Donation Cases

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6600 July 30, 1954
HEIRS OF JUAN BONSATO and FELIPE BONSATO, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFA UTEA, ET AL., respondents.
Benedict C. Balderrama for petitioners.

Inocencio Rosete for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals holding two deeds of donation
executed on the first day of December, 1939 by the late Domingo Bonsato in favor of his brother
Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, to be void for being donations mortis
causa accomplished without the formalities required by law for testamentary dispositions.
The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Case No. 8892) on June 27,
1945, by respondents Josefa Utea and other heirs of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea
Nacario, both deceased. Their complaint (for annulment and damages) charged that on the first
day of December, 1949, Domingo Bonsato, then already a widower, had been induced and
deceived into signing two notarial deeds of donations (Exhibits 1 and 2) in favor of his brother
Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, respectively, transferring to them several
parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 5652, 12049, and 12052, situated in the
municipalities of Mabini and Burgos, Province of Pangasinan, both donations having been duly
accepted in the same act and documents. Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations
were mortis causa and void for lack of the requisite formalities. The defendants, Juan Bonsato
and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the donations made in their favor were voluntarily
executed in consideration of past services rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that
the same were executed freely without the use of force and violence, misrepresentation or
intimidation; and prayed for the dismissal of the case and for damages in the sum of P2,000.
After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered its decision on November 13, 1949, finding that
the deeds of donation were executed by the donor while the latter was of sound mind, without
pressure or intimidation; that the deeds were of donation inter vivos without any condition
making their validity or efficacy dependent upon the death of the donor; but as the properties
donated were presumptively conjugal, having been acquired during the coverture of Domingo
Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, the donations were only valid as to an undivided one-half
share in the three parcels of land described therein.
Thereupon the plaintiffs duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning as primary error the
holding of the court below that the donations are inter vivos; appellants contending that they
were mortis causa donations, and invalid because they had not been executed with the
formalities required for testamentary disposition.
A division of five of the Court of Appeals took the case under consideration, and on January 12,
1953, the majority rendered judgment holding the aforesaid donations to be null and void,
because they were donations mortis causa and were executed without the testamentary
formalities prescribed by law, and ordered the defendants-appellees Bonsato to surrender the
possession of the properties in litigation to the plaintiffs-appellants. Two Justices dissented,
claiming that the said donations should be considered as donations inter vivos and voted for the
affirmance of the decision of the Court of First Instance. The donees then sought a review by
this Court.
The sole issue submitted to this Court, therefore, is the juridical nature of the donations in
question. Both deeds (Exhs. 1 and 2) are couched in identical terms, with the exception of the
names of the donees and the number and description of the properties donated. The principal
provisions are the following.
ESCRITURA DE DONATION
Yo, Domingo Bonsato, viudo de Andrea Nacario, mayor de edad, vencino y residente
del municipio de Agno, Pangasinan, I.F., por la presente declaro lo siguiente:
Que mi osbrino Felipe Bonsato, casado, tambien mayor de edad, vecino de Agno,
Pangasinan, I.F., en consideracion de su largo servicio a Domingo Bonsato, por la
presente hagor y otorgo una donacion perfecta e irrevocable consumada a favor del
citado Felipe Bonsato de dos parcelas de terreno palayero como se describe mas abajo.
(Description omitted)
Que durante su menor de edad de mi citado sobrino Felipe Bonsato hasta en estos dias,
siempre me ha apreciado y estimado como uno de mis hijos y siempre ha cumplido
todas mis ordenes, y por esta razon bajo su pobriza sea movido mi sentimiento para dar
una recompensa de sus trabajos y aprecios a mi favor.
Que en este de 1939 el donante Domingo Bonsato ha entregado a Felipe Bonsato

dichos terrenos donados y arriba citados pero de los productos mientras vive el donante
tomara la parte que corresponde como dueo y la parte como inquilino tomara Felipe
Bonsato.
Que en vista de la vejez del donante, el donatorio Felipe Bonsato tomara posesion
inmediatamente de dichos terrenos a su favor.
Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donancion y el donatario
Felipe Bonsato tendra todos los derechos de dichos terrenos en concepto de dueo
absoluto de la propiedad libre de toda responsibilidad y gravamen y pueda ejercitar su
derecho que crea conveniente.
En Testimonio de todo lo Cual, signo la presente en Agno, Pangasinan, I.F., hoy dia 1.0
de Diciembre, 1939.
Domingo (His thumbmark) Bonsato
Yo, Felipe Bonsato, mayor de edad, casado, Vecino de Mabini, Pangasinan, I.F.,
declaro por la presente que acepto la donacion anterior otorgado por Domingo Bonsato
a mi favor.
(Sgd.) Felipe Bonsato
SIGNADO Y FIRMADO EN PRESENCIA DE:
(Sgd.) Illegible (Sgd.) Illegible
The majority of the special divisions of five of the Court of Appeals that took cognizance of this
case relied primarily on the last paragraph, stressing the passage:
Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion . . .
while the minority opinion lay emphasis on the second paragraph, wherein the donor states that
he makes "perfect, irrevocable, and consummated donation" of the properties to the respective
donees, petitioners herein.
Strictly speaking, the issue is whether the documents in question embody valid donations, or
else legacies void for failure to observe the formalities of wills (testaments). Despite the
widespread use of the term "donations mortis causa," it is well-established at present that the
Civil Code of 1889, in its Art. 620, broke away from the Roman Law tradition, and followed the
French doctrine that no one may both donate and retain ("donner at retenir ne vaut"), by
merging the erstwhile donations mortis causa with the testamentary dispositions, thus
suppressing said donations as an independent legal concept.
ART. 620. Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor partake
of the nature of disposals of property by will and shall be governed by the rules
established for testamentary successions.
Commenting on this article, Mucius Scaevola (Codigo Civl, Vol. XI, 2 parte, pp. 573, 575 says:
No ha mucho formulabamos esta pregunta: Subsisten las donaciones mortis

causa como institucion independiente, con propia autonomia y propio compo
jurisdiccional? La respuesta debe ser negativa.
xxx xxx xxx
Las donaciones mortis causa se consevan en el Codigo como se conserva un cuerpo

fosil en las vitrinas de un Museo. La asimilacion entre las donaciones por causa de
muerte y las transmissiones por testamento es perfecta.
Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th ed.), Vol. V. p. 83, expresses the same opinion:
"La disposicion del articulo 620 significa, por lo tanto: 1..o, que han desaparecido las
llamas antes donaciones mortis causapor lo que el Codigo no se ocupa de ellas en
absoluto; 2.o, que toda disposicion de bienes para despues de la muerte sigue las
reglas establecidas para la sucesion testamentaria.
And Castan, in his Derecho Civil, Vol. IV (7th Ed., 1953), p. 176, reiterates:
(b) Subsisten hoy en nuestro derecho las donaciones mortis causa? De lo que
acabamos de decir se desprende que las donaciones mortis causa han perdido en el
Codigo Civil su caracter distintivo y su naturaleza y hay que considerarlos hoy como una
institucion suprimida, refundida en el legado ... . Las tesis de la desaparcion de las
donaciones mortis causa en nuestro Codigo Civil, acusada ya precedentemente por el
pryecto de 1851 puede decirse que constituye una communis opinion entre nuestros
expositores, incluso los mas recientes.
We have insisted on this phase of the legal theory in order to emphasize that the term
"donations mortis causa" as commonly employed is merely a convenient name to designate
those dispositions of property that are void when made in the form of donations.
Did the late Domingo Bonsato make donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in favor
of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should reveal any or all of the
following characteristics:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive (Vidal vs. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil.,
633);
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista vs. Sabiniano, G. R.
L-4326, November 18, 1952);
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation, Exhibits 1 and 2, executed
by the late Domingo Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the
owner's share of the fruits or produce ("de los productos mientras viva el donante tomara la
parte que corresponde como dueo"), a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership
of the donated property remained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of stipulation
that the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to
be "irrevocable", a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis
causa where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator can not
lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code, Art. 737; New Civil Code, Art.
828).
It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase "that after the death of the
donor the aforesaid donation shall become effective" (que despues de la muerte del donante
entrara en vigor dicha donacion"). However, said expression must be construed together with
the rest of the paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the
donor's death, the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the
donated property, free from all liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the
donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated. Such reservation constituted
a charge or encumbrance that would disappear upon the donor's death, when full title would
become vested in the donees.
Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion y el donatario
Felipe Bonsato tendra todos derechos de dichos terrenos en concepto de dueo
absoluto de la propiedad libre de toda responsibilidad y gravamen y puede ejercitar su
derecho que crea conveniente.
Any other interpretation of this paragraph would cause it to conflict with the irrevocability of the
donation and its consummated character, as expressed in the first part of the deeds of donation,
a conflict that should be avoided (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 1285; New Civil Code, Art. 1374; Rule
123, sec. 59, Rules of Court).
Que mi sobrino FILIPINO BONSATO, casado, tambien mayor de edad, vecino de Agno,
Pangasinan, I. F., en consideracion de su largo servicio a Domingo Bonsato, por la presente
hago y otorgo una donacion perfecta e irrevocable consumada a favor del citado Felipe
Bonsato de dos parcelas de terreno palayero como se describe mas abajo.
In the cases held by this Court to be transfers mortis causa and declared invalid for not having
been executed with the formalities of testaments, the circumstances clearly indicated the
transferor's intention to defer the passing of title until after his death. Thus, in Cario vs. Abaya,
70 Phil., 182, not only were the properties not to be given until thirty days after the death of the
last of the donors, but the deed also referred to the donees as "those who had been mentioned
to inherit from us", the verb "to inherit" clearly implying the acquisition of property only from and
after the death of the alleged donors. In Bautista vs. Sabiniano, 49 Off. Gaz., 549; 92 Phil., 244,
the alleged donor expressly reserved the right to dispose of the properties conveyed at any time
before his death, and limited the donation "to whatever property or properties left undisposed by
me during my lifetime", thus clearly retaining their ownership until his death. While in David vs.
Sison, 42 Off. Gaz. (Dec, 1946) 3155, the donor not only reserved for herself all the fruits of the
property allegedly conveyed, but what is even more important, specially provided that "without
the knowledge and consent of the donor, the donated properties could not be disposed of in any
way", thereby denying to the transferees the most essential attribute of ownership, the power to
dispose of the properties. No similar restrictions are found in the deeds of donation involved in
this appeal.
That the conveyance was due to the affection of the donor for the donees and the services
rendered by the latter, is of no particular significance in determining whether the deeds Exhibits
1 and 2 constitute transfers inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have identical motivation.
Nevertheless, the existence of such consideration corroborates the express irrevocability of the
transfers and the absence of any reservation by the donor of title to, or control over, the
properties donated, and reinforces the conclusion that the act was inter vivos. Hence, it was
error for the Court of Appeals to declare that Exhibits 1 and 2 were invalid because the
formalities of testaments were not observed. Being donations inter vivos, the solemnities
required for them were those prescribed by Article 633 of the Civil Code of 1889 (reproduced in
Art. 749 of the new Code, and it is undisputed that these were duly complied with. As the
properties involved were conjugal, the Court of First Instance correctly decided that the
donations could not affect the half interest inherited by the respondents Josefa Utea, et al. from
the predeceased wife of the donor.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is
revived and given effect. Costs against respondents.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33849 August 18, 1977
TEODORICO ALEJANDRO, IRENEO POLICARPIO, VIRGINIA ALEJANDRO, MARIA

ALEJANDRO, SALUD ALEJANDRO, EMILIA ALEJANDRO, FLORENCIO ALEJANDRO
and DIONISIA ALEJANDRO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMBROSIO M. GERALDEZ, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch V, Sta. Maria, ANDREA DIAZ and ANGEL DIAZ, respondents.
G.R. No. L-33968 August 18, 1977
ANDREA DIAZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AMBROSIO M. GERALDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of

First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, TEODORICO ALEJANDRO, IRENEO
POLICARPIO, VIRGINIA ALEJANDRO, MARIA ALEJANDRO, EMILIA ALEJANDRO,
FLORENCIO ALEJANDRO and DIONISIA ALEJANDRO, respondents.
Ponciano G. Hernandez for Teodorico Alejandro, et al.
Porfirio Villaroman for Andrea Diaz and Angel Diaz.
AQUINO. J.
This is a case about donations inter vivos and mortis causa . The bone of contention is Lot
No. 2502 of the Lolomboy Friar Lands Estate with an area of 5,678 square meters, situated
in Sta. Maria, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7336. The facts are
as follows: On January 20, 1949 the spouses Gabino (Gavino) Diaz and Severa Mendoza,
their daughter-in-law Regina Fernando and their three children, Olimpia Diaz, Angel Diaz
and Andrea Diaz, executed a deed of donation covering eight lots of the Lolomboy Friar
Lands Estate, owned by the Diaz spouses, located at Barrio Parada, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
The deed reads as follows:
KASULATAN NG PAGKAKALOOB (A DEED OF DONATION)
ALAMIN NG LAHAT NG MAKATUTUNGHAY NITO:
Ang pagkakaloob (donation) na ito, ginawa at pinagtibay dito sa municipio ng

Sta. Maria, lalawigan ng Bulacan, Pilipinas, ngayong ika 20 ng Enero, 1949,
ng mag-asawang GABINO DIAZ at SEVERA MENDOZA, filipinos, may mga
sapat na gulang, naninirahan sa nayon ng Parada, Sta. Maria, Bulacan na
dito'y kinikilalang NAGKALOOB (DONORS), sa kapakanan nila REGINA
FERNANDO, filipina, may sapat na gulang, viuda; OLIMPIA DIAZ, filipina,
may sapat na gulang, kasal kay Teodorico Alejandro, ANGEL DIAZ, filipino,
may sapat na gulang, kasal kay Catalina Marcelo, at ANDREA DIAZ, filipina,
may sapat na gulang, kasal kay Perfecto Marcelo, mga naninirahan sa nayon
ng Parada, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, na dito'y kinikilalang PINAGKALOOBAN
(DONEES).
PAGPAPATUNAY:
Na ang Nagkaloob (DONORS) ay siyang mayari, at kamayari at
namomosision sa kasalukuyan ng mga parcelang lupa kasama ang mga
kagalingan na nasa lugar ng Parada, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, mapagkikilala sa
paraang mga sumusunod (description and statements as to registration are
omitted):
1. TCT No. 7336, Lot No. 2502, 5,678 square meters.
2. TCT No. 10998, Lot No. 2485, 640 square meters.
3. TCT No. 10840, Lot No. 2377,16,600 square meters.
4. TCT No. 10997, Lot No. 2448,12,478 square meters.
7. TCT No. 17961, Lot No. 2521, 715 square meters.
Na dahil at alang-alang sa pagmamahal at masuyong pagtingin na taglay ng

NAGKAKALOOB (DONORS) sa Pinagkakalooban (DONEES) gayun din sa
tapat at mahalagang paglilingkod noong mga lumipas na panahon na ginawa
ng huli sa una, ang nabanggit na nagkakaloob sa pamamagitan ng
kasulatang ito ng pagkakaloob (Donation) ay buong pusong inililipat at lubos
na ibinibigay sa nasabing pinagkakalooban ang lupang binabanggit at
makikilala sa unahan nito, laya sa ano mang sagutin at pagkakautang,
katulad nito:
(a) Na ang lupang sinasaysay sa Lote No. 2502 o Titulo No. 7336, (No. 1)
sa unahan nito ay hinati sa dalawang parte ang unang parte (1/2) na nasa
bandang Kanluran (West) ay ipinagkakaloob ng mag-asawang Gabino Diaz
at Severa Mendoza sa kanilang anak na si Angel Diaz, kasal kay Catalina
Marcelo; at ang ikalawang parte (1/2) na nasa 'bandang silangan (East) ay
ipinagkakaloob ng mag-asawang Gabino Diaz at Severa Mendoza sa
kanilang anak na si Andrea Diaz, kasal kay Perfecto Marcelo."
(Note Some dispositions are not reproduced verbatim but are merely
summarized because they are not involved in this case. Paragraph (a) above
is the one involved herein).
(b) Lot No. 2485, TCT No.10998, to Regina Fernando (daughter- in-law of
the donors and widow of their deceased son, Miguel Diaz) and Olimpia Diaz
in equal shares.
(c) Lot No. 2377, TCT No. 10840, 1/3 to Angel Diaz, 1/3 to Andrea Diaz,
and 1/3 "ay inilalaan o inihahanda ng mag-asawang Gabino Diaz at Severa
Mendoza sa kanilang sariling kapakanan o mga gastos nila.
(d) Lot No. 2448, TCT No. 10997 to Olimpia Diaz sa condicion na
pagkakalooban ni Olimpia Diaz si Crisanta de la Cruz, asawa ni Alejandro - -
- - - (sic) sakaling si Crisanta ay mamatay ng halagang isang daang piso
(P100), bilang gastos sa libing."
(e) Na ang lupang-solar na sinasaysay sa Lote No. 4168 o Titulo No. 2051
(No. 5); lupang-bukid na sinasaysay sa Lote No. 25?2 o Titulo No. 17960
(No. 6); at lupang-bukid na sinasaysay sa Lote No. 2521 o Titulo No. 17961
(No. 7) sa unahan nito ay inilalaan o inihahanda ng mag-asawang Gabino
Diaz at Severa Mendoza sa kanilang sariling kapakanan o mga gastos nila.
(f) Lot No. 2643, TCT No. 21453, to Regina Fernando and her children
with the deceased Miguel Diaz in whose name the said Lot was already
registered.
Na kaming mga pinagkakalooban (DONEES) na sila Regina Fernando,

Olimpia Diaz, Angel Diaz at Andrea Diaz ay tinatanggap namin ng buong
kasiyahang loob ang pagkakaloob (Donation.) na ito, at sa pamamagitan nito
ay kinikilala, pinahahalagahan, at lubos na pinasasalamatan namin ang
kagandahang loob at paglingap na ipinakita at ginawa ng nagkakaloob
(Donors).
AT SA WAKAS, ang pagkakaloob na ito (DONATION), ay sumasailalim sa

paraang mga sumusunod:
1. Ang mga Pinagkakalooban (Donatarios) na sila Regina Fernando, Olimpia

Diaz, Angel Diaz, at Andrea Diaz, siyang nakaaalam sa mga gastos sa
pagkakasakit at sa libing ng NAGKALOOB (DONANTE);
2. Na ang mga Pinagkalooban (DONATARIOS) ay hindi maaaring

makapagbili sa pangatlong tao ng nasabing mga pagaari samantalang ang
nagkaloob (Donante) ay buhay Datapwa't kung ang pagbibiling gagawin ay
upang malunasan ang mga gastos at menitencion ng Nagkaloob (Donante)
samakatuwid ang nasabing pagbibili ay matuwid;
3. Gayun din, samantalang kaming mag-asawang Gabino Diaz at Severa

Mendoza ay buhay, patuloy ang aming pamamahala, karapatan, at
pagkamay-ari sa mga nasabing pagaari na sinasaysay sa unahan nito na
pag-aari namin; ngunit sakaling kami ay bawian ng buhay ng Panginoong
Dios at mamatay na ang mga karapatan at pagkamay-ari ng bawa't
Pinagkalooban (Donatarios) sa bawa't pag-aari na nauukol sa bawa't isa ay
may lubos na kapangyarihan."
SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT, linagdaan namin ang kasulatang ito, dito sa

Sta. Maria, Bulacan, ngayon ika 20 ng Enero, 1949, sa patibay ng dalawang
sacsing kaharap. Signature ThumbmarkSignature GABINO DIAZ SEVERA
MENDOZA REGINA FERNANDO Thumbmark Signature SignatureOLIMPIA
DIAZ ANGEL DIAZ ANDREA DIAZ
(Acknowledgment signed by Notary Celedonio Reyes is omitted)
Gabino Diaz died in 1962. On October 20, 1964 Severa Mendoza and her two children,
Andrea Diaz and Angel Diaz, executed a deed of donation denominated as "Kasulatan ng
Pagbibigay na Magkakabisa Pagkamatay (Donation Mortis causa )" over one-half of Lot No.
2377-A, which is a portion of Lot No. 2377 of the Lolomboy Friar Lands Estate (which in turn
is item 3 or [c] in the 1949 deed of donation already mentioned).
In that deed of donation, Severa Mendoza donated to Andrea Diaz her one-half share in Lot
2377-A, which one-half share is Identified as Lot 2377-A-1, on condition that Andrea Diaz
would bear the funeral expenses to be incurred after the donor's death. She died in 1964.
It should be noted that the other one-half share in Lot 2377-A or Lot No. 2377-A-2 was
previously adjudicated to Angel Diaz because he defrayed the funeral expenses on the
occasion of the death of Gabino Diaz.
On May 12, 1970 Andrea Diaz sued her brother, Angel Diaz, in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Sta. Maria Branch V for the partition of Lots Nos. 2377-A and 2502 (Civil Case No.
SM-357). Teodorico Alejandro, the surviving spouse of Olimpia Diaz, and their children
intervened in the said case. They claimed one-third of Lot No. 2502. Angel Diaz alleged in
his answer that he had. been occupying his share of Lot No. 2502 "for more than twenty
years". The intervenors claimed that the 1949 donation was a void mortis causa disposition.
On March 15, 1971 the lower court rendered a partial decision with respect to Lot No. 2377-
A. The case was continued with respect to Lot No. 2502 which is item No. 1 or (a) in the
1949 deed of donation. The record does not show what happened to the other six lots
mentioned in the deed of donation.
The trial court in its decision of June 30, 1971 held that the said deed of donation was a
donation mortis causabecause the ownership of the properties donated did not pass to the
donees during the donors' lifetime but was transmitted to the donees only "upon the death
of the donors".
However, it sustained the division of Lot No. 2502 into two equal parts between Angel Diaz
and Andrea Diaz on the theory that the said deed of donation was effective "as an extra-
judicial partition among the parents and their children. Consequently, the Alejandro
intervenors were not given any share in Lot No. 2502. Angel Diaz and the intervenors were
ordered to pay Andrea Diaz "attorney's fees of P1,000 each or a total of P2,000".
The Alejandro intervenors filed a motion for reconsideration, On July 16, 1971 the trial court
denied that motion but eliminated the attorney's fees.
Andrea Diaz and the Alejandro intervenors filed separate appeals to this Court under
Republic Act No. 5440. Andrea Diaz contends that the 1949 deed of donation is a valid
donation inter vivos and that the trial court erred in deleting the award for attorney's fees.
The Alejandro intervenors contend that the said donation is mortis causa; that they are
entitled to a one-third share in Lot No, 2502, and that the trial court erred in characterizing
the deed as a valid partition. In the ultimate analysis, the appeal involves the issue of
whether the Alejandro intervenors should be awarded one-third of Lot No. 2502, or 1,892
square meters thereof, as intestate heirs of the Diaz spouses.
To resolve that issue, it is necessary to determine whether the deed of donation is inter
vivos or mortis causa. A brief exposition on the nature of donation inter vivos and mortis
causa may facilitate the resolution of that issue. Many legal battles have been fought on the
question of whether a particular deed is an inter vivos or mortis causadonation. The copious
jurisprudence on that point sheds light on that vexed question. The Civil Code provides:
ART. 728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor
partake of the nature of testamentary provisions, and shall be governed by
the rules established in the Title on Succession. (620).
ART. 729. When the donor intends that the donation shall take effect during
the lifetime of the donor, though the property shall not be delivered till after
the donor's death, this shall be a donation inter vivos. The fruits of the
property from the time of the acceptance of the donation, shall pertain to the
donee, unless the donor provides otherwise. (n)
ART. 730. The fixing of an event or the imposition of a suspensive condition,

which may take place beyond the natural expectation of life of the donor,
does not destroy the nature of the act as a donation inter vivos unless a
contrary intention appears. (n)
ART. 731. When a person donates something subject to the resolutory

condition of the donor's survival, there is a donation inter vivos. (n)
ART. 732. Donations which are to take effect inter vivos shall be governed by
the general provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not
determined in this Title. (621)."
Nature of donations inter vivos and mortis causa transfers. Before tackling the issues
raised in this appeal, it is necessary to have some familiarization with the distinctions
between donations inter vivos and mortis causabecause the Code prescribes different
formalities for the two kinds of donations. An utter vivos donation of real property must be
evidenced by a public document and should be accepted by the donee in the same deed of
donation or in a separate instrument. In the latter case, the donor should be notified of the
acceptance in an authentic form and that step should be noted in both instruments. (Art.
749, Civil Code. As to inter vivos donation of personal property, see art. 748).
On the other hand, a transfer mortis causa should be embodied in a last will and testament
(Art. 728, supra). It should not be called donation mortis causa . It is in reality a legacy (5
Manresa, Codigo Civil, 6th Ed., p. 107). If not embodied in a valid will, the donation is void
(Narag vs. Cecilio, 109 Phil. 299; Aznar vs. Sucilla 102 Phil. 902; Tuazon vs. Posadas, 54
Phil. 289; Serrano vs. Solomon, 105 Phil. 998, 1002).
This Court advised notaries to apprise donors of the necessity of clearly specifying whether,
notwithstanding the donation, they wish to retain the right to control and dispose at will of
the property before their death, without the consent or intervention of the beneficiary, since
the reservation of such right would be a conclusive indication that the transfer' would be
effective only at the donor's death, and, therefore, the formalities of testaments should be
observed; while, a converso, the express waiver of the right of free disposition would place
the inter vivoscharacter of the donation beyond dispute (Cuevas vs. Cuevas, 98 Phil.
68,72).
From the aforequoted articles 728 to 732, it is evident that it is the time of effectivity (aside
from the form) which distinguishes a donation inter vivos from a donation mortis causa . And
the effectivity is determined by the time when the full or naked ownership (dominum plenum
or dominium directum) of the donated properties is transmitted to the donees. (See Lopez
vs. Olbes, 15 Phil. 540; Gonzales and Fuster Fabra vs. Gonzales Mondragon, 35 Phil. 105).
The execution of a public instrument is a mode of delivery or tradition (Ortiz vs. Court of
Appeals, 97 Phil. 46).
If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that the full or naked
ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the donor's
death, then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis
causa which should be embodied in a last will and testament (Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals,
95 Phil. 481).
But if the donation takes effect during the donor's lifetime or independently of the donor's
death, meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) ) of the donated
properties passes to the donee during the donor's lifetime, not by reason of his death but
because of the deed of donation, then the donation is inter vivos (Castro vs. Court of
Appeals, L-20122, April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 1076).
The effectivity of the donation should be ascertained from the deed of donation and the
circumstances surrounding its execution. Where, for example, it is apparent from the
document of trust that the donee's acquisition of the property or right accrued immediately
upon the effectivity of the instrument and not upon the donor's death, the donation is inter
vivos (Kiene vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 97 Phil. 352).
There used to be a prevailing notion, spawned by a study of Roman Law, that the Civil
Code recognizes a donation mortis as a juridical act in contraposition to a donation inter
vivos. That impression persisted because the implications of article 620 of the Spanish Civil
Code, now article 728, that "las donaciones que hayan de producir sus efectos pro muerte
del donante participan de la naturaleza de las disposiciones de ultima voluntad, y se regiran
por las reglas establecidas en el capitulo de la sucesion testamentaria" had not been fully
expounded in the law schools. Notaries assumed that the donation mortis causa of the
Roman Law was incorporated into the Civil Code.
As explained by Justice J. B. L. Reyes in the Bonsato case, supra, article 620 broke away
from the Roman Law tradition and followed the French doctrine that no one may both
donate and retain. Article 620 merged donationsmortis causa with testamentary dispositions
and thus suppressed the said donations as an independent legal concept. Castan Tobenas
says:
(b) Subsisten hoy en nuestro Derecho las donaciones mortis causa ? De

lo que acabamos de decir se desprende que las donaciones mortis
causa han perdido en el Codigo civil su caracter distintivo y su naturaleza, y
hay que considerarlas hoy como una institucion suspirimida, refundida en la
del legado. ...
La tesis de la desaparicion de las donaciones mortis causa en nuestro

Codigo Civil, acusada ya precedentemente por el projecto de 1851, puede
decirse que constituye una communis opinio entre nuestros expositores,
incluso los mas recientes. ...
Garcia Goyena, comentando dicho proyecto, decia que la Comision se habia

adherido al acuerdo de suprimir las donaciones mortis causa , seguido por
casi todos los Codigos modernos. Las donaciones mortis causa a;adia-
eran una especie de montsruo entre los contratos y ultimas voluntades; las
algarabia del Derecho romano y patrio sobre los puntos de semenjanza y
disparidad de estas donaciones con los pactos y legados no podia producir
sino dudas, confusion y pleitos en los rarisimos casos que ocurriesen por la
dificuldad de apreciar y fijar sus verdaderos caracteres' "(4 Derecho Civil
Espanol, Comun y Foral, 8th Ed., 1956, pp. 182-3).
Manresa is more explicit. He says that "la disposicion del articulo 620 significa, por lo tanto:
(1) que han desaperacido las llamadas antes donaciones mortis causa , por lo que el
Codigo no se ocupa de ellas en absoluto; (2) que toda disposicion de bienes para despues
de la muerte sigue las reglas establecidas para la sucesion testamentaria" (5 Comentarios
al Codigo Civil Espanol, 6th Ed., p.107). Note that the Civil Code does not use the term
donation mortis causa . ( Section 1536 of the Revised Administrative Code in imposing the
inheritance tax uses the term "gift mortis causa ").lwphl@it
What are the distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa? Justice Reyes in the
Bonsato case says that in a disposition post mortem (1) the transfer conveys no title or
ownership to the transferee before the death of the tansferor, or the transferor (meaning
testator) retains the ownership, full or naked (domino absoluto or nuda proprietas) (Vidal vs.
Posadas, 58 Phil. 108; De Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil. 633; (2) the transfer is revocable
before the transferor's death and revocabllity may be provided for indirectly by means of a
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista vs. Sabiniano,
92 Phil. 244), and (3) the transfer would be void if the transferor survived the transferee.
In other words, in a donation mortis causa it is the donor's death that determines that
acquisition of, or the right to, the property donated, and the donation is revocable at the
donor's will, Where the donation took effect immediately upon the donee's acceptance
thereof and it was subject to the resolutory condition that the donation would be revoked if
the donee did not give the donor a certain quantity of rice or a sum of money, the donation
isinter vivos (Zapanta vs. Posadas, Jr., 52 Phil. 557).
Justice Reyes in the subsequent cast of Puig vs. Penaflorida, L-15939, November 29, 1965,
15 SCRA 276, synthesized the rules as follows:
1. That the Civil Code recognizes only gratuitous transfers of property which
are effected by means of donations inter vivos or by last will and testament
executed with the requisite legal formalities.
2. That in inter vivos donations the act is immediately operative even if the
material or physical deliver (execution) of the property may be deferred until
the donor's death, whereas, in a testamentary disposition, nothing is
conveyed to the grantee and nothing is acquired by him until the death of the
grantortestator. The disposition is ambulatory and not final.
3. That in a mortis causa disposition the conveyance or alienation should be

(expressly or by necessary implication) revocable ad nutum or at the
discretion of the grantor or so called donor if he changes his mind (Bautista
vs. Saniniano, 92 Phil. 244).
4. That, consequently, the specification in the deed of the cases whereby the
act may be revoked by the donor indicates that the donation is inter vivos and
not a mortis causa disposition (Zapanta vs. Posadas, 52 Phil. 557).
5. That the designation of the donation as mortis causa , or a provision in the

deed to the effect the donation "is to take effect at the death of the donor", is
not a controlling criterion because those statements are to be construed
together with the rest of the instrument in order to give effect to the real intent
of the transferor (Laureta vs. Mata and Mango, 44 Phil. 668; Concepcion vs.
Concepcion, 91 Phil. 823; Cuevas vs. Cuevas, 98 Phil. 68).
6. That a conveyance for an onerous consideration is governed by the rules

of contracts and not by those of donations or testaments (Carlos vs. Ramil,
20 Phil. 183; Manalo vs. De Mesa, 29 Phil. 495).
7. That in case of doubt the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter

vivos rather than mortis causa , in order to avoid uncertainty as to the
ownership of the property subject of the deed.
It may be added that the fact that the donation is given in consideration of love and affection
or past or future services is not a characteristic of donations inter vivos because
transfers mortis causa may be made also for those reasons. There is difficulty in applying
the distinctions to controversial cases because it is not easy sometimes to ascertain when
the donation takes effect or when the full or naked title passes to the transferee. As
Manresa observes, "when the time fixed for the commencement of the enjoyment of the
property donated be at the death of the donor, or when the suspensive condition is related
to his death, confusion might arise" (5 Codigo Civil, 6th Ed., p. 108).
The existence in the deed of donation of conflicting stipulations as to its effectivity may
generate doubt as to the donor's intention and as to the nature of the donation (Concepcion
vs. Concepcion, 91 Phil. 823).
Where the donor declared in the deed that the conveyance was mortis causa and forbade
the registration of the deed before her death, the clear inference is that the conveyance was
not intended to produce any definitive effect nor to pass any interest to the grantee except
after her death. In such a case, the grantor's reservation of the right to dispose of the
property during her lifetime means that the transfer is not binding on her until she dies. It
does not mean that the title passed to the grantee during her lifetime. (Ubalde Puig vs.
Magbanua Penaflorida, L-15939, Resolution of January 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 136).
In the following cases, the conveyance was considered a void mortis causa transfer
because it was not cast in the form of a last will and testament as required in article 728,
formerly article 620:
(a) Where it was stated in the deed of donation that the donor wanted to give the donee
something "to take effect after his death" and that "this donation shall produce effect only by
and because of the death of the donor, the property herein donated to pass title after the
donor's death" (Howard vs. Padilla, 96 Phil. 983). In the Padilla case the donation was
regarded as mortis causa although the donated property was delivered to the donee upon
the execution of the deed and although the donation was accepted in the same deed.
(b) Where it was provided that the donated properties would be given to the donees after
the expiration of thirty days from the donor's death, the grant was made in the future tense,
and the word "inherit" was used (Carino vs. Abaya, 70 Phil. 182).
(c) Where the donor has the right to dispose of all the donated properties and the products
thereof. Such reservation is tantamount to a reservation of the right to revoke the donation
(Bautista vs. Sabiniano 92 Phil. 244).
(d) Where the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of donation reveal that
the donation could not have taken effect before the donor's death and the rights to dispose
of the donated properties and to enjoy the fruits remained with the donor during her lifetime
(David vs. Sison, 76 Phil. 418).
But if the deed of donation makes an actual conveyance of the property to the donee,
subject to a life estate in the donors, the donation is is inter vivos (Guarin vs. De Vera, 100
Phil. 1100).
Articles 729, 730 and 731 have to some extent dissipated the confusion surrounding the two
kinds of donation. The rule in article 729 is a crystallization of the doctrine announced in
decided cases.
A clear instance where the donor made an inter vivos donation is found in De Guzman vs.
Ibea 67 Phil. 633. In that case, it was provided in the deed that the donor donated to the
donee certain properties so that the donee "may hold the same as her own and always" and
that the donee would administer the lands donated and deliver the fruits thereof to the
donor, as long as the donor was alive, but upon the donor's death the said fruits would
belong to the donee. It was held that the naked ownership was conveyed to the donee upon
the execution of the deed of donation and, therefore, the donation became effective during
the donor's lifetime.
In Sambaan vs. Villanueva, 71 Phil. 303, the deed of donation, as in Balaqui vs. Dongso, 53
Phil. 673, contained conflicting provision. It was provided in the deed that the donation was
made "en consideracion al afecto y carino" of the donor for the donee but that the donation
"surtira efectos despues de ocurrida mi muerte (donor's death).
That donation was held to be inter vivos because death was not the consideration for the
donation but rather the donor's love and affection for the donee. The stipulation that the
properties would be delivered only after the donor's death was regarded as a mere modality
of the contract which did not change its inter vivos character. The donor had stated in the
deed that he was donating, ceding and transferring the donated properties to the donee.
(See Joya vs. Tiongco, 71 Phil. 379).
In Laureta vs. Mata and Magno, 44 Phil. 668 the deed of donation provided that the donor
was donating mortis causa certain properties as a reward for the donee's services to the
donor and as a token of the donor's affection for him. The donation was made under the
condition that "the donee cannot take possession of the properties donated before the
death of the donor"; that the ' donee should cause to be held annually masses for the
repose of the donor's soul, and that he should defray the expenses for the donor's funeral.
It was held that the said donation was inter vivos despite the statement in the deed that it
was mortis causa . The donation was construed as a conveyance in praesenti ("a present
grant of a future interest") because it conveyed to the donee the title to the properties
donated "subject only to the life estate of the donor" and because the conveyance took
effect upon the making and delivery of the deed. The acceptance of the donation was a
circumstance which was taken into account in characterizing the donation as inter vivos.
In Balacui vs. Dongso, supra, the deed of donation involved was more confusing than that
found in the Lauretacase. In the Balaqui case, it was provided in the deed that the donation
was made in consideration of the services rendered to the donor by the donee; that "title" to
the donated properties would not pass to the donee during the donor's lifetime, and that it
would be only upon the donor's death that the donee would become the "true owner" of the
donated properties. However, there was the stipulation that the donor bound herself to
answer to the donee for the property donated and that she warranted that nobody would
disturb or question the donee's right.
Notwithstanding the provision in the deed that it was only after the donor's death when the
'title' to the donated properties would pass to the donee and when the donee would become
the owner thereof, it was held in the Balaqui case that the donation was inter vivos.
It was noted in that case that the donor, in making a warranty, implied that the title had
already been conveyed to the donee upon the execution of the deed and that the donor
merely reserved to herself the "possesion and usufruct" of the donated properties.
In Concepcion vs. Concepcion, 91 Phil. 823, it was provided in the deed of donation, which
was also styled asmortis causa , that the donation was made in consideration of the
services rendered by the donee to the donor and of the donor's affection for the donee; that
the donor had reserved what was necessary for his maintenance, and that the donation "ha
de producir efectos solamente por muerte de la donante".
It was ruled that the donation was inter vivos because the stipulation that the donation
would take effect only after the donor's death "simply meant that the possession and
enjoyment, of the fruits of the properties donated' should take effect only after the donor's
death and not before".
Resolution of the instant case. The donation in the instant case is inter vivos because it
took effect during the lifetime of the donors. It was already effective during the donors'
lifetime, or immediately after the execution of the deed, as shown by the
granting, habendum and warranty clause of the deed (quoted below).
In that clause it is stated that, in consideration of the affection and esteem of the donors for
the donees and the valuable services rendered by the donees to the donors, the latter, by
means of the deed of donation, wholeheartedly transfer and unconditionally give to the
donees the lots mentioned and described in the early part of the deed, free from any kind of
liens and debts:
Na dahil at alang-alang sa pagmamahal at masuyong pagtingin

na taglay ng NAGKAKALOOB (DONORS) sa Pinagkakalooban
(DONEES) gayun din sa tapat at mahalagang paglilingkod
noong mga lumipas na panahon na ginawa ng huli sa una ang
nabanggit na nagkakaloob sa pamagitan ng kasulatang ito ng
pagkakaloob (Donation) ay buong pusong inililipat at lubos na
ibinibigay sa nasabing pinagkakalooban ang lupang
binabanggit at makikilala sa unahan nito, laya sa ano mang
sagutin at pagkakautang, katulad nito:
Following the above-ousted granting, habendum and warranty clause is the donors'
declaration that they donate (ipinagkakaloob) Lot No. 2502, the property in litigation, in
equal shares to their children Angel Diaz and Andrea Diaz, the western part to Angel and
the eastern part to Andrea.
The acceptance clause is another indication that the donation is inter vivos.
Donations mortis causa , being in the form of a will, are never accepted by the donees
during the donors' lifetime. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos.
In the acceptance clause herein, the donees declare that they accept the donation to their
entire satisfaction and, by means of the deed, they acknowledge and give importance to the
generosity and solicitude shown by the donors and sincerely thank them.
In the reddendum or reservation clause of the deed of donation, it is stipulated that the
donees would shoulder the expenses for the illness and the funeral of the donors and that
the donees cannot sell to a third person the donated properties during the donors' lifetime
but if the sale is necessary to defray the expenses and support of the donors, then the sale
is valid.
The limited right to dispose of the donated lots, which the deed gives to the donees, implies
that ownership had passed to them by means of' the donation and that, therefore, the
donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime. That is a characteristic of a
donation inter vivos.
However, paragraph 3 of the reddendum in or reservation clause provides that "also, while
we, the spouses Gabino Diaz and Severa Mendoza, are alive, our administration, right, and
ownership of the lots mentioned earlier as our properties shall continue but, upon our death,
the right and ownership of the donees to each of the properties allocated to each of them
shall be fully effective." The foregoing is the translation of the last paragraph of the deed of
donation which reads:
(3) Gayun din samantalang kaming mag-asawang Gabino Diaz at Severa
Mendoza ay buhay, patuloy and aming pamamahala, karapatan, at
pagkamayari sa mga nasabing pagaari na sinasaysay sa unahan nito na
pagaari namin; ngunit sakaling kami ay bawian ng buhay ng Panginoong Dios
at mamatay na, ang mga karapatan at pagkamayari ng bawa't pinagkalooban
(Donatorios) sa bawa't pagaari nauukol sa bawa't isa ay may lubos na
kapangyarihan.
Evidently, the draftsman of the deed did not realize the discordant and ambivalent
provisions thereof. Thehabendum clause indicates the transfer of the ownership over the
donated properties to the donees upon the execution of the deed. But
the reddendum clause seems to imply that the ownership was retained by the donors and
would be transferred to the donees only after their death.
We have reflected on the meaning of the said contradictory clauses. All the provisions of the
deed, like those of a statute and testament, should be construed together in order to
ascertain the intention of the parties. That task would have been rendered easier if the
record shows the conduct of the donors and the donees after the execution of the deed of
donation.
But the record is silent on that point, except for the allegation of Angel Diaz in his answer
(already mentioned) that he received his share of the disputed lot long before the donors'
death and that he had been "openly and adversely occupying" his share "for more than
twenty years". (Andrea Diaz on page 17 of her brief in L-33849 states that the donees took
possession of their respective shares as stipulated in the deed of donation. Pages 3,4,18
and 19, tsn March, 1971).
Our conclusion is that the aforequoted paragraph 3 of the reddendum or reservation clause
refers to thebeneficial ownership (dominium utile) and not to the naked title and that what
the donors reserved to themselves, by means of that clause, was the management of the
donated lots and the fruits thereof. But, notwithstanding that reservation, the donation, as
shown in the habendum clause, was already effective during their lifetime and was not
made in contemplation of their death because the deed transferred to the donees the naked
ownership of the donated properties.
That conclusion is further supported by the fact that in the deed of donation, out of the eight
lots owned by the donors, only five were donated. Three lots, Lots Nos. 4168, 2522 and
2521 were superflously reserved for the spouses or donors in addition to one- third of Lot
No. 2377. If the deed of donation in question was intended to be a mortis causa disposition,
then all the eight lots would have been donated or devised to the three children and
daughter-in-law of the donors.
The trial court's conclusion that the said deed of donation, although void as a donation inter
vivos is valid "as an extrajudicial partition among the parents and their children" is not well-
taken. Article 1080 of the Civil Code provides that 46 should a person make a partition
of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it
does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
We have already observed that the said donation was not a partition of the entire estate of
the Diaz spouses since, actually, only five of the eight lots, constituting their estate, were
partitioned. Hence, that partition is not the one contemplated in article 1080.
There is another circumstance which strengthens ' the view that the 1949 deed of donation
in question took effect during the donors' lifetime. It may he noted that in that deed Lot No.
2377 (items 3 and [c]) was divided into three equal parts: one-third was donated to Andrea
Diaz and one-third to Angel Diaz. The remaining one-third was reserved and retained by the
donors, the spouses Gabino Diaz and Severo Mendoza, for their support. That reserved
one-third portion came to be known as Lot No. 2377-A.
In 1964 or after the death of Gabino Diaz, his surviving spouse Severa Mendoza executed a
donation mortis causa wherein she conveyed to her daughter, Andrea Diaz (plaintiff-
appellant herein), her one-half share in Lot No. 2377-A, which one-half share is known as
Lot No. 2377-A-1, the other half or Lot No. 2377-A-2 having been already conveyed to
Angel Diaz.
That disposition of Lot No. 2377-A-2 clearly implies that the conveyance in the 1949 deed of
donation as to Lot No. 2377 took effect during the lifetime of the donors, Gabino Diaz and
Severa Mendoza, and proves that the 1949 donation was inter vivos.
The instant case has a close similarity to the pre-war cases already cited and to three post-
liberation cases. In theBonsato case, the deed of donation also contained contradictory
dispositions which rendered the deed susceptible of being construed as a donation inter
vivos or as a donation causa.
It was stated in one part of the deed that the donor was executing "una donacion perfects e
irrevocable consumada" in favor of the donee in consideration of his past services to the
donor; that at the time of the execution of the deed, the donor "ha entregado" to the donee
"dichos terrenos donados'; that while the donor was alive, he would receive the share of the
fruits corresponding to the owner; and "que en vista de la vejez del donante, el donatario
Felipe Bonsato tomara posesion inmediatamente de dichos terrenos a su favor". These
provisions indicate that the donation in question was inter vivos
However, in the last clause of the deed in the Bonsato case (as in the instant case), it was
provided 'que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion y el
donatario Felipe Bonsato tendra todos log derechos de dichos terrernos en concepto de
dueno absolute de la propriedad libre de toda responsabilidad y gravemen y pueda ejercitar
su derecho que crea conveniente". These provisions would seem to show that the donation
was mortis causa .
Nevertheless, it was held in the Bonsato case that the donation was inter vivos because (1)
the ownership of the things donated passed to the donee; (2) it was not provided that the
transfer was revocable before the donor's death, and (3) it was not stated that the transfer
would be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
It was further held in the Bonsato case that the stipulation "que despues de la muerte del
donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion", should be interpreted together with the prior
provision regarding its irrevocable and consummated character, and that would mean that
the charge or condition as to the donor's share of the fruits would be terminated upon the
donor's death.
The Puig case, supra, is even more doubtful and controversial than the instant case. In
the Puig case, the donor, Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon, in a deed entitled
"Donacion Mortis causa dated November 24, 1948 cede y transfiere en concepto de
donacion mortis causa to the donee, Estela Magbanua Penaflorida three parcels of land in
consideration of the donee's past services and the donor's love and affection for the latter.
It was stipulated in the deed that the donor could alienate or mortgage the donated
properties "cuando y si necesita fondos para satisfacer sus proprias necesidades sin que
para ello tega que intervener la Donataria, pues su consentimiento se sobre entiende aqui
parte de que la donacion que aqui se hace es mortis causa , es decir que la donacion
surtira sus efectos a la muerte de la donante". It was repeated in another clause of the deed
"que lacesion y transferencia aqui provista surtira efecto al fallecer la Donante".
It was further stipulated that the donee would defray the medical and funeral expen of the
donor unless the donor had funds in the bank or "haya cosecho levantada or recogida en
cual caso dichos recursos responderan portales gastos a disposicion y direccion de la
donataria". Another provision of the deed was that it would be registered only after the
donor's death. In the same deed the donee accepted the donation.
In the Puig case the donor in another deed entitled Escritura de Donacion mortis causa "
dated December 28, 1949 donated to the same donee, Estela Magbanua Penaflorida three
parcels of land en concepto de una donacion mortis causa " in consideration of past
services. It was provided in the deed "que antes de su nuerte la donante, podra enajenar
vender traspasar o hipotecar a cualesquiera persona o entidades los bienes aqui donados
a favor de la donataria en concepto de una donacion mortis causa ". The donee accepted
the donation in the same deed.
After the donor's death both deeds were recorded in the registry of deeds. In the donor's will
dated March 26, 1951, which was duly probated, the donation of a parcel of land in the
second deed of donation was confirmed.
Under these facts, it was held that the 1948 deed of donation mortis causa was inter
vivos in character in spite of repeated expressions therein that it was a mortis
causa donation and that it would take effect only upon the donor's death. Those
expressions were not regarded as controlling because they were contradicted by the
provisions that the donee would defray the donor's expenses even if not connected with her
illness and that the donee's husband would assume her obligations under the deed, should
the donee predecease the donor. Moreover, the donor did not reserve in the deed the
absolute right to revoke the donation.
But the 1949 deed of donation was declared void because it was a true conveyance mortis
causa which was not embodied in a last will and testament. The mortis causa character of
the disposition is shown by the donor's reservation of the right to alienate or encumber the
donated properties to any person or entity.
In the Cuevas case, supra, one Antonina Cuevas executed on September 18, 1950 a
notarial conveyance styled as "Donacion Mortis causa " where she ceded to her nephew
Crispulo Cuevas a parcel of unregistered land. Crispulo accepted the donation in the same
instrument. Subsequently, or on May 26, 1952, the donor revoked the donation.
The deed of donation in the Cuevas case contained the following provisions which, as in
similar cases, are susceptible of being construed as making the conveyance an inter
vivos or a mortis causa transfer:
"Dapat maalaman ni Crispulo Cuevas na samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ang lupa na

ipinagkakaloob ko sa kaniya ay ako pa rin ang patuloy na mamomosecion,
makapagpapatrabajo, makikinabang at ang iba pang karapatan sa pagmamayari ay sa akin
pa rin hanggang hindi ako binabawian ng buhay ng Maykapal at ito naman ay hindi ko nga
iyaalis pagkat kung ako ay mamatay na ay inilalaan ko sa kaniya."
Translation
"Crispulo Cuevas should know that while I am alive, the land which I donated to him will still
be under my continued possession; I will be the one to have it cultivated; I will enjoy its fruits
and all the other rights of ownership until Providence deprives me of life and I cannot take
away the property from him because when I die I reserve the property for him." (sic)
It was held that the donation was inter vivos because the phrase "hindi ko nga iyaalis (I will
not take away the property") meant that the donor expressly renounced the right to freely
dispose of the property in favor of another person and thereby manifested the irrevocability
of the conveyance of the naked title to the donee. The donor retained the beneficial
ownership or dominium utile Being an inter vivos donation, it could be revoked by the donor
only on the grounds specified by law. No such grounds existed. The donee was not guilty of
ingratitude. The other point to be disposed of is the matter of the claim for attorney's fees of
Andrea Diaz against the Alejandro intervenors.
The other point to be disposed of is the matter of the claim for attorney's fees of Andrea
Diaz against the Alejandro intervenors.
After a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the
apparent good faith of the Alejandro intervenors in asserting a one-third interest in the
disputed lot and their close relationship to Andrea Diaz, we find that it is not proper to
require them to pay attorney's fees (Salao vs. Salao, L-26699, March 16, 1976, 70 SCRA
65). (Andrea Diaz did not implead Angel Diaz as a respondent in her petition for review.)
WHEREFORE, the trial court's amended decision is reversed insofar as it pronounces that
the deed of donation is void. That donation is declared valid as a donation inter vivos.
The disputed lot should be partitioned in accordance with that deed between Andrea Diaz
and Angel Diaz.
The decision is affirmed insofar as it does not require the Alejandro intervenors to pay
attorney's fees to Andrea Diaz. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29204 December 29, 1928
RUFINA ZAPANTA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
JUAN POSADAS, JR., ET AL., defendants-appellants.
---------------------------------
G.R. No. L-29205 December 29, 1928
ROSARIO PINEDA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
---------------------------------
G.R. No. L-29206 December 29, 1928
OLIMPIO GUANZON, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
---------------------------------
G.R. No. L-29207 December 29, 1928
LEONCIA PINEDA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
---------------------------------
G.R. No. L-29208 December 29, 1928
EMIGDIO DAVID, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
---------------------------------
G.R. No. L-29209 December 29, 1928
GERONIMA PINEDA, plaintiff-appellees,

vs.
Office of the Solicitor-General Reyes for appellants.

Aurelio Pineda for appellees.
AVANCEA, C. J.:
Father Braulio Pineda died in January 1925 without any ascendants or descendants leaving
a will in which he instituted his sister Irene Pineda as his sole heiress. During his lifetime
Father Braulio donated some of his property by the instruments to the six plaintifffs,
severally, with the condition that some of them would pay him a certain amount of rice, and
others of money every year, and with the express provision that failure to fulfill this condition
would revoke the donations ipso facto. These six plaintiff-donees are relatives, and some of
them brothers of Father Braulio Pineda. The donations contained another clause that they
would take effect upon acceptance. They were accepted during Father Braulio's lifetime by
every one of the donees.
Every one of the six plaintiffs filed a separate action against the Collector of Internal
Revenue and his deputy for the sums of which each of them paid, under protest, as
inheritance tax on the property donated to them, in accordance with section 1536 of the
Administrative Code, as amended by section 10 of Act No. 2835, and by section 1 of Act
No. 3031. Section 1536 of the Administrative Code reads:
Every transmission by virtue of inheritance, devise, bequest, gift mortis causa or

advance in anticipation of inheritance, devise, or bequest of real property located in
the Philippine Islands and real rights in such property; . . .
The trial court in deciding these six cases, held that the donations to the six plaintiffs made
by the deceased Father Braulio Pineda are donations inter vivos, and therefore, not subject
to the inheritance tax, and ordered the defendants to return to each of the plaintiffs the
sums paid by the latter.
The defendants appealed from this judgment.
The whole quetion involved in this appeal resolves into whether the donations made by
Father Braulio Pineda to each of the plaintiffs are donations inter vivos, or mortis causa, for
it is the latter upon which the Administrative Code imposes inheritance tax. In our opinion,
said donations are inter vivos. It is so expressly stated in the instruments in which they
appear. They were made in consideration of the donor's affection for the donees, and of the
services they had rendered him, but he has charged them with the obligation to pay him a
certain amount of rice and money, respectively, each year during his lifetime, the donations
to become effective upon acceptance. They are therefore not in the nature of
donations mortis causa but inter vivos.
The principal characteristics of a donation mortis causa, which distinguish it essentially from
a donation inter vivos, are that in the former it is the donor's death that determines the
acquisition of, or the right to, the property, and that it is revocable at the will of the donor. In
the donations in question, their effect, that is, the acquisition of, or the right to, the property,
was produced while the donor was still alive, for according to their expressed terms they
were to have this effect upon acceptance, and this took place during the donor's lifetime.
The nature of these donations is not affected by the fact that they were subject to a
condition, since it was imposed as a resolutory condition, and in this sense, it is necessarily
implies that the right came into existence first as well as its effect, because otherwise there
would be nothing to resolve upon the nonfulfillment of the condition imposed. Neither does
the fact that these donations are revocable, give them the character of donations mortis
causa, inasmuch as the revocation is not the failure to fulfill the condition imposed. In
relation to the donor's will alone, these donations are irrevocable. On the other hand, this
condition, in so far as it renders the donation onerous, takes it further away from the
disposition mortis causa and brings it nearer to contract. In this sense, by virtue of this
condition imposed, they are not donations throughout their full extent, but only so far as they
exceed the incumbrance imposed, for so far as concerns the portion equivalent to or less
than said incumbrance, it has the nature of a real contract and is governed by the rule on
contracts (art. 622 of the Civil Code). And in the part in which it is strictly a donation, it is a
donation inter vivos, because its effect was produced by the donees' acceptance during the
donor's lifetime and was not determined by the donor's death. Upon being accepted they
had full effect. If the donor's life is mentioned in connection with this condition, it is only fix
the donor's death as the end of the term within which the condition must be fulfilled, and not
because such death of the donor is the cause which determines the birth of the right to the
donation. The property donated passed to the ownership of the donees from the
acceptance of the donations, and these could not be revoked except upon the nonfulfillment
of the condition imposed, or for other causes prescribed by the law, but not by mere will of
the donor.
Neither can these donations be considered as an advance on inheritance or legacy,

according to the terms of section 1536 of the Administrative Code, because they are neither
an inheritance nor a legacy. And it cannot be said that the plaintiffs received such advance
on inheritance or legacy, since they were not heirs or legatees of their predessor in interest
upon his death (sec. 1540 of the Administrative Code). Neither can it be said that they
obtained this inheritance or legacy by virtue of a document which does not contain the
requisites of a will (sec. 618 of the Code of Civil Pocedure).
1aw phi 1.net
Besides, if the donations made by the plaintiffs are, as the appellants contended, mortis
causa, then they must be governed by the law on testate succession (art. 620 of the Civil
Code). In such a case, the documents in which these donations appear, being instruments
which do not contain the requisites of a will, are not valid to transmit the property to the
donees (sec. 618, Code of Civil Procedure.) Then the defendants are not justified in
collecting from the donees the inheritance tax, on property which has not been legally
transferred to them, and in which they acquired no right.
For these reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without special pronouncement
as to costs. So ordered.
Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Ostrand and Johns, JJ., dissent.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19740 March 22, 1923
PAULO LAURETA, as administrator of the estate of Severa Magno y Laureta,

deceased, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO EMILIO MATA and ESTER MAGNO, defendants-appellants.
N. Segundo and Pedro L. Valdes for appellants.

Jose Fonacier for appellee.
STATEMENT
The following instrument, known in the record as Exhibit A, omitting the description of the
lands and other personal property, was executed February 2, 1918:
DEED OF DONATION
In the municipality of Solsona,
EXECUTED BY SEVERA
Ilocos Norte, Philippine Islands,
MAGNO Y LAURETA IN
I, Severa Magno y Laureta,
FAVOR OF PEDRO EMILIO
widow, seventy years old
MATA
and resident of the municipality of Solsona, Ilocos Norte, Philippine Islands, a

proprietor by occupation, hereby declared that for the purpose of giving the young
Pedro Emilio Mata, single, seventeen years old, resident of this municipality and son
of Pastor Mata, already deceased, and Ester Magno, a reward for the services which
he is rendering me, and as a token of my affection toward him and of the fact that he
stands high in my estimation, I hereby donate "mortis cause" to said youth all the
properties described as follows:
(Here follows an accurate description of a large number of parcels of real estate, and a
large amount of personal property.)
I declare that all the rice lands above mentioned are my exclusive property,
and to identify in a clear manner the halves mentioned in some of the
foregoing clauses I hereby state that they are the one-half that was allotted to
me in the petition had between me and the heirs of my deceased husband,
and, therefore, all the part that was allotted to me in the said partition is the
subject of this donation.
I also declare that I likewise donate to the said youth the right to, and usufruct
of, two parcels of land situated in Mariquet, on which I hold a mortgage for the
sum of P250, subject to the conditions stipulated in the document executed to
evidence the said mortgage.
I also declare that it is the condition of this donation that the donee cannot
take possession of the properties donated before the death of the donor, and
in the event of her death the said donee shall be under obligation to cause a
mass to be held annually as a suffrage in behalf of my soul, and also to
defray the expenses of my burial and funerals.
I, Ester Magno, widow, of age, resident of the municipality of Solsona, and

mother of the young Pedro Emilio Mata, the donee under this document,
hereby accept this donation on behalf of may said son, thanking the donor for
her liberality and affection toward my said son, Pedro Emilio Mata, the donee,
with all the conditions imposed by the donor.
In testimony whereof we affixed our marks to these present in Solsona, this
2d day of February, 1918.
(Marked) SEVERA MAGNO

(Sgd.) ESTER MAGNO
(Sgd.) PEDRO EMILIO MATA
Signed in the presence of :

(Sgd.) IGNACIO FLORES
(Sgd.) ELIAS DULDULAO
(Then follows the notarial acknowledgment in due and regular form.)
It is admitted that at the time of its execution, the grantor was the owner in fee simple of all
the lands therein described. In the course of time the grantor died and at the time of her
death Pedro Emilio Mata, the grantee in the deed, and Ester Magno, entered upon and took
possession of the lands.
The plaintiff applied for and was appointed administrator of the estate of the grantor Severa
Magno y Laureta, deceased, and made a demand upon the defendants for possession of
the lands which was refused, resulting in this action by the plaintiff as administrator, to
recover possession of the premises and the sum of P9,000 as the value of the products of
the land from April 9, 1918, until the termination of the case, for the sum of P1,200
damages, for the unlawful and wrongful withholding of possession, and costs.
For answer the defendants made a specific denial of all of the material allegation of the
complaint, and pray judgment for costs.
Upon such issues the case was tried and submitted upon a stipulation of facts to the effect
that any title or right of possession which Pedro Emilio Mata has to the possession of the
premises is founded upon Exhibit A.
The lower court rendered judgment to the effect that the plaintiff was entitled to the
possession of the lands in question and the sum of P1,050, the agreed rental value and
costs, from which the defendants appeal, assigning nine different errors, the combined
substance of which is that the lower court erred in holding that the donation made by the
deceased, known as Exhibit A, should be construed under the provisions of article 620 of
the Civil Code, and that the defendants did not acquire title to the lands under it, that their
possession was illegal, and that the land was the property of the heirs of the deceased, and
in rendering judgment for the plaintiff, and in overruling the defendants' motion for a new
trial.
JOHNS, J.:
Its execution having been admitted, the question involved is the construction, legal force,
and effect of Exhibit A. Among other things it recites that I, Severa Magno y Laureta, widow,
seventy years old . . . hereby declare that for the purpose of giving the young Pedro Emilio
Mata, single, seventeen years old, . . . and son of Pastor Mata, already deceased, and
Ester Magno, "a reward for the services which he is rendering me, and as a token of my
affections toward him and of the fact that he stands high in my estimation, I hereby donate
"mortis causa" to said youth all the properties described as follows." In the second
paragraph it is said: "Therefore, all the part that was allotted to me in the said partition is the
subject of this donation." In the third it recites: "I also declare that I likewise donate to the
said youth the right to, and usufruct of, two parcels of land situated in Mariquet, etc." In the
fourth "I also declare that it is the condition of this donation that the donee cannot take
possession of the properties donated before the death of the donor, etc."
The donee, Pedro Emilio Mata, was the son of Pastor Mata, deceased, and was seventeen
years old at the time the instrument was executed. The instrument further recites that Ester
Magno, a widow and the mother of Pedro Emilio Mara, with all the conditions imposed by
the donor, accepted the donation on behalf of her son, and thanked the donor for her
liberality and the affection for her son.
The plaintiff contends and the trial court found that Exhibit A should be construed under the
terms and provisions of article 620 of the Civil Code as follows:
Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor partake of the
nature of disposals of property by will and shall be governed by the rules established
for testamentary successions.
As we analyze it, Exhibit A is a donation in prsenti and conveyed the fee simple title to the
lands in question subject only to the life estate of the donor. It must be conceded that during
her lifetime the grantor had a legal right to convey the fee simple title to her lands to any
person in her discretion, reserving to herself a life estate. In legal effect, that is what she did
here. The conveyance of the lands took effect upon the making and delivery of the deed,
reserving a life estate only in the donor. The conveyance itself was not "to become effective
upon the death of the donor," but took effect at the time of its execution. The instrument
does not recite that the conveyance itself is not to become effective until the death of the
donor, but, in legal effect, it recites that an actual conveyance is made subject to the life
estate of the donor. Upon its face Exhibit A comes squarely within the provisions of article
623 of the Civil Code, which reads:
A donation is perfected as soon as the donor has knowledge that it has been
accepted by the donee.
Here, it appears from the instrument itself that Ester Magno accepted the donation on
behalf of the son, and the acceptance is incorporated in the body of the instrument and
made a part of it, and is signed by the donor and acceptor in the presence of witnesses and
the instrument as a whole is legally acknowledge before a notary public.
Again, when the instrument is construed as a whole it shows upon its face a delivery and
acceptance. The donor conveys the land, and in and by the same instrument the mother of
the donee accepts the conveyance upon the terms and conditions stated in the deed.
Corpus Juris, vol. 18, p. 208, says:
Where, however, a deed containing a provision that it is not to take effect until the
grantor's death is actually delivered to the grantee during the lifetime of the grantor, it
will be sustained as a present grant of a future interest.
That is this case. Legally speaking, it was a delivery and an acceptance of the deed. The
facts bring the case squarely within article 623 of the Civil Code. Here, there was a donation
and an acceptance both in the same instrument which made it a perfected donation within
the meaning of article 623.
Commenting on article 620 of the Civil Code in volume 5, page 82, of the 1910 edition,
Manresa says:
In pure donations, in donations until an affixed day, and in donations with a

resolutory condition the property is of course conveyed to the donee during the life of
the donor and as to this point there is no question.
When the time fixed for the commencement of the enjoyment of the property
donated be at the death of the donor, or when the suspensive condition is related to
his death, confusion might arise. To avoid it we must distinguish between the actual
donation and the execution thereof. That the donation is to have effect during the
lifetime of the property must be made during his life or after his death. From the
moment that the donor disposes freely of his property and such disposal is accepted
by the donee, the donation exists, perfectly and irrevocably (articles 618 and 623).
Until the day arrives or until the condition is fulfilled, the donation, although valid
when made, cannot be realized. Thus, he who makes the donation effective upon a
certain date, even though to take place at his death, disposes of that which he
donated and he cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said
property in favor of another. If the thing is lost thru the fault of the donor, or if it is
damaged, indemnity may be recovered. Regarding donations with suspensive
conditions, it is sufficient to read articles 1120 and 1122 to understand the effects
which this kind of donation has during the lifetime of the donor. He who makes a
donation effective after his death, makes a donation, not a legacy. The mere name
of the act, when a different intention does not clearly appear, is enough in order to
make applicable thereto the rules of law referring to donations. However, if the ill-
named donor not only postpones the date of the execution of the donations until his
death but also reserves the right to revoke said act at his pleasure, then this act is
not valid as a form of contract; this is in truth a disposition of property mortis
causa which requires the same solemnities as required in making a will.
Although it is not include in the stipulation of facts, it does appear from the record that some
of the property described in Exhibit A was sold and disposed of by the donee during the
lifetime of the donor.
In any event, Exhibit A was a donation in prsenti as distinguished from a gift in futuro,
hence does not come under the provisions of article 620 of the Civil Code.
The effect of this decision is to hold that Pedro Emilio Mata took and acquired a valid title to
the premises in dispute at the time Exhibit A was executed, subject only to the life estate of
the donor, and he is now the owner of the lands described in the pleadings. But the
defendants made a general denial, and did not ask for affirmative relief, hence none can be
granted.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the plaintiff's complaint is dismissed, with
costs in favor of the defendants. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. L-4225. August 25, 1952.]
LORENZA CONCEPCION, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. EMILIA CONCEPCION, Defendant-

Appellant.
Enrique J. Corpus and Jose T. Nery for Appellant.
Nemesio Balonso for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. DONATIONS; BODY OF DOCUMENT AND STATEMENTS CONTAINED THEREIN DETERMINE

INTENTION OF DONOR. It is the body of the document of donation and the statements contained
therein, and not the title, that should be considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor.
2. ID.; ID. Even when the donor calls the donation mortis causa instead of inter vivos, even if he
says it is to take effect after his death, when from the body of the instrument or donation it is to be
gathered that the main consideration of the donation is not the death of the donor but rather services
rendered to him by the donee or his affection for the latter, then the donation should be considered as
inter vivos, and when duly accepted, it transfers title immediately to the donee, and the condition that
the donation is to take effect only after the death of donor should be interpreted as meaning that the
possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the property donated should take place only after donors
death.
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
The present appeal involves the interpretation of Exhibit A, a deed of donation, - whether it is inter
vivos or mortis causa, because if the former, it is valid having been duly accepted by the donee, but if
the latter it would be void because being in the nature of disposal of property by will, according to
article 620 of the Civil Code, it shall be governed by the rules established for testamentary succession.
According to the law governing the execution of wills, a will should be attested by three witnesses, and
there should be an attestation clause. But here there are only two witnesses to the deed of donation
(Exhibit A), and it contains no attestation clause. For a better understanding of and to facilitate
reference to said Exhibit A, we reproduce its pertinent provisions.
ESCRITURA DE DONACION ONEROSA MORTIS CAUSA
Sepan Todos Por La Presente: jgc:chanro bles. com.ph
"Yo, Manuela Concepcion, mayor de edad, viuda, Filipina, con residencia y direccion postal en el
municipio de San Antonio, provincia de Zambales, Filipinas, hago constar que, en consideracion a los
buenos servicios prestados a mi por mi sobrina, Emilia Concepcion, antes y durante estos dias y
teniendo, ademas, especial predileccion por sus buenas cualidades y el cario que tengo de ella, en
quien cifro un porvenir provechoso, por la presente declaro que hago DONACION MORTIS CAUSA a
favor de mi citada sobrina, Emilia Concepcion, sujeta a las condiciones que mas abajo se especifican,
de las siguientes propiedades que se describen a continuacion, a saber: chan rob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary
(Description of the properties donated.)
CONDICIONES
Que las condiciones de esta DONACION son las siguientes, a saber: chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry
(a) Que el producto de una tercera (1/3) parte del terreno arriba descrito como parcela No. 1, o sea la
cosecha de una extension superficial de SEIS MIL DOSCIENTOS CINCUENTA METROS CUADRADOS
(6,250 m. c.) equivalentes a una balita, hacia el lado Este de dicho terreno, sera separado anualmente
y se empleara para los gastos de la celebracion de mi aniversario, en caso de mi muerte, y en
memoria tambien de la muerte de mis mayores y parientes y en sufragio de las almas de los difuntos,
por lo menos una vez al ao, pero tambien puede hacerse dicha celebracion tantas veces como
creyera conveniente y propio la mencionada donatoria, Emilia Concepcion, que no pasara de P50 al
ao.
x x x
Que yo declaro ademas que no tengo hijos, ni ascendientes ni descendientes, ni herederos forzosos,
motivo por el cual me he creido con derecho y facultad suficiente para disponer en la forma como lo
hice de mis citadas propiedades, habiendome reservado lo necesario para mi mantenimiento.
Que estas parcelas de terreno arriba descritas y deslindadas no estan aun registradas bajo la ley del
Registro de la Propiedad No. 496 ni bajo la Ley Hipotecaria espaola, por lo que las partes convienen,
para los efectos que procedan, registrar esta escritura bajo las disposiciones de la Ley No. 3344.
Que yo declaro por ultimo que esta DONACION MORTIS CAUSA como su mismo nombre lo indica, ha
de producir efectos solamente por muerte de la donante.
ACEPTACION
Yo, Emilia Concepcion, mayor de edad, soltera, filipina, con residencia y direccion postal en el
municipio de San Antonio, provincia de Zambales, Filipinas, por la presente hago constar que acepto la
donacion arriba expresada por lo que quedo sumamente agradecida a mi dicha tia, Doa Manuela
Concepcion, por tal generosidad, y me comprometo a cumplir fielmente todas y cada una de las
condiciones arriba impuestas.
En testimonio de todo lo cual firmamos la presente en el municipio de San Antonio, provincia de

Zambales, Filipinas, hoy a 7 de Marzo de 1944, A.D.
(Fda.) MANUELA CONCEPCION
(Donante)
(Fda.) EMILIA CONCEPCION
(Donatoria)
A little more than three years after the execution of the above- quoted deed of donation, or rather on
November 18, 1947, the donor Manuela Concepcion died. Plaintiffs-appellees who are six nephews and
nieces of the donor, all surnamed Concepcion instituted special proceedings No. 491 of the Court of
First Instance of Zambales for the summary settlement of the estate of their aunt, the donor. Because
the estate or the greater portion thereof sought to be summarily settled and distributed was included
in the donation, the donee Emilia Concepcion filed opposition to the petition for summary settlement
claiming that the six parcels subject of the donation belonged to her. The Court in said special
proceedings without deciding the title and right of possession to the six parcels claimed by Emilia,
merely ordered the partition of the estate of Manuela Concepcion among all her heirs who are besides
the six petitioners, Emilia Concepcion and her four brothers. Thereafter, and because Emilia refused to
give up the parcels said to have been donated to her, including a house and a granary as well as
personal properties, the six original petitioners in the special proceedings filed the present action (civil
case No. 1230) in the Court of First Instance of Zambales to have themselves declared owners of and
entitled to the possession of their shares in those properties claimed by Emilia in the proportion of
one-eleventh (1/11) for each.
In her answer Emilia claimed title to said properties by reason of the donation and submitted a copy of
the deed of donation. After trial, the lower court found that the donation was one mortis causa and
because it was not executed in the manner required by the law on wills, it was declared null and void;
the properties therein included were all declared part of the estate of the deceased Manuela
Concepcion subject to distribution among the heirs in the proportion of 1/11 for each as declared by
the court in special proceedings No. 491; defendant Emilia Concepcion was ordered to deliver to each
of the plaintiffs their respective shares of the products of the land for the agricultural year 1947-48
and those to be obtained thereafter in the proportion of 1/11 to each heir.
Emilia Concepcion appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals where the parties filed their
respective briefs, but finding that only questions of law were involved in the appeal, said court by
resolution certified the case to this Court.
Examining the deed of donation, Exhibit A, we find the title using the phrase mortis causa which
phrase was repeated in the paragraph just before the aceptacion with the clause that the donation
was to "producir efectos solamente por muerte de la donante." The lower court, evidently, impressed
by these features, concluded that the donor intended to make her donation effective after her death,
and that consequently, it was a donation mortis causa.
The trial court is not entirely to blame. The deed of donation is really confusing and far from clear. The
one who drafted the document would appear to have been himself confused, and in using legal
phraseology rather added not a little to the confusion. We confess that the distinction between a
donation inter vivos and a donation mortis causa, in spite of the comments of legal writers and the
doctrines laid down by the courts is not always sharp and clear, specially when the donation is
couched in language which admits of possible different interpretations. But, it is a rule consistently
followed by the courts that it is the body of the document of donation and the statements contained
therein, and not the title that should be considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor. Here,
the donation is entitled and called donacion onerosa mortis causa. From the body, however, we find
that the donation was of a nature remunerative rather than onerous. It was for past services
rendered, services which may not be considered as a debt to be paid by the donee but services
rendered to her freely and in goodwill. The donation instead of being onerous or for a valuable
consideration, as in payment of a legal obligation, was more of remuneratory or compensatory nature,
besides being partly motivated by affection.
We should not give too much importance or significance to or be guided by the use of the phrase
"mortis causa" in a donation and thereby to conclude that the donation is not one of inter vivos. In the
case of De Guzman Et. Al. v. Ibea Et. Al. (67 Phil., 633), this Court through Mr. Chief Justice Avancea
said that if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the
donor styles it mortis causa.
In the case of Laureta v. Mata Et. Al. (44 Phil., 668), the court held that the donation involved was
inter vivos. There, the donor Severa Magno y Laureta gave the properties involved as
"a reward for the services which he is rendering me, and as a token of my affection toward him and of
the fact that he stands high in my estimation, I hereby donate mortis causa to said youth all the
properties described as follows: chanrob1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry
x x x
"I also declare that it is the condition of this donation that the donee cannot take possession of the
properties donated before the death of the donor, and in the event of her death the said donee shall
be under obligation to cause a mass to be held annually as a suffrage in behalf of my soul, and also to
defray the expenses of my burial and funerals." cralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary
It will be observed that the present case and that of Laureta above cited are similar in that in both
cases the donation was being made as a reward for services rendered and being rendered, and as a
token of affection for the donee; the phrase "mortis causa" was used; the donee to take possession of
the property donated only after the death of the donor; the donee was under obligation to defray the
expenses incident to the celebration of the anniversary of the donors death, including church fees.
The donation in both cases were duly accepted. In said case of Laureta this Court held that the
donation was in praesenti and not a gift in futuro. In support of its ruling, this Court reproduced the
comment of Manresa on article 620 of the Civil Code reading as follows: jgc:chanroble s.com.p h
"In pure donations, in donations until an affixed day, and in donations with a resolutory condition the
property is of course conveyed to the donee during the life of the donor and as to this point there is no
question.
"When the time fixed for the commencement of the enjoyment of the property donated be at the
death of the donor, or when the suspensive condition is related to his death, confusion might arise. To
avoid it we must distinguish between the actual donation and the execution thereof. That the donation
is to have effect during the lifetime of the donor or at his death does not mean the delivery of the
property must be made during his life or after his death. From the moment that the donor disposes
freely of his property and such disposal is accepted by the donee, the donation exists, perfectly and
irrevocably (articles 618 and 623). Until the day arrives or until the condition is fulfilled, the donation,
although valid when made, cannot be realized. Thus, he who makes the donation effective upon a
certain date, even though to take place at his death, disposes of that which he donated and he cannot
afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of another. If the thing is lost
thru the fault of the donor, or if it is damaged, indemnity may be recovered. Regarding donations with
suspensive conditions, it is sufficient to read articles 1120 and 1122 to understand the effects which
this kind of donation has during the lifetime of the donor. He who makes a donation effective after his
death, makes a donation, not a legacy. The mere name of the act, when a different intention does not
clearly appear, is enough in order to make applicable thereto the rules of law referring to donations.
However, if the ill-named donor not only postpones the date of the execution of the donation until his
death but also reserves the right to revoke said act at his pleasure, then this act is not valid as a form
of contract; this is in truth a disposition of property mortis causa which requires the same solemnities
as required in making a will."cralaw vi rtua1aw lib rary
In the case of Sambaan v. Villanueva, (71 Phil., 303), the donor made a donation "en consideracion al
afecto y cario que profeso a mi ahijado Jesus Flavio Villanueva." The donor furthermore imposed the
condition that "esta donacion la otorgo bajo las consideraciones que: solamente surtira efectos
despues de occurrida mi muerte, . . . ." This court citing the same comment of Manresa just quoted
above held that since the donation was simply made in consideration not of the death of the donor but
of the affection to the donee, the donation was inter vivos and not mortis causa, and that the
condition imposed to the effect that the donation "solamente surtira efectos daspues de ocurrida mi
muerte," did not argue against the nature of the donation.
Again, in the case of Joya v. Tiongco (71 Phil., 379); wherein the donor made the donation of a parcel
of land to the brothers Agustin and Pedro Joya because of her relationship to them, and where said
donation was duly accepted and registered, the decision of the Court of Appeals which found the
donation to be mortis causa was reversed by this court and the donation was held to be inter vivos for
the reason that the death of the donor was not the consideration of the donation but only a
suspensive condition, and that the mere fact that the property donated was not to be delivered
immediately to the donee but only after death of donor did not render the donation mortis causa.
From all the preceding considerations, it is clear that even when the donor calls the donation mortis
causa instead of inter vivos, even if he says it is to take effect after his death, when from the body of
the instrument or donation it is to be gathered that the main consideration of the donation is not the
death of the donor but rather services rendered to him, by the donee or his affection for the latter,
then the donation should be considered as inter vivos, and when duly accepted, it transfers title
immediately to the donee, and the condition that the donation is to take effect only after the death of
donor should be interpreted as meaning that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the
property donated should take place only after donors death. To this effect, is the holding of this court
in the case of Balaqui v. Dongso (53 Phil., 673), where the donor Hipolita Balaqui made a donation to
Placida Dongso in consideration of her good services rendered and because the donee had lived with
the donor as a daughter, the donation containing the following paragraph: jgc:chanrob les.com. ph
"This gift to said Placida Dongso resident of Candon, Ilocos Sur, Philippine Islands, in recompense for
her services to me, does not pass title to her during my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true
owner of the two aforementioned parcels, including my house and shed thereon, and she shall be
rightfully entitled to transmit them to her children. I also bind myself to answer to said Placida and her
heirs and successors for this property, and that none shall question or disturb her right." cralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary
This court in that case held that the donation was inter vivos and irrevocable, and not mortis causa,
notwithstanding the fact that the donor stated in said deed that she did not transfer the ownership of
the two parcels of land donated, until upon her death, for such a statement could mean nothing else
than that she only reserved to herself the possession and usufruct of said property, and because the
donor could not very well guarantee the aforesaid right after her death.
In the present case, we may well hold as we do that the donor or rather the person who drafted the
deed, in using the phrase "mortis causa" and in providing that the donation should take effect only
after the donors death simply meant that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the properties
donated should take effect only after the donors death and not before, although this intention is
rendered even dubious due to the fact that in one paragraph of the donation, she stated that she had
reserved what was sufficient and necessary for her maintenance which may mean that all the
properties donated were deemed transferred to the donee immediately after the donation had been
accepted.
One other consideration may be mentioned in support of our stand. The donation here was accepted
by Emilia; said acceptance is embodied in the deed of donation, and both donor and donee signed
below said acceptance conclusively showing that the donor was aware of said acceptance. The deed
and acceptance was by agreement of both recorded or registered. Everything was complete. Only
donations inter vivos need be accepted, Donation mortis causa being in the nature of a legacy need
not be accepted. (Manresa, Vol. 5, Fifth edition [1932], p. 83.) Presuming that the donor Manuela and
the donee Emilia knew the law, the fact that they not only agreed to the acceptance but regarded said
acceptance necessary argues for their understanding and intention that the donation was inter vivos.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the donation in question is inter vivos and not mortis causa, and
that it is valid because the requisites of the law about the execution of wills do not apply to it. The
decision appealed from is hereby reversed with costs.
G.R. No. L-8327 December 14, 1955
ANTONINA CUEVAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. CRISPULO

CUEVAS, Defendant-Appellee.
Pedro D. Maldia for appellant.

Teodoro P. Santiago for appellee.
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
On September 18, 1950, Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized

conveyance entitled "Donacin Mortis Causa," ceding to her nephew
Crispulo Cuevas the northern half of a parcel of unregistered land in
barrio Sinasajan, municipality of Penaranda, Province of Nueva Ecija
(Exhibit A). In the same instrument appears the acceptance of
Crispulo Cuevas.chanroblesvi rtuala wlibra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry
"Subsequently, on May 26, 1952, the donor executed another

notarial instrument entitled "Revocacion de Donacion Mortis Causa"
(Exhibit B) purporting to set aside the preceding conveyance; and
on August 26, 1952, she brought action in the Court of First
Instance to recover the land conveyed, on the ground (1) that the
donation beingmortis causa, it had been lawfully revoked by the
donor; and (2) even it if were a donation inter vivos, the same was
invalidated because (a) it was not properly accepted; (b) because
the donor did not reserve sufficient property for her own
maintenance, and (c) because the donee was guilty of ingratitute,
for having refused to support the donor. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary c hanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry
Issues having been joined, and trial had, the Court of First Instance
denied the recovery sought, and Antonina Cuevas thereupon
appealed. The Court of Appeals forwarded the case to this Court
because, the case having been submitted on a stipulation of facts,
the appellant raised only questions of law. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s vi rtual law lib rary
The first issue tendered converns the true nature of the deed
"Exhibit A"; whether it embodies a donation inter vivos, or a
disposition of property mortis causa revocable freely by the
transferor at any time before death. 1 chanrobles vi rtua l law li bra ry
It has been rules that neither the designation mortis causa, nor the
provision that a donation is "to take effect at the death of the
donor", is a controlling criterion in defining the true nature of
donations (Laureta vs. Mata, 44 Phil., 668; Concepcion vs.
Concepcion, 91 Phil., 823). Hence, the crux of the controversy
revolves around the following provisions of the deed of donation:
Dapat maalaman ni Crispulo Cuevas na samantalang ako ay

nabubuhay, and lupa na ipinagkakaloob ko sa kaniya ay ako pa rin
and patuloy na mamomosecion, makapagparatrabaho,
makikinabang at ang iba pang karapatan sa pagmamayari ay sa
akin pa rin hanggang hindo ko binabawian ny buhay ng Maykapal at
ito naman ay hindi ko nga iya-alis pagkat kung ako ay mamatay na
ay inilalaan ko sa kaniya.
There is an apparent conflict in the expression above quoted, in that

the donor reserves to herself "the right of possession, cultivation,
harvesting and other rights and attributes of ownership while I am
not deprived of life by the Almighty"; but right after, the same
donor states that she "will not takle away" (the property) "because I
reserve it for him (the donee) when I die." chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
The question to be decided is whetehr the donor intended to part

with the title to the property immediately upon the execution of the
deed, or only later, when she had died. If the first, the donation is
operative inter vivos; if the second, we would be confronted with a
disposition mortis causa, void from the beginning because the
formalities of testaments were not observed (new Civil Code, Arts.
728 and 828; heirs of Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, 2 50 Off. Gaz.
(8), p. 3568; Tuason vs. Posadas, 54 Phil., 289; Sent. Trib. Sup. of
Spain, 8 July 1943).chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary
We agree with the Court below that the decisive proof that the
present donation is operative inter vivor lies in the final phrase to
the effect that the donor will not dispose or take away ("hindi ko
nga iya-alis" in the original) the land "because I am reserving it to
him upon my death." By these words the donor expressly renounced
the right to freely dispose of the property in favor of another (a
right essential to full ownership) and manifested the irrevocability of
the conveyance of the naked title to the property in favor of the
donee. As stated in our decision in Bonsato vs. Court of
Appeals, ante, such irrevocability is characteristic of donations inter
vivos, because it is incompatible with the idea of a disposition post
mortem. Witness article 828 of the New Civil Code, that provides:
ART. 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before
his death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void.
It is apparent from the entire context of the deed of donation that

the donor intended that she should retain the entire beneficial
ownership during her lifetime, but that the naked title should
irrevocably pass to the donee. It is only thus that all the expressions
heretofore discussed can be given full effect; and when the donor
stated that she would continue to retain the "possession, cultivation,
harvesting and all other rights and attributes of ownership," she
meant only the dominium utile, not the full ownership. As the Court
below correctly observed, the words "rights and attributes of
ownership" should be construed ejusdem generis with the preceding
rights of "possession, cultivation and harvesting" expressly
enumerated in the deed. Had the donor meant to retain full or
absolute ownership she had no need to specify possession,
cultivation and harvesting, since all these rights are embodied in full
or absolute ownership; nor would she then have excluded the right
of free disposition from the "rights and attributes of ownership" that
she reserved for herself. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry
Hence, the Court below rightly concluded that the deed Exhibit A
was a valid donationinter vivos, with reservation of beneficial title
during the lifetime of the donor. We may add that it is highly
desirable that all those who are called to prepare or notarize deeds
of donation should call the attention of the donors to the necessity
of clearly specifying whether, notwithstanding the donation, they
wish to retain the right to control and dispose at will of the property
before their death, without need of the consent or intervention of
the beneficiary, since the express reservation of such right would be
conclusive indication that the liberality is to exist only at the donor's
death, and therefore, the formalities of testaments should be
observed; while, a converso, the express waiver of the right of free
disposition would place the inter vivos character of the donation
beyond dispute (Heirs of Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, 50 Off. Gaz.
(8), p. 3568). chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual la w libra ry
The argument that there was no sufficient acceptance, because the

deed "merely recites that (1) the donee has duly read all the
contents of this donation; (2) that he 'shall fully respect all its
terms'; and (3) that 'for the act of benevolence' he is expressing his
gratitude" but there is no show of acceptance (Appellant's brief, p.
7), is without basis. To respect the terms of the donation, and at
the same time express gratitude for the donor's benevolence,
constitutes sufficient acceptance, If the donee did not accept, what
had he to be grateful about? We are no longer under the formulary
system of the Roman law, when specific expressions had to be used
under paid of nullity. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
Also unmeritoriious is the contention that the donation is void

because the donor failed to reserve enough for ther own support. As
we have seen, she expressly reserved to herself all the benefits
derivable from the donated property as long as she lived. During
that time, she suffered no diminution of income. If that was not
enough to support her, the deficiency was not dur to the
donation. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary c hanro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
Finally, the donee is not rightfully chargeaboe with ingratitude,

because it was expressly stipulated that the donee had a total
income of only P30 a month, out of which he had to support
himself, his wife and his two children. Evidently his means did not
allow him to add the donor's support to his own burdens. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary ch anro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs in this

instance, appellant having obtained leave to litigate as a pauper. So
ordered. chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15939 November 29, 1965
ANGELES UBALDE PUIG, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ESTELA MAGBANUA PEAFLORIDA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Ceferino de los Santos, Jr. for plaintiffs-appellants.

Salonga, Ordoez & Associates for defendants-appellants.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal to this Court from a decision of March 23, 1959, issued by the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, in its Civil Case No. 2892, declaring null and void certain deeds of
donation executed by the late Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon.
The facts were stipulated in the court below, to the effect that on April 10, 1953, Carmen
Ubalde Vda. de Parcon died in the City of Iloilo, without forced heirs, leaving certain
properties in the City and province of Iloilo. She left a will and was survived by nephews and
nieces, children of her predeceased brother, Catalino Ubalde, and sister, Luisa Ubalde,
married to Ariston Magbanua.
It also appears that besides her will, the deceased had executed two notarial deeds of
donation. One, entitled DONACION MORTIS CAUSA, was executed on November 24,
1948, in favor of her niece, Estela Magbanua, married to Mariano Peaflorida, purporting to
convey to the donee the properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 2338 and
18951 of the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo, subject to the following stipulations:
Que por y en consideracion al afecto, amor y cario que la Donante guarda para con
la Donataria y tambien por motivo de la lealtad y atencion y servicion fieles que la
ultima ha rendido, come sigue aun rindiendo, a favor de la primera, dicha Donante,
por la presente, CEDE Y TRANSFIERE, en concepto de donacion mortis causa, a
favor de la antedicha Donataria, las parcelas de terreno arriba descritas con las
mejoras existentes en ellas, bajo las siguientes condiciones:
1. Que la Donante se reserva el derecho de hipotecar y aun vender las propiedades

objecto de esta escritura de donacion mortis causa, cuando y si necesita fondos
para satisfacer sus propias necesidades, sin que para ello tenga que intervenir la
Donataria, pues su consentimiento se sobre entiende aqui, aparte de que la
donacion que aqui se hace es mortis causa, es decir que la donacion surtira sus
efectos a la muerte de la donante;
2. Que la donataria sufragana todos los gastos necesarios para los tratamientos
medicos, gastos de hospital y/o entierro de la donante a menos que dicha donante
tenga propios fondos depositados en un banco o bancos o que haya cosecho
levantada o recogida. en cual caso dichos recursos responderan portales, gastos a
disposicion y direccion de la donataria;
3. Que la cesion y transferencia aqui provista surtira efecto al fallecer la Donante; y
4. Que si la Donataria muere antes de la Donante esta donacion surtira efecto a

favor de los hijos o descendientes de la primera, pero su marido, el actual
Governador de la provincia de Iloilo Hon. Mariano B. Peaflorida, asumira las
deligaciones que asume en esta escritura de donacion la Donataria Doa Estela
Magbanua, especialmente la de atender a los gastos de ultima enfermedad y
entierra de la Donante.
5. Que esta escritura de donacion no se presentara al Registrador de Titulos de

Iloilo sino despues de la muerte de la donante. Que la Donataria, por la presente,
acepta la donacion aqui hecha de las tres (3) parcelas de terreno arriba, descritas,
con las mejoras existentes en ellas, en las o bajo las condiciones y/o estipulaciones
arriba expresadas, y al mismo tiempo de su mas expresivo y sincero aprecio y
gratitud para con la Donante y expresa su imperecedero agradecimiento por la
benevolencia y generosidad demonstrada por dicha Donante en este acto.
Que Don Mariano B. Peaflorida, marido de la Donataria, asume las obligaciones

contenidas en el parrafo 4 o de las condiciones de esta escritura de donacion.
On December 28, 1949, the deceased executed another deed of donation, also entitled
"ESCRITURA DE DONACION MORTIS CAUSA" in favor of the same donee, Estela
Magbanua Peaflorida, conveying to her three parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 925, 927 and 11042 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo stipulating as
follows:
Que la DONANTE, en consideracion a los servicios prestados a la tiene, por la

presente cedo y traspaso a la DONATARIA, en concepto de una DONACION
MORTIS CAUSA, (1) la totalidad del Lote No. 2054 del Catastro de Pototan, arriba
descrito, y cubierto por el Certificado de Transferencia de Titulo No.926 expedido su
favor por el Registrador de Titulos de la provincia de Iloilo, con todas las mejoras
existentes en ella, (2) la totalidad de la porcion secana y alta que no sea dedicada a
la siembra y cultivo de palay de Lote No. 2053 de Catastro de Pototan, y cubierto
por el certificado de Transferencia de Titulo No. 927, expedido a su favor por el
Registrador de Titulos de Iloilo, con todas las mejoras existentes en ella; (3) y la
mitad de Lote No. 58 de la Catastro de Pototan, Iloilo, y cubierto por el certificado de
Transferencia de Titulo No. 11042, expedido a su favor por el Registrador de Titulos
de Iloilo, con todas las mejoras existentes en ellas, cuya mitad de Lote No. 58 es la
que colinda con los lotes Nos. 61, 62 y 63 del Catastro del Pototan, Iloilo, y cuyas
tres lotes Nos. 2053, 2055, y 58 estan mas detalladamente descritos en el parrafo
anterioir, bajo las condiciones siguientes:
Que si en la fecha de su muerte no haya la DONANTE tras pasado VENDIDO o

cedido a otras terceras personas o entidades la mitad de dichos lotes No. 58 del
Catastro del Pototan, Iloilo, la aqui DONATARIA se compromete y se obliga a pagar
a Caridad Ubalde, casada con Tomas Pedrola, y residente en el municipio de
Pototan, Iloilo, la cantidad de SEIS CIENTOS PESOS (P600.00), y el pago de esta
cantidad se verificara en la fecha en que la aqui DONATARIA tome posesion de la
mitad de dicho lote No. 58;
Que antes de su muerte, la DONANTE, podra enajenar, vender, traspasar o

hipotecar a cualesquier personas o entidades los bienes aqui donados a favor de la
DONATARIA en concepto de una donacionmortis causa;
Que esta escritura de donacion mortis causa no se registrara en la oficina del

Registrador de Titulos de Iloilo sino despues del fallecimiento de la DONANTE; y
Que la DONATARIA acepta la presente donacion bajo las condiciones arriba

consignadas y hace constar publicamente su agradecimiento a la DONANTE por
sugenerosidad y liberalidad.
Both donations were recorded in the corresponding Registry of Deeds after the death of the
donor.
The will executed by the deceased on March 26, 1951 was submitted to the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceedings No. 991; and because the Executor and Special
Administrator, Mariano B. Peaflorida, would not attack the validity of the donations above-
referred to, the nephews and nieces of the late Carmen Ubalde, children of her
predeceased brother, Catalino Ubalde, filed the present suit against their cousins
Magbanua, seeking to have the two deeds of donation set aside for lack of testamentary
formalities; and after issue joined and by decision of March 23, 1959 the Court of First
Instance rendered judgment, with a dispositive portion reading as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment
(a) Declaring the aforementioned two deeds of donation mortis causa, executed in
favor of the defendant Estela Magbanua Peaflorida without the testamentary
formalities prescribed by law invalid and of no effect;
(b) Declaring that the disposition mortis causa in favor of Estela Magbanua
Peaflorida of the portion of Lot No. 2053 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan, Iloilo,
covered by T.C.T. No. 927 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo, described as "la porcion
secana y alta que no esta dedicada al cultivo y siembra de palay" contained in the
void deed of donation mortis causa dated December 26, 1949, was validated by
paragraph ten of the will subsequently executed by Carmen Ubalde on March 26,
1951;
(c) Ordering the defendant Estela Magbanua Peaflorida to forthwith deliver to the
administrator or executor of the estate of the deceased Carmen Ubalde Vda. de
Parcon the parcels of land covered by T.C.T. Nos. 2338, 18951, 925 and 11042 of
the Register of Deeds of Iloilo for proper distribution among the lawful heirs and the
parcel of land covered by T.C.T. No. 927 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo for
adjudication in accordance with the aforesaid will; and
(d) Dismissing the case with respect to the defendants Mariano B. Peaflorida,
Isabel Magbanua Velasco, Neri Magbanua and Efrain Magbanua.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Both parties, plaintiff and defendant, appealed.
Two issues are propounded in the appeal, which are:
(1) Are the two donations, previously described, inter vivos or mortis causa? It being
admitted that in the latter event the donations are void for not being executed with
testamentary formalities.
(2) Was the donation of a portion of Lot 2053 of the Pototan Cadastre, covered by T.C.T.
No. 927 of the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo, validated by par. 10 of the last will and testament
of the decedent, which reads as follows:
DECIMO. Lego a Doa Angeles Ubalde, casada con Don Francisco Puig, toda la
porcion palayera del Lote No. 2053 del catastro de Pototan, Iloilo, y cubierto por el
certificado de Transferencia de Titulo No. 927 expedido a mi favor por el Registrador
de Titulos de Iloilo, y en relacion con este lote, hago constar que he cedido y
traspasado, en concepto de una donacion mortis causa, a Doa Estela Magbanua,
casada con Don Mariano B. Peaflorida, la porcion alta y secana que no esta
dedicada al cultivo y siembra de palay de este mismo Lote No. 2053, segun
documento que he firmado a su favor.
With regard to the character of the donations, it is well to recall here that the jurisprudence
of this Court has established the following rules:
(1) That the donation mortis causa of the Roman Law and the Spanish pre-codal legislation
has been eliminated as a juridical entity from and after the enactment of the Spanish Civil
Code of 1889 (Art. 620) as well as the Civil Code of the Philippines (Art. 728), which admit
only gratuitous transfers of title or real rights to property either by way of donations inter
vivos or else by way of last will and testament, executed with the requisite legal formalities.
In the first case, the act is immediately operative, even if the actual execution may be
deferred until the death of the donor; in the second, nothing is conveyed to the grantee and
nothing is acquired by the latter, until the death of the grantor-testator, the disposition being
until then ambulatory and not final (Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 481).
(2) That an essential characteristic of dispositions mortis causa is that the conveyance or
alienation should be (expressly or by necessary implication) revocable ad nutum, i.e., at the
discretion of the grantor or so-called "donor," simply because the latter has changed his
mind (Bautista vs. Sabiniano, 92 Phil. 244; Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 481).
(3) That, in consequence, the specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be
revoked by the donor indicates that the donation is inter vivos, rather than a
disposition mortis causa (Zapanta vs. Posadas, 52 Phil. 557).
(4) That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the
effect that the donation is "to take effect at the death of the donor" are not controlling criteria
(Laureta vs. Mata, 44 Phil. 668; Concepcion vs. Concepcion, L-4225, August 25, 1952;
Cuevas vs. Cuevas, 68 Phil. 68); such statements are to be construed together with the rest
of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor (Concepcion vs.
Concepcion, supra; Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, supra).
(5) That a conveyance for onerous consideration is governed by the rules of contracts and
not by those of donation or testament (Carlos vs. Ramil, 20 Phil. 183; Manalo vs. de Mesa,
29 Phil. 495).
(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos rather
than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject
of the deed.
Tested by the foregoing principles, the donation of November 24, 1948, while somewhat
ambiguous, should be held inter vivos in character. Admittedly, it is designated as "mortis
causa," and specifies that it will take effect upon the death of the donor; but, as previously
stated, these expressions are not controlling, and, in the instance, before us, are
contradicted by other provisions indicating a contrary intent. Thus,
(a) The conveyance of the properties described in the deed (Annex A, amended complaint)
appears made in consideration of the undertaking of the donee, Estela Magbanua, to bear
"all expenses for medical treatment, hospital expenses and/or burial of the Donor," without
limiting the time when such expenses are to be incurred. In fact, the use of the words "y/o
entierro" (and/or burial) strongly suggests that the illness and hospitalization expenditures to
be borne by the donee may or may not be connected with the donor's last illness.
(b) Emphasizing the onerous character of the transaction is the requirement that if the
donee should predecease the donor, Governor Peaflorida shall assume the obligations of
the donee, "especialmente" (but not exclusively) "los gastos de ultima enfermedad y
entierro de la donante" (par. 4), and this undertaking was assumed even if the properties
donated would not go to Peaflorida but to the donee's children and descendants (par. 3). It
was evidently because of this liability, unconnected with the conveyance, that Peaflorida
had to sign the document together with the donee. It is easy to see that unless the
conveyance were to be effective before the death of donor,, the obligations assumed by the
donee and Governor Peaflorida (her husband) would be without consideration (causa). In
a very similar case (Manalo vs. De Mesa, 29 Phil. 495), this court ruled:
There can be no doubt that the donation in question was made for a valuable
consideration, since the donors made it conditional upon the donees' bearing the
expenses that might be occasioned by the death and burial of the donor Placida
Manalo, a condition and obligation which the donee Gregorio de Mesa carried out in
his own behalf and for his wife Leoncia Manalo; therefore, in order to determine
whether or not said donation is valid and effective it should be sufficient to
demonstrate that, as a contract, it embraces the conditions the law requires and is
valid and effective, although not recorded in a public instrument. (Manalo vs. de
Mesa, 29 Phil. 495, 500)
Such conditions (consent, subject matter, causa or consideration and observance of the
formalities or solemnities required by law) are all present in the deed of November 24, 1948.
(c) Again, while there is a clause that the donor reserved her right "to mortgage or even sell
the donated property,when and if she should need funds to meet her own needs," this last
sentence of the stipulation appears incompatible with the grantor's freedom to revoke a true
conveyance mortis causa, a faculty that is essentially absolute and discretionary, whether
its purpose should be to supply her needs or to make a profit, or have no other reason than
a change of volition on the part of the grantor-testator. If the late Carmen Ubalde Vda. de
Parcon wished or intended to retain the right to change the destination of her property at her
sole will and discretion, there was no reason for her to specify the causes for which she
could sell or encumber the property covered by her bounty.
It is illuminating, in this respect, to compare the provisions above discussed with the
corresponding paragraph of the second deed of donation dated December 28, 1949. The
latter recites as follows:
Que antes de su muerte, la Donante podra enajenar, vender, traspasar o hipotecar a

cualesquier personas o entidades los bienes aqui donados a favor de la Donataria,
en concepto de una donacion mortis causa. (Annex "B", Rec. App., pp. 24-25)
Here is an unlimited power to indirectly avoid the alleged donation any time the donor
should choose to do so, and which leaves no doubt as to the mortis causa nature of the
conveyance; unlike the prior donation, where the power to indirectly revoke is hedged in by
the specification that the donor could dispose of the property only to satisfy her needs,
thereby impliedly rejecting alienations for any other purpose. Hence, following the rule
ofZapanta vs. Posadas, 52 Phil. 557, the donation of November 24, 1948 must beheld to
partake of the nature of a conveyance inter vivos.
(d) Finally, it is no objection to our view that the donation of November 24, 1948 should
provide that it is not to be recorded until after the donor's death (par. 5), since the absence
of registration would affect only subsequent purchasers, without denying the validity and
obligatory effects of the conveyance as between the parties thereto.
We, therefore, conclude, and so hold, that the court below erred in adjudging the deed of
November 24, 1948 to be null and void. The same is valid and operative as a donation inter
vivos.
Turning now to the deed of donation (also labelled mortis causa) executed by and between
the same parties on December 28, 1949, the text thereof (quoted ante, pp. 4-5) is clear that
no proprietary right was intended to pass to the alleged "donee" prior to the "donor's" death,
and that the same was a true conveyance mortis causa, which by law is invalid because it
was not executed with the testamentary formalities required by the statutes in force at the
time. Here, unlike in the previous donation the designation is donation mortis causa is
confirmed by the fact that no signs contradict or limit the unqualified and unrestricted right of
the donor to alienate the conveyed properties in favor of other persons of her choice at any
time that she should wish to do so; it is so expressed in the deed, and it indirectly
recognizes the donor's power to nullify the conveyance to the alleged "donee" whatever the
"donor" wished to do so, for any reason or for no particular reason at all. As we have seen,
this faculty is characteristic of conveyances post mortem or mortis causa: for the right of the
transfer or to alienate the "donated" property to someone else necessarily imports that the
conveyance to the "donee" will not become final and definite in favor of the latter until the
death of the "donor" should exclude every possibility that the property maybe alienated to
some other person.
Defendant-appellant Estela Magbanua Peaflorida contends that this second deed of

December 28, 1949 is also a donation inter vivos; and she argues that the stipulated power
of the grantor to encumber or alienate the property to persons, other than the donee, at any
time before the grantor dies, should be viewed as a mere resolutory condition that does not
contradict but confirms the immediate effectivity of the donation. This ingenious argument is
not legally tenable, since it ignores the circumstance that the so-called "resolutory condition"
is one purely dependent upon the exclusive will of the grantor, and is proof that the deed as
executed, is not obligatory at all (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 1115; Civil Code of the Philippines,
Art. 1182). Confirming the rule, both the old and the new Civil Codes prescribe that the
effectivity, compliance, or binding effect of contracts cannot be left to the sole will of one of
the parties (Art. 1256, Civ. Code of 1889; Art. 1308, Civil Code of the Philippines).
It is also argued that the stipulation empowering the "donor" to alienate the property
elsewhere would be unnecessary if the donation were mortis causa. The flaw in this
reasoning is that it loses sight of the fact that the clause in question proves that there is no
donation at all, since it shows that the alleged donor, Carmen Ubalde, did not wish to be
bound, and did not want to lose her title to, nor her control over, the property during her own
lifetime. There was, therefore, no conveyance inter vivos, since none was intended; and no
donation mortis causabecause, as already pointed out, acts intended to be effective after
the death of the grantor must be executed in the form of a last will and testament, or else
they will not be legally valid.
The nullity of the donation of December 28, 1949 has an exception: the conveyance therein
of "la porcion alta y secana que no esta dedicada al cultivo y siembra de palay" of Lot 2053
of the Pototan (Iloilo) Cadastre was correctly held by the appealed decision to have been
confirmed and validated by the late Carmen Ubalde in clause 10 of her last will and
testament executed on March 26, 1951 (Stip. of Facts, Annex "A"; Rec. on Appeal, pp. 52-
53), when she solemnly declared that she had conveyed said portion to defendant-appellant
Estela Magbanua by donation mortis causa. While made by way of reference, we are
satisfied that this portion of the will's tenth clause (previously quoted on page 7 of this
decision) is valid as an independent testamentary legacy, as it is apparent and indubitable
that the decedent had intended to bequeath the described portion of Lot 2053 to the
defendant-appellant. That it should be expressed in the past tense is irrelevant:
technicalities should not be allowed to enervate the manifest will of the testatrix, clearly
expressed in a valid testament, or unavoidably inferred therefrom.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo should
be and is modified by declaring, as we hereby rule, that the deed of Donation executed by
the late Carmen Ubalde in favor of Estela Magbanua Peaflorida on November 24, 1948 is
a valid and effective conveyance by way of donation inter vivos, duly accepted by the
donee.
IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS, the appealed decision is affirmed. Without costs in this
instance.
Let the records be returned to the Court of origin for further proceedings in conformity with
this opinion.
G.R. No. L-8178 October 31, 1960
JUANITA KAPUNAN, ET AL. Petitioners, vs. ALIPIO N. CASILAN

and the COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
E. Granador, J. B. Velasco, D. T. Reyes, Luison & Cruz for

petitioners.
Manuel Lim and Julio Siayco for respondent.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
This is a petition to review on certiorari a decision of the Court of

Appeals declaring the respondent Alipio N. Casilan owner of certain
real property described in the complaint and ordering petitioners to
deliver possession thereof to said respondent. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ib rary
The facts are not disputed. The property in question, which is a

commercial lot1located in Tacloban City, was on October 2, 1935
donated by the spouses Ruperto Kapunan, Sr., and Iluminada
Fernandez de Kapunan to their daughter Concepcion K. Salcedo,
who accepted the donation in the same document. The deed of
donation was acknowledged on the same date by the donors and
done before Notary Public Mateo Canonoy, the donors' son-in-law
and the donee's brother-in-law. The property, however, remained in
the possession of the donors. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law li bra ry
On December 23, 1939, Concepcion K. Salcedo donated the same

property to her daughter Marita Antonia Salcedo, then a minor. In
behalf of said minor, Iluminada Fernandez Vda. de Kapunan, the
donee's grandmother and acting guardian whom the said donee was
then living as her parents were estranged from each other, accepted
the donation. The acceptance was contained in the deed of donation
itself, which was authenticated by the same Notary Public Mateo
Canonoy. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry
On November 4, 1944, Concepcion Kapunan Salcedo and the

respondent Alipio N. Casilan executed a "Deed of Conditional Sale"
wherein the former accepted the latter's offer to purchase the land
in dispute, and received the sum of P2,000 as part of the purchase
price, the balance of P4,500 to be paid within 3 years therefrom.
Notwithstanding the fact that the property in question was in the
possession of the petitioners and respondent Alipio N. Casilan knew
that Conception Kapunan Salcedo had previously donated the said
property in favor of her daughter Marita Antonia Salcedo, the said
respondent on June 14, 1945 proceeded to buy the same and paid
the balance of the purchase price on the assurance given by the
donor that the donation was not legal. The deed of sale was
annotated on July 27 of the same year in the Daily Book of the
Register of Deeds of Leyte, but not on the original certificate of title
because of the refusal of Iluminada Vda. de Kapunan to deliver the
duplicate certificate of title. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry
In due time, the respondent Casilan filed a petition in the Court of
First Instance of Leyte the compel Iluminada Vda. de Kapunan to
surrender the transfer certificate of title, but the petition was
dismissed. In connection with this petition, Concepcion K. Salcedo,
on March 9, 1946, gave a deposition that she had knowledge of the
acceptance by her mother Iluminada Vda. de Kapunan of the
donation she made to her daughter Marita Antonia Salcedo. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry
To recover title and possession of the property in question,

respondent Casilan filed the present action in the Court of First
Instance of Leyte against Concepcion Kapunan de Salcedo,
Iluminada Fernandez Vda. de Kapunan and Marita Antonia Salcedo.
Juanita, Crinidad, Ruperto, Jr., Emma, Lilia, Socorro and Rosario, all
surnamed Kapunan, intervened as alleged co-owners of the land in
dispute and as heirs of their late father Don Ruperto Kapunan, Sr.
On March 31, 1950, after hearing, the trial court, Judge Hipolito Alo
presiding, rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff, herein
respondent Casilan, to be the owner of the property in question and
ordering the defendants and intervenors to deliver possession
thereof to said plaintiff. The trial court also dismissed the complaint
in intervention. Acting, however, upon the motions for
reconsideration filed by the defendants and intervenors, the lower
court, through Judge Jose S. Rodriguez, in are solution dated May
30, 1950, reconsidered its decision and declared the sale of the
property in question by Concepcion K. Salcedo in favor of
respondent Alipio N. Casilan null and void. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, that court reversed the decision and awarded the land
undisputed to Alipio N. Casilan. Hence, this petition for review. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary
It is petitioners' contention that Notary Public Mateo Canonoy, who

was related to the parties in the donation within the fourth civil
degree of affinity, was, under Articles 22 and 28 of the Spanish
Notarial law, incompetent and disqualified to authenticate the deed
of donation executed by the Kapunan spouses in favor of their
daughter Concepcion Kapunan Salcedo. Said deed of donation,
according to petitioners, became a mere private instrument under
Article 1223 of the old Civil Code, so that under the ruling laid down
in the case of Barretto vs. Cabreza (33 Phil., 413), the donation was
in efficacious. The appellate court, however, in the decision
complained of held that the Spanish Notarial Law has been repealed
with the enactment of Act No. 496. We find this ruling to be correct.
In the case of Philippine Sugar Estate vs. Poizart (48 Phil., 536),
cited in Vda. de Estuart vs. Garcia (Adm. Case No. 212, prom.
February 15, 1957), this Court held that "The old Spanish notarial
law and system of conveyance was repealed in the Philippines and
another and different notarial law and system became the law of the
land with the enactment of Act No. 496." chanrobles vi rtua l law lib rary
We do not, however, agree with the Court of Appeals that the

donation in favor of Marita Antonia Salcedo was null and void in that
there was no "constancia autentica" given to the donor Concepcion
K. Salsedo that the donation had been accepted. Article 633 of the
Civil Code of 1889 provided that -
Art 633. In order that a donation of real property be valid it must be

made by public instrument in which the property donated must be
specially described and the amount of the encumbrances to be
assumed by the donee expressed. chanroblesv irt ualawli b raryc han robles vi rt ual law li bra ry
The acceptance must be made in the deed of gift or in a separate

public writing; but it shall produce no effect if not made during the
lifetime of the donor.
chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry
If the acceptance is made by separate instrument, authentic notice

thereof shall be given the donor, and this proceeding shall be noted
in both instruments.
Under the above legal provisions, a donation transfers title

effectively if it is accepted with all the formalities that must
accompany the acceptance of donations of realty, to wit, thru the
medium of a public instrument with authentic notice to the donor,
unless the acceptance is made in the deed of gift itself.
(Tagala vs. Ybeas, 49 Off. Gaz., 200).In the present case, the deed
of donation executed by Concepcion K. Salcedo in favor of her
daughter Marita Antonia Salcedo states "that the said donee, Marita
Antonia Kapunan Salcedo being a minor and being represented by
hermaternal grandmother, Iluminada F. Vda. de Kapunan, does
express her appreciation and gratefulness for the generosity of said
donor." The acceptance having been made in the deed of gift itself,
notification thereof to the donor in a "constancia autentica" was
evidently not necessary. It is true that the acceptance was made on
another date and in a place other than that where the deed was
executed, but the deed of donation as so worded implied a previous
understanding between the parties who intervened therein, and,
and, whatsoever, the donor, Concepcion K. Salcedo, admittedly
knew of the actual acceptance by the donee through the latter's
grandmother. Pursuant to Art. 623 of the old Civil Code, her
knowledge of such acceptance perfected the donation.. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary
It is also argued that the acceptance of the donation by the donee's

grandmother was not valid since at the time of the acceptance she
had not yet been appointed legal guardian of the donee. Under
article 626 of the old Civil Code, a donation to an incapacitated
donee requires its acceptance by his lawful representative. This
rule, however, appears to be applicable only in case of onerous and
conditional donations, where the donee may have to assume certain
charged or burdens. As was said by former justice Montemayor in
Perez vs. Calingo (CA, 40 Off., Supp. 11, p. 53), "In simple and
pure donations, a formal acceptance is not important for the donor
acquires no right to be protected and the donee neither undertakes
to do anything nor assumes any obligation. In this case, the
acceptance may be said to be a mere formality required by law for
the performance of the contract. Whenever the donation does not
impose any obligation upon the donee the acceptance may be made
by the donee himself." Anyway, if under the rule provided in Article
626 of the old Civil Code the donation of realty to a minor may be
accepted in his behalf by his mother (Laurentavs. Mata, 44 Phil.,
668), we see reason why a simple and pure donation made by the
mother herself in favor of he own minor daughter may not be validly
accepted through the grandmother, the donee's acting guardian
who was later appointed as her legal guardian. It should here be
stated that Iluminada Vda. de Kapunan who accepted the donation
in behalf of the minor donee was appointed legal guardian of the
said minor on June 12, 1944, or prior to the execution of the deed
of conditional sale between the donor Concepcion K. Salcedo and
herein respondent Alipio N. Casilan. There being no showing that
the donation had been revoked prior to the appointment of the
donee's grandmother as her legal guardian, It is apparent that said
donation had been confirmed and impliedly ratified by the parties
intervening therein before the execution of the deed of sale referred
to. (See Atacador vs. Silayan, 67 Phil., 674.) chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
In conclusion, we find and so hold that the donation of the property

in dispute to Maria Antonia Salcedo by Concepcion K. Salcedo was
valid, and consequently the sale thereof by the latter in favor of
respondent Alipio N. Casilan was null and void. Said respondent
however, may still recover what he has paid under the equitable
principle that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the
expense of another. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary
WHEREFORE, the decision complained of is reversed and the sale of

the property in controversy in favor of respondent Alipio N. Casilan
declared null and void. Without costs. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary
[G.R. No. 112796. March 5, 1998]
TITO R. LAGAZO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO

CABANLIT, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Where the acceptance of a donation was made in a separate instrument but not
formally communicated to the donor, may the donation be nonetheless considered
complete, valid and subsisting? Where the deed of donation did not expressly impose
any burden -- the expressed consideration being purely one of liberality and generosity -
- but the recipient actually paid charges imposed on the property like land taxes and
installment arrearages, may the donation be deemed onerous and thus governed by the
law on ordinary contracts?
The Case
The Court answers these questions in the negative as it resolves this petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision [1] of the
Court of Appeals[2] in CA-GR CV No. 38050 promulgated on November 29, 1993. The
assailed Decision reversed the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Manila, in Civil Case
No. 87-39133 which had disposed[3] of the controversy in favor of herein petitioner in the
following manner:[4]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and

against the defendant as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant, or any person claiming rights under him, to

surrender to plaintiff possession of the premises known as Lot 8w, Block 6,
Psd-135534 of the Monserrat Estate, and the improvement standing thereon,
located at 3320 2nd St., V. Mapa, Old Sta. Mesa, Manila;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of Five Thousand

(P5,000.00) Pesos, as and for attorneys fees; and
3. Costs against the defendant.
The defendants counterclaims are hereby dismissed.
The Facts
Although the legal conclusions and dispositions of the trial and the appellate courts
are conflicting, the factual antecedents of the case are not substantially disputed.[5] We
reproduce their narration from the assailed Decision:
Civil Case No. 83-39133 involves an action filed by plaintiff-appellee [herein

petitioner] on January 22, 1987 seeking to recover from defendant-appellant
[a] parcel of land which the former claims to have acquired from his
grandmother by donation. Defendant-appellant [herein private respondent], on
the other hand, put up the defense that when the alleged donation was
executed, he had already acquired the property by a Deed of Assignment
from a transferee of plaintiff-appellees grandmother.
The evidence for plaintiff-appellee [herein petitioner] is summarized as

follows:
Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a widow and grandmother of plaintiff-appellee,

was awarded in July 1975 a 60.10-square meter lot which is a portion of the
Monserrat Estate, more particularly described as Lot 8W, Block 6 of Psd-
135834, located at 3320 2nd St., V. Mapa, Old Sta. Mesa, Manila. The
Monserrat Estate is a public land owned by the City of Manila and distributed
for sale to bona fide tenants under its land-for-the-landless program. Catalina
Jacob constructed a house on the lot.
On October 3, 1977, or shortly before she left for Canada where she is now a
permanent resident, Catalina Jacob executed a special power of attorney
(Exh. A) in favor of her son-in-law Eduardo B. Espaol authorizing him to
execute all documents necessary for the final adjudication of her claim as
awardee of the lot.
Due to the failure of Eduardo B. Espaol to accomplish the purpose of the

power of attorney granted to him, Catalina Jacob revoked said authority in an
instrument executed in Canada on April 16, 1984 (Exh. D).Simultaneous with
the revocation, Catalina Jacob executed another power of attorney of the
same tenor in favor plaintiff-appellee.
On January 30, 1985, Catalina Jacob executed in Canada a Deed of Donation

over a Lot 8W in favor of plaintiff-appellee (Exh. E). Following the donation,
plaintiff-appellee checked with the Register of Deeds and found out that the
property was in the delinquent list, so that he paid the installments in arrears
and the remaining balance on the lot (Exhs. F, F-1 and F-2) and declared the
said property in the name of Catalina Jacob (Exhs. G, G-1, G-2 and G-3).
On January 29, 1986, plaintiff-appellee sent a demand letter to defendant-

appellant asking him to vacate the premises (Exh. H). A similar letter was sent
by plaintiff-appellees counsel to defendant on September 11, 1986 (Exh.
I). However, defendant-appellant refused to vacate the premises claiming
ownership thereof. Hence, plaintiff-appellee instituted the complaint for
recovery of possession and damages against defendant-appellant.
Opposing plaintiff-appellees version, defendant-appellant claimed that the

house and lot in controversy were his by virtue of the following documents:
1. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Catalina Jacob dated October 7, 1977

in favor of Eduardo B. Espaol covering the residential house located at the
premises (Exh. 4).
2. Deed of Assignment over Lot 8W executed by Catalina Jacob in favor of

Eduardo Espaol dated September 30, 1980 (Exh. 5); and
3. Deed of Assignment executed by Eduardo B. Espaol over Lot 8W and a

residential house thereon in favor of defendant-appellant dated October 2,
1982 (Exh. 6).
After trial, the lower court decided in favor of plaintiff-appellee and against
defendant-appellant, rationalizing that the version of the former is more
credible than that of the latter. According to the lower court:
From the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties[,] it appears that the
plaintiff- has a better right over the property, subject matter of the case. The version of
the plaintiff is more credible than that of the defendant. The theory of the plaintiff is that
the house and lot belong to him by virtue of the Deed of Donation in his favor executed
by his grandmother Mrs. Jacob Vda. de Reyes, the real awardee of the lot in
question. The defendants theory is that he is the owner thereof because he bought the
house and lot from Eduardo Espaol, after the latter had shown and given to him Exhibits
1, 4 and 5. He admitted that he signed the Deed of Assignment in favor of Eduardo
Espaol on September 30, 1980, but did not see awardee Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes
signed [sic] it. In fact, the acknowledgement in Exhibit 5 shows that the
assignor/awardee did not appear before the notary public. It may be noted that on said
date, the original awardee of the lot was no longer in the Philippines, as both parties
admitted that she had not come back to the Philippines since 1977. (Exhs. K, K-
1). Defendant, claiming to be the owner of the lot, unbelievably did not take any action
to have the said house and lot be registered or had them declared in his own
name. Even his Exhibit 7 was not mailed or served to the addressee. Such attitude and
laxity is very unnatural for a buyer/owner of a property, in stark contrast of [sic] the
interest shown by the plaintiff who saw to it that the lot was removed from the delinquent
list for non-payment of installments and taxes due thereto [sic].[6]
Ruling of the Appellate Court
In reversing the trial courts decision,[7] Respondent Court of Appeals anchored its
ruling upon the absence of any showing that petitioner accepted his grandmothers
donation of the subject land. Citing jurisprudence that the donees failure to accept a
donation whether in the same deed of donation or in a separate instrument renders the
donation null and void, Respondent Court denied petitioners claim of ownership over
the disputed land. The appellate court also struck down petitioners contention that the
formalities for a donation of real property should not apply to his case since it was an
onerous one -- he paid for the amortizations due on the land before and after the
execution of the deed of donation -- reasoning that the deed showed no burden, charge
or condition imposed upon the donee; thus, the payments made by petitioner were his
voluntary acts.
Dissatisfied with the foregoing ruling, petitioner now seeks a favorable disposition
from this Court.[8]
Issues
Petitioner anchors his petition on the following grounds:[9]
[I.] In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals decided a
question of substance in a way not in accord with the law and applicable
decisions of this Honorable Court.
[II.] Even granting the correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
certain fact and circumstances transpired in the meantime which would render
said decision manifestly unjust, unfair and inequitable to petitioner.
We believe that the resolution of this case hinges on the issue of whether the
donation was simple or onerous.
The Courts Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Main Issue:
Simple or Onerous Donation?
At the outset, let us differentiate between a simple donation and an onerous

one. A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality (no strings
attached), while an onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or
future services equal to or more in value than the thing donated. [10] Under Article 733 of
the Civil Code, donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on
contracts; hence, the formalities required for a valid simple donation are not applicable.
Petitioner contends that the burdens, charges or conditions imposed upon a
donation need not be stated on the deed of donation itself. Thus, although the deed did
not categorically impose any charge, burden or condition to be satisfied by him, the
donation was onerous since he in fact and in reality paid for the installments in arrears
and for the remaining balance of the lot in question. Being an onerous donation, his
acceptance thereof may be express or implied, as provided under Art. 1320 of the Civil
Code, and need not comply with the formalities required by Art. 749 of the same
code. His payment of the arrearages and balance and his assertion of his right of
possession against private respondent clearly indicate his acceptance of the donation.
We rule that the donation was simple, not onerous. Even
conceding that petitioners full payment of the purchase price of the lot might have been
a burden to him, such payment was not however imposed by the donor as a condition
for the donation. Rather, the deed explicitly stated:
That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONEE inspires in
the DONOR, and as an act of liberality and generosity and considering further that the
DONEE is a grandson of the DONOR, the DONOR hereby voluntarily and freely gives,
transfer[s] and conveys, by way of donation unto said DONEE, his heirs, executors,
administrators and assigns, all the right, title and interest which the said DONOR has in
the above described real property, together with all the buildings and improvements
found therein, free from all lines [sic] and encumbrances and charges
whatsoever;[11] [underscoring supplied]
It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge petitioner as
the donee. The words in the deed are in fact typical of a pure donation. We agree with
Respondent Court that the payments made by petitioner were merely his voluntary
acts. This much can be gathered from his testimony in court, in which he never even
claimed that a burden or charge had been imposed by his grandmother.
ATTY FORONDA:
q After you have received this [sic] documents, the x x x revocation of power of attorney and
the Special Power of Attorney in your favor, what did you do?
WITNESS:
a I went here in City Hall and verif[ied] the status of the award of my grandmother.
q When you say the award, are you referring to the award in particular [of the] lot in favor of
your grandmother?
a Yes, Sir.
q What was the result of your verification?
a According to the person in the office, the papers of my grandmother is [sic] includ[ed] in the
dilinquent [sic] list.
q What did you do then when you found out that the lot was includ[ed] in the dilinquent [sic]
list?
a I talked to the person in charged [sic] in the office and I asked him what to do so that the lot
should not [be] included in the dilinquent [sic] list.
ATTY. FORONDA:
q And what was the anwer [sic] given to you to the inquiry which you made?
WITNESS:
a According to the person in the office, that I would pay the at least [sic] one half of the
installment in order to take [out] the document [from] the delinquent list.
q And [were] you able to pay?
a I was able to pay, sir.
q What were you able to pay, one half of the balance or the entire amounts [sic]?
a First, I paid the [sic] one half of the balance since the time the lot was awarded to us.
q What about the remaining balance, were you able to pay it?
a I was able to pay that, sir.
q So, as of now, the amount in the City of Manila of the lot has already been duly paid, is it
not?
a Yes, sir.[12]
The payments even seem to have been made pursuant to the power of
attorney[13]executed by Catalina Reyes in favor of petitioner, her grandson, authorizing
him to execute acts necessary for the fulfillment of her obligations. Nothing in the
records shows that such acts were meant to be a burden in the donation.
As a pure or simple donation, the following provisions of the Civil Code are
applicable:
Art. 734. The donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee.
Art. 746. Acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and the
donee.
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be
made in a public instrument, specifying therein the property donated and the
value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation and in a separate
public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime
of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified

thereof in authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
In the words of the esteemed Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,[14] Like any other contract,
an agreement of the parties is essential. The donation, following the theory of
cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected only upon the moment the donor knows
of the acceptance by the donee. Furthermore, [i]f the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall
be noted in both instruments.[15]
Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its absence
makes the donation null and void.[16] The perfection and the validity of a donation are
well explained by former Sen. Arturo M. Tolentino in this wise:
x x x Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of
a deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the
donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument
of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made
in another. Solemn words are not necessary; it is sufficient if it shows the intention to
accept. But in this case it is necessary that formal notice thereof be given to the donor,
and the fact that due notice has been given must be noted in both instruments (that
containing the offer to donate and that showing the acceptance). Then and only then is
the donation perfected. If the instrument of donation has been recorded in the registry of
property, the instrument that shows the acceptance should also be recorded. Where the
deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the
acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not
noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and
void.[17]
Exhibit E (the deed of donation) does not show any indication that petitioner-
donee accepted the gift. During the trial, he did not present any instrument evidencing
such acceptance despite the fact that private respondent already raised this allegation
in his supplemental pleading[18] to which petitioner raised no objection. It was only after
the Court of Appeals had rendered its decision, when petitioner came before this Court,
that he submitted an affidavit[19] dated August 28, 1990, manifesting that he
wholeheartedly accepted the lot given to him by his grandmother, Catalina Reyes. This
is too late, because arguments, evidence, causes of action and matters not raised in the
trial court may no longer be raised on appeal.[20]
True, the acceptance of a donation may be made at any time during the lifetime of
the donor. And granting arguendo that such acceptance may still be admitted in
evidence on appeal, there is still need for proof that a formal notice of such acceptance
was received by the donor and noted in both the deed of donation and the separate
instrument embodying the acceptance. At the very least, this last legal requisite of
annotation in both instruments of donation and acceptance was not fulfilled by
petitioner. For this reason, the subject lot cannot be adjudicated to him.
Secondary Issue:
Supervening Events
Petitioner also contends that certain supervening events have transpired which
render the assailed Decision manifestly unjust, unfair and inequitable to him. The City of
Manila has granted his request for the transfer to his name of the lot originally awarded
in favor of Catalina Reyes. A deed of sale[21] covering the subject lot has in fact been
executed between the City of Manila, as the vendor, and petitioner, as the vendee. The
corresponding certificate of title[22] has also been issued in petitioners name.
A close perusal of the city governments resolution[23] granting petitioners request
reveals that the request for and the grant of the transfer of the award were premised on
the validity and perfection of the deed of donation executed by the original awardee,
petitioners grandmother. This is the same document upon which petitioner, as against
private respondent, asserts his right over the lot. But, as earlier discussed and ruled,
this document has no force and effect and, therefore, passes no title, right or interest.
Furthermore, the same resolution states:
WHEREAS, in a report submitted by Ms. [Menchu C.] Bello [, Special

Investigator,] on February 7, 1990, it is stated that x x x constructed on the lot
is a make-shift structure used for residential purposes by the proposed
transferee Tito Lagazo and his family; x x x and that constructed at Lot 8,
Block 6, former Monserrat Estate is a make-shift structure used as a dwelling
place by Lagazo and family because the front portion of their house which
was constructed on a road lot was demolished, and the structure was
extended backward covering a portion of the old temporary road lot. x x x
The above findings of the investigator are, however, directly contradictory to the
testimonies in court of petitioner himself and of private respondent. Petitioner claimed
the following: that the house constructed on the subject lot was owned by his
grandmother Catalina Jacob; that before the latter left for Canada in 1977, Eduardo
Espaol had already been living in the same house and continued to do so until 1982;
and that private respondent occupied the premises after Espaol left.[24] On the other
hand, private respondent testified that he bought the subject house and lot from
Eduardo Espaol in 1982, after which he and his family occupied the same; but
sometime in 1985, they had to leave the place due to a road-widening project which
reduced the house to about three meters [in] length and one arm[]s width. [25]
Between the testimonies under oath of the contending parties and the report -- not
subjected to cross-examination -- which was prepared by the investigator who
recommended the approval of petitioners request for transfer, it is the former to which
the Court is inclined to give more credence. The investigators report must have been
based on the misrepresentations of petitioner who arrogated unto himself the
prerogatives of both Espaol and private respondent. Further, it is on record that
petitioner had required private respondent to vacate the subject premises before he
instituted this complaint. This shows he was not in actual possession of the property,
contrary to the report of the investigator.
Cabanlits Claim of Ownership
Petitioner also assails Respondent Courts conclusion that it is unnecessary to pass

upon private respondents claim over the property. Petitioner insists that the principal
issue in the case, as agreed upon by the parties during pretrial, is who between the
parties is the owner of the house and lot in question.
In disposing of the principal issue of the right of petitioner over the subject property
under the deed of donation, we arrive at one definite conclusion: on the basis of the
alleged donation, petitioner cannot be considered the lawful owner of the subject
property. This does not necessarily mean, however, that private respondent is
automatically the rightful owner.
In resolving private respondents claim of ownership, the examination of the
genuineness of the documents (deeds of assignment over the lot between Catalina
Reyes and Eduardo Espaol and between Espaol and private respondent) upon which
he asserts his right is necessary, especially in light of petitioners allegations of
forgery. However, the respective assignors in both documents are not parties to the
instant case. Not having been impleaded in the trial court, they had no participation
whatsoever in the proceedings at bar. Elementary norms of fair play and due process
bar us from making any disposition which may affect their rights. Verily, there can be no
valid judgment for or against them.[26]
Anyhow, since petitioner, who was the plaintiff below, failed to prove with clear and
convincing evidence his ownership claim over the subject property, the parties thus
resume their status quo ante. The trial court should have dismissed his complaint for his
failure to prove a right superior to that of private respondent, but without prejudice to
any action that Catalina Reyes or Eduardo Espaol or both may have against said
private respondent. Stating this point otherwise, we are not ruling in this case on the
rights and obligations between, on the one hand, Catalina Reyes, her assigns and/or
representatives; and, on the other, Private Respondent Cabanlit.
Not having proven any right to a valid, just and demandable claim that compelled
him to litigate or to incur expenses in order to protect his interests by reason of an
unjustified act or omission of private respondent, petitioner cannot be awarded
attorneys fees.[27]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 105944. February 9, 1996]
SPOUSES ROMULO AND SALLY EDUARTE, petitioners, vs. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEDRO CALAPINE
(substituted by ALEXANDER CALAPINE and ARTEMIS
CALAPINE, respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of

a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it.[1] On the part of the donor, it
is an exercise of ones generosity. However, on several occasions, instead of
being accorded recognition and appreciation for this act of beneficence, the
donor ends up as a victim of greed and ingratitude. This was the fate that
befell Pedro Calapine (herein original plaintiff) constraining him to cause the
revocation of the donation that he made to his niece in 1984. The instant
petition for certiorari is interposed by the spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte,
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 29175 which
affirmed the revocation of the donation made by Pedro Calapine to his niece,
Helen Doria, and at the same time declared petitioners as purchasers in bad
faith of the property donated.
As set out in the appealed decision, the undisputed facts are as follows:
Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in San
Cristobal, San Pablo City, with an area of 12,199 square meters, as evidenced by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-2129 (Exhibits A and 1). On April 26, 1984, he
executed a deed entitled Pagbibigay-Pala (Donacion Inter-Vivos) ceding one-half
portion thereof to his niece Helen S. Doria (Exhibit B).
On July 26, 1984, another deed identically entitled was purportedly executed by Pedro
Calapine ceding unto Helen S. Doria the whole of the parcel of land covered by OCT
No. P-2129 (Exhibits C and D), on the basis of which said original certificate was
cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-23205 was issued in
her name (Exhibits G and 2).
On February 26, 1986, Helen S. Doria donated a portion of 157 square meters of the
parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-23205 to the Calauan Christian Reformed
Church, Inc. (Exhibit H), on the basis of which said transfer certificate of title was
cancelled and TCT No. T-24444 was issued in its name covering 157 square meters
(Exhibit 2-A) and TCT No. T-24445, in the name of Helen S. Doria covering the
remaining portion of 12,042 square meters (Exhibit 3).
On March 25, 1988, Helen S. Doria sold, transferred and conveyed unto the spouses
Romulo and Sally Eduarte the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-24445, save the
portion of 700 square meters on which the vendors house had been erected (Exhibits I
and 3-F), on the basis of which TCT No. 24445 was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT
No. T-27434, issued in the name of the vendees (Exhibit 4).
Claiming that his signature to the deed of donation (Exhibits C and D) was a forgery
and that, she was unworthy of his liberality, Pedro Calapine brought suit against
Helen S. Doria, the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. and the spouses Romulo
and Sally Eduarte to revoke the donation made in favor of Helen S. Doria (Exhibit B),
to declare null and void the deeds of donation and sale that she had executed in favor
of the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. and the spouses Romulo and Sally
Eduarte (Exhibits H, I and 3-F) and to cancel TCT Nos. T-24444, 24445 and T-27434.
Answering the complaint, the defendants spouses denied knowledge of the first deed
of donation and alleged that after a part of the property was donated to the defendant
Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc., the remaining portion thereof was sold to
them by the defendant Helen S. Doria; and that the plaintiffs purported signature in
the second deed of donation was his own, hence genuine. They prayed that the
complaint against them be dismissed; that upon their counterclaim, the plaintiff be
ordered to pay them moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees; and that upon
their cross-claim the defendant Helen S. Doria be ordered to reimburse them the
purchase price of P110,000 and to pay them moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees (pp. 23-31, rec.).
The defendant Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. manifested in its answer the
willingness to reconvey to the plaintiff that part of the property donated to it by Helen
S. Doria (pp. 36-38, rec.). And having executed the corresponding deed of
reconveyance, the case as against it was dismissed(pp. 81-83; 84, rec.).
The defendants Helen S. Doria and the City Assessor and the Registrar of Deeds of
San Pablo City did not file answers to the plaintiffs complaint.
After the plaintiffs death on August 27, 1989, on motion, he was substituted by his
nephews Alexander and Artemis Calapine upon order of the Court (pp. 147-152; 250,
rec.).
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 30, San Pablo
City rendered judgment, the dispositive part of which provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by the Court in the

instant case in favor of plaintiff and against defendant Eduartes to wit:
1. DECLARING as it is hereby declared, the revocation of the Deed of Donation

dated April 26,1984;
2. ANNULLING, voiding, setting aside and declaring of no force and effect the Deed
of Donation dated July 26, 1984, the deed of absolute sale executed on
March 25, 1988 by and between spouses Eduartes and Helen Doria, and the Transfer
Certificate of Title No-T-27434 issued under the name of spouses Romulo and Sally
Eduarte;
3. ORDERING the office of the Register of Deeds, San Pablo City, to cancel TCT No.
T-27434 or any other adverse title emanating from OCT No. P-2129 and in lieu
thereof, to issue a new transfer certificate of title covering the subject property under
the names of the substitute-plaintiffs Alexander and Artemis both surnamed Calapine,
after payment of the corresponding fees and taxes therefor; and
4. ORDERING defendant Helen Doria to pay substitute-plaintiffs the sum of

P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.
Judgment on the cross-claim of defendant Eduartes against Helen Doria is further
rendered by ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of P110,000.00 with legal
interest thereon starting from March 25, 1988 until full payment, and the further sum
of P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.
The counterclaim of defendant Eduartes against plaintiff is hereby dismissed for lack
of merit.
Costs against defendant Helen Doria in both the complaint and the cross-claim (pp.
11-12, decision, pp. 264-265, rec.).
Only the defendants Eduarte spouses took an appeal (p. 266, rec.), claiming that the
trial court erred -
1. In annulling, voiding, setting aside, and declaring of no force and effect -

(a) the deed of donation (Exhibits C and 1-A), dated July 26,1984;
(b) the deed of absolute sale (Exhibits 1 and 3-E) executed
on March 25, 1988 by and between Spouses Eduartes and Helen Doria;
(c) TCT No. T-27434 (Exhibit 4) issued in the name of spouses Romulo Eduarte
and Sally Eduarte; and
in revoking the deed of donation (Exhibit B) dated April 26,1984;
2. In declaring the appellants Eduartes buyers in bad faith;
3. In not finding the plaintiffs guilty of estoppel by silence and/or guilty of suppression of
evidence instead of finding the appellants Eduartes guilty of suppression of
evidence; and
4. In finding that the signature of Pedro Calapine in the deed of donation (Exhibits C
and 1-A) dated July 26,1984 a forgery based on the opposite findings of the
handwriting experts presented by each party and in the absence of the testimony of
Pedro Calapine who was then still alive (pp. 1-2, appellants brief.)[2]
In its decision dated April 22, 1992,[3] respondent Court of Appeals

dismissed petitioners appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Respondent court was in complete accord with the trial court in giving more
credence to the testimony of private respondents expert witness, NBJ
document examiner Bienvenido Albacea, who found Pedro Calapines
signature in the second deed of donation to be a forgery. It also ruled that by
falsifying Pedro Calapines signature, Helen Doria committed an act of
ingratitude which is a valid ground for revocation of the donation made in her
favor in accordance with Article 765 of the Civil Code. Furthermore,
respondent court upheld the trial courts finding that petitioners are not buyers
in good faith of the donated property as they failed to exercise due diligence in
verifying the true ownership of the property despite the existence of
circumstances that should have aroused their suspicions.
Petitioners are now before us taking exception to the foregoing findings of
respondent Court of Appeals and contending that the same are not in accord
with the law and evidence on record.
Anent the revocation of the first deed of donation, petitioners submit that
paragraph (1) of Article 765 of the Civil Code does not apply in this case
because the acts of ingratitude referred to thereih pertain to offenses
committed by the donee against the person or property of the donor.
Petitioners argue that as the offense imputed to herein donee Helen Doria -
falsification of a public document - is neither a crime against the person nor
property of the donor but is a crime against public interest under the Revised
Penal Code, the same is not a ground for revocation.
In support of this contention, petitioners cite the following portions found in
Tolentinos Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code:
Offense against Donor - x x x. The crimes against the person of the donor would
include not only homicide and physical injuries, but also illegal detention, threats and
coercion; and those against honor include offenses against chastity and those against
the property, include robbery, theft, usurpation, swindling, arson, damages, etc. (5
Manresa 175-176).[4]
This assertion, however, deserves scant consideration. The full text of the
very same commentary cited by petitioners belies their claim that falsification
of the deed of donation is not an act of ingratitude, to wit:
Offense Against Donor. All crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are
causes for revocation. There is no doubt, therefore, that the donee who commits
adultery with the wife of the donor, gives cause for revocation by reason of
ingratitude. The crimes against the person of the donor would include not only
homicide and physical injuries, but also illegal detention, threats, and coercion; those
against honor include offenses against chastity; and those against the property, include
robbery, theft, usurpation, swindling, arson, damages, etc. [Manresa 175-
176].[5] (Italics supplied).
Obviously, the first sentence was deleted by petitioners because it totally

controverts their contention. As noted in the aforecited opinion all crimes
which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation.
Petitioners attempt to categorize the offenses according to their classification
under the Revised Penal Code is therefore unwarranted considering that
illegal detention, threats and coercion are considered as crimes against the
person of the donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes against
personal liberty and security under the Revised Penal Code.[6]
Petitioners also impute grave error to respondent Court of Appeals in
finding that the second deed of donation dated July 26, 1984 was falsified.
Petitioners deplore the fact that more credence was given to the testimony of
the NBI handwriting expert who found Pedro Calapines signature in the
second deed of donation to be a forgery despite the existence of controverting
testimony by PC-INP Crime Laboratory (PCCL) Chief Document Examiner
which petitioners adduced as evidence on their part.
We are not persuaded. Respondent Court of Appeals and the trial court
cannot be faulted for giving more weight and credence to the testimony of the
NBI handwriting expert considering that the examination of the said witness
proved to be complete, thorough and scientific.
In gauging the relative weight to be given to the opinion of handwriting
experts, we adhere to the following standards:
We have held that the value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon
his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance
he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies
in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape
notice or detection from an unpracticed observer. The test of genuineness ought to be
the resemblance, not the formation of letters in some other specimens but to the
general character of writing, which is impressed on it as the involuntary and
unconscious result of constitution, habit or other permanent course, and is, therefore
itself permanent.[7]
Confronted with contradicting testimonies from two handwriting experts,

the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals were convinced by the opinion
of the NB! handwriting expert as it was more exhaustive, in contrast with the
testimony of petitioners witness from the PCCL which was discarded on
account of the following flaws:
The Court is not convinced with Cruzs explanations. Apart from the visual
inconsistencies, i.e., the strokes with which some letters were made, the variety in the
sizes of the letters, the depth, the difference in the slant which the Court itself
observed in its own examination of both the questioned signatures and those standard
specimen signatures, there is evidence showing that Cruz did not make a thorough
examination of all the signatures involved in this particular issue. Thus even in the
report submitted by the PCCL it was admitted that they omitted or overlooked the
examination of at least three (3) standard specimen signatures of Pedro Calapine
which were previously subject of the NBI examination marked as Exhibits S-9, S-10
and S-il. When questioned regarding this oversight, Cruz testified that in his opinion,
the inclusion or non-inclusion of said exhibits in their examination will not affect the
same and they would have arrived at the same conclusion anyway. Again, when asked
why they did not bother to have the original copies of the documents being questioned
(Exhs. Q-1 through Q-3) for their examination, Cruz replied that they are using a
special film so it will not matter whether the documents being examined are the
original or a mere photocopy (TSN 8, 10, 12 and 26, Hearing of Nov. 23, 1989).
The Court will not attempt to make its own conclusion or resolution on such a
technical issue as the matter at hand in the light of the cavalier attitude of Cruz. In
fine, between the examinations made by the two witnesses, that of Albaceas proved to
be complete, thorough and scientific and is worthy of credence and belief.[8]
The afore-quoted findings confirm beyond doubt the failure of petitioners expert
witness to satisfy the above-mentioned criteria for evaluating the opinion of
handwriting experts. At the same time, petitioners witness failed to rebut the
convincing testimony of the NB! handwriting expert presented by private respondents.
We therefore find no reason to deviate from the assailed conclusions as the same are
amply supported by the evidence on record.
Finally, proceeding to the crucial issue that directly affects herein petitioners, it is
reiterated that petitioners are buyers in good faith of the donated property, and
therefore, it was grave error to annul and set aside the deed of sale executed between
petitioners and donee Helen Doria.
In adjudging petitioners as buyers in bad faith, respondent Court of

Appeals affirmed the trial courts finding that the attendant circumstances, that
is, the presence of other occupants as well as houses built of strong materials
and fruit bearing trees in the subject land, should have aroused the suspicion
of petitioners and impelled them to exercise due diligence in verifying the true
ownership of the property being sold. Petitioners dispute the tower courts
conclusion and argue that although there were other occupants in the subject
property, no adverse claim was made by the latter as they were mere tenants
therein, thus, petitioners were not obliged to make any further inquiry because
the property being sold was covered by a certificate of title under Helen Dorias
name.
We agree with petitioners. The rule is well-settled that mere possession
cannot defeat the title of a holder of a registered torrens title to real
property.[9] Moreover, reliance on the doctrine that a forged deed can legally
be the root of a valid title is squarely in point in this case:
Although generally a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title,

however there are instances when such a fraudulent document may become the root of
a valid title. One such instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred
from the name of the true owner to the forger, and while it remained that way, the
land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the
right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate.
Where there was nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the
ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required
to explore further than what the Torrens Title upon its face indicates in quest for any
hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the
rule were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which
the Torrens System seeks to insure would entirely be futile and nugatory.[10]
When herein petitioners purchased the subject property from Helen Doria,
the same was already covered by TCT No. T-23205 under the latters name.
And although Helen Dorias title was fraudulently secured, such fact cannot
prejudice the rights of herein petitioners absent any showing that they had any
knowledge or participation in such irregularity. Thus, they cannot be obliged to
look beyond the certificate of title which appeared to be valid on its face and
sans any annotation or notice of private respondents adverse claim. Contrary
therefore to the conclusion of respondent Court, petitioners are purchasers in
good faith and for value as they bought the disputed property without notice
that some other person has a right or interest in such property, and paid a full
price for the same at the time of the purchase or before they had notice of the
claim or interest of some other person in the property.[11]
Respondent Court therefore committed a reversible error when it affirmed
the ruling of the trial court annulling and setting aside the deed of absolute
sale dated March 25, 1988 between petitioners and Helen
Doria, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27434 issued under
petitioners name, the established rule being that the rights of an innocent
purchaser for value must be respected and protected notwithstanding the
fraud employed by the seller in securing his title.[12]
!n this regard, it has been held that the proper recourse of the true owner
of the property who was prejudiced and fraudulently dispossessed of the
same is to bring an action for damages against those who caused or
employed the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an action against the
Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for recovery of damages against the
Assurance Fund.[13]
Conformably with the foregoing, having established beyond doubt that
Helen Doria fraudulently secured her title over the disputed property which
she subsequently sold to petitioners, Helen Doria should instead be adjudged
liable to private respondents, and not to petitioners as declared by the trial
court and respondent Court of Appeals, for the resulting damages to the true
owner and original plaintiff, Pedro Calapine.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed decision is
hereby MODIF!ED. The portions of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
San Pablo City, Branch 30, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 29175 which ordered the following:
xxx xxx xxx;
2. ANNULLING, voiding, setting aside and declaring of no force and effect x x x , the
deed of absolute sale executed on March 25, 1988 by and between spouses Eduartes
and Helen Doria, and the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27434 issued under the
name of spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte;
3. ORDERING the office of the Register of Deeds, San Pablo City, to cancel TCT No.
T-27434 or any other adverse title emanating from OCT No. P-2129 and in lieu
thereof, to issue a new transfer certificate of title covering the subject property under
the names of the substitute-plaintiffs Alexander and Artemi s both surnamed Calapine,
after payment of the corresponding fees and taxes therefor: and
4 xxx . xxx xxx
Judgnient on the cross-claim of defendant Eduartes against Helen Doria is further

rendered by ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of P110,000.00 with legal
interest thereon starting from March 25, 1988 until full payment, x x x.
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Instead, Helen Doria is hereby ordered to pay herein private respondents
the sum of P110,000.00 with legal interest counted from March 25, 1988 until
full payment, as damages for the resulting loss to original plaintiff Pedro
Calapine.
In all other respects, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.

Donation Cases

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Donation Cases

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-6600 July 30, 1954

HEIRS OF JUAN BONSATO and FELIPE BONSATO, petitioners,

Benedict C. Balderrama for petitioners.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Que en este de 1939 el donante Domingo Bonsato ha entregado a Felipe Bonsato

Domingo (His thumbmark) Bonsato

(Sgd.) Felipe Bonsato

SIGNADO Y FIRMADO EN PRESENCIA DE:

(Sgd.) Illegible (Sgd.) Illegible

Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion . . .

No ha mucho formulabamos esta pregunta: Subsisten las donaciones mortis

xxx xxx xxx

Las donaciones mortis causa se consevan en el Codigo como se conserva un cuerpo

G.R. No. L-33849 August 18, 1977

TEODORICO ALEJANDRO, IRENEO POLICARPIO, VIRGINIA ALEJANDRO, MARIA

G.R. No. L-33968 August 18, 1977

ANDREA DIAZ, petitioner,

HON. AMBROSIO M. GERALDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of

Ponciano G. Hernandez for Teodorico Alejandro, et al.

Porfirio Villaroman for Andrea Diaz and Angel Diaz.

KASULATAN NG PAGKAKALOOB (A DEED OF DONATION)

ALAMIN NG LAHAT NG MAKATUTUNGHAY NITO:

Ang pagkakaloob (donation) na ito, ginawa at pinagtibay dito sa municipio ng

1. TCT No. 7336, Lot No. 2502, 5,678 square meters.

2. TCT No. 10998, Lot No. 2485, 640 square meters.

3. TCT No. 10840, Lot No. 2377,16,600 square meters.

4. TCT No. 10997, Lot No. 2448,12,478 square meters.

5. TCT No. 2051, Lot No. 4168, 1,522 square meters.

6. TCT No. 17960, Lot No. 2522, 3,418 square meters.

7. TCT No. 17961, Lot No. 2521, 715 square meters.

8. TCT No. 21453, Lot No. 2634, 8,162 square meters.

Na dahil at alang-alang sa pagmamahal at masuyong pagtingin na taglay ng

Na kaming mga pinagkakalooban (DONEES) na sila Regina Fernando,

AT SA WAKAS, ang pagkakaloob na ito (DONATION), ay sumasailalim sa

1. Ang mga Pinagkakalooban (Donatarios) na sila Regina Fernando, Olimpia

2. Na ang mga Pinagkalooban (DONATARIOS) ay hindi maaaring

3. Gayun din, samantalang kaming mag-asawang Gabino Diaz at Severa

SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT, linagdaan namin ang kasulatang ito, dito sa

(Acknowledgment signed by Notary Celedonio Reyes is omitted)

ART. 730. The fixing of an event or the imposition of a suspensive condition,

ART. 731. When a person donates something subject to the resolutory

(b) Subsisten hoy en nuestro Derecho las donaciones mortis causa ? De

La tesis de la desaparicion de las donaciones mortis causa en nuestro

Garcia Goyena, comentando dicho proyecto, decia que la Comision se habia

3. That in a mortis causa disposition the conveyance or alienation should be

5. That the designation of the donation as mortis causa , or a provision in the

6. That a conveyance for an onerous consideration is governed by the rules

7. That in case of doubt the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter

Na dahil at alang-alang sa pagmamahal at masuyong pagtingin

"Dapat maalaman ni Crispulo Cuevas na samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ang lupa na

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-29204 December 29, 1928

RUFINA ZAPANTA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

G.R. No. L-29205 December 29, 1928

ROSARIO PINEDA, plaintiff-appellee,

G.R. No. L-29206 December 29, 1928

OLIMPIO GUANZON, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

G.R. No. L-29207 December 29, 1928

LEONCIA PINEDA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

G.R. No. L-29208 December 29, 1928

EMIGDIO DAVID, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

G.R. No. L-29209 December 29, 1928

GERONIMA PINEDA, plaintiff-appellees,