The Continuity Theory of Reality in Plato's Hippias Major

Michael L. Morgan

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 21, Number 2, April 1983, pp.
133-158 (Article)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.1983.0039

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/227044/summary

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 The Continuity Theory of
Reality in Plato's
Hippias Major
MICHAEL L. M O R G A N

THE PRIMARY REASON t h a t s t u d e n t s o f Plato h a v e r e c e n t l y r e t u r n e d to the

Hippias Major is to assess its role in Plato's p h i l o s o p h i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t . ' I n
the m o s t i m p o r t a n t a m o n g r e c e n t t r e a t m e n t s , J o h n M a l c o l m a r g u e s f o r a
k i n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e Hippias Major a n d Plato's m i d d l e T h e o r y o f F o r m s ,
while Paul W o o d r u f f " d e f e n d s t h e Hippias Major's n e u t r a l i t y o n m e t a p h y s i c a l
questions. T h e case s e e m s to t u r n o n t h r e e d o c t r i n e s a n d w h e t h e r t h e y a r e
p r e s e n t in t h e d i a l o g u e . T h e y a r e (1) the Xc%)to~6g o r s e p a r a t i o n b e t w e e n
F o r m s a n d c o n c r e t e particulars, (z) the c o m p r e s e n c e o f o p p o s i t e s in c o n c r e t e
p a r t i c u l a r s a n d t h e p u r i t y o f F o r m s , a n d (3) so-called s e l f - p r e d i c a t i o n . O n c e
this w e l l - k n o w n trio is e x a m i n e d a n d clarified, t h e Hippias Major c a n he
p l u n d e r e d f o r e v i d e n c e o f t h e i r p r e s e n c e . Malcolm, while a d m i t t i n g that (i)
is n o t explicit in t h e d i a l o g u e , a r g u e s t h a t (2) ~ a n d (3) are. Clearly he takes
s e p a r a t i o n to c o n t a i n s o m e t h i n g m o r e t h a n , o r at least d i f f e r e n t f r o m , the
c o m p r e s e n c e o f opposites. W o o d r u f f a r g u e s v i g o r o u s l y against (i) b u t takes
all t h r e e to be closely related. :3

' On the Hippias Major (hereafter HM), see Dorothy Tarrant, The Hippia,~ Major (Cam-
bridge, 1998); John Malcolm, "On the Place of the Hzppias Major in the Development of Plato's
Thought," Archiv fiir Geschichte der Phi&sophie5o, 3 (1968), 189-195; Paul Woodruff, "Socrates
and Ontology: The Evidence of the Hippias Major," Phronesis 23,2 (1978), ml-117; R.E.Allen,
Plato~ Euthyphro and the Earlier Theory of Forms (London,197o), passim; Marion Soreth, Der
Platonische Dialog Hippias Maior (Munich, 1953); A. Croiset, Hippias Majeur, Charmide, Lache,~,
Lysis (Paris , 19~1).
I have nothing to add to the debate concerning the authenticity of the HM. I agree with
Grube and Malcolm in behalf of its authenticity. Cf. W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philoso-
phy, IV (Cambridge, 1975), p. 175-6.
Allen claims (2) in Plato~ Euthyphro 73-4.
:~ Guthrie (IV, 176-6) argues that none of Plato's language in the HM requires a theory of
transcendent Forms.

[133]
 134 HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y

Late in the Hippias Major, as part o f a r e f u t a t i o n o f the proposal that z6

is visual a n d a u d i t o r y pleasure, Socrates a n d Hippias d e b a t e the mer-
its o f a theory, which Socrates calls "Hippias's continuity t h e o r y o f reality."
T h e result o f Socratic criticism, it is a t h e o r y o f two kinds o f p r o p e r t i e s and
how they are distributed t h r o u g h o u t wholes and their parts. A m o n g o l d e r
c o m m e n t a t o r s , T a r r a n t a n d Ross have discussed this t h e o r y and the elenchos
o f which it is a part, but their t r e a t m e n t s are inadequate. 4 My proposal is to
look first at the setting f o r this metaphysical view, t h e n to describe it, ar-
guing that it is a t h e o r y a b o u t properties, parts, and wholes, and finally to
e x p l o r e its relations to (1), (2), and (3) above. T h e Hippias Major, in short,
may exhibit an early stage in Plato's metaphysical thinking, but w h e t h e r that
stage includes (1), (2), or (3) might best be assessed by c o u c h i n g o u r exami-
nation in the f r a m e w o r k o f a metaphysical t h e o r y explicitly p r e s e n t e d in the
dialogue.

THE FINAL ARGUMENT IN T H E H I P P I A S MAJOR

In the Hippias Major Socrates a n d the sophist Hippias discuss a n u m b e r o f
definitions o f the beautiful (~6 5 At first Hippias offers his own pro-
posals, but eventually Socrates is himself compelled to make suggestions,
a l t h o u g h these too---for example, that the beautiful is the fitting (T6 nQ~rov)
and that it is the useful (Xff~,ot~ov)--are subsequently rejected. T h e final
major o n e o f these proposals, i n t r o d u c e d by Socrates a n d e n d o r s e d by Hip-
pias, requires extensive discussion ( 2 9 7 e 5 - 3 o 3 d lo); it is that "the beautiful is
the pleasure which comes t h r o u g h h e a r i n g and seeing" (~98a6-7). 6
T h e elenchos that follows has t h r e e parts: (I) 2 9 8 d 5 - 3 o o b 3 ; (II) 3oob4 -
3o2c7; (III) 3 o 2 c 7 - 3 o 3 d l o .
In (I) Socrates begins his r e f u t a t i o n by seeking to establish two things:
that if a pair o f things are beautiful, t h e n each too must be beautiful and
that if both a pair and a m e m b e r are beautiful, all must possess something,
i n d e e d some identical thing, that makes t h e m all beautiful. At least the
second part o f this conclusion, that beautiful things have some o n e thing in
c o m m o n that makes t h e m all beautiful, seems s t a n d a r d Socratic doctrine,
widely b r o a d c a s t e d and accepted in the early dialogues and eventually to

Tarrant, lXi-lxiv, 72-84; Sir David Ross, Plato's Theoryofldeas (Oxfi)rd, 1951), p. 17. Cf.
Malcolm, pp. 189-9o, n. 3.
The original definitional question is asked at ~86dl-2: ~e~ q)~Q6,~;(otg ~tv e~e~o ~ ~6~t
96 and repeated, in slightly altered terms, at 286d8-el: ~te 6[6ct~ov~ dtvz6 z6
6"~t~o~t . . . . Ultimately seven definitions are proposed and rejected.
9~ That visual and auditory pleasures are only a part of pleasure and not the whole of it is
said first at 297e6- 7 and repeated again at 3o2e4-5 . This repetition of the language of part-
whole already suggests that the later discussion of bothand eachmight be viewed as a sub-species
of the part-whole relation. Later we shall adduce further evidence in support of this claim.
 CONTINUITY THEORY 135

find its way into Plato's t h i n k i n g J T h e f o r m e r part, however, is m o r e un-

usual. Socrates has got Hippias to agree that with respect to the pleasures o f
vision a n d those o f hearing each one by itself is beautiful and both together
are beautiful (299c8-9). Given the standard Socratic view about the need for
some single c o m m o n a ~ t o v 8 to account for all beautiful things being beauti-
ful, one is led to ask what visual a n d auditory pleasures, severally and collec-
tively, have in c o m m o n that makes each a n d both to be beautiful. T h e first
stage in the elenchos (I) fixes attention on this problem and begins to elimi-
nate possible solutions to it. But what gives rise to this difficulty is the
conviction that if either a pair collectively or its members severally are beau-
tiful, t h e n the other must be as well. W h e n Socrates suggests that, bereft o f
alternatives, one might have to admit that the final possible ~ff~tov of beauty
is present in the pair but not in each, Hippias recoils. I f the pair and its
members are all beautiful and if this final possible ct[Ttov is solely responsible
for beauty, t h e n all must have it!
Socrates' suggestion and Hippias's amazed reply (3oob4-8) generate the
second stage of the a r g u m e n t (II) and specifically a discussion o f Hippias's
i n d e p e n d e n t reason for holding that if a pair is beautiful, its members must
be, a n d vice versa. We shall r e t u r n to (II) later in o r d e r to examine Hippias's
"continuity theory o f reality" (CTR), as Socrates calls it, more thoroughlyY
For the present, it is sufficient to note these features of it. (1) It is a view
about wholes and about treating things like beauty, justice, gold, and ivory as
wholes and not as cut up into parts ( 3 o l b 2 - 5 ) . (2) These things are called
~ 0 y or ~Qctqo~t~ ( 3 o l b 2 - 3 ) , and they include such items as strength,
justice, beauty, gold, and ivory. (3) As Hippias first states it, the view is that
"you will never find that you and I both have a ~60og (collectively) that
neither I nor you have (separately)" (3ood7-8). This is in inexact formula-
tion, however; it should read "you will never find that we both have a ndt0og
that either of us lacks or that either of us has one that we both lack." In
short, if the pair-member relation (both--each) is a case of the whole-part
relation, as I shall argue later, then Hippias believes parts and wholes to

7 W h a t I have in m i n d , o f course, is t h e discussion o f t h e "simple" ct~ct at Phaedo l o o c - e .

T h e s a m e u s a g e as we find h e r e in t h e H M is also f o u n d in t h e Euthyphro, for e x a m p l e , a n d in
the Meno.
At 2 9 9 e 4 - 5 Socrates refers to being through vision as a possible c a n d i d a t e for dtw~ . . . z6
ct~Lov e{~ctL. T h i s is i n t e n d e d as an a n s w e r to a 6~ct~t q u e s t i o n ( 2 9 9 d 8 - 9 ) , a r e q u e s t for why
s o m e t h i n g is b e a u t i f u l a n d for e~g 6 ~tno~k~noweg Qct~e o:~,~6t~ e~vctt (~99e'~; cf. Euthyphro
6 e 3 - 5 ; Meno 7 2 c 6 - d l ) . Socrates later speaks o f 6~ote~ ct~,z~tg ( 3 o a d l - 2 ) a n d at 3o2e9
uses t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l dative ( ~ o ~ ; cf.3oob5) to signal t h e causal force h e h a s in m i n d . In
short, in this p a s s a g e in t h e H M Plato uses a variety o f devices to r e f e r to t h e causal o r aetiological
force o f w h a t a c c o u n t s for t h i n g s h a v i n g a c o m m o n p r o p e r t y .
For discussion r e g a r d i n g its status as a theory, its n a m e , a n d its p r o v e n a n c e , see o u r
subsequent remarks.
 136 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

have all the same ztd0y or characteristics. It is no wonder then that he

believes what he does about beautiful pairs and their members and specifi-
cally about the pair, visual and auditory pleasures.
Hippias's theory strikes Socrates as remarkable if not bizarre, and he
proposes as an alternative what amounts to a qualified or modified continu-
ity theory. Subsequently Socrates argues for this alternative as a modification
of Hippias's view. For, Socrates proposes, Hippias is right about some ~&0y,
wrong about others, among them, for example, numbers and mathematical
properties, with which Hippias was surely familiar.'" Their differences not-
withstanding, Socrates and Hippias do agree about the beautiful.
Stage III of the elenchos contains the bulk of" the argument in its final
form. The gist is that no single, common ~d0og can be found which makes
visual and auditory pleasures, collectively (both) and severally (each), beauti-
ful. Hippias has agreed that:

(1) there is some single thing which all beautiful things have and which
makes them all beautiful (3ooa9-b2), and
(~) visual and auditory pleasures are collectively beautiful if and only if each
is beautiful (~99c8-9).
Together these entail:
(P) " I f both visual and auditory pleasures are beautiful, collectively and
severally, then what makes them beautiful belongs to them both and to
each" (3o2c8-d2).
Stage III begins with this claim. Socrates then proceeds to show that plea-
sure, which satisfies (P), is nonetheless a bad candidate. For if pleasure
makes things beautiful, why are not other sensible pleasures, like those of
food, drink, and sex, also beautiful? (3o~d3-4; cf. 298d5-c3) Earlier Soc-
rates had shown that being visual or being auditory, i.e., the different sen-
sory capacities with which and through which the two kinds of pleasure
come, simply do not satisfy (P) (~99d8-3ooa8); either would leave the other
and the pair without reason to be beautiful. This leads Socrates to the final
alternative; perhaps it is the fact that the beautiful pleasures are collectively
visual and auditory that accounts for their beauty. If it is not their genus that
serves, might it be their composite differentiae?
The elenchos continues as a reductio:

'" On Hippias's familiaritywith mathematics, astronomy, geometry, and harmonics, see

Tarrant, pp. xx-xxi, both for referencesand discussion,especiallythe reference to Heath's very
laudatory appraisal.
 CONTINUITY THEORY 137

(I) Suppose that the ~d0og that accounts for the beauty of visual and
auditory pleasures, collectively and individually, is being-visual-and-
auditory (P,v) (3o2d7-e5). ''
(II) Both have P,v but each do not (3o2e5-6; cf.299c6-7).
(III) Therefore, each is not beautiful (3o2e9-3o3al). '~
(IV) Therefore, both are beautiful, and each is not (3o3a2).
(V) T h e r e are ~d0y such that they belong to both (a whole) if and only if
they belong to each (its parts) ( 3 o 3 a 4 - - 7 ) . 1:~
(VI) The beautiful (~6 is of this kind (3o3bl-c7).
(VII) Therefore, if the beautiful is a ~d0og such that both have it if" and
only if each does and if each is not beautiful, then both are not
(3o3dl-3).
[(VIII) Therefore, both and each are not beautiful (III and VII).]
(IX) If visual and auditory pleasures are beautiful (D, the proposed defi-
nition), then it is impossible that both and each are not beautiful
(3o3d4-5; cf. 299c8-9).
The result of the elenchos is that the third or final alternative z~dt0og which
could account for the beauty of auditory and visual pleasures proves to be
impossible. If (1) and (2) are undeniably true, then D must be relinquished.
(X) "It is impossible for visual and auditory pleasures to be beautiful, for if
[this] is beautiful, then something impossible is produced" (3o3d7-9).
" Socrates says "this characteristic (~o0~6 7E ~6 ~d0og) belongs to both but not to each . . . . "
The expression "this characteristic" must refer to being-visual-and-auditory. There are two
reasons for this reading. First, the following 0dtQ clause (e6-9) explicitly refers to an earlier
passage (',99c4-7), where the property in question is ~ o41cto~Qc0 a summary expression for ~
~t 8r 6xpe0~g; in 299c4-6 the question being asked is whether visual pleasure or auditory
pleasure is, each o f them, pleasant because each is visual-and-auditory. Clearly, the answer is no.
Secondly, the only other possible antecedent for ~ofi~6 ye ~6 ~d0og is ~6 fig6 o~ zesty&L~.6 ~tv 8~
6~ec0~ & fi, i.e., visual and auditory pleasure. But the preceding lines ( d 7 - e l ) have
already isolated from these pleasures their dif]erentia, being visual and auditory, as the subject of
discussion. Tarrant follows Stallbaum incorrectly (83).
"~ The point of 3o~e9-3o3al is clear. There is a minor question, however, about what
1)~60cotg Socrates has in mind. Tarrant ignores this question, but it is of interest. What is at
issue in the c0o~e clause (3o.~el 1--3o3al ) is "calling both beautiful but not calling each beautiful"
on the grounds that what makes them beautiful is present only in both. That is, the ~zc60eotg
should provide the transition from the causal to the linguistic claim. The l)~60eotg in question,
then, ought to take shape as an extended version of (1): ifx has in it what makes things to be
beautiful, then x is called "beautiful."
'~ This, of course, is just a restatement of one part of Socrates' modified CTR. We shall
discuss the language or terminology of ~d0~l later. I omit in the display of the argument a
minor complication. At 3o3a9-1o Socrates says that ~6 ~xd~E~)ov and ~6 dt~o~e~)ov are not
members of the kind of ~d0og identified in (V). Rather, like numbers, odd, and even, both and
each, viewed as characteristics, do not suit both the pair and its members. What Plato thought
the subject of both, for exarnple, is--this need not concern us.
138 HISTORY or PHILOSOPHY

From the beginning of the Hippias Major and throughout the present
argument, Hippias rightfully takes Socrates' what-is-x question to be about
what makes beautiful things to be beautiful. He assumes, as an unquestioned
feature of his causal beliefs, that whatever causes x to be F must itself be F.
This is why Hippias so easily accepts Socrates' first version of the proposed
definition, "what makes us happy, not all pleasures, but rather what is
through hearing and seeing, is beautiful" (297e6-7) and never winces when
"beautifuL" is used as a predicate with the definiens in subject position (cf.
298d4-5, 299b3-4, 3o2e9-3o3a~). '4 On the back of this aetiological as-
sumption, Socrates constructs an elenchos that brings the proposed definition
to ruin and does so by exploiting a metaphysical view about parts and
wholes.

THE CONTINUITY THEORY OF R E A L I T Y

Hippias's Continuity Theory of Reality: Stage II of the argument (3oob4-3o~c7)

is devoted to the statement and discussion of Hippias's "continuity theory."
For the purposes of the elenchos, the theory provides support for Hippias's
belief that visual and auditory pleasures collectively are beautiful if and only
if each individually is beautiful. For our purposes, however, the theory pre-
sents itself as a metaphysical view about properties, parts, and wholes. In
order to understand it fully, let us first see how it is introduced and in what
terms. Then we can ask whether it is a theory at all, whether it is really about
parts and wholes, and finally what its possible origins are.
How is Hippias's view introduced? At 3 o o b 4 - 5 Socrates, looking ahead,
asks this question: "if these pleasures [viz., visual and auditory] both are
conditioned in a certain way, but each [singly] is not, then they would not be
beautiful by means of this 7~t0~lact?" As we know, Socrates' strategy in the
sequel will be to show that being-visual-and-auditory cannot be what makes
this pair of pleasures beautiful; the question just quoted provides the engine
for Socrates' argument. What is novel in this passage, however, is the termi-
nology which Socrates uses for the first time to characterize this relation
between a pair and its members. He speaks of the pair as JreT~6v0~otv and as
not being beautiful T6w~ ye ~ ~0~t~-~t. Hippias, in his amazed reply,
adopts the same terminology: "how could it be, Socrates, that when neither
,4 Hippias accepts, from the dialogue's outset, the use o f "beautiful" as the predicate for a
p r o p o s e d definition. I do not think that Hippias is confused. For a good survey o f the s t a n d a r d
view--that Hippias, like o t h e r Socratic interlocutors, confuses universals and particulars--see
A l e x a n d e r Nehamas, "Confusing Universals and Particulars in Plato's Early Dialogues," Review
of Metaphysics XIX, 2 (December, 1975), 2 8 7 - 9. Like Nehamas, I reject this s t a n d a r d view, but
my reason is d i f f e r e n t from his. It is that Hippias sees all along that he is being asked to identify
or define an aition and that the aition for F must itself be F.
 CONTINUITY THEORY 139
is conditioned (~te~xov0v~ag) by some thing or other, both are conditioned
(ztEztov0~vett) by that condition (toOto t6 ztd0og) which conditions (ax~xov0ev)
neither" (3oob6-8). I n d e e d , as this speech makes clear, Hippias not only
employs the same terminology, he virtually parodies it, only then to report
that he has ample experience with both "the nature (dpa)otg) of these things
and the vocabulary ( ~ t g ) o f the present statements" (3ooc2-3). Further-
more, both Socrates and Hippias continue to use the same terms as they
distinguish their views on these ~tdt0rl or ~tet0r~txcttct and their presence in
pairs and m e m b e r s (3ood7-8, e 3 - 6 ; 3 o l a 2 - 3 , b8; 3o2a2, cl).
As Hippias tells Socrates, his familiarity is two-fold. On the one hand, he
is acquainted with a certain terminology or vocabulary. On the other, he
admits to being familiar with the ~ o t g or n a t u r e o f what he refers to as
"these things" (t6vt~0v, 3ooc2), where his intent must be to pick out either
these ax6t0tl or both and each. Later, however, we discover that both a n d each
are a m o n g these ~rd0tl ( 3 o 3 a 9 - i o ) , and this r e c o m m e n d s that we take the
antecedent o f to4tc0v to be the m o r e generic term. What Hippias confesses,
then, is some familiarity with the nature of these axd0tI, a familiarity that is
somehow associated with the belief that both o f a pair have a ztd0og if and
only if each does (3ood7-8).
Socrates is incredulous. We shall discuss shortly his alternative view a n d
the examples which Hippias solicits in s u p p o r t of his own theory. At this
point Hippias does, however, register a general indictment of Socrates' view
in terms that may help us f u r t h e r to u n d e r s t a n d his own. Socrates had
suggested that it is possible for a pair to have a ~d0og (~ov0~vcxt, 3ooe4)
even if neither m e m b e r does and vice versa (3ooe3-6). This is Hippias's
criticism:

You, Socrates, do not look at the wholes of things (t6t 6~.a tt0v ~0CCqllCCtC0v),nor [do]
those with whom you habitually converse; rather you test by taking up in your
arguments the beautiful and each of the things that are and by cutting them into bits.
For this reason it escapes you that the bodies of being are naturally large and con-
tinuous. And now this has escaped you to such a degree that you think that there is
something, either a property or a being, which is at the same time with respect to
both but not each or conversely with respect to each but not both. In this way, your
thinking is unreasonable, undiscerning, foolish, and unthinking. (3olb2-c3)

W h a t is Hippias's criticism? It is both general and specific. Generally,

Hippias criticizes Socrates for failing to look at wholes, the whole o f the
beautiful and o f other things (~tpdyIX~tc~, 6wet). Instead, Socrates "chops
these wholes up into bits" and for this reason misses realizing that these
things, which Hippias now calls o ~ t ~ o . ~:flg ol)6totg, are large a n d
 14o n I S T O g V Or PHILOSOPHY

c o n t i n u o u s . '5 Specifically, H i p p i a s n o t i c e s t h a t this f a i l u r e has a n a b s u r d

i m p l i c a t i o n i n t h e p r e s e n t case, f o r it l e a d s S o c r a t e s to t h i n k t h a t it is p o s s i b l e
f o r a p a i r o f t h i n g s to h a v e s o m e p r o p e r t y e v e n t h o u g h e a c h m e m b e r d o e s
n o t , a n d vice versa. T h i s , H i p p i a s c h a r g e s , is u t t e r l y foolish a n d s h o w s e v e r y
lack o f c l e a r t h i n k i n g .
I f t h e s e a r e H i p p i a s ' s c r i t i c i s m s o f Socrates, w h a t d o t h e y s u g g e s t a b o u t
his o w n t h e o r y ? Like S o c r a t e s ' view, H i p p i a s ' s " c o n t i n u i t y t h e o r y " (~tavae[
k6ym ~ g 6vo~ccg ~c~& ] [ : ~ a v , 3 o l e 3 - 4 ) is a t h e o r y a b o u t t h i n g s w h i c h c a n
b e called collectively o~,6tat o r :*Oay~ta~a o r ~ t 0 v 1 o r o~o~,a~a ~flg 6v~ag. All
o f t h e s e t e r m s s e e m to b e u s e d i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y , or, at t h e v e r y least, t h e u s e
o f t h e s e t e r m s d o e s s u g g e s t t h a t t h e ~d0~l i n t r o d u c e d e a r l i e r a r e a m o n g t h e
6y~ca o r az~dy~ta~a, w h i c h a r e t h e objects o f S o c r a t e s ' a n d H i p p i a s ' s views.
S o c r a t e s ' u s a g e l a t e r ( 3 o 2 c 4 - 7 ) i n t i m a t e s t h a t t h e a-,~0rI a r e a subclass o f
o~,o~at o r t h a t t h e t e r m s a r e i n fact i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e . E v e n t h e text at 3 ~ ~b 7 -
8 (e~vat ~t ~] ~rd0og/] o0o~ay), t h o u g h it c o u l d m e a n t h a t t h e s e a r e two k i n d s
o f t h i n g s , n e e d m e a n n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n t h a t t h e t h i n g in q u e s t i o n c o u l d be
called e i t h e r a ~ d 0 o g o r a n o~6tc~. '6 M o r e o v e r , o~o~c~, h e r e a n d e l s e w h e r e in
this p a s s a g e , serves n i c e l y as a n o m i n a l i z a t i o n o f t h e v e r b , e q u a l in f o r c e to
~ ~ 0 v o ~ o v ( 3 o o b 4 - 5 ) . T h e s e o~'o/c~t o r b e i n g s , w h i c h S o c r a t e s a n d
his f r i e n d s c u t u p , a r e j u s t t h e t h i n g s w h i c h H i p p i a s w a n t s us to t r e a t as
wholes, ~& 6~.c~ ~ v g0c~y~d~0v. S u r e l y t h e s e m u s t i n c l u d e , a n d p e r h a p s e v e n
b e i d e n t i c a l with, t h e z~d0rI a l r e a d y i n t r o d u c e d as t h e objects a b o u t w h i c h
Hippias knows the c~3otg; 3o~a~-3 is s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e tbr such a

,5 On the translation of this sentence (3olb5-7), see Tarrant, pp. 77-79. Zilles's judgment
of a purported reference to Hippias at Lysi.~ "214b4-5 is too hasty but nonetheless certainly
provocative, as we discuss later (see W. Zilles, "Hippias aus Elis," Hermes (1918), 46--7). Tarrant,
after considering several readings, seems inclined to [ollow Gruhe (Cla.ssicalQuarterly, July-
Octoher, 1926), who takes as "also" and reads "There[~re you fail to perceive that such
large bodies of being are also by nature continuous." The difference between Grube's transla-
tion and my own depends upon what the expression gt~t ~aC,'~a is meant to recall and hence
upon whether the conclusion is that these bodies are continuous or both continuous and large.
My own preference is to take the gt& "~ag~ct to refer to the ~.ot'tet~ltvo~'ccg,immediately proxi-
mate, and to take ~eyd~. 1626tctvem] as the conclusion which explicates what "seeing the wholes
of things" comes to, i.e., that it amounts to seeing properties as large, continuous masses. The
lack of z& for om~tc~zc~,which is nonetheless treated as a subject, is a drawback of this interpreta-
tion, but it is not forbidding. It is not clear to me why failing to see the things as wholes would
lead to failing to notice their continuity; chopping them up might lead naturally to both.
'~ Tarrant's discussion (79) is unhelpful. One should not, I think, over-read oCeo{ct here.
The evidence is simply not strong enough to take azdt0og to mean accidental and o6o~ct to mean
essential attribute. Even Euthyphro 11a6-b1, where a distinction is definitely made, is not sup-
port for this particular distinction. Allen erroneously compares the use of :*d0og and o0o~cr here
with the usage in the Euthyphro (R.E. Allen, "Plato's Earlier Theory of Forms," in Gregory
Vlastos (ed.), The Philosophy of Socrates (Garden City, 1971),p.32 ~).
 CONTINUITY THEORY 141

conclusion. Reflections such as these confirm what is a m o d e s t but u n d e n i -

able conclusion, that Hippias's own t h e o r y is a b o u t things like beauty and
treating t h e m as whole, c o n t i n u o u s bodies t h r o u g h o u t nature.
I f o n e thinks o f all the beauty in n a t u r e as a whole, t h e n to be sure the
totality or whole o f beauty is likely to be large. But how is it continuous?
T h e r e is s o m e t h i n g that we have thus far missed about Hippias's view. Why,
if o n e takes all the beauty in n a t u r e as a whole, o u g h t o n e to hold that a pair
is beautiful if and only if each o f its m e m b e r s is? Why does all the beauty in
n a t u r e f o r m a c o n t i n u o u s r a t h e r than a discontinuous whole? Why an un-
b r o k e n , n o n i n t e r m i t t e n t mass o f beauty? A n d why should this apply to all
o96tctt o r ~60~1, to all things, f r o m being just, tired, w o u n d e d , wise, old, and
y o u n g to being gold, silver, and ivory (cf. 3 o o e 7 - 3 o l a 2 ) ? '7
B e f o r e we press a h e a d a n d a t t e m p t to answer these questions a b o u t the
c o n t e n t o f Hippias's view a n d its relation to the premise a b o u t pairs and
their m e m b e r s , let us pause to consider the status o f Hippias's view and
w h e t h e r it is in fact a view a b o u t parts and wholes. First, is the view in fact a
theory? A l t h o u g h n o t h i n g o f real i m p o r t a n c e turns on this question o f sta-
tus, the evidence is sufficiently d e a r for us to treat what Hippias advocates as
as theory, and that means as an o r d e r l y set o f beliefs about the n a t u r e o f a
certain class o f entities. T o be sure, Socrates may be courting e x a g g e r a t i o n
and inflation, in a d e r o g a t o r y m a n n e r , when he calls Hippias's view a L6vlog
( 3 o x e 3 - 4 ) . But Socrates and Hippias both speak o f their views on pairs and
their m e m b e r s as g6~ct or things that are believed ( 3 o l d 6 ; cf. a 7 and 3ooe3),
and Hippias does e m b e d these beliefs, as I have b e g u n to suggest, in o t h e r
beliefs a b o u t ~60~1 a n d how they should be looked at or viewed (cf. o6
o 3 o l b 2 - 3 ) . Moreover, this overall set o f beliefs has two features we
have already noticed, at least in Hippias's eyes: they employ a quasi-technical
vocabulary o f s~60og and its verbal forms, and they are about the otgotg o f
these ~&0rI. This evidence is strong e n o u g h to justify o u r thinking that what
Hippias and Socrates hold are, at least in Hippias's eyes, akin to theories
a b o u t real entities (o{,o@tt), akin p e r h a p s to o t h e r c o n t e m p o r a r y o r p r i o r
physical theories.
Not only is Hippias p r o p o s i n g a theory, he is p r o f e r r i n g a t h e o r y a b o u t
~60~1 or p r o p e r t i e s a n d their p r e s e n c e in parts and wholes. T h e gist o f that
theory, m o r e o v e r , is that these ~6.OvI are distributed in n a t u r e in such a way

'7 We have asked the question with respect to Hippias's theory: how does treating ~d0~l as
large wholes involve or imply continuity of these bodies? And how does this entail Hippias's
views about pairs and their members? In the text, these questions naturally arise in terms of
Hippias's criticism of Socrates' view (3olb2-c3): how does chopping ~60~1 into bits lead to the
belief that a pair can have a Jt60og which its members lack and vice versa (cf. 3olb7-c2)?
 ~4 2 HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y

that they should be seen as wholes, large and continuous ones. Hippias takes
this theory to imply that he a n d Socrates together have a ~d0og if a n d only if
each o f t h e m does. T h e y are a just pair, for example, if a n d only if each of
them is just. ,8 W h a t this means, o f course, is that every pair has all the same
properties as each o f its members, and this is a strange view, to say the/east.
Why, indeed, would someone have held such an extreme theory?
At 2 9 9 c 6 - 9 Socrates first employs the terms "both" (dtDy6T~Q~z) and
"each" (~ with specific reference to visual and auditory pleasures,
taken collectively as a pair and taken singly or individually. My view about
this terminology is that it specifies a particular case, the relation between a
particular type of whole, a pair, and its parts, the two members, which falls
u n d e r a general Hippian theory about parts, wholes, and how ~d0~l are
distributed t h r o u g h o u t them. T h e evidence is suggestive rather than conclu-
sive, but the general interpretation is r e c o m m e n d e d by the need to tie tog-
ether Hippias's theory with its application in the present case.
These are some of the reasons for treating Hippias's theory as one about
parts and wholes, rather than as a somewhat informal belief about both and
each: (1) T h e final definition in the Hippias Major is first proposed as the
identification o f the beautiful with pleasure, not all pleasures (~t~jTt ztdo~g
~&g figodg, 297e6), but only visual and auditory ones. At 299b3-4 these are
called a "part o f pleasure" (z6 ~Qog xoO ~]r and at 3o2e4-5, once again,
"not all pleasure" (~6 l ] ~ , oa) ~&v). T h r o u g h o u t the a r g u m e n t , both Socrates
and Hippias treat what they call "both" as also a "part" o f a larger whole,
once r e f e r r e d to as "the totality" (~(lv), once as "all" (~doc~g). A l t h o u g h they
never in fact call, say, visual pleasures a "part" of a part o f a whole, it is not
implausible to appreciate the terminology o f "both" and "each" as in part of
strategy invoked to avoid the cumbersomeness of such a phrase. (2) Hip-
pias's theory, by his own admission, does see ~dO~l as wholes, does not cut them
up, and does deal with the oc0#ia~a o f entities as large and continuous. T h e
~dtOvI, however, are properties or characteristics of things; the verb-forms of
the word ~dOog require grammatical subjects. W h e n viewed together in
terms of their ~dtOg, the referents of these subject terms are wholes and parts
of wholes. As we shall see, these subjects are sometimes bodies with constitu-
ent parts a n d sometimes aggregates with members. But, in general, as sub-
jects of properties or ~d0r I, they are precisely those things that are c o m p a r e d
in terms o f w h e t h e r the properties they have are mutually i n t e r d e p e n d e n t .
In such cases, they are always things related to each other as wholes and
parts. (3) At 3 o 3 a 9 - i o Socrates notes, and Hippias agrees, that the both and

,s This is one of Hippias's examples at 3ooe7-3ola7 . We shall consider later all the ~60"q
mentioned here and elsewhere in the argument.
 CONTINUITY THEORY 143

the each, i.e., being both and being each, are themselves properties which
things have. It turns out that while the beautiful fits Hippias's theory, the
both and the each do not. Clearly, then, Hippias's theory is not exclusively
about both and each, any more than it is exclusively about beauty, justice,
and a host of other things. It is a theory about ~St0q in general, the things
that have them, and how these subjects are related to each other. Given this
general framework, the interesting case, invoked by the present elenchos,
occurs when the subjects in question are related as part and whole.
Two difficulties press upon us. (1) How does the lack of the continuity
theory and the tendency to chop things u p - - t h e plight of Socrates and his
friends--lead to the belief that parts and wholes need not share all of their
properties? (2) Why does seeing wholes allow one to recognize continuity
and what is it that is continuous? T h e key text is Hippias's critique of Soc-
rates at 3 o l b 2 - c 3 . Another look at this passage, however, will show that our
interpretation of it has been inadequate and faulty and that it has led us
astray.
What are the ot~o~ta~a fflg o0o~ctg (3olb6) which Hippias, but not So-
crates, sees as "large and continuous?" Earlier we said that these were the
~d0~l themselves; "o(~taza ~ g 6v~tag" is simply another expression for
~ z~v 6w~0v, the ~t0vl being discussed since 3oob4 . But this is wrong.
There is another alternative and one that will link Socrates' failure with his
tendency to disconnect parts and wholes.
The word 6tare occurs only twice in Plato. '-~ But, in its Ionic form, it is
found in epic poetry, tragedy, and in an important fragment of Empedocles'
poem on nature. B59 says:
But as one divine element mingled further with another,
These things ['ell together as each chanced to meet each other,
And many other things besides these sprang forth that were [already] continuous
(Stqw
While the standard reading of 5tvlve I takes it as a temporal adverb
("continually" or "in continual succession"), O'Brien has argued that an ad-
jectival, spatial interpretation is not ruled out. y'' Monsters may arise both
from the chance joining together of limbs, organs, and so on, and as other
beings that are continuous from their birth. B59 intimates, then, that the
mingling of Empedocles' elements---earth, air, fire, and water--will at a
certain point produce continuous physical bodies. Indeed, Plato himself says
"J The occurrence at Laws VIII, 839a sheds no Light on the present passage. Cf. Liddell and
Scott, ad loc.
~" See Denis O'Brien, Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle (Cambridge, 1969), pp.234-6; Cf. G.S.Kirk &
J.E.Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1964), P.337, and Guthrie II, p.2o3, for
examples of the adverbial reading.
 144 HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y

just this, for, in a passage that surely refers to Empedocles or one of his
disciples, he calls the products of the combination of mingling of earth, air,
fire, and water "~h ~e~& ~m3m ~ a m " (Laws X, 889bl-5). ~' If the "title"
for Hippias's theory is indeed borrowed from Empedocles, then the oco~ar
~ g 6yoUng would be not the elements themselves, but rather the physical
things made of them. And there is further reason to think that the back-
ground of Hippias's theory is Empedoclean. Hippias's theory is about ~ o t g
and about 6~.~; he is explicit about this. At Lysis 21464- 5 Plato identifies
those who discuss and write ~e~)g qn)o~g re xag ~o6 5XoO with thinkers who
say 6~t T6 5~otov ~0 6~o@ &vgyx~l &E~ d~t~.ove~vat ("that the like must always
desire the like"). The latter is a well-known trope of Empedocles' thought, '~'~
a provocative indication that the background for Hippias's theory in the
Hippias Major, a theory about nature and wholes, is Empedoclean and hence
that the o ~ l ~ x a are physical bodies, like the sun and stars.
The foregoing evidence encourages us to return and interpret Hippias's
criticism of Socrates in a new way. By cutting up beauty and each ~d0og into
bits and pieces, Socrates does not see the wholes of things. This may be
because the things made of these fragments of properties are perceived as
collections with no principle of unity, and it may also be because the ~d0~l
themselves are no longer perceived as wholes but as splintered, disparate
fragments. By their nature, however, physical bodies are large and continu-
ous wholes, and Socrates' procedure, as Hippias sees it, at least hides this
from him. In additon, he fails to realize that ifx is a part of y, then x's and y's
properties are not fragmented, x's properties being only in x and vice versa.
Rather x's properties are present throughout x and throughout the wholes of
which x is a part; similarly for y and its parts. Socrates' way of looking at
properties makes it possible tor him to find properties in parts that are not
found in their whole and properties in a whole that are not tbund in its
parts. But if one sees properties not as bits or parts of things but as spread
uniformly or "continuously" throughout parts and wholes, then such an
error is impossible. For Hippias, physical bodies are continuous wholes; their
properties are not localized within them but are present, as it were, continu-
ously throughout them. And this goes tor all parts, wholes, and their
properties.
On the face of it, Hippias's extreme or unrestricted continuity theory

~' Laws X, 8 8 9 b l - 5 : "They maintain that fire, water, earth, and air owe their existence to
nature a n d chance, and in no case to art, and that it is be means o f these entirely inanimate
substances that the secondary physical bodies (T~t ~te~d m ( t ~ a o~tct~ct)--the earth, sun, moon,
and s t a r s - - h a v e been p r o d u c e d . " (tr., T.J.Saunders)
~= Guthrie |I, p.156, pp. 165-66; Edward Hussey, The Presocratics (New York, 1972 ), pp.
132-33.
 CONTINUITY THEORY 145

seems absurd. Surely, we might think, even Hippias o u g h t to realize that

some restrictions are unavoidable--with regard to rai0vI of size, weight, and
location. But Hippias does not seem to appreciate the manifest absurdity of
the theory radically formulated. At first he is blind to it, and, when Socrates
demonstrates the need for qualifications, for properties that simply cannot
apply uniformly to parts a n d wholes, Hippias shows no special a m a z e m e n t
( 3 o ~ a l - b 4 ; cf.3o3a9-1o). Perhaps what Hippias was so intent on advocat-
ing was m o r e the spirit than the letter of his radical view.
Socrates' Criticism and the Qualified Continuity Theory of Reality: Broadly
speaking, what Hippias abhors is the tendency to chop up properties and
wholes so that one is inclined to consider the properties o f the parts as
i n d e p e n d e n t of those o f the wholes and vice versa. Perhaps he even shud-
ders at the idea of treating properties or n6t0~I as themselves bits or pieces of
stuff. This or something like it is the spirit of his own view, at any rate, and
more explicitly o f his criticism of Socrates as well. ~:~
Eventually Hippias and Socrates agree that not all nd0vl satisfy Hippias's
severe requirements. Some do, to be sure, but some do not ( 3 o 2 b i - 6 ) . Let
us call Socrates' theory the "qualified" continuity theory, to distinguish it
f r o m Hippias's completely general, unqualified, or unrestricted version. A
careful reading of stage II o f the elenchos shows that the overall structure of
the exchange is reciprocal. Hippias states his view on properties; Socrates
offers his alternative, which Hippias criticizes with examples and then in the
speech we have examined; Socrates concludes with a telling refutation that
wins Hippias's immediate and almost casual approval. While Socrates' belief
is actually i n t r o d u c e d as an alternative to Hippias's (3ooc9-d4), it is helpful
to view it as a modification of the more stern, extreme position.
Socrates challenges Hippias's theory in an interesting way. If Hippias is
right and a pair is two, then each m e m b e r would also be two, and if each is
one, then both are one (3oxdg-e5). In addition, if each is one and one is
odd, then, on Hippias's theory, both, t h o u g h they are two, are odd. Or if we
note that both are even, then each, although one, is even. Hippias has a
reputation as a mathematician and geometer; ~4 Socrates' refutation is aimed,
~:~ T h e r e is no substantial evidence in the dialogues about Socrates' metaphysical views. ()ne
result of the current examination of the HM is to bring to light such evidence. Indirect support
for thinking that Socrates did have a doctrine about individual objects being collections of
things comes from his connection with Anaxagoras, via Archelaus. There is reason to think tha!
Anaxagoras did influence Plato. For discussion, see John Brentlinger, "Incomplete Predicales
and the Two-World Theory of the Phaedo," Phronesis 17 (197z), 61-79, and David Furley,
"Anaxagoras and Parmenides," in Roger A. Shiner & J o h n King-Farlow (eds.), New Essays in
Plato and the Pre-Socratics (Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 11), pp. 8o-83.
It is not implausible to think that Socrates accepted some of Anaxagoras's views on the composi-
tion of individual substances, causality, and predication.
'~4 See note lO above.
 146 HISTORY or PHILOSOPHY

it appears, to shake his mathematical scruples, for the u p s h o t o f Hippias's

theory o f nature is the complete c o m p r e s e n c e o f the o d d and the even,
indeed o f all numbers, and hence the disruption o f the very nature o f
n u m b e r itself: 5
T h e direct conclusion that Socrates wants from his refutation is that some
p r o p e r t i e s - - a m o n g them one, two, odd, even, and, as he later notes, both
and each ( 3 o 3 a 9 - 1 o ) - - a r e not uniformly distributed t h r o u g h o u t parts and
their wholes, but others are. Socrates' theory, then, includes two principles:

P I T h e r e are some properties F, G . . . . such that for some parts and for
some wholes, the whole has F if and only if all its parts have F.
P~ T h e r e are some properties H, L . . . . such that ['or some parts and for
some wholes, the whole has H whether or not its parts do and the parts
have H whether or not the whole does. 26

Like Hippias's theory, Socrates' view is about properties ( ~ 0 T I or o~o~c~t)

It is not a theory about two kinds o f parts and wholes, if that means those
parts and wholes that have uniform properties and those that do not. Rather
it is a theory about two kinds o f properties, those that are uniformly distrib-
uted t h r o u g h parts and their wholes and those that need not or c a n n o t be so
distributed. Derivatively o f course Socrates is t h o u g h t by Hippias also to
hold a certain view about physical bodies, parts, and wholes. But Socrates'

~ Socrates' refutation is p r e s e n t e d in two stages: (1) if Hippias is right, then what is 'a is also
I and what is I is ",. (II) filrthermore, if what is 2 is even and 1 is odd, then the same tiling is
odd and even. T h i s final conclusion might be interpreted in a variety o f ways. I t all n u m b e r s are
both odd and even, then n u m b e r is destroyed. Also, if all n u m b e r s are both odd and even, then
n u m b e r s are not a~at----<t. Phaedo lo3e--lO5C.
~ Socrates formulates his view in terms of both and each (3ooe3-6: cf. Hippias's way o f
putting it at 3 o l b 7 - c 2 ) : "it seems to me that it is possible for us both to have a p r o p e r t y
(z~ov0~vc~t) which neither I have, n o r l n o r you have; and again that neither o f us have o t h e r
properties which we both have." This is a bit odd and is not precisely r e n d e r e d by (P2). Socrates
seems to be pointing to one asymmetry, w h e r e x and y are t o g e t h e r F but x is not F and y is not is
not F, and saying that this is possible when or becat~w or in solar as either x is not F or x is not F
and y is not F or x and y are t o g e t h e r F. Hippias's r e p o r t ( 3 o l b T - c ~ ) suggests taht Socrates also
holds the converse. (P'~) r e p r e s e n t s both claims.
(P~) might better be put m o r e strongly. In the p r e s e n t form, it says that the presence o f a
p r o p e r t y in a whole is i n d e p e n d e n t o f its presence in the parts; this is the force of " w h e t h e r or
not." But in ['act Socrates may want to rule out the " w h e t h e r " and m e a n
(P~*) T h e r e are some properties H, L . . . . such that ['or some parts and some wholes, the
whole has H and the parts do not and the parts have H and the whole does not. H e r e "and"
means s o m e t h i n g like 'only if'. In addition, Socrates may want these properties always to func-
tion in this way. This would yield the still s t r o n g e r
(p'~**) T h e r e are some properties H, L . . . . such that for all parts and wholes, the whole has
H only if the parts do not and the parts have H only if the whole does not. Socrates' mathemati-
cal examples, where n u m b e r s are treated as complete properties, r e c o m m e n d this very s t r o n g
reading. (P2), as it stands, says that there are certain properties that sometimes act discontinu-
ously, a n d this seems a m o r e cautious and m o r e correct account.
 CONTINUITY THEORY 147
own statements leave this uncertain. We shall say m o r e shortly about the
c o n c e p t i o n o f the part-whole relation that is implied by the e x c h a n g e be-
tween Hippias and Socrates. For the m o m e n t , we can r e m a i n with what is
explicit, which is that Socrates' "qualified" continuity t h e o r y is a b o u t two
kinds o f p r o p e r t i e s and how they are distributed t h r o u g h o u t the objects that
have them.
Hippias and Socrates, in the course o f their discussion, give several ex-
amples o f each sort o f p r o p e r t y . I f (P1) defines a class o f continuous p r o p -
erties (properties c o n t i n u o u s t h r o u g h o u t parts and their wholes) and (P2) a
class o f discontinuous ones, the list o f examples cited in the course o f the text
can be divided like this:
Continuous Properties
just, unjust, healthy, tired, wounded, struck, gold, silver, ivory, noble, wise, honored,
old, young, beauty, strong.
Discontinuous Properties
two, one, odd, even, each, both, rational, irrationaP 7 (in quantity) (cf. 3ooe7-3 ola7,
3old5-e3, 3o9a2-bl, 3o3b6-c2).
As (P1) and (P2) are f o r m u l a t e d , they do not provide an exhaustive, un-
qualified classification o f properties, and these examples ctmfirm such a j u d g -
ment. For while Hippias surely intends wounded, fbr example, to be a continu-
ous p r o p e r t y , it is not clear that it must always be so. While only w o u n d e d
p e o p l e are m e m b e r s o f the set o f w o u n d e d people, surely .John Smith can be
w o u n d e d without every part o f him being d a m a g e d or afflicted. A n d even if"
one were to r e s p o n d that J o h n Smith is w o u n d e d only if at least some o f his
parts are w o u n d e d , this will still not satisfy ( P I ) o r (P2). St)crates' two-fold
classification o f p r o p e r t i e s may be better than Hippias's radical, e x t r e m e clas-
sification, but it is still not a c o m p l e t e o r perfect classification.
T h i s lack o f completeness is an unsettling complicaton. At 3 o 3 b l - c 6 So-
crates seems to take it for g r a n t e d that ~6 is either a c o n t i n u o u s or
discontinuous property--tertium non dator. Both interlocutors find no diffi-
culty with this, a disturbing acquiescence if Socrates' t h e o r y is as blatantly
deficient as we have shown.
T h e solution to this complication, I think, lies in reflecting on a m o r e
p r o f o u n d c o m p l i c a t i o n - - f o r both Hippias's t h e o r y and Socrates' as well.
While the two theories are a b o u t parts and wholes, a closer scrutiny o f the
classes o f examples uncovers some unclarity a b o u t how parts and wholes are
conceived as related to each other. Exactly how do Hippias and Socrates
u n d e r s t a n d the n a t u r e o f parts, wholes, and their relationship?
Hippias's examples, all o f which are i n t e n d e d as c o n t i n u o u s properties,

47 All of the examples of discontinuous properties are mathematical. We discuss this later.
 148 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

are s p o k e n o f this way: " I f both o f us are just, would not each o f us also be;
or if each is unjust, not also both; or if we are healthy, not also each?"
( 3 o o e 8 - 3 O l a l ) T h e same p a t t e r n is r e c o m m e n d e d for the others, for being
tired, w o u n d e d , wise, old, and beautiful. Socrates agrees not only with the
examples themselves but also with Hippias's way o f describing how they
satisfy (PI) (3o3b~-5). T h a t is, both m e n seem to be assuming that wholes
are aggregates o r collections, and both seem to a g r e e that at least some
p r o p e r t i e s are such that the whole collection has that p r o p e r t y if and only if
all the m e m b e r s do, and vice versa. Let us call this the Aggregate interpreta-
tion o f the part-whole relation. Simply put, it is the view that wholes are
defined collections o f things a n d that parts are the things that constitute the
whole as defined. In the case o f a bag o f twenty marbles, the whole is the
aggregate o f twenty marbles, while the parts are the twenty marbles, taken
individually or separately.
I f this is what Hippias intends, however, and also what Socrates believes,
then it is surely puzzling. In the case o f being just, for example, it is o n e
thing to be an aggregate or collection o f just people, a n o t h e r to be a just
collection. Even if a completely just citizenry s e e m e d to g u a r a n t e e the justice
o f a polls, surely a polis' being just does not d e p e n d u p o n the universal justice
o f all o f its m e m b e r s . ~8 N e i t h e r Hippias n o r Socrates have specified w h e t h e r
the whole or aggregate is simply the sum o f its defining parts or w h e t h e r it is
s o m e t h i n g in addition to that sum, ~9 a l t h o u g h their m a n n e r o f expression (at
3 o o e 8 - 3 o l a l and 3 o 3 b 2 - 5 ) strongly suggests the f b r m e r . While this Aggre-
gate i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of" parts and wholes might explain why Socrates thinks
the classification o f c o n t i n u o u s and discontinuous p r o p e r t i e s to be exhaus-
tive, it does, however, invite o t h e r problems.
T h e examples o f c o n t i n u o u s p r o p e r t i e s and predicates and the account
o f their distribution over wholes and parts is the model for the ~t60og u n d e r
discussion, r6 and its distribution with respect to visual and a u d i t o r y
pleasures. Just as "the collection o f persons is just" could m e a n either " . . . is
a just collection" or " . . . is a collection o f just persons," so "the visual and
auditory pleasures are beautiful" could m e a n either " . . . are a pair o f beau-
tiful pleasures" or " . . . are a beautiful pair o f pleasures." But, as the argu-

~ C o m m e n t a t o r s have worried a g o o d deal a b o u t this relation b e t w e e n t h e justice o f indi-

viduals a n d that o f t h e polls, especially as they try to u n d e r s t a n d t h e a c c o u n t s of" gt I in
Republic IV. Articles o n the subject f o r m a small industry. For s o m e i m p o r t a n t p a p e r s a n d
bibliography, see G r e g o r y Vlastos (ed.), Plato H: Ethics, Politics, and Philosophy of Art and Religion
( G a r d e n City, 1971 ).
~' T h i s distinction between a whole as a m e r e a g g r e g a t e a n d a whole as a new unity is
i n t r o d u c e d a n d exploited in t h e criticism o f Socrates' d r e a m at Theaetetus "~o2d-2o6c. For r e c e n t
discussion a n d bibliography, see (Jail Fine, " K n o w l e d g e a n d Logos in t h e Theaetetu.s,; Philosophical
Review 88,3 (July, 1979), 3 6 6 - 3 9 7 .
 CONTINUITY THEORY ~49
m e n t reveals, e a c h o f t h e p l e a s u r e s is not b e a u t i f u l , precisely b e c a u s e it has
n o t h i n g in it t h a t c a n satisfactorily a c c o u n t f o r its b e i n g b e a u t i f u l a n d f o r the
b e a u t y o f all a n d o n l y b e a u t i f u l things. If" so, t h e n (Pl), as H i p p i a s a n d
S o c r a t e s s e e m to w a n t it, e i t h e r fails to be a n a c c e p t a b l e m o d e l f o r ~6
o r it already begs t h e q u e s t i o n a g a i n s t p r o v i d i n g a satisfactory a c c o u n t o f h o w
" b e a u t i f u l " c a n be a c o n t i n u o u s p r e d i c a t e . I n short, it looks like the p r o -
p o s e d d e f i n i t i o n o f z6 1 6 2 is u n d e r m i n e d by ( P I ) a n d the A g g r e g a t e
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f p a r t s a n d w h o l e s as H i p p i a s a n d Socrates u n d e r s t a n d it.
A n d t h e r e is g o o d r e a s o n to t h i n k t h a t t h e y d o u n d e r s t a n d ( P l ) this way, i.e.
a c c o r d i n g to t h e A g g r e g a t e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f parts a n d wholes, f o r their
d o i n g so w o u l d e x p l a i n w h y t h e y d o n o t w o r r y a b o u t t h e e x h a u s t i v e n e s s o f
t h e qualified c h a r a c t e r o f (Pl). I f H i p p i a s is o n l y c o n c e r n e d with, let us say,
a collection o f old cars, he n e e d n o t w o r r y t h a t old cars m a y c o n t a i n , a m o n g
o t h e r things, s o m e n e w parts. N o r d o e s he h a v e to be c o n c e r n e d t h a t it
m i g h t v e r y well be a n e w collection.
W h i l e H i p p i a s m a y h a v e r e a s o n s to treat wholes as the a g g r e g a t e s o f their
collected m e m b e r s , s u c h a view s a b o t a g e s a n y a t t e m p t to save the d e f i n i t i o n
o f ~6 T h i s m a y , h o w e v e r , be n o t so m u c h a n o b j e c t i o n to u n d e r s t a n d -
i n g H i p p i a s in these t e r m s as m u c h as a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n f o r o n e way o f
d i a g n o s i n g the gist o f the elenchos against him. N o n e t h e l e s s , this view o f
w h o l e s is very u n s a t i s f y i n g a n d n a r r o w . Is t h e r e n o e v i d e n c e that H i p p i a s
a n d S o c r a t e s h a d a b r o a d e r c o n c e p t i o n o f the p a r t - w h o l e relation?
A c a r is a whole, the p a r t s o f w h i c h a r e its e n g i n e , b a t t e r y , tires, chassis,
a n d so o n ; m o u t h , nose, ears, a n d eyes a r e all parts o f a lace. N o t all wholes
a r e a g g r e g a t e s , t r e a t e d e i t h e r as s u m s o r as unities t h a t s u p e r v e n e o n t h o s e
sums. S o m e w h o l e s a r e s i m p l e unities c o m p o s e d o f c o n c a t e n a t e d parts, the
n a t u r e s o f w h i c h a r e u n l i k e e a c h o t h e r a n d the wholes w h i c h t h e y constitute.
N o t h e r e in the Hippias Major b u t r a t h e r in the Protagoras, Plato's e x a m p l e o f
s u c h a w h o l e is a face. 3'' Let us call this the Substance i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e
p a r t - w h o l e relation. Clearly it is a view o f parts a n d w h o l e s d i f f e r e n t f r o m
b o t h v e r s i o n s o f the A g g r e g a t e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as we h a v e discussed t h e m .
D o e s H i p p i a s o r Socrates s e e m to a d v o c a t e o r i m p l y t h e S u b s t a n c e i n t e r p r e -
tation as a plausible a c c o u n t ?

:~" Protagoras holds that .justice and the other virtues are parts of &Qe~'gl,just as the mouth
and nose, for example, are parts of the face. Hence, he thinks that '~justice" and "holiness" are
names of different things that are themselves parts of the whole that is dtQexil. In the course of
the process of nursing this belief from Protagoras, Socrates (329d4-8) offers two models [br the
part-whole relation and asks Protagoras which better suited to the case of&Qew] and the virtues.
The two models are (1) that of the parts of a face to the whole face and (2) that of bits of gold to
the whole chunk which they compose. As I shall try to show, this scheme can be viewed as a
refinement of the Substance interpretation of the part-whole relation, an interpretation ac-
knowledged implicitly but not analyzed in tile HM.
150 HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y

O n e might think that three o f Hippias's examples of continuous prop-

erties--XQvoo~ I] &~)yv~,o~. /~ ~X~cpdv~tvot ( 3 o x a 3 - 4 ) - - a r e bold and decisive
evidence that Hippias at least did conceive of wholes as chunks of some
substance, the parts of which are slices, pieces, or otherwise severed bits. T o
be sure, one might argue that these examples are not exactly like a face and
its parts, for here the substances are chunks or masses of some h o m o g e n e -
ous kind o f m a t t e r so that the parts are not unlike the whole and each other
in kind. In fact, the parts o f a c h u n k of gold, for example, are precisely like
each other a n d the whole in being gold, yellow, heavy, and so on. :~' This
similarity holds as well for m a n y other natural substances--silver and ivory
a m o n g them. W h a t these examples represent, then, is not the Substance
interpretation as we described it, where parts and whole are n o n - h o m o g e n e -
ous, but r a t h e r a d i f f e r e n t Substance interpretation, where parts and whole
are all of the same kind. Such a view, moreover, yields a bonus, for it fits
perfectly Hippias's e x t r e m e continuity theory. In the case of h o m o g e n e o u s
stuffs, any piece and the bits that make it up share their kind and kind-
b o u n d properties. A n d there is a f u r t h e r bonus, for on this Substance inter-
pretation, where parts a n d wholes are homogeneous, the continuity of a
physical body and the continuity of its kind and k i n d - b o u n d properties
t h r o u g h o u t all of its parts become coextensive continuities. By associating
Hippias with this account of the part-whole relation, we provide a vivid
ratification o f the distinctive n a m e that Socrates gives to Hippias's theory.
Attractive as this line of reasoning may be, however, it is, I think, errone-
ous. Hippias's theory is not ambiguous between an Aggregate and a Substance
interpretation of the part-whole relation, at least not in this way. Hippias
shows no signs of thinking that wholes are substances composed of homoge-
neous parts, and to claim that he did is to point wrongly in the direction o f
Anaxagoras rather than Empedocles as Hippias's m e n t o r in natural
philosophy? ~ T h e examples which Hippias cites in response to Socrates--
from 6~ a n d ~6t to y~vvcr162 ~iptot, y~)ov'l;eg, and v~ot--are all pro-
perties which objects can or cannot have? :~(pQvoo~, ~tgyvQo~, and ~.eq~v~tvot
fit this pattern. T h e y m e a n " m a d e of gold," "silver-plated," and " m a d e o f

:~' Is it possible that the gold e x a m p l e in the Protagoras is an e c h o of" t h e m e n t i o n o f gold

h e r e in t h e H M ? A n d , too, t h e u s e o f gold as a m o d e l for t h e Receptacle at Timaeus 5 o a - c ?
:~ T h e only m e n t i o n o f A n a x a g o r a s in t h e H M is u n c o n n e c t e d with Hippias's n a t u r a l
p h i l o s o p h y a n d is u n c o m p l i m e n t a r y ; unlike Hippias, we are told, A n a x a g o r a s ' s w i s d o m was o f
no m o n e t a r y benefit to him. I n d e e d , he i n h e r i t e d a g r e a t s u m a n d s q u a n d e r e d it. Cf. H M
282e9-283b6.
:~:~ T h e r e is no indication h e r e or e l s e w h e r e in this passage that Socrates or H i p p i a s m a d e a
firm a n d clear distinction b e t w e e n essential a n d accidental properties. It is n o t e w o r t h y , how-
ever, that H i p p i a s h e r e speaks hypothetically a n d that his e x a m p l e s are all o f p r o p e r t i e s that we
would take to be accidental. See n o t e 2o above.
 CONTINUITY THEORY 151

ivory," a n d in Hippias's speech they are attributed to Socrates and to Hip-

pias himself. W h a t Hippias is arguing, then, is that if Socrates and he were
m a d e o f gold, t h e n both would be m a d e o f gold, and vice versa. N o t h i n g is
said h e r e a b o u t gold, ivory, o r silver as wholes or parts, only about being-
made-of-gold and the others as properties o f a pair and its members.
In addition, when Socrates later turns to criticize Hippias, he does so by
pointing solely to n u m b e r and properties relative to n u m b e r . I f Hippias's
t h e o r y had b e e n stated in terms o f h o m o g e n e o u s wholes and their parts,
Socrates might have a d d e d to his criticism examples o f size, location, and
weight, discontinuous p r o p e r t i e s relevant to h o m o g e n e o u s parts and wholes.
It is suggestive, a l t h o u g h surely not decisive, that Socrates limits his critique
as he does. T h e model o f part-whole, h e r e as before, seems to be that o f an
A g g r e g a t e as a sum o f its m e m b e r s .
T h e s e reflections o n the part-whole relation and its role in the p r e s e n t
passage might be t h o u g h t to lead us to the conclusion that o f the f o u r
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f the part-whole relation that we have discussed, :~4 Hippias's
and Socrates' theories seem to assume one o f the Aggregate interpretations,
to n e e d a second, and to ignore both Substance interpretaions. Earlier, how-
ever, we a r g u e d that these theories, while applied on the present occasion to
a case o f aggregation, i.e., a case o f pairs and their members, are in ['act
m o r e general than this. If this is the case, however, does it m e a n that Hip-
pias and Socrates did m o r e than apply a general t h e o r y to a special case?
Does it mean, that is, that they identified all parts and wholes as m e m b e r s o f
aggregates a n d their sums?
Fortunately t h e r e is no reason to force Hippias and Socrates into such a
n a r r o w view o f parts and wholes. We a r g u e d that in his criticism o f Socrates,
Hippias indicated clearly that some wholes, some natural bodies, o u g h t not
be conceived as c h o p p e d u p into bits. Socrates seems to think, as Hippias
suggests, that things are c o m p o s e d o f properties. Hippias, after Empedocles,
doubtless thinks o f t h e m as m i x t u r e s o f elements. Both o u g h t to realize,
then, that some wholes are m o r e like a face than a bag o f marbles. I f the
examples o f gold and a face, o f f e r e d by Socrates to Protagoras (Prot.
3 2 9 d 4 - 8 ) , are any indication o f a belief about two kinds o f parts and
wholes, a d o c t r i n e that the Socrates o f the Hippias Major might have en-
dorsed, t h e n Socrates' t h e o r y is richer than the particular case to which it is
h e r e applied.
In a very interesting way, then, this debate over the continuity t h e o r y and

34 This is a summary of these four part-whole interpretations: (1) Aggregate: (a) wholes as
sums, (b) wholes as new unities; (2) Substance: (a) wholes as homogeneous, (b) wholes as
non -homogeneous.
152 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
the classification o f p r o p e r t i e s in t e r m s o f their distribution t h r o u g h o u t
wholes a n d their parts r e p r e s e n t s an i m p o r t a n t but i n t e r m e d i a t e stage in
Socrates' a n d Plato's thinking. Precise distinctions a b o u t parts a n d wholes are
not yet m a d e . Unlike the Protagoras, the HippiasMajor h a r b o r s no distinction
b e t w e e n substances like gold a n d a face, i.e., b e t w e e n h o m o g e n e o u s a n d
n o n - h o m o g e n e o u s p a r t - w h o l e relations. A n d unlike the Theaetetus, it houses
no distinction b e t w e e n a whole as a m e r e s u m a n d a whole as a new, s u p e r -
venient unity. But o n e can find in the Hippias Major a distinction b e t w e e n
wholes as A g g r e g a t e s a n d wholes as Substances, a distinction o f which later
t r e a t m e n t s look to be c o n s i d e r a b l e r e f i n e m e n t s ? 5 F u t h e r m o r e , in the Hippias
Major t h e r e is, or at least a p p e a r s to be a distinction m a d e between ~zdt01] a n d
o0o~ctt, but exactly what it c o m e s to r e m a i n s largely obscure.
G u t h r i e speaks o f Socrates' criticism o f H i p p i a s as a "little logical point
a b o u t n u m e r i c a l p r o p e r t i e s . '':s6 I have tried to show that the passage is richer
t h a n this. B u t G u t h r i e is r i g h t that all the d i s c o n t i n u o u s p r o p e r t i e s discussed
are n u m e r i c a l ones. T h e y are, however, not unlike the c o n t i n u o u s ones, for
b o t h s u p e r v e n e on o t h e r p r o p e r t i e s , to o n e d e g r e e or a n o t h e r . F o r this
reason, the question of" their application m u s t follow a p r i o r application o f
s o m e o t h e r p r e d i c a t e or predicates. T h e question w h e t h e r you a n d I are j u s t
d e p e n d s first on o u r h a v i n g b e e n picked o u t as p e r s o n s a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y on
o u r b e i n g g r o u p e d as a pair o f persons. T h e question w h e t h e r visual a n d
a u d i t o r y pleasures are beautiful, on the o n e h a n d , a n d visual-and-auditory,
on the other, d e p e n d s on a n a l o g o u s acts. In sum, the logical points are not
little ones, n o r are they restricted to n u m e r i c a l p r o p e r t i e s . For reasons like
this, we can say that a h h o u g h the Hippias Major does not itself go far towards
clarifying all o f these matters, it serves to rise questions that focus a t t e n t i o n
on t h e m , a t t e n t i o n that eventually results in distinctions like that b e t w e e n
accidental a n d essential p r o p e r t i e s .

SOCRATES' QUALIFIED CONTINUITY THEORY AND THE METAPHYSICS OF

TIlE HIPPIAS MAJOR
We h a v e tried to show that Socrates a n d H i p p i a s a g r e e to a qualified conti-
nuity t h e o r y o f p r o p e r t i e s , parts, a n d wholes. A c c o r d i n g to that theory,
things are collections o f p r o p e r t i e s , s o m e o f which are c o n t i n u o u s t h r o u g h -
out a whole a n d its parts, s o m e o f which are not. T h e r e is h e r e m e t a p h y s i c s
o f an incipient a n d u n d e v e l o p e d sort but explicit m e t a p h y s i c s nonetheless.

:~:' One might be inclined to argue that Hippias's theory applies only to pairs and members
(hoth and each) and not to part-whole relations more generally. My account is an attempt in
part to show that the broader interpretation is plausible, richer, and recommended by indica-
tions in the text.
:~i Guthrie IV, p. 187.
 CONTINUITY THEORY I53
W h a t w e n o w w a n t to a s k is w h e t h e r t h e t h r e e P l a t o n i c d o c t r i n e s , w h i c h w e
e n u m e r a t e d e a r l i e r a n d a b o u t w h i c h t h e r e is s u c h c o n t r o v e r s y , w o u l d b e
a p p e a l i n g to o n e w h o h e l d t h e c o n t i n u i t y t h e o r y we h a v e d e s c r i b e d . Is this
t h e o r y , as a n e x p l i c i t l y m e t a p h y s i c a l view, a s t a g e o n t h e w a y to t h e P l a t o n i c
T h e o r y o f F o r m s ? D o e s it p o i n t in t h e d i r e c t i o n , n o t o n l y o f l a t e r d i s c u s s i o n s
o f p a r t s a n d w h o l e s , b u t also o f P l a t o ' s d o c t r i n e o f p u r e , i n d e p e n d e n t l y
existing Forms?
T h e c o m p r e s e n c e o f o p p o s i t e s is s e r i o u s l y i m p l i c a t e d in t h e P l a t o n i c t h e -
o r y o f t h e s e p a r a t i o n o f t h e w o r l d o f F o r m s f r o m t h e w o r l d of" s e n s i b l e
p a r t i c u l a r s a n d o b s e r v a b l e p r o p e r t i e s Y S o m e c o m m e n t a t o r s t a k e t h e fact
t h a t o p p o s i t e s a r e c o m p r e s e n t in c o n c r e t e p a r t i c u l a r s to constitute t h e " i m p e r -
f e c t i o n o f t h e s e n s i b l e w o r l d " a n d t h e r e b y to b e w h a t f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i s t i n -
guishes Forms from sensible objects. In short, there are those who would
identify t h e s e p a r a t i o n o f F o r m s w i t h t h e i r b e i n g i m m u n e to c o m p r e s e n c e .
A n d this i m m u n i t y is t h o u g h t to i n v o l v e t h e n o t i o n o f t h e F o r m ' s b e i n g
p u r e l y a n d u n q u a l i f i e d l y w h a t it is. O n e c a n , t h a t is, i n t e g r a t e t h e t h r e e
doctrines, making of them a neat package, and Plato may indeed have come
to c o n c e i v e o f t h e t h r e e as i n t e r r e l a t e d in this v e r y way.
F o r t h e p r e s e n t , h o w e v e r , let us c o n s i d e r t h e c o m p r e s e n c e of" o p p o s i t e s
o n its o w n . : By i t s e l f s u c h c o m p r e s e n c e d o e s n o t e n t a i l s e p a r a t i o n ; :~ o t h e r
p r e m i s e s a r e n e e d e d to m o b i l i z e a n e n t a i l m e n t o r a n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e
t w o d o c t r i n e s . A l l e n calls c o m p r e s e n c e a r e g u l a t i v e p r i n c i p l e o f d i a l e c t i c ;
V l a s t o s e m p h a s i z e s its r o l e in P l a t o ' s d e g r e e s o f r e a l i t y t h e o r y , i n t e r p r e t e d as
p r i m a r i l y a n e p i s t e m o i o g i c a l t h e o r y . I r w i n i d e n t i f i e s it w i t h t h e k i n d o f

:~7 For discussion, see T. Irwin, "Plato's Heracleiteanism," Philosophical Quarterly ~7 (.lanu-
ary, 1977), 1-13; R.E.AIIen, "The Argument from Opposites in Rep. V," The Review of Metaphys-
ics XV (1961), 325-335; John Brentlinger, "Incomplete Predicates and the Two-Wnrld Theory
of the Phaedo," Phronesis XVI I (1972), 61-79; Alexander Nehamas, "Plato on the I mperfectinn
of the Sensible World." American Philosophical Quarterly 1~ (~975), 1~ 27; Gregory Vlastos,
"Degrees of Reality in Plato," in Renford Bambrough (ed.), New Essays on Plato and Aristotle
(London, 1965).
:~ By "the compresence of opposites" I mean to refer to (a) tile fact that there are some
things which, if they have one of a pair of opposite properties, also have the other, and (b) the
fact that there are some things which can have only one of such a pair. fn the case of a property
F, for example, if some object x has F, it also has G, F's opposite. But the F, which makes all F
things to be F, is only F and cannot be G. In the Republic, there is reason to think that Plato takes
compresence to occur necessarily. That is, if x is F, x must also be G. One might hold a weaker
view, however, according to which x can be and frequently is G. In the HM what is at issue is the
presence of at least such a weaker view.
:~" Heraclitus seems to have held some view about the compresence or "unity" of opposites.
And Anaxagoras's doctrine that "all things have a portion of all things" would entail such
compresence--and much else besides, of course. Neither, however, have a view of separation.
For Plato's association of Heraclitus with compresence, see HM z89b3- 5. Cs Irwin, "Plato's
Heracleiteanism," passim.
154 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
c h a n g e that is t h o u g h t by Plato to infect all sensibles. 4" W h a t e v e r its even-
tual p u r p o s e o r role within Plato's thinking, however, the doctrine o f corn-
presence can be c o n s i d e r e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y in terms o f two questions. ( 1 ) I s
some f o r m o f the d o c t r i n e o f the c o m p r e s e n c e o f opposites p r e s e n t in the
Hippias Major? (2) Is it reasonable to s u p p o s e that one who held the quali-
fied continuity we have described m i g h t also advocate such a d o c t r i n e o f
compresence?
I n the course o f the early elenchoi in the Hippias Major Socrates does use
the presence o f opposites in objects to discredit Hippias's p r o p o s e d deft-
nitions. 4' A beautiful m a i d e n is both beautiful a n d ugly a n d hence c a n n o t
be what ~6 162 is by itself (~89-5). T h e reason for this denial is that xd,
162 by itself is "that by m e a n s o f which all o t h e r things are o r d e r e d a n d
a p p e a r beautiful w h e n that f o r m is a d d e d to [them] " ( 2 8 9 d 9 - 4 ; cf.299c 9 -
dl); p r e s u m a b l y such a cause o f beauty c a n n o t be both beautiful a n d ugly.
T h e beautiful being s o u g h t is the sort o f thing that can n e v e r a p p e a r ugly to
a n y o n e a n y w h e r e ( 2 9 1 d l - 3 ) ; it i~ always beautiful for e v e r y o n e in c o m p a r i -
son to all things ( 2 9 2 d 6 - e 8 ) . A l t h o u g h , as Malcolm notes, Plato does not
have Socrates a n d Hippias here explore all the senses in which opposites are
c o m p r e s e n t in observables, he canvasses e n o u g h o f the relevant cases to
make clear his intention. 4~ T h e object o f definition, that which makes all
things beautiful when a d d e d to them, c a n n o t be ugly in any sense. 4:~ Surely
Socrates, who is p r o v i d i n g the dialectical g u i d a n c e o f which this denial o f
c o m p r e s e n c e is a part, himself takes the doctrine seriously. 44
But what exactly does Socrates believe a b o u t opposites? T w o things: (1)
that certain things are infected with opposition, a n d (2) that real or g e n u i n e
causes, the objects o f definition, are not. Some things, if" they have o n e o f a
pair o f opposite properties, can and d o have the o t h e r ; others cannot. 45 Is
this pair o f beliefs compatible with the qualified continuity theory?
Socrates' t h e o r y is a t h e o r y a b o u t two types o f properties, distinguished in
terms o f how they distribute t h r o u g h o u t wholes a n d their parts. A m o n g the
c o n t i n u o u s p r o p e r t i e s are the beautiful, the just, the unjust, and the wise, all
attested or plausible objects o f Socratic definitional inquiry a n d all p r o p e r t i e s
4- See Irwin, ibid.; Allen, Plato's Euthryphro, 73-4; Vlastos, "Degrees of Reality."
4, For discussion, see Allen, ibid.; Malcolm, "On the Place of the Htppias Major."
44 Malcolm, "On the Place of the Hippias Major," pp. 192- 3.
4:~ We have discussed above why Socrates accepts so readily the predications "The beautiful
is beautiful" and "D is beautiful," where D is the proposed definiens of the beautiful.
" There may also be a use of the compresence in Socrates' criticism of Hippias's extreme
continuity theory. We noted earlier that one result of his criticism (3o2al-b3) is that all num-
bers are both odd and even. This result is unacceptable tbr a number of reasons, one of which
might be that numbers are causes not only of what they are but also of properties tied to them.
Cf. Phaedo lo3c--lo5c and note 28 above.
4~ See note 4o.
 CONTINUITY THEORY 155

for which Plato holds that t h e r e are c o r r e s p o n d i n g Forms. 4~ But the same
claims hold for the one, the two, the odd, and the even, all examples of"
discontinuous properties. 47 F u r t h e r m o r e , both types o f properties can and
d o include pairs o f opposites. Socrates' t h e o r y is about w h e t h e r a single
p r o p e r t y can be p r e s e n t in two related things; the c o m p r e s e n c e doctrine is
a b o u t w h e t h e r two related p r o p e r t i e s can be simultaneously present in one
thing. It might seem that the two doctrines have d i f f e r e n t scopes a l t o g e t h e r
and for this reason n e i t h e r entail n o r exclude each other.
T h e relation o f the two is not quite so neatly u n d e r s t o o d , however, for
Socrates' t h e o r y is not only a b o u t properties; it is also about two types o f
parts and wholes. A n d the c o m p r e s e n c e doctrine is not only about opposite
properties; it is also a b o u t two types o f things in which the opposites can be
present. 4~ S u p p o s e we consider, then, a whole such as a pair o f two just
people. O n Socrates' theory, the pair is just, and each p e r s o n is just, but only
in d i f f e r e n t senses. T h e p e o p l e are individually just, say, because o f their
character, virtue, and behavior; the pair is just because its m e m b e r s are.
According to the d o c t r i n e o f c o m p r e s e n c e , if each p e r s o n is just, he or she
can be, and probably is, unjust as well. A n d if so, then the pair o f just people
is also a pair o f unjust ones. C o n t i n u o u s properties, then, can easily satisfy
the r e q u i r e m e n t s o f c o m p r e s e n c e if the whole is a m e r e aggregate. What,
however, o f discontinuous properties? Consider both and each, for example.
O n Socrates' theory, the pair is both two; the m e m b e r s are each one. Can the
pair also be one? Can the m e m b e r s each be two and both? T h e answer is that
such c o m p r e s e n c e is possible only if one, two, and the o t h e r discontinuous
p r o p e r t i e s are yet to be qualified so that, for example, a pair of" shoes can be
said to be one pair o f shoes but also two shoes. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , however, if"
discontinuous p r o p e r t i e s can be qualified in this way, t h e n they are not
d i s c o n t i n u o u s - - u n l e s s , that is, Hippias and Socrates intend that the two
predications, o f the whole and its parts, must be unequivocal. T h e result, it
seems, is that opposite discontinuous properties, only if u n d e r s t o o d un-
equivocally, c a n n o t be c o m p r e s e n t u n d e r certain circumstances. And if o n e
were to balk at this result, refusing to treat both and each as opposites, o n e
n e e d only t u r n to o d d and even, which yield the same conclusion.
T h e p r o b l e m o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g the relationship between these two doc-
trines becomes even m o r e acute when the wholes in question are taken to be

i~ Definitions are sought, in the HM for the beautiful, and in Rep. 1 fk~rthe.just; in the
Phaedo and Republic forms are attested to for all four.
47 See Phaedo lo3c-lo5c and Republic VII, passim.
4~ In fact, there are more than two types of"things, since opposite properties are present in
actions, persons (souls), and properties as well as in concrete individual things (cf. HM 292c9-
d3).
 156 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

s u b s t a n c e s . I n t h e c a s e o f a g g r e g a t e s , t h e w h o l e c o u l d n o t b e a n e w u n i t y ; in
the case of substances, the whole cannot be non-hemogeneous. Once again,
i f w e b e g i n w i t h a c h u n k o f g o l d , b o t h it a n d its p a r t s c a n b e h e a v y a n d l i g h t ,
b u t its d i s c o n t i n u o u s p r o p e r t i e s - - i t s w e i g h t o r s h a p e , f o r e x a m p l e - - - d o n o t
c o n f o r m . A n d i f a d e t e r m i n a t i n o f d i s c r e t e q u a n t i t y is n o t t h o u g h t to h a v e
an oppositeIspheres and cubes, though incompatible, are not polar oppo-
sites, t h e r e a r e s u r e l y d e r i v a t i v e p r o p e r t i e s t h a t a r e , e.g., a n g u l a r a n d
curved.
T h e s e r e f l e c t i o n s b r i n g us to a c o n c l u s i o n . E i t h e r S o c r a t e s ' q u a l i f i e d c o n -
t i n u i t y t h e o r y , w h i c h a p p e a r s to d e a l w i t h p r o p e r t i e s f o r w h i c h d e f i n i t i o n s
a r e s o u g h t , m u s t b e r e s t r i c t e d to u n e q u i v o c a l p r e d i c a t i o n o r t h e d o c t r i n e o f
c o m p r e s e n c e m u s t b e r e s t r i c t e d in s c o p e ? 9 N e i t h e r r e f i n e m e n t is d e v e l o p e d
in t h e Hippias Major b u t it is n o t i m p o s s i b l e t h a t S o c r a t e s h a d o n e o r b o t h in
mindior t r e a t e d t h e d i s c o n t i n u o u s p r o p e r t i e s as a l r e a d y c o m p l e t e a n d to
be qualified no further.
T h e c o m p r e s e n c e o f o p p o s i t e s e n t a i l s t h a t w h i l e s o m e t h i n g s a r e said to
b e F a n d G, w h e r e t h e s e a r e o p p o s i t e s , o t h e r t h i n g s c a n o n l y b e s a i d to b e
e i t h e r F o r G. B u t this m e a n s t h a t w h a t m a k e s t h i n g s to b e b e a u t i f u l , f o r
e x a m p l e , is i t s e l f s a i d to b e b e a u t i f u l . 5'' I n t h e Hippias M a j o r S o c r a t e s e i t h e r
r e c o g n i z e s o r p r o p o s e s j u s t this. I n d o i n g so, h o w e v e r , is h e b e i n g c o n s i s t e n t
w i t h his t h e o r y o f c o n t i n u o u s a n d d i s c o n t i n u o u s p r o p e r t i e s ?
A s we h a v e s h o w n , S o c r a t e s ' t h e o r y is p a r t i a l l y a t h e o r y a b o u t o b j e c t s like
~6 t h a t m a k e o t h e r t h i n g s to b e t h e w a y t h e y a r e . T h e p r o p e r t i e s t h a t
t h e t h e o r y d e a l s w i t h , t h a t is, p l a y a c a u s a l r o l e , a n d t h e s e p r o p e r t i e s o r
o b j e c t s a r e j u s t t h e s o r t o f t h i n g t h a t is said to b e t h e s u b j e c t o f s o - c a l l e d
self-predications. Moreover, Socrates' theory concerns the presence of these
p r o p e r t i e s in w h o l e s a n d t h e i r p a r t s , a n d it c o n c e r n s t h e r e b y w h a t k i n d o f

~ For one example of such a restriction, see Phaedo lO3C-lO5C. In certain cases, if x is dp
and if" F and G are opposites, such that all yk are F, then x is F and cannot be G and still remain
~,.
7" We cannot enter into a full-scale discussion of the semantics of so-called self-predications.
Two valuable discussions can be fbund in: R.E.Allen, "Participation and Predication in Plato's
Middle Dialogues," reprinted in R.E.AIIen (ed.), Studies in Plato" Metaphysics (London, 1965);
Alexander Nehamas, "Self-Predication and Plato's Theory of Forms," American Philosophical
Qu~lrterly 16,~ (1979), 93-1o3. Nehamas suggests and argues for the following analysis of self-
predication (95): The F itself" is F =def. The F itself', whatever it turns out to be, is what it is to
be F. This reading may be correct fin" later dialngues, but it cannot be correct for the HM. As I
have tried to show above, Socrates' argument requires that one must be able to ask about an~
predication "x is F" why x is F. What, that is, makes x to be F? But if Nehamas is right, such a
question is unnecessary for "The F itself is F." However, in the HM, Socrates and Hippias
assume that if the F itself" is the ~, then the qb is F, and the same causal question applies. This
would be unnecessary if "The ~p is F" meant 'The qb is what it is to be F." On Nehamas's analysis
this would be so, since in each case of a proposed account, the definiens would in fact be what it is
to be F.
 CONTINUITY THEORY 157
relation, if any, holds between what can be said o f the whole a n d what can be
said o f its parts. Does this theory, however, either state or imply a n y t h i n g
a b o u t what can be said o f these properties themselves? I f Socrates were to
think that the p r o p e r t y that makes W to be, say, beautiful is also a part, o f W,
t h e n he m i g h t also believe that p r o p e r t y is beautiful 5' a n d beautiful in pre-
cisely the same s e n s e - - i f he took beauty to be a c o n t i n u o u s p r o p e r t y . T h e r e
is no d o u b t at all that he does the latter ( 3 o 3 b i - c 7 ) . E v e r y t h i n g turns on
w h e t h e r a p r o p e r t y o f W is a part o f W. I do not know how to decide this fi)r
Socrates in the Hippias Major but, as I m e n t i o n e d before, I think that Hip-
pias's criticism o f Socrates at least hints that Socrates took objects to be
collections o f discrete properties. It is at least plausible to treat such p r o p -
erties as parts o f the objects c o m p o s e d o f them.
I have been trying to show how o n e m i g h t move f r o m Socrates' t h e o r y to
self-predication. Moreover, if we consider the reverse direction, then given
self-predication, we can explain, via Socrates' theory, how the object (the
whole) acquires the n a m e o f the f o r m o r p r o p e r t y in it. ~'~ O u r conclusion,
then, is that Socrates' continuity t h e o r y is certainly compatible with s e l f
predication, and, when p r o v i d e d with o t h e r premises, may be very closely
associated with it.
H a v i n g discussed the c o m p r e s e n c e o f opposites a n d serf-predication, we
can now t u r n tO separation, the ;(mQtobt6g, and the T w o - W o r l d doctrine st)
characteristic o f the Phaedo a n d the Republic. Surely, if the c o m p r e s e n c e o f
opposites is taken to constitute separation, then o u r question has already
been answered. But if not, if separation requires s o m e t h i n g else, the answer
may be m o r e elusive. Socrates does r e f e r to ~6 as that which makes
things a p p e a r to be beautiful " w h e n that f o r m is a d d e d to [them]" ( = 8 9 d 3 - 4 ;
2 9 2 c 9 - d 3 ) , and this may seem to r e c o m m e n d some n o t i o n o f i m m a n e n t
p r o p e r t y . But he also speaks o f ~6 as "that at which we look and say
that they are beautiful" (299e2), which m i g h t be taken to suggest, t h o u g h it
need not, 5:~ a m o d e l or p a r a d i g m separated f r o m things. T h r o u g h o u t the
Hippias Major a n d o u r passage, the t e r m i n o l o g y used to r e p r e s e n t the rela-
tion between concrete things, actions, a n d so on and the object o f inquiry is a
causal l a n g u a g e - - t h e instrumental dative, the word cff~tov, the notion o f

~' Socrates would also think that every_part of W is beautiful.

~ That is, we can explain eponymyfor Socrates. Why do we call x "beautiful"? Because there
is something in x that makes beautiful things to he beautiful. That thing is itself beautiful and
indeed only beautiful and not ugly. It is a part of x, and "beautiful" is a continuous predicate.
Therefore, x is beautiful.
:':~ Plato frequently uses dt~of3~a~e0 to refer to the act of looking at the separated Forms; see
Rep. VII, 539a3-5; V, 472c4-dl; VII, 54oa4-c~. It is used atEuthyphro 6e3-6 in a similar way,
although it is widely agreed that the tg~a there, while a ~mQc~6~ty~tc~,is not separated. Cf. Allen,
Plato's Euthryphro, 98-9, and Meno 7~c6-d 1, for a more controversial case.
158 H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

making. This does not decidedly favor either separation or non-separation.

But there is one text that does, I think, at least from Hippias's point of view.
In his criticism of Socrates (3olb2-c3), Hippias chastizes Socrates for "test-
ing the beautiful and each of the things that are (6{,xct) by taking them in
their discussions and cutting them up" (b4-5). Although Hippias's point is
that this leads to an erroneous tendency to view things as discontinuous, it does
suggest as well that Socrates treats things as collections of pieces of pro-
perties. Separated forms can be brought into this picture, I think, but only
with difficulty.
In the end, however, Socrates' theory about continuous and discontinu-
ous properties neither implies separation nor is it incompatible with it. But if
the indications I cited are persuasive---or indeed if compresence is taken to
constitute separation for Socrates, then separation is unlikely in the Hippias
Major.
CONCLUSION

My purpose in this paper has been to test the scope of Socrates'--and

Plato's--metaphysical convictions in the Hippias Major and to do so in a
rather unusual way. I hope to have shown that the theory of properties,
parts, and wholes is one that Socrates himself held and that it can serve in a
two-fold fashion as we look ahead to Plato's more developed thought. First,
it reveals areas where further reflection and investigation are needed and
where--in the Protagoras, Theatetus, Philebus, and elsewhere--Plato seems to
have pursued distinctions about properties, parts, and wholes not yet articu-
lated in the Hippias Major. Secondly, the theory can be used to test the
presence of certain Platonic doctrines in the Hippias Major. When that is
done, we see that one who endorsed the theory probably would not have
taken properties to be separated, might very well have thought that the
cause of an object's being F must itself" be F, but could have adopted a belief
in the compresence of opposites only with modifications in his theory. While
modest results, these are nonetheless helpful in trying to understand the
development of Plato's thinking on metaphysical matters at the time the
Hippias Major was written. 54

Indiana University
~4 I would like to thank Alan Bowen and Paul W o o d r u f f for valuable c o m m e n t s and
criticisms o f an earlier draft.