In re: Rallos

IPI No. 12-203- CA-J, 12-9-08-CA

December 20, 2013
En Banc

Remedy for judicial errors

A petition was filed by the heirs of Vicente Rallos for the payment of just compensation on two
parcels of land. In a pending motion for reconsideration of the grant of application of the writ of preliminary
injunction on the ordered release of public funds for payment, the court received a letter of complaint, and
affidavit-complaint from Rallos charging administrative and criminal offenses for the alleged misconduct
and erroneous resolutions of the respondent Justices.

What is the proper remedy for alleged erroneous resolutions of respondent justices?

Errors on judicial acts of justices should be corrected through appropriate judicial remedies. Her
resorting to the filing of letter-complaint was entirely improper, she should have waited for the action of the
CA on her motion for reconsideration, and should the motion be denied, the proper remedy is to appeal. It
was premature and unprocedural to insist that the justices could have ruled on the grounds for annulment
when the judgment for annulment on the merits has not yet been resolved. The resolution should be
awaited because the CAs appreciation of the convenio as evidence on its validity and effectiveness is still
required. Disregarding the policy would result in the pre-mature filing of administrative complaints, which
is a form of abuse of court processes.

In re: Rallos
IPI No. 12-203- CA-J, 12-9-08-CA
December 20, 2013
En Banc

Exercise of Inhibition among Justices

In the course of the case where a petition was filed by the heirs of Vicente Rallos for the payment of
just compensation on two parcels of land, Justice Hernando inhibited from further participating after the
grant for temporary restraining order to release public funds as the ordered payment to Rallos. Justice
Abarintos was then assigned in view of the transfer of Justice Paredes to Manila but after two days, he also
inhibited from further participating in the case as well as Justice Delos Santos. Later on, the case was now
assigned to Justice Ingles together with Justice Maxino and Manahan. Rallos said that he should be informed
of the inhibition of justices. They were charged for alleged bias, negligence, and with improper motives on
the case.

Can they be sanctioned for their voluntary inhibition in the case? Is it required for the party to be
informed of their inhibition?

No. Voluntary inhibition was well noted in the rules of court, which gives them the discretion
whether to desist from sitting in the case with just and valid causes. In the absence of clear and persuasive
showing by a party that the justice would not be objective and impartial, the court is in no position to
dispute him. Indeed, at the stage of the proceeding, to inhibit is a matter of conscience and sound discretion
on the justices part. Moreover, courts are directed to proceed with extreme prudence and caution especially
in satisfying judgments involving public funds. Further, a party to a case is not required to be informed of
the justices inhibition in the case, unless he desires, he must file a motion for inhibition to become entitled to
be notified of the courts action and of its reasons.

Legaspi vs. Cebu City

G.R. No. 159110, 159692
December 10, 2013
En Banc

Police Power and Due process

Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted to authorize traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any
motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in Ordinance No. 801. Petitioners
Legaspi and Jaban Sr. experienced this immobilization through the clamping of tires of their vehicles. Jaban
Sr. said, he was not afforded due process for imposing fine without hearing and was not informed of the
reason for the immobilization. Legaspis car was towed after being clamped. Petitioners now challenge the
validity and constitutionality of the vehicle on whether they enacted within the legislative powers of Cebu
City and whether the questioned ordinance met the requirements for validity as well as the limitations set
by the constitution and statutes.

Was the ordinance valid?

Yes. Through the delegation power to the LGU by the legislature, Cebu City has correctly enacted
traffic rules and regulations including punishment for illegally parked vehicles or whatever obstructed the
streets, alleys, and sidewalk in their aim to ensure a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets of
Cebu City at tall times. By virtue of the general welfare clause, the ordinance passed the substantive tests of
validity and constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the constitution and statutes. The
reason for immobilization without notice or pre-trial is because the transgressors were not around when it
was immobilized, as in the case, the petitioners. It is not a breach of procedural due process since they are
given the chance to reverse apprehensions through timely protest, which equally satisfies the need for a
hearing.

UCPB vs. Lumbo

G.R. No. 162757
December 11, 2013
First Division

Possession over foreclosed property

The respondent Lumbo obtained a mortgage of a parcel of land in Boracay, Aklan from UCPB for
the loan amount of 12Million, which they eventually failed to settle. UCPB registered the land in question
after the foreclosure sale. The respondents Lumbo did not take action for the redemption of the foreclosed
property within 12-months after the registration of the sale. CA however, granted an injunction writ filed by
Lumbo, in which UCPB petitioned for review.

Was UCPB entitled to the possession of the land in question?

 Yes. Non-redemption within the given period loses their right to the property and its possession.
The reckoning period of redemption by the mortgagor starts from the registration of the sale in the registry
of Deeds and redemption period is 12-months from its registration, in which the respondents failed to do
within the said period. There was no error at all that UCPB filed its ex parte petition for writ of possession
because the pending the action for annulment of the foreclosure sale does not constitute a legal ground to
prevent it from implementation of a writ of possession.

Republic vs. Manila Electric Company

G.R. No. 201715
December 11, 2013
First Division

Arbitration v. Mediation

NAPOCOR and MERALCO agreed to submit their dispute for mediation and filed their joint
application for the approval and implementation of the pass-through provision of their settlement
agreement subject to the approval of the ERC. The OSG requested that their dispute should be resolved
through arbitration and not mediation in view of the arbitration clause in their Contract for the sale of
Electricity.

Should the request be granted?

No. The primary competence to determine the enforceability of the arbitration clause of the CSE is
within the RTC. Granting the request would lead to the usurping of the jurisdiction of the RTC and since the
Settlement Agreement has been declared valid; the petitioners option is to appeal in due course.

Republic vs. Manila Electric Company

G.R. No. 201715
December 11, 2013
First Division

Intervening rendition of the decision on the merits

MERALCO filed an action for declaratory relief when the OSG manifested its opposition to the
validity of the settlement agreement. The RTC dismissed the OSGs motion to cancel or to stay proceedings
and to refer the parties to arbitration. The pre-trial hearing of the decision on the merits was reset due to
non-appearance of the OSGs representative and deliberate refusal to participate in the proceedings. The
OSG said that RTC judge committed grave abuse of discretion for the issuing the assailed orders.

Was the OSG correct?

No. RTC has already granted MERALCOs petition for declaratory relief and declared the
Settlement Agreement valid and binding and leaves the approval of the joint application to the ERC. The
challenge against the RTCs interlocutory orders, and other intervening rendition is now rendered moot and
academic as they were designed to prevent the trial and pre-trial on the merits. Further, the RTC judge was
not tainted with grave abuse of discretion for declaring the petitioners to have waived its right since their
deliberate refusal and non-appearance to the pre-trial already constituted their waiver.