Republic of the Philippines Petitioner failed to comply with her undertaking; thus private respondent Gumersindo filed a motion
rivate respondent Gumersindo filed a motion for
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 141853 February 7, 2001
TERESITA V. IDOLOR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. GUMERSINDO DE GUZMAN and ILUMINADA DE GUZMAN and
HON. PRUDENCIO A. CASTILLO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch 220, Quezon City, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Teresita Idolor which seeks to set aside the
decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals which reversed the Order 2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City3 granting Idolor's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and the
resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.4
On March 21, 1994, to secure a loan of P520,000.00, petitioner Teresita Idolor executed in favor of
private respondent Gumersindo De Guzman a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage with right of extra-judicial
foreclosure upon failure to redeem the mortgage on or before September 20, 1994. The object of said
mortgage is a 200-square meter property with improvements located at 66 Ilocos Sur Street, Barangay
Ramon Magsaysay, Quezon City covered by TCT No. 25659.
On September 21, 1996, private respondent Iluminada de Guzman, wife of Gumersindo de Guzman,
filed a complaint against petitioner Idolor before the Office of the Barangay Captain of Barangay Ramon
Magsaysay, Quezon City, which resulted in a "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" which agreement is quoted in
full5:
"Kami, ang (mga) may sumbong at (mga) ipinagsusumbong sa usaping binabanggit sa itaas, ay
nagkakasundo sa pamamagitan nito na ayusin ang aming alitan gaya ng sumusunod:
Na ako si Teresita V. Idolor of legal age ay nakahiram ng halagang P520,000.00 noong September 20,
1994.
Na ang nasabing halaga ay may nakasanlang titulo ng lupa (TCT No. 25659) under Registry receipt
3420 dated July 15, 1996.
Na ako si Teresita V. Idolor ay humihingi ng 90 days palugit (grace period) to settle the said amount.
Failure to settle the above account on or before December 21, 1996, I agree to execute a deed of sale
with the agreement to repurchase without interest within one year.
Total amount of P1,233,288.23 inclusive of interest earned.
At nangangako kami na tutupad na tunay at matapat sa mga katakdaan ng pag-aayos na inilahad sa
itaas."
execution before the Office of the Barangay captain who subsequently issued a certification to file
action.
On March 21, 1997, respondent Gumersindo De Guzman filed an extra judicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage pursuant to the parties agreement set forth in the real estate mortgage dated March
21, 1994.
On May 23, 1997, the mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to respondent Gumersindo, as
the highest bidder and consequently, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997.
On June 25, 1998, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220, a complaint
for annulment of Sheriff's Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction against private respondents, Deputy Sheriffs Marino
Cachero and Rodolfo Lescano and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City alleging among others
alleged irregularity and lack of notice in the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings subject of the real
estate mortgage. In the meantime, a temporary restraining order was issued by the trial
court. 1wphi1.nt
On July 28, 1998, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining private respondents, the
Deputy Sheriffs and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City from causing the issuance of a final deed of
sale and consolidation of ownership of the subject property in favor of the De Guzman spouses. The
trial court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the de Guzman spouses.
Spouses de Guzman filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking
annulment of the trial court's order dated July 28, 1998 which granted the issuance of a preliminary
injunction.
On September 28, 1999, the respondent court granted the petition and annulled the assailed writ of
preliminary injunction. Teresita Idolor filed her motion for reconsideration which was denied in a
resolution dated February 4, 2000.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Teresita V. Idolor. The issues raised by
petitioner are: whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling (1) that petitioner has no
more proprietary right to the issuance of the writ of injunction, (2) that the "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" did
not ipso facto result innovation of the real estate mortgage, (3) that the "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" is
merely a promissory note of petitioner to private respondent spouses; and (4) that the questioned writ
of preliminary injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The core issue in this petition is whether or not the respondent Court erred in finding that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in enjoining the private and public respondents from causing the
issuance of a final deed of sale and consolidation of ownership of the subject parcel of land in favor of
private respondents.
Petitioner claims that her proprietary right over the subject parcel of land was not yet lost since her right
to redeem the subject land for a period of one year had neither lapsed nor run as the sheriff's certificate
of sale was null and void; that petitioner and the general public have not been validly notified of the
auction sale conducted by respondent sheriffs; that the newspaper utilized in the publication of the
notice of sale was not a newspaper of general circulation.
We do not agree.
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. 6 Before an
injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be aright
in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be
directed is a violation of such right.7 Hence the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the
granting of an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Failure to
establish either the existence of a clear and positive right which should be judicially protected through
the writ of injunction or that the defendant has committed or has attempted to commit any act which has
endangered or tends to endanger the existence of said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the
injunction.8 The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the
court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before
their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. 9 It is to be resorted to only when
there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any
standard of compensation.10
In the instant case, we agree with the respondent Court that petitioner has no more proprietary right to
speak of over the foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a writ of injunction. It appears that
the mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to private respondent Gumersindo on May 23,
1997 and the sheriff's certificate of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on
June 23, 1997. Petitioner had one year from the registration of the sheriff's sale to redeem the property
but she failed to exercise her right on or before June 23, 1998, thus spouses de Guzman are now
entitled to a conveyance and possession of the foreclosed property. When petitioner filed her complaint
for annulment of sheriff's sale against private respondents with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction on June 25, 1998, she failed to show sufficient interest or title in the property
sought to be protected as her right of redemption had already expired on June 23, 1998, i.e. two (2)
days before the filing of the complaint. It is always a ground for denying injunction that the party seeking
it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the ultimate relief sought - in other words,
that she shows no equity.11 The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is
not aground for an injunction.12
Petitioner's allegation regarding the invalidity of the sheriff's sale dwells on the merits of the case; We
cannot rule on the same considering that the matter should be resolved during the trial on the merits.
Petitioner next contends that the execution of the "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" dated September 21, 1996
between her and spouses de Guzman before the Office of the Lupon Tagapamayapa showed the
express and unequivocal intention of the parties to novate or modify the real estate mortgage; that a
comparison of the real estate mortgage dated March 21, 1994 and the "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" dated
September 21, 1996 revealed the irreconciliable incompatibility between them, i.e., that under the first
agreement, the amount due was five hundred twenty thousand (P520,000) pesos only payable by
petitioner within six (6) months, after which it shall earn interest at the legal rate per annum and non-
payment of which within the stipulated period, private respondents have the right to extra-judicially
foreclose the real estate mortgage while under the second agreement, the amount due was one million
two hundred thirty three thousand two hundred eighty eight and 23/100 (P1,233,288.23) inclusive of
interest, payable within 90 days and in. case of non payment of the same on or before December 21,
1996, petitioner should execute a deed of sale with right to repurchase within one year without interest;
that the second agreement "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" was a valid new contract as it was duly executed
by the parties and it changed the principal conditions of petitioner's original obligations. Petitioner
insists that the "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" was not a mere promissory note contrary to respondent
court's conclusion since it was entered by the parties before the Lupon Tagapamayapa which has the
effect of a final judgment.13
We are not persuaded.
Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the obligation by a
subsequent one which terminates it, either by changing its objects or principal conditions, or by
substituting a new debtor in place of the old one, or by subrogating a third person to the rights of the
creditor.14 Under the law, novation is never presumed. The parties to a contract must expressly agree
that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one. 15 Accordingly, it was held that no
novation of a contract had occurred when the new agreement entered into between the parties was
intended to give life to the old one.16
A review of the "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" which is quoted earlier does not support petitioner's
contention that it novated the real estate mortgage since the will to novate did not appear by express
agreement of the parties nor the old and the new contracts were incompatible in air points. In fact,
petitioner expressly recognized in the Kasunduan the existence and the validity of the old obligation
where she acknowledged her long overdue account since September 20, 1994 which was secured by a
real estate mortgage and asked for a ninety (90) days grace period to settle her obligation on or before
December 21, 1996 and that upon failure to do so, she will execute a deed of sale with a right to
repurchase without interest within one year in favor of private respondents. Where the parties to the
new obligation expressly recognize the continuing existence and validity of the old one, where, in other
words, the parties expressly negated the lapsing of the old obligation, there can be no novation. 17 We
find no cogent reason to disagree with the respondent court's pronouncement as follows:
"In the present case. there exists no such express abrogation of the original undertaking. The
agreement adverted to (Annex 2 of Comment, p.75 Rollo) executed by the parties on September 21,
1996 merely gave life to the March 21, 1994 mortgage contract which was then more than two years
overdue. Respondent acknowledged therein her total indebtedness in the sum of P1,233,288.23
including the interests due on the unpaid mortgage loan which amount she promised to liquidate within
ninety (90) days or until December 21, 1996, failing which she also agreed to execute in favor of the
.mortgagee a deed of sale of the mortgaged property for the same amount w1thout interest. Evidently, it
was executed to facilitate easy compliance by respondent mortgagor with her mortgage obligation. It
(the September 21, 1996 agreement) is not incompatible and can stand together with the mortgage
contract of March 21, 1994.
A compromise agreement clarifying the total sum owned by a buyer with the view that he would find it
easier to comply with his obligations under the Contract to Sell does not novate said Contract to
Sell (Rillo v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 461 [1997]).
Respondent correctly argues that the compromise agreement has the force and effect of a final
judgment. That precisely is the reason why petitioner resorted to the foreclosure of the mortgage on
March 27, 1997, after her failure to comply with her obligation which expired on December 21, 1996.
Reliance by private respondent upon Section 417 of the New Local Government Code of 1991, which
requires the lapse of six (6) months before the amicable settlement may be, enforced, is misplaced.
The instant case deals with extra judicial foreclosure governed by ACT No. 3135 as amended."
Notably, the provision in the "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" regarding the execution of a deed of sale with
right to repurchase within one year would have the same effect as the extra-judicial foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage wherein petitioner was given one year from the registration of the sheriff's sale in
the Registry of property to redeem the property, i.e., failure to exercise the right of redemption would
entitle the purchaser to possession of the property. It is not proper to consider an obligation novated by.
unimportant modifications which do not alter its essence. 18 It bears stress that the period to pay the total
amount of petitioner's indebtedness inclusive of interest amounted to P1,233,288.23 expired on
December 21, 1996 and petitioner failed to execute a deed of sale with right to repurchase on the said
date up to the time private respondents filed their petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage. The failure of petitioner to comply with her undertaking in the "kasunduan" to settle her
obligation effectively delayed private respondents' right to extra-judicially foreclose the real estate
mortgage which right accrued as far back as 1994. Thus, petitioner has not shown that she is entitled to
the equitable relief of injunction. 1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated
September 28, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 134343. January 30, 2001]
MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NENA DE GUZMAN, BEN DE
GUZMAN and CECILIO CRUZ, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for review seeking to set aside the 14 November 1997 Decision [1]of the Court of
Appeals nullifying the 20 June 1996 Order [2] of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 75, San Mateo, Rizal, which
directed the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction against private
respondents requiring them and all persons claiming under them to vacate the three (3) parcels of land
subject matter of the case, to desist from further entering the property, and to allow petitioner to take full
possession and control of the property as registered owner thereof. Petitioner likewise seeks the review
of the 28 April 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying his Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts: On 26 May 1993 petitioner Maximo A. Savellano Jr. filed a complaint [3]for "Recovery of
Possession of Real Property with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writs
of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction" against private respondents Nena de Guzman,
Ben de Guzman, Cecilio Cruz and John Doe. Petitioner claimed that he was the registered owner of
three (3) parcels of land situated in Sitio Labahan, San Mateo, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 459007, 459008 and 459166 portions of which were allegedly occupied by the de Guzmans,
Cruz and other John Does without his knowledge and consent for at least a year prior to the institution
of his complaint.
In their Answer,[4] private respondents denied the allegations stating that they had been in the peaceful
possession of the property since 1976 or for more than seventeen (17) years prior to the institution of
this complaint. In support thereof Nena de Guzman presented real property tax declarations and tax
receipts issued by the Municipal Treasurer of San Mateo in her favor. Private respondents further
claimed that the certificates of title offered in evidence by Maximo Savellano did not cover the premises
being occupied by them.
To resolve this issue, the trial court, upon agreement of the parties, issued an order directing the
surveyor of the Bureau of Lands to conduct a survey of the property, with the manifestation from
counsel of private respondents that they would vacate the property if it be shown that they were
occupying petitioner's property.
In compliance therewith, Engr. Andres L. Valencia, Chief of the Control Section, Surveys Division, Land
Management Bureau, DENR-Region IV, conducted a ground survey of the property covered by TCT
Nos. 459007, 459008, 459166. Thereafter, Engr. Valencia submitted his narrative report with the
following findings: "3.4. that there are three houses within the claim of the plaintiff; 3.5. that lot 11-A
(LRC) Psd-88304 was encrouch (sic) by the concrete fence at its eastern part; and 3.6. that corners 1
and 2 of lot 11-E (LRC) Psd 99304 and corners 5 & 6 of Lot 11-C-1 (LRC) Psd-206834 were not
monumented."[5]
Meanwhile, petitioner Maximo Savellano presented evidence in support of his application for the
issuance of the writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Likewise, private respondents
presented evidence to refute the issuance of the writ. Subsequently, they moved that they be given until
20 May 1996 within which to file their Formal Offer of Evidence, which the trial court granted.
On 23 May 1996 petitioner Maximo Savellano filed an Urgent Motion praying that the right of private
respondents to present documentary evidence be deemed waived. On 7 June 1996 the lower court
granted the motion. Private respondents thereafter moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
After a consideration of the evidence presented, the trial court issued the assailed Order stating in part
that petitioner Savellano had clearly established his right to a preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction. The court heavily relied on Santos v. Court of Appeals[6] which held that the general rule
prohibiting the use of injunction to transfer possession or control of property from one party to the other
does not obtain when (a) the applicant has clearly established his rights over the disputed property, and
(b) the defendant is merely an intruder; or (c) where the action seeks to prevent a purchaser at an
auction sale from molesting the rights of a debtors co-owner whose rights have not been affected by the
sale.
Upon finding that petitioner Maximo Savellano was the registered owner of the property, the trial court
ordered the issuance of a writ of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction against private
respondents.
Forthwith, private respondents moved for reconsideration. They argued against the accuracy and
correctness of Engr. Valencias narrative report inasmuch as: (a) only the monument check was used in
the setting of the monuments and relocation survey in violation of Sec. 363 of the Surveyors' Manual of
the Philippines; (b) Engr. Valencia disregarded the natural boundaries in the survey, such as the
Susugin Creek; (c) the report was not approved by the Executive Director of Region IV of the DENR;
and, (d) despite serious objections, Engr. Valencia used only one of the three (3) relative positions in
plotting the plan submitted to the court.[7]
On 18 October 1996 petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Release and Enforcement of Writ of
Injunction, which was granted on 22 October 1996. In turn, on 17 February 1997, private respondents
filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the immediate resolution of their motion for reconsideration. In due
time, the lower court issued an order denying their motion.
On a petition for review on certiorari filed after initially issuing a restraining order, the Court of Appeals
nullified the Order of the trial court holding that the resolution to vacate granted in the writ of preliminary
injunction was patently erroneous since it preempted the decision that would have been rendered by
the lower court after trial on the merits. The appellate court further held that the conclusion that private
respondents were mere squatters on Maximo Savellanos property should have been threshed out not
in the hearing on the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction but after trial on the
merits.[8]
Failing to obtain a reconsideration, Savellano filed this petition for review on certiorari raising issues
that, in fine, centered on whether compelling reasons existed to justify the trial court's grant of
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction.
We find the petition devoid of merit. The well-settled principle, buttressed by a long line of cases [9] is
that injunctions, as a rule, will not be granted to take property out of the possession or control of one
party and place it into that of another whose title has not been clearly established by law. In Angela
Estate, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[10] we held -
Injunctions, like other equitable remedies, will issue only at the instance of a suitor who has sufficient
interest or title in the right or property sought to be protected x x x x It is always a ground for denying
injunction that the party seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the
ultimate relief sought in other words, that he shows no equity x x x x The complainants right or title,
moreover, must be clear and unquestioned, for equity, as a rule, will not lend its preventive aid by
injunction where the complainants title or right is doubtful or disputed.
The rationale for the rule as enunciated in Devesa v. Arbes[11] is -
To hold otherwise would be to render practically of no effect the ordinary actions, and the enforcement
of judgment in such action. If a complainant could secure relief by injunction in every case where the
defendant is doing or threatens or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act
probably in violation of the plaintiffs rights and could enforce the judgment granting the injunction by the
summary contempt proceedings x x x x he would seldom elect to enforce his rights in such cases by the
ordinary remedies, involving as they do the difficulty and oftentimes fruitless labor of enforcing jugments
obtained therein by execution.
In the case before us, the preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction issued by the trial court
practically granted the main relief prayed for even before the hearing of the case on the merits and
solely on the basis of a narrative report the accuracy and validity of which are seriously questioned by
private respondents. A punctilious perusal of the records leads us to the conclusion that the accuracy
and validity of the report are at best debatable and should be ventilated during the trial on the merits
before a definite determination can be reached. As succinctly put by the appellate court, "the report
cannot be the sole basis of the court to finally rule that the premises occupied by the petitioners are
within the subject property owned by private respondent."[12]
the issuance of a writ of injunction, the issue is not one of ownership but, as correctly noted by the
appellate court, "whether or not the titles of (petitioner) cover the premises being occupied by the
(private respondents)."
Private respondents vigorously maintain that the property being occupied by them lies outside of the
property covered by petitioners certificates of title. While it may have been desirable for them to
produce certificates of title over the property which they occupy, the absence thereof for purposes of the
issuance of the writ does not militate against them. And if the defense interposed by them is
successfully established at the trial, the complaint will have to be dismissed.
The effect of the preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunctions issued by the lower court is to
dispose of the main case without trial. Private respondents will have to be hurled off into the streets,
their houses built on the premises demolished and their plantings destroyed without affording them the
opportunity to prove their right of possession in court. In view of the rights to be affected through the
issuance of injunctions, courts should at best be reminded that "(t)here is no power the exercise of
which is more delicate which requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or which is
more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuing of an injunction."[15]
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the Decision sought to be reviewed, the instant petition
is DENIED, and the 14 November 1997 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44320
(nullifying the 20 June 1996 Order of the RTC-Br. 75, San Mateo, Rizal, granting the writ of Preliminary
Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction against private respondents Nena de Guzman, Ben de Guzman
and Cecilio Cruz) is AFFIRMED.
Forthwith, let the records of this case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

More so, the pronouncement of the lower court in its assailed Order to the effect that private SO ORDERED.
respondents were "mere intruders or squatters" constitutes a prejudgment of the case and a reversal of
the rule on burden of proof, since it would assume the proposition which petitioner still has the burden
of proving. Such conclusion, right or wrong, could only be made after the parties have completed the
presentation of their respective evidence. In short, such a finding was premature.

It should further be noted that the lower court was not being asked to rule with finality on the issue of
whether private respondents were indeed squatting on petitioners property, but only to determine
tentatively if petitioner was indeed entitled to the issuance of an injunction.

Anent the lower courts reliance on Santos v. Court of Appeals,[13] we find it misplaced.True, we made a
pronouncement that, exceptionally and as an equitable concession, an injunctionmay be granted to
take property out of the possession or control of one party and place it into that of another; yet, it must
be pointed out that in that case the government's title to the property had been shown to be clear, well-
defined and certain and that there was an urgent need for its issuance in order to prevent social unrest
in the community for having been deprived of the use and enjoyment of waters found in the reservoir
located in the subject premises.[14] In contrast, petitioner, to our mind, has not clearly established his title
to the property in question nor has he clearly shown that private respondents were indeed "mere
intruders or squatters thereon." As such, the exception enunciated in Santos v. Court of Appeals does
not apply.

In fine, petitioner has not made out a clear case, free from any taint of doubt or dispute, to warrant the
issuance of a prohibitory mandatory injunction. It is true that he possesses certificates of title in his
name covering several parcels of land located in San Mateo, Rizal. But inasmuch as it relates solely to
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 127967 December 14, 2005
FEDERATED REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through the Commanding
General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Visayas Command (AFP-
VISCOM), Respondents.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
Eminent domain is one of the fundamental powers inherent to the State as a sovereign. It is the
authority and right of the State to take private property for public use upon observance of due process
of law and payment of just compensation.1 Any arm of the State that exercises such power must wield
the same with circumspection and utmost regard for procedural requirements.2
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Federated Realty
Corporation (FRC) against the Republic of the Philippines through the Armed Forces of the Philippines-
Visayas Command (AFP-VISCOMM) and several of its men.3
The operative facts, together with a historical background of the property involved, follow. Knowing the
history of the property is essential to understanding the case.
Petitioner FRC is the registered owner of a 543-square meter lot in Apas, Lahug, Cebu City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 119929 of the Registry of Deeds of Cebu City. The lot adjoins a
military reservation, Camp Lapu-Lapu, where the Command Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines-Visayas Command (AFP-VISCOMM) is situated.
The lot in question used to be a portion of Lot No. 933 containing an area of 37,126 square meters and
formed part of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate. In 1932, Lot No. 933 was registered in the names of
Francisco Racaza, Pantaleon Cabrera and Josefina Martinez per TCT No. RT 2533 (T-13) issued on 30
August 1932.
Sometime in 1938, Lot No. 933 was one of 18 lots subjected to expropriation proceedings by the
government before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu in the case entitled Commonwealth of the
Philippines v. Borromeo, et al. (Commonwealth case), docketed as Civil Case No. 781, for the purpose
of establishing a military reservation. 4 Pursuant to the CFI Order dated 19 October 1938, the Republic
deposited P9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank as a precondition for entry to the lots sought to
be expropriated.
On 14 May 1940, the CFI rendered a Decision5 condemning Lot No. 933 along with the 17 other
adjacent lots of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate in favor of the Republic. In 1947, the whole military
reservation was converted into a national airport by virtue of a Presidential Proclamation and, by virtue
thereof, turned over to the National Airports Corporation.
The Decision in the Commonwealth case notwithstanding, the legal ownership of the expropriated
lands was mired in controversy. This Court has had two occasions to rule on the question of ownership
involving two of the lots. Valdehueza v. Republic,6 decided in 1966, concerned Lot Nos. 932 and 939 of
the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, while Lot No. 932 was likewise the subject of Republic v. Lim,7 decided
earlier this year. In both cases, the Court found that by the very admission of the government, there
was no record of payment of compensation by the government to the landowners. Thus, the Court ruled
in both cases that there was no transfer of the lots involved in favor of the government. The decisions,
however, did not touch on the state of ownership of Lot No. 933 which was not involved in the cases.
Beginning in 1940, Lot No. 933 had been subdivided. Part of it was segregated as Lot 933-B under TCT
No. 49999 in the name of Francisco Racaza who sold the same to the Cebu Agro Development
Corporation (Cebu Agro) on 11 March 1974. 8 Cebu Agro had Lot 933-B further subdivided into three
farm lots to expand its rabbit farm. TCT No. 108002 was issued for Lot 933-B-1 by the Register of
Deeds of Cebu City on 05 April 1989 while TCT No. 108001 was issued for Lot 933-B-2. On 08 April
1992, TCT No. 119740 was issued for Lot 3, with an area of 543 square meters, which is a portion of
the consolidation of Lots 933-B-1 and 933-B-2. All three titles were registered in the names of Arturo
Mercader, the President-General Manger of Cebu Agro, and his wife Evangeline Mercader, who
religiously paid the real property taxes for the three lots.9
On 27 April 1992, FRC bought Lot 3 from the Mercader spouses and was issued TCT No. 119929
therefor by the Register of Deeds.10
FRC hired workers to fence the said lot in preparation for the construction of a commercial building
thereon. However, the fence construction was halted on 03 June 1992 when Captain Rogelio Molina
arrived with a jeepload of fully-armed men from the AFP-VISCOMM, and ordered FRCs workers to stop
building the structure per instructions of AFP-VISCOMM Commanding General Romeo Zulueta.
Intimidated, FRCs men stopped working. When they resumed work the following day, Captain Molina
returned with his armed men and again ordered them to stop the construction. A similar incident
occurred on 08 July 1992, with Captain Molina asserting that the lot in question formed part of the
military reservation. All three incidents were recorded in the blotter of Police Station 2, Mabolo, Cebu
City.11
On 22 July 1992, FRC filed a Complaint12 for injunction and damages with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu against Captain Rogelio Molina and six John Does. The complaint was later amended to
implead the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) through the AFP-VISCOMM and its Commanding
General Romeo Zulueta. FRC sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, to order the respondents to cease, desist and refrain from threatening,
intimidating and harassing the workers constructing its fence and to cease, desist and refrain from
committing acts of intrusion into and deprivation of subject land, and to cease, desist and refrain from
harassing, disturbing and interfering with its peaceful and lawful possession and enjoyment thereof.
FRC also prayed that after trial, (i) the injunction be made permanent, (ii) respondents adjudged without
any legal right to or interest whatsoever in the parcel of land in litigation, (iii) respondents ordered to
pay compensatory and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.
On the same day, the trial court issued the TRO13 prayed for with a duration of 20 days, and set the
hearing of the application for preliminary injunction.
In their Answer,14 respondents admitted that Captain Rogelio Molina ordered FRCs workers to desist
from fencing the land in dispute on the ground that said lot is government property. However, they
denied that he and his armed men threatened and/or harassed the said workers.
In an Omnibus Order15 dated 26 August 1992, the trial court granted FRCs application for preliminary
injunction which writ it later made permanent in an Order16 dated 12 October 1995 "until such time that
the issue of ownership between the parties shall have been resolved by a competent court." 17 The trial
court found that the subject property is in the possession of FRC and its predecessor-in-interest and
ruled that FRCs assertion of ownership is supported by a TCT which must be upheld until nullified by a
competent court in a proper proceeding. In all probability, the Republic would prevent the construction
of FRCs fence, if not provisionally prevented by court order, thereby making injunction a proper relief,
the lower court noted.
Aggrieved, the Republic filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) on 24 November 1995 a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 with an urgent prayer for TRO and/or preliminary injunction seeking to set aside
the 12 October 1995 Order of the trial court.18 It justified its immediate recourse to the appellate court
on the basis of urgency and the perceived futility of filing a motion for reconsideration with the lower
court, thereby leaving it with no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
except through the petition.19
As per Resolution20 dated 29 November 1995, the CA gave due course to the petition and temporarily
restrained the implementation of the trial courts questioned order pending full consideration of the
Republics petition.
On 12 September 1996, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision21 granting the Republics petition for
certiorari, setting aside the trial courts 12 October 1995 Order, and making permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction it issued against the implementation of the trial courts decision. It further ordered
the trial court to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-12290.
The appellate court ratiocinated that FRC does not have a clear and unmistakable right over the subject
property on the ground that "the subject lot not only adjoins military structures, but the main entrance
thereof carries the arch of the AFP-VISCOMM identifying beyond peradventure of doubt that one is
entering the premises of the AFP, a government entity." 22 It likewise held that the damage which FRC
may suffer in enjoining it from undertaking any improvements on the subject property "pales in
comparison with what the [Republic] stands to suffer in the event of a permanent injunction against it
the integrity of its military premises." 23 It concluded that not until FRCs title to the land is upheld by final
judgment may a writ of injunction properly issue to prevent the Republic from disallowing FRC to fence
the lot and introduce any improvement thereon.
FRC then filed a motion for reconsideration 24 but the same was denied by the CA in
a Resolution25 dated 31 January 1997. The appellate court found the trial court in grave abuse of
discretion when it disregarded the fact that the subject lot had been expropriated by the government a
long time ago in the Commonwealth case.
Hence, this petition.
The core issue in this case is whether or not injunction lies in favor of FRC to prevent the Republic from
interfering in the exercise of its rights of ownership over the subject property.
In a long line of cases, this Court has held that injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting
substantive rights and interests.26 The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction
rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of
pecuniary compensation and the prevention of multiplicity of suits. 27 Where facts are not shown to bring
the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused.28
Thus, to be entitled to injunctive relief, the following must be shown: (1) the invasion of a right sought to
be protected is material and substantial; (2) the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (3)
there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.29
In reversing the trial court, the CA found FRCs case to be wanting in the second and third requisites.
We disagree.
We first take up the second requisite. Without ruling on the question of ownership over the subject
property, we shall delve into the respective claims of ownership of the parties if only to determine if FRC
had sufficiently established the existence of a right to be protected by a writ of injunction.
Basically, FRC anchors its claim on the indefeasibility of its registered title to the subject lot which
cannot be collaterally attacked by the Republic in an injunction suit. It further alleges, and as found by
the trial court, that along with its predecessors-in-interest it has been in open, peaceful and continuous
possession thereof since time immemorial, tilling the same and paying all the taxes due thereon.
On the other hand, the Republic has not presented any title over the subject lot but instead relies
heavily on the Commonwealth and Valdehueza cases in asserting ownership and possession over the
same, arguing that it was expropriated by the government for military purposes in 1940. It further
alleges that its possession of the subject lot is evidenced by the existence of military structures on the
adjoining lots and that of the Camp Lapu-Lapu arch on the main entrance of the property in question.
Time and again, we have upheld the fundamental principle in land registration that a certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. 30 It becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land. 31 One who
deals with property registered under the Torrens system may rely on the title and need not go beyond
the same.32 Such principle of indefeasibility has long been well-settled in this jurisdiction and it is only
when the acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that the doctrine finds no
application.33
In the instant case, it is undisputed that FRC is a holder of a certificate of title over the lot in question.
Records show that each of FRCs predecessors-in-interest was likewise a holder of an indefeasible title.
Furthermore, no patent irregularity can be gleaned on the face of FRCs title. Yet, the Republic
challenges the validity of the same by maintaining that the subject lot had long been expropriated in
favor of the government. Although it does not present any title over the property, the Republic invokes
the expropriation proceedings which are the Commonwealth and Valdehueza cases. However, the
Republics reliance on the proceedings does not in any way bolster its cause.
First, Valdehueza involves Lot Nos. 932 and 939. It does not in any way deal with the subject property
nor were FRC and its predecessors-in-interest made parties thereto. Hence, the ruling therein cannot
be applied to the instant case.
On the other hand, the property in question was indeed made subject of expropriation proceedings in
the Commonwealth case. However, the CFI in said case made no mention of the award of the land
subject thereof in favor of the government. The CFI merely fixed the valuation of the lots involved for
the purpose of payment of just compensation by the government. Until the government has paid for the
value of the lots, ownership shall remain with the respective landowners. 34 In Republic v. Lim, we
reiterated the rule that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator
only upon full payment of just compensation.35
We note that the Republic claims possession over the subject lot based first on its alleged deposit
of P9,500 pursuant to the CFI Order dated 19 October 1938 in the Commonwealth case, and second,
on the existence of military structures on the adjoining lots of the subject property coupled with the
existence of a portion of the runway of the defunct Lahug airport on Lot No. 933 and the arch of Camp
Lapu-Lapu on the subject lot. However, the records are bereft of evidence on the alleged deposit made
by the Republic with the Philippine National Bank. The Republic merely relies on our ruling
in Valdehueza which the Republic claims to have reinforced the Commonwealth case. However,
although Valdehueza and even Lim do mention a disbursement of the said amount, there was no proof
presented by the Republic in both cases as to the receipt of the said deposit by the authorized
depositary.36 Even then, said cases do not involve Lot No. 933. There is also nothing in
the Commonwealth case stating that the Republic had in fact made the required deposit as
precondition to possession of the subject lot.
There is also no evidence presented as to the existence of the camps arch on subject lot. In any case,
the Republic cannot base its right to the subject lot solely on the alleged presence of a government
structure therein. The law provides for a strict procedure for expropriation which the State must follow
lest it violates the constitutionally enshrined principle that "private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation."37
Assuming that the Republic had indeed paid the deposit or made full payment of just compensation, in
regular order this should have led to the cancellation of title, or at least, the annotation of the lien in
favor of the government on the certificate of title covering the subject lot. The registration with the
Registry of Deeds of the Republics interest arising from the exercise of its power of eminent domain is
in consonance with Section 88 of Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act (now Section 85 of P.D. 1529
also known as the Property Registration Decree),38 to wit:
SEC. 88. Whenever any land of a registered owner, or any right or interest therein, is taken by eminent
domain, the Government or municipality or corporation or other authority exercising such right shall file
for registration in the proper province a description of the registered land so taken, giving the name of
such owner thereof, referring by number and place of registration in the registration book to each
certificate of title, and stating what amount or interest in the land is taken, and for what purpose. A
memorandum of the right or interest taken, shall be made on each certificate of title by the register of
deeds, and where the fee simple is taken a new certificate shall be entered to the owner for the land
remaining to him after such taking, and a new certificate shall be entered to the Government,
municipality, corporation, or other authority exercising such right for the land so taken. All fees on
account of any memorandum of registration or entry of new certificate shall be paid by the authority
taking the land.
Furthermore, Section 251 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the law in force at the time of
the Commonwealth case likewise provides for the recording of the judgment of expropriation in the
Registry of Deeds. Said provision reads, to wit:
SEC. 251. Final Judgment, Its Record and Effect. The record of the final judgment in such action
shall state definitely by metes and bounds and adequate description. the particular land or interest in
land condemned to the public use, and the nature of the public use. A certified copy of the record of
the judgment shall be recorded in the office of the registrar of deeds for the province in which
the estate is situated, and its effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff for the public use stated the
land and estate so described.39(Emphasis supplied)
There is no showing that the Republic complied with the aforestated registration requirement. Without
such compliance, it cannot be said that FRC had notice of the Republics adverse claim sufficient to
consider the former in bad faith, for the law gives the public the right to rely on the face of the Torrens
title and to dispense with the need of further inquiry, except only when one has actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to inquire further into its
integrity.40 Such is the very essence of our Torrens system as ruled in Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590,
thus:
The real purpose of the system is to quiet title of land; to put a stop forever to any question of the
legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which
may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is
registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the courts, or
sitting in the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land. x x x The certificate, in the
absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once
registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, except in some direct
proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost.41
In any event, if FRC or any of its predecessors-in-interest had fraudulently acquired title to the subject
lot, this issue should be properly ventilated in a direct proceeding for that purpose, and not in an
injunction suit. By law, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. 42 In Leyson v.
Bontuyan,43 we ruled, to wit:
While Section 47 of Act No. 496 provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack,
the rule is that an action is an attack on a title if its object is to nullify the same, and thus challenge the
proceeding pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is considered direct when the object of
an action is to annul set aside such proceeding, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, an attack
is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the proceeding is
nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
Therefore, FRCs claim as a titleholder is given preference by law to any other claim of right over said
land. Until such title is nullified, the Republic can raise no more than a doubtful claim over the property
in question, which dubious claim militates against the issuance in its favor of a writ of injunction. So, the
appellate court erred in stating the rule in reverse and in granting injunctive relief to the Republic when
its claim of ownership as against FRCs is unclear. It must be stressed that injunction is not proper
when its purpose is to take the property out of the possession or control of one party and transfer the
same to the hands of another who did not have such control at the inception of the case and whose
legal title has not clearly been established,44 for the reason that before the question of ownership is
determined, justice and equity demand that the parties be maintained in status quo so that no
advantage may be given to one party to the detriment of the other.45
All told, reversing the appellate court we rule that the second requisite for injunctive relief, that FRC
holds a clear and unmistakable right over the subject lot, has been sufficiently established.
Anent the third requisite, the appellate court ruled that in the event of a permanent injunction the
Republic stands to suffer greater injury compared to FRC, as a private commercial building within a
camp will pose serious danger and damage to military operations. Again, we disagree.
In seeking the affirmation of the writ of injunction issued by the CA to enjoin the implementation of the
permanent injunction ordered by the trial court against it, the Republic invokes national security and the
integrity of its military operations. It argues that civilians cannot be allowed to lurk within military
premises.

However, we cannot overemphasize that until FRCs title is annulled in a proper proceeding, the
Republic has no enforceable right over the subject property. Neither military operational integrity nor
national defense vests title to property in favor of the government. Hence, the CA was in error in
enjoining enforcement of the lower courts order, as injunction does not protect rights not in esse.46 The
possibility of irreparable damage, without proof of violation of an actually existing right, is not a ground
for injunction.47

Furthermore, the only so-called military structure allegedly found on Lot No. 933 is the arch of Camp
Lapu-Lapu. It is not even clear where exactly on Lot No. 933 this arch stands. Neither was it shown
when the same was constructed. Note that the lot in question is not the entire Lot No. 933, but only a
portion thereof. We cannot imagine

how fencing a 543-square meter lot can lead to grave and irreparable damage to the Republic. Our
ruling in the Lim case is instructive, to wit:

The Republics assertion that the defense of the State will be in grave danger if we shall order the
reversion of Lot 932 to respondent is an overstatement. First, Lot 932 had ceased to operate as an
airport. What remains in the site is just the National Historical Institutes marking stating that Lot 932 is
the "former location of Lahug Airport." And second, there are only thirteen (13) structures located on Lot
932, eight (8) of which are residence apartments of military personnel. Only two (2) buildings are
actually used as training centers. Thus, practically speaking, the reversion of Lot 932 to respondent will
only affect a handful of military personnel. It will not result to "irreparable damage" or "damage beyond
pecuniary estimation," as what the Republic vehemently claims.48

Lot No. 932 adjoins the subject lot. Although, there existed on Lot No. 932 training centers and housing
for military personnel, we ruled that the reversion of Lot No. 932 to respondent therein, a private party,
will not cause irreparable injury to the Republic that gives rise to a ground for injunctive relief. What
more in this case when the only structures alleged to exist on subject lot are a portion of an unused
runway and an arch? Thus, the Republics contention that it will suffer serious damage if injunction is
ordered against it is more imagined than real.

Meanwhile, the exercise by FRC of its rights of ownership over the subject lot is being unduly
restrained. At this point, its possession and ownership of the subject property must be respected.

Since the Republic has failed to prove its indubitable right over the lot in question we have to rule that
FRC possesses a clear and unmistakable right over the subject lot that necessitates the issuance of a
writ of injunction to prevent serious damage to its interests as titleholder thereto. Meanwhile, FRC may
institute a separate proceeding to quiet its title wherein the issue of ownership over the subject property
may finally be resolved.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 12
September 1996 of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the Order dated 12 October 1995 of the
Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164459 April 24, 2007
LIMITLESS POTENTIALS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CRISOSTOMO YALUNG, and ATTY. ROY MANUEL
VILLASOR, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking to annul and set aside: (1) The Decision, 1 dated 16 September 2003, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73463 entitled, Limitless Potentials, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel D. Victorio, in his
capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 141, Crisostomo
Yalung, and Atty. Roy Manuel Villasor, which dismissed herein petitioners Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of merit, and (2) The Resolution, 2 dated 8
July 2004, of the appellate court in the same case which denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
because the issues and arguments raised therein had already been passed upon and judiciously
resolved in the Decision dated 16 September 2003.
The controversy of this case stemmed from the following facts:
On 12 October 1995, Digital Networks Communications and Computers, Inc. (Digital) and herein
petitioner Limitless Potentials, Inc. (LPI), a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws, entered into a Billboard Advertisement Contract whereby petitioner was to construct
one billboard advertisement for Digitals product for a period of one year, with an agreed rental
of P60,000.00 per month plus Value Added Tax (VAT). It was agreed, among other things, that Digital
will make a three-month deposit in the following manner, to wit: (a) P60,000.00 plus VAT upon the
signing of the contract, and (b) P120,000.00 plus VAT upon completion of the billboard. Digital complied
with the aforesaid agreement.
The billboard, however, was destroyed by unknown persons. In view thereof, the contract between
Digital and the petitioner was considered terminated. Digital demanded for the return of their rental
deposit for two months, but the petitioner refused to do so claiming that the loss of the billboard was
due to force majeure and that any cause of action should be directed against the responsible persons.
Thus, on 18 April 1997, Digital commenced a suit against herein petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, presided over by then Judge Estela Perlas-Bernabe (Judge
Perlas-Bernabe)3 , for the return of Digitals deposit, which was equivalent to two months rental
inclusive of VAT and attorneys fees. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 55170.
On 18 June 1997, consistent with its defense against Digitals Complaint, petitioner filed a ThirdParty
Complaint4against Macgraphics Carranz International Corporation (Macgraphics) and herein private
respondents Bishop Crisostomo Yalung (Bishop Yalung) and Atty. Roy Manuel Villasor (Atty. Villasor)
alleging that it had entered into a contract of lease with Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM),
as represented by the private respondents, over a space inside San Carlos Manor Seminary in
Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City, where petitioner erected the subject billboard. Petitioner further averred
that despite its full compliance with the terms and conditions of the lease contract, herein private
respondents, together with their cohorts, maliciously dismantled and destroyed the subject billboard
and prevented its men from reconstructing it. Thereafter, petitioner learned that Macgraphics had
"cajoled and induced" RCAM, through the private respondents, to destroy the subject billboard to
enable Macgraphics to erect its own billboard and advertising signs. Thus, by way of affirmative
defenses, petitioner claimed that: (a) the destruction of the subject billboard was not of its own making
and beyond its control, and (b) Digitals cause of action, if any, should be directed against the private
respondents and Macgraphics. Hence, petitioner prayed that judgment be rendered in its favor and to
hold private respondents liable for the following: (a) moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00; (b)
exemplary, temperate and nominal damages amounting to P300,000.00; (c) P300,000.00 as attorneys
fees; (d) P50,000.00 as litigation expenses; and (e) costs of suit, allegedly suffered or incurred by it
because of the willful destruction of the billboard by the private respondents.
In response, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the aforesaid Third-Party Complaint based
on the following grounds: (1) litis pendentia; (2) lack of cause of action; (3) forum shopping; and (4) lack
of privity of contract. The MeTC, in an Order dated 25 August 1997, 5 denied the said Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner filed an Amended Third-Party Complaint. Again, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss
Amended Third-Party Complaint. However, the MeTC also denied the Motion to Dismiss Amended
Third-Party Complaint in an Order dated 10 October 1997.6
On 9 December 1997, private respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, assailing the Orders dated 25 August 1997 and 10 October 1997 of the MeTC of Makati City
denying their Motion to Dismiss Third-Party Complaint and Motion to Dismiss Amended Third-Party
Complaint, respectively, in Civil Case No. 55170.
The RTC issued an Order on 6 February 1998, 7 granting private respondents prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction, conditioned upon the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of P10,000.00.
Thus, the MeTC was enjoined from hearing the Third-Party Complaint in Civil Case No. 55170. The
pertinent portion of the aforesaid Order reads, as follows:
When the application for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction was heard this
afternoon, [herein petitioner] who did not file comment on the petition appeared thru counsel Emmanuel
Magnaye. It was brought out to the attention of this Court that respondent judge is poised on pursuing
the hearing of the case before her despite the pendency of this petition. It appeared that the case was
set by respondent judge for hearing ex-parte for the reception of [herein petitioners] evidence on 23
February 1998. It also appeared that [herein private respondents] were declared in default despite the
fact that they have filed their answer and the motion to lift such order of default and for admission of the
answer was denied by respondent judge.
Upon consideration of the allegations in the petition and the oral manifestations and admissions of both
parties, this Court hereby resolves to issue the writ of preliminary injunction in order to preserve the
status quo as well as not to render the issue herein raised moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the motion for preliminary injunction is granted. Accordingly, upon the filing by [herein
private respondents] of a bond in the amount of P10,000.00, let a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued, enjoining respondent judge, or her successor, from hearing the [T]hird [P]arty [C]omplaint
against [herein private respondents] in Civil Case No. 55170 until further orders from this Court. 8
Subsequently, however, the RTC rendered a Decision 9 on 28 April 2000, dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari filed by private respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. The preliminary injunction issued by
this Court on 6 February 200010 (sic) is hereby dissolved.
Costs against [herein private respondents].11
Disgruntled, private respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the
RTC in its Order12 dated 26 June 2000.
Petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment Against the Bond, and in compliance with the directive of the
RTC, the petitioner filed a pleading 13 specifying its claims, thus: (a) attorneys fees in the sum of P74,
375.00; and (b) moral damages for the tarnished good will in the sum of P1,000,000.00.
The RTC, in its Order dated 3 April 2002, 14 denied petitioners Motion for Judgment Against the Bond
declaring that the preliminary injunction was not wrongfully obtained; therefore, the claim for damages
on the bond is untenable.
Aggrieved, the petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Order, which was also denied
by the RTC in its Order dated 6 August 2002.15
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure before the Court of Appeals assailing the Orders of the RTC dated 3 April 2002 and 6 August
2002 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of
jurisdiction.
On 6 November 2002, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution 16 dismissing the Petition for failure to
show proof that a certain Quirino B. Baterna has been duly authorized by the petitioner to file the
Petition for and in its behalf. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, which
was granted by the appellate court in its Resolution dated 24 January 2003 17 thereby reinstating the
Petition for Certiorari filed by the petitioner.
On 16 September 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dismissing the Petition filed by the
petitioner for utter lack of merit. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration based on the following
grounds:
I. The dismissal of the petition and dissolution of the injunction amount to a determination that the
injunction was wrongfully or improvidently obtained.
II. The petitioner suffered damages by reason of the issuance of the injunction.
III. The damages claimed by the petitioner are covered by the injunction bond.
The Court of Appeals through a Resolution dated 8 July 2004, denied the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioner pointed out two basic legal issues wherein the appellate court committed serious and
reversible errors, to wit:
I. Is malice or bad faith a condition sine qua non for liability to attach on the injunction bond?
II. Are attorneys fees, litigation costs, and cost of delay by reason of the injunction covered by the
injunction bond?
Petitioner argues that malice or lack of good faith is not an element of recovery on the bond. The
dissolution of the injunction, even if the injunction was obtained in good faith, amounts to a
determination that the injunction was wrongfully obtained and a right of action on the injunction
immediately accrues to the defendant. The petitioner maintains that the attorneys fees, litigation costs,
and cost of delay by reason of the injunction are proper and valid items of damages which can be
claimed against the injunction bond. Hence, having proven through testimonial and documentary
evidence that it suffered damages because of the issuance of the writ of injunction, and since malice or
lack of good faith is not an element of recovery on the injunction bond, petitioner asserts that it can
properly collect such damages on the said bond.
Private respondent Bishop Yalung on the other hand, prays for the outright dismissal of the present
Petition due to the alleged failure of the petitioner to comply with the mandatory rule on proper
certification on non-forum shopping under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. According to him, it is not sufficient for Mr. Baterna to make the undertaking that "I have not
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in the Supreme Court, etc."
inasmuch as such undertaking should have been made by the principal party, namely, the petitioner. He
underscores that the verification/disclaimer of forum shopping executed by Mr. Baterna on behalf of the
petitioner is legally defective for failure to enumerate with particularity the multiple civil and criminal
actions, which were filed by him and the petitioner against the private respondents.
Private respondent Bishop Yalung also avers that the petitioner is not entitled to collect damages on the
injunction bond filed before the court a quo. Primarily, as the appellate court mentioned in its Decision,
the preliminary injunction was directed not against the petitioner but against the MeTC. The petitioner
was not restrained from doing any act. What was restrained was the hearing of the Third-Party
Complaint while the Petition for Certiorari was pending, "in order to preserve the status quo and not to
render the issue therein moot and academic." 18 Also, the fact that the decision is favorable to the party
against whom the injunction was issued does not automatically entitle the latter to recover damages on
the bond. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim that it suffered damages because of the issuance of the
writ of injunction.
Private respondent Atty. Villasor shares the same argument as that of his co-respondent Bishop Yalung
that it was the MeTC which was enjoined and not herein petitioner. Private respondent Atty. Villasor
further alleged that in the Special Civil Action for Certiorari, the action is principally against any tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions who has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, private respondents Petition for Certiorari before
the RTC principally pertains to the MeTC and not to herein petitioner. Additionally, private respondent
Atty. Villasor argues that it was petitioner who was benefited by such writ of preliminary injunction,
because the injunction left Digital unable to prosecute Civil Case No. 55170 against herein petitioner.
Lastly, private respondent Atty. Villasor claims that petitioner did not oppose their application for a writ of
preliminary injunction at the hearing wherein petitioner was duly represented by counsel.
Simply stated, the threshold issues are:
I. Can petitioner recover damages from the injunction bond?
II. Was petitioner able to substantiate the damages?
Quite apart from the above, there appears to be another question concerning the alleged violation by
the petitioner of the mandatory rule on proper certification on non-forum shopping.
In the case at bar, petitioner repeatedly argues that malice or lack of good faith is not an element of
recovery on the injunction bond. In answering this issue raised by petitioner, this Court must initially
establish the nature of the preliminary injunction, the purpose of the injunction bond, as well as the
manner of recovering damages on the said bond.
A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and
protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action. 19 It is an order granted at any
stage of an action, prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party, court, agency or person to
perform or to refrain from performing a particular act or acts. A preliminary injunction, as the term itself
suggests, is merely temporary, subject to the final disposition of the principal action. 20 It is issued to
preserve the status quo ante, which is the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that preceded
the actual controversy,21 in order to protect the rights of the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit.
Otherwise, if no preliminary injunction is issued, the defendant may, before final judgment, do the act
which the plaintiff is seeking the court to restrain. This will make ineffectual the final judgment that the
court may afterwards render in granting relief to the plaintiff. 22 The status quo should be existing ante
litem motam, or at the time of the filing of the case. For this reason, a preliminary injunction should not
establish new relations between the parties, but merely maintain or re-establish the pre-existing
relationship between them.23
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to
some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Thus, to be entitled
to an injunctive writ, the petitioner has the burden to establish the following requisites:
(1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;
(2) a violation of that right;
(3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.24
A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when, among other things,
the applicant, not explicitly exempted, files with the court, where the action or proceeding is pending, a
bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that
the applicant will pay such party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the
injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not
entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be
issued.25 Thus, the posting of a bond is a condition sine qua non for a writ of preliminary injunction to be
issued.
The injunction bond is intended as a security for damages in case it is finally decided that the injunction
ought not to have been granted. Its principal purpose is to protect the enjoined party against loss or
damage by reason of the injunction,26 and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly.
The damages sustained as a result of a wrongfully obtained injunction may be recovered upon the
injunction bond which is required to be deposited with court. 27 Rule 57, Section 20, of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, which is similarly applicable to preliminary injunction, 28 has outlined the
procedure for the filing of a claim for damages against an injunction bond. The aforesaid provision of
law pertinently provides:
SEC. 20. Claim for damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive attachment. - An application
for damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive attachment must be filed before the trial or
before appeal is perfected or before the judgment becomes executory, with due notice to the attaching
party and his surety or sureties, setting forth the facts showing his right to damages and the amount
thereof. Such damages may be awarded only after proper hearing and shall be included in the
judgment on the main case.
If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party against whom the attachment was
issued, he must claim damages sustained during the pendency of the appeal by filing an application in
the appellate court, with notice to the party in whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety or
sureties, before the judgment of the appellate court becomes executory. The appellate court may allow
the application to be heard and decided by the trial court.
Nothing herein contained shall prevent the party against whom the attachment was issued from
recovering in the same action the damages awarded to him from any property of the attaching party not
exempt from execution should the bond or deposit given by the latter be insufficient or fail to fully satisfy
the award.29
Now, it can be clearly gleaned that there is nothing from the aforequoted provision of law which requires
an enjoined party, who suffered damages by reason of the issuance of a writ of injunction, to prove
malice or lack of good faith in the issuance thereof before he can recover damages against the
injunction bond. This Court was very succinct in the case of Aquino v. Socorro, 30 citing the case of Pacis
v. Commission on Elections,31 thus:
Malice or lack of good faith is not an element of recovery on the bond. This must be so, because to
require malice as a prerequisite would make the filing of a bond a useless formality. The dissolution of
the injunction, even if the injunction was obtained in good faith, amounts to a determination that the
injunction was wrongfully obtained and a right of action on the injunction bond immediately accrues.
Thus, for the purpose of recovery upon the injunction bond, the dissolution of the injunction because of
petitioners main cause of action provides the actionable wrong for the purpose of recovery upon the
bond.
We, therefore, agree with the petitioner that indeed, malice or lack of good faith is not a condition sine
qua non for liability to attach on the injunction bond.
With respect to the issue raised by the petitioner regarding the coverage of the injunction bond, this
Court finds it necessary to quote once again the provision of Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit:
Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action or proceeding is
pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the
effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of
the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not
entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued.
The aforesaid provision of law clearly provides that the injunction bond is answerable for all damages.
The bond insures with all practicable certainty that the defendant may sustain no ultimate loss in the
event that the injunction could finally be dissolved. 32 Consequently, the bond may obligate the
bondsmen to account to the defendant in the injunction suit for all damages, or costs and reasonable
counsels fees, incurred or sustained by the latter in case it is determined that the injunction was
wrongfully issued.33 Likewise, the posting of a bond in connection with a preliminary injunction does not
operate to relieve the party obtaining an injunction from any and all responsibility for damages that the
writ may thereby cause. It merely gives additional protection to the party against whom the injunction is
directed. It gives the latter a right of recourse against either the applicant or his surety or against both. 34
The contention of the petitioner, thus, is tenable. Attorneys fees, litigation costs, and costs of delay can
be recovered from the injunction bond as long as it can be shown that said expenses were sustained by
the party seeking recovery by reason of the writ of preliminary injunction, which was later on determined
as not to have been validly issued and that the party who applied for the said writ was not entitled
thereto. The case of Aquino v. Socorro, 35 citing the case of Pacis v. Commission on Elections, 36 holds
that the dissolution of the injunction, even if the injunction was obtained in good faith, amounts to a
determination that the injunction was wrongfully obtained and a right of action on the injunction bond
immediately accrues. It is also erroneous for the appellate court to rule that petitioner is not entitled to
claim damages from the injunction bond simply because the preliminary injunction was directed against
the MeTC and not against the petitioner. The MeTC does not stand to suffer damages from the
injunction because it has no interest or stake in the Petition pending before it. Damage or loss is
suffered by the party whose right to pursue its case is suspended or delayed, which in this case, is the
petitioner. Upon issuance of the writ of injunction, it is the petitioner who will stand to suffer damages for
the delay in the principal case because, had it not been for the injunction, the petitioner would not have
incurred additional expenses for attending the separate hearings on the injunction, and the RTC can
already decide the main case and make a prompt determination of the respective rights of the parties
therein. Hence, even if the preliminary injunction was directed against the MeTC and not against the
petitioner, it is the latter which has the right to recover from the injunction bond the damages which it
might have suffered by reason of the said injunction.
As to the second main issue in the present case, although we do recognize that the petitioner had a
right to recover damages from the injunction bond, however, we agree in the findings of the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the findings of the RTC, that the petitioner did not sustain any damage by
reason of the issuance of the writ of injunction. In the petitioners Motion for Judgment Against the
Bond,37 petitioner stated therein, thus:
5. There can be no serious debate that the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary injunction, all at the
instance of [herein private respondents], resulted in actual and pecuniary damages on the part of
[herein petitioner] in the amount more than the value of the bond posted by [private respondents]. The
attorneys fees for expenses in litigation alone expended by [petitioner] to defend itself in this
proceedings, not to mention other pecuniary damages, amounts to P10,000.00.38
In the case at bar, petitioner is claiming attorneys fees in the sum of P74,375.00 it allegedly paid to
defend itself in the main case for certiorari, which it would not have spent had the private respondents
not filed their nuisance Petition and secured a writ of preliminary injunction. Likewise, by reason of the
unfounded suit, the good will of the petitioner was brought to bad light, hence, damaged. 39 It is
noteworthy to mention that the undertaking of the injunction bond is that it shall answer for all damages
which the party to be restrained may sustain by reason of the injunction if the court should finally decide
that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto. Apparently, as the appellate court pointed out in its Decision
dated 16 September 2003, the damages being claimed by the petitioner were not by reason of the
injunction but the litigation expenses it incurred in defending itself in the main case for certiorari, which
is definitely not within the coverage of the injunction bond. Thus, this Court is not convinced that the
attorneys fees in the amount of P74,375.00 as well as the moral damages for the tarnished good will in
the sum of P1,000,000.00 were suffered by the petitioner because of the issuance of the writ of
injunction.
Furthermore, this Court will not delve into the sufficiency of evidence as to the existence and amount of
damages suffered by petitioner for it is already a question of fact. It is settled that the factual findings of
the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme
Court.40 Although this rule is subject to exceptions, 41 the present case does not fall into any of those
exceptions which would have allowed this Court to make its own determination of facts. This Court
upholds the factual findings of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that there is insufficient evidence
to establish that petitioner actually suffered damages because of the preliminary injunction issued by
the RTC.
Now, on the matter of proper certification on non-forum shopping.
The requirement of a Certification on Non-Forum Shopping is contained in Rule 7, Section 5, of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that:
The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice,
unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or
non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court without
prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative
sanctions.
Private respondent Bishop Yalung might have overlooked the Secretarys Certificate 42 attached to the
petitioners Petition for Review, which authorized Mr. Baterna, President of herein petitioner LPI, to
represent the latter in this case. According to the Secretarys Certificate, the Board of Directors of
petitioner LPI, at a special meeting held on 12 August 2004 at its office at No. 812 J.P. Rizal St., Makati
City, during which there was a quorum, the following resolutions were approved, to wit:

RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that the corporation reiterates the authority of its
President, Mr. Quirino B. Baterna, to represent the corporation in all cases by and/or against the
corporation vis--vis the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila/Crisostomo Yalung, Roy Villasor/Digital
Netwrok (sic) Communications and Computers, Inc., and/or MacGraphics Carranz International
Corporation, to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No.
164459 to assert/protect LPIs rights and interests in connection with C.A.-G.R. No. 73463, entitled
"Limitless Potentials, Inc., vs. Hon. Manuel Victorio, et al.," Honorable Court of Appeals, Manila.

RESOLVED FURTHERMORE, that any and all acts of our President, concerning the above-referenced
subject matter are hereby affirmed, confirmed and ratified by the corporation for all legal intents and
purposes.43

Private respondent Bishop Yalung further argued that Mr. Baterna failed to enumerate in the
Certification against Forum Shopping the multiple cases filed by him and the petitioner against private
respondents. This is also erroneous.

Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. 44 It exists
where the elements of litis pendentia 45 are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to
res judicata in another.46 It may be resorted to by a party against whom an adverse judgment or order
has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by an
appeal or a special civil action for certiorari.47

As the RTC correctly found, there was no violation of the rule against forum shopping. The cause of
action in petitioners case for consignation and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 95-1559, 48 is
different from the cause of action in its Third-Party Complaint in Civil Case No. 55170. The damages
sought in the first case were those suffered by petitioner by reason of the alleged breach of the contract
of lease by the RCAM; whereas the damages sought in the Third-Party Complaint were those allegedly
suffered by petitioner owing to the destruction of its billboard by the private respondents, thereby
terminating the Billboard Advertisement Contract between petitioner and Digital. Digital also sued
petitioner for recovery of the rental deposits it had already paid under the same contract. Consequently,
petitioner had to engage the services of counsel and incurred litigation expenses in order to defend
itself in the case filed against it by Digital. Thus, the two actions are completely different and distinct
from each other so much so that a decision in either case could not be pleaded as res judicata in the
other. Hence, there is no forum shopping that would necessitate the outright dismissal of this case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 16 September 2003 and 8 July 2004, respectively, affirming
the Decision of the RTC dated 28 April 2000, denying herein petitioners motion to recover damages
against the injunction bond, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-77691 August 8,1988
PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO HERRERA, respondents.
Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner.
Abalos, Gatdula & Bermejo for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The case dramatizes the unpleasant spectacle of a lawyer tangling with his own client, more often than
not, in the matter of fees. The lawyer, the petitioner himself, would have his petition decided on pure
questions of procedure, yet, the Court cannot let pass unnoticed the murkier face of the controversy,
wherein the law is corrupted to promote a lawyer's selfseeking ends, and the law profession, debased
into a simple business dealing. Accordingly, we resolve it on the basis not only of the questions raised
by the petitioner pertaining to procedure, but considering its serious ethical implications, on its merits as
well.
We turn to the facts.
The private respondent was the registered owner of eight (six, according to the petitioner) parcels of
land located in Quezon City. 1 Between 1977 and 1978, 2 he obtained various loans from the L & R
Corporation, a financing institution, in various sums totalling P420,000.00 As security therefor, he
executed deeds of mortgage in favor of the corporation over the parcels aforesaid. On August 28,1979,
and upon the maturing of said loans, the firm caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage following
his failure to pay, as a consequence of which, the said eight (six, according to the petitioner) parcels of
land were disposed of at public auction, and in which L & R Corporation was itself the highest bidder.
Pending redemption, the private respondent filed a complaint for injunction against L & R Corporation,
to enjoin consolidation of title in its name, in which he succeeded in obtaining preliminary injunctive
relief. He was represented by the petitioner. Two years later, and with no imminent end to the litigation
in sight, the parties entered into a compromise agreement whereby L & R Corporation accorded the
private respondent another year to redeem the foreclosed properties subject to payment of
P600,000.00, with interest thereon at one per cent per month. They likewise stipulated that the
petitioner shall be entitled to attorney's fees of P100,000.00. On November 19, 1982, the
court 3 approved the compromise.
The private respondent, however, remained in dire financial straits a fact the petitioner himself
concede 4 for which reason he failed to acquire the finding to repay the loans in question, let alone
the sum of P100,000.00 in attorney's fees demanded by the petitioner. That notwithstanding, the
petitioner moved for execution insofar as his fees were concemed. The court granted execution,
although it does not appear that the sum was actually collected. 5
Sometime thereafter, the petitioner and the private respondent met to discuss relief for the latter with
respect to his liability to L & R Corporation on the one hand, and his obligation to the petitioner on the
other. The petitioner contends that the private respondent "earnestly implored" 6 him to redeem the said
properties; the private respondent maintains that it was the petitioner himself who 'offered to advance
the money," 7 provided that he, the private respondent, executed a "transfer of mortgage" 8 over the
properties in his favor. Who implored whom is a bone of contention, but as we shall see shortly, we are
inclined to agree with the private respondent's version, considering primarily the petitioner's moral
ascendancy over his client and the private respondent's increasing desperation.
The records further show that the parties, pursuant to their agreement, executed a "Deed of Sale and
Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a document that enabled the petitioner, first, to
redeem the parcels in question, and secondly, to register the same in his name. The private respondent
alleges that he subsequently filed loan applications with the Family Savings Bank to finance a wet
market project upon the subject premises to find, according to him, and to his dismay, the properties
already registered in the name of the petitioner. He likewise contends that the "Deed of Sale and
Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem" on file with the Register of Deeds (for Quezon
City) had been falsified as follows:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Pl00,000.00) I, FRANCISCO HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign and
convey unto TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, any and all my rights of the real properties and/or
to redeem from the Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties foreclosed and sold at
public auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City and subject matter of the above Compromise Agreement in
Civil Case No. Q30679 ... 9
whereas it originally reads:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), I, FRANCISCO HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign
and convey unto TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, any and all my rights of equity of redemption
and/or to redeem from the Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties foreclosed and sold
at public auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City and subject matter of the above Compromise Agreement
in Civil Case No. Q30679. . . 10
As a consequence, the private respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim upon the
respective certificates of title embracing the properties. Upon learning of the same, the petitioner moved
for the cancellation of the adverse claim and for the issuance of a writ of possession. The court granted
both motions. The private respondent countered with a motion for a temporary restraining order and
later, a motion to recall the writ of possession. He likewise alleges that he commenced disbarment
proceedings before this Court against the petitioner 11 as well as various criminal complaints for estafa,
falsification, and "betrayal of trust" 12 with the Department of Justice. On December 1, 1983, finally, he
instituted an action for reconveyance and reformation of document, 13 praying that the certificates of title
issued in the name of the petitioner be cancelled and that "the Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of
Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem dated May 3, 1983 ... be reformed to reflect the true
agreement of Francisco Herrera and Paterno R. Canlas, of a mortgage." 14 He vehemently maintains
that the petitioner's "agreement with [him] was that the latter would lend the money to the former for a
year, so that [petitioner] would have time to look for a loan for the wet market which [the petitioner]
intended to put up on said property." 15 Predictably, the petitioner moved for dismissal.
The trial court, however, denied the private respondent's petition. It held that the alteration complained
of did not change the meaning of the contract since it was "well within [the petitioner's] rights" 16 "to
protect and insure his interest of P654,000.00 which is the redemption price he has paid;" 17 secondly,
that the petitioner himself had acquired an interest in the properties subject of reconveyance based on
the compromise agreement approved by Judge Castro in the injunction case, pursuant to Section
29(b), of Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, that had, consequently, made him a judgment creditor in his
own right; thirdly, that the private respondent had lost all rights over the same arising from his failure to
redeem them from L & R Corporation within the extended period; and finally, that the petitioner cannot
be said to have violated the ban against sales of properties in custodia legis to lawyers by their
clients pendente lite, since the sale in question took place after judgment in the injunction case
abovesaid had attained finality. The complaint was consequently dismissed, a dismissal that eventually
attained a character of finality.
Undaunted, the private respondent, on December 6, 1985, filed a suit for "Annulment Of Judgment 18 in
the respondent Court of Appeals, 19 praying that the orders of Judge Castro: (1). granting execution
over the portion of the compromise agreement obliging the private respondent to pay the petitioner
P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; (2) denying the private respondent's prayer for a restraining order
directed against the execution: and (3) denying the motion to recall writ of possession, all be set aside.
The petitioner filed a comment on the petition, but followed it up with a motion to dismiss. On December
8, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the first of its challenged resolutions, denying
the motion to dismiss. On March 3, 1987, the Appellate Court denied reconsideration. 20
Hence the instant petition.
As we stated, the petitioner assails these twin resolutions on grounds of improper procedure.
Specifically, he assigns the following errors:
I.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC G.R.
NO. 07860 ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS IN REALITY A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED OUT
OF TIME AND SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN DUE COURSE.
II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC G.R.
NO. 07860 ON THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA
III.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT CONSIDERING AC G.
R. 07860 AS MOOT AND ACADEMIC SINCE PETITIONER HAD DISPOSED OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES LONG BEFORE THE FILING OF THIS SUIT.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DENYING
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS SOLELY ON THE GROUND THAT THE ARGUMENT RAISED
THEREIN ARE BUT REHASH OF THE ARGUMENTS IN HIS COMMENT TO THE PETITION. 21
The petitioner argues that the petition pending with the respondent court "is actually a petition for
certiorari," 22disguised as a pleading for annulment of judgment and that in such a case, it faces alleged
legal impediments (1) It had been filed out of time, allegedly two years from the issuance of the
assailed orders, and (2) It was not preceded by a motion for reconsideration. He adds that assuming
annulment of judgment were proper, no judgment allegedly exists for annulment, the aforesaid two
orders being in the nature of interlocutory issuances.
On purely technical grounds, the petitioner's arguments are impressive. Annulment of judgment, we
have had occasion to rule, rests on a single ground: extrinsic fraud. What "extrinsic fraud" means is
explained in Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation : 23
xxx xxx xxx
It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, however, that can serve as a
basis for the annulment of judgment. Fraud has been regarded as extrinsic or collateral, within the
meaning of the rule, "where it is one the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, or real
contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not
to the judgment itself, but of the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission
of the controversy." In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in
the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been
prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent. 24
A perusal of the petition of therein private respondent Herrera pending before the respondent Court
reveals no cause of action for annulment of judgment. In the first place, and as herein petitioner Canlas
correctly points out, the judgment itself is not assailed, but rather, the orders merely implementing it.
Secondly, there is no showing that extrinsic fraud, as Makabingkil defines it, indeed vitiated the
proceedings presided over by Judge Castro. On the contrary, Herrera's petition in the respondent court
will show that he was privy to the incidents he complains of, and in fact, had entered timely oppositions
and motions to defeat Atty. Canlas' claims under the compromise agreement.
What he objects to is his suspected collusion between Atty. Canlas and His Honor to expedite the
former's collection of his fees. He alleges that his counsel had deliberately, and with malevolent
designs, postponed execution to force him (Herrera) to agree to sell the properties in controversy to him
(Atty. Canlas) subject to redemption. ("...[I]t was understandable that respondent Atty. Paterno R.
Canlas did not implement the writ of execution, instead he contacted petitioner in order that petitioner
would sign the questioned documents. This was the clincher of the plan of respondent Atty, Paterno R.
Canlas to divest petitioner of his properties. For this purpose, it is obvious that respondent Atty. Paterno
R. Canlas had to conspire with the respondent court judge to achieve his plan." 25) Aside from being
plain speculation, it is no argument to justify annulment. Clearly, it does not amount to extrinsic fraud as
the term is defined in law.
Neither is it proper for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Certiorari presupposes the absence of an
appeal 26and while there is no appeal from execution of judgment, appeal lies in case of irregular
implementation of the writ. 27 In the case at bar, there is no irregular execution to speak of As a rule,
"irregular execution" means the failure of the writ to conform to the decree of the decision
executed. 28 In the instant case, respondent Herrera's charges, to wit, that Judge Castro had erred in
denying his motions for temporary restraining order and to recall writ of possession, or that His Honor
had acted hastily (". . . that respondent court/judge took only one [1) day to resolve petitioner's motion
for issuance of [a] [restraining] order. . ." 29) in denying his twofold motions, do not make out a case for
irregular execution. The orders impugned are conformable to the letter of the judgment approving the
parties'compromise agreement.
The lengths the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, would go to in a last-ditch bid to hold on to his
lands and constraints of economic privation have not been lost on us. It is obvious that he is uneasy
about the judgment on compromise itself, as well as the subsequent contract between him and his
lawyer. In such a case, Article 2038 of the Civil Code applies:
Art. 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence intimidation, undue influence, or
falsity of documents, is subject to the provisions of article 1330 of this Code ...
in relation to Article 1330 thereof:
Art. 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or
fraud is voidable.
in relation to its provisions on avoidance of'contracts. 30 The court notes that he had, for this purpose,
gone to the Regional Trial Court, a vain effort as we stated, and in which the decision had become final.
We, however, sustain Atty. Canlas' position-on matters of procedure for the enlightenment solely of
the bench and the bar. It does not mean that we find merit in his petition. As we have intimated, we
cannot overlook the unseemlier side of the proceeding, in which a member of the bar would exploit his
mastery of procedural law to score a "technical knockout" over his own client, of all people. Procedural
rules, after all, have for their object assistance unto parties "in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding." 31 If procedure were to be an impediment to such an
objective, "it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy." 32 It was almost eight decades ago that the Court held:
... A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle
art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each
contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as
wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be
done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by the a rapier's thrust ... 33
It is a ruling that almost eight decades after it was rendered, holds true as ever.
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no financing entity
was willing to extend him any loan with which to pay the redemption price of his mortgaged properties
and petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded in the Compromise Judgment," 34 a development
that should have tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his interests over
and above those of his client, in opposition to his oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer ... with all good
fidelity ... to [his] clients." 35 The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a
moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of
judicial notice, eluded not a few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown" of his
own client are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to
"delay no man for money." 36
It is true that lawyers are entitled to make a living, in spite of the fact that the practice of law is not a
commercial enterprise; but that does not furnish an excuse for plain lust for material wealth, more so at
the expense of another. Law advocacy, we reiterate, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births
are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits
which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with a public
interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. 37Anent attomey's fees, section 24, of Rule 138, of the
Rules, provides in part as follows:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney... A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
So also it is decreed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code, reproduced in part, as follows:
Art. 2208 ...
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
We do not find the petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in the sum of P100,000.00 reasonable. We do
not believe that it satisfies the standards set forth by the Rules. The extent of the services he had
rendered in Civil Case No. 30679, and as far as the records will yield, is not impressive to justify
payment of such a gargantuan amount. The case itself moreover did not involve complex questions of
fact or law that would have required substantial effort as to research or leg work for the petitioner to
warrant his demands. The fact that the properties subject thereof commanded quite handsome prices in
the market should not be a measure of the importance or non-importance of the case. We are not
likewise persuaded that the petitioner's stature warrants the sum claimed.
All things considered, we reduce the petitioner's fees, on a quantum meruit basis, to P20,000.00.
It is futile to invoke the rule granting attorneys a lien upon the things won in litigation similar to that
vested upon redemptioners. 38 To begin with, the rule refers to realty sold as a result of execution in
satisfaction of judgment. In this case, however, redemption was decreed by agreement (on
compromise) between the mortgagor and mortgagee. It did not give the petitioner any right to the
properties themselves, much less the right of redemption, although provisions for his compensation
were purportedly provided. It did not make him a redemptioner for the plain reason that he was not
named one in the amicable settlement. To this extent, we reverse Judge Pedro Santiago's ruling in Civil
Case No. 40066, recognizing Atty. Canlas' "legal right, independent of the questioned deed of sale and
transfer which was executed subsequently on May 3, 1983, to redeem the subject realty from the L & R
Corporation pursuant to Sec. 29 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court." 39Whatever right he had, it was,
arguably with respect alone to his renumeration. It did not extend to the lands.
Secondly, and assuming that such a right exists, it must be in proportion to the "just fees and
disbursements" 40due him. It is still subject to the tempering hand of this Court.
The Court notes a hidden agenda in the petitioner's haste to execute the compromise agreement and
subsequently, to force the transfer of the properties to himself. As we have observed, in spite of the
issuance of the writ of execution, it does not appear that the petitioner took pains to implement it. We
find this perplexing given his passionate and persistent pleas that he was entitled to the proceeds.
There can indeed be no plausible explanation other than to enable him to keep an "ace" against the
private respondent that led finally, to the conveyance of the properties in his favor. To be sure, he would
have us beheve that by redeeming the same from the mortgagee and by in fact parting with his own
money he had actually done the private respondent a favor, but this is to assume that he did not get
anything out of the transaction. Indeed, he himself admits that "[t]itles to the properties have been
issued to the new owners long before the filing of private respondents [sic] petition for annulment." 41 To
say that he did not profit therefrom is to take either this Court or the petitioner for naive, a proposition
this Court is not prepared to accept under the circumstances.
We are likewise convinced that it was the petitioner who succeeded in having the private respondent
sign the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a pre-
prepared document apparently, that allowed him (the petitioner) to exercise the right of redemption over
the properties and to all intents and purposes, acquire ownership thereof. As we have earlier averred,
the private respondent, by reason of bankruptcy, had become an easy quarry to his counsel's moral
influence and ascendancy. We are hard put to believe that it was the private respondent who "earnestly
implored" 42 him to undertake the redemption amid the former's obstinate attempts to keep his lands
that have indeed led to the multiple suits the petitioner now complains of, apart from the fact that the
latter himself had something to gain from the transaction, as alluded to above. We are of the opinion
that in ceding his right of redemption, the private respondent had intended merely to forestall the total
loss of the parcels to the mortgagee upon the understanding that his counsel shall acquire the same
and keep them therefore within reach, subject to redemption by his client under easier terms and
conditions. Surely, the petitioner himself would maintain that he agreed to make the redemption"in order
that [he] may already be paid the P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded him in the Compromise
Agreement," 43 and if his sole concern was his fees, there was no point in keeping the properties in their
entirety.
The Court simply cannot fag for the petitioner's pretensions that he acquired the properties as a gesture
of magnanimity and altruism He denies, of course, having made money from it, but what he cannot
dispute is the fact that he did resell the properties. 44
But if he did not entertain intents of making any profit, why was it necessary to reword the conveyance
document executed by the private respondent? It shall be recalled that the deed, as originally drafted,
provided for conveyance of the private respondent's "rights of equity of redemption and/or
redeem" 45 the properties in his favor, whereas the instrument registered with the Register of Deeds
purported to transfer "any and all my rights of the real properties and/or to redeem," 46 in his favor. He
admits having entered the intercalations in question but argues that he did so "to facilitate the
registration of the questioned deed with the Register of Deeds" 47 and that it did not change the
meaning of the paper, for which Judge Santiago acquitted him of any falsification charges. 48 To start
with, the Court is at a loss how such an alteration could "facilitate" registration. Moreover, if it did not
change the tenor of the deed, why was it necessary then? And why did he not inform his client? At any
rate, the agreement is clearly a contract of adhesion. Its provisions should be read against the party
who prepared it.
But while we cannot hold the petitioner liable for falsification this is not the proper occasion for it
we condemn him nonetheless for infidelity to his oath "to do no falsehood" 49
This brings us to the final question: Whether or not the conveyance in favor of the petitioner is subject
to the ban on acquisition by attorneys of things in litigation. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code
state as follows:
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either
in person or through the mediation of another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his guardianship;
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been intrusted to them, unless the
consent of the principal have been given;
(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration;
(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision thereof, or of any
government owned or controlled corporation, or institution, the administration of which has been
instrusted to them; this provision shall apply to judges and government experts who, in any manner
whatsoever, take part in the sale;
(5) Justice judges prosecuting attorneys clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied
upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective
functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part
by virtue of their profession.
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law.**
In Rubias v. Batiller, 50 we declared such contracts to be void by force of Article 1409, paragraph (7), of
the Civil Code, defining inexistent contracts. In Director of Lands v. Ababa 51 however, we said that the
prohibition does not apply to contingent contracts, in which the conveyance takes place after judgment,
so that the property can no longer be said to be "subject of litigation."
In the instant case, the Court observes that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of
Redemption and/or to Redeem" was executed following the finality of the decision approving the
compromise agreement. It is actually a new contract not one in pursuance of what had been agreed
upon on compromise in which, as we said, the petitioner purportedly assumed redemption rights
over the disputed properties (but in reality, acquired absolute ownership thereof). By virtue of such a
subsequent agreement, the lands had ceased to be properties which are "the object of any litigation."
Parenthetically, the Court states that a writ of possession is improper to eject another from possession
unless sought in connection with: (1) a land registration proceeding; (2) an extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage of real property; (3) in a judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has
possession and no third party has intervened; and (4) in execution sales. 52 It is noteworthy that in this
case, the petitioner moved for the issuance of the writ pursuant to the deed of sale between him and
the private respondent and not the judgment on compromise. (He was, as we said, issued a writ of
execution on the compromise agreement but as we likewise observed, he did not have the same
enforced. The sale agreement between the parties, it should be noted, superseded the compromise.)
The writ does not lie in such a case. His remedy is specific performance.
At any rate, the transfer, so we hold, is not subject to the injunction of Article 1491 of the Civil Code. But
like all voidable contracts, it is open to annulment on the ground of mistake, fraud, or undue
influence, 53 which is in turn subject to the right of innocent purchasers for value. 54
For this reason, we invalidate the transfer in question specifically for undue influence as earlier detailed.
While the respondent Herrera has not specifically prayed for invalidation, this is the clear tenor of his
petition for annulment in the Appellate Court. It appearing, however, that the properties have been
conveyed to third persons whom we presume to be innocent purchasers for value, the petitioner, Atty.
Paterno Canlas, must be held liable, by way of actual damages, for such a loss of properties.

We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In condemning Atty.
Canlas monetarily, we cannot overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled his hability
for payment of the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas alone liable for damages is to enrich said respondent
at the expense of his lawyer. The parties must then set off their obligations against the other. To obviate
debate as the actual amounts owing by one to the other, we hold Francisco Herrera, the private
respondent, liable to Atty. Paterno Canlas, the petitioner, in the sum of P654,000.00 representing the
redemption price of the properties, 55 in addition to the sum of P20,000. 00 as and for attomey's fees.
We order Atty. Canlas, in turn, to pay the respondent Herrera the amount of P1,000,000.00, the sum he
earned from the resale thereof, 56 such that he shall, after proper adjustments, be indebted to his client
in the sum of P326,000.00 as and for damages.

Needless to say, we sustain the action of the respondent Court of Appeals in taking cognizance of the
petition below. But as we have stated, we are compelled, as the final arbiter of justiciable cases and in
the highest interests ofjustice, to write finis to the controversy that has taxed considerably the dockets
of the inferior courts.

Let the Court further say that while its business is to settle actual controversies and as a matter of
general policy, to leave alone moot ones, its mission is, first and foremost, to dispense justice. At the
outset, we have made clear that from a technical vantage point, certiorari, arguably lies, but as we have
likewise stated, the resolution of the case rests not only on the mandate of technical rules, but if the
decision is to have any real meaning, on the merits too. This is not the first time we would have done
so; in many cases we have eschewed the rigidity of the Rules of Court if it would establish a barrier
upon the administration ofjustice. It is especially so in the case at bar, in which no end to suit and
counter-suit appears imminent and for which it is high time that we have the final say. We likewise
cannot, as the overseer of good conduct in both the bench and the bar, let go unpunished what
convinces us as serious indiscretions on the part of a lawyer.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered.

1. ORDERING the petitioner, Atty. Patemo Canlas, to pay to the private respondent, Francisco Herrera,
the sum of P326,000.00, as and for damages;

2. ORDERING the petitioner to SHOW CAUSE why no disciplinary action may be imposed on him for
violation of his oath, as a lawyer, within ten (10) days from notice, after which the same will be
consolidated with AC No. 2625;

3. DISMISSING this petition and REMANDING the case to the respondent Court of Appeals for
execution; and

4. ORDERING the petitioner to pay costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines HONORABLE PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, Judge, Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch 1, The
SUPREME COURT Provincial Sheriff, Province of Bohol, and MARIANO OGILVE, et. al., respondents.
Manila
Lord Marapao and Lorenzo A. Lopena for petitioners.
FIRST DIVISION
Roque R. Luspo for respondents.

G.R. No. L-25660 February 23, 1990

LEOPOLDO
VENCILAO, MAURO RENOBLAS, TELESFORO BALONDIA, FELIX ABANDULA, FAUSTOGABAIS
EN, ISIDORO ELIVERA, RAYMUNDO BONGATO, MARTIN ROLLON, EUSTAQUIO MEDANA,
DOROTEO ELIVERA, FRANCISCO PAGAURA, MACARIO GEPALAGO, GREGORIO ITAOC,
ALEJANDRO RENOBLAS, SIMEON BARBARONA, GREGORIO RENOBLAS, FRANCISCO ASOY,
TEOFILA GUJELING, FABIAN VILLAME, VICENTE OMUSORA, PEDRO BALORIA, GREGORIO
ITAOC, TERESITA ITAOC, FAUSTINO ITAOC, FORTUNATO ITAOC, FLORENTINA GEMENTIZA,
RESTITUTA OMUSORA, ZOILA OMUSORA, FELISA OMUSORA, ROBERTO HAGANAS, FELISA
HAGANAS, FERMIN HAGANAS, VICTORIANO HAGANAS, JULIA SEVILLA, ROMAN MATELA,
MARCELA MATELA, DELFIN MATELA, PELAGIO MATELA, ROBERTA MATELA, PROCOPIO
CABANAS and SERAFINA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellants,
vs.
TEODORO VANO, JOSE REYES, ROSARIO REYES, SALUD OGILVE BELTRAN, AMALIA R.
OGILVE, FLORA VDA. DE COROMINAS, JESUSA REYES, LOURDES COROMINAS MUNOZ, JUAN
COROMINAS, LOURDES C. SAMSON CEBALLOS, SOLEDAD C. SAMSON RAMA, DOLORES V.
GARCES FALCON, JAIME GARCES, JOAQUIN REYES, and PEDRO RE R. LUSPO, defendants-
appellees.
G.R. No. L-32065 February 23,1990
LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SOFRONIO ROLLON, AURELIO ELIVERA, FRANCISCO PAGAORA,
MARTIN ROLLON, GRACIANO MAHINAY, GERARDO ELIVERA, GREGORIO ITAOC, ISIDRO
ELIVERA, DEMOCRITO ELIVERA, FAUSTO GABAISIN, ALBINO RENOBLAS, EUSTAQUIO
MENDANIA, SIMEON BARBARONA, TELESFORO BALONDA, FELIX ABANDOLA, SATURNINA
GEPILAGO, TEOFILA GOHILING, TOMAS REAMBONANSA, MARCOS HAGANAS, PASTOR ASNA
and MAURO RENOBLAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, Judge, Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch 1, and
MARIANO OGILVE, et. al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-33677 February 23, 1990
LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SOFRONIO ROLLON, AURELIO ELIVERA, FRANCISCO PAGAORA,
MARTIN ROLLON, GRACIANO MAHINAY, GERARDO ELIVERA, GREGORIO ITAOC, ISIDRO
ELIVERA, DEMOCRITO ELIVERA, FAUSTO GABAISIN, ALBINO RENOBLAS, EUSTAQUIO
MENDANIA, SIMEON BARBARONA, TELESFORO BALONDA, FELIX ABANDOLA, SATURNINA
GEPILAGO, TEOFILA GOHILING, TOMAS REAMBONANSA, MARCOS NAGANAS, PASTOR ASNA
and MAURO RENOBLAS, petitioners,
vs.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
On February 7, 1974, We resolved to allow the consolidation of these three cases, considering that they
involve the same parties and parcels of land: (1) G.R. No. L-25660---this is an appeal from the order of
the Court of First Instance of Bohol (now Regional Trial Court) 1 dated May 12,1964 dismissing the
cases of some of the plaintiffs-appellants and its order dated August 25, 1965 denying the motion for
reconsideration and the motion to declare the defendants- appellees in default; (2) G.R. No. L32065---
this is a petition for certiorari of the order of the Court of First Instance of Bohol dated May 14, 1970
directing the execution of its prior order dated May 6, 1969 finding petitioners guilty of contempt; (3)
G.R. No. L-33677--- this is a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition of the order of the
Court of First Instance of Bohol dated June 2, 1971 directing the demolition of the houses of the
petitioners.
On February 15, 1988, We resolved to require the parties to manifest whether or not they are still
interested in prosecuting these cases, or supervening events have transpired which render these cases
moot and academic or otherwise substantially affect the same. On March 25, 1988, the petitioners filed
an ex parte manifestation that they are still very much interested in the just prosecution of these cases.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
G.R. No. 25660
On April 1, 1950, the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an application for registration of the parcels of
land allegedly inherited by them from Juan Reyes, in Land Registration Case No. 76, L.R.C. Record
No. N-4251. On July 26,1951, administratrix Bernardina Vda. de Luspo filed an amended application for
registration. After hearing, the land was registered under Original Certificate of Title No. 400 (pp. 84-85,
Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo).
On October 9, 1962, a complaint for reconveyance of real properties with damages and preliminary
injunction, Civil Case No. 1533, (pp. 2-19, Record n Appeal; p. 7, Rollo) was filed by plaintiffs-
appellants before the Court of First Instance of Bohol. It was alleged that they are the lawful owners of
their respective parcels of land including the improvements thereon either by purchase or inheritance
and have been in possession publicly, continuously, peacefully and adversely under the concept of
owners for more than thirty (30) years tacked with the possession of their predecessors-in-interest.
However, those parcels of land were included in the parcels of land applied for registration by the heirs
of Juan Reyes, either by mistake or fraud and with the intention of depriving them of their rights of
ownership and possession without their knowledge, not until the last part of 1960 when the defendants-
appellees, through their agents, attempted to enter those parcels of land claiming that they now belong
to the heirs of Juan Reyes. To the complaint, the defendants-appellees moved to dismiss on two
grounds (pp. 19-22, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), namely: (1) for lack of cause of action and (2) the
cause of action is barred by prior judgment.
On July 20, 1963, the court a quo issued an order denying defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss (pp.
29-30, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). However, acting on the motion to set aside such order (pp. 31-
32, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), on May 12, 1964, the same court issued another order reversing
itself partially (p. 56, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the cases herein of the plaintiffs Alejandro Renoblas, Fausto Cabaisan, Fabian Villame,
Gregorio Ita-oc, Faustino Ita-oc, Fortunato Ita-oc, Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas, Fermin Haganas,
Victorians Haganas, Julia Sevilla, Ramon Matela, Roberto Matela, Procopio Cabaas and Vicente
Amosora are hereby dismissed on the ground of res adjudicata with these plaintiffs paying
proportionately eighteenth forty one (18/41) of the costs, but the petition to dismiss the case of the rest
of the plaintiffs is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
On May 28,1964, the plaintiffs-appellants whose cases were dismissed filed a motion for
reconsideration (pp. 57- 58, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). On July 24, 1964, the plaintiffs-appellants
whose cases were not dismissed filed a motion to declare the defendants-appellees in default for failure
to file their answer with the time prescribed by law (pp. 68-75, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). On the
other hand, defendants-appellees filed their opposition to the motion for reconsideration praying that
the complaint as regards the rest of the plaintiffs-appellants be likewise dismissed (pp. 75-80, Record
on Appeal; p. 7 Rollo).
On August 25, 1965, the court a quo issued an order in connection therewith (pp. 82-98, Record on
Appeal; p. 7, Rollo) denying all motions.
The case is now before Us with the following as assignments of errors (p. 3, Brief for the Plaintiffs-
Appellants; p. 9, Rollo), to wit:
I by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASES OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
WHOSE NAMES ARE ALREADY MENTIONED ABOVE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THEIR
CASES ARE BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT OF RES ADJUDICATA.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
WHOSE CASES ARE NOT DISMISSED TO DECLARE THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES IN
DEFAULT FOR HAVING FAILED TO FILE THEIR ANSWER WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED BY
LAW.
On August 12, 1966, a resolution was issued by this Court dismissing the appeal as regards the second
issue because the order appealed from was merely interlocutory, hence, not appealable (pp. 35-38,
Rollo).
On August 17, 1988, petitioners Alex Abandula, Mauro Renoblas, Simeon Barbarona, Fabian Villame,
Macario Gepalago, Eustaquio Medana, Julia Sevilla, Gregorio Itaoc, Francisco Asoy and Martin Rollon
filed a motion to withdraw their appeal on the ground that they are now the absolute owners and
possessors of their respective parcels of land subject of Civil Case No. 1533.
The appeal is not impressed with merit.
The plaintiffs-appellants claim that no evidence was presented by the defendants-appellees that they
(plaintiffs-appellants) were notified of the date of the trial on the merits of the application for registration
nor were they given copies of the decision of the trial court. Likewise, they contend that res judicata is
not applicable in an action for reconveyance.
The allegations that no evidence was presented by the defendants-appellees that plaintiffs-appellants
were notified of the date of the trial on the merits of the application for registration nor were they given
copies of the decision of the trial court are new issues. It is a well-settled rule that, except questions on
jurisdiction, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court below and it
is within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings (Cordero vs. Cabral, G.R. No. 36789, July 25,
1983, 123 SCRA 532). The other contention that res judicata is not applicable in an action for
reconveyance is not plausible. The principle of res judicata applies to all cases and proceedings,
including land registration and cadastral proceedings (Republic vs. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-35376,
September 11, 1980, 99 SCRA 65; Paz vs. Inandan 75 Phil. 608; Penaloza vs. Tuazon, 22 Phil. 303).
It is a settled rule that a final judgment or order on the merits, rendered by a court having jurisdiction of
the subject matter and of the parties, is conclusive in a subsequent case between the same parties and
their successors in interest litigating upon the same thing and issue, regardless of how erroneous it may
be. In order, therefore, that there may be res judicata, the following requisites must be present: (a) The
former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the
subject matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be,
between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action
(San Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281; Ramos vs. Pablo, G.R. No. 53692, Nov. 26,1986, 146 SCRA 24).
The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of res judicata is that parties should not be permitted to
litigate the same issue more than once and when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined
parties and those in privity with them in law or estate (Sy Kao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61752,
Sept. 28,1984,132 SCRA 302). The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom
and sanctified by age, and is founded on the broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that
there should be an end to litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject once fully and
fairly adjudicated. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium (Carandang vs. Venturanza, G.R. No. L41940,
Nov. 21,1984,133 SCRA 344). To ignore the principle of res judicata would be to open the door to
endless litigations by continuous determination of issues without end (Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the
Mountain Province vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 80294- 95, Sept. 21, 1988, 165 SCRA 515).
Thus, when a person is a party to a registration proceeding or when notified he does not want to
participate and only after the property has been adjudicated to another and the corresponding title has
been issued files an action for reconveyance, to give due course to the action is to nullify registration
proceedings and defeat the purpose of the law.
In dismissing the cases of some of the petitioners, the court a quo meticulously discussed the presence
of all the elements of res judicata (pp. 36-38; pp. 42-54, Record on Appeal; p. 7; Rollo):
There is no question that in that Registration Proceedings, LRC Record No. N-4251, Land Registration
Case No. N-76, the Court of First Instance of the province of Bohol had jurisdiction of the subject
matter, that said court had rendered a judgment on the merit that was terminated in the Court of
Appeals since December, 1958, and that decision is now final with a decree of registration over the
parcels of land described in the application issued to the applicants.
The subject matter (the parcels of land) now claimed by the plaintiffs in this case at bar are the same, or
at least part of the parcels already adjudicated registration in that registration case to the persons,
some of them are made defendants in this case before us. The cause of action between the two cases
are the same, ownership of these parcels of land, though the forms of action are different, one is an
ordinary Land Registration and the other is reconveyance.
'It is settled that notwithstanding the difference in the form of two actions, the doctrine of res
adjudicata will apply where it appears that the parties in effect were litigating for the same thing. A party
can not, by varying the form of action, escape the effects of res adjudicata (Aguirre vs. Atienza, L-
10665, Aug. 30, 1958; Geronimo vs. Nava No. L-1 21 1 1, Jan. 31, 1959; Labarro vs. Labateria et al.,
28 O.G. 4479).
'Well settled is the rule that a party can not by varying the form of action, or adopting a different method
of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action
shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their privies. (Francisco vs. Blas, et al., No. L-
5078; Cayco, et al., vs. Cruz, et al., No. L-1 2663, Aug. 21, 1959).
'Accordingly, a final judgment in an ordinary civil action, determining the ownership of certain lands
is res adjudicata in a registration proceeding where the parties and property are the same as in the
former case (Paz vs. Inandan 75 Phil. 608; Penaloza vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303).'
xxx xxx xxx
But are there identities of parties in this case before us and the former registration proceedings?
Identity of parties means that the parties in the second case must be the same parties in the first case,
or at least, must be successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the former
action or proceeding, or when the parties in the subsequent case are heirs (Chua Tan vs. Del Rosario,
57 Phil. 411; Martinez vs. Franco, 51 Phil. 487-1 Romero vs. Franco, 54 Phil. 744; Valdez, et a]. vs.
Penida No. L- 3467, July 30, 1951).
xxx xxx xxx
Returning our attention to the case at bar, and with in mind the principles of res adjudicata above-
quoted, we noticed that many of the plaintiffs were not oppositors in the former registration case, but
many are children of the former oppositors. In such a case we have to determine the case of every
plaintiff, if the former decision in the land registration case is conclusive and binding upon him.
xxx xxx xxx
The defendants had proven that the adjoining owners and claimants of the parcels of land object of
registration proceeding had been notified when the land was surveyed. These persons notified
according to the surveyor's certificate, Exhibit "B" were as follows: Cipriano Samoya, Fausto Baguisin,
Silveria Pahado, Enojario Laroda, Alejandro Renoblas, Heirs of Gregorio Lofranco, Julian Villame,
Pedro Itaoc, Adriano Toloy, Bartolome Omosura, Marcelina Asilon, Gregorio Baguinang, et al., Nicolas
Omosura, Simon Lagrimas, et al., Martin Quinalayo, Gorgonio Baquinang, Demetrio Asolan, Catalino
Orellena, Heirs of Catalina Palves, Manuel Mondano, Angel Mondano, Victoriano Balolo, Eugenio del
Rosario, Verinici Bayson, Felomino Ruiz, Apolonio Horbeda, and Mun. of Calape.
The following persons were notified by the Chief of the Land Registration Office of the initial hearing
(Exhibit "J") of the registration proceedings enjoining them to appear on June 16,1952, at 8:30 a.m.,
before the Court of First Instance of Bohol to show cause why the prayer of said application should not
be granted: the Solicitor General, the Director of Lands, the Director of Public Works and the Director of
Forestry, Manila; the Provincial Governor, the Provincial Fiscal and the District Engineer, Tagbilaran,
Bohol; the Municipal Mayor, Gorgonio Baguinang, Demetrio Azocan, Catalino Orellena, Manuel
Mondano, Angel Mondano, Victoriano Bolalo, Eugenio del Rosario, Verinici Bayson, Filomeno Ruiz,
Apolonio Horboda, the Heirs of Gregorio Lofranco, Julian Villame, Pedro Itaoc, Adriano Toloy,
Bartolome Omosura, Marcelina Asilom, Gregorio Baguinang, Nicolas Omosura, Simon Lagrimas and
Martin Quinalayo, Calape, Bohol; the heirs of Catalino Polvos, Fausto Baguisin, Cipriano Samoya,
Silveria Pohado, Enojario, Laroda, Alejandro Renoblas and Leoncio Barbarona, Antequera Bohol.
And after the application had been filed and published in accordance with law the following persons
represented by Atty. Conrado D. Marapao filed opposition to that registration proceeding: Felipe
Cubido, Simon Lagrimas, Simeon Villame, Felix Lacorte, Victor Omosura, Germana Gahil, Anastacio
Orillosa, Enerio Omosura, Valeriano Tuloy, Cipriano Sanoya, Pablo Dumadag, Andres Reimbuncia,
Roman Reimbuncia, Celedonio Cabanas, Moises Cabanas, Calixto Gohiting, Gervasio Sevilla, Pedro
Omosura, Daniel Itaoc, Luis Omosura, Bartolome Omusura, Nicasio Omosura, Calixto Sevilla, Teodora
Omosura, Jose Sabari, Silverio Lacorte, Silverio Tuloy, Gertrudes Sevilla, Teodora Sevilla, Magno
Orillosa, Gervacia Sevilla, Marcos Hagonas, Eleuterio Pandas, Pablo Omosura, Fabian Villame,
Teodoro Omosura, Magdalina Asilom, Mauricio Matela, Marciano Ordada, Eusebio Omosura, and
Gregorio Repelle, (Exhibit "E"), Atty. Juna V. Balmaseda in representation of the Bureau of Lands, and
Asst. Fiscal Norberto M. Gallardo in representation of the Municipality of Calape.
Plaintiffs Mauro Renoblas and Gregorio Renoblas are children of plaintiff Alejandro Renoblas. Plaintiff
Telesforo Balanda is son-in-law of Alejandro, being the husband of Juliana Renoblas, daughter of
Alejandro. Plaintiff Alejandro Renoblas was not one of the oppositors in the registration proceedings,
but he was notified of the initial healing of that registration case and by the surveyor that surveyed the
land object of registration (Exhibit J-Movant). Therefore, the decision of the land registration proceeding
is binding upon him and his case is dismissed on the ground of res adjudicata with costs.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiff Fausto Cabaisan was notifed by the surveyor and that notice of the initial hearing. And though
he was not an oppositor, the former land registration proceeding is binding on him. Therefore, this case
is dismissed in so far as Fausto Cabaisan is concerned with costs.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiffs Gregorio Ita-oc, Teresita Ita-oc, Faustino Ita-oc and Fortunate Ita-oc are children of Daniel Ita-
oc, one of the oppositors in the registration proceedings. They claim parcel No. 10 described in
paragraph 2 of the complaint. Gregorio Ita-oc testified that his land was inherited by said plaintiffs'
mother from her father, Pio Sevilla. The evidence on record (Exhibits J-3, J- 4, J-5). However (sic),
shows that the land is declared in the name of Daniel Ita-oc, a former oppositor in the registration case.
Hence, these plaintiffs are successors-in-interest of Daniel Ita-oc, and, therefore, are bound by the
decision in that registration case. Their case, therefore, is dismissed, with costs.
"Plaintiffs Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas, Fermin Haganas and Victoriano Haganas are children of
Marcos Haganas, a former oppositor in the registration case. Marcos testified that his claim before was
only two hectares, while the claim of his children is seven hectares, which come from his wife, not from
him. These plaintiffs claim two parcels, one under Tax Declaration No. R-4452, and Tax Declaration No.
R-8456. It appears that Tax Declaration No. R-4452 (Exhibit M) is in the name of Marcos Haganas and
the land described under Tax Declaration No. R-8456 was bought by the spouses Marcos Haganas and
Tomasa Sevilla from Gertrudis Sevilla in 1956 (Exhibit M-3), who was an oppositor in the registration
proceeding. Therefore, plaintiffs Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas, Fermin Haganas, and Victoriano
Haganas are successors-in-interest to properties in which the decision in the registration case is
conclusive and binding to their predecessors-in-interest. Hence, their case here is dismissed with costs.
Plaintiff Julia Sevilla is the wife of Marcelo Matela, who was the oppositor in the registration
proceedings. Plaintiffs Roman Matela, Marcela Matela, Delfin Matela, and Roberta Matela are their
children. She has no son by the name of Pelagic. Julia testified that the land now claimed by her
children came from her father Pio Sevilla. The land that was claimed by Mauricio Matela as oppositor
was in his name under Tax Declaration No. 5099. This is the same land now claimed by plaintiffs Julia
Sevilla, Ramon Matela, Marcela Matela, Delfin Matela, and Roberta Matela (Exhibit 0-4). These
plaintiffs are successors-in-interest of Mauricio Matela, who is bound by the decision in that land
proceeding wherein he was the oppositor. Therefore, the case of these plaintiffs are dismissed with
costs.
Plaintiff Procopia Cabanas was the wife of Andres Reambonancia, oppositor in the land registration
proceedings. She claims parcel No. 20 described in paragraph 2 of the complaint bearing Tax
Declaration No. R-8121. It appears that this land is declared in the name of Andres Reambonancia
(Exhibit N-3) who, as oppositor in the land registration case, is bound by the decision of that case.
Therefore, the case of plaintiff Procopia Cabanas as successor-in-interest to Andres Reambonancia, is
hereby dismissed, with costs.
Plaintiff Vicente Amosora is the son of Enerio Amosora and Florencia Gahil both oppositors in the
former registration case. The land claimed by plaintiff Vicente Amosora is described as parcel No. 24 of
paragraph 2 of the complaint under Tax Declaration No. R-6107, under the name of his father Enerio
Amosora. Since Enerio Amosora was an oppositor in the former land registration of which this land was
a part, the decision of that land registration case is conclusive and binding not only to Enerio Amosora,
but also to his successor-in-interest, plaintiff Vicente Amosora, whose case therefore, is dismissed with
costs.
G.R. No. L-32065
Upon the death of administratrix Bernardina Vda. de Luspo, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3561 was
issued in the name of Pedro R. Luspo and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3562 was issued in the name
of several persons (p. 36, Rollo).
A writ of possession dated November 6, 1959, a first alias writ of possession dated January 6, 1961,
and a second alias writ of possession dated July 2, 1966 were issued by the trial court against the
petitioners. A sample of the guerilla-like, hide and seek tactics employed by the petitioners was proved
by the official report of the deputy sheriff dated January 21 1960. Another evidence of petitioners'
refusal to sign and to vacate was a certification dated July 22, 1966 and the Sheriffs return dated
October 25, 1966.
On March 29, 1967, a petition for contempt was filed by Mariano Ogilve, who is one of the registered
owners of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3562, against the petitioners for
refusing to vacate the land occupied by them and for refusing to sign the Sheriffs return.
On May 6, 1969, the court a quo issued a resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads (p.
47, Rollo):
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, make it of record that Procopia Reambonansa
voluntarily left the land and dropped out from the case; the charge of contempt against Alejandro
Renoblas (who died) is dismissed and each of the remaining 22 respondents are hereby found guilty of
contempt under Sec. 3-b of Rule 71 and are hereby sentenced each to pay a fine of One Hundred
Pesos, authorizing the Constabulary Detachment at or near Candungao Calape Bohol to collect the
same and to transmit the money to the Clerk of this Court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency at the rate of one day for every P2.50 or fraction of a day, the said Constabulary Detachment
to effect the commitment if any of them is unable to pay the fine. The fingerprints of each of these 22
respondents shall also be taken by the constabulary and filed with the record of this case.
It is so ordered.
On June 4, 1969, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforestated resolution whereas
Ogilve filed an opposition thereto.
On February 14, 1970, the motion for reconsideration was denied. On March 18, 1970, another motion
for reconsideration was filed by petitioners on the ground of pendency of the action for reconveyance in
Civil Case No. 1533 and their appeal in G.R. No. L-25660. On May 14, 1970, the court a quo ordered
the proper officers to actually execute the resolution dated May 6, 1969.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues:
I
THAT THE SAID RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ISSUING A WRIT OF POSSESSION WITHOUT
ANY COMPLAINT FILED IN COURT FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER, NOR FOR
RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF THE PARCELS OF LAND IN QUESTION
AGAINST THE HEREIN PETITIONERS.
II
THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ISSUING A WRIT OF POSSESSION
AGAINST THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, WHO WERE NOT PARTIES TO THE REGISTRATION
PROCEEDING AND WHO WERE NOT DEFEATED OPPOSITORS OF THE SAID APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Petitioners contend that they were not claimants-oppositors nor defeated oppositors in the said land
registration case, as their names do not appear in the amended application for registration; that they
have occupied the subject parcels of land for more than thirty (30) years which began long before the
filing of the application for registration; and that after the hearing of the registration case, they continued
in possession of the said land.
In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its registration in
his name necessarily carried with it the delivery of possession which is an inherent element of the right
of ownership. The issuance of the writ of possession is, therefore, sanctioned by existing laws in this
jurisdiction and by the generally accepted principle upon which the administration of justice rests
(Romasanta et. al. vs. Platon, 34 O.G. No. 76; Abulocion et. al. vs. CFI of Iloilo, et. al., 100 Phil. 554
[1956]). A writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a
registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion
thereof during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree (Demorar vs.
Ibaez, et al., 97 Phil 72 [1955]).
The petitioners' contention that they have been in possession of the said land for more than thirty (30)
years which began long before the filing of the application for registration and continued in possession
after the hearing of the registration case, worked against them. It was a virtual admission of their lack of
defense. Thus, the writs of possession were properly issued against them.
However, We do not subscribe to the ruling of the court a quo that petitioners are guilty of contempt.
Under Section 8 (d) of Rule 19, Rules of Court, if the judgment be for the delivery of the possession of
real property, the writ of execution must require the sheriff or other officer to whom it must be directed to
deliver the possession of the property, describing it, to the party entitled thereto. This means that the
sheriff must dispossess or eject the losing party from the premises and deliver the possession thereof
to the winning party. If subsequent to such dispossession or ejectment the losing party enters or
attempts to enter into or upon the real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or
possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession of the person adjudged to be entitled thereto,
then and only then may the loser be charged with and punished for contempt (Quizon vs. Philippine
National Bank, et. al., 85 Phil. 459). According to this section, it is exclusively incumbent upon the
sheriff to execute, to carry out the mandates of the judgment in question, and in fact, it was he himself,
and he alone, who was ordered by the trial judge who rendered that judgment, to place the respondents
in possession of the land. The petitioners in this case had nothing to do with that delivery of possession,
and consequently, their refusal to effectuate the writ of possession, is entirely officious and impertinent
and therefore could not hinder, and much less prevent, the delivery being made, had the sheriff known
how to comply with his duty. It was solely due to the latter's fault, and not to the disobedience of the
petitioners' that the judgment was not duly executed. For that purpose, the sheriff could even have
availed himself of the public force, had it been necessary to resort thereto (see United States v.
Ramayrat 22 Phil. 183).
G.R. No. L-33677
On March 22,1971, Mariano Ogilve filed a Motion for a Writ of Demolition which was granted by the trial
court on April 5, 1971 (pp. 42-43, Rollo) against those who were adjudged guilty of contempt. On April
29, 1971, the petitioners filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of said order. On June 2, 1971, the
trial court issued another order, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 48, Rollo):
WHEREFORE, in the absence of writ of preliminary injunction Deputy Provincial Sheriff Pedro Aparece
must not only take P.C. soldiers with him but also carpenters to effect the demolition, the carpenters
being at the expense of the Luspo.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition.
The issue here is whether or not the respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion and thus excluded the herein petitioners from the use and enjoyment of
their right to which they are entitled when he (respondent judge) issued the order of demolition on April
5, 1971 and again on June 2, 1971 (p. 107, Rollo).
On July 14, 1971, this Court issued a temporary restraining order (p. 51, Rollo).
The petition is not impressed with merit.
The petitioners allege that the respondent-judge cannot issue a writ of demolition pending the
resolution of G.R. No. L-32065.
We rule that the petition in G.R. No. L-32065 was not a bar to the issuance of the writ of demolition. It is
significant to note that the subject matter of the petition in G.R. No. L-32065 is the order dated May 14,
1970 directing the execution of the prior order dated May 6, 1969 finding petitioners guilty of contempt
and not the writs of possession themselves. Thus, the respondent Judge correctly issued the writs of
demolition. In Meralco vs. Mencias, 107 Phil 1071, We held:
[I]f the writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of possession of
the land to the successful litigant therein (Demorar vs. Ibanez, 97 Phil. 72; Pasay Estate Company vs.
Del Rosario, et al., 11 Phil. 391; Manlapas vs. Llorente 48 Phil. 298), a writ of demolition must, likewise,
issue, especially considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the former which, without said
writ of demolition, would be ineffective.
xxx xxx xxx
[The issuance of the writ of demolition] is reasonably necessary to do justice to petitioner who is being
deprived of the possession of the lots in question, by reason of the continued refusal of respondent ......
to remove his house thereon and restore possession of the promises to petitioner.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) In G.R. No. L-25660, the appeal is DENIED and the orders of the Court of First Instance dated May
12, 1964 and August 25, 1965 are AFFIRMED; the motion to withdraw the appeal of some of the
plaintiffs-appellants is GRANTED;
2) In G.R. No. L-32065, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of the Court of First Instance dated
May 14, 1970 is SET ASIDE; and
3) In G.R. No. L-33677, the petition is DISMISSED and the order of the Court of First Instance dated
June 2, 1971 is AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing
the Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84788, dated 17 November 2005, which
JETRI CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION/ ANASTACIA G.R. No. 171687 dismissed petitioners appeal for its failure to file its appellants brief within the reglementary period
CORPUZ RIGOR, President, despite notice.

Petitioner,

Sometime in 1994, petitioner Jetri Construction Corporation applied for a P20,000,000.00 Omnibus
Present: Line Credit Facility with Far East Bank and Trust Company, predecessor-in-interest of herein
respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). Upon approval of said credit facility,
petitioner Jetri Construction Corporation was able to borrow from the bank a total
of P20,000,000.00. As security for the loans, petitioner mortgaged its land covered by Transfer
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 213950 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila as well as the 4-storey building
- versus - erected thereon located at No. 177 M. dela Fuente St., Sampaloc, Manila. A Comprehensive Surety
Chairperson, Agreement was also executed by Anastacia Corpus Rigor, president of Jetri Construction Corporation,
wherein she acted as surety of the corporations loans from Far East Bank and bound herself to pay
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, jointly and severally with Jetri Construction Corporation all obligations the latter may incur.

CHICO-NAZARIO, and

NACHURA, JJ. When Jetri Construction Corporation defaulted in paying the loan, it entered into a Loan Restructuring
Agreement with the bank wherein it acknowledged that its obligation under the Discounting Line was for
the total amount of P22,621,876.37.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,

Respondent.
Promulgated: For failure of Jetri Construction Corporation to pay the loan under the Loan Restructuring Agreement
upon maturity, the bank foreclosed the real estate mortgage on the property covered by TCT No.
213950. On 22 November 1999, an auction sale was held wherein the mortgaged property was sold to
the bank, it being the lone and highest bidder. The Certificate of Sale was registered and annotated at
June 8, 2007
the back of TCT No. 213950 on 3 December 1999.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

Upon expiration of the redemption period, with petitioner failing to redeem the property, ownership over
the mortgaged property was consolidated in favor of the bank and a new certificate of title was issued in
its name, particularly TCT No. 250654.
DECISION

On 28 August 2001, BPI filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 62, Civil Case
No. 01-1336 against herein petitioner for alleged foreclosure deficiency in the amount
of P33,270,131.25.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Jetri Construction Corporation, on the other hand, simultaneously filed two complaints against
respondent BPI and its managing officers, respectively.The first is a complaint for (a) annulment of
mortgage foreclosure; (b) cancellation of respondents derivative Transfer Certificate of Title No.
250654; (c) quieting of petitioners ownership and restoration of title; and (d) indemnity for damages
before the RTC of Manila, Branch 50 and docketed as Civil Case No. 04-111298. The second is a
complaint for Estafa before the City Prosecutors Office of Manila against the managing officers of BPI
for the alleged misappropriation of the Three (3) Million Pesos paid by petitioner as amortization for its
loan.
Despite demands, petitioner refused to vacate the premises of the foreclosed property, thus, on 15
August 2003, herein respondent filed a Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Possession of Real
Property[2] before the RTC of Manila.
On 28 February 2005, the RTC of Manila, Branch IV, issued the assailed Order [3] issuing the writ of
possession prayed for by respondent BPI.According to the court a quo:
As to the Oppositors attack on the validity of the foreclosure sale, the Highest Tribunal has already
ruled in several cases that:
The order for writ of possession issue as a matter of course with no discretion being left to the court
and any question regarding the validity of the sale should be determined in a subsequent proceeding
and cannot be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of writ of
possession. [De Gracia vs. San Jose, et al., 94 Phil. 623].
x x x the order for a writ of possession issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion
and approval of the corresponding bond. No discretion is left to the court. And any question regarding
the regularity and validity of the sale (and the subsequent cancellation of the writ) is to be determined in
a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Sec. 8. Such question is not to be raised as a justification for
opposing the issuance of a writ of possession, since, under the Act, the proceeding for this is ex
parte. [Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 142 SCRA, citing
Marcelo Steel Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 89].
Moreover, in the case of Ong vs. CA, 333 SCRA 189, the High Court fortified the foregoing obiter
dicta by declaring that:
As a rule, any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal
ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession. Regardless of whether or not there is a
pending suit for annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of
possession, without prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of the said case.
As to the prayer of the petitioner bank for the issuance of writ of possession over the subject property,
the court finds no cogent reason why the same should not be issued, in the case of PDCP Bank vs.
Vestil 264 SCRA 467, the Supreme Court declared among others, that:
In cases in which, an extra-judicial sale is made pursuant to an extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage,
redemption is governed by secs. 29 to 31 and sec. 35, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and sec. 35
provides among others, that, If no redemption is made within twelve (12) months after the sale, the
purchaser or his assignee is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property.The rule therefore
is that: after the redemption period has expired, the purchaser of the property has the right to be placed
in possession thereof.
In Navarra vs. CA, 204 SCRA 850, The Highest Tribunal ruled:
The purchaser at an extra-judicial foreclosure sale has the right to the possession of the property even
during the one-year period of redemption provided he files an indemnity bond. After the lapse of the
said period with no redemption having been made, that right becomes absolute and may be demanded
by the buyer even without the posting of the bond. Possession may then be obtained under a writ
which, may be applied for ex parte pursuant to sec. 7 of Act 3135 as amended by Act 4118.
It having been established that the period of redemption of the property described in Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 213950 (now Transfer Certificate of Title No. 250654) which was sold at public auction to
Far East Bank and Trust Company, (the herein petitioners predecessor-in-interest) as highest bidder in
connection with the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the mortgage has already expired without said
property having been redeemed and a new title, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 250654 issued in the
name of Far East Bank and Trust Company (now) Bank of the Philippine Islands and in conformity with
the provisions of Act 3135, as amended, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, let the corresponding writ of possession be issued directing the Sheriff of this Branch to
place the herein petitioner bank in actual physical possession of the foreclosed property situated in the
district of Sampaloc, City of Manila, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 213950, now
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 250654, and to eject therefrom mortgagor JETRI Construction
Corporation, its agents and such other persons claiming rights under it.[4]
Aggrieved by the aforequoted Order, petitioner instituted an appeal before the Court of Appeals which
was dismissed by the appellate court in a Resolution dated 17 November 2005, which reads:
For failure of the appellant to file its appellants brief within the reglementary period despite notice, the
appeal is declared ABANDONED and hereby DISMISSED, pursuant to Section 1 (e), Rule 50 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[5]
Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the dismissal of its appeal before
the appellate court. In Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, it was averred that counsel for petitioner
did not receive any notice to file its brief from the Court of Appeals as well as a copy of the letter of
transmittal of the record from the clerk of the lower court to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner, thus,
argued that this non-compliance by the clerk of the lower court in violation of Section 10 of Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court caused the unwarranted confusion which actually deprived the petitioner of the
means to know when the reglementary period to file its brief had commenced.
In a Resolution dated 1 March 2006, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration in this
wise:
Finding no merit on oppositor-appellants MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, dated December 5,
2005, considering that the Notice to File Brief, dated July 21, 2005, was sent to and received by
the oppositor-appellant, through counsel, on August 1, 2005, as shown by the attached Registry Return
Receipt (Back of p. 6, Rollo), and taking into consideration the Comment filed thereto by counsel for
petitioner-appellee, We hereby DENY the motion. [6]
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the dismissal of its appeal by the Court of Appeals amounts to a denial of due
process. Petitioner now explains in its petition before this Court that its counsel failed to receive the
Notice to file appellants brief by honest mistake or unforeseen accident as the same was received and
allegedly misplaced by one Angeline Diguinat, who was just a visiting relative of petitioners counsel
seeking financial assistance for the victims of the calamities in the province of Aurora. Moreover,
petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, in the interest of justice, equity and fair play, could have
simply directed petitioners counsel to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for failure to
comply with the order to file appellants brief.
Rule 44, Section 7[7] of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that it shall be the duty of the appellant to
file his brief within 45 days from receipt of notice; and failure to comply with this mandate is a ground for
the dismissal of the appeal as provided under Rule 50, Section 1(e) [8] of the Rules of Civil Procedure. In
the instant case, there is no question that petitioner failed to file its appellants brief despite notice which
warranted the dismissal by the appellate court of its appeal as ordained in the Rules of Court. However,
petitioner maintains that such failure must be excused as it was occasioned by an unforeseen accident
or honest mistake that petitioners counsel did not receive the notice ordering it to file the appellants
brief. Thus, petitioner rationalizes, it is erroneous for the Court of Appeals to summarily dismiss the
appeal (thereby depriving petitioner of due process) on the ground of failure to file appellants brief
within the reglementary period which could not have been possibly computed since petitioners counsel
did not receive the notice due to honest mistake or unforeseen accident. Hence, petitioner was
deprived of his due process right.
We find petitioners postulations bereft of merit. As stated in the Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated 1 March 2006, the Registry Return Receipt shows that the Notice to File Brief, dated 21 July
2005, was sent to and received by petitioner, through counsel, on 1 August 2005. However, no
appellants brief was filed by petitioner until the Resolution dated 17 November 2005, dismissing the
appeal was issued by the appellate court. Evidently, petitioners counsel was negligent in failing to file
the required appellants brief within 45 days from receipt of said notice as mandated by the Rules of
Court.Petitioners counsel, nevertheless, would like to lay the blame at the door of
one Angeline Diguinat, who allegedly was only visiting to solicit financial aid for victims of the calamities
in Aurora. Petitioners counsel explains that AngelineDiguinat, being unlearned and unaware of the
significance of the letter, unconsciously or accidentally misplaced or misfiled the notice. Still hurting,
petitioners counsel explains in the Reply that he has no regular office assistant or secretary as he is
alone in his law office which also serves as his residence.
Regrettably, such excuse of petitioners counsel is unacceptable. It is the duty of a practicing lawyer to
so arrange matters that official or judicial communications sent by mail reach him promptly. [9] For failure
to do so, he and his clients must suffer the consequences of his negligence. [10]Furthermore, a lawyer
can adopt an efficient way of handling court mail matters even if his residence also serves as his office.
[11]
Hence, if petitioners counsel was not informed by his visiting relative of the Notice to File Brief,
petitioners counsel cannot hide behind his relatives negligence to excuse his own failure to adopt an
efficient way of managing his court notices. That said, this Court cannot fault the Court of Appeals for
dismissing the appeal which was done in faithful compliance with the rules of procedure the Court has
been mandated to observe.
Nevertheless, in our desire to put an end to the present controversy, we have carefully perused the
records of this case and have reached the conclusion that the order assailed is in perfect harmony with
law and jurisprudence.
Petitioner Jetri Construction Corporation raises the validity of the foreclosure sale as a ground to attack
the propriety of the issuance of the Writ of Possession. This is erroneous. This Court, in numerous
decisions, has enunciated that any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure
cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession. [12] Regardless of whether or
not there is a pending suit for annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is
entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of the said case.
[13]
Any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale, as well as the consequent cancellation
of the writ, is to be determined in a subsequent proceeding. [14] In fact, petitioner itself has already
commenced Civil Case No. 04-111298 before the RTC of Manila, Branch 50 for annulment of mortgage
foreclosure. Therefore, the determination of the validity of said foreclosure sale is best left to the
discretion of the court wherein said complaint has been filed.

More succinctly, the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial
act.[15] After the consolidation of title in the buyers name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the
property, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right. [16] And its issuance to a purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale is merely a ministerial function. [17] It is undisputed that herein petitioner
failed to redeem the property within the redemption period and thereafter, ownership was consolidated
in favor of herein respondent and a new certificate of title was issued in its name, particularly TCT No.
250654.Thus, it was purely ministerial for the trial court to issue a writ of possession in favor of herein
respondent upon the latters filing of a petition. The issue of nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale
was of no moment.[18] Said issue cannot bar the issuance of a writ of possession since, as stated
above, any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure is not a legal ground for
refusing the issuance of a writ of possession.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84788 dismissing petitioners appeal for failure of appellant to file
its appellants brief within the reglementary period despite notice is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 111662 October 23, 1997
A.G. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE IGNACIO CAPULONG, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134; NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY; and A.
FRANCISCO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. S.P. No. 30227 which upheld the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 134, Makati, dismissing petitioner's complaint on the ground of the lack of jurisdiction.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On November 4, 1981, petitioner A.G. Development (AGDC) and public respondent National Housing
Authority (NHA) entered into a "Memorandum of Agreement" 1 wherein the former agreed to construct
on its lot a dormitory-apartment-commercial building for the latter at a total cost of Eleven Million Four
Hundred Fifty Two Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty Nine Pesos (P11,452,989.00). Pursuant to the
agreement, AGDC executed in favor of NHA a promissory note 2 and a real estate mortgage 3 over the
land as a security for the obligation. Thereafter, NHA made an initial payment of three million three
hundred eight thousand four hundred forty (P3,308,440.00) to AGDC to cover a portion of the contract
price.
On August 30, 1983, however, NHA rescinded the agreement and demanded the immediate return of
the initial amount paid on the ground that AGDC was not able to complete the project on time. The
demand was refused, as a result of which, the real estate mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed and
the property sold to NHA as the highest bidder. The one-year period to redeem having expired, a new
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued in favor of NHA; thereafter, a writ of possession was
applied for and granted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City docketed as LRC Case No. 3067
(85).
On December 3, 1986, AGDC filed a complaint against NHA before the Makati RTC docketed as Civil
Case No. 15495 for breach of contract, declaration of nullity of the promissory note and real estate
mortgage, and annulment of foreclosure sale and reversion of possession and title. NHA filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia, which was denied by the trial court. While the case was
pending, private respondent A. Francisco Realty and Development Corp. (AFRDC) filed a motion to
intervene claiming that it is an innocent purchaser for value of the subject property since it had already
bought the foreclosed property from NHA. 4
Consequently, AFRDC filed a motion to dismiss before the Makati RTC, reasoning that the said court
has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and annul the writ issued by the Quezon City RTC since
both are co-equal or coordinate jurisdiction. The Makati RTC ruled in favor of AFRDC and dismissed
AGDC's complaint. 5 Recourse to the Court of Appeals proved futile. Hence, this petition.
In resolving the instant petition, the principal issue to be addressed is whether the issuance of a writ of
possession by the Quezon City RTC constitutes res judicata as to bar the complaint filed by AGDC.
It is an oft-repeated rule that for res judicata to apply, the following requisites must concur:
a) the former judgment must be final;
b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
c) the judgment must be on the merits; and
d) there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter and causes of
action. 6
Although not explicitly stated, a basic requisite for res judicata to apply is that there are two cases
which have been decided on the merits.
In affirming the Makati RTC's dismissal of AGDC's complaint, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
issuance of the writ of possession has the effect of confirming the title of NHA over the property in
question. 7 As such, the grant of said writ constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is final
as to the claim of nullity of the promissory note, real estate mortgage and the resultant extra-judicial
foreclosure sale. We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the action to annul both the real estate
mortgage and the foreclosure sale is barred by res judicata.
The issuance of a writ of possession is not a judgment on the merits. A writ of possession is generally
understood to be an order whereby the sheriff is commanded to place a person in possession of a real
or personal property, 8such as when a property is extra-judicially foreclosed. 9 In this regard, the
issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial
function. 10 As such, the Court neither exercises its official discretion nor judgment. 11 In other words, the
issuance of the writ of possession is summary in nature, 12 hence the same cannot be considered a
judgment on the merits which is defined as one rendered after a determination of which party is right,
as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal technical point. 13
Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to
the exercise of administrative powers or to legislative, executive or ministerial
determination. 14 Accordingly,
cases disposed of on technical grounds do not fall within the doctrine of res judicata. 15 Hence, the
issuance of the writ of possession by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was not a judgment oil the
merits but simply an incident in the transfer of title.
We also note that LRC Case No. 3067 (85) is not an action as defined by law. An action is an act by
which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection of a right or the
prevention or redress of a wrong 16 and such is commenced by filing a complaint with the
Court. 17 However, in the procedure for the issuance of a writ of possession, no complaint is necessary,
the filing of an ex parte motion being enough. 18 Indeed, the term "action" does not include non-judicial
proceedings, although they are before a court, as in cases where the court does not act in a judicial
capacity. 19

There is also another consideration that supports this conclusion since an extra-judicial foreclosure only
requires the posting and publication of the notices to effect the same. 20 It has been held that a
proceeding to foreclose a mortgage by advertisement is not an action. 21

In the absence of the necessary elements, the doctrine of res judicata cannot be applied in the instant
petition.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby GRANTED. Civil Case
No. 15495 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
URSULA MAGLENTE, CONSOLACION G.R. No. 148182
BERJA, MERCEDITA FERRER,
THELMA ABELLA and ANTONIO NGO,
Petitioners, Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA* and
GARCIA, JJ.
HON. PRISCILLA BALTAZAR-
PADILLA, in her capacity as the
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Manila
Branch 38, VISITACION GABELO,
ERLINDA ABELLA, PETRA PEREZ,
ERLINDA TRAQUENA, BEN CARDINAL,
EDUARDO TRAQUENA, LEOPOLDO
TRAQUENA, MARIFE TUBALAS,
ULYSIS MATEO, JOCELYN FERNANDEZ,
ALFONSO PLACIDO, LEONARDO
TRAQUENA, SUSAN RENDON and
MATEO TRINIDAD,
Respondents. Promulgated:
March 7, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the order [1] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 38, dated April 20, 2001, denying petitioners motion
for the issuance of a writ of possession in their favor.
The antecedent facts follow.
On January 15, 1985, Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC), owner of a 687.80-square meter parcel of
land at 400 Solana St., Intramuros, Manila, entered into a contract of lease for three years with one of
the petitioners, Ursula Maglente. In the contract, it was stated that, if PRC were to sell the leased
property, Maglente would be given the first priority (right of first refusal) to buy it. Both parties likewise
agreed that the lessee was prohibited from subleasing any portion of the property without the consent
of the lessor. However, after the execution of the lease contract, petitioner Maglente subleased portions
of the property to respondents.
On March 9, 1987, when the lease contract was about to expire, PRC sent a written offer to sell the
leased property to Maglente. In response, the latter intimated that she would exercise her right of first
refusal to purchase the property with co-petitioners as her co-buyers. In February 1989, PRC received
a letter from respondents expressing their desire to purchase the same property.
On February 23, 1989, PRC filed a complaint for interpleader[2] in the RTC against both petitioners and
respondents so they could litigate among themselves on who had the right to purchase the property.
[3]
On March 11, 1991, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and declared them as the rightful
parties to purchase PRCs property. The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring [petitioners] Ursula Maglente, Consolacion Berja, Mercedita Ferrer, Thelma Abella and
Antonio Ngo as the rightful [parties] to purchase the land in controversy; and
2. Ordering[PRC] to execute the corresponding contract of sale/contract to sell in favor of [petitioners]
aforementioned in accordance with this Decision within 30 days from notice hereof.[4]
Dissatisfied with the above decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed
the judgment of the trial court.
Undaunted, respondents found their way to this Court, assigning as sole error the ruling of the CA
upholding the right of petitioners. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 111743.
On October 8, 1999, we affirmed the decision of the CA and denied respondents petition for lack of
merit.[5] We declared:
In the case under consideration, the contract of sale was already perfected PRC offered the subject lot
for sale to [petitioners] Maglente and her group Respondent Maglente and her group accepted such
offermanifesting their intention to purchase the property as provided for under the lease contract. Thus,
there was already an offer and acceptance giving rise to a valid contract. As a matter of fact,
[petitioners] have already completed payment of their downpayment of P100,000. Therefore, as borne
by evidence on record, the requisites under Article 1318 of the Civil Code for a perfected contract have
been met.
On April 11, 2000,[6] we ordered entry of judgment.
On motion of petitioners, a writ of execution was later issued by the RTC directing PRC to execute the
contract of sale/contract to sell in favor of petitioners.
As ordered, PRC executed a deed of sale in favor of petitioners. The latter then filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession but respondents (who were occupying the property) objected on the
ground that the trial courts decision on the interpleader case merely resolved petitioners right to
purchase the leased property but did not declare them as the owners entitled to possession. The trial
court sustained respondents argument and denied petitioners motion.[7]
Petitioners are now before us via this special civil action for certiorari raising this sole query: whether or
not they are entitled to a writ of possession after being adjudged (in the interpleader case) as the
proper parties to buy the subject property, considering that a deed of sale has already been executed in
their favor.[8]
In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65, petitioners assail the Manila RTCs denial of their motion for
the issuance of the writ of possession. However, they do not allege that the trial court was without
jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction, or that it committed grave abuse of discretion in denying said
motion, as required in all Rule 65 petitions.
The remedy of certiorari is limited to acts of any tribunal or board exercising judicial functions without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. [9] It must be based on jurisdictional grounds
like want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion; otherwise, any error committed by it will amount to
nothing more than an error of judgment which may be questioned only on ordinary appeal.[10]
Considering, however, that a question of law[11] is involved, that is, whether a writ of possession should
be granted to a party with the right of first refusal in an interpleader case, we give due course to this
petition.
Indeed, should petitioners be granted the writ of possession they seek? We rule in the negative.
A writ of possession shall issue only in the following instances: (1) land registration proceedings; (2)
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial foreclosure of property provided that
the mortgagor has possession and no third party has intervened, and (4) execution sales. [12] Here,
petitioners seek the writ as a consequence of the trial courts decision ordering the execution of a
contract of sale/contract to sell in their favor. The writ does not lie in such a case.
Furthermore, the trial courts decision in the interpleader case (affirmed by both the CA and the SC)
merely resolved the question of who, between petitioners and respondents, had the right to
purchase PRCs property. The directive was only for PRC to execute the necessary contract in favor of
petitioners as the winning parties, nothing else. The trial courts writ of execution read:
 SO ORDERED.

NOW THEREFORE, [PRC] is hereby ordered to execute a contract of sale/contract to sell in

favor of [petitioners] within thirty (30) days from the date of execution hereof. The Branch Sheriff
shall return this Writ to the Court within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt until the judgment is
satisfied in full or its effectivity expires. The returns of periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the
proceedings taken and shall be filed with the Court and copies thereof promptly furnished the
parties[13] (emphasis supplied)

It was clear that, at that point, petitioners were not yet the owners of the property. The execution of the
deed of sale in their favor was only preliminary to their eventual acquisition of the property. [14] Likewise,
although we stated in G.R. No. 111743[15] that the contract of sale between petitioners and PRC had
already been perfected, we refrained from declaring them the owners since, pending the execution of
the deed of sale or delivery of the property, ownership had yet to transfer to them at that time. [16]

Thus, petitioners argument that the trial courts writ of execution [17] in the interpleader case carried with it
the corollary right to a writ of possession is without merit. A writ of possession complements the writ of
execution onlywhen the right of possession or ownership has been validly determined in a case directly
relating to either.[18] The interpleader case obviously did not delve into that issue.

Furthermore, the rule is that the enforcement of a judgment may not vary or alter the tenor of the
judgment but must strictly conform to it.[19] It should be in harmony with the judgment that gives it life
and not exceed it.[20] We thus cannot fault the trial court for refusing to issue a writ of possession to
petitioners as its issuance would not be in conformity with the trial courts judgment in
the interpleader case.

Finally, petitioners cannot recover possession of the property via a mere motion. They must file the
appropriate action in court against respondents to recover possession. While this remedy can delay
their recovery, this Court cannot permit an abbreviated method without subverting the rules and
processes established for the orderly administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, the assailed order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, is
hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the petition is DISMISSED.

Costs against petitioners.

 Hi Baby Hi Baby
Goodluck! Goodluck!
Review well. I Review well. I
love you. :* love you. :*
Hi Baby Hi Baby
Goodluck! Goodluck!
Review well. I Review well. I
love you. :* love you. :*