, and expec-
torant.
quan (V.) a monetary unit used in Tonkin (and Quinam).
One quan (long string) = 10 tin (short string) = 600
coins (kasjes). See: Explanation for Units of Measure-
ment.
radix china (or China root) the dried root of the smilax china,
used for medicinal purposes. The root is astringent
and slightly tonic; the parched and powdered leaves
were used as a dressing on burns and scalds.
rial of eight (D. reaal van achten) Spanish silver coin, minted in
Peru, Mexico, and Sevilla, worth 48 stivers (before
1662) and 60 stivers (after 1662).
rixdollar (D. rijksdaalder) silver coin, worth 48 stivers (up to
1665), 60 stivers (after 1666).
xxviii glossary
sandalwood the fragrant red wood of the Pterocarpus santalina,

native to South India, used for carvings, cosmetics,
and incense.
sappanwood (D. sappanhout) the red dye-wood of the Caesalpina
sappan, found in South-East Asia but mainly exported
from Siam, used for medicine and for dying cotton
products.
shichusen (J.) copper coin minted privately in Japan. In the early
seventeenth century, in an attempt to standardize the
monetary system, the Japanese Government forbade the
circulation of these coins in Japan. They were there-
fore exported to Quinam and Tonkin in a considerable
quantity
shuin-sen (J. )Japanese Red Seal ship.
schuitzilver (D.) silver ingot cast in the shape of a small boat.
sittouw silk textile from Tonkin.
spelter (D. spiaulter) zinc alloyed with small amounts of cop-
per, lead and a few other metals, usually found in the
form of ingots, slabs, or plates.
sumongij silk textile from Tonkin.
Surat rupee (D. Suratse ropia): silver coin, valued 37 stivers.
See: Explanation for Units of Measurement.
tael a monetary unit and a unit of weight. See: Explanation
for Units of Measurement.
the thua silk textile from Tonkin.
tin see: quan
toraisen (J.) copper coins imported to Japan from China. In the
early seventeenth century, in an attempt to standard-
ize the monetary system, the Japanese Government
forbade the circulation of these coins in Japan. They
were therefore exported to Quinam and Tonkin in a
considerable quantity.
Vua (V.) King, but actually Emperor (Hong : ) in
the context of seventeenth-century Tonkin. See also:
Cha.
wako (J. ) Japanese pirate.
yakan (J.) kettle.
glossary xxix
zeni (J.) A Japanese term used by the Dutch to indicate coins

(kasjes), imported by foreign merchants into Tonkin.
See also: kasjes, eiryaku sen, genho tsuho, shichusen,
toraisen.
xxx glossary
Map 1. Vietnam in seventeenth-century South-East Asia

contents xxxi
Map 2. VOC map of Vietnam (Tonkin and Quinam), late 1650s

Source: Nationaal Archief, The Hague.
xxxii
contents
Map 3. VOC illustration of The River of Tonkin, seventeenth century

Source: Nationaal Archief, The Hague.
contents xxxiii
Map 4. The River of Tonkin as depicted by the English c. 1670s

Source: British Library, London. Indications highlighted by the author.
xxxiv contents
Illustration 1. Letter of Cha Trnh Cn to Governor-General Willem van Outhoorn,

16 Dec. 1699, VOC 1623.
introduction 1
INTRODUCTION
The subject
Students of Vietnamese history have long bemoaned the enduring

ignorance about the relationship between the Vietnamese Kingdom of
Tonkin1 and the Dutch East India Company (the Verenigde Oostin-
dische Compagnie, hereafter VOC), caused by the fact that the VOC
documents relating to Tonkin have remained unexplored. These rich
and enticing sources on the political economy of seventeenth-century
Tonkin have posed a virtually insurmountable barrier to research-
ers because they are written in seventeenth-century Dutch.2 There
is one exception. W. J. M. Buch, who had on an earlier occasion
written about the VOC relations with Quinam, devoted an article
to Dutch-Vietnamese relations under the title La Compagnie des
Indes Nerlandaises et lIndochine, published in Bulletin de lcole
Franaise dExtrme-Orient (1936-7).3 Although this study provides
readers with a chronological history of the VOC in Indo-China, it
fails to analyse the political and commercial trends which constituted
the eventful history of the VOC-Tonkin relationship in detail. Conse-
quently, it does not provide any analysis of the Dutch impact on the
political economy of Tonkin, nor does it present any idea about the
position of Tonkin in the intra-Asian trading network of the VOC.
Despite the need of, and continuous calls for, a comprehensive study
of the VOC-Tonkin relationship, only a few articles have appeared
in the second half of the twentieth century in which the operation in
Tonkin of the VOC are dealt in the framework of the East Asian trade
of the Dutch Company in general. None of these articles has dealt
fully with the VOC-Tonkin relationship per se.4
This lack of knowledge about the Tonkin trade of the VOC has
occasionally led historians to inappropriate conclusions. In 1961,
Thnh Th V wrote Ngoi thng Vit Nam hi th k XVII, XVIII
v na u th k XIX [The Foreign Trade of Vietnam in the Seven-
teenth, Eighteenth, and Early Nineteenth Centuries] which remains
a standard work in this field up to today.5 In this study, Thnh Th
V used Buchs article as one of the Western sources available at the
time he was writing. Some of his conclusions on the Tonkin trade of
the VOC as well as the development of foreign trade in seventeenth-
2 introduction
century Tonkin are unconvincing, however, largely because of the

lack of figures on the VOCs import and export volumes. Similarly,
in the early 1970s, Nguyen Thanh Nha in his Tableau conomique
du Vietnam aux XVIIe et XVIIIe Sicles argued that, as the commod-
ity economy and foreign trade of the country developed, the elite of
Vietnamese society became a less monolithic group succumbing to
the intrusion of an invading power, that is money. Because of the
shortage of concrete figures, it was not clear in his arguments what the
seventeenth-century foreign trade of Vietnam looked like or to what
extent this development influenced local society. Moreover, some of
his claims of fundamental socio-economic changes such as the emer-
gence of the embryonic bourgeoisie seem, as A. B. Woodside has
pointed out, exaggerated, or at least not thrown into proper relief
by comparisons with the greater changes occurring in neighbouring
societies at the same time.6 As a study of the monetary aspect of
Vietnamese history, John K. Whitmores article, Vietnam and the
Monetary Flow of Eastern Asia, Thirteenth to Eighteenth Centuries,
has correctly demonstrated the position of Vietnam in the international
monetary system in the medieval and early modern periods. However,
the significant turning-point of the seventeenth century and such mon-
etary aspects as the volume of precious metals and coins imported
into Tonkin by the Dutch and other foreigners as well as the impact
of this trade on the local price level, labour, and handicraft industries
are not properly addressed.7
It was not until the early 1990s that the socio-economic history of
central and southern Vietnam (Quinam or Cochin China) in the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries was brought to light by Li Tanas
Nguyn Cochinchina. After analysing the internal aspects of Quinam,
Li analyses the dynamics of the country with respect to overseas trade,
placing central Vietnam in the closely knit trading networks of East
and South-East Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.8 It is
no exaggeration to say that Lis landmark study has offered historians
a standard reference on early-modern central and southern Vietnam.
Her achievement probably explains the fact that, since the publication
of her work, most of the studies on early modern Vietnam have dealt
in fact with Quinam and have virtually failed to mention Tonkin. Two
such works can serve as an example here.
In an attempt to include Vietnam in the world of early modern
South-East Asian maritime commerce, in his profound work South-
east Asia in the Age of Commerce Anthony Reid has argued that, in
introduction 3
opposition to the sustained urban growth in the other South-East Asian

countries where power shifted from the older capitals to trade-based
cities, the trade boom gave Vietnam the impetus to develop a new
type of a cosmopolitan, commercial citythe capital Thng Long.
He praises the grandeur of the capital compared to other South-East
Asian cities.9 The crucial miss in Reids discussion of the commer-
cial development of Thng Long in the seventeenth century is that
he considered this phenomenon in itself, not placing it in the con-
text of the interrelated commercial trading network, first, along the
Tonkin River and secondly and more importantly, in the East and
South-East Asian trading networks which were being run effectively
by both Asian merchants and European commercial enterprises. Simi-
larly, in his reflective work Strange Parallels, Victor B. Lieberman,
too, has discussed every aspect of seventeenth-century Tonkin except
its foreign trade, whereas he did deal properly with the overseas trade
of Quinam.10 In short, the clear-cut fact inexorably emerges that, in
contrast to the availability of good references relating to Quinam, the
protracted ignorance of the foreign trade of Tonkin has continued to
challenge historians who have wished to obtain a birds-eye view on
northern Vietnam in the early modern era.
This monograph deals specifically with VOC-Tonkin political and
commercial relations between 1637 and 1700. Nevertheless, it should
be stressed that, since the VOC was the largest trading partner of
Tonkin and its archive is the best documented, a comprehensive study
of the Dutch enterprise will not only highlight the VOC-Tonkin rela-
tionship per se, it will also help to draw attention to such relevant
aspects of seventeenth-century Tonkin as economic development and
social transformation. Before introducing the analytical framework of
this study, it is of importance to recapitulate one of the most relevant
aspects of this monograph: the Tonkin connection in the intra-Asian
trade of the VOC during the seventeenth century.
Tonkin in the intra-Asian trade of the VOC
Recent research on VOC trade has rightly considered its well-devised

intra-Asian trade the key factor in the commercial success of the Dutch
Company in Asia in the seventeenth century.11 Shortly after their
arrival in Asia, Dutch merchants realized the importance of establish-
ing and maintaining a closely knit trading network between various
4 introduction
trading markets. The prime task of such a network was to supply goods
for their homeward-bound ships but it also had a second essential role:
to yield profits by redistributing Asian goods to these places.
The intra-Asian trade of the VOC was run as follows. Silver was
invested in Indian textiles which were indispensable to conducting the
pepper and spice trade with the Indonesian Archipelago. While the
bulk of the Indonesian spices was shipped to the Netherlands, a large
amount of these commodities was also distributed to various Asian
trading centres such as India, Persia, Formosa (present-day Taiwan),
and Japan. Raw silk and silk piece-goods procured in Bengal, Persia,
China, and Tonkin were sent to Japan, where they were exchanged for
Japanese silver and, in the later period, copper and gold. The bulk of
Japanese silver was sent to various Asian trading-places as investment
capital and, to a lesser extent, it was exchanged for Chinese gold in
Formosa. This gold, together with that which arrived from the Repub-
lic itself was remitted to the Coromandel Coast in order to keep the
textile trade running smoothly.12 With the successful re-organization of
its East Asian trade during the 1630s, the fan-shape trading network of
the VOC, spreading out from its centre in Batavia, enjoyed a period of
high profits and great effectiveness. By the middle of the seventeenth
century, the intra-Asian trade had become so important to the entire
business of the VOC in the East that, writing to their masters in the
Netherlands in 1648, the Governor-General and the Council of the
Indies in Batavia figuratively referred to it as the soul of the Company
which must be looked after carefully because if the soul decays, the
entire body would be destroyed.13
If the intra-Asian trade was the key factor in the success of the
VOC business in general, its exclusive trade with Japan, which the
Dutch enjoyed from the early 1640s, made a critical contribution to
the success of this intra-Asian trade. Insofar as the financial aspect
of the Company was concerned, the rapid enlargement of its business
in Asia in the early seventeenth century required an annual increase
in the amount of its capital mainly in the form of silver bullion and
gold. Despite the fact that there were no serious problems regarding the
supply of these metals from the Netherlands, there was a limit to the
capital that the directors were in a position to send to the East Indies.14
The best solution to this shortage problem was to develop the Japan
trade in order to procure silver from this island nation. The annual
production of Japanese silver had increased spectacularly throughout
introduction 5
the latter half of the sixteenth century and peaked during the first three
decades of the seventeenth century.15
Yet, in order to obtain Japanese silver, the Dutch needed Chinese
silk. Prior to the arrival of the Dutch in the Far East in the early
1600s, what was known as the Chinese-silk-for-Japanese-silver trade
had been conducted smoothly by Portuguese, Chinese, and Japanese
traders. Having no direct access to mainland China, the VOC was
forced to conduct a third-country trade in order to purchase Chi-
nese silk at a regional rendezvous. It was this trading strategy which
encouraged the Company to make contact with Quinam during the first
three decades of the 1600s. Nevertheless, by the middle of the 1630s
the outflow of Chinese silk to regional markets gradually dried up as
the economy of China was thrown into disarray by internal political
chaos. Tonkinese silk presented itself as an ideal alternative to Chinese
yarn on the Japanese market from this time until the middle of the
1650s, when Bengali silk began to capture the Japanese market and
became profitable. Between 1641 and 1654, the VOCs Tonkin-Japan
trade reached its zenith. It is estimated that during this fourteen-year
period, out of the 12.8 million guilders worth of commodities which
the VOC shipped to Japan, the contribution of Tonkinese raw silk and
silk piece-goods was 3.5 million guilders.16 By analysing the VOCs
import and export trade with Tonkin, this monograph demonstrates
the critical role of the Tonkin connection, at least in a certain period,
in the Far Eastern trade of the VOC in particular and its intra-Asian
trade in general.
Source materials and analytical framework
This monograph analyses the political and commercial relations

between the VOC and Tonkin during the period 1637-1700. It will
focus on various aspects of the mutual relationship between the two
parties, namely: the vicissitudes in political relations and varying trends
in the VOCs import (silver and copper) and export (silk, ceramics,
musk, and gold) trade. The research begins with a glimpse into the
history of the Vietnamese maritime trade, focusing particularly on the
seventeenth-century foreign trade of Tonkin and the arrival of the VOC
in Quinam and Tonkin. After having presented a general background
to Vietnamese historiography and the Dutch setting, it analyses the
VOC-Tonkin political and commercial relations in detail as this is the
6 introduction
main thesis of this monograph. Finally, it examines Dutch influence

on indigenous society and economy.
Since this study deals specifically with the VOC-Tonkin relation-
ship, the principal sources are the Dutch records relating to Tonkin
preserved at the Nationaal Archief (National Archive) of the Neth-
erlands in The Hague.17 Most of the information and figures used
in this study have been extracted from the unpublished collection of
Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren which contains most of the records
of the VOCs Tonkin factory between 1637 and 1700. For the years
in which the Tonkin factory records have been lost, relevant informa-
tion about the VOCs Tonkin trade could be found in the records of
the VOC factories in Formosa and Japan. The published VOC sources
such as the Generale Missiven and the Batavia Dagh-register also
provided helpful information on the VOC-Tonkin political relations.
In order to deal effectively with diverse themes in one book, this
monograph employs different methodologies. Instead of applying
a simple chronological narrative as Buch has done, this study uses
the thematic approach in examining the vicissitudes in the political
relations. In Part Three, which examines the commercial relations, I
investigate the structure of the VOCs Tonkin trade and its changes
over time. I also make use of the quantitative method to demonstrate
the trends in the VOCs import and export trade with Tonkin. When
necessary, a comparison between Dutch records and records in other
languages such as English and Vietnamese is made.
As a background, Part One (Chapters One and Two) provides an
overview of Vietnamese historiography. Since there have been dif-
ferent, even contradictory, points of views about the foreign trade
of Vietnam, its overseas trade in particular, several sub-chapters are
devoted to recapitulating the ideas of several schools.18 It is argued
in this section that, although the Vietnamese found themselves in an
extremely favourable geographical position lying across the East-West
and the North-South maritime routes, they were far from active in
participating in maritime activities. It was the civil wars between the
Trnh and their Nguyn rivals in the early seventeenth century, lead-
ing to the political separation of Quinam and Tonkin, which reversed
the attitude of both rivals toward foreign trade. In foreign traders both
sides found a crucial source of supply of weapons and money to pros-
ecute their rivalry and ambitions for territorial expansion. In Tonkin,
the arrival of foreign merchants with large capital sums stimulated
the development of its commodity economy, especially the silk and
introduction 7
ceramic industries. The permanent residence of foreign merchants in

the capital laid the foundation for an interrelated commercial system
along the Tonkin River, linking the commercial centre of Thng
Long with the outside world.
Part Two (Chapters Three and Four) examines the political history
of the VOC-Tonkin relationship in detail. It has already been men-
tioned that the chief aim of the VOC was to acquire silk which it could
trade in Japan, while the L/Trnh rulers expected some more tangible
advantages than just commerce from the Dutch Company, namely a
military alliance and a regular supply of weapons. Conflicting interests
severely challenged the strength of the mutual relationship. After a
short period in which an intimate relationship was enjoyed, the VOC-
Tonkin tie deteriorated and ended embarrassingly in 1700. On the basis
of major historical events, this part highlights the major phases in the
VOC-Tonkin political relationship in the period 1637-1700.
Part Three (Chapters Five to Seven) analyses the VOCs Tonkin
trade from its inception in 1637 to its end in 1700. Arriving in Tonkin
with the expectation of acquiring Vietnamese silk to export to Japan
in exchange for silver, the Dutch Company was indeed able to con-
duct this trade to its satisfaction until the middle of the 1650s. Then,
the demand of Japanese consumers shifted from Vietnamese silk to
the Bengali product. Consequently, the Tonkin-Japan silk trade of the
VOC, indeed its Tonkin trade in general, began to decline, notwith-
standing endless attempts made by the High Government19 to revive
the ailing patient during the 1660s. After the silk age, the Dutch
Tonkin factory switched to the export of such products as Vietnamese
silk piece-goods and Chinese musk to the Netherlands, Chinese gold to
the Coromandel Coast, and Vietnamese ceramics to the insular South-
East Asian markets.
In Part Four (Chapter Eight) an attempt is made to examine the
Dutch impact on the indigenous society during the 1637-1700 period.
Utilizing information and analyses from the preceding chapters supple-
mented by contemporary travelogues, this chapter highlights significant
transformations in the local politics, society and economy under Dutch
influence. While conclusions on the political and economical aspects
can be drawn on the basis of concrete figures and information, we can
only speculate on the Dutch impact on the cultural and social domains.
Incontrovertibly, the VOCs import of metals for coinage and export
of local products from Tonkin stimulated the development of the com-
modity economy of Tonkin. This is largely believed by Vietnamese
8 introduction
historians to have contributed remarkably to the emergence of sprouts

of capitalism in Vietnam. The Dutch participation in several of the
military campaigns of Tonkin against Quinam in the 1640s, not to
mention their regular supply of weapons and ammunition throughout
the seventeenth century, are regarded as an external catalyst in the
Tonkin-Quinam wars.
part one: the setting 9
PART ONE: THE SETTING
Vietnamese-speakers occupied an extremely narrow coastal strip, wedged

between sea and mountains and balanced at either end by an open delta,
that of the Red River in the north and of the Mekong in the south.
The eight-hundred mile corridor itself was cut up into narrow east-west
basins, with no single center of gravity, no interior axis comparable to
the Irrawady or Chaophraya.20
Introduction
A watery environment and a maritime atmosphere are striking features

which impress foreigners once they arrive in Vietnam. Leaning against
the western mountain range, the long, extenuated country enjoys three
thousand kilometres of Eastern shoreline covering the entire Indo-Chi-
nese coast. This auspicious topography means that most Vietnamese
live relatively near to the open sea.
Watching ships passing by from a Vietnamese beach, it would be
impossible not to think of a glorious history of maritime trade writ-
ten by local mariners. Such a natural upwelling of feeling had indeed
once been shared by the French priest Alexandre de Rhodes who vis-
ited Vietnam in the early seventeenth century.21 Despite this maritime
environment, Vietnamese maritime history, taken as a whole, was far
from significant, especially when the tremendous geographical advan-
tage that the Vietnamese have on their doorstep is considered. The
ancient Vietnamese who had originally occupied the mountainous and
hilly north-western part of modern northern Vietnam began to exploit
the Hng (Red) River delta as early as the first millennium BC, but
they virtually halted their exploration on the coastal plain. The newly
arrived Vietnamese contented themselves with cultivating the rather
infertile littorals, casting an indifferent eye on all ships passing by
and unresponsively turning their backs to all commercial tides which
prevailed in the waters adjacent to them in the later periods. This
disinterested attitude towards seafaring activities was fostered by the
Vietnamese dynasties which ruled the country from the early eleventh
century.22 Although the political crises and conflicts they engendered
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries forced Vietnamese rul-
10 part one: the setting
ers to thaw their frigid attitude towards overseas trade and encouraged
them to contact foreign merchants in their quest for military support,
this improvement was but transient. As the costly Tonkin-Quinam
conflict eventually was terminated in a ceasefire in 1672, the Viet-
namese rulers concessions to foreign trade decreased. By the early
eighteenth century, there were hardly any Western merchants left in
northern Vietnam. In the central and southern regions, despite the
Nguyns more open and flexible outlook, foreign trade also declined.
Notwithstanding the predominant presence and administrative control
of the southern Vietnamese in most of the water frontier of the lower
Mekong delta from the mid-eighteenth century, their participation in
this regional trading hub was marginal.23
Before examining in detail the eventful political and commercial
history of seventeenth-century Vietnamese-Dutch relationship in the
following chapters, it is important to provide historiographies with a
focus on relevant topics. This part therefore briefly introduces the his-
tory of Vietnamese maritime trade, the internal political unrest versus
economic enlargement from the early sixteenth century and after, the
expansion of the countrys foreign trade, and the lively presence of
foreign merchants in northern Vietnam in the seventeenth century.
political background 11
CHAPTER ONE
POLITICAL BACKGROUND
1. Vietnamese maritime trade prior to 1527
Les Tunquinois peine exercent-ils aucun Traffiq hors du Royaume,

pour trois raisons principales. La premire, parce quils nont pas lart
de la boussole, & du navigage, ne sloignans iamais dans la mer de la
veu de leurs costes, ou de leurs montagnes. La seconde, parce que leurs
vaisseaux de port ne sont pas durer aux brisans des vagues, & contre
les tempestes qui arrivent ordinairement en un long voyage; les planches,
& les pices de bois nestant point jointes, & attaches cloux, ou
chevilles, mais seulement avec certaines ligatures, quil faut renouveller
tous les ans. Et la troisime est, parce que le Roy ne permet pas quils
passent aux autres Royaumes, o le Traffiq obligeroit les Marchands
de s habituer, ce qui diminueroit le tribut personnel quil tire de ses
sujets.
Alexandre de Rhodes (1651)24
The Hundred Vits and the Vietnamese

Prior to the middle of the first millennium BC, the area of what is
present-day southern China and northern Vietnam was occupied by a
large non-Chinese community, the Vit (Yue) people. The Vit com-
munity consisted of different groups which were popularly known as
Bch Vit (Baiyue or Hundred Vits). When Emperor Qin Shihuang
successfully unified China and established the Qin Dynasty in 221
BC, there were still four known Vit kingdoms: ng u (Dongou),
Mn Vit (Minyue), Nam Vit (Nanyue), and Lc Vit (Luoyue).
While the first three occupied modern southern China, Lc Vit was
situated in what is today northern Vietnam. Hence, the Vit group
which formed the Kingdom of Lc Vit was one group among what
were known as Hundred Vits and is widely believed to be the
ancestor of the Vietnamese nation today. Thanks to the widespread
use of metal tools, this Vit group gradually expanded the territory in
which they lived from the mountainous and hilly areas down to the
plains in order to exploit the heavier soils in the lower Hng River
delta and the northern coastal plain. Around the beginning of the
12 chapter one
Christian era, the Vietnamese were largely occupying what is present

northern Vietnam.25
In 221 BC, the Chinese Qin Empire invaded its southern neigh-
bours and began a long-term process of sinicizing the Vit people.
After successfully pacifying the Vit states in 214 BC, the Qin estab-
lished four commanderies in the newly conquered lands, namely: Mn
Chung (Minzhong); Nam Hi (Nanhai); Qu Lm (Guilin); and Tng
(Xiang). The last commandery included northern Vietnam.26 Accord-
ing to Vietnamese historiography, in order to try to repel the Qin
invasion, the people of Lc Vit allied with the people of Ty u
(Xiou) to form the Kingdom of u Lc (Ouluo). After 210 BC, when
Emperor Qin Shihuang died and other Vit states supplanted the Qin
occupation, the Vietnamese Kingdom of u Lc declared its independ-
ence in c. 208 BC. However, a bare thirty years later, in 179 BC, u
Lc was conquered by Nam Vit (Nanyue), which, in 111 BC, itself
succumbed to the Chinese Han Empire. Consequently, u Lc was
incorporated into the Han Empire together with Nam Vit and ruled
by successive Chinese dynasties until the early tenth century.27
As revealed in the early Chinese sources, the Chinese motive for
conquering their southern neighbours was to raid the prosperous Vit
states. The Vit kingdoms had long had a reputation among the Chi-
nese as rich lands which produced plenty of valuable goods, especially
sub-tropical products such as rhinoceros horns, elephant tusks, king-
fisher feathers, and pearls. Indeed, the Vit people not only enjoyed
fertile paddy-fields but they were privileged by an advantageous geo-
graphy which enabled them to communicate and trade with people in
the southern territories. It was this coastal trade which enriched the
Vit kingdoms. Early Chinese documents praised, among many other
Vit places, Phin Ngu (Panyu, near modern Guangzhou (Canton)), the
capital of the Kingdom of Nam Vit, as a collecting-centre for luxury
and valuable goods such as rhinoceros horns, elephant tusks, tortoise-
shell, pearls, fruit, cloth, silver, and copper. It was said that Chinese
merchants trading to this place all grew very wealthy.28
The Chinese colonization of northern Vietnam, 179 BCAD 905

These Chinese sources recount that at the time of the Chinese colo-
nization, in certain periods northern Vietnam acted as an entrept or
commercial hub of Chinas maritime trade. These valuable documents
also provide evidence of a regular trade between modern Guangzhou
and the ports of the north-western coast of the Gulf of Tonkin which
brought the former great wealth. Around the Christian era, the ports of
embarkation for the Chinese South Sea trade were Hepu and Xuwen
lying on the north-eastern shore of the Gulf of Tonkin, where pearl-
fishing and a pearl market had been well established. Later, these two
ports lost their role and foreign merchants began to visit the adjacent
areas of modern Hanoi regularly.29 From the middle of the third cen-
tury, a protracted revolt broke out in northern Vietnam. Worse still,
the covetousness of Chinese governors and prefects there not only
hampered the local trade, it was even considered the major cause
which led to the Chm invasion of northern Vietnam in the middle
of the fourth century.30
Shortly after the relationship with the Chm Kingdom was stabi-
lized, a series of Vietnamese revolts against the Chinese colonization
broke out. These largely ravaged the local trade and discouraged
foreign merchants who now resolved to sail farther north to mod-
ern Guangzhou, where trading conditions were relatively peaceful.31
Despite the fact that peace was restored later and foreigners occasion-
ally arrived in northern Vietnam to trade, it seems that the Hng River
delta could never regain its position in the regional maritime trade once
it had been lost. Meanwhile, the port of Guangzhou continued to thrive
and quickly became Chinas maritime gateway to the South Seas. From
the Sui Dynasty (589618), not only did most Chinese junks leave for
the South Seas from this port, but foreign vessels trading to China also
brought merchants to reside and trade at Guangzhou.32
In contrast to these Chinese sources which generally acknowledge
the important position of northern Vietnam in the early periods of
Chinas maritime trade, the Vietnamese chronicles in the later periods
simply considered northern Vietnam during the Chinese millenarian
colonization a purely agriculture-based country and the Vietnamese
as farmers whose economy was based largely on paddy-fields and
domestic handicrafts.33 Taken in conjunction with Vietnamese written
documents, recent archaeological studies have also tended to support
this largely and conventionally believed viewpoint. Moreover, meticu-
lous analyses of motifs of boats engraved in the early Vietnamese
bronze drums (dated around the beginning of the Christian era) have
led scholars to draw the conclusion that these engraved motifs reflected
freshwater boats, not marine vessels which could sail in the open
sea.34
14 chapter one
Illustration 2. Tonkinese boats in the Hng River
Admitting their ancestors weakness in seafaring activities, Viet-

namese scholars have sought a justification in the putative generosity
of Mother Nature. The general ecosystem of the sub-tropical region
indubitably gifted the primitive inhabitants with sufficient food, but
on the down side it made them less inventive and sapped any ambi-
tion for the improvement of technology. From this point of view, the
fertility of the Hng River delta and the propensity of the coastal
plains to allow expansion have often been blamed for the inadequacy
of the Vietnamese in the regional maritime trade.35 In short, conven-
tional Vietnamese historiographies see northern Vietnam as an agrarian
country and the Vietnamese as farmers who contented themselves with
cultivating the bare coastal fields while glancing incuriously at all
ships sailing past their coast.
Was northern Vietnam under the Chinese millenarian colonization,
though only in certain periods, an entrept in the maritime trade of
China as has been vividly depicted in the early Chinese documents?
If this were a true picture, what was the role of the Vietnamese in
these commercial activities? The following arguments seek to answer
these questions as well as to draw some preliminary conclusions on
this topic which continues to arouse controversy.
In the first place, there are some geographical terms in the early
Chinese sources which perhaps need further clarification. Although
the concept of modern political borders when doing historical research

should be erased from the mind, particularly for the complex topic of
the Hundred Vit community, it still should not be overlooked that the
fact that the ports of Hepu and Xuwen, though located in the north-
east of the Gulf of Tonkin, still geographically and historically were
in the orbit of present-day Guangdong. By the Christian era, these
two places were undoubtedly occupied by the Vit people. However,
it is also certain that the Vit people who occupied these ports were
not the Vietnamese from present-day Vietnam. Hence, these two ports
basically developed without a Vietnamese contribution.
The second point which requires comment is that, although early
Chinese sources described the Vit people as skilful sailors, they failed
to distinguish to which Vit group these seamen belonged. Since the
Vietnamese had descended into the coastal areas a relatively short
time before, they could hardly have been those who sailed profession-
ally to the southern China ports for commercial purposes. Weighed
against this, the ports in modern Guangdong had long been known as
places which produced good sailors and the best shipbuilding timber.
Consequently, the Yue sailors described in the early Chinese records
were unlikely to have been the Vietnamese. Even by the time northern
Vietnam had become a hub of Chinese maritime trade, it appears that
the Vietnamese may not have played an active role in this commer-
cial dynamism either. Instead, Chinese and sinicized Vit merchants
were said to be commercially mobile and dynamic in the lands newly
conquered by the Chinese.36
Finally, the fact that Vietnamese maritime trade was insignificant
during the millennium of Chinese domination does not necessarily
gainsay the important position of northern Vietnam in the regional
maritime trade. After being pacified and ruled by the Chinese, Jiaozhi
(synonymous with northern Vietnam) became the headquarters of the
Jiaozhou Prefect which was entrusted by successive Chinese dynasties
to act as the commercial hub of Chinas maritime trade. One plausible
reason for this trust was perhaps that northern Vietnam conveniently
was located between China and other southern kingdoms from where
such valuable sub-tropical products as calambac, rhinoceros horns, ele-
phant tusks, tortoise-shell, pearls, and the like arrived. This felicitous
geographical position for trading with the southern lands continued to
play a significant role for Vietnam in the period of independence and
this will be analysed below.
16 chapter one
Independent i Vit and the state monopoly of foreign trade,

10101527
After a series of unsuccessful revolts against Chinese domination in
the eighth century, from 905 to 1010, the Vietnamese Khc, Ng,
inh, and Former L Dynasties enjoyed more success and steadily
supplanted the Chinese administration. They were victorious in repel-
ling several Chinese military interventions. An embryonic independent
Vietnamese administration was established and progressively renewed
which laid a solid foundation for the development of the Vietnamese
Kingdom of i Vit (Great Vit) during the L (10101226), Trn
(12261400), and the early stage of the L (14281788) Dynasties.
The i Vits capital was established in Thng Long, modern Hanoi.
During this independent era, except for a brief invasion and occupa-
tion by the Ming Empire between 1407 and 1428, i Vit was a
kingdom which made its mark in the region and thrice defeated the
Mongol invaders during the thirteenth century. It crushed the Chinese
Ming troops in the early fifteenth century, and gradually suppressed
the Chm Kingdom of Champa in order to extend its southern border
in the subsequent centuries.37
The independent i Vit Kingdom experienced rapid economic
growth, especially in rural agriculture and handicrafts. The Vietnamese
textile industry had developed so spectacularly by the early reigns of
the L Dynasty that, in 1040, King L Thi Tng gave his courtiers
all the Chinese silks stored in the state depository and decided from
then on to use local silk instead of that from China for court dress. The
mining industry, especially gold-mines, also began to flourish, which
in turn gave the tributary trade with China a boost. Other handicraft
industries also progressed rapidly. During the Trn and the early stage
of the L Dynasties, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, large
quantities of Vietnamese blue and white wares were exported to the
regional and international markets.38
The economic growth offered a good opportunity for the expansion
of i Vits foreign trade. This economic branch was still restricted
as it was monopolized by the dynasties and confined mainly to the
tributary trade with China. Indeed, in its early reigns, the L Dynasty
did seek to stimulate foreign trade when, in 1012, i Vit requested
the Chinese Song for permission to trade to Yongzhou in modern
Guangxi by sea. This petition was rejected; the Song only allowed the
Vietnamese the trade to Guangzhou and other border markets which it
had granted earlier. In 1149, Javanese and Siamese merchants arrived

eager to trade with i Vit. The L Dynasty opened Vn n seaport
in the modern north-eastern province of Qung Ninh for foreign trade.
It simultaneously allowed foreign merchants to trade in the Din Chu
district in the modern province of Ngh An.39 From the early Trn
Dynasty (12261400), foreign trade was put under strict control in
response to the pressure of the Mongol invasion. In order to prevent
infiltration by Chinese spies, i Vit forbade foreign merchants to
venture to inland markets and restricted their trade to some coastal
places appointed for that purpose. This partly explains the famous
adage written by a thirteenth-century Chinese traveller who noted
that This country [namely i Vit] does not trade [with foreign-
ers].40 The northern seaport of Vn n seemed to decline from the
mid-thirteenth century blighted by the Trns vigilance in uncovering
Chinese spies and consequently the restrictions on the countrys for-
eign trade. Conversely, the southern commercial centres of i Vit in
modern Thanh Ho, Ngh An, and H Tnh flourished. There, foreign
merchants were not restricted simply to the purchase of Vietnamese
merchandise but also could acquire valuable commodities from neigh-
bouring countries such as Champa, Laos, and Cambodia.41
The only contentious issue, if any, concerning the overseas trade of
i Vit in the independent periods is whether we should consider it
a commencement or merely a continuity. Those who have disregarded
the role of northern Vietnam in the regional maritime trade before the
independent period see now a fresh commencement of the maritime
trade of the country thanks largely to the rapid economic growth.42
In contrast to this point of view, others consider the overseas trade of
i Vit in the independent era simply as a continuity, even a some-
what pale shadow of what it had been. Momoki Shiro, for instance,
argues that i Vit was no longer a great South China Sea trading
centre after the tenth century although its development still depended
more on the control of trade networks and export commodities than on
peasants and agrarian produces.43 The major cause of the dwindling
of the maritime trade of i Vit after the tenth century was the fatal
shifting of the Chinese maritime trade centre from northern Vietnam
to southern China during the Tang Dynasty. Chinese junks trading to
the Southern Seas now departed from Guangzhou and Fujian and often
sailed past northern Vietnam to call at either the southern Vietnamese
seaports of Din Chu or the Chm seaports in modern central Viet-
nam. These transformations in the regional maritime trade caused the
18 chapter one
southern commercial centres of i Vit to flourish more prosperously

than the northern seaport of Vn n.44
The heyday of these southern commercial centres was short-lived.
The Chm who then occupied the southern part of central Vietnam
increasingly became involved in the South China Sea trade and gradu-
ally moved their maritime centres to the southern seaports of Kauthara
and Panduranga in modern Phan Rang. These commercial places
siphoned off foreign merchants into the Chm coast. In the meantime,
the alteration of several commercial routes affected i Vits foreign
trade significantly. The most significant re-routing was the reversal of
Cambodian maritime trade towards the Gulf of Siam. These centrifugal
movements derived i Vit of its profitable intermediary position
between China and other southern kingdoms which it had been enjoy-
ing thus far. This explains, at least partly, the fact that during the Trn
era (12261400), i Vit concentrated more on agriculture than on
foreign trade. Besides, the Trns vigilance prompted by the Mon-
gol invasion in the thirteenth century toughened the strict measures
imposed by the court to control foreign trade. These measures were
taken in order to prevent Chinese spies from entering the country.
Foreign merchants were now forbidden to visit the inland markets
and they were strictly confined to the north-eastern seaport of Vn
n. These daunting measures contributed to three glorious victories
of the Trn against the Yuan-Mongol troops in the second half of the
thirteenth century. By the end of the following century, however, the
Trn had declined and the dynasty was eventually usurped by H Qu
Ly, who founded the H Dynasty in 1400 but failed to preserve inde-
pendence of the country from Ming invasion and occupation between
1407 and 1428.45
After successfully liberating the country from the Chinese occu-
pation in 1428, L Li established the L Dynasty (14281788). The
remarkable revival of the countrys agrarian economy throughout the
rest of the fifteenth century elevated i Vit to an economic and
military power in the region. The state vigilance intent on ejecting
Chinese spies which had been strictly regulated throughout the Trn
Dynasty was eased. Chinese merchants, for example, were report-
edly allowed to trade at nine ports and border markets. Despite this
lessening of restrictions, foreign trade was still strictly monopolized
and largely bridled by the court whose Confucian ideology sought to
develop agriculture at the expense of trade. Articles 612617 of the
L Code, for instance, regulated the heavy fines to be imposed on and

severe punishments inflicted on both officials and ordinary people who
carried out illegal trade at the Vn n seaport.46
2. Incessant conflicts and political schisms, 15271672
Les Portugais qui estoient avec nous, luy firent des presens qui leur
semblrent plus sortables, & plus propres du temps, cest savoir de
belles armes complettes pour couvrir la personne du Roy, sil vouloit
sen servir la guerre ... Il neut pas alors le loisir de nous entretenir de
plus longs discours ayant toutes ses penses tournes lattaque quil
alloit faire.
Alexandre de Rhodes (1651)47
After the L Dynasty had slid into a decline in the late fifteenth cen-
tury, in 1527, Mc ng Dung, a high-ranking courtier, supplanted
the crumbling L, claimed imperial status, and established the Mc
Dynasty. The Mc continued to rule the country from the capital Thng
Long, which was now popularly called ng Kinh (the East Capital,
also historically and geographically a designation of the delta of the
Hng River) to distinguish it from the Ty Kinh (the West Capital)
in the Thanh-Ngh region which was under the sway of the restored
L Dynasty. Shortly after the Mc usurpation, in 1532, Thanh-Ngh
loyalists began a movement to restore the L Dynasty, using Thanh
Ho and Ngh An Provinces as a base from which to rival the Mc
in ng Kinh. Among the supporters of the L restoration movement
was Nguyn Kim, another high-ranking courtier of the L Dynasty.
It is important to stress here that, although Emperor L Trang Tng
was enthroned in 1532, the restoration movement was entirely mas-
terminded by Nguyn Kim. When this orchestrator was poisoned by
a Mc agent in 1545, Trnh Kim, his son-in-law, succeeded him and
continued the fight with the Mc. In 1592, the restored L defeated
the Mc and returned to ng Kinh. The Mc fled to the northern
province of Cao Bng and continued to contest the L/Trnh court
until the late seventeenth century under the spiritual protection of the
Chinese Ming and Qing Dynasties.48
At the time the L and the Mc were fiercely waging war, con-
flict and confrontation erupted among leaders of the L restoration
movement which consequently led to another internal conflict in the
following century, the Trnh-Nguyn wars. After succeeding Nguyn
20 chapter one
Illustration 3. A Tonkinese warship in the Hng River
Kim in 1545, Trnh Kim assassinated Nguyn Ung, Nguyn Kims

eldest son, and kept a vigilant eye on Nguyn Hong, the second
son of Nguyn Kim. In this way he consolidated his position and
eliminated his potential rivals. Considering his precarious position
under Trnh Kims suspicion, Nguyn Hong feigned insanity and
returned to the countryside. In 1558, Nguyn Hong asked his sister
to intercede with Trnh Kim, her husband, to appoint him governor of
Thun Ha prefecture, consisting of present-day Qung Bnh, Qung
Tr, and Tha Thin Hu Provinces. Believing that Nguyn Hong
would not be able to survive in such a vulnerable frontier jurisdiction,
Trnh Kim approved the request. In the same year, Emperor L Anh
Tng appointed Nguyn Hong garrison commander of Thun Ha
prefecture. In 1572, Nguyn Hong was awarded the southerly pre-
fecture of Qung Nam, which consisted of modern Nng, Qung
Nam, and Qung Ngi Provinces, for his meritorious services to the
country over the past years.49
Illustration 4. Tonkinese elephant troops and infantrymen

While the ng Kinh and Thanh-Ngh regions were badly dev-

astated during the fierce L-Mc wars, the southern prefectures of
Thun Ha and Qung Nam enjoyed a fairly peaceful atmosphere
thanks to Nguyn Hongs benign government. Strikingly enough, the
people of the infertile Thun-Qung regions were capable of supplying
provision not only for themselves but also for the L/Trnh troops gar-
risoning the Thanh-Ngh Provinces. Besides agriculture, foreign trade
also flourished. The northern annals of i Vit s k ton th had to
admit the fact that Nguyn Hong ruled with geniality ; seaborne
merchants from foreign kingdoms all came to buy and sell, a trading
center was established.50
When the Mc were finally driven out of Thng Long in 1592,
Nguyn Hong brought his armies back to ng Kinh to counter-
attack the Mc alongside the L/Trnh troops. He cherished the hope
of eliminating the Trnh family in order to unify the country under
his sway. In 1599, his hope seemed blighted as Trnh Tng, his rival,
was promoted from the rank of grand duke to that of king (vng)
while Nguyn Hong still remained a grand duke. Having to swallow
this setback in the face-to-face competition with Trnh Tng at court
and, having spent almost ten years in ng Kinh without achieving
his ambitions, Nguyn Hong made a sudden return to his southern
base in the same year.51 From that moment on, Nguyn Hong began
to plan his new strategy: establishing his own independent kingdom.
Under these conditions he expanded foreign trade using it as a crucial
means to gain money and, more importantly, modern weapons to arm
his troops. Therefore, through foreign merchants trading to Hi An,
the Nguyn rulers imported Western weapons and military technology
which contributed decisively to the survival of Nguyns embryonic
independence against seven fierce counter-attacks by the L/Trnh
armies between 1627 and 1672.52
The sustained consolidation of Thun-Qung worried the L/Trnh
rulers in ng Kinh. In 1620, taking the Nguyns tarrying with tax
payment as a pretext, Trnh troops harassed the southern border but
were repelled. Considering its well-armed troops after almost three
decades of consolidation and painfully aware of the Trnhs hostile
attitude, the Nguyn decided to abandon the sending of their tax obli-
gations to ng Kinh and openly declared their intention to restore the
L Dynasty. In 1627, the Trnh raised the banner of supporting the L
Emperor to suppress the rebellious Nguyn as a rallying call to attack
Thun Ho, commencing the Trnh-Nguyn wars, popularly known in
22 chapter one
Illustration 5. Tonkinese soldiers practising sword fighting
Vietnamese history as the conflict between ng Trong (Quinam) and

ng Ngoi (Tonkin).53 Notwithstanding their numerous armiesas
many as 180,000 soldiers were deployed at some times in the con-
flictthe Trnh could never get over the Nguyn defensive walls at
ng Hi. Seven campaigns launched by Tonkin were all defeated
by Quinam. The southern armies also hit back and briefly held some
parts of Ngh An Province between 1655 and 1660.54
Illustration 6. Detailed drawing of a Dutch cannon currently preserved at the ancient

capital of Hu. This cannon may have been one of those the Nguyn confiscated from
the Dutch shipwrecks off Quinams shore
After the seventh campaign ended without any breakthrough, the

L/Trnh of Tonkin decided to end this protracted and costly conflict,
bitterly accepting their failure to suppress the Nguyn separatists. The
Gianh River in modern ng Hi, the unconquerable frontier in this
conflict, came to serve as the border between the two kingdoms. The
1672 cease-fire offered each side a free hand to focus on their own
territorial affairs. Tonkin carried out a series of attacks on the Mc
clan who had been stubbornly contesting the L/Trnh rulers under
the spiritual protection of the Ming and later on the Qing Dynasties.
In 1677, Cao Bng was completely pacified; some members of the
Mc clan fled to China but were later on captured and handed over to
the L/Trnh rulers by the Chinese authorities in 1683. In the mean-
time, the Nguyn also geared up their territorial expansion towards
the south. Under increasing pressure from the southern Vietnamese,
the Chm Kingdom had finally vanished by the turn of the eighteenth
century. From now on, the southern frontier region was completely
open to the Vietnamese-speaking people who gradually made their
dominant presence known in present-day Saigon and the surrounding
provinces throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.55
Illustration 7. Vua (Emperor) L at his court

24 chapter one
On paper, the numerous Trnh troops could or should have easily

defeated the Nguyn armies, which were much smaller in number.
This assumption would have been entirely misplaced. Recent studies
have looked for the causes of the Trnh failures in various aspects of
the conflict. It is popularly argued that the distance of the battlefield
decisively hindered the Trnh armies which had to travel hundreds of
miles to the southern frontier and required a well-maintained supply
of provisions along extenuated routes. In contrast, the Nguyn soldiers
only needed to garrison in their forts to resist the northern invaders.
Climate also played a hand; because of the sub-tropical climate of the
Thun Ho region, the Trnh armies could only campaign during the
spring season when the weather was relatively cool and dry, but had
to withdraw before the hot and rainy summer season. Therefore, the
southern armies which were garrisoned in well-built forts mounted
with superior ordnance simply needed to persist in their defence to
see the Trnh withdrawing their troops before a lack of provisions
forced them to and their soldiers succumbed to the intolerable cli-
mate.56 Nevertheless, the really crucial factor was the difference in
the weaponry employed by each side in the war. While the Nguyn
were in the position to arm their troops with Western-style cannon,
ordnance, gunpowder, and other military innovations which were
either imported from overseas or manufactured locally by employing
knowledge garnered from Western technology, the Trnh still mainly
employed traditional and Chinese-style weapons. Superior weapons
offered better results. Hence, the Nguyn not only successfully resisted
the Trnh attacks at ng Hi, they even had the armed capability to
destroy Dutch ships in the early 1640s, and to overrun and occupy
the southern territory of the Trnh for several years at the end of the
1650s.57
Why did Nguyn Quinam have access to Western weapons and
modern military technology while Trnh Tonkin did not? Indubitably,
it was the well-organized foreign trade of the Nguyn which played a
key role throughout the seventeenth-century wars. With a clear strategy
in his mind after returning from ng Kinh in 1599, Nguyn Hong
and his successors consolidated and facilitated the foreign trade of the
country to build relationships with other foreign powers, most notably
the Portuguese in Macao and the Japanese Tokugawa. Via these com-
mercial and political links, the Nguyn could import foreign weapons
and modern military technology. This bestowed on the Nguyn almost
three decades in which to prepare for the conflict which broke out in
Illustration 8. Cha (King) Trnh at his court
earnest in 1627. Instead of looking outwards, the Trnh mired in the

ongoing wars with the Mc. Moreover, it seems that the Trnh rulers
did not really consider employing Western weapons and modern mili-
tary technology until after their second defeat by the Nguyn in 1633.
By this time, the Trnh must have been fully aware of the superior-
ity of Western weaponry which the Nguyn had been employing so
efficiently. The Trnh, therefore, energetically began to seek external
military assistance from foreign powers to balance the internal conflict.
To lure foreign commercial and military powers to their land, the Trnh
rulers utilized the products of Tonkins handicraft industries. The fol-
lowing section discusses this sector of the local economy during the
centuries of political unrest.58
26 chapter two
CHAPTER TWO
ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
1. Handicraft industries and export commodities
Gi th gi vic trong nh
Khi vo canh ci khi ra thu tha.59
The sixteenth-century political crisis caused severe devastation of Viet-
nams agriculture and conscriptions required by the incessant military
campaigns, compounded by natural disasters, largely contributed to
regular crop failures. More critically, large tracts of the state-owned
land were gradually privatized by local rulers, diminishing the area of
public land, the most crucial means of production on which Vietnam-
ese peasants relied. Consequently, the number of landless farmers grew
quickly, causing a disproportionate surplus of unemployed labourers
in northern Vietnamese villages.60
In contrast to the overcrowded Hng River delta of ng Kinh,
Thun Ho and Qung Nam were less densely populated. Here unfail-
ing opportunities were available for northern migrants to acquire and
exploit plenty of land once they ventured into these southern prefec-
tures. This was not a new demographical development. Since the late
1400s, the Vietnamese-speaking people had been constantly migrat-
ing, either voluntarily or forcibly made to do so, to Thun Ho and
Qung Nam. The flow of migrants continued throughout the 1500s
in response to the increasing pressure from the population boom and
the subsequent land shortage in ng Kinh. After Nguyn Hong was
appointed Governor of Thun Ha in 1558, then of Thun Ho and
Qung Nam jointly in 1572, the social composition of Vietnamese
immigration to the southern regions changed completely, including not
only landless farmers and exiles but also wealthy people, the majority
of them relatives and dependents of the Nguyn family. Hence, the
population of these southern prefectures artificially peaked in the latter
half of the 1500s.61
While a large number of landless peasants resolved to leave their
northern hamlets to look for a new life in the southern frontier region,
those who remained behind looked for an instant income from tra-
economic background 27
ditional handicrafts. The excess of labourers fortuitously coincided

with the increasing demand for local export handicraft products from
the late sixteenth century, fuelled by the regular arrival of foreign
merchants in search of such items. These factors stimulated the devel-
opment of the country handicrafts and temporarily helped solve the
problem of an excess workforce.62
Raw silk and piece-goods

There is an abundance of silk in Tonkin. The natives, both the rich and
the poor, all wear silk. The Dutch trade to every corner where they could
yield profit. Every year they ship away a great quantity of Tonkins silk.
They are the largest exporter of Tonkins silk to the Japan market.
J. B. Tavernier (1679)63
The chief riches, and indeed the only staple commodity, is silk, raw
and wrought: of the raw the Portuguese and Castilians in former days,
the Hollanders lately, and at present the Chinese, export good quantity
to Japan, etc.: of their wrought silks the English and the Dutch expand
the most.
Samuel Baron (1685)64
Silk had been woven by the Vietnamese for centuries and some sorts
of Vietnamese silk piece-goods had become internationally famous.
By the mid-1200s, fully aware of the high quality of Vietnamese
silk, King Thi Tng of the L Dynasty decided henceforth to dress
the court in local silks instead of Chinese products. Although featur-
ing prominently among the tributary items sent to China, Vietnamese
silk was also exported to various regional markets on board of for-
eign ships. In his famous Suma Oriental, the early sixteenth-century
Portuguese traveller Tom Pires noted that the Vietnamese Kingdom
of Cochin China (synonymous at the time with i Vit) produced,
amongst other valuable items, bigger and wider and finer taffeta
of all kinds than there is anywhere else here and in our [countries].
They have the best raw silks in colours, which are in great abundance
here, and all that they have in this way is fine and perfect, without
the falseness that things from other places have.65
By the early seventeenth century, Vietnamese silk had become so
popular on the regional market that the French priest Alexandre de
Rhodes, who first arrived in northern Vietnam in 1627, noted that this
product, together with aloes wood, was among the most important of
the merchandise which lured Chinese and Japanese merchants to trade
28 chapter two
with Tonkin.66 Silk was undoubtedly the key item which encouraged
the annual arrival of Japanese and Chinese junks in Tonkin in the
first decades of the 1600s. As the Japanese consumers became used
to the Vietnamese product, the volume of Vietnamese silk exported
to Japan by the Chinese, Japanese, and Portuguese increased from the
early 1630s. In 1634, the Dutch factors at Hirado recorded that in this
year Chinese junks brought in total 2,500 piculs of both Chinese and
Vietnamese silk to Japan.67 The prospect of a profitable silk trade with
the Trnh lands encouraged the VOC to establish political and com-
mercial relations with northern Vietnam. Two years later, the Dutch
chief factor in Japan, Nicolaas Couckebacker, compiled a promising
report on the current production and trade of Tonkinese silk.68 In the
following year, the Dutch made their inaugural voyage to Tonkin and
began to export Vietnamese silk, alongside that from China, to Japan.
In the second half of the seventeenth century, the Dutch also exported
Vietnamese silk to the Netherlands. The English, who began to trade
with Tonkin from 1672, also exported Vietnamese silk to London from
the late 1670s. Despite an auspicious beginning, the annual quantity
of Vietnamese silk exported to Europe by the Dutch and the English
was neither regular nor substantial.69
In the early seventeenth century silk was produced in virtually
every Tonkinese village. Silk weaving was a traditional household
handicraft. There were, however, several manufacturing centres where
silk textiles were produced in great quantities. Most of these places
were located either within the capital Thng Long itself or in the sur-
rounding prefectures in the present-day provinces of H Ty, Sn Ty,
Bc Ninh, Hi Dng, and Sn Nam, where orchards of mulberry
trees were watered and fertilized by the Hng River. Besides the silk
textiles made by ordinary people, a considerable quantity of silk was
manufactured by state-owned factories, whose products were confined
not only to court dresses and the tributary trade but were also delivered
to foreign merchants from whom in return the royal families received
silver, copper, and curiosities.70
In the actual process of silk production, there were two major
crops per year. The summer crop harvested between April and May
was the largest crop. In the 1630s, the Dutch estimated that the summer
crop yielded around 1,5001,600 piculs of raw silk and roughly 5,000
6,000 silk piece-goods, whereas, the winter crop harvested between
October and November provided around half of the amount yielded by
the summer harvest. Consequently, foreign merchants involved in the
Tonkin-Japan silk trade often arrived in Tonkin before the summer to

buy silk and departed for Japan before the southern monsoon ended in
July or August. Shortly after the summer harvest, a silk auction was
organized by the court in the capital Thng Long. The delivery price
varied according to the privileges which foreign merchants enjoyed but
was always higher than on the free market. Afterwards local weavers
and brokers sold and delivered their products to the foreigners accord-
ing to what they had purchased. The winter yarn was either kept for
Japan-bound shipments in the summer or shipped to Europe. From
the second half of the seventeenth century, the Dutch mainly exported
Tonkinese winter silks to the Netherlands. These winter cargoes were
first shipped to Batavia in the spring and transhipped in vessels leaving
for Europe. The English, who failed to re-open their trade with Japan
in 1673, also exported Tonkinese silk to London during the last quarter
of the seventeenth century.71
Despite the large amounts produced annually, the quality of Tonk-
inese export silk was generally lower than that of its Chinese and
Bengal counterparts, which were also exported regularly to Japan in
the seventeenth century. The reason for this lay in the characteristics
of the local mulberries, the silkworms, and the tropical climate of
Tonkin. Mulberry trees planted in northern Vietnam, according to an
eighteenth-century European traveller, were small shrubs, which are
every year cut down to the ground in the winter and the plant of which
must be renewed from time to time, if they would obtain fine silk,
the old plants, as well as the large trees, give but indifferent silk.72
The silkworm was another decisive factor. The silkworm bred in
Tonkin adapted well to the tropical climate and even spun cocoons
during the hot summer, but the bulk of these were yellow, hence, the
yarn was yellow (bogy), which was neither esteemed nor marketable
on the Japanese market. The Vietnamese therefore tried to import
Chinese silkworms which spun white yarn. Unused to the tropical
climate, the imported silkworms were only able to spin cocoons in the
cool weather of autumn and spring. By this time most of the mulberry
trees had been chopped down. The amount of this sort of silk was
therefore small, contributing to the fact that the winter silk crop was
quantitatively inconsiderable.
Despite the small amount of the winter silk, there were often not
enough buyers because foreign merchants were well aware of the very
fact that the Japanese make a great difference between the new silk
and the old.73 The new silk here referred partly to the summer prod-
30 chapter two
uct to distinguish it from the old which was harvested during the
winter. During the early 1660s, silks were often so abundant in the
winter sales that the prices dropped rapidly. A high-ranking local man-
darin of Tonkin therefore requested Batavia to send ships to Tonkin
during the New Year season to buy all winter silks which were sold
at relatively low prices.74
Ceramics
They [the Vietnamese] have porcelain and potterysome of great
valueand these go from there to China to be sold.
Tom Pires (1515)75
Pottery was used by the Vietnamese from the Neolithic age, c. 5,000
years before the Christian era. During the Chinese millenarian rule
(179 BCAD 905), Vietnamese pottery techniques, especially those
for producing glazed ceramics, steadily advanced under the influence
of Chinese ceramic technology. The independent era from the early
tenth century then provided good conditions for the development of the
Vietnamese ceramic industry. i Vits Yuan-style brown underglaze
wares and the glassy-green celadons of the Trn Dynasty (12261400)
were not only produced in sufficient quantities for domestic use, they
also found good prices on the international market. Siamese and Java-
nese merchants trading to i Vit purchased, among other local
merchandise, ceramics and exported them mainly to insular South-
East Asian markets in modern Indonesia and the Philippines.
Although the Vietnamese ceramic industry suffered a slight set-
back during the brief Ming invasion and occupation (140728), the
diffusion of advanced Chinese ceramic technology to northern Vietnam
during this period helped improve the quality of Vietnamese ceramics,
especially the Vietnamese blue and white wares. Hence, various types
of ceramics in conjunction with the overglaze-enamelled wares were
exported to regional and international markets in the early reigns of
the L Dynasty (14281788), especially when the Ming reinforced its
ban on the foreign trade of China. Profiting from this embargo, Viet-
namese ceramics were now exported to places as far away as Egypt
and Turkey in the west, South-East Asian insular markets in the south,
and Japan in the East. After the Ming lifted its ban on foreign trade
in 1567, high-quality Chinese porcelain and ceramics again flooded
the international market. Consequently, Vietnamese wares had to cede
their predominant position but briefly rebounded in the early 1670s,
when the Chinese Qing Dynasty again curbed its foreign trade in a
concerted effort to eliminate the Zheng clan in Formosa.76
Prior to the sixteenth century, most of the Vietnamese ceramics
exported to the international market were manufactured at the Chu
u kilns in modern Hi Dng Province. This production centre,
however, declined rapidly throughout the sixteenth century, falling
victim to the vast devastation caused by the L-Mc wars. By the early
seventeenth century, Bt Trng ceramic village, which was located
relatively close to Thng Long, emerged as the major ceramic centre
in i Vit. Consequently, most of the ceramics which the Chinese,
Dutch, and the English exported to the South-East Asian market in the
late seventeenth century were manufactured there.77
The quality of Vietnamese export ceramics varied according to
the demand on different markets. The fifteenth- and sixteenth-century
export ceramics were mainly fine wares, probably because the inter-
national demand for such high-quality products was facing a severe
shortage of fine Chinese porcelain. Such Vietnamese ceramics exported
to Western Asia as the octagonal bottles with underglaze-cobalt decora-
tion or the dishes with peony sprays painted in underglaze-cobalt were
as fine as Chinese products. By contrast, the quality of the late seven-
teenth-century Vietnamese wares exported to the insular South-East
Asian countries was much lower. The Dutch and Chinese shipments of
Vietnamese wares consisted mainly of coarse wares for daily use such
as plates, cups, and rice bowls. The demand for this sort of ware was
also largely attributable to the current shortage of Chinese coarse wares
in the regional markets after the Qing banned its people from sailing
abroad in order to isolate and suppress its Zheng rivals in Formosa. If
fine Chinese porcelain could be substituted by Japanese high-quality
Hizen porcelain, the Chinese coarse wares were then supplemented by
Vietnamese coarse ceramics.78 After successfully pacifying Formosa
in 1683, the Qing lifted its ban on foreign trade. Chinese porcelain of
all qualities again flooded the international market. Vietnamese ceram-
ics, repeating the sixteenth-century story, again failed to compete with
coarse Chinese porcelain in the regional markets.79
Other miscellaneous exports

The lacquerware made in Tonkin was, according to a seventeenth-
century European traveller, not inferior to any but that of Japan
only, which is esteemed the best in the world; probably because the
32 chapter two
Japan wood is much better than this at Tonquin, for there seems not
any considerable difference in the paint or varnish.80 The most popu-
lar objects of Tonkinese lacquerware were drawers, cabinets, desks,
frames, and trays. These were chiefly made of fir and lacquered
white. One seemingly insurmountable problem was that local joiners
were reportedly so careless that they often damaged objects. Besides,
Vietnamese lacquerers were generally not innovative or inventive in
their craft. They failed to produce new objects and fashion decorative
motifs to meet the discerning demand of the international market. As a
consequence in an effort to improve Tonkinese lacquerware contracted
for London, during the 1680s the English East India Company planned
to send one English carpenter to Tonkin to instruct local lacquerers
in preparing objects. Occasionally, the English Company also sent
undecorated objects from London to Tonkin to be lacquered there.81
The English trade in Tonkinese lacquerware was rather short-lived.
From the late 1680s, the English directors in London frequently com-
plained about the low-quality lacquerwares which the English factory
in Thng Long had sent home. Disgruntled they ordered that only fine
objects should be purchased for London from then on.82 The Dutch, on
the other hand, were not interested in trading in Tonkinese lacquerware
as they could always obtain Japanese products.
Tonkinese copperware was occasionally exported by foreign mer-
chants. In 1688, for instance, in Thng Long the English bought two
great bronze bells for Constantine Phaulkon, a Greek adventurer who
rose to power at the Siamese court of King Narai, in Siam. These
bells were confiscated by the local mandarins when the English were
retreating via the Hng River to their ship at Doma.83
The refining of silver was another important craft. It was gener-
ally more profitable for foreign merchants to have their silver refined
before putting it into circulation.84
Cinnamon was another highly sought-after item. However, the
court strictly monopolized the production of and trade in this product
and severely punished the smuggling of cinnamon. This monopoly was
reinforced until the early eighteenth century, when the local people
were finally allowed to peel and trade cinnamon provided that they
paid tax to the Government.85 Despite the strict court monopoly during
the seventeenth century, the contraband trade in cinnamon continued.
Nevertheless, the annual quantity of cinnamon was far from substan-
tial. In 1643, for instance, acting on Batavias demand for cinnamon
for the Netherlands, the Dutch factors in Thng Long purchased 635
catties at the general price of 5 taels per picul. Considering the poor
quality of that years cinnamon which may not have fetched good
prices on the home market, the Dutch chief resolved to send this por-
tion of cinnamon to Japan, where it yielded 17 taels per picul on
average.86
Musk and gold were also desirable items which foreign merchants,
the Dutch in particular, exerted themselves to procure in Tonkin. While
gold was important to the Dutch Coromandel trade, musk was in great
demand in the Netherlands. The bulk of these two products was not
actually produced locally but came from the Chinese provinces of
Yunnan and Guangxi and, to a lesser extent, the Kingdom of Laos.87
The Dutch demand for these products increased in the 1650s as Zeelan-
dia Castle (Formosa) failed to purchase enough Chinese gold to meet
requirements on the Coromandel Coast. Batavia therefore urged its
factors in Tonkin to import both Chinese and Vietnamese gold for the
Coast factories. Unfortunately, political chaos in southern China not
only disrupted the flow of Chinese goods to Formosa, it also impeded
the export of Chinese gold and musk to northern Vietnam, preventing
the Dutch factory in Thng Long from fulfilling Batavias demand.
The depression in the VOCs Tonkin gold and musk trade did not
come to an end until the early 1670s when the Tonkin-China border
trade was revived. By this time the Dutch Company was no longer
keen on pursuing Chinese gold in Tonkin as from the mid-1660s the
Japanese Government had granted the Dutch permission to export
Japanese gold. The Dutch factory in Thng Long therefore mainly
bought up musk for the Netherlands.88
2. New trends in foreign trade
And though the Chova [Cha] values foreign trade so little, yet he
receives from it, embarrassed as it is, considerable annual incomes into
his coffers, as tax, head-money, impositions, customs, &c. But though
these amount to vast sums, yet very little remains in the treasury, by
reason of the great army he maintains, together with other unnecessary
expenses.
A more open trend in foreign trade, the 1500s

The Vietnamese rulers never sought to encourage trade, especially
overseas trade. While domestic trade was limited to the most basic
34 chapter two
level at which ordinary people could exchange their surplus goods for
other daily necessities, foreign trade was strictly monopolized by the
court and mainly confined to the tributary trade with China and, to a
much lesser extent, with southern vassals such as Laos and Champa.
The rulers neither dispatched ships to other countries for commercial
purposes nor did they encourage ordinary people to do so.90 Foreign
merchants arriving in i Vit were also restricted to living and trad-
ing in some coastal market-places only. This certainly contributed to
making the Vietnamese, as Tom Pires accurately portrayed them in
the early sixteenth century, a very weak people on the sea.91
Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century political unrest transformed i
Vits foreign trade. After supplanting the decaying L in 1527, the
Mc Dynasty sought to reform the countrys economy which had been
plunged into a rapid decline. Not only were rural agriculture and handi-
crafts revived, foreign trade was also stimulated in response to the
Mcs flexible, more liberal outlook on this economic branch. The i
Vits internal economic revival in the early years of the Mc Dynasty
fortuitously paralleled the expansion of the South China Sea trade
networks throughout the sixteenth century which, in turn, considerably
stimulated the countrys foreign trade. Huge quantities of Vietnamese
handicraft products such as silks and ceramics were exported to the
international market throughout this century.92
The Mcs open-minded policy towards foreign trade was scrupu-
lously maintained even after they had been driven out of Thng Long
in 1592 by the L/Trnh, who undoubtedly realized the tremendous
advantage of having foreign merchants in their land for at least two
reasons. First and foremost, since handicrafts were following a steady
upwards trend in production and offered a substantial quantity of goods
for export, the presence of foreign merchants to export these surplus
products was extremely important. Therefore, the regular arrival of the
Japanese shuin-sen between 1604 and 1635 was crucial to the steady
development of Tonkinese handicrafts and foreign trade. Hence, what
has become known as the Tonkinese silk for Japanese silver trade
was embryonically shaped during the early decades of the 1600s. The
Tonkin-Japan trading link was fuelled by the Portuguese participation
from 1626. In order to cut the heavy losses caused by the itowappu (the
yarn allotment) on the exportation of Chinese raw silk to Nagasaki,
the Portuguese resolved instead to export Tonkinese raw silk.93 This
explains the large amount of 965 piculs of Tonkinese yarn the Portu-
guese procured for their Japan trade in 1636.94 This coincided with the
promulgation of the Japanese maritime prohibition (kaikin), which not

only encouraged the Portuguese but also prompted the Dutch to replace
the Japanese at several trading-places in South-East Asia, including
northern Vietnam. With active Dutch participation from the late 1630s,
the Tonkin-Japan trading orbit continued to grow and this period of
florescence lasted until the middle of the 1650s. It was this lucrative
trade which lured the English back to the East Asian markets in the
early 1670s.95
The second reason for the welcome afforded foreign traders by the
Vietnamese rulers, especially the L/Trnh authorities from the early
1600s, was that they were aware of the dual contribution of foreign
trade. Besides money in the form of precious metals, the L/Trnh
rulers also hoped to procure modern weapons from foreign merchants
in order to balance the disparity in armament in their rivalry with the
Nguyn. Prior to the outbreak of the Trnh-Nguyn wars in 1627,
the Trnh troops had mainly been armed with China-derived firearms
which were evidently far inferior to the modern Western-style weapons
employed by the Nguyn.96 The superiority of the Nguyns West-
ern-style weapons offered their troops an advantage over the Trnh
armies. By their second consecutive defeat in 1633, the Trnh must
have realized the superiority of the Nguyn defensive walls which
were defended by Western-style ordnance and piled with high-quality
ammunition. The pre-eminence of the Western cannon and pistols the
Portuguese presented the Trnh rulers on their arrival in the late 1620s
prompted the latter to seek out an alliance with a European power for
the purpose of obtaining Western-style weapons. This explains why
Portuguese merchants were warmly welcomed and Portuguese priests
were allowed to preach with considerable freedom in northern Vietnam
during the first few years after their first arrival in 1626.97 But after
they found out about the continuing Portuguese intimacy with their
Nguyn rivals, the Trnh began to lure the Dutch into an alliance with
them by offering the Dutch Company many attractive trading privi-
leges. At this point it must be said that before making any alliance with
European powers, the Trnh had endeavoured to buy foreign weapons
from Asian merchants trading to their land.98
In short, the Mcs policies of opening up foreign trade was assid-
uously cultivated and slightly modified in the early reigns of the
L/Trnh Government to tie in with their weapon-seeking strategy.
This was the key factor which transformed the seventeenth-century
foreign trade of Tonkin into a golden era and, more significantly,
36 chapter two
gave birth to an unprecedented commercial system which is briefly

discussed in the following section.
The birth of the seventeenth-century commercial system

As far as the transformation of i Vits foreign trade is concerned,
the Mcs more open outlook on foreign trade and the L/Trnhs con-
tinuation and modification of these flexible policies gave birth to an
inter-related commercial system which prevailed in the foreign trade
of Tonkin throughout the seventeenth century. This was stimulated
by a new element: the presence of foreign merchants in the capital
Thng Long and other inland commercial centres. It seemed that by
the dawn of the 1600s, foreign merchants were allowed to reside
and trade in Thng Long and Ph Hin. The presence of foreigners
in various inland cities was the key factor in the emergence of an
unprecedented commercial system which consisted of three places
located along the River of Tonkin: Doma, Ph Hin, and Thng
Long.99 These three places were functionally different to but organi-
cally interrelated with each other.
Doma (today Tin Lng District of Hi Phng City) was no more
than an anchorage and temporary residence for foreign sailors accord-
ing to the Dutch and English documents. After having navigated safely
through the channel of the sandbar, foreign ships sailed up to Doma,
a riverine village which in those days was located five or six leagues
from the sea. Here, cargoes were unloaded and conveyed to Ph Hin
and Thng Long on river barges. When the trading season ended and
export cargoes were ready, local boats again shipped these cargoes
down to Doma to be loaded on board ships. During the trading sea-
PH HIN
Customs office;
Temporary factories
Gulf of Tonkin
Hng River local boats Thi Bnh River
THNG LONG DOMA

Commercial centre; Anchoring place;
Permanent factories sailors residence
Figure 1. The commercial system of seventeenth-century Tonkin

son, crews rested at Doma for about two months to repair their ships
and prepare provisions for their departures. Should one ship have to
wait for a longer time, the crew could reside in riverside houses which
were erected specifically for foreign sailors. There were no large-scale
business transactions at Doma, beyond daily services and the supply
of provisions.100
Ph Hin was a customs town lying between the anchorage Doma
and the political and commercial centre Thng Long. Ph Hin, with
the seat of the governor, controlled all river traffic passing the town.
In certain periods, foreign merchants had to establish their temporary
factories and residence here. The Dutch had a short residence at Ph
Hin between 1637 and 1640, as did the English during the 167283
period.101 The development of Ph Hin must have been stimulated by
the presence of foreign merchants, though often only for short times.
As soon as these foreigners moved up to Thng Long, the commercial
life of Ph Hin declined.102 On their arrival in the summer of 1672,
the English disappointedly depicted Ph Hin in the following way:
it is so farr from all commerce, we can doe noething, noe merchants
come to us. Therefore, the English thought of ways to escape Ph
Hin for Thng Long, but they did not get permission to reside and
trade in the capital by the court until 1683. The English always visited
Thng Long, where they rented houses for several months while they
carried out their business and they returned to their factory at Ph Hin
when the trading season had ended. By the late 1680s, Ph Hin had
grown so commercially desolate that, although it was still a sizeable
town with around 2,000 houses, the Inhabitants are most poor people
and soldiers.103 After a brief period of commercial successes, from the
middle of the seventeenth century, Ph Hin mainly functioned as a
customs town. Foreign merchants sailing between Doma and Thng
Long often called here to report their passage and offer presents to
the Governor.104
Thng Long, the forerunner of modern Hanoi, was not only the
political headquarters but also the biggest commercial centre of i
Vit and Tonkin until the late eighteenth century. The prosperity of
Thng Long probably reached its peak during the seventeenth cen-
tury thanks to the planned development of handicraft industries, the
expansion of the foreign trade, and, remarkably, the presence of for-
eign merchants in the city. During the seventeenth century, most of
the export products of Tonkin were manufactured either within or in
the vicinity of Thng Long, which ensured that the capital was an
important economic centre.105 Foreign products were sold there and
38 chapter two
Illustration 9. A part of Thng Long, the capital of Tonkin, showing the Dutch and English
factories. The Dutch held a factory throughout the 16401700 period, while the English
had a brief residence here between 1683 and 1697
local export merchandise gathered in Thng Long was then shipped

down to Doma to be loaded on board foreign ships.
Because Thng Long was the biggest rendezvous in Tonkin, for-
eign merchants preferred to settle there to other places. Consequently,
the number of foreigners residing in the capital grew steadily and this
growth was of great concern to the L/Trnh rulers who, from the mid-
dle of the century, issued a series of decrees to restrict and gradually
reduce the number of foreigners dwelling in the capital to transact their
business. After the half-hearted court policies in the 1650s and 1660s,
the Chinese were finally forced to leave the capital for other places
in the 1680s. Despite their eviction, they still tried in one way or the
other to visit Thng Long during the trading season. After that, the
Dutch (and the English from 1683 onwards) were the only foreigners
who were allowed to dwell and conduct business in Thng Long. From
this time, however, commercial activities in Thng Long fell into a
rapid decline. Shortly after the court had banished the Chinese, one
after another European merchant abandoned the trade with Tonkin,
mainly because it had become unprofitable, although the draconian
measures of the court against foreign merchants may have played a
role as well. As a result, the commercial function of Thng Long was
considerably reduced.
In short, the seventeenth-century commercial system of Tonkin

burgeoned from the constant enlargement of its foreign trade. In turn,
this commercial system facilitated the development of the overseas
trade of the country. As court policies on foreign merchants were
tightened and their trade with Tonkin simultaneously became less
profitable, foreign merchants gradually left northern Vietnam. The
commercial system lying along the Tonkin River consequently faded.
In addition to the draconian measures of the court hampering foreign
merchants, deteriorating trading conditions also discouraged them as
their trade with this country was less lucrative. The following part
discusses the major hindrances which obstructed foreign merchants
once they arrived in Tonkin to trade.
Complicated trading conditions

As for foreign traders, a new comer suffers, besides hard usage in his
buying and selling, a thousand inconveniences, and no certain rates on
merchandizes imported or exported being imposed, the insatiable man-
dareens caused the ships to be rummaged, and take what commodities
may likely yield a price at their own rates, using the Kings name to
cloak their griping and villainous extortions, and for all this there is no
remedy but patience.
The complication of the transportation system was the first challenge

which faced foreign merchants trading with Tonkin. The main estu-
ary of the River of Tonkin, that is the modern Thi Bnh estuary,
was naturally barricaded by a long, large sandbar which offered a
relatively large but shallow channel for ships to sail through. In order
to navigate this channel safely, ships needed a combination of favour-
able wind, high tide, and, more crucially, the skilled assistance of
local pilots who were mainly fishermen living in a coastal village
called Batsha, probably present-day Phng i village of Tin Lng
district, Hi Phng city. In the early 1630s, the Dutch described the
channel through the sandbar as very dangerous , a Japanese junk
had been shipwrecked a few years earlier after having touched the
hard-sand seabed.107 The channel silted up year by year because of
the annual alluvium deposited in it. By 1648, only a decade after
their first arrival, the Dutch factors in Tonkin became so anxious
about the rapid silting up of the Thi Bnh estuary that they appealed
to the High Government from then on to send only shallow-draught
flute ships which could carry relatively large cargoes to Tonkin and
40 chapter two
Formosa. They should not draw more than twelve feet of water.108 In
the same year, Philip Schillemans, the Dutch chief in Thng Long,
applied to the L/Trnh court for permission to enter Doma through
the Vn c estuary, which was located farther north of the mouth of
the Thi Bnh River. This petition was granted. Any sense of relief
was short-lived as the Dutch soon realized that the Vn c River was
neither deeper nor safer than the Thi Bnh estuary. The request for
shallow-draught flute ships was again sent to Batavia.109
By the time the English arrived in Tonkin in 1672, the hazard pre-
sented when sailing through the channel had become a great challenge
for foreign ships, especially Western vessels. The English crossed over
the barr with much hazard and danger but (blessed be God) in safety,
onely lost a boate and an anchor.110 Sixteen years later, an English-
man accounted this hazardous entrance in the following words: the
channel of the bar is hard sand, which makes it the more dangerous;
and the tides whirling among the sands, set divers ways in a tides
time; which makes it the more dangerous still.111 The depth of the
channel varied from season to season. When the northerly monsoons
blew (NovemberJanuary) the water was as high as 26 or 27 feet at
spring tide; when the southerly monsoons blew (MayJuly) the water
was not above 15 or 16 feet at spring tide. Because most European
ships, with the exception of some Dutch and Chinese vessels from
Illustration 10. The Thi Bnh estuary or the main entrance of the River of Tonkin
Japan making port there in the winter time, arrived in Tonkin from
southern quarters around the summer, the ebb-tide season, they needed
assistance from local pilots.112
Having safely crossed the sandbar, ships entered the Thi Bnh
River and sailed about six leagues up to their anchorage at Doma.
Shortly after ships had anchored at Doma, capados (local mandarins,
often eunuchs, representing the Cha and the Crown Prince in dealing
with foreign merchants) went down to Doma to register the people
on board, list merchandise and money, receive presents, and purchase
desirable merchandise for the royal families. Only after the mandarins
had visited and inspected the ships, could the cargoes be discharged
and the ships repaired and provisioned for their departure. Unloaded
cargoes would be conveyed to Thng Long or/and Ph Hin on board
local boats which were chartered at reasonable prices. Local rowing
boats were the major vehicles to ferry merchants and merchandise
between Doma and Ph Hin/Thng Long.
Besides presents and goods for the Cha, princes, and high-rank-
ing mandarins, foreign merchants were obliged to deliver a certain
amount of their money, mainly silver and copper, to these noblemen
in exchange for raw silk and piece-goods. The amount of precious
metal handed over differed from nation to nation. While the Chinese
were generally exempted from this obligation, every trading season the
Dutch had to advance on average 25,000 taels of silver to the Cha,
around 10,000 taels to the Crown Prince, and approximately 1,000
taels to each high-ranking capado. These amounts could occasionally
be decreased if the Dutch had little silver that particular year. Because
the local rulers often supplied bad silk and at much higher prices, the
Dutch and other foreigners always tried to conceal part of their money
so that they could spend more on goods on the free markets. In 1644,
for instance, the Dutch brought as many as 100,000 taels to Tonkin but
they pretended to have no more than 20,000. After many arguments,
the Cha reluctantly accepted 12,500 taels, reminding the Dutch to
advance the full amount of 25,000 taels the next year.113 There were
also occasions when the Dutch failed to buy silk from local produc-
ers, hence, willingly offered more silver to the local authorities. In
1649, for instance, the Dutch offered the Cha and the Crown Prince
46,735 taels in total in order to receive 355 piculs of raw silk from
them. The reason for this acquiescence was that the powerful, high-
ranking mandarin Ongiatule had falsely accused the Dutch of attacking
and destroying the Japanese Resimons junk in which Ongiatule had
42 chapter two
shares. The Cha said that if the accusation was proved, he would kill
all Dutch people currently living in his country. Local people, fearing
the consequences, did not dare to deal with the Dutch.114
With the exception of presents and the money advanced to local
rulers for the delivery of silk, foreign merchants were exempted from
all import and export taxes.115 This was said to be more advantageous
to the foreigners than having them pay taxes, considering the high
customs duties they had to pay for every arrival at and departure from
Quinam. According to the Nguyn scales of taxation, each European-
rigged ship had to pay 8,000 and 800 quan (one quan varied between
0.5 and 1.0 guilder) respectively for its arrival and departure, while
an Asian vessel paid approximately 3,000 for its arrival and 300 quan
for its departure.116
Because the Cha often bought foreign goods at very low prices,
sometimes lower even than the purchase prices, the mandarins pre-
ferred to take foreign goods in his name so that they could also benefit
from the low prices. Out of their depth, foreign merchants preferred
to avoid dealing with local rulers. There was a general regulation that
mandarins were obliged to pay foreigners once the Cha had paid. But
it was a false security as the mandarins in charge of the royal familys
business often delayed payments. To collect overdue and long-standing
debts, foreigners had to submit petitions to the Cha, who then ordered
their debtors to honour these within a certain time.117
Only after the local rulers had bought what they wanted, could
foreign merchants commence the sale of the remaining part of their
cargoes, mainly to local brokers. In order to commence their business
transactions, they needed to have a chop, a trading licence from the
court, which would permit them to trade freely. Each licence was valid
for one trading season only, hence, foreigners needed to apply for a
new chop on their arrival. With a chop in hand, they were supposed
to trade freely with the local traders, but in reality, this licence could
be obstructed by local mandarins. In order to manipulate the sale of
foreign merchandise on the local market as well as the supply of local
goods to foreign merchants, some influential eunuchs did their best
to prevent foreigners from trading directly with local people. Besides
high-level obstruction, foreign traders also faced strong competition
from both local brokers, foreign speculators living permanently in
Tonkin, and fierce rivals among themselves. On their first arrival in
1637, for instance, the Dutch, despite the trading privileges offered by
the Cha, faced harmful obstruction from local mandarins who wanted
to monopolize the supply of local silk to the VOC.118 This kind of

obstacle not only remained unresolved, it even worsened as the Trnh
rulers gradually revoked the trading privileges, the baits that they had
originally used to lure the Dutch into a military alliance with them
between 1637 and 1643. In 1649 the Dutch factory in Thng Long was
virtually isolated. The eunuchs who had long been endeavouring to
monopolize the silk supply to the Company sent their servants prowl-
ing around the Dutch residence armed with bamboo sticks to beat off
any local people coming to the Dutch factory to sell silk. The Dutch
complained about this to the Cha, who offered them no remedy but
a frigid answer: I have not summoned you to my country.119 As
Tonkins wars with Quinam eventually ended in 1672, the formers
need of foreign weapons also eased off, hence and consequently the
Trnhs interests in foreign trade declined. In 1672, when the English
arrived in Tonkin for the first time, they were put in their place by
a local mandarin, who made it clear to them that while wee [the
English] were out wee might have kept out. The king was king of
Tonkin before wee came and would be after we were gone, and that
this country hath noe neede of any forreigne thing.120
What worried foreign merchants most was that the legal system
did not provide any surety for the conduct of trade. The mandarins in
charge of dealing with foreign merchants handled matters in a way
which pleased them and from which they could obtain profits.121 If
the foreigners ran into difficulties, they had to address themselves to
the mandarins whose benevolence depended on the copiousness of the
gratuity they received. In the spring of 1644, for instance, the Dutch
in Thng Long had to bribe the Minister of Justice when petitioning
him to secure a stay of execution for some drunken Dutchmen who
had badly injured court servants in a blazing row in which a Dutch-
man had been killed.122
The only channel of communication was through the interpreters,
who also operated as traders or brokers. Consequently, their loy-
alty to their foreign employers was often doubtful as they were also
subjected to the mandarins pressure. Aware of this predicament, for-
eigners always tried to find non-native interpreters in order to lessen
their dependence on the people of Tonkin.123 As elsewhere throughout
Asia, Portuguese was the language which foreign merchants trading
in Tonkin often used to communicate with local people through the
channel of interpreters.
Despite all the difficulties and setbacks, foreign merchants doggedly
44 chapter two
pursued their trade with Tonkin throughout the seventeenth century.

The reason, needless to argue, lay in the handsome profits, as the Eng-
lish senior merchant himself confessed in 1673, after sadly bemoaning
the virtually unbearable trading conditions in northern Vietnam. The
Dutch have long experienced these things and very many affronts,
wrote the English chief, but because they have noe way to revenge
themselves of them and finding good profitt upon theire silk for Japan,
they suffer patiently, as we must doe if we contynue here.124 The
following section briefly introduces the principal foreign merchants
trading with Tonkin throughout the seventeenth century, whose pres-
ence was unquestionably the central abutment which bridged the
isolated Gulf of Tonkin to connect the Kingdom of Tonkin to the
outside world during this commercial century.
3. Foreign merchants
With all these rich Commodities, one would expect the People [of
Tonkin] to be rich; but the Generality are very poor, considering what a
Trade is driven here. For they have little or no Trade by Sea themselves,
except for Eatables, as Rice and Fish, which is spent in the Country. But
the main Trade of the Country is maintained by the Chinese, English,
Dutch, and other Merchant Strangers, who either reside here constantly,
or make their annual Returns hither.
William Dampier (1688)125
The Chinese
China remained the main trading partner of i Vit even after it
became independent in the early tenth century. Although the Chinese
Song Dynasty banned its subjects from trading with several barba-
rous lands, including Vietnam, until the early twelfth century, Chinese
trading vessels sometimes drifted to the southern neighbour of i
Vit, where they were warmly welcomed by local people. Upon their
return, they carried home valuable cargoes of textiles and cash.126
The thirteenth-century Mongol conquest of China severely affected
the opportunity of Chinese merchants to trade with Vietnam. It also
forced i Vit to reduce its foreign trade and impose a strict con-
trol on foreign traders to its country to prevent the infiltration of
Chinese spies. After successfully expelling the Ming occupation and
restoring the independence of the country in 1428, the L Dynasty
relaxed the state vigilance on Chinese merchants a little. Even so,
foreign merchants were allowed to reside and trade at nine appointed

trading-places only. In the southern provinces of Ngh An and H
Tnh, Chinese merchants could also trade at three market-places.127
In general, despite its relaxation of policies towards foreign trade,
the L Dynasty continued to exert vigilance in dealing with foreign
trade as well as with foreign merchants trading in its territories. The
L Code which was in force at the end of the fifteenth century, for
instance, included several articles strictly regulating foreign merchants,
especially the Chinese.128
Despite the Vietnamese rulers harsh measures against them, Chi-
nese merchants were not deterred from regularly visiting Vietnam. It is
presumed that they were the major carriers of Vietnamese ceramics to
the international market during the first half of the sixteenth century.
In his Suma Oriental written in the early 1500s, Tom Pires noted that
the Vietnamese rarely come to Malacca in their junks. They go to
China, to Canton to join up with the Chinese; then they come for
merchandise with the Chinese in their junks.129 After the Ming lifted
its ban on foreign trade in 1567, the number of Chinese junks trading
to i Vit presumably increased, despite the fact that the number of
licences granted by Chinese authorities to junks sailing to northern
Vietnam was relatively small. This official figure is contradicted by a
late sixteenth-century account which states there was a great number
of Chinese vessels leaving Chinese ports for neighbouring countries
either with or without a licence issued clandestinely by governors
of Chinas southern seaports.130 These neighbouring countries cer-
tainly included i Vit, considering the shortness of the voyage as
well as the long-standing trading relationship between the two coun-
tries. Another Chinese document written in 1593 reveals the fact that
despite the Ming prohibition on Chinese people from trading with
the Japanese, villainous merchants recklessly send goods to Giao-chi
and other places where Japanese come to trade with them. Giao-chi
(Jiaozhi) here obviously refers to i Vit or northern Vietnam.131
The statement contained in this document is strongly supported by
the fact that by the early 1590s, Japanese shuin-sen began to visit
northern Vietnam.132
The more open attitude of the Vietnamese Mc Dynasty towards
foreign trade encouraged Chinese merchants who wished to trade with
i Vit. The number of overseas Chinese residing in northern Vietnam
seemed to grow constantly throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. Since i Vit needed to exchange surplus handicraft prod-
46 chapter two
ucts for precious metals and other necessities, the Vietnamese rulers
had to thaw their frigid attitude towards the expansion of foreign trade.
The Chinese and other foreigners reportedly resided and traded in
inland commercial centres such as Ph Hin and Thng Long.133
The Chinese community in the capital grew so quickly that in 1650,
the court, mindful of the ongoing political turmoil in China after the
collapse of the Ming Dynasty in 1644, ordered all foreigners, but with
the Chinese especially in mind, to be moved to the southern quarters
of Thanh Tr and Khuyn Lng, which were about five kilometres
from the capital.134 Although the implementation of this plan was
delayed and foreign merchants continued to live in the capital, the
concern of the court about the Chinese did not diminish. During the
1663 nationwide survey on foreigners residing in Tonkin, the Chinese
were split into two categories: permanent and temporary residents.
Three years later, the court ordered that Chinese who wanted to live
permanently in Tonkin had to register as a member of Vietnamese
families and adopt Vietnamese customs which would involve changing
their hairstyle, the way of dress, and the like. In 1687, the Govern-
ment stepped up its control of the overseas Chinese, forcing them to
leave Thng Long for surrounding areas. After this ukase, the Chinese
could only visit the capital with a written permission granted by local
authorities. Smarting from these harsh regulations, with the exception
of those who were content to move to Ph Hin, most of the Chinese
left Tonkin for other countries.135
In order to compete with other foreign merchants trading in Tonkin,
the overseas Chinese established a solid trading network to promote
mutual assistance. Wealthy Chinese owned silk workshops and will-
ingly offered their products to their countrymen at reasonable prices.
Chinese middlemen gathered local goods during the off season and
sold them to Chinese merchants during the trading season. There is
abundant evidence that most of the Chinese junks arriving annually
in Tonkin were involved in the export of Tonkinese silk to Japan.
Utilizing their well-established trading networks, these Chinese wasted
no time in buying cargoes of silk and left for Japan before the Dutch
were in a position to do so. After the autumn sale in Nagasaki, these
Chinese merchants returned to Tonkin with sufficient quantities of
Japanese silver to purchase more Vietnamese silks.
Besides relying on their solid trading networks, the Chinese some-
times received financial support from Japanese officials who secretly
invested money in the Tonkin-Japan silk trade. In the 16467 trad-
ing season, for instance, a part of the 80,000 taels which the Chinese
brought to Tonkin was contributed by Japanese officials in Nagasaki.
In Tonkin, by offering higher prices to local silk-producers, the Chi-
nese had no problem acquiring 400 piculs of raw silk and a large
number of silk piece-goods and departed for Japan in early July. Only
after the Chinese had sailed away could the Dutch begin their transac-
tions and then leave for Japan in August.136 Although the Tonkin-Japan
silk trade showed a steady decline from the mid-1650s, a considerable
number of Chinese merchants were still involved in this trade route. As
revealed from the journal registers of the English factory in Tonkin, the
English failure to export local silk to London was often caused by the
fierce Chinese competition. In 1676, for instance, the English factory
could not purchase enough silk piece-goods for Europe because five
Chinese junks had swept the country of what silk was made.137
Besides the Chinese involved in the Tonkin-Japan silk trade, there
was a small number of overseas Chinese trading between Tonkin
and other South-East Asian ports, but the volume of this trade was
relatively small. Another community of overseas Chinese in north-
ern Vietnam was involved in the Tonkin-China border trade. These
Chinese, co-operating with Vietnamese merchants, re-exported such
foreign merchandise as South-East Asian spices and European textiles
from northern Vietnam to southern China. The return trade consisted
of, among other miscellaneous items, Chinese gold and musk which
were in great demand among European merchants in Tonkin. This
border trade seemed to flourish from the early 1650s, profiting from
the stagnation of the mainland China-Formosa trade which diverted the
flow of Chinese gold and musk to northern Vietnam at the expense of
Formosa. After a little more than a decade, from the early 1660s, the
Tonkin-China border trade was very adversely affected by the political
chaos in southern China.138
Commercial setbacks in conjunction with the measures taken by the
court from the mid-seventeenth century which damaged the Chinese,
discouraged Chinese merchants from maintaining their trade with the
L/Trnh domain. After having been expelled from Thng Long in
the late 1680s, a large number of overseas Chinese decided to leave
Tonkin for other countries. Those who were content to move to Ph
Hin and the border town of Qung Yn in the present-day north-east-
ern province of Qung Ninh continued to trade, albeit on a lesser scale.
By the late seventeenth century, the Dutch, who had vainly tried to
establish a permanent factory at Qung Yn in the early 1660s, noted
48 chapter two
that this town had been transformed into a commercial hub in the
wake of the removal of the Chinese to this place. Although such inland
commercial places as Thng Long and Ph Hin rapidly declined from
the late 1680s, profiting from the presence of the Chinese, Qung Yn
continued to thrive in the next century.139
The Japanese
The relationship between Vietnam and Japan presents a fascinating
picture. The initial contact between the two countries may have com-
menced in 1509, when a Ryukyan delegation visited i Vit.140 For
a very long while after that brief encounter nothing more was heard,
probably because of the chaotic situation in the island empire which
was the theatre of civil war. In 1592, of the nine licences which
Kampaku Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the military ruler of Japan, issued
to junks trading abroad, one was granted to a vessel which sailed to
northern Vietnam.141 This does not exclude the possibility that the
Japanese already visited the Vietnamese coast earlier than the issue
of this 1592 licence. An entry in the Vietnamese annal i Vit s
k ton th vaguely implies the presence of Japanese merchants and
pirates along the Vietnamese coast in the 1550s.142 This is endorsed
by a Chinese document written in the early 1590s which confirms that
the Japanese regularly visited Chao Chi (a Chinese term which was
synonymous with i Vit or northern Vietnam) to buy silks from
Chinese merchants.143
Cogently, northern Vietnam was far from important to the Japanese
in their hunt for Chinese silk. Since the late sixteenth century, the
seaport of Hi An in Quinam had enjoyed a reputation among foreign
traders as an important rendezvous, where Chinese ships carrying valu-
able cargoes of silk arrived annually.144 Most of the Japanese shuin-sen
which traded with Vietnam made port at Hi An. The reason was not
only the fame of Quinam as a rendezvous but its reputation as a pro-
ducer of several key export items such as aloes wood and calambac.
In this it surpassed Tonkin which offered merely local products, most
notably silks and textiles. Unsurprisingly, and in marked contrast, the
Nguyns international outlook and flexible policies towards the for-
eign trade of Quinam also encouraged foreign merchants to make use
of Hi An and turned it into an international entrept throughout the
seventeenth century.145
In contrast to the Nguyns successful dealing with the Japanese,
the Trnh were not only incapable of utilizing the shuin-sen system,
they even irritated the Japanese rulers with their half-hearted attempts
at diplomacy. While the Nguyn had contacted the Japanese Bakufu
through Japanese shuin-sen merchants as early as 1600, the Trnh only
sent their first diplomatic letter to Edo nearly a quarter of a century
later in 1624 in rather indifferent terms expressing their wishes to cre-
ate a good relationship with the Japanese Government.146 It seemed
that increased hostilities with the Nguyn prompted the Trnh to con-
sider widening their international relationships in order to support their
military campaigns. There is also a sound possibility that some Japa-
nese merchants trading between Japan and Tonkin, who also acted as
diplomatic agents for the Shogun in dealing with northern Vietnam,
may have influenced the Trnh rulers to promote the bilateral relation-
ship between Tonkin and Japan. In 1628, one year after the official
outbreak of the Trnh-Nguyn wars, Cha Trnh Trng dispatched a
second letter to the Shogun Iemitsu. The style of this letter, however,
was so arrogant that the Japanese Shogun, annoyed by the Trnhs
haughtiness and bearing in mind his favourable relationship with the
Nguyn rulers of Quinam, immediately issued a ban on shipping to
northern Vietnam, prohibiting Japanese merchants to sail to the Trnh
domain.147 No shuin-sen arrived in Tonkin in the next two years but
in 1631, the Japan-Tonkin trade was resumed. It was short-lived as
the maritime prohibition decreed by the Japanese Government in 1635
abolished the shuin-sen system and the Japanese trade with Tonkin
consequently ended. Some Japanese merchants remained in Tonkin
and acted either as brokers or interpreters for foreign merchants.148
Patchy source materials prevent a proper documentation of a quan-
titative account on the Japanese trade with Tonkin during the 160435
period. A record of the 1634 trading season which has survived reveals
that a shuin-sen heading for northern Vietnam that year was allotted
the relatively large capital of 800 kanme or 80,000 taels of silver. If
we are to accept Iwao Seiichis estimate that the average capital per
shuin-sen stood at 500 kanme or 50,000 taels, around 2,000,000 taels
or 7.5 tons of Japanese silver were shipped to northern Vietnam by
the Japanese shuin-sen in the first three decades to be exchanged for
Tonkinese silk and other local products.149 That amount of money,
combined with that brought to Tonkin by the Chinese and Portuguese,
contributed to the rapid development of Tonkinese handicraft indus-
tries and foreign trade at that time.
50 chapter two
The Portuguese
Beginning to sail regularly between Malacca and China after 1511,
the Portuguese must have become gradually acquainted with the Viet-
namese coast. Around 1524, the Portuguese had reportedly erected a
stele in the Chm Islands, off Hi An coast, to mark their presence at
that place. In 1533, a Portuguese priest even visited the Hng River
delta but was forced to leave shortly afterwards because of political
turmoil and fierce fighting.150 As the Portuguese had commercially
and religiously set their sights on both China and Japan, they paid
little attention to Vietnam. But after having successfully settled in
Macao in 1557, and carrying on the profitable Macao-Japan trade,
the Portuguese also became interested in trading with Hi An. By
the early 1580s, there were reportedly some Portuguese residing in
central Vietnam.151 Besides Portuguese merchants, Portuguese mis-
sionaries also endeavoured to preach in central Vietnam from the late
sixteenth century. So modest was their achievement in proportion to
the excessive expenses that the Portuguese missionaries resolved to
abandon their religious propagation after just a few years. No further
attempt to preach in Vietnam was made until the early 1600s when
Portuguese missionaries in China and Japan found themselves facing
increasing difficulties arising from State policies against the Chris-
tian religion. Because of this, the Portuguese looked further afield
and again turned their attention towards Vietnam. Subsequently, the
Portuguese established their mission in Quinam in 1615 and went on
to set up another mission in Tonkin twelve years later.152
In contrast to their commercial and religious activity in Quinam,
no significant attempt was made with respect to Tonkin until 1626. In
this year, the Portuguese in Macao sent their first delegates, mission-
aries rather than merchants, to the Trnh realm.153 The Trnh rulers,
under the pressure from the conflict with their Nguyn rivals, warmly
welcomed the Portuguese, allowing them to trade and preach freely
in their territory. It seemed that the northern rulers were hoping to
enter into an alliance or at least to receive military support. It proved
a vain hope as Portuguese merchants in Macao were hesitant about
conducting trade with Tonkin in the following years, held back by the
current unprofitable trade compounded by the high risk of piracy and
shipwreck. The non-appearance of the Portuguese in 1628 and 1629
coupled with their continuing intimacy with the Nguyn, angered the
Trnh ruler who decreed a ban on the propagation of the Christian
religion in his land in 1630 and deported all missionaries from Tonkin.
Portuguese merchants were exempted from this ban.154

The Portuguese trade with Tonkin gathered momentum in the early
1630s because of the stagnation of the trade with Japan. The itowappu
(the yarn allotment) system which was expressly devised to gain a
tighter grip on the sale of Chinese yarn in Japan seriously reduced
the annual Portuguese profits. As a result, the Lusitanian merchants
resolved to cut down the import volume of Chinese silk.155 In 1634,
the Portuguese brought a mere two hundred piculs of Chinese silk to
Japan, but simultaneously increased their annual import of Chinese
piece-goods and Tonkinese raw silk which were exempted from the
itowappu restrictions. This explains the steep increase in the import
volume of Tonkinese silk by the Portuguese. In 1636, three Portuguese
vessels arrived in northern Vietnam from Macao and bought 965 piculs
of Tonkinese raw silk in total for Japan. It was at a cost as one gali-
ota was shipwrecked off the Island of Hainan.156 In 1635, when the
Japanese Government abolished the shuin-sen system and banned its
subjects from trading abroad, the Portuguese hoped to replace the Japa-
nese trading network in northern Vietnam. This strategy was doomed
to be short-lived as they were expelled from Japan in 1639. Despite
all their commercial setbacks, the Portuguese in Macao maintained a
regular trade with Tonkin until the late 1660s.157
There is no doubt that in the Portuguese trade with Tonkin, silver
and copper cash constituted the staple items imported into Tonkin.
There was a steady demand for copper cash because, although the
Vietnamese had been using this sort of currency for centuries, the
dynasties could not mint sufficient coins to meet the domestic demand.
To make up the deficiency, a large part of this currency circulating
in northern Vietnam was imported from China.158 Since there was
a great amount of unused copper coins in Japan, prior to 1639, the
Portuguese occasionally shipped these copper coins from Japan to
Tonkin. After losing their Japan connection, the Portuguese imported
Chinese coins minted in Macao into Tonkin.159 Their trade in cop-
per coins yielded spectacular profits. In 1651, for instance, the Dutch
glowered jealously as their Portuguese competitor enjoyed a net profit
of 20,000 taels from the cargo of copper coins they had shipped to
Tonkin. The Dutch also learnt that in 1650 the Portuguese had even
earned as much as 180,000 taels from the copper cash cargo valued
at 120,000 taels sent to Quinam.160 After a decade or so, from the
early 1660s the Portuguese copper cash trade with northern Vietnam
faced fierce competition from the Chinese and the Dutch, who also
52 chapter two
imported Japanese copper coins into Tonkin in great quantities as will

be discussed in details in Chapter Five.161
The Dutch
The first Dutch contact with Vietnam occurred in 1601 under embar-
rassing circumstances: some twenty sailors from a Dutch ship were
killed by Vietnamese people in central Vietnam.162 The Dutch none
the less resolved to trade at Hi An, which was famous among foreign
merchants as an important South-East Asian emporium where such
valuable export merchandise as Chinese silks could be procured. All
the Dutch efforts to establish regular trade links with Quinam between
1601 and 1638 produced nothing but hatred and grievous losses. By
the middle of the 1630s, the Dutch antipathy towards the Nguyn had
probably reached its boiling point. In the meantime, Batavia was also
considering turning its Vietnamese trade to Trnh Tonkin.163
The resolve of the VOC to trade with Tonkin was stimulated even
more by the seclusion policy imposed by the Japanese Government in
1635. As Tonkinese silk now became fairly profitable on the Japanese
market, the Dutch at Hirado lost no time in replacing the shuin-sen and
prepared an inaugural voyage to the Trnh realm.164 In the spring of
1637, the Grol left Japan for Tonkin. The official relationship between
the Dutch East India Company and the Kingdom of Tonkin was estab-
lished in the same year and lasted until 1700. During the course of
sixty-three years, the VOC imported mainly Japanese silver and cop-
per cash (kasjes in seventeenth-century Dutch) into Tonkin in order
to buy, among a selection of local products, Tonkinese silk for Japan,
ceramics for South-East Asian insular markets, and silk piece-goods
and musk for the Netherlands.165
The English
The expectation of founding a profitable intra-Asian trading network
with Japan serving as a headquarters was the motive spurring the Eng-
lish on to open their trade with Quinam as early as they established
their Japan trade in 1613. In this year, the English factory in Japan
entrusted this task to two English merchants who were subsequently
sent to Hi An on board a Japanese junk. The mission proved ill-fated:
one Englishman was murdered alongside with one Dutchman and one
Japanese merchant, and the other one mysteriously disappeared.166
This misfortune degenerated into acrimonious recrimination as the
Dutch and the English blamed each other for the catastrophic murder
of their men. Despite the fact that the English in Japan later sent
two other merchants to Hi An to investigate this murder, no final
conclusion was reached.167 After the 1613 incident, the English made
no further attempt to enter into a relationship with the Vietnamese
as their factory in Japan was eventually closed down in 1623 after
only ten years of unsuccessful trade. Enjoying greater flexibility of
movement, English free merchants did sporadically visit both Tonkin
and Quinam.168
The reconstitution of the English East India Company in the 1660s
caused a significant shift in its Asian trade.169 The Company attempted
to expand its trade to East Asian countries, using Banten, its only
base in South-East Asia, as a springboard for launching this strategy.
Around 1668, the Court of Committees in London was looking for an
appropriate opportunity to re-open relations with Japan using Cambo-
dia as a channel.170 The plan to re-enter the Japan tradein this the
directors in London may have been influenced by their officials in
Banten or they themselves may have overestimated its prospectswas
then put into practice at the end of 1671.171 The directors of the Eng-
lish Company entertained no doubts that trading with Japan would be
profitable, as they had observed at first hand the considerable success
of the VOC in the preceding decades. They also grew convinced that
the regional trade between Japan and other areas would reap extra
profits for their Company.172 Among the selected targets was Tonkin,
whose silks and other textiles were highly valued and could fetch good
prices in Japan. Traders who took Tonkinese silks to Nagasaki were
in turn able to purchase Japanese silver and copper. These valuable
metals would be brought back to invest in local merchandise at other
factories to keep up the flow of goods in the Japan trade and to sup-
ply goods marketable in Europe. The ultimate aim of the English in
trading with Tonkin was, therefore, to create the so-called Tonkinese-
silk-for-Japanese-silver trade, as had successfully been undertaken by
the Dutch since 1637. The search for new markets for English manu-
factured goods was another reason which spurred the Company on to
carry out this plan.173
As this strategy was approved by the Court of Committees in Lon-
don, in 1671 a fleet of three ships was sent to open trading relations
with Tonkin, Formosa, and Japan. In the summer of 1672, the Zant
arrived in Tonkin, where the English were allowed to reside in and
trade at Ph Hin, a small town which was circa 50 kilometres from
54 chapter two
Thng Long. After such a promising beginning in Tonkin, the English

found themselves in a precarious situation in East Asia because the
Japanese Government refused to grant the English a trading licence.174
The Japan misadventure placed the English factory in Tonkin in a
dilemma since, from the outset, the English considered their factory in
northern Vietnam a mere supplier of silk for the Japan trade. Now the
hope for the Japan trade proved to be Dead Sea fruit, was it necessary
to maintain the Tonkin factory? In the meantime, the Third Anglo-
Dutch war in Europe (16724) severely affected the English trade in
Asia. Because of the Dutch hostilities, English shipping in the South-
East Asian waters was forced to stop. Consequently, the English in
Tonkin were isolated from the rest of the Company trading factories
in the East until the summer of 1676, when the first English ship since
1672 arrived in Tonkin. The combination of these negative develop-
ments put the Company trade with northern Vietnam in an almost
untenable situation in the first decade of its expansion strategy.175
Despite the ban on trade with Japan and the unprofitable local
operations, the Court of Committees in London decided to continue
its trade with Tonkin. From a strategic perspective, the Company held
the long-term view that the East Asian markets offered great potential
despite current difficulties and setbacks. At the same time, the English
factors in northern Vietnam were also endeavouring to find alterna-
tive outlets for Tonkinese products to justify the continuation of the
Tonkin factory. In fact, shortly after their arrival in 1672 the English
had been aware of the fact that Tonkinese silk found a ready market
in Manila. Consequently, in their reports to Banten and London, the
English in Tonkin urged their masters to negotiate with the Spanish
so that they could exchange Tonkinese silk for Spanish silver.176 Nor
was Manila the only market. Several sorts of Vietnamese high-qual-
ity silk piece-goods were thought likely to yield profit on the London
market. These optimistic proposals may have influenced the Company
directors in their deliberations about the continuation of the Tonkin
trade in the mid-1670s.177
As the Manila project finally turned out to be nothing but an illu-
sion, the English factory turned to exporting Tonkinese lacquerware
and various sorts of silk piece-goods such as baas, loas, pelings, hock-
iens, and the like to London. This trade proved successful for nearly
a decade thanks to high sale prices and a quick turnover on the home
market. The rub was the small cargoes which the English factory in
Tonkin could afford to send home. From the middle of the 1680s,
the directors in London often complained about the poor quality of

the products which the Tonkin factory dispatched. The situation in
the Tonkin factory was dire as it was afflicted by constant losses, the
upshot of private trading, embezzlement, and contradictory decisions
made by the factors. Disappointed by the negligible quantity of local
products which the English factors in Tonkin could manage to send to
England, as the deficit increased and uncollected debts rose to more
than 30,000 pounds sterling, the Court of Committees finally decreed
the Tonkin factory be abandoned in 1693. The Tonkin malaise, how-
ever, dragged on until 1697 when Fort St. George was able to send
one ship to bring the Company servants and property back to the safe
haven of Madras.178
Other foreign merchants

Although the Spanish in Manila never made any overtures to open
official relations with the L/Trnh Government, they occasionally sent
ships to Tonkin to purchase local goods, particularly silk and musk.
According to a Dutch observation in 1651, the Spanish in Manila sent
a junk to Tonkin to explore the possibility of creating a triangular
trading network between Manila, Tonkin, and Cambodia. In order
to facilitate this mission, the Governor of Manila had even given
the owner of this junk, a Spanish Brabander, the title of ambassa-
dor of Spanish Manila. In the following year, this junk returned to
Tonkin with a capital of 30,000 taels in which the Governor of Manila
reportedly had a share of 20,000 rials. Every penny of this capital
was exchanged for Tonkinese raw silk and various sorts of musk. In
Cambodia this cargo yielded a handsome profit. The appearance of
this Spanish interloper in Tonkin worried the Dutch factors, who
then suggested to their masters in Batavia that this junk be diverted
to other places.179
While the Dutch sought vainly for a ruse to stop the Spanish
intrusion into the Indo-Chinese markets, the latter geared up their
commercial strategy to penetrate the Tonkin trade by co-operating
with the Japanese free merchant Resimon, who had been living and
trading in northern Vietnam for many years, in order to strengthen
the Tonkin-Manila trade route. In 1654, Resimon bought a junk and
hired a Dutch pilot to manage the regular voyage between Tonkin
and Manila. The Dutch factors protested about the interference of
Resimon but to no avail.180 It seemed that the Spanish involvement
56 chapter two
in the Tonkin-Manila trade did not end until the late 1660s, after
suffering several disastrous losses. In 1666, the Castilian vessel oper-
ating regularly between Manila and Tonkin foundered in the Gulf of
Tonkin. Although the crew survived, their cargo was a complete loss.
In the following year, Resimon, who had been actively involved in
the Tonkin-Manila trade since the mid-1650s, died, leaving this trade
route deserted. Two fatal misfortunes within two years were a severe
blow to the Tonkin-Manila trade route in which the Spaniards had been
active participants, and ended the brief Spanish commercial relations
with northern Vietnam.181
The first French delegates, priests masquerading as merchants,
arrived in Tonkin in 1669 but were neither permitted to trade nor
allowed to preach in this country. The reason for the French failure,
as recounted by the Dutch factors in Thng Long, was their fairly
worthless presents for the Cha and other high-ranking courtiers.182
Although the French mission sailed away with its tail between its
legs, the two French priests who had arrived in Tonkin a few years
earlier continued to preach secretly in the littoral village of Doma.
When the court discovered the nature of their work, these Frenchmen
and three Vietnamese Christians were imprisoned. After their release,
the two priests were ordered to remain at Doma and were forbidden
to propagate their faith in the country. Despite being restricted, these
Frenchmen continued to convert the Vietnamese clandestinely.183 In
1674, the French in Siam sent another delegation to Tonkin. The junk
which carried the French mission was caught up in a tempest and
drifted to Manila, where the priest by the name of Pallu and the Eng-
lish merchant Nicolas Waite, who had taken his passage from Siam to
Tonkin, were immediately imprisoned by the Spanish.184
In 1680, the French made their third effort to establish themselves
in northern Vietnam when another mission left Banten for Tonkin.
The L/Trnh rulers gave the French mission a fairly warm welcome
and granted its members permission to live and trade at Ph Hin.
Although the French did maintain a factory at this town, the volume of
their trade with Tonkin was disappointingly low.185 In 1682, the fourth
French mission arrived in Tonkin with presents and a letter from King
Louis XIV to the L/Trnh rulers, soliciting free trade and propaga-
tion of the Christian religion in northern Vietnam. The L/Trnh rulers
granted free trade but adamantly refused to allow religious propaga-
tion in Tonkin.186 The French therefore had no option but to continue
their meagre trade and pursue their religious mission clandestinely in

northern Vietnam in the years thereafter.
Siamese merchants arrived to trade with i Vit as early as the
twelfth century but their trade with Vietnam in the following centuries
was irregular. As an offshoot of their active participation in regional
trade in the early modern period, Siamese merchants sporadically
visited the central Vietnamese coast.187 As a dispute raged between
Quinam and Siam over the Nguyn invasion of Cambodia in the 1650s,
the Siamese rulers contacted the Trnh in Tonkin asking them to chal-
lenge the Nguyn in Quinam. Hence, in 1659 and 1660, a Siamese
ambassador spent time travelling back and forth on board Resimons
junk as it traded between Tonkin and Siam to negotiate with the Trnh
rulers about an embargo on the Nguyn import of Siamese rice in
retaliation for their invasion of Cambodia. The negotiations seemed to
have ended unsatisfactorily. No trading relationship between Tonkin
and Siam was engendered by these diplomatic activities.188
A decade later, the Siamese trade with Tonkin seemed to revive
as the Siamese King dispatched two junks to trade with Tonkin in
1670 and 1671 consecutively. Strangely enough, the sailors on one of
these two junks did not return. This incident embarrassed the Siamese
ruler who later sought help from the VOC in order to bring the junk
and its sailors back to Ayutthaya.189 Acting on the Siamese Kings
request, Batavia ordered its servants in Tonkin to force these Siamese
to return home. In 1675, six out of the seven Siamese expatriates were
brought home on board a Dutch ship. The Siamese captain managed
to stay in Tonkin after having married a Vietnamese lady, who was
later detained by the English for owing overdue debts.190 This inci-
dent must have discouraged the Siamese rulers, for the Siamese trade
with Tonkin ended, despite sporadic visits by Siamese merchants to
northern Vietnam on board foreign junks.
Concluding remarks
Using the area of what is nowadays the Hng River delta in northern
Vietnam as a solid base, the Vietnamese-speaking people constantly
expanded their living space towards the south throughout the second
millennium AD. By the eighteenth century the southwards movement
had generally been completed; the Vietnamese inhabited the entire
eastern shoreline of the Indo-Chinese coast. Strangely enough, they did
58 explanation for units of measurement
not utilize this watery and maritime environment to turn their country
into a maritime power in the region, despite the fact that the country
did provide several key items for export and international maritime
trade routes ran just along the Vietnamese coast for many centuries.
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the state policies
towards foreign trade underwent a severe transformation. Political
crises forced the dynasties to reduce their strictness towards trade,
overseas trade in particular, to seek weapons and military support from
the Western trading companies. The expansion of handicraft industries
offered Tonkin annually a large amount of products (silk and ceramics)
for export to regional and international markets. Foreign merchants
such as the Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese, Dutch, English, and French
regularly arrived to trade there.
part two: the political relations 59
PART TWO: THE POLITICAL RELATIONS
Nu met het vertreck van dit schip, soo send ick desen brieff aen den
Bataviasen Coning, op dat hy myne meeninge soude konnen weten, dat
de coopmanschappen, die in het aenstaende mochten gesonden werden,
nevens eenige groote stucken, die ick sal betaelen met syde naer haer
waerde; oock soo versoeck ick, dat my een constapel Macy [mach?]
toegesonden werden om by my te blyven, daermede ick versoecke de
Koninck van Batavia my gelieve te helpen tot myn contentement, opdat
wy, soo langh de son en maen haer schynsel geven sullen, voor altoos
vrunden blyven mogen.191
Introduction
The ultimate goal of the L/Trnh rulers in their exertions to lure

the VOC to Tonkin was to create a military alliance with the VOC
in order to fight against Nguyn Quinam. Batavia was nothing loath
as it wanted to establish trading relations with northern Vietnam in
its bid to export raw silk and silk piece-goods to Japan. If this were
to facilitate its silk trade, the Company, as it had to do elsewhere in
Asia, was willing to involve itself to a certain extent at least in the
politics of Tonkin. The mutual relationship which developed between
Tonkin and the VOC in the 16371700 period, despite attempts by
both sides to keep it on an even keel, underwent many vicissitudes
as will be discussed in detail in the next two chapters.
60 part two: the political relations
intimate phases 61
CHAPTER THREE
INTIMATE PHASES
where since wee [the English] arrived have heard of yours Majesties
great kindness to the Hollanders, as loving & receiving them as people
of your own family We acknowledge that the Dutch at present may
be in greater favour with your Majestie, having lived here many yeares,
butt in all other places wee have the priority of them Wee likewise
request of your Majestie to give order to your mandarines to settle and
confirme us with the same accostomed previledges that the Dutch have
already procured from your Majestie.192
1. The abortive Dutch trade with Quinam, 16011638193
The first contact between the Dutch and the Vietnamese took place
even before the foundation of the Dutch East India Company. In
1601, a Dutch fleet commanded by Admiral Jacob van Neck en route
to South-East Asia from Macao called at a Chm bay to take on
fresh water. Fearful of the Dutch presence, the local inhabitants living
around that bay fled. Shortly after this first Dutch visit to central Viet-
nam, the VOC ships the Leiden and the Haarlem on their way to the
Middle Kingdom called at the Vietnamese coast where twenty-three
Dutch sailors were killed by the local people. This bloody encounter
did not discourage the Dutch from visiting Quinam. The merchants
Jeronimus Wonderaer and Albert Cornelisz Ruyll were sent to Hi An
to negotiate the opening of trade and were given a friendly welcome
and granted a licence to trade freely at Hi An. Shortly afterwards,
a rumour spread that the Nguyn rulers were preparing a surprise
attack on the Dutch. Upon hearing this unfounded rumour, the Dutch
merchants hastily returned to their ships after having raided and burnt
one village on their way to the sea. Because the southerly monsoon
had ended, the Leiden and the Haarlem did not pursue their intended
voyage to China and returned to Patani.194
The Dutch needed many years to overcome the aftermath of this
unfortunate encounter. As the Malay Archipelago was the main theatre
of the Dutch commercial activities in the East, central Vietnam was of
little importance. This state of affairs altered with the establishment
62 chapter three
of the Japan trade in 1609. Trading with Quinam became suddenly

attractive to the Dutch Company. For a profitable trade with Japan,
the Dutch, just as their Chinese and Portuguese competitors, needed
Chinese silk, and since Chinas ports remained closed to the Dutch,
they needed to procure Chinese silk at such regional rendezvous as
Hi An.195 In 1613, the Dutch factory in Japan sent two merchants
and a small cargo valued at 9,000 guilders to Hi An. This attempt
again ended in a bitter loss of both people and property. One of the
two Dutchmen was murdered together with an English merchant who
had just arrived from Japan. The cause of this murder was never fully
uncovered despite the investigations of two merchants sent to Hi
An by the English factory in Japan.196 What the 1613 misfortune did
reveal was that the Dutch aggression in Hi An in 1601 now came
back to haunt them. After this second loss, Dutch eagerness to trade
with central Vietnam was greatly dampened and simultaneously their
hatred of the Nguyn domain strengthened. Some Dutchmen even pro-
posed raiding Chinese and Portuguese vessels trading to Hi An to
exact vengeance and compensate themselves for their string of losses
in this country.197
In 1617, the Dutch were offered an opportunity to break the dead-
lock. In this year, the Dutch factories in Siam and Patani received
letters from high-ranking mandarins of Quinam, inviting the Company
on behalf of the Cha to trade with their country. The Patani Council
accepted the invitation and decided to send two ships which were used
to capture Portuguese vessels to Quinam, but both of them ended up
in Hirado without visiting Hi An. In the following years, two other
ships were destined for Quinam but, considering the high risk in trad-
ing with central Vietnam, the crews mutinied and refused to obey their
masters order. Hence, the opportunity to re-open the dialogue with the
Nguyn rulers was regrettably wasted. During the 1620s, the Dutch
made no further attempt to make contact with the Indo-Chinese coast
as they had their hands full with their Chinese campaign, which led
to the establishment of a foothold on Formosa in 1624.198
By the early 1630s, another opportunity presented itself to the Dutch
to open trade with Quinam. In the autumn of 1632, a junk which
the Dutch had captured from the Portuguese drifted to the Hi An
shore, where, according to the local custom, it was held. The Dutch
survivors were released and sent to Batavia on board a Chinese junk.
The Nguyn rulers accordingly sent a letter to the High Government
in Batavia, reporting this accident and cordially inviting the Dutch
intimate phases 63
Company to trade in their country. In view of the current stagnation of

the VOCs Formosa-Japan trade,199 Batavia immediately embraced this
new opportunity to establish trading relations with Hi An. In 1633,
two Dutch ships carrying two skilled merchants, Paulus Traudenius and
Franois Caron, left Batavia, carrying an adequate capital of 278,000
guilders. These merchants were warmly welcomed by the Nguyn,
who granted them favourable trading privileges. Despite their facilita-
tion by the court, the Dutch could not match the Portuguese and the
Japanese in buying and selling goods. Two junks arrived from Japan
with 300,000 taels and fiercely competed for the silk. Consequently,
most of the Dutch capital remained unspent. Feeling disappointed, the
Dutch merchants left for Formosa with most of the unspent money,
leaving only two Dutchmen with a small amount of capital to maintain
the Company presence at Hi An.200
This failure did not stop Batavia from making another attempt to
trade with Quinam. But, in order to avoid the stiff Portuguese and
Japanese competition during the trading season, the Dutch resolved
to send ships to Hi An from Formosa during the wintertime. By so
doing, they hoped to purchase winter silk which was normally har-
vested between October and December. This strategy miscarried as
there was a large number of overseas Japanese residing permanently
at Hi An. So powerful were these overseas Japanese that they had the
wherewithal to influence the local authorities to hinder the Dutch trade.
Thwarted by these tactics, the Dutch failed to purchase gold and silk,
although there was an abundance of these two products on the local
market. Hence, of the 186,485 guilders the Company had earmarked
for the Quinam trade this year, 111,549 guilders remained unspent and
had to be shipped back to Batavia in the spring of 1634.201
Misfortune continued to beset the Dutch trade with Hi An. In the
winter of 1633, the Kemphaan and the Quinam en route from Formosa
to Batavia were shipwrecked off Quinam. Salvaged goods, including
merchandise, money, and cannon, which the Dutch survivors brought
ashore, were confiscated by the local mandarins. The current unprofit-
able trade with Quinam coupled with the Nguyns arcane confiscation
laws disgusted Batavia and aroused even more aversion.202 Those
Dutch merchants who had experienced the Quinam trade insisted that
the Company would attain nothing from that country but losses and
calamities. Their thoughts were no doubt influenced by the fact that
silk and gold, the two key products which the Company had high hopes
of procuring from Quinam, could since 1633 be provided by Formosa.
64 chapter three
In the meantime, the demand for gold on the Coromandel Coast had
also eased as the Coast trade went into a state of temporary decline.203
Considering the difficulty in re-opening the relationship once it had
been officially abandoned, Batavia restrained itself from exacting any
vengeance. Grinding up its loins yet again, the Company made another
attempt to trade with central Vietnam in the following year.
Despite the patience shown by Batavia, the Company trade in
Quinam could not make a break-through. So depressing was the Dutch
trade at Hi An in 1634 that only 37,403 of 57,287 guilders could be
spent on low-quality silk and gold. Worse still, the Grootebroek en
route from Hi An to Formosa ran into a storm and wrecked on the
Paracels, off the coast of Quinam. Thirteen survivors were humiliat-
ingly treated by the local authorities while the salvaged goods, valued
at 23,580 rixdollars, were again confiscated. The only saving grace
was that the Cha allowed the people to return to Batavia on a Japa-
nese junk.204
This years losses snapped the patience of Batavia with respect to
its trade with Quinam. Upon the return of the Japanese junk to Hi
An in the summer of 1635, the Governor-General sent a letter to the
Cha, demanding him to return the salvaged goods and monies which
his mandarins had unjustifiably robbed from the Dutch survivors. To
stress his demand, the Governor-General assigned Abraham Duycker,
who had been directing the Company trade in central Vietnam up to
that time, to negotiate compensation with the Nguyn ruler. Duycker
was expected to accomplish three tasks: negotiate with Cha Nguyn
to retrieve all confiscated goods and monies; to extract more trading
privileges for the Company; and imply that if the Nguyn declined
these requests, the Company would ally with the Trnh rulers of Tonkin
and simultaneously impose a protracted blockade on the coast of Qui-
nam.205
The new Cha who succeeded his father in 1635 refused the
Companys demand for compensation, despite his partiality for the
Dutch.206 Reviewing the sum of 23,580 rixdollars, the Cha reasoned
that it had been illegally confiscated and embezzled by a mandarin
who had been beheaded the previous year. He was neither responsible
for such an illegal action nor should he bear responsibility for what
had happened during his fathers reign. Therefore, the Cha wanted
the Company to withdraw its demand for compensation. In return, he
would grant the Dutch favourable trading privileges, exempting them
from all taxes and the obligation to give presents. This concession
intimate phases 65
pleased Duycker but did by no means satisfy the Governor-General

and the Councillors of the Indies, who severely reprimanded him for
his unsuccessful negotiations. Consequently, in the summer of 1636,
Nicolaas Couckebacker, the chief factor of the Hirado factory, was
assigned the position of the Company representative in re-negotiations
with Cha Nguyn. In its letter to the Nguyn ruler, Batavia insisted
on compensation and uttered a stern warning it would attack Quinam
if its requests were not fulfilled unconditionally.207
The haughty tone of the letter from Batavia extremely annoyed the
Nguyn ruler. Had his courtiers seen the letter, said the Cha dur-
ing his personal meeting with Duycker, they would have killed all
Dutch merchants currently trading in his country. The Cha adamantly
refused the Companys demand for compensation and told Duycker
that he was willing to return one cannon which his people had salvaged
from the Grootebroek, although Duycker had counted eighteen pieces
altogether on his previous visits. He also rejected Duyckers request
for a meeting with Couckebacker, who was currently lying at anchor
off the Hi An coast. The Cha angrily expostulated that he was the
king of a country, not a merchant whose only concern was to discuss
trade. Should he feel like dealing with the Company, he would write
directly to the Governor-General. Replying to the threat from Batavia
to ally with the Trnh and launch an attack on Quinam, the Cha
ironically provoked Duycker, saying that he was ready to welcome the
Dutch fleets. They could exact all the revenge they pleased. Otherwise
they should feel free to trade with his country.208
The final attempt to negotiate made by Batavia thus failed embar-
rassingly. Threats made no impression at all on the Nguyn rulers and
also from a simple commercial viewpoint, the Company would gain
nothing from fighting the Nguyn. As it so happened trade did not suf-
fer as the Hirado factory sent a ship to Hi An in the spring of 1637.
There, Duycker and the other Dutchmen were warmly received by the
Cha, who promised to facilitate the Company trade and offered them
a well-built house in Hi An in which they could reside in comfort.
Even more important was the partiality of the Japanese residing in Hi
An towards the Company. Duycker therefore believed that the Com-
pany trade with central Vietnam would be profitable this year.209
The scene changed drastically, however, after Duycker left Hi An
for Batavia in March 1637. Because the Japanese resolved to co-oper-
ate with the Chinese in the running of the Quinam-Japan trade, they
reneged on the agreement they had made with the Dutch. Therefore,
66 chapter three
most of the Dutch silk contracts with the Japanese were unfulfilled.
As luck would have it, silk was scarce and expensive on the local
market that season because heavy rains had largely destroyed the sum-
mer silk harvest. The shortage was compounded by the fact that the
Trnh rulers forbade their people to export Tonkinese silk to Quinam.
Consequently, Dutch merchants in Hi An could spend only 54,123
of 130,004 guilders on silk and other miscellaneous items.210
However, as no decision from the High Government to abandon
the trade with the Nguyn domain was forthcoming, the Japan factory
and Zeelandia Castle were obliged to continue the Quinam trade. In
the spring of 1638, Duycker again sailed to Hi An from Formosa
with a cargo valued at 61,218 guilders. Silk and sugar, the two key
items which the Dutch expected to purchase in Hi An, were scarce
and dear. It was believed that as long as the Trnh rulers persisted in
their ban on the export of Tonkinese silk to Quinam, the silk shortage
in central Vietnam would undoubtedly drag on. The Dutch now seri-
ously wondered whether it was worthwhile to maintain a trade with
Quinam which was both unprofitable and miserable while their trade
with Tonkin and Formosa was much more profitable and pregnant
with promise. In a disappointed tone Duycker wrote to Hendrick Jansz
Nachtegael, the chief of the Dutch factory in Siam, for advice. He did
not know that the Governor-General and the Council of the Indies
had already decided to abandon the Company trade with Quinam.
In the summer of 1638, Batavia sent a ship to Hi An to take its
servants and property to Formosa; the Dutch trade with Quinam had
finally come to an end. The decision of Batavia to abolish its trade
with central Vietnam was made after having carefully considered the
risks involved in continuing its relationship with the Nguyn rulers,
since it had officially established political and commercial relations
with the L/Trnh one year earlier.211
2. The Dutch arrival in Tonkin, 1637
The Dutch had already been looked for during the past year since the
Portuguese had given notice of our intended expedition. They had
repeated the usual calumnies, prejudicing the King of Tonkin against
us. They had even suggested to him [Cha Trnh Trng] that we prob-
ably intended to try to take his life; that we would no doubt enter his
presence well armed with sabres and pistols, and that we would set out
from Quinam to come here.
Carel Hartsinck (1637)212
intimate phases 67
In contrast to their repeated endeavours to build a relationship with

Quinam, the Dutch did not bestow much attention on trade with Tonkin
in the first three decades of the seventeenth century. In fact, in 1613,
the Hirado factory half-heartedly sought to establish relationships with
both Vietnamese kingdoms when it assigned two Dutch merchants
to put this plan into operation. These Dutchmen, as mentioned in the
previous sections, arrived first at Hi An, where one was assaulted and
the other murdered. Although the Dutch made various efforts to trade
with central Vietnam from this year on, there was no plan whatsoever
to trade with the north until the early 1630s when Japanese politics
and commerce underwent a critical transformation.213 In 1635, the
Japanese Tokugawa Government promulgated a policy of seclusion,
prohibiting Japanese people to sail abroad. Consequently, the Japa-
nese shuin-sen trading system was disrupted. Such Western merchants
as the Portuguese and the Dutch all hoped to seize the place of the
Japanese traders at various trading-places including the Vietnamese
Kingdoms of Tonkin and Quinam. After trying vainly to improve their
trade with Quinam, the Dutch finally decided to shift their commer-
cial focus to Tonkin, whose silk had become increasingly profitable
on the Japanese market. Besides, the Trnh rulers of Tonkin had also
dropped hints about granting them favourable trading privileges once
they actually began to trade with northern Vietnam.214
It is certainly curious that the Dutch were so tardy in opening up
trade with Tonkin, in contrast to their repeated attempts to establish
trade with Quinam. Tonkinese silk had been regularly exported to
Japan and it was well-known that the bulk of the Vietnamese silk avail-
able in Quinam was not locally produced but imported from Tonkin.
Yet it was the Dutch commercial weakness in Japan during the first
three decades of the seventeenth century which restrained them from
expanding their trade to other countries in the region. Until 1621, the
Dutch factory at Hirado in Japan was virtually isolated from the rest
of the Companys intra-Asian trading network.215 Besides, Tonkinese
silk was obviously inferior to the Chinese product which was still eas-
ily purchasable in central Vietnam. Hence, Tonkin was commercially
less attractive than Quinam. Not until the middle of the 1630s when
Tonkinese silk became more marketable and profitable on the Japa-
nese market, did the Dutch Company begin to consider trading with
the L/Trnh domain.216
In 1636, Couckebacker gathered reliable information from mer-
chants who had been trading with Tonkin in order to compile a report
68 chapter three
on the current trading situation in northern Vietnam. This impressive

report contained information on such important topics as geographical
features, the commercial and political situation, and trading prospects.
Most remarkable was Couckebackers optimistic estimation that Tonkin
annually produced approximately 1,500 to 1,600 piculs of raw silk,
5,000 to 6,000 silk piece-goods, and a substantial quantity of cinna-
mon. The bright future of the Tonkin trade drawn in Couckebackers
report encouraged the Governor-General and the Council of the Indies
to seek to establish relations with the L/Trnh rulers the following
year. In 1637, the Grol left Japan for northern Vietnam.217
Handicapped by repeated Portuguese slanders on them, the Dutch
were slightly suspect when they arrived in Tonkin. Because the Portu-
guese had begun to expand their trade with Tonkin after the Japanese
seclusion policy in 1635, they were worried about the arrival of the
Grol. Hence they tried to severely prejudice the Trnh ruler by say-
ing that the Dutch probably intended to assassinate him. To provoke
the Cha, the Portuguese had rumoured that the Dutch had offered
the Nguyn 150 pearls for the Chm Islands off the coast of Hi An.
Their minds full of forebodings, the local authorities were at first quite
vigilant with the Dutch on their arrival. They ordered them to lay down
their weapons and not to fire their cannon. Thanks to Hartsincks dex-
terous and courteous behaviour, the Dutch were able to overcome this
early challenge. The Dutch chief sat upon the mats willingly during
receptions, showed his reverence for the Cha, chewed betel after the
local custom, and elegantly took off his cap and bowed when visiting
the royal tombs. Consequently, the Dutch not only established fairly
good relations with the court, they were also granted more favourable
trading privileges than other foreign merchants. The Cha even sym-
bolically adopted Carel Hartsinck as his own son, offering him court
dress and flags so that the Dutch chief could enter Tonkin freely on
his next arrival.218
Incontrovertibly, the Trnhs warm reception of and generosity
towards the Dutch was a strategy to lure them into a military alli-
ance or, at least, to obtain Western weapons to suppress their Nguyn
rivals. After their second defeat at the hands of the Nguyn in 1633,
the Trnh rulers had been assiduously seeking military assistance
from Western powers. The Portuguese had once been the Trnhs
target but their irregular arrivals, and especially their intimate rela-
tions with the Nguyn, displeased the Trnh.219 As clearly reflected
in the Dutch records, at times at which Batavia was vainly demand-
intimate phases 69
ing compensation from the Nguyn, the Trnh hinted that they would
willingly compensate the Company for the losses that it had suffered
in the Nguyn domain should Batavia agree to trade and be an ally of
Tonkin.220 These hints dropped by the Trnh obviously influenced the
Dutch negotiations with the Nguyn ruler. During their first meeting
with a Tonkinese mandarin, the Dutch were informed that Cha Trnh
had been awaiting the Dutch arrival impatiently and would cordially
welcome them in the capital. The Chas decree sent to the Dutch
said: The arrival of the Dutch gives satisfaction to the Cha. Com-
missioners have been sent to escort the Dutch and their goods to the
royal court. At every meeting the Cha without fail asked Hartsinck
about Dutch power, their relations with other European countries, and
whether they would be willing to ally with Tonkin to fight against
Quinam. Carel Hartsinck adroitly responded satisfactorily to all the
Chas questions but invariably politely excused himself from discuss-
ing any alliance, saying that such an important decision could only be
made by the Governor-General in Batavia.221
Despite the trading privileges granted by the Cha, the Dutch trade
in Tonkin was severely obstructed by some high-ranking eunuchs.
These mandarins tried in one way or the other to extort money from
the Company in exchange for raw silk and piece-goods and openly
expressed their desire to manipulate the silk supply. They also
obstructed the Dutch sale of import goods and appropriated a large
part of the Company goods on the Chas account to resell them in
the local market.
These impediments, however, could not dim the attraction of the
Tonkinese silk trade. The Dutch noticed on their arrival that, the year
before, the average purchase price of Tonkinese raw silk had been 45
taels per picul while that in Quinam had stood between 100 and 130
taels per picul. It was the low purchase price of Tonkinese raw silk
which had lured the Portuguese to visit Tonkin in the winter of 1636/7
with three ships. Because many foreign ships arrived, the purchase
price of Tonkinese raw silk rose to 60 taels per picul on average,
but this still left it far lower than that in Quinam.222 Therefore, the
Dutch could easily exchange their cargo valued at 188,166 guilders for
536.95 piculs of raw silk and 9,665 silk piece-goods, valued at 190,000
guilders in total. This silk cargo reportedly yielded an average profit of
80 per cent in Japan. The success of the inaugural voyage to Tonkin
prompted the Dutch to cultivate intimate political relations with the
Trnh rulers in order to facilitate their silk trade between Tonkin and
70 chapter three
Japan. At long last they had found the raw silk and silk piece-goods
they so hungrily desired to run their Japan trade. From now on, Tonki-
nese silk left on board Dutch ships in exchange for Japanese silver
and Dutch ordnance.
3. Ideological struggles and belligerent decisions, 16371643
Military or peaceful involvement, 16371641?

It was noted earlier that, by the middle of the 1630s, the Trnhs strat-
egy of luring the VOC into a military alliance fortuitously coincided
with the latters plan to carve itself a place on the Tonkin market so
as to export silk to Japan. In order to reach their goal, the Trnh rulers
first inveigled the VOC out of the Nguyn domain and having suc-
ceeded persuaded Batavia to ally with them to wage war against their
Nguyn rivals. They hinted that they would compensate the VOC for
all the financial losses which the Company had suffered at the hands
of the Nguyn rulers, provided the Company traded with and supported
Tonkin militarily. At this juncture, Duyckers negotiations with Cha
Nguyn Phc Lan to procure compensation and trading privileges for
the Company failed. The time was ripe to encourage Batavia to shift
its commercial focus from Quinam to Tonkin.
Nevertheless, the VOC found itself on the horns of a dilemma:
how could it maintain the relationship with Tonkin without stirring
up adverse reactions in Quinam and vice-versa. Despite the current
unprofitable state of the Company trade with Quinam, mindful of the
Companys long-term strategy for the Indo-Chinese Peninsula, the
High Government still wanted to seek an amicable relationship with
the Nguyn Kingdom.223 Military involvement with the Trnh rulers
was not a favourable option for the Company at this moment, since
it had already overburdened itself with wars and conflicts elsewhere
in Asia.224 Batavia therefore needed to calculate carefully all pos-
sible gains and losses should it ally with Tonkin in a war against
Quinam.225
As reflected in the VOC documents, prior to the Companys inau-
gural voyage to Tonkin in 1637, Batavia still believed that it could
maintain peaceful relationships with both Vietnamese kingdoms simul-
taneously. In his instruction to Carel Hartsinck in Tonkin in the spring
of 1637, Duycker optimistically reasoned that, although the Trnh-
Nguyn wars had already been in full swing for several years, the local
intimate phases 71
inhabitants still had no difficulty in crossing the border to exchange

their commodities.226 Duyckers opinion was perhaps optimistically
coloured by the fact that the Portuguese had been trading peacefully
with both Vietnamese kingdoms up to that time. Notwithstanding his
stated belief, Duycker still instructed Hartsinck to sound out Cha
Trnh Trngs attitude towards the Company given that the latter was
waging war against Quinam to gain compensation.227
To the north the Trnh rulers were constantly pressing the Dutch to
enter into a military alliance and to support them materially with sol-
diers, ships, weapons, and other martial paraphernalia to fight against
Quinam. Cha Trnh Trng not only openly expressed his desire to
ally himself with the Dutch during his meetings with Hartsinck at
his palace in 1637 but, in order to persuade the Governor-General in
Batavia of the final victory over Quinam, he showed how powerful his
armies were, at least on paper, in the following impressive list:228
300,000 excellent soldiers
2,000 big elephants
10,000 warhorses well-trained for warring
1,000 war galleys
50,000 heavy guns which can be used both on land and on board the galleys
1,000 pieces of ordnance
30,000 guns with red lacquered stocks and long butts which can also shoot
30 bullets
20,000 guns with black lacquered stocks and short butts which can also
shoot 30 bullets
And in order to explain the reason why he had waged war against
Nguyn Quinam as well as his current need of the Companys military
support, the Cha gave the following justifications:229
My country Tonkin lies at the centre [of the region]. Kings and Lords
from the East, West, and North come to pay their respects to me with
the exception of the South [Quinam]. The people there are country folk
whose lives and contacts are weak and who carry out all good and laud-
able things in a wrong way. They rely on and comfort themselves in
unusual ways and do not obey me. If I want to war against them at sea
with galleys then the passage thence is too far for me, and the billows
too high and the wind and the rain disadvantageous. Therefore I cannot
achieve this by this means which leads these wicked people to persist
even more in their wrongful ways and behaviour; which pleases them.
These are the reasons why I have planned to seek the help from the
Dutch. Should Your Majesty be willing to agree, then I shall ally my
country forever with your country. Could you kindly supply me with
72 chapter three
three ships and 200 excellent men who can handle ordnance well and
send them to Tonkin? In addition, I shall order my kinsmen and closest
noble soldiers to war against these people at sea. Then at that precise
time I shall also arrive there overland with all my troops so that Quinam
can be attacked from both sides simultaneously and be destroyed.
In the same letter, Cha Trnh also promised to cover the costs and
expenses incurred by the Company by sending ships and soldiers
for up to two to three hundred thousand rixdollars. Above all, once
the rebellious region had been completely pacified, he would grant
the Company favourable privileges allowing it to reside, trade, build
forts, and collect taxes and pluck all sorts of incomes and fruits
from Quinam.230 Besides this letter to the Governor-General, Cha
Trnh Trng and Crown Prince Trnh Cn, who succeeded his father
in 1657, also sent letters and presents to President Nicolaas Coucke-
backer in Hirado to strengthen the relationship. In the capital Thng
Long, Cha Trnh Trng even symbolically adopted Carel Hartsinck
as his own son.231
In 1639, Cha Trnh sent his first ambassador to Batavia in order
to attract more attention from the Company. The sole mission of the
Tonkinese delegation was simply to visit the Company headquarters
and observe its military prowess in order to seek out if there were any
truth in the Portuguese calumnies about the Dutch. For the past few
years, the Lusitanians had been busily spreading rumours that the Dutch
in Asia were nothing better than pirates. As the Tonkinese Ambassador
was extremely impressed by the grandeur of the VOC headquarters
in Batavia as well as the cordiality with which the High Government
treated him, the Portuguese slanders on the Dutch transpired to be
groundless. More importantly, the envoys report of his voyage to
Batavia impressed the Cha and prompted him to consolidate political
relations with the Company. Anxious to lure the Dutch into a military
alliance to counter-attack Quinam, he generously granted the Dutch
factors even more trading privileges to buy and sell commodities in
his territories.232
Upon the return of the Tonkinese delegation, Batavia assigned
Couckebacker to be the Company representative to negotiate with the
Cha about conditions necessary to forge a military alliance. Coucke-
backer had been scrupulously instructed by the High Government that
he should always parry the Chas direct demands for Dutch assis-
tance. He explained to the Cha that the Company was a trading
enterprise and, hence, should not involve itself in military actions. As
intimate phases 73
matters stood, its ships in Asian waters were subject to the Portuguese
threat, and the Company desperately needed to hold some squadrons
in reserve to protect its servants and property from its mortal enemy.
Should the Cha need weapons to fight against Quinam, the Company
would try to sell him some of its spare ordnance and ammunition.
In exchange for the Companys assistance, the High Government
expected the Cha would generously grant the Dutch factors more
trading privileges and simultaneously forbid the Portuguese to trade
with Tonkin. Cha Trnh rejected these conditions and the negotiations
stagnated. If the High Government did not reduce its unreasonable
conditions, the Cha threatened, he would terminate the relationship
with the Company. His armies were powerful enough to pacify the
Nguyn Kingdom without Dutch assistance. If the Company did not
want to assist him but wanted only to trade with his country, they
should feel free to come.
Such menaces did not embarrass Couckebacker in the least. He
politely thanked the Cha for no longer demanding military assistance
from the Company. Shortly after this unsuccessful round of negotia-
tions, Couckebacker left for Formosa and Batavia. As predicted, upon
his departure, Cha Trnh Trng sent a letter to Governor Van der
Burch in Formosa, demanding the Company to provide him with five
warships, 600 well-armed soldiers, 100 pieces of ordnance, and 200
gunners to attack Quinam in his next campaign.233
Upon his arrival in Batavia in December 1639, Couckebacker
submitted a detailed report of his mission to Tonkin to the High Gov-
ernment. According to what he had observed and perceived during his
short visit to Thng Long, the politics of Tonkin were rather unstable.
Although the Trnh family had completely amassed the power at court
in its own hands, its position was highly vulnerable. The Mc clan
who had been driven out of ng Kinh since 1592 remained a constant
threat to the L/Trnh Government. Around the capital, the Chas
opponents also threatened to overthrow him. Given this situation, all
the Chas promises to the Company were by no means guaranteed.
Ruminating on the perspective of a military alliance with Tonkin,
Couckebacker pessimistically concluded that what the Trnh rulers
wanted was not to create a genuine alliance but to effectuate a transfer
of the burden of their war onto the Company.234
Couckebackers cautious advice about dealing with the Trnh ruler
did not alter the ultimate decision of Batavia to ally with Tonkin to
wage war against Quinam. In his letter to Cha Trnh Trng in 1640,
74 chapter three
Governor-General Van Diemen thanked the Cha for entertaining his

official so kindly during his visit to Tonkin, and he expressed his hope
to establish a successful alliance between the two parties in the future.
The Governor-General also expected the Cha to inform him of the
date as well as the garrisoning place for the first allied campaign, so
that the High Government could send squadrons to Tonkin. Because
he did not receive a reply from the Trnh ruler, the Governor-General
sent another letter to Thng Long in 1641.235 In November of the same
year, Governor Paulus Traudenius in Formosa also dispatched a let-
ter of his own and presents to Cha Trnh Trng. Delighted with the
Companys apparent readiness towards forming an alliance, the Trnh
ruler planned to send another ambassador to Batavia to strengthen the
relationship and discuss the first allied campaign. Before Captain Jacob
van Liesvelt, who had just arrived from Formosa, left for Batavia with
the Tonkinese commissioner, the Cha finally agreed to two impor-
tant conditions: to compensate the Company willingly for its losses
in Quinam in the past few years, and to send his armies to garrison
Poutsin, the estuary of the Gianh River on the border between Tonkin
and Quinam, to await the Dutch fleet. After achieving these conces-
sions, Van Liesvelt departed for Batavia with a Tonkinese envoy on
18 January 1642.236
Tension escalating in Quinam, 1642

The relationship between the VOC and Quinam worsened after Batavia
withdrew its servants and property from Hi An completely in the
summer of 1638. Tensions between the two parties escalated in the
next few years as Batavia step by step cautiously committed itself
to a military alliance with Thng Long and these tensions erupted in
the spring of 1642 when the Company suffered new misfortunes at
the hands of the Nguyn rulers. On 26 November 1641, the Maria de
Medicis and the Gulden Buijs sailing to Batavia from Formosa encoun-
tered a storm and were wrecked on the coast of Quinam. Eighty-two
survivors (thirty from the Gulden Buijs and the rest from the Medicis)
managed to come ashore with a considerable amount of money and
merchandise. The rest, including Captain Jacob Jansen, the merchants
Guilelmo de Wilt and Jan de Waert, and some Japanese, lost their
lives. As soon as the survivors reached the shore, they were captured
and held at Hi An. The salvaged goods, including money and eighteen
cannon, were confiscated. The Cha later summoned two constables to
serve in his palace and released three Chinese merchants amongst the
intimate phases 75
survivors, sending them to Batavia on board a Chinese junk sailing via

Palembang to inform the High Government about the foundering of
the Company ships.237 As the news of the imprisonment of Company
servants and the confiscation of salvaged goods reached Batavia, the
High Government decided unanimously to attack Quinam to avenge
its losses.238
Tensions soon spilled over into an open conflict by Jacob van Lies-
velts hostile appearance off the Quinam coast. After his departure
from Tonkin, on 6 February Van Liesvelt passed the Bay of Tourane
where present-day Nng city is situated. There, the Tonkinese
Ambassador asked Van Liesvelt to capture some Quinamese. Anxious
to please the mandarin, the Dutch captain, ignorant of the recent wreck
of the Company ships, sent thirty well-armed soldiers ashore to capture
several hundreds of Quinamese and then quickly sailed away. At sea,
the captives informed Van Liesvelt about the latest shipwrecks and the
Dutch prisoners at Hi An. The captain therefore returned to negotiate
with the Nguyn rulers for an exchange of prisoners.239
In Quinam, the news of the appearance of the hostile Dutch ship
and its raid on the coastal people soon reached the court. A fleet of
thirty-five ships commanded by the Crown Prince was ready to defend
the coastal area against a Dutch attack.240 In response to the Princes
demand for a meeting, Van Liesvelt appointed Isaacq Davids the Com-
pany representative to negotiate with the Prince. Both sides agreed to
release all captives. Following the agreement, Van Liesvelt freed all
Quinamese captives on board, keeping only the Quinamese mandarin
and the Japanese interpreter, whom the Prince had sent to negotiate
with Van Liesvelt, as security. With a great show of reluctance, the
Prince refused to free any Dutch prisoners until Van Liesvelt had
released his officials and had also handed over the Tonkinese Ambas-
sador to Quinam. High handedly the Prince threatened to execute all
Dutch captives if his order was not obeyed within one day. Van Lies-
velt strongly protested against the Princes exorbitant ultimatum and
threatened that any such assault would lead to fierce revenge by the
Company. During these tense negotiations, the Dutch captives at Hi
An secretly informed Van Liesvelt that the Prince was preparing a
large fleet of some 300 well-armed vessels to launch a sudden attack
on the Dutch ship. After a few days of fruitless negotiation, Van Lies-
velt decided to leave for Batavia, carrying with him the Quinamese
official and the Japanese interpreter.241
Both parties blamed each other for the incidents and not unnaturally
76 chapter three
interpreted them differently. The Nguyn accused Van Liesvelt of cap-

turing their subjects illegally in peacetime. Regarding the shipwreck
of the Maria de Medicis and Gulden Buijs, directly after the accident,
the Cha had sent three Chinese survivors to Batavia to inform the
Governor-General of the incident. The rest of these survivors were not
imprisoned but guarded by the Japanese chief at Hi An. The Cha
wanted to see the official reply from Batavia on this matter before
taking any decision. The Cha took pains to stress that the court had
the right to take all survivors prisoners and confiscate all salvaged
goods from every shipwreck along the coast as was laid down in local
law.242 Even leaving this tradition aside, since the VOC had officially
allied itself with his enemy, the Trnh, he had all the more reason to
do so. Eager to please the Nguyn rulers, the Japanese chief affirmed
the genuineness of this statement.243
What had the Nguyn rulers actually done during these incidents?
It is possible to piece together a general picture of these events with the
help of sporadic, and sometimes contradictory, documents. The survi-
vors of the Maria de Medicis and the Gulden Buijs were held captive at
Hi An under the surveillance of the chief of the Japanese community.
Three Dutchmen were ordered to serve in the Chas palace and the
rest was provided with six bales of rice and 6,000 copper coins. The
Dutch prisoners at Hi An lived in constant trepidation after hearing all
sorts of rumours. Some said that Cha Nguyn would sooner or later
send them to Batavia, while other rumoured that should the tension
escalate and the Company remain steadfast in its alliance with Trnh
Tonkin, the Dutch captives would be executed. Pertinently, the actions
of the Nguyn rulers before Van Liesvelts raid imply that they had
indeed tried to avoid a military confrontation with the Company.244
After Van Liesvelt had left Quinam for Batavia, Cha Nguyn
summoned twelve Dutchmen to his palace. He strongly condemned
Van Liesvelts hostility towards his people at a time at which he and
his people had been endeavouring to deal peacefully with the Com-
pany in order to eschew tension. After sending three Chinese survivors
to Batavia to inform the Governor-General, he had even thought of
releasing the rest of the Dutch captives. Now he had to wait for the
Governor-Generals reply on this matter. Perceiving the Chas hesita-
tion, the Dutch prisoners asked him to let them carry his letter to the
Governor-General in Batavia, where they would try their best to dispel
the tension. Their request was granted; fifty Dutchmen were allowed to
sail to Batavia under the command of Joris Welten, the former captain
intimate phases 77
of the Gulden Buijs, on 19 March 1643. The rest remained at Hi An

until good news should arrive from Batavia.245
The good news, for which the Dutch prisoners were longing, never
came as the VOC-Quinam relationship was raised to a higher level of
tension because of another misfortune. Only two days after she had
left Quinam, the junk carrying the fifty Dutchmen was attacked by
a Portuguese ship off the Chm coast. The unarmed Dutch junk was
quickly overwhelmed and most of those on board were killed. Eight-
een Dutchmen narrowly escaped by diving into the water.246 After
the Portuguese had sailed away, the survivors landed on the Chm
coast where four more died of exhaustion. Thirteen survivors were
well received and later distributed to the care of several high-ranking
mandarins by the Chm King. The last man, Juriaen de Rooden, was
presented to the King of Cambodia, who later freed him and let him
go to Batavia.247
The Dutch military defeats, 16421643

While the antipathy of Batavia towards Quinam was growing day
after day, the Nguyn concessions in these incidents were not per-
ceived correctly. After the shipwreck of the Maria de Medicis and the
Gulden Buijs, the High Government agreed unanimously to ally with
Tonkin to take revenge against Nguyn Quinam.248 The goals of the
military operations were to liberate the Dutch captives at Hi An, to
seek compensation, and, equally important, to save the reputation of
the Company which had been badly damaged after the accumulation
of misfortunes in Quinam. Consequently, in the summer of 1642, a
fleet of five ships carrying 222 men (the Kievit carried seventy men,
Meerman sixty-five, Wakende Boei thirty-five, Zeeuwsche Nachtegaal
thirty-five, and Brack seventeen) commanded by Jan van Linga was
launched to attack Quinam. The fleet carried orders from Batavia
to capture as many Quinamese prisoners as it could on the way to
Tourane. There, Van Linga would send the Governor-Generals letter
to Cha Nguyn. Another letter would be sent to the Dutch captives
at Hi An, ordering them to escape with the assistance of the fleet.
Van Linga should try to convince the Cha that, once the Dutch cap-
tives were released, the Company would stop its overtures to Tonkin.
If the Cha did not free all Dutch prisoners within forty-eight hours,
Van Linga would execute half the Quinamese captives and the other
half would be sent to Tonkin.249
78 chapter three
From 31 May 1642 the Dutch fleet began to raid coastal villages
in Quinam. The Dutch troops landed at the Bay of Cambir (modern
Qung Ngi Province), where they burnt around 400-500 houses and
captured thirty-eight people. In order to swell the number of captives,
Van Liesvelt, who was sailing with the fleet, proposed a reckless tactic.
Unfortunately this led to a heavy loss of Dutch soldiers. Leaving the
fleet behind, Van Liesvelt and some twenty soldiers went to Cham-
pullo (C Lao Chm), off the Hi An coast, on a small boat in order
to launch a sudden attack and capture local people. The Quinamese,
having been warned by the local authority about the Dutch hostility,
were very vigilant in their look-out for the arrival of these Dutch-
men. They therefore made a surprise attack on the Dutch vessel and
immediately killed Van Liesvelt and ten more men. The others were
badly injured and died later as a result of their wounds.250 Despite this
heavy loss, Van Linga did not break off negotiations with the Nguyn
rulers. But after all further attempts to free the last Dutch captives at
Hi An failed, the Dutch commander took the fleet to the Gianh River
to join the Trnh armies.251
To Van Lingas surprise, there was no Tonkinese army at the Gianh
River; Cha Trnh Trng had not mounted the campaign as he had
informed Batavia he would do. Disappointed in the Trnh ruler, Van
Linga and the Dutch fleet sailed northwards to Tonkin. In his letter to
Cha Trnh, Van Linga exaggerated the Dutch actions off Hi An and
expressed his disappointment with the non-appearance of the Chas
armies. Cha Trnh Trng justified himself to Van Linga, stating that
he had been there in April to await the Dutch fleet. Because the Dutch
did not come when they said they would, he finally withdrew.252 His
intention now was to campaign during the following spring; he exhorted
the Dutch fleet to arrive in time to put itself under his command. After
having settled the final agreements about the next campaign with the
Cha, Van Linga took the fleet to Formosa.253
In its instruction to the fleet, the High Government had anticipated
the possibility that the Trnh armies might not campaign, and hence
had instructed Van Linga that, should the Trnh ruler fail to show up,
he should either sail to Tonkin or continue to raid along the coast of
Quinam before proceeding to Formosa.254 After the first unsuccessful
attempt at co-operative action, Batavia grew suspicious of the ambiva-
lent behaviour of the Trnh ruler and wary of the somewhat unusual
nature of the military alliance proposed by Tonkin. Nevertheless, its
losses in Quinam were so heavy that Batavia could arrive at no better
intimate phases 79
a solution than pursuing vengeance. With some perception of the way

matters stood, the High Government was aware that even the least con-
cession to Quinam would irritate the Trnh rulers, probably severely
disrupting its lucrative exportation of Tonkinese silk to Japan.
In his letter to Cha Trnh Trng of December 1642, Governor
Paulus Traudenius in Formosa expressed his regret that Van Lingas
fleet had not met the armies of Tonkin at the Gianh River to mount
an attack on Quinam. The Governor also confirmed that, as the Cha
had demanded, a fleet of five ships would be in Tonkin in the coming
spring to join the campaign.255 As planned, a fleet of five ships (the
Kievit, Wakende Boei, Zeeuwsche Nachtegaal, Wijdenes, and Zand-
voort) and 290 soldiers (130 infantry and 160 mariners) under the
command of Johannes Lamotius left Formosa for Tonkin in January
1643. According to Traudeniuss instruction to Lamotius, the fleet was
to garrison near the islands of the Fishers at the estuary of the Thi
Bnh River. There, Lamotius should fire his guns to inform the people
of Tonkin of the arrival of the Dutch fleet. Detailed instruction for the
campaign would be given by Antonio van Brouckhorst, the chief of the
Tonkin factory. If the Chas armies were again not ready to attack
Quinam, Lamotius should wait for a maximum of ten days and then
set sail for Batavia before the north-east monsoon ended.256
To the disappointment of Lamotius, the Cha was again not ready
for the campaign. After a few days lying at anchor in the Gulf of
Tonkin, Lamotius decided to sail the fleet to Batavia. This displeased
Cha Trnh Trng who insisted that these ships remain in Tonkin in
order that their companies would march to Quinam with him. Lamotius
refused to wait as Governor Traudenius had instructed him to sail to
Batavia should the armies of Tonkin not be ready. Having failed to
persuade Lamotius to wait for his troops, Cha Trnh demanded that
the Wakende Boei and fifty gunners be left behind in order to depart to
the Gianh River with him in the summer. Lamotius agreed. At the end
of February, the remaining four ships left Tonkin for Batavia. Within
a few days, the Zeeuwsche Nachtegaal and the Kievit were forced
to return to Tonkin because the monsoon had changed. The return
of these ships delighted the Cha but worried the High Government
because Batavia feared another shipwreck. Lamotius was severely
reprimanded for his irresponsible command as well as his ill-judged
agreement with the Cha to leave the Wakende Boei behind.257
Despite two failed campaigns, Batavia was still prepared to send
another fleet to ally with the Trnh to attack Quinam in the summer
80 chapter three
of 1643.258 In its letter to Cha Trnh Trng in the spring of 1643,

Batavia confirmed that the Dutch fleet would appear at the Gianh
River in the summer and await his armies. This letter was brought
to Thng Long by President Jan van Elseracq on his way to Japan.
The Governor-Generals letter reinforced by Elseracqs visit certainly
encouraged the Trnh ruler to dispatch his troops to the Gianh River.
Therefore, in the third lunar month (around April) of 1643, Cha Trnh
commanded 10,000 soldiers and a large warship fleet to set out to
attack Quinam.259 While waiting for the arrival of the Dutch fleet to
pursue the campaign at sea, Tonkinese infantry tried to capture some
forts but to no avail. According to Cha Trnhs letter to Governor-
General Van Diemen, his soldiers secretly strewed caltrops to trap the
Nguyn armies on the battlefield. This tactic proved abortive because
the southern soldiers discovered what had been done and hence did not
venture onto the battlefield. The Tonkinese army was already depleted
as a large number of Tonkinese soldiers had died in attempts to con-
quer several forts. Because many of his soldiers were dying every day,
falling victim to the hot summer climate and because no Dutch fleet
showed up as Batavia had promised, the Cha eventually withdrew
his troops in August 1643.260
In the meantime, because of the non-arrival of the Kievit, Wakende
Boei and Zeeuwsche Nachtegaal, Batavia had to select other ships for
the campaign. These were the Wijdenes, Waterhond, and Vos, carrying
200 soldiers under the command of Pieter Baeck, but the ships could
not leave Jambi for the Gianh River until the end of June. Commander
Pieter Baeck was instructed that should Cha Trnh Trng be dispar-
aging about this small fleet, he should justify himself by explaining
that the High Government really had planned to send a larger fleet to
ally with Tonkin, but the absence of the three afore-mentioned ships
had upset the scheme. The Governor-General believed that the fleet,
although consisting of only three ships, would still be effective in
the campaign if the Kievit and Zeeuwsche Nachtegaal, which Bata-
via supposed had had to return to Tonkin because of contrary wind,
would join up with the Wakende Boei to sail with the Chas armies
to the Gianh River. The High Government also carefully instructed
Baeck how to negotiate with the Nguyn rulers should they propose
the Company a ceasefire.261
On 7 July, the fleet was just around five miles from the Gianh River
when they were engaged in a fierce battle with some sixty warships
of the Nguyn navy. The Wijdenes caught fire and exploded, killing
intimate phases 81
Commander Pieter Baeck and most of the people on board. Those who
managed to jump from the ship were captured and executed by the
Nguyn soldiers. The other two ships were heavily damaged; Captain
Jan Erntsen of the Waterhond also died during the fight.262 Shocked
by this fierce battle, the Waterhond and the Vos managed to escape.
Not daring to call at the Gianh River to look for the Trnh armies
who were garrisoned so near the battle that they could even hear the
gunfire, the Waterhond and the Vos fled to the Gulf of Tonkin. On 19
July, these ships accidentally encountered the Meerman, a Company
ship en route to Japan from Tonkin with a large cargo of silk.263 Hear-
ing of the new defeat, Van Brouckhorst immediately sent a message
to the Dutch factors in Thng Long to instruct them how to deal with
the Trnh rulers, especially with the Cha when he returned from
the battlefield. Afterwards the Meerman sailed to Japan. At the end
of July, the Waterhond and the Vos also left Tonkin for Formosa.
The Prince had tried in vain to detain the Dutch ships until the Cha
returned so that they could justify their failure to ally with his fathers
armies at the border.264
The Dutch officials in the Northern Quarters (Japan, Formosa, and
Tonkin) believed that the defeat of Pieter Baecks fleet would arouse
strong opposition to the Company trade in Thng Long and plant
the seeds of doubt about Dutch naval power in the Trnh minds. The
dilemma which the Dutch officials in the Northern Quarters were fac-
ing was how to confess their defeat to the Trnh rulers without harming
the reputation of the Company. In his letter to Cha Trnh Trng in
October 1643, President Van Elseracq of the Nagasaki factory exag-
gerated the victory of the Vos and the Waterhond, simultaneously
stretching the heavy loss of the Nguyn navy up to at least seven war-
ships and around eight hundred soldiers. And, in order to assuage the
Chas discontent with the Company, Elseracq admitted that the non-
appearance of the fleet at the Gianh River was blameworthy. Those
who had made such a terrible mistake would be severely punished by
the King of Holland.265
In fact, the Dutch factory in Thng Long suffered much less obstruc-
tion than the Dutch officials had generally presumed; there followed
no maltreatment of the Dutch factors. The business transactions of
the factory were maintained peacefully perhaps because of the Chas
expectation that the military alliance with the VOC would be contin-
ued. Shortly after his arrival in the capital, Cha Trnh summoned
to his palace Merchant Isaacq Gobijn, whom the Prince had kept as
82 chapter three
hostage after Van Brouckhorsts departure for Japan in July. The Cha
wanted to hear the complete story about the incident from the Dutch
representative. After a peaceful discourse, Gobijn was allowed to sail
to Formosa with the Kievit and the Wakende Boei.266
After Gobijns departure, Cha Trnh sent a long letter to the
Governor-General. He informed the Hollantschen Prins [Prince of
Holland] about the failure of the co-operation and described the unsuc-
cessful campaigns of his soldiers in their assaults on some well-built
forts in Quinam. The Cha blamed the failure on the Dutch side:
I had expected that you would assist me with ships and soldiers but none
arrived. I provisioned the three ships which remained in my country so
that they could accompany me on my march to Poutsin adequately and
respected the soldiers on board because they were mighty fighters. But
they did not help me and were wanting in courage to fight against the
enemy. When I ordered them to do battle with and destroy the Quinam-
ese armies, they simply excused themselves and sailed their ships back
and forth on the deep sea, so far from the coast. Therefore the people of
Quinam all laughed at your soldiers.267
After having reminded the Governor-General one more time of the
true story: that those cowardly Dutch gunners had been laughed
at by the Nguyn soldiers, the Cha provoked him:
So, please come here with your ships and 5,000 men to fight against
Quinam until the final victory has been achieved. But you should send
brave soldiers, not merchants, because even if you send twenty ships to
the coast of Quinam, they could not do the Quinamese any harm because
they are far from the sea. Therefore you should send well-trained soldiers
to fight on land.268
Despite or perhaps because of the Chas letter, Batavia ended its
military alliance with Tonkin. The short-lived coalition only resulted
in three unsuccessful campaigns because of the following reasons.
Most certainly, Batavia had underestimated the strength of the Nguyn
army. In its instructions to the fleets destined for Quinam, Batavia
often gave the commanders guidelines about how to negotiate with
the Nguyn rulers should the latter surrender or propose a ceasefire
with the Company. It is rather ironical that, even after the 1642 defeat
in which Van Liesvelt and some twenty soldiers died, Batavia still
clung to its arrogant belief in its superiority when it again advised
Pieter Baeck how to bargain with the Nguyn, should the latter pro-
pose the Company a truce. Moreover, and as a consequence of the
serious underestimation of Batavia, the Dutch commanders and sol-
intimate phases 83
diers were overconfident and hence too impulsive when they set about
attacking Quinam. Van Liesvelt and his companions died as a result
of their reckless tactics. In the summer of 1643, the fleet of Pieter
Baeck simply swaggered past the shore of Quinam without taking any
precautions. Therefore, when some sixty Nguyn warships suddenly
surrounded and attacked the Dutch fleet, the Wijdenes caught fire and
exploded immediately. The Waterhond and the Vos had only eight
and six cannon respectively on board; the rest were reportedly lying
dismantled in the hold.269
Finally, the ambivalence allied with the hesitation of the Trnh rulers
during these allied campaigns was another critical cause which led to
the final failure of the alliance. Hamstrung by the consecutive failures
of the Trnh armies to appear in the summer of 1642 and spring of
1643, the two Dutch fleets were sent there to no purpose. The Dutch
gunners who had travelled to Nht L with the Trnh armies in the
summer of 1643 described the Cha as being so faint-hearted that
he dared not attack the enemy who were very close to his garrison.
When the Dutch soldiers urged him to fight, he refused, giving as his
justification that he did not want to put the Dutch gunners in danger.
What the Cha was expecting was a powerful Dutch fleet from Bata-
via. Therefore, when no fleet arrived as he expected, he withdrew his
forces, leaving the Wakende Boei and Kievit stranded in the shallow
estuary vulnerable to the threat of the Nguyn armies.270
4. The Quinam interlude and frigid relations with Tonkin,

16441651
The VOCs unilateral war with Quinam, 16441651

The defeats of the Company by Quinam, not counting the heavy losses
incurred prior to this war, aroused more hatred against the Nguyn.
The High Government in Batavia unanimously agreed to continue the
prosecution of military revenge on Quinam. But now distrusting the
Trnh rulers, Batavia decided to act on its own. The unilateral war
waged against Quinam had three aims. The primary motive was that
Batavia wanted revenge on Quinam for its heavy defeats in 1642 and
1643 and felt it necessary to save the Companys reputation which
had been recently blackened. Batavia was also anxious to liberate
the rest of the Dutch captives who were still held prison in central
Vietnam. Finally, if possible, the High Government was desirous of
84 chapter three
seeking compensation for all the losses the Company had suffered at
the hands of the Nguyn rulers.
In 1644, Hendrik Dircsz. van den Graeff (or Platvoet), in command
of the Lillo and the Haring carrying 115 soldiers, blockaded the coast
of Quinam. The fleet was under orders to raid all ships trading with
Quinam and capture as many inhabitants as it could. Having sailed
from Batavia in June, Platvoets fleet met the Kievit, Leeuwerik, Dol-
fijn, and Wakende Boei returning from Phnompenh one month later.
In Cambodia, a fierce battle between these Dutch ships and the Cam-
bodian armies had broken out in which Captain Hendrik Harouze had
been killed and the Dutch fleet had suffered severe damage. After
the unexpected meeting, Sijmon Jacobsz. Domkes, the interim Com-
mander of the fleet returning from Phnompenh, and Platvoet went to
visit the King of Champa, who had been maintaining good relations
with the Company and had even adopted Pieter van Regemortes, the
former chief factor of the Cambodia factory, as his son.271 Afterwards,
Domkes joined Platvoet to launch an attack on Quinam. From 24 July,
a fleet of four ships consisting of the Kievit, Leeuwerik, Lillo, and Ha-
ring began to cruise along and raid the coast of Quinam. Apart from
the sporadic forays, this united fleet could not find any considerable
target because the littoral of Quinam was quiet. Whether it was safe
was another matter and a landing was neither safe nor had instruc-
tions for it been issued. Therefore, after a few days of patrolling the
coast of Quinam without achieving anything, the fleet sailed to For-
mosa.272 After this 1644 fiasco, Batavia launched no official attack
on the Nguyn territory any more. Despite this apparent withdrawal,
the VOC-Quinam relationship remained hostile. The Company ships
sailing through Nguyn waters were instructed to capture any ship
whatsoever trading with Quinam.
In the years leading to the 1651 peace agreement, there were several
attempts by both sides to exchange captives. By the end of 1643, there
were nineteen Dutch prisoners at Hi An. One year later, this number
had been reduced to fourteen: five had died of disease. For its part,
the VOC held seventeen Quinamese captives in Formosa; the number
of them at the other places is unknown.273 Despite their imprisonment,
the Dutch prisoners at Hi An managed to send several letters to their
masters in Formosa, Siam, and Batavia, requesting them to arrange
an exchange of captives.274 These letters may have contained indirect
signals from the Nguyn rulers to the Company, calling for a dialogue
and for an end to the harmful hostilities. This did not elicit any posi-
intimate phases 85
tive reply from the Dutch side, although several letters were sent to
the Dutch captives at Hi An by the Dutch officials.275 In 1644, the
crisis could have been defused with the active assistance of the French
priest Alexandre de Rhodes. Having received permission from Cha
Nguyn Phc Lan, the French priest, who was then preaching in cen-
tral Vietnam, proposed to act as a mediator in a reciprocal exchange
of captives. He urged the Dutch captives at Hi An to write a letter
to their Governor-General on 26 June 1644 requesting him to arrange
the exchange.276 Meanwhile the Quinamese captives in Formosa also
sent a similar letter to Governor Franois Caron, petitioning that one
of them be allowed to return to Quinam to appeal their Cha for a
complete exchange of captives, while the rest remained in Formosa
as hostages until all Dutch prisoners at Hi An had been freed.277 The
Dutch officials turned a deaf ear to these petitions, and this matter was
ignored until the early 1650s.
Was this because the High Government still believed that it could
solve the crisis by force? Or was Batavia afraid that the Companys
reputation might be disgraced by proposing a ceasefire? These ques-
tions still remain unanswerable. Nevertheless, several events relevant
to the Company trade in the Indo-Chinese Peninsula may provide clues
about what influenced Batavias attitude towards Quinam. The tension
between the VOC and Cambodia is the first to spring to mind. In the
wake of the escalating tension with the Cambodian court, in September
1643 the chief factor of the Dutch factory, Pieter van Regemortes, and
most of the Dutch merchants in the capital Phnompenh were murdered
and imprisoned; the factory was looted. To avenge this assault, a fleet
of five ships commanded by Admiral Harouze sailed up the Mekong
River to attack Phnompenh in 1644. This mission failed miserably;
the Admiral was killed during the battle. The following year, the King
of Cambodia stepped up to challenge the Company by sending it an
impertinent letter.278 It was just at this juncture that the relationship
between Batavia and Tonkin entered a difficult phase after the Com-
panys withdrawal from the military alliance. Despite the erosion of
the relationship between the court and the factory, the Companys
export of Tonkinese silk to Japan yielded high profits. As the Quinam
issue remained sensitive, Batavia obviously avoided dealing with this
matter in order to protect its vulnerable commercial relations with the
Trnh domain. Finally, the exchange of captives was no longer an
important issue for Batavia because, after a successful gaol-break of
six Dutchmen in 1645, there were only eight Dutch captives left in
86 chapter three
Hi An. By 1650, only three men were reportedly still alive.279 These
were perhaps the major reasons which reduced the interest of Batavia
in negotiating with Quinam as it was careful not to tread on toes and
thereby avoided irritating the Trnh rulers in Thng Long.
The peace agreement with Quinam, 1651

In 1648, Cha Nguyn Phc Tn was enthroned. The political trans-
formation in Quinam paved the way for a new dialogue with Batavia.
Shortly after succeeding to power, the new Cha stated that he was
willing to release the remaining Dutch captives and sign a truce with
the Company to end the current hostility between the two parties pro-
vided that Batavia showed its willingness to negotiate.280 The Nguyn
rulers proclamation was cordially welcomed in Batavia. In fact, by
the late 1640s, the Gentlemen XVII281 had been urging the High Gov-
ernment to look for an appropriate occasion to end the tenacious and
harmful confrontation with Quinam. This order was indeed mentioned
again in their letter to Batavia in 1650.282
In early 1650, the Nguyn rulers stepped up the process of normal-
izing the relationship with the VOC when a high-ranking mandarin
from the Nguyn court stated in his letter to Bingam, the chief of
the Chinese community in Batavia, that the Nguyn rulers were now
ready to release all Dutch captives and sign a peace agreement with
the Dutch Company. In January 1651, Batavia freed some Quinamese
captives as a gesture towards commencing the process of normaliza-
tion with the Nguyn Kingdom. In April of the same year, Batavia
concluded the Quinam issue when it assigned Willem Verstegen,
the former chief factor of the Dutch factory in Japan, as the Company
representative in the negotiations with Quinam. In June, Batavia sent
a letter to the Dutch captives at Hi An, asking them to inform Cha
Nguyn of the final decision of Batavia. Simultaneously, another let-
ter was dispatched to the Quinamese mandarin via Bingam, informing
him of Batavias plan to send an ambassador to Quinam at the end
of the year. 283
The commission to Quinam was successful. Leaving Batavia in
April 1651, Verstegen arrived in Tonkin in July, where he visited Cha
Trnh Trng with a view towards enhancing the mutual relationship,
and where he inspected the Tonkin factory.284 In the summer of 1651,
Verstegen sailed for Formosa, from where he departed for Quinam in
November. Off the Quinam coast, Merchant Hendrick Baron was sent
ashore to inform the local authorities about the arrival of the Dutch
intimate phases 87
commissioner. The Dutch delegates were cordially received. When

Baron returned to the ship, ten mandarins accompanied him to inform
Verstegen that Cha Nguyn was awaiting his arrival; coastal inhab-
itants had been ordered to welcome any Dutch ship arriving in their
country warmly. After this short and pleasant prelude, Baron travelled
to the Chas palace. A few days later, Baron returned with a local
mandarin, who had been entrusted by Cha Nguyn to discuss prepa-
rations for a peace treaty with Verstegen. The preliminaries for the
treaty ran smoothly. Verstegen also returned thirty-three Quinamese
prisoners and handed the Governor-Generals presents to the Cha. On
27 November 1651, Verstegen went to the court and was entertained in
style by the Nguyn rulers. The Cha also returned the last three Dutch
prisoners, granted the Company free trade in his country, and allowed
Verstegen to seek out a plot of land on which to build a factory at
Hi An. On 8 December 1651, the ten-article treaty was completed
and signed.285 In the days thereafter, the chief of the Japanese com-
munity assisted Verstegen in buying a house at Hi An in which to
re-establish the Company factory. Having successfully concluded his
mission, Verstegen departed for Batavia. The newly-established fac-
tory was managed by the Chief Factor Hendrick Baron and several
Company servants.286
The 1651 treaty ended a decade of unremitting crisis between the
VOC and Quinam, but the pleasant interlude was short-lived. Right
after Verstegens departure, the newly revived relationship was torn
apart. Upon hearing the rumour that Verstegen had had some Tonki-
nese ambassadors on board his ship, the Cha immediately ordered
his officials to inspect the Dutch vessel. By the time the inspectors
arrived at the harbour, Verstegen had already sailed away. The Japa-
nese chief in charge of checking foreign vessels insisted that he had
inspected the ship carefully and he had found no such people. Despite
the Japanese chiefs assurance, Cha Nguyn still kept Baron and four
Dutch factors imprisoned and was even toying with the idea of execut-
ing them. It was said that the Cha changed his mind and reprieved
the Dutch prisoners only minutes before the planned execution. In
January 1652, the Dutch factors and their property were shipped to
Batavia on a Chinese junk. Cha Nguyn sent an equivocal letter to the
Governor-General, stating that, despite all the negative developments
after Verstegens departure, he still felt bound to the newly signed
treaty and hence expected Batavia to continue to send ships to trade
with his country. In Batavia, the incident was interpreted negatively:
88 chapter three
the High Government considered the Chas maltreatment of its ser-

vants a devious play to insult the Company. Pushing aside the newly
renewed relationship, Batavia again declared war on Quinam.287
Frigid relations with the Trnh, 16441647

The negotiations for a military alliance between Tonkin and the VOC
which had lasted five years (163741) ended quickly after three unsuc-
cessful allied campaigns. After the disastrous summer of 1643, the
Tonkin-VOC military alliance was automatically terminated. No fur-
ther co-operation was openly discussed although Cha Trnh kept
asking for support in the form of weapons and ammunition from the
Company. In his letter to Governor-General Van Diemen in 1643,
Cha Trnh Trng asked the High Government to provide him with
ships, weapons and, above all, 5,000 infantry men to fight on land in
the next campaign.288 The Chas extravagant demands could not be
answered in time because his letter was carried to Formosa and the
translated version did not arrive in Batavia until 1645.289 The silence
of Batavia annoyed the Cha. According to the Dutch factors in Thng
Long, perhaps to prove to the Company that Tonkin could prosecute
the war with its own means, Cha Trnh sent a large force of thirty-
one galleys, 15,000 soldiers, and a large number of elephants, horses,
and other equipment to attack Quinam in May 1644. Another army
of 30,000 soldiers under his command was held in readiness in the
capital to assist the frontier troops if needed.290
Notwithstanding its unilateral war against Quinam and the Trnh
insistence that the alliance be upheld, Batavia still decided to end the
military co-operation with Tonkin. After all the misfortunes, Bata-
via now realized that a final victory over Quinam was an illusion. It
also recognized the correctness of the predictions of Hartsinck and
Couckebacker on the nature of the alliance which Cha Trnh Trng
wanted to create with the Company. In 1643, Hartsinck insisted to the
Gentlemen XVII in Amsterdam that the Company should never trust
the Trnh promises. Therefore, it did not make any sense to ally with
Tonkin.291 The following year, Cha Trnh Trng openly stated that
the Company had played a too minor role in the military alliance and,
taken as a whole, it was rather Tonkin which had assisted the Company
during the conflict with Quinam than the other way around. When this
haughty statement reached Batavia, the High Government concluded
that the Trnh rulers had accepted the fact that the military alliance
between the Company and Tonkin had officially ended.292
intimate phases 89
The end of the intimate stage marked the commencement of a period

of a frigid relationship between the VOC and Tonkin. On his arrival in
Tonkin in December 1643, Van Brouckhorst soon sensed the distant
attitude of the local mandarins. The eunuchs of the Cha demanded
50,000 taels of silver for their master in exchange for raw silk at a
price of 15 faccaar, while the market price was currently 35 faccaar.
After numerous repudiations, Van Brouckhorst offered 12,500 taels,
giving as his excuse that the factory had been supplied with only
20,000 taels this year. The Cha accepted this small amount in the
end but warned Van Brouckhorst that the amount of 25,000 taels was
now fixed for the arrival of every ship.293 On his return to Tonkin in
December 1644, Van Brouckhorst was stopped at the estuary: the Cha
had decreed that if the Dutch were unable to advance him the fixed
amount of 25,000 taels of silver for the silk delivery, in order to avoid
unnecessary quarrels they should not enter Tonkin. Van Brouckhorst
had to acquiesce in the demand in order to secure the relationship.294
It was also agreed that from that year onwards, the annual amount
of silver the Dutch factory had to advance to Cha Trnh would be
25,000 taels. The excuse that the Company had been supplied with
only a small amount of silver from Japan would no longer be toler-
ated. Disputes over the silver advance were still not played out as the
Cha sometimes demanded extra silver in the event that more Dutch
vessels should arrive in Tonkin. Such an instance speedily presented
itself: in June 1645, the Gulden Gans was sent to Tonkin to assist
the Zwarte Beer to convey the silk cargo to Japan. Cha Trnh Trng
asked the Dutch factory for a surcharge of 12,000 taels for the arrival
of the Gulden Gans. The Dutch factors rejected the Chas demand
and explained to him that the ship had been sent to Tonkin to replace
the Zwarte Beer, which was not seaworthy enough to sail between
Tonkin and Japan. Therefore it carried neither silver nor merchan-
dise but only the Governor-Generals presents to him. The Cha later
withdrew his demand but his discontent with the Dutch factory clearly
increased.295
The cool relationship was further exacerbated by the misbehaviour
of the Company servants. In January 1645, a scuffle occurred between
two drunken Company servants and a group of local people. One fac-
tor was killed in the fight. A dozen of the Chas servants were badly
injured. The fight landed the factory in a sea of trouble. The Cha
insisted on having the second Dutch rowdy executed and fined the
Dutch factory 1,000 taels to compensate for the loss of his servants.
90 chapter three
The Dutch factory delayed handing the second Dutch rabble-rouser

over to the court and liberally bribed the chief mandarins in charge of
investigating the scuffle. During the New Year festival, Van Brouck-
horst also offered the courtiers lavish presents. The trouble was finally
resolved by conciliatory Dutch actions. The bribes, however, cost the
factory an excessive amount of money.296 In January 1646, this kind
of trouble erupted again. The Junior Merchants Heycoop and Harten
were seriously assaulted by some Chinese belonging to the merchant
fleet of the Chinese mandarin Iquan (Zheng Zhilong). Merchant Jan
van Riebeeck appealed to the court, demanding the Chinese villains be
punished and compensation for the Dutch factors. The Dutch petitions
were entirely ignored. It was said that the Trnh rulers did not dare to
deal with Chinese merchants trading under the auspice of Iquan.297
After the quarrels had been settled, the instability of the local poli-
tics threatened the safety of the Dutch factory and greatly hindered
its trade. In April 1645, Trnh Tc was raised to the status of Crown
Prince and Cha Trnh Trng offered him the absolute control over
the state army. When the Cha fell gravely ill in May, other princes
rebelled to overthrow the Crown Prince.298 The struggle quickly turned
the capital Thng Long into a bloody battlefield where, according to
some sources, around 4,000 people were killed. During the insurrec-
tion, the Dutch Company servants hid themselves fearfully inside the
factory. Although the rebellion was eventually extinguished, the local
trade was badly affected. Trade in the capital had completely stagnated
and its resumption took months to revive.299
Observing the Chas discontent with the Company, local manda-
rins, especially the capados (eunuchs) openly obstructed the Dutch
factory trade. They tried in whatever way they could contrive to
squeeze silver out of the factory by delivering low quality silk at high
prices. In 1650, for instance, besides the 25,000 taels advanced to the
Cha and the 10,000 to the Crown Prince, the Dutch factory had to
provide 10,000 taels more for five chief capados: 7,000 to Ongiatule;
1,000 to Ongiavun; 1,000 to Ongsjadert; and 1,000 each to Ontjen-
udgween and Tun.300 The delivery price of silk varied from person to
person according to their position at court and their relationship with
the Company. It is certain that payment received from the capados
was often more liberal than that from the royal family but still much
worse than that which the free merchants were offering. Despite the
concessions the factory made on the silver advance, the relationship
intimate phases 91
of the factory with the capados was not always peaceful. In 1647, for
instance, dissatisfied with the Dutch factory, some capados spread
the rumour that the court had forbidden the local people to trade with
the Dutch factors. The factory trade consequently stagnated as local
sellers, fearful of trouble, stopped dealing with the Dutch. The Dutch
factors appealed to the court and won: the Cha approved the free
trade of the factory.301 In the same year the capados presented Cha
Trnh with a plan to monopolize the silk supply to the Dutch factory.
According to their proposal, the Dutch procurement of silk and other
sorts of local products should be confined to some specially appointed
merchants at fixed prices. The factory lodged a strong protest about
this plan and put a serious complaint to the High Government in Bata-
via saying that the capados had obviously learnt about the Japanese
itowappu system and now wanted to apply it in their own country.302
Had the Cha approved this proposal, the Companys Tonkin trade
would no longer have been feasible. Determined to prevent the Cha
from approving the capados plan, Van Brouckhorst went to the court
to offer the Cha 5,000 taels and requested that the Dutch free trade be
renewed. His petition was granted. The capados refused to relinquish
their idea to persuade the Cha to approve their monopoly plan in the
following years.303
While all this manoeuvring was going on, the Chinese competition
in purchasing local silk had become more heated from the mid-1640s.
Besides the great quantity of Chinese silk exported to Japan directly
from mainland China, Chinese merchants now also increased their
export volume of Tonkinese silk to the Japanese market. Some Japa-
nese officials in Nagasaki also had shares in Chinese junks sailing
between Tonkin and Nagasaki and they offered Chinese merchants
large capitals to run the Tonkin-Japan silk trade. In 1646 and 1647, the
Chinese arrived in Tonkin with 80,000 and 120,000 taels respectively.
By offering local sellers twenty taels more per picul of raw silk, the
Chinese quickly procured large cargoes and left for Japan.304
The relationship deteriorated, 16471651

Carel Hartsinck (163741) and Antonio van Brouckhorst (16417)
were both capable and experienced directors. During their terms of
office, the factory established and maintained a good relationship with
the court despite the Chas displeasure with the Company after the
termination of the military alliance in 1643. After the retirement of
92 chapter three
Van Brouckhorst in 1647, however, the relations of the factory with

the court deteriorated.
Perceiving the importance of the personality of the director in man-
aging the Tonkin trade, in the mid-1640s, Van Brouckhorst began to
train Jan van Riebeeck to be his successor. The chief was convinced
that Van Riebeeck was ideally suited to the position on account of his
knowledge of the local language and his civil behaviour towards the
local people. When Van Brouckhorst sailed to Japan in the autumn
and winter of 1646, Van Riebeeck managed the factory skilfully in
his absence. In order to circumvent the capados hindrance in buy-
ing silk, Van Riebeeck went to silk-producers in the evening when
his presence would not be greatly remarked upon, to advance money
and buy silk.305 Instead of applauding his initiative, the High Govern-
ment was irritated by his private trade. In the summer of 1647, Van
Riebeeck was summoned to Batavia to justify his private undertaking.
Philip Schillemans became the third director of the Dutch factory in
Tonkin (1647-50).306
The new director proved incapable of managing the trade of the fac-
tory. During his term, the Dutch political and commercial position in
Tonkin markedly deteriorated. The Cha and the Crown Prince refused
to pay the full sum which often occasioned the factory grievous losses.
The size of the annual cargoes of silk which the Tonkin factory sent
to Japan shrank and was less stable. In the spring of 1649, the factory
was demolished and moved to another site because the Prince wanted
the ground on which it stood to build a shooting range. This removal
cost the factory an excessive amount of money.307
As the Cha grew more hostile towards the Company, local manda-
rins imposed draconian measures on the Dutch factors. Having failed
to monopolize the silk supply to the Dutch factory, some capados tried
to hinder the Dutch free trade. They sent servants to prowl around the
Dutch residence and thrashed local people coming to trade with the
Dutch factory. When the Dutch complained about the damages they
had suffered, the Cha gave a cool reply: Ick en heb uw niet in mijn
landt geroepen.308
In 1650, the factory again suffered a series of losses and setbacks.
On Whit-Monday, the crews of the Maasland and the Beer went ashore
to enjoy the festivities. Upon return, they were assaulted by Chinese
merchants sailing upstream. Both sides were embroiled in a noisy
scuffle in which a boatswain of the Company was killed and four
more sailors were badly injured. The Cha strongly condemned the
intimate phases 93
misbehaviour of the Dutch in his country and fined the factory 50 rials
for its rowdiness. The Dutch lodged a protest against the unreasonable
fine, but to no avail.309
During this conflict, another problem arose as a result of a false
accusation made by the great eunuch Ongiatule.310 This capado had
a large share in a junk owned by the Japanese free merchant Resi-
mon. Because of the late arrival of the junk, he accused the Dutch
Company of having attacked and destroyed the vessel at sea. Upon
hearing this accusation, the Cha threatened to behead all the Dutch
factors if the allegation was proved true. Although it soon transpired
that the claim was false, the factory business transactions ground to a
complete standstill because the local people, sensing the tension, dared
not trade with the Dutch factors. Caught in a cleft stick, the factory
had to advance most of its silver to the court to be exchanged for the
delivery of 355 piculs of raw silk.311 Worse still, the Japan-bound ship
ran into a heavy storm at sea which soaked most of the merchandise
on board. Consequently, the profit margins of the cargo for this year
varied between only 35 and 40 per cent.312
Discouraged by all troubles the factory had encountered during
the past few years, beginning in 1649, Philip Schillemans frequently
requested the High Government to be allowed to resign. To justify his
resignation, the chief asserted the Tonkin factory was currently facing
three major difficulties: i) the confrontations with local rulers, espe-
cially with the Trnh court, ii) the limitation on buying capacity which
meant that part of the investment capital was unspent, and iii) the
large-scale private trade arranged by factors of the Northern Quarter.
Besides his request to resign, Schillemans also recommended Merchant
Willem Bijlvelt to succeed him in his post. The chief complimented
Bijlvelt on his intelligence and dexterity in handling affairs.313 In Bata-
via, the High Government was greatly displeased with Schillemans
reports and severely reprimanded him for his lacklustre management.
Junior Merchant Jan de Groot was appointed the fourth director of
the Tonkin factory. In order improve the management there, Batavia
decided to send De Groot first to Japan, where Van Brouckhorst, the
former director of the Tonkin factory, could advise him how to man-
age the Tonkin trade. Afterwards, De Groot would sail to Tonkin to
succeed Schillemans.314
While the accumulated difficulties of the factory were as yet not
solved, Schillemans died in June 1650. Jacob Keijser succeeded him
and managed the business smoothly in this interim period, despite stiff
94 chapter three
competition from foreign merchants. That year three junks from Japan
and another three from Batavia brought a large amount of capital to
Tonkin which was exchanged for 820 piculs of raw silk and a consid-
erable quantity of silk piece-goods.315
In the summer, the court issued a placard proclaiming that, within a
short time, all foreigners would be moved to a new place outside the
capital. Under the courts new arrangement, the Dutch factory would
be removed to the area governed by the eunuch Ongiatule. The Dutch
factors were anxious because the move would undoubtedly cast upon
the Company an unbearable expense because of having to rebuild
residences and storehouses. An even worse prospect was that should
the factory be moved to the area governed by Ongiatule, its import and
export trade would sooner or later be manipulated by this powerful
capado. Before his departure to Japan, Keijser petitioned the Cha to
allow the factory to remain in Thng Long in order to avoid incur-
ring excessive building costs. After his petition had been rejected, the
Dutch chief appealed to the Cha, asking him to delay the move until
he had returned to Tonkin from Japan. Cha Trnh Trng and Crown
Prince Trnh Tc encouraged the chief to leave and not to worry
about the factory. The Cha ordered Keijser to buy ten cannon for
him and two more iron pieces for the Crown Prince. In July, Keijser
departed for Japan. The management of the factory was entrusted to
Hendrick Baron assisted by eight assistants and gunners.316
Understanding the importance of satisfying the Cha and the Crown
Prince in their demand for goods, the Tonkin factors urged the High
Government to do its utmost to provide the goods ordered by the Trnh
rulers. Zeelandia Castle was entrusted with arranging such commodi-
ties for ships leaving for Tonkin. In March 1651, the new director, Jan
de Groot, arrived in the capital Thng Long. His reception was not
very cordial as the Cha was disappointed with the objects which the
Company offered him and complained that the Dutch had been bring-
ing less merchandise and fewer rarities to his country. As the Cha
showed even less good will towards them, the Dutch factors suffered
more difficulties in their efforts to buy and sell goods. In 1651, despite
their constant petitions, the Dutch were still not allowed to maintain
their factory inside the capital. Observing the Chas hesitation, the
capado Ongiatule, assisted by the Japanese merchant Resimon and
supported by the Crown Prince, continued to importune the Trnh ruler
to move the Dutch factory to an area under his authority.317
Reporting to Batavia in 1651, Chief De Groot explained that unless
intimate phases 95
the factory remained in the capital, the Tonkin trade would no longer
be profitable for the Company. Excessive expenses would be incurred
for building a new factory. This would be compounded by the handi-
cap that the appointed area was quite far from the centre of the capital
so that there would be fewer merchants coming to trade with the fac-
tory, especially during the rainy season. Worst of all, once the factory
was under Mandarin Ongiatules authority, the Company would have
to sell foreign merchandise to and buy local goods from him. At long
last, his persistent attempts to monopolize the Company trade would
be crowned with success.
Another concern to which De Groot referred in his report was the
political instability in Tonkin. Cha Trnh Trng was now seventy-four
years old and physically enfeebled. It was widely rumoured that, upon
the Chas death, the capital would likely be embroiled in a fierce
rebellion. The Dutch factors worried that in any such insurrection the
factory would be looted. Even if the factory were to survive such a
pillaging, the risk of losing the advance money which the factors had
already handed over for the silk delivery was still high. Not a single
penny from the annual advance of around 60,000 taels of silver could
be guaranteed to be received back, even after peace would have been
restored. Taking these risks into consideration, De Groot suggested that
the Company should suspend its Tonkin trade for a few years.318
Despite the chiefs cautions, the High Government resolved to main-
tain its Tonkin trade. Batavia expected that although the Cha was
elderly, he would still live for many years to come. Upon his death,
the Crown Prince would succeed to the throne peacefully because the
Chas brother, the most dangerous threat to the succession of the
Crown Prince, had been poisoned the year before.319 The High Gov-
ernment therefore urged its factors to improve the relationship with
the Trnh rulers in order to facilitate the Company trade. To assist its
servants to overcome all present difficulties, especially to maintain
the factory in the capital and to shore up the eroding relationship with
the Trnh court, in the summer of 1651, Batavia decided to send an
ambassador to Tonkin.320
96 chapter four
CHAPTER FOUR
VICISSITUDES, DECLINE AND THE FINAL END
1. Revival of the relationship, 16511660
Verstegens commission to Tonkin, 1651

As mentioned in Chapter Three, by the early 1650s, constrained by
the Gentlemen XVIIs insistence on ending the harmful conflict with
Quinam, the High Government in Batavia decided to sign a peace
treaty with the Nguyn rulers. Batavia assigned Willem Verstegen,
the former chief factor of the Nagasaki factory, the Company repre-
sentative to negotiate with the Nguyn Government. Before visiting
Quinam during the winter, Verstegen would sail first to Tonkin as
the Companys ambassador with a fourfold mission: to assist the fac-
tors to obtain permission from the Cha to retain the factory in the
capital; to negotiate with the Cha to obtain more trading privileges
for the Company so that the factors would be able to commence their
transactions straight after the Company ships had arrived and dispatch
their ships as soon as they had finished business; to sign a contract
with the Crown Prince to buy all the raw silk and silk piece-goods
should the Trnh ruler repudiate the previous points; and to inspect
the factory, because the Gentlemen XVII had been complaining about
the rumour then widely circulating that private trade in the Northern
Quarters (Tonkin, Japan, and Formosa) had been flourishing on a
very large scale.321
Leaving Batavia in April, Verstegen arrived in Tonkin in July 1651.
His sudden visit helped him to discover an extensive private trade
rampant among most of the Tonkin factors. On board the Kampen
and the Witte Valk anchored at Doma, the inspector found and con-
fiscated large amounts of private goods loaded for Japan. Inside the
factory, factors audaciously stored their private goods alongside the
Companys commodities. The bookkeeping at the factory was neither
accurate nor updated; some entries of De Groots private goods were
even mistakenly entered in the Company records. Taking good note of
De Groots deplorable mismanagement, Verstegen dismissed him and
sent him to Formosa to be prosecuted by the legal branch there. Jacob
vicissitudes, decline and the nal end 97
Keijser, who was also accused of indulging in private trade but on a

minor scale, was appointed interim director of the factory.322
The Dutch Ambassador and entourage were royally entertained at
court. The Cha delightedly accepted the Governor-Generals letter
and presents to him, as did the Crown Prince and the highly influential
mandarin Ongiatule. Pleased with the appearance of the Dutch Ambas-
sador as well as the Governor-Generals apparent partiality towards his
country, Cha Trnh Trng acquiesced in most of Batavias requests.
He allowed the Dutch to retain their factory in the capital itself and
promised to facilitate their transactions. He also bestowed a high-rank-
ing mandarin title on Verstegen which was engraved on a gold plate.
Both the Cha and the Crown Prince made plans to send their ambas-
sadors to Batavia in the winter to congratulate Governor-General Carel
Reniers on his taking office and to consolidate the mutual relationship
with the Company.323
Upon his return, Verstegen wrote a long, detailed report on his
inspection of the Tonkin factory. The commissioner assessed that pros-
pects for the Tonkin trade were more optimistic and promising than
had been reported by the factors and the trade itself was still profitable,
despite the hindrances and obstructions it had to suffer. He therefore
disagreed with De Groots earlier suggestion to suspend the Tonkin
trade. The report was also highly critical of De Groots management.
His own observation had shown him that De Groot, just as his pre-
decessor Schillemans, was not respected by the local people. At the
meeting with the Cha, a mandarin had even severely castigated De
Groot for his insolence and accused the chief of selling the Governor-
Generals presents to the Cha to local people. Verstegen therefore
advised the High Government to send only skilfully diplomatic and
highly responsible chiefs to Tonkin. In order to curb the private trade
between Tonkin and Japan, Verstegen suggested that from then on the
chief should no longer travel to Japan but remain in Thng Long to
direct the factory trade during the off season.324
The relationship between the factory and the court was remarkably
improved after Verstegens visit. The chief was often invited to the
royal festivities and to attend audiences, while the factors had more
liberty to trade. When the Delfhaven departed for Batavia in November
1651, the Cha sent his ambassador and fifteen mandarins, and the
Crown Prince sent his own ambassador and another ten officials to
revitalize the relationship with Batavia and to congratulate Governor-
General Carel Reniers (16503) on his appointment to office. Cha
98 chapter four
Trnh Trng informed the High Government that he had adopted the
Governor-General as his son and granted him the title Theuuw Baeuw
Quun Congh (Thiu Bo Qun Cng: ) being, in the Chas
words, the highest rank in the mandarin system of Tonkin.325 The
title was engraved upon a gold plate weighing 20 taels. The Crown
Prince also presented the Governor-General, now his brother, a man-
darins cap and three princely parasols as a proof of his eternal love.
The Tonkinese delegates were entertained cordially. In June 1652, they
returned home on board a Company ship leaving for Tonkin.326
A short-lived permanent factory, 1651

Shortly after Verstegens visit, Batavia promoted the Tonkin factory
to a permanent rank in order to enable its factors to reside there with
a substantial capital with which to trade during the off season. It is
possible this decision was taken on the basis of at least two delibera-
tions. First, the improvement in the relationship between the High
Government and the L/Trnh court after Verstegens mission meant
that the factory would enjoy a favourable position in the years to come.
Second, the annual cargoes of Tonkinese silk exported to Japan had
yielded high profits in the past few years. By leaving more factors
residing in Thng Long, Batavia hoped to increase the purchasing
capacity of the factory and maximize the profit in the Companys
Tonkinese silk trade. Indeed, in the mid-1640s, Antonio van Brouck-
horst had already urged Batavia to assign at least one or two junior
merchants and several gunners to take charge of the factory after the
Company ships had departed for Japan.327 The rub was that it seemed
that most of the Company servants wanted to sail to Japan rather than
remain in Thng Long. Such a decision was reinforced by the fact
that Cha Trnh had sometimes ordered the chief not to leave many
factors behind after the Company ships had sailed away.328
After such high expectations, the life-span of the Tonkin factory
was ephemeral. In the spring of 1652, the High Government decided
to withdraw the project. This abrupt annulment was made after due
consideration was given to the risk of leaving a large amount of capital
in Thng Long in the hands of a few servants. It was buttressed by the
fact it was reported by the Deshima factory that profits on Tonkinese
silk had begun to decline in Japan, overtaken by the strong competition
of the Chinese, who also actively participated on the Tonkin-Japan
shipping route. It was therefore impractical to maintain a permanent

factory in Tonkin at this time.329
The abolition proved to be the right decision. In these years, the
Chinese competition was so fierce the Dutch factors could only com-
mence their transactions after the Chinese had spent their capital on
local products and left for Japan. Sadly, the improvement in the mutual
relationship with the Trnh rulers was also transient. A few months
after Verstegens visit, the Crown Prince and his mandarins again
squeezed the factory to pay excessive amounts of silver for silk at
high prices. If their demand was not met, they would find some way
or other to obstruct the factory trade. In 1653, the factory suffered a
serious loss after the execution of the chief capado Ongiatule. This
eunuch still owed the factory 14,499 guilders and the Cha, who had
confiscated his fortune, declined to pay the debt.330 Matters deterio-
rated when, after succeeding to the throne, Crown Prince Trnh Tc
informed the factory that from now on he would continue to enjoy
25,000 taels of silver every year as his predecessors had done. He
also demanded another 7,000 taels, the amount that the factory had
often offered to Ongiatule. Over and above this, the Company had to
provide him with four long iron cannon at the cost of 14,000 taels.
These would be paid for in silk. The Dutch factors complained that the
erstwhile Crown Prince was obviously imitating the Japanese Shogun
in dealing with foreign merchants.331 Although the amount was later
reduced to 22,000 taels, the High Government was still disgusted with
his demand because, as well as 25,000 taels the factory had to offer
Cha Trnh Trng, almost half of its annual capital went to the Trnh
rulers, who invariably delivered bad quality silk at excessively high
prices. Batavia hoped that Cha Trnh Trng would soon stop dealing
with the factory so that the factors could reduce the amount of silver
advanced to local rulers in order to reserve more capital for buying
silk on the local market.332
The first phase of decline, the 1650s

Despite the competent management of the interim director Jacob Keij-
ser (16513), the Tonkin trade of the Company began to show a
decline in these years. In Japan, the profit margin on Tonkinese silk
gradually fell, as it failed to match the marketability and profitability
of Bengali silk.333 There was no let-up in the private trade of the Dutch
merchants and Keijser too was accused of conducting illegal trade as
100 chapter four
well as mismanagement. He also made the mistake of promising the

Trnh rulers to declare in detail all commodities and capital shipped to
Tonkin, not a very smart move by a merchant who wanted to negotiate.
As well as this concession, the factory would present them with very
valuable goods. The High Government heavily reprimanded Keijser
for making this agreement, saying that this would be too costly for
the Company and troublesome for his successors. In April 1653, the
Governor-General dismissed Keijser and recalled him to Batavia to
account for his private trade and alleged wrongdoings. Louis Isaacszn
Baffart was appointed chief of the Tonkin factory (16536).334
Baffart succeeded in improving personal relations with some capa-
dos, thereby facilitating the procurement of local goods for the factory.
The capado Ongiadee helped Baffart negotiate with the Trnh rulers to
reduce the amount of silver advanced to them for silk. He also agreed
to sell all the Laotian musk he could procure in the area he gov-
erned to the factory.335 Despite these achievements, the Dutch Tonkin
trade was facing a long-term decline. From the mid-1650s, Tonkinese
silk became less profitable and marketable on the Japanese market.
This co-incided with the deterioration of the local trading situation in
Tonkin. A series of natural disasters ravaged the annual production of
Tonkinese silk. The 1654 flood ruined most of the mulberry groves,
causing a severe shortage of silk on the local market. Worse still, the
shortage of copper coins led to a severe loss in purchasing power of
silver, the main form of investment capital the Company had set aside
for its Tonkin trade. Reporting to Batavia on the loss on the silver/
cash exchange in April 1654, the Tonkin factory lamented that the
exchange rate per tael of silver had slumped from 1,6001,700 cash
during the last three months to only 800 cash. There was a gloomy
prediction that within a short time one tael of silver would likely drop
to 700 to 600 to 500 cash only.336 Because of the silk shortage and the
devaluation of silver, the purchase price soared. In 1653, the Dutch
factors were already aware that the purchase price of Tonkinese silk
had increased by 20 per cent on average. Consequently, out of the
cargo worth 300,000 guilders the Tonkin factory dispatched to Japan
in 1653, silk occupied only roughly 55 per cent of the total. In 1654,
the Tonkin cargo to Japan was valued at 174,531 guilders only; the
unspent capital had to be shipped to Formosa. Considering the mea-
gre profit margin which Tonkinese silk yielded in Nagasaki this year,
Baffart suggested to the Governor-General that the High Government
should suspend the Tonkin factory for a while.337 Batavia disapproved
of this suggestion. Instead, it reduced the investment capital destined

for the Tonkin trade in 1655 and ordered the factors to buy no Tonki-
nese yarn for the Japan market. Therefore, only 25,773 guilders were
sent to Thng Long to buy silk piece-goods for the Netherlands.338
Mindful of the irregular silk production in Tonkin in recent years,
in an attempt to lessen the dependence on the procurement of silk for
Japan, Batavia decided to import Tonkinese and Bengali silkworms
to produce silk in Batavia. In 1653, the High Government ordered
the Tonkin factory to transport local silkworms to Batavia. The first
shipment was pretty much of a disaster because most of the silkworms
died during the long voyage to Batavia. Those which survived as well
as the samples of Tonkinese mulberry flourished in Batavia. The High
Government hoped that abundant mulberry groves would produce opu-
lent silk crops.339 In 1654, Batavia again sent a demand for Tonkinese
silkworms. This time the factory failed to fulfil this order because the
superstitious Vietnamese farmers, fearing that their silkworms would
die should the strangers watch them, wanted neither to show nor sell
their silkworms to the Dutch.340
The High Government not only attempted to solve the shortage in
the silk supply, but it tried at the same time to reduce the losses of
the Tonkin factory on the silver/cash exchange as well. It is important
to point out here that although the Vietnamese had been using copper
cash for centuries, as a rule Vietnamese dynasties could not mint suf-
ficient coins to meet the demand of the local market. They therefore
had to rely partly on the copper coins minted in China. Because of the
current political and economic chaos in mainland China, the regular
supply of Chinese coins to northern Vietnam had virtually drawn to a
standstill, causing a serious shortage of copper coins. The situation was
the same in the southern Kingdom of Quinam.341 In order to cut their
losses on the silver import and reduce their dependence upon these
coins, the Portuguese had been importing copper coins minted by Chi-
nese in Macao into Tonkin.342 In 1654, Batavia made its first attempt
towards solving the copper cash shortage in Tonkin when it had coins
minted locally in order to send them to northern Vietnam. It was a
good try but the experiment failed because the Trnh rulers devalued
these coins.343 The shortage of copper coins in Tonkin went on until
the following decade. In the early 1660s, however, the Company suc-
cessfully dealt with the copper cash equation when it began to import
Japanese zeni (copper cash) into Tonkin in great quantities.344
Despite all the exertions of the High Government, the VOCs Tonkin
102 chapter four
trade continued to lose ground in the latter half of the 1650s. After a
temporary suspension, the Company once again exported Tonkinese
silk to Japan in 1656, but the profit margins were so slender that the
Company again cancelled the importation of Tonkinese silk to Japan
between 1658 and 1660.345 The capital which Batavia destined for its
Tonkin trade was consequently reduced.
There were internal causes as well. The unstable political situa-
tion in Tonkin also contributed to the decline in the factory trade.
In 1655, the other princes prepared an insurrection to supplant the
Crown Prince. The rebels threatened to burn down the capital. Had
the Cha failed to defuse the insurrection at the very last moment, the
city would have been subjected to bloodshed. A great number of the
inhabitants of the capital fled to the countryside for fear of a bloody
massacre. The panic-stricken Dutch and other foreigners remained in
the capital. Although the rebellion was eventually prevented, it took
months to restore the commercial rhythm of the city.
Right after this political turmoil, the Tonkinese armies marched
south to attack Quinam. The fifth Tonkinese military campaign against
Quinam dragged on for almost six years (165560), being the longest
and most costly campaign during the half century of war between
the two kingdoms. This time, the Nguyn armies not only stood their
ground and successfully defended their fortresses but also overran
some parts of the Trnhs southern province of Ngh An and occupied
this until 1660. Attacks and counter-attacks happened every year dur-
ing the period 165560, causing heavy losses on both sides. At the
end of 1660, the southern armies were forced to withdraw behind the
former border, the Gianh River. The Trnh troops overran the frontline
but were unable to achieve a decisive victory and conquer the whole
southern kingdom.346 In 1661, the Trnh armies again attacked Qui-
nam but gained no result.347 The economy of Tonkin was seriously
devastated during this protracted campaign harassed by subsequent
natural disasters and the voracious demand for soldiers, which led to
a shortage of labour. In 1660, the Dutch factors estimated that around
one-fifth of the population of Tonkin was forcibly conscripted. Most
of them reportedly became impoverished after returning home from
the battlefield.348
Trying to come to terms with these military problems prompted the
Trnh rulers to consolidate their relationship with Batavia in order to
secure a supply of weapons and ammunition. As reflected in the VOC
records, from 1655, the Trnh rulers regularly sent letters to Gover-
nor-General Joan Maetsuyker demanding military equipment. When

armament was urgently needed, the Trnh rulers even confiscated can-
non from the Company ships anchored at Doma. To prepare for the
1656 attack, Cha Trnh Tc asked for the nine cannon on board the
Cabo de Jacques when this ship arrived and went on to confiscate
seven more pieces when she left Tonkin.349 Despite such importunity,
the High Government would not and could not fully satisfy the Trnh
demands. Most certainly, Batavia did not want to change its non-
aligned attitude towards the Trnh-Nguyn wars and, undeniably, it
was itself burdened by its military involvement throughout Asia. In
Europe, the Dutch were still at war with the English. Just at this junc-
ture, the Dutch Twelve-Year Truce with the Portuguese was drawing
to a close. After a period of relative quiet, an offensive episode in Asia
erupted with the commencement of the term of office of Governor-
General Joan Maetsuyker (165368).350 In the Indonesian Archipelago,
the hostile relationship with various sultans remained unmitigated.
In Indo-China, the war with Cambodia had not ended, and a new
confrontation with the Nguyn broke out again shortly after the 1651
Peace Treaty. Elsewhere in parts of South Asia, such as Ceylon and
India, the Companys military attempts to supplant the Portuguese
went temporarily into abeyance, but a prosecution was to take place
once the truce ended.351
2. Attempts to expand the Tonkin trade, 16601670
In fine, it is pity so many conveniences and opportunities to make the

kingdom rich and its trade flourishing should be neglected; for if we
consider how this kingdom borders on two of the richest provinces in
China, it will appear that, with finall difficulty, most commodities of that
vast Empire might be drawn hither ; nay, would they permit strangers
the freedom of this inland trade, it would be vastly advantageous to the
kingdom; but the Chova [Cha] has, and will probably in all times
to come, impede this important affair.
In the early 1660s, political and military tensions challenged Tonkin

on both sides. Even as its fifth campaign against Quinam could make
no break-through on the southern frontier, Tonkin was increasingly
being challenged by the Manchu armies on the northern frontier with
China. After gradually beating back the restored Ming forces, the
Qing armies approached the China-Tonkin border and demanded the
104 chapter four
L/Trnh Government send tribute to Peking.353 Being exceedingly

preoccupied with the conflict with Quinam, Tonkin could not dispatch
its first tribute to Peking until 1663.354 Consequently, the Manchu
soldiers attacked Vietnamese merchants trading to southern China and
hindered the Chinese in exporting such merchandise as Chinese gold
and musk to Tonkin. Bowing to this escalating tension, the Tonkin-
China border trade stagnated, which greatly impeded the import and
export trade of the Dutch factory. Calamity followed calamity and the
Company lost Formosa to the Zheng family in 1662. All these nega-
tive developments forced the VOC to readjust its strategy towards the
Tonkin trade in the first half of the 1660s.
The decline in the Tonkin-China border trade and the loss of

Formosa
In the mid-1640s, China became embroiled in a dynastic war between
the newly established Qing and the waning Ming, which lasted until
the early 1660s. Since the Ming-Qing conflict was largely fought out
in the southern provinces of China, it exerted an enormous impact
on the politics and economy of Tonkin. At Cao Bng, the Mc clan
sought the spiritual protection of the Ming Dynasty in their efforts
to continue their rivalry with the L/Trnh in Thng Long. The Ming
intervention was the deciding factor which prevented the L/Trnh
rulers from toppling their Mc rivals until the late 1670s.355
The long-lasting conflict in southern China also affected the com-
merce of Tonkin, and as stated, the border trade between the two
countries was the chief victim. Despite the Trnhs restriction on the
border crossing, both Vietnamese and Chinese merchants still could
exchange their commodities on a quite large scale. For the most part
the goods exported to China from Tonkin included South-East Asian
spices and European textiles which were imported into Tonkin by
the Dutch, Chinese and other foreign merchants. In return, Chinese
gold and musk were among the miscellaneous goods which merchants
brought to northern Vietnam. From the late 1650s, the Chinese gold
exported to Tonkin became one of the most important products on
which the VOC set its sights for the Coromandel trade. The reason was
that Chinese gold had become scarce in Formosa reflecting the eco-
nomic stagnation of the China-Formosa trade. The High Government
therefore ordered the Tonkin factory to purchase as much Chinese
gold as possible for the Coast factories. Chinese musk was bought
for the Netherlands.356
Before long, these two items grew scarce in Tonkin as the border
trade declined. In 1655, the Tonkin factory reported to Batavia that,
although the civil war in China had not caused a complete stagnation in
the exportation of Chinese goods over the China-Tonkin border, it had
reduced the flow of Chinese gold to northern Vietnam to a remarkable
extent.357 The annual volume of the border trade had fallen steadily
by the early 1660s. In 1661, Peking reminded the L/Trnh court that
should the latter fail to send tribute to Peking within a short time, the
border would be violated.358 Because Thng Long did not dispatch a
tribute to Peking in 1662, Chinese soldiers attacked the Vietnamese
merchants travelling to the border to buy Chinese gold and musk, con-
fiscating all their capital and commodities.359 These merchants were
later released and ordered to return to Thng Long to inform the L/
Trnh court that tension on the border would not be resolved until their
tribute had arrived at Peking. Consequently, the Tonkin-China border
trade was temporarily interrupted. The Tonkin factory therefore failed
to procure the much wanted Chinese gold and musk.360
While the stagnation in the Tonkin-China border trade had not yet
improved, the Far Eastern trading network of the VOC was severely
affected by the loss of Formosa to the Zheng family in 1662. Indeed,
the Dutch Formosa trade had already been in a decline from the mid-
1640s because of the fall in the annual export volume of Chinese
goods to the island.361 In 1656, in an attempt to control the export of
Chinese goods and to monopolize the lucrative trade between China
and Japan, Zheng Chenggong (alias Coxinga), alleging that the Dutch
had molested his junks in the South-East Asian waters, imposed an
economic embargo on Dutch Formosa, driving the Companys For-
mosa trade into a complete standstill. In early 1660 there were rumours
that the Zheng armies would invade the island sometime in April of the
same year. After gathering enough evidence to convince themselves of
this eventuality, Governor Fredrik Coyett and the Council of Formosa
prepared for an invasion and requested assistance from Batavia. The
Governor-General and the Council of the Indies reacted quickly and in
late July a fleet of twelve ships arrived in Formosa from Batavia. As
the months passed without any invasion from the mainland, the com-
mander and most of the experienced officers in the fleet left Formosa
for Batavia in two of the ships despite the vigorous protests of Coyett
and the Formosa Council; the rest remained on the island. At the end
of April 1661, the Zheng troops invaded the island. After resisting for
106 chapter four
nine months, the Dutch surrendered. The loss of Formosa was a severe
blow to the Companys East Asian trading network.362
The VOCs Tinnam strategy, 16611664

In its efforts to recover from the heavy loss of Formosa to Zheng
Chenggong in 1662, the VOC formed a naval alliance with the newly
established Qing Dynasty, principally to take revenge on the Zheng
clan, but also to obtain trading privileges from the Chinese Court to
compensate for the loss of Formosa. Despite sporadic joint naval oper-
ations in the years 16624, which effectively reduced Zheng power
in Amoy and Quemoy, the final goal of conquering Formosa did not
materialize owing to Pekings hesitation. The trading privileges which
the Chinese granted the Company in the early years of the mutual
relationship were consequently revoked.363
Another way of gaining a niche in the China trade was to attempt
to penetrate China from Tonkin. The Company records reveal that
besides using the diplomatic channel to Peking, Batavia also instructed
its Tonkin factors to cruise along the coastline to explore the seaport
system of north-east Tonkin, near the Chinese border, and to look for
possibilities to establish a permanent factory there for direct trade with
the Chinese. In April 1661, Batavia sent the Meliskerken to Tonkin,
where she was ordered to obtain a licence from the Trnh rulers to
explore the area called Tinnam in the present north-eastern province
of Qung Ninh.
What was the major aim of this exploration? The answer is directly
related to the Companys demand for Chinese gold and musk. Prior
to the 1650s, Zeelandia Castle had regularly been sending Chinese
gold, as well as silver imported from Japan, to Coromandel.364 The
annual volume of this precious metal supplied by Zeelandia Castle
fell sharply from the mid-1650s owing to the competition from the
Zheng, especially after the latter decreed a complete embargo on the
Formosa trade in 1656. With the loss of Formosa in 1662, the Com-
panys shortage of gold became even more exigent. Batavia therefore
turned its attention to the Tonkin factory, urging the Dutch factors in
Thng Long to import Chinese gold for Coromandel, where the latest
profit was reportedly 25 per cent.365
As vividly reflected in the records of the Tonkin factory, from
the beginning of the Company trade with Tonkin gold had been pur-
chased there sporadically mainly to be re-exported to India. The major
part of the gold the Dutch factors procured in Tonkin was, however,
not locally produced, although Tonkin had several gold-mines in the

north-western region.366 Besides these, Tonkin also mined gold in the
present-day northern province of Thi Nguyn, and copper and silver
in modern Tuyn Quang, Thi Nguyn, Hng Ho, and Lng Sn.
The annual output of these metals, particularly gold, was far from
substantial, however.367 Most of the gold available in northern Viet-
nam, besides a small part which came from the western kingdom of
Laos, originated from the southern Chinese provinces of Yunnan and
Guizhou.368 This Chinese gold and also the much sought-after musk
were transported mainly by Chinese and Vietnamese merchants. As
for the gold price, in 1661 it was recorded by the Tonkin factors that
the purchase price of the best gold in Gingminfoe, the chief city of
Yunnan, reached a maximum of 90 taels, resulting in a profitable
gold/silver ratio of 1:9. The Vietnamese merchants who often traded to
China also affirmed that the gold price in Tonkin was generally lower
than that in Guangzhou.369 The High Government therefore wanted
to establish a second factory in Tonkin, near the border with China
precisely to procure Chinese gold for the Coromandel Coast and, in
the long run, to obtain a direct access to mainland China. This was
something that the Company had set its sights on ever since its first
arrival in Asia.
It was, however, neither safe nor easy to make such exploratory
voyages in the northern part of the Gulf of Tonkin in the early 1660s.
This area had a reputation of being a dangerous place for trading ves-
sels, made unsafe by the daring raids of the pirate Thun. Because of
political chaos in southern China, what were known as Chinese long-
hair pirates gathered around the north-eastern Tonkin-China border to
raid trading vessels sailing between Tonkin and such southern Chinese
ports as Macao and Guangzhou. In July 1660, the Prince of Tonkin
commanded a large fleet of some seventy well-armed ships to attack
the Thun gang. Although a large number of his men were captured,
Thun himself managed to escape.370 The region was therefore still not
completely safe for ships making passage there.
Despite this risk, the Tonkin factory still managed to explore the
area called Nova Macao. After obtaining a licence from the Prince to
undertake the voyage, Hendrick Baron and his colleagues carried out
an exploratory voyage in March 1662. From Doma, the Meliskerken
sailed northwards, wove a course among the Archipel Islands, and
finally arrived at Tinnam. On 18 April, Baron left Tinnam to travel
overland to the province of Loktjouw from where he continued to
108 chapter four
travel to Tjoeang, a place in the Province of Ay, on horseback. At a

meeting with the Governor of Loktjouw, he was advised to return to
the capital because the ambassadorial road was unsafe. Heeding the
advice, Baron decided to return to Loktjouw and then to the capital
Thng Long, where he and his men arrived safely on 3 May 1662.371
Despite its safe return to Tonkin, the mission was far from success-
ful: no factory was set up mainly because of the chaotic situation on
the border and the disapproval of the Tonkin court. Nevertheless, after
this voyage of exploration, the Dutch factory continued to observe the
area and nourished the hope of making a break-through into mainland
China from that border market.
Upon his return, Baron made a meticulous report on the expedi-
tion and presented his thoughts on the Tinnam trade. He believed that
establishing a permanent factory in that area would in the long run be
commercially profitable and strategically important for the Company.
He set out a detailed analysis of every place in the area. Ay and Lok-
tjouw were located relatively close to some important provincial cities
along the border and would attract local merchants coming to trade
with the factory. The drawback was that these places were located
relatively far from a waterway, hence, the challenge would be to find
ways of reaching them and transporting goods. Tinnam was therefore
considered to be the most suitable location. Having a permanent fac-
tory there would be ideal for the Company for a number of reasons.
Principal among them was that Tinnam was close to Thenlongfoe,
therefore travelling between the two places would not be inconvenient.
This support was bolstered by the fact that local merchants preferred
travelling to Tinnam rather than to other places. As nobody disputed,
Tinnam had a good harbour; the Company ships could anchor conven-
iently in front of the factory. They would have no difficulty reaching
there as the coastal area and its adjacent islands, including the area
lying between Vanning and the mouth of the River Tinnam, had been
carefully sounded, and was said to be very navigable. Then there was
the fact that Tinnam was not so far from Nanning. Those who travelled
between these places said that they normally needed twenty-seven
days to complete a trip, either on foot or by boat. Finally and also
importantly, if a factory were to be founded at Tinnam, not only would
goods pour into this place from the south-western provinces and Nan-
ning, but gold would also arrive from Yunnan in a more substantial
quantity than ever before. Musk could also be procured without the
competition which complicated this trade in the capital Thng Long.
There, Resimon, enjoying the auspices of the local mandarins, often

bought up all the musk before the factory could even enter the market.
In 1662, for instance, the Tonkin factory failed to procure any musk
because the capado Ongia Haen had assisted the said speculator to
make a clean sweep of all musk which was carried to Thng Long
from Ay and Loktjouw.372
The precautions taken by the Trnh rulers, however, turned the
Dutch Tinnam strategy into nothing but a distant dream. Highly con-
scious of the current chaos in southern China, the Trnh rulers were not
happy with the Dutch plan to trade on the north-eastern border, and
hence delayed granting them permission to trade at Tinnam. Despite
the courtesy shown by Governor-General Joan Maetsuycker in sending
several letters to him concerning the Companys application for the
Tinnam trade, the Cha still procrastinated about allowing the Com-
pany a licence to commence its trade on the border. In August 1663,
Cha Trnh summoned several Dutch factors to his palace for a dis-
course on the Tinnam trade.373 After the dialogue, the Cha promised
to consider the Dutch petitions, but no official approval was forthcom-
ing. In 1664, the Dutch application to commence trading in Tinnam
succumbed to a complete failure. The Dutch factors lamented to their
masters in Batavia that the capados in charge of conducting the appli-
cation for the factory were too timorous to intercede with the Cha,
and the mandarin Ongdieu had maliciously interpreted the Com-
panys Tinnam strategy as very harmful to Tonkin. Expressing his
opinions on this matter during his audience with the Cha, the man-
darin said that the Dutch presence on the border would undoubtedly
entail political disorder, hence, threaten the security of the country.
The Trnhs hesitation to approve the Dutch petition therefore dragged
on interminably. Reporting to the High Government in early 1664,
the Dutch factors in Thng Long wrote that, while any chance of the
Tinnam trade was extremely doubtful, the only thing that they could
endeavour to do at this moment was to attract the attention of Chinese
merchants coming to Tonkin. In their letter to Batavia at the end of
1664, the factors sadly confirmed that it was absolutely hopeless to
cherish any hope for the eventuation of the Tinnam strategy. The Cha
had hinted several times that he would never allow any foreigner to
trade at Tinnam.374 With the said confirmation, the Tinnam strategy
of Batavia finally ended.
110 chapter four
Tonkin as a permanent factory, 1663

As the Tinnam project soon proved to be a great delusion, the Dutch
factors suggested that the High Government should repromote the
Tonkin factory to the rank of permanent. They argued that since the
Companys Tonkin trade had been in rapid decline, repromotion would
help to improve the situation. The argument was set out in the follow-
ing points. As the Tinnam plan had been disapproved by the Trnh
rulers, the Company should nurture its only factory in Thng Long.
In order to improve the current limitation on purchasing capacity,
the factory needed more personnel to conduct the trade, especially to
procure Chinese goods which arrived sporadically in Tonkin during
the off season. A second hurdle was that the annual production of
Tonkinese silk had rapidly decreased in the past few years. Because
of the Zheng belligerence in regional waters, various junks sailing
between Tonkin and Japan were forced to suspend their voyages. In
view of this suspension and because they were doubtful about the
buying capacity of the Dutch factory, Tonkinese silk-producers turned
part of their mulberry grounds into paddy-fields. The factors there-
fore hoped that the repromotion of the factory would not only foster
the factorys purchasing capacity but also encourage local people to
maintain their silk production.375
The factors arguments were simultaneously reinforced by recom-
mendations from the Companys trading partners in Tonkin. In his
letter to the Governor-General at the end of 1662, the Tonkinese man-
darin Plinlochiu informed Batavia that Tonkinese winter silk had been
produced abundantly during the past few years, but there had not been
enough customers to buy up those great quantities and the purchase
price had also been considerably reduced. If the Company ships arrived
in Tonkin only in May and left for Japan shortly afterwards as they
had been doing hitherto, how could the factors procure enough silk in
such a short time? Plinlochiu therefore advised the Governor-General
to keep ships, factors, and a substantial capital sum in Tonkin to pur-
chase winter silk to make the silk cargoes for the Japan-bound ships
ready before the summer.376 At the same time, Resimon sent a letter
to Director-General Carel Hartsinck. According to the Japanese middle
man, the annual silk production of Tonkin had been quite unstable in
recent years because for safetys sake local silk-makers only began to
work after foreign ships had arrived and the merchants had advanced
them money. He therefore advised the High Government to hold one
ship back in Tonkin to encourage local people to produce silk for
the Company. Otherwise, Tonkinese farmers would switch over to

planting rice and beans which were the staple provisions of the local
inhabitants.377
On the basis of these recommendations it was decided on 24 April
1663 to repromote the Tonkin factory to a permanent station for three
cogent reasons: to stimulate the Tonkinese to maintain their annual
production of silk for which the Company still had a great demand
in both the Netherlands and Japan; to help the factors to select raw
silk and silk piece-goods more carefully; and to attract more Chinese
merchants to come to Tonkin with gold and musk in order to increase
the export volume of these products of the Tonkin factory. The Tonkin
factory would be staffed with fourteen people residing there perma-
nently to conduct the trade. Besides the increase in personnel, annual
investment capital would also be increased in order to save a certain
amount of money for the winter trading season. It was also agreed
that half of the annual capital for the Tonkin trade, which consisted
mainly of silver and copper coins, would be supplied by the Deshima
factory; the rest would be provided by Batavia.378
Continued decline, the 1660s

As the Tinnam strategy did not work out as expected, the decline in
the Companys Tonkin trade which had begun in the latter half of
the 1650s continued inexorably. During the first three years of the
1660s, the annual export volume of the Tonkin factory stood relatively
low largely in view of the meagre profit margins the Tonkinese silk
cargoes brought on the Japanese market. Because the Tonkinese silk
cargo valued at 185,372 guilders sent to Japan in 1659 produced only
a 25 per cent profit,379 Batavia informed the Tonkin factory in 1660
that the investment capital for the Tonkin trade that year would be
reduced.380 Notwithstanding the paucity of the available funding, only
12,038 guilders could be spent on local goods. This depressing export
volume was said to be due to the Trnhs fifth military campaign
against Quinam which had absorbed most of the countrys labour
forces into the army. Likewise, fearful of sudden conscriptions, a large
part of the inhabitants of the capital fled to the countryside.381 The
investment capital for the 1662 trading season was sharply increased,
totalling 405,686 guilders. Batavia urged its factors in Thng Long to
spend at least 100,000 guilders on gold which was in high demand
for the Coromandel trade. The rest should be invested in raw silk and
112 chapter four
silk piece-goods for both Japan and the Netherlands. The Tonkin fac-
tory failed to fulfil these orders. Because the Qing armies had raided
merchants trading across the border in retaliation for the L/Trnhs
failure to send their first tribute to Peking, there was hardly any Chi-
nese gold or musk on offer on the Tonkin market. The Dutch factors
therefore had no choice but to spend only 22,761 guilders on gold.
The silk cargo for Japan was also much smaller than expected, valued
at only 150,000 guilders. The reason for this limited cargo was that a
devastating typhoon and subsequent rains had destroyed most of the
mulberry groves in the country. The capital Thng Long was also
flooded. The bulk of the silk stored in the Dutch factory was soaked
because of the rain. Nor were these natural calamities the only reason.
The local silk industry had been heavily eroded in the past few years
because of the impoverishment of the people.382
All this hit just at a time when the economic depression in Tonkin
was worsened by the shortage of copper cash which led to a devalu-
ation of silver. The rapid fall of the silver/cash ratio which began in
the early 1650s went on into the first half of the 1660s and caused the
Company heavy losses. As mentioned previously, in 1654, the High
Government had made an unsuccessful attempt to right the cash equa-
tion when it had sent copper zeni coins minted in Batavia to Tonkin.383
Since then, Batavia had found no appropriate solution to cut the loss
of silver imported until 1663, when it began to export Japanese cop-
per zeni to Tonkin in great quantities.384 In 1660, Resimon blamed the
current silver devaluation on the VOC, arguing that the great amounts
of silver imported into Tonkin by the Company had caused the rapid
fall in the silver/cash ratio.385 This accusation was not ungrounded
although it was not the main reason for the distortion of the exchange
rate. While the shortage of these copper coins was the major factor in
the rapid fall of the silver/cash ratio, the large quantities of Japanese
silver annually imported into Tonkin by both the Dutch and by the
Chinese also contributed to the depression of the exchange rate. Bata-
via was by no means bothered with such a harmless indictment. It was
more concerned with how to cut the loss of silver imported into Tonkin
and reduce the dependence of the Tonkin factory on the local copper
coins. As 400,000 Japanese copper zeni sent to Tonkin in 1661 turned
out to be profitable, these denomination coins were thereafter regularly
imported into Tonkin until the second half of the 1670s.386
The discovery of the efficacy of importing Japanese copper zeni
into Tonkin did help to relieve the Companys dependence on local
coins and to reduce the losses on the importation of silver, but it could
not revive the steadily declining Companys Tonkin trade. The repro-
motion of the Tonkin factory in 1663 did not work out as expected
either. During the summer 1663, Tonkin again suffered from heavy
rains and high water. Most of the provinces, including the capital
Thng Long, were flooded, which considerably reduced the produc-
tion of summer silk. Consequently, out of the 373,465 guilders the
Company had sent to Tonkin, the factory could spend only 198,974 on
silk for the Japan-bound ship. As the Tonkin-China border trade had
ground to a complete standstill, the Companys demands for cargoes
for Coromandel and Europe could not be fulfilled either.387
The decline of the VOCs Tonkin trade intensified in these years
despite the fact the High Government poured a substantial amount
of investment capital into Tonkin. When those large sums of money
could not be spent entirely during the trading seasons, this stimulated
the factors to embezzle, to misuse money, and to pursue private trade.
Despite his skilful management, the Chief, Hendrick Baron, was sus-
pected of indulging in private trade. His successor, the interim Director
Hendrick Verdonk, was even recalled to Batavia to justify himself
before the Justice Council for the same crime.388 Corruption such as
this considerably eroded the Tonkin trade in the later years.
In order to foster the Tonkin trade after the 1663 repromotion,
Batavia instructed its Tonkin factors to eliminate several stiff com-
petitors, even if they had to resort to dirty tricks. The first target was
the free Dutch merchant Bastian Brouwer. This man had bribed some
high-ranking capados in order to procure their auspices to speculate
in goods which seriously harmed the import and export trade of the
factory. In 1664, the High Government ordered Brouwer to return to
Batavia but he refused to do so.389 The second target was the great
Chinese merchant Itchien who had been among the most feared com-
petitors of the Tonkin factory for many years. This merchant not only
possessed substantial trading capital which he either owned himself or
with which he was provided by Japanese officials at Nagasaki, he also
had constructed a strong trading network between Tonkin and Japan.
His brother resided in Tonkin and acted as an agent in purchasing
goods and making the cargoes ready for him. Batavia therefore wanted
to obstruct this merchants trade in order to boost the Companys
Tonkin-Japan silk trade. In March 1664, Itchien returned to Tonkin
from Japan with a large capital of 200,000 taels. Shortly before his
arrival, the factory made great exertions to advance a large part of its
114 chapter four
money for raw silk and silk piece-goods. The Dutch chief presented
the Cha with two iron cannon and submitted a petition, requesting
that the court prohibit Itchien from commencing his business until
the Dutch factors had finished theirs. The petition was rejected. The
Cha said that he wanted foreigners trading freely and equally in his
country, hence, he would not favour one above another.390
Desperately trying to prevent Itchien from sailing back to Japan,
the Dutch factors sent the Hooglanden to the entrance of the river
and spread the rumour that the crew had been ordered to capture any
foreign ship coming to and going out of Tonkin. Frightened by this
rumour, two Chinese junks did not dare to depart for Japan in the
summer of 1664.391 The Tonkin factory therefore could assemble a
large silk cargo for Japan, valued at 387,135 guilders. Despite all the
hard work, this considerable cargo made a profit of scarcely 19 per
cent in Nagasaki.392 In the following year, Batavia stepped up its proj-
ect to eliminate the Company competitors in Tonkin when it ordered
the Tonkin factors to attack and capture the Chinese junks trading
between Tonkin and Cambodia, and to intercept the Siamese vessels
sailing between Tonkin and Japan.393 The problem was that this was a
double-edged tactic. The Trnh rulers were displeased with the Dutch
factors aggression and ordered them to cease perpetrating such hostile
actions in their country. The Japanese reaction was reportedly even
more harmful to the Company, because these junks contained large
shares belonging to Japanese officials in Nagasaki. In April 1665,
Batavia wrote to the Deshima factory that it had ordered the Tonkin
factors to end the blockade of these junks in order to avoid fermenting
discontent among the Japanese.394
The factorys relationship with the court, apart from the Chas
displeasure with the factors because of their hostility towards Itchien,
passed smoothly during the 1660s. It was their need of weapons and
ammunition that inclined the Trnh rulers to consolidate the relation-
ship with Batavia. Prior to 1672, when Tonkin campaigned against
Quinam for the last time, the Cha and the Crown Prince regularly
dispatched letters and presents to the Governor-General. In return, they
often demanded, besides various miscellaneous items, more martial
paraphernalia as ordnance, bullets, ammunition, saltpetre, and sulphur.
The court also dealt more reasonably with the factory in terms of pay-
ments. In 1666 and 1667, for instance, in order to persuade the High
Government to provide him with ordnance for the forthcoming cam-
paigns against both the Mc in the north and the Nguyn in the south,
Cha Trnh Tc willingly paid the factory for saltpetre at prices which
were even higher than those on the market.395 In Batavia, the High
Government also tried to satisfy at least some of the Trnhs demands
in order to avoid their displeasure which might lead them to impede the
VOC trade. Saltpetre and sulphur were often sent to Tonkin in great
quantities, but the demands for cannon and ammunition proved more
difficult to satisfy. Batavia lamented the current shortage of these com-
modities, saying that the wars against France and England in Europe
had lessened the supply considerably in recent years, while the limited
number of weapons the Company currently possessed was desperately
needed for the defence of its fortresses throughout Asia. In general the
Cha sympathized with the Governor-General, but he occasionally
reacted irately and rhetorically argued:
I have absolutely no doubt that the Governor-General needs them [pieces
of ordnance and cannon balls] for the defence of your fortresses. But
you should be aware that I also badly need them to defend mine I
am certain that my demands are not at all beyond your supply capabili-
ties.396
In 1671, when he was preparing for the last campaign against the
Nguyn, Cha Trnh Tc asked the High Government to provide him
not only with weapons, as he had often requested, but also with a
skilled constable, who should reside in Tonkin to assist him.397 Batavia
again apologized for its inability to satisfy the Chas demands. The
Governor-General expressed his hope that the Companys failure to
satisfy the Chas demands would not affect their mutual friendship.398
The Cha again replied that he entirely sympathized with the difficult
situation in which the Company found itself and promised to continue
his support for the Company servants in his country.399
3. Towards the final end, 16701700
The eventful 1670s

The 1670s witnessed several remarkable transformations in Tonkin
which, in the long run, reversed the Trnhs attitude towards the for-
eign trade of the country in general and their relationship with the
VOC in particular. In 1672, the last campaign mounted by Tonkin
against Quinam ended without achieving any breakthrough. Exhausted
by the costly and protracted conflict both sides resolved to put an
end to the rivalry.400 Tonkin now turned its efforts towards pacify-
116 chapter four
ing the Mc clan. After the Nan Ming Dynasty was finally defeated
and the Zheng family fled to Formosa in the early 1660s, the Mc
were isolated and weakened. Therefore, in 1677, the Tonkin armies
easily vanquished their Mc rivals and completely pacified Cao Bng
Province. Some members of the Mc family fled to southern China
but were later captured by the Qing armies and extradited to Tonkin
in 1683.401 Gradually peace was restored in northern Vietnam after
almost two centuries of civil war. The cessation of military activi-
ties by Tonkin by the early 1680s saw a remarkable reduction in its
demands for weapons and martial paraphernalia from the Company.
On paper, there seemed to be no obstruction to a revival of the
economy after peace prevailed in the country. Ironically though, the
situation declined in a totally opposite direction. The country suffered
a series of regularly recurring crop failures during the last quarter of
the seventeenth century. The decline in the agriculture-based economy
of Tonkin dragged on and intensified during the first half of the eight-
eenth century which led to subsequent peasant rebellions and social
disorder.402 This grave situation was not helped by several reforms
introduced by the court that compromised the efficiency of the admin-
istrative system. After the end of the conflict with the Nguyn and
the complete pacification of their Mc rivals, there was a remarkable
transfer of power from military officials to the literati.403 The orthodox
Confucian ideology revived, a school of thought which scorned trade,
foreign trade in particular. These negative developments discouraged
foreign merchants. Under the combined yoke of the depression of
the economy and the courts harsh measures against them, a large
part of the local Chinese population began to leave Tonkin in the
late 1680s, followed by the English and the Dutch in 1697 and 1700
respectively.404
The VOCs Tonkin trade was severely affected by those transforma-
tions. Because of the current low profits of its Tonkin trade, the High
Government resolved to take measures. In the summer of 1670, the
Hoogcapel was wrecked at sea while en route to Japan from Tonkin.
Seizing this accident as an opportunity, Batavia decided to close the
Tonkin-Japan direct shipping route in an attempt to cut the excessive
charge of maintaining this trade as well as ending the large-scale pri-
vate trade arranged for their own benefit by factors.405 From 1671, all
cargoes prepared by the Tonkin factory were ordered to be shipped to
Batavia, from where they would be distributed to different destinations.
This reform of the Tonkin-Japan silk trade marked a milestone in the
history of the VOC commerce with Tonkin. The meagre profit margin
yielded by the Tonkinese silk cargoes in Japan continued to decrease
after 1671. In 1678, for instance, the Deshima factory reported to
Batavia that Tonkinese raw silk and silk piece-goods had made a profit
respectively of only 16 and 14 per cent, hardly enough to cover the
transport costs. Discouraged by the report, Batavia decided to reduce
the export volume of Tonkinese silk to Japan, conceding its failure to
revive the regular export volume of Tonkinese silk to Japan throughout
the 1660s. In 1679, the High Government informed the Tonkin fac-
tory that, as the Tonkin trade continued to slump, it had been forced
to reduce both the annual amount of investment capital for the factory
as well as the number of factors residing in Thng Long in a move to
cut unnecessary expenses.406
The 1671 reform could not prevent the further decline of the Tonkin
trade. While the sale of Tonkinese raw silk stagnated in Japan, this
yarn was unmarketable in Europe because of its low quality. The Com-
panys import and export trade with Tonkin was therefore reduced to
a minimal volume. Worse still, the stagnation of the Tonkin-China
border trade dragged on, preventing the transportation of such import
goods as South-East Asian pepper and European textiles from northern
Vietnam to southern China. It also obstructed the flow of such Chinese
goods as gold and musk into Tonkin.407 Consequently, from this time
the Tonkin factory often made a deficit as its daily expenses exceeded
its yields. In 1678, for instance, the factory spent 24,049 guilders while
it profited only 3,016 guilders, suffering a deficit of 21,036 guilders.
This situation never again improved before the end of the Company
trade with Tonkin.408
The stiff competition from the other foreign merchants in Tonkin in
the 1670s caused the Dutch Tonkin factory more difficulties. Besides
the Chinese, and occasionally the Portuguese and Spanish from Macao
and Manila, the French and English also appeared on the scene. In
1669, the first French ship visited Tonkin in order to seek permission
to trade and to make propaganda for the Christian faith in northern
Vietnam. Although any activity by the French mission was forbidden
by the L/Trnh court, the French priests who had arrived in Tonkin
earlier continued to live in the coastal area, preparing the way for
another group of French merchants and missionaries in Tonkin in the
early 1680s.409 The English arrived in Tonkin in the summer of 1672.
After a few years of being forced to live in the small town of Ph
Hin, the English were finally allowed to reside and trade in the capi-
118 chapter four
tal Thng Long, competing with the Dutch factory in the buying and
selling of goods.410
Decline intensified, 16801690

During the 1680s, the VOCs Tonkin trade slid even further into a
decline for various causes. In 1680, a big flood ravaged the vast prov-
ince of Thanh Ho and caused a severe famine in the southern region.
In the following year, a protracted drought which afflicted the major
provinces of the country again led to another famine, causing hundreds
of deaths everyday. So severe was the 1681 famine that, according to
Dutch observers, starving people had to eat dead bodies lying unburied
in order to survive. Cha Trnh Tc urged the Dutch factory to import
rice and whatever other provision it was possible to acquire.411 Two
famines within two years largely destroyed the economy of Tonkin,
especially the handicraft industries. After these famines, prices rose
sharply reflecting the scarcity of goods available.412 Natural disasters
continued to devastate the economy of Tonkin in the following years,
exacerbating the countrys economic decline. In 1688, another large-
scale famine hit the country. Consequently, Cha Trnh Cn again
had to request the Dutch Company to provide his country with rice.
The arrival of the Gaasperdam in the summer with eighty bales of
Javanese rice was therefore warmly welcomed.413
Punishing competition from other European merchants contributed,
just as before, to the decline of the Companys Tonkin trade. By the
early 1680s, the French Tonkin trade had been consolidated consider-
ably. In 1680 and 1682, two French missions arrived in Thng Long
to negotiate with the Trnh rulers about trading privileges and to dis-
seminate Christian propaganda. The French priests who had arrived in
Tonkin in the early 1670s were also involved in trading activities.414
In 1683, the English began to run their factory in the capital and com-
peted fiercely with the Dutch. They arrived with a trading capital of
80,000 rials and offered higher prices to local weavers to buy pelings
for their homeward-bound ship.415 By offering copious presents and
satisfying most of the Trnhs demands, the English acquired more
favourable trading privileges than the Dutch. In the late 1680s, the
Dutch factors realized that the Trnh rulers were more inclined to
deal with the English than with themselves. The reason was that the
English had offered Cha Trnh Cn better cannon. The Tonkin fac-
tory therefore urged the High Government to send more superlative
presents to the court next year. In 1689, the Governor-General wrote
to the Cha and asked him to protect and facilitate the Dutch factors.
Batavias letter and presents placated the Cha for a while. After the
Company failed to supply him with the objects demanded, the relation-
ship between the factory and the court deteriorated again.416
After Batavia decided to reduce the annual investment capital for
the Tonkin trade in 1679, approximately 150,000 guilders were remit-
ted to the Tonkin factory every year, less than half of the amount that
Batavia had often sent to Tonkin in the years up to the mid-1650s.
Because Tonkinese raw silk fetched virtually no profit on the Japa-
nese market, in 1681, Batavia ordered the Tonkin factory to restrict
its purchase to musk and silk piece-goods for the Netherlands. The
Governor-General also requested Cha Trnh Cn to deliver no raw
silk to the factory.417 In 1686, the bottom dropped out of the Tonki-
nese raw silk market in Japan because of the change in the regulations
on the import and export trade issued by the Japanese Government in
1685.418 A Chinese junk carrying Tonkinese raw silk to Japan this year
even had to return with its complete cargo unsold.419 The Governor-
General again reminded the Cha that the transformation in the Japan
trade had forced the Company to end its exportation of Tonkinese silk
to the island market. He therefore expected that the Cha would pay
the factory in either cash or silk piece-goods such as pelings, which
could still be sold in the Netherlands. The requests from Batavia fell
on deaf ears. The Trnh ruler forced the Dutch factors to accept raw
silk, asking why he should change the regular mode of payment which
his predecessors had practised for so many years. Because of the low
purchase price for Tonkinese raw silk, Batavia ordered the Tonkin
factory to have some samples of local raw silk spun using the Chinese
and Bengali methods in order to forward them to the Netherlands. It
seems that the experiment failed and the project of spinning Tonkinese
yarn by new methods was eventually revoked.420
The deteriorating relationship between the factory and the court
caused even more concern than the trade problems. Since Cha
Trnh Cn (r. 16821709) had succeeded to the throne, the relation-
ship between the factory and the court rapidly worsened. Because the
Tonkin trade yielded such meagre returns, Batavia reduced the value
of presents sent to the Cha, something that displeased him. In 1682,
the Cha informed the factory that were the presents to continue to be
of such a low value, the Company would have to leave his country in
order to avoid a dispute.421 In 1688 and 1689, Cha Trnh Cn stopped
sending letters to the Governor-General as Batavia had failed to send
120 chapter four
him the objects he demanded.422 In 1691, Cha Trnh threatened to

deport the Dutch factory from the capital because Batavia had failed
to send the crystal ware which he had ordered in the past few years.
In order to please the Trnh ruler, the Dutch factors offered him more
gifts and promised to present him with a fixed amount of goods every
year.423 The Chas discontent with the Company probably reached
its nadir in 1693 when he had the chief factor, Jacob van Loo, and
the captain of the Westbroek imprisoned because Batavia had failed
to send him amber. The Dutchmen were not released until the factory
had signed an agreement to guarantee the delivery of amber and other
objects which the Cha had ordered on the next ship.424
Because of the detention of Van Loo and the captain, the departure
of the Westbroek was delayed until January 1694. A few days after her
departure for Batavia, she was forced to return to Tonkin by contrary
winds. In the meantime, the Chinese arriving in Batavia from Tonkin
had informed the High Government about the Chas insults to the
Dutch factors. The Governor-General and the Council of the Indies
therefore resolved to send Johannes Sibens, the former chief factor of
the Tonkin factory, to Thng Long to assist the factors to resolve the
problems. Batavia also urged the directors in the Netherlands to send
the red amber and crystal ware that they had ordered for the Cha in
the past few years as quickly as possible.425
Sibens arrival in Thng Long did ease the tension for a while.426
In the summer of 1695, the amber and crystal ware which the Cha
had ordered finally arrived, but to the factors disappointment, he was
unimpressed with his gifts which the Company had ordered for him
from the Netherlands with so much difficulty. The Cha seized a large
part of the factorys silver and goods in payment for raw silk, and
heaping insult upon injury, the Crown Prince also insulted the Dutch
factors. In 1694, he asked the factory for 200 taels of silver for which
he would pay in silk. The Dutch excused themselves explaining that
they had no silver with them at that moment. Merchant Gerrit van Nes
and the interpreter of the factory were immediately summoned to his
palace, where they were detained for ten days and were not released
until they had paid fines.427 In 1695, the Cha again imprisoned
the factory interpreter and confiscated a part of the factory silver in
order to compensate himself for the insignificant gifts that Batavia had
offered him that year. The current tension with the court confused the
factors.428 On the departure of the Cauw to Batavia, the Cha and the
Prince again sent letters to the Governor-General demanding various

sorts of merchandise.429
The last ship, 1699/1700

After the imprisonment and the detention of Company servants, in the
mid-1690s the High Government began to consider the possibility of
ending the Companys unprofitable trade with Tonkin. In their mis-
sive to the Gentlemen XVII in 1695, the Governor-General and the
Council of the Indies suggested to put an end to the trading relations
with the L/Trnh Kingdom. But for as long as no official reply from
the Board of the Directors was forthcoming, the High Government was
obliged to continue the Tonkin trade. In its missives to the Tonkin
factory, Batavia always ordered its factors to behave circumspectly
in order to avoid any confrontation with the Trnh rulers. The Gov-
ernor-General also requested the Cha to grant the Company more
trading privileges as well as to protect its servants currently trading
in his country.430
When the Cauw arrived in Tonkin in the summer of 1696, the Cha,
dissatisfied with the modest presents Batavia offered him, again seized
part of the factorys silver. All the while, the Dutch factory continued
to suffer increasing snubs and insults: the interpreters were detained
for twenty days while the factory was ransacked by some twenty-five
soldiers. Their intransigence brought the business of the factory almost
to a complete standstill. Consequently, the cargo which the Cauw car-
ried to Batavia at the end of this year was valued at around 57,000
guilders only.431
During their meeting in the summer 1697, the Governor-General
and the Councillors of the Indies again considered abandoning the
Companys Tonkin trade. It was argued that since the Tonkin trade
had yielded no profit in recent years and the factors had often been
humiliated, there was no point in maintaining such a fraught trad-
ing relationship. Their only concern was that once the relationship
had officially been terminated, it would be extremely difficult for the
Company to return in the future. Moreover, since no official reply
from Holland had arrived, the High Government did not want to take
responsibility for such an important decision. Hence, no final conclu-
sion on the fate of the Tonkin trade was made. 432
The relationship between the Company and Tonkin deteriorated
further in 1697 and 1698. Despite the Governor-Generals reconcilia-
122 chapter four
tory letters to them, the Trnh rulers continued to make extravagant

demands on the factory. They also neglected to reply to the Gover-
nor-General in 1698.433 During their meeting in January 1698, the
Governor-General and the Council of the Indies again agreed that
the Company should withdraw from Tonkin.434 In the same year, the
Gentlemen XVIIs reply on the Tonkin issue arrived in Batavia: the
Gentlemen XVII still wanted to maintain the Tonkin trade. If the Com-
pany abandoned its trade with the L/Trnh Kingdom, where else could
it buy such silk piece-goods as pelings, hockiens, and chiourongs for
Patria? Unswayed by these arguments, the Governor-General and the
Council of the Indies continued to defend their opinion that the Tonkin
factory should be closed. They argued that, if the Company could
not purchase pelings and other such textiles from Tonkin, it could
expediently spend that investment capital on the other products at the
other trading-places such as Bengal and Batavia, with the prospect of
making a much more promising profit. Nevertheless, at this moment,
Batavia wanted to wait for the official reply from the Trnh rulers
before making any final decision.435
When it became aware that the Trnh rulers had neglected to reply
to the Governor-General when the Cauw left for Batavia in the winter
of 1698/9, the High Government concluded that the Company had no
reason whatsoever to delay the abandonment of the Tonkin trade.436 In
June 1699, the decision to give up the Tonkin trade was finalized.437
The Cauw was sent to Tonkin for the last time to bring the Company
servants and property back to Batavia. In letters to the Cha and the
Crown Prince to explain the Companys decision, the Governor-Gen-
eral confirmed that the Company might consider returning to Tonkin
if the Cha thought that it was necessary.438
In contrast to Batavias expectation, Cha Trnh Cn was not at
all discomposed about the Companys withdrawal. After removing
all Company property, Chief Factor Van Loo handed the factory keys
over to the capados. And without a formal farewell or any such cer-
emony, the Dutch quietly left the capital Thng Long for Doma to
prepare for their departure. In the winter of 1699/1700, the Cauw left
for Batavia, carrying all the Dutch factors, the Companys assets, and
a small cargo valued at 58,956 guilders. Before the Cauws departure
the Cha sent the following letter to the Governor-General: 439
I am the King whom Heaven empowers to govern and protect my sub-
jects. Because I govern according to the mandate of Heaven, foreigners
come to my country from different places to reside and trade. All for-
eign merchants arriving in my land from faraway countries receive my
beneficent protections.
You complained that I had not replied to your letter last year. It was
neither because I was displeased with you nor because I disrespected
you. On the contrary, my respect for you was as much as it ever had
been. I did not do so because I did not want you to waste time replying
to me. You must have already known that although Heaven neither
speaks nor writes to us, yet governs the Earth with four seasons. What
is the use of exchanging letters? They are nothing more than papers that
make nonsense and trouble sore eyes.
While all foreign merchants had to reside outside the capital Thng
Long, your people were allowed to live inside. They were even allowed to
build a stone factory. These favours are evidence that I always favoured
your people above other foreigners.
You complained about my strictness towards your people. I accept that
truth. But your people caused all such strictures. Anyone who lives in my
country has to obey the local laws; as those living in your country should
obey your laws. The Dutch forgot this. They often declared only half of
the cargoes they shipped to my country. This caused me great losses.
I do not oppose the decision to recall your people and abandon your trade
in my country, but I hope you will change your opinion.
Concluding Remarks
Just as elsewhere in Asia, the commercial relations of the VOC with

Tonkin were closely interwoven with local political ambitions. After
a few years of hesitation, the High Government agreed to ally with
Tonkin to attack Quinam, responding to the Trnh rulers intolerable
pressure, not to mention the Dutch desire for revenge on Quinam. But
Batavia sent fleets to Tonkin in 1642 and 1643 to no avail.
The Dutch revocation of the military alliance with Tonkin dis-
pleased the Trnh rulers and contributed to the steady erosion of the
Tonkin-VOC relationship. In order to facilitate the import and export
trade of the Tonkin factory, the Governor-General and the Council of
the Indies continued to send presents and letters to the Trnh rulers and
maintain fairly favourable political relations with Thng Long until
the early 1680s. From then on the rapid decline of the Companys
Tonkin trade and the Trnhs dismissive attitude towards the factory
discouraged the High Government from maintaining its relationship
with Tonkin and eventually forced it to abandon the Companys fac-
tory in Tonkin.
124 chapter four
part three: the commercial relations 125
PART THREE: THE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS
Phi Thng Bt Ph ().440
The main Trade of the Country [Tonkin] is maintained by the Chinese,

English, Dutch, and other Merchant Strangers, who either resided here
constantly, or make their annual Return hither. These export their Com-
modities, and import such as are vendible here. The Goods imported
hither besides Silver, are Salt-peter, Sulphur, English Broad-cloaths,
Cloath-rashes, some Callicoes, Pepper and other Spices, Lead, great
Guns, &c.
Introduction
The procurement of local silk products for Japan, and, to a much lesser
extent, gold for Coromandel, and silk piece-goods and other miscel-
laneous items such as musk for the Netherlands was the raison dtre
for the operations of the VOC in Tonkin. In order to procure local
products, the Tonkin factory needed to be provided with ready cash
consisting mainly of silver bullion. Copper and zeni (copper coins)
from Japan were also imported into Tonkin to be circulated along
with the local and Chinese copper cash (the round coin with a square
hole in the middle) at any time of the devaluation of silver. Compared
to silver and copper zeni, other miscellaneous items imported by the
VOC into Tonkin were of minor importance, and hardly made up
more than five per cent of the Companys annual imports (see Figure
3).442 Such commodities consisted mainly of provisions for the Dutch
factors daily use such as wine, arrack, and butter. Some sorts of mer-
chandise like pepper, glassware, knives, Japanese yakan (kettles) also
found customers in the local market. But the most important import
commodities were those that the L/Trnh rulers specifically demanded
such as cannon, bullets, saltpetre, sulphur, ammunition, various sorts
of Indian and European textiles, and curiosities.443
126 part three: the commercial relations
silver/copper: 1637-71
TONKIN FORMOSA JAPAN
silk: 1637-71
silk/musk/ copper/silver/
gold/ceramics weapons/spices copper silk
1637-1700 1672-1700
SOUTH-
EUROPE EAST
CORO- silk/musk/gold ceramics
BATAVIA 1663-81 ASIAN
MANDEL 1637-1700 PORTS
silver/ spices
misc. items 1637-
1700
Figure 2. The VOCs import and export trade with Tonkin in the seventeenth century
the import trade 127
CHAPTER FIVE
THE IMPORT TRADE
t Geene wy daar komen aan te brengen en den handel dryven, bestaat

meest in silver; oock kopere kasjes, die in Japan gegoten off gemaeckt
worden voort eenige specereyen, saltpeter, cattoene lynwaten, dog
alles, buyten het voorsch. silver ende kopere kasjes, in geen groote quan-
titeyt, alsoo het vertier daarvan seer kleyn is.
Pieter van Dam444
1. Silver
Of all the merchandise imported into Tonkin by the Company, silver

constituted the staple commodity. Notwithstanding the relatively high
demand for Japanese copper zeni during the 1660s and 1670s, silver
was absolutely indispensable to the Dutch Tonkin trade. The English
who arrived early in 1672 to trade with Tonkin for the first time
lamented the partiality for silver, admitting that the life of this trade
is money [silver].445 Most of the silver which the Dutch and the
Chinese imported into Tonkin originated from Japan. It is a well-
known fact that, after the re-opening of their Japan trade in the early
1630s, the Dutch trading position in Japan had been consolidated
and was stronger than ever before. Buttressed by this expansion and
security, they were able to export a considerable amount of Japanese
silver every year. Therefore, when the Dutch were presented with
the opportunity to replace the Japanese in exporting Tonkinese silk
to Japan from 1637, they also used Japanese silver to exchange for
Tonkinese silkthe most popular trading method which the Japanese
and Chinese had followed thus far. In Japan, silver could be readily
procured by the Dutch factors so that the Tonkin-bound ships could
depart with the required amount of silver before the end of the north-
east monsoon.
In Tonkin, the Dutch factors advanced this silver to local rulers,
brokers, and silk-weavers in order to acquire silks during the summer
sale. Although silver could be advanced for big silk contracts, small
business transactions in the local market were normally required to be
paid in copper cash. The Dutch therefore had to exchange part of their
128 chapter ve
silver for local coins for both the peddling trade and daily expenses.
After Japan banned the export of its silver in 1668, most of the sil-
ver the VOC imported into Tonkin was either from the Netherlands or
other Asian countries. Coincidently, from this year, the annual import
volume of this precious metal to Tonkin by the Company decreased
not only because silver was in short supply but also because of the
current general decline in its trade with northern Vietnam.
In merchandise
12,840 (3.2%)
In Japanese silver
384,750 (96.8%)
Figure 3. Division of the capital sent to Tonkin for the 1644/5 trading season
(Dutch guilders)
Source: Calculated from NFJ 57, Dagregister Nagasaki, 22 Oct. 1644.
In the early years of their trade with Tonkin, the Dutch often had
their imported silver refined by the local refiner in order to acquire
purer bullion.446 The so-called refining of the Japanese and Mallacx
silver was a regular occurrence throughout the first half of the seven-
teenth century, but afterwards it seems to have been abandoned when
losses were incurred. The 1656 refining of various silver imported
into Tonkin reportedly encountered all-round grievous losses as the
kronen or leeuwendaalders lost 24 per cent, the Japanese schuitzilver
16 per cent, the rijksdaalder and provintindaalder 8, and the Spanish
rials 4 per cent, respectively. Consequently, the silver valued around
180,000 guilders which the Company sent to Tonkin that year incurred
a general loss of 4 per cent after being refined. From that year, it
seems that silver imported into Tonkin from which the purchase price
of silks would be judged was tested only for its purity content.447
As the Companys Tonkinese silk trade yielded high profits in
Japan in the 163754 period, Japanese silver was sent directly to north-
ern Vietnam on board the Dutch ships which sailed annually between
these two places. Every year the amount of silver supplied to Tonkin
was relatively stable, valued at around 100,000 taels. In the heyday of

the Dutch Tonkinese silk trade (164452), the quantity of silver sent to
northern Vietnam rose to around 130,000 taels per year. Table 1 shows
how, until the mid-1650s, silver always occupied approximately 95 per
cent of the annual imports; other import products shared around 5 per
cent only. (See also Figure 3 for the 1644/5 trading season.)
Table 1. The VOCs import of silver into Tonkin, 16371668

(silver in taels; total capital in Dutch guilders)
Year Silver Total Year Silver Total
capital capital
1637 60,000 188,166 1653 - -
1638 130,000 298,609 1654 40,000? 149,750
1639 25,000 382,458 1655 - 25,773
1640 80,000 439,861 1656 50,000 184,215
1641 - 202,703 1657 *c. 90,000 276,077
1642 60,000 297,529 1658 - -
1643 100,000 299,835 1659 *100,000 317,500
1644 135,000 397,590 1660 *5,000 64,773
1645 150,000 454,606 1661 *32,000 164,703
1646 130,000 352,544 1662 *50,000 405,686
1647 130,000 377,637 1663 *100,000 394,670
65,000
1648 130,000 457,928 1664 100,000 347,989
*35,000
1649 100,000 334,105 1665 80,000 420,245
1650 70,000 372,827 1666 - 419,779
1651 110,000 552,336? 1667 - 137,181
1652 230,000 680,294 1668 *40,000 254,219
Sources: VOC 1123, 1124, 1140, 1141, 1144, 1145, 1146, 1149, 1156, 1158, 1161, 1163,
1166, 1169, 1172, 1175, 1184, 1194, 1197, 1206, 1213, 1216, 1219, 1220, 1230, 1233,
1236, 1240, 1241, 1243/4, 1252, 1253, 1259, 1264, 1265, 1267/8; Dagh-register Batavia
16371668/9; Generale Missiven, I-IV.
Note: *: Silver from Batavia, the rest directly from Japan.
After this relatively regular and stable phase, the annual import of
Japanese silver into Tonkin by the Company decreaseda fall which
can be attributed to various factors. From the viewpoint of the Tonkin-
Japan commerce of the Company, the decrease in the Japanese silver
flow to northern Vietnam was a reaction to the rapid drop in the annual
profit margins which Tonkinese silk could yield in the early 1650s. As
a matter of fact, at this point the Dutch decided to switch to Bengali
silk which was becoming marketable and profitable on the Japanese
130 chapter ve
market. The annual amount of capital, silver in particular, which Bata-

via assigned to the Tonkin trade was subsequently reduced, a logical
move as it was highly dependent upon two factors: the demand for
Tonkinese silk and the quantity of Bengali silk intended for Japan.
From the perspective of the exchange rate, the reduction in the silver
import into Tonkin by the Company was perhaps an indirect conse-
quence of the fall of the silver/cash ratio caused by a serious shortage
of local coins. In 1652, the Dutch in Thng Long had already lamented
the grievous losses incurred when exchanging silver for copper coins.
In the following year, within three months, this ratio slumped from
1,600 to 1,700 cash down to less than 800 cash per tael of silver. At
the current falling rate, the Dutch factors reported to Batavia, the ratio
was likely to reach as low as 700 to 500 coins per tael within a short
time.448 No doubt as part of the same economic process the purchase
prices had increased generally 20 per cent, causing a huge loss to
the export trade of the Company. In 1654, for instance, the purchase
price of Tonkinese raw silk was 5.15 guilders per catty, while in the
163649 period it had been on average 3.5 guilders. This silk was sold
in Nagasaki at 6.92 guilders per catty, offering a roughly calculated
profit margin of around 34 per cent only.449 This meagre yield was so
discouraging that Batavia resolved to suspend the export of Tonkinese
silk to Japan for a while in 1655. Hence, the Dutch factory in Thng
Long was provided with only 25,773 guilders to buy piece-goods for
the Netherlands.450 From this year, the Company began to reduce the
annual capital it invested in the Tonkin trade and the silver imports
were reduced as well. After 1655, the annual silver capital remitted
for the Tonkin trade hardly ever reached the former level of 100,000
taels. In the 165668 period, with the exception of a few particular
years when the Company attempted to revive its export of Tonkinese
silk to Japan, the annual amount of silver the Company sent to Thng
Long stood at around 60,000 taels.
As soon as the Companys direct trade route between Tonkin and
Japan was seriously affected by the diminution in the annual profit
margin, the silver needed for the Tonkin trade was provided from
Batavia in lieu of Japan. The reason for this change is unclear. It
can, however, be confidently assumed that this had nothing to do
with the capacity of the Company to export Japanese silver, since
this export was relatively stable until the Japanese Governments ban
on the export of silver in 1668. It may therefore be hypothesized that
this was another attempt by the High Government to acquire tighter
control of this trading route, or at least to reduce as much as it could
the private trade between these two places which was said to have
been pursued on a rather large scale.451
This hypothesis is based on the fact that 77,000 taels of Japanese
silver were exported to Batavia for the first time in 1656. In the years
leading up to 1662, the Deshima factory sent a total of 632,648 taels
of Japanese silver to Batavia, of which 375,000 taels were earmarked
for the Tonkin trade.
Table 2. Re-export of Japanese silver from Batavia to Tonkin, 16561663

(taels)
Year Japan to Batavia Batavia to Tonkin
1656 77,000 0
1657 100,000 . 90,000
1658 83,500 0
1659 43,700 100,000
1660 132,000 5,000
1661 76,448 32,000
1662 120,000 50,000
1663 0 100,000
1664 - *35,000
1665 0 0
1666 40,000 0
1667 80,000 0
Sources: VOC 1213, 1216, 1219, 1220, 1230, 1233, 1236, 1240, 1241, 1243/4, 1252,
1253, 1259, 1264, 1265, 1267/8; Dagh-register Batavia 1656/71666/7; Generale Mis-
siven, III-IV.
Note: *: Silver from the Netherlands, the rest is Japanese silver from Batavia.
After the loss of Formosa in 1662, the Company continued to foster

the hope of approaching China from its Tonkin foothold, manoeuvring
to obtain a licence from the L/Trnh rulers to establish another factory
in Tinnam in the north-eastern province of Qung Ninh, from which to
trade with China (see Chapter Four). As this expectation soon proved
to be a piped dream, in April 1663 Batavia repromoted the Tonkin
factory to the status of a permanent trading station with the intention
of attracting Chinese traders to Tonkin in order to facilitate the pro-
curement of Chinese gold for Coromandel, as well as Chinese musk
and Tonkinese silk piece-goods for the Netherlands. In this situation
the Companys supply of silver to its factory in Thng Long in 1663
and 1664 revived, reaching 100,000 and 135,000 taels respectively.
Since the Tonkin factory could not spend all this money on the items
132 chapter ve
which the Company had ordered, and the cargoes purchased yielded
too meagre a profit in Japan, Batavia again reduced the annual capital,
including silver, for the Tonkin factory in the following years.
Although the Japanese Governments ban on the export of silver in
1668 did not cause the Dutch Company any serious problems since it
quickly turned to exporting gold and copper instead,452 it did slightly
affect the Dutch Tonkin trade. Having been deprived of the traditional
flow of Japanese silver, Batavia now had to look for this precious
metal in other places. In 1664, when the sending of Japanese silver to
Batavia was temporarily suspended, Batavia had already switched over
to supplying Tonkin with silver from the Netherlands. Out of approxi-
mately 55,000 taels which the Tonkin factory had demanded for the
1664 trading season, Batavia could afford only 35,000 taels as little
silver had arrived from Holland.453 During the so-called zeni period,
which covered the years between 1663 and 1677, the annual quantities
of silver imported into Tonkin by the Dutch Company were particu-
larly low compared to the quantity of zeni, except for the first three
years when the Tonkin factory was newly repromoted to a permanent
office and hence supplied with a relatively large amount of capital.
Between 1666 and 1677, silver shipped to Tonkin barely accounted
for one-fifth of the Companys annual investment.
The form of the silver for Tonkin also changed from bullion to
coins, consisting of both Western and Asian species such as provin-
tindaalders, kruisdaalders, Mexican rials, Surat rupees and so forth.
In Tonkin, most of these coins were melted down to make silver ingots
before being circulated. After the zeni period, these silver coins con-
stituted the staple of the Companys silver investment in Tonkin until
1700. In 1672, for instance, a total of 1,761 marks and another five
chests (c. 5,000 taels) of silver bars were sent to Tonkin.454 Silver bars
appear quite often in the list of cargoes consigned to Tonkin until the
mid-1670s, before being replaced by provintindaalders, Surat rupees,
and Mexican rials. When it proved to have been profitable to have sent
some 52,016 Surat rupees to Tonkin in 1675, this Indian coin was then
regularly imported there not only by the Dutch but also by the English.
In 1677, for example, Batavia shipped a total of 152,000 Surat rupees
to Tonkin.455 In the next year, the Dutch observed that their English
competitors had also procured a considerable quantity of silver from
Surat and shipped this to Tonkin on the Formosa.456 The Dutch import
of these silver coins into northern Vietnam remained stable until they
eventually abandoned the Tonkin trade in 1700.
2. Japanese copper zeni
The Vietnamese monetary system prior to the seventeenth century

The history of the Vietnamese monetary system prior to the French
colonization of the nineteenth century can be divided into two major
periods: the period of gold and silver, and that of copper coins. The
Vietnamese used silver and gold as the major form of exchange until
the tenth century when they successfully supplanted the Chinese colo-
nization which had lasted a thousand years and established their own
independent kingdom.457 Influenced by the Chinese monetary system
in which copper coins had been used for centuries, King inh B Lnh
(96879) minted copper coins bearing his regnal title, Thi Bnh. In
984, King L Hon (9801005) of the Former L Dynasty minted the
Thin Phc coins. After that, copper coins were sporadically minted
during the L (10101226) and Trn (12261400) Dynasties, and, as
has been pointed out by Whitmore, were as much for a political as an
economic purpose since the Vietnamese relied heavily on the supply
of copper coins from China.458 It seems that the supply of Chinese
copper coins to northern Vietnam ran smoothly during these centuries
which gave considerable impetus to the rapid expansion of i Vits
economy. There was a brief period during the H Dynasty (14007)
when paper money was introduced.459 After liberating the country
from the Ming occupation (140728), the L Dynasty (14281788)
attempted to stabilize the increasing demand for cash by minting good
Vietnamese copper coins. It also reset the value of these coins: one
quan (long string) made ten tin (short string) and consisted of 600
copper cash coins. This standard value remained unchanged until the
nineteenth century.460
The one stumbling-block was that the minting of cash by the L
Dynasty failed to keep pace with the indigenous demand. In order to
reduce the shortage of these denomination coins, the central govern-
ment stepped up the number of coins minted in the state factories,
and it passed decrees (in 1434, 1486, 1658, and 1741) to forbid the
Vietnamese to select the good and neglect the damaged coins. These
efforts had little effect because there were different sorts of coins
which were minted in different metals. Copper and zinc coins simul-
taneously circulated in the country, especially the zinc ones minted
by the Mc Dynasty in the sixteenth century.
In order to stabilize the monetary system, in 1663, Thng Long
134 chapter ve
decreed all zinc coins be destroyed.461 More important to the monetary

situation was that, by the seventeenth century, the L/Trnh rulers
enjoyed an alternative source of supply of both minting materials and
coins from foreign merchants trading to Tonkin. As analysed in the
preceding chapters, great quantities of silver and, to a lesser extent,
Japanese zeni (copper coins) were imported into northern Vietnam
by the Dutch, Chinese and other foreign merchants. This affected the
silver/cash exchange ratio and had a great impact on the economy of
Tonkin.
The cash shortage in the 1650s and the VOCs import of Japanese
copper zeni into Tonkin
As the scarcity of local copper coins led to the fall in the exchange
ratio of silver/cash, causing a great devaluation in the silver imported
into Tonkin, foreign traders quickly switched from silver to copper,
especially to copper coins, in order to cut the losses which would
have been incurred by silver imports.462 Utilizing their advantageous
foothold of Macao, where Chinese copper coins could be either newly
minted or existing specie procured, in 1652, the Portuguese sent a
navet to Tonkin carrying a goodly sum in copper coins minted by the
Chinese residing in Macao. Despite the Tonkinese rulers attempts to
devaluate this specie, the Portuguese still profited around 20,000 fine
taels from this special cargo and, more importantly, relieved their
dependence on copper coins in business transactions. The scarcity of
cash afflicted not only Tonkin, it also caused upsets in Quinam, hence
the import of copper coins offered an even more spectacular profit in
the southern kingdom. In 1651 the Portuguese had reportedly earned
an impressive profit margin of 150 per cent from this copper coin,
enjoying a net profit of 180,000 taels from 120,000 taels worth of
zeni imported into Quinam.463
Having no access to the supply of Chinese copper coins at that
moment, the Dutch factors in Thng Long managed to reduce the
loss indirectly by shrewdly eschewing any straight competition with
the Chinese in purchasing local goods. Realizing that copper coins
often became dear when foreign ships arrived, the Dutch factors in
Tonkin proposed to their masters that from now on the Company
ships should be sent to Tonkin a little earlier. This would allow them
to commence their business transactions before the Chinese; should
this scheme go awry they should keep their silver unspent until the
Chinese had left for Japan.464 This was obviously a passive and, hence,
ineffectual solution. The cash shortage continued to ravage the Dutch

import and export trade. In April 1654, the Tonkin factors lamented
that the exchange rate, which had been 1 tael of silver for 1,600-1,700
cash in the last few months, had fallen to only 1/800. At this rate of
fall, predicted the factors, it would likely plummet to the rate of 1/700
to 600 to 500 within a short time.
In the same year, the High Government made its first effort towards
alleviating the Companys drawback in this copper cash equation, hav-
ing some copper zeni minted in Batavia and shipped to Tonkin for a
trial. This attempt failed because the L/Trnh rulers accepted only the
big coins and devalued the small ones.465 The cash plague showed no
sign of abating and after 1660 was more detrimental to the Company.
This year, the silver/cash ratio fell to 1/570 to 850 only, setting a new
record of a silver devaluation up to 30 per cent. The low exchange
rate was perhaps one of the reasons the Trnh rulers refused to accept
any of the silver the Dutch offered them for the delivery of silk. And,
perhaps to reduce to some extent the scarcity of copper coins which
seemed to have reached an alarming level, the Trnh rulers had a
great quantity of copper coins minted by the State mint. The courts
efforts to control the shortage of copper coins meant that the embry-
onic plan of the Japanese entrepreneur Resimon to import Japanese
copper zeni, as the Dutch chose to describe it figuratively, vanished
into thin air.466
Batavia was doubly disadvantaged as it had no means to dissipate
the sluggishness of its factors in their grappling with the shortage
of copper coins which compared badly with the dynamism of other
foreign merchants trading to Tonkin. Having thought long and deep,
in 1660 Batavia ordered the Deshima factory to purchase some Japa-
nese copper zeni as samples for Tonkin. The next year, 400,000 coins
were sent to the Dutch factory in Thng Long and this proved to be
a success, yielding a profit of 40 per cent.467 But the most successful
aspect of this trial was that besides silver, from now on the Company
could send Japanese copper zeni to Thng Long compensating, at least
partly, the loss in the silver trade the Company had had to endure thus
far in Tonkin. Having hit upon a good solution, from 1663 the Dutch
regularly imported Japanese copper zeni into Tonkin and, as soon as
this specie became popular and profitable in northern Vietnam, they
reduced the import of silver to a remarkably small quantity (Tables
1 and 3).
136 chapter ve
Table 3. The VOCs import of Japanese copper zeni into Tonkin, 1660-1679
(pieces, unless stated otherwise)
Year Total Year Total
1660 0 1670 7,750,000
1661 400,000 1671 c. 21,400,000
1662 0 1672 6,360,000
1663 9,230,000 1673 8,520,000
1664 c. 15,762,184 1674 23,809,523
1665 31,524,369 1675 17,568,000
1666 800,000 1676 c. 39,400,000
1667 10,080 lb. 1677 c. 5,000,000
1668 10,540,000 1678 0
1669 15,748,300 1679 0
Sources: VOC 1233, 1236, 1240, 1241, 1243/4, 1252, 1253, 1259, 1264, 1265, 1267/8,
1272, 1278, 1283, 1290, 1294, 1302, 1304, 1307, 1311, 1314, 1320, 1322, 1330, 1339;
Dagh-register Batavia 16611679.
This naturally prompts the question: what were these Japanese copper
zeni and how did they fit into the Vietnamese market? Generally
speaking, the export of Japanese copper coins to Vietnam can be
divided into two major phases; each phase marked by different sorts
of coins. The first period was the early seventeenth century when,
in an attempt to standardize the monetary system of Japan, the Japa-
nese Government decided that only good coins minted in Japan could
be circulated on the Japanese market. Coins imported from China
(toraisen) or minted privately in Japan in the earlier years (shichu-
sen) were banned from domestic circulation. The Japanese shuin-sen
merchants and the Dutch, Chinese, and Portuguese therefore exported
these banned and hence devalued coins in great quantities, mainly to
central Vietnam, where the Nguyn rulers, having neither a source of
copper nor a coin supply, either used them as money or melted them
to cast guns and utensils for daily use.468 Consequently, these coins
circulated in Tonkin alongside other sorts of cash. The French priest
Alexandre de Rhodes, who arrived in northern Vietnam in the late
1620s, observed two sorts of coins in use on the Tonkinese market:
the great coins imported into Tonkin by the Chinese and Japanese
and accepted throughout the whole country, and the small coins
minted locally and circulating only inside the capital and four sur-
rounding provinces.469
The second phase took place between 1659 and 1685. During this
period, the Japanese in Nagasaki were allowed to mint Nagasaki trade
coins for export. Besides the coins which were minted for the Nan
Ming in southern China and the Zheng family in Formosa in the later
period (eiryaku sen), the bulk of the Nagasaki trade coins was shipped
to both central and northern Vietnam. Most of these coins bore the
Chinese Song reign title of Yuanfeng (Viet. Nguyn Phong) and were
called genho tsuho by the Japanese.470
Illustration 11. The Japanese genho tsuho minted for export during
the 1659-1685 period
The genho tsuho coins were not only crucial to the economy of
Quinam, whose severe need of all sorts on coins to meet the great
demand of the local market virtually never abated throughout the sev-
enteenth century, they also played an indispensable role in balancing
the monetary system of Tonkin during the third quarter of the 1600s.
As already mentioned in passing, in the early 1650s, Tonkin suffered
a severe shortage of coins probably because of the disruption of the
regular cash flow from China owing to political chaos on the border.
The Portuguese therefore switched over to importing coins minted by
the Chinese in Macao into Tonkin. This trade yielded high profits.471
In order to cut the losses on the silver import as well as to reduce
their dependence on foreign copper cash, the VOC introduced copper
coins minted in Batavia into Tonkin in 1654. This experiment failed
and from this year to 1661, when it shipped some 400,000 Japanese
copper zeni to Tonkin as an experiment, the Dutch Company made no
effort to profit from the cash shortage in Tonkin.472 As the Japanese
copper coins were accepted and proved to be profitable in Tonkin,
they were increasingly imported by the Dutch as well as the Chinese
until the late 1670s. Thanks largely to the sufficiency of these coins,
the shortage of copper coins in Tonkin was basically solved; the silver/
cash ratio subsequently revived.
138 chapter ve
The revelation of the profitability of the Japanese copper zeni in

the Tonkin trade assumed even greater significance after the 1668
ban on the export of silver by the Japanese Government. If silver
still accounted for roughly 40 per cent of the investment capital in
1668, the last year of the dispatch of a consignment of silver bullion
to Tonkin by the Company, it was almost none in the following year,
but simultaneously 15,748,300 Japanese copper zeni accounted for
approximately 40 per cent of that years capital. In 1674, 23,809,000
zeni sent to Tonkin by the Dutch accounted for around 66 per cent of
the total capital and two years later, the share of this specie had even
increased to around 73 per cent. Taking the entire zeni period into
account, these Japanese copper coins provided around 22 per cent of
the annual capital sent to Tonkin by the Company.473
It may well be that proven Dutch capacity for importing Japanese
zeni into his kingdom was the reason for the Cha to grant the Dutch
the monopoly of this specie in Tonkin in 1675. The Company, how-
ever, could not enjoy this privilege for long because, in the following
year, zeni became cheap in northern Vietnam. Reporting trading con-
ditions at the factory in 1675, the chief of the Tonkin factory, Albert
Brevinck, informed his masters in Batavia that the Japanese copper
zeni had been losing profit by the day.474 The next year, copper ingots
were said to be preferred to zeni though the latter were still indispens-
able to the purchasing of local goods, particularly low-quality silk.
Armed with these figures, for the import of metals to Tonkin this
year, Batavia ordered the Deshima factory to lessen the number of
zeni, while expecting a good quantity of copper. In obedience to this
order, only 5,000,000 zeni were conveyed to Tonkin in 1677. The year
after, it was widely reported that from now on the Tonkin factory no
longer required the Japanese copper zeni.475 The Company once again
switched back to importing silver into Tonkin as it had done regularly
before the zeni period.
The reasons of this sudden end are a bit of a mystery. Iwao Sei-
ichi has suggested that the circulation of Japanese zeni in Tonkin had
been reduced after 1661 when an embassy from Qing China arrived in
Thng Long and ordered the L/Trnh rulers to strike Chinese copper
coins for circulation in Tonkin themselves.476 It is true that the Qing
decrees and presents arrived in Thng Long in 1662 and, in the follow-
ing year, Tonkin sent its first tribute to Peking.477 Nevertheless, this
seems to have had no effect at all on the import into or the circulation
of the Japanese zeni in Tonkin since these coins were imported in
growing quantities by the Dutch and the Chinese until 1677. It could
well be that the VOC stopped importing Japanese zeni into Tonkin
after 1677 because of the growing availability of Chinese coins allied
with the attempts of the Tonkinese court to mint good copper coins
in the State minting houses.
3. The arms trade and the import of other miscellaneous items
With the exception of silver and copper which constituted the most
distinguishable trends in the VOCs import trade with Tonkin during
the 16371700 period, the importation of all other commodities was
small by comparison. While Western items such as cloth and textiles
were too expensive for a relatively poor consumer market like Tonkin,
other Asian trade goods such as spices were largely imported into
northern Vietnam by Chinese and other Asian merchants. This con-
spired to make the VOCs importation of miscellaneous commodities
into northern Vietnam peripheral to that of silver and copper zeni,
and any such items were often a clear reflection of the Trnh rulers
demands.
Since the Trnhs ultimate aim in creating a relationship with the
Dutch was to obtain military support, understandably their regular
demand for goods, besides silver and copper and several sorts of
curiosities, from the Dutch Company consisted of weapons and such
military paraphernalia as pieces of ordnance and cannon balls and bul-
lets of various sizes, other ammunition, saltpetre, sulphur, and Arabian
horses. Most of the pieces of ordnance and the cannon balls which the
VOC sold to the Trnh rulers were those which were currently used
by the Company itself in Asia.478 In 1649, for instance, Cha Trnh
Trng informed Dutch chief factor Philip Schillemans that he wanted
ten iron ordnance pieces for himself and two more for his eldest son
when the Company ships arrived in Tonkin next time. In order to
please the Tonkinese ruler, the Dutch had to remove two cannon from
their establishment in Formosa to present to the Cha in 1650. These
pieces satisfied the Trnh ruler so much that he again asked for two
more cannon which shot balls with a larger diameter than those which
the Company had presented him that year.479 Because the armies of
Tonkin were constantly being defeated and overrun, during its fifth
campaign against Quinam (165560) the Trnh kept demanding can-
non, balls and all sorts of ordnance from the Company. In 1661, in
140 chapter ve
order to arm with all due speed an urgent campaign against Quinam,
the Cha asked for and confiscated six cannon from on board the
Meliskerken which was anchored at Doma.480
Table 4. Goods ordered by Cha Trnh Tc, 1668

2 metal ordnance which fire 60-tael balls
20 iron ordnance, to wit: 10 pieces of 50-tael balls and 10 pieces of 80-tael
balls; together with many ginjoujap [?] as had always been sent
100,000 catties of sulphur
50,000 catties of saltpetre
10,000 balls for each ordnance
20 pieces of red cloth
5 pieces of black cloth
5 pieces of blue cloth
together with 20 pieces of perpetuanen of all colours, as much amber as
the Governor-General would be pleased to send.
10 amber necklaces, all sorts of chintzes, as much white linen as had been
sent before.
6 barrels of olive oil, as much copper and tin as the Governor-General
would be pleased to send.
Source: Letter from Cha Trnh Tc to Batavia in 1668, in Dagh-register Batavia 1668
1669, 239-40.
The Dutch, in common with other foreign merchants, were far from
willing to deal with the Trnh rulers because the latter often devalued
the import goods in order to get away with paying more cheaply for
what they ordered and bought.481 In 1662, for instance, Cha Trnh
Tc divided the saltpetre which the Dutch imported into Tonkin for
him into three grades, a stratagem which reduced the average price
to only seven taels per picul whereas he had agreed with the Dutch
factors the year before to pay ten taels five maas per picul. This sub-
tracted 3,245 taels of silver or 11,009 guilders from the profit which
the Company had counted on making on this commodity. The reason
for this unexpected lowering in price, as explained by the Cha, was
that the saltpetre the Company offered him that year was white and
of poor quality; another consideration which had swayed him was the
current low price on the free market.482 The Trnh skinflint attitude to
payments discouraged the Dutch, who responded by trying to delay
or reduce the earlier demands.
In the late 1660s, perhaps in order to prepare for their seventh
campaign against Quinam (1672), the Trnh rulers increased their
annual orders for weapons and ammunition. Once bitten Batavia now
often delayed and cut down on the quantities, reasoning that the Dutch
themselves needed weapons badly in the long-drawn-out war with the
English in both Europe and Asia. Replying to the Governor-General in
1667, Cha Trnh Tc wrote in a disgruntled tone that the Dutch were
not the only people with enemies and needing weapons. He believed
Batavia could always reserve some arms and ammunition for him to
defend his fortresses as well.483
As the frequency of their conflicts with the Nguyn and the Mc
eased after 1672 and 1677, the Trnhs demand for weapons from the
Company lessened. Cannon were now frequently ordered to be cast or
bought in the Netherlands modelled after wooden mock-ups.484 This
kind of order, which often took the Company around three or four
years to fulfil, reflects the loss of prestige of Western weapons in the
eyes of the northern Vietnamese rulers, who paid less and less for
them. In 1678, for instance, the Dutch Company lost 3,000 guilders
on the pieces of ordnance which it had bought for the Tonkinese ruler
in the Netherlands because Cha Trnh Tc was so miserly in his
payments.485 From this period, all the guns to which the Cha took
exception were returned to Batavia. Instead, he and his successors
asked the Company to provide him with skilled Dutch constables and
gun-smiths who would reside in Thng Long to assist in the Trnh
war efforts.486
The Dutch and other foreign merchants also imported a great vari-
ety of exotic objects and curiosities into Tonkin. They included rare
animals such as Arabian horses, lions, and parrots; such varied sorts
of curiosities as Japanese printed textiles and screens, diamond rings,
amber, textiles, tulip bulbs, olive oil, and Spanish wine. Generally,
these curiosities were brought to Tonkin by the foreigners as presents
for the local rulers but, occasionally, the Cha, princes, and mandarins
asked the Dutch to either buy or to have these made for them.
Gifts were generally considered a favourable means by which for-
eign merchants could ingratiate themselves with the local authorities
in order to facilitate their trade. There was also a down side to this
gift-giving. Special demands could be a sort of burden, especially if
the local rulers were dissatisfied with the objects offered. In 1665, for
instance, the amber beads which Batavia sent the Cha and the Prince
as presents were not accepted because they were not red enough. The
Queen also was dissatisfied with the pearl that the Dutch offered,
demanding the Dutch to find another pearl which was similar to the
142 chapter ve
wooden model she had sent to them.487 In the summer of 1693, the
dissatisfaction of the Cha with the presents which the Company had
offered him even generated such tension that the chief of the Dutch
factory, Jacob van Loo, and the captain of the Company ship West-
broek were imprisoned. The reason was that the Cha was neither
satisfied with the horse which the Company had presented him, nor
had the amber he had ordered arrived.488 The imprisonment of the
Dutch factors occurred again in the following years whenever the
Trnh were discontent with presents and objects ordered.
the export trade (i): tonkinese silk for japan 143
CHAPTER SIX
THE EXPORT TRADE (I):

TONKINESE SILK FOR JAPAN
In vorige tyden hebben wy de syde en syde-manufacturen, by ons daar

ingekoft, met een schip directlijck nae Japan gesonden, en daarop rede-
lycke winsten behaalt, maar de voorsch. syde naderhant seer in prijs
geresen sijnde, behalven dat de Chinesen daar mede in het vaerwater
quamen, heeft die directe vaart en handel beginnen af te nemen, sulcx
dat men eyndelijck, vermits de sobere winsten en sware onkosten van soo
een schip daartoe specialijck te gebruycken, deselve heeft gestaeckt.
Pieter van Dam489
1. The Far Eastern silk trade prior to the early 1630s
Chinese raw silk and silk piece-goods were undoubtedly among the
most important merchandise which European merchants trading in
Asia in the early modern period attempted to procure for both the
intra-Asian trade and the European market. In pre-modern times,
these products were much sought after in Japan, where they could be
exchanged for silver which was an important requisite in the intra-
Asian trade. Long before the Portuguese participation in the Far
Eastern silk trade, the exchange of Chinese silk for Japanese silver
had been consummately managed by Chinese and Japanese merchants.
Then by the sixteenth century, the increasing raids by Japanese pirates
(wako) along the China coast forced the Ming Dynasty to limit the
maritime activities of its coastal inhabitants and to prohibit Chinese
merchants from trading with Japan. As they faded from the scene,
the Portuguese, having established a system of footholds from India
to China, opened their lucrative China-Japan silk trade in 1545. The
Ming ban on Chinese shipping to Japan enabled the Portuguese to
complete the circle of their intra-Asian trade network and enjoy the
fruit of the profitable Macao-Japan silk trade through the latter half
of the sixteenth century.490
At the dawn of the seventeenth century, the Portuguese Macao-
Japan silk trade declined as their privileged position in Japan eroded.
More seriously, from being king of the castle, the strength of Asian
144 chapter six
merchants, soon compounded by the arrival of other European rivals,

challenged the Portuguese Asian trading network. Chinese merchants
remained the most formidable competitors and after the 1590s the
Japanese also emerged as another doughty rival. Organized under the
shuin-sen policy, the latter began to frequent South-East Asian ports
with large amounts of precious metals eager to import Chinese silk
and other marketable goods for their home market.
The arrival of the English and the Dutch in Asia at the end of the
sixteenth century was another serious threat to the Portuguese trading
position. In 1609, the VOC established a factory at Hirado (Japan).
In the first two decades Dutch Japanese trade was far from significant
as the VOC was not yet secure in its position in East Asia.491 Hav-
ing no direct access to China, the Dutch ships frequented South-East
Asian ports where Chinese merchants often arrived with silk and silk
piece-goods. Yet, the annual amount of Chinese silk which the Com-
pany could manage to obtain from these rendezvous was insubstantial,
although, in order to foster its Japan trade, the Company often reduced
the demand for the Chinese silk for the Netherlands whenever the
demands of these two marketplaces collided.492
Among the trading-places where VOC ships sailed to buy Chinese
silk was Hi An. As mentioned in Chapter Three, all the attempts
of the Dutch to trade with this place, just as their vain efforts in
China, resulted in only hatred and losses.493 With the establishment
of the Formosa trade in 1624, to a certain extent, the Dutch were able
to compensate for their inability to enter into a commercial relation
with China.494 From the early 1630s, VOC attempts to expand its Far
Eastern trade happened to concur with several political and commer-
cial transformations in Japan which contributed enormously to the
enlargement of its trading network. A few years after its abolition of
the shuin-sen network in 1635, the Japanese Government deported the
Portuguese from Nagasaki, triggering remarkable changes within the
East Asian maritime trade network.495 In 1636 Nicolaas Couckebacker,
the Opperhoofd of the Hirado factory, joyfully informed his masters
in Batavia of the declaration of the Japanese seclusion policy and the
subsequent possibility to expand the Company trade to several places
with which Japanese merchants formerly had regularly traded.496
Considering the current transformation in the Far Eastern trade, the
High Government in Batavia confidently reported its planned strat-
egy to take over the Japanese trading network at several places in
the Indo-Chinese Peninsula to the Gentlemen XVII.497 Among the
countries targeted was Tonkin which enjoyed a good reputation as a

silk-producer and silk-exporter of the East among European merchants
and travellers.498
In 1637 the first Dutch ship arrived in northern Vietnam; with it
the VOC relationship with Tonkin was officially established. From
this year, the Company began to export in the main Tonkinese raw
silk and silk piece-goods to Japan and, to a much lesser extent, to the
Netherlands (see Figure 4). In short, the VOCs Tonkin trade revolved
around the central activity of exporting local raw silk to Japan and
importing Japanese silver back into Tonkin.499
For the
Netherlands
For Japan 12,600 (9.4%)
122,400
(90.6%)
Figure 4. Intended division of the Tonkinese silk cargo, 1645

(taels)
Source: Dagh-register Batavia 1644/5, 108-22.
During its first thirty-three years, the VOCs Tonkin-Japan direct silk
trade was subject to various fluctuations which clearly fell into three
main phases: the period of experiment (163740); the period of high
profit (164154); and the period of decline (165570). While the
Company trade with Tonkin managed to keep going until 1700, and
its export of Tonkinese silk to Japan still occurred sporadically in
the 16701700 period, the Tonkin-Japan silk trade generally ended
in 1670 when Batavia halted the Tonkin-Japan direct shipping for
two reasons: unprofitable trade conditions and to control the private
trade between these two places. After that the Tonkinese silk cargoes
intended for the Japan trade were all carried to Batavia, where they
were transhipped onto the Japan-bound ships.
146 chapter six
2. The period of experiment, 16371640
At least thirteen years before commencing their trade with Tonkin,

the Dutch in Japan had already taken note of the marketability and
profitability of Tonkinese silk goods on the Japanese market. In 1624
the Dutch factors at Hirado noted that among the junks arriving from
various destinations, one was from Tonkin laden with silk and silk
piece-goods.500 In 1633 the Hirado factory again reported to Bata-
via that among the 2,500 piculs of raw silk the Chinese shipped to
Japan, a large amount was Tonkinese.501 In 1636, the Chinese made
a large profit on their silk trade thanks to the high sales price, to wit:
Tonkinese silk was generally sold at Hirado at 290 taels per picul;
the Quinamese silk at 233 taels, the Chinese silk at 267 taels, and the
bogy or yellow silk was sold at 325, 288, and 240 taels per picul.502
To prepare for the inaugural voyage to Tonkin the following year,
Chief Factor Couckebacker gathered information from those who had
visited Tonkin and made a detailed report on the Tonkinese silk trade
noting pertinent data about geographical, political, and trading situa-
tions, local customs, silk harvests, the current prices of silk, and the
like. He optimistically calculated that annually, besides other local
goods, northern Vietnam could deliver 15001600 piculs of raw silk,
5 to 6 thousand piculs of piece-goods and a batch of cinnamon.503 A
cargo valued at 188,166 guilders consisting of 60,000 taels of silver,
300 piculs of copper, 200 piculs of iron ingots and other miscel-
laneous items was prepared for the Grol, which sailed to Tonkin in
early 1637.504
The inaugural voyage was a success. The cargo valued 188,166
guilders was exchanged for silk and silk piece-goods at fair prices: 15
faccaar from the King; 16 faccaar from the free market; and 17 fac-
caar from some mandarins.505 In July, the Grol left Tonkin for Japan
via Formosa with a cargo worth around 190,000 guilders, consisting
of 53,695 catties of raw silk (168,378 guilders) and 9,665 various
piece-goods (11,268 guilders).506 In Japan, the Tonkinese silk cargo
was sold at 180 taels per picul, the bogy or yellow silk at 265 taels,
making a general profit margin of around 80 per cent. In January 1638,
Hartsinck, the chief factor of the Tonkin factory, returned to Tonkin
with a capital of 298,609 guilders. This year, the Company formally
established a factory and, with the Chas permission, explored the
potential of the silk trade in the north-western city of Zenefay (most
probably Yn Bi). In July the Zandvoort returned to Japan with 800
piculs of raw silk; another cargo of 285 piculs of raw silk and 8,972
silk piece-goods was shipped to Japan on board a chartered Chinese
junk. At the sale in Japan, Tonkinese raw silk fetched an average
of 240 taels per picul, reaping 60 taels more than the year before.
Meanwhile, the sale of 300 bales of Persian silk at Nagasaki report-
edly yielded a loss of 4,525 guilders.507 The second Tonkin cargo that
year valued at 113,645 guilders, which was loaded on the chartered
Chinese junk, was expected to contribute a profit of at least 230,000
guilders.508
Hartsincks missive analysing both the advantageous and disadvan-
tageous aspects of the Tonkin trade raised optimistic hopes in Batavia.
The local capados (eunuchs) were the main obstruction to any success
in the free trade the Cha had granted the Company. These manda-
rins, who had carved themselves a niche as brokers and speculators,
manoeuvred to monopolize the silk supply to foreign merchants in
order to squeeze more of its silver from the Company forcing it to
purchase silk at dearer prices, and hinder the Dutch from carrying out
direct transactions with local people. Although this had not yet become
clear, the high expectations fostered by the Trnh ruler of creating a
military alliance against his Nguyn rival with the Company was to
lead the Company into a costly military involvement in the future.
The maintenance of a factory in Tonkin was said to be impractical,
as Hartsinck had pointed a negative picture of Tonkin as a treacher-
ous and thievish country, and had intimated the factory might be
looted after the ships had left. The competition from the Portuguese
and the Chinese was also fierce. In 1637, for instance, the Portuguese
arrived from Macao with two junks and one navet; two other vessels,
one priests junk and one galliota had arrived in Tonkin the previous
November and December and had wintered there to buy silk. As the
Dutch sailed up to the capital Thng Long, these two vessels were
preceding down the Hng River preparatory to departing for Macao,
carrying on them 620 piculs of raw silk. In April the other Portuguese
junks left Tonkin with a large cargo consisting of, among other goods,
965 piculs of raw silk.509 None of this dimmed the current profit of the
Tonkin trade, however. With the exception of a certain amount of sil-
ver which the Dutch factory had to advance local rulers for the delivery
of silk, they were exempted from arrival and departure taxes.
The success of the 1637 voyage heralded a handsome profit for the
Companys Tonkin-Japan silk trade in the following years. Hartsinck,
despite his complaints about the commercial climate in Tonkin, also
148 chapter six
confidently calculated that the Dutch factors would be able to purchase

around 1,000 piculs of raw silk besides a good part of piece-goods
for Japan. The annual profit from this trade, according to Hartsinck,
could be around four tons of gold. These promising figures encouraged
Batavia to carry on its trade with northern Vietnam.510
In 1639 and 1640 the Company trade with Tonkin was closely
interwoven with political activities. In 1639 Couckebacker, who was
assigned to be the Company representative in negotiating with the
Trnh, visited Tonkin to discuss the military alliance and future attacks
on Quinam in more depth. In the same year, the Trnh ruler sent a del-
egation to Batavia to consolidate the mutual relationship. Dutch trade
in Thng Long was therefore facilitated. In this year, the Tonkinese
silk cargo for Japan which was valued at up to 311,268 guilders con-
sisted of 685 piculs of raw silk. In 1640, the Companys capital for the
Tonkinese silk trade was increased to 439,861 guilders.511 Enriched by
this large amount of money, the Tonkin factory managed to purchase
three rich silk cargoes valuing approximately 758,455 guilders and
sent these to Batavia, where 622,000 guilders worth of raw silk and
silk piece-goods were then reshipped to Japan.512
Disappointment was in store as these large cargoes yielded only an
average profit margin of 40 per cent. Despite the temporary fall in the
Tonkinese silk profit, Batavia once again remitted the Tonkin factory
a good capital sum in the following year. The confidence of Batavia
was paid off handsomely as its Tonkin-Japan silk trade began to take
off in this year, a trend which strengthened.
3. The period of high profit, 16411654
The boom period of the VOCs Tonkinese silk trade coincided with
some crucial political transformations in East Asian countries as well
as a remarkable change in the regional maritime trade network. When
the final attempt of the Macao Portuguese to resurrect their trade with
Japan failed in 1640, a large number of Portuguese merchants had no
option but to migrate to the South-East Asian ports in search of new
ventures. At more or less the same timebecause of the Japanese
Governments seclusion policyJapanese merchants were deprived
of their Tonkin-Japan silk trade, having to cede it to the Dutch and
the Chinese. In China, after the invasion of the Manchu in 1644, a
protracted civil war devastated the economy. This political chaos also
caused a drastic fall in the regular influx of Chinese goods to the

Dutch entrept of Formosa.513
Shortly before the decline of the Formosa trade, in 1641 the
itowappu (the yarn allotment) system in Japan was extended to cover
all Chinese silk and silk piece-goods imported to Japan.514 This would
have undoubtedly reduced the profit margins on the Chinese goods the
Company imported to Japan, if the heads of the five shogunal cities
and the Governor of Nagasaki were not to raise the itowappu sales
prices of Chinese varieties.515 Confronted with the revision of the
itowappu, the VOC had to readjust its silk trade and its silk supplies
to Japan in order to avoid falling into the trap of overdependence on
this sales system. Besides strengthening the Tonkin trade by providing
more capital and ships to boost the import volume of Tonkinese silk
for Japan, Batavia also sought to import other silks which were not
restricted by the itowappu system. In 1644, the Dutch factory in Persia
purchased 527 bales of Persian silk at excessively high prices, valued
at a total of 427,249 guilders to send to Japan. It was a wasted effort.
This expensive cargo yielded only 50 per cent in Nagasaki, which was
highly unsatisfactory in view of the high investment capital and exces-
sive expenses incurred.516 Batavia therefore decided the next year to
use the capital with which it had intended to purchase Persian silk to
buy Bengali silk for the Japanese market.517 Thereafter Bengali raw
silk and piece-goods were regularly exported to Japan and steadily
gained a place on the market, before turning out to be the most market-
able and profitable silk goods in Japan from the mid-1650s.518
Silk trade under military alliances, 16411643

As discussed in detail in Chapter Three, the years from 1641 to 1643
witnessed the most intimate political relations between Tonkin and
the VOC. Batavia sent three fleets to assist the Trnh armies in their
attack on Quinam in 1642 and 1643. Two out of these three fleets
were defeated off Hi An.519
Basking in the glow of this intimate relationship, the Companys
silk trade in Tonkin was conducted satisfactorily. In Japan, however,
Tonkinese silk was still sold at irregular gross profits, its sales price
fluctuating to the rhythm of the import volume of Chinese yarn. In
1641, the Tonkinese silk cargo totalling 202,703 guilders encountered
grievous losses in Nagasaki owing to the reiteration of the proclama-
tion of sumptuary laws by the Shogunate.520 Because of the current
150 chapter six
depression of the silk auction in Nagasaki, the council of the Deshima

factory decided to ship back all the goods which could not fetch the
cost price there, hoping that they could be sold at a fair profit in the
Netherlands or in other regional markets.521 Despite the stagnation of
the silk market in Japan, a capital of 300,000 guilders was prepared for
the Tonkin factory.522 The next year a Tonkin cargo of 129,352 guil-
ders fetched a good profit in Japan because, as the Dutch in Nagasaki
were informed, Chinese piece-goods had risen more than 30 per cent
in Miyako, Osaka, and Edo. In the light of the meagre imports by the
Chinese, they were likely to rise a further 20 per cent. The heads of
the five shogunal cities also urged the Dutch to import more silk for
the next year.523
Seeing the high profit margins which the Japan trade offered in the
1642 trading season, Chinese merchants who used to sail to Formosa
now sailed directly to Nagasaki in 1643. In that year, many junks of
the Chinese mandarin Zheng Zhilong alias Iquan arrived at Nagasaki,
carrying some large cargoes of silk and silk piece-goods. This stream
of Chinese junks sailing directly to Japan caused a drastic fall in the
flow of Chinese goods to Formosa. The Siam and Cambodia cargoes
were also small, reflecting the shortage of export goods in these coun-
tries.524 Meanwhile, Tonkinese silk gained a good profit of 120 per
cent in Nagasaki, having sold at 272 taels 6 maas 9 condrins per picul
on average.525 The itowappu prices for Chinese raw silk were fixed at
275 taels for the first grade and 245 taels for the second. The heads
of the five shogunal cities and the Governor of Nagasaki promised
the Dutch to raise the itowappu prices to 295 and 265 the next year,
provided that the Company were to supply the market with a large
quantity.526
Decline of Formosa and rise of Tonkin, 16441654

In August 1644 Governor Lemaire in Formosa informed the Deshima
factory that half of the Companys demand for Chinese goods from
Formosa remained unfulfilled.527 In the meantime, Iquans junks
continued to sail directly from mainland China to Nagasaki heav-
ily loaded with silk cargoes. In Japan, Chinese raw silk of the first
and the second grades were sold respectively at 355 and 325 taels
per picul, offering the Chinese a high profit margin.528 In August
1648 a letter from the Governor of Formosa to Fredrik Coyett, the
chief factor of the Deshima factory, informed him that the import of
commodities from China had shrunk to almost nothing.529 In 1651,

Batavia was informed that the Formosa trade had managed to gain a
small advantage albeit that mainland China had provided no important
merchandise to Formosa.530
In Tonkin, the Dutch factory was now also confronted with a more
difficult phase. Feeling disappointed with the poor military perfor-
mance of the Dutch in the 1642 and 1643 campaigns, Cha Trnh
withdrew some trading privileges he had previously granted the VOC
altogether and grew stricter in dealing with the Dutch factors.531 The
Chas palpable discontent encouraged his officials to obstruct Dutch
trade, causing the Company many losses. Local politics also conspired
to thwart the Dutch. Several rebellions and insurrections which broke
out during this period not only largely damaged the national economy,
they also obstructed the foreign trade of Tonkin. Yet, despite this
brooding atmosphere, the VOCs Tonkinese silk trade generally flour-
ished until the mid-1650s. To strengthen it, Batavia decided to leave
a junior merchant and some assistants provided with a substantial
sum of money in Tonkin after ships had sailed to Japan. This was to
foster the procurement of local products, especially the winter silk.
The Company now also started to export more Tonkinese raw silk,
silk piece-goods, and several sorts of local products such as musk and
cinnamon to the home market in the Netherlands.532
In the years 1644 and 1645, the Dutch factors in Thng Long ran the
silk trade satisfactorily, exporting large cargoes of Tonkinese silk and
silk piece-goods to Japan, where they yielded good profits. In Naga-
saki, the 1644 cargo of 299,572 guilders consisting of approximately
665 piculs of raw silk made a profit of 104 per cent (or 90 taels of
silver per every picul of raw silk).533 The next year, Tonkinese raw silk
was sold at 322 taels per picul. The other raw silks generally fetched
lower profits: the Persian silk yarn which had been purchased at a
much higher price was sold at only 262 and 254 taels per picul,534 and
the itowappu price for Chinese raw silk was fixed at 320 and 280 taels
per picul for the first and the second grades respectively.535 Another
hundred piculs of Tonkinese silk were forwarded to the Netherlands,
as Formosa was incapable of supplying the commodity.536
152 chapter six
Table 5. Composition of the Tonkinese silk cargo to Japan, 1644

(totalling 299,572 guilders)
64,515 catties of raw silk of which:
50,712 catties from local people
13,803 catties from the Cha and local mandarins
8,017 pieces of raw soumongij
2,334 pieces of raw baas
2,911 pieces of white pelings of which:
2,042 pieces figured
869 pieces plain
6,162 pieces of Tonkinese hockiens
4,043 pieces of Senuasche [?] hockiens
4,340 pieces of white chios or unpatterned satijntges
233 pieces of velvet lined with gold and diamond
6,233 catties of sitouw or coarse wrought silk
Sources: NFJ 57, 1 Sept. 1644; Dagh-register Batavia 16445, 108-22.
Silk piece-goods
32,019 (26.16%)
Raw silk
90,000 (73.53%) Cardamom
239 (0.19%)
Cinnamon
142 (0.12%)
Figure 5. Intended division of the Tonkinese goods for Japan, 1645

(taels Japanese silver)
Source: Appendix 5.
In the next two years, the profit on the Tonkinese silk trade decreased
slightly. This was the unhappy outcome of the heavy rains in 1645
which flooded a large part of the Tonkinese mulberry groves. Con-
sequently, the capital which Batavia had remitted for the purchase of
winter silk remained unspent. Worse still, the Zwarte Beer and Hil-
legaersbergh, which conveyed the Tonkinese silk cargoes to Japan
in July 1646, were caught in a storm at sea; most of the merchandise
was soaked.537 Because of its spoiled condition, Tonkinese raw silk
generally gained 50 taels less per picul than the previous year. None-
theless the other raw silks yielded a nice profit: Chinese silk was sold
at 300 taels per picul for the first grade and 260 for the second; the
Persian at 206 taels per picul at first but slumped to 198 taels at the
end of the sales season.538
In 1647, high-ranking eunuchs at the L/Trnh court attempted to
persuade the Cha to approve their plan to monopolize the silk sup-
ply to the Dutch Company. According to their proposal, the Dutch
purchase of silk should be confined to some appointed merchants only
and at fixed prices. Had the Cha approved these mandarins plan,
reported the Dutch factors in Thng Long, the Companys Tonkin trade
would have been baulked.539
At the same time, the Chinese competition in Tonkin remained
fiercely unremitting. Almost inevitably, some clashes and scuffles
broke out between the Chinese and the Dutch.540 Seeing the impres-
sive profits which Tonkinese silk yielded in Japan and basking in the
protection of the Zheng family, Chinese merchants returned to Tonkin
with 80,000 taels of silver. By offering higher purchase prices to local
weavers and brokers, they experienced no trouble in exporting around
400 piculs of raw silk and another large batch of silk piece-goods. The
stiff Chinese competition in purchasing silk brought the transactions
of the Dutch factory to a complete standstill. Only after the Chinese
had left Tonkin for Japan in July, could the Dutch factors commence
their business. Thanks to an abundant silk harvest this year, they expe-
rienced no difficulty in purchasing a cargo of 634 piculs of raw silk
for Japan, where it made a reasonable profit margin.541 This year, the
itowappu prices for Chinese first- and the second-grade raw silk were
310 and 270 taels per picul respectively while Bengali yarn was report-
edly sold at 80 taels less than it had previously yielded.542
Under the weak management of the Chief Factor Philip Schillemans,
cracks began to appear in the Tonkin trade in 1648.543 This year,
Chinese merchants arrived with 120,000 taels and again offered local
sellers 20 taels of silver for every picul of raw silk, siphoning off most
of the silk available on the local market. So abundant was this years
summer silk harvest that, after the Chinese had left, the Dutch fac-
tors still managed to buy 522 piculs of raw silk, 12,273 pelings, 14
piculs of cardamom, a good amount of velvet, sumongij, chiourong,
putting together a large cargo worth 393,584 guilders for Japan.544 In
Nagasaki, the Tonkinese raw silk bought from the Cha and the Crown
Prince, which occupied the bulk of the cargo, was sold at 333 and 279
taels per picul respectively. The Bengali silk did not fetch the price
154 chapter six
it should have done and the piece-goods yielded an even lower profit
while the Persian silk which had necessarily been purchased at high
prices yielded less than 20 per cent.545
In 1649, the volume of the Tonkinese silk cargo for Japan decreased
dramatically hampered by the scarcity of goods in the aftermath of
storms and floods. Out of the large capital which the Company had
invested for the Tonkin trade, 160,000 guilders remained unspent and
had to be shipped back to Formosa at the end of the trading season.
Worse still, shortly after its departure, the Kampen, carrying the Tonki-
nese silk cargo worth 254,126 guilders, ran into a storm at sea. When
sheltering close to the island of Nanau off the Chinese coast, thirteen
crewmen were captured by the local inhabitants and the ship was
chased away.546 All such misfortunes aside, the Tonkinese silk cargo
yielded a spectacular profit of around 400,000 guilders. Happily, the
Bengali silk cargo also made a good profit which buoyed the Dutch
up with high hopes of satisfactory profits in the following years as the
Bengali yarn gained a wider reputation on the Japanese market.547 In
1650, the Tonkin cargo valued at 329,613 guilders, consisting of 595
piculs of raw silk, fetched a relatively low profit in Nagasaki because
the sales price dropped 174 taels per picul on average compared to the
sales of the previous year. Similarly, Bengali raw silk also lost 233
taels per picul. The slump in the sales prices in Nagasaki that year was
caused by the enormous amount of silk that the Chinese had carried to
Japan: sixty-nine junks from mainland China had reportedly brought
a total of 930 piculs of raw silk to Nagasaki while several junks from
northern Vietnam carried 820 piculs of Tonkinese raw silk, not count-
ing another sizeable amount of silk piece-goods.548
At the time of the erosion of the Tonkin trade, a rumour circu-
lated claiming that the private trade of the Company servants in the
North-Eastern Quarters was flourishing on a very large scale. Disqui-
eted by this rumour, the Gentlemen XVII ordered Batavia to inspect
the Company trade in these places. Willem Verstegen was sent as
an extraordinary commissioner to Tonkin in 1651 to inspect the fac-
tory and assist the factors to overcome the challenges with which the
capado had confronted them. Ongiatule was angling to have the Dutch
factory removed to a place under his governance in order to monopo-
lize the silk supply to the Company.549 In that same year Batavia
decided to promote the Tonkin factory to a permanent trading centre
in view of the visible improvement in the Tonkinese silk trade after
Commissioner Verstegens visit and the good profit margins which
Tonkinese silk had been bringing on the Japanese market in the recent
years. This plan, however, was short-lived. Batavia withdrew the plan
shortly after its approval because of the political and trading instabil-
ity in Tonkin, which made it a precarious undertaking to keep a large
capital sum there with only a few servants after the Company ships
had sailed away.550
Nevertheless, the Dutch Tonkinese silk trade evidently did improve
after the commissioners visit. In the summer of 1651, the VOC shipped
a silk cargo of around 362,000 guilders to Japan, where the profit it
made was reported to be 102 per cent.551 Tonkinese raw silk was sorted
into three kinds: the primero was sold at 277 and 283 taels 7 maas per
picul; the secondo at 239; and the silk which had been delivered by the
royal family was sold at 225 taels 9 maas per picul. Bengali silk was
sold at even higher profit margins, yielding 174, 121, and 192
per cent respectively for the finished silk, bariga, and pee.552
Inspired by the satisfactory profit the Tonkinese silk cargo had
yielded in Japan the Company decided to send 680,194 guilders to
northern Vietnam for the 1653 trading season, but this large invest-
ment did not succeed as expected. In his letter to Batavia, Keijser, the
chief factor of the Tonkin factory, reported that the Tonkin trade had
begun to decline and offered less profit by the day and consequently
the maintenance of a permanent factory in the capital Thng Long
was very injurious.553 In Tonkin the trade was worse than it has ever
been. Flooding had destroyed a large part of the mulberry groves.
More seriously, the shortage of copper coins caused a general increase
of around 20 per cent in the purchase price of all merchandise.554 The
price of raw silk and silk piece-goods had risen. The cabessa, for
instance, was bought at the price of 8, 7 and 7 faccaar.555 The silk
piece-goods were also very scarce because local weavers, shocked by
the high costs of raw silk, stopped their production of piece-goods. Out
of the Tonkin cargo of 300,000 guilders to Japan this year, raw silk
and silk piece-goods were valued at not more than 174,531 guilders.556
This cargo yielded only 70 per cent in Japan, which was too inconsid-
erable in view of the huge expenses and high risks of the Tonkin trade.
The Company therefore reduced the investment capital assigned to
the Tonkin factory in 1654 to 149,750 guilders only, reserving, when
added to the money unspent remaining at the Tonkin factory, a total
capital of around 365,238 guilders for the next trading season.557
In 1654, the volume of the Tonkinese silk cargo shrank further and
it was valued at only 159,000 guilders. In Nagasaki, the net profit on
156 chapter six
the Tonkinese silk trade continued to fall, making a profit margin of

only 34 per cent while the Bengali silk rumals and charkhanas were
sold at gross profits of 66 and 122 per cent respectively.558 Because
of these disappointing profits, the Company exported no Tonkinese
silk yarn to Japan in 1655.559 While the Vietnamese silk trade faltered,
the Companys silk trade in Bengal continued to progress. The large
gap between the purchase and sales prices brought the Bengali silk a
general profit margin of at least 120 per cent this year and marked an
end to the lucrative period of Tonkinese silk in Japan.560
2400 Tonkinese Total Silk

2200
2000
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
1637
1639
1641
1643
1645
1647
1649
1651
1653
1655
1657
1659
1661
1663
1665
1667
1669
1671
1673
1675
1677
1679
1681
1683
1685
1687
1689
1691
1693
1695
1697
Figure 6. Silk exported to Japan by the VOC, 16371697
(thousand Dutch guilders)
Sources: Adapted mainly from: Klein, De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel, 168 (See Appen-
dix 6); Oskar Nachod, Die Beziehungen, Table C. The total amount of silk imported into
Japan in the years 1663 and 1664 appeared neither in Kleins nor Nachods tables but
the Tonkinese silk cargoes to Japan were recorded in Generale Missiven, III, and Dagh-
register Batavia 1663 and 1664.
Note: the total amount of silk imported into Japan in 1640 was 3,457 guilders.
4. The period of decline, 16551671
The decline of the VOCs Tonkin silk trade had been foreseen some
years before the Companys export volume of Tonkinese silk to Japan
finally fell to nought in 1655 (see Appendix 6 and Figure 6). The
decline was revealed not only in the smaller and irregular silk car-
goes the Tonkin factory sent to Japan during the early 1650s, but
also in the narrowing gap between the purchase and the sales prices
of Tonkinese raw silk (see Appendix 7 and Figure 7). As the annual
profit margins brought by Tonkinese silk in Japan began to grow
irregular from the early 1650s, Bengali silk quietly gained ground
on the Japanese market. In 1649, Dircq Snoecq, the chief factor of
the Deshima factory, observing the excellent profits yielded by that
years Bengali silk cargo, already hoped that Indian silk goods would
be profitable in Japan in the years to come when they had become
better known.561 The annual profit which Bengali silk contributed
to the Japan trade of the Company rose steadily. In 1653 the gross
profit of Bengali silk shot up to 174, 135, 121, and 192 per cent
respectively for the finished silk, bariga, cabessa, and pee, achieving
the highest profit margin among the textiles the Company imported
to Japan. The mongo, another unfinished Bengali silk which was sent
as a trial, even yielded 200 per cent. The Bengal cargo of 150,388
guilders, therefore, made a net profit of 191,241 guilders in Japan in
that year.562
In 1655, a crucial change in the Japanese sales system of all silks
imported to Japan affected the division of the silks the Company
imported into Japan. Between November 1654 and September 1655,
fifty-seven Chinese junks arrived in Nagasaki, flooding the Japan
market with 1,401 piculs of raw silk and another large quantity of
piece-goods.563 Finding itself unable to buy this excessive amount of
silks, the Japanese guild of silk merchants petitioned the Government
to relieve it of the obligation to buy all Chinese silk. The Shogun
therefore cancelled the itowappu system altogether.564 The abolition
of the yarn allotment raised anxieties in Batavia for, without this fix-
ing-price policy, Chinese silk would undoubtedly be sold at higher
profit margins. Batavia was worried about the current weakness of
the Company in importing Chinese silk. Although civil war in China
disrupted the flow of Chinese goods to Formosa, Zheng Chenggong
(Coxinga) continued to carry out an exclusive trade in Chinese silk
with Japan. As a consequence, the profit on the Chinese silk trade had
fallen into the hands of the Zheng family, not the Company.
Under these circumstances, Bengali silk became the key answer
to the challenging question of how the Company could maintain its
lucrative silk trade with Japan. Following its 1653 success, Bengali
silk continued to yield handsome gross profits. In 1656 the average
profit margin of the cargo of Indian yarn reportedly stood at 101 per
cent.565 So marketable and profitable was Bengali silk on the Japan
158 chapter six
market that, in 1661, the Dutch factors in Nagasaki wrote to Batavia

stating that they were willing to receive as much Bengali silk as the
Company could afford to send.566 During the 165672 period, the
VOCs export of Bengali silk to Japan grew rapidly, occupying four-
fifths of the total amount of raw silk which the Company sold on the
Japanese market.567
The profitability of Bengali silk on the Japanese market caused a
rapid decline in the export volume of Tonkinese silk to Japan from the
mid-1650s. The instability of Tonkinese politics and its economy was
another important reason which accelerated the decline in the VOCs
silk trade with northern Vietnam. The fifth and the most costly military
campaign in the series between Tonkin and Quinam which lasted for
almost six years (165560) absorbed most of the workforce of the
country and largely destroyed its economy.568 In this unpredictable
environment, the annual export volumes of Tonkinese silk to Japan
by the VOC were unstable. In 1657, for instance, out of the 300,000
guilders which Batavia remitted for the Tonkin trade, the Dutch in
Thng Long could manage to spend only 93,606 guilders on Tonkinese
silk. Feeling disappointed with the current depression of the Tonkinese
silk production, Batavia again halted the export of Tonkinese silk to
Japan in 1658. Nevertheless the Companys Tonkin-Japan silk trade
was resumed in the next year, when 185,000 guilders were sent to
Thng Long to purchase silk for Japan. In the years just previous to
1662, when the Formosa base of the Company was finally conquered
by the Zheng, the annual Tonkinese silk cargoes to Japan were valued
at around 180,000 guilders. Despite these relatively large shipments,
the profit margins yielded in Japan were too small.569 In contrast to
the current low profit made by Tonkinese silk, the Bengali product
yielded on average 110 per cent in 1658 and continued to rise spec-
tacularly in the following years, reaching the impressive record of 192
per cent in 1671.570 The popularity and profitability of Bengali silk
from the mid-1650s decisively supplanted the predominant position of
Tonkinese silk on the Japanese market.
The loss of Formosa to the Zheng in 1662 as well as the Companys
abortive Tinnam strategy led to the decision of Batavia to repromote
the Tonkin factory to the status of a permanent trading station in
1663.571 By this elevation, Batavia hoped to foster the procurement of
both Chinese gold and musk and Tonkinese silk for both Japan and the
Netherlands.572 Under these circumstances, between 1664 and 1668,
the Tonkinese silk cargoes sent to Japan were relatively large, valued
at 250,000 and 300,000 guilders per shipment. In 1669, the Tonkinese

silk cargo to Japan was even valued as high as 432,000 guilders.573
These lucrative cargoes were assembled primarily because of the per-
manent factory and secondly because of the Second Anglo-Dutch War
(16657). As the war in Europe made sailing conditions hazardous,
home-bound Dutch shipping was suspended. The Tonkinese silk car-
goes intended for the Netherlands were therefore rerouted to Japan.
Considering the prospect of recommencing the export of Tonkinese
silk piece-goods to Europe once the war ended, the Dutch factors in
Thng Long dared not to stop buying Tonkinese silk, fearing that the
local farmers would turn the mulberry groves into paddy-fields. The
only option open to them was to send the Tonkinese silk cargoes to
Japan.574 Notwithstanding these sizeable shipments, the profit margins
were disappointingly meagre. In 1664, for instance, the Tonkin cargo
of 387,135 guilders which was about one-quarter of the total capital
imported to Japan that year barely scraped a 19 per cent profit. The
Companys plan to send one skilled silk-weaver to Tonkin to assist
the regeneration of the silk trade was consequently cancelled.575 The
1665 silk load which was valued at up to 337,779 guilders again only
just made a profit of 20 per cent.576
In the next two years, Tonkinese silk suddenly once more turned
out to be marketable when two cargoes valued at 250,876 and 299,000
yielded respectively 101 and 112 per cent in Nagasaki.577 The Dutch in
Thng Long exported silk worth 322,000 guilders to Japan in 1669, but
the profit margin decreased to only 80 per cent. In 1670, the Hoogca-
pel on its way from Tonkin to Japan with a cargo of 199,177 guilders
encountered a heavy storm and was lost at sea. Batavia, seizing upon
this accident as a motive, decided to abandon the Tonkin-Japan ship-
ping route. It was openly stated that another misfortune at sea should
be avoided since the Tonkin factory often failed to send ships to Japan
before July or August, the typhoon season. Sound as this argument
was, it was not the real reason. By abandoning the direct Tonkin-
Japan silk trade, Batavia hoped to end the large-scale private trade
conducted by the Dutch factors in these two places which was said to
have spiralled beyond the control of the Company.578
In 1677 a relatively large load of Tonkinese silk valued at 268,000
guilders was again shipped to Japan. Although piece-goods generally
yielded 40 per cent, raw silk profited barely more than 16 per cent.579
Between this year and 1699, when Batavia eventually decided to end
its trade with northern Vietnam, Tonkinese silk was exported to Japan
160 chapter six
at irregular intervals and on a minor scale. The gross profits varied

between 16 and 25 per cent.580 As a consequence of the depression
in its Tonkin-Japan silk trade, Batavia sent most of Tonkinese silk
piece-goods to the Netherlands.
5. On the capital and profit
Gaps of several years in the records have made it impossible to pres-

ent any absolute calculation on the total capital the Company invested
in the Tonkinese silk trade. Nevertheless, a rough calculation on the
capital and profit can be made for most of the years. Some pioneering
research on this topic will be utilized in this paragraph.581
The short experimental period failed to produce good profits,
although Batavia often sent a large annual capital sum to Tonkin
between 1637 and 1640. During these years, Batavia spent around
1.1 million guilders on Tonkinese silk. Despite this enormous sum, the
average annual profit yielded in Japan stood at only 30 per cent. The
reason for this low profit margin was the ready availability of Chinese
silk which still accounted for 63 per cent of the total amount of silk
which was imported to Japan by the VOC, hence Tonkinese silk had
a share of only 37 per cent. The profit margins on these two sorts of
silk were relatively proportional: Chinese silk brought 70 per cent of
the total profit while Tonkinese silk made a contribution of a modest
30 per cent (Figures 8 and 9). The positive signals of the flourishing of
the Companys Tonkinese silk trade in the second period can be seen
in the growing gap in the profit margin on Tonkinese silk in compari-
son to the Chinese product. These profit margins were the result of the
difference between the purchase and the sales prices. As the Company
had to purchase Chinese silk from middlemen in Formosa and other
rendezvous, the purchase price of Chinese silk was generally high. In
contrast, Tonkinese silk could be procured at a reasonable price by
the Dutch factors in Thng Long. This made a great difference in the
profit margins, which were respectively 45, 56, and 67 per cent for
Chinese silk and 56, 95, and 114 per cent for Tonkin product in the
first three years.
The second period (164154) witnessed the spectacular success of
the Companys Tonkinese silk trade from the point of view of both
large capital and high profit margins. Large capital sums were remit-
ted for the Tonkin trade, inspired primarily by the encouraging profit
12
10
0
1636
1637
1638
1639
1640
1641
1642
1643
1644
1645
1646
1647
1648
1649
1650
1651
1652
1653
1654
1655
1656
1657
1658
1659
1660
1661
1662
1663
1664
1665
1666
1667
1668
Purchase (in Tonkin) Sale (in Japan)
Figure 7. Purchase and sales prices of Tonkinese raw silk, 16361668

(Dutch guilders per catty)
Source: Adapted from Appendix 7.
margins which the Tonkinese silk trade had been yielding and also
by the current decline in the Formosa trade. According to P. W.
Kleins calculations, during this fourteen-year period, out of around
12.8 million guilders worth of goods the VOC imported to Japan,
approximately 7 million or 54 per cent consisted of raw silk and silk
piece-goods. Out of this 7 million, Tonkinese silk fetched around
fifty per cent, meaning approximately 3.5 million guilders were spent
on Tonkinese silk.582 Making sound economic sense, the wide gap
between the purchase and sales prices of Tonkinese silk offered high
profit margins. Throughout this period, the purchase price of Tonki-
nese raw silk stood at around 3.5 guilders per catty, while the average
sales price fetched in Japan was 8 guilders per catty. This offered
an average gross profit margin of 130 per cent for the entire period,
much higher than that on Bengali and Chinese yarns which yielded
105 and 37 per cent respectively.583
The high profits obtained from the Tonkinese silk trade during this
fourteen-year period was even more significant to the Companys
Japan trade, considering the gradual reduction in the net profit made
in recent years. Whereas the annual net profit of the Japan trade had
varied between 1 and 2.4 million guilders in the 16359 period, it
fell to only 0.5 million in 1642 and fluctuated between 0.38 and 0.95
million in the 164954 period.584 In the most lucrative year of 1649,
for instance, the purchase and sales prices of Tonkinese raw silk were
162 chapter six
respectively 3.64 and 9.97 guilders per catty, making a profit margin
of roughly 174 per cent. Hence, the Tonkinese silk cargo which was
valued at 299,000 guilders that year would yield a profit of around
363,660 guilders. (It should be kept in mind that calculations on the
profit do not include all sorts of expenses.) Consequently, of the
709,000 guilders the Companys Japan trade yielded this year, Tonki-
nese silk contributed roughly 51 per cent.585 For the entire 164154
period, the Tonkinese silk contributed 71 per cent to the gross profit
of the Companys silk trade in Japan and around one third of the total
profit which the Deshima factory transferred to Batavia.586
During the third period of the VOCs export of Tonkinese silk to
Japan (165570), the low profit margin compounded by the irregular-
ity of silk production in northern Vietnam reduced the annual capitals
remitted for the Tonkin trade. The import volumes of Tonkinese silk
now depended on two factors: the erratic demand on the Japan mar-
ket and the export volume of Bengali silk to Japan. Since it had been
introduced to Japan for the first time in 1640, Bengali silk gradu-
ally won itself a stable position on the Japanese market and, from
the early 1650s, proved to be more marketable and hence profitable
than its Tonkinese counterpart.587 If the purchase price of Tonkinese
raw silk in the years 163749 had fluctuated between 2.54 and 3.64
guilders per catty, it rose to 4.43 and 5.84 guilders per catty in the
16658 period, causing a sharp increase of around 66 per cent in the
purchase price. In the meantime, the sales price of Tonkinese yarn in
Japan fell drastically, offering profit margins of only 58, 34, and 29
per cent respectively in the years 1652, 1654, and 1656. Between 1665
and 1669, the Companys export of Tonkinese silk to Japan revived;
the value of the annual cargoes stood at around 300,000 guilders.
This short-lived recovery can be attributed to the decision of Batavia
to lower the annual import volume of Bengali silk to Japan to at most
170,000 pounds in order to stabilize the sales price588 and the repromo-
tion of the Tonkin factory to the status of permanent in 1663.
In spite of these changes, Tonkinese silk did not regain its once-
lost predominance over Bengali silk on the Japanese market. The
annual profits remained small. In 1668, for instance, the Tonkinese
raw silk cargo valued at 369,000 guilders raised a profit of only 26
per cent in Nagasaki.589
During the last quarter of the seventeenth century, alongside the
rapid reduction in its silk export to the Japanese market, the Compa-
nys export of Tonkinese silk to Japan was insubstantial, valued at
19
13
63
77
68
5
37
18
1636- 1641- 1655-

1640 1654 1668
Tonkinese silk Chinese silk Bengali silk
Figure 8. Division of silk imported into Japan by the VOC, 16361668

(per cent)
22
7
70
76
71
7
30
17
1636- 1641- 1655-

1640 1654 1668
Tonkinese silk Chinese silk Bengali silk
Figure 9. Division of profits from silk imported into Japan by the VOC, 16361668
(per cent)
Source: Adapted from Klein, De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel, 172-3 (Table 4).
164 chapter six
hardly above 20,000 guilders per shipment. Obviously, the profits were
proportionally paltry. Not wishing to flog a dead horse, the Company
decided that the major part of Tonkinese silk, especially silk piece-
goods should be exported to the Netherlands.
the export trade (ii): other products 165
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE EXPORT TRADE (II):

OTHER PRODUCTS
1. Tonkinese products for the Netherlands
En dewyle men t comptoir daar hadde, en mede voor t vaderlant

inkoop liet doen van syde stoffen, voort muscus en anders, wiert de
voorsch. syde, sooals die voor Japan wiert ingekoft, over Batavia der-
waerts gevoert, en dat soo lang als daarop eenigh voordeel wiert behaalt.
Maar deselve vervolgens meer en meer verduyrende, is dat eyndelijck
mede nagebleven, en het comptoir alleen gehouden, met seer weynigh
bedienden, tot inkoop van syde waeren, soo voor t vaderlandt also voor
Persin, mitsgaders muscus en andere kleynigheden.
Pieter van Dam590
Silk piece-goods
In the overall Company policy of exporting Tonkinese raw silk to
Japan, the export of Tonkinese silk and silk piece-goods to the Neth-
erlands constituted no more than a sideline. Evidence to support this
assertion is the very fact that up to about 1670, as Glamann has
pointed out, the Companys export of Asian piece-goods to Europe
was generally modest and came a poor second to its sales within
Asia.591 Among the silk items which the Company brought home
in the first three decades of the seventeenth century, Chinese items
unmistakably constituted the chief group. But when it established a
factory in Persia in the early 1620s, the Company was able to procure
Persian silk for the Netherlands, and it decided to reserve Chinese
silk for the Japan trade which was in a process of restructuring in
the early 1630s.592
Shortly after the establishment of trading relations with northern
Vietnam in 1637, the Dutch factors began to send Tonkinese silk
textiles to Batavia, where they were reloaded on board the home-
ward-bound ships. The export volumes of Tonkinese silk piece-goods
to the Netherlands in the first years were neither substantial nor regu-
lar in comparison to those sent to Japan, since Chinese piece-goods
still constituted the staple in the homeward-bound cargoes. From the
166 chapter seven
early 1640s, political turmoil in mainland China obstructed the regular

influx of Chinese goods to Formosa and reduced the annual import
volumes of Chinese products of the Company.593 As a consequence
the VOC fostered the import of Tonkinese silk piece-goods to the
Netherlands.
In 1644, the chief of the Tonkin factory, Antonio van Brouck-
horst, suggested to Batavia that in order to facilitate the purchase of
Tonkinese silk and piece-goods for both Japan and the Netherlands, it
would be advisable to leave one junior merchant and some assistants
supplied with substantial amounts of money to reside permanently in
the capital Thng Long to buy silk in the off season.594 This proposal
was approved; the Companys export of Tonkinese silk and piece-
goods ran smoothly in the years which followed. In the 1645 trading
season, for instance, out of the 135,000 taels (approximately 385,000
guilders) which the Company provided for the Tonkinese silk trade,
Batavia instructed that 122,400 taels (90.4%) was to be spent on raw
silk and silk piece-goods for Japan, the rest of 12,600 taels (9.6%) was
to be used to buy raw silk and silk piece-goods for the Netherlands
(see Figure 10).595
When the profit margins which Tonkinese silk cargoes fetched in
Japan fell rapidly from the early 1650s, Batavia resolved to suspend
the Tonkinese silk export to Nagasaki for a while, but ordered the
Dutch factors in Thng Long to purchase Tonkinese silk piece-goods
only for the Netherlands.596 In response to the current shortage of
copper coins, hence, the devaluation of silver, the purchase price of
Tonkinese raw silk increased on average 20 per cent. Tonkinese weav-
ers, shaken by the high price of the raw silk, only wove piece-goods
after foreign merchants had advanced the sum required to pay for them
in full. Because of this, the 1655 and 1656 cargoes of piece-goods
which the Tonkin factory sent to the Netherlands were valued at only
25,773 and 16,000 guilders respectively.597
If the 1645 composition of silk and silk piece-goods had been 90.6
per cent for Japan and 9.4 per cent for the Netherlands, it was already
68 and 32 per cent respectively in 1661. Out of 264,144 guilders
allotted to the Tonkin trade that year, Batavia ordered 84,144 guil-
ders to be spent on local piece-goods for the Netherlands, consisting
mainly of pelings.598 This composition was permanently maintained
throughout the decade of 166070. In 1664, for instance, out of the
164,703 guilders Batavia sent to Tonkin, 50,000 were to be spent on
9.6
31.8
79.9
84.7
100
90.4
68.2
19.1
15.3
1645 1661 1688 1693 1695

For Japan For the Netherlands
Figure 10. Division of the Tonkin cargoes, 16451695

(per cent)
Sources: Dagh-register Batavia 16445, 108-22; 1661, 89-91; 1664, 298; VOC 1453;
1536; 1537; 1580; 1596.
silk piece-goods for the home market, the rest would be invested in
raw silks for Japan, making a rough ratio of 30/70.599
In the last three decades of the Companys Tonkin trade, the annual
capital reserved for the procurement of Tonkinese piece-goods for the
Netherlands showed an overall increase, prompted by the slump in
the Companys export of Tonkinese raw silks to Japan reinforced by
its cancellation of the Tonkin-Japan direct shipping route in 1671. As
the profit margin on Tonkinese silk in Japan fell drastically during
the 1670s, the Dutch factors in Thng Long were instructed to pro-
cure Tonkinese silk piece-goods, most popularly among them pelings,
for the Netherlands. From the early 1680s, the Companys export of
Tonkinese silk to Japan virtually ended; besides some local miscel-
laneous items the Dutch factors in Thng Long bought Tonkinese silk
piece-goods for the European market only.600 The annual capital for
purchasing Tonkinese piece-goods consequently increased to between
100,000 and 150,000 guilders per year. In 1681, for instance, out of
113,318 guilders invested in the Tonkin trade, Batavia ordered its fac-
168 chapter seven
tors to buy no goods other than pelings and musk for the Netherlands,
earmarking nothing for the Japan trade.
To make sure that this composition would be adequately fulfilled, in
his letter to Cha Trnh Tc, the Governor-General requested the latter
not to supply the Company with any raw silk that year.601 Choosing
not to heed the Governor-Generals request, the Cha forced the Dutch
factors to accept a large amount of Tonkinese yarn, but at better prices.
The next year, the English and the French also arrived in Tonkin with
large amounts of capital to buy silk piece-goods for Europe, escalating
the fierce competition between these European rivals and consequently
pushing up the purchase prices, particularly those of pelings and musk.
Given these circumstances and resultant prices, the Tonkinese piece-
goods cargo reportedly yielded no profit in the Netherlands.602
This discouraging trading situation dragged on notwithstanding
exertions by the Company to improve the state of its Tonkin trade.
In 1686, the Governor-General again demanded the Cha pay the
Company in either cash or such silk piece-goods as pelings instead
of raw silk because Tonkinese yarn was currently not marketable and
therefore not profitable. Batavias request again fell on deaf ears; Cha
Trnh Cn forced the Dutch factors to accept raw silks for the silver
which the factory had advanced him earlier.603
In 1688, Batavia instructed the Tonkin factory to order local
spinners to spin Tonkinese raw silk using the Chinese and Bengali
methods, hoping that the innovation in spinning would make it suitable
for the European market. Therefore, in the summer of 1688, samples
of Chinese and Bengali raw silk were sent to Tonkin to be spun.
Soon afterwards, the well-thought-out plan proved illusory. After one
year of bringing in low prices, Tonkinese yarn again grew scarce and
expensive as the harvest had been poor. In spite of this, the Dutch fac-
tors still managed to have 72 catties of Tonkinese raw silk spun using
the Chinese and Bengali techniques.604 It seems that these samples
failed to find favour with Western consumers as nothing came out of
this attempt. Consequently the export of Tonkinese silk piece-goods
stumbled for around one more decade before it finally ended when the
Company abandoned its Tonkin trade in early 1700.
Musk
Musk was another highly sought-after item in the Netherlands. Although
exported from Tonkin, repeating the story of gold, the major part of
musk available on the Tonkin market was not produced locally but, if
we are to believe the Company historian Pieter van Dam, it originated

mainly from the Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan and, to a
lesser extent from the kingdom of Laos.605
Reviewing the history of the Companys musk trade, it seems that
its interest in this product was not awakened until 1652, when the
Dutch factors in Tonkin were ordered to purchase some Laotian musk
for the Netherlands as an experiment. That same year, Batavia was
informed that Bastiaan Brouwer, a Spanish Brabander working the
triangular trade between Manila, Tonkin, and Cambodia under the
auspices of the Governor of Manila, had also bought a large quantity
of musk in Tonkin and carried it to Cambodia, where he gained a good
price of 80 taels per catty.606 When it turned out that musk was also a
marketable item in Holland, the Tonkin factory was ordered to supply
the homeward-bound cargoes with whatever musk it could obtain in
Tonkin. But after a few halcyon years, in the late 1650s, musk, as did
gold, became scarce on the Tonkin market. The civil war in southern
China severely curtailed the flow of the Chinese musk to Tonkin.
Chinese and Vietnamese merchants involved in the cross-border trade
were often robbed by the Qing soldiers, acutely exacerbating the scar-
city of Chinese musk on the Tonkin market. The Laotian musk was
therefore preferred.
In 1655, the Dutch factors in Thng Long utilized their good rela-
tions with the capado Ongiadee to contract with him to buy all the
Laotian musk which would be exported to Tonkin through the region
governed by him.607 This agreement failed to live up to expectations
because the annual quantities of Laotian musk exported to Tonkin were
neither regular nor substantial. Consequently, the Dutch factors could
purchase for Batavia only 25 catties of musk that year.608
The low export volumes of musk from the Tonkin factory were
in part also attributable to Resimons stiff competition and specula-
tion. As long as this Japanese free merchant was still facilitated and
protected by local mandarins, the Dutch procurement of musk, not
to mention gold and piece-goods, would still have to contend with
very exacting competition indeed. Between 1650 and 1660, when the
Dutch export volume of musk from Tonkin hardly surpassed some 30
catties per year, this entrepreneur experienced no difficulty in send-
ing 112 catties 10 taels of musk to Siam in the year 1659 alone. This
portion of musk was then bought by the Dutch factory in Siam at a
much higher price. The next year, the Siam factory, again, had to buy
72 catties of musk which Resimon had sent from Tonkin. To rub
170 chapter seven
salt into the wound, Batavia had to pay interest on its late payment
to Resimon.609
Dissatisfied with the mediocre performance of the Tonkin factors in
procuring musk, in 1661 Batavia unrelentingly increased its demands
for this product as well as for Tonkinese pelings. Out of the 264,144
guilders Batavia destined for the Tonkin factory during the 16612
trading season, 180,000 was earmarked to buy Tonkinese raw silk for
Japan, and the rest was to be spent on pelings and 1,800 ounces of
musk for the Netherlands.610 No matter what Batavia did to encourage
some improvement in the purchase of musk in Tonkin, its efforts fell
on stony ground. The Tonkin trade was so ailing at that moment, the
Dutch factors were hard put to buy any musk at all for the domestic
market.
Table 6. The VOCs export of musk from Tonkin, 1653-1681

Year Amount Year Amount
1653 some 1673 192 catties
1656 25 catties 1674 304 catties
1663 14 taels 2 maas 1675 326/8 catties
1664 1717/32 catties plus 8 taels 3 maas 1677 118 catties
1665 131 catties 15 taels 1 maas 1678 156 catties
1672 some
Sources: Dagh-register Batavia 16531682; VOC 1197, 1290, 1294, 1386.
In his report to the Governor-General, Hendrick Baron, the chief factor

of the Tonkin factory, explained that the current depression in the
musk trade in Tonkin was primarily caused by the Manchu military
campaigns against the Nan Ming and its staunch supporters, the Zheng
clan in south-eastern China. The other fly in the ointment was Resimon
and his manipulations. With the full support and connivance of the
mandarin Ongiahaen, this merchant did his best to procure all Chinese
musk as soon as this product crossed the border.611
In 1663, the directors in the Netherlands demanded 3,000 ounces of
musk for the next homeward-bound voyage. Besides urging its Tonkin
factors to supply the bulk of this demand, Batavia also ordered the
factory in Agra (India) to provide the Company with supplies of this
product. The High Government stressed that in order to timely dispatch
musk and Tonkinese piece-goods to the Netherlands, the Tonkin fac-

tors should send whatever items they could purchase to Batavia before
1 November. To the disappointment of Batavia, Tonkin sent in 1663
and 1664 only 14 taels 2 maas (around 0.9 catty) and 17 17/32 catties of
musk respectively. The reasons for these paltry cargoes were a reprise
of those of previous years, namely the Manchu violence on and around
the border and Resimons speculations.612
Despite these meagre supplies, Batavia raised its order for musk at
the Tonkin factory in the 1664 trading season, demanding for the Neth-
erlands 50,000 guilders worth of silk piece-goods and 4,000 ounces
of musk.613 The Dutch factors in Thng Long now resolved to contract
with Resimon to buy all the gold and musk from him. Despite their
efforts, they could procure for Batavia only 8 taels 3 maas of musk in
the winter of 1664 and 20 catties more in the summer of 1665, barely
fulfilling one sixth of the total demand.614
These tiny cargoes raised the ire of Batavia, especially when it was
informed that other foreign merchants trading in Tonkin had been
able to purchase more musk than its factors. The Castilian merchant
Gonsalvo Discouar, for instance, had percipiently co-operated with
Resimon and spent a considerable capital on both Tonkinese silk piece-
goods and Chinese musk. Believing that the export volume of musk
could be increased if its factors in Tonkin were to do their best, Batavia
sternly renewed the order for the previous year and stressed that the
Tonkin factory should provide the homeward-bound ships with 4,000
ounces of musk. Just as the pressure Batavia exerted on its factors for
musk seemed about to hit the ceiling, the Companys Tonkin musk
trade started to improve, responding favourably to the revival of the
Tonkin-China border trade. A cargo valued at 56,492 guilders that
the Tonkin factory sent to Batavia in the winter of 1665 reportedly
contained 111 catties 15 taels 1 maas of musk.615 After this, the annual
export volume of musk by the Tonkin factory increased considerably
and remained stable until 1700, when the Company finally severed its
trading relations with Tonkin.
2. Gold for the Coromandel Coast
The same Countries [Boutan and Yunnan] yield gold also, and supply
this Country [Tonkin] with it: for whatever Gold Mines the Tonquinese
are said to have in their own Mountains, yet they do not work upon them.
172 chapter seven
In the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the supply of

gold and silver played an indispensable part in the entire commercial
activities of the Dutch East India Company in the East. As a fixed
rule, right from its foundation in 1602, every chamber of the Company
was instructed to send silver pieces of eight to Asia as investment
capital, and if this specie was not provided in full, then gold was
consigned as an alternative.617 As early as 1602, gold was included in
the Companys cargoes dispatched to Asia when 247,500 guilders in
rosenobels was exported under the auspices of the Company.618 Silver
in the form of both minted coins and bullion was the sort of money
which was indispensable to the Company in running its intra-Asian
trade throughout the two centuries of its existence. Nevertheless, in
some places gold was preferred, especially on the eastern coast of
the Indian Sub-Continent. The Indian trade of the Company required
both silver and gold as investment capital: silver was generally in
high demand in Bengal and copper was very acceptable in Surat, but
gold was desirable in Coromandel. During the seventeenth century,
the Coromandel Coast was the most important destination for the gold
exported from Europe and by Asian gold exporters. To maximize the
profit on the Coromandel trade, or at least to direct this trade into the
most profitable channels, the Company was forced to provide its Coast
factories with gold. The gold supply from the Netherlands to Asia
was not always sufficient to cover the demands. During the 1640s,
for instance, Batavias requests for adequate amounts of capital were
not always satisfied; its demand for African gold for its Asiatic trade
was ignored altogether by the Gentlemen XVII.619
The Company was not entirely dependent on the Netherlands for its
supply of precious metals, although during the first thirty years of the
Companys existence, its trading capital relied heavily on the money
sent from the Republic. After this, however, the trend changed signifi-
cantly. In the case of the gold supply for Coromandel, for instance, by
the early 1630s, a larger proportion of the annual capital was being
provided by Asian factories which relieved the Coast of its dependence
on the Netherlands for the supply of capital.620
This change can be largely attributed to the developments in the
intra-Asian trade which not only enabled the VOC to make profits on
its intra-Asian trading network, but also helped furnish its factories
with desirable and marketable commodities.621 One of the key factors
which enabled the Company to establish its pre-eminent position in
this commerce was the Japan trade. Generally speaking, after this trade
had been restructured and strengthened in the early 1630s, the Hirado
factory, and, later on, the Deshima factory were able to export a sub-
stantial amount of silver every year from Japan. The major part of this
silver was shipped to Formosa, where it was exchanged for Chinese
commodities which were sought after on both the Asian and European
markets. During the 164060 period, the Company regularly exported
silver valued at around one million guilders per year from Japan. Part
of this silver was exchanged for Chinese gold in Formosa which was
then exported mainly to Coromandel, supplementing the gold which
was purchased from Java, Malacca, Laos, and Indragiri.622 The gold
supply from the island of Formosa to Coromandel proceeded smoothly
during the 1630s, before falling into a phase of decline from the early
1640s, induced by the decline in the Formosa trade.
Facing the decline in the gold supply from Formosa, the Company
was forced to look for alternative possibilities. In fact, in 1640, the
Japan factory, conscious of the importance of providing the Coro-
mandel trade with gold, had already exported some Japanese koban
(small gold coins) and oban (large gold coins), valued at 144,050 taels
for the first time. The Dutch export of Japanese gold was short-lived
because the Japanese Government issued a ban on the export of gold
in the following year, fearing a drain of bullion. Because this ban on
the Japanese gold export was strictly enforced until 1665, the Com-
pany had to look for a gold supply from other places. When the gold
supply from East Asia stagnated, the Company factory in Gamron in
Persia started to purchase the gold which arrived there from Europe via
the land route. In the 1640s and in the following decade, this Persian
factory could provide the Indian factories annually with a substantial
sum consisting mainly of silver and gold.623 In South-East Asia, the
Company itself endeavoured to mine gold on the West Coast of Suma-
tra, and lost no time in procuring this precious metal from various
other places such as Manila, Makassar, and Malacca, eager to supply
the Indian Coast with whatever gold it could afford.624 In spite of its
assiduous efforts, the total amount was inconsiderable.
In the context of this gold shortage, Tonkin emerged as an alter-
native gold supplier in the late 1650s, born of necessity when the
gold supply from the East Asian quarters rapidly declined. In order to
comprehend the sudden emergence of Tonkin in this role, some facts
should be clarified. In 1651, it was reported to Batavia that the flow
of Chinese gold to Formosa had come to a complete standstill. The
capital which Zeelandia Castle could afford to send to the Coroman-
174 chapter seven
del Coast struggled to reach around 6 tons, 4 tons (400,000 guilders)

less than it had been planned.625 In the middle of the 1650s, the High
Government was again informed that the VOC servants in Formosa,
suffering from the poor trade caused by the civil war in mainland
China and Zhengs embargo on Dutch Formosa, were struggling to
gather a mere 3 tons of gold, 8 tons less than 1653. Pertinently, it was
noted that the flow of Chinese gold now streamed in the direction of
Tonkin instead of Formosa.626
The Dutch loss of Formosa to Coxinga in 1662 disrupted the reg-
ular gold flow from Formosa to eastern India and exacerbated the
Companys gold shortage even more severely. In the meantime, the
profit margins on gold on the Coromandel Coast revived in the 1660s
because the Mughal Emperor demanded his tribute be paid in gold
pagodas.627 Batavia therefore turned to Tonkin in its hopes of solving
the gold issue, and urged its factors in Thng Long to import Chinese
gold for Coromandel, where the latest profit was said to be 25 per
cent.628
Most of the gold the Company purchased for India in Tonkin was
not mined locally. Although in the seventeenth century gold was mined
in the present-day northern province of Thi Nguyn, the annual gold
output was negligible.629 The major part of the gold available on the
Tonkin market was actually imported from China.630 Vietnamese and
Chinese merchants trading across the border often travelled to Yunnan
and Guizhou to buy Chinese gold. The price of Chinese gold sold in
northern Vietnam was said to be reasonable. In 1661, for instance, the
purchase price of Chinese gold in Tonkin, according to a Vietnamese
merchant trading to Nanking, was lower than that in Guangzhou.631
Ever alert, Batavia, therefore, ordered the Tonkin factors to purchase
as much Chinese gold as they could and, to devise a long-term strat-
egy, penetrating the Chinese gold market from the Tonkin springboard.
As the Companys petitions to the L/Trnh rulers for a licence to trade
on the border were repeatedly delayed, Batavia repromoted its Tonkin
factory to a permanent trading headquarters in the hope that a boost
in status would easen the procurement of the Chinese gold pouring to
northern Vietnam.632
Despite all these strategies, the Tonkin factory often failed to sup-
ply the Coast factories with adequate gold cargoes. Rising military
tensions in southern China meant Vietnamese and Chinese merchants
could not trade across the border. In 1661, under pressure from the
increasing demand for gold for the Coast, the High Government, while
still nurturing the hope of obtaining a licence from the Japanese Gov-
ernment to export Japanese gold to India, urged the Tonkin factors
to purchase whatever gold they could find to supply the Coromandel
trade.633 The next year, Batavia again demanded the Tonkin factors
spend at least 100,000 guilders on gold. Under such a constraint, the
Tonkin factors planned to spend 102,107 guilders on gold, and the idea
was to keep another large amount of money ready in stock, awaiting
the arrival of another consignment of gold which was expected to
arrive from Yunnan.
Hopes were dashed as the rainy weather impeded the journey of the
traders. To make matters worse, Qing soldiers raided the Vietnamese
merchants trading on the border in order to punish the L/Trnh court
for the delay in sending its tribute to the new dynasty in Peking.634 As
a consequence of these commercial setbacks, the Tonkin factory could
purchase only 3,861 taels of gold, valued at approximately 22,716
guilders. Shipped to the Coast factories in 1663, this small sum of
gold brought a profit of 23 per cent at Paliacatta.635
The weakness of the Tonkin factory in supplying gold for Coro-
mandel was one of the reasons which prompted Batavia to urge the
Gentlemen XVII in the Netherlands to supply gold for the Asian trade
of the Company. In 1664, the general missive from Batavia to the
directors requested that its demand for minted gold and ducats valued
at 500,000 guilders per year was to be continued.636 As has been
demonstrated by Tapan Raychaudhuri, the demand for gold from the
Netherlands in the late 1650s and early 1660s by Batavia, was tem-
porary because the Deshima factory was officially permitted to export
Japanese gold again in 1665.637
In April 1663, the High Government resolved to repromote the
Tonkin factory to the status of a permanent office, in order to stimulate
the gold and musk trade across the Chinese border.638 Batavia had high
hopes its factors in Thng Long would be able to furnish the return
ships with gold.639 In December, the Zeeridder returned to Batavia
with a cargo valued at 148,295 guilders, consisting of approximately
1,900 taels of gold. In the spring, the Bunschoten also sailed to Bata-
via, carrying a small cargo of 31,211 guilders, consisting of 674 taels
of gold for Coromandel.640
Despite these disappointing gold cargoes, in the 1664 trading season
Batavia continued to insist that the Tonkin factory endeavour to supply
the Coast factories with whatever gold it could procure in Tonkin. In
order to fulfil this order, the Dutch factors contracted with the Japanese
176 chapter seven
entrepreneur Resimon that he would sell all the gold he had at the end
of the trading season at the fixed price of 12.5 taels of silver for one
tael of 24-carat gold.641 This contract could not be honoured because
of the current severe shortage of gold on the Tonkin market.
Unable to fulfil the demand, the Dutch factors resolved to use most
of their capital to buy silk and piece-goods. Consequently, upon the
departure of the Zeeridder for Batavia in November 1664, the Tonkin
factors were able to send only 713 taels of gold, promising their mas-
ters to try their best in the coming months to spend around 60,000
to 70,000 guilders on gold.642 This promise the Tonkin factory also
failed to keep: the Bunschotens cargo for Batavia consisted of only
1,387 taels of gold. In their missive to the Governor-General in 1665,
the Dutch factors confessed that the gold trade in Tonkin had virtually
stagnated and, worse still, the prospect of improving the procurement
of gold in the future seemed hopeless.643 In November of the same
year, no gold was found in the Tonkin cargo shipped to Batavia. The
Tonkin factory lamented that this years failure had been caused by
the complete stagnation of the gold flow from China. Daunted by
various difficulties, Chinese gold merchants no longer visited northern
Vietnam.644
In order to maintain the gold supply to the Coast after the consecu-
tive failures of the Tonkin factory to procure Chinese gold, in 1663
the Deshima factory ignored the Japanese Governments ban on gold
exports and deliberately exported Japanese gold coins.645 After the
Shogunate authorized their 1664 application for the export of gold, the
Dutch began to export Japanese gold in considerable amounts from
1665. From 1668, when the Japanese Government banned the export
of silver and lowered the purchase price of Japanese gold, the Dutch
export of Japanese gold rose sharply. The problem of the gold supply
to Coromandel was now basically solved because the Japanese koban
could easily be reminted into Indian pagodas as their metallic content
was nearly the same.646 Consequently, from the mid-1660s, Tonkin
was no longer considered an important gold supplier for the Coast,
although Chinese gold was still occasionally procured in Tonkin and
exported to Coromandel.
3. Tonkinese ceramics for the insular South-East Asian markets
The Earthen Ware of this Country [Tonkin] is coarse and of grey Colour,
yet they make great quantities of small Earthen Dishes, that will hold
half a Pint or more. They are broader toward the brim than at the bottom,
so that they may be stowed within one another. They have been sold by
Europeans in many of the Malayan Countries, and for that reason Capt.
Pool in his first Voyage bought the best part of 100,000 in hope to sell
them in his return homeward at Batavia, but not finding a market for
them there, he carried them to Bencouli on the Island Sumatra, where he
sold them at a great profit to the Governour Bloom The China Wares
which are much finer, have of late spoiled the sale of this Commodity
in most places.
The porcelain trade of the VOC had begun in the very early years of
its trade with Asia. Since the profitable auction in the Netherlands in
1604 of Chinese porcelain captured from the Portuguese ship Santa
Catarina, the demand for Chinese ceramics in the Dutch Republic
had swelled. The Companys export of Asian wares, mainly Chinese
ceramics, to Europe was irregular as it was dependent on a myriad
of factors. The VOCs export of Chinese wares to Europe flourished
in the 1630s, but soon stagnated as political chaos in mainland China
severely disrupted production. Under the increasing pressure exerted
by the Manchus, the Chinese Ming Dynasty eventually collapsed in
1644. The dynastic change led to a protracted conflict between the
die-hard supporters of the Ming and the newly established Qing which
largely destroyed the porcelain manufacturing centre of Jingdezhen and
consequently caused a severe shortage of fine Chinese porcelain.
After 1647 fine Chinese porcelain was virtually unprocurable on
the international market. The VOC, in search of a substitute, switched
over to the export of Japanese Hizen porcelain. In 1650 and 1651,
the Deshima factory sent 145 dishes and 176 pieces of Hizen ware to
Tonkin. In 1652, a Japanese porcelain cargo consisting of large and
small medical pots was shipped from Deshima to Formosa. After that,
the VOC often exported Japanese Hizen porcelain to Batavia, mark-
ing the beginning of a regular trade in fine Japanese ware. In 1657, a
load of Japanese porcelain was shipped to the Netherlands to test its
salability. As this cargo found a favourable market, the VOC regularly
exported Japanese porcelain to Europe.648 After around a decade of
high profits, the Companys export of Japanese porcelain to the Neth-
erlands declined and temporarily ended in 1665, mainly because of the
high purchase prices in Japan.649
Fine porcelain was only part of the story. While Western merchants
opened the European market for fine Chinese and Japanese porcelain,
178 chapter seven
Chinese merchants maintained their regular export of coarse Chinese

ware, produced mainly in Fujian and Guangdong, to the insular South-
East Asian market. This too was to suffer from the political upheavals
of dynastic change. From the early 1660s, the traditional flow of coarse
Chinese porcelain to this vast market stagnated in the wake of the
political changes in southern China. Finally having to succumb to the
superior power of the Qing, the last-ditch Ming loyalists in southern
China were defeated. In 1662, the Zheng abandoned their foothold
on the coast of mainland China and withdrew to Formosa. Pursuing
a policy of isolating and then pacifying Zheng Formosa, the Qing
Dynasty closed the door for Chinas foreign trade, and removed its
subjects from the coastal areas. The traditional flow of coarse Chinese
porcelain to the South-East Asian markets, which had been regularly
maintained by the Zheng family, was disrupted, causing a severe
shortage of coarse Chinese ware on the regional market.650 Whereas
Chinese fine porcelain had been amply supplemented by fine Japa-
nese products, coarse Chinese ware was then substituted by Tonkinese
ceramics. Coarse Tonkinese ceramics were now widely exported to the
regional markets until the early 1680s.
This ushered in a big change. Despite the fact that Tonkinese ceram-
ics had been sporadically exported to the regional market prior to
the early 1660s, the annual export quantities were presumably incon-
siderable. In 1663, Batavia noted that a Chinese junk had arrived
from northern Vietnam with 10,000 groove porceleijn koppen (coarse
ceramic cups).651 In the next five years, roughly 250,000 pieces of
Tonkinese ceramics were shipped to Batavia by the Chinese (see
Appendix 8).
These large cargoes of Tonkinese ceramics impressed the High Gov-
ernment and prompted it to participate in the export of Tonkinese
ceramics to the insular South-East Asian markets. In response to the
swing, in 1669 the Dutch factory in Thng Long sent the first load of
381,200 coarse Tonkinese cups to Batavia.652 From this year until the
early 1680s, when Chinese porcelain again flooded the international
market, the Dutch were among the foreign exporters of Tonkinese
ceramics to the insular South-East Asian market (see Appendix 8).
Taken as a whole, the emergence of Tonkin as a major ceramic exporter
in the early 1660s was simply a transitory substitution, similar to what
had happened during the sixteenth century.653
In a nutshell, the expansion of Tonkinese export ceramics to the
regional markets in the early 1660s was stimulated by two main causes:
the disruption of the traditional flow of coarse Chinese ceramics to

South-East Asia after 1662, and the decline in the Dutch Tonkinese
silk export. As hinted at in the previous chapter, more can be said
about the second factor. By the late 1660s, the VOCs endeavours
to revive its Tonkinese silk trade proved to be futile. In April 1669,
Batavia therefore instructed its factors in Tonkin to ballast their return
ships with local ceramics, which the latter executed with great promp-
titude.654 In the following year, the Dutch in Thng Long reported to
their masters that the quality of the Tonkinese ceramics was better than
that of the previous year.655 The Dutch factors managed to purchase
large cargoes of Tonkinese wares for the Batavia-bound ships. The
VOCs export of Tonkinese ceramics to the insular South-East Asian
markets during these years can be considered as a dual success: the
VOCs regular trade with northern Vietnam ran smoothly during the
time its Tonkin-Japan silk trade stagnated because of low profits, and
it also benefited, though rather inconsiderably, from the export of
Tonkinese ceramics.
Following sound economic principle, the annual export volume of
Tonkinese ceramics to the regional market fluctuated according to the
demands of the insular markets. While Figure 11 shows the fluctuation
in the total export amount of Tonkinese ceramics to Batavia during
the 166381 period, Figure 12 demonstrates a relatively stiff rivalry
between Tonkin, Chinese, and Japanese wares competing for a domi-
nant position in the regional market.
After emerging as a major ceramic export commodity in the early
1660s, coarse Tonkinese ceramics dominated the South-East Asian
markets in the years 1669 and 1670. Putting together Tonkinese
ceramic cargoes exported to South-East Asia by other foreign mer-
chants, roughly one million pieces of Tonkinese ceramics were shipped
to the insular markets during these two years. During these two years
alone, 772,600 pieces of Tonkinese ceramics were shipped to Batavia
by the VOC.
This supremacy was short-lived as the annual quantity of Tonkinese
ceramics which reached Batavia in the years thereafter fell drastically.
From 1672, the VOC factories in Baros, Cirebon, Toulougbauw [?],
and Banten often sent Tonkinese ceramics back to Batavia as they
failed to find buyers (see Appendix 9). In the meantime, only three
years after the peak of the ceramic export of Tonkin, Japan reemerged
as ceramic exporter when some 563,098 pieces of Japanese porcelain
were sent to Batavia in 1673.656 From 1677, coarse Chinese ware
180 chapter seven
650000
600000
550000
500000
450000
400000
350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
1663
1664
1665
1666
1667
1668
1669
1670
1671
1672
1673
1674
1675
1676
1677
1678
1679
1680
1681
Figure 11. Tonkinese ceramics exported to Batavia, 16631681
(pieces)
Sources: Adapted from Appendix 8.
700000 Tonkinese
Chinese
600000
Japanese
500000
400000
300000
200000
100000
0
1663
1664
1665
1666
1667
1668
1669
1670
1671
1672
1673
1674
1675
1676
1677
1678
1679
1680
1681
1682
Figure 12. Ceramics exported to the South Seas, 16631682

(pieces)
Sources: Adapted from Appendix 8; Dagh-register Batavia 16241682; Volker, Porcelain;
Ho, The Ceramic Trade, 35-70.
Note: It has been noted by Bennet Bronson that some quantitative data on the export of
Chinese and Japanese wares in Volkers (and consequently Hos) research are not reliable.
Bronson, Export Porcelain in Economic Perpective, 129.
began to reach the insular markets in large quantities again, marking

a spectacular return after it had to cede the market to Tonkinese and
Japanese products.
According to the VOC records, altogether roughly 1.5 million pieces
of Tonkinese ceramics were shipped to the regional market between
the 1660s and 1680s. The real number must undoubtedly have been
much higher, in view of the fact that we are not in the possession of
the full data.657 Regardless of this matter and taking into account only
the numbers recorded in the VOC documents, between 1663 and 1681
Tonkinese ceramics had a share of 30 per cent of the total amount of
ceramics exported to the South Seas (stretching from Japan in the east
to the east coast of Africa in the west), while Chinese, Japanese, and
Persian wares amounted to 33, 36, and 1 per cent respectively. If we
accept Volkers very conservative estimate that 12 million pieces
were exported by the VOC during its first eighty-years of trading
Asian ceramics (160282),658 Tonkinese ceramics, which were exported
exclusively for fewer than two decades, shared approximately 12 per
cent; Japanese wares which were exported for around three decades
counted for 16 per cent; and the remaining 72 per cent were mainly
coarse Chinese ceramics.
33 36
30
Japanese Tonkinese Chinese Persian and other
Figure 13. Division of ceramics exported to the South Seas, 16631682

(per cent)
Tonkinese ceramics were mainly bought for use in insular South-

East Asia. During this periodwith the exception of several recorded
shipments made by the English from Tonkin to their headquarters
in Banten and IndiaTonkinese ceramics were exported mainly to
Batavia by the Chinese and the Dutch.659 There they were redistrib-
uted to such different consumer markets as Banten, Cirebon, Baros,
182 chapter seven
72
12 16
Japanese Tonkinese Chinese and Other
Figure 14. Ceramics exported by the VOC, 16021682

(per cent)
Sources: Adapted from Appendix 8; Volker, Porcelain, 218; Ho, The Ceramic Trade,
35-70.
Palembang, Timor, Banda, Gresik, West Coast of Sumatra, and the

like. In the southern Philippines, reflecting the ambiguous political
division, Tonkinese ceramics were imported by both the Dutch and
English Companies.660 Besides these insular South-East Asian mar-
kets, Tonkinese ceramics were also sporadically exported to Japan and
the Indian Sub-Continent.661 Some English homeward-bound ships
reportedly carried loads of Tonkinese ceramics but these cargoes were
insignificant.662
According to the Dutch records, the assortment of the seventeenth-
century Tonkinese export ceramics was rather monotonous. It included
mainly cups, rice-bowls, tea cups, and roof tiles. Artistic and sophis-
ticatedly decorated objects such as celadon pedestals, blue and white
kendi, hollow-backed glazed stoneware tiles, tall jars, and the like
were not mentioned, although these objects have quite often been
found at archaeological sites in Java. Various explanations can be
adduced for this anomaly. The written documents may not have been
detailed enough, or possibly, the Dutch were not interested in trading
these sorts of objects. Making a further deduction from the second
supposition, it is more likely that it was the Chinese or others who
exported these products. Whatever the reasons behind the absence of
written documents on these sorts of objects, it is clear that the major-
ity of Tonkinese wares exported to the regional markets in the late
seventeenth century consisted of utensils for everyday use which were
largely manufactured at the Bt Trng ceramic village.
Descriptions of the Tonkinese ceramic cargoes were often brief,
being nothing more than short notes on the sending of Tonkinese

ceramics among other local goods shipped to Batavia. The patchiness
of documents prevents us from reconstructing an insightful picture on
the export of Tonkinese ceramics. As for the capital and profits made,
it is certain that the total capital the VOC spent on Tonkinese ceramics
was not remarkable, considering the low value of this commodity. In
1670, 214,160 pieces of Tonkinese ceramics cost only 2,650 guilders,
making an average price of 1.24 cent per piece. Based on this we can
calculate that the 772,600 pieces of Tonkinese ceramics exported by
the VOC cost a total of 9,560 guilders, a far cry from what was spent
on the Companys Tonkinese silk shipments. The profits that the VOC
made on these Tonkinese ceramic cargoes were presumably small.
Besides exporting Tonkinese ceramics, the Dutch and other foreign
merchants also imported, mainly Chinese and Japanese, porcelain into
Tonkin. Appendix 10 shows the sporadic VOC shipments of foreign
porcelain into Tonkin. It also reflects the fairly unconcerned attitude
displayed by the Company towards this minor trade. Since the Com-
panys import trade, as analysed earlier, focused mainly on precious
metals and, to a lesser extent, on the commodities demanded by local
rulers, such miscellaneous items as ceramics failed to spark any inter-
est. Most of the ceramics which the Company imported into Tonkin
indeed often pertained to the orders of local rulers. In contrast to
the Dutch meagre import, the Chinese imported considerably more.
In 1676 alone, for instance, Chinese merchants brought 9,000 pieces
of (most probably Chinese) cups, plates, flasks, brandy-flagons, and
brandy-cups, and approximately 100,000 pieces of Japanese assorted
wares to Tonkin (see Appendix 10).
This still begs the question of whether such large amounts of Chi-
nese and Japanese wares shipped to northern Vietnam were consumed
in Tonkin itself or whether they were reshipped to other marketplaces.
Since the Dutch Company often complained about the high purchase
prices of Japanese porcelain in Japan, it is doubtful if these expensive
items were all consumed in Tonkin, where the long tentacles of the
Royal Court had already forbidden its subjects to use exotic merchan-
dise including foreign ceramics and textiles.663
Appendix 11 shows that, unlike the Chinese who deliberately
imported Chinese and Japanese porcelain into Tonkin as merchandise,
the VOC shipments of foreign porcelain to Tonkin were often con-
tingent upon the Trnh rulers demands and orders. While the number
of objects per order was inconsiderable, totalling hardly more than
184 chapter seven
some dozens of pieces, the assortment of the objects ordered was

monotonous. They were mainly flasks which were apparently used as
ornaments by the court and royal family.664 The court demonstrated the
size and decorative motifs by providing wooden models and handed
them over to the Dutch factory to be made in Japan since the VOC
had no access to mainland China.
Concluding remarks
Silk was the centre of gravity which pulled the VOC towards Tonkin
in the late 1630s. Thanks primarily to their political and military
concessions but with their patient endurance also, Dutch merchants
were able to conduct their import and export trade with Tonkin satis-
factorily in the first twenty years. Raw silk and silk piece-goods were
exported to Japan in substantial quantities in the years leading to 1654,
where they yielded handsome annual profits for the Company. As the
Tonkin-Japan silk trade grew less profitable from the mid-1650s, the
Company altered its focus from raw to woven silk which it exported
mainly to the European market. Miscellaneous items such as musk
and cinnamon were also carried home while gold purchased in Tonkin
was sent to the Coromandel Coast, and ceramics were largely shipped
to insular South-East Asia.
As in most Asian trading-ports, the Company needed silver and
copper as its main forms of investment capital if it were to conduct its
export trade profitably. The proportion of silver to copper varied from
period to period according mainly to the demand on the local market
and the supply of these items. The ready access of the Company to
these metals in Japan was an enormous advantage to its Tonkin trade
and maximized its profit margins in the major periods of its entire
trade with the L/Trnh domain.
Being a link in the chain of the intra-Asian trade, the Companys
Tonkin trade depended heavily on the vicissitudes in the demand and
supply sides in this trading network. The case of the Tonkin-Japan silk
trade can be considered as an exemplary instance. As Tonkinese silk
lost its allure on the Japanese market, the Company switched over to
the export of piece-goods and miscellaneous items to be sent to Europe
and to ceramics for the insular South-East Asian markets. These alter-
native export lines did not necessarily imply the prospect of the nice
profit margins which they offered but simply reflected the persistence
of the Company in its endeavours to avoid losing a trading station
which might putatively be important to its commercial strategies in

later periods. In the case of Tonkin, it was the prospect of penetrating
the vast market of China which stimulated the Company to hang on
to its factory in Thng Long for at least a decade until it was eventu-
ally closed. By the turn of the eighteenth century, however, Batavia
cancelled its trading relations with Tonkin as, prior to that time, its
perspective on the China trade had dimmed considerably.
186 chapter seven
part four: dutch-vietnamese interactions 187
PART FOUR: DUTCH-VIETNAMESE INTERACTIONS
They [the animals] are very shy since the English and Dutch settled here;
for now the Natives as well as they shoot them: but before their Arrival
the Tonquinese took them only with Nets Since the Jesuits came into
these parts, some of them [the Tonkinese] have improved themselves in
Astronomy pretty much. They know from them the Revolution of Plan-
ets; they also learn of them natural Philosophy and especially Ethicks
several Mechanick Arts and Trades so that here are many Tradesmen,
viz. Smiths, Carpenters, Sawyers, Joyners, Turners, Weavers, Tailors,
Potters, Painters, Money-changers, Paper-makers, Workers on Lacker-
Ware, Bell-founders, &c.
Introduction
The seventeenth century has long been considered a watershed in

Vietnamese history. It witnessed not only social transformation born
of the protracted series of political crises, it also saw the penetra-
tion of regional and international trading networks into the country.
A combination of internal and external factors led to a remarkable
metamorphosis of Vietnamese society and its economy during this
eventful century.
The vicissitudes in the southern Vietnamese Kingdom of Quinam
have been clarified in a series of comprehensive works in recent
years, those of Tonkin have remained unstudied.666 On the basis of
the information and analyses which have been reviewed in the preced-
ing chapters, this part is devoted to sketching the major features of
Dutch influence on the politics, economy, and society of seventeenth-
century Tonkin.
188 part four: dutch-vietnamese interactions
the dutch east india company trade 189
CHAPTER EIGHT
THE DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY TRADE

AND ITS IMPACT ON SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
VIETNAMESE SOCIETY
1. Dutch residents and local society
Winter, the tenth lunar month, [the court] forbade its subjects to study
the Christian religion. In the past, people of Christian lands arrived in our
country and propagated their fallacious religion to attract the poor. Many
foolish and ignorant people followed this belief. Inside the churches,
men and women lived cheek by jowl with each other. [The court] had
previously expelled the priests but the religious tracts were still circu-
lated and places for preaching still remained. The iniquitous habits were
therefore not stopped. Now [the court] again forbade [the propaganda of
the Christian religion].
Ton th (1663)667
Factories and factors

In order to pursue the import and export trade as profitably and con-
veniently as possible, the VOC needed to establish and maintain a
factory in Tonkin, just as it had done in many other trading-places
throughout Asia. In the first few years, the Dutch were lodged in the
customs town of Ph Hin, midway between the sea and the capital
Thng Long. As the diplomatic relations between the Company and
Tonkin pursued a steady course in these years, in the early 1640s, the
Dutch were granted permission to reside and trade in Thng Long.
After their removal upriver, their factory at Ph Hin was deserted.
The Dutch factory in the capital was moved several times during
the 1640s before it found a permanent location in the early 1650s.
Patchy descriptions of the early years of the Dutch residence in Tonkin
prevent us from making any feasible reconstruction of the Dutch fac-
tory in this period. All that can be said with certainty is that it often
consisted of one or two poorly constructed thatched and mud-walled
houses, closely resembling most of the indigenous dwellings which
were highly vulnerable to thieves, fires, and storms. In 1649, the
Dutch residence was completely demolished because the Crown Prince
wanted the ground to build a shooting-range. The next compound was
190 chapter eight
erected on the bank of the Hng River, near present Long Bin bridge.
Although the factory suffered several fires and floods which required
very thorough repairs, it was well maintained until 1700 when the
Company resolved to leave Tonkin.
The methods of management of the Tonkin trade were also subject
to change. Prior to 1671, the Tonkin factory was subordinate to both
the High Government in Batavia and the VOC factory in Japan. Bata-
via reserved the right to issue general instructions on the Tonkin trade,
leaving the calculation of and deciding on the annual investment capi-
tal, the import and export volumes of the Tonkin factory to the Japan
factory. Consequently, the profits and losses on the Tonkin cargoes
were calculated and subsequently entered into the bookkeeping of the
Japan factory. Zeelandia Castle in Taiwan was also involved in man-
aging the Tonkin trade to a certain extent through supplying some of
the goods and objects that the Tonkin factory demanded. After direct
shipping between Tonkin and Japan was discarded in 1671, the Tonkin
factory fell directly under the High Government in Batavia.
The number of Dutch factors residing in Thng Long either rose or
fell according to the state of commercial reforms and untrammelled
functioning of the Companys Tonkin trade at any particular time.
As the Companys import and export trade in the early years enjoyed
the backing of the local authorities by grace of the amicable relation-
ship between Batavia and Thng Long, the Dutch factors could easily
procure silk around two months before sending ships to Japan while
the southern monsoon still prevailed. The revocation of the military
alliance with Tonkin by Batavia in 1644 harmed the Tonkin-VOC rela-
tionship, but none the less the High Government decided to reinforce
the trading capacity of the Tonkin factory by increasing the number of
Dutch factors in Thng Long. By the early 1650s, there were around
nine Dutch factors in residence in Thng Long at any one time.
The personnel of the Tonkin factory consisted of one director, one
assistant-director, one bookkeeper, one surgeon, several assistants
including merchants, soldiers and, occasionally, such people as tailors
and trumpeters. Wary of being spied on by the local inhabitants, the
Dutch factory restricted the employment of locals as much as possible,
hiring the Tonkinese mainly as mediators and interpreters. As part of
their duties, these Vietnamese employees were actively involved in
trade, selling the import items and buying local goods for the Com-
pany. When the Tonkin factory was promoted to permanent status in
1663, the number of Dutch factors in Tonkin shot up to fourteen, but
it was again reduced to around ten after the revocation of the promo-
tion. In 1679, when Batavia reduced the annual investment capital
assigned to the Tonkin trade, there were only five Company servants
left in Thng Long. They were joined by a few slaves and soldiers for
menial duties, to guard the compound, escort the chief when he went
out, and to assist the factors in such daily business as weighing and
ferrying goods up and down the river. Generally speaking, the number
of Company servants residing in Thng Long was smaller than that at
other trading-places such as Siam in the same period.668
Although the personnel lived in Tonkin the whole year round, their
business transactions were conducted mainly during the summer trad-
ing season, which took place between May and July. Prior to the early
1670s, the transactions of the Dutch factory concentrated solely on
advancing silver for the delivery of silk. After the Company ships
arrived in Tonkin early in the spring, the factors would hand the silver
over to local mandarins, brokers, and silk-producers. Between May
and July, they would be busy collecting silk from those to whom they
had advanced the money, as well as buying products from retailers. In
July or August, the chief accompanied the rich silk cargoes to Japan
and would not return to Tonkin until the next spring, bringing with
him sufficient capital to prepare for the next trading season. After
the Tonkin-Japan route was abandoned in 1671, the Company ships
left Tonkin for Batavia during the wintertime and would not return
until early the following summer. The reconstitution of the Companys
Tonkin trade in the early 1670s required more factors to live in Tonkin
and carry out the commercial transactions before the Company ships
arrived from Batavia. The advantage of this shipping arrangement
was that the Company ships leaving Tonkin could always carry with
them the silk and piece-goods purchased during the winter trading
season to Batavia, where they were transhipped either to Japan or the
Netherlands.
The directorship: the need for Vietnamese learning and

diplomatic activities
Similar to, or even more demanding than other trading-places in the
East, the success of the Tonkin trade depended heavily on the knowl-
edge and experience of the chief of the factory in his dealings with
the indigenous authorities. His ability to maintain favourable relations
with the court and with the mandarins in charge of the Company trade
192 chapter eight
was of the utmost importance. To undertake such a task, he needed to

have a good knowledge of the local customs and, more importantly,
the local language.
In the early years of the Tonkin trade, the chiefs of the Tonkin
factory were carefully selected from merchants who had a good knowl-
edge of Tonkin or of the East Asian trade in general. This was a
great help when they had to contact local rulers and other people.
The first chief, Carel Hartsinck, for instance, was quite familiar with
the ins-and-outs of the Tonkin trade when he visited Tonkin for the
first time in 1637. He had obtained in Japan reliable information from
foreign merchants, mainly Japanese and Chinese, trading to Hirado.
The inaugural VOC voyage to Tonkin under his command was con-
sequently a sound success.
In the years that followed, the High Government often appointed a
merchant to this office who had already been living in Tonkin for a
few years. After the establishment of the Dutch factory in Thng Long
in the 1640s, it was a common, though unwritten, regulation that, in
the final years of his term, the incumbent chief trained a merchant
whom he trusted in order to recommend him to the High Govern-
ment. The advantage of this arrangement was that the successor had
already accumulated a great deal of experience about the local trade
and society before he actually succeeded to the directorship. For obvi-
ous reasons the policy of training and preparing merchants who had
been living in Thng Long for the directorship of the Tonkin factory
was not without drawbacks. It appears that the longer a merchant lived
in Tonkin, the greater the risk he would become embroiled in private
trade as a consequence of his good knowledge of the local trade. In
the middle of the 1640s, for instance, the most suitable person for the
succession to the Tonkin directorship, Merchant Jan van Riebeeck
who, according to the incumbent director Antonio van Brouckhorst,
understood the Vietnamese language well and behaved civilly to the
Vietnamesewas disapproved by the High Government with which
he stood accused of private trade. This proved to be a costly mistake.
The third director, Philip Schillemans, who had virtually no previous
knowledge of the Tonkin trade, failed to deal diplomatically with the
local mandarins and thus contributed largely to the erosion of the
Companys Tonkin trade in the following years.
Despite the endless efforts made by the High Government to curb
the private trade between the Northern Quarters, plus heavy fines on
those who brought private silk and textiles to Japan, Tonkinese silk
was still smuggled to Nagasaki by the Company servants.669 It was

said that as long as the Japanese officials and traders at Nagasaki
supported if not encouraged this activity, it was impossible for the
Company to eliminate its servants Tonkin-Japan private trade.670
After the dismissal of the incompetent Schillemans, Batavia expected
that the appointment of Jan de Groot in 1650 would restore the Tonkin
trade. In order to provide the new chief with the necessary experience
in managing the Tonkin trade and in dealing with the Tonkinese rulers,
the High Government even sent him to Japan where he was trained by
the former Chief Factor Antonio van Brouckhorst before he sailed
to Tonkin to succeed Schillemans. To the great disappointment of
Batavia, the new chief was found guilty of conducting a large-scale
private trade, just a few months after he took office. He was immedi-
ately dismissed. The interim director, Jacob Keijser (16513), proved
to be a skilled manager, but he never won the approval of the High
Government because he too was accused of trading privately on a
large scale. Other competent directors as Hendrick Baron (16604)
and Hendrick Verdonk (16645) were also reprimanded for carry-
ing out illegal actions. It was only after the abandoning of the direct
Tonkin-Japan shipping route in 1671 that the Tonkin factors private
trade could be almost eliminated. Even in the later years Tonkinese
goods were still being privately transported to Batavia by the Company
servants, though on a much lesser scale.
It is important to point out here that what has been called the Viet-
namese learning of the Dutch, and indeed of other foreign merchants
at that time, was confined to the learning of the spoken Vietnamese
language. As the seventeenth-century Vietnamese people used two
entirely different language systems, the Vietnamese language for
speaking and Chinese characters for writing, the Dutch often only
learnt to speak Vietnamese, which was a pragmatic necessity for their
daily business. Pertinently, by that time the process of romanizing the
Vietnamese spoken language by Western priests had been carried out
for around a century.671 This may have helped the VOC servants to
note down the pronunciation more easily. In the Dutch records, there
are sporadic notes on the pronunciation of the Vietnamese language.
In 1651, for instance, the Vietnamese mandarin title of Thiu Bo
Qun Cng which Cha Trnh Trng granted Governor-General Carel
Reniers was spelled by the Dutch as Theuuw Baeuw Quun Congh.
Although there is a discrepancy between the seventeenth-century and
todays transcription, the sounds of these two phrases, when we read
194 chapter eight
them aloud, are quite similar. Just a few years before this event, Jan
van Riebeeck had reportedly written some paragraphs of his report
to the Gentlemen XVII in Amsterdam in the romanized Vietnamese
language to show his masters how good his Vietnamese was.672
Besides observing the diplomatic protocol of the Tonkinese court,
participating in the local festivities was the other important part of the
activities of the chief and the factory council as well. Such activities
often proved costly because the guests were expected to come with
valuable presents. Since there were many feasts throughout the year in
Tonkin, they became a real burden on the Dutch as well as other for-
eigners. There were four great occasions a year which cost the Dutch
excessive amounts of money for presents for the Emperor, Cha, and
great mandarins: the New Year holiday; the May festival; and the
birthdays of the Emperor and the Cha. Besides these four main fes-
tivities, foreign merchants were quite often invited by high-ranking
mandarins to dinner, dramatic performances, music, and the like at
their houses. These invitations, again, cost a considerable amount of
money in term of presents and tips.
Religious practices and anti-Christian sentiments in Tonkin

The propagation of the Christian religion was forbidden in Tonkin,
except for the short period between 1626 and 1630 when the priests
of the Society of Jesus in Macao were allowed to propagate their faith
freely and convert the Vietnamese. After a few years preaching in
Tonkin, in 1630 the French priest Alexandre de Rhodes of the Soci-
ety of Jesus and his colleagues were expelled.673 The anti-Christian
policy of the court during these years was half-hearted, however, and
the Jesuits in Macao continued to visit Tonkin after 1630 to resume
their conversion work which was, as noted by the Dutch in 1633, just
as fruitful as it was in mainland China.674 The number of Tonkinese
Christians increased rapidly and, by the early 1640s, had reportedly
reached around 100,000. The large number of Tonkinese Christians
converts must have irritated the court, especially after a chaotic fight
between hundreds of Tonkinese Christians and some fifty Chinese in
the southern province of Ngh An in 1639. To a certain extent, the
religious disorder in Ngh An in 1639 can be considered a miniature
of the Shimabara Rebellion of 1637 and 1638 in Japan which led to
the Tokugawa persecution of the Japanese Christians, Western priests,
and finally to the expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan. The L/
Trnh Government, too, reacted strongly to this event and pursued
both the local Christians and the Western Jesuits without compunc-
tion. Nevertheless, it appears that the anti-Christian sentiment of the
L/Trnh court was not as strong as that of the Japanese Tokugawa
and the clandestine propagation and conversion continued in Tonkin,
though under more difficult circumstances.675
Learning from the harsh experiences of religious persecution to
which their colleagues in Japan had been subjected, and in order to
avoid unnecessary trouble with the Tonkinese rulers, the Company
servants in Thng Long constantly warned their masters in Batavia not
to transport priests or religious objects to northern Vietnam.676 The
anti-Christian sentiment eased slightly in the following years but was
exacerbated again in 1663 when the court issued a decree banning all
sort of propagation and practice of the erroneous beliefs, namely the
Christian religion, in Tonkin.677 This decree was maintained so strictly
throughout the following decades that, according to Dutch observa-
tions in 1677, the religious work of the French and Portuguese priests
bore very inconsiderable fruit in Tonkin.678 Under increasing pres-
sure from the L/Trnh Government, in 1678 the Spanish Dominican
monk Joan D Arjona was expelled to Banten, where he appealed to
the High Government in Batavia for passage on board a Company ship
departing for Ayutthaya.679
The suppression of Christianity by the Tonkinese Government prob-
ably reached its zenith in August 1694 when the Governor of Ph
Hin had the English flag burnt in front of him, forbidding the English
from then on to fly their flag in Tonkin because the English flag bore
a cross on it. Although the English tried to vindicate themselvesas
did the Dutch who also interceded for their English competitorsthat
the cross merely symbolized their country and had nothing whatsoever
to do with the Christian religion, the mandarin insisted on forbidding
them to fly their flag unless the cross was removed.680
The Dutch did not suffer any trouble from the anti-Christian sen-
timent of the Tonkin court. In contrast to its strict regulations on
religious propaganda, the Tonkinese court generally tolerated the reli-
gious practices of the foreigners as long as they did not perform their
devotion publicly. It appears that the Company servants in Tonkin
could pray inside the factory, while sailors could also follow their
religious observances on board their ships at Doma. Except for their
observance, the Dutch, who were too loose Livers to gain reputa-
tion to their Religion,681 made no attempt to propagate their faith in
Tonkin.
196 chapter eight
Paid company and sentimental attachment: Foreign merchants

and Vietnamese women
The relatively high degree of autonomy and the potent economic
importance of women in early modern and modern South-East Asia
is well-known. Recent research on sexual relations in early modern
South-East Asia has revealed the striking fact that women enjoyed a
high degree of freedom and played an active part in courtship and
lovemaking.682 Seventeenth-century Tonkin was again an exception
to this pattern attributable to the progressive imposition of the sternly
patriarchal Confucian system in the fifteenth century.683
The L Code of the late fifteenth century contained a series of stern
articles governing the sexual relations between women and men, plac-
ing special emphasis on the virginity of women.684 At the peak of the
influence of Confucianism, this sexual norm was strictly guarded. It
appears that, just around a century later, such regulations were being
severely challenged. Besides the sixteenth-century political crises and
social disorder, the arrival of foreign merchants, and hence their need
of sexual partners, must have been a decisive catalyst in transforming
Vietnamese social norms towards sexual relationships. By the late
1680s, the custom of buying wives in Tonkin, in the eyes of an English
traveller, had degenerated into that of hiring Misses:685
[This] gives great liberty to the young Women, who offer themselves
of their own accord to any Strangers, who will go to their Price. There
are of them of all Prizes, from 100 Dollars to 5 Dollars Even the
great Men of Tonquin will offer their Daughters to the Merchants and
Officers, though their Stay is not likely to be above five or six Months in
the Country: neither are they afraid to be with Child by White Men, for
their Children will be much fairer than their Mothers, and consequently
of greater Repute, when they grow up, if they be Girls.
This passage is rather shocking to Vietnamese today whose general
image of Vietnamese women in the early modern period is of mere
followers of first their parents and then their husbands and their sons.
They were believed to have had virtually no liberty in their social or
sexual lives. It is therefore not surprising at all that, until today, there
has been hardly any research by Vietnamese historians into this phe-
nomenon. In the most recent historiography, there have been various
loose remarks on the increase in obscene thoughts and novels which
led the court in 1663 to issue a decree to forbid the obscene relations
between man and women. It seems that this decree had no effect, as
the court issued other decrees in 1718 and again in 1760 forbidding
the printing and selling of pornographic poems and literature.686

The promulgation of the 1663 decree is an indication that the situa-
tion had presumably reached an alarming level by that time. Although
there was no official statement about the root of such a problem, it is
most likely that the arrival of male foreign merchants in Tonkin in the
seventeenth century must have largely contributed a challenge to the
local sexual norms, a phenomenon which was repeated in many other
South-East Asian societies in the early modern and modern periods.
It has been pointed out in recent research that the need for sexual
partners of itinerant traders turned many local women into temporary
wives, concubines, and prostitutes.687 It seems evident that this trend
was incompatible with the seventeenth-century Vietnamese Confucian
ideology on sexual relationships.
Patchy information in the Dutch and English sources on seven-
teenth-century Tonkin supports this assertion. Not too long after their
first arrival, local vrouwen [women] began to appear in Dutch fac-
tors daily lives although, in a similar situation to Dutch employees at
other trading-places, there were hardly any detailed accounts depict-
ing their sexual affairs. It is, however, possible to presume that it
was quite easy for the Company factors to live with local women
just as their colleagues in Japan enjoyed Japanese wives and keisei
(courtesans) in Hirado and after their move to restricted Deshima, or
as the Company employees in Ayutthaya who courted and lived with
the Siamese and Mon women.688 In 1657, for instance, the assistant
Evert Janszoon obtained permission from the chief of the Tonkin fac-
tory to take a Vietnamese lady with whom he had been living for
many years to Batavia to marry her.689 Another Dutch merchant liv-
ing in Tonkin in the 1650s and 1660s, Hendrick Baron, had entered
into a sexual relationship with an indigenous lady who had borne
him a son, Samuel Baron. Although the Dutch and English sources
do not provide detailed information about this interesting story, it is
clear that such an affair was not problematic for either side and this
mestizo son faced no problems from the local authorities which many
mestizo children in other places such as Siam suffered. In the early
1670s, Samuel Baron was even employed by the English East India
Company because, according to his statement, his grandfather on his
fathers side had been Scottish.690
Maintaining a temporary marriage or a sexual relationship would
be economically profitable for both parties. Besides the money a
woman was promised before entering into the relationship, she could
198 chapter eight
also make herself and her partner extra profits by retailing the import
goods and using her husbands money to invest in local goods in the
off season and sell them during the trading season. The property of
the English chief during the early 1690s was even retained by his
Tonquinse wench, who strenuously challenged the new English chief
factor whenever the latter tried to retrieve the Companys property
which had been embezzled by his predecessor.691
While the arrangement of a temporary marriage and a permanent
sexual partner was popularly resorted to in the capital Thng Long
where foreign factors resided permanently, prostitution was reportedly
rife at the anchorage of Doma, where sailors often rested two or three
months awaiting their departure. Women who had been refused by
wealthier merchants, wrote Dampier in 1688, would be caressed by
the poor Seamen, such as the Lascars, who are Moor of India, com-
ing hither in Vessels from Fort. St. George, and other places.692 The
most dreadful report on the widespread prostitution at Doma was
the English chiefs laments in 1694 which said that, while the Dutch
seamen were all in good health and lusty thanks to the good discipline
of the Dutch factory, the sailors on the English frigate the Pearl were
gravely ill due to excessive debauches.693
As a curiosity it may be mentioned here that it has recently been
stated in the Vietnamese media that Emperor L Thn Tng (r. 161943
and 164962) had a Dutch wife, although the Dutch records contain
no such information.694
2. The impact of the VOC trade on Tonkins economy
Cassies [copper coins] were very high, att 24 & 25,000 cassies per barr
which sometime the noise of a ships coming and great deal of silver
given out make their fall 30 or 40 per cent which so much proportion-
ally enhances the price of goods which thing considered your Honours
&ca. will perceive, as formerly advised how much it would be to the
Right Honourable Companys advantage to have a double stock since
money here is not to be procured att any reasonable rate.695
The VOCs import of monetary metals and its impact on the silver/
cash ratio
As mentioned in Chapter Five, the Vietnamese reduced the shortage
of small change between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries by
exchanging silver and gold for Chinese copper coins. This outflow
of silver in exchange for Chinese copper coins was recorded by a

European writer in the late 1680s:
Another occasion of hindrance and stop to trade is, that they [the L/
Trnh rulers] permit the greater part of what silver comes into the coun-
try (commonly a million dollars per annum) to be carried to Bowes and
China, to be exchanged for copper cash, which rises and falls according
as the Chova [Cha Trnh] finds it agree with his interest; besides, this
cash will be defaced in few years, and consequently not current, which
grand inconveniences causes considerable losses to merchants, and signal
prejudice to the public. Thus goes the silver out of the country, and no
provision is made against it, which is very bad policy. 696
The bulk of the precious metals which Tonkin used in exchange for
Chinese copper coins consisted of Japanese silver bars and, to a much
lesser extent, of silver bars which were melted down in Tonkin from
Spanish rials, Dutch silver coins, and Indian rupees. There were basi-
cally four sorts of silver circulating on the local market. The finest
sort was called lysee which contained 100 per cent pure silver, the
other three were respectively rials of eight (94 per cent), rixdollars
(85 per cent), and Japanese silver (82 per cent).697 Large transactions
could be paid in silver, but small business deals and daily expenses
required copper cash. Since Japanese silver constituted the most impor-
tant investment capital of the Dutch and Chinese, it was regarded as
the basic silver in the exchange for cash in Tonkin. Consequently,
the silver foreign merchants often mentioned in their silver/cash
exchange rate referred directly to Japanese silver.698
The shortage of sources prevents any reconstruction of a full account
of the silver import into Tonkin by foreign merchants. Nevertheless,
the VOC archives allow us to obtain an overall view on the Dutch
Companys imports of this precious metal into Tonkin from 1637 till
1668, when the Japanese Government banned the export of Japanese
silver.699 During this period, roughly 2,527,000 taels of mainly Jap-
anese silver (or approximately seven million Dutch guilders) were
imported into Tonkin by the VOC. After losing its access to Japanese
silver, the Dutch Company switched over to the import of such mis-
cellaneous silver coins as provintindaalders, kruisdaalders, Mexican
rials and Surat rupees. By that time, the annual quantity was consider-
ably less as the Companys Tonkin trade declined rapidly in the second
half of the seventeenth century.700 Although there are no records on
the silver imported into Tonkin by other foreign merchants in the same
period, sporadic information extracted from the VOC records suggests
200 chapter eight
that Chinese merchants carried as much Japanese silver as did the

Dutch to Tonkin. Quite apart from this, prior to the mid-1630s a large
amount of Japanese silver had been shipped to northern Vietnam by
the Japanese, Chinese, and Portuguese. Regardless of the absence of
source materials and taking into consideration only the figures given in
the VOC records, it seems that this stream of precious metal had been
crucial to the L/Trnh rulers in their efforts to stabilize the monetary
system and the economy of Tonkin.
This import of silver into northern Vietnam affected the silver/cash
ratio and hence the buying and selling prices in Tonkin. The exchange
ratio between silver and cash often fluctuated, as figuratively noted by
the English factors in 1696, according to the noise of a ships com-
ing and great deal of silver given out.701 Figure 15, which consists of
three different quantitative factors, has been composed on purpose to
demonstrate the different trends in the exchange ratio only.
4500
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1637
1639
1641
1643
1645
1647
1649
1651
1653
1655
1657
1659
1661
1663
1665
1667
1669
1671
1673
1675
1677
1679
1681
1683
1685
1687
1689
1691
1693
1695
1797
Silver/cash ratio Silver import Zeni import
Figure 15. The VOCs import of silver and copper zeni and the fluctuation of the
silver/cash ratio in Tonkin, 16371697
Sources: Table 1; sporadic numbers given in Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren, G/12/17-1

to G/12/17-10, and Dagh-register Batavia 16241682.
Notes: Exchange rate: cash per tael of silver; silver import: x 100 taels; zeni import: x
1,000 pieces.
As shown in Figure 15, when the Dutch first arrived in 1637, one
tael of silver was worth around 2,000 cash. By the late 1640s, the
silver/cash ratio began to fall, reaching the ratio of 1/1,500 in the early
1650s, and it slumped to 1/800 in April 1654. It was then predicted by

the Dutch factors that the ratio would be likely to drop to 1/700-500
within a few months should the situation not improve. This exchange
rate continued to stand low until the early 1660s, when the composi-
tion of silver/copper coins imported into Tonkin by the Dutch, and
the Chinese as well, was altered.
As is vividly reflected in Figure 15, at the times at which the silver/
cash ratio fell rapidly, the annual import volume of silver into Tonkin
by the VOC increased sharply. This raises the question of to what
extent did these contradictory trends relate to each other? It seems
that the great amount of silver imported into Tonkin by the Dutch
Company prior to the 1650s considerably affected the exchange rate.
Indeed, by 1653 the VOC servants in Thng Long had already realized
that the exchange rate was often lowered upon the arrival of a foreign
ship. They therefore planned to exchange silver for copper cash either
before or after the trading season in order to reduce the loss on the
silver exchange. It was a forlorn hope, since it placed the factory in a
dependent position.702 In 1660, Resimon blamed the low silver/cash
ratio on the Dutch Company. The Japanese free merchant accused the
Dutch of importing too much silver into Tonkin which contributed
largely to the depression of the exchange rate.703 It all depends how
one looks at it: the shortage of copper coins in Tonkin during the
1650s caused the severe fall in the silver/cash ratio, yet the surplus of
silver on the Tonkin market in turn also affected the exchange ratio.
Resimons accusation was therefore by no means groundless, although
it was not perfectly true.
It is interesting, too, to note from Figure 15 that, in contrast to the
contradiction between the amount of silver imported and the exchange
rate, the import of Japanese copper coins into Tonkin seems to have
been parallel with, or even propped up, the silver/cash exchange ratio.
After their successful introduction of Japanese copper zeni into Tonkin
for the first time in the early 1660s, the Dutch regularly imported
these coins until the late 1670s. The introduction as well as the regular
importation of these coins in the later years undoubtedly helped Tonkin
to overcome its severe shortage of copper coins and to stabilize the
exchange rate. The above-mentioned figure reflects one clear-cut fact
that, as the quantity of Japanese copper zeni imported into Tonkin
by the VOC increased sharply in the early 1670s, the silver/cash
ratio revived remarkably. By 1672, the silver/cash exchange rate had
increased to 1/1,200 and it even rose to 1/1,450 in 1676. By the early
202 chapter eight
1680s, it had even reached the level of the late 1630s, standing at the
ratio of 1/2,200.704 With the revival of the silver/cash ratio, the severe
shortage of copper coins which had badly affected the economy of
Tonkin during the 1650s and the early 1660s was basically solved.
Impact on prices
Examining the general trend in the prices in seventeenth- and eigh-
teenth-century Vietnam, Nguyen Thanh Nha has concluded that, while
the price level was quite stable in the long run, the prices tended to
rise and fall within short periods.705 This conclusion is sustained by
the fluctuation in prices mentioned sporadically in the VOC records.
It appears that it was the VOCs import of silver and cash into Tonkin
in particular which affected the change in the local exchange rate and
hence caused a slight rise in the purchasing price of local goods in a
short period. However, these imports did not have any lasting impact
on the trend of prices in Tonkin in the seventeenth century. As rice
constituted the staple, the prices of other wares seemed to rise and
fall according to the price of rice. By and large, the buying and sell-
ing prices were highly dependent on the abundance of the agricultural
harvests, including the mulberry crops which were crucial to the silk
industry. They often rose in years of crop failures and the subsequent
scarcity of goods and foods, and quickly returned to the normal level
when the situation was stable again. They were also severely affected
at times when cash grew scarce.
In the VOC trade in Tonkin, there were two major sets of prices
to which the Dutch as well as other foreign merchants paid particular
attention. The first set, and the one with which they were most con-
cerned, was the price of local export goods, silk in particular, since
foreign merchants considered Tonkin almost solely as a supplier of
raw silk and silk piece-goods. Prior to the early 1650s, when Tonkin
experienced a severe shortage of cash, the purchase price of raw silk
in Tonkin remained virtually unchanged, fluctuating at around 3.5
guilders per catty. It rose to around 5 guilders per catty during the
1650s and 1660s, before settling back to the price of the 1630s in the
following decades.706 Tonkinese silk became cheap in the later half
of the 1680s when the Japanese market turned its back on it. In 1687,
for instance, the purchase price of Tonkinese raw silk even slumped as
low as to around only 2 guilders per catty on the free market.707 The
prices of other commodities also fluctuated proportionally.
Table 7. The prices of several Tonkinese commodities, 1642

Raw silk 152,380 cash per picul
Sittouw 3,400 -
Cinnamon 11,000 -
Sumongij 2,810 cash per piece
Baa 3,200 -
Hockiens 1,200 -
Pelings 3,600 -
Zenuwasche [?] hockiens 1,400 -
Velvet 7,000 -
Chio 1,400 -
Source: Calculated from VOC 1146, Instructie voor Brouckhorst op zijn voyagie naer
Tonkin [Instruction for Brouckhorst sailing to Tonkin], 15 Dec. 1642, fos. 708-11.
Note: 1 tael of silver = 2 guilders 17 stivers = c. 2,000 cash.
The second set of prices consisted mainly of food stuffs. As mentioned

before, similar to and even more subject to fluctuations than export
commodities, the price of food stuffs was hugely dependent on the
annual harvest. It seems that, with the exception of such difficult times
as natural disasters, famines, and military campaigns, the prices of
daily provisions remained virtually unchanged throughout the seven-
teenth century. In the early 1640s one kilogram of rice cost around 20
cash and a hen cost around 110 cash. By the 1670s, a hen was said to
have been only 80 cash. As reflected in the Dutch and English records,
foreigners enjoyed a rather luxurious life when residing in Tonkin.
Their daily expenditure on food was extremely high in comparison
to that of the local population. In 1642, for example, a Dutch factor
budgeted 129 cash per day on average for such sumptuous foods
as chicken, geese, fish, rice, vegetables, eggs, crabs, prawns, fruits
and the like. Thirty years later, an English factor spent an average
of 223 cash per day.708 These expenses were out of the question for
the common people of Tonkin where a carpenter or a weaver earned
hardly 40 cash per day. In the early 1690s, a Tonkinese rice cup was
sold to the English at the price of 3.7 cash. Hence, a potter needed
to sell at least thirty rice cups in order to buy a hen or at least five
pieces to buy one kilogram of rice.709
In short, while the import and export trade of the foreigners may
have influenced the price of export goods in certain periods, it seems
that their residence did not make a lasting impact on the local food
prices. It might well be that the number of foreign merchants resid-
204 chapter eight
ing in Tonkin to trade was too small in order to affect the prices of
provisions and daily services.
Impact on labour
In his profound research on the impact of the European East Indian
Companies on the early modern economy of Bengal, Om Prakash
concluded that the rather impressive increase in income, output and
employment took place mainly because the Euro-Bengal trade was
not a normal trade involving an exchange of goods for goods, but
one involving an exchange of precious metals for goods, implying an
export surplus for Bengal.710 It must be stated from the outset that
the foreign trade of Tonkin was by no means comparable to that of its
Bengal counterpart in terms of either size or duration. Nevertheless,
the nature of these two places showed some reciprocal similarities
if the bullion for goods trade, that is silver and copper for silk
and textiles, which shaped the structure of the trade of the European
Companies with Bengal is taken into consideration. Bengal therefore
may serve as a suitable model for studying the internal aspects of the
seventeenth-century foreign trade of Tonkin.
In order to discern the impact of foreign trade on the division of
local labour, the silk industry in particular, it is necessary to recapitu-
late the general features of the silk and textile industry of Tonkin in
the seventeenth century. The silk manufacture of Tonkin had devel-
oped spectacularly by the first half of the seventeenth century and
several silk-producing centres flourished inside and nearby the capital
Thng Long. Even so, the bulk of the raw silk and silk piece-goods
was still produced by farmers who had been pursuing this work as
a traditional household handicraft for centuries. By the early 1640s,
there were approximately 953,810 households (or 4,769,050 people)
in northern Vietnam; the majority resided in the Hng delta basin.711
Although most of these households were involved in silk manufactur-
ing, there can be no question they ever contemplated abandoning their
paddy-fields and switching over to mulberry groves completely. Incon-
trovertibly, silk was produced by Tonkinese farmers as a side-line. As
this handicraft industry was immensely popular, the annual production
could still meet the increasing demand of foreign merchants.
The VOC spent approximately 13,514,028 guilders mainly on Ton-
kinese silk between 1637 and 1699, an average of around 215,000
guilders per year (Appendix 3). This period also witnessed the devel-
opment of the Chinese trade with Tonkin. Although we do not have
any accurate figures about the Chinese purchases, fragmentary infor-

mation in the Dutch records suggests that the total Chinese investment
in their Tonkin trade amounted to around two-thirds of that invested
by the Dutch. If this is correct, then another sum of approximately
9,009,352 guilders was invested in Tonkinese products, mainly silk,
by the Chinese during the 16371700 period.712 This means that there
would have been 22,523,380 guilders spent on Tonkinese export prod-
ucts, most notably silk, by the Dutch and the Chinese between 1637
and 1700, an average sum of around 350,000 guilders per annum,
apart from the purchases made by the Japanese and Portuguese in the
earlier period as well as those of the English and French during the
last quarter of the seventeenth century.713
How far did this large sum of money contribute to the development
of the silk industry in Tonkin? A definite answer cannot be given,
but it is certain that this industry must have been boosted by the for-
eign demand, because the seventeenth century witnessed a spectacular
development in the silk industry in northern Vietnam. When this prod-
uct was still highly marketable and profitable in Japan, it was reported
by the Dutch that 1,500 piculs (90 tons) of raw silk and around 6,000
silk piece-goods such as pelings, baas, chio, sumongij, hockiens and
the like were produced for export annually.714
In order to produce this quantity, large numbers of labourers must
have been involved in this industry. The absence of historical docu-
ments on the average silk production per household means figures
for it have to be deduced. According to a present-day farmer in the
Hng delta province of Thi Bnh, his family harvests 10 kilograms
of raw silk on average per season. Assuming that a seventeenth-cen-
tury household harvested the same amount, at least 9,000 households
or around 45,000 labourers (around 1 per cent of the population of
Tonkin) could possibly have been involved in manufacturing 90 tons
(1,500 piculs) of raw silk; leaving aside a great number of reelers,
bleachers, weavers and so on involved in the process of producing
silk piece-goods. If we make a simple calculation that a household,
regardless of its investments and expenses during the season, harvested
10 kilograms (166.5 catties) raw silk per season, at the average price
of 3.5 guilders per catty, this yielded around 60 guilders per year from
the silk production. In an agricultural country like Tonkin, where the
majority of prices were affected by the rise and fall of the rice price,
the sum of 60 guilders was equal to around 39 piculs (or 2,331 kilo-
grams) of rice at the price of 15 tin (about 1.5 guilders) per picul.
206 chapter eight
This amount of rice was more than sufficient for a five-person family.
Naturally this calculation is fairly rough and simple because it fails
to account for the fact that farmers had to pay tax and sell part of their
product to the court at low prices. Yet, it demonstrates how the silk
and ceramic industries must have contributed greatly to the expansion
of the seventeenth-century economy of Tonkin as they provided large-
scale employment for labourers. The rub was that these flourishing
industries were unstable as Tonkinese silk and ceramics were by and
large supplementary to Chinese products. Therefore, when Bengali and
Chinese silk were available, Tonkinese yarn lost its predominance on
the regional market.
From the late 1660s the Tonkinese farmers began to convert their
mulberry groves into paddy-fields and as a precaution local weavers
would not begin their work until the foreign merchants had arrived or
advanced them money. The decline in the silk industry also affected
other classes such as merchants, brokers and the like. By the late
1680s, the merchant commonly stays 3 or 4 months for his goods
after he has paid for them; because the poor are not employed till ships
arrive in the country, and then they are set to work by the money that
is brought thither in them.715 The departure of the English and the
Dutch in 1697 and 1700 respectively, not to mention the exodus of
many Chinese merchants during the 1680s, must have greatly reduced
the number of Tonkinese labourers who had been either fully or partly
employed in export handicraft industries.
The commercial centres and the commercial system

Another aspect of the impact of foreign trade on Tonkins economy
was the growth of commercial centres, hence the development of a
commercial system. The capital Thng Long is the most outstanding
example. Besides its function as a political centre, Thng Long had
also served as an important commercial centre in the Vietnamese King-
dom of i Vit since the eleventh century. With the establishment
of the L Dynasty in 1428, the commercial role of this city entered a
period of constant expansion. The royal citadel and the palaces in the
city were surrounded by an economic-residential area stretching along
the bank of the Hng River. Prior to the late sixteenth century Thng
Long was still a remote place, far removed from the main routes of
international commerce. Other commercial centres in the region such
as Ayutthaya, Pegu, and further the Javanese port towns of Demak
and Banten had developed much earlier.716
Once it was permitted, the residence and commercial activities of a

foreign community contributed towards linking this commercial city to
international trade. In the following century, such foreign merchants as
the Chinese, Portuguese, Dutch, and English all resided and traded in
the capital. Thng Long was therefore transformed into an international
trading city, a status attributable largely to a series of capital devel-
opment policies promulgated by the L/Trnh, the development of a
commodity economy, and great social migrations.717
The presence of foreign merchants in Thng Long enlivened the
commercial life of the city. It attracted more local people to come to
trade directly with foreign traders. As mentioned before, the Dutch
factors bought the bulk of their silk from local authorities and brokers.
They also purchased this product from local farmers and retailers who
travelled to the city on market days to sell silk and piece-goods. There
were also silk guilds and silk factories in the city, which were linked to
various interregional silk-trading networks. For example, raw silk and
unfinished piece-goods from the villages of Bi, La, and M were
transferred to Hng o Street, where they were redyed, bleached, and
finished, before being sold to foreign merchants.718 There were also
various miscellaneous services in the city which also in part served
the foreigners, including the silver refining, portage, and even pros-
titution.
Ph Hin was another town which developed during this commer-
cial century. Although the establishment of the place called the Hin
Department can be dated back to the late fifteenth century, it was not
until the early seventeenth century that this town developed commer-
cially, though this florescence was relatively short-lived. There was an
unwritten law that foreign merchants arriving in Tonkin for the first
time had to reside and trade at the riverine town of Ph Hin, around
fifty kilometres downstream from Thng Long. After having resided
there for a few years they were approved of by the court and were
permitted to establish a factory in the capital Thng Long. Enlivened
by the temporary residence of the Chinese, Japanese, and the Dutch
during the first half of the seventeenth century, commercial life in
Ph Hin flourished for a few decades. At the zenith of its glory, Ph
Hin is said to have consisted of two major quarters: one for the Chi-
nese and the other for Japanese merchants. There were also various
quarters in which export products were made. The commercial life of
this town faded quickly, however, as the number of overseas Japanese
decreased after the seclusion policy introduced by the Japanese Gov-
208 chapter eight
ernment in the mid-1630s and after the removal of the Chinese and
Dutch residences to the capital in the early 1640s. Even then, Ph Hin
maintained its function as a customs office. It controlled all fluvial
transport passing by as well as the flow of import and export goods
between the capital Thng Long and the anchorage of Doma.719
The development of Thng Long and Ph Hin was remarkable.
The commercial function of other places which were involved in the
foreign trade of Tonkin in the seventeenth century was of minor impor-
tance. Doma, which has been overestimated by some Vietnamese
historians as a commercial centre, was actually an anchorage. Despite
its humble status, this place played a crucial role in the birth of the
seventeenth-century commercial system in Tonkin.720 By the dawn
of the eighteenth century, the town of Qung Yn on the north-east-
ern border with China was reportedly flourishing, benefiting from the
residence of throngs of Chinese merchants. By this time, however,
the foreign trade of Tonkin was already in rapid decline; one after the
other foreign merchant was leaving the Kingdom of Tonkin.
Were the first seeds of capitalism sown?

The question of whether the first seeds of capitalism had been sown
in Vietnamese society in the pre-modern period in the wake of the
development of the commodity economy of the country and the expan-
sion of its foreign trade was the topic of an enduring debate among
Vietnamese historians during the 1960s. As the northern Vietnamese
were setting up a political system with a socialist orientation after
the defeat of the French in 1954, it was said that the study on the
emergence and development of the capitalist economy and the bour-
geoisie contributes an important significance to todays revolutionary
task.721 By that time, populist propaganda spread the story that the
country had evolved directly from a feudal into a socialist society
without experiencing a capitalist period. Most Vietnamese scholars,
however, believed that, although Vietnam was by and large a feudal
society until the establishment of the socialist government immediately
after the Second World War (1945), capitalist elements had obviously
taken root in it. In other words, the first seeds of capitalism had been
sown in Vietnamese feudal society several centuries earlier.722
In this debate on the sprouts of capitalism in Vietnam, one of the
central questions was when and in which forms they emerged in Viet-
namese society. The various answers and propositions adduced can
be divided into two major groups. The first group believed that there
had been an embryonic capitalist mode of production in northern Viet-

nam as early as the seventeenth century. The most visible indications
of such a new economic trend were the large-scale handicraft indus-
tries in textiles and ceramics as well as the increasing number of free
labourers working in these industries.723 Taking a contrary position,
the historians of the second school claimed that such indications were
not convincing enough and accused the scholars of the first school of
misinterpreting the Marxist theory of capitalism. They concluded that
the commodity economy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
was a feudal economy, and that what is known as the capitalist
mode of production neither sprouted nor developed in the feudal period
between the seventeenth and the early nineteenth century.724
It is not my intention to reassess this complex debate which cov-
ers various fields and many centuries since this study focuses on the
Dutch-Vietnamese relationship. Nevertheless, since this monograph
deals with the development of the commodity economy and foreign
trade of Tonkin in the seventeenth century, it may be useful to toss
some relevant information into this dispute in order to prompt a recon-
sideration of the once-dominant question of whether the first seeds of
embryonic capitalism were sown in seventeenth-century Tonkin. Reca-
pitulating the debate from a twenty-first century perspective, it is clear
that both schools have presented convincing historical facts. Their
approaches and arguments, however, have been too heavily influenced
by classical Marxist theories on capitalism, which would have been
much more appropriate to the European context than the Oriental and
Vietnamese background. In most of the cases, instead of considering
the phenomenon of the expansion of the commodity economy as it was
in seventeenth-century Vietnamese context, scholars have tended to
frame it into the Marxist theories of, for instance, the mode of produc-
tion, the productive force and the like. In this sense, it seems that the
Vietnamese scholars made the mistake against which Marx had often
warned: not to consider his theory as a detailed prophecy.
In recent research it has been stressed that the transformation from
feudalism to capitalism cannot be located on any one day in any one
month in any one year, and that it was a transition composed of a
multitude of partial changes.725 Looking back at the case of seven-
teenth-century Tonkin, it is obvious that significant transformations
occurred in the economy and society of the country such as the priva-
tization of state-owned land, the increasing number of free labourers,
the development of the handicraft industries and foreign trade, and the
210 chapter eight
growth of several commercial centres. These, to a certain extent, could

be considered the embryonic elements from which a capitalist mode
of production evolved. However, as was the situation in most other
Asian countries, these elements were prevented from developing any
further to transform Tonkin from a feudal to a capitalist society.726 It
has recently been pointed out that the two basic economic elements
from which commercial capitalism sprouted, namely a long-distance
trade and the large-scale production of handicraft manufactures, failed
to materialize in Vietnam.727 As mentioned in the preceding chapters,
although silk was the key export product of Tonkin in the seventeenth
century, silk manufacture was by and large a household handicraft
industry. Most of the labourers working in the silk-producing areas
around Thng Long were part-time workers who travelled to the capi-
tal during the off season in search of extra income and would return to
their villages during the cultivation and harvest seasons. In short, there
were new socio-economic elements apparent in seventeenth-century
Tonkin, but they never attained the strength to transform Tonkin from
a feudal to a capitalist society.
3. The Dutch catalyst in the Tonkin-Quinam conflict
All rich curiosities instruments or materialls of war never escape the

King or in fine anything else that he fancies, & he take them at his owne
rates. The Dutch takes care to furnish him, but its with such things as
yield them profitt. The Dutch bring him yearly saltpeeter, brimstone,
cast round shott from the Coast, demy-culverin.728
The Dutch East India Company played an active role in the Tonkin-
Quinam wars in the early 1640s. As a maritime trader whose wishes
were to export Tonkinese silk to Japan, it had quickly become involved
in the Vietnamese political crisis. By the late 1630s, the High Gov-
ernment began to consider an alliance with the L/Trnh Government
to fight against Nguyn Quinam. Dutch activities in the early 1640s
transformed them from the position of having to be persuaded by
Thng Long into that of the persuader, as they enthusiastically urged
the L/Trnh rulers to campaign against Quinam. The prevaricating
L/Trnh rulers consecutively backed out of the allied campaigns in the
summer of 1642 and the spring of 1643 without offering a good reason.
But it is clear that the enthusiasm of the Dutch greatly influenced the
Trnh rulers to send troops to attack Quinam in the summer of 1643.
This joint campaign was unsuccessful as the Dutch ships were heav-
ily damaged by the Quinamese navy before they had had a chance to
co-operate with the Tonkinese troops to attack Quinam. Three bitter
failures within two years and the two ambiguous non-appearances of
the Tonkinese armies discouraged the High Government which decided
to revoke the military alliance with Tonkin after the 1643 defeat.
Instead, it continued to take revenge on Quinam alone in the period
164450. Because of increasing pressure from the Gentlemen XVII in
the Netherlands, Batavia finally signed a treaty to end the protracted
conflict with Quinam in 1651. Within only a few months, the treaty
was not worth the paper it was written on. In the early 1660s, Batavia
made several attempts to trade with Quinam, but in vain.729
Despite its revocation of the military alliance with Tonkin in 1644,
the Company still supported Tonkin against Quinam by selling weap-
ons and military equipment to the former. Hundreds of cannon and a
huge number of cannon balls, ammunition, saltpetre, sulphur and other
martial appurtenance were shipped to Tonkin by the VOC. This supply
was maintained at a high level even after the Trnh-Nguyn conflict
ceased in 1672. The reason was that another rival of the L/Trnh
rulers on the border with China, the Mc family, was not completely
defeated until the late 1670s. In 1675, for instance, the Experiment
carried a total of 40,800 Dutch pounds of refined Bengali saltpetre
and 20,000 musket balls to Tonkin. The bronze cannon which Batavia
had ordered to be manufactured in the Netherlands for the Tonkinese
rulers according to the wooden models had not yet arrived there to be
forwarded to Tonkin.730 Generally speaking, despite their non-involve-
ment the Dutch still played a critical part in the Trnh-Nguyn wars by
supplying weapons and military equipment to the L/Trnh rulers.
Towards the end of the Tonkin-Quinam conflict, the Tonkinese rul-
ers demanded the Company to provide them not only with weapons
but also with such specialists as military engineers and constables in
order to assist them to improve the quality of their armies. Since the
Tonkin trade was no longer lucrative, the High Government often
found excuses not to comply with the Trnh demands. A stance it
would never have dared to adopt at other important trading-places
such as Japan, where it was more than willing to satisfy the Japanese
rulers in order to facilitate its trade.731 In order to reduce discontent at
the court as much as possible, Batavia ordered its servants in Thng
Long to do whatever they could to satisfy the Trnh rulers. In 1677,
for instance, Cha Trnh Tc had a big gun cast by his craftsmen but
212 chapter eight
then could not shift it. The Dutch and the English were summoned to
the court and asked to design a big crane to move the gun. According
to the English source, despite having a Dutch carpenter with them,
the Dutch failed to construct a suitable crane to shift the gun but the
English successfully lifted it. After their failure in this competition, the
Dutch suffered a great deal of resentment and subsequent hindrance
to their trade from the local authorities.732
In any such discussion, it is important to bear in mind the fact that,
although Dutch weapons were a critical element in the seventeenth-
century Vietnamese political wrangle, they did not arrive in Vietnam,
in Sun Laichens words, in vacuum since the military technology of
i Vit (both Tonkin and Quinam) was quite well developed by that
time.733 Vietnam had long been known as an intermediary in tech-
nology transfers and by the late sixteenth century its weapons had
become quite superior on the battlefields against the Chinese in the
north as well as against the Chm in the south.734 While the Nguyn
rulers in central Vietnam had better access to Western-style military
technology, the Chinese-style weapons of the L/Trnh were by no
means far inferior to those of their Nguyn rival. Supplemented by
Dutch weapons after 1637 the fighting quality of the northern armies
improved considerably. Alexandre de Rhodes noted in the early 1650s
that the Tonkinese musketeers handled their weapons with great dex-
terity.735 By the late 1680s, there was a comment by a European
traveller that the Tonkinese soldiers were good marksmen inferior
to few, and surpassing most nations in dexterity of handling and quick-
ness of firing their muskets.736 Besides wielding the guns which were
often described, the Tonkinese soldiers were also armed with the so-
called Backs Guns which were carried and handled by two soldiers.
These weapons were said to be extremely useful in clearing passes or
firing over the rivers, where the enemies were firmly entrenched.737
This sort of weapon must have been critical in attacking the Nguyn
troops assembled on the southern bank of the Gianh River.
4. Miscellaneous issues
The arrival of foreign merchants and priests in the early modern period
offered the Vietnamese a good opportunity to learn Western tech-
niques. It was said that Cha Trnh Trng was very excited about
the accuracy of the European cog-wheeled clocks and hour-glasses
with which the French priest Alexandre de Rhodes presented him in
1627.738 Since clocks were strange objects to the Vietnamese who had
virtually no knowledge of such mechanisms, the European priests in
Tonkin were said to be purposely skilled in mending Clocks, Watches,
or some Mathematical Instruments. The reason was that knowing
they were so skilled the mandarins would ask them to come to the
capital Thng Long, a place strictly forbidden to the priests, to mend
the malfunctioning clocks for them. Once they were in the city, these
priests would seize any opportunity to preach and convert the Viet-
namese.739 Clocks were so attractive and respectable that, according
to some sources, in the eighteenth century a Vietnamese man from
Quinam even travelled to Holland to learn the techniques of making
and mending clocks. Upon return, he was employed by the Nguyn
rulers. With his skills and knowledge, he was not only capable of
mending malfunctioning time-pieces but also of manufacturing very
sophisticated cog-wheeled clocks and telescopes.740
The trading connections between Tonkin and foreign merchants with
other Asian ports also offered the Vietnamese a good opportunity to
travel. Prior to the seventeenth century the Vietnamese dynasties had
rarely sent ships to other countries to trade. The Vietnamese, when
they travelled abroad, went first to such ports in southern China as
Guangzhou where they took passage on board of foreign vessels to
visit other trading-places.741 With the arrival of foreign merchants from
the late sixteenth century, the Tonkinese could travel on board foreign
ships to Nagasaki, Batavia, Malacca, and Ayutthaya. Free foreign mer-
chants living in Tonkin even fitted out their own vessels and hired as
many as fifty Vietnamese seamen to sail between Tonkin and other
ports. For instance, in the 1650s and 1660s the Japanese merchant
Resimon, who was residing permanently in Tonkin because he could
not return to Japan, possessed two junks sailing between Tonkin and
Manila and Siam. Most of the sailors on these junks were Vietnamese.
There were also a number of Vietnamese sailors and people living
and trading in such South-East Asian ports as Banten, Batavia, Ayut-
thaya, and Malacca.742 Occasionally, the Tonkin court also asked the
Dutch Company to allow its officials to travel to Nagasaki on board
the Company ships leaving Tonkin for Japan. The purpose of their
voyages, as recounted by the Dutch factory in Thng Long, was to sell
Tonkinese silk in Nagasaki in order to buy various sorts of Japanese
objects for the royal family.743
The Tonkinese court did not raise strong opposition to the travelling
abroad of its subjects until the late seventeenth century, when it issued
214 chapter eight
a decree forbidding such passage. This was caused by the accident to

an English junk in Quinam in 1693. In that year, some English factors
in Thng Long bought a junk and signed on some thirty Tonkinese
crew to sail the junk to trade in Malacca. Upon its return the junk was
wrecked off the Quinam coast; the Tonkinese people were captured.
Seizing upon this accident as a pretext, in January 1694 the court
issued a decree forbidding foreign merchants from allowing the Tonki-
nese to travel on board their ships leaving Tonkin. With this decree,
a century of relative freedom in sailing abroad on board foreign ships
by the Tonkinese people ended.744
Concluding remarks
The Dutch left their influence on virtually every aspect of Tonkin

society between 1637 and 1700. While the Dutch impact on the local
culture and society still leaves much to be speculated on and examined,
their influence on the indigenous economy is obvious. The economy
of Tonkin was stimulated by the great amounts of silver, copper, and
copper coins imported into the country by the Dutch Company during
the period 16371700. The Dutch import and export volumes had a
considerable impact on the local exchange rates, on prices, and on
labour. Besides, the VOC also played a role as an active catalyst in the
Tonkin-Quinam crisis, even though its involvement in the Vietnamese
conflict was rather transient.
conclusion 215
CONCLUSION
The seventeenth century represented a turning-point in Vietnamese

history. The political disorder of the sixteenth century had culminated
in the political and territorial separation between the two opposing
kingdoms: Tonkin in the north ruled by the L/Trnh court and Quinam
in the south governed by the Nguyn family. During the series of
Trnh-Nguyn wars (1627-72), Tonkin launched seven military cam-
paigns against Quinam. None of these expeditions achieved a decisive
result. While the wars did absorb a great deal of the manpower and
finance on both sides, it has to be admitted that they also stimulated
the development of the commodity economy and foreign trade of
both countries. In Tonkin, the Vietnamese rulers revised their hitherto
negative attitude towards trade and traders in favour of a more posi-
tive outlook, and accepted the presence of foreign merchants in their
country as they were eager to buy modern weapons with which to gain
an edge in the long-lasting conflict with the Nguyn of Quinam.
Political schism was not the only change, even though it was
probably the most drastic. The economy of Tonkin also transformed
significantly during this century. The privatization of land reduced the
amount of the state-owned land on which farmers relied considerably,
causing a huge surplus of labour in the Hng River delta. Although
many landless people migrated to the south, a large number managed
to find work in local handicraft industries and trading-related services.
In response to the development of the commodity economy of the
country and the increasing demand for Vietnamese silk on the regional
markets, such foreign merchants as the Japanese, Chinese, Portuguese,
and later the Dutch, English, and French regularly visited Tonkin.
The burgeoning of the countrys foreign trade generated a commercial
system linking the commercial city of Thng Long to the regional
and international maritime trading networks a phenomenon not seen
in preceding centuries. Political and commercial transformations in
East Asia during the 1630s, but above all the seclusion policy of the
Tokugawa Shogunate which forced Japanese merchants to withdraw
from overseas shipping and excluded the Portuguese from the Japanese
market, greatly affected foreign trade in Tonkin and its diplomatic
relations with the outside world. Under mounting pressure to seek
216 conclusion
military support from a Western power, Thng Long lured the Dutch
into a short-lived military alliance. Despite the vicissitudes in their
political and commercial relations, the Dutch-Vietnamese relationship
lasted until the end of this century.
In the preceding chapters I have reached a number of conclusions
about the political and commercial history of the Dutch East India
Company in seventeenth-century Tonkin. I have also analysed general
features of early modern Tonkin and investigated Dutch impact on the
local society and economy. I shall not review these conclusions in the
following pages since they have been better placed in more detailed
and deeply analysed contexts. Instead, I would like to draw some gen-
eral conclusions about the VOC-Tonkin relationship in the seventeenth
century, focusing on three major points: political vicissitudes; fluctuat-
ing commercial trends; and the Vietnamese-Dutch interactions.
Conflicting interests and the political vicissitudes
The political history of the VOC-Tonkin relationship is an event-

ful story of conflicting interests cultivated by each side. The Trnh
rulers realized that it would be a difficult task to conquer Quinam,
whose well-built walls were sturdily defended by cannon supplied
mainly by the Portuguese. However, from the early 1630s, the pos-
sibility of obtaining military support from a Western military power
nurtured their hope of a victory in this war. Because the Portuguese
had supported Quinam, the Trnh rulers targeted the Dutch for help.
Their continuous hints that they would grant the Dutch Company
trading privileges should the latter abandon Quinam and ally itself
and trade with Tonkin did encourage the Dutch to deal more sternly
with the Nguyn rulers and in 1637 to commence their relationship
with Tonkin. In order to cajole the Dutch Company into a military
alliance with them, the Trnh rulers granted the Dutch factory more
trading privileges than it did to other foreigners. The persistent persua-
sion of the Trnh paid off handsomely as Batavia eventually agreed
to send ships and soldiers to assist Tonkin to conquer Quinam in the
early 1640s.
In contrast to the Trnh insistence, the Dutch were far from inter-
ested in becoming embroiled in the Vietnamese political crisis. As was
its attitude towards the other kingdoms in mainland South-East Asia,
the VOC never considered conquering and colonizing the Indo-Chi-
nese Peninsula a serious option. Its policies towards both Quinam and
conclusion 217
Tonkin in the seventeenth century were designed only to improve its

commercial positions in these countries. Consequently, after opening
trade relations with Tonkin, acutely aware of the importance of main-
taining a friendly relationship with the Nguyn domain to facilitate
its shipping between Batavia and its Northern Quarters such as Japan,
Formosa, and Tonkin, Batavia still tried to maintain a friendly rela-
tionship with Quinam. The heavy losses of Company ships, cargoes,
and sailors in central Vietnam in the spring of 1642, however, caused
Batavia to change its mind. The VOC-Quinam tension culminated in
sporadic outbursts of open conflict between 1642 and 1651, when a
short-lived peace agreement was concluded. Under such circumstances,
the decision of Batavia to ally itself militarily with Tonkin in a joint
venture to conquer Quinam was a dual-purpose strategy: revenging
itself on Quinam and improving its relationship with Tonkin in order
to facilitate its lucrative Tonkin-Japan silk trade.
Even now, the hesitance of the Trnh to send troops to rendezvous
with the Dutch fleets in 1642 and 1643 is still inexplicable. It would
seem to be implausible that, after half a decade of persuading the
Dutch to create a military alliance, the Trnh would not prepare a large
operation to conquer Quinam with the Dutch support. Paradoxically,
the Trnh did not campaign as they had informed Batavia they would.
This vitiated any efforts made by the two Dutch fleets in the summer
of 1642 and the spring of 1643. The third campaign of the hapless
allies in the summer of 1643 also failed bitterly. While Thng Long
blamed the unsuccessful alliance on the Dutch soldiers lack of will
to fight, Batavia interpreted the ambiguous non-attendance of Tonkin
armies in 1642 and 1643 as a malicious trick by the Trnh to transfer
the heavy burden of conquering Quinam onto its shoulders. Whatever
the cause may have been, Batavia now decided to suspend its military
alliance with Tonkin despite the Trnh insistence, reinforced by the
unilateral wars it fought against Quinam during the period 1644-51.
The termination of the military alliance ended the intimate phases in
the VOC-Tonkin relationship. Notwithstanding their constant demand
for weapons, the Trnh rulers now dealt more harshly with the Dutch
factors. As a consequence, the Vietnamese-Dutch political relation-
ship deteriorated rapidly, especially from the middle of the 1650s,
when the Tonkin-Japan silk trade of the Company declined. The fail-
ure of the Tinnam strategy in the early 1660s was a severe blow to
attempts by Batavia to revive the Tonkin trade and heavily affected
the VOC-Tonkin relationship in the following years. The subsequent
218 conclusion
reconstitutions of the Tonkin trade by the High Government in the

1670s (abandoning the Tonkin-Japan direct route in 1671 and reduc-
ing the annual capital for the Tonkin factory in 1679) meant that
the value of its annual presents to the Trnh was also reduced. This
irritated the Trnh rulers and, from the early 1690s, was the major
cause of disputes between the court and the factory. Tonkinese rulers
detained Dutch factors and interpreters whenever they felt dissatisfied
with the presents and goods Batavia offered them. Disappointed with
the unprofitable Tonkin trade as well as extremely annoyed by the
increasing maltreatment of its servants, from the middle of the 1690s,
Batavia considered withdrawing from the Tonkin factory. It was the
Gentlemen XVIIs hesitance about abandoning the relationship with
Tonkin which delayed the withdrawal from the Tonkin factory until
the spring of 1700, when the Cauw brought all the Companys assets
and servants to the safe haven in Batavia.
The intra-Asian trade and varying commercial trends
One of the most crucial factors which contributed to the success of

the VOCs intra-Asian trade during the seventeenth century was its
well-devised Japan trade. As silk was regarded as the key to unlock-
ing the Japanese market, the pursuit of this commodity was pivotal to
the success of the VOCs Japan trade. Possessing no direct access to
mainland China, the Dutch Company endeavoured to procure Chinese
silk from regional markets outside China. Chinese silk attracted the
VOC to Quinam, but in the end it was Tonkinese silk which prompted
the Dutch Company to shift its commercial focus from central to
northern Vietnam in the mid-1630s. There were three major phases
in the history of the VOCs silk trade with Japan: the phase of the
Chinese product prior to the early 1640s; the phase of Tonkinese silk
between 1641 and 1654; and the phase of Bengali silk from 1655.
Tonkinese silk played a crucial role in the success of the VOCs
Japan trade between 1637 and 1654. The success of the Tonkin silk
trade was particularly significant to the Japan trade of the VOC if we
bear in mind the very fact that the net profits which the Dutch fac-
tory in Nagasaki transferred annually to Batavia during these years
were falling rapidly. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that, if
Surat was the left arm of the spice trade with the Moluccas, Tonkin,
certainly for the 1641-54 period, was the left arm of the silver trade
with Japan.
conclusion 219
Being a link in the chain of the East Asian trade and, in a broader
perspective, the intra-Asian trade, the commercial function of the
Tonkin factory was often reconstituted according to the commercial
re-organization of the Companys Asian trade. If prior to the mid-
1650s the Tonkin factory functioned as a silk provider for the Japan
trade, this role altered significantly in the decades thereafter. From the
middle of the 1650s, the Tonkin factory was ordered to diversify its
export products, ranging from Tonkinese raw silk to Tonkinese silk
piece-goods and ceramics, and Chinese musk and gold. The Tinnam
strategy devised by Batavia in the early 1660s for the purpose of
trading across the Tonkin-China border was obviously an attempt to
adapt its Tonkin trade to the transformations in the East Asian trade
and the intra-Asian trade.
The decline of the Japan trade of the Company during the last quar-
ter of the seventeenth century forced Batavia to reduce the size of its
Tonkin trade. With its decision in 1679 to reduce the amount of annual
investment capital for the Tonkin factory down to approximately 150
thousand guilders, Batavia indirectly admitted its failure to revive the
Tonkin trade to the levels of the preceding decades. Nevertheless, the
Tonkin factory still provided some marketable commodities necessary
to the Company trade and could serve as a strategic connection in the
long-term strategy of the Company towards the Middle Kingdom. But
when its factors were increasingly being maltreated in Thng Long,
Batavia eventually decided to abandon the Tonkin trade in the spring
of 1700.
Trade as a bridge for Dutch-Vietnamese interactions
Although the Dutch were not the first Europeans to trade in Tonkin
in the early modern period, they were by far the most influential mer-
chants. Their permanent residence in the capital and large-scale trade
influenced the indigenous society and economy critically. It appears
that in northern Vietnam, the Dutch interacted well with, though were
not really integrated into, the indigenous society. The Dutch Com-
pany servants, especially the chief merchants, learnt the Vietnamese
language and familiarized themselves with Vietnamese customs to
facilitate the trade of the factory. Some of them lived in domestic
harmony with their Tonkinese wives, and itinerant maritime traders
found it easy to go hiring misses or courtesans. Vietnamese-Dutch
220 conclusion
offspring was born as a consequence of these sexual relationships.

While trading and interacting on an intimate level, the Dutch, along
with other Europeans, also diffused Western thoughts, technology,
ethic, religion, and other new streams of ideas into Tonkin.
The impact of Dutch trade on the indigenous economy was unequiv-
ocally clear. The rise and fall of the annual import and export volume
of the Tonkin factory was the factor which decided the production of,
for instance, raw silk and silk piece-goods, and hence, the number of
labourers employed in these industries. It also affected other aspects
of the local economy such as the silver/cash ratio and buying and
selling prices.
It is therefore no exaggeration to say that during the course of
sixty-four years of residing in and trading with Tonkin, the Dutch
significantly influenced the local political economy. If any one single
external factor which contributed to the internal transformations of
seventeenth-century Tonkin had to be singled out, the influence of the
Dutch, together with the Chinese, must take pride of place.
appendices 221
APPENDICES
222 appendices
appendices 223
APPENDIX 1
VUA (EMPERORS) L AND CHA (KINGS) TRNH

IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY TONKIN
a. Vua (Emperors) L:
Period Emperor Title of Reign

1600-1619 L Knh Tng Thun c
1619-1643 L Thn Tng Vnh T
1643-1649 L Chn Tng Phc Thi
1649-1662 L Thn Tng Khnh c
1663-1671 L Huyn Tng Cnh Tr
1672-1675 L Gia Tng Dng c
1676-1705 L Hy Tng Vnh Tr
b. Cha (Kings) Trnh:
Period King Title of Reign

1570-1623 Trnh Tng Bnh An Vng
1623-1657 Trnh Trng Thanh Vng
1657-1682 Trnh Tc Ty Vng
1682-1709 Trnh Cn nh Vng
224 appendices
APPENDIX 2
GOVERNORSGENERAL AND
CHIEF FACTORS OF THE DUTCH FACTORY IN TONKIN
IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
a. GovernorsGeneral of the VOC:
1636-1645 Antonio van Diemen

1645-1650 Cornelis van der Lijn
1650-1653 Carel Reniers
1653-1678 Joan Maetsuyker
1678-1681 Rijcklof van Goens
1681-1684 Cornelis Janszoon Speelman
1684-1691 Joannes Camphuys
1691-1704 Willem van Outhoorn
b. Chief Factors of the Dutch factory in Tonkin:
1637-1641 Carel Hartsinck

1642-1647 Antonio van Brouckhorst
1647-1650 Philip Schillemans
1650-1651 Jacob Keijser (interim opperhoofd, first time)
1651 (Mar.-June) Jan de Groot (dismissed by Commissioner Verstegen)
1651-1653 Jacob Keijser (interim opperhoofd, second time)
1653-1656 Louis Isaacszn Baffart
1657-1659 Nicolaas de Voogt (de Voocht)
1660-1664 Hendrick Baron
1664-1665 Hendrick Verdonk
1665-1667 Constantijn Ranst
1667-1672 Cornelis Valckenier
1672-1677 Albert Brevinck
1677-1679 Johannes Besselman
1679-1687 Leendert (Leonard) de Moy
1687-1691 Johannes Sibens
1691-1700 Jacob van Loo
appendices 225
APPENDIX 3
DUTCH SHIPPING IN TONKIN, 1637-1699
Year Name of ship Value (guilders) of

import export
1637 Grol, plus a junk from Formosa 188,166 190,000
1638 Zandvoort; Waterlooze Verve; Wijdenes 298,609 187,277
1639 Rijp; Lis; Waterlooze Verve 382,458 311,268
1640 Lis; Engel; Rijp 439,861 431,974
1641 Meerman (two trips); Klein Rotterdam 202,703 240,380
1642 Kievit (two trips); Brack (two trips); 297,529 129,352
Kelang; Kievit; Wakende Boei; Meerman
(two trips); Zeeuwsche Nachtegaal
1643 Kievit; Wakende Boei; Zeeuwsche 299,835 200,000
Nachtegaal; Wijdenes; Zandvoort; Lillo;
Waterhond; Vos; Jonge Zaaier
1644 Leeuwarden; Zwarte Beer; Bresken 397,590 299,572
1645 Gulden Gans; Zwarte Beer; Hillegaers- 454,606 378,092
bergh
1646 Zwarte Beer 352,544 ?
1647 - 377,637 352,454
1648 Kampen; Witte Valk 457,928 393,384
1649 Kampen; Witte Valk; Zwarte Beer; Maas- 334,105 254,126
land
1650 - 372,827 513,293
1651 Witte Valk; Kampen; Delfhaven 552,336 ?
1652 Witte Valk; Taiwan; Katwijk; Bruinvisch 680,294 434,628
1653 Witte Valk; Taiwan; Kampen - ?
1654 Witte Valk; Zeelandia 149,750 300,000
1655 Vleermuys 25,773 ?
1656 Cabo de Jacques (two trips) 184,215 ?
1657 Coukerken; Wakende Boei 276,077 93,606
1658 - - -
1659 Zeeridder; Spreeuw 317,500 318,183
1660 Roode Hert 64,773 -
1661 Roode Hert; Meliskerken 164,703 316,487
226 appendices

import export
1662 Klaverskerke; Bunschoten; Roode Vos 405,686 318,264
1663 Bunschoten; Hooglanden; Zeeridder 394,670 510,102
1664 Elburg (two trips); Zeeridder; Bunschoten 347,989 533,785
1665 Spreeuw; Zeeridder; Buiksloot 420,245 309,384
1666 Spreeuw; Hilversum; Zwarte Leeuw 419,779 371,044
1667 Witte Leeuw; Buiksloot 137,181 11,459?
1668 Buiksloot; Zuylen; Overveen 254,219 16,019?
1669 Bloempot; Overveen; Pitoor 184,657 44,194?
1670 Vredenburgh; Pitoor; Hoogcapel 183,804 249,335?
1671 Bleyswyck; Meliskerken; Armuyden 366,338 297,529
1672 Meliskerken; Bleyswyck; Papegay 318,327 450,998
1673 Papegay; Meliskerken 182,544 80,030
1674 Papegay; Voorhout 167,386 215,943
1675 Experiment; Marken 343,600 147,668
1676 Janskercke; Croonvogel 244,933 90,800
1677 Experiment; Croonvogel 385,213 488,407
1678 Experiment; Croonvogel 19,284 230,334
1679 Croonvogel 110,576 125,608
1680 Croonvogel 113,318 94,922
1681 Croonvogel 132,354 126,053
1682 Croonvogel 165,420 137,964
1683 Croonvogel 197,879 172,145
1684 Croonvogel; Bombay 138,980 161,480
1685 Wachthond 60,303 ?
1686 Wachthond 58,000 111,371
1687 Gaasperdam ? 74,648
1688 Gaasperdam 115,091 158,371
1689 Gaasperdam 174,930 145,453
1690 Gaasperdam 174,786 345,943?
1691 Gaasperdam 150,759 125,933
1692 Boswijk ? 130,000
1693 Westbroek 172,711 -
1694 De Wind 50,000 219,843
1695 Cauw 84,813 49,840
1696 Cauw 61,502 57,000
appendices 227

import export
1697 Cauw ~50,000 ~50,000
1698 Cauw ~50,000 ~50,000
1699 Cauw ~50,000 58,956
1700 Tonkin factory was closed
Sources: Adapted from figures given in Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren; Dagh-register

Batavia 16241682; Generale Missiven (Vols. I-VII); BL OIOC G/12/17.
Note: The capital invested for one trading season could be transferred to the following
season should the Tonkin factory fail to invest the whole sum in local goods that year.
As a consequence, the amount of import and export capital in one trading season does
not always tally.
228 appendices
APPENDIX 4
FOREIGN SHIPPING IN TONKIN, 1637-1699
Year Dutch Chinese Portuguese English Other*

1637 2 0 1 0 0
1638 3 1 3 0 0
1639 3 0 1 0 0
1640 3 0 1 0 0
1641 3 3 1 0 0
1642 9a - 1 0 0
1643 9a - - 0 0
1644 3 - - 0 0
1645 3 - 1 0 0
1646 1 3 1 0 0
1647 0 5 1 0 0
1648 2 - 1 0 0
1649 4 2 1 0 0
1650 0 5 0 0 0
1651 3 - 1 0 1
1652 4 4 1 0 1
1653 3 5 1 0 1
1654 2 6 1 0 1
1655 1 3 1 0 1
1656 2 2 2 0 0
1657 2 2 1 0 3
1658 0 - 1 0 0
1659 2 0 1 0 1
1660 1 3 1 0 4
1661 2 2 1 0 1
1662 3 - - 0 0
1663 3 - 0 0 0
1664 4 1 - 0 0
1665 3 - 1 0 1
1666 3 - - 0 1
1667 2 1 - 0 4
1668 2 2 - 0 3
1669 3 3 1 0 0
appendices 229
Year Dutch Chinese Portuguese English Other*

1670 3 3 0 0 6
1671 3 - 1 0 5
1672 3 4 0 1 1
1673 2 4 1 0 0
1674 2 2 0 0 3
1675 2 1 0 0 1
1676 2 2 0 1 3
1677 2 3 0 1 1
1678 2 1 0 1 2
1679 1 2 0 1 1
1680 1 2 0 1 2
1681 1 - 0 - 0
1682 1 2 0 2 2
1683 1 - 0 1 1
1684 2 - 0 - 0
1685 1 - 0 0 0
1686 1 1 0 3 -
1687 1 4 0 1 0
1688 1 - 0 3 -
1689 1 - 0 0 0
1690 1 - 0 0 0
1691 1 - 0 - 2
1692 1 - 1 2 0
1693 1 4 1 1 0
1694 1 - 0 0 -
1695 1 2 0 0 0
1696 1 - 0 0 0
1697 1 - 0 1 -
1698 1 - 0 0 0
1699 1 - 0 0 0
1700 0 0 0 0 -
Sources: Adapted from sporadic figures given in Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren; BL

OIOC G/12/17; Dagh-register Batavia 16241682; Generale Missiven I-VI; Souza, The
Survival of Empire, 114.
Note: *: including Siamese, Spanish, French and other South-East Asian vessels.
a: including ships Batavia sent to Tonkin (to ally with the Tonkinese force) to at-
tack Quinam.
230 appendices
APPENDIX 5
INTENDED DIVISION OF THE TONKIN CARGO FOR

JAPAN, 1645
(taels Japanese silver)
20,250 catties of raw silk from the Cha 27,000

60,000 catties of raw silk from local people 63,000
4,000 pieces of soumongij 6,904
4,000 pieces of raw and black baas 8,095
5,000 pieces of Toncquinse hockins 3,273
4,000 pieces of plain and figured Zenuaasche hockins 3,333
3,000 pieces of pelings 1,666
2,000 pieces of white chios 1,428
200 pieces of velvet lined with gold 666
20 piculs of cinnamon 142
20 piculs of cardamom 239
50 piculs of sittouw 227
Total for Japan 122,400
120 piculs of silk of the best quality for the Netherlands 12,600
Total capital for the Tonkin factory in 1645 135,000
Sources: NFJ 57, 22 Oct. 1644; Dagh-register Batavia 1644-5, 108-22.
appendices 231
APPENDIX 6
TONKINESE SILK EXPORTED TO JAPAN BY THE VOC,

1635-1697
(thousand Dutch guilders)
Year Total import Silk Tonkinese silk Tonkinese silk via

Total raw silk Formosa Batavia
1635 1,009 713 0 0 0
1636 1,593 1,116 0 0 80
1637 2,647 1,420 177 168 21
1638 3,625 2,219 167 155 1
1639 3,471 1,687 0 55 55
1640 6,286 3,457 622 492 0
1641 1,067 470 178 164 1
1642 737 423 87 72 2
1643 774 451 118 101 0
1644 1,377 525 234 190 1
1645 1,432 939 297 243 0
1646 901 459 307 222 1
1647 789 400 287 214 9
1648 649 431 327 187 0
1649 578 277 209 201 3
1650 916 579 299 257 0
1651 974 584 362 280 12
1652 1,031 521 362 295 0
1653 917 626 310 261 0
1654 707 395 159 150 0
1655 683 323 0 0 0
1656 1,412 867 225 223 0
1657 1,061 611 90 79 0
1658 1,084 571 0 0 0
1659 1,138 710 183 183 0
1660 994 626 0 0 0
1661 1,236 896 174 174 33
1662 1,583 1,083 144 143 6
- - - - - -
1665 1,756 1,174 231 228 0
232 appendices
Year Total import Silk Tonkinese silk Tonkinese silk via

Total raw silk Formosa Batavia
1666 1,010 551 208 205 -
1667 1,346 750 299 235 59
1668 2,017 1,409 432 369 -
1669 1,409 998 322 322 -
1670 1,437 860 0 0 0
1671 1,102 501 0 0 3
1672 1,739 1,065 0 0 0
1673 1,478 997 0 0 0
- - - - - -
1677 1,010 729 0 0 268 (236)
- - - - - -
1679 818 500 0 0 148 (138)
- - - - - -
1686 575 80 0 0 52 (33)
1687 355 12 0 0 0 (0)
1688 576 173 0 0 22 (9)
1689 488 70 0 0 24 (24)
1690 572 157 0 0 26 (5)
1691 555 144 0 0 3 (3)
1692 613 270 0 0 0 (6)
1693 735 204 0 0 20 (20)
1694 450 237 0 0 0 (0)
1695 730 177 0 0 0 (0)
1696 473 208 0 0 11 (0)
1697 891 210 0 0 16 (16)
Source: Adapted from Klein, De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel, 168 (Table 1).
appendices 233
APPENDIX 7
SILK PRICES AS RECORDED BY

THE DESHIMA FACTORY, 1636-1668
(Dutch guilders per catty)
Year Tonkinese silk Chinese silk Bengali silk

purchase sale purchase sale purchase sale
1636 3.71 7.88 4.89 9.83 - -
1637 3.24 5.08 4.94 7.18 - -
1638 3.20 6.25 5.20 8.12 - -
1639 3.63 7.79 4.99 8.35 - -
1640 3.35 4.83 - - - -
1641 3.25 3.09 4.80 5.83 - -
1642 2.54 6.14 4.87 8.83 - -
1643 2.62 7.32 4.81 7.83 - -
1644 2.95 6.47 5.69 9.26 4.08 8.08
1645 3.02 8.12 5.97 8.07 - -
1646 3.33 7.51 8.15 7.64 - -
1647 3.60 6.84 5.28 7.76 4.11 7.04
1648 3.58 9.90 - 8.82 4.18 8.32
1649 3.64 9.97 12.67 14.95 4.11 12.06
1650 - - 11.02 11.02 3.97 6.47
-
1652 4.39 6.95 9.49 9.49 2.84 6.44
-
1654 5.15 6.92 8.68 10.43 3.94 8.80
1655 4.85 7.56 - - 3.81 7.87
1656 5.39 6.96 - - 4.44 7.20
1657 - - - - 4.61 6.53
1658 - - - - 3.95 8.30
-
1660 - - - - 4.31 7.27
- - - - -
1665 4.51 5.46 5.90 10.20 4.14 4.99
1666 4.43 8.94 - - 2.78 6.81
1667 4.78 10.16 - - 3.75 8.39
1668 5.84 7.41 - - 3.95 6.57
Source: Klein, De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel, 170 (Table 2).
234 appendices
APPENDIX 8
TONKINESE CERAMICS EXPORTED TO BATAVIA

AND OTHER PLACES, 1663-1681
a. to Batavia
Date Carriers Description

3/1663 1 junk 10,000 coarse cups
3/1664 2 junks 120,000 middle-sized cups
3/1666 2 wanckans 60,000 coarse cups
2/1667 Zevenster 30,000 coarse cups
5/1668 1 ship 40,000 coarse cups
1/1669 Overveen* 381,200 cups
4/1669 1 Chinese junk 70,000 cups
11/1669 Pitoor* 177,240 cups
2/1670 2 vessels 95,000 coarse cups
3/1670 1 Chinese junk Loaded with coarse wares
11/1670 Pitoor* 214,160 pieces worth 2,650 guilders
4/1672 1 vessel 5,000 coarse cups
1/1675 1 Chinese junk Loaded with Tonkinese wares
3/1675 1 vessel 30,000 coarse cups
7/1678 1 vessel 100,740 pieces and 8 cases
1/1680 1 junk 85,000 coarse cups
1681 1 Batavian Chinese junk 120,000 cups
b. to other places
Date Carriers Destination Description

2/1669 1 Chinese junk Banten Some ceramics
2/1674 1 Chinese junk Siam 90,000 cups
2/1680 EIC Advice Banten Tonkinese coarse wares
3/1681 EIC Societeyt Europe Tonkinese coarse wares
Sources: Adapted from sporadic figures given in Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren; BL

OIOC G/12/17; Dagh-register Batavia 16241682; Volker, Porcelain.
Note: *: VOC ships.
appendices 235
APPENDIX 9
RE-SHIPMENTS OF TONKINESE CERAMICS, 1670-1681
Date Carrier From Destination Description

6/1670 3 vessels Batavia Westkust
Ceramics worth 168
rds
1670 1 vessel Batavia Amboina 8,000 cups
1670 1 vessel Batavia Banda 89,391 cups
1670 1 vessel Batavia Timor Ceramics worth 30
rds
10/1671 1 vessel Batavia Gresik Ceramics worth 30
rds
1671 Cabeljauw* Batavia Banda 89,000 cups, 30,000
roof-tiles
7/1672 1 vessel Batavia Palembang Cups worth 30 rds
7/1672 1 vessel Batavia Banjer Cups worth 40 rds
7/1672 1 vessel Batavia Pakalongen Cups worth 40 rds
8/1672 1 vessel Batavia Aracan Cups worth 680 rds
11/1672 - - - 8,138 cups unsold
at Amboina
1672 - Baros Batavia 25,000 returned
1672 - Cirebon Batavia 2 bundles of tea-
cups were sent back
6/1680 1 ship* Touloungbauw Batavia 6,000 cups were
[?] sent back
12/1680 1 ship* Banten Batavia 10,000 cups were
sent back
3/1681 1 English ship Batavia England Some Tonkinese
ceramics
1681 - Banten Batavia 5,000 cups were
returned
Sources: Adapted from sporadic numbers given in Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren; BL
OIOC G/12/17; Dagh-register Batavia 16241682; Volker, Porcelain; Farrington, English
East India Company Documents Relating Pho Hien and Tonkin, 148-61.
Notes: * VOC ship; rds (rixdollars)
236 appendices
APPENDIX 10
CERAMICS IMPORTED INTO TONKIN, 1637-1681
Year Carriers From Descriptions

7/1637 Grol* Taiwan 85 pieces of fine porcelain as
samples
12/1644 1 Chinese junk - Some porcelain
2/1645 1 Portuguese - Some ceramics
vessel
5/1645 1 vessel of - A large quantity of ceramics
Iquan
11/1647 Witte Valk* Taiwan 260 coarse bowls and plates worth
16 guilders
6/1653 1 vessel Batavia Rice-bowls worth 105 rials
1655 8 vessels - These vessels arrived from
Batavia, Manila, and Macao with
many ceramics.
1662 3 ships* Batavia With curious porcelain
1663 1 ships* Deshima Some porcelain
12/1663 Hoogelande* Batavia 1,000 pieces of Japanese porcelain
for the Cha
10/1664 Spreeuw* Batavia Some porcelain
10/1665 Spreeuw* Japan 8,860 Japanese ceramics
1667 Overveen* Japan One lot of unspecified porcelain
10/1668 Overveen * Japan 676 pieces of Japanese porcelain
1669 Eendracht* 164 pieces of Japanese porcelain
6/1672 Meliskerken* Batavia One case of Japanese porcelain
5/1674 Papegay* Batavia 5 straw bundles of Japanese por-
celain
5/1675 Experiment* Batavia 6 straw bundles of Japanese porce-
lain (totalling 117 pieces)
2/1676 2 Chinese Japan With silver, cash, and Japanese
junks porcelain
1676 1 Chinese junk China 400 bundles of cups painted with
dragons, 200 bundles of smaller
cups, 200 bundles of plates, 50
ditto flasks, 20 ditto smaller kind,
10 bundles of small white arrack
flagons, 20 bundles of small
brandy cups
appendices 237
Year Carriers From Descriptions

1676 1 Formosan Japan
32,000 cups, 17,400 ditto different
junk kinds, 39,900 plates, 4,800 small
arrack cups, 500 tea-pots, 2,000
large bowls, 10 large dishes
(Of these two ships, the Cha
bought 7,000 cups painted with
dragons, 2,000 ditto smaller kind,
7,000 plates, 1,000 smaller arrack
cups, 10 large dishes, 10 jugs, 500
coarse cups, 200 tea cups. The
viceroy bought: 5,000 cups, 1,000
ditto smaller, 3,000 tea plates, 400
small arrack cups, 5 large dishes,
40 flasks, 600 plates with dragons
5/1676 Janskercke* Batavia 87 pieces of Japanese porcelain
1678 50 fine round porcelain teapots
similar to the accompanying
models as to figures and shapes
and 60 small flasks similar to the
accompanying models
7/1680 Croonvogel* Batavia 3,000 pieces of Japanese porcelain
2/1681 1 Chinese junk Japan 5 straws bundles of small figured
plates, 1 with white tea-cups,
150 with figured rice bowls, 170
with ditto plates, 100 with small
arrack jugs, 20 bundles of common
bowls, 1 ditto small arrack cups,
30 figured pots. 10 small arrack
jugs to the old Cha as presents; 5
small arrack jugs to the viceroy as
presents
3/1681 1 Chinese junk Japan 200 straw bundles figured porce-
lain cups, 25 with small common
arrack jugs, two packs with
trifles, small birds, lions, etcetera,
105 straw bundles with plates
decorated with fishes, 8 with small
arrack jugs, to the viceroy 5 fig-
ured arrack jugs
7/1681 Croonvogel* Batavia Japanese flasks and teapots
Sources: Adapted from sporadic numbers given in Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren; BL
OIOC G/12/17; Dagh-register Batavia 1624-1682; Volker, Porcelain.
Note: *: VOC ship.
238 appendices
APPENDIX 11
PORCELAIN THE VOC ORDERED IN JAPAN FOR THE

TRNH RULERS, 1666-1681
Date Description of orders

3/1666 The prince requested 50 Japanese tall, narrow flasks with floral
pattern
1668 Batavia ordered Japanese porcelain for Tonkin and other
places
11/1669 Deshima factory ordered 30 Japanese flasks for Tonkin via the
Otona [supervisor] of Deshima
1670 The Cha demanded 30 porcelain flasks made after wooden
models
1/1672 Deshima received 4 wooden models to make cups and pots for
Tonkin
2/1673 Wooden models from Tonkin lost in the wreck of the Cuylen-
burgh
3/1673 Small jars to be made or bought for the Cha according to
models
6/1673 Deshima received new models to order flasks for Tonkin
1678 Tonkin requested 1,000 middle-sized rice-bowls and 2,000 tea-
plates of the medium quality
6/1681 6,000 pieces of Japanese porcelain delivered to the Cha
6/1681 Japanese flasks and teapots were sent to Tonkin
Sources: Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren; Dagh-register Batavia 16241682; Volker,
Porcelain; NFJ 310.
239
NOTES
Notes to Introduction
1 From the early seventeenth century, i Vit was split into two kingdoms: ng
Ngoi (Tonkin) ruled by the L/Trnh and ng Trong (Quinam) governed by the Nguyn.
ng Ngoi, (outer road or outer direction) was known to Westerners as Tonkin (also
Tonquin, Tonqueen), a corruption of the Vietnamese name ng Kinh (literally meaning:
Eastern Capital). The term ng Kinh used in this book refers narrowly to the deltaic
plain of the Hng River, while Tonkin and ng Ngoi are alternatively used to refer
to Northern Vietnam which included both ng Kinh and the Thanh-Ngh regions. ng
Trong (inner road or inner direction) was usually recorded as Quinam, a corruption
of the Vietnamese term Qung Nam. The English and other Westerners called Quinam
Cochin China, which, in the seventeenth century, consisted of the prefectures of Thun Ho
and Qung Nam but gradually expanded its territory towards the south, incorporating what
is today the southern part of Central Vietnam and the Mekong River delta by the eighteenth
century. On the terminology of these terms: Nguyn Ti Cn, V vic dng hai ng t
vo ra ch s di chuyn n mt a im pha nam hay pha bc trong ting Vit
hin i [About the Usage of the Two Verbs To Go In and To Go Out to Indicate Travel
to a Point in a Southern Direction or a Northern Direction in Modern Vietnamese], TCKH
4 (1991), 36-42; Keith W. Taylor, Surface Orientations in Vietnam: Beyond Histories of
Nation and Region, The Journal of Asian Studies, 57/4 (1998), 949-78.
2 Phan Huy L, Ph Hin: Research Issues to Be Considered, in The Association of
Vietnamese Historians & Peoples Committee of Hi Hng Province (ed.), Ph Hin: The
Centre of International Commerce in the 17th-18th Centuries (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers,
1994), 10-22.
3 W. J. M. Buch, La Compagnie des Indes Nerlandaises et lIndochine, BEFEO 36
(1936), 97-196 & 37 (1937), 121-237; id., De Oost-Indische Compagnie en Quinam: de

Betrekkingen der Nederlanders met Annam in de XVIIe eeuw (Amsterdam/Paris, 1929).
4 The most significant study of the VOCs Tonkin trade is the article by P. W. Klein,
De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel van de Vereenigde Oost-indische Compagnie en het

inter-Aziatische verkeer in de 17e eeuw, in W. Frijhoff and M. Hiemstra (eds.), Bewogen
en Bewegen: de historicus in het spanningsveld tussen economie and cultuur (Tilburg:
Gianotten, 1986), 152-77. In this article, the silk trade of the VOC with Tonkin throughout
the entire period of the relationship is studied in detail. Besides, several publications by
Japanese scholars have also partly dealt with the VOCs Tonkin trade. See Nara Shuichi,
Silk Trade between Vietnam and Japan in the Seventeenth Century, in Ph Hin, 162-
83; Yoko Nagazumi, The Tonkinese-Japanese Trade in the Mid-seventeenth Century
(in Japanese), Annual Reports of Josai Graduate School of Economics, 8 (1992), 21-46;
Kato Eiichi, Shuinsen Licence Trade and the Dutch in Southeast Asia, in The National
Committee for the International Symposium on the Ancient Town of Hi An (ed.), Ancient
Town of Hi An (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1993), 142-8.
5 Thnh Th V, Ngoi thng Vit Nam hi th k XVII, XVIII v na u th k
XIX [The Foreign Trade of Vietnam in the Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Early Nineteenth
Centuries] (Hanoi: S hc, 1961).
240 notes
6 Nguyen Thanh Nha, Tableau conomique du Vietnam aux XVIIe et XVIIIe Sicles
(Paris: Cujas, 1970). For criticisms of some of Nguyen Thanh Nhas claims, see the book
review by Alexander Woodside in The Journal of Asian Studies, 30/4 (1971), 922-3.
7 John K. Whitmore, Vietnam and the Monetary Flow of Eastern Asia, Thirteenth to
Eighteenth Centuries, in J. F. Richards (ed.), Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and
Early Modern Worlds (California: Carolina Academic Press, 1983), 363-96.
8 Li Tana, Nguyn Cochinchina, Southern Vietnam in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries (Ithaca: SEAP, 1998). See also: Li Tana and Anthony Reid (eds.), Southern
Vietnam under the Nguyen, Documents on the Economic History of Cochinchina (Dang
Trong), 1602-1777 (Singapore: ISEAS, 1993); Li Tana, An Alternative Vietnam? The
Nguyen Kingdom in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, Journal of Southeast Asian
Studies, 29 (1998), 111-21. Besides Lis works, there are also several remarkable studies
on early modern Central and Southern Vietnam. See, for instance, Nola Cooke, Regional-
ism and the Nature of Nguyen Rule in Seventeenth-Century Dang Trong (Cochinchina),
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 29 (1998), 122-61; Nola Cooke and Li Tana (eds.),
Water Frontier: Commerce and the Chinese in the Lower Mekong Region, 1750-1880
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004); Charles Wheeler, Re-thinking the Sea
in Vietnamese History: Littoral Society in the Integration of Thun-Qung, Seventeenth-
Eighteenth Centuries, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 37/1 (2006), 123-53.
9 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, Vol. 2: Expansion and Crisis
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 62-3, 71 and passim.

10 Victor B. Lieberman, Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800-
1830, Vol. 1: Integration in the Mainland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003),
Chapter Four.
11 Om Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal 1630-1720
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 15-23; Leonard Bluss, No Boats to China:
the Dutch East India Company and the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635-
1690, Modern Asian Studies, 30/1 (1996), 51-70; Paul A. Van Dyke, How and Why the
Dutch East India Company Became Competitive in Intra-Asian Trade in East Asia in the
1630s, Itinerario, 21/3 (1997), 41-56; Femme Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company,
Expansion and Decline (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2003), 124-6.
12 Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company, 121-4; Prakash, The Dutch East India
Company, 16, 19; Ryuto Shimada, The Intra-Asian Trade in Japanese Copper by the Dutch
East India Company during the Eighteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 5-8.
13 Om Prakash, European and Asian Merchants in Asian Maritime Trade, 1500-1800:
Some Issues of Methodology and Evidence, in J. M. Flores (ed.), Revista de Cultura

13/14: The Asian Seas 1500-1800, Local Societies, European Expansion and the Portu-
guese (Macao, 1991), 131-9 (Reprinted in Om Prakash, Precious Metals and Commerce,
Variorum 1994). See also: Holden Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600-1800
(Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1976), 3-27; Els M. Jacobs, Koopman in
Azi: de handel van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tijdens de 18de eeuw (Zutphen:
Walburg Pers, 2000).
14 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, 16, 19. See also: Femme Gaastra, The
Exports of Precious Metal from Europe to Asia by the Dutch East India Company, 1602-
1795, in Richards (ed.), Precious Metals, 447-76; id., The Dutch East India Company and
its Intra-Asian Trade in Precious Metals, in Wolfram Fischer et al. (eds.), The Emergence
of a World Economy, 1500-1914 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1986), I, 97-112.
15 Atsushi Kobata, The Production and Uses of Gold and Silver in Sixteenth- and
Seventeenth-Century Japan, Economic History Review, 18/2 (1965), 245-66. See also:
Robert LeRoy Innes, The Door Ajar: Japans Foreign Trade in the Seventeenth Century
(Diss., The University of Michigan, 1980), 21-41.
to part one 241
16 Klein, De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel, 152-77; Bluss, No Boats to China,
51-70; Hong Anh Tun, Mu dch t la ca Cng ty ng n H Lan vi ng Ngoi,
1637-1670 [The VOC-Tonkin Silk Trade, 1637-1670], NCLS 3 (2006), 10-20.
17 A general guide to the VOC records relating to Quinam and Tonkin can be found
in: Truong Van Binh and John Kleinen, Verenigde Oost Indische Compagnie (VOC),
Materials on Relations between the Dutch East India Company and the Nguyen Lords in
the 17th and 18th Centuries, in Ancient Town of Hoi An, 37-48; Hong Anh Tun, Cng
ty ng n H Lan ng Ngoi, 1637-1700: T liu v Nghin Cu [The Dutch East
India Company in Tonkin, 1637-1700: Documents and Research Issues to Be Considered],
NCLS 3 (2005), 30-41.
18 See Chapter One for a detailed discussion of this debate.
19 (Dutch Hoge Regering). The Government of the VOC in Asia, residing in Batavia.
Its members were the Governor-General and the Councillors of the Indies.
Notes to Part One: The Setting

20 Lieberman, Strange Parallels, 343.
21 Alexandre de Rhodes, who visited both central and northern Vietnam in the early
seventeenth century, was impressed by the fact that there were at least fifty sizeable sea-
ports along the Vietnamese coast, each of which could afford between fifteen and twenty
big ships to lie at anchor at the same time. These ports were so safe that vessels could lie
overnight without necessarily dropping anchor. Alexandre de Rhodes, Histoire du royaume
de Tunquin (Lyon: Jean Baptiste Devenet, 1651), 56-7.
Such a wonder has been briefly discussed in Charles Wheeler, A Maritime Logic to
Vietnamese History? Littoral Society in Hi Ans Trading World c. 15501830, paper
presented at the conference Seascapes, Littoral Cultures, and Trans-Oceanic Exchanges,
Library of Congress, Washington DC, 12-15 Feb. 2003; id., Re-thinking the Sea in Viet-
namese History: Littoral Society in the Integration of Thun-Qung, Seventeenth-Eighteenth
Centuries, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 37/1 (2006), 123-53. On Vietnams water
tradition: Keith W. Taylor, The Birth of Vietnam: Sino-Vietnamese Relations to the Tenth
Century and the Origins of Vietnamese Nationhood (Diss., The University of Michigan,
1976), Introduction.
22 On the Vietnamese expansion to the lower Hng River delta and their seafaring
weakness: H Vn Tn et al., Kho c hc Vit Nam [Archaeology in Vietnam], II (Hanoi:

KHXH, 2000); Phan i Don, Lng Vit Nam: mt s vn kinh t x hi [The Viet-
namese Village: Some Socio-economic Issues] (Hanoi: KHXH, 1992); Dip nh Hoa,
Thc tin v trit l sinh thi nhn vn ca ngi Vit trong nng nghip [Reality and
Eco-humanistic Thought of the Vietnamese about Agriculture], NCLS 1 (1992), 11-20; Ch
Vn Tn, Nhng c trng c bn ca vn minh Vit Nam thi khai sinh [Significant
Features of Early Vietnamese Civilization], KCH 2 (1994), 7-16; H Vn Tn, Cc h sinh
thi nhit i vi tin s Vit Nam v ng Nam [Tropical Eco-systems and Vietnam-
ese and South-East Asian Prehistory], KCH 3 (1982), 6-16. A brief history of independent
Vietnam from the eleventh century on can be found in Trng Hu Qunh et al., i cng
lch s Vit Nam [A Brief History of Vietnam], I (Hanoi: Gio dc, 1999).
23 On Vietnamese foreign trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: Thnh Th
V, Ngoi thng Vit Nam; Nguyen Thanh Nha, Tableau conomique du Vietnam; Keith
W. Taylor, Nguyn Hong and the Beginning of Vietnams Southward Expansion, in
Anthony Reid (ed.), Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1993), 42-65; Li, Nguyn Cochinchina; id., An Alternative Vietnam?, 111-21;
Charles Wheeler, Cross-Cultural Trade and Trans-Regional Networks in the Port of Hoi
242 notes
An (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 2002); Lieberman, Strange Parallels, Chapter 4; Cooke
and Li (eds.), Water Frontier.
Notes to Chapter One

24 Rhodes, Histoire du royaume de Tonkin, 56.
25 On the Hundred Vit, the Vietnamese, and the Vietnamese historiography of the
early period: Taylor, The Birth of Vietnam; Trng Hu Qunh et al., Lch s Vit Nam,
58-102; Wang Gung Wu, The Nanhai Trade: The Early History of Chinese Trade in
the South China Sea (Singapore: Time Academic Press, 1998), 1-14. Recent researches
have even hypothesized that the modern Vietnamese may have originated from the Lawa
who still inhabit modern northern Thailand. See: T c, Ngi Lc Vit phi chng l
mt nhm Lawa c? [Could the Lc Vit People be an Ancient Lawa Group?], NCLS 5
(2000), 56-69.
26 Wang, The Nanhai Trade, 1-14.
27 Taylor, The Birth of Vietnam, Chapters 1 & 2; Wang, The Nanhai Trade, 7-14;
Trng Hu Qunh et al., Lch s Vit Nam, 47-80.

28 Wang, The Nanhai Trade, 7.
29 Ibid., 17, 25.
30 Ibid., 31-5.
31 Trng Hu Qunh et al., Lch s Vit Nam, 63-98; Wang, The Nanhai Trade,
37-8.
32 Wang, The Nanhai Trade, 17, 25, 31, 35, 38, 44, 45; Jenifer Holmgran, Chinese Colo-
nization of Northern Vietnam: Administrative Geography and Political Developments in the

Tonking Delta, First to Sixth Century AD (Canberra: Australian National University Press,
1980), 175; Kenneth R. Hall, Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast
Asia (Honolulu: Hawaii University Press, 1985), 194-7; Momoki Shiro, Dai Viet and the
South China Sea Trade from the 10th to the 15th Century, Crossroads, 12-1 (1998), 1-34.
A brief account of the Vietnamese historiography of this period can be found in Taylor,
The Birth of Vietnam; Trng Hu Qunh et al., Lch s Vit Nam, 63-98.
33 See, for example, Ton th (4 vols). It is important to keep in mind that these chroni-
cles were compiled after the Vietnamese had regained their independence from the Chinese,
namely, post tenth century (Taylor, The Birth of Vietnam, Introduction). Li Tana even
suggests that for political and ideological reasons, the Vietnamese writers of the Ton th
deliberately failed to mention the international commerce which the Vietnamese had been
pursuing in this famous annal. Li Tana, A View from the Sea: Perspectives on the Northern
and Central Vietnam Coast, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 37/1 (2006), 83-102.
34 Nguyn Vn Kim, V tr ca mt s thng cng Vit Nam trong h thng bun bn
Bin ng th k XVI-XVII: Mt ci nhn t iu kin a-nhn vn [On the Position of

some Vietnamese Seaports in the Trading System of the Eastern Sea during the Sixteenth
and Seventeenth Centuries], in id., Nht Bn vi Chu , 108-19.
35 See: H Vn Tn, Cc h sinh thi; Dip nh Hoa, Thc tin v trit l; Ch
Vn Tn, Nhng c trng c bn; Phan i Don, Lng Vit Nam; Trng Hu Qunh
et al., Lch s Vit Nam.
36 In her recent article on ancient and medieval Vietnamese maritime trade, Li Tana
argues that northern Vietnam was highly dependent on maritime activity until the fifteenth
century. Moreover, the Vietnamese were also active in the triangular trade between northern
Vietnam, Hainan, and Champa. Li, A View from the Sea, 83-102.
37 For a general account on the independent era of Vietnam, see Trng Hu Qunh
et al., Lch s Vit Nam, Part 4. On the Vietnamese defeats of the Mongol and Chinese
to chapter one 243
Ming in the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries: H Vn Tn and Phm Th Tm, Cuc khng
chin chng xm lc Nguyn Mng th k XIII [The Resistance to the Yuan-Mongol
Invasions in the Thirteenth Century] (Hanoi: KHXH, 1968); Phan Huy L and Phan i
Don, Khi ngha Lam Sn v phong tro gii phng dn tc u th k XV [The Lam
Sn Revolt and the National Liberation Movement in the Early Fifteenth Century] (Hanoi:
KHXH, 1965). On Champa: George Maspero, The Champa Kingdom: The History of an
Extinct Vietnamese Culture (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2002); Momoki Shiro, A Short
Introduction to Champa Studies in Fukui Hayao (ed.), The Dried Areas in Southeast Asia
(Kyoto, 1999), 65-74.
38 Trng Hu Qunh et al., Lch s Vit Nam, 136-49, 190-215; 324-30; Yoji Aoyagi,
Vietnamese Ceramics Discovered on Southeast Asian Islands, in Ancient Town of Hi

An, 72-6; John Stevenson and John Guy, Vietnamese Ceramics: A Separate Tradition
(Michigan: Art Media Resources, 1997), 47-61.
39 On the expansion of i Vit handicraft during the L and Trn Dynasties: Phm
Vn Knh, Mt s ngh th cng hi th k X-XIV: ngh dt, gh gm, ngh khai

khong v luyn kim [Some Handicrafts in the Tenth-Fourteenth Centuries: Weaving,
Ceramics, Mining, and Metallurgy], NCLS 3 (1976), 42-53; Guy, Vietnamese Ceramics
in International Trade, in Stevenson and Guy, Vietnamese Ceramics, 47-61; Momoki,
Dai Viet: 18-22.
Examining the number of Vietnamese tributes to the Chinese court as well as the value
of their tributary goods, Momoki Shiro argued that i Vit must have earned consider-
ably from this tributary trade system with China because the value of the gifts which
the Chinese court returned to their vassals was always higher than that which the vassal
countries had presented to it. This, according to Momoki, partly explains why i Vit
was the most enthusiastic vassal in sending tribute to China after it became independent
in the tenth century.
In his recent study, John Whitmore proves that the rise of northern Vietnams coastal
trade in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries had contributed greatly to the state formation
of i Vit. John K. Whitmore, The Rise of the Coast: Trade, State and Culture in Early
i Vit, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 37/1 (2006), 103-22.
40 Quoted from Li, Nguyn Cochinchina, 59.
41 Phm Vn Knh, B mt thng nghip Vit Nam thi L-Trn [The Commercial
Face of Vietnam during the Ly and Tran Dynasties], NCLS 6 (1979), 35-42; Hall, Maritime
Trade, 173-5; Momoki, Dai Viet: 11-15; O. W. Wolters, Two Essays on Dai Viet in the
Fourteenth Century (New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1988).
42 See: Phm Vn Knh, B mt thng nghip Vit Nam: 35-42; Trng Hu Qunh,
Lch s Vit Nam, 148-9, 209-11.

43 Momoki, Dai Viet, 1-34. Li, however, believes that, after its independence in the
tenth century, the maritime trade of i Vit was quite flourishing thanks to its intermedi-
ary position between overseas countries and China. Northern Vietnam was also actively
involved in the horse, salt, and slave trade in the Jiaozhi Ocean which stretched from the
south-east coast of China southwards across the Gulf of Tonkin towards Champa. Li, A
View from the Sea: 83-102.
44 Momoki, Dai Viet: 1-34; Hall, Maritime Trade, 194-7; Lieberman, Strange Paral-
lels, 365.
45 See Hall, Maritime Trade, 181-6 and Momoki, Dai Viet, 18-19 for arguments on
maritime transformation in the Indo-Chinese Peninsula. Discussion on the Trn agrarian

expansion can be found in Sakurai Yumio, Land, Water, Rice and Men in Early Vietnam,
translated by T. A. Stanley, edited and published privately by Keith W. Taylor, Cornell
University (n.d.), 271-2 and Lieberman, Strange Parallels, 362-5. On the collapse of the
Trn and the defeat of the H by the Ming in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth cen-
244 notes
turies: John K. Whitmore, Vietnam, H Qu Ly and the Ming (13711421) (New Haven:
Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 1985).
46 Quc triu hnh lut [The L Codes] (Ho Chi Minh City, 2003), 221-3. See also:
Nguyen Ngoc Huy, Ta Van Tai and Tran Van Liem, The L Code: Law in Traditional
Vietnam: A Comparative Sino-Vietnamese Legal Study with Historical-Juridical Analysis
and Annotations (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1987). A discussion of i Vits
regulations on foreign merchants can be found in Momoki, Dai Viet, 18-23.
47 Rhodes, Histoire du Royaume de Tunquin, 135.
48 An account of the fifteenth-century Vietnamese historiography can be found in Trng
Hu Qunh et al., Lch s Vit Nam, 338-45; Taylor, Surface Orientations, 949-78; Trn
Quc Vng, Trng Trnh Nguyn Bnh Khim trong bi cnh vn ho Vit Nam th
k XVI [Nguyn Bnh Khim in the Cultural Context of Sixteenth-Century Vietnam], in
Trn Th Bng Thanh and V Thanh (eds.), Nguyn Bnh Khim: v tc gia v tc phm
[Nguyn Bnh Khim: His Life and Works] (Hanoi: Gio dc, 2001), 70-83.
49 Ton th, III, 132 and passim. Thc lc, I, 27-8, Trng Hu Qunh et al., Lch s
Vit Nam, 342-3. An analysis of Nguyn Hong and the Nguyn southward expansion can
be found in Taylor, Nguyn Hong, 42-65; Li, An Alternative Vietnam?, 111-21.
50 Ton th, III, 147, quoted from Taylor, Nguyn Hong, 49. See also the Nguyn
annal Thc lc, I, 31.

51 Ton th, III, 205, 208; Thc lc, I, 33-5. A detailed analysis of Nguyn Hongs
competition with Trnh Tng for power at court during the period 15929 and his resolution
to return to Thun Ho can be found in Taylor, Nguyn Hong, 55-9.
52 C. R. Boxer, Portuguese Conquest and Commerce in Southern Asia, 1500-1750
(London: Variorum Reprints, 1985), 165-6; Taylor, Nguyn Hong, 61-5; Li, Nguyn
Cochinchina, 43-6.
53 On the terminology of these words, see note 1 in Introduction.
54 The seven campaigns took place in 1627, 1633, 1643, 1648, 1655-60, 1661, and
1672. See for details Ton th, III, 226-90. Analyses of Tonkins military power can be
found in Alain Forest, La guerre et le militaire dans le Tonkin des Trinh, in Nguyn
Th Anh and Alain Forest (eds.), Guerre et paix en Asie du sud-est (Paris: LHarmattan,
1998), 135-58.
55 Cng mc, II, 340-1, 349-53; Lch triu, IV: Section of International Relations,
204. On the Nguyn southward movement: Taylor, Surface Orientations; Li, Nguyn
Cochinchina; Cooke and Li (eds.), Water Frontier.
56 In his letter to the Governor-General of the Dutch East India Company in Batavia in
1643, Cha Trnh Trng complained that a large number of his soldiers had died on the
battlefield succumbing to harsh weather, and therefore he asked for more military assistance
from the Company. See VOC 1149, Getranslateerden brieff van den Toncquinsen coninq
aen den gouverneur generael gedateerd anno 1643 [Translated letter from the King of
Tonkin [Cha Trnh Trng] to the Governor-General], 1643, fos. 683-5; Franois Valentyn,
Oud en Nieuw Oost Indin (Dordrecht and Amsterdam, 1724-6), III, 17-18. Discussions
of geographical features of the frontier of ng Hi can be found in L. Cadire, Le mur
de ng-Hi: etude sur lestablissement des Nguyn en Cochinchine, BEFEO 6 (1906),
138; Keith W. Taylor, Regional Conflicts Among the Vit People between the 13th and
19th Centuries, in Nguyen The Anh and Forest (eds.), Guerre et paix, 109-34.
57 Thc lc, I, 55-6; D. G. E. Hall, A History of Southeast Asia (London: MacMillan,
1968), 415; Boxer, Portuguese Conquest, 165-6; Li, Nguyn Cochinchina, 43-6; Sun Lai-
chen, Chinese Military Technologies and i Vit, 13901497 (Working Paper No. 11,
National University of Singapore, 2003).
58 Brief discussions of handicrafts will focus on the Trnh domain only. On economic
aspects of the Nguyn realm: Li, Nguyn Cochinchina; Wheeler, Cross-Cultural Trade.
to chapter two 245
Notes to Chapter Two

59 Lasses take care of all work at home, Now spinning and then embroidering (Viet-
namese ditty).
60 Nguyn Danh Phit, Vit Nam thi Mc-Cuc chin khng khoan nhng gia hai
tp on phong kin L-Trnh v Mc [Vietnam in the Mac PeriodThe Remorseless

Struggle between the L/Trnh and the Mc Feudal Clan], NCLS 9 (2004), 3-13.
61 Li, Nguyn Cochinchina, 18-31.
62 Phan Huy L, Ch ban cp rung t thi L s v tnh cht s hu ca loi rung
t th nghip [The Land-Conferring Regulation in the Early Period of the L Dynasty

and the Nature of the Possession of Ancestral Land], in id., Tm V Ci Ngun [Back to
the Source] (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1998), I, 576-90; Nguyen Thanh Nha, Tableau
conomique du Vietnam; Li, Nguyn Cochinchina, 24-8; Trng Hu Qunh et al., Lch
s Vit Nam, 354-70.
63 J. B. Tavernier, Relation nouvelle et singulire du Royaume du Tonkin, Revue
Indochinoise (1908), 514.

64 Samuel Baron, A Description of the Kingdom of Tonqueen, in John Pinkerton
(ed.), A Collection of the Best and Most Interesting Voyages and Travels in All Parts of
the World (London, 1811), IX, 663.
65 Tom Pires, The Suma Oriental of Tom Pires: An Account of the East, From the Red
Sea to Japan, Written in Malacca and India in 15121515, tr. and ed. Armando Corteso
(London: Hakluyt Society, 1944), 115.
66 Rhodes, Histoire du royaume de Tonkin, 56-7.
67 Dagh-register Batavia 1634, 249-50.
69 For descriptions of Tonkinese silk production and trade: Valentyn, Oud en Nieuw
Oost Indin, III, 6-11; Pieter van Dam, Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie, 2-
I, ed. F. W. Stapel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1931), 363-4. Detailed accounts of the
VOCs export of Tonkinese silk will be analysed in Chapter Six.
70 Richard, History of Tonquin, 716, 736, 738-41; Nguyen Thanh Nha, Tableau
conomique du Vietnam, 117; Nguyn Tha H, Economic History of Hanoi in the 17th,
18th and 19th Centuries (Hanoi: ST Publisher, 2002), 155-69.
71 In the VOC records the Dutch called the summer crop somertijt and the winter crop
wintertijt. Dagh-register Batavia 1636, 69-74; William Dampier, Voyages and Discover-
ies (London: The Argonaut Press, 1931), 49-50; Valentyn, Oud en Nieuw Oost Indin,
III, 6.
72 Richard, History of Tonquin, 740.
73 BL OIOC G/12/17-2, Journal Register of the English factory in Tonkin, 1112 May
1675, fo. 133.

74 Nara, Silk Trade, 167; Dagh-register Batavia 1663, 71 and passim.
75 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 48.
76 John Stevenson, The Evolution of Vietnamese Ceramics, 23-45, and John Guy,
Vietnamese Ceramics in International Trade, 47-61, in John Stevenson and John Guy
(eds.), Vietnamese Ceramics: A Separate Tradition (Michigan: Art Media Resources, 1994);
Phan Huy Le et al., Bat Trang Ceramic, 14th-19th Centuries (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers,
1994); Kerry Nguyen Long, Vietnamese Ceramic Trade to the Philippines in the Seven-
teenth Century, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 30/1 (1999), 1-21.
77 Hn Vn Khn and H Vn Cn, Gm Chu u Vit Nam [Chu u Ceramics],
paper presented at the workshop Vietnamese-Japanese Relations from the Fifteenth to

the Seventeenth Centuries as Seen from the Ceramic Trade (Hanoi, Dec. 1999); Kerry
Nguyen Long, Bat Trang and the Ceramic Trade in Southeast Asian Archipelagos, in
246 notes
Phan Huy L et al., Bat Trang Ceramic, 84-90; Nguyen Thua Hy, Economic History of
Hanoi, 185-95.
78 Bennet Bronson, Export Porcelain in Economic Perspective: The Asian Ceramic
Trade in the 17th Century, in Ho Chumei (ed.), Ancient Ceramic Kiln Technology in
Asia (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1990), 126-50; Ho Chumei, The Ceramic
Trade in Asia, 16021682, in A. J. H. Latham and Heita Kawakatsu (eds.), Japanese
Industrialization and the Asian Economy (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 35-
70; Gunder A. Frank, Reorient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1998), 97.
79 Aoyagi, Vietnamese Ceramics, 72-6; Stevenson and Guy, Vietnamese Ceramics,
47-61, 63-83.
81 BL OIOC E/3/90, London General to Tonkin, 1682, 1684 and 1685, fos. 40-1, 214-
15, and 296-8; BL OIOC E/3/91, London General to Tonkin, 1687, fos. 225-8; Dampier,
Voyages and Discoveries, 47-8; Nguyen Thua Hy, Economic History of Hanoi, 197-9.
82 BL OIOC E/3/92, London General to Fort St. George, 1691, fo. 68; BL OIOC E/3/92,
London General to Tonkin, 1691, 1692, 1695, fos. 75, 102-3, 179-80, 193.
83 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 72-3.
84 Nguyen Thua Hy, Economic History of Hanoi, 175-7.
85 Lch triu, III: Section of National Resources, 74-5.
86 VOC 1145, Missive from Antonio van Brouckhorst to Batavia, Oct. 1643, fos. 647-
50.
87 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 49; Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 2-I, 364-6.
88 Dagh-register Batavia 1661, 49-55, 87, 89-91; 1663, 71 and passim; Generale Mis-
siven, II, 451-2, 781; Generale Missiven, III, 69, 386-9. On the VOCs demand for gold
and musk: Tapan Raychaudhuri, Jan Company in Coromandel 1605-1690: A Study in the
Interrelations of European Commerce and Traditional Economy (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1962); Peter Borschberg, The European Musk Trade with Asia in the Early
Modern Period, The Heritage Journal, 1 (2004), 1-12; see also Chapter Seven for further
analyses of the Companys exportation of gold and musk from Tonkin in the latter half
of the seventeenth century.
89 Baron, Description of Tonqueen, 664.
90 Hng Thi, Vi nt v quan h gia Vit Nam v cc nc ng Nam trong lch
s [Some Features on the Relationship between Vietnam and South-East Asian Countries
in History], NCLS 3 (1986), 63-9.
91 Pires, Suma Oriental, 114. On i Vit regulations on foreign residence, see Riichiro
Fujiwara, The Regulation of the Chinese under the Trnh Regime and Pho Hien, in Ph
Hin, 95-8; Momoki, Dai Viet, 1-34.
92 Guy, Vietnamese Ceramics in International Trade, 47-61.
93 Itowappu (Japanese) or pancado (Portuguese) was a system in which Chinese silk
imported into Japan was purchased by Japanese merchants at prices fixed by the Japanese
authorities, namely the heads of the five shogunal cities (Miyako, Edo, Osaka, Sakai, and
Nagasaki) in order to prevent rising prices as a result of competition. This system was first
applied to the Portuguese in 1604, to the Chinese in 1633, and then to the Dutch in 1641.
It was annulled in 1655 and was re-applied from 1685. Innes, The Door Ajar, 248-9, 264;
Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, 120-1; The Deshima Dagregisters 16411650,
ed. Cynthia Viall and Leonard Bluss, XI (Leiden: Intercontinenta, No. 23, 2001), 412.
94 Innes, The Door Ajar, 264; George B. Souza, The Survival of Empire, Portuguese
Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea 16301754 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986), 114.
95 Anthony Farrington, The English East India Company Documents Relating Pho
Hien and Tonkin, in Ph Hin, 148-61; Hoang Anh Tuan, From Japan to Manila and
to chapter two 247
Back to Europe: The Abortive English Trade with Tonkin in the 1670s, Itinerario, 29/3
(2005), 73-92.
96 Sun, Chinese Military Technologies.
97 Rhodes, Histoire du Royaume de Tunquin, 135.
98 Japanese passengers on vessels visiting northern Vietnam in the 1630s reportedly
sold weapons to the Vietnamese. Innes, The Door Ajar, 149-50.

99 The River of Tonkin in the Western documents was actually a complex of several
rivers which linked the capital Thng Long with the sea. The Hng River rises from China
and flows to the Gulf of Tonkin passing Thng Long. In the province of Hng Yn, it
splits into two main river systems: the Hng River system flows past the modern city of
Nam nh and the Thi Bnh River system flows past present-day Hi Phng City. The
River of Tonkin in the Dutch and English texts includes the Hng River from Hanoi to
Hng Yn and the Thi Bnh River system from Hng Yn to the sea.
100 Because of the dearth of written sources, Vietnamese researchers used to consider
Doma a port-city or a commercial centre with large-scale business transactions. Nguyn

Tha H, Sng ng Ngoi v Doma: Mt th c bin mt [The Tonkin River
and Doma: A Vanished Town?], XN 4 (1994), 24-5; Th Thu Lan, Vng ca sng
ng Ngoi th k XVII-XVIII v du tch hot ng ca thng nhn phng Ty [The
Area of the Estuary of the Tonkin River in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries and
the Remains of the Commercial Activities of Western Merchants] (BA thesis, Vietnam
National University, Hanoi, 2003), 57-82. This hypothesis is not supported by the Dutch
and English documents, which depict Doma as nothing more than an anchorage at which
sailors awaited business transactions which were carried out in the capital Thng Long.
101 C. B. Maybon, Une Factorerie anglaise au Tonkin au XVIIe sicle (1672-1697),
BEFEO 10 (1910), 169-204; Farrington, The English East India Company, 148-61;
Nguyn Quang Ngc, Some Features on the Dutch East India Company and Its Trade
Office at Pho Hien, 132-41.
102 Indigenous literature and poems praised the prosperity of Ph Hin throughout the
seventeenth century, setting up contradictions to the information derived from Dutch and
English records. For research on Ph Hin using indigenous sources, see Trng Hu
Qunh, The Birth of Pho Hien, in Ph Hin, 29-38; Nguyen Tuan Thinh, Stele of Chuong
Pogoda and the Past Appearance of Ph Hin, in Ph Hin, 142-4.
However, quantitative analyses of data from two local stelae at Ph Hin reveal not such
prestigious a picture of Ph Hin, indicating an agrarian instead of a commodity-economy
town. Detailed information on this research can be found in Vu Minh Giang, Contribution
to Identifying Pho Hien through two Stelae, in Ph Hin: The Centre of International
Commerce in the 17th-18th Centuries (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994), 116-24.
103 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 17-18.
104 This duty seemed to be slack by the last quarter of the century. In 1672, for instance,
the English on their way to Thng Long bypassed the audience with the governor as they
were informed that he could not entertain them until they had paid their respects to the
prince in the capital. BL OIOC G/12/17-1, English factory records, 13 July 1672, fo. 11.
105 Nguyen Thua Hy, Economic History of Hanoi, 154-220; Reid, Southeast Asia in the
Age of Commerce, II, 63.

108 VOC 1172, Missive from Schillemans and Van Brouckhorst to Batavia, 19 Nov.
1648, fos. 495-513; Generale Missiven, II, 356-7.

109 Generale Missiven, II, 389-91, 465. For the natural characteristics of the river sys-
tems in northern Vietnam, see L B Tho, Thin nhin Vit Nam (Nature of Vietnam)
(Hanoi: KHKT, 1977).
110 BL OIOC G/12/17-1, English factory records, 25 June 1672, fo. 4.
248 notes
112 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 14-16. Classical descriptions of river trans-
portation in Tonkin can be found in Dagh-register Batavia 1636, 69-74; Valentyn, Oud
en Nieuw Oost Indin, III, 1-6; Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 2-I, 363; Baron, Description of
Tonqueen, 658-9; Richard, History of Tonquin, 712. An interesting analysis of the tides
of the Gulf of Tonkin during the seventeenth century can be found in David E. Cartwright,
The Tonkin Tides Revisited, The Royal Society, 57/2 (2003), 135-42.
113 VOC 1156, Missive from Antonio van Brouckhorst to Batavia, 26 Jan. 1644, fos.
147-8; Buch, La Compagnie (1937), 121.

114 Buch, La Compagnie (1936), 130.
115 Ibid., 153; A. Lamb, The Mandarin Road to Old Hu: Narratives of Anglo-Vietnam-
ese Diplomacy from the 17th Century to the Eve of the French Conquest (London: Chatto
& Windus, 1970), 50.
116 The duty on Asian vessels varied between 300 and 4,000 quan for each arrival and
between 30 and 400 quan for each departure. L Qu n, Ph bin tp lc [A Compilation

of the Miscellaneous Records When the Southern Border Was Pacified] (Hanoi: KHXH,
1977), 231-2. See also Li, Nguyn Cochinchina, 83.
117 Generale Missiven, II, 389; Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 49-50.
118 VOC 1124, Daghregister van Carel Hartsinck van de negotie gedaen met t schip
Groll naer Toncquijn van 31 Jan.7 Aug. 1637 [Diary of Carel Hartsinck of the trade car-
ried out on the ship Grol to Tonkin from 31 Jan.7 Aug. 1637], fos. 53-79; J. M. Dixon,
Voyage of the Dutch Ship Groll from Hirado to Tongking, Transactions of the Asiatic
Society of Japan, 9 (1883), 180-215.
119 Generale Missiven, II, 389-90.
120 BL OIOC G/12/17-1, English factory records, 3 July 1672, fos. 6-7. See also Hoang
Anh Tuan, From Japan to Manila and Back to Europe, 73-92.

121 BL OIOC G/12/17-8, English factory in Tonkin to London and Banten, 29 Dec.
1682, fos. 304-8.

123 BL OIOC G/12/17-2, English factory in Tonkin to London, 2 Feb. 1674, fos.
100-5.
124 BL OIOC G/12/17-2, English factory in Tonkin to Banten, 5 Oct. 1673, fos.
88-92.
126 Momoki, Dai Viet, 1-34.
127 Ibid.
128 See Articles 612-616 of the L Code in Quc Triu hnh lut, 221-3.
129 Pires, Suma Oriental, 115.
130 Juan Gonzalez de Mendoza, The History of the Great and Mighty Kingdom of China,
reprinted from the translation of R. Parke and edited by Sir George T. Staunton (London:
Hakluyt Society, 1853), 95. Details on licences issued for various destinations between
1589 and 1592 can be found in Innes, The Door Ajar, 53.
131 Giao-chi was a Chinese name for northern Vietnam. Innes (The Door Ajar, 54),
however, believed that the Giao-chi mentioned in this record referred to Hi An (Faifo)
in central Vietnam.
132 Innes, The Door Ajar, 56.
133 Chau Hai, The Chinese in Pho Hien and Their Relations with Other Chinese in
other Urban Areas of Vietnam, 211.

134 Generale Missiven, II, 450-2; Fujiwara, The Regulation of the Chinese, 97-8.
135 Cng mc, 300; Fujiwara, The Regulation of the Chinese, 97; Chau Hai, The
Chinese in Pho Hien, 210-16.

to chapter two 249
137 BL OIOC G/12/17-4, English factory in Tonkin to Banten, 30 Nov. 1677, fos.
216-20.
138 Dagh-register Batavia 1657; 1659; 1661.
139 VOC 8364, Missive from Sibens to Batavia, 10 Jan. 1692, fos. 1-3. See also Buch,
La Compagnie (1937), 186.

140 Takara Kurayoshi, The Kingdom of Ryukyu and Its Overseas Trade, in J. Kreiner
(ed.) Sources of Ryukyuan History and Culture in European Collections (Munchen: Ludi-
cian Verlag, 1996), 49.
142 The Ton th, III, 132, records that in the tenth lunar month of 1558, Chancellor
Trnh Kim requested the L Emperor that Duke Nguyn Hong be promoted Governor
of Thun Ho to guard against the eastern pirates. Historians largely believed that these
vaguely mentioned eastern pirates were Japanese pirates who were raiding along the
Vietnamese coast. See Taylor, Nguyn Hong, 45-6; Nguyn Vn Kim, Quan h Vit
Nam-Nht Bn th k XVI-XVII: Gp thm mt s t liu v nhn thc mi [Viet-
nam-Japan Relations in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: New Documents and
Reassessments], in id., Nht Bn vi Chu , 121.
143 Cited from Peri Noel, Essai sur les relations du Japon et de l Indochine sur XVIe
et XVIIe sicles, BEFEO 23 (1923), 2-3, 15.

145 Kawamoto Kuniye, The International Outlook of the Quang Nam (Nguyen) Regime
as Revealed in Gaiban Tsuusho, in The National Committee for the International Sym-
posium on the Ancient Town of Hi An (ed.), Ancient Town of Hi An (Hanoi: The
Gioi Publishers, 1993), 109-16; Li, Nguyn Cochinchina; Wheeler, Cross-Cultural Trade;
Ishizawa Yoshiaki, Les quartiers japonais dans lAsie du Sud-Est au XVIIme sicle,
in Nguyn Th Anh and Alain Forest (eds.), Guerre et paix en Asie du sud-est (Paris:
LHarmattan, 1998), 85-94.
146 According to Hayashi Akiras Tsuko ichiran [A Collection of Letters Exchanged
between the Japanese Government and Foreign Countries in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries], there were eight letters sent to the Tokugawa Government between 1601 and
1606 by Nguyn Hong. In return, the Japanese Bakufu replied to the Nguyn six times.
Cited from Li, Nguyn Cochinchina, 61.
147 Innes, The Door Ajar, 139; Li, Nguyn Cochinchina, 61.
148 Nguyn Tha H and Phan Hi Linh, Quan h thng mi gia Nht Bn v
Vit Nam th k XVI-XVII [Japan-Vietnam Commercial Relations in the Sixteenth and

Seventeenth Centuries], paper presented at the workshop Vietnamese-Japanese Relations
from the Fifteenth to the Seventeenth Centuries as Seen from the Ceramic Trade (Hanoi,
Dec. 1999).
149 Iwao Seiichi, Shuin-sen Boeki-Shi no Kenkyu [A Study of the Trade of Red Seal
Ships] (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1958), 49, 269.

150 P. Y. Manguin, Les Portugais sur les ctes du Vit-Nam et du Camp (Paris: cole
Franaise dExtrme-Orient, 1973), 48-9; Nguyn Tha H, Qun o Paracels v cc

nh hng hi B o Nha trong th k XVI [The Paracels and the Portuguese navigators
in the sixteenth century], TCKH 3 (1998), 30-42; R. Jacques, Les missionnaires portugais
et les dbuts de lglise catholique au Vit-nam, Vol. 1 (Reichstett-France: nh Hng
Tng Th, 2004), 46-51.
151 Lamb, The Mandarin Road, 19; Manguin, Les Portugais, 186.
152 Jacques, Les missionnaires portugais, Vol. 1, 53-5, 67-9.
153 P. Baldinotti, La Relation sur le Tonkin de P. Baldinotti, BEFEO 3 (1903), 71-7.
154 Alexandre de Rhodes, Divers voyages et missions (Vietnamese edition) (Ho Chi
Minh City: U ban on kt Cng gio, 1994), 69-84; Souza, The Survival of Empire,
113.
250 notes
155 Innes, The Door Ajar, 248-9, 264; Prakash, The Dutch East India Company,
120-1.
156 Dixon, Voyage of the Dutch Ship Groll, 180-216; Manguin, Les Portugais; Innes,
The Door Ajar, 264.

157 Souza, The Survival of Empire, 114.
158 For a brief history of Vietnamese coinage and currency, see Vn Ninh, Tin c
Vit Nam [Ancient Vietnamese Coinage] (Hanoi: KHXH, 1992); Robert S. Wick, Money,
Markets, and Trade in Early Southeast Asia, The Development of Indigenous Monetary
Systems to AD 1400 (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1992), 19-65; Whitmore,
Vietnam and the Monetary Flow, 363-96.
159 Souza, The Survival of Empire, 115-20.
160 VOC 1184, Missive from Pieter Boons to Batavia, 2 Nov. 1651, fos. 1-11; Generale
Missiven, II, 651-2.

161 On the Portuguese trade in copper coins with Tonkin, see Souza, The Survival of
Empire, 115-20; Shimada, The Intra-Asian Trade in Japanese Copper, 23-5.

162 Details of the first arrival of the Dutch and their abortive trade with Nguyn Quinam
in the years leading to 1638 will be analysed in detail in Chapter Three.

163 A general account of the Dutch trade with Quinam during the first four decades
of the seventeenth century can be found in Buch, De Oost-Indische Compagnie; id., La

Compagnie (1936), Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
164 Buch, La Compagnie (1936), 136-62.
165 See the following chapter for the inaugural Dutch voyage to the Trnh land. A concise
account of the Dutch silk trade with Tonkin can be found in Klein, De Tonkinees-Japanse
zijdehandel, 152-77. Political and commercial relations between the Dutch Company and
Tonkin will be highlighted in the following chapters.
166 The English accused the Dutch of being troublemakers causing the death and abduc-
tion of the English merchants. They claimed that the Nguyn rulers had actually planned to
murder the Dutch to avenge the murder of the Quinamese by the Dutch in previous years
(Richard Cocks, Diary of Richard Cocks, Cape-merchant in the English factory in Japan,
16151622: with Correspondence, edited by Edward Maunde Thompson, Vol. 2 (London:
Hakluyt Society, 1883), 268). The Dutch, on the other hand, blamed the English servants,
claiming that the rude behaviour of the English merchants towards the Nguyn rulers had
cost them their lives. However, while killing these rude English, the Nguyn rulers had
accidentally murdered one Dutchman as they failed to distinguish between the European
merchants (Buch, La Compagnie (1936), 117). Similar judgements can be found in C. B.
Maybon, Histoire moderne du pays dAnnam, 15921820 (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1920), 65;
Hall, A History of South-East Asia, 358; Lamb, The Mandarin Road, 12-15.
167 There was a similar assassination, though undated, recorded in the account of the
Italian priest Christopher Borri, who lived in Hi An between 1618 and 1622, just a few
years after the said murder. According to Borris explanation, the assassination was openly
carried out by the Nguyn rulers in order to please the Portuguese. The victims of this
assassination, Borri says, were only Dutch merchants. See Borri, An Account of Cochin-
China, in John Pinkerton (ed.), A Collection, 796-7. See also Chapter Three for further
discussions of this incident.
168 Innes, The Door Ajar, 99-100.
169 On the English East India Company: K. N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia
and the English East India Company 16601760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1978); J. Black, The British Seaborne Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2004).
170 In the late 1660s, the Banten Agents proposal for opening trading relations with
Japan, Formosa, Tonkin, and Cambodia was approved by the Court of Committees in
London. The Banten Agent planned to initiate trading relations with Cambodia, from where
to chapter two 251
the English factors would try to penetrate Japan with a letter of recommendation plus
ambassadors from the Cambodian King (BL OIOC E/3/87, General of the Court of Com-
mittees to Banten, Jan. 1668, fos. 106-7). The plan to penetrate Japan via Cambodia was,
however, finally abandoned and the English decided to sail to Nagasaki from Formosa on
their own account in June 1673. Tsao Yung-ho, The English East India Company and
the Cheng Regime on Taiwan, in Chang Hsiu-jung et al., The English Factory in Taiwan,
16701685 (Taipei: Taiwan National University, 1995), 1-19.
171 C. R. Boxer, Jan Compagnie in Japan 16721674 or AngloDutch Rivalry in Japan
and Formosa (Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, S.I.: s.l., 1931), 139-46, 161-7;
Tsao Yung-ho, The English East India Company, 1-19.
172 Femme Gaastra, The Shifting Balance of Trade of the Dutch East India Company,
in Leonard Bluss and Femme Gaastra (eds.), Companies and Trade, Essays on Overseas
Trading Companies during the Ancien Rgime (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1981),
47-69.
173 D. K. Basett, The Trade of the English East India Company in the Far East, 1623-
1684, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1/4 (1960), 32-47, 145-57; Chaudhuri, The
Trading World of Asia, 54, 215-20.
174 On the English mission to Japan: BL OIOC G/12/17-2, English factory in Tonkin to
Banten, 24 July 1674, fos. 110-16; Boxer, Jan Compagnie in Japan, 139-46, 161-7. See also
Leonard Bluss, From Inclusion to Exclusiveness, the Early Years at Hirado, 16001640,
in Leonard Bluss, Willem Remmelink & Ivo Smits (eds.), Bridging the Divide: 400 Years
the Netherlands-Japan (Leiden: Hotei Publishing, 2000), 42; Derek Massarella, A World
Elsewhere: Europes Encounter with Japan in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 359-63.
175 Hoang Anh Tuan, From Japan to Manila and Back to Europe, 73-92.
176 BL OIOC G/12/17-2, English factory in Tonkin to Banten, 7 Dec. 1672, fos. 41-
55.
177 BL OIOC G/12/17-2, English factory in Tonkin to Banten, 24 July 1674, fos. 110-
16.
178 A full account of the political and commercial relations between the English East
India Company and Tonkin between 1672 and 1697 can be found in the complete set of the
Journal Registers of the English Factory in Tonkin (BL OIOC G/12/17-1 to G/12/17-10).
179 Generale Missiven, II, 652.
180 Ibid., 702, 779.
181 Generale Missiven, III, 613.
183 Generale Missiven, III, 882, 903; IV, 3.
184 BL OIOC G/12/17-2, Thomas James to William Gyfford, 25 Dec. 1674, fos. 139-
41.
185 Maybon, Histoire moderne du pays dAnnam, 82.
186 Taboulet, La geste franaise en Indochine, Histoire par les textes de la France en
Indochine des origines 1914 (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1955), 85.

187 Li, Nguyn Cochinchina, 88; Li and Reid (eds.), Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen,
31; C. E. Goscha, La prsence vietnamienne au royaume du Siam du XVIIme sicle:

vers une perspective pninsulaire, in Nguyn Th Anh and Forest (eds.), Guerre et paix,
211-44; Kennon Breazeale, Thai Maritime Trade and the Ministry Responsible, in id.
(ed.), From Japan to Arabia: Ayutthayas Maritime Relations with Asia (Bangkok: The
Foundation for the Promotion of Social Sciences and Humanities Textbook Project, 1999),
29-32.
188 Dagh-register Batavia 1661, 49-55; Buch, La Compagnie (1937), 142.
252 notes
190 BL OIOC G/12/17-2, English factors in Tonkin to the Governor of Ph Hin, 5
Mar. 1675, fos. 127-8.
Notes to Part Two: The Political Relations

191 Now at the departure of this ship I am sending this letter to the King of Batavia,
in order that he will be informed of my intention to pay for the commodities, which may
be sent in the near future, together with a few pieces of large ordnance, in silk according
to their value. I also request that one constable be sent to me to remain with me. I request
the King of Batavia to aid me with this [i.e. sending the constable] to my satisfaction in
order that we shall remain friends for ever for as long as the sun and the moon will shine.
Letter from Cha Trnh Tc to Governor-General Joan Maetsuyker in 1670, in Dagh-reg-
ister Batavia 1670, 205-6.
Notes to Chapter Three

192 BL OIOC G/12/17-1, Petition of the English factory in Tonkin to Cha Trnh Tc,
18 July 1672, fo. 12.

193 The writing of this sub-chapter is based largely on the pioneering work of Buch,
De Oost-Indische Compagnie.
194 Buch, De Oost-Indische Compagnie, 9-10 ; Buch, La Compagnie (1936), 114-15;
H. A. Foreest and A. de Booy (eds.), De vierde schipvaart der Nederlanders naar Oost-
Indi onder Jacob Wilkens en Jacob van Neck (15991604), II (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1980-1), 67-91; Li and Reid (eds.), Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen, 6-26.
The following stories on the Dutch in central Vietnam have been largely based on Buchs
pioneering research.
195 Kato Eiichi, From Pirates to Merchants: The VOCs Trading Policy towards Japan
during the 1620s, in Reinhold Karl Haellquist (ed.), Asian Trade Routes: Continental and
Maritime (London: Curzon Press, 1991), 181-92; id., Shuinsen Licence Trade, 142-8.
196 The Italian priest Christopher Borri, who lived in Hi An between 1618 and 1622,
recorded this incident: The King [Cha Nguyn Phc Nguyn] ordered all the Dutch to go
ashore but as they were going upon the river in boats, they were on a sudden assaulted
by the gallies, which destroyed most of them. The King remained master of their goods;
and to justify this action, alleged, that he very well knew the Dutch, as notorious pirates,
who infested all the seas, were worthy of severer punishment; and therefore, by proclama-
tion, forbid any of them ever resorting to his country. Christopher Borri, An Account
of Cochin-China, in John Pinkerton (ed.), A Collection of the Best and Most Interesting
Voyages and Travels in All Parts of the World (London, 1811), XI, 796-7; see also Buch,
La Compagnie (1936), 117; Lamb, The Mandarin Road, 12-15.
198 Buch, De Oost-Indische Compagnie, 17; Buch, La Compagnie (1936), 119-21.
On the Dutch involvement in China, see Leonard Bluss, The Dutch Occupation of the
Pescadores, 16221624, Transactions of the International Conference of Orientalists in
Japan (The Toho Gakkai, XVIII, 1973), 28-44.
199 Bluss, The Dutch Occupation of the Pescadores, 28-42; Tsao Yung-ho, Taiwan
as an Entrept in East Asia in the Seventeenth Century, Itinerario, 21/3 (1997), 94-114.
201 Buch, De Oost-Indische Compagnie.
202 All foreign merchants complained about this confiscation law which was also said to
to chapter three 253
have been implemented in Pegu. See Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 15; Frdric Man-
tienne, Indochinese Societies and European Traders: Different World of Trade? (17th18th
Centuries), in Nguyen The Anh and Yoshiaki Ishizawa (eds.), Commerce et Navigation en
Asie du Sud-Est (XIVeXIXe sicle) (Tokyo: Sophia University, 1999), 113-25.
203 Buch, La Compagnie (1936), 132-3; Raychaudhuri, Jan Company in Coromandel,
187-8.
205 VOC 1120, Instructie door gouverneur Hans Putmans [in Tayouan] aen Abraham
Duijcker naer Quinam [Instruction from Governor Putmans to Duijcker going to Quinam],
21 Feb. 1636, fos. 225-31; Buch, La Compagnie (1936), 136-7.
206 Cha Thng (Nguyn Phc Lan, 163548) succeeded Cha Si (Nguyn Phc
Nguyn, 161335).
207 VOC 1120, Missive from Abraham Duycker to Batavia, 7 Oct. 1636, fos. 459-78;
VOC 1120, Translaet van de missive van den coninck van Quinam ontfangen tot Batavia 12
Dec. 1636 [Translation of the missive received from the King of Quinam [Cha Thng]
in Batavia on 12 Dec. 1636], fos. 491-2; Buch, La Compagnie (1936), 139-40.
208 Dagh-register Batavia 1636, 91-3; Buch La Compagnie (1936), 136-45.
209 VOC 1123, Sommarium der coopmanschappen van 8 Oct. 16363 Maert 1637 naer
Batavia, Siam, Cambodja, Quinam en Toncquijn versonden. [Summary of the commodi-

ties sent to Batavia, Siam, Cambodia, Quinam, and Tonkin, from 8 Oct. 1636 to 3 Mar.
1637], fos. 782-3.
210 VOC 1123, Missive from Duycker to Governor-General Antonio van Diemen, 21
Nov. 1637, fos. 970-7. See also Buch, La Compagnie (1936), 157-8.
211 VOC 1127, Missive from Henrick Nachtegael [in Siam] to Abraham Duycker in
Coutchin China, 3 May 1638, fos. 369-80; Buch, La Compagnie (1936), 159-62.
212 Dixon, Voyage of the Dutch Ship Groll, 180-215.
213 Buch, De Oost-Indische Compagnie, 12. On political and commercial transformations
during the early 1630s, see Akira Nagazumi, Dhiravat na Pombejra, and A. B. Lapian, The
Dutch East India Company in Japan, Siam and Indonesia: Three Essays (Working Paper
No. 16, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1982); Van Dyke, How and Why, 41-56.
214 Generale Missiven, I, 513-22; Buch, La Compagnie (1936), 142.
215 Kato Eiichi, Unification and Adaptation, the Early Shogunate and Dutch Trade
Policies, in Leonard Bluss and Femme Gaastra (eds.), Companies and Trade: Essays on
Overseas Trading Companies during the Ancien Rgime (Leiden: Leiden University Press,
1981), 207-29; id., Shuinsen Licence Trade and the Dutch in Southeast Asia, in Ancient
Town of Hi An (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1993). 142-8; Bluss, From Inclusion to
Exclusiveness, 13-32.
216 Buch, La Compagnie (1936), 141-3 and passim; Van Dyke How and Why; Tsao
Yung-ho, Taiwan as an Entrept, 94-114.

217 Dagh-register Batavia 1636, 72-3, 104; Valentyn, Oud en Nieuw Oost Indin, III,
7-18; Buch, La Compagnie (1936), 150-2.

218 A detailed account of the inaugural Dutch voyage to Tonkin can be found in VOC
1124, Daghregister van Carel Hartsinck van de negotie gedaen met t schip Groll naer Ton-
cquijn van 31 Jan.7 Aug. 1637 [Diary of Carel Hartsinck of the trade carried out on the
ship Grol to Tonkin from 31 Jan.7 Aug. 1637], fos. 53-79; VOC 1124, Translaet missive
van den coninck van Tonquin aen den Governeur Generael [Translated missive from the
King of Tonkin [Cha Trnh Trng] to the Governor-General, [1637], fos. 80-1; VOC 1124,
Acte waerbij den coopman Carel Hartsinck van den coninck van Tonquin tot sijn geadop-
teerde soon verclaert ende aengenomen wert [Act in which Merchant Carel Hartsinck has
been declared and accepted as the King of Tonkins adopted son], [1637], fo. 85. See also
Dixon, Voyage of the Dutch Ship Groll; Buch, La Compagnie (1936), 152-4.
219 Because of the unprofitable trade with Tonkin as well as the high risk of piracy and
254 notes
shipwreck on the Macao-Tonkin trading route, Portuguese merchants in Macao did not sail
to Tonkin in the years 1628 and 1629. Largely owing to the Portuguese non-appearance,
the Cha, in a fit of disappointment, deported all the Jesuits who had arrived in Tonkin on
board the Portuguese ships in 1626 and 1627. Rhodes, Histoire du royaume de Tunquin,
121-30, 154-6, 221-5, 272-5.
220 VOC 1120, Instructie door gouverneur Hans Putmans aen Abraham Duijcker naer
Quinam medegegeven [Instruction given by Governor Hans Putmans to Duycker going

to Quinam], 21 Feb. 1636, fos. 225-31; Dagh-register Batavia 1636, 67, 91; Buch, La
Compagnie (1936), 137, 142.
221 VOC 1124, Dagregister Groll, fos. 53-79; Dixon, Voyage of the Dutch Ship
Groll.
222 VOC 1124, Translaet missive van den coninck van Tonquin aen den Gouverneur
Generael [Translated missive from the King of Tonkin [Cha Trnh] to the Governor-
General], [1637], fos. 80-1; Buch, La Compagnie (1936), 140.
223 Dagh-register Batavia 16311633, 433.
224 Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company, 37-65; C. R. Boxer, Jan Compagnie in
War and Peace 1602-1799 (Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1979), 1-28.
226 Dixon, Voyage of the Dutch Ship Groll, 180-215.
227 Ibid.
228 VOC 1124, Translaet missive van den coninck van Tonquin aen den Gouverneur
Generael, 1637 [Translated missive from the King of Tonkin [Cha Trnh Trng] to the
Governor-General, 1637] , fos. 80-1.
229 Ibid.
230 Ibid.
231 VOC 1124, Translaet missive van den coninck van Tonquin aen president Couck-
ebacker [Translated missive from the King of Tonkin [Cha Trnh Trng] to President
Couckebacker], 1637, fo. 82; VOC 1124, Translaet missive van den prins van Tonquin
aen president Couckebacker [Translated missive from the Prince of Tonkin [Trnh Tc] to
President Couckebacker], 1637, fo. 83; VOC 1124, Acte adoptie Hartsinck als soon van
de coninck van Tonquin, [1637], fo. 85. See the preceeding section for the inaugural VOC
voyage to Tonkin in 1637.
232 N. MacLeod, De Oost-indische Compagnie als Zeemogendheid in Azi, II (Rijswijk:
Blankwaardt & Schoonhoven 1927), 318-19.

234 Ibid., 167-8.
235 A detailed discussion of Couckebackers arguments concerning the Chas ambiva-
lent delays during these campaigns as well as the current hesitation of Batavia to continue
its alliance with Tonkin can be found in Buch, De Oost-Indische Compagnie, 74-7; Buch,
La Compagnie (1936), 168-9.
236 MacLeod, De Oost-Indische Compagnie, II, 319; Buch, La Compagnie (1936), 169.
The Gianh River in modern Qung Bnh Province served as the borderline between Tonkin
and Quinam throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Cng mc, II, 260.
237 Dagh-register Batavia 16411642, 124-6, 641.
238 VOC 665, Resoluties Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, 12 Apr. 1642; MacLeod, De
Oost-Indische Compagnie, II, 319-20; Buch, La Compagnie (1936), 174-5.

240 The Crown Prince was Nguyn Phc Tn, Thc lc, I, 55-6.
241 Dagh-register Batavia 16411642, 124-6; Buch, La Compagnie (1936), 172.
242 According to the seventeenth-century English traveller William Dampier, the confis-
cation law was in force not only in ng Trong but also in Pegu: Dampier, Voyages and
Discoveries, 13. See also Mantienne, Indochinese Societies, 113-25.
243 VOC 1141, Letter from a Japanese in Quinam to his compatriots in Batavia, fos.
135-7.
245 VOC 1140, Missive van de gevangens uijt Quinam aen den gouverneur Paulus
Traudenius [in Tayouan] [Missive from the prisoners in Quinam to Governor Paulus Trau-
denius], 19 July 1642, fos. 295-8.
247 VOC 1141,Verclaringh van den corporael Juriaen de Rooden aengaende de cru-
eliteijt bij de Macaose Portugeesen aen de 50 Nederlanders bij den coningh van Quinam
gelargeert gepleeght [Declaration by Corporal Juriaen de Rooden concerning the cruelty
perpetrated by the Portuguese from Macao against the fifty Dutchmen set free by the King
of Quinam], fos. 138-40.
248 VOC 665, Resoluties Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, 12 Apr. 1642.
250 MacLeod, De Oost-Indische Compagnie, II, 320.
251 VOC 1140, Reports, resolutions, declarations, diaries, and documents of Captain
Van Linga during the voyage from Batavia to Quinam, fos. 347-95.
252 Cha Trnh clearly lied to Van Linga because the Vietnamese annals recorded no
such campaign in the spring and summer of 1642.

253 VOC 1140, Reports, resolutions, declarations, diaries, and documents of Captain
Van Linga during the voyage from Batavia to Quinam, fos. 347-95.
255 VOC 1146, Missive van Traudenius in t Casteel Zeelandia aen den coninck van
Toncquin [Missive from Traudenius in Zeelandia Castle to the King of Tonkin [Cha Trnh
Trng]], 15 Dec. 1642, fos. 722-3.
256 VOC 1146, Instructie voor Lamotius vertreckende over Toncquin ende Quinam naer
Batavia [Instruction for Lamotius sailing to Batavia via Tonkin and Quinam], 12 Jan.
1643, fos. 720-1.
257 VOC 1145, Missive from Antonio van Brouckhorst to Governor-General Antonio
van Diemen, 1 Oct. 1643, fos. 99-103; Buch, La Compagnie (1936), 181.
258 VOC 1145, Resolutien bij Johan van Elseracq ende sijnen raedt op de custe van
Toncquin ende in Japan genomen 30 Meij, 10 Junij en 23 September 1643 [Resolutions

taken by Johan van Elseracq and his council off the coast of Tonkin and in Japan], fos.
259 For the 1643 campaign of Tonkin: Cng mc, II, 253; Ton th, III, 237; VOC
1149, Getranslateerden brieff van den Toncquinsen coninq aen den gouverneur generael
[Translated letter from the King of Tonkin [Cha Trnh Trng] to the Governor-General],
1643, fos. 683-5.
260 Ibid.
261 VOC 666, Resoluties Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, 11 May 1643.
262 Thc lc, I, 55-6; C. C. Van der Plas, Tonkin 1644/45, Journaal van de Reis van
Anthonio van Brouckhorst (Amsterdam: Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen te Amsterdam,

1955), 18-25.
263 VOC 1145, Missive from Van Brouckhorst to Governor-General Antonio van
Diemen, 1 Oct. 1643, fos. 99-103.

264 VOC 1144, Daghregister gehouden bij den ondercoopman Gobijn [Diary kept
by Junior Merchant Gobijn], 13 July-30 Oct. 1643, fos. 694-714; Van der Plas, Tonkin
1644/45, 18-25.
265 VOC 1148, Missive van Van Elseracq [in Nagasaki] aen den grootmachtigen coninck
van Annam, Chotsingh, [Missive from Van Elseracq to the powerful King of Annam [Cha
Trnh Trng], 30 Oct. 1643, fos. 138-9; MacLeod, De Oost-Indische Compagnie, II, 322.
266 VOC 1144, Dagregister Gobijn, 13 July30 Oct. 1643, fos. 694-714.
256 notes
267 Excerpted from VOC 1149, Getranslateerden brieff van den Toncquinsen coninq aen
den gouverneur generael [Translated letter from the King of Tonkin [Cha Trnh Trng]
to the Governor-General], 1643, fos. 683-5.
268 Ibid.
269 Van der Plas, Tonkin 1644/45, 18-25.
272 Buch, De Oost-Indische Compagnie, 100-3; L. C. D. Van Dijk, Neerlands vroegste
betrekkingen met Borneo, den Solo Archipel, Cambodja, Siam en Cochinchina (Amsterdam:
J. H. Scheltema, 1862), 328-9.
273 Dagh-register Batavia 16431644, 25; Buch, La Compagnie (1936), 190.
274 VOC 1140, Missive van de gevangens uijt Quinam aen den gouverneur Paulus
Traudenius [Missive from the prisoners in Quinam to Governor Traudenius], 19 July 1642,
fos. 295-8; VOC 1164, Translaet missive door de gevangene Nederlanderen in Quinam
op 13 Julij 1647 aen den president Pieter Antonissen Overtwater geschreven [Translated
missive written by the Dutchmen imprisoned in Quinam to President Overtwater], 13 July
1647, fos. 469-70; VOC 1170, Brieven door den praesident Pieter Antonisz. Overtwater
desen jare 1648 aen de gevangene Nederlanderen in Quinam geschreven mitsgaders de
becomen antwoort daerop [Letters written by President Overtwater to the Dutch prisoners
in Quinam and the reply received], 1648, fos. 477-80.
275 VOC 1164, Missive geschreven door den president Pieter Antonissen Overtwater
aen de gevangenen in Quinam [Missive written by President Overtwater to the prisoners

in Quinam], 30 Mar. 1647, fo. 465; VOC 1170, Brieven door praesident Overtwater aan
de gevangene Nederlanderen in Quinam geschreven, 1648, fos. 477-80.
276 VOC 1148, Dutch prisoners in Quinam to Governor-General Van Diemen, 26 July
1644, fos. 522-3.

277 VOC 1149, Translaet request der gevangene Quinangers aen den gouverneur Francois
Caron in dato 20 November 1644 gepresenteert [Tranlated request from the Quinamese
prisoners to Governor Franois Caron presented on 20 Nov. 1644], fo. 634.
278 H. P. N. Muller, De Oost-Indische Compagnie in Cambodja en Laos (The Hague:
Nijhoff, 1917), 348, 352, 355; MacLeod, De Oost-Indische Compagnie, II, 317; Buch,
La Compagnie (1937), 219-20; Carool Kernsten, Strange Events in the Kingdoms of
Cambodia and Laos (Chiangmai: White Lotus Press, 2003), 1-17, 47-9.
280 Cha Nguyn Phc Tn (164887) succeeded his father Cha Nguyn Phc Lan
(163548).
281 (Dutch: Heren XVII) The board of seventeen directors representing the six chambers
of the VOC.
282 Van Dijk, Neerlands vroegste betrekkingen, 119; Plakaatboek, II, 143.
284 VOC 1182, Rapport van Willem Verstegen, wegens sijn besendingh na de Noor-
der quartieren, besonderlijck van Toncquin, Taijouan ende Quinam [Report from Willem
Verstegen on his mission to the Northern Quarters, particularly Tonkin, Tayouan, and
Quinam], 20 Jan. 1652, fos. 71-126.
285 VOC 1187, Accoort ende verbont tussen dedele Comp. ende den coninck van
Quinam gemaect [Agreement and treaty between the VOC and the King of Quinam], 9
Dec. 1651, fos. 506-8. For a translation of this treaty into modern Dutch and English: Buch,
De Oost-Indische Compagnie, 112-13; Anthony Reid, The End of Dutch Relations with the
Nguyen State, 1651-2, in Li and Reid (eds.), Southern Vietnam under the Nguyn, 33-7.
286 A full description of Verstegens mission in 1651 to Tonkin, Formosa, and Quinam
can be found in his report: VOC 1182, Rapport van Willem Verstegen, wegens sijn besend-
ingh na de Noorder quartieren, besonderlijck van Toncquin, Taijouan ende Quinam [Report
from Willem Verstegen on his mission to the Northern Quarters, particularly Tonkin,
Tayouan, and Quinam], 20 Jan. 1652, fos. 71-126. See also: Buch, La Compagnie (1936),
194-6.
287 VOC 1188, Rapport van den oppercoopman Hendrick Baron wegen de Quinamse
constitutie [Report from Senior Merchant Hendrick Baron concerning the constitution of
Quinam], 2 Feb. 1652, fos. 628-33; VOC 1188, Daghregister van den oppercoopman Hen-
drick Baron [Diary of Chief Merchant Hendrick Baron [in Quinam], 15 Dec. 16512 Feb.
1652, fos. 634-48; Reid, The End of Dutch Relations, 35-7.
288 VOC 1149, Getranslateerden brieff van den Toncquinsen coninq aen den gouverneur
generael [Translated letter of the King of Tonkin [Cha Trnh Trng] to Governor-General
[Van Diemen], 1643, fos. 683-5.
290 Dagh-register Batavia 16441645, 111. However, the Vietnamese annals mention
no such military campaign by Tonkin against Quinam in 1644.

291 VOC 1141, Discourssen ende cort rapport over eenige poincten concernerende den
jegenwoordigen stant der Japanse, Chinese, Tonquinsche commertie, insgelijcx ons gevoe-
len wegen de Quinamsche saecken, en hoe de Tonquinsche negotie bij vertieringe van
eenige profitabile coopmanschappen in Europa, soude connen verbetert, wijder uijt gebreijt
werden, te presenteren aen de Ed. heeren bewinthebberen der Vereenichde Nederlandsche
Oostindische Compagnie ter vergaderinge van de seventiene, getekent Carel Hartsinck,
Amsterdam 26 Augustij 1643 [Discourse and short report on some points concerning the
present state of the trade with Japan, China, and Tonkin, furthermore our opinion on the
Quinam affairs, and how the Tonkin trade could be improved and expanded by the sale
of some profitable commodities in Europe, to be presented to the Directors of the VOC
at the meeting of the Gentlemen Seventeen, signed Carel Hartsinck, Amsterdam, 26 Aug.
1643], fos. 359-74.
292 VOC 1156, Missive from Antonio van Brouckhorst to Batavia, 26 Jan. 1644, fos.
147-8; Dagh-register Batavia 16431644, 141-3.

293 VOC 1156, Missive from Van Brouckhorst in Tonkin to Batavia, 26 Jan. 1644, fos.

294 VOC 1156, Missive from Van Brouckhorst [in Nagasaki] to Batavia, 24 Oct. 1645,
fos. 223-8.
296 VOC 1156, Missive from Van Brouckhorst [in Nagasaki] to Batavia, 24 Oct. 1645,
fos. 223-8; Dagh-register Batavia 16441645, 108-22.

297 VOC 1161, Dagregister Tonkin, 29 Nov. 164531 July 1646, fos. 705-46.
298 Cng mc, II, 256; Ton th, III, 238-9.
299 Ton th, III, 238-9; Generale Missiven, II, 281; Buch, La Compagnie (1937),
122.
302 For the itowappu system, see note 93 in Chapter Two.
304 Generale Missiven, II, 325-6; VOC 1166, Advies door den coopman Jan van Rie-
beeck aen de heeren bewinthebberen over den handel in Toncquin anno 1648 [Advice
from Merchant Jan van Riebeeck to the Gentlemen XVII concerning the Tonkin trade
1648], fos. 669-84.
306 VOC 1169, Instructie voor den oppercoopman Philips Schillemans als opperhooft
na Toncquin [Instruction for Senior Merchant Philip Schillemans going as opperhoofd to

Tonkin], 29 Nov. 1647, fos. 395-7.
258 notes
308 I did not summon you to my country, Generale Missiven, II, 389.
309 VOC 1175, Dagregister Tonkin, 25 Feb.4 Sept. 1650, fos. 448-94; Generale Mis-
siven, II, 450-2.
310 For Ongiatule, see note 330 in Chapter Four.
311 VOC 1175, Dagregister Tonkin, 25 Feb.4 Sept. 1650, fos. 448-94; Buch, La Com-
pagnie (1937), 129-30.

314 VOC 672, Resoluties Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, 14 June 1650; Buch, La
Compagnie (1937), 130-1.

315 VOC 1175, Dagregister Tonkin, 25 Feb.4 Sept. 1650, fos. 448-94; Generale Mis-
siven, II, 450.

316 VOC 1175, Instructie aen den eersten assistent Hendrik Baron in Tonckin gelaten
[Instruction for First Assistant Hendrik Baron in Tonkin], 27 July 1650, fos. 446-7; VOC
1184, Instructie voor den eersten adsistent Hendrick Baron door den coopman Jacob Keijser
verleent [Instruction for First Assistant Hendrick Baron from Merchant Jacob Keijser] 27
July 1650, fos. 20-2; Generale Missiven, II, 450-1.
319 None of the Vietnamese annals recorded this event.
Notes to Chapter Four

321 Generale Missiven, II, 485; Buch, La Compagnie (1936), 194-6.
322 VOC 1184, Instructie door de commissaris Verstegen aen den coopman Jacob Kaiser
als opperhooft over t comptoir Toncquin [Instruction from Commissioner Verstegen to
Merchant Jacob Keijser as the opperhoofd of the Tonkin factory], 11 July 1651, fos. 62-
8.
324 VOC 1182, Rapport van Willem Verstegen, wegens sijn besendingh na de Noorder
quartieren, besonderlijck van Toncquin, Taijouan ende Quinam [Report from Willem Ver-
stegen on his mission to the Northern Quarters, particularly Tonkin, Tayouan, and Quinam],
20 Jan. 1652, fos. 71-126; Generale Missiven, II, 530-2.
326 Ibid.
327 E. C. Gode Molsbergen, De Stichter van Hollands Zuid-Afrika Jan van Riebeeck
(16181677) (Amsterdam: S. L. Van Looy, 1912), 32.

329 Buch, La Compagnie (1937), 135-6. See Chapter Six for a detailed account of the
Companys silk trade with Tonkin.

330 Ongiatule (ng gi T l) was the eunuch Hong Nhn Dng who was executed in
1652 for attempting to murder the Cha: Ton th III, 242-3; Cng mc II, 262; VOC
1197, Missive van de raad van Tonkin aan Batavia [Missive from the Tonkin Council to
Batavia], Nov. 1653, fos. 598-611; Generale Missiven, II, 650-1, 654-5.
331 VOC 1220, Rapport aan gouverneur-generaal Joan Maetsuyker van Nicolaas de
Voogt [Report to Governor-General Maetsuyker from De Voogt], 7 Dec. 1657, fos. 839-
47.
333 Klein, De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel; Hoang Anh Tuan, Mu dch t la ca
to chapter four 259
Cng ty ng n H Lan vi ng Ngoi, 1637-1670 [The VOC -Tonkin Silk Trade,

1637-1670], NCLS 3 (2006).
334 Generale Missiven, II, 697-702; Buch, La Compagnie (1937), 138.
335 VOC 1197, Missive from the Tonkin Council to Batavia, Nov. 1653, fos. 598-611;
Generale Missiven, III, 69.

336 VOC 1206, Missive from Louis Baffart from Tayouan to Batavia, Nov. 1654, fos.
65-90.
337 Ibid.; Generale Missiven, II, 696, 697-702.
338 VOC 677, Resoluties Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, 27 Apr. 1655; Generale Mis-
siven, III, 2.
339 VOC 1197, Missive from the Tonkin Council to Batavia, Nov. 1653, fos. 598-611;
Generale Missiven, II, 759.

340 VOC 1206, Missive from Louis Baffart from Tayouan to Batavia, Nov. 1654, fos.
65-90; Generale Missiven, II, 779.

341 On the shortage of copper coins in Quinam: Buch, De Oost-Indische Compagnie,
25; Li, Nguyn Cochinchina, 90-3.

342 Generale Missiven, II, 777-8. On the Vietnamese monetary system: Whitmore, Viet-
nam and the Monetary Flow, 363-96. See also Chapter Eight for the usage and production
of copper coins in Vietnamese history.
343 VOC 1206, Missive van Louis Baffart uit Tayouan aan Batavia, Nov. 1654, fos.
65-90.
344 See Chapters Five and Eight for more detailed discussions of the shortage of copper
cash in Tonkin in the mid-seventeenth century.

345 Klein, De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel, 152-77.
346 According to the records of the Dutch factory, the Tonkinese troops flooded the
southern kingdom. Cha Nguyn had to flee to the southwestern mountains near Cambo-
dia to hide from the Trnh armies (Dagh-register Batavia 1661, 50-1). The Vietnamese
annals also recount that the Trnh armies could defeat the Nguyn in southern Ngh An
but could not overrun the border.
347 Cng mc, II, 262-91; Ton th, III, 244-59; Cadire, Le mur de ng-Hi,
87-254.
349 Dagh-register Batavia 16561657, 49; 1663, 71 and passim.
350 Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company, Chapter 2.
351 Hall, A History of Southeast Asia, 312-25.
354 Cng mc, II, 296.
355 Lch triu, IV, 147-50, 204. On the MingQing transition: John E. Wills Jr., Pepper,
Guns, and Parleys, The Dutch East India Company and China, 16621681 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1974), 1-28; Lynn A. Struve (ed.), Time, Temporality, and Impe-
rial Transition: East Asia from the Ming to Qing (Honolulu: Association for Asian Studies
and University of Hawaii Press, 2005).
356 A detailed account of the export of Chinese gold and musk by the Tonkin factory
will be given in Chapter Seven.

359 Dagh-register Batavia 1663, 71 and passim. The first Tonkin tribute to Peking was
recorded in June 1663: Cng mc, II, 296. Ton th (III, 264) however noted that the
1663 Tonkin tribute was to Ming China. This must have been mistakenly recorded.
360 VOC 1240, Missive from Hendrick Baron to Batavia, 12 Nov. 1662, fos. 1355-74.
361 NFJ 57, Dagregister comptoir Nagasaki, 1 Aug. 1644; NFJ 61, Dagregister comp-
260 notes
toir Nagasaki, 15 Sept. 1648; Generale Missiven, II, 452; Tsao Yung-ho, Taiwan as an
Entrept, 94-114.
362 For the Dutch loss of Formosa to the Zheng in 1662: Generale Missiven, III, 386-
9; Wills, Pepper, Guns, and Parleys, 25-8; Leonard Bluss, Tribuut aan China, Vier
eeuwen NederlandsChinese betrekkingen (Amsterdam: Cramwinckel, 1989), 65-72; Tonio
Andrade, Commerce, Culture, and Conflict: Taiwan under European Rule, 16241662 (Ph.
D. Diss., Yale University, 2000), 314-24.
363 For the vicissitudes of the Sino-Dutch relationship in the 166281 period: Wills,
Pepper, Guns, and Parleys.

364 Raychaudhuri, Jan Company in Coromandel, 186-9.
365 Generale Missiven, III, 386-9.
367 On mining in Tonkin in the seventeenth-century: Lch triu, III, 76-9; Trng Hu
Qunh et al., Lch s Vit Nam, I, 370-1; Whitmore, Vietnam and the Monetary Flow,
370-3.
368 Dagh-register Batavia 1661, 49-55; Baron, Description of Tonqueen, 663; Dam-
pier, Voyages and Discovery, 49; Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 2-I, 361-5.
369 For the export of Laotian gold to Tonkin: Nguyen Thanh Nha, Tableau conomique
du Vietnam, 160, 170. A general account of the exportation of Chinese gold to Tonkin via
the border can be found in Dagh-register Batavia 1661, 49-55.
371 VOC 1236, Missive from Hendrick Baron to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1661, fos. 829-55;
Dagh-register Batavia 1661, 89-91. Most of the place-names found in the Dutch records
remain unidentified because of the odd pronunciation and hence orthography.
Dagh-register Batavia 1663, 71 and passim.

373 The Cha wanted to know how far Tinnam and Vanning were from the capital,
Thng Long, and whether his subjects at those places were vulnerable to the Chinese threat.
The Dutch answered the first question, saying that those places did not seem to be terribly
far, but did not answer the second. Dagh-register Batavia 1663, 689-92.
374 VOC 1241, Missive van het opperhoofd en de raad van Tonkin aan Batavia [Mis-
sive from the Opperhoofd and Council of Tonkin to Batavia], 6 Nov. 1663, fos. 356-66;
Dagh-register Batavia 1663, 689-92; 1664, 202-4, 548-50.
375 VOC 1240, Missive from Baron to Batavia, 12 Nov. 1662, fos. 1355-74; Buch, La
Compagnie (1937), 160.

376 Plinlochiu to Governor-General Joan Maetsuycker, in Dagh-register Batavia 1663,
71 and passim.
377 Resimon to Director-General Carel Hartsinck, in Dagh-register Batavia 1663, 71
and passim.
378 VOC 678, Resoluties Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, 24 Apr. 1663; Dagh-register
Batavia 1663, 338; 1664, 204.

379 Generale Missiven, III, 305, 307.
380 Ibid., 346-7.
381 Ibid., 377, 378.
382 VOC 1236, Missive from Baron to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1661, fos. 829-55; VOC 1240,
Missive from Baron to Batavia, 12 Nov. 1662, fos. 1355-74; Generale Missiven, III, 450-
1.
383 VOC 1206, Missive from Louis Baffart from Tayouan to Batavia, 18 Nov. 1654,
fos. 65-90.
384 On the exportation of Japanese copper coins to Tonkin by the VOC: Shimada, The
Intra-Asian Trade in Japanese Copper, 95. See also Chapters Five and Eight for detailed
analyses of this subject.
to chapter four 261
Generale Missiven, III, 450-1.
389 VOC 679, Resoluties Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, 14 June 1664; Generale Mis-
siven, III, 450-1.

390 Dagh-register Batavia, 1663, 689-90.
391 VOC 1252, Missive from Hendrick Verdonk to Batavia, 23 Feb. 1665, fos. 209-
48.
392 Dagh-register Batavia 1664, 506, 581.
393 Ibid., 143-4.
395 Cha Trnh Tc to Governor-General Joan Maetsuycker, 1666 and 1667, in Dagh-
register Batavia 16661667, 221-2, 400.

396 Id., 1667, in Dagh-register Batavia 16661667, 400-1.
399 Id., 1668 and 1673, in Dagh-register Batavia 16681669, 239; 1673, 72-3.
400 Ton th, III, 288-90; Thc lc, I, 84-88; Cng mc, II, 329-30.
401 Cng mc, II, 340, 349-50.
402 According to Vietnamese historiography, out of the twenty-four-year period between
1675 and 1698, there were eight years in which Tonkin experienced severe natural disasters
such as drought, flood, heavy hail, and dike-breaks which all led to large-scale famines
(Cng mc, II, 335-78; Trng Hu Qunh et al., Lch s Vit Nam, 394-8). This period
was therefore as miserable as the years 15611610, when fourteen years out of sixty saw
agricultural failures. Lieberman, Strange Parallels, 396-7.
403 Keith W. Taylor, The Literati Revival in Seventeenth-Century Vietnam, Journal
of Southeast Asian Studies, 1 (1987), 1-23.

404 See Chapter Two for a general account of the presence, activity, and departure of
foreign merchants in seventeenth-century Tonkin.

406 VOC 694, Resoluties Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, 10 June 1679.
407 VOC 1294, Missive from Albert Brevinck and the Tonkin Council to Batavia, 18
Oct. 1673, fos. 522-37.

408 Generale Missiven, IV, 344. On the profits and expenses of the Tonkin factory in the
last decades: Klerk de Reus, Geschichtlicher berblick der Administrativen, Rechtlichen

und Finanziellen Entwicklung der Niederlndischen-Ostindischen Compagnie (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1894), Appendix IX.
409 Generale Missiven, III, 712; Maybon, Histoire moderne du pays dAnnam, 77.
410 Hoang Anh Tuan, From Japan to Manila and Back to Europe, 73-92.
411 VOC 1362, Missive from Leendert de Moij and the Tonkin Council to Batavia, 8
Jan. 1681, fos. 996-1005; VOC 1377, Missive from Leendert de Moij and Johannes Sibens
to Batavia, 5 Jan. 1682, fos. 556-64; Generale Missiven, IV, 539-41. On Tonkins natural
disasters and famines: Cng mc, II, 347.
412 BL OIOC G/12/17-7, Records of the English Factory in Tonkin, 22 June 1682, fol.
286.
413 VOC 1453, Missive from Johannes Sibens and Dirck Wilree, and the Tonkin Council
to Batavia, 19 Dec. 1688, fos. 299-312.

414 Maybon, Histoire moderne du pays dAnnam, 82, 84.
416 VOC 1453, Rapport van den ondercoopman en Tonckins opperhooft Joannes Sibens
262 notes
aen Batavia, 18 Jan. 1689 [Report from Junior Merchant and Opperhoofd of Tonkin Joannes
Sibens to Batavia], fos. 313-15; VOC 1462, Missive from Sibens and the Tonkin Council
to Batavia, 26 Nov. 1689, fos. 8-9. See also Chapter Two for detailed accounts of foreign
merchants in seventeenth-century Tonkin.
417 Generale Missiven, IV, 435-6.
418 In 1685 the Japanese Government issued regulations to limit the maximum value of
goods the Dutch and the Chinese could import. Accordingly, the Chinese were limited to
a total of 6,000 kanme in silver (600,000 taels of silver) while the Dutch were restricted
to 3,400 kanme (340,000 taels of silver). Discussions of the Japanese regulations on the
import and export trade can be found in Innes, The Door Ajar, 319-27; Prakash, The Dutch
East India Company, 134-5.
421 VOC 1377, Missive from Leendert de Moij and the Council to Batavia, 2 Jan. 1683,
fos. 565-7.
422 VOC 1485, Translaet missives van den koninck van Toncquin aen gouverneur gen-
erael Johannes Camphuijs [Translated missives from the King of Tonkin [Cha Trnh Cn]
to Governor-General Camphuys], 1691, fos. 181-3.
423 The annual gifts included seven pieces of red felt, two pieces of black felt, three
pieces of blue felt, four pieces of red perpetuanes, twenty pieces of red bethilles, thirty
pieces of woollen cloth, twenty pieces of fine salemporis, ten catties of fine amber, some
aloes wood, some parrots, and two thoroughbreds aged 5 or 6 years. VOC 8364, Briefje
van Sibens en raad tot Tonkin aan Batavia [Note from Sibens and Tonkin Council to
Batavia], 10 Jan. 1692, fos. 1-3.
424 VOC 8365, Missive from Jacob van Loo and the Council to Batavia, 23 Nov. 1693,
fos. 1-3.
425 Generale Missiven, V, 687.
426 VOC 1557, Sibens on his mission to Tonkin, 13 Dec. 1694, fos. 219-24.
427 VOC 1580, Missive from Van Loo and Leendertsz to Batavia, 24 Dec. 1694, fos.
1-7; Generale Missiven, V, 721.

428 VOC 1180, Van Loo and the Tonkin Council to Batavia, 25 Nov. 1695, fos. 12-
35.
429 VOC 1580, Prince of Tonkin to Batavia, 1695, fos. 37-9.
434 VOC 713, Resoluties Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, 28 Jan. 1698.
436 VOC 1609, Missive from Van Loo to Batavia, 3 Dec. 1698, fos. 1-12; Generale
Missiven, VI, 54.

438 Generale Missiven, VI, 75-6.
439 VOC 1623, Cha Trnh Cn to Governor-General Willem Outhoorn, 1699, fos. 15-
16. See also Buch, La Compagnie (1937), 194.

440 No commerce, no wealth (Vietnamese proverb).
to chapter ve 263
Notes to Part Three: The Commercial Relations

442 In Bengal, for instance, treasuremainly silver bullion and coinsaccounted for as
much as 92 per cent of the value of the VOCs import trade to this region between 17089
to 171617. Om Prakash, Bullion for Goods: International Trade and the Economy of
Early Eighteenth Century Bengal, The Indian Economic and Social History Review, 13
(1976), (159-87), 163. (Reprinted in Om Prakash, Precious Metals and Commerce).
443 Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 2-I, 361-2.
Notes to Chapter Five

444 That which we import and trade there [Tonkin] consisted mainly of silver, also
copper cash, which are cast or made in Japan Furthermore some spices, saltpetre, cotton
textiles, but, apart from the afore-mentioned silver and copper cash, all goods in small
quantity, because their consumption is very scant. Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 2-I, 361-2.
445 BL OIOC G/12/17-1, English factory in Tonkin to Banten and London, 10 Oct.
1672, fos. 36-7.

447 Generale Missiven, III, 109-10. A detailed account of the refining of the Mallacx
silver can be found in VOC 1140, Specificatie van t Mallacx zilver in Toncquin geraff-
ineert [Specification of the Mallacx silver refined in Tonkin in 1641], fos. 158-60.
449 Calculated from Klein, De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel, 170 (Table 2).
450 VOC 677, Resoluties Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, 27 Apr. 1655. See also: Buch,
La Compagnie 1937 (121-237), 140.

451 Generale Missiven, II, 485. See Chapters Three and Four for an account on the
private undertakings of the Dutch factors in Tonkin and the investigation of Commissioner
Verstegen in the early 1650s.
452 Gaastra, The Exports of Precious Metal, 453.
453 VOC 1241, Missive van opperhoofd en raad in Tonkin aan Batavia [Missive from
Opperhoofd and Council in Tonkin to Batavia], 6 Nov. 1663, fos. 356-66; Dagh-register
Batavia 1664, 298.
454 Dagh-register Batavia 1672, 160, 193-4.
455 Dagh-register Batavia 1675, 186; 1677, 140, 177.
456 VOC 1339, Missive from Jan Besselman and Council in Tonkin to Batavia, 17 Sept.
1678, fos. 500-9; Dagh-register Batavia 1678, 224.

457 Taylor, The Birth of Vietnam, 203-4. See also: Wick, Money, Markets, and Trade,
19-65.
458 Whitmore, Vietnam and the Monetary Flow, 183-4. See also: Vn Ninh, Tin
c thi L-Trn [Money in the L-Trn Dynasties], NCLS 6 (1979), 26-34; id., Tin c
Vit Nam.
459 Lch triu, III, 61.
460 A brief account of the Vietnamese monetary system can be found in Whitmore,
Vietnam and the Monetary Flow, 365-70.

461 Lch triu, III, 63-4; Whitmore, Vietnam and the Monetary Flow, 367-9.
462 See Chapter Four for further details on Tonkins cash shortage in the early 1650s
and Chapter Eight for discussions of the fluctuation of the silver/cash ratio.
463 Generale Missiven, II, 651-2. On the Portuguese import of copper coins into Tonkin:
264 notes
Souza, The Survival of Empire, 115-20. A general account of foreigners import of coins
into Quinam can be found in Li, Nguyn Cochinchina, 90-3.
464 VOC 1197, Missive from the Council in Tonkin to Batavia, Nov. 1653, fos. 598-611;
Generale Missiven, II, 697-702.

fos. 65-90; Buch, La Compagnie (1937), 139.

Dagh-register Batavia 1661, 89; Generale Missiven, III, 450-1.

468 Luc Duc Thuan, Japan Early Trade Coins and the Commercial Trade between Viet-
nam and Japan in the 17th Century, www.VietAntique.com; Whitmore, Vietnam and the
Monetary Flow, 363-96. On the export of Toraisen and Shichusen to Quinam: A. van Aelst,
Japanese coins in southern Vietnam and the Dutch East India Company, 16331638,
Newsletter (The Oriental Numismatic Society, 109, Nov.-Dec. 1987), (n.p); Li, Nguyn
Cochinchina, 90-3.
470 Innes, The Door Ajar, 587; Luc Duc Thuan, Japan Early Trade Coins; Shimada,
The Intra-Asian Trade in Japanese Copper, 95.

471 Generale Missiven, II, 651-52; Souza, The Survival of Empire, 115-20.
fos. 65-90; Buch, La Compagnie (1937), 139.

473 These percentages are calculated from figures shown in Table 3.
474 VOC 1314, Missive from Albert Brevincq and Council to Batavia, 19 Nov. 1675,
fos. 19-22; Generale Missiven, IV, 88.

475 Generale Missiven, IV, 88, 111, 174.
476 Quoted in Shimada, The Intra-Asian Trade in Japanese Copper, 95.
477 Cng mc, II, 296; Ton th, III, 260, 262, 264.
478 A general account of i Vit military technology can be found in Sun, Chinese
Military Technologies.
479 VOC 1175, Missive from Philip Schillemans to Batavia, Nov. 1650, fos. 495-513;
Generale Missiven, II, 389-91, 450.

480 VOC 1236, Missive from Hendrick Baron to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1661, fos. 829-55.
See also: Buch, La Compagnie (1637), 144-5.

481 This was not only a complaint of foreign merchants but was also confirmed by
European travellers who visited Tonkin during this century. See Baron, Description of
Tonqueen, 663-64; Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 49-50.
Dagh-register Batavia 1663, 71-3.

483 Letter from Cha Trnh Tc to Governor-General Joan Maetsuyker in 1667, in
Dagh-register Batavia 16661667, 400-1.

484 Generale Missiven, IV, 86-8, 221.
485 VOC 1339, Missive from Johannes Besselman to Batavia, 17 Sept. 1678, fos. 500-9;
Dagh-register Batavia 1678, 224.

486 Letters from Cha Trnh Tc to Batavia in 1672 and 1679, in Dagh-register Batavia
1672, 67-9; 1679, 100-3.

488 VOC 8365, Missive from Jacob van Loo and Council in Tonkin to Batavia, 23 Nov.
1693, fos. 1-3.

to chapter six 265
Notes to Chapter Six

489 In previous times we sent the silk and the silk piece-goods, which we purchased
there [i.e. Tonkin] on a ship straight to Japan, and we made a reasonable profit on them.
But because the price of the aforesaid silk rose considerably afterwards, apart from the
fact that the Chinese also joined in the trade, the direct shiping and trade started to decline.
So finally, because of the meagre profits and the onerous expenses of employing a ship
specially for this purpose, this [direct shipping] was abandoned. Van Dam, Beschryvinge,
2-I, 362.
490 On the Portuguese China-Japan trade in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries:
Chang Tien-Ts, Sino-Portuguese Trade from 1514 to 1644, A Synthesis of Portuguese

and Chinese Sources (Leiden: Brill, 1933); Michael Cooper, The Mechanics of the Macao-
Nagasaki Silk Trade, Monumenta Nipponica, 27/4 (1972), 423-33; Souza, The Survival
of Empire.
491 Kato Eiichi, Unification and Adaptation, 207-29.
492 Kristof Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, 16201740 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1958), 114.
493 See Chapter Three for the abortive Dutch trade with Quinam. See also: Buch, De
Oost-Indische Compagnie; Ancient Town of Hoi An; Li, Nguyn Cochinchina.

494 Bluss, The Dutch Occupation of the Pescadores, 28-42; Tsao Yung-ho, Taiwan
as an Entrept, 94-114.
495 Nagazumi, Dhiravat and Lapian, The Dutch East India Company in Japan, Siam and
Indonesia; Van Dyke, How and Why, 41-56.

496 Generale Missiven, I, 513.
497 Ibid., 522.
498 See Pires, Suma Oriental, I, 114-15.
499 On the VOC silk trade with Tonkin: Buch, La Compagnie (1936), 97-196 & (1937),
121-237; Klein, De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel, 152-77; Nagazumi, The Tonkinese-

Japanese Trade, 21-46; Nara, Silk Trade, 162-83.
503 Dagh-register Batavia 1636, 69-74. See also: Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 2-I, 361-5;
Valentyn, Oud en Nieuw Oost Indin, III, 1-6.

504 On the VOCs successful inaugural voyage to Tonkin: VOC 1124, Daghregister van
Carel Hartsinck van de negotie gedaen met t schip Groll naer Toncquijn van 31 Jan.7
Aug. 1637 [Diary of Carel Hartsinck of the voyage of the Grol to Tonkin in 1637], fos.
53-79; Dagh-register Batavia 1637, 144; Dixon, Voyage of the Dutch Ship Groll.
505 Faccaar: see Glossary. VOC 1124, Daghregister Groll, fos. 53-79; Van Dam,
Beschryvinge, Vol. 2-I, 361-5.

506 Generale Missiven, I, 585; Klein, De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel, 165-6.
508 The Chinese owners killed nineteen Dutchmen on board, robbed the Company cargo
and took it to Cambodia. During the sale of this cargo, the Dutch factors in Cambodia
discovered what had happened thanks to some notes kept in the silk bales. Generale Mis-
siven, II, 7-8; Buch, La Compagnie (1937), 206.
509 VOC 1124, Daghregister Groll 1637, fos. 53-79.
510 One ton of gold valued at around 35,416 taels of silver or 100,935 guilders: Ge-
nerale Missiven, I, 742; VOC 1124, The act of Cha Trnh Trng to adopt Carel Hartsinck
as his own son, fo. 85.
266 notes
512 Dagh-register Batavia 16401641, 146; Klein, De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel,
167.
513 Tsao Yung-ho, Taiwan as an Entrept, 94-114.
514 Innes, The Door Ajar, 248-5; Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, 120-1; The
Deshima Dagregisters 16411650, 412.
515 Dagh-register Batavia 16431644, 147; Generale Missiven, II, 211-12.
518 On the export of Bengali silk to Japan in the 164052 period: Prakash, The Dutch
East India Company, 122-4.

520 Dagh-register Batavia 16411642, 58, 62-5, 72. The number given in Generale
Missiven, II, 146, for that years Tonkin cargo to Japan was 225,000 guilders. On Japans
sumptuary laws: Donald H. Shively, Sumptuary Regulation and Status in Early Tokugawa
Japan, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 25 (1964-5), 123-64.
521 The Deshima Dagregisters 16411650, 33-4.
523 NFJ 56, Dagregister comptoir Nagasaki, Aug.-Sept. 1642.
524 NFJ 57, Dagregister comptoir Nagasaki, June-Nov. 1643.
525 Generale Missiven, II, 211-12; Van der Plas, Tonkin 1644/45, 23.
526 The Deshima Dagregisters 16411650, 116.
527 Ibid., 166-7.
528 NFJ 57, Dagregister comptoir Nagasaki, Feb.Sept. 1644.
531 VOC 1156, Missive from Antonio van Brouckhorst to Batavia, 15 Oct. 1644, fos.
149-55.
532 Ibid.; Gode Molsbergen, De Stichter van Hollands Zuid-Afrika, 32; Buch, La Com-
pagnie (1937), 121-4.

534 Ibid., 222.
535 The Deshima Dagregisters 16411650, 215-16.
537 VOC 1156, Missive from Van Brouckhorst in Nagasaki to Batavia, 24 Oct. 1645,
fos. 223-8; VOC 1161, Dagregister Tonkin, 29 Nov. 164531 July 1646, fos. 705-46.
538 Generale Missiven, II, 289; NFJ 59, Dagregister comptoir Nagasaki, 1220 Sept.
1646.
540 Gode Molsbergen, De Stichter van Hollands Zuid-Afrika, 39.
542 NFJ 60, Dagregister comptoir Nagasaki, Sept.-Oct. 1647.
543 VOC 1169, Instruction for Philip Schillemans as opperhoofd of the Tonkin factory,
29 Nov. 1647, fos. 395-7.

544 Sumongij, chiourong, and the like are sorts of Tonkinese silk textiles. Most of them
remain unidentified owing to the odd phonetic spellings of the European merchants. VOC
1172, Missive from Schillemans and Van Brouckhorst in Nagasaki to Governor-General
Cornelis van der Lijn, 19 Nov. 1648, fos. 381-4.
545 Generale Missiven, II, 364-5; NFJ 61, Dagregister comptoir Nagasaki, 9 & 24 Nov.
1648.
547 Ibid., 390; The Deshima Dagregisters 16411650, 367.
548 Generale Missiven, II, 422, 450-1.
to chapter six 267
549 Ibid., 530-2; Buch, La Compagnie (1937), 132-4. Information on Ongiatule can be
found in note 330 in Chapter Four.
551 VOC 1184, Missive [from Tonkin] to Governor-General Carel Reniers, 24 Nov.
1651, fos. 14-19; Klein, De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel, 177 (Table 1).

553 VOC 1197, Missive [from Tonkin] to Batavia, Nov. 1653, fos. 598-611.
554 Generale Missiven, II, 697-702. On the currency system and the shortage of copper
cash during the 1650s: Whitmore, Vietnam and the Monetary Flow, 363-6; Souza, The
Survival of Empire, 115-20.
556 VOC 1197, Missive [from Tonkin] to Batavia, Nov. 1653, fos. 598-611; Generale
Missiven, II, 777.

557 Generale Missiven, II, 756. Buch, La Compagnie (1937), 139-41.
558 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, 124.
559 Klein, De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel, 167.
560 Calculated from Klein, De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel, 170 (Table 2).
564 Innes, The Door Ajar, 279-85; Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, 124.
567 Ibid.
568 On the fifth campaign of Tonkin against Quinam: Cng mc, II, 263-91.
569 For a general account on the Companys Tonkin trade between 1655 and 1660:
Buch, La Compagnie (1937), 140-5. The above calculation was based on sporadic selec-
tions of numbers given in VOC 1213 (1655/6), 1216 (1656), 1219 (1656), 1220 (1657),
1230 (1659), 1233 (1660), 1236 (1661); Generale Missiven, III; Dagh-register Batavia
1656/71661.
571 VOC 678, Resoluties Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, 24 Apr. 1663. On the Dutch
loss of Formosa in 1662: Wills, Pepper, Guns, and Parley, 25-8; Tsao Yung-ho, Taiwan
as an Entrept: 94-114.
572 Dagh-register Batavia 1661, 89-91; 1663, 158; 1665, 548. See Chapter Four for
the Dutch Tinnam mission and their strategy towards the procurement of Chinese gold
and musk.
574 VOC 1278, Missive from Cornelis Valckenier and Council to Batavia, 5 Jan. 1670,
fos. 1861-2; Buch, La Compagnie (1937), 166-7.

575 Dagh-register Batavia 1664, 506, 581.
577 Buch, La Compagnie (1937), 164; Klein, De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel,
168.
579 Klein, De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel, 168; Buch, La Compagnie (1936),
173-4.
581 Those groundbreaking studies include Oskar Nachod, Die Beziehungen der nieder-
lndischen ostindischen Kompagnie zu Japan im siebzehnten Jahrhundert (Leipzig: Rob.

Friese Sep., 1897); Buch, La Compagnie; Klein, De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel.
582 Klein, De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel, 166-9.
268 notes
583 Adapted from numbers given in Klein, De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel, 169
and Table 2. It is important to keep in mind that the VOCs calculation of profits on the
Tonkinese silk trade rarely took the shipping costs into account.
584 Nachod, Die Beziehungen, Table A (Umsatz-Tabelle) and Table C (Einfuhr von
Rohseide), CCII-CCVI.
585 Calculated from Nachod, Die Beziehungen, Tables A and C; Klein, De Tonkinees-
Japanse zijdehandel, 166-71; Generale Missiven, II, 388, 389-91.

586 Klein, De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel, 169, 173 (Table 4).
587 Generale Missiven, II, 696; Souza, The Survival of Empire, 115-20; Richard von
Glahn, Myth and Reality of Chinas Seventeenth-Century Monetary Crisis, The Journal
of Economic History, 56/2 (1996), 429-54.
588 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, 125-6.
Notes to Chapter Seven

590 And while we maintained a factory there [in Tonkin] and also bought silk piece-
goods, musk and other items for the Netherlands, the silk which we bought for Japan was
carried thither via Batavia. This was done as long as it yielded any profit. But [the silk]
grew more and more expensive so that we finally abandoned this, and the factory was
maintained, manned by just a few servants, only in order to purchase silk piece-goods for
the Netherlands and Persia, and also to buy musk and other miscellaneous items. Van
Dam, Beschryvinge, 2-I, 362.
591 Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, 133.
592 Ibid., 135; Femme Gaastra, De Textielhandel van de VOC, Textielhistorische Bij-
dragen, 34 (1994), 56-7.

593 In the 1644 trading season, Zeelandia Castle reported to the Deshima factory in Japan
that half of the Companys demand for Chinese goods to be procured there could not be
fulfilled. In 1648, the Governor of Formosa kept lamenting that the export of Chinese com-
modities to this island from the mainland had dwindled to almost nothing. This situation
remained more or less the same in the 1650s. NFJ 57, Dagregister comptoir Nagasaki, 10
Sept. 1643; NFJ 61, Dagregister comptoir Nagasaki, 15 Sept. 1648.
595 Dagh-register Batavia 16441645, 108-22; Van der Plas, Tonkin 1644/45, 30.
597 VOC 1216, Missive from Gustavus Hanssen to Batavia, 20 Feb. 1656, fos. 436-42;
Generale Missiven, II, 777; Generale Missiven, III, 2, 61.

600 See Chapter Six for detailed information on the Companys export of Tonkinese
silk to Japan.
601 Generale Missiven, IV, 435, 490; Buch, La Compagnie (1937), 177-8.
602 VOC 1377, Missive from Leendert de Moij and Johannes Sibens to Batavia, 5 Jan.
1682, fos. 556-64.

603 VOC 1438, Missive from Tonkin to Batavia, 24 Jan. 1687, fos. 669-70.
604 VOC 1456, Missive from Dirck Wilree and the Tonkin Council to Batavia, 19 Jan.
1689, fos. 2018-20.

605 Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 2-I, 364-5. See also: Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries,
49; Baron, Description of Tonqueen, 663; Richard, History of Tonquin, 711. For a
general account of the musk trade in the early modern period: Borschberg, The European
Musk Trade, 1-12.
to chapter seven 269
606 VOC 1194, Missive [from Tonkin] to Batavia, 8 Dec. 1652, fos. 165-239; Generale
Missiven, II, 651-2.
607 VOC 1216, Missive from Gustavus Hanssen to Batavia, 20 Feb. 1656, fos. 436-42;
Generale Missiven, III, 69.

610 Ibid., 89-90.
611 VOC 1240, Missive from Baron to Batavia, 12 Nov. 1662, fos. 1355-74; Dagh-
register Batavia 1661, 89-91; 1663, 71 and passim.

612 VOC 1241, Missive from the Opperhoofd and Council in Tonkin to Batavia, 6 Nov.
1663, fos. 356-66; Dagh-register Batavia 1663, 689-92; 1664, 65-7.

614 Dagh-register Batavia 1664, 298, 548-50; 1665, 83, 193, 222, 370-2.
615 VOC 1253, Missive from Constantijn Ranst to Batavia, 30 Oct. 1665, fos. 1712-34;
Dagh-register Batavia 1665, 370.

617 For a general account of the Companys bullion trade, see Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic
Trade, 50-72; Gaastra, The Exports of Precious Metals, 447-76.

618 Gaastra, The Export of Precious Metals, 453. According to Glamann (Dutch-Asiatic
Trade, 51), not until 1618 gold was sentintended for the Coromandel Coastin all
72,000 rials out of the total cargo of the money of 612,000 rials.
619 Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, 57. Gaastra (The Export of Precious Metals, 453),
examining such Company documents as the orders from Batavia, resolutions of the Gen-
tlemen XVII, and receipts in Asia, has stated that 1632 to the end of the 1650s was the
period without gold. The demand for gold from Batavia began once again in 1658, and
in 1662 gold was sent from the Netherlands to Asia.
620 Raychaudhuri, Jan Company in Coromandel, 187.
621 Niels Steengaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: The East
India Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1973), 140.
623 Gaastra, The Export of Precious Metals, 464-5, 474 (Appendix 4).
624 Ibid., 466; Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, 58.
626 Ibid., 781.
627 Raychaudhuri, Jan Company in Coromandel, 190-1.
629 Dagh-register Batavia 1661, 49-55. See also: Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries,
49; Baron, Description of Tonqueen, 663; Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 2-I, 361-5; Lch triu,
III, 76-9; Whitmore, Vietnam and the Monetary Flow, 370-3.
630 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 49; Baron, Description of Tonqueen, 663.
632 VOC 678, Resoluties Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, 24 Apr. 1663. A detailed
discussion of this issue can be found in Chapter Four.

633 Generale Missiven, III, 386, 440.
634 VOC 1240, Missive from Baron to Batavia, 12 Nov. 1662, fos. 1355-74; Dagh-
register Batavia 1663, 71 and passim.

635 Generale Missiven, III, 450-1, 457.
636 Ibid., 457-66.
638 VOC 678, Resoluties Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, 24 Apr. 1663; Dagh-register
Batavia 1663, 158; 1664, 202-4.

270 notes
640 VOC 1241, Missive from Opperhoofd and Council in Tonkin to Batavia, 6 Nov.
1663, fos. 356-66; Dagh-register Batavia 1664, 65-7.
642 VOC 1252, Missive from Verdonck to Batavia, 23 Feb. 1665, fos. 209-48.
643 VOC 1253, Missive from Constantijn Ranst to Batavia, 30 Oct. 1665, fos. 1712-
34.
644 Dagh-register Batavia 1665, 83, 370-2; Generale Missiven, III, 491.
645 Nachod, Die Beziehungen, 357.
648 Cynthia Viall, De Bescheiden van de VOC betreffende de handel in Chinees en
Japans porselein tussen 1634 en 1661, Aziatische Kunst, 3 (Amsterdam: Rijksmuseum,

1992), 26.
649 Cynthia Viall, Japanese Porcelain for the Netherlands: The Records of the Dutch
East India Company, in The Kyushu Ceramic Museum (ed.), The Voyage of Old Imari
Porcelains (Arita, 2000), 176-83.
650 Ho, The Ceramic Trade, 35-70.
653 On the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century export of Vietnamese ceramics for the inter-
national market: Guy, Vietnamese Ceramics in International Trade, 47-61; John Guy,
Vietnamese Ceramics from the Hoi An Excavation: The Cu Lao Cham Ship Cargo,
Orientations (Sept. 2000), 125-8.
654 VOC 1278, Missive from Cornelis Valckenier and Council to Batavia, 5 Jan. 1670,
fos. 1861-2.
655 VOC 1278, Missive from Cornelis Valckenier and Council to Batavia, 12 Oct. 1670,
fos. 1892-1907.
656 Ho, The Ceramic Trade, 35-70.
657 Dampier (Voyage and Discoveries, 48) noted in his account written in 1688 that the
English export of Tonkinese ceramics to the Indian market brought considerable profits.
658 Volker (Porcelain and the Dutch East India Company, 218) estimated that out of
around 12 million pieces of ceramics which the Company traded between 1602 and 1682,
Tonkinese wares made up approximately 1,450,000 pieces, the rest was Japanese (1,900,000
pieces) and Chinese and others (8,650,000 pieces).
660 Kerry Nguyen Long, Bat Trang and the Ceramic Trade, 84-90.
661 Dampier, Voyage and Discoveries, 48; Louise Allison Cort, Vietnamese Ceramics
in Japanese Contexts, 62-83, and Guy, Vietnamese Ceramics in International Trade,

47-61, in Stevenson and Guy, Vietnamese Ceramics.
663 The L/Trnh court decreed in 1661 that Confucian scholars, dignitaries, young
bachelors, village headmen, village elders, mandarins children and grandsons, as well as
civilians have to use domestic products. Quoted from Thnh Th V, Ngoi thng Vit
Nam, 61. More detailed regulations of the Tonkinese court on this can be found in Cng
mc, II, 282-90.
664 Trn c Anh Sn, s Vit Nam k kiu ti Trung Hoa t 1804 n 1924 hin
tng tr ti Bo tng M thut Cung nh Hu [Porcelain Ordered in China for the Viet-
namese Court between 1804 and 1824 which is Preserved in the Hu Imperial Museum of
Fine Arts] (Diss., Vietnam National University, Hanoi, 2002), 27-37.
to chapter eight 271
Notes to Part Four: Dutch-vietnamese Interactions

665 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 24, 46.
666 See Li, Nguyn Cochinchina; Wheeler, Cross-Cultural Trade.
Notes to Chapter Eight

667 Ton th, III, 265.
668 BL OIOC G/12/17-1, Tonkin factory to London, 7 Dec. 1672, fos. 41-55. On the
Dutch factory and factors in Siam, see George Vinal Smith, The Dutch in Seventeenth-
Century Thailand (Northern Illinois University: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Special
Report No. 16, 1977); Dhiravat na Pombejra, VOC Employees and their Relationships
with Mon and Siamese Women: A Case Study of Osoet Pegua, in Barbara Watson Andaya
(ed.), Other Pasts: Women, Gender and History in Early Modern Southeast Asia (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 2000), 195-214.
669 Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakkaatboek, I, 509-12.
670 Yoko Nagazumi, From Company to Individual Company Servants: Dutch Trade
in Eighteenth-Century Japan, in Leonard Bluss and Femme Gaastra (eds.), On the 18th
Century as a Category of Asian History: Van Leur in Retrospect (Aldershot: Ashgate,
1998), 147-72.
671 On the romanization of the Vietnamese language by the Western priests: Jacques,
Les missionnaires portugais, I.

672 On the Dutch learning the Vietnamese language: Generale Missiven, II, 575; Gode
Molsbergen, De Stichter van Hollands Zuid-Afrika; Buch,La Compagnie (1937), 126-8.

675 On the persecution of the Christians in Japan in the late 1630s and the deportation of
the Portuguese: Innes, The Door Ajar, 156-64. On the religious disorder in Tonkin in 1639:
Rhodes, Histoire du royaume de Tunquin, 288-308.
677 Ton th, III, 265.
680 BL OIOC G/12/17-9, Tonkin factory records, 21 Aug. 1694, fo. 369.
681 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 70; Susan Legne, The Spirit of Christianity,
the Spirit of a Trading Nation, in Bluss et al. (eds.), Bridging the Divide, 82.
682 Anthony Reid, Female Role in Pre-colonial Southeast Asia, Modern Asian Studies,
22/3 (1988), 629-45; id., Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, I: The Lands below the
Winds, 146-50; Barbara Watson Andaya, From Temporary Wife to Prostitute: Sexuality
and Economic Change in Early Modern Southeast Asia, Journal of Womens History, 9/4
(1998), 11-34.
683 Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, I, 146.
684 See: Hng c thin chnh th [Hng c Reign Edicts and Decrees Promulgated
for Good Government], (Saigon: Nam H n Qun, 1959), 39; Quc triu hnh lut,
157-9.
686 See: Ton th, III, 264-5; Trng Hu Qunh et al., Lch s Vit Nam, 391; Nguyn
Tha H, Kinh t hng ho v i sng vn ho ca nc i Vit th k XVI n u

th k XVIII [The Commodity Economy and the Cultural Life of i Vit, Sixteenth-
Early Eighteenth Centuries], (Unpublished manuscript, Institute of Vietnamese Studies
272 notes
and Development Sciences, Vietnam National University, Hanoi, 2005).

687 See for details: Reid, Female Role in Pre-colonial Southeast Asia; id., Southeast
Asia in the Age of Commerce, I, 146-50, Andaya, From Temporary Wife to Prostitute;
Dhiravat, VOC Employees, 195-214.
688 The Deshima Dagregisters 1651-1660, viii; Dhiravat, VOC Employees.
689 VOC 1222, Missive from Nicolaes de Voogt to Governor Fredrick Coijett [in
Tayouan], 7 Aug. 1657, fos. 334-7; Buch, La Compagnie (1937), 142.

690 On Samuel Baron: VOC 1330, Jan Besselman and the Tonkin factory to Batavia, 13
Oct. 1677, fos. 697-705; BL OIOC E-3-87, London General to Banten, 21 Sept. 1671, fo.
239. On the mestizo children in Siam: Smith, The Dutch in Seventeenth-Century Thailand,
101-2; Dhiravat, VOC Employees, 200-14.
691 See for details from BL OIOC G/12/17-9, Tonkin factory records, May 1693- July
1697, fos. 318-475.

693 BL OIOC G/12/17-9, Tonkin factory records, 13 May 1694, fo. 361.
694 Some people believe that one of the statues in the temple of the L Kings in Thanh
Ha Province is a Dutch lady because her face looks Western. I have visited the temple
but have found no such distinguishing features of the statue in comparison to the others
which are placed on the same altar. On the anecdote on Vietnamese media: Mai Thanh
Hi, Giai thoi v 108 vua cha [Anecdotes on 108 Kings and Lords of Vietnam], www.
mofa.gov.vn.
695 BL OIOC G/12/17-9, Tonkin factory to Fort St. George, 24 Nov. 1696, fo. 460.
697 BL OIOC G/12/17-1, Tonkin Factory to London, 7 Dec. 1672, fos. 41-55.
698 Nguyen Thanh Nha, Tableau conomique du Vietnam.
699 Detailed figures on the VOCs import of silver can be found in Table 1 in Chapter
Five.
700 See also Chapter Five for more detailed analyses of the VOCs silver import into
Tonkin.
701 BL OIOC G/12/17-9, Tonkin factory to Fort St. George, 24 Nov. 1696, fo. 406.
702 VOC 1197, Missive [from the Council in Tonkin to Batavia], Nov. 1653, fos. 598-
611; Generale Missiven, II, 697-702.

704 Numbers extracted from the records of the English factory in Tonkin: BL OIOC
G/12/17-1, fos. 41-55; G/12/17-3, fo. 169; G/12/17-6, fo. 272. See also Chapter Five for
details on the VOCs import of Japanese copper zeni into Tonkin.
705 Nguyen Thanh Nha, Tableau conomique du Vietnam.
706 See Chapter Six for details of the prices of Tonkinese raw silk.
707 Calculated from Buch, La Compagnie (1637), 183-4.
708 Calculated from VOC 1140, Specificatie van de on- ende montcosten anno 1642 in
Toncquin gevallen [Specification of the daily expenses of the Tonkin factory, 1642] fos.
133-9; BL OIOC G/12/17-1, Tonkin factory records, 20 Aug. 1672, fos. 29-30.
709 BL OIOC G/12/17-9, Tonkin factory records, 25 Dec. 1693, fo. 340.
710 Prakash, Bullion for Goods, 159-87; id., The Dutch East India Company, 234-48.
See also: Femme Gaastra, Geld tegen Goederen: Een Structurele Verandering in het Neder-
lands-Aziatisch Handelsverkeer, Bijdragen en Mededelingen Betreffende de Geschiedenis
der Nederlanden, 91/2 (1976), 249-72.
711 Li, Nguyn Cochinchina, 171.
712 According to the VOC records, there were many years in which the Chinese invest-
ment in their Tonkin trade even surpassed that of the Dutch Company. In 1664, for instance,
the Chinese arrived in Tonkin from Japan with 200,000 taels of silver (c. 570,000 guilders)
to buy silk for the Japanese market, while the Dutch factory was provided with 347,989
to chapter eight 273
guilders only. VOC 1252, Missive from Verdonk to Batavia, 23 Feb. 1665, fos. 209-48;
Buch, La Compagnie (1937), 161-2.
713 If we take Iwao Seiichis estimation that one shuin-sen carried an average investment
capital of around 50,000 taels of silver (or 155,000 guilders), approximately 2,000,000 taels
of silver (or 6,200,000 Dutch guilders) had been brought to Tonkin by the Japanese alone
between 1604 and 1635. Iwao, Shuin-sen, 49, 269.
716 Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, II, 62-3.
717 Philippe Papin, Historie de Hanoi (Paris: Fayard, 2001), 161; Nguyn Tha H,
Economic History of Hanoi, 5-19.

718 Nguyn Tha H et al., th Vit Nam th k XVII-XVIII [Vietnamese Towns in
the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries], (Unpublished manuscript, Department of His-

tory, Vietnam National University, Hanoi, 2004), 27-9.
719 Most of the Vietnamese historians still believe that Ph Hin flourished commercially
throughout the seventeenth century. This was based mainly on the assumption that the
Dutch and other foreign merchants maintained their factories at Ph Hin, even after they
had been allowed to reside and trade in the capital. In fact, once they had been granted
a licence to trade and live in Thng Long, foreign merchants in general abandoned their
trading footholds at Ph Hin. See: Ph Hin; Phan Huy L, Pho Hien, 10-22; Nguyn
Tha H et al., th Vit Nam, Chapter Three.
720 See Chapter Two for discussions of the role of Doma as well as its position in the
commercial system along the Tonkin River.

721 on Trng Truyn, Mm mng T bn ch ngha v s pht trin ca Ch ngha
T bn Vit Nam [The Seeds of Capitalism and the Development of Capitalism in Vietnam]
(Hanoi: ST Publishers, 1959), 4.
722 The debate on the emergence of capitalism in Vietnam in the Early Modern and
Modern Periods can be found in NCLS in the 1960s.

723 See for detailed arguments: Nguyn Vit, Bn v mm mng ch ngha T bn
Vit Nam di thi Phong kin [On the Seeds of Capitalism in Vietnam in the Feudal
Period], NCLS 35 (1962), 21-34; NCLS 36 (1962), 28-37.
724 See: ng Vit Thanh, Vn mm mng T bn ch ngha di thi Phong kin
Vit Nam [On the Seeds of Capitalism in Vietnam in the Period of Feudalism], NCLS
39 (1962), 33-43; NCLS 40 (1962), 41-47.
725 Immanuel Wallerstein, From Feudalism to Capitalism: Transition or Transitions?
Social Forces, 55/2 (1976), 273-83. See also: Claudio J. Katz, Karl Marx on the Transition
from Feudalism to Capitalism, Theory and Society, 22 (1993), 363-89.
726 See M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indo-
nesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962),
9. Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, II, 268-70.
727 Nguyen Thua Hy, Economic History of Hanoi, 222-34; id., Kinh t hng ho.
728 BL OIOC G/12/17-4, Tonkin factory to London, 7 Dec. 1672, fo. 42.
729 See: Buch, La Compagnie (1937), 145-58.
731 The Deshima Dagregisters 1651-1660, ii. See also: G. K. Goodman, Japan: the
Dutch Experience (London: Athlone, 1986).

732 BL OIOC G/12/17-4, Tonkin factory records, Aug. 1677, fos. 212-15.
733 Sun, Chinese Military Technology.
734 Ibid.; Nguyn Th Anh, Traditional Vietnams Incorporation of External Cultural
and Technical Contributions: Ambivalence and Ambiguity, Southeast Asian Studies, 40/4
(2003), 444-58.
735 Alexandre de Rhodes, Rhodes of Vietnam, The Travels and Missions of Father
274 notes
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737 Ibid.; Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 54-5.
738 Rhodes, Divers voyages et missions, 70-1.
740 L Qu n, Ph bin tp lc, 328-9. See also: Nguyn Th Anh, Traditional
Vietnams Incorporation: 444-58.

741 Pires, Suma Oriental, I, 114-15.
742 Generale Missiven, II, 613, 702, 779; Dagh-register Batavia 1661, 49-55.
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1907.
744 BL OIOC G/12/17-10, Tonkin factory records, May 1693Feb. 1694, fos. 318-45;
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INDEX
Agra, 170 Brouwer, Bastiaan (Dutch free merchant),

Amoy, 106 113, 169
Amsterdam, 88, 194 Buch, W.J.M., 1, 6
Anglo-Dutch war, 54, 159 Bunschoten (VOC ship), 175-6
Archipel Islands, 107 Bi, 207
Arjona, Joan D (Dominican monk), 195 Burch, Johannes van der (VOC governor),
arrack, 125 73
u Lc (Ouluo), 12
Ayutthaya, 57, 195, 197, 206, 213 Cabo de Jacques (VOC ship), 103
calambac, 15, 48
baas, 54, 102, 203, 205 Cambir, 78
Bc Ninh, 28 Cambodia, 17, 53, 55, 57, 84-5, 103, 114,
Bch Vit (Baiyue), 11 169
Baeck, Pieter (VOC commander), 80-3 armies, 84
Baffart, Louis Isaacszn (VOC director), cargoes, 150
100 Court, 85
Bakufu, 49 King, 77, 85
Banda, 182 maritime trade, 18
Banten, 53-4, 56, 179, 181, 195, 206, 213 VOC factory, 84
Baron, Hendrick (VOC director), 86-7, 94, cannon, 22, 24, 35, 63, 65, 68, 74, 83, 94,
107-8, 113, 170, 193, 197 99, 103, 114-15, 118, 125, 139-41, 211,
Baron, Samuel (EIC merchant), 27, 33, 39, 216
103 Canton, 12, 45
Baros, 179, 181 Cao Bng, 19, 23, 104, 116
Bt Trng, 31, 182 capados, 41, 90-4, 99-100, 109, 113, 122,
Batavia, 4, 6, 29, 30, 32-3, 40, 52, 55, 57, 147, 154, 169
59, 62-6, 68-80, 82-8, 91-103, 105-6, cardamom, 152-3
109-17, 119-23, 126, 129-32, 135-8, Caron, Franois, 63, 85
140-1, 144-9, 151-2, 154-60, 162, 165- Cauw (VOC ship), 120-2, 218
81, 183, 185, 190-1, 193, 195, 197, ceramics
200, 211, 213, 216-19 Chinese, 30, 177, 179, 181
Batsha, 39 Tonkinese, 176, 178-83
Beer (VOC ship), 92 trade, 180, 182
Bencouli, 177 Vietnamese, 30-1, 45
Bengal, 4, 29, 122, 129, 156-7, 172, 204 Ceylon, 103
Bengali Chm
silk, see silk bay, 61
product, 7, 158 coast, 18, 77
Bijlvelt, Willem (VOC merchant), 93 invasion, 13
Bingam (Chinese chief in Batavia), 86 Kingdom, 13, 16, 23
bogy, 29, 146 King, 77, 84
Brack (VOC ship), 77 seaports, 17
Brouckhorst, Antonio van (VOC director), Chm Islands, 68,
79, 81-2, 89, 90-3, 98, 166, 192-3, 203 Champa, 16-7, 34
288 index
Champullo, see C Lao Chm copper

Chao Chi, see Jiaozhi cash, 51-2, 101, 112, 125, 127, 133,
Chaophraya, 9 135, 137, 199, 201
charkhanas, 156 coins, see coins
China Coromandel Coast, 4, 7, 33, 64, 107, 171-
foreign trade, 178 2, 174, 184
maritime gateway, 13 trade, 33, 104, 111, 172-3, 175
maritime trade, 12-3, 15 Couckebacker, Nicolaas (VOC director),
ports, 15, 45, 62 28, 65, 67-8, 72-3, 88, 144, 146, 148
trade, 106 Coyett, Fredrik (VOC governor), 105, 150
China-derived firearms, 35 C Lao Chm (Champullo), 78
China-Formosa trade, 47
China-Japan silk trade, 143 Nng (Tourane), 20, 75, 77
Chinese i Vit,16-8, 27, 30, 31, 34, 37, 44-5, 48,
ceramics, see ceramics 57, 206, 212
ceramic technology, 30 foreign trade, 16, 34, 36
Court, 106 economy, 133
junks, 13, 17, 28, 45-7, 62, 75, 87, 91, i Vit s k ton th, 21, 48
114, 119, 147, 150, 157, 178 Dam, Pieter van, 127, 143, 165, 169
long-hair pirates, 107 Dampier, William, 44, 125, 171, 177, 187,
merchants, 12, 18, 44-8, 74, 90-2, 198
104, 109, 111, 113, 143-4, 150, 153, ng Ngoi, 22
174, 178, 200, 206, 208 ng Trong, 22
millenarian rule, 30 Davids, Isaacq (VOC representative), 75
musk, see musk Delfhaven (VOC ship), 97
porcelain, see porcelain Deshima, 177, 197
silk, see silk VOC factory, 98, 111, 114, 117, 131,
silkworms, 29 135, 138, 150, 157, 162, 173, 175-
spies, 17-8, 44 6, 197
traveller, 17 VOC Council, 150
chios, 152, 203, 205 Diemen, Antonio van (VOC Governor-
chiourongs, 122, 153 General), 74, 80, 88
chop, 42 Din Chu, 17
Chova (Cha), 33, 103, 199 inh B Lnh, 133
Chu u, 31 inh Dynasty, 16
cinnamon, 32-3, 68, 146, 151-2, 184, 203 Discouar Gonsalvo (Castilian merchant),
Cirebon, 179, 181 171
clocks, 212-13 Dolfijn (VOC ship), 84
Cochin China, 2, 27 Doma, 32, 36-8, 40-1, 56, 96, 103, 107,
coins 122, 140, 195, 198, 208
Chinese, 51, 101, 139 Domkes, Sijmon Jacobsz. (VOC com-
copper, 51-2, 76, 100-1, 111-12, 125, mander), 84
130, 133-6, 138-9, 155, 166, 198-9, ng u (Dongou), 11
201-2, 214 ng Hi, 22-4
Japanese, 52, 136-8, 201 ng Kinh, 19, 21, 24, 26, 73
silver, 132, 199 Dutch
Vietnamese, 133 Company, 1, 3, 7, 33, 35, 62, 67,
Confucian ideology, 18, 116, 197 86, 90, 93, 118, 132, 137, 139, 141,
constables, 74, 141, 211 153, 183, 199, 201, 213-14, 216,
contraband trade, 32 218-19
index 289
merchants, 3, 61, 63, 65-7, 85, 99, Formosa-Japan trade, 63

113, 184, 197 Fort St. George, 55, 198
prisoners, 75-7, 84-5, 87 France, 115
Republic, 177 French
sailors, 61 colonization, 133
ships, 24, 52, 57, 63, 70, 75, 81, 84, delegates, 56
87, 128, 144-5, 159, 211 King (Louis XIV), 56
Dutch-Vietnamese relations, 1, 187, 209, merchants, 117
216, 219 mission/missionaries, 56, 117-18
Duycker, Abraham (VOC director), 64- Fujian, 17, 178
6, 70-1
Gaasperdam (VOC ship), 118
East Asia, 54, 144, 215 galliota, 147
East Asian trade, 1, 4, 192, 219 Gamron, 173
Edo, 49, 150 genho tsuho, 137
Egypt, 30 Gentlemen XVII (Heren XVII), 88, 96,
eiryaku sen, 137 121-2, 144, 154, 172, 175, 194, 211
elephant tusks, 12, 15, 20, 71, 88 Gianh River, 23, 74, 78-81, 82, 102, 212
Elseracq, Jan van (VOC president), 80, Giao-chi (Jiaozhi), 45
81 gifts, 120, 141
English East India Company (EIC), 32, Gingminfoe, 107
53, 197 Glamann, K., 165
competitors, 132, 195
Gobijn, Isaacq (VOC merchant), 81-2
directors, 32
gold
merchants, 52, 56, 62
African, 172
trade, 32, 54
Chinese, 4, 7, 33, 47, 104-7, 112,
English
131, 158, 173-4, 176
carpenter, 32
flag, 195 Japanese, 33, 173, 175-6
ships, 54 merchants, 176
Entrept, 12, 14, 48, 149 trade, 5, 176
Euro-Bengal trade, 204 Vietnamese, 33
European Governor-General, 4, 64-6, 68-9, 71-2, 74,
commercial enterprises, 3 76-7, 80, 82, 85, 87-9, 97-8, 100, 103,
companies, 204 105, 109-10, 114-15, 118-23, 140-1,
countries, 69 168, 170, 176, 193
market, 143, 167-8, 173, 177, 184 Graeff, Hendrik Dircsz. van den (VOC
merchants, 38, 47, 118, 143, 145 commander), 84
Experiment (VOC ship), 211 Gresik, 182
Grol (VOC ship), 52, 68, 146
faccaar, 98, 146, 155 Groot, Jan de (VOC director), 93-7, 193
firearms, 35 Grootebroek (VOC ship), 64-5
Fishers Island, 79 Guangdong, 15, 178
Former L Dynasty, 16, 130, 133 Guangxi, 16, 33
Formosa (EIC ship), 132 Guangzhou, 12-3, 16-7, 107, 174, 213
Formosa, 4, 6, 31, 33, 40, 47, 53, 62-4, 66, Guizhou, 107, 174
73-4, 78, 79, 81-2, 84-6, 88, 96, 100, Gulden Buijs (VOC ship), 74, 76-7
104-6, 116, 126, 131-2, 137, 139, 144, Gulden Gans (VOC ship), 89
146, 149-51, 154, 157-8, 160-1, 166,
173-4, 177-8, 217 H Ty, 28
Council, 105 H Tnh, 17, 45
trade, 105, 106, 149, 151, 161, 173 Haarlem (VOC ship), 61
290 index
Hi Phng, 36, 39 trade, 172

Han Empire, 12 yarn, 157
Hng o Street, 207 Indo-China, 1, 103
Hanoi (Thng Long), 13, 16, 37 Indo-Chinese, 9, 55, 57, 62, 70, 85, 144,
Haring (VOC ship), 84 216
Harouze, Hendrik (VOC captain), 84-5 Indonesia, 30
Harten (VOC merchant), 90 Indonesian archipelago, 4, 103
Hartsinck, Carel (VOC director), 66, 68- Indragiri, 173
72, 88, 91, 110, 146-8, 192 intra-Asian trade, 3-5, 143, 172, 184, 218-
Hepu, 13, 15 19
Heycoop (VOC merchant), 90 Iquan (Zheng Zhilong), 90, 150
Hin Department, 207 junks, 150
High Government (Hoge Regering), 39, Irrawady, 9
62, 66, 70, 72-5, 77-80, 83, 86, 88, Itchien (Chinese merchant), 113-14
91-101, 103-4, 107, 109-10, 112-18, itowappu, 34, 51, 91, 149-51, 153, 157
120-3, 130, 135, 144, 170, 174-5, 178, Iwao, Seiichi, 49, 138
190, 192-3, 195, 210-11, 218
Hillegaersbergh (VOC ship), 152 Janszoon, Evert (VOC assistant), 197
Hirado, 28, 52, 62, 65, 67, 72, 144, 146, Japan, 4-7, 27-33, 41, 44, 46-54, 59, 62-3,
173, 192, 197 67-70, 79-82, 85-6, 89, 91-4, 96-102,
Hizen, 31, 177 105-6, 110-14, 116-17, 119, 125-32,
H Dynasty, 18, 133 134, 136, 143, 144-63, 165-7, 170, 173,
H Qu Ly, 18 177, 179, 181-4, 190-5, 197, 205, 210-
hockiens, 54, 122, 152, 203, 205 11, 213, 217-18
Senuasche, 152 trade, 4, 34, 52-4, 62, 70, 119, 127,
Hi An, 21, 48, 50, 52-3, 61-8, 74-8, 84- 144-5, 150, 157, 161-2, 165, 168,
7, 144, 149 172, 218-19
Holland, 121, 132, 169, 213 VOC factory, 66, 173, 190
King, 81 Japanese
Prince, 82 copper coins, see coins
Hng River, 14, 19-20, 28, 32, 36, 50, 57, copper zeni, see zeni
147, 190, 106 Government, 33, 49, 51-2, 54, 119,
Hng River Delta, 11, 13-4, 26, 50, 57, 136, 138, 144, 173, 175, 176, 199
215 maritime prohibition, 35
Hoogcapel (VOC ship), 116, 159 market, 5, 29, 52, 67, 91, 100, 111,
Hooglanden (VOC ship), 114 119, 136, 146, 149, 154-5, 157-8,
horses, 88, 142 162, 184, 202, 215, 218
Arabian, 139, 141 officials, 46-7, 91, 113-14, 193
hour-glasses, 212 porcelain, see porcelain
Hundred Vit (Baiyue), 11 printed screens, 141
Hng Ho, 107 printed textiles, 141
silver, see silver
India, 4, 103, 106, 143, 170, 174-5, 181, yakan, 125
198 Jansen, Jacob (VOC captain), 74
Indian Java, 173, 182
factories, 173 Javanese
pagodas, 176 merchants, 17, 30
rupees, 199 port towns, 206
silk goods, 157 rice, 118
Sub-Continent, 172, 182 Jesuits, 187, 194-5
textiles, 4, 125 Jiaozhi, 15, 45
index 291
Jiaozhou, 15 Leiden (VOC ship), 61

Jingdezhen, 177 Lemaire (VOC governor), 150
Justice Council, 113 Li, Tana, 2
Lieberman, Victor B., 3
kaikin (Japanese maritime prohibition), 35 Liesvelt, Jacob van (VOC captain), 74-6,
Kampaku, 48 78, 82-3
Kampen (VOC ship), 96, 154 Lillo (VOC ship), 84
kasjes, 52, 127 Linga, Jan van (VOC captain), 77-9
Kauthara, 18 loas, 54
Keijser, Jacob (VOC director), 93-4, 97, Loktjouw, 107-9
99-100, 193 London, 28-9, 32, 47, 53-5
keisei, 197 Loo, Jacob van (VOC director), 120, 122,
Kemphaan (VOC ship), 63 142
Khc Dynasty, 16 Louis XIV (King of France), 56
Khuyn Lng, 46 L Dynasty, 16-7, 27, 133
Kievit (VOC ship), 77, 79-80, 82-4 L Thi Tng (King), 16
Klein, P. W., 156, 161, 163 lysee, 199
koban, 173, 176
kronen, 128 Maasland (VOC ship), 92
kruisdaalders, 132, 199 Mc ng Dung, 19
Mc
Lc Vit (Luoyue), 11-2 agent, 19
lacquerware, 31-2 clan, 23, 73, 104, 116
Tonkinese, 32, 54 Dynasty, 19, 21, 25, 34, 45, 114, 116,
Lamotius, Johannes (VOC commander), 133, 141, 211
79 usurpation, 19
Lng Sn, 107 Macao, 24, 50-1, 61, 101, 107, 117, 134,
Laos, 17, 33-4, 107, 169, 173 137, 143, 147-8, 194
Lascars, 189 Macao-Japan trade, 50
L Anh Tng (Emperor), 20 Madras, 55
L Code, 19, 45, 196 Maetsuyker, Joan (VOC Governor-Gen-
L Dynasty, 18-9, 21, 30, 44-5, 133, 206 eral), 103
L Hon (King), 133 Makassar, 173
L Li (Emperor), 18 Malacca, 45, 50, 173, 213-14
L-Mc wars, 21, 31 Malay Archipelago, 61
L Thn Tng (Emperor), 198 Mn Chung (Minzhong), 12
L Trang Tng (Emperor), 19 Mn Vit (Minyue), 11
L/Trnh, 23, 34, 66, 104, 207, 212 Manchu, 148, 177
armies/troops, 21 armies/soldiers, 103-4
authorities, 35 invasion, 148
Court, 19, 40, 98, 105, 117, 153, 175, military campaigns, 170
195, 215 violence, 171
domain, 47, 67, 184 Manila, 54-6, 117, 169, 173, 213
Government, 35, 55, 73, 104, 194-5, project, 54
199-200, 210 Governor, 55, 169
Kingdom, 121-2 Maria de Medicis (VOC ship), 74,76-7
rulers, 7, 21, 23, 35, 38, 56, 59, 68, Marxist theories, 209
104, 125, 131, 134, 135, 138, 174, Meerman (VOC ship), 77, 81
210-11 Mekong
leeuwendaalders, 128 River, 85
Leeuwerik (VOC ship), 84 Delta, 10
292 index
Meliskerken (VOC ship), 106-7, 140 navet, 134, 147

mestizo, 197 Neck, Jacob van (VOC admiral), 61
Mexican rials, 132, 199 Nes, Gerrit van (VOC merchant), 120
Ming Netherlands, 4, 6-7, 28-9, 32-3, 52, 101,
Dynasty, 46, 104, 116, 143, 177 104, 111-12, 119-20, 125, 128, 130-
Empire, 16 2, 141, 144-5, 150-1, 158-60, 164-72,
forces/troops, 16, 103 175, 177, 191, 211
invasion/occupation, 18, 30, 44, 133 Ngh An, 17, 19, 22, 45, 102, 194
intervention, 104 Ng Dynasty, 16
loyalists, 178 Nguyn Hong, 20, 21, 24, 26
Ming-Qing conflict, 104 Nguyn
Minister of Justice, 43 armies/soldiers, 24, 80-3, 102
Miyako, 150 domain/Kingdom, 62, 66, 69-70, 73,
M, 207 86, 217
Moluccas, 218 invasion of Cambodia, 57
Momoki, Shiro, 17 navy, 80-1
mongo, 157 rivals, 6, 35, 50, 68, 70
Mongol rulers, 21, 49, 61-2, 65-6, 70, 74-6,
conquest of China, 44 78, 80, 82, 84, 86-7, 96, 136, 212-
invasion of Vietnam, 17-8 13, 216
invaders/troops, 16-8 separatists, 23
Moor, 198 Nguyn Kim, 19-20
Mughal Emperor, 174 Nguyn Phong (Yuanfeng), 137
Mulberry Nguyn Phc Lan, 70, 85
damage to, 100, 152, 155 Nguyn Phc Tn, 86
groves/grounds, 100-1, 112, 152, Nguyen Thanh Nha, 2, 202
155, 159, 204, 206 Nguyn Ung, 20
crops, 202 Nova Macao, 107
trees, 28-9 oban, 173
musk, 5, 33, 47, 52, 55, 104-9, 111-12, 117, Ongiadee (Tonkinese mandarin), 100, 169
119, 125-6, 151, 158, 168-71, 184 Ongia Haen (Tonkinese mandarin), 109
Chinese, 7, 104, 131, 169-71, 219 Ongiatule (Tonkinese mandarin), 41, 90,
Laotian, 100, 169 93-5, 97, 99, 154
trade, 33, 169-71, 175 Ongiavun (Tonkinese mandarin), 90
Ongsjadert (Tonkinese mandarin), 90
Nachod, Oskar, 156 Ontjenudgween (Tonkinese mandarin), 90
Nachtegael, Hendrick Zansz (VOC direc- Osaka, 150
tor), 66
Nagasaki, 34, 46-7, 53, 91, 100, 113-14, pagodas, see Indian
130, 136, 144, 147, 149-51, 153-5, 157- Palembang, 75, 182
9, 162, 166, 193, 213 Paliacatta, 175
Governor, 149-50 Pallu (French priest), 56
trade coins, 136-7 Panduranga, 18
VOC factory, 81, 96, 218 Paracels, 64
Nam Hi (Nanhai), 12 Patani, 61-2
Nam Vit (Nanyue), 11-2 Council, 62
Nan Ming Dynasty, 116, 137, 170 Pearl (EIC ship), 198
Nanking, 174 Pegu, 206, 54
Nanning, 108 Peking, 104-6, 112, 138, 175
Narai (King of Siam), 32 pelings, 54, 118, 119, 122, 152-3, 166-8,
Nationaal Archief, 6 170, 203, 205
index 293
pepper, 4, 117, 125 Quemoy, 106

Persia, 4, 149, 165, 173 Quinam (VOC ship), 63
VOC factory, 173 Quinam, 1-3, 5-6, 8, 10, 22, 24, 42-3,
Persian 48-53, 57, 59, 61-7, 69-80, 82-8, 96,
silk, see silk 101-4, 111-15, 123, 134, 137, 139-40,
wares, 181 148-9, 158, 187, 210-18
Phan Rang, 18 Quinamese, 75, 78
Phaulkon, Constantine, 32 armies, 82
Phin Ngu (Panyu), 12 captives/prisoners, 75, 77, 84-7
Philippines, 30, 182 mandarins/officials, 75
Phnompenh, 84-5 navy, 75, 211
Phng i, 39 silk, see silk
Pires, Tom, 9, 34, 45
Platvoet (Graeff, Hendrik Dircsz. van den raw silk, see silk
VOC commander), 84 Raychaudhuri, Tapan, 175
Plinlochiu (Tonkinese mandarin), 110 Red River Delta, see Hng River Delta
porcelain Regemortes, Pieter van (VOC director),
Chinese, 30-1, 177-8 84-5
Japanese, 177, 179, 183 Reid, Anthony, 2
Hizen, see Hizen Reniers, Carel (VOC Governor-General),
trade, 177 97, 193
Portuguese Republic, see Dutch Republic
competitors, 51, 62 Resimon (Japanese merchant), 55-6, 93-4,
junks/vessels, 51, 62, 147 109-10, 112, 135, 169-71, 176, 201,
merchants, 35, 50-1, 148 213
missionaries/priets, 35, 50, 195 Rhodes, Alexandre de (French priest), 9,
trade, 51 11, 19, 27, 85, 136, 194, 212
traveller, 27 Riebeeck, Jan van (VOC merchant), 90,
Prakash, Om, 204 92, 192, 194
precious metals, 2, 35, 46, 144, 172, 183, Rooden, Juriaen de (VOC sailor), 77
199, 204 rosenobels, 172
provintindaalders, 132, 199 rumals, 156
Ruyll, Alber Cornelisz, 61
Qin Ryukyan delegation, 48
Dynasty, 11
Empire, 12 Saigon, 23
occupation of northern Vietnam, 12 Santa Catarina (Portuguese vessel), 177
Qin Shihuang (Emperor), 11 satijntges, 152
Qing Schillemans, Philip (VOC director), 40,
armies, 103, 112, 116 92-3, 97, 139, 153, 192-3
Dynasty, 19, 23, 31, 104, 106, 138, schuitzilver, 128
177-8 Senuasche hockiens, see hockiens
soldiers, 169, 175 shallow-draught flute ships, 39-40
quan, 142, 133 shichusen, 136
Qung Bnh, 20 Shimabara Rebellion, 194
Qung Nam, 20-1, 26 shuin-sen, 34, 45, 48-9, 51-2, 67, 136, 144
Qung Ngi, 20, 78 Siam, 18, 32, 56-7, 62, 66, 84, 150, 169,
Qung Ninh, 17, 47, 106, 131 191, 197, 213, 234
Qung Tr, 20 Siamese
Qung Yn, 47-8, 208 ambassador, 57
Qu Lm (Guilin), 12 court, 32
294 index
King, 57 Sn Ty, 28
merchants, 17, 57 Song Dynasty, 16, 44, 137
rice, 57 South China Sea, 17, 18, 34
trade, 57 South Seas, 13, 180-81
vessels, 114 South-East Asia, 2, 35, 53, 61, 173, 179,
Sibens, Johannes (VOC director), 120 181, 184, 196, 216
Sichuan, 169 Spanish, 54-6, 117
silk interloper, 55
auctions, 29, 150 rials, 128, 199
Bengali, 5, 99, 129-30, 149, 153-8, silver, 54
162-3, 218 wine, 141
Chinese, 5, 16, 48, 51-2, 62, 91, 143- Sui Dynasty, 13
4, 146, 149, 153, 157, 160, 163, Suma Oriental, 27
165, 206, 218 Sumatra
industry, 112, 202, 204-6 West Coast, 173, 177, 182
market, 119, 150 sumptuary laws, 149
merchants, 157 Surat, 132, 172, 218
Persian, 147, 149, 151, 153-4, 165 rupees, 132, 199
piece-goods, 4, 5, 7, 27-8, 47, 52,
54, 59, 68-70, 94, 96, 101, 111-12, Taiwan, 4, 190
114, 117, 119, 122, 125, 131, 143- Tang Dynasty, 17
55, 159-61, 165-8, 171, 184, 202, Tavernier, J. B., 27
204-5, 219-20 Ty u (Xiou), 12
production, 28, 101, 110, 158, 162, Ty Kinh, 19
205 textiles, 28, 44, 48, 53, 122, 141, 157, 183,
Quinamese, 146 192, 204, 209
raw, 4-5, 27-8, 34, 41, 47, 51, 55, European, 47, 104, 117, 125, 139
59, 68-70, 89, 91, 93-4, 96, 111, Indian, 4
114, 117, 119-20, 130, 143, 145-55, Japanese, 141
157-9, 161-2, 165-6, 168, 170, 184, Tonkinese, 165
202-5, 207, 219-20 Thi Bnh
Tonkinese, 5, 28-9, 34, 46, 49, 51-2, regnal title, 133
54, 66-7, 69-70, 79, 85, 91, 98-100, estuary, 39-40
102, 110-11, 117, 119, 127-31, 143, province, 205
145-68, 171, 179, 183-4, 192, 202, river, 36, 40-1, 79
206, 210, 213, 218-19 Thi Nguyn, 107, 174
Vietnamese, 7, 27-8, 67, 156, 215 Thng Long, 3, 7, 16, 19, 21, 28-9, 31-4,
silkworms, 29, 101 36-8, 40-1, 43, 46-8, 54, 56, 72-4, 80-1,
silver 86, 88, 90, 94, 97-8, 101, 104-6, 108-
bullion, 4, 125, 138 13, 117-18, 120, 122-3, 130-1, 133-5,
coins, 132, 199 138, 141, 147-8, 151, 153, 155, 158-
ingot, 132 60, 166-7, 169, 171, 174-5, 178-9, 185,
Japanese, 4, 5, 34, 46, 49, 52, 53, 189-92, 195, 198, 201, 204, 206-8, 211,
70, 112, 127-32, 143, 145, 152, 213, 215-17, 219
199-200 Thanh Ho, 17, 19, 118
Mallacx, 128 Thnh Th V, 1
trade, 34, 53, 135, 218 Thanh Tr, 46
sitouw, 152 Thanh-Ngh, 19, 21
smuggling, 32 The Hague, 6
Snoecq, Dircq (VOC director), 157 Thenlongfoe, 108
Sn Nam, 28 Theuuw Baeuw Quun Congh, 193
index 295
Thin Phc (regnal title), 133 Toyotomi Hideyoshi (Japanese Kampaku),

Thiu Bo Qun Cng, 98, 193 48
Tha Thin Hu, 20 Trn Dynasty, 16-8, 30, 133
Thun Ho, 20-1, 24, 26 Traudenius, Paulus (VOC governor), 63,
Thun (pirate), 107 74, 79
tin, 133, 205 Trnh
Tin Lng, 36, 39 Kingdom, 121-2
Timor, 182 rulers, 25, 35, 43, 49-50, 57, 59, 64,
Tinnam, 106-9, 131 66-71, 73, 79, 81, 83, 86, 88, 90,
river, 108 94-5, 99-104, 106,0,9022 cm
strategy, 106, 109, 111, 158, 219, 219 109-10, 114, 118, 121-3, 125, 131, 134-
plan, 110 5, 138-40, 174, 183, 199-200, 210-11,
project, 110 216, 217-18
trade, 108-9 Trnh Cn, 72, 118-19, 122, 168
Tokugawa Iemitsu, 49 Trnh Kim, 19-20
Tokugawa Shogunate, 149, 176, 215 Trnh Tc, 90, 99, 103, 115, 118, 140, 141,
Tonkin 168, 211
commodity economy, 6-7, 207-9, 215 Trnh Trng, 49, 66, 71-4, 78-81, 86, 88-
factory (EIC), 54-5 90, 94-5, 97-9, 139, 193, 212
factory (VOC), 6-7, 79, 86, 92-3, Trnh Tng, 21
97-8, 100-1, 104-7, 109-14, 116- Tng (Xiang), 12
23, 125, 131, 132, 138, 146, 148, Turkey, 30
150, 154-6, 158-9, 162, 166, 168- Tuyn Quang, 107
Twelve-Year Truce, 103
71, 174-6, 190, 192, 197, 218-20,
227, 230
Vn n, 17-9
Gulf, 13, 15, 36, 44, 56, 79, 81, 107
Vanning, 108
market, 70, 112, 168-9, 174, 176, 201
Vn c estuary, 40
River, 3, 7, 39
Verdonk, Hendrick (VOC director), 113,
trade, 1, 6, 7, 49, 54-5, 68, 91-3, 95, 193
97, 99-104, 110-11, 113, 116-19, Verstegen, Willem (VOC representative),
121-3, 127, 130-2, 138, 145, 147, 86, 87, 96-9, 154
149, 153-5, 158, 160, 162, 166-8, Vietnam, 2, 3, 8-15, 17-8, 27-30, 33, 35,
170, 184, 190-3, 199, 205, 211, 39, 44-5, 47-52, 54-7, 59, 61-2, 64-8,
217-19 83, 85, 101, 104-5, 107, 116-17, 128-9,
Tonkin-China border trade, 33, 47, 104-5, 132-9, 145-6, 148, 154-5, 158-9, 162,
107, 113, 117, 171, 219 165, 174, 176, 178-9, 183, 195, 200,
Tonkin-Japan silk trade, 7, 29, 46-7, 91, 202, 204-5, 208-10, 212, 217-9
113, 116, 145, 147-8, 158-60, 179, 184, foreign trade, 1-2, 6
217 Vietnamese
Tonkin-Manila trade, 55-6 ceramics, see ceramics
Tonkin-Quinam crisis, 214 coins, see coins
Tonkin-Quinam wars/conflict, 8, 10, 210- gold, see gold
11 maritime trade, 5, 10-1, 15
Tonkinese merchants, 47, 104-5, 107, 169, 175
ambassador, 72, 75 rulers, 10, 33, 35, 45-6, 141, 215
armies/soldiers, 22, 80, 102, 211-12 seamen/sailors, 213
delegation, 72 silk, see silk
silk, see silk Volker T., 180, 182
toraisen, 136 Vos (VOC ship), 80-1, 83
Toulougbauw, 179
296 index
Waite, Nicolas (English merchant), 56 Yn Bi, 146

wako, 143 Yunnan, 33, 107, 168-9, 171, 174-5
Waterhond (VOC ship), 80-1, 83
weapons Zandvoort, 79, 146
Chinese-style, 24, 212 Zeelandia Castle, 33, 66, 94, 106, 173, 190
West Coast, see Sumatra Zeeridder (VOC ship), 175-6
Westbroek (VOC ship), 173, 182 Zeeuwsche Nachtegaal (VOC ship)
Whit-Monday, 92 Zenefay, 146
Whitmore J. K., 2, 133 zeni, 101, 112, 125, 127, 132-9, 200-1
Wijdenes (VOC ship), 79-80, 83 Zheng Chenggong (Coxinga), 105-6, 157,
Witte Valk (VOC ship), 96 174
wooden mock-ups, 141 Zheng
Wonderaer, Jeronimus (Dutch merchant), belligerence, 110
61 embargo, 174
rivals, 31
Xuwen, 13, 15 Zheng Zhilong, see Iquan
Zwarte Beer (VOC ship), 89, 152

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Silk for Silver

Hoang Anh Tuan

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Copyright 2007 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

printed in the netherlands

This book is dedicated to my mentors: Professor Femme Gaastra

SERIES EDITORS FOREWORD

Probably nowhere in the world have such profound changes in his-

Furber, whose description of this period as The Age of Partnership

the world. The TANAP Monographs on the History of Asian-Euro-

Preface and Acknowledgements xvii

PART ONE: THE SETTING

Chapter One: Political background 11

Chapter Two: Economic background 26

PART TWO: THE POLITICAL RELATIONS

Chapter Three: Intimate phases 61

Chapter Four: Vicissitudes, decline and the final end 96

Decline intensified, 16801690 118

PART THREE: THE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

Chapter Five: The import trade 127

Chapter Seven: The export trade (ii): Other products 165

PART FOUR: DUTCH-VIETNAMESE INTERACTIONS

Chapter Eight: The Dutch East India Company trade and

7. Silk prices as recorded by the Deshima factory,

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writing of this monograph has a rather complicated history and

Gaastra, despite his tight timetable, unfailingly would spend every

of the Institute for the History of European Expansion and Global

BAVH Bulletin des Amis de Vieux Hue

EXPLANATION FOR UNITS OF MEASUREMENT

1 tael = 10 maas = 100 conderin

1 picul = 100 catties

Bakufu (J. ) the Shogunate Government.

hockiens (V. hong quyn?) (also hockingh, hockins) yellow

navet (P. naveta) small sea-sailing ship.

sandalwood the fragrant red wood of the Pterocarpus santalina,

zeni (J.) A Japanese term used by the Dutch to indicate coins

Map 1. Vietnam in seventeenth-century South-East Asia

Map 2. VOC map of Vietnam (Tonkin and Quinam), late 1650s

Map 3. VOC illustration of The River of Tonkin, seventeenth century

Map 4. The River of Tonkin as depicted by the English c. 1670s

Illustration 1. Letter of Cha Trnh Cn to Governor-General Willem van Outhoorn,

Students of Vietnamese history have long bemoaned the enduring

century Tonkin are unconvincing, however, largely because of the

opposition to the sustained urban growth in the other South-East Asian

Tonkin in the intra-Asian trade of the VOC

Recent research on VOC trade has rightly considered its well-devised

Source materials and analytical framework

This monograph analyses the political and commercial relations

main thesis of this monograph. Finally, it examines Dutch influence

ceramic industries. The permanent residence of foreign merchants in

historians to have contributed remarkably to the emergence of sprouts

PART ONE: THE SETTING

Vietnamese-speakers occupied an extremely narrow coastal strip, wedged

A watery environment and a maritime atmosphere are striking features

1. Vietnamese maritime trade prior to 1527

Les Tunquinois peine exercent-ils aucun Traffiq hors du Royaume,

The Hundred Vits and the Vietnamese

Christian era, the Vietnamese were largely occupying what is present

The Chinese colonization of northern Vietnam, 179 BCAD 905

Illustration 2. Tonkinese boats in the Hng River

Admitting their ancestors weakness in seafaring activities, Viet-

the concept of modern political borders when doing historical research