Republic vs rosemoor mining

Facts:

Petitioners, Dr. Lourdes S. Pascual, Dr. Pedro De la Concha, Alejandro De La Concha, and Rufo De Guzman, have been granted
permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan, after succeeding in discovering marble
deposits of high quality and in commercial quantities in Mount Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato mountain range. After compliance
with numerous required conditions, License No. 33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines in favor of the herein petitioners.

Shortly after Respondent Ernesto R. Maceda was appointed Minister of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR),
petitioners License No. 33 was cancelled by him Because of the aforesaid cancellation, the original petition was filed and later substituted by
the petitioners

On September 27, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision that the privilege granted under respondents license had already ripened into a
property right, which was protected under the due process clause of the Constitution.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, it affirms the decision of the trial court that the grant of the quarry license was authorized by law. Hence
this petition.

Issue:

(1) [W]hether or not QLP No. 33 was issued in blatant contravention of Section 69, P.D. No. 463; and

(2) whether or not Proclamation No. 84 issued by then President Corazon Aquino is valid. The corollary issue is whether or not the
Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto law applies to Proclamation No. 84

Held

1. The language of PD 463 is clear. It states in categorical and mandatory terms that a quarry license, like that of respondents, should cover
a maximum of 100 hectares in any given province. This law neither provides any exception nor makes any reference to the number of
applications for a license. Section 69 of PD 463 must be taken to mean exactly what it says. Where the law is clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.[22]

Moreover, the lower courts ruling is evidently inconsistent with the fact that QLP No. 33 was issued solely in the name of Rosemoor Mining
and Development Corporation, rather than in the names of the four individual stockholders who are respondents herein. It likewise brushes
aside a basic postulate that a corporation has a separate personality from that of its stockholders.[23]

The interpretation adopted by the lower courts is contrary to the purpose of Section 69 of PD 463. Such intent to limit, without qualification,
the area of a quarry license strictly to 100 hectares in any one province is shown by the opening proviso that reads:Notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 14 hereof x x x. The mandatory nature of the provision is also underscored by the use of the wordshall. Hence, in the
application of the 100-hectare-per-province limit, no regard is given to the size or the number of mining claims under Section 14

2. In line with the foregoing jurisprudence, respondents license may be revoked or rescinded by executive action when the national interest
so requires, because it is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.[29]Respondents
themselves acknowledge this condition of the grant under paragraph 7 of QLP No. 33, which we quote:

7. This permit/license may be revoked or cancelled at any time by the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences when, in his opinion
public interests so require or, upon failure of the permittee/licensee to comply with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463,
as amended, and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, as well as with the terms and conditions specified
herein; Provided, That if a permit/license is cancelled, or otherwise terminated, the permittee/licensee shall be liable for all unpaid
rentals and royalties due up to the time of the termination or cancellation of the permit/license

WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby GRANTED and the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

La bugal blaan vs ramos

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/dec2004/127882.htm

http://pinoycasedigest.blogspot.com/2013/08/la-bugal-blaan-tribal-association-inc.html

http://digestingcases.blogspot.com/2015/06/la-bugal-blaan-tribal-association-inc.html
http://legalnature.blogspot.com/2007/10/la-bugal-blaan-tribal-assn-vs-ramos.html

http://karissafaye.blogspot.com/2010/05/la-bugal-blaan-vs-denr-jan.html

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BALITE PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE

March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) was granted Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land,
which included the hotly-contested Diwalwal area.

on June 27, 1991congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076, or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act, it created the Provincial Mining Regulatory
Board (PMRB) under the DENR Secretarys direct supervision and control. Statute also authorized the PMRB to declare and set aside small-scale
mining areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary[5] and award mining contracts to small-scale miners under certain conditions.

Subsequently, a petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the admission of a Mineral Production Sharing Arrangement (MPSA) proposal
over Diwalwal was filed before the DENR Regional Executive Director, docketed as RED Mines Case No. 8-8-94 entitled, Rosendo Villaflor, et
al. v. Marcopper Mining Corporation.

On February 16, 1994, while the RED Mines case was pending, Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133 to petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold
Mining Corporation (SEM),[8] which in turn applied for an integrated MPSA over the land covered by the permit.

In due time, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. XI in Davao City (MGB-XI) accepted and registered the integrated MPSA
application of petitioner, after the publication MAC cases arises.

March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act, was enacted. Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA) tasked to resolve disputes
involving conflicting mining rights. The RPA subsequently took cognizance of the RED Mines case, which was consolidated with the MAC
cases.

On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 which provided that the DENR shall study thoroughly
and exhaustively the option of diret state utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area.

On July 16, 1997, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals against
PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC). It prayed for the nullification of the above-
quoted Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the "direct state utilization" espoused therein would effectively impair its vested rights
under EP No. 133; and that the memorandum order arbitrarily imposed the unwarranted condition that certain studies be conducted before mining
and environmental laws are enforced by the DENR.

Issue:

Whether or not the MO 97-03 divested petitioner of its vested right to the gold rush area under its EP No. 133.

Held:

the alleged vested rights claimed by petitioner, it is well to note that the same is invariably based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being
disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases. A reading of the appealed MAB decision reveals that the continued efficacy of EP No. 133 is one of
the issues raised in said cases, with respondents therein asserting that Marcopper cannot legally assign the permit which purportedly had expired.
In other words, whether or not petitioner actually has a vested right over Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still an indefinite and unsettled matter.
And until a positive pronouncement is made by the appellate court in the Consolidated Mines cases, EP No. 133 cannot be deemed as a source of
any conclusive rights that can be impaired by the issuance of MO 97-03.

Additionally, there can be no valid opposition raised against a mere study of an alternative which the State, through the DENR, is authorized to
undertake in the first place. Worth noting is Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically provides:

SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests
or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision
of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements
with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may
be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be
provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant. (Underscoring ours)

Likewise, Section 4, Chapter II of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 states:

SEC. 4. Ownership of Mineral Resources. - Mineral Resources are owned by the State and the exploration, development, utilization, and
processing thereof shall be under its full control and supervision. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into mineral
agreements with contractors. (Underscoring ours)

Thus, the State may pursue the constitutional policy of full control and supervision of the exploration, development and utilization of the countrys
natural mineral resources, by either directly undertaking the same or by entering into agreements with qualified entities. The DENR Secretary
acted within his authority when he ordered a study of the first option, which may be undertaken consistently in accordance with the constitutional
policy enunciated above.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44693 is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC. vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

This is a petition that seeks to set aside the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the dismissal of the petitioner's action for
annulment and cancellation of free patents granted to the private respondents on the ground that the petitioner has no personality to file an action
for reversion, the lands involved being public In character.

On July 20, 1962, the President of the Philippines granted the following mining patents on mineral claims located at Ungay Malobago, Rapu-
Rapu Albay.

Way back on October 30, 1959, John Canson, Jr. and Carlos Stilianopulos assigned their rights to their mining claims in favor of the petitioner.
The assignment of rights was recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on December 2, 1959.

, the Register of Deeds of Albay issued the respective original certificates of titles pursuant to Section 122 of Act No. 496 in the names of John
Canson, Jr., Carlos Stilianopulos, and the petitioner.

Subsequently, or from 1968 to 1974, the following free patents were granted by the respondent Director of Lands and the corresponding original
certificates of titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of Albay: the patents covered portions of the lots covered by the patents belonging to
the petitioner.

The petitioner filed a complaint for annulment and cancellation of patents against the private respondents and prayed that all the free patent titles
issued in their favor for properties over which original certificates of title had already been issued in its favor be declared null and void.

The Director of Lands, who was impleaded as a formal defendant, filed his answer alledging, among others, that the petitioner has no personality
to institute the cancellation proceedings inasmuch as the government is the grantor and not the petitioner, and it should be the grantor who should
institute the cancellation proceedings.

On January 25, 1980, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. It ruled that since the disputed properties form part of
disposable land of the public domain, the action for reversion should be instituted by the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines and that, therefore, the petitioner lacks personality to institute the annulment proceedings.

The petitioner appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court.

On April 5, 1984, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. According to the Court, under Section 101 of the Public Land Law,
only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead has the authority to institute an action on behalf of the Republic for the cancellation of
the respondents' titles and for reversion of their homesteads to the Government

Issues

a) Whether or not the appellate court committed an error of law when it ruled that the lands in question belong to the public domain;
b) whether or not the appellate court erred in discussing the complaint on the ground that the petitioner had no personality to institute the same.

With regard to the first issue, the petitioner maintains that since its mining claims were perfected prior to November 15, 1935, the date when the
1935 Constitution took effect, the applicable law is the Philippine Bill of 1902 and that under this Act, a valid location of a mining claim
segregates the area from the public domain.

The Solicitor-General, on the other hand, argues that the petitioner's mining patents covered by Torrens Titles were granted only in 1962 by the
President of the Philippines, by authority of the Constitution of the Philippines. Under the then Constitution, except for public agricultural lands,
natural resources which includes all mineral lands, shall not be alienated. (Art. XIII, Section 1, 1935 Constitution) Therefore, what the mining
patents issued in 1962 conveyed to petitioner was only the ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals within the area covered
by the petitioner's Torrens Titles but not the ownership of the land where the minerals are found.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Pnb vs lui she

Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister Lorenza were the owners in common of a piece of land in Manila.

The sisters lived in one of the houses, while Wong Heng, a Chinese, lived with his family in the restaurant. Wong had been a long-time lessee of
a portion of the property, having a monthly rental of P2,620.

On September 22, 1957 Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property as her sister died with no other heir. Then already well advanced
in years, being at the time 90 years old, blind, crippled and an invalid, she was left with no other relative to live with, but she was taken cared of
by Wong.

"In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of the Lessee to her," Justina Santos executed on November 15, 1957, a contract of lease in
favor of Wong, covering the portion then already leased to him and another portion fronting Florentino Torres street. The lease was for 50 years,
although the lessee was given the right to withdraw at any time from the agreement;

On December 21 she executed contract giving Wong the option to buy the leased premises for P120,000, payable within ten years at a monthly
installment of P1,000. The option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a petition for which was then pending in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal.

On November 18, 1958 she executed two other contracts, one extending the term of the lease to 99 years, and another fixing the term of the
option at 50 years. Both contracts are written in Tagalog. In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959, she bade her legatees to respect the
contracts she had entered into with Wong, but in a codicil of a later date (November 4, 1959) she appears to have a change of heart. Claiming that
the various contracts were made by her because of machinations and inducements practised by him, she now directed her executor to secure the
annulment of the contracts Both parties however died, Wong Heng on October 21, 1962 and Justina Santos on December 28, 1964. Wong was
substituted by his wife, Lui She, the other defendant in this case, While Justina Santos was substituted by the Philippine Banking Corporation.
Justina Santos maintained now reiterated by the Philippine Banking Corporation that the lease contract should have been annulled along
with the four other contracts because it lacks mutuality, among others

Issue

Was the contract between Wong (Lui She) and Justina Santos (Phil. Banking) enforceable?
No. The contract of lease, as in this case, cannot be sustained. However, to be sure, a lease to an alien for a reasonable period was valid, so was an
option giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship.

But if an alien was given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or
otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it became clear that the arrangement was a virtual transfer of ownership.

The contracts in question are annulled and set aside; the land subject-matter of the contracts was ordered returned to the estate of Justina Santos
as represented by the Philippine Banking Corporation.

La bugal

FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 (The Philippine
Mining Act of 1995), its implementing rules and regulations and the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA)
dated March 30, 1995 by the government with Western Mining Corporation(Philippines) Inc. (WMCP).
Accordingly, the FTAA violated the 1987 Constitution in that it is a service contract and is antithetical to the principle of
sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources,
to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.

ISSUE:
What is the proper interpretation of the phrase Agreements involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance contained in
paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its implementing rules and regulations
insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement.
Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided that the State retains the power to
direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or modify plans and actions of the contractor. The idea of full control is
similar to that which is exercised by the board of directors of a private corporation, the performance of managerial,
operational, financial, marketing and other functions may be delegated to subordinate officers or given to contractual
entities, but the board retains full residual control of the business.

Chavez pea

The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took
over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR (Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or
about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.

PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.

HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction a
gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila
Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint venture agreement) to AMARI, a
private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore,
since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources
other than agricultural lands of the public domain.