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Pelaez v Auditor General

- EO purports to create 33 municipalities.

- EO is null and void, the authority to create municipal corporations is an act legislature in nature.
- Thus, it is beyond the power of the President to create municipalities through Executive Orders.

Municipality of Jimenez v Executive Secretary

- An EO creating the Municipality of San Andres, segregating the same from Municipality of
Narciso is null and void power to create municipality is a legislative act.
- However, San Andres has attained a status that of a de facto municipal corporation.
- Requisites of De Facto Municipal Corp (LACA Power); and that recognition of by the State of the
Corporate existence of the Municipality.
- And has attained its De Jure status (created by operation of law) by virtue of enactment of the
Local Government Code, which provides that Municipalities existing as of the date of effectivity
of this code shall continue to exist and operate as such

Municipality of Jimenez v Executive Secretary

- The Municipality of Sinacaban has been in existence for period of 40 years, and at 16 years of
prior to the promulgation of judgment in the case of Palaez.
- Sinacaban has attained its de facto status (LACA Powers) and recognition of the State of its
corporate existence.
- Whatever is the defect in the creation of Municipality of Sinacaban was cured by the ruing in the
case of Narciso.
- Thus, the said Municipality has attained its de jure status (by operation of the law) through
enactment of the LGC, which provides that municipalities existing at the effectivity of the code
shall continue to exist and operate as such.

BSP v COA

- BSP is a public Corporation under its charter CA 111. Its charter created it as a public
corporation to serve public interest
- The statutory designation of BSP as public corporation and substantial participation of the
government in selection of members of National Executive Board of BSP BSP as constituted in
its charter is a GOCC.
- BSP is both a GOCC with original charter and an instrumentality of the government.
- Note: Art 12 Sec 16 provides that the Congress shall not, except by general law provide for the
formation of private corporation

Feliciano v COA

- Local Water Districts are created pursuant to PD 198.

- It was ruled the LWD is a public corporation, a GOCC created under a special charter; thus under
the auditing jurisdiction of COA.
- LWD is not a private corporation because it is not under a general law Corporation Code.

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- The Constitutional prohibition is creation of original charter for private corporations, as they
should be incorporated under a general corporation law. There is no prohibition on creating a
special charter for several GOCCs.

Philippine Society for Prevention and Cruelty to Animals vs COA

- PSPCA is a quasi-corporation, a private corporation which renders service for public need.
- Certain juridical entities are impressed with public interest, does not, by such circumstance
makes an entity a public corporation.
- Although PSPCA was created through special, the general corporation code was not yet existing.
- PSPCA lost its operational funding and is deprived of its function to make arrest.

Camid v Office of the President

- Municipality of Andong has not attained the status of de factor municipal corporation, due to
absence of recognition by the State of its corporate existence, evidenced by no appropriation of
funds and absence of election in the municipality.
- Thus, it cannot be deemed to have achieved the status of de jure municipality upon the
enactment of LGC, because of non recognition by state of its existence.

League of the Cities of the Philippines v COMELEC

- The cityhood laws are constitutional, it was ruled that the Congress clearly intended that the
LGUs covered by the cityhood laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009.
- RA 9009 prescribed that municipalities seeking conversion into cities must have at least 100M
income, exclusive of the revenue share obtained from the central government.
- The municipalities had pending conversion prior to the adoption by Senate of Bill 2157 as RA
9009

League of Province v DENR

- Sec 17 b (3) (iii) of the LGC is constitutional.

- The authority of Sec of DENR to review the grant of mining permit by the province is pursuant to
its quasi-judicial power.
- It is not a means of control that violate the autonomy of the LGU, but rather the function of
determining rights based on law it sought to enforce.

Arrastre v CA

- The mayor denied the petitioners application for renewal of permit; petitioner contends that
the issuance of permit is a ministerial duty of the mayor, and that the latter does not have the
authority to deny application.
- It was ruled that the power granted by LGC to mayor in issuance of permit carries with full
discretion to deny the issuance thereof, despite compliance with documentary requisites.
- The power of mayor to issue licenses is pursuant to the general welfare clause of the LGC, which
is a delegation of police power to LGU to prescribe regulations to protect the health and safety
of the people, and maintenance of peace and order within their respective jurisdiction.

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Fernando v St Scholastica College

- To successfully invoke the exercise of police power under the general welfare clause, must
conform to the following tests:
1. Strict Scrutiny Test government is required to show presence of compelling government
interest and absence of less restrictive means in achieving the interest.
2. Rational Relationship Test (1) for the interest of general public / lawful subject; (2)
reasonable means employed / lawful method.
- Absence of concurrence of 2 requisites, the regulation must be struck down due to arbitrary
intrusion to private rights or violation of due process.
- The set-back requirement would tantamount to the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation.
- The subject of the regulation maybe valid, it being pursued for public interest, however the
means employed to achieve the same is unreasonable.

City of Manila v Laquio

- The LGU pursuant to its delegated police, could exercise summary abatement of nuisance per
se.
- Thus, the summary abatement of motels (closure) by LGU is a violation of due process, because
motels are not nuisance per se.
- The regulation does not conform to valid exercise of delegated police power: (1) lawful subject
and (2) lawful methods.
- The subject of regulation maybe valid to avoid prostitution, however, the means employed to
carry out the regulation is unreasonable. It deprives the motel owners of their right to conduct
business and their property without due process of law.

Municipality of Paranaque v VM Realty Corp

- Resolution was passed for the purpose of expropriation of property of the petitioner for
alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing home to the homeless.
- It was ruled that the exercise of eminent domain, expropriation of private property for public
use was not validly complied with. (note the 4 requisites)
- Also, a mere resolution is not substantial compliance to the exercise it power to expropriate.

Figuracion v Cresencio

- On this case, it was the Supreme Court that made the decision to withdraw the subject local
road from public domain, and the Sanggunian is not empowered to declare the same an
alienable.
- The road used for public service is under the control of congress and the LGU has no authority to
regulate its use.
- The LGC provides that property withdrawn from public use may be used for any purpose for
which the other real property belonging to LGU concerned maybe lawfully used

New Sun Valley Homeowners Assoc v BBSV

- GR the closure and opening of roads requires passage of ordinance by concerned LGU.

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- But it has not application on this case, the subject land has been donated to the city
government, and the issuance of resolution is for the purpose of reminder to appellant that the
road is under public domain, and not for the purpose of opening / closure of the same.

White Light Corp v City of Manila

- Ordinance violation of due process, allows summary abatement / closure of the motels/ inn
which are not nuisance per se.
- Requisite to valid exercise of police power not complied.

Municipality of Hagonoy vs Dumdum

- GR is that the State cannot be sued without its consent; however implied consent is granted by
the State to be sued when it entered into a contract with private entity.
- However, as to the liability, the government funds may not be seized under writ of execution /
garnishment to satisfy judgment.
- The disbarment of public funds is covered by corresponding appropriation as required by the
law.

Municipality of Camiling v Lopez

- The absence of approval of governor on the ordinance does not render the same null and viod.
- There is no prohibition against municipal council entering into contracts on municipal
properties.

Estate of Pedro Gonzales v Perez

- Deed of sale executed by Marikina council without approval of governor is valid and has the
effect of transferring ownership.
- The absence of approval does not make the contract void, but only voidable subject to
ratification of the governor.
- Thus, it remains valid and has the effect of transferring ownership until the same is nullified.

Land Bank v Cavayuran

- Conversion of plaza, a public domain, into commercial centre is beyond the power of the
municipality (ultra vires)
- It being a property under public domain, it is outside the commerce of man and cannot be
subject of appropriation
- and under the control of congress, same should not be withdrawn from public domain unless
expressly withdrawn by the congress through legislation.