CHAPTER 2 SCIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF SCIENCE Science @ Pive-Paclor System 1c is the science of systems.' To represent scientific situ- ‘ations effectively the logician of science organizes a five- {faotor system. Three of the central factors correspond to ‘he three major phases of a scientific situation: (1) erude data, (@) operations, (8) products. The two flanking factors comprise (4) the thing and event matrix and (5) the eultural sources. These ‘various componenta are indicated in the accompanying diagram. "When the logician of science analyzes a scientific situation he is himoelf engaging in a scientific enterprise. His work therefore ‘mirrors the pattern of scientific endeavor as outlined in the pre- ‘ceding chapter. His essential subject matter, corresponding to the crude dats of the original investigator, is the work of the latter ‘under the exact conditions in which itis carried on. "The logi of science is primarily critical. The logician is con- ‘cemed with the integration of the scientific enterprise. He asks: ‘How consistent with soentifc rules are the scientist's operations? How do the hypotheses correspond with the data? How effective ‘ae hypotheses in producing results? How carefully have the data been checked with relevant statistics? How closely do the inter- pretation comport with the findings? "Now, asa ule things and events themselves serve as criteria to correct errors and lead to valid systems. Scientists, however, ‘operate in a middle ground between two constraining borders: on ‘one side the immense domain of things, processes, and events, Including the scientist; on the otber the cultura institutions which {nfuenoe bie waye of thinking and his operational techniques. The Togician’s tank is to estimate the relative proportion of findings the scientist derives from cultural and from event sources (chap. 3). "ee Kant, Papebology nnd Loge 28 aA ES $s cuvrunai ‘2 4 a i ey ee es ‘THE SCIENTIFIC SITUATION Drrrentir Sovuess op Serene Covsraverions Disgrace Suowise2 ‘THE toate OF NoDERX scrENCE 1 the ratio favors cultural influences it is clear that the worker is ‘misinterpreting his dato Systems and Metasystoms in Science Scientific work always involves a set of underlying presup- positions. When organized these assumptions constitute a meta system. Whether the original investigator ix or i not aware of them they nevertheless influence his scientific systom. Tt is there- fore exceedingly important that the scientist include the meta- ‘system when he examines any systemic structure. The following ‘schema indicates the minimal design for an ideal scientific system: TL. Metasystems A, Criteria (Philosophies! presuppositions) B. Protopostulates ‘System Assumptions) TH. Scientife Systems A. Definitions (solation and location of domain) B. Postulates (Relevant Assumptions) ©. Data, Variables, Units (vent selection) D. Investigating Operations (Observation, Mensuration, Calculation) E, Prodet Construction (Laws, Theories, Equations, Explanations) ‘A. Criteria, These conceen the scientist's general philorophi- cal presuppositions, including his motivations. They reach back to his atitude toward the comprehensiveness, funetion, and goat ‘of research. We have questioned, for instance, the attitudes of ‘universalism, absolutism, and finality. Criteria alo afect a scen- lists attitudes toward such questions as causality and the auton omous vs, the representative character of syrobolie structures Does he regard mathematial equations ax models of reality oF merely as constructs sammving up discoveries? 'B. Protopoulaten. hase represent more definite assump. tions, They indicate nn awareness of background issues. In #35: [SCIENCE AND Late OF ScrENCE 29 temizing Bucidean geometry, for example, the protopostulates imply thot the axioms and postulates are different from non- Buclidean systems, Bridgman’s logic exemplifies most effectively the nature of protopostalates. This physiist hes distinguished hime by pro- posing the operational viewpoint to structurze the seientifie chaos Drought about by relativity and quantum mechanics. For one thing, the operational approech constitutes an admonition to be on guard; the physicist, for instance, must be certain how he derives his equations, how be applies them. It was Bridgman who alerted physicists to the operations which gave meaning to the ‘concepts used. Furthermore, he indicated what sort of protopestu- lates to reject: ‘Tei that thought ie Ue mame ofall hing, that thee is such sting ter lg igor, at coocisne can bo drawn dowel with an incapable ecesity, that matbunaten hae an holotevlity aod controle experience ‘These excellent principles, however, become completely vti- ated by the protopostulates that Bridgman himeelf adopts. He assumes that there is n mind fitted with psychic powers: + dt experience embrace oly th thing in my conaiounea— Sense izpreaion of various sors and various srs of erbraone— ‘od ugh ee? ‘Thus he accoptsa slipsistc protopostulate. For him tables, clouds, ‘and stars are mental constructions somehow projected to consti- ‘ute extertal things. The objectivity of external things is guaran teed by the agreement generated when one solipsistic mind reacts in lar way to te introal and purely private ats of a Can # satisfactory system of physies be erected on such a metasystem as a foundation? Bridgman himself is sceptical and relies upon “the mast obvious observation”—namely, “thinking isan activity of the human nervous system.”* Actually, his “ob- 1 presupposition of spirtistic philosophy.20 ‘THE toate oF woDERX scrExCR ‘Bridgman's solipsstc protopostulate about “reacting minds” ‘ean only be integrated with a valid system by transforming it into ‘the construction: All scientific work consists of the operations of specie individuals upon objects or events. But this means uproot ing all dualistic assumptions. Table, chairs, and clouds are not “ental” erestions but everyday objeots which supply the basis for constructing descriptions of their natures, constitutions, and relations. ‘Quis custodict ipeot custodea? Apparently one task of the logician of science is to prevent the use of a faulty metasyster. But obviously he himselt is subject to presuppositions derived from his particular cultural background. Does this mean we are left without systemizing criteria? Not at all, if only we abjure absolute standards. From investigations and their eritical analysis ‘valid scientific systems are derived 1, someTire sere ‘The basic divisions of a aystem we are now to consider pro- vide a model of typical ecient job. A. Definitions, Scientific definition are constructs developed for the purpose of isolating and locating a domain of work. They serve to clarify the character of scientific enterprises, whether & ingle research or elas of investigations. ‘Depending upon type of metesystem, definitions refer either to things and events or to concepts and terme Obviously we would streas things and events, since they are what the aystemizer is bas- feally concerned with. Concepts and terms, however, must take their place within the definitions division of s sciatic eystem. Te virus an organism? This question suggests how important it may be for a researcher to define the objects be investigates. Clearly, itis not a matter of how to use terms, not 8 matter of ‘what altitude (concept) to adopt toward a aubstance progressively covering a lef, for instance, but rather whether exchusively chem {cal or biological operations must be performed. Another example: ‘To ak whether light is corpscular, aswell as radiant, is primarily ‘problem of light, not of terms oF ways of thinking about light. 'B. Postuats, Systemic postulates in mathematics are among the clearest examples because the materials are formal and rela- ‘onal. Ie is obvious, however, that all cient work implies pos- scuENen AND Loate OF sctENcE a ‘lates, even though they are not formally set out. Tn the content, sciences, postulates are frequently merged with the protopostu- lates of the metasystem, such as the rejection of Newton's abeo- lute or unjoined spece and time, in favor of Minkowali-Binstein speculations. C. Data, Variables, Unit. Data problems aro crucial for ays- tematics. How a logician treats “what is given” at once reveal his ‘metasystem. There is striking contrast between those who build ‘on the conventional protopostulates of “sensations,” “sense data” ‘or “experience” and those who regard scientiSe data as the things ‘and events which et probleme. ‘The objective logician, however, diferentiates between pris- tine and transformed things. Pristine data are best illustrated by sccidentally diseovered things: cosmic rays, inert gases, the fune- ‘ion of the pancreas in insulin secretion. Transformed data are the ‘numerous synthetic compounds the chemist produces from simpler ‘compounds and elements. A striking instanceof a discovered trans- formation datum isthe artiScial radioactivity fret detected by the Joliot-Curies when they subjected an sluminum window to the rays of Polonium.* ‘The theorist who begins with things and events frees himself completly from the etuntion indiated inthe folowing sate In pal ans oon ene te fendaoetl sms of (on thingy arc sod posse evel by senmton” ‘This statement perverts the fact that exentis constructs reine and asf the characteristics " ing with them. Rejecting prtate metsyriems the logician looks ‘on vatiables as factor abstracted from data or from operations ‘jen them. Apa, whatever be tain ari ae aly __D- Investigative Operations. Fortunately logician of science der very ite, if a lin their decrption of what happens in the field or the laboratory. Ths agreement is owing to the fact tbat technical operations lou resemble the manipulative be- havior of everyday life and technological procedure. Furthermore, ey Fo Bary of Meni Kary p10. "Tees, Nata of Papua Tho2 ‘Tam oaie oF MODERN SCIENCE because of the extensive ute of apparatnsthe operations have to ‘onform to standards ext by ecosomic and industrial contingencies 105). > eae sent, boweve, fl tod ato lo the ner behavioral principe. Much scientifcopeation is thus interpreted ‘5 procenes going on within the person; this s especially true of ‘ubile ection ik thinking and reasoning, which, as we have eaen, fre misinterpreted ag epinititc acta. But if one does not impose ‘oncontct deseriptionupan investigative operations there is no ‘ily at all in treating the acts of constructing dats and mak- ing hypotheses end inferences as dainivo contacts with ting ‘The most palpable type of data contruction is the section snd itolation of things from ther ordinary background in order to fecitate observation. More elaborate operations of tis order tre putting thing in a vacuum, separating them into parts by ‘living spliting, or dissecting them, attaching things to others n'a new way asin traneplanting tines, diwolving tings, elec- ‘tially dimociating, freeaing and boring them. ‘Somewhat more remot operations require treatment by anal- gis and models. Such things as wind tunnels, wires which ans- Togialy conduet neural impulses, in vivo growings, and nerve- ‘mtede preperations are imaginative and imitative constructions for furthering interbebavioral operations. In this manner projec- tice may be treated as though they were point in motion without color, mass, siz oF shape. ‘But what about hypotheoes which are conventionally thought of as preceding manipulations? ‘The obvious answer is that no Iaypotbess can be consiricted except hy prior contact with events. Newton emphasized this point when be eet down ht famous ex- clamation:hypothaea non figo." He distinguished between prop- tition which were and were not deduced or inferred fom the venta tadied "ti hardy necasary to mention the inevitable manipula- tions required in making and reporting records. But the implica. tion euch manipulations have for » naturalistic description of sciatic work i ot always acknowledged. How draw and photo- {quph things and procesen unless they are available for contact? [Nori the manipulative contact to be minimized whea things are "Gasol Stan. SCIBNCR AND Locte OF scrExcR: 33 represented or merely referred to by graphs or verbal description instead of mirrored by reproductive techniques, E. Theory and Law Construction. The scientific system is rounded ott by the creation of formulse, equations or principles. tia legitimate to say that the goal of the entire enterprise is to attain these products. "Equations and principles are universally regarded as consti- ‘tuting or representing laws, theories, interpretations, explanations "Now, depending upon the protopostulates of a given system, laws ‘and explanations are differently evaluated. In the extreme, they are taken as (a) free creations of mind or reason or (b) invariant relations independently existing in the “universe” (p. 38). The former view is excellently illustrated in the following: Phyl cosets ar ros erations ofthe human sind, and ae ‘of bomeer it by na, unguely determined by the etaral weed* ‘Jourdain stands for the second view: Matiematcs is independent of wn penonally and of the world ide aad we ca fl Unt our vm Gacoverea and views do not ce ti rth bt ely th tet och we ae Interbehavoral protopostulates,contrariwise, lead tothe view that scientiic equations and formulae, though abstract, even ab- struse, are always derived from the worker's direct or indirect contacts wich events, and must therefore be verifiable in terme of the later. Event-bound constructs (p. 59 fare illustrated by the physical lav of freely falling bodies, the low of gravitation, and by gus laws Scientific laws, in other words, are simply general tions formulated from direct observation." Even if loog chain of connected interpretationsintervenes between originaleventsand ‘the final construction, the theory or law still Functions as a de- seription of events. Descrigtion and Bzplanation. Tt has long been the tradition to differentiate sharply between descriptive and explanatory prop- sitions and lawa. ‘The erux ofthis distinction is that explanation ‘somehow transcends events, provides certain and a priari knowl- "ial nad, latin of Physi. 32, fate of Matbomation 9: "Campa, Physics The Elements, eb.au ‘me Loate OF MODERN SCIENCE ‘edge concerning their nature. Obviously, prineipes of metaphyai- ‘al reality are at the bottom of this. Mach, Kirchoff, and Pearson, following the lesd of Comte in limiting scientific laws to elaborate description, bese their argumnent upon an epistemological doctrine ‘of phenomenaliam or positivism (p. 1). 'No ultimate division between description (observation) and explanation (aw) is justiabe from the standpoint of actual i Yestigation, A scientific situntion reveals only events on the one hhand, activities of the scientist on the other. As we have seen, the fist confrontation with events, when referred to or recorded, Involves constructions. Isolating an event in a laboratory setup constitutes constructional behavior. All deseriptions and proposi- tions ate constructions. Any differentiation, then, betwoen deserip- tion and explanation can oaly be made on the besis of conven- fence. As rue, explanations constitute elaborate descriptions, typically thoso relating some event to one or many others. ‘Empirical and Rational Lows. Empirical laws have been re- ‘garded as descriptions derived from observation; rational laws as partaking of ¢ priori or deductive principles. When taken in an ‘bsolute anse the dstnetion is worthless. Science harbors no a priori principles. Relatively speaking, however, some laws are ‘more remote than others from immediate observation or measure- ‘ment, Through aa interval of time, law produets become estab- lished and later serve a criteria and rales of system making. Laws ‘of conservation of energy and mass, for instance, must be taken in this sens of established hypotheses. Generally, empirical laws, in ‘contrast to rational ones, imply readily available contacta with ‘things; iti therefore easor to verify hypotheses. In place of the above distinction we specify three types of general laws: (a) ob- ‘servational, (0) experimental, and (c) rational. . (a) Obeersational Law. ‘Kepler's laws of planetary motion are excellent examples of this type. The fellowing three proposi- tions he set up are definitely founded on such observations as can be made on nonmanipulabe things: (2) Bray plant mover in an elie of which the wun oss ne cue (@) Toe radio vector drown from the ran to the planet ewes ‘out equal areas in eq tine {@) The nn oft porte ten of to plata ae to 08 soother a tha obs of tht esa tans ren the un. SCIENCE AND LOGIC OF SCIENCE 35 () Reperimental Lavs. Experimental laws are propositions based on the direct manipulation of things. Such are Galileo's laws of freely falling bodies: «= Sgt; Hooke's law: P= A(t —D/t, Boyle's low: PV =C; and Snell's law: Sin a/Sin =H. (©) Rational Lave. Newton's three laws of motion exemplify the rational type and constitute excellent instruments for scien~ tife orientation, but are not close to manipulative situations, ‘They neglect such a fundamental factor as fiction, and in general bespeak more contact with mathematical relations than with ex- perimental observation. It is the rational laws, such as Newton's ‘axioms or laws of motion, which invoke the question how mathe- matical formulae can be applied to actual events, (very bay entnus in ita state of eto of efor mation ina ight line, unas it compelled to lange that stata by fort Inpremed ups (@) The change of maton ix proportianal tothe motive fre im ‘reed and is made in he right ie fo wih that fre Sips (G) To ever ation there i alway oppo an el eto of he muta ations of tro Bele pon each ober ar alma ea ad Arce to contrary pat ‘The relation of the three typos of laws is excellently ilus- trated by Maxwell's famous electromagnetic equations: FFetsn = ff vatican F Hyde = ff 0, + £820 aA where B, = electric field slong any closed path; H, = magnetic ffux slong any closed path; ds = element of length; » = perme- ability of vacuum; 484/31 = rate of change in the strength of an lectric field; sH./61 = rate of change in strength of magnetic fields; J, = density of convection current perpendicular to eur- face bounded by the path; « = dielectric constant of vacuum; @A = clement of area." Based on Faraday’s concrete manipula tions Maxwell's equations first appeared in the form of rational analogies, but through Hertz’s experimentation became descrip- tions of observable happenings. ting thn equations and defning tie tr hav loved36 ‘THE toate OF MODERN sciENCE ‘We bave taken our examples from physics, but there are com- parable laws in each of the sciences. Tn some, of course, the ‘observational or experimental type isthe most prominent. Actu- ally the three types are not altogether diflrent, nor concerned ‘with mutually exclusive events ‘Nor have we differentiated between theories and laws, though this is frequently done. For example, Campbell regards thoories ts derivations from laws and as concerned with hypothetical en- tities and relations more or less imposed upon events. Other triters reverse this order and look upon laws as well established, ‘ered hypotheses or theories. ‘The Role of Systems in Research Scientific aystematis is not only continuous with specific researches but plays an important investigative role. Briefly we ‘onsider the relations between focalised research and the ecience of science ‘Like the original investigator the logician, too, is concerned ‘with the properties of already known things and with the dis covery of new events, In addition he is interested in the original ‘scientist's interbehavior with these events, and thus plays double role in the scientific situation. Naturally the logician is more {eresied in the theoretial and systematic outcome of research For him, primary deseriptions, experimental findings, and results, ‘of measurement are raw materials. The researcher by comparison {i generally in more intimate contact with original events. He also keeps close to techniques and methods of dealing with things, ‘whereas the logician focuses upon the results of employing those ‘techniques for the purposes of general orientation and interpreta tion, "The logician of science obviously stands st some distance from the investigator's first trial-and-error efforts, though he is not always excluded from the satisfaction of locating new fields fof work. On the sthole, t00, the logio of science is more formal ‘Even more than the original researcher the logician smooths and ‘coordinates erude findings, organizes the materials according to accepted rues. OF course, orginal materials, to begin with, are Phyl: Tee Beats SCIENCE AND LoOIC OF actENCE 37 channelized and standardized, but the logician introduces still more system. ‘The science of science is comparative and historical. The critic ranges over time and thos traces variations and similai in the premises employed for setting problems at different periods ‘and places, as well as in the techniques for implementing sich premises. He is also able to cut aross speife enterprises in order ‘0 compare research methods. ‘The primary function of eystemization in research isto sensi- ‘ize the worker to the implications and consequences of investign- tion. Compare the work of such superlative geometers as Newton and Huygens, who were severely bounded by Euclidean postula- tion, with the achievements of Gauss, Riemann, Klein, and Hil- bert who, sided by time and circumstance, could look upon geom- try as a vast operational field, in which geometrie systems could ‘be compared and new ones established simply by controlling the postulational process ‘A similar comparison can be made between those physicists ‘who refine their measurements within the limits of Newtonian mechanics and those who work with subnuclesr and quantum ‘radiation. The latter not only gather data, ft curves, but phunge ‘as well into problems of basic relations and the final significance of ther investigational results. ‘The practical advantage of systemological orientation over ‘esearch lis in avoiding routine method and procedure. Too often scientific erterprises are fixed in a groove of specified findings. The goal being st, the worker may make hundreds of measurements, ‘analyze hundreds of substances, ll goel directed. The greater the worker's training and skil, the easier the end is achieved. Quite ‘otherwise when investigation requires freedom of wide perspec. tive. Was it not the advantage of broader knowledge end training than was the lot of the ordinary seientist that gave Pasteur, ‘Metehnikof, and Galvani their investigative impet Undoubtedly the science of science isthe most serviceable at the ereative point of setting up postulates, establishing view- points, formulating premises, constructing new frames of refer- ‘ence. Kinstein, itis said, has been able to make his momentous "Bevery, The Art of Skate Iaveaition,p. 238 ‘TIE LooIe OF MODERN scrENCE contributions because be spurned axioms; in other words, he was ‘rilling to discard established aystems and replace them by newer "The logic of science has its dangers aa well as its merits. There is considerable hazard in eystemologial procedures because of ‘extrapolating from specific findings. However, this merely rein: forces the view that sophisticated eientife work isan adventurous enterprise. Logic of Science and Historical Philosophy ‘Scientists agree that the work of constructing concepts, laws» principles, and hypotheses are activities of the scientist. They do ot agree, however, concerning the nature of these constructional processes, chiefly because of their entanglement with historical philosophy and its fallacious ideas of mind. This is true whether they adopt what they call a realistic, idealistic or materialistic standpoint. ‘or covion ht individual fount hari ot on ‘the basis of past and present contacts with things does away wi the futile speculation of how knowledge can be correlated with an external world, And constructs based upon historical ideas of mind fre no longer regarded as an acceptable underlying philosophy, 28 Jordan assumes: ‘The new phys i ot consivable without the ines ofthe psitiat percept tory; converaly, postin wa fist stated od rendered prese with fhe replacient of thinking ia objective ‘process by te new thought form of empementaiy* Just how, in ourinterbehavioral system, peresiving and know. lose their immaterial and transpatial quality, and knowledge precarious nature, we consider fully inthe chapter on Paychol- ‘ogy, but some preliminary orientation is necessary at this point. ‘We make a direct approach to perceptual events, which con of contacts with objects during which the organism builds up response functions corresponding to the objects’ stimulus func- tions. Depending upon numerous factors, such as setting and stimulational media, interbehavioral (psychological) felds are de- ‘eloped, fields which may be described as differentiating inter- fe 2h Can 1 SCIENCE AND LoatC oF sctENcE 39 bebevior. In ote word, the crguiam paonna a number of ifferent responses to the same object, and each response iss Sine on the bss of the setting in which the cotta ecu, For any one individual every object or event usually bas a very large number of stimulus functions. The individual in tum de- ahaa ore pisereirer teerd tara ‘em science eannot tolerate the view that physiological impulses ‘are transformed into psychic experience. With this brief prepara tion ofthe ground let us consider the relation of science to vatious traditional philosophic. ‘Science and Realism. Though realistic scientists may admit that they really construct principles and laws, they still regard the constructional work as merely formulational and, as we have seen, believe the formulae represent independent existents dis. covered by scientist. Realistic philosophy has two aspects: the ontological and epistemological. The ontological constitutes belie in the auton- ‘omous existence of a world entirely independent of the scientist; in this world are placed enttios and forees looked upon as Platonic reals. So when the scientist sets up mathematical equations they are not simply conventional symbols or linguistic forms, but signe for invariable relations in nature. ‘On the epistemological side, realistic scientists refuse to admit that mental states or sense data constitute the objeete studied; they are but evidences of things.in-themeelves, These things-in- ‘themselves are not unknown entities which only stir up knowledge in the mind: they are more or leas completely known. Atoms and their parts, genes, the various forees and processes the slentist works with are existences partially or completly discovered, not simply mental projections. Realistic philosophy is based upon the rationalistic view of ‘mind. To discover the independently existing principle and rela- tions = powerful cognitive agent is roquired. To illustrate the ‘operations of “reason” emphasis is placed upon such processes as selection, abstraction, and integration. ‘For some scientists the inclination toward realism ie coupled with definite theological attitudes, Such is obviously the ease with Planck." But even those writers who do not directly align them "seit Auobtgrphy and Orne Papersry ‘THE LoaIc OF MODERN SCIENCE selves with o religious way of thinking do so indireetly by espous- jing some form of traditional philosophy which draws from theo- oie sur ‘Scince and Idzalon, Ideal aeatist ae the erreme creat, Keowee or thr frankly comatose om. cepisin shor, slate of ming, whether or ot coresponding fo ‘era thing Hinorcaly, the ielts ade upon te common tame fect nt Iuowlege a diferent tom tings knowns thas ‘they emphasize the relativity, the incompleteness, the possible cece cst panciee Teri hon i its pit mpi do (rine. Beginning with an emphasis on experience they soon tis ndsalty of experience on, bento they are ppc ot spistualsa they and equrely athe predicament of mental ‘ivy: Bddogon's postin Ws perdnen ber: Cex wating pi py aise so tha gprs a tl eaten in coon” idealists, attempting to extents themselves fom thi tal by operon str th ct hat by vaio manipulative techniques the utter privacy of both the contents and the acts of chong canbe mae publi f ‘ether ar dais cept or reco pri principles de- pends upon his dtaled notions o the mindy rule, Ho any oot the view tht the mind lea eable and enfurng eat Capublesf suing power or antoating pec knowige and ‘iving it its character. Such isthe view of the Kantians, Hegelians, Ea eter ronal eno Os the ter ned, expeent may ‘ethos slomie and ephemera mental stats o Harmen hold. For them all laws and principles are presumed to be derived from diaphanous experiences, by creative powers based on nothing toe tno et ert ‘Modern objective psychology completely undermines these ideas otractions When cocoa tnd sens retaken fo be tperito reponces to Things and evento the praca of sich eons; "knvwiog” wich rats ibe things known hes no ‘uta hwy. “Snead Potion, Te posi’ primary thesis thet Fraser ral en sciENcE AND Loote oF sctenc a principles and laws are direct correlate of things studied. The basis for their thesis, of course, is that the things dealt with in ‘science ate themselves constricted from elementary procaases called senantions (psychic elements). Mach represents this view. HE assumes thet both physical and mental things are constructed from neutral entities. These neutral entities are “color, sounds, {eroperatures, preanures, spaces, times, feelings, volitions,” ete, ‘The avowed intention of the positivist ie to begin with common. sease eventa, then to show how the principles of science are con. structed from Ure; in other Words, how an exteraal world is created by organising internal sensations or sense data, In this ereational hypothesis the process of developing de- scriptions of things (names, concepts, laws) is transformed into the erestion of things. Abandon Berkeleyan spiritualism, the pri. mary factor in this type of misconstruction,straightway the dic Jemma vanishes. Logical empircits who have become dissatisfied withthe role of psychic states in the scientific domain have adopted two notable ‘means of deleting them. One is verbal exorcism, the simple dec. laration that the universe is monistic and material. The other is toresort to a dialectic procedure as follows: first, eience is reduced ‘to statements or propositions; next linguiatic entities are claimed to be free from blemish—ineorruptible. Finally itis declared that since every statement about psychic entities ean be equated with statements shout materisl ones, the peychic and the material (nonpaychic) are equivalent." These are dubious ways of making ‘piritualstic paychology acceptable. ‘Science and Conceptual. The conceptualist is to be com- ‘mended for not emphasizing absolute truth of autonomous es. ‘ences. Following the constructional procedures of mathematios he stresses concepts or terms. Thus ecientife lnws and descriptions ‘become conventional symbols for representing things, In this man ‘er he hopes to mediate between spirtsti ephemeralities and substantial realistic essences, but unfortunately, the conceptual- ist's formulation remains superficial sinoe he clings to spirtistic ‘metaphysics, Although he avoids both the extremes of absolute truth and Be; fo example, ei, Te mindboty problem, deter tem aha2 ‘mp Looie oF MODERN scrENcE Platonic essencee, he still misrepresents the scientific enterprise, ‘even its mathematical aspects. He overlooks the fact that the fclentit works with definite materials, Who can deny thet when relations constitute scientific data, there is greater constructions! freedom than in the cas of things? But relations are facts, too, Hence the constructive procedure cannot be independent of the i interbehaved with. The scientist is not a spiritistic entity arbi ‘tratily creating statements or lawa out of his own substance. He is fan individual reared ina certain culture, acting on the bass of his ‘background and contacts. This cultural background we consider in the following chapter. 0 ‘THE CULTURAL ASPECTS OF SCIENCE