SERAPIO V.

SANDIGANBAYAN

CONSOLIDATED CASES January 28, 2003

G.R. No. 148468, G.R. No. 148769, G.R. No. 149116

FACTS:

Edward Serapio was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation. This foundation was established to help provide educational opportunities for the poor and
underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students. Donations came pouring in from various
institutions, organizations and that of Chavit Singson. However, on the latter part of 2000, Chavit
accused then President Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in the illegal number game jueteng as
protector, beneficiary and recipient. The Ombudsman took the necessary steps and find probable cause,
thus the case of plunder before the Sandiganbayan.

The accused, herein petitioner took all legal remedy to bail but consequently due to numerous petitions
and motion to quash, the same was suspended and counter petitioned. Petitioner also prayed for
issuance of habeas corpus.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner should be arraigned first before hearing his petition for bail;

WON petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended information during pendency of his
petition to bail; and

WON petitioner should instead be released through a writ of habeas corpus.

HELD:

A. Although he was already arraigned, no plea has yet been entered thereby rendering the case moot.
Nonetheless, the court takes cognizance and held that arraignment is not a prerequisite to conduct
hearing on petition for bail.
B. The court finds no inconsistency between an application of an accused for bail and his filing of motion
to quash. Bail, is a security given to release a person in custody of the law. A motion to quash on the
other hand is a mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint filed against him
for insufficiency of its facts in posits law. This tow has objectives not necessarily antithetical to each
other.

C. In exceptional cases, habeas corpus may be granted by the court even when the person is detained
pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender. However, in the case at bar, there is no showing of
any basis for the issuance of the writ. The general rule is that the writ does not apply when the person
alleged to be restraint of his liberty is in custody of an officer under process issued by competent court;
more so, petitioner is under detention pursuant to a valid arrest order.

The petition was partly GRANTED on motion to quash. The petition for habeas corpus and bail was
DISMISSED.

EN BANC

[A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387. September 10, 1997]

FLAVIANO B. CORTES, complainant, vs. JUDGE SEGUNDO B.

CATRAL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Aparri, Cagayan,
respondent.

RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:

Once again, the Court is asked to elucidate on the rules in the grant of the
application for bail.
A sworn letter complaint was filed by Flaviano Cortes charging Judge
Segundo B. Catral of the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan with Gross Ignorance of the
Law committed as follows:
1. He granted bail in murder cases without hearing: People v. Duerme, et al., Criminal
Case No. 07-893 for murder and People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag, Criminal Case No.
08-866 for murder

These two cases are like the case of Teresita Q. Tucay v. Judge Roger Domagas, 242
SCRA 110 being classified as heinous crimes there (sic) are supposedly unbailable;

2. On May 3, 1995, Barangay Captain Rodolfo Castanedas Criminal Case No. 11-
6250 for Illegal Possession of Firearm was raffled and assigned to his sala. The
provincial prosecutor granted a bailbond ofP180,000.00 but it was reduced by Judge
Segundo Catral for only P30,000.00. The worst part of it no hearing has been made
from 1995 to the present because according to his clerks, he is holding it in
abeyance. This Barangay Captain Rodolfo Castaneda is one of the goons of Julio
Bong Decierto his nephew who has a pending murder case;

3. Another Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera with a homicide case was granted with a
bailbond of P14,800.00 by Judge Segundo Catral. The amount is too low. It is because
this Nilo de Rivera is another goon of Julio Bong Decierto;

4. Jimmy Siriban the right hand man of Julio Bong Dicierto was sued for concubinage
and convicted by Judge Herminio del Castillo in MTC. Jimmy Siriban appealed and it
was elevated to the RTC Branch 08, the sala of Judge Segundo Catral. Judge Segundo
Catral acquitted Jimmy Siriban, rumors in Aparri spread that the wife of Judge
Segundo Catral went to Jimmy Siribans house to get the envelop; [1]

In his comment dated August 16, 1996, respondent judge branded the
complainant as a self anointed concern (sic) citizen of Aparri, Cagayan who has
gained notoriety as a character assassinator, a public nuisance and most often
called speaker for hire during election time. Respondent further laments that a
ghost lawyer is taking advantage of the notoriety of Mr. Flaviano Cortes by
manipulating him like a robot and letting him loose like a mad dog barking on
the wrong tree and biting everybody including the other members of the bench. [2]

With regard to the first charge, respondent judge, in his comment, clarified
that Criminal Case No. 07-893 is the case of People v. Willie Bumanglag y
Magno for frustrated homicide pending in Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court
of Aparri where the presiding judge is Hon. Virgilio Alameda. However, if the
complainant is referring to Ahmed Duerme y Paypon, et al., Criminal Case No.
874 for murder pending in Branch 7 of the RTC where respondent was then
[3]

designated as presiding judge, respondent stresses that the provincial

prosecutor recommended P 200,000.00 as bailbond for each of the
accused. Subsequently, in a motion for reduction of bailbond, the resolution of
the motion was submitted to the sound discretion of the court. The court,
mindful of the fact that the prosecution is banking on weak circumstantial
evidence and guided by the factors prescribed in Section 9 of Administrative
Circular 12-94 issued an order for reduction of the bailbond from P200,000.00
[4]

to P50,000.00. [5]

In the case of People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag, Criminal Case 08-866 for

murder, the inquest judge issued a warrant of arrest for the accused with no bail
recommended. When the case was elevated to the Regional Trial Court upon
information filed by the provincial prosecutor, the information made no mention
of a bailbond. In the hearing of the petition to determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong, the fiscal opted not to introduce evidence and
recommended bail in the sum of P200,000.00 instead. Respondent judge
acting on the said recommendation and again guided by the provision of
Section 9, Administrative Circular 12-94 in conjunction with the evidence extant
on the record approved the recommendation of Prosecutor Apolinar Carrao. A [6]

duplicate copy of trial prosecutor Apolinar Carraos letter dated September 3,

1996 addressed to the provincial prosecutor Romeo Sacquing was presented
by the respondent to disprove the accusation that he granted bail to the accused
without conducting any hearing. [7]

As regards the third charge concerning the illegal possession of firearm

against Barangay Captain Rodolfo Castaneda, the bailbond recommended by
the prosecutor was P180,000.00.Accused, through counsel Atty. Bulseco, filed
a motion for reduction of the bailbond to P30,000.00. Counsel even vouched
and guaranteed the appearance of the accused in court, whenever
required. The motion for reduction of bailbond was submitted without serious
opposition and the prosecutor mindful perhaps that there is no corpus of the
crime as no firearm was caught or taken from the possession of the accused
merely submitted the same to the discretion of the court. [8]

In Criminal Case No. 08-915 concerning a homicide case against Barangay

Captain Nilo de Rivero, respondent judge says that the bailbond of P14,800.00
was recommended by the acting Officer-In-Charge (OIC) as contained in his
manifestation accompanying the information. Respondent judge then acting
[9]

on the recommendation of the OIC provincial prosecutor and mindful of the

guidelines in fixing a reasonable amount of bailbond coupled by the fact that
the evidence on record is merely circumstantial and there was no eyewitness
to the commission of crime granted bailbond in the sum of P14,800.00. [10]

Finally, respondent judge says the accusation regarding the acquittal of one
Jimmy Siriban is simply the product of a dirty imagination and is a dirty trick
intended to defame the name of his family by rumor mongers who are unwilling
to come out in the open to substantiate their accusation.
On September 9, 1996, respondent submitted his additional comment dated
September 5, 1996 informing the Office of the Court Administrator that Criminal
Case No. 07-784, referred to in the letter complainant (sic) of Mr. Flaviano
Cortes, has already been dismissed by Judge Virgilio Alameda, RTC, Branch
07, Aparri Cagayan, in his order dated August 16, 1996. Respondent judge
[11]

stresses that, as can be gleaned from the penultimate paragraph of said order,
the accused, despite reduction of their bailbonds, remained detention prisoners
because of their failure to post bond. In his original comment, respondent
stated, among others, that the evidence against the accused in Criminal Case
No. 07-874 was based on weak circumstantial evidence which prompted the
court to grant them a reduced bailbond of P50,000.00. Respondent judge noted
that the complaining witnesses never appeared despite the fact that the case
had been set for hearing several times.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of the
complaint saying that there is nothing in the allegations of the complainant that
would warrant the imposition of administrative sanction against respondent
judge.
In recommending the dismissal of the complaint against respondent judge,
the Office of the Court Administrator noted, x x x complainant failed to show any
indication that bad faith motivated the actuation of the respondent in granting
and reducing the amount of bail of the accused in some of the criminal cases
that were assigned in his sala. x x x it is crystal clear that the increase or
reduction of bail rests in the sound discretion of the court depending upon the
particular circumstances of the case. It should be noted further that the
reduction in the amount of bail of the accused in the criminal cases in question
were all done by the respondent with the knowledge and conformity of the
Public Prosecutor concerned. Moreover, the actions taken by the respondent
were in the exercise of judicial discretion that may not be assailed in an
administrative proceedings (sic).[12]

We do not agree.
Bail is the security required by the court and given by the accused to ensure
that the accused appears before the proper court at the scheduled time and
place to answer the charges brought against him or her. It is awarded to the
accused to honor the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense without being
subject to punishment prior to conviction.[13]
 Bail should be fixed according to the circumstances of each case. The
amount fixed should be sufficient to ensure the presence of the accused at the
trial yet reasonable enough to comply with the constitutional provision that bail
should not be excessive. Therefore, whether bail is a matter of right or of
[14]

discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor

or fiscal or at least he must be asked for his recommendation because in fixing
the amount of bail, the judge is required to take into account a number of factors
such as the applicants character and reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or
whether he is a fugitive from justice.
[15]

When a person is charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion

perpetua or life imprisonment, bail is a matter of discretion. Rule 114, Section 7
of the Rules of Court states: No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the
evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of
the criminal action. Consequently, when the accused is charged with an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the judge is
mandated to conduct a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion
of the court, not only to take into account the guidelines set forth in Section 9,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, but primarily to determine the existence of strong
evidence of guilt or lack of it, against the accused.
A summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the
purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for
purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to
enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the
evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the
trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The course
of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to
receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross examination. [16]

Respondent judge, in two instances, granted bail to an accused charged

with murder, without having conducted any hearing as to whether the evidence
of guilt against the accused is strong.
In the case of People v. Ahmed Duerme y Paypon, et al., Criminal Case No.
874, accused Ahmed Duerme together with four other persons were charged
with the crime of murder. The provincial prosecutor recommended the sum
of P200,000.00 as bailbond for each accused. The records do not reveal
[17]

whether a hearing was actually conducted on the application for bail although
respondent judge implies that there was one, stating that acting on this
recommendation of the provincial prosecutor and taking into account the
guidelines prescribed in Section 9 of Administrative Circular 12-94, the court
issued a warrant of arrest and fixed the amount of P200,000.00 for the
provisional liberty of each of the accused. Subsequently, counsel for accused
[18]

Ahmed Duerme filed a motion for reduction of bail. The hearing of the motion
was conducted on August 21, 1995 with the prosecution, not having interposed
any opposition, and submitting the resolution of the motion to the sound
discretion of the court instead. Respondent judge then issued an order granting
a reduced bailbond of P50,000.00 for accused Ahmed Duerme inasmuch as
the evidence was not so strong to warrant the fixation of said
amount. Respondent judge, in his comment, disclosed that the prosecution
[19]

was banking on weak circumstantial evidence since there was no eyewitness

to the commission of the offense as borne out from the affidavits and sworn
statements of the prosecution witnesses. The order granting the reduced
[20]

bailbond, however, did not contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution. [21]

In the case of People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag, Criminal Case No. 08-866,

accused Bumanglag was charge with murder in a criminal complaint filed before
the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Ana, Cagayan. After conducting a preliminary
investigation, the inquest judge issued a warrant of the arrest for the accused
with no bail recommended. When the case was elevated to the Regional Trial
Court, the information made no mention of a bailbond. Consequently, accused
through counsel filed a petition for bail. In the hearing of the petition to
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong,
the fiscal opted not to introduce evidence and recommended the sum
of P200,000.00 instead. Respondent judge, acting on said recommendation
[22]

and again guided by the provision of Section 9, Administrative Circular 12-94 in

conjunction with the evidence extant on record, issued an order granting bail to
the accused in the sum of P200,000.00. Unable to post the said bond,
[23]

accused through counsel filed a motion to reduce bail. In the course of the
[24]

hearing of the petition, the public prosecutor manifested that he had no

objection to the sum of P50,000.00 as bail for the accused. Respondent judge,
then guided by the factual setting and the supporting evidence extant on
record reduced the bail bond from P200,000.00 to P50,000.00 as
[25]

recommended by the prosecutor. Once again, the order granting the bail
of P200,000.00, as well as the reduced bail bond of P50,000.00, did not contain
a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
Respondent judge insists that in the aforecited cases, a hearing was
actually conducted on the application and motion for reduction of bail, but the
public prosecutor opted not to introduce evidence and submitted the resolution
of the petition, as well as the motion for reduction of bail, to the sound discretion
of the court instead. Respondent observed that since it is a basic principle of
procedure that the prosecution of criminal cases is under the direct control and
supervision of the fiscal or prosecutor, would it be procedurally proper for the
court to compel prosecutor Apolinar Carrao, the public prosecutor assigned in
the case of People v. Rodrigo Bumanlag, Criminal Case No. 08-866, to prove
the evidence of guilt of the accused for the crime of murder when the prosecutor
candidly admitted in open court that in his honest view, the strength of evidence
on hand for the state can only prove the crime of homicide and not murder? [26]

In the recent case of Inocencio Basco v. Judge Leo M. Rapatalo, this court
[27]

ruled that x x x the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where
the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application of bail
to the sound discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise required if the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant
and fix bail. The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few
cases wherein the court ruled that, even if the prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still
mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching questions from
which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it against
the accused.
The reason for this is plain. Inasmuch as the determination of whether or
not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion, It may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the
court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence
and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or
produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial
[28]

discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the
petitioner having the right of cross examination and to introduce evidence in his
own rebuttal. [29]

Respondent judge justifies the grant of bail in the two cases by stating that
the prosecutor recommended the grant of bail. Respondent also added that in
the case of People v. Ahmed Duerme, there were no eyewitnesses to the
commission of the offense as borne out from the affidavits and sworn
statements of the witnesses. As a matter of fact, the case had already been
[30]

dismissed for failure to prosecute by Judge Alameda inasmuch as the

prosecutor himself admitted that there was lack of interest on the part of the
witnesses to pursue the case and not a single witness ever went to court to see
him.[31]
 The fact that Criminal Case No. 07-874 was subsequently dismissed by
Judge Alameda does not completely exculpate respondent judge. We need
only remind him that he is not bound by the recommendation of the prosecutor
and the affidavits and sworn statements of the witnesses are mere hearsay
statements which could hardly be the basis for determining whether or not the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
Worth noting, too, is the fact that the order granting the application, as well
as the reduction for bail the aforecited cases, did not contain a summary of the
evidence presented by the prosecution. In Criminal Case No. 07-874,
respondent only arrived at the conclusion that "the evidence was not so strong
to warrant the fixation of said amount and the observation that:When the
[32]

hearing of this petition was called, some legal skirmishes arose between the
Prosecutor and the Defense Counsel, after which, the prosecutor out of
humanitarian reason yielded and manifested that he is amenable that the
accused be admitted to bail in the amount of P200,000.00 in Criminal Case No.
08-866. Well settled in a number of cases is the rule that the courts order
[33] [34]

granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution, otherwise the order granting or denying bail may be invalidated
because the summary of the evidence for the prosecution which contains the
judges evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an aspect of
procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense.
The procedural lapse of respondent judge is aggravated by the fact that
even though the accused in Criminal Case No. 07-874, People v. Ahmed
Duerme, have yet to be arrested, respondent already fixed bail in the sum
of P200,000.00. Respondent evidently knew that the accused were still at large
as he even had to direct their arrest in the same order where he simultaneously
granted them bail. At this juncture, there is a need to reiterate the basic
[35]

principle that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in
custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be
[36]

premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for bail for some whose
freedom has yet to be curtailed.
With regard to the third charge filed against respondent judge, we adopt the
findings of the Office of the Court Administrator that the complainant failed to
show that bad faith motivated the actuation of respondent judge in reducing the
amount of bail in Criminal Case No. 11250 for Illegal Possession of Firearm
against Barangay Captain Rodolfo Castaneda. Respondent judge, in granting
and subsequently reducing the recommended bailbond of P180,000.00
considered the fact that there was no corpus of the crime as no firearm was
taken from the possession of the accused, as well as the fact that counsel for
the accused vouched and guaranteed the appearance of the accused in court
whenever required. Moreover, records show that, contrary to the allegations
[37]

of the complainant, the trial of the case had already been set for hearing but on
more than one occasion, the defense counsel, as well as the prosecutor, both
moved to have it reset. [38]

In Criminal Case No. 08-915 for homicide filed against accused Nilo de
Rivera, complainant alleges that the amount of P14,800.00 granted by
respondent as bailbond of the accused is too low. Respondent judge stresses
that the amount was recommended by the prosecutor and not motu propio by
the trial court. Respondent added that the amount of bail was appropriate
inasmuch as it was fixed in accordance with the guidelines set forth in Section
9 of Administrative Circular 12-94. As long as in fixing the amount of bail, the
court is guided by the purpose for which bail is required, that is, to secure the
appearance of the accused to answer charges brought against him, the
decision of the court to grant bail in the sum it deems appropriate will not be
interfered with.
With respect to the last charge, we adopt the findings of the office of the
Court Administrator that there is nothing in the record to substantiate the
allegation of the complainant that the acquittal of a certain Jimmy Siriban by
respondent judge was tainted with irregularity. Other than his bare allegation,
complainant has yet to present evidence as to any irregularity committed by
respondent judge in acquitting Mr. Siriban.
In sum, we find respondent Judge Segundo B. Catral guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for having granted bail to the accused in Criminal Cases
No. 07-874 and 08-866 without having conducted the requisite hearing. It is
indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the Court should be besieged with
a number of administrative cases filed against erring judges involving bail. After
all, there is no dearth of jurisprudence on the basic principles involving bail. As
a matter of fact, the Court itself, through its Philippine Judicial Academy, has
been including lectures on the subject in the regular seminars conducted for
judges. Be that as it may, we reiterate the following duties of the trial judge in
case an application for bail is filed:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor
of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation
(Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that
the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence
of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied. [39]

With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the Rules of Court,
trial judges are enjoined to study them as well and be guided
accordingly. Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account for an erroneous
decision rendered in good faith, but this defense is much too frequently cited
even if not applicable. A number of cases on bail having already been decided,
this Court justifiably expects judges to discharge their duties assiduously. For
judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic
legal principles. Faith in the administration of justice can only be engendered if
litigants are convinced that the members of the Bench cannot justly be charge
with a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Segundo B.
Catral is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine P20,000.00 with the WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
comendador, et al v de villa (8/2/91)

Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the
AFP were directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers
for the alleged participation the failed coup on December 1 to 9, 1989.
Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as
mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their
motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process.

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but
the application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of
preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty.
However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even
military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.

The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for
habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame
without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no
formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year
after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.

Held: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities

to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing
of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of
February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their
counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for
reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had
been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits
on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit
controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge.
(Right to challenge validity of members of G/SCM)

It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces
accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no
authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial
proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and
on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.

The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been
recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general
rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more
emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.

On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year
from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with the requirementsof due
process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating
Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one
year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved
in the failed coup.

Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In
G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to
allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under article
18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also
granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private
respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.

Magno vs. CA (Crim1)

Oriel Magno, petitioner, vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, respondents.

June 26, 1992

Paras, J:

Facts:

Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair shop
operational, approached Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries.

VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation, advising its Vice President, Joey
Gomez, that Mancor was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could
accommodate Magno and and provide him credit facilities.

The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment as
warranty deposit but Magno couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP Gomez to look for third party
who could lend him that amount.

Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided that amount.

As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of them were cleared and the rest had no
sufficient fund.

Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled out the
equipment.

Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found guilty.

Issue:

Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question.

Held:

No

Ratio:

To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it was not his own
account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust debt since he did not
receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing
company which is managed by the officials and employees of LS Finance.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-46490 January 24, 1939

MARIANO MARCOS, PIO MARCOS and QUIRINO LIZARDO, petitioners,
vs.
ROMAN A. CRUZ, Judge of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, respondent.

Vicente J. Francisco, Bartolome Guirao, Federico Diaz, Alberto Saguitan, and Juliana E. Castro for
petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta for respondent judge.

IMPERIAL, J.:

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition the petitioners pray that the order of the respondent judge
dated December 29, 1938, denying another motion filed by them to be admitted to bail, be set aside,
and by way of affirmative relief ask that they be set at liberty upon giving bail in the amount to be
fixed.

On December 7, 1938, the provincial fiscal of Laguna, who was assigned as such in Ilocos Norte,
filed the following information:

The undersigned charges Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, Ferdinand Marcos, Quirino Lizardo, and
John Doe (whose identity has so far not been established), with the crime of murder, committed as
follows:

That on or about the night of September 20, 1935, in the municipality of Batac, Province of
Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the
aforementioned accused, armed with firearms, acting upon a common understanding and
conspiring with one another, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with treachery, evident
premeditation, and intent to kill, fired at Julio Nalundasan, then representative-elect for the
second district of Ilocos Norte, hitting him in the right side, the bullet having entered vital
internal organs and injuring them, which wounds cause the instant death of said Julio
Nalundasan.

Contrary to law, with the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and the perpetration of the
crime in the home of the deceased.

Laoag, Ilocos Norte, December 7, 1938.

(Sgd.) HIGINO B. MACADAEG

Provincial Fiscal for Laguna

with special designation in the
Province of Ilocos Norte

Witnesses:

DR. RAMON RABAGO, c/o Phil. Army

Cotabato, Cotabato

DR. DOMINGO SAMONTE, c/o Dept. del Interior

Manila, and others

The information was submitted to the respondent judge who, after examining prosecution witnesses
Calixto Aguinaldo and Valentin Rubio, on that very day issued the warrant for the arrest of the
accused, stating that from the testimony of these witnesses it was evident that the crime charged
had been committed and that the accused had probably committed it. Being of the opinion that the
crime charged was penalized with a capital punishment, and that the accused were not entitled to
bail, the court likewise decreed that the accused remain in detention. At the investigation conducted
by the respondent judge, where Calixto Aguinaldo and Valentin Rubio testified, the accused were
not present, and the whole proceeding took place in their absence. On December 8, 1938, Mariano
Marcos moved to be admitted to bail. The motion was set for hearing that same afternoon, which
was orally opposed by the fiscal, and without either party adducing any evidence, the motion was
submitted. Pio Marcos, Ferdinand Marcos, and Quirino Lizardo on the 12th also moved to be
admitted to bail. This motion was set for hearing on the 20th of December, 1938, but at the request
of the accused, who wanted to file a supplementary motion, the hearing was postpone till the
following day. On December 21st, the four accused filed the supplementary motion, attaching
thereto their sworn statements marked A, B, C and D. Here as in the original motion the accused
urgently prayed that they be released on bail, and in their sworn statements Mariano Marcos,
Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo declared that the testimony of Calixto Aguinaldo and Valentin
Rubio accusing them of murder was false, and that they were innocent. On December 21st these
motions came up foe hearing before the respondent judge, Fiscal Macadaeg appearing for the
prosecution, and Attorney Vicente J. Francisco for the defense. The latter asked that the prosecution
present its evidence to show that the accused fell within the exception of section 1, paragraph 16,
Article III of the Constitution, and section 63 of General Orders, No. 58, that is, that they were
accused of a capital offense, that the proof of guilt was evident and the presumption of guilt strong.
The fiscal refused to do so and contended that under the law the prosecution was not bound to
adduce such evidence, that the judge might take into account that adduced during the investigation
he had made, and that at any rate it was the defense that was bound to establish the right of the
accused to bail. The respondent judge sustained the fiscal and the hearing came to a close without
either party adducing any evidence. The motions having thus been submitted, the respondent judge
on December 29, 1938 issued an order denying them and ruling that the accused Mariano Marcos,
Quirino Lizardo and Pio Marcos were not entitled to bail because they were charged with a capital
offense, the proof against them was evident, and the presumption of guilt strong. Prior to this date
they had asked for a preliminary investigation. The motion to that effect was denied on the ground
that the investigation conducted by the respondent judge before issuing the warrant of arrest was in
the nature of a preliminary investigation. Motion for reconsideration was filed, and on December 27,
1938 this motion was likewise denied, but the judge in the same order admitted Ferdinand Marcos to
bail on the ground that he was under 18 when the crime was committed, that he was a remarkably
bright student of the College of Law in the University of the Philippines, that he would finish his
studies the following March, and that he had given assurances, together with his lawyers, that he
would not leave the Philippines.

As may be seen, the question of law raised by this petition is whether the accused Mariano Marcos,
Pio Marcos, and Quirino Lizardo are entitled to be admitted to bail at this stage of the criminal
proceedings, that is, before conviction. Section 1, paragraph 16, Article III of the Constitution,
provides:

(16) All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those
charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Excessive bail shall not be
required.

Section 63 of General Orders, No. 58, provides:

SEC. 63. All prisoners shall be bailable before conviction, except those charged with the
commission of capital offenses when proof of guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is
strong.
Section 63 of General Orders, No. 58, does not run counter to section 1, paragraph 16, Article II of
the Constitution, since in this jurisdiction every accused person is bailable before conviction, unless
charged with a capital offense, when proof of guilt is evident and presumption of guilt strong (U.
S. vs. Babasa, 19 Phil., 198; Montalbo vs. Santamaria, 54 Phil., 955). When the crime charged is a
capital offense, admission to bail lies within the discretion of the court, and defends upon whether
the proof is evident and the presumption of guilt strong (Montalbo vs. Santamaria, supra).

When the motions filed by the three accused came up for trial, counsel asked that the prosecution
adduce its evidence to show whether they fell within the exception, and whether or not they were
entitled to bail; but the court upheld the prosecution and declared that the burden of proof was on the
accused to show that they were entitled to bail. The controversy thus gave to rise to the legal
question as to which side bears the burden of proof in such cases. Section 66 of General Orders,
No. 58, provides:

SEC. 66. When admission to bail is a matter of discretion, the court must require that
reasonable notice of the hearing of the application for bail be given to the promotor fiscal.

It will be seen that this section provides for a hearing of the application for bail it says nothing about
the party bound to prove the right to bail. The prosecution contends that the burden of proof lies on
the accused because they must prove their affirmative allegation that they are entitled to bail and
because the filing of the information sets up the presumption of their guilt. The defense contends
that since it is the exception to the rule that the accused are not entitled to bail, it is the prosecution,
and not the accused, which is bound to prove it.

In the States of the Union there are two tendencies or theories touching the onus probandi where
there is a petition to be admitted to bail before conviction of the accused. In some State it has been
held that the burden of proof lies on the accused who asked to be admitted to bail because the filing
of the indictment raises the presumption of guilt and that the proof against the accused is evident or
clear (8. C. J. S., sec. 34, p. 61; McAdams vs. State, 147 N. E., 764; 196 Ind., 184; Ex parte Cooper,
45 P. [2d], 584). In Shaw vs. State (47 S. W. [2d], 92; 164 Tenn., 192), the Supreme Court of
Tennessee held that in the absence of proof by the petitioner that he is bailable for a capital offense,
the indictment raises the presumption of guilt required by the constitutional provision regarding bail.
In State vs. Kutcher (129 A., 632; 3 N. J., Misc., 636), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that
although the indictment does not raise the presumption of guilt sufficient for the trial on the merits, it
does raise that presumption for all intermediate proceedings, such as a petition to be admitted to
bail. In State vs.Lowe (86 So., 707; 204 Ala., 288), the Supreme Court of the State held that a
person under an indictment for a capital offense is presumed guilty to the extent of not being entitled
to release on bail.

In other States it has been held that in the petitions for admission to bail the burden of proof to show
that the accused is not bailable lies on the prosecution (8 C. J. S., sec. 34, p. 61; 6 Am. Jur., par. 25,
p. 59; Ford vs. Dilley, 156 N. W., 513; 174 Ia., 243; Ex parte Johnson, 280 S. W., 702; Ex
parte Dumas, 7 S. W. [2d], 90; 110 Tex. Cr., 1Ex parte Fleming, 261 S. W., 1037; 97 Tex. Cr., 304;
Commonwealth vs. Stahl, 35 S. W. [2d], 563; 237 Ky., 388;Ex parte Readhimer, 60 S. W. [2d], 788;
123 Tex. Cr., 635; Ex parte Martin, 45 S. W. [2d], 965; 119 Tex cr., 141;Ex parte Landers, 9 S. W.
[2d], 1106; Tex. Cr., 604; Ex parte Crawford, 265 S. W., 906; 98 Tex Cr., 289; Ex parteTownsley,
220 S. W., 1092; 87 Tex. Cr., 252). In Ford vs. Dilley, supra, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that at
a hearing regarding bail the State must begin to adduce evidence if it denies that the offense is
bailable. It was stated that since according to the provisions of law the rule is that the accused is
bailable, and the exception is that he cannot be admitted to bail, the burden of proving that a case
falls within the exception lies on the prosecution opposing the grant of bail.
As may be seen, the fundamental reason the courts had in holding that the accused must prove his
right to bail is the presumption of guilt arising from the filing of the indictment. It has further been said
that the filing of the indictment likewise destroys the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused. If this theory has some persuasive force, it is due to the procedural system followed is
nearly all the States of the Union for securing the indictment. There the district attorney gathers the
evidence for the prosecution and presents it before the Grand Jury, which, after examining it,
deliberates upon whether or not to present the indictment. This indictment is presented only after the
injury is morally convinced that the crime has been committed and that the accused is guilty. In this
jurisdiction there is no jury, and the evidence for the prosecution is gathered and organized by the
fiscal, who later files the information. Undoubtedly the legal requirement that the indictment be
presented by the jury aims at surrounding the citizen with greater guarantees before being molested
with his arrest, preliminary investigation, trial, and the consequent expenses of his defense. This
guarantee in favor of the citizen does not exist in our jurisdiction, because we have no jury, for which
reason we incline towards the second theory that the filing of the information does not raise the
presumption of guilt or destroy the presumption of the defendant's innocence provided for in section
57 of General Orders, No. 58. We therefore hold that when a person accused of a capital offense
asks to be admitted to bail before conviction, the burden of proof lies, not on him, but on the
prosecution to show that he is not bailable.

It is argued that the respondent judge, before issuing the warrant for the arrest of the accused,
examined the two witnesses for the prosecution presented by the fiscal, and that their testimony
raised the presumption of the defendants' guilt and supplied the further requirement that proof of
guilt must be evident. We cannot give our assent to this connection. It ought not to be forgotten that
such testimony was taken in the absence of the accused, and that the latter had no opportunity to
see the witnesses testify or to cross-examine them. We are not unmindful of the fact that in People
vs. Solon (47 Phil., 443), and in Payao vs. Lesaca (63 Phil., 210), we said that when the
investigation of a criminal case is conducted by a judge of first instance, it includes both the
summary investigation spoken of in Act No. 194, as amended by Acts Nos. 1450 and 1627, and the
preliminary investigation referred to in section 13 of General Orders, No. 58; and we are aware of
the contention of the prosecution that applying the doctrine laid down in those two cases, the
evidence adduced before the respondent judge could be used against the accused and in fact
established the presumption of guilt. But it must be borne in mind that the hearing required by
section 66 of General Orders, No. 58, is essentially different from the preliminary investigation to
which every person is entitled who is accused of a crime triable before the Court of First Instance,
and that if the prosecution had intended the summary investigation conducted by the respondent
judge to be a preliminary investigation, its duty was to summon the accused and adduce its evidence
in their presence. Other reasons preventing the consideration of such evidence against the accused
are: that the fiscal did not reproduce or offer it at the hearing of the petitions for bail; and that in the
sworn statements which the accused attached to their supplementary motion, they denied the
imputation of guilt, and rebutted the testimony of Calixto Aguinaldo and Valentin Rubio, which they
described as false and improbable. In these circumstances it was the duty of the respondent judge,
to require the fiscal to adduce his evidence in order to show that the crime charged was capital, that
the proof was evident, and the presumption of guilt strong.

Although the petition filed is entitled certiorari and prohibition, we consider that the proper relief is
only the first, since there is no allegation or ground for invoking the second. Certiorari lies in this
case because the respondent judge exceeded, as we have pointed out, the discretion conferred
upon him by law (section 217, Code of Civil Procedure; De Castro and Morales vs. Justice of the
Peace of Bocaue, 33 Phil., 595; Valdez vs. Querubin, 37 Phil., 774; Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phil.,
182; Salvador Campos y Cia. vs. Del Rosario, 41 Phil., 45; Larrobis vs.Wislizenus and Smith, Bell &
Co., 42 Phil., 401; Encarnacion and Navarro vs. Sheriff of Rizal, 63 Phil., 467; Carreon vs. Buyson
Lampa, 63 Phil., 449).
Wherefore, let the writ of certiorari issue and the order of December 29, 1938 denying bail to the
accused Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, and Quirino Lizardo be set aside. The respondent judge, or
whoever acts in his stead, shall set the petitions filed by these accused regarding bail for hearing, at
which the fiscal should prove that they fall within the exception and are therefore not entitled to bail
because they are charged with a capital offense, the proof is evident, and the presumption of their
guilt is strong. The evidence thus adduced may be rebutted by the accused with other evidence to
show their right. Without special award of costs. So ordered.

Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Diaz, Concepcion, and Moran, JJ., concur.

ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN: DIGEST AND COMMENTS

G.R. No. 213847; August 18, 2015
Ponente: Bersamin

Doctrines:
Primary objective of bail The strength of the Prosecution's case,
albeit a good measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for
causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of
bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.

Bail is a right and a matter of discretion Right to bail is afforded in

Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule
114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.

FACTS:
On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with
plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported
involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)
Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail,
which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for
Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary
surrender.

Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix

Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that:
(a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt
was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary
surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion temporal, thus
allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age and
physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed
resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless
the crime charged is punishable byreclusion perpetua where the
evidence of guilt is strong.
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner
would be convicted, he will be punishable by reclusion perpetua.

b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is

strong.

2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight

risk.

HELD:
1. YES.

Bail as a matter of right due process and presumption of

innocence.
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the
constitutional right to be released on bail.

The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused

at trial and so the amount of bail should be high enough to assure
the presence of the accused when so required, but no higher than
what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.

Bail as a matter of discretion

Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution
and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
to wit:

Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution.

The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal

offense, shall be bailable.

Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with

reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his
guilt is strong.

Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established
that the evidence of guilt is strong.Where evidence of guilt is not
strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of the
court.

Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:

Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an

offense not punishable by death,reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and
acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided
it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if
the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of
the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be
filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to
continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the
same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has

committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded

sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in
either case.

Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life

imprisonment, or reclusion perpetuasubject to judicial discretion.
In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: [S]uch discretion
may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the
degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he
should be granted provisional liberty. Bail hearing with notice is
indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily
determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong.

The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs.

Catral:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the

prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application

for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.
2. YES.

Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail

The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the
international community arising from its commitment to
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person
to liberty and due process and for detainees to avail of such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to
liberty. Quoting fromGovernment of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the
SC emphasized:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article
II of our Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on
the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In
other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail. (emphasis in decision)

Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of

discretion
Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly
disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced
age of Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in denying the Motion to Fix Bail. It acted whimsically and
capriciously and was so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].

[G.R. No. 131909. February 18, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ALFREDO CABRAL,
Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30, Camarines Sur and RODERICK
ODIAMAR,respondents.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

Assailed before this Court is the August 1, 1997 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA GR.
No. 42318 which affirmed the March 24, 1995 and June 14, 1996 orders[2] of the lower court
granting accused-respondents Motion for Bail and denying petitioner Peoples Motions to Recall
and Invalidate Order of March 24, 1995 and to Recall and/or Reconsider the Order of May 5, 1995
confirming the hospitalization of accused-respondent.
Accused-respondent Roderick Odiamar was charged with rape upon the complaint of Cecille
Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporary liberty, accused-respondent filed a motion praying that he
be released on bail which petitioner opposed by presenting real, documentary and testimonial
evidence. The lower court, however, granted the motion for bail in an order, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the evidence not being strong at the (sic) stage of the trial, this court
is constrained to grant bail for the provisional liberty of the accused Roderick
Odiamar in the amount of P30,000.00. (Italics supplied)

Believing that accused-respondent was not entitled to bail as the evidence against him was
strong, the prosecution filed the two abovementioned motions which the lower court disposed of,
thus:

WHEREFORE, the motions dated 10 May 1995 and 15 May 1995 both filed by Atty.
Romulo Tolentino, State Prosecutor, are hereby denied, for lack of merit.

The above-cited orders prompted petitioner to file a petition before the Court of Appeals with
prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals denied
the petition reasoning thus:

We have examined in close and painstaking detail the records of this case, and find
that the claim of the People that the respondent judge had over-stepped the exercise of
his jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders, is unimpressed with merit. We are not
inclined to declare that there was grave abuse in respondent courts exercise of its
discretion in allowing accused to obtain bail. There is grave abuse of discretion where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. We do not
find this to be so in this case. Our ruling is based not only on the respect to be
accorded the findings of facts of the trial court, which had the advantage (not
available to Us) of having observed first-hand the quality of the autoptic proference
and the documentary exhibits of the parties, as well as the demeanor of the witnesses
on the stand, but is grounded on the liberal slant given by the law in favor of the
accused. Differently stated, in the absence of clear, potent and compelling reasons,
We are not prepared to supplant the exercise of the respondent courts discretion with
that of Our own.

Still convinced by the merit of its case, petitioner filed the instant petition submitting the
following sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION DESPITE A
SHOWING BY THE PROSECUTION THAT THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE
PROVING RESPONDENTS GUILT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.

The above-submitted issue pertains to the orders of the lower court granting accused-
respondents application for bail which it justified through its summary of the evidence presented
during the hearing.Said order states, thus:

Now going over the evidence adduced in conjunction with the petition for bail filed by
the accused through counsel, the court believes that the evidence so far presented by
the prosecution is not strong. This is so because the crime of rape is not to be
presumed; consent and not physical force is the common origin of acts between man
and woman. Strong evidence and indication of great weight alone support such
presumption. It is the teaching of applicable doctrines that form the defense in rape
prosecution. In the final analysis, it is entitled to prevail, not necessarily because the
untarnished truth is on its side but merely because it can raise reasonable, not fanciful
doubts. It has the right to require the complainant (sic) strong evidence and an
indication of great weight (People v. Godoy, G.R. No. L-31177, July 15, 1976), and in
the instant case, the reasonable doubt is on the evidence of the prosecution, more so,
because the intrinsic nature of the crime, the conviction or the acquittal of the accused
depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant (People v. Oliquino,
G.R. No. 94703, May 31, 1993). Rightly so, because in the commission of the offense
of rape the facts and circumstances occuring either prior, during and subsequent
thereto may provide conclusion whether they may negate the commission thereof by
the accused (People v. Flores, L-6065, October 26, 1986). If they negate, they do
presuppose that the evidence for the prosecution is not strong. More so, because in the
instant case, the facts and circumstances showing that they do seem to negate the
commission thereof were mostly brought out during the cross-examination. As such,
they deserve full faith and credence because the purpose thereof is to test accuracy
and truthfulness and freedom from interest and bias or the reverse (Rule 132, Sec. 6,
Revised Rules of Evidence). The facts and circumstances brought up are as follow, to
wit:

a) That, when the offended party Cecille Buenafe rode in the jeepney then driven by
the accused Roderick Odiamar in that evening of July 20, 1994 at about 8:00 oclock
from the Poblacion, Lagonoy, Camarines Sur the former knew that it was for a joy
ride. In fact, she did not even offer any protest when the said jeepney proceeded to the
Pilapil Beach resort at Telegrafo, San Jose, Camarines Sur instead of Sabang, same
municipality, where she and Stephen Florece intended to go. And when the said
jeepney was already inside that resort, Cecille even followed the accused in going
down from the jeepney also without protest on her part, a fact which shows
voluntariness on the part of the offended party and, therefore, to the mind of the court
her claim of rape should not be received with precipitate credulity. On the contrary, an
insight into the human nature is necessary (People v. Barbo, 56 SCRA 495). And it is
only when the testimony is impeccable and rings true throughout where it shall be
believed (People v. Tapao, G.R. No. L-41704, October 23, 1981). Rightly so, because
the aphorism that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but it must be credible in itself in conformity with the common
experience and observation of mankind is nowhere of moral relevance than in cases
involving prosecution of rape (People v. Macatangay, 107 Phil. 188);

b) That, in that resort, when the accused Roderick Odiamar and companions allegedly
forced the offended party Cecille Buenafe to drink gin, the latter, at first, refused and
even did not swallow it but later on voluntarily took four (4) shots there shows that
there (was) no force. And as regards the claim that the accused Roderick Odiamar and
companions allegedly forced the said offended party to inhale smoke, out of a small
cigarette, presumably a marijuana, it becomes doubtful because the prosecution,
however, failed to present any portion of that so-called small cigarette much less did it
present an expert witness to show that inhaling of smoke from the said cigarette would
cause dizziness. Rightly so, because administration of narcotics is covered by Art.
335, par. 2 Revised Penal Code (People v. Giduces C.A. 38 O.C. 1434 cited in the
Revised Penal Code, Aquino, Vol.III, pp. 392). As such, the burden of proof rests
with the prosecution but it failed to do so;

c) That, in that cottage where the accused, Roderick Odiamar allegedly brought the
offended party, Cecille Buenafe, the former was able to consummate the alleged
offense of rape by removing the two (2) hands of the offended party, placed them on
her knee, separating them thereby freeing the said hand and consequently pushed the
head of the accused but the latter was able to insert his penis when the said offended
party was no longer moving and the latter became tired. Neither evidence has been
presented to show that the offended party suffered an injury much less any part of her
pants or blouse was torn nor evidence to show that there was an overpowering and
overbearing moral influence of the accused towards the offended party (People v.
Mabunga, G.R. No. 96441d, March 13, 1992) more so, because force and violence in
the offense of rape are relative terms, depending on the age, size and strength of the
parties and their relation to each other (People v. Erogo, 102077 January 4, 1994);

d) That, after the alleged commission of rape at about 3:00 oclock in the early
morning of July 21, 1994, the offended party, Cecille, Stephen Florece and the latters
companions all boarded the same jeepney going back to the Poblacion of Lagonoy,
without the said offended party, protesting, crying or in any way showing sign of grief
regarding the alleged commission of the offense of rape until the jeepney reached the
house of Roderick Odiamar where the latter parked it. As in other cases, the testimony
of the offended party shall not be accepted unless her sincerity and candor are free
from suspicion, because the nature of the offense of rape is an accusation easy to be
made, hard to be proved but harder to be defended by the party accused though
innocent (People v. Francisco G.R. No. L-43789, July 15, 1981). It becomes
necessary, therefore, for the courts to exercise the most painstaking care in
scrutinizing the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution (People v. Dayag, L-
30619, March 29, 1974);

e) That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe had herself physically examined by Dr.
Josephine Decena for medical certificate dated July 27, 1994 and it states, among
others, that there was a healed laceration on the hymen, her laceration might have
been sustained by the said offended party, a month, six (6) months, and even a year,
prior to the said examination and that the said laceration might have been caused by
repeated penetration of a male sex organ probably showing that the offended party
might have experienced sexual intercourse. This piece of testimony coming from an
expert, such finding is binding to court (Rules of Court, Moran, op.cit, vol 5, 1963, ed.
pp. 413).

f) That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe accompanied by the Station Commander
of Lagonoy, Camarines Sur, proceeded to Naga City and upon the suggestion of Gov.
Bulaong, the said offended party submitted for medical treatment before the same
physician per medical certificate dated August 1, 1994 but according to the said
physician the lesions near the umbilicus were due to skin diseases but the said
offended party claim they were made by the accused after the sexual acts. As such,
there were contradictions on material points, it becomes of doubtful veracity (People
v. Palicte 83 Phil.) and it also destroys the testimony (People v. Garcia, G.R. No.
13086, March 27, 1961). As to the fact that the said lesion was made by the accused
subsequent to the commission of the act, it is immaterial. As such, it has no probative
value.

The lower court concluded that the evidence of guilt was not strong.
 The Office of the Solicitor General disagreed with the lower court. It opined that aside from
failing to include some pieces of evidence in the summary, the trial court also misapplied some
well-established doctrines of criminal law. The Office of the Solicitor General pointed out the
following circumstances duly presented in the hearing for bail:

First. There was no ill motive on the part of Cecille to impute the heinous crime of
rape against respondent (People v. Paragsa, 83 SCRA 105 [1978]; People v. Delovino,
247 SCRA 637 [1995]).

Second. Dr. Belmonte, the psychiatrist who attended to Cecille testified that based on
her psychiatric examination of the latter, Cecille manifested psychotic signs and
symptoms such as unusual fear, sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts, psychomotor
retardation, poverty of thought content as well as depressive signs and
symptoms. These abnormal psychological manifestations, according to Dr. Belmonte,
are traceable to the rape incident (Pages 5-7, TSN, November 22, 1994.)

Third. The unrebutted offer of compromise by respondent is an implied admission of

guilt (People v. Flore, 239 SCRA 83 [1994]).

Fourth. Cecille was threatened by a deadly weapon and rendered unconscious by

intoxication and inhalation of marijuana smoke.

Fifth. The fact that after the conduct of two (2) preliminary investigations, no bail was
recommended in the information constitutes clear and strong evidence of the guilt of
(all) the accused (Baylon v. Sison, 243 SCRA 2

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the

Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773.
These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz, private
respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the
said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges
that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential
extraditee.

The facts are:

On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong
Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on
June 20, 1997.

On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and became the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.

Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the
offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of
conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and
October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for
the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application
for the provisional arrest of private respondent.

On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.

On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition andmandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas
corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.

On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.

On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.

On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and
sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final
and executory on April 10, 2001.

Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil
Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part,
private respondent filed, in the same case,-a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for
bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk."

On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-
95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.

On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001
allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:

In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further erosion of civil liberties. The petition
for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes
that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times
hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for
judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the
government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion
for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they
so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire,
manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be
filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking,
said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation
be noted therein accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.

Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the
right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under
the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting
in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:

Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first
time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may
be granted bail.

In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking
through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in
criminal proceedings," thus:

x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted
above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1,
6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando,J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail
will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusfinds application "only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII,
Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes
the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean
that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this Court
cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual
person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the
corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual
person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that
the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the
second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted
in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the
laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg
principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now
a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave
recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life,
liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the
principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon
the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court,
in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution,3 the principles set
forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also
adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and
ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life,
liberty, and due process.

The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment
is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity
of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has
the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable
it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other
words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to
criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and
protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts
ruling in Purganan is in order.

First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is
not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings,
such as deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.

Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential
history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during
the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the
Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.

The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure
to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting
that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to
treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while
deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal
law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.

In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that
foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail
pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon
the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed
in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both
are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the
light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.

Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines
"extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection
with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him
under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."

Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand
the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the
correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal
proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its
nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow
extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different
nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is
it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent
the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from
which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14

But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a
deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain
the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of
P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further
note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional
arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from
provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for
extradition is received subsequently."

Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a

criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of
liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary
detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.

Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained
incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other
words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any
crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his
fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the
extradition court to grant him bail.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence
of the accused. As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary
presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition
proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is
the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such
extraditee is a fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears
the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the
purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due
process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an
extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily
met.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying
bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of
substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of
extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used
in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must
prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders
and processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not
a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not,
the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and
thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

People v Veridiano Digest

G.R. L-62243, October 12, 1984

Effectivity of laws

At issue in this case is the applicability of BP 22 which was circulated a month after private
respondent issued the dishonored check.
 Facts:
1. On or about the 2nd week of May 1979, private respondent Benito Go Bio Jr. issued a check
amounting to P200, 000 to one Filipinas Tan. Said check was subsequently dishonored and
despite repeated demands, the respondent failed to make the necessary payment. Hence, the
filing of charges against him for violation of B.P. 22 or the Bouncing Check law.

2. Go Bio filed a Motion to Quash alleging that the information did not charge an offence on
ground that BP 22 has not yet taken effect when the offense was committed on May 1979. Said
law took into effect on June 29, 1979. The prosecution opposed the motion and contended that
the date of the dishonor of the check -- September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of
the offense, hence BP 22 is applicable.

3. The respondent judge granted Go Bio's motion and dismissed the criminal action hence, this
petition. Petitioner contends that BP 22 was published in the Official Gazette on April 4, 1979,
and hence became effective 15 days thereafter or on April 24, 1979. PR contends however that
said publication was only released on June 14, 1979 but since the questioned check was issued
about the second week of May 1979, then he could not have violated BP 22 because it was not
yet released for circulation at the time.

Issue: W/N BP 22 was already in effect when the offense was committed

NO.

The penal statute in question was circulated only on June 14, 1979 and not on its printed date
of April 9, 1979. Publication of the law is necessary so that the public can be apprised of the
contents of a penal statute before it can be bound by it. If a statute had not been published
before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such law to be violated. Hence,
the accused could not have committed the alleged crime. In effect, when the alleged offense
was committed there was still no law penalizing it. If BP 22 intended to make the printed date
of issue of the Official Gazette as the point of reference in the determination of its the
effectivity, it could have provided a special effectivity provision. Finally, the term
"publication" in BP 22 must be given the ordinary accepted meaning, to make known to the
people in general.

Webb v De Leon (Criminal Procedure)

Webb v De Leon
GR No. 121234
August 23, 1995

FACTS:

On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint
charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other
persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita
Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W.
Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.

Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.

Petitioners: fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility
of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to her inconsistencies between
her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sown statements. They criticize the procedure followed
by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.

charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino
issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary
examination.

Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their
right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended
their preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:

(1) Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to
charge accused with crime of rape and homicide?

(2) Did respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abuse their discretion when they
failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against the
accused?

(3) Did the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional right to due process during their
preliminary investigation?

(4) Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge
Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused?

HELD:

(1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects.
Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

(2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has
been committed and that the person arrested committed it.

Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that upon filing of an information, the RTC may issue a
warrant for the accused.

Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that respondent judges should have
conducted searching examination of witnesses before issuing warrants of arrest against
them.
(3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the
opportunities to be heard.

The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and
for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.

(4) NO.

Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision
whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond
executive and legislative interference.

In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department whose principal
power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary
component of this right is to prosecute their violators.

PEOPLE VS. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR. (CASE DIGEST)

By: Atty.Fred | October 4, 2007 in Criminal Law, Digests

2 Replies | Related posts at the bottom of article

(This is a digest of People vs. Claudio Teehankee, Jr., G.R. Nos. 111206-08, 6 October 1995)

The facts:

In 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman to her home at Campanilla Street, Dasmarinas
Village, Makati. Roland John Chapman went with them. When they entered the village, Maureen asked
Leino to stop about a block away from her house, as she wanted to walk the rest of the way for she
did not want her parents to know that she was going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her
while Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the radio.

While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by
accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on the middle of the road.
Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked: Who are you? (Show me your) I.D.
When Leino handed his I.D., the accused grabbed and pocketed the I.D., without bothering to look at
it.

Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: Why are you
bothering us? Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him.
Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: Why did you shoot me? Chapman
crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get
up and leave Chapman alone. Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked:
Do you want a trouble? Leino said no and took a step backward.

The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she became hysterical and
started screaming for help. She repeatedly shouted: Oh, my God, hes got a gun. Hes gonna kill us.
Will somebody help us? All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen,
warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and
made no attempt to move away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away from him. Maureen continued to be
hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side of accuseds car. Accused tried but failed
to grab her. Maureen circled around accuseds car, trying to put some distance between them. The
short chase lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined
her to shut up and sit down beside Leino. Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk.

For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot Leino. Leino
was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness. Leino heard
another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was happening and saw
accused return to his car and drive away. Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed
at least 3 people who saw the incident.

As a result of the incident, 3 separate criminal cases were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee,
Jr. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2)
FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN.
When Hultman subsequently died after 97 days of confinement at the hospital and during the course
of the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder was amended to MURDER.

The defense:

Accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi. Accused claimed that during the shooting incident,
he was not anywhere near the scene of the crime, but in his house in Pasig. Accused averred that he
only came to know the 3 victims in the Dasmarinas shooting when he read the newspaper reports
about it. Accused admitted ownership of a box-type, silver metallic gray Mitsubishi Lancer, with plate
number PDW 566. He, however, claimed that said car ceased to be in good running condition after its
involvement in an accident. Until the day of the shooting, his Lancer car had been parked in the garage
of his mothers house in Dasmarinas Village. He has not used this car since then. Accused conceded
that although the car was not in good running condition, it could still be used.

The ruling:

Eyewitness identification and out-of-court identification.

The accused was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of 3 eyewitnesses who positively
identified him as the gunman. However, he vigorously assails his out-of-court identification by these
eyewitnesses.

He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Leino, the lone surviving victim of the crimes at
bar. Appellant urges: First, that Leinos identification of him outside an unoccupied house in Forbes
Park was highly irregular; Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and the newspapers before
he identified him; Third, that Leinos interview at the hospital was never put in writing; Fourth, that the
sketch of appellant based on the description given by Leino to the CIS agents was suppressed by the
NBI. It is surmised that the sketch must have been among the evidence turned over to the NBI when
the latter assumed jurisdiction over the investigation; and, lastly, that Leino could not have
remembered the face of the accused. The shooting lasted for only five (5) minutes. During that period,
his gaze could not have been fixed only on the gunmans face. His senses were also dulled by the five
(5) bottles of beer he imbibed that night.

It is understandable for the accused to assail his out-of-court identification by the prosecution
witnesses in his first assignment of error. Eyewitness identification constitutes vital evidence and, in
most cases, decisive of the success or failure of the prosecution. Yet, while eyewitness identification
is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence
such as the fingerprint or DNA testing. Some authors even describe eyewitness evidence as
inherently suspect. The causes of misidentification are known, thus:

Identification testimony has at least three components. First, witnessing a crime, whether as a victim
or a bystander, involves perception of an event actually occurring. Second, the witness must memorize
details of the event. Third, the witness must be able to recall and communicate accurately. Dangers
of unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at each of these three stages, for whenever people
attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve information accurately, they are limited by normal human
fallibilities and suggestive influences.

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where
the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots
where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where
a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of
out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case,
courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of
constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following
factors, viz: (1) the witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness
degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the
crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

Using the totality of circumstances test, the alleged irregularities cited by the accused did not result in
his misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is nothing wrong in Leinos identification
of the accused in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal that this mode was resorted
to by the authorities for security reasons. The need for security even compelled that Leino be fetched
and escorted from his house in Forbes Park by U.S. embassy security officials and brought to the
house where he was to make the identification. The Leinos refused to have the identification at the
NBI office as it was cramped with people and with high security risk. Leinos fear for his safety was not
irrational. He and his companions had been shot in cold blood in one of the exclusive, supposedly safe
subdivisions in the metropolis.

There is no hard and fast rule as to the place where suspects are identified by witnesses. Identification
may be done in open field. It is often done in hospitals while the crime and the criminal are still fresh
in the mind of the victim.

Accused cant also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio and TV accounts of the shooting
before he personally identified him. The records show that while Leino was still in the hospital, he was
shown 3 pictures of different men by the investigators. He identified the accused as the gunman from
these pictures. He, however, categorically stated that, before the mug shot identification, he has not
seen any picture of accused or read any report relative to the shooting incident. The burden is on
accused to prove that his mug shot identification was unduly suggestive. Failing proof of impermissible
suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the admission of his out-of-court identification by Leino.

There is no reason to doubt the correctness of the accuseds identification by Leino. The scene of the
crime was well-lighted by a lamp post. The accused was merely 2-3 meters away when he shot Leino.
The incident happened for a full 5 minutes. Leino had no ill-motive to falsely testify against the
accusedt. His testimony at the trial was straightforward. He was unshaken by the brutal cross-
examination of the defense counsels. He never wavered in his identification of the accused. When
asked how sure he was that the accused was responsible for the crime, he confidently replied: Im
very sure. It could not have been somebody else.

The accused cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the investigators to reduce to a sworn
statement the information revealed by Leino during his hospital interviews. It was sufficiently
established that Leinos extensive injuries, especially the injury to his tongue, limited his mobility. The
day he identified appellant in the line-up, he was still physically unable to speak. He was being fed
through a tube inserted in his throat. There is also no rule of evidence which requires the rejection of
the testimony of a witness whose statement has not been priorly reduced to writing.

The SC also rejected the accuseds contention that the NBI suppressed the sketch prepared by the
CIS on the basis of the description given by Leino. There is nothing on the record to show that said
sketch was turned over by the CIS to the NBI which could warrant a presumption that the sketch was
suppressed. The suspicion that the sketch did not resemble the accused is not evidence. It is
unmitigated guesswork.

The SC was also not impressed with the contention that it was incredible for Leino to have remembered
the accuseds face when the incident happened within a span of 5 minutes. Five minutes is not a short
time for Leino to etch in his mind the picture of the accused. Experience shows that precisely because
of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a
crime, can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals. The natural reaction of
victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the
manner the crime was committed. Most often, the face end body movements of the assailant create
an impression which cannot be easily erased from their memory. In this case, there is absolutely no
improper motive for Leino to impute a serious crime to the accused. The victims and the accused were
unknown to each other before their chance encounter. If Leino identified the accused, it must be
because the accused was the real culprit.

The SC also gave credence to the testimony of the other two witnesses. As to the testimony of
Cadenas, his initial reluctance to reveal to the authorities what he witnessed was sufficiently explained
during the trial he feared for his and his familys safety. The Court has taken judicial notice of the
natural reticence of witnesses to get involved in the solution of crimes considering the risk to their lives
and limbs. In light of these all too real risks, the court has not considered the initial reluctance of fear-
gripped witnesses to cooperate with authorities as an authorities as an indicium of credibility. As to the
testimony of Mangubat, the SC found nothing in the records to suspect that Mangubat would perjure
himself.

2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt

According to the the accused, the trial court erred in not holding that the prosecution failed to establish
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. First, he claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his
involvement in previous shooting incidents. Second, the NBI failed to conduct an examination to
compare the bullets fired from the gun at the scene of the crime with the bullets recovered from the
body of Chapman. Third, the prosecution eyewitnesses described the gunmans car as white, but the
trial court found it to be silver metalic gray. Fourth, the accused could not have been the gunman, for
Mangubat said that he overheard the victim Hultman plead to the gunman, thus: Please, dont shoot
me and dont kill me. I promise Mommy, Daddy. The accused also contends that a maid in a house
near the scene of the crime told Makati police Alberto Fernandez that she heard Maureen say: Daddy
dont shoot. Dont. Fifth, the NBI towed accuseds car from Dasmarinas Village to the NBI office which
proved that the same was not in good running condition. Lastly, the result of the paraffin test conducted
on appellant showed he was negative of nitrates.
The accused points to other possible suspects, viz:. ANDERS HULTMAN, since one of the
eyewitnesses was quoted in the newspapers as having overheard Maureen plead to the gunman:
Huwag, Daddy.; and, (b) JOSE MONTAO, another resident of Dasmarias Village, who had a
white Lancer car, also bearing license plate number 566.

The accused, however, cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because the trial judge violated the
rule on res inter alios acta when he considered his involvement in previous shooting incidents. This
rule has long been laid to rest. The harmless error rule is also followed in our jurisdiction. In dealing
with evidence improperly admitted in trial, the court examines its damaging quality and its impact to
the substantive rights of the litigant. If the impact is slight and insignificant, the court disregards the
error as it will not overcome the weight of the properly admitted evidence against the prejudiced party.

In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports about the troublesome character of
appellant is a harmless error. The reference is not the linchpin of the inculpatory evidence appreciated
by the trial judge in convicting the accused. As aforestated, the accused was convicted mainly because
of his identification by 3 eyewitnesses with high credibility.

The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the fatal gun with the bullets found at
the scene of the crime. The omission, however, cannot exculpate the accused. The omitted
comparison cannot nullify the evidentiary value of the positive identification of the accused.

There is also little to the contention of the accused that his Lancer car was not in running condition.
Allegedly, this was vicariously proved when the NBI towed his car from Dasmarias Village where it
was parked to the NBI office. Again, the argument is negated by the records which show that said car
was towed because the NBI could not get its ignition key which was then in the possession of the
accused. Clearly, the car was towed not because it was not in running condition. Even the accuseds
evidence show that said car could run. After its repairs, the accuseds son, Claudio Teehankee III,
drove it from the repair shop in Banawe, Quezon City to Dasmarinas Village, in Makati, where it was
parked.

Nor was the SC impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the eyewitnesses description of the color
of the gunmans car. Leino described the car as light-colored; Florece said the car was somewhat
white (medyo puti); Mangubat declared the car was white; and Cadenas testified it was silver metallic
gray. These alleged discrepancies amount to no more than shades of differences and are not
meaningful, referring as they do to colors white, somewhat white and silver metallic gray. Considering
the speed and shocking nature of the incident which happened before the break of dawn, these slight
discrepancies in the description of the car do not make the prosecution eyewitnesses unworthy of
credence.

The accuseds attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders Hultman, the adoptive father of Maureen
Hultman, deserves scant consideration. The accused cites a newspaper item where Maureen was
allegedly overheard as saying to the gunman: Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy. The evidence on
record, however, demonstrates that Anders Hultman could not have been the gunman. It was clearly
established that Maureen could not have uttered said statement for two (2) reasons: Maureen did not
speak Tagalog, and she addressed Anders Hultman as Papa, not Daddy. Moreover, Leino
outrightly dismissed this suspicion. While still in the hospital and when informed that the Makati police
were looking into this possibility, Leino flatly stated that Anders Hultman was NOT the gunman. Leino
is a reliable witness.

The accused cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was negative of nitrates. Scientific
experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has . . . proved extremely unreliable in use. The only
thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It
cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge
of a firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the
same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers,
pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco
may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the
products of combustion of tobacco. In numerous rulings, we have also recognized several factors
which may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the
assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the
direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. In the case at bar, NBI Forensic
Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified and confirmed that excessive perspiration or washing of hands
with the use of warm water or vinegar may also remove gunpowder nitrates on the skin. She likewise
opined that the conduct of the paraffin test after more than seventy-two (72) hours from the time of the
shooting may not lead to a reliable result for, by such time, the nitrates could have already been
removed by washing or perspiration. In the Report on the paraffin test conducted on appellant,
Forensic Chemist Elizabeth Ayonon noted that when the accused was tested for the presence of
nitrates, more than 72 hours has already lapsed from the time of the alleged shooting.

3. The right to an impartial trial.

The the accused blames the press for his conviction as he contends that the publicity given to his case
impaired his right to an impartial trial. He postulates there was pressure on the trial judge for high-
ranking government officials avidly followed the developments in the case (as no less than then Vice-
President Estrada and then DOJ Secretary Drilon attended some of the hearings and, President
Aquino even visited Hultman while she was still confined at the hospital). He submits that the trial
judge failed to protect him from prejudicial publicity and disruptive influences which attended the
prosecution of the cases.

The SC did not sustain the accuseds claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to
prejudicial publicity. Its true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive
publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of
an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances
an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded
as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field . . . The press
does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by
subjecting in the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that
the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the
publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible
to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational
criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight
to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the
facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who
is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly
protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Our judges are learned in the law and trained
to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere
exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, the accused can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the
barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. The SC had previously
rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled
that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar,
the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence
of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of
the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity
which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. The accused has the burden
to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden. There is no evidence showing that the
trial judge allowed the proceedings to turn into a carnival. Nor did he consent to or condone any
manifestation of unruly or improper behavior or conduct inside the courtroom during the trial of the
case at bar.

Parenthetically, the accused should be the last person to complain against the press for prejudicial
coverage of his trial. The records reveal he presented in court no less than 7 newspaper reporters and
relied heavily on selected portions of their reports for his defense. The defenses documentary
evidence consists mostly of newspaper clippings relative to the investigation of the case at bar and
which appeared to cast doubt on his guilt. The press cannot be fair and unfair to appellant at the same
time.

Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that the trial judge voluntarily inhibited himself from further
hearing the case, but the SC, nothing in the conduct of the proceedings to stir any suspicion of partiality
against the trial judge, directed the trial judge to proceed with the trial to speed up the administration
of justice.

4. The presence of treachery

The accused claims that treachery was not present in the killing of Hultman and Chapman, and the
wounding of Leino for it was not shown that the gunman consciously and deliberately adopted
particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime. The accused asserts that mere
suddenness of attack does not prove treachery.

The 3 Informations charged the accused with having committed the crimes with treachery and evident
premeditation. Evident premeditation was correctly ruled out by the trial court for, admittedly, the
shooting incident was merely a casual encounter or a chance meeting on the street since the victims
were unknown to the accused and vice-versa. It, however, appreciated the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.

On the other hand, the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing of Chapman. Prosecution
witness Leino established the sequence of events leading to the shooting. He testified that for no
apparent reason, the accused suddenly alighted from his car and accosted him and Maureen Hultman
who were then walking along the sidewalk.

Appellant questioned who they were and demanded for an I.D. After Leino handed him his I.D.,
Chapman appeared from behind Leino and asked what was going on. Chapman then stepped down
on the sidewalk and inquired from appellant what was wrong. There and then, the accused pushed
Chapman, pulled a gun from inside his shirt, and shot him. The gun attack was unexpected. Why did
you shoot me? was all Chapman could utter. Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out
swiftly and left him with no chance to defend himself. Even then, there is no evidence on record to
prove that the accused consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the
accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself. The accused acted on the spur of the
moment. Their meeting was by chance. They were strangers to each other. The time between the
initial encounter and the shooting was short and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was thus the
result of a rash and impetuous impulse on the part of the accused rather than a deliberate act of will.
Mere suddenness of the attack on the victim would not, by itself, constitute treachery. Hence, absent
any qualifying circumstance, the accused should only be held liable for Homicide for the shooting and
killing of Chapman.

As to the wounding of Leino and the killing of Hultman, treachery clearly attended the commission of
the crimes. The evidence shows that after shooting Chapman in cold blood, the accused ordered Leino
to sit on the pavement. Maureen became hysterical and wandered to the side of appellants car. When
the accused went after her, Maureen moved around his car and tried to put some distance between
them. After a minute or two, the accused got to Maureen and ordered her to sit beside Leino on the
pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two were gunned down by the accused
. Clearly, the accused purposely placed his two victims in a completely defenseless position before
shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse of time between the killing of Chapman and the
shooting of Leino and Hultman a period which the accused used to prepare for a mode of attack
which ensured the execution of the crime without risk to himself.

Penalties:(Note: Mr. Teehankee was pardoned in 2008)

(1) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the shooting of Roland John Chapman.
He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay
the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: P50,000 as indemnity for the victims death;
and, P1,000,000 as moral damages.

(2) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of
Maureen Navarro Hultman. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, and to
pay the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: P50,000 as indemnity for her death;
P2,350,461.83 as actual damages; P564,042.57 for loss of earning capacity of said deceased;
P1,000,000 as moral damages; and P2,000,000 as exemplary damages.

(3) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for the
shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 8 years of prision
mayor as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the said
offended party the following amounts: P30,000 as indemnity for his injuries; P118,369.84 and
equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; P1,000,000 as moral
damages; and, P2,000,000 as exemplary damages.

(4) In all three cases, to pay each of the 3 offended parties the sum of P1,000,000, or a total of
P3,000,000, for attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and

(5) To pay the costs in all 3 cases.

Olaguer etal. v. Military Commission (Case DIgest)

Olaguer etal. v. Military Commission, G.R. No. L-54558, May 22, 1987
FACTS: Petitioners, as civilians, have been charged the crime of subversion. Consequently, the
Chief-of-Staff of the AFP created a military tribunal, named Military Commission No. 34, to try
criminal case against petitioners. Petitioners were then convicted and have been imposed a
penalty of death penalty. Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition to enjoin the military tribunal
from taking further action on their case for the tribunal should be considered null and void.
Respondents invoked that the creation of Military Commission is constitutional as ruled upon in
a previous case Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2.- as decided upon by the Supreme Court.
However, petitioners contend that such ruling must be overturned because the ruling is now
inapplicable since Martial Law has already been lifted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in Aquino v. Military Commission be abandoned and/or
modified in so far as the case at bar is concerned?

HELD: Yes.

REASONING: First, the Court considered that since the martial law has been lifted during the
case is still pending, military tibunals, which were created for the purpose of martial law, shall be
held void already since the law itself is lifted. Second, the Court relied on the dissenting views of
some justices in Aquino v. MilComm, stating that Civilians like the petitioner placed on
tiral for civil offenses under general law are entited o trial by judicial process, not by executive
or military processxxx..Judicial power exist only in courts.1Moreover, the Court emphasized
thatReverence for precedent, simply as precedent, cannot prevail when constitutionalism and
the public interest demand otherwise. Thus, a doctrine which should be abandoned or modified
should be abandoned or modified accordingly. after all, more important than anything else is
that this Court should be right.
1Justice Tehankee in his separate dissenting opinion.