The Logic and Rhetoric of John Stuart Mill

Author(s): James P. Zappen

Source: Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 3 (1993), pp. 191-200
Published by: Penn State University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237767
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The Logic and Rhetoric of John Stuart Mill

James P. Zappen

Scholars hve examine! John Stuart Mill's System of Logic

(1843) and On Liberty (1859) individually, but hve not shown how
they are related.1 Schollmeier claims that the concept of induction
in the Logic is essentially the same as the concept of example in
Aristotle's Rhetoric.2 Cherwitz and Hikins argue that On Liberty is
a rhetoric of public discussion that addresses questions about the
nature of truth and the conflict of opposing opinions raised in the
Rhetoric.3 They speculate that the Logic and On Liberty may be
related and suggest that the question of how they are related
"would seem to off er a fruitful area for future research."4

In this paper, I argue that the Logic and On Liberty are re-
lated as logicai and rhetorical counterparts of Mill's method of
induction and that thse works draw together not only Mill's
logic and rhetoric, but also his psychology and politics. In the
context of th body of his work, Mill identifies logic as a part of
psychology, psychology being concerned with thought generally,
logic with valid thought specifically.5 In the Logic , he recognizes
a problem in inductive logic that threatens its validity.6 He ex-
plains the method of induction as a process of reasoning from
particulars to a generalization, but he observes that this process
is problematic since we cannot reason from particulars to a gen-
eralization with any certainty in the validity of the generaliza-
tion. He therefore sets in place of the generalization our own
exprience, and he seeks to ensure the validity of our reasoning
by joining to our own exprience the cumulative exprience of
humanity. In what he regarded as his most mature politicai
work, Mill affirms the principles of participation and comp-
tence that underlie his theory of reprsentative government.7 In
On Liberty, he develops a rhetoric of public discussion as a corol-
lary to his politics, and he seeks to further ensure the validity of
our reasoning by engaging this rhetoric as a check upon our

Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1993. Copyright 1993 The Pennsylvania
State University, University Park PA

191

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 192 JAMES P. ZAPPEN

cumulative exprience.8 In this way, he p

to a fundamental problem of inductive logi

II

When he identifies logic as a part of psychology, Mill establishes

the basis for his critique of deductive and inductive logic in the
Logic. In An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy,
Mill explains that he finds in Hamilton two distinct formulations of
logic in its relationship to psychology.9 One is the science of logic,
which is concerned with thought generally, with the ways in which
we do actually reason. The other is the art of logic, which is con-
cerned with valid thought specifically, with the rules or precepts
according to which we reason when we reason correctly. Mill ex-
plains that he prefers the latter formulation, but he does not alto-
gether relinquish the former since he also holds that logic, as "a
collection of precepts or rules for thinking," must be "grounded on
a scientific investigation of the requisites of valid thought," that is,
upon an investigation not of the rules themselves, but of the ways
in which we do actually reason when we reason correctly - of the
actual mental processes that provide the basis for the rules - which
is precisely the investigation that he undertakes in the Logic
(9:359-60).
In the Logic, Mill seeks to subvert deductive logics based upon
intuition, which he commonly assocites with th German a priori
view of human knowledge, and to set in their place his own version
of inductive logic.10 Consistent with his identification of logic as a
part of psychology, he includes in his dfinition of logic both the
science and the art of reasoning, both "the analysis of the mental
process which takes place whenever we reason" and "the rules,
grounded on that analysis, for conducting the process correctly"
(7:4). He seeks to sub vert deductive logic by demonstrating that
the syllogism accords with the rules rather than the actual mental
process. He recognizes, as had many others, that one traditional
form of the syllogism has always inhrent in it a petitio principii, a
begging the question, as in the following example:

Ali men are mortai,

Socrates is a man,
therefore
Socrates is mortai. (7:184)n

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 THE RHETORIC OF MILL 193

He explains that this syllogism proves nothin

know th generai principle, "Ali men are mo
ready know the conclusion, Socrates is mortai
that "no reasoning from gnerais to particulars c
anything: since from a generai principle we ca
ticulars, but those which the principle itself
(7:184). 12 He claims that, when we are not gov
trary fiat of logicians," we can and do reason
other particulars:

If, from our exprience of John, Thomas, &c, wh

but are now dead, we are entitled to conclude th
are mortai, we might surely without any logicai
concluded at once from those instances, that the D
is mortai. The mortality of John, Thomas, and oth
whole vidence we hve for the mortality of the D
Not one iota is added to th proof by interpolatin
tion. (7:187)

Mill does not conclude, however, as is usually

reasoning is from particulars (such as John and T
other particulars (such as the Duke of Wellington
nizes that the actual mental process of reasoning
generalization: "An induction from particula
lowed by a syllogistic process from those gnerai
lars, is a form in which we may always state o
please . . . and into which it is indispensable to
ing, when there is any doubt of its validity" (
concludes that the actual mental process of rea
processes, the one inductive, the other deduct

Although, therefore, ail processes of thought in

premises are particulars, whether we conclude fr
generai formula, or from particulars to other par
that formula, are equally Induction; we shall ye
usage, consider the name Induction as more pecu
the process of establishing th generai proposition
opration, which is substantially that of interpr
proposition, we shall cali by its usuai name, Dd

In accordance with common usage, therefore

method of induction as a process of reasoning fr
generalization, as "that opration of the mind,
that what we know to be true in a particular c

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 194 JAMES P. ZAPPEN

true in all cases which resemble the form

respects" and "the process by which we co
of certain individuals of a class is true of
He daims that this method is valid: "Wh
particular cases, we can legitimately draw
legitimately make our inference a generai
ever the vidence which we derive from observation of known

cases justifies us in drawing an inference respecting even one un-

known case, we should on the same vidence be justified in draw-
ing a similar inference with respect to a whole class of cases"
(7:196,284).
While his investigation of the actual mental process of reasoning
thus justifies an inductive as opposed to a deductive logic, Mill
nonetheless observes a problem in the method of induction, a
problem that leads him from psychology and logic to politics and
rhetoric. If it is true, as Mill believes it is, that we can reason from
a set of particulars (such as white swans) to a generalization (Ail
swans are white), it is also true that we cannot do so with any
certainty in the validity of the generalization since we cannot be
certain that the next particular that we encounter (it might be a
black swan) will resemble, in relevant respects, the set of particu-
lars upon which we hve based the generalization. Mill believes
that we can reason from a set of particulars to a generalization on
the assumption of uniformity in the course of nature, though we
encounter difficulty with respect to the generalization: "The uni-
verse, so far as known to us, is so constituted, that whatever is true
in any one case, is true in ail cases of a certain description; the only
difficulty is, to find what description" (7:306). Moreover, we en-
counter a similar difficulty with respect to the assumption of unifor-
mity in the course of nature since "this large generalization" is
"itself an instance of induction" and "far from being the first induc-
tion we make . . . is one of the last" and is therefore subject to the
same difficulty as ail the others (7:307).
Given this fundamental problem of inductive logic, Mill sets in
place of the generalization our own exprience. Although he con-
tinues to interpret the method of induction as a process of reason-
ing from particulars to a generalization, he nonetheless recognizes
that generalizations are fallible, but that exprience is genuine. He
points out that the assumption of uniformity in the course of nature
does not hold in every instance, that nature varies, so that while
"we hve always a propensity to generalize from unvarying experi-

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 THE RHETORIC OF MILL 195

enee," we hve to be sure that if there are instan

exprience, we can know them, and "this assur
majority of cases, we cannot hve, or can hv
moderate degree," and we can never hve in "an
subjects of scientific inquiry" (7:312-13). Neve
lieves that our exprience is genuine, even when i
establish a generalization: "That ail swans are w
been a good induction, since the conclusion has
ous. The exprience, however, on which the con
genuine" (7:313). Mill concludes that since we
particulars (such as white swans) to our expr
usually white or insofar as we hve exprience are
a very moderate degree of assurance, we canno
exprience to other particulars (other white sw
tainty that our reasoning is deductively valid.
Mill nonetheless believes that we can ensure t
reasoning in two ways, one of which he explain
other in On Liberty. In th Logic, he explains t
that our reasoning is valid, in some instances mor
if we rely upon the cumulative exprience of h
out that our process of reasoning from particu
ence dpends not only upon our immediate exp
ple, with white swans), but also upon our large
example, with the colors of animais). Why, h
reject the assertion that there are black swans
surely reject the assertion that there are men wh
beneath their shoulders? He answers that we accep
reject the latter because our exprience of uniform
of nature varies, because that exprience tells us t
constancy in the colours of animais, than in th g
their anatomy" (7:319). 14 And what assuranc
our reasoning, based upon this larger exprien
explains that exprience is its own test, "that w
to inform us, in what degree, and in what case
exprience is to be relied on" (7:319). He theref
own exprience must be based upon the cumul
humanity, upon "a generai knowlege of the pr
the uniformities existing throughout nature,"
pensable foundation . . . of a scientific formula of
be a survey of the inductions to which mankin
ducted in unscientific practice" (7:319-20). On

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196 JAMES P. ZAPPEN

cumulative exprience, we can apparently

tainty about the variety of colors of anima
of their anatomy, for example, than we can
But we still cannot reason from this cumul
particulars with any certainty that our
valid.

III

In On Liberty, Mill develops a rhetoric of public discussion as a

corollary to his politics, and he explains that we can further ensure
that our reasoning is valid if we engage this rhetoric as a check
upon our cumulative exprience. In his Considrations on Repr-
sentative Government, by his own account his most mature politicai
work, Mill affirms the two principles that pro vide the basis of his
theory of reprsentative government.15 One is the principle of par-
ticipation, which holds "that the only government which can fully
satisfy ail the exigencies of the social state, is one in which the
whole people participate; that any participation, even in the small-
est public function, is useful" (19:412). The other is the principle of
comptence, which requires of participants in government both
"high mental qualifications" and a concern for "th generai welfare
of the community" (19:436). 16 Mill believes that participation can
improve comptence and that the best way to ensure both is "the
utmost possible publicity and liberty of discussion" (19:436). 17
In On Liberty, Mill explains how a rhetoric of public discussion
can help to ensure that our reasoning is valid.18 Whereas in the
Logic he had allowed that exprience is its own test, he now main-
tains that exprience alone is incorrigible, but that it can be cor-
rected through public discussion: "Man . . . is capable of rectifying
his mistakes, by discussion and exprience. Not by exprience
alone. There must be discussion, to show how exprience is to be
interpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact
and argument: but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on
th mind, must be brought before it" (18:231). He still believes
that exprience is cumulative: "As mankind improve, the number
of doctrines which are no longer disputed or doubted will be con-
stantly on the increase: and the well-being of mankind may almost
be measured by the number and gravity of the truths which hve
reached the point of being uncontested" (18:250). However, he
also believes that this cumulative exprience must be checked and

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 THE RHETORIC OF MILL 197

corrected continuously and that it can be che

only if we possess some contrivance to insure
living apprhension" (18:251). He claims that t
of questioning is just such a contrivance:

The Socratic dialectics, so magnificently exemplifi

of Piato, were a contrivance of this description. T
a negative discussion of the great questions of p
directed with consummate skill to the purpose of
who had merely adopted the commonplaces of re
he did not understand the subject - that he as yet
meaning to the doctrines he professed; in order th
of his ignorance, he might be put in the way to a
resting on a clear apprhension both of the meani
of their vidence (18:251).

Mill characterizes this method as a negative lo

that it is essential to the advancement of pos
"Such negative criticism would indeed be poor
mate resuit; but as a means to attaining any po
conviction worthy of the name, it cannot be
(18:251-52).
Mill proposes that the Socratic method of questioning, as a rheto-
ric of public discussion that checks and corrects our cumulative
exprience, be introduced into generai use and applied to ail sub-
jects, including th naturai sciences. He claims that nothing else in
prsent modes of ducation supplies its place, and he insists that
"until people are again systematically trained to it, there will be
few great thinkers, and a low generai average of intellect, in any
but the mathematical and physical departments of spculation"
(18:252). He proposes that this method be applied to ail subjects
except the mathematical. He pointedly includes even th naturai
sciences: "But on every subject on which diffrence of opinion is
possible, the truth dpends on a balance to be struck between two
sets of conflicting reasons. Even in naturai philosophy, there is
always some other explanation possible of th same facts; some
geocentric theory instead of heliocentric, some phlogiston instead
of oxygen" (18:244). He excludes mathematical subjects since "the
peculiarity of the vidence of mathematical truths is, that ail the
argument is on one side," and so "there are no objections, and no
answers to objections" (18:244). But he does believe that, even in
th naturai sciences, we can ensure that our reasoning is valid -
though still not deductively valid - if we rely upon our cumulative

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 198 JAMES P. ZAPPEN

exprience and if we subject that exprien

discussion.

IV

Mill's Logic and On Liberty are related as logicai and rhetorical

counterparts of his method of induction, the Logic setting in place
of the generalization from particulars both our own exprience and
the cumulative exprience of humanity, On Liberty engaging a
rhetoric of public discussion as a check upon our cumulative expri-
ence. These works draw together Mill's psychology and his politics
as well, psychology providing the grounds for Mill's scientific inves-
tigation of our actual mental processes in the Logic, politics estab-
lishing the underlying principles for the development of his rheto-
ric of public discussion in On Liberty. Viewed thus as an integrated
whole, thse works pro vide not a logic and a rhetoric but a logicai
and rhetorical solution to a fundamental problem of inductive
logic.

Department of Language, Literaturey and Communication

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

Notes

1. Rfrence is to Mill's Collected Works. Volume and page numbers are in-
cluded in the text.
2. Schollmeier 1984, 209.
3. Cherwitz and Hikins 1979, 12-15.
4. Cherwitz and Hikins 1982, 82.
5. On Mill's logic, see Nagel (1950), xxiii-xliii; Blake, Ducasse, and Madden
(1960), 218-32; Anschutz (1953), 61-145; McRae (1974); and Scarre (1989), 1-
170. On his "psychologism," see Nagel (1950), xxxi-xxxviii; Blake, Ducasse, and
Madden (1960), 223-27; McRae (1974), xxxix-xlviii; and Scarre (1989), 104-25.
6. The problem is usually referred to as Hume 's problem. Lowe (1987), 334-36,
illustrtes the problem when he observes that the process of reasoning "from 'This
is a raven' and 'Ravens are black' to This is black' " is not deductively valid since
th generai principle that serves as a major premise, "Ravens are black," expresses
only a normal or typical disposition or tendency, not a universal condition. Unlike
Hume (1854), 4:30-64, however, who sought to justify inductive logic, Mill as-
sumed its justification and sought rather to explain it. On Hume's problem, see also
Stove (1986), 30-43. On Mill's ignorance of Hume's problem, see McRae (1974),
xxxiv-xxxvi; and Scarre (1989), 80-103.
7. On Mills theory of reprsentative government, see Spitz (1962); Thompson
(1976), 3-135; and Brady (1977), xxxv-lxii.
. Un Mill s commitment to liberty of thought and discussion, see Spitz (1962),
190-94; Thompson (1976), 80-82; and Brady (1977), liv-lv.
9. McRae 1974, xlin-xliv.
10. Nagel 1950, xxiii-xxxi; Anschutz 1953, 61-77; McRae 1974, xxi-xxxix; and
Scarre 1989, 126-70.

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 THE RHETORIC OF MILL 199

11. Scarre (1989), 50-51, citing Hamilton, points out that w

actually a special form of th petitio principii, th hysteron
Hamilton (1873), 2:369, the petitio principii violtes the rule
begged, borrowed, or stolen; that is, nothing is to be presu
itself requires a dmonstration"; the specialized form hyster
rule that "No proposition is to be employed as a principle of
which is only to be evinced as a consquence of the propositi
to prove."
12. Scarre (1989), 51-53, notes that Mill fails to acknowledge that this suasive
form of the syllogism (called suasive because it proves the conclusion) is not the
only form, the charge of petitio principii being irrelevant in an explanatory syllo-
gism, for example, since its point is not to prove a conclusion that we do not know,
or do not accept, but to explain a conclusion that we do already know and accept.
He explains that a suasive syllogism serves "to persuade someone to accept a
conclusion on th basis of premises he already accepts" whereas an explanatory
syllogism serves "to provide a reason why a conclusion already known is true."
Aristotle (1960), 85-87 (Posterior Analytics, I.xiii.78a23-bl2), provides the follow-
ing example of an explanatory syllogism (which he says establishes not the fact but
the reason): That which is near does not twinkle, The planets are near, Therefore
the planets do not twinkle.
13. On Mill's belief that ail reasoning is from particulars to particulars, see Nagel
(1950), xxxviii-xliii; Blake, Ducasse, and Madden (1960), 218-23; Anschutz (1953),
131-45; McRae (1974), xxviii-xxxvii; Schollmeier (1984); and Scarre (1989), 65-79.
14. Scarre (1989), 95-97, calls thse "local uniformity principles," but notes that
they are mere "approximations to the truth" that dpend upon other universal
propositions, such as the principle of uniformity in the course of nature. He con-
cludes that since Mill refuses "to allow universal propositions to function as prem-
ises" and insists that " 'real' inference is always from particulars to particulars," he
is left "without any effective criterion for distinguishing rational inductive projec-
tions from irrational ones."
15. "Autobiography," Collected Works, 1:265; and Thompson 1976, 3-135.
16. Thompson (1976), 63-77, distinguishes thse two kinds of comptence as
instrumental and moral comptence.
17. Thompson 1976, 36-53.
18. Cherwitz and Hikins (1979), 16-20; and Cherwitz and Hikins (1982), 73-74,
explain that Mill's rhetoric of public discussion requires of participants three l-
ments or precepts that together constitute his "doctrine of assurance": access to
one's opinions, dfense of those opinions, and actual correction of them.

Rfrences

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1953.
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Method: The Renaissance through the Nineteenth Century. Edited by Edward
H. Madden. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960.
Brady, Alexander. "Introduction." In Essays on Politics and Society, Collected
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ance as a Rhetorical Epistemology." In Explorations in Rhetoric: Studies in
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 200 JAMES P. ZAPPEN

Hamilton, Sir William. Lectures on Metaphysics an

Mansel and John Veitch. 2 vols. Boston: Gould an
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Lwe, E. J. "What Is the 'Problem of Induction'?"
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