Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both
assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of
Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient
evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig,
Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square
meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more
than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan
presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as
surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of
249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No.
20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanans application for
land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the
name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at
Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan
had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto), 4 the
CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession
prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR
certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15,
1982, Velazcos possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing
Malabanans period of possession.
Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CAs
decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit 5 (Naguit)
remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this
regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and
disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the
Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out
that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for
registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere
obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and
declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their
argument that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land
of the public domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that the
property had been "converted" into private property through prescription at the time of the
application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was previously classified
as agricultural land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to
establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the part
of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as
alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the
State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos, 7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic
v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable
opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest
had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof;
that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan
filed the application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the
land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and
disposable by the State.
The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the
application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the
interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It
reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different
classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership.11Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b)
belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or
although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of
the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the
State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country
from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, 14 all lands of the
public domain belong to the State.15 This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown
to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the
classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of
the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. 19 Section 10,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically,
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing
land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution
adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral,
but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses
to which they may be devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is
done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department. 22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be
alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public
domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of
the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil
Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands
classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or
disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural. 24 A positive act of the Government is
necessary to enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands
under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. 26 If, however, public
land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when
public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth,
thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such
conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect. 27 Thus, until the
Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or
the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and
not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of
the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise
classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it
excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of
Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2
of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant
must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession
and occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier;
and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public
domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands
of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration
must have been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision
to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public
domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and
disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the
requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification
or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable
agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any
possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It
observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere
judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent
be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession
and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left
to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession and
occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12,
1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written
by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress
prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as
agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect or incomplete title is
derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the
character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of
the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of the period. 29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine,
corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already
converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of
possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the
application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute
the presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which
prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicants possession
and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical,
open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but
a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that
such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to
unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation
thereof for the number of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear
in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears out, when
Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent requirements
and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly
residential lands, subject to area limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby converting such
land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and
registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run against the
State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of
the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private
ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated
or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and
disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11
of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the
application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the
time of the application, provided the applicants possession and occupation of
 the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive
presumption that the applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by
virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already
ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private property. 37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no
longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are
removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted
into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or
disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or
extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to private
ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition
sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property
of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying
the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure
converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to
be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless
Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended
for public service or for the development of the national wealth.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's
Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 144057. January 17, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
seeking to review the Decision[1] of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate court affirmed the decisions of both the Regional Trial Court
(RTC),[2] Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC)[3] of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which granted the application for
registration of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito S. Naguit,
filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land
situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-
D, Nabas Cadastre, AP 060414-014779, and contains an area of 31,374 square meters. The application
seeks judicial confirmation of respondents imperfect title over the aforesaid land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The public prosecutor,
appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed
the petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal opposition to the
petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court issued an order of general default against the whole
world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888
until 1991.[4] On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato
Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale
made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956.[5] Subsequently, the heirs of Maming
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the
same. She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator
introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in addition to
existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on
the subject land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the subject land which have been
issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the
land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the
government until she filed her application for registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested that the
government did not intend to present any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as representative of
the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite notice. On September 27, 1997,
the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the operation of the
Property Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto
registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit.[6]
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied for was declared alienable
and disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the certification from Regional Executive Director Raoul
T. Geollegue of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI. [7] However, the
court denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated February 18, 1998.[8]
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo,
Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision, dismissing the appeal. [9]
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the
petition filed by the Republic and affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was filed by the Republic
on September 4, 2000.[10]
 The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the appellate court
gravely erred in holding that there is no need for the governments prior release of the subject lot from
the public domain before it can be considered alienable or disposable within the meaning of P.D. No.
1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the required
period.[11]
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before
the applicants possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court[12] in
arguing that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable.
Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have
maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable, the OSG
argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings,
bears close examination. It expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws.
....
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under
Section 14(1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that
the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land
should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain
meaning of Section 14(1). Since June 12, 1945, as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase
under a bonafide claim of ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the
words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely
located.[13] Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position.
Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the
public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant.
Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper
to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State
irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has
already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention
on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
 This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of Appeals.[14] Therein,
the Court noted that to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.[15] In that case, the subject land had been certified by
the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the alienable status of
the land, compounded by the established fact that therein respondents had occupied the land even
before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said property. In the case at bar,
even the petitioner admits that the subject property was released and certified as within alienable and
disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.[16]
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,[17] wherein the Court noted
that while the claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in question
were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not succeed.
In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was
declared alienable and disposable. Thus, in this case, where the application was made years after the
property had been certified as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
A different rule obtains for forest lands,[18] such as those which form part of a reservation for
provincial park purposes[19] the possession of which cannot ripen into ownership.[20] It is elementary
in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. As held
in Palomo v. Court of Appeals,[21] forest land is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how
lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable.[22] In the case at bar, the property in question was undisputedly classified as
disposable and alienable; hence, the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of
Appeals.[23]
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the basis of Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which pertains to original registration through ordinary
registration proceedings. The right to file the application for registration derives from a bona
fide claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimants open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but those titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed
necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced
from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that
the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the
reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer
to agricultural lands of the public domain, while the Property Registration Decree uses the term
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It must be noted though that the Constitution
declares that alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.[24] Clearly, the
subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073
preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which
commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of those who have acquired ownership of private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. [25] There is a
consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into
private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30)
years.[26] With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of private lands
under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership
through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later
than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor
may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees
now over fifty years old.[27] The inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as
alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, as correctly accomplished by the lower courts.
The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had been in possession
in the concept of owner for the required period. The argument begs the question. It is again hinged on
the assertionshown earlier to be unfoundedthat there could have been no bona fide claim of ownership
prior to 1980, when the subject land was declared alienable or disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that
Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her
predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual, and
the Court generally respects the factual findings made by lower courts. Notably, possession since 1945
was established through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time Naguit purchased
the property as well as tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax declarations and
realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are
good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying
taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least
proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[28]
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent can be traced
back to that of her predecessors-in-interest which commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years,
it is indeed beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired title thereto which may be properly
brought under the operation of the Torrens system. That she has been in possession of the land in the
concept of an owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without any opposition from any private person
and the government itself makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection
under the law.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120066. September 9, 1999]
OCTABELA ALBA Vda. De RAZ, Spouses MANUEL and SUSANA BRAULIO, RODOLFO,
LOURDES and BEATRIZ all surnamed ALBA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and JOSE LACHICA, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is an appeal by certiorari from a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals dated
August 18, 1992 affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch
I, in Land Registration Case No. K-101, LRC Record No. K. 15104, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The parcel of land described in Plan Psu-161277 and the improvements thereon
situated in the Poblacion of the Municipality of Banga, Province of Aklan, Philippines, with an
area of 4,845 square meters is brought under the operation of the property registration decree
(PD No. 1529) and the title thereto is registered and confirmed in the name of applicant Jose
Lachica, married to Adela Raz of Kalibo, Aklan, Philippines;
2. A ten (10) meter road width along the national road mentioned in the application be
segregated for future road widening program upon payment of just compensation to be
annotated at the back of the title;
3. For lack of merit, the opposition filed by the spouses Manuel and Susana Braulio,
Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz, Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba are hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[1]
The factual antecedents of the case as summed by the trial court and adopted by the Court of
Appeals are as follows:
Applicant Jose Lachica filed this application for title to land on April 28, 1958 with the claim that
the land applied for was purchased by him and his wife, Adela Raz from, from one Eulalio Raz.The
documents attached to the application are: technical description, surveyors certificate, certification
by the chief deputy assessor of Aklan and the blue print of Psu-161277.
The initial hearing was scheduled for October 31, 1958 and the certificate of publication in the
Official Gazette was issued on September 23, 1958. The certification of posting of the notice of
initial hearing was issued on October 13, 1958.
The land applied for is residential, situated in the Poblacion of Banga, Aklan, with an area of 4,845
square meters, bounded on the northeast by the property of the Municipality of Banga (Sketch, Exh.
F).
The initial hearing was held on October 31, 1958. An order of general default was issued but those
who presented their opposition, namely, Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz, Manuel and Susana Braulio,
Jose Rago, representing Apolonia Rebeco, the Director of Lands and the Municipality of Banga
represented by the Provincial Fiscal, were given thirty (30) days to file their written opposition.
Manuel C. Braulio and Susana P. Braulio filed their opposition on October 31, 1958. They opposed
the registration of the southeastern portion of the 240 square meters of the land applied for alleging
that they are the owners in fee simple and possessors of said portion and all the improvements
thereon for not less than 70 years together with their predecessor-in-interest deriving their title by
purchase from the original owners. They prayed for the Court to declare them the true and absolute
owners of the disputed portion of the same in their names.
On October 31, 1958, Octabela Vda. de Raz filed her opposition.
Jose Rago filed his opposition on November 29, 1958 as the duly constituted attorney-in-fact of
Apolonia Rebeco although no special power of attorney was attached. He opposed the registration of
the northeastern portion of the land applied for, with an area of 43.83 square meters. He alleged that
his principal is the owner by right of succession and is in the possession of said portion with all its
improvements for more than 80 years together with his predecessor-in-interest, continuously,
peacefully and openly under claim of ownership. He prayed that his principal be declared the true
and absolute owner of the disputed portion of 43.83 square meters.
On March 22, 1966, the Court issued an Order allowing the applicant to hire another surveyor to
segregate the non-controversial portion of the land applied for and to notify the oppositors and their
counsels.
On January 12, 1970, a motion to lift the order of general default and to admit the attached
opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba, as well as a motion to admit the
attached amended petition of Octabela Vda. de Raz were filed. The Court in its order dated March
21, 1970 admitted said opposition and set aside the order of default.
In their opposition, Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Octabela Alba
Vda. de Raz, alleged that they are the co-owners of a portion of the land applied for with an area of
2,262 square meters bounded on the north by Januario Masigon, Nicolas Realtor, Agustina Rebeldia
and Apolonia Rebeco, on the south by Eulalio Raz and on the west by the public market of
Banga. They claimed to have inherited the above-mentioned portion from their late father, Eufrosino
M. Alba, who purchased the same from Dionisia Regado in 1918. Hence, they have been in
possession continuously, openly and peacefully under claim of ownership of the above-mentioned
portion for not less 70 years. They prayed that the disputed portion of 2,262 square meters be
registered as their pro-indiviso property.
In her amended opposition, Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz opposed the registration of the southeastern
portion of the land applied for with an area of 331.44 square meters. She claimed to have been in
peaceful, continuous and open possession together with her deceased husband, Eulalio Raz, under
claim of ownership of the above-mentioned portion for not less than 70 years, by purchase from its
owners. She likewise opposed the registration of the western portion of the land applied for, with an
area of 676 square meters, having purchased the same from its original owners on (sic) her
predecessor-in-interest has been open, peaceful and continuous under claim of ownership for a
period of not less than 70 years. She prayed that the portion of 331.44 square meters be registered in
her name and that of the heirs of Eulalio Raz, pro indiviso., and the other portion of 676 square
meters be registered solely in her name.
On February 25, 1970, the applicant Dr. Jose Lachica filed his consolidated opposition and reply to
the motion to lift order of default stating that there is no reason to do so under the Rules of Court,
and that the opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba, as well as the amended
opposition of Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz are without merit in law and in fact.
On March 21, 1970, the motion to lift the order of general default was granted and the opposition of
Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba, as well as the opposition of Octabela Alba Vda. de
Raz were all admitted.
In the hearing of March 3, 1972, applicant offered for admission exhibits A to I and the testimonies
of Pedro Ruiz (April 20, 1971), Jose Rago (Oct. 23, 1970) and Dr. Jose Lachica (July 16, 1971; Feb.
10, 1972). The Court admitted the same.
On March 13, 1974, the Court issued an order appointing Engr. Angeles Relor to act as
Commissioner and delimit the portions claimed by the three sets of oppositors and submit an
amended approved plan together with the technical description for each portion.
The Commissioners report and sketch was submitted on December 4, 1974. The applicant filed his
opposition to the Commissioners report on December 12, 1974. The Court in its order of December
13, 1974 required the Commissioner to submit an amended report and amended sketch.
The Commissioners corrected report and sketch was submitted on February 24, 1975 which the
Court approved on February 25, 1975 there being no objection from the parties.
On March 15, 1977, the Court issued an order whereby the testimony of oppositor Octabela Alba
Vda. de Raz was stricken off the record for her failure to appear in the scheduled hearing on March
15, 1977.
Again, in its order dated May 27, 1977 the testimony of Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz was stricken off
record because the latter was bedridden and can not possibly appear for cross-examination.
Oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz substituted by her heirs filed a formal offer of exhibits
on August 24, 1988. Applicant filed his comments thereto on August 29, 1988. The Court admitted
said exhibits and the testimony of their witness on March 1, 1989.
In this applicaton for title to land filed by applicant Jose Lachica, four oppositions were filed by the
following:
 1. Jose Rago, in representation of Apolonia Rebeco;
2. Manuel C. Braulio and Susana Braulio;
3. Rodolfo, Lourdes and Beatriz, all surnamed Alba, represented by Octabela Alba Vda.
de Raz; and
4. Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz.
In the hearing of October 23, 1970, counsel for oppositor Jose Rago manifested that he would file a
motion for withdrawal of opposition and Jose Rago himself declared his conformity (Tsn, Oct. 23,
1970, p. 5). Although no formal motion to withdraw was actually filed, oppositor Rago has not
presented evidence on his behalf; hence, his opposition must be disregarded.
As regards oppositor Manuel C. Braulio ans Susana Braulio, a deed of sale supposedly executed by
Susana Braulio and Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz in 1956 was identified by Felimon Raz, a witness for
the oppositors (Tsn, Sept. 29, 1977, pp. 3 to 4). However, said deed cannot be found in the
records. Even so, the Braulios have not presented evidence to show that by the time this application
was filed, they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, public, peaceful and
continuous possession of the land claimed, in concept of owner, for at least 10 years sufficient to
acquire title thereto (Arts. 1117, 1118, 1134, Civil Code of the Philippines). As such, the opposition
of Manuel C. Braulio and Susana Braulio must be dismissed.[2]
On the basis of the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the applicant and the
oppositor Raz, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the applicant as stated at the outset.In
dismissing the claim of the remaining oppositors Rodolfo, Lourdes and Beatriz, all surnamed Alba,
represented by Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz and Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz herself, the trial court in
sum noted that said oppositors have never offered any explanation as to the non-payment of realty
taxes for the disputed portions of the subject property from 1941 to 1958 while the
respondent/applicant continuously paid taxes under Tax Declaration No. 14181 covering said property
from 1945-1958 when the case was filed per certification issued by the Municipal Treasurers Office
of Banga.[3] In rendering judgment in favor of respondent/applicant, the trial court stressed that while
it is true that tax receipts and declarations of ownership for tax purposes are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when
accompanied by proof of actual possession.
Dissatisfied, petitioners interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
Unfazed, petitioners now come to this Court arguing that
1. The Civil law provisions on prescription are inapplicable.
2. The applicable law is Section 48 [a] of the Public Land Law or Act 141, as amended.
3. Private respondent has not acquired ownership in fee simple, much less has he met the
conditions for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 [a] of Act
141, as amended, except perhaps for a 620 square meter portion of the land applied
for because:
3.1. There is absolutely no proof of the alleged sales made by Raz and Alba.
3.2. There is absolutely no reliable proof of the alleged theft of the deeds of sale.
3.3. The identity of the land has not been established.
3.4. The Court of Appeals misapplied the basic rules governing the introduction of
secondary evidence.
3.5. The applicant/respondents Tax Declaration No. 14181 is a doctored tax declaration.
3.6. Applicant/respondents tax declarations have no probative value.
3.7. Applicant/respondent has not satisfied the required quantum of evidence in land
registration cases.
3.8. Petitioners-oppositors have proven their right over the subject property.
In rendering judgment in favor of private respondent, the Court of Appeals reasoned, inter
alia, as follows:
On the basis of the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the applicant, the trial court
did not err in confirming that the applicant is the absolute owner in fee simple of the property subject
of the application for registration entitling him to register the same in his name under the operation
of PD 1529.
It is of no moment that the applicant failed to produce the originals of those other deeds/documents
of conveyances, for he was able to present sufficient substantial secondary evidence, in accordance
with the requirements of Section 4, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, now Section 5, same
Rule of the Revised Rules on Evidence, and the doctrines in point.
Thus, Government vs. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817, explained that when the original writing is not
available for one reason or another which is the best or primary evidence, to prove its contents is the
testimony of some one who has read or known about it. Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA
148, laid out the foundation before secondary evidence is introduced, that the due execution,
delivery and reason for non-production of the original writing must first be produced. Raylago vs
Jarabe, 22 SCRA 1247, ruled that it is not necessary to prove the loss of the original document
beyond all possibility of mistake. A reasonable probability of its loss is sufficient and this may be
shown by a bonafide (sic) and diligent search, fruitlessly made, for it in places where it is likely to be
found. After proving the due execution and delivery of the document, together with the fact that the
same has been lost or destroyed, its contents may be proved, among others, by the recollection of
witnesses. And Beall vs. Dearing, 7 ala. 126; and Bogardas vs. Trinity Church, 4 Sandf. Ch. (Nn.y.)
639, are of the view that that where the lost documents are more than thirty (30) years old and would
thus prove themselves if produced, secondary evidence of their contents is admissible without proof
of their execution.
In the case at bar, petitioner acquired the property in 1940-1941. He presented the Deed (Exh. G)
executed by the vendor Faustino Martirez. While he failed to present the other deeds of sale covering
the other portions of the property, he has sufficiently established that they were notarized documents
and were taken by his mother-in-law sometime in 1956. He reported the loss to the authorities and
even filed a case of theft. He further exerted efforts and made a diligent search of those documents
from the notary public but in vain. He presented the clerk of the Municipal Treasurers Office of
Banga, who testified having seen those deeds as they were presented to him by the applicant and
which were used as basis for the preparation and issuance of Tax Declaration No. 14181 in the name
of the tax declarant. Tax Declaration No. 14181 (Exh. H) was presented in Court, proving that the
land was declared for tax purposes in the name of the applicant and his wife. The applicant has been
paying the realty tax covering the property since 1945 and beyond 1958, when the application for
registration was filed in court, per certification of the Municipal Treasurer of Banga (Exh. 1).
In resume, We find and so hold as did the trial court that Dr. Jose Lachica is the abolute owner in fee
simple of the land described in his application for its original registration in his name. The land
contains an area of 4,845 square meters, more or less, situated in Banga, Aklan, and
Bounded on the NE., along line1-2, by property of Apolonia Rimate; on the SE., along line 2-3, by
National road; on the SW., along line 3-4, by property of the Mpl. Government of Banga (Public
Market); and on the NW., along line 4-1, by property of the Municipal Government of Banga (Public
Market). Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan, being N. 45 deg. 02 E., 423.38 m. from B.L.L.M. 1,
Mp. of Banga, Aklan;
thence, S. 33 deg. 46 E., 87.66 m. to point 2
thence, S. 56 deg. 42 W., 63.81 m. to point 3
thence, N. 37 deg. 22 W., 59.26 m. to point 4
thence, N. 33 deg. 42 E., 73.08 m. to the point of
beginning, xxx All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground by
P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons. Bearings true date of the survey, January 25, 1957, and that of the approval,
October 3, 1957.
The applicant has been in public, open, continuous and adverse possession of the property since
1940-41 up to the present to the exclusion of all, and thereby also acquired the property by
acquisitive prescription, in accordance with Sections 40 and 43 of Act 190, otherwise known as the
Code of Civil Procedure, having been in actual and adverse possession under claim of ownership for
over ten (10) years, and thus in whatever way his occupancy might have commenced or continued
under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants, resulted in the
acquisition of title to the land by acquisitive prescription (Vda. de Delima vs. Tio, 32 SCRA 516).
Indeed, to borrow the apt words of the ponente in the Delima case, such proof of ownership of, and
the adverse, continuous possession of the applicant since 1940, strongly xxx militate against any
judicial cognizance of a matter that could have been withheld in its ken, hence, whatever right
oppositors may have had over the property or any portion thereof was thereby also lost through
extinctive prescription in favor of the applicant who had been in actual, open, adverse and
continuous possession of the land applied for in the concept of owner for over 10 years when the
application for registration was filed in court.[4]
It is a fundamental and settled rule that findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals are final, binding or conclusive on the parties and upon this Court, [5] which will not be
reviewed[6] or disturbed on appeal unless these findings are not supported by evidence[7] or unless
strong and cogent reasons dictate otherwise.[8]
More explicitly, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which are as a general rule deemed
conclusive, may be reviewed by this Court in the following instances:
1.] When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory;[9]
2.] When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;[10]
3.] When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken, absurd[11] or impossible;
4.] Where there is a grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;[12]
5.] When the appellate court in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case,
and such findings are contrary to the submission of both appellant and appellee;
6.] When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of
facts;[13]
7.] When the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; [14]
8.] When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
9.] When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; and
10.] When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record. [15]
The primordial issue to be resolved is whether or not the private respondent/applicant is entitled
to the confirmation of his ownership in fee simple for the 4, 845 square meter parcel of landhe applied
for.
In sum, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals adjudicated and confirmed private
respondent/applicants title to the land on the basis of the findings that: 1.] the private
respondent/applicant purchased the land from Faustino Martirez; 2.] the subject land is covered by
Tax Declaration No. 14181; 3.] the private respondent/applicant has paid the realty taxes on the land
from 1945 up to the filing of his application in 1958; 4.] the private respondent/applicant has been in
actual, open and continuous possession of the subject land in the concept of owner since 1945, and 5.]
the private respondent/applicant has acquired the land by prescription.
As stated earlier, a review of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals is not a function that
this Court normally undertakes[16] unless the appellate courts findings are palpably unsupported by the
evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.[17] A thorough
review of the record convinces this Court that the general rule with regard to the conclusiveness of the
trial courts and appellate tribunals factual findings should not be applied because there are material
circumstances which, when properly considered, would have altered the result of the case.
First, a circumspect scrutiny of the evidence extant on record reveals that with the exception of
620 square meters, there has been no satisfactory showing of how private respondent/applicant
acquired the remainder of the subject land.
As can be gathered from the discussion of the appellate court, as well as the arguments proffered
by private respondent, he acquired the land in question from three (3) sources, namely: a.] A Deed of
Sale dated August 13, 1941 allegedly executed by Faustino Martirez covering 840 square meters; b.]
300 square meters allegedly purchased from private respondents father-in-law Eulalio Raz, and c.]
3,725 square meters private respondent allegedly bought in 1940 from Eufrocino Alba.
 The sale involving the first parcel of land covering 840 square meters, was not questioned by
petitioners as its technical description delineated in the Escritura De Venta Absoluta dated August 13,
1941,[18] to wit:
Un terreno solar residencia antes palayero regado, actuado en el casco central del municipio de
Banga, Capiz. Sin ninguna mejora, de una extension superficial de ochocientos cuarenta metros
cuadrados (840 mts. cds.) 6 sean cuarenta metros de frente por otros veinte y unmetrode fondo,
cuyos linderos por el Norte con propiedad de Eufrosino Alba y con Eulalio Raz; por Este con Eulalio
Raz y con la carretera provincial de Kalibo a Banga; por Sur con la misma carretera provincial y con
terreno del municipio para mercado; y por al Oeste con al terreno del mercado municipal de Banga y
con propiedad de Eufrosino Alba y al terreno tienes sus mojones de cemento en todos sus cuatro
cantos de linderia y sin otro limite visible de linderia mas que dichos mojones y esta amillarado a mi
nombre en una sola hoja declaratoria de propiedad Tax No. 12374 en la Oficina del Tasador
Provincial de Capiz, cuyo valor amilarado actual es veinte pesos (P20.00) xxx
leaves no room for doubt as to its identity, total area of 840 square meters as well as its dimensions of
40 meters in front and 21 meters at the base. How this parcel was further reduced to 620 square meters
is explained by the fact that the Municipal Government of Banga appropriated 220 square meters
thereof for the Banga Public Market Road.
What, however, is seriously contested are the alleged purchases of the other two parcels from
Eulalio Raz measuring 300 square meters and from Eufrocino Alba measuring 3,725 square meters
owing to the questionable circumstances surrounding their acquisition.
The records disclose that the subject land was originally owned by Dionisia Regado under Tax
Declaration No. 802.[19] The records further reveal that Dionisia Regado sold: [1.] 1,850 square meters
of the land to the Municipality of Banga evidenced by a Spanish document denominated as a deed of
sale dated April 29, 1914;[20] [2.] 1,320 square meters to Eulalio Raz evidenced by a document
entitled Escritura de Venta Absoluta dated September 6, 1918,[21] and [3.] 2,938 square meters to
Eufrocino Alba evidenced by a deed of conveyance dated September 6, 1918 written in Spanish. [22]
Faustino Martirez acquired a portion of 840 square meters from Eulalio Raz on January 15,
1933.[23] Raz retained 480 square meters, however, he and his wife Octabela Alba conveyed a 240
square meter portion thereof to Susana Braulio on November 5, 1956. [24] Subsequently on May 29,
1969, the heirs of Eufrocino Alba sold a 676 square meter portion of the parcel purchased by Eufrocino
to Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz.[25] The deed of conveyance was duly registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Aklan pursuant to Act No. 334 on June 17, 1969 [26] and is covered by Tax Declaration No.
332 in the name of Eulalio Raz, her husband.[27]
Other than the foregoing transactions involving the subject land which are borne out by the
documentary evidence on record, private respondent/applicant did not produce the alleged deeds of
conveyances evidencing the purported transfers made by Eulalio Raz and Eufrocino Alba in his
favor. Instead he relied chiefly on secondary evidence to prove the existence thereof which was
sustained by both the trial and the appellate courts. Such reliance on secondary evidence vis--vis the
peculiar facts prevailing in this case rests on infirm legal bases much more so in the face of the
overwhelming documentary evidence of petitioners arrayed against it because
. . . [a] contract of sale of realty cannot be proven by means of witnesses, but must necessarily be
evidenced by a written instrument, duly subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent, or by
secondary evidence of their contents. No other evidence, therefore, can be received except the
documentary evidence referred to, in so far as regards such contracts, and these are valueless as
evidence unless they are drawn up in writing in the manner aforesaid.[28]
An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document evidencing his title thereto, must
prove not only the genuineness of his title but the identity of the land therein referred to. The
document in such a case is either a basis of his claim for registration or not at all. If , as in this case,
he only claims a portion of what is included in his title, he must clearly prove that the property
sought to be registered is included in that title.[29]
Second, there are glaring variances in the identities and technical descriptions of the land
applied for by private respondent/applicant and the land he purportedly purchased from Eufrocino
Alba.
 Private respondent/applicant alleged that he purchased the remainder of the subject land
measuring 3,725 square meters from Eufrocino Alba sometime in 1940 averring that this parcel is
listed as Item No. 5 of his Exhibit I which is denominated as an Inventory And Appraisal Of The
Properties Of The Spouses Adela Raz De Lachica (Deceased) and Dr. Jose Lachica. Item No. 5[30] of
the said inventory described the parcel of land mentioned therein as follows:
5. Una parcela de terreno cocal secano, amillarado en nombre de Eufrocino Alba bajo el Tax No.
12792 por valor de P390.00, situado en el municipio de Banga, Capiz, que linda el Norte con
Lorenzo Retiro, y Silverio Relis; al Este con la carretera provincial Banga-Libacao; al sur con
Bienvenido M. Alba y al Oeste con Cirilo rala y Adela Raz; con una extension aproximada de una
(1) hectarea (20) areas y (35) centiareas poco mas o menos. (Note: Said property was purchased by
the spouses Jose Lachica and Adela Raz Lachica from Eufrocino M. Alba in the amount of P500.00
as evidenced by a Escritura de Compraventa executed on November 25, 1940, at Himamaylan,
Negros Occidental and notarized by Atty. Conrado Gensiano, as Reg. Not. 122, Pag. 67, Libro VIII,
Serie 1940).
On the other hand, the land applied for is described technically per Psu 161277 as
A parcel of land (as shown on Plan Psu-161277), situated in Poblacion, Municipality of Banga,
Province of Aklan. Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by property of Apolonia Rimate; on the SE.,
along line 2-3, by National Road; on the SW., along line 3-4, by property of the Mpl. Government of
Banga (Public Market); and on the NW., along line 4-1, by property of the Municipal Government of
Banga (Public Market). Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan, being N. 45 deg. 02 E., 423.38 m.
from B.L.L.M. 1, Mp. of Banga, Aklan;
thence S. 33 deg. 46 E. 87.66 m. to point 2
thence S. 56 deg. 42 W., 63.81 m. to point 3
thence N. 37 deg. 22 W., 59.26 m. to point 4
thence N. 33 deg. 42 E., 73.08 m. to the point of
beginning, containing an area of FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND FORTY FIVE
(4,845) SQUARE METERS. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the
ground by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons. Bearings true date of survey, January 25, 1957, and that of the
approval, October 3, 1957.[31]
It will be readily noted vis--vis the foregoing that: a.] the land applied for is covered by Tax
Declaration No. 14181 while the parcel allegedly purchased from Eufrocino Alba is covered by Tax
Declaration No. 15792; b.] the land applied for is palayero whereas the land allegedly acquired from
Eufrocino Alba is cocal secano. Palay is unhusked rice,[32] thus, the term palayero refers to land
devoted to the planting of rice; cocal, on the other hand, means coconut tree
plantation[33] while secano denotes unwatered land or a dry sand bank;[34] c.] the land applied for has
an area of 4,845 square meters whereas the land supposedly sold by Eufrocino Alba measures 12,035
square meters; d.] the land applied for is bounded on the NE by the Banga Public Market, on the SE
by Apolonia Rimate, on the SW by the Banga-Kalibo National Road; and on the NW by the Banga
Public Market whereas the land allegedly obtained from Eufrocino Alba is bounded on the N by
Ernesto Retino and Silverio Relis, on the E by the Banga-Libacao Carretera Provincial, on the S by
Bienvenido Alba and on the W by Cirilo Rala and Adela Raz. It needs be stressed in this regard that a
person who claims that he has better right to real property must prove not only his ownership of the
same but also must satisfactorily prove the identity thereof. [35]
Third, both trial and appellate courts placed undue reliance on Tax Declaration No. 14181
considering that there is no satisfactory explanation of how the area of land covered by Tax Declaration
No. 14181 geometrically ballooned from a modest 620 square meter lot to a huge parcel measuring 4,
845 square meters.
As pointed out by petitioners, Tax Declaration No. 14181 was preceded by 1954 Tax
Declaration No. 13578 in the name of private respondent/applicant and his spouse which shows that
the land declared therein for taxation purposes covers an area of 620 square meters. Tax Declaration
No. 13578 was preceded by 1953 Tax Declaration No. 13040 in the name of Adela Raz, private
respondents wife. The land declared for taxation purposes therein also has an area of 620 square
meters. Tax Declaration No. 134040 was preceded by 1947 Tax Declaration No. 6528 in the name of
private respondents wife, Adela Raz. The land declared therein for taxation purposes likewise
measures 620 square meters.
It appears that the quantum leap from 620 square meters in 1947 to 4,845 square meters in 1956
came about on account of an affidavit dated November 17, 1956 wherein private respondent/applicant
requested[36] the Municipal Assessor of Banga to issue a revised tax declaration covering 4,845 square
meters on the bare claim that the area has been decreased to only 620 square meters. The timing of the
revision and its proximity to the date of filing of the application can not but engender serious doubts
on the application more so considering that prior thereto realty tax payments covering the period 1945
to 1956 covered an area measuring 620 square meters and private respondent/applicant is banking on
said payments to claim possession and ownership over the same period for an infinitely larger area of
4,845 square meters.
A tax declaration, by itself, is not conclusive evidence of ownership.[37] Tax declarations for a
certain number of years, although constituting proof of claim of title to land,[38] is not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership unless they are supported by other effective proof. [39] It was, thus, held in one
case[40] that where realty taxes covering thirty-one (31) years were paid only a few months prior to the
filing of an application, such payment does not constitute sufficient proof that the applicant had a bona
fide claim of ownership prior to the filing of the application.Still in another case, [41] the claim that the
applicant had been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the disputed land was not given
credence because it was negated by the fact that he declared the land for taxation purposes in October
1959 when he filed his application for registration although he could have done so in 1937 when he
allegedly purchased the land. A belated declaration is, furthermore, indicative that the applicant had
no real claim of ownership over the subject land prior to the declaration[42] and where there are serious
discrepancies in the tax declarations as in this case, registration must be denied. [43] If at all, the
foregoing facts only serves to underscore private respondent/applicants crafty attempt to cloak with
judicial color his underhanded scheme to seize the adjoining parcels of land and to enrich himself at
the expense of its rightful owners.
Fourth, the lower courts reliance on prescription is not well-taken given the peculiar facts
prevailing in this case.
The law in force at the time an action accrues is what governs the proceeding consistent with
the fundamental dictum that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
proved.[44] Basic is the rule that no statute, decree, ordinance, rule, regulation or policy shall be given
retrospective effect unless explicitly stated so.[45] Along the same vein, a courts jurisdiction depends
on the law existing at the time an action is filed [46]and a law continues to be in force with regard to all
rights which accrued prior to the amendment thereof. [47]
In this case, the controlling statute when the private respondent/applicant filed his application
for registration on April 28, 1958 is Section 48 of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by RA Nos.
1942 and 6236,[48] which states that:
SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States have applied for
the purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and
royal decrees then in force and have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection
therewith, but have with or without default upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title
therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands
continuously since the filing of their applications.[49]
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure.These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. [50]
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands
of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. [51]
A circumspect scrutiny of the assailed Decision readily shows that in affirming the ruling of the
trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the provisions of Section 19 of Act 496 [52] in relation to the
Civil Codes provisions on prescription on the assumption that the subject land is private land. Therein
lies the flaw in the appellate courts postulate. The application for registration of private respondent is
for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect title considering that the land is presumed under the
Regalian Doctrine to be part of the public domain.
Public lands are broadly classified into 1.] Alienable or disposable lands; and, 2.] Inalienable
or non-disposable public lands. Non-disposable public lands or those not susceptible of private
appropriation include a.] Timber lands; and, b.] Mineral lands.[53] For purposes of administration and
disposition, the lands of the public domain classified as disposable or alienable are further sub-
classified into a.] Agricultural; b.] Residential, commercial, industrial or for similar productive
purposes; c.] Educational, charitable or other similar purposes, and d.] Reservations for town sites and
for public and quasi-public purposes.[54]
From the foregoing classifications, public agricultural land may be defined as those alienable
portions of the public domain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. Thus the term
includes residential, commercial and industrial lands for the reason that these lands are neither timber
nor mineral lands.[55]
On the other hand, Section 19 of Act No. 496, as amended, permits the registration of private
lands claimed to be owned by the applicant in fee simple which refer to:
1.] Lands acquired by various types of titles from the government during the Spanish
Regime by way of grants by the Spanish crown namely the: a.] Titulo real or royal grant;
b.] Concession especial or special grant; c.] Composicion con el estado title or adjustment title;
d.] Titulo de compra or title by purchase and; e.] Informacion posesoria or possessory
information title, which could become a Titulo gratuito or a gratuitous title;[56]
2.] Lands that are claimed to be owned by accession, i.e. accretion, avulsion, formation
of islands, abandoned river beds, as provided for in Articles 457, 461 and 464 of the Civil Code;
and
3.] Lands which have been acquired in any other manner provided by law.
Suffice it to state that the land sought to be registered by private respondent hardly falls under
any of the latter classifications of land referred to by Act No. 496, as amended. Given the foregoing
facts, prescription in the manner invoked by both courts can not be pleaded to bolster private
respondent/applicants claim because
. . . [N]o public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from
the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of title from the state . . . .[57]
xxxxxxxxx
Indeed, the possession of public agricultural land, however, long the period may have extended,
never confers title thereto upon the possessor.[58] The reason, to reiterate our ruling, is because the
statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural land does not operate against the State, unless
the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the
required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. [59]
Fifth, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that prescription can be applied in the manner
invoked by the trial court and the appellate court, it must be pointed out that
. . . [W]hile Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that (o)wnership and other real rights over
immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years, this
provision of law must be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that
xxx (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in good faith and with just title
for the time fixed by law. Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere possession
thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless such possession was acquired con
justo titulo y buena fe (with color of title and good faith).[60] The good faith of the possessor consists
in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and
could transmit his ownership.[61] For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse
claimant came into possession of the property through one of the recognized modes of acquisition of
ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.[62]
It can not be said that private respondents possession was con justo titulo y buena fe. On the
contrary, private respondent/applicants act of appropriating for himself the entire area of 4,845 square
meters to the exclusion of petitioners who have been occupying portions of the disputed land
constituted acts of deprivation of the latters rights which is tantamount to bad faith. Indeed this Court
has ruled that the
. . . [c]oncealment and misrepresentation in the application that no other persons had any claim or
interest in the said land, constitute specific allegations of extrinsic fraud supported by competent
proof. Failure and intentional omission of the applicants to disclose the fact of actual physical
possession by another person constitutes an allegation of actual fraud. [63] Likewise, it is fraud to
knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third
person.[64]
Suffice it to state in this regard that to allow private respondent/applicant to benefit from his
own wrong would run counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio - no man can be allowed to
found a claim upon his own wrongdoing.[65]
It need not be overemphasized that extraordinary acquisitive prescription can not similarly vest
ownership over the property upon private respondent/applicant because Article 1137 of the Civil Code
states in no uncertain terms that
ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of good faith.
Needless to state, private respondent/applicants possession of thirteen (13) years falls way
below the thirty-year requirement mandated by Article 1137.
Sixth, petitioners/oppositors have, in stark contrast to the secondary proof of private respondent,
adduced overwhelming evidence to prove their ownership of the portions they claim in the subject
land. The evidence on record clearly points to the fact that private respondent/applicants right, if at all,
is confined to only 620 square meters or what has been left of the 840 square meters he purchased
from Faustino Martirez after 220 square meters thereof were appropriated by the Municipality of
Banga for the Public Market Road.[66]
The records further bear out that the original owner of the whole area was one Dionisia Regado
who executed three (3) deeds of sale covering certain portions of the disputed lands, namely: 1.] the
Deed of Sale dated April 29, 1914 covering 1,850 square meters executed in favor of the Municipality
of Banga;[67] 2.] the Deed of Sale dated July 10, 1915 covering 1,320 square meters executed in favor
of Eulalio Raz;[68] and, 3.] the Deed of Sale dated September 6, 1918 covering the balance with an area
of 2,938 square meters in favor of Eufrocino Alba.[69]
Faustino Martirez acquired only an 840 square meter portion of the land by purchase from
Eulalio Raz on January 15, 1933 as confirmed in paragraph 2 of the Escritura De Venta
Absolutaexecuted by him on August 13, 1941.[70] After selling 840 square meters to Faustino Martirez,
Eulalio Raz retained 480 square meters but on November 5, 1956 Eulalio Raz and his wife Octabela
Alba conveyed 240 square meters to Susana Braulio[71] leaving a balance of 240 square meters which
remained undisposed.
On May 29, 1969, Virginia Alba, Inocentes Alba and Estrella Alba, children of the deceased
Eufrocino Alba, sold a 676 square meter portion of the 2,938 square meter lot purchased by their father
from Dionisia Regado to petitioner/oppositor Octabela alba Vda. De Raz. [72] This Deed was duly
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Aklan in accordance with Act No. 3344 on June 17,
1969.[73] The land is covered by Tax Declaration No. 332 in the name of Octabela Alba Vda. De Razs
husband.[74]
Petitioner/oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. De Razs ownership of the remaining 240 square meter
portion which she and her husband Eulalio Raz bought from Dionisia Regado[75] and the 676 square
meter portion which they bought from the heirs of Eufrocino Alba [76] is fully substantiated by
documentary proof.[77] Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Albas ownership of a portion
measuring 1,335 square meters[78] and another portion measuring 2,262 square meters[79] is likewise
backed by documentary evidence. Susana Braulios ownership of a 240 square meter portion [80] which
she acquired from Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz on November 11, 1956[81] is also documented, her
predecessor-in-interest having acquired the same from Dionisia Regado on September 6, 1918. [82]
The foregoing only serves to underscore the paucity of the proof of private respondent/applicant
to support his claim of ownership over the entire 4, 845 square meter area. He has not adduced
evidence to show how and when he was able to acquire, with the exception of 840 square meters
further reduced to 620 square meters on account of 220 square meters appropriated for the market
road, the bigger area of 3,755 square meters from anybody let alone the ancestral owner, Dionisia
Regado.
His claim is anchored mainly on Revised Tax Declaration No. 14181 which he was able to
procure from the Municipal Assessor of Banga in 1956 on the basis of a self-serving affidavit which
proffered the lame excuse that there was error in the statement of the area of the land which he claimed
to be 4,845 square meters instead of 620 square meters which was the area reflected in earlier tax
declarations namely, 1954 Tax Declaration No. 13578; 1953 Tax Declaration No. 13043; and 1947
Tax Declaration No. 6528.
Be that as it may, the Court has reservations on the propriety of adjudicating to petitioners the
contested portions of the subject land, in view of their failure to present the technical descriptions of
these areas. Furthermore, there is no sufficient evidence showing that petitioners have been in open,
adverse, exclusive, peaceful and continuous possession thereof in the concept of owner, considering
that the testimony of Octabela Alba vda. De Raz was stricken off the record.
WHEREFORE, based on foregoing premises, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 1 dated August 18, 1992 in Land Registration Case No. K-101, LRC Record
No. K-15104 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1.] The 620 square meter portion on which private respondent Jose N. Lachicas house is
situated, clearly delineating its metes and bounds, is hereby ORDERED segregated from the
parcel of land described in Psu-161277 situated in the Poblacion of the Municipality of Banga,
Province of Aklan, Philippines with an area of 4,484 square meters, to be registered and
confirmed in the name of private respondent;
2.] A ten (10) meter road width along the National road mentioned in the application be
segregated for future road widening programs upon the payment of just compensation to be
annotated at the back of the title.
3.] Insofar as the ownership of the remainder of the subject land is concerned, the case
is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for the reception of further evidence for the
petitioners to establish the other requisites for the confirmation of title and registration in their
names of the areas they respectively claim.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., on official leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925
VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.
Monico R. Mercado for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a complaint filed by
Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring
plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land described in the second paragraph of the
complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the
ground that the land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title
issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as
damages, with the costs.
For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every allegation contained
therein and, as special defense, alleged that the land in question was a property of the Government of
the United States under the administration and control of the Philippine Islands before its sale to
Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with law.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale
made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the cancellation of the
certificate of title issued to her, with the costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the
Director of Lands took this appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The holding
that the judgment rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff and defendant Angela Razon on the
parcel of land in question is controlling in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is entitled to
recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of the sale made by the Director of
Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of
the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be cancelled; and (3) the denial of
the motion for new trial filed by the Director of Lands.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then a
fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to
repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After having been in possession thereof for about eight years, and
the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899,
sold it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before
the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on
said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which
he had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of the land in question, first, by
Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous,
adverse and public, without any interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, except
when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga to recover the possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after considering the evidence
introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela
Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E). Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the
land in question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase
thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and
opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five years
(Exhibit P). After making the proper administrative investigation, the Director of Lands overruled
the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the
register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela
Razon. Armed with said document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in
question, and as he refused to do so, she brought and action for forcible entry and detainer in the
justice of the peace court of Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the
case being one of title to real property (Exhibit F and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.
With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by the appellant in his
assignments of error.lawphi1.net
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question
openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the
year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet
it is controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in possession thereof.
When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had
already been in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four years. And
if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it
on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the
period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. These being the facts, the
doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cario vs. Government
of the Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449 1), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is,
moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No.
2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government
were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his
predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and
publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of
Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin
Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant
may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of
section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a
grant of the State, it had already ceased to be the public domain and had become private property, at
least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently,
in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which
he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela
Razon did not thereby acquire any right.
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-
appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.lawphi1.net
If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation
of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin
Susi has the right to bring an action to recover possession thereof and hold it.
For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed from, the same is
hereby affirmed in all its parts, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14722 May 25, 1960
IGNACIO MESINA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, ET AL., defendants.
EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, defendant-appellee.
Agustin C. Bagasao for appellant.
Luis Manalang and Associates for appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Plaintiff brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija praying that Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1137 of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija be ordered cancelled and that
the registration case pending before the same court covering the property described therein be given
due course and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiff P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the
statute of limitations. The reasons advanced are: the complaint was filed on March 25, 1958. The
decree of registration or issuance of patent over the property was issued "sometime on September
12, 1953 or thereabout", while the transfer certificate of title covering the same was issued on
September 16, 1953. The present action which calls for the cancellation of said decree and title has,
therefore, been filed after the elapse of more than four years, which cannot be done, because the title
has already become indefeasible and incontrovertible. The court sustained this motion and dismissed
the complaint. Hence the present appeal.
Plaintiff claims that he is the owner in fee simple of Lot No. 3259, with improvements thereon,
situated in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija; that he has been in actual possession thereof since 1914,
publicly, openly, peacefully and against the whole world and up to the present time he is the only
one who benefits from the produce thereof; that said lot is at present the subject of registration
proceedings pending in the same court known as Registration Case No. N-372, L.R.C. Cad. Record
No. N-12238; that sometime in September 12, 1953, the Director of Lands, without exercising due
care, and in spite of his knowledge that defendants had not complied with the knowledge that
defendants had not complied with the requirements of Commonwealth Act No. 141, issued a
homestead patent in their favor as a consequence of which a certificate of title was issued in their
name by the register of deeds; that said title was procured by defendants through frauds, deception
and misrepresentation since they knew that the lot belonged to the plaintiff; and that the Director of
Lands has no authority nor jurisdiction to issue a patent covering said land because it is a private
property of plaintiff. For these reasons, plaintiff prays that said decree and title be cancelled.
Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957 (amending Section 48-b of
Commonwealth Act 141), provides:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceeding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
In the case of Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil., 424, it was observed that where all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical possession
openly, continuously, and publicly, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the
provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of
Commonwealth Act No. 141), the possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law
not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of
title be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the court an application therefor
being sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874 (reproduced as Section 50,
Commonwealth Act No. 141). Thus, the following is what this Court said on the matter:
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land
in question openly, continuously, adversely and publicly, personally and through his
predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. ... When on August
15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already
been in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-forty years.
And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish
pond when he sold it on December 13, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to
possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of
memory. ... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover the presumption juris et de
jure established paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that
all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he
has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an
agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly
since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions
of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her
favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to grant,
but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be
issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is
sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control, of the Director of Lands.
Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands
disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus
made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.
(Emphasis supplied)
Such is the situation in which the plaintiff claims to be in his complaint. He alleges that he is the
owner in fee simple of the lot in question, with the improvements thereon, situated in San Antonio,
Nueva Ecija, and that he has been in actual possession thereof since 1914, publicly, openly,
peacefully and against the whole world, and that up to the present time he is the only one who
benefits from the produce thereof. He further claims that said lot is present the subject of a
registration proceeding pending in the same court, known as Registration Case No. N-372, L.R.C.
Cad. Record No. N-12238. If by legal fiction, as stated in the Susi case, plaintiff is deemed to have
acquired the lot by a grant of the State, it follows that the same had ceased to be part of the public
domain and had become private property and, therefore, is beyond the control of the Director of
Lands. Consequently, the homestead patent and the original certificate of title covering said lot
issued by the Director of Lands in favor of the defendants can be said to be null and void, for having
been issued through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation.
Considering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a motion to dismiss on the
ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of limitations, which apparently is
predicated on the theory that a decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of
fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree, 1 which theory does not apply here because
the property involved is allegedly private in nature and has ceased to be part of the public domain,
we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing the case outright without giving plaintiff
a chance to prove his claim. It would have been more proper for the court to deny the motion on the
ground that its object does not appear to be indubitable, rather than to have dismissed it, as was done
by the trial court.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. No costs.
Paras, Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 134308. December 14, 2000]
SUSANA MENGUITO, EMELITA MENGUITO-MANALILI, HELEN MARTA
MENGUITO-LUNA, RENATO MENGUITO, BERSAMIN MENGUITO,
FROILAN MENGUITO and GENEROSO MENGUITO, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Unless a piece of public land is shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain. Even assuming that such land has been classified as
alienable, title thereto can be registered only upon presentation of incontrovertible proof of adverse,
notorious and open possession in the concept of owner for a period of thirty years.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the September
30, 1997 Decision[1] and the June 23, 1998 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV
No. 39638. The decretal portion of said Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
appellees application for registration is hereby DISMISSED.[3]
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City (Branch 157),[4] which was
reversed by the appellate court, granted petitioners application for registration in this wise: [5]
WHEREFORE, the order of general default against the whole world heretofore entered in this case is
affirmed, and judgment is hereby rendered confirming the registerable title of the applicants to the
land described in their application under plan Swo-13-000227 and its technical descriptions, situated
in the Barrio of Ususan, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, and containing an aggregate area of
2,112 square meters; and individual and separate certificates of titles to the lots comprising the said
land are hereby ordered registered in the names of the applicants, as follows:
1. For lots 6045-A, 6045-B, 6045-C, and 6045-D in the name of Susana Menguito, of legal age,
widow, Filipino citizen, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pater[o]s, Metro Manila;
2. For Lot 6045-E -- in the name of Renato Menguito, of legal age, married to Irene Toledo, Filipino
citizen, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;
3. For Lot 6045-F -- in the name of Bersamin Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single, with
residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;
4. For Lot 6045-G -- in the name of Generoso Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single, with
residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;
5. For Lot 6045-H -- in the name of Helen Marta Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single,
with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;
6. For Lot 6046-I -- in the name of Froilan Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to
Zenaida Carag, with residence and postal address at T.Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila;
7. For Lot 6045-J -- in the name of Emelita Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to
Luciano Manalili, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila; and
8. For Lot 6045-K -- in the name of Generoso Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to
Luciano Manalili; and Froilan Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Zenaida Carag, all
with residence and postal address at T. Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila.
Upon the finality of this Decision, let an Order be issued to the Commissioner of Land Registration
Authority for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificates of title in
favor of the applicants pursuant to Section 39 of PD No. 1529.
SO ORDERED.
The Facts

The antecedents of the case are adequately summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:
On November 10, 1987, in the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila an Application for
Registration of Title was filed by the following successors-in-interest of the deceased spouses Cirilo
Menguito and Juana Manalo-Menguito, namely: SUSANA MENGUITO, EMELITA MENGUITO-
MANALILI, HELEN MARTA MENGUITO-LUNA, RENATO MENGUITO, BERSAMIN
MENGUITO, FROILAN MENGUITO and GENEROSO MENGUITO. Docketed in the said court
as LRC Case No. N-10938, the application reads:
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE
The above-named applicants hereby apply to have the land hereinafter described brought under the
operation of the Land Registration Act as amended by the Property Registration Decree No. 1529
and to have their title thereto registered and confirmed,
AND DECLARE:
1. That the applicants are the owners in fee simple of eleven (11) parcels of land situated in the
Barrio of Ususan, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, and are bounded and described as shown
on plan Swo-13-000227 (lot Nos. 6045-A, 6045-B, 6045-C, 6045-D, 6045-E, 6045-F, 6045-G, 6045-
H, 6045-I, 6045-J and 6045-K) and corresponding technical descriptions, x x x;
2. That said parcels of land are assessed for taxation for the current year at P5,910.00 as per Tax
Declaration No. B-11-01351 of the land record of Taguig, Metro Manila;
3. That to the best of applicants knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage or encumbrance of any
kind whatsoever affecting the said land nor any other persons having any estate or interest therein,
legal or equitable, in possession, remainder, reversion or expectancy;
4. That the applicants acquired the said parcels of land by inheritance;
5. That said parcels of land are occupied by the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in actual, open, peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession, in the concept of owners, of said
parcels of land for more than thirty years;
6. That the names in full and addresses as far known to the undersigned, of the owners of all
adjoining properties are as follows:
(a) Pilar Menguito
Pateros-Taguig Road
Ususan, Taguig
Metro Manila
b) Andres Filemon
Pateros-Taguig Road
Ususan, Taguig
Metro Manila
c) Beatriz Dumagat
Pateros-Taguig Road
Ususan, Taguig
Metro Manila
d) Maura Cabanatan
Pateros-Taguig Road
Ususan, Taguig
Metro Manila
e) Pateros-Taguig Road
c/o The District Engineer
Pasig, Metro Manila
7. That the applicants full name, age, citizenship, residence, and postal address, are as follows:
SUSAN MENGUITO, widow; EMELITA M. MANALILI, married to Luciano Manalili; HELEN
MARTA M. LUNA, married to Benjamin Luna, Jr.; RENATO MENGUITO, married to Irene
Toledo; BERSAMIN MENGUITO, married to Elvira Salvacion; FROILAN MENGUITO, married
to Zenaida Carag; and GENEROSO MENGUITO, single; all of legal age, Filipinos, and with
residence and postal address at T. Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila.
8. That should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable in the instant case, the applicants
hereby apply for the benefit of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended;
9. That the following documents are attached hereto and made part hereof:
(a) Tracing cloth plan of Swo-13-000227
(b) Two (2) print copies of said plan Swo-13-000227
(c) Three (3) copies each of the Technical Description of:
Lot 6045-A
 Lot 6045-B
Lot 6045-C
Lot 6045-D
Lot 6045-E
Lot 6045-F
Lot 6045-G
Lot 6045-H
Lot 6045-I
Lot 6045-J
Lot 6045-K
(d) Three (3) copies of Engineers Certificate
(e) Four (4) copies of Tax Declaration No. B-011-01351
xxxxxxxxx
(Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 1-5).
Acting on the foregoing application, the lower court issued a Notice of Initial Hearing addressed to:
the Solicitor General, the Director of the Land Management Bureau, the Secretary of the Department
of Public Works and Highways, the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Director of
the Bureau of Forest Development, and the owners of the adjacent properties as mentioned in the
application, informing them that the application is scheduled for initial hearing on April 25, 1989.
The addressees were then ordered to present such claims as you may have to said lands or any
portion thereof, and to submit evidence in support of such claims and unless you appear at said court
at the time and place aforesaid, your default will be recorded and the title to the lands will be
adjudicated and determined in accordance with law and the evidence before the Court, and
thereafter, you will forever be barred from contesting said application or any decree entered thereon
(Exhibit A).
Said notice of initial hearing was published in the April 5, 1989 issue of Abante, a daily tabloid
(Exhs. C, C-1, C-1-A).
Earlier, or on March 30, 1989, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed
its Opposition to the application for registration contending:
1. That neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or
prior thereto (Sec. 48 [b], C.A. 141, as amended by P.D. 1073).
2. That the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant, if any, attached to or alleged in
the application, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the
lands applied for or his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof
in the concept of owner, since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto. Said muniments of title do not appear
to be genuine and indicate the pretended possession of applicant to be of recent vintage.
3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be
availed of by the applicant who has failed to file an appropriate application for registration within the
period of six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as required by Presidential Decree No. 892. From
the records, it appears that the instant application was filed on July 31, 1990.
4. That the parcel applied is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines
not subject to private appropriation. (Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 5-6).
The Solicitor General therefore prayed for the denial of the application for registration and for the
declaration of the properties subject thereof as part of the public domain belonging to the Republic
of the Philippines.
At the scheduled initial hearing of the case on April 25, 1989, a certain Jose Tangco, Jr. appeared
and registered a verbal opposition to the application. On motion of counsel for the applicants, the
court issued an Order of General Default against the whole world, except as against the oppositors
Republic of the Philippines and Jose Tangco, Jr., who was directed to file his written opposition but
never did. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
On June 13, 1990, the applicants filed their Formal Offer of Evidence, submitting therewith the
following documentary exhibits: (1) Plan Swo-13-000227 (Exh. F); (2) technical descriptions of Lot
Nos. 6045-A to 6045-J, inclusive (Exhs. F to F-10, inclusive); (3) Engineers Certificate (Exh. G); (4)
Extra-judicial Settlement and Partition executed by the applicants dated December 12, 1985 (Exh.
H); (5) description of the land and the apportionment thereof among the applicants (Exhs.H-1 and H-
2, respectively); (6) Tax Declarations (Exhs. I, J, K, L, M, N and O) (7) Tax Receipts (Exhs. O, O-1,
P. P-1, Q and R); (8) Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated May 7, 1969 executed by Cirilo Menguito
in favor of Pedro Menguito (Exh. S); and (9) Deed of Partition dated November 7, 1990 executed by
the applicants (Exh. T).
On September 12, 1990, the oppositor Republic filed its Manifestation and Opposition to applicants
formal offer of evidence. The said manifestation reads:
It interposes no objection to the admission of Exhibits A, B, C, D, relative to jurisdictional
requirements. It has no objection to Exhibits E, F, F-1, to F-10 relating to the plan and the technical
description of the lots being applied for and Exhibit G which is the Engineers certificate.
It objects to Exhibits H, H-1 to H-2 the extrajudicial settlement and partition dated December 12,
1985 for being self serving. It objects to Exhibits I, J, K, L, M and N for being incompetent and
insufficient proof of possession of the lot in question by applicants or their predecessors-in
interest. In fact the said tax declarations do not date back to at least June 12, 1945. It objects to
Exhibits O, P, Q, and R, the same being incompetent and insufficient to prove possession since June
12, 1945. It objects to Exhibits O, P, Q, and R, the same being incompetent and insufficient to prove
possession since June 12, 1945. It objects to Exhibit S as being self-serving being a mere photocopy
of the alleged Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated May 7, 1989 executed by Cirilo Menguito the same
cannot be accepted in evidence, applicants not having first laid the basis for the presentation of
secondary evidence. It objects to the first page of Exhibit T, being self-serving and a mere
photocopy. Furthermore, page 2 of said exhibit, where the supposed acknowledgment of the
instrument appears, refers to different parcels of land other than those being applied for.
WHEREFORE, considering that the applicants have failed to prove their title to the lands applied
for, it is respectfully prayed that the application for registration be denied and that the land applied
for be declared as part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
Considering the above, oppositor respectfully manifests that there is no need for it to submit
evidence in support of its opposition. (Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 11-13).
On May 15, 1991, the lower court rendered its decision disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the order of general default against the whole world heretofore entered in this case is
affirmed, and judgment is hereby rendered confirming the registerable title of the applicants x x x
On June 11, 1991, the oppositor Republic, through the Solicitor General, moved for a
reconsideration of the afore-quoted decision, to which a written opposition was interposed by the
applicants.
On July 8, 1991, the lower court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.[6]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals agreed with respondent that the lower court had failed to consider the
legal requirements for registration of imperfect titles; namely: (1) the land is alienable and disposable;
and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed the land openly,
continuously, exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945. It was not convinced that the land in
question had been classified as alienable or disposable and that petitioners or their predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of it since June 12, 1945.
Hence, this Petition.[7]
The Issue

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit a single issue for our consideration:

Whether or not the court a quo erred in reversing the findings of facts of the trial court.[8]
In fine, the Court will resolve whether the CA erred in rejecting petitioners application for the
registration of their respective titles.
The Courts Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.

Sole Issue: Registration of Petitioners Titles

Section 48 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141,[9] as amended, provides for the registration of
imperfect titles to lands of the public domain in this wise:
"SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest thereon, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) those who by themselves or through their predecessor in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure.
They shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1073[10] clarified paragraph b of the said provision by specifically
declaring that it applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. [11]
Hence, as observed by the appellate court, petitioners were duty-bound to prove two legal
requirements: (1) the land applied for was alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and
adversely since June 12, 1945.
The records show that petitioners failed to establish these two requisites.
Classification of the Land

To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: This survey plan is inside Alienable and
Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry
on January 3, 1968, appearing on Exhibit E (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: All lands
of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.[12] Unless public
land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of
the inalienable public domain. Indeed, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. [13] To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. [14] Absent such evidence, the land sought
to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit E
indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute
a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere
surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said
surveyors assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared
alienable.
Period of Possession

Even assuming arguendo that petitioners have been able to prove that the land is alienable, their
Petition for confirmation of their imperfect titles and registration thereof under the law will still be
denied. The reason is that they have failed to establish possession of the lots in question -- openly,
continuously, exclusively and adversely -- in the concept of owner for at least 30 years, since June 12,
1945.
Petitioners do not claim that they are the original possessors of the lots in question, which had
allegedly belonged to Cirilo Menguito before he donated it to his son Pedro.When Pedro died in 1978,
these lots allegedly passed down to petitioners.
Although petitioners can trace their possession of the land from as far back as 1968 only, they
would tack it to that of their predecessors, who had supposedly been in possession thereof even before
the Second World War. There is not enough convincing proof, however, to support such claim.
 Petitioners presented evidence that they had been paying real estate taxes since 1974.[15] Their
predecessors-in-interest, they claimed, have also been paying taxes on the land for several years before
them, and Cirilo Menguito had declared the land for tax purposes in 1943.[16] However, they did not
present any documents or any other satisfactory proof to substantiate this claim. General statements,
which are mere conclusions of law and not proofs of possession, are unavailing and cannot suffice. [17]
Cirilos six children were not presented as witnesses by petitioners during the hearing of their
application for registration of the lots in question. In fact, of the six children, only Pilar Menguito was
personally informed of petitioners application. Still, she was not presented as a witness.
There can be no question that Cirilos children were the best witnesses, because they could have
substantiated petitioners claim that indeed the lots in question had been donated to Pedro
Menguito. Moreover, they may even have in their possession documents that can adequately support
their supposed claim. Instead, petitioners presented only Raymunda Bautista, the alleged tenant of
Cirilo Menguito, who had tilled the land before petitioners built their houses thereon. Neither Cirilos
children nor the documents that they might have had in their possession were presented.
Furthermore, serious doubts are cast on petitioners claim that their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession and occupation of the land. Because they
are of recent vintage, the tax declarations (Exhs. I to N), tax receipts (Exhs. O. O1, P, and P-1) and the
Municipal Treasurers certifications of tax payments (Exhs. Q and R) presented in evidence are
incompetent and insufficient to prove petitioners and their predecessors-in-interests possession of the
lots in question.
Because the factual findings of the trial and the appellate courts were contrary to each other, we
waded into the records,[18] but found no reason to modify the assailed CA Decision. Much as we want
to conform to the States policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands
to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice, our hands are tied by the laws
stringent safeguards against registering imperfect titles. In this case, we agree with the CA that
petitioners have not presented sufficient proof of their compliance with the legal requirements for
registration of imperfect titles.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-58867 June 22, 1984
DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO VALERIANO, GABRIELA VALERIANO
VDA. DE LA CRUZ, LETICIA A. VALERIANO and MARISSA VALERIANO DE LA
ROSA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Carlos C. Serapio for private respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioners-public officials, through the Solicitor General, seek a review of the Decision and
Resolution of the then Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the former Court of First Instance
of Bulacan, Branch III, decreeing registration of a parcel of land in private respondents' favor. The
land in question, Identified as Lot 2347, Cad-302-D, Case 3, Obando Cadastre, under Plan Ap-03-
000535, is situated in Obando, Bulacan, and has an area of approximately 9.3 hectares. It adjoins the
Kailogan River and private respondents have converted it into a fishpond.
In their application for registration filed on May 10, 1976, private respondents (Applicants, for
brevity) claimed that they are the co-owners in fee simple of the land applied for partly through
inheritance in 1918 and partly by purchase on May 2, 1958; that it is not within any forest zone or
military reservation; and that the same is assessed for taxation purposes in their names.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development
opposed the application on the principal ground that the land applied for is within the unclassified
region of Obando, Bulacan, per BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927; and that areas within the
unclassified region are denominated as forest lands and do not form part of the disposable and
alienable portion of the public domain.
After hearing, the Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in favor of the Applicants. This
was affirmed on appeal by respondent Appellate Court, which found that "through indubitable
evidence (Applicants) and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, continuous,
peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcel of land under a bona fide claim of ownership
for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application" and are, therefore, entitled to
registration. It further opined that "since the subject property is entirely devoted to fishpond
purposes, it cannot be categorized as part of forest lands. "
Before this instance, the principal issues posed are: (1) whether or not Courts can reclassify the
subject public land; and (2) whether or not applicants are entitled to judicial confirmation of title.
The parties, through their respective counsel, stipulated that the land is within an unclassified region
of Obando, Bulacan, as shown by BF Map LC No. 637, dated March 1, 1927. 1 No evidence has
been submitted that the land has been released or subsequently classified despite an Indorsement,
dated November 17, 1976, of the District Forester, to the Director of Forest Development, containing
the following recommendation:
Subject area requested for release was verified and found to be within the
Unclassified Region of Obando, Bulacan per BF LC Map No. 637, certified
March 1, 1927. However, on-the-spot inspection conducted by a
representative of this Office, it disclosed that the same was devoid of any
forest growth and forms part of a well-developed and 100 percent producing
fishponds. Two houses of light materials were erected within the area for the
caretakers temporary dwelling.
In view thereof, and in fairness to the applicant considering the investment
introduced therein this Office believes that the release is in order,
Recommended for approval and be disposed of in accordance with the Public
Land Law. 2
The Government's case is meritorious.
In effect, what the Courts a quo have done is to release the subject property from the unclassified
category, which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. The classification of public lands is an
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts. In the
absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and
rendered open to disposition. 3 This should be so under time-honored Constitutional precepts. This is
also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, 4 and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with
the conservation of such patrimony. 5
The recommendation of the District Forester for release of subject property from the unclassified
region is not the ultimate word on the matter. And the fact that BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1,
1927 showing subject property to be within the unclassified region was not presented in evidence
will not operate against the State considering the stipulation between the parties and under the well-
settled rule that the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or
agents, 6 if omission there was, in fact.
While it may be that the Municipality of Obando has been cadastrally surveyed in 1961, it does not
follow that an lands comprised therein are automatically released as alienable. A survey made in a
cadastral proceeding merely Identifies each lot preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication
of title to any of the lands upon claim of interested parties. Besides, if land is within the jurisdiction
of the Bureau of Forest Development, it would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to
register it under the Torrens System.
Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession Applicants may have had, and,
however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. 7
The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by Applicants, or the alleged titling of properties
around it, does not automatically render the property as alienable and disposable. Applicants' remedy
lies in the release of the property from its present classification. In fairness to Applicants, and it
appearing that there are titled lands around the subject property, petitioners-officials should give
serious consideration to the matter of classification of the land in question.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is reversed and the application for registration in Land
Registration Case No. N299-V-76 of the former Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, is
hereby dismissed, without prejudice to the availment by the applicants of the proper administrative
remedy. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., took no part

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3714 January 26, 1909
ISABELO MONTANO Y MARCIAL, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, ET AL., respondents.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, appellant.
Attorney-General Araneta, for appellant.
F. Buencamino, for appellee.
TRACEY, J.:
Isabelo Montano presents a petition to the Court of Land Registration for the inscription of a piece of
land in the barrio of Libis, municipality of Caloocan, used as a fishery having a superficial area of
10,805 square meters, and bounded as set out in the petition; its value according to the last
assessment being $505.05, United States currency.
This petition was opposed by the Solicitor-General in behalf of the Director of Lands, and by the
entity known as Obras Pias de la Sagrada Mitra, the former on the ground that the land in question
belonged to the Government of the United States, and the latter, that it was the absolute owner of all
the dry land along the eastern boundary of the said fishery.
The Court of Land Registration in its decision of December 1, 1906, dismissed the said oppositions
without costs and decreed, after a general entry by default, the adjudication and registration of the
property described in the petition, in favor of Isabelo Montano y Marcial.
From this decision only counsel for the Director of Public Lands appealed to this court. It is a
kindred case to Cirilo Mapa vs. The Insular Government, decided by this court on February 19,
1908, reported in 10 Phil. Rep., 175.
As some discussion has arisen as to the scope of that decision, it appears opportune to reaffirm the
principle there laid down. The issue was, whether the lands used as a fishery , for the growth of nipa,
and as salt deposits, inland some distance from the sea, and asserted, though not clearly proved to be
overflowed at high tide could be registered as private property on the strength of ten years'
occupation, under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 of the Phil. Commission. The point
decided was that such land within the meaning of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, was
agricultural, the reasoning leading up to the conclusion being that congress having divided all the
public lands of the Islands into three classes it must be included in one of the three, and being clearly
neither forest nor mineral, it must of necessity fall into two division of agricultural land. In the
concurring opinion, in order to avoid misapprehension on the part of those not familiar with United
States land legislation and a misunderstanding of the reach of the doctrine, it was pointed out that
under the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States the phrase "public lands" is held to be
equivalent to "public domain," and dos not by any means include all lands of Government
ownership, but only so much of said lands as are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement
by homestead and other like general laws. Accordingly, "government land" and "public domain" are
not synonymous items; the first includes not only the second, but also other lands of the Government
already reserved or devoted to public use or subject to private right. In other words, the Government
owns real estate which is part of the "public lands" and other real estate which is not part thereof.
This meaning attached to the phrase "public lands" by Congress in its land legislation is settled by
usage and adjudication beyond a doubt, and without variation. It is therefore doing the utmost
violence to all rules of construction to contend that in this law, dealing with the same subject-matter
in connection with these Islands, a different meaning had, without indication or motive, been
imported into the words. They cannot have one meaning in any other statute and a different and
conflicting meaning in this statute. Where property in general is referred to therein, other and apt
phrases are used in order to include it; for instance, section 12 provides "that all the property and
rights which have been acquired in the Phil. Islands by the United States ... are hereby placed under
the control of the Government of the said Islands." Therefore, there is much real property belonging
to the Government which is not affected by statutes for the settlement, prescription or sale of public
lands. Examples in point are properties occupied by public buildings or devoted to municipal or
other governmental uses.
Among the authorities cited in the Mapa case are two, Shively vs. Bowlby (152 U.S., 1), and
Mann vs. Tacoma Land Co. (153 U.S., 273), in which it was held that general public land laws did
not apply to land over which the tide ebbs and flows. Mr. Justice Gray, in Shively vs. Bowlby, which
is in itself an epitome of the American Law of Waters, speaking of the tide lands, said:
But Congress has never undertaken by general laws to dispose of such lands. . . .
The Congress of the United States, in disposing of the public lands, has constantly acted
upon the theory that those lands, whether in the interior, or on the coast, above high-
water mark, may be taken up by actual occupants, in order to encourage the settlement of
the country, but that the navigable water and the soils under them. whether within the
above the ebb and flow of the tide, shall be and remain public highways; and being
chiefly valuable for the public purposes of commerce, navigation, and fishery, and for the
improvement necessary to secure and promote those purposes, shall not be granted away
during the period of territorial government. (Pp. 48 and 49.)
The conclusions of the court are in part stated as follows:
Lands under tide waters are incapable of cultivation or improvement in the manner of
lands above high-water mark. They are of great value to the public for the purposes of
 commerce, navigation, and fishery. Their improvement by individuals, when permitted, is
incidental or subordinate to the public use and right. Therefore the title and the control of
them are vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the whole people . . . .
Upon the acquisition of a territory by the United States, whether by cession from one of
the States, or by treaty with a foreign country, or by discovery and settlement, the same
title and dominion passed to the United States, for the benefit of whole people, and in
trust for the several States to be ultimately created out of the territory . . . .
The United States, while hold the country as a territory, having all the powers both of
national and municipal government, may grant, for appropriate purposes, titles or rights
in the soil below high-water mark of tide waters. But that have never done so in general
laws. (Pp. 57 and 58.)
In Mann vs. Tacoma Land Co., it was said by Mr. Justice Brewer (p. 284);
It is settled that the general legislation of Congress in respect to public lands does not
extend to tide lands .... It provided that the scrip might be located on the unoccupied and
unappropriated public lands. As said in Newhall vs. Sanger (92 U.S., 761, 763.) "The
words "public lands" are habitually used in our legislation to described such as are
subject to sale or other disposal under general laws."
In Illinois Central R.R. Company vs. Illinois (146 U.S., 387) Mr. Justice Field, delivering the
opinion of the court, said:
That the State holds the title tot he lands under the navigable waters of lake Michigan
within its limits, in the same manner that the State hold title to soils under tide water, by
the common law, we have already shown, and that title necessarily carries with it control
over the waters above them whenever the lands are subjected to use. But it is a title
different in character from that which the States holds in lands intended for sale. It is
different from the title which the United States hold in the public lands which are open to
preemption and sale. It is a title held in trust for the people of the States that they may
enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of
fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties. The interest of
the people in the navigation of the waters and in commerce over them may be improved
in many instances by the erection of wharves, docks, and piers therein, for which purpose
the State may grant parcels of the submerged lands; and so long as their disposition is
made for such purposes, no valid objections can be made to the grants .... The control of
the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are
used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any
substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining .... The
State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are
interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave them entirely under
the use and control of private parties, except in the instance of parcels mentioned for the
improvement of the navigation and use of the waters, or when parcels can be disposed of
without impairment of the public interest in what remains, that can abdicate its police
powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace .... So with
trusts connected with public property, or property of a special character, like lands under
navigable waters, they can not be placed entirely beyond the direction and control of the
State.
The ownership of the navigable waters of the harbor and the lands under them is a subject
of public concern to the whole people of the State. The trust with which they are held,
therefore, is governmental and can not be alienated, except in those instances mentioned
of parcels used in the improvement of the interest thus held, or when parcels can be
disposed of without detriment to the public interest in the lands and waters remaining. . . .
. (Pp. 452-455.)
Mr. Justice Fields quotes from an opinion by Mr. Justice Bradley, delivered in a case in the Circuit
Court, speaking of lands under water, as follows (p. 457):
Being subject to this trust, they were publici juris; in other words, they were held for the
use of the people at large. It is true that to utilize the fisheries, especially those of
 shellfish, it was necessary to parcel them out to particular operators, and employ the rent
or consideration for the benefit of the whole people; but this did not alter the character of
the title. The land remained subject to all other public uses as before, especially to those
of navigation and commerce, which are always paramount to those of public fisheries. It
is also true that portions of the submerged shoals and flats, which really interfered with
navigation, and could better subserve the purposes of commerce by being filled up and
reclaimed, were disposed of to individuals for that purpose. But neither did these
dispositions of useless parts affect the character of the title to the remainder.
These citations are thus given at length in order to make clear, first, the lands under the ebb and flow
of the tide of navigable waters are not in America understood to be included in the phrase "public
lands" in Acts of Congress of United States; nor, perforce, can they best understood in laws of the
Philippine Commission drawn immediately under the sanction of those Acts; and second, that such
lands are under existing Congressional legislation the subject of private ownership, any occupation
therefore be subordinate to the public purpose of navigation and fishery. While as well in the
original thirteen States in which there was never a national public domain to which the land laws of
Congress could apply as in States more recently created out of that domain and which upon their
formation became masters of their own land policy the local laws govern riparian and littoral rights,
subject only to Congressional control in matters of foreign and interstate commerce (
U.S. vs. Mission Rock Co., 189 U. S., 391), yet, as to the unappropriated public lands constituting
the public domain the sole power of legislation is vested in Congress, which are uniformly and
consistently declined to assume the function of authorizing or regulating private appropriation of
such rights. Therefore, in the absence of specific Congressional legislation, it is impossible for
individuals to acquire title under the ten years provision of Act No. 926 or even through a definite
grants from the local legislature of lands beneath navigable waters in which the tide ebbs and flows,
except for wharf-age or other purposes auxiliary to navigation or other public uses, unless in
conformity with the preexisting local law of the Archipelago.
The matter is dwelt is upon for the reason that the late Attorney-General in his very able brief calls
attention to the effect apprehended from the extension of the words "agricultural lands" as used in
Act No. 926 to include all public lands not forest or mineral in character, specifying two acts of the
Philippine Commission, the validity of which he fears might thereby be called into question. The
first of these, Act No. 1039, dedicates to use of the Navy Department of the United States
Government certain ground and buildings in Cavite, while the other, Act No. 1654, is a fore-shore
law regulating the control and disposal of filled Government lands. If the term "agricultural lands"
be held to include all government property not forest or mineral in character, he suggests that these
Acts, not being in conformity with the procedure of Act No. 926, as approved by Congress, would
be invalid, and moreover, that the Philippine Government would be seriously tied up in the
management and disposition of other lands owned by it.
Without finally passing on this question in relation to lands the owners of which are not before us
parties to this action, it is appropriate, in answering the argument of the law officer of the State, to
point out that this consequence appears to be avoided by the restricted sense given to the words
"public lands" or "public domain" in the Act of Congress and in Act No. 926, as hereinbefore noted.
Neither the property affected by Act No. 1039, already in use by the Navy Department of the United
States, nor the foreshore land mentioned in Act No. 1654, which is under the ebb and flow of the
tide, was, in so far as appears in the Acts before us, part of the public domain to be disposed of under
sections 13, 14, 15, and 16 of the Act of congress of July 1, 1902, and for that reason it is not
included in any of the three subdivisions of "public lands" as agricultural or otherwise, although it
was part of the property acquired in the Philippine Islands by the United States by the treaty of peace
with Spain, which by section 12 of that Act was "placed under the control of the Government of said
Islands, to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof." It would seem that the validity
of the Cavite Act can not be successfully assailed on this ground, while it may well be that The Fore-
shore Act on examination will be found to fall, as to its general purpose, within the authorization of
section 11 of the Act of Congress, whereby the duty is imposed upon the Island government of
improving the harbors and navigable waters in the interest of commerce.
As a consequence, it follows that The Public Land Act did not apply to the fisheries in the Mapa
case, if they are to be regarded as constituting, in a general sense, land under tidal waters. It becomes
necessary, therefore, to refer to the character of the lands.
Although argued at different times, five of these cases have been presented substantially together, all
being covered by one brief of the late Attorney-General in behalf of the Government in which, with
many interesting historical and graphic citations he describes that part of the marginal seashore of
the Philippine Islands known as manglares, with their characteristic vegetation. In brief, it may be
said that they are mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grow various
kindred plants which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their roots deep into
the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there. These constitute the mangrove flats of
the tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also, to some extent, cultivated by man for the sake
of the combustible wood of the mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm
propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that they
can not be so regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases cited or in general
American Jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available for purpose of navigation,
and they "may be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains." Mr. Justice
Bradley, in the passage quoted by Mr. Justice Field, makes an exception of submerged shoals and
flats. In Railroad Company vs. Schurmeir (74 U.S., 272) , a Government patent of public land
bordering upon a river was held to include a parcel submerge at very high water and separated from
the mainland by a slough in which the water ran when ordinarily high. In Mobile vs. Hallett (41
U.S., 260), at page 266. Mr. Justice Catron remarked in his dissenting opinion:
. . . and that a mud flat, flowed by tide water, is the subject of grant by the Government to
an individual, I think can not well be doubted by anyone acquainted with the southern
country; when such valuable portions of it are mud flats, in the constant course of
reclamation.
In several of the older States along the Atlantic coast such flats, either by force of ordinance, custom,
judicial construction, or local laws are held to pass under private grants as appurtenant to the
uplands. (Winslow vs. Patten, 34 Maine, 25; Litchfield vs. Scituate, 135 Mass., 39; People vs. New
York and Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y., 71; Stevens vs. P.& N. Railroad, 5 Vroom, 34 N.J. Law,
532.) There is even stronger reason for excepting mud flats from the rule of tide lands in these
Islands, owing to the peculiarities of their configuration and to the nature of the tropical growth
thereon, and whatever may be action of the tide, we do not think that in the Philippines such of the
shoals covered by this vegetation, whether spontaneously or by cultivation, as are not available for
free navigation, or required for any other purpose of general benefit, can be considered tidal land
reserved for public use alone, under the governmental trust for commerce and public fishery, but on
the contrary, we regard them as public property, susceptible of a sort of cultivation and of
improvement, and as such, subject to occupation under paragraph 6 of section 54 of the Land Law.
Instances may hereafter arise of fisheries unduly established in what are clearly navigable waters
which would constitute a nuisance, and not be the subject of prescription or of grant. A brief
reference to the five cases under consideration in this court, however, will serve to show that they all
fairly fall within the benefits of the law. In the Mapa case1 the property was far from the the sea,
partly occupied as fish pond, as nipa land, and as a salt pit. It does not appear whether it was
connected with the sea by nature or by art, or whether the tide ebbed or flowed upon it, or whether
the salt was sufficient to impart to any portion of it a mineral character. In the Santiago case 2 there
was a fishery about two thousand yards from the sea, with which it communicated by a river, and a
portion of the inclosure was dedicated to growing the aquatic tree called bacawan. The fishery had
been constructed by man, upon land heretofore sown with this tree. In the Gutierrez case 3 it was
shown that the land was partly highland, growing fruit trees, and partly lowland , converted by the
occupant of the upland into a fishery by this labor. In the Baello case, 4 the river running to the sea
was a hundred meters away, the salt water therefrom reaching the lowland by means of an artificial
canal cut by the owner of the land when he gave up cultivating bacawan thereon, an made it into a
fishery. In the Montano case, although there was a considerable depth of water over the soil, yet
before the fishery was made, some thirty years before the trial, bacawan had been sown and
propagated in the mud by the owner who finally sold the entire cut when he built the dikes.
All these lots, in their original state, whether near the sea or at a distance from it inland, and whether
bare or washed by the tides, were not covered by waters practically navigable and were filled,
whether naturally or artificially, with vegetation sometimes cultivated and in common use for fuel
and for building purposes, and they were all adapted to fisheries or fish hatcheries by the labor of
man introducing or regulating the access of salt water thereto. It is obvious that that all five cases are
of the same general nature and that one rule must be applied to them all.
In this discussion of the meaning which the Congress of the United States attached to the phrase
"public lands" in the Philippine Bill, we have assumed that it was used in the same sense as in other
laws enacted by that body. If, however, it can be considered as employed with reference to the
peculiar conditions of the territory to which it was to be applied and to the local law or usage
prevailing therein, the result would not be different. In many of its general features the Spanish law
of public lands in the Philippines resembled the American. Government property was of two kinds
first, that of public use or service, said to be of public ownership, and second, that of having a
private character or use. (Civil Code, arts. 339 and 340.) Lands of the first class, while they retain
their public character are inalienable; those of the second are not.
By the royal decree of February 13, 1894, it was enacted that all "the land, soil, ground not under
cultivation, and forests in the Philippine Islands should be considered saleable crown lands," which
are not included in the four exceptions stated, among which were "those which belonged to the forest
zones which the State desires to hold for the Commonwealth." This corresponds in the main to the
American classification into Government property, public lands, and forest reserve. Mineral lands
are elsewhere defined. It is to be noted, however, that in the two languages terms ordinarily
equivalent are not in this relation employed in the same sense and that lands de dominio
publico signify quite a different thing from the arbitrary English Phrases "public lands" or "public
domain."
The Law of Waters of 1866, which was the latest Spanish Law of Waters extended to these Islands,
provides that private property can not be acquired in lands preserving the character of public
ownership (title 1, art. 1, par. 29), and among the lands declared of public ownership and use by
article 1 of chapter 1 of title 5 of the same law are:
The seashore. By shore is understood the land alternately covered and uncovered by
the sea in its tidal movement. Its interior, or land limit, is the point reached by the highest
and equinoctial tides. At those places not affected by tides, the land limit is the highest
point reached by sea water in ordinary storms or hurricanes. (Par. 3.)
So that under this legislation the same question also presented itself as to what constituted seashore,
which was of public use and trust and therefore not alienable. This question can not be said to have
been settled by official ruling at the time of the American occupation. From the official records it
appears that there were then pending for registration a great number of possessory expedientes,
twenty-two of which, made before April 17, 1895, were from the Province of Pampanga alone, in
which the land was described as manglares. Under the royal decree of 1894 such manglares appear
at the outset to have been registered and considered alienable and numbers of them were conceded
by adjustment, including considerable tracts in the town of Sexmoan and Lubao in Pampanga.
Claims having been made that on account of the trees growing thereon they formed part of the forest
reserve and also because, being covered and uncovered by the tide, they were part of the shore, and
in either case were inalienable, the engineer in chief of the forestry district of the center of Luzon
addressed, on January 7, 1893, a communication to the inspector general de montes ( Forestry
Department) in which he expressed an opinion that as part of the shore they were not subject to
private ownership and asked for an early decision of the question. On November 26, 1893, the acting
inspector-general notified the chief of the district of the Visayas in Mindanao that his excellency, the
governor-general, had that they ordered all action suspended on expedientes of manglar and nipa
lands and salt marshes until the questions involved in regard thereto should be determined. In this
condition the matter remained until the expiration of the Spanish sovereignty.
By article 14 of the Law of Waters the right of shore fishery was declared public, but by article 23
authority might be granted individuals to establish shore hatcheries for fish and shellfish, and by
article 15 salt-water ponds on private ground not communicating with the sea by water navigable by
boats were recognized as private property, while chapter 10 permitted and regulated the draining of
swamps and marshes, both of private and of public ownership.
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law the custom had grown up of
converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which became common feature of settlements
along the coast and at the time of the change of sovereignty constituted one of the most productive
industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and prove a public
disaster. In our opinion it was the object of Congress not to work such a result but, on the contrary,
in furtherance of the purposes of the treaty of Paris, to recognize and safeguard such property.
Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Land Registration is affirmed, without costs.
Torres, Mapa, and Carson, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 83609 October 26, 1989
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, IBARRA BISNAR and AMELIA BISNAR, respondents.
Ibarra L. Bisnar for himself and for and in behalf of co-private respondent Amelia Bisnar.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
Petitioner Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, seeks a review of the decision dated May
27, 1988, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66426, entitled "Ibarra Bisnar, et al. vs.
Director of Lands," affirming in toto the decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, granting
the private respondents' application for confirmation and registration of their title to two (2) parcels
of land in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256.
In their joint application for registration of title to two (2) parcels of land filed on July 20,1976, the
applicants Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar claimed to be the owners in fee simple of Lots 866 and 870 of
the Pilar Cadastre Plan AP-06-000869, respectively containing an area of 28 hectares (284,424 sq.
m.) and 34 hectares (345,385 sq. m.) situated in barrio Gen. Hizon, Municipality of President Roxas,
Province of Capiz (p. 14, Rollo). The applicants alleged that they inherited those parcels of land (p.
41, Rollo) and they had been paying the taxes thereon (p. 40, Rollo).
On December 16,1976, the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development,
opposed the application on the grounds that:
1. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient
title to acquire ownership in fee simple of the land or lots applied for, the
same not having been acquired by any of the various types of title issued by
the Spanish Government, such as, (1) 'titulo real' or royal grant, (2) the
'concession especial' or special grant, (3) the 'composicion con el estado titulo'
or adjustment title, (4) the 'titulo de compra 'or title by purchase, and (5) the
'informacion possessoria' or possessory information under the Royal Decree
of 13 February 1894, or any other recognized mode of acquisition of title over
realty under pertinent applicable laws.
2. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
application.
3. The properties in question are a portion of the public domain belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private appropriation, (pp. 17-
19, Record on Appeal). (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)
On February 24,1977, the applicants filed an amended application, which was approved on March
14, 1977, and included the following allegation:
Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case, they
hereby apply for the benefits of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act 141, as
amended, as they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of
the land as owners for more than fifty (50) years. (p. 16, Rollo.)
After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the names of the
applicants, herein private respondents. It found that applicants and their predecessors- in-interest
have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcels of land
under bona fide claims of ownership for more than eighty (80) years (not only 30) prior to the filing
of the application for registration, introduced improvements on the lands by planting coconuts,
bamboos and other plants, and converted a part of the land into productive fishponds (p. 68, Rollo).
On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision. It held that the classification of the
lots as timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said lots
are indeed more valuable as forest land than as agricultural land, citing as authority the case
of Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10). In this petition, the government
alleges that:
1. the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or
disposable agricultural land, mineral land or forest land is a prerogative of the
Executive Department of the government and not of the courts;
2. that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
private ownership; and
3. that an applicant for registration of title has the burden of proving that he
meets the requirements of Section 48 of Com. Act No. 141, as amended. (p.
19, Rollo.)
The principal issue in this appeal is whether the lots in question may be registered under Section 48
(b) of CA 141, as amended.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, we ruled:
As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted
from Act 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the
Executive Department of the government and not the courts. With these rules,
there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which
determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the government, through the
Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion
for respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed
area is within a timberland block, and (2) as certified to by the then Director
of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes. (pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is
classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless and until the land classified as forest is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply
(Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129
SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679).
Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vano vs.
Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]). A parcel
of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power
and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]).
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public
agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded (p. 26, Rollo). We reiterate
our ruling in Amunategui that:
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of
proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended by Republic Act 1942. He must overcome the presumption
that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an
interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an
imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has
had continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application.
(Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69.)
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside. The application for registration in
LRC Cad. Rec. 1256 of the former Court of First Instance, is hereby dismissed without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81564 April 26, 1990
ACTING REGISTRARS OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS OF PASAY CITY, PASIG AND
MAKATI, METRO MANILA, petitioners,
vs.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 57, IN MAKATI, METRO MANILA
PRESIDED OVER BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, AND THE
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DELFIN CASAL, represented by DOMINGO C.
PALOMARES, ADMINISTRATOR, respondents.
G.R. No. 90176 April 26, 1990
THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DELFIN CASAL, represented by DOMINGO C.
PALOMARES, ADMINISTRATOR, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE CONRADO VASQUEZ, JR., Presiding Judge, BRANCH 118, RTC,
RICARDO P. SANTIAGO, ET AL., respondents.
Taada, Vivo & Tan for the Intestate Estate of the Late Delfin Casal.
Antonio J. Dalangpan for himself and the heirs of Delfin Casal.
Pedro S. Ravelo for Gerardo Casal.
Filomeno Peralta, Jr. for Domingo C. Palomares.

SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioners ** charge His Honor, Judge Francisco Velez, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57,
Makati, Metro Manila, with grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order authorizing the private
respondent, through Domingo Palomares, to perform acts of ownership over a 2,574-hectare parcel
of land known as Hacienda de Maricaban spread out in various parts of Makati, Pasig, Taguig,
Pasay City, and Paraaque. There is no controversy as to the facts.
On November 5, 1985, the private respondent, Domingo Palomares, as administrator of the heirs of
Delfin Casal, commenced suit with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 132, Makati, Metro Manila for
declaratory relief, quieting of title, cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 192, and
cancellation of entries upon Original Certificate of Title No. 291.
Palomares had earlier come to this Court (February 27, 1985) on a similar petition, and in addition,
to direct the Register of Deeds to issue a duplicate owner's copy of Original Certificate of Title No.
291, embracing allegedly Hacienda de Maricaban, in lieu of the (alleged) lost one. On September 9,
1985, the Court denied the petition for lack of merit. (G.R. No. 69834).
On December 19, 1985, the petitioners filed their answer.
On June 2, 1986, the private respondent filed a motion to admit amended complaint impleading the
Republic of the Philippines and the Registers of Deeds of Pasig, Makati, and Pasay City as parties-
respondents, and alleging, among other things, that: (1) on October 1, 1906, the Court of Land
Registration (James Ostrand, Presiding Judge) confirmed the title of Dolores Pascual Casal y Ochoa,
a native of Madrid, Spain, over the 2,574-hectare parcel above-mentioned; (2) on October 17, 1906,
the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued OCT No. 291 in her name; (3) upon her death, and successive
deaths of her heirs, the property devolved on Gerardo, Reynaldo, Lolita, and Erlinda, all surnamed
Casal, great grandchildren of Dolores; (4) no conveyances or dispositions of any kind have been
allegedly made upon the parcel; (5) TCT No. 192, which covers the same landholding, is allegedly
spurious and inexistent; (6) the State itself, by placing 27,213,255 square meters thereof under a
military reservation (Fort McKinley now Fort Bonifacio), by Proclamation No. 423, and fifty
hectares thereof pursuant to Proclamation No. 192, had been guilty of landgrabbing; (7) any and all
holders of any and all TCTs emanating therefrom or from TCT No. 192, are null, void, and of no
force and effect; and (8) as a consequence thereof, the heirs of Dolores Casal suffered various
damages and attorney's fees.
On June 26, 1986, the petitioners filed an answer, stating, among other things, that: (1) the estate of
Dolores Casal (or Delfin Casal, her grandchild) is not a juridical person authorized by law to bring
suit; (2) the Registers of Deeds of Makati, Pasig, and Pasay City are not the real parties in interest,
but rather, the registered owners over which the court had not acquired jurisdiction; (3) the non-
joinder of the real parties in interest is fatal; (4) OCT No. 291 has long been cancelled; (5) Judge
Gregorio Pineda of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI, Pasig, had earlier denied
prayers for the issuance of duplicate owner's copy of OCT No. 291 because the land embraced
therein had been validly delivered to the Government; (6) the Supreme Court itself had denied the
Casals' appeal; *** (7) as a consequence, res judicata is a bar; (8) prescription has also set in; and (9)
the Casal's claims can not validly override the titles of innocent purchasers for value.
On August 29, 1986, the respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order, directing the
petitioners to cease and desist from performing the acts complained of.
In a subsequent memorandum, the petitioners alleged that Dolores Casal had conveyed the property
to the Government of the United States in 1906 and the Manila Railroad Company on which Judge
Ostrand, the Presiding Judge of the Court of Land Registration, later Justice of this Court, had
stamped his imprimatur.
On October 12, 1987, the respondent court issued an order in the tenor, as follows:
No other opposition having been registered, this Court hereby resolves to grant the
plaintiffs' prayer in the OMNIBUS MOTION in order to safeguard the integrity of the
land embraced in OCT 291, hereby authorizing for this purpose the plaintiff Domingo C.
Palomares:
1. To order such subdivision and/or individual survey or surveys within Parcel
II, Parcel III and Parcel IV under Survey Plan Psu-2031 by a licensed geodetic
engineer or engineers at plaintiffs' expense in order to facilitate and simplify
the efficient administration of the property described in OCT 291; and
2. To sell, exchange, lease or otherwise dispose (of) any area or areas or
portion or portions thereof, subject to the approval of the Intestate Estate
Court, to cover expenses for the payment of taxes to which the property is
subject, as well as expenses of administration and for the protection of the
integrity of the said lands.
SO ORDERED. 1
Eleven days later, or on October 23, 1987 to be precise, it issued another order, as follows:
Acting on the plaintiffs MOTION dated October 15, 1987 praying for the issuance of a
Writ of Execution implementing the Order of this Court dated October 12, 1987 before
the expiration of the time to appeal, and after inquiring from the plaintiff's counsel for
their reason in seeking the same, the Court hereby issues this clarificatory order affirming
the power of the plaintiff Domingo C. Palomares to execute and perform the acts
authorized in the said Order of October 12, 1987 without the need of a Writ of Execution,
where no relief has been sought therefrom by any party, said Order being implementable
at the instance of the said plaintiff Domingo C. Palomares, anytime when the said Order
becomes final 15 days after the said plaintiff received copy of the same (see Section 39,
Chapter IV, B.P. Blg. 129). Plaintiff Domingo C. Palomares may therefore take whatever
steps he considers appropriate for the implementation of the said Order without need of
further Orders or additional authority from this Court.
SO ORDERED. 2
The petitioners filed a notice of appeal; the respondent court, however, denied it" 3 "it being directed
against . . . an interlocutory order. . . 4
Hence, this recourse.
The petitioners interpose the following questions:
A. Whether or not respondent Court can validly decide before trial in favor of private
respondent the ownership and possession of the 25,743,514 square meters (of) land
known as "Hacienda de Maricaban", which is the main issue in this case;
B. Whether or not respondent Court can validly allow private respondent to exercise and
perform all acts of ownership and possession over the said land before trial
 C. Whether or not respondent Court has acquired jurisdiction to hear and decide this
action;
D. Whether of not respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in not dismissing this action or allowing petitioners to appeal from the
orders in question. 5
In their comment, the private respondent averred, among other things, that: (1) the respondent court,
contrary to the petitioners' claim, did not decide the case "before trial"; (2) OCT No. 291 had not
been validly cancelled and that the rubber stamp impression thereon, "CANCELLED" is a forgery;
(3) the act of Judge Pineda, in denying issuance of OCT No. 291, duplicate owner's copy, can not be
considered res judicata because that case involved purportedly a mere petition for issuance of
duplicate owner's copy; (4) non-joinder of proper parties is not a jurisdictional defect; (5) the TCTs
issued thereafter are a nullity because OCT No. 291 had not been shown to have been duly
cancelled; (6) OCT No. 291 has become imprescriptible; and (7) the private respondent has a valid
right of dominion over the property.
In the meantime, the private respondent came to this Court on certiorari (G.R. No. 90176) alleging
that on December 15, 1987, in connection with Sp. Proc. No. P-2993 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 118, Pasay City, entitled "In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the Late Fortunato Santiago
and Mariano Pantanilla Crisanta P. Santiago, et al., Petitioners," Judge Conrado Vasquez, Jr. issued
an order disposing of certain parcels which the private respondent claims as forming part and parcel
of Hacienda de Maricaban.
On June 20, 1988, the respondent judge in G.R. No. 81564 filed his own comment, asserting, among
other things, that: (1) what he had sought to bar, by virtue of injunction, was incursions and forcible
entries of trespassers and squatters; (2) the petitioners can not rightly claim that he had prematurely
adjudicated the case, because there was allegedly no decision to begin with; (3) that he issued the
writ of preliminary injunction in order only to maintain the status quo ante bellum that is, to re-place
the private respondent, which had been allegedly in prior possession, in possession; (4) he did not
allegedly authorize unbridled "acts of ownership" to be exercised on the property; (5) all rights of
dominion given thereon were subject to the approval of the intestate estate court; (6) he denied the
notice of appeal because the order dated October 12, 1987, was interlocutory in nature from which
no appeal lies; (7) as to jurisdiction, the various motions filed by petitioners, allegedly accepting the
court's jurisdiction, have clothed the court with jurisdiction, and that besides, the jurisdictional
question was never raised except now.
On July 7, 1988, the petitioners filed a reply traversing the respondent judge's allegations.
On August 26, 1988, the respondent judge filed a supplemental comment. He reiterated that the writ
of injunction was directed only on such spaces not occupied by the Government (Fort Bonifacio,
Libingan ng mga Bayani, Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Nayong Pilipino, Population
Commission, National Science and Development Board, and National Housing Authority).
Meanwhile, Atty. Antonio J. Dalangpan for and on behalf purportedly of the "Heirs of Delfin Casal"
and the private respondent, Domingo Palomares, file a Comment/Opposition in Intervention", dated
December 23, 1988 asking for the outright dismissal of the petition.
On December 14, 1989, the private respondent filed a manifestation, stating, among other things,
that assuming OCT No. 291 had been cancelled, there was still basis for the respondent judge to
prevent landgrabbers from entering into vacant portions of the state embraced thereby.
The Court finds the issues, quintessentially, to be:
(1) Is OCT No. 291 still valid and subsisting?
(2) Did the respondent judge, in issuing the orders, dated October 12 and October 23,
1987, commit a grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction?
I.
Is OCT No. 291 still valid and subsisting?
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the hectarage embraced by TCT No. 192
(OCT No. 291) consists of Government property. Three things persuade the Court: (1)
the decrees of Proclamations Nos. 192 and 435; (2) the incontrovertible fact that OCT
No. 291 has been duly cancelled; and (3) the division of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R.
CV No. 00293, affirming the decision of Hon. Gregorio Pineda, Judge of the then Court
 of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI, in LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 2484, Case No. R-1467
thereof, entitled "In Re: Issuance of Owner's Duplicate of Certificate of Title No. 291," as
well as our own Resolution, in G.R. No. 69834, entitled "Domingo Palomares, et al., v.
Intermediate Appellate Court".
(a)
Proclamation No. 192 ("RESERVING FOR THE VETERANS CENTER SITE
PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED
IN THE PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON") and Proclamation No. 423
("RESERVING FOR MILITARY PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG, TAGUIG, AND
PARAAQUE PROVINCE OF RIZAL, AND PASAY CITY") have the character of
official assertions of ownership, and the presumption is that they have been issued by
right of sovereignty and in the exercise of the State's dominical authority. We take not
only judicial notice thereof 6 but accept the same as a valid asseveration of regalian light
over property.
With respect to the premises occupied by the Libingan ng mga Bayani, Ninoy Aquino
International Airport, Nayong Pilipino, the Population Commission, National Science and
Development Board, and the National Housing Authority, we do not have the slightest
doubt that they stand on Government property by sheer presumption that, unless
otherwise shown, what the Government occupies is what the Government owns.
While there is no presumption that property is Government property until otherwise
shown, because the law recognizes private ownership, thus:
Art. 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial property of
the State, provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of all property
belonging to private persons, either individually or collectively. 7
we find hard evidence on record that: (1) the property covered by OCT No. 291 had been
conveyed to the United States of America; (2) it had been later ceded to the Republic of
the Philippines, and (3) as a consequence, OCT No. 291 was cancelled upon final order
of Judge Ostrand.
Be that as it may, the private respondent in G.R. No. 81564 is pressed hard to establish the fact that
portions of the property, especially the open spaces referred to in the lower court's writ of injunction
and the private respondent's manifestation of December 14, 1989, and which open spaces it claims to
be outside Maricaban, are indeed outside Maricaban (or OCT 291). With respect, however, to parts
thereof on which Fort Bonifacio, Libingan ng mga Bayani, Ninoy Aquino International Airport,
Nayong Pilipino, Population Commission National Science and Development Board, and National
Housing Authority sit, the hands of the private respondent are tied.
Claims that Judge Ostrand's decree was a counterfeit is not only self-serving, it finds no support
from the records. The presumptions is "that official duty has been regularly performed," 8 and the
burden is on the private respondent to prove irregular performance. The barren insistence that Judge
Ostrands order was a forgery is not sufficient to overthrow the presumption. To begin with, the act
of forgery has been seasonably disputed by the petitioners. Secondly, the Acting Registrar of Deeds
of Pasig, who supposedly certified to the fake character of Judge Ostrand's order, has himself joined
the other petitioners in opposing the reconveyance sought.
(b)
The decision in AC-G.R. No. 00293, dismissing the private respondent's petition for the issuance of
a new owner's copy of OCT No. 291, a dismissal affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 69834, also
militates against the return of the property to the heirs of Delfin Casal. The Appellate Court's
judgment, a judgment sustained by this Court, operates as, at the very least, the law of the case
between the parties, that OCT No. 291 has been cancelled and the land covered has been conveyed
and ceded to the National Government. The fact that AC-G.R. CV No. 00293 dealt with a petition
for issuance of lost owner's duplicate copy is no argument because be that as it may, the private
respondent can not rightfully say that the heirs of Delfin Casal still have title to the land. If it can not
secure a new owner's copy, it can mean that they have lost title thereto.
(c)
The principle of res judicata is also a bar to the instant proceedings. It should be noted that in G.R.
No. 69834, Mr. Domingo Palomares prayed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered it is most respectfully prayed to the most Honorable
Supreme Court, that in the name of law, justice and fair play, to prevent and frustrate
"land-grabbing" by the government, decision be rendered:
FIRST, That a thorough review of the aforementioned resolution of the
Intermediate Appellate Court be made;
SECOND, That after due consideration, the resolution subject of review be set
aside based on the aforestated assignment of error;
THIRD, That the Order of the Lower Court dated Jan. 19, 1977 be affirmed as
the lawful and valid order;
FOURTH, To erase all doubts by declaring OCT No. 291 as continuously and
existing validly against the whole world;
FIFTH, Clearing OCT No. 291 of all adverse claims, since the herein
petitioners are the true and legally declared heirs; and
SIXTH, Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal to issue the Owner's
Duplicate Copy of OCT No. 291.
Petitioner-Appellant further prays for other just and equitable reliefs.****
When we therefore denied that petition, we, in effect, held that reconstitution (of lost duplicate
owner's copy) was not possible because the mother title (OCT No. 291) had been duly cancelled.
And when we therefore declared OCT No. 291 to have been cancelled, we perished all doubts as to
the invalidity of Mr. Palomares' pretenses of title to Maricaban. Our judgment was conclusive not
only as to Mr. Palomares, but also as to the existing status of the property. As we have held:
The lower Court correctly ruled that the present action is barred by the final judgment
rendered in the previous case of Tuason & Co. vs. Aguila, Civil Case No. Q-4275, of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal. The reason is plain: if the herein appellants really had a
preferential right to a conveyance of the land from J.M. Tuason & Co., or if the certificate
of (Torrens) title held by Tuason & Co. were truly void and ineffective, then these facts
should have been pleaded by these appellants in the previous case (Q-4275), since such
facts, if true, constituted a defense to the claim of Tuason & Co. for recovery of
possession. If appellants failed to plead such defenses in that previous case, they are
barred from litigating the same in any subsequent proceeding, for it is a well established
rule that as between the same parties and on the same subject and cause of action, a final
judgment is conclusive not only on matters directly adjudicated, but also as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto. 9
II
Did the respondent judge, in issuing the order, dated October 12, 1987, commit a grave abuse of
discretion equivalent to lack of excess of jurisdiction?
(a)
The Court has no doubt that Judge Velez is here guilty of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction to warrant certiorari. As above-stated, what he gave away, by virtue of
reconveyance, was property that inalienably belongs to the Government or its successors. Worse, he
gave away property without notice to the actual possessors, that is, the present registered owner. It is
beyond debate, as we have indicated, that the land had been, since the cancellation of OCT No. 291,
parcelled out to a succession of buyers and owners. In the absence of notice, it acquired no
jurisdiction to decree redelivery or reconveyance. It is well-established that owners of property over
which reconveyance is asserted are indispensable parties, without whom no relief is available and
without whom the court can render no valid judgment. 10
Furthermore, the present holders of the land in question are innocent purchasers for value, or
presumed to be so in the absence of contrary evidence, against whom reconveyance does not lie. 11
(b)
The respondent judge can not conceal his faults behind arguments that he did not intend to convey
the premises, but rather, to secure, allegedly, vacant portions thereof from interlopers. First, this is
not stated in his order. Second, that order is clear and unequivocal that Domingo Palomares has the
right "[t]o sell, exchange, lease or otherwise dispose of any area or areas or portion or portions
thereof . . . " 12 Third and last, the security of the property is the lookout of the claimants, and not the
court's. In case the premises the respondent judge's injunctive writ have been directed belong to
others, let them air their plaints.
(c)
The Court is also agreed that the challenged order was issued with no benefit of trial or hearing. The
private respondent can not validly rely on AC-G.R. No. 00293 as the "trial or hearing" to justify the
issuance of its said order, in the first place, because it is a different proceeding. But above all, the
private respondent itself says that AC-G.R. CV No. 00293 can not be made a basis for denying
reconveyance because "the . . . petition was merely for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy
. . . 13 Accordingly, it can not invoke that case and yet, repudiate its effects. It is the height of
contradiction.
(d)
It was also grave error for the lower court to deny the Solicitor General's notice of appeal. The
Government had all the right to appeal because: (1) the order of October 12, 1987 was in the nature
of a final judgment, as "final judgment" is known in law (however it is captioned), that is to say, one
that "finally disposes of the pending action so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial
court; 14 (2) it did not merely maintain the status quo, but allowed Mr. Domingo Palomares to
transact on the property by near right of dominion over it.
Judge Velez had therefore no reason, indeed, excuse, to deny the Government's notice of appeal.
What is plain is the fact that Judge Velez was hell-bent, so to speak, in blocking the Government's
efforts to defend what rightfully belongs to it.
What has obviously been lost on the parties, Judge Velez in particular, is the established principle
that injunction does not lie "to take property out of the possession or control of one party and place it
into that of another." 15 In this wise it has also been held:
xxx xxx xxx
It is a well established doctrine in this jurisdiction that an injunction is not the proper
remedy for the recovery of possession of real estate and the improvements thereon, as
well as for the ejectments therefrom of the actual occupants who claim to have title to or
material interest therein. The use of said remedy in such cases has invariably been
considered unjustified, in open violation of the legal presumption that the bona
fide possessor of a certain piece of land and improvements thereon, holds the same under
claim of ownership and with a just title, and as an advanced concession of the remedy to
which the claimant might be entitled. (Citations omitted) 16
xxx xxx xxx
Injunction, moreover, is an extraordinary remedy. It lies only in certain cases, to wit:
Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted at
any time after the commencement of the action and before judgment when it is established:
(a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or
in the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation
or the non-performance thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or
(c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to
be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiffs rights respecting the subject of
the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. 17
xxx xxx xxx
The conspicuous and unusual zeal with which Judge Francisco Velez now defends his acts 18 has not
escaped us. His Honor should have borne in mind that in proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules,
such as the present cases, the judge is included only as a nominal party. Unless otherwise ordained
by this Court, he is not called upon to answer or comment on the petition, but rather, the private
respondent. It is indeed distressing to note that it is the very judge who has taken the cudgels for the
latter, in defending its interests, when he, the judge, should have remained a neutral magistrate. Res
ipsa loquitor. 19 He must get his just deserts.
 III
The Court thus closes the long-drawn tale of Hacienda de Maricaban. In this connection, let trial
judges be cautioned on the indiscriminate disposition of our dwindling natural resources to private
persons. Accordingly, we grant G.R. No. 81564 and dismiss G.R. No. 90176, and so also, end what
has come down as nearly a century of uncertainty, doubt, and conflict Maricaban has left in its trail.
The Court has finally spoken. Let the matter rest.
WHEREFORE:
1. The petition in G.R. No. 81564 is GRANTED:
(a) The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by our Resolution, dated April 13, 1988,
enjoining the respondent judge from enforcing his: (i) order of October 12, 1987 and (ii)
the follow-up order of October 23, 1987, is made permanent and
(b) Original Certificate of Title No. 291 is declared duly CANCELLED;
2. The petition in G.R. No. 90176 is DISMISSED; and
3. Judge Francisco Velez is ordered to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be
administratively dealt with for giving away, by virtue of reconveyance, property that
inalienably belongs to the Government, without notice to the registered owner, and
without benefit of trial or hearing; for blocking Government efforts to defend what
rightfully belongs to it; and for filing his comment of June 17, 1988 and supplemental
comment of August 26, 1988 without express leave of court.
Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Grio-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., and Gutierrez, Jr., J., are on leave.
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 195990, August 05, 2015
HEIRS OF RAFAEL GOZO REPRESENTED BY CASTILLO GOZO AND RAFAEL
GOZO, JR., Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION CORPORATION OF THE
SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH (PUMCO), SOUTH PHILIPPINE UNION
MISSION OF SDA (SPUMCO) AND SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH AT SIMPAK,
LALA, LANAO DEL NORTE REPRESENTED BY BETTY PEREZ , Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by petitioners Heirs of Rafael Gozo seeking to
reverse and set aside the 10 November 2010 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals and its 14 February
2011 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00188. The assailed decision and resolution reversed the 30
June 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte and held that
the action for nullification and recovery of possession filed by the petitioners is already, barred
by laches. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated 30 June 2004 of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The South Philippine Union Mission of the Seventh Day Adventist Church remains the
absolute owner of the donated property.4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Facts

Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of the Spouses Rafael and Concepcion Gozo (Spouses Gozo)
who, before their death, were the original owners of a parcel of land with an area 236,638 square
meters located in Sitio Simpak, Brgy. Lala, Municipality of Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte. The
respondents claim that they own a 5,000 square-meter portion of the property. The assertion is based
on the 28 February 1937 Deed of Donation 5 in favor of respondent Philippine Union Mission
Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventist (PUMCO-SDA). Respondents took possession of the
subject property by introducing improvements thereon through the construction of a church building,
and later on, an elementary school. On the date the Deed of Donation is executed in 1937, the
Spouses Gozo were not the registered owners of the property yet although they were the lawful
possessors thereof. It was only on 5 October 1953 that the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-
642 covering the entire property was issued in the name of Rafael Gozo (Rafael) married to
Concepcion Gozo (Concepcion) pursuant to the Homestead Patent granted by the President of the
Philippines on 22 August 1953.6

In view of Rafael's prior death, however, his heirs, Concepcion, and their six children, namely,
Abnera, Benia, Castillo, Dilbert, Filipinas and Grace caused the extrajudicial partition of the
property. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Lanao del Norte issued a new certificate of title
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (T-347)-2927 under the names of the heirs on 13
January 1954.

On 30 July 1992, Concepcion caused the survey and the subdivision of the entire property including
the portion occupied by PUMCO-SDA.8 It was at this point that respondents brought to the attention
of Concepcion that the 5,000 square-meter portion of the property is already owned by respondent
PUMCO-SDA in view of the Deed of Donation she executed together with her husband in their
favor in 1937. When Concepcion, however, verified the matter with the Register Deeds, it appeared
that the donation was not annotated in the title. The absence of annotation of the so-called
encumbrance in the title prompted petitioners not to recognize the donation claimed by the
respondents. The matter was left unresolved until Concepcion died and the rest of the owners
continued to pursue their claims to recover the subject property from the respondents.

A compromise was initially reached by the parties wherein the petitioners were allowed by
respondents to harvest from the coconut trees planted on the subject property but a misunderstanding
ensued causing respondents to file a case for qualified theft against the petitioners.

On 19 June 2000 or around six decades after the Deed of Donation was executed, petitioners filed an
action for Declaration of Nullity of Document, Recovery of Possession and Ownership with
Damages against PUMCO-SDA before the RTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. 9 In their-Complaint
docketed as Civil Case No. 21-201, petitioners claimed that the possession of PUMCO-SDA on the
subject property was merely tolerated by petitioners and therefore could not ripen into
ownership.10 In addition, petitioners argued that the signatures of the Spouses Gozo were forged
underscoring the stark contrast between the genuine signatures of their parents from the ones
appearing in the deed.11Finally, petitioners averred that granting for the sake of argument that the
said signatures were genuine, the deed of donation will remain invalid for lack of acceptance which
is an essential requisite for a valid contract of donation.12

For their part, respondents insisted on the validity of the donation and on the genuineness of the
signatures of the donors who had voluntarily parted with their property as faithful devotees of the
church for the pursuit of social and religious ends.13 They further contended that from the moment
the Spouses Gozo delivered the subject property to respondents in 1937, they were already in open,
public, continuous and adverse possession thereof in the concept of an owner. 14 A considerable
improvement was claimed to have been introduced into the property in the form of church and
school buildings.15 The argument of the petitioners, therefore, that the donation was invalid for lack
of acceptance, a question which came 63 years after it was executed, is already barred by laches.

After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. Both parties adduced documentary and
testimonial evidence to support their respective positions.

On 30 June 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision16 in favor of the petitioners thereby declaring that
they are the rightful owners of the subject property since the contract of donation which purportedly
transferred the. ownership of the subject property to PUMCO-SDA is void for lack of acceptance. In
upholding the right of the petitioners to the land, the court a quo held that an action or defense for
the declaration of nullity of a contract does not prescribe. Anent the claim that petitioners slept on
their rights, the RTC adjudged that the equitable doctrine of laches is inapplicable in the case at bar
because the action of the registered owners to recover possession is based on Torrens title which
cannot be barred by laches. The RTC disposed in this wise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
[petitioners], to wit:
(1) Declaring the 5,000 square meter portion of the land covered by TCT [No.] (T-347)-292 part of
the common property of the [petitioners]; and

(2) Declaring the Deed of Donation as void.

The [petitioners], however, are not entitled to damages, attorney's fees and cost of litigation prayed
for.17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision 18 and ordered the dismissal of
petitioners' complaint on the ground of laches. The appellate court opined that petitioners failed to
assert their rights over the land for more than 60 years, thus, laches had set in. Even if petitioners
were the registered owners of the land in dispute, laches would still bar them from recovering
possession of the same.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners was likewise denied by the appellate court in
a Resolution19 dated 14 February 2011.

Petitioners are now before this Court via this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the
reversal of the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on the sole ground
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE
THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO ON THE GROUND OF
LACHES.20ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court's Ruling

While the opposing parties center their arguments and counterarguments on the timeliness of raising
the question of the validity of' donation, a careful scrutiny of the records, however, reveals a
significant fact that at the time the Deed of Donation was executed by the Spouses Gozo on 28
February 1937, the subject property was part of the inalienable public domain. It was only almost
after two decades later or on 5 October 1953 that the State ceded its right over the land in favor of
the Spouses Gozo by granting their patent application and issuing an original certificate of title in
their favor. Prior to such conferment of title, the Spouses Gozo possessed no right to dispose of the
land which, by all intents and purposes, belongs to the State.

Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in Article XII, Section 2 of our Constitution, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable
public domain.21

The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the executive department of the
government and not the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as an
unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. This is in
consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State and
that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.22

All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Accordingly, all public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the alienable public
domain. As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from the government; and it is indispensable that the person
claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode
of acquisition recognized by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the Government that the land applied for is alienable and disposable. 23

Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1073, remains to this day the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of
lands of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands. The following provisions under
Title I, Chapter II of the Public Land Act, as amended, is very specific on how lands of the public
domain become alienable or disposable:24
SEC. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain
into:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the
purposes of their administration and disposition.
SEC. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable public
lands, the Batasang Pambansa or the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Natural
Resources, may from time to time declare what public lands are open to disposition or concession
under this Act.

xxxx

SEC. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been
officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been
reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner
become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or
any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to
be so. However, the President may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain
open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may,
for the same reason, suspend their concession or disposition until they are again declared open to
concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the Congress.

SEC. 9. For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain
alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to which such
lands are destined, as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Agricultural;cralawlawlibrary
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;cralawlawlibrary
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall
from time to time make the classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a
similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another. 25cralawredChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code, the
President delegated to the DENR Secretary the power to determine which of the unclassified lands
of the public domain are (1) needed for forest purposes and declare them as permanent forest to form
part of the forest reserves; and (2) not needed for forest purposes and declare them as alienable and
disposable lands.26

Per the Public Land Act, alienable and disposable public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can
be disposed of only as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. For homestead settlement;cralawlawlibrary
2. By sale;cralawlawlibrary
3. By lease; and
4. By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:

(a) By judicial legalization;cralawlawlibrary

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).27
Homestead over alienable and disposable public agricultural land is granted after compliance
by an applicant with the conditions and requirements laid down under Title II, Chapter IV of the
Public Land Act, the most basic of which are quoted below:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 12. Any citizen of the Philippines over the age of eighteen years, or the head of a family, who
does not own more than twenty-four hectares of land in the Philippines or has not had the benefit of
any gratuitous allotment of more than twenty-four hectares of land since the occupation of the
Philippines by the United States, may enter a homestead of not exceeding twenty-four hectares of
agricultural land of the public domain.

SEC. 13. Upon the filing of an application for a homestead, the Director of Lands, if he finds that the
application should be approved, shall do so and authorize the applicant to take possession of the land
upon the payment of five pesos, Philippine currency, as entry fee. Within six months from and after
the date of the approval of the application, the applicant shall begin to work the homestead,
otherwise he shall lose his prior right to the land.

SEC. 14. No certificate shall be given or patent issued for the land applied for until at least one-fifth
of the land has been improved and cultivated. The period within which the land shall be cultivated
shall not be less than one nor more than five years, from and after the date of the approval of the
application. The applicant shall, within the said period, notify the Director of Lands as soon as he is
ready to acquire the title. If at the date of such notice, the applicant shall prove to the satisfaction of
the Director of Lands, that he has resided continuously for at least one year in the municipality in
which the land is located, or in a municipality adjacent to the same and has cultivated at least one-
fifth of the land continuously since the approval of the application, and shall make affidavit that no
part of said land has been alienated or encumbered, and that he has complied with all the
requirements of this Act, then, upon the payment of five pesos, as final fee, he shall be entitled to a
patent.28ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is clear under the law that before compliance with the foregoing conditions and requirements the
applicant has no right over the land subject of the patent and therefore cannot dispose the same even
if such disposal was made gratuitously. It is an established principle that no one can give what one
does not have, nemo dat quod non habet.29 It is true that gratuitous disposal in donation may consist
of a thing or a right but the term right must be understood in a "proprietary" sense over which the
possessor has jus disponendi.30 This is because in true donations there results a consequent
impoverishment of the donor or diminution of his assets.31 In Republic v. Court of Appeals,32 the
Court declared the contract of donation, executed by the donor who has no proprietary right over the
object of the contract, null and void, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the military "camp site" was executed between
Eugenio de Jesus and Serafin Marabut, such donation would anyway be void because Eugenio de
Jesus held no dominical rights over the site when it was allegedly donated by him in 1936. In
that year, Proclamation No. 85. of President Quezon already withdrew the area from sale or
settlement and reserved it for military purposes, x x x Eugenio de Jesus cannot be said to be
possessed of that "proprietary" right over the whole 33 hectares in 1936 including the disputed
12.8081 hectares for at the time this 12.8081-hectare lot had already been severed from the mass
disposable public lands by Proclamation No. 85 and excluded from the Sales Award.
Impoverishment of Eugenio's asset as a result of such donation is therefore farfetched. (Emphasis
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is beyond question that at the time the gratuitous transfer was effected by the Spouses Gozo on 28
February 1937, the subject property was part of the public domain and is outside the commerce of
man. It was only on 5 October 1953 that the ownership of the property was vested by the State to
the Spouses Gozo by virtue of its issuance of the OCT pursuant to the Homestead Patent granted by
the President of the Philippines on 22 August 1953. Hence, the donation of the subject property
which took place before 5 October 1953 is null and void from the very start.33

As a void contract, the Deed of Donation produces no legal effect whatsoever. Quod nullum est,
nullum producit effectum34 That which is a nullity produces no effect.35 Logically, it could not have
transferred title to the subject property from the Spouses Gozo to PUMCO-SDA and there can be no
basis for the church's demand for the issuance of title under its name. Neither does the church have
the right to subsequently dispose the property nor invoke acquisitive prescription to justify its
occupation. A void contract is not susceptible to ratification, and the action for the declaration of
absolute nullity of such contract is imprescriptible.36

The lack of respondents' right over the property was confirmed when the Spouses Gozo had the
entire property, including the portion occupied by the church, surveyed and patented, and covered by
their homestead patent. Further, after a certificate of title was issued under their names, the Spouses
Gozo did not effect the annotation thereon of the supposed donation. Registration is the operative act
that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. 37 Indeed it has been ruled that where
there was nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the
property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the
Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may
subsequently defeat his right thereto.38 If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of
the certificate of title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would entirely be futile and
nugatory.39 The public shall then be denied of its foremost motivation for respecting and observing
the Land Registration Act.40

Just as significantly, the homestead application of the Spouses Gozo over the entire area of the
property including that occupied by respondents and the issuance in their favor of the corresponding
title without any complaint or objection from the respondents, remove the case of the petitioners
from the operation of the doctrine of laches.

And, further than the issuance of an original title, the entire property was made subject of an
extrajudicial partition of the property by the Gozo heirs resulting in the issuance of TCTs in their
names in 1954. Again, in no instance during the partition did the respondents make known their
claim over the property.

Clearly from the facts, the petitioners asserted their rights repeatedly; it was the respondents who
kept silent all throughout about the supposed donee's rights.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated 10 November 2010 and Resolution dated 14 February 2011 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 00188 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 63786-87. April 7, 1993.

UNITED PARACALE MINING COMPANY, INC., AND COCO GROVE, INC., petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, in his capacity as the former Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte, Branch 2, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. 70423. April 7, 1993.
ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. ALFREDO L.
BENIPAYO, as Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and PHILZEA MINING &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 73931. April 7, 1993.
JOSEPH V. LOPEZ and MIGUEL C. ANDRADE, petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT MARSMAN & COMPANY, INC. and UNITED
PARACALE MINING COMPANY, INC., respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez and Gatmaitan for United Paracale and Coco Grove, Inc.
Pedro A. Venida for respondents in G.R. 63786-87 and petitioners in G.R. 73931.
J.V. Natividad & Associates for Zambales Chromite.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTERPRETATION OF A STATUTE; PROPER ONLY
WHEN THERE IS DOUBT OR AMBIGUITY IN ITS LANGUAGE; CASE AT BAR. The view
of the petitioner that by virtue of the registration of the mining claims under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 624, the mining claims became private property and thereby brought outside the
control and supervision of the Director of Mines is without legal basis. The abovecited law does not
distinguish between private property and lands of the public domain. The provision of law involved
is clear and is not susceptible to interpretation. A condition sine qua non before the court may
construe or interpret a statute is that there be doubt or ambiguity in its language. Section 7 of P.D.
1281 quoted above defining the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Mines is clear.
Time and again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application. [Cebu
Portland Cement Company vs. Municipality of Naga, Cebu, 35 SCRA 708 (1968)] Where the law is
clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but
to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. [Chartered Bank Employees Association vs. Ople, 138 SCRA
273 (1985)].
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDICIAL RELIEF; NOT A VESTED RIGHT; A
MERE STATUTORY PRIVILEGE, NOT A PROPERTY RIGHT. There can be no vested right
in a judicial relief for this is a mere statutory privilege and not a property right. The distinction
between statutory privileges and vested rights must be borne in mind for persons have no vested
rights in statutory privileges. The state may change or take away rights which were created by the
law of the state, although it may not take away property which was vested by virtue of such
rights.(16A Am. Jur. 2d, pp. 652-653) Besides, the right to judicial relief is not a right which may
constitute vested right because to be vested, a right must have become a title, legal or equitable, to
the present or future enjoyment of property, or to the present or future enforcement of a demand or
legal exemption from a demand made by another. (National Carloading Corporation v. Phoenix-E1
Paso Express, Inc., cited in 16A Am, Jur. 2d, p. 651) Definitely, the judicial relief herein referred to
by the petitioner does not fall under any of these.
3. CIVIL LAW; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1214; A VALID EXERCISE OF THE SOVEREIGN
POWER OF THE STATE AS OWNER OF LAND OF PUBLIC DOMAIN; SUSTAINED IN CASE
AT BAR. The heart of these twin petitions is the question of constitutionality of P.D. 1214.
Unless P.D. 1214 is successfully assailed, the petitioners will be but mere applicants for the lease of
the mining claims involved and would thus have no causes of action against private respondents.
This question has been resolved by this Court in Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc. vs. Leido, Jr.
[156 SCRA 1 (1987), which ruling was reiterated in Zambales Chromite Mining Company, Inc. vs.
Leido, Jr., 176 SCRA 602 (1989)] thus: "(W)e hold that Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not
unconstitutional.' It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands of
the public domain, of which petitioner's mining claims still form a part, and over the patrimony of
the nation, of which mineral deposits are a valuable asset. It may be underscored, in this connection,
that the Decree does not cover all mining claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those
claims over which their locators had failed to obtain a patent. And even then, such locators may still
avail of the renewable twenty-five year (25) lease prescribed by Pres. Decree No. 463, the Mineral
Development Resources Decree of 1974. Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the
affected land or the mining claim. It merely segregates the located land or area from the public
domain by barring other would-be locators from locating the same and appropriating for themselves
the minerals found therein. To rule otherwise would imply that location is all that is needed to
acquire and maintain rights over a located mining claim. This, we cannot approve or sanction
because it is contrary to the intention of the lawmaker that the locator should faithfully and
consistently comply with the requirements for annual work and improvements in the located mining
claim. This, we cannot approve or sanction because it is contrary to the intention of the lawmaker
that the locator should faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements for annual work and
improvements in the located mining claim. Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8,
Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution. The same Constitutional mandate is found in Sec. 2, Art. XII of
the 1987 Constitution.
DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J p:
The cases herein were consolidated upon the representations of petitioners that they involve the same
issues or questions of law or at the very least, revolve around the same set of facts. A perusal of the
records, however, reveals the contrary. Only two petitions are properly consolidated. Thus, it
behooves Us to discuss the cases separately.
In blatant violation of Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which in part, provides:
"Sec. 2. Contents of the petition The petition shall contain a concise statement of the matters
involved, the assignment of errors made in the court below, and the reasons relied on for the
allowance of the petition, . . . (Emphasis Ours.).
"Only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must be distinctly set forth . . ."
this petition devotes nine (9) pages under the subtitle "Summary statement of the matters involved"
to a discussion of matters off tangent from the real issues in the case. Definitely, the question of
whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Regional Trial Court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order suspending hearing pending the resolution of their
motion to dismiss, does not involve the Philippine Bill of 1902, Executive Order No. 141, much less
P.D. 1214. The counsel for petitioners even discussed pending cases in this Court (G.R. No. 63786 -
87 and 69203) which have completely nothing to do with the instant petition except for the fact that
the parties therein are being represented by the same counsel as in this petition. In several pleadings
subsequent to their petition, petitioners insisted that the proceedings in the court below must be
restrained until this Court resolves the pending cases abovecited. For this reason this case was
consolidated thereto.
A summary of the real matters involved in this petition is found in the respondent Court's decision,
to wit:
"This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the Regional Trial Court, Branch XL, in
Camarines Norte from issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 5148 and to
disqualify the respondent judge from acting in that case. The case was brought by the respondents
Marsman and Co., Inc. and United Paracale Mining, Inc., to enjoin the petitioners, Joseph V. Lopez
and Miguel Andrade, from entering and conducting mining operations within the "McDonald" and
"San Antonio" Tunnels in Paracale, Camarines Norte, in which the private respondents have mining
claims ("Tulisan," "Santa Marta," "California," and "Rocky Mountain Fraction"). On December 11,
1984 the RTC issued a restraining order against the petitioners.
On December 12 the petitioners filed their answer alleging that, in accordance with PD 1214, the
private respondents had forfeited their right to the mining claims. They likewise argued that in view
of PD 605, the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case. On the same day the petitioners moved
for the disqualification of the respondent judge of the RTC, claiming (sic) that in issuing the
restraining order of December 11, 1984, he showed his "bias, prejudice and personal hatred of and
hostility to the [petitioners'] counsel [Atty. Pedro A. Venida]."
On December 24, 1984 the petitioners filed a motion for a preliminary hearing on their defense that
the RTC lacked jurisdiction under PD 605 to issue a temporary restraining order or injunction in
cases involving or growing out of the action of administrative officials on the applications for
permits for the disposition, exploitation, utilization, or exploration or development of the natural
resources. Accordingly the RTC, in its order of September 5, 1985, suspended the hearing of the
case until the resolution of the petitioners' motion to dismiss. It is at this point that the present
petition was filed." 1
The respondent Court denied this petition on grounds that: (1) the questions being raised are not
proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 but rather defenses which should be raised in the
action itself; (2) the question of jurisdiction which has yet to be resolved by the trial court pending
resolution of the motion to dismiss is prematurely raised; and (3) there was no basis for determining
whether or not the judge must be disqualified. 2
The review of this decision is what is on appeal before.
We refuse to be persuaded by the petitioners that the RTC must be enjoined from exercising its
jurisdiction in settling the case presented before it for the reason that the constitutionality of the law
involved in the said case is being questioned before this Court. This case should have been disposed
of independently of the other petitions herein.
The respondent Court of Appeals committed no reversible error. Neither did it commit grave abuse
of discretion as what petitioners want this Court to believe. The petitioners fail to point out any
assigned error which the respondent Court had supposedly committed but simply narrate the action
taken by it. Much less have they stated the reasons relied upon for the allowance of the instant
petition. For being insufficient in substance and in form, the instant petition lacks merit and must be
dismissed.
G.R. No. 70423
This is a petition involving the question of jurisdiction of regular courts in cases which had been
placed under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines under P.D. 1281.
This petition seeks to reverse the order of then Judge, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals,
Hon. Alfredo L. Benipayo, dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner herein on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction, citing Section 7 of P.D. 1281 and the doctrine enunciated in Twin Peaks Mining
Association, et al. vs. Navarro, 3 that an action for the enforcement of mining contracts, in this case
cancellation of a mining contract, is outside the competence of regular courts in view of the law
cited. 4
The complaint filed with the then CFI of Manila, Branch XVI, was one for the rescission of its
mining contract with herein private respondent on grounds of violations of the terms and conditions
thereof, with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
The trial court, however, upon motion of the defendant therein, dismissed the case.
Petitioner wants Us to construe Section 7 of P.D. 1281 as applicable only to mineral lands forming
part of the public domain and not to mining claims located and registered under Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 624 as is its case.
Section 7 of P.D. 1281 reads as follows:
Sec. 7. In addition to its regulatory and adjudicative functions over companies, partnerships or
persons engaged in mining exploration, development and exploitation, the Bureau of Mines shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
(a) a mining property subject of different agreements entered into by the claim holder thereof with
several mining operators;
(b) complaints from claimowners that the mining property subject of an operating agreement has not
been placed into actual operations within the period stipulated therein; and
(c) cancellation and/or reinforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal of the
claimowner/operator to aside by the terms and conditions thereof.
All actions and decisions of the Director of Mines on the above cases are subject to review, motu
proprio or upon appeal by any person aggrieved thereby, by the Secretary of Natural Resources
whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt by the
aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with the applicable
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 309 and Letter of Instructions Nos. 119 and 135.
The view of the petitioner that by virtue of the registration of the mining claims under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and Act No. 624, the mining claims became private property and thereby brought
outside the control and supervision of the Director of Mines is without legal basis. The abovecited
law does not distinguish between private property and lands of the public domain. The provision of
law involved is clear and is not susceptible to interpretation. A condition sine qua non before the
court may construe or interpret a statute is that there be doubt or ambiguity in its language. 5 Section
7 of P.D. 1281 quoted above defining the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Mines
is clear. Time and again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for
application. 6 Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says
and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. 7
This Court in Benguet Corporation vs. Leviste, 8 made these pronouncements:
"We grant the petition. Presidential Decree No. 1281 which took effect on January 16, 1978 vests the
Bureau of Mines with jurisdictional supervision and control over all holders of mining claims or
applicants for and/or grantees of mining licenses, permits, leases and/or operators thereof, including
mining service contracts and service contractors insofar as their mining activities are concerned. To
effectively discharge its task as the Government's arm in the administration and disposition of
mineral resources, Section 7 of P.D. 1281 confers upon the Bureau quasi-judicial powers as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Analyzing the objective of P.D. 1281, particularly said Section 7 thereof, the Court in Twin Peaks
Mining Association, the case relied upon by petitioner, noted that the trend is to make the
adjudication of mining cases a purely administrative matter. This observation was reiterated in the
more recent case of Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals."
The petitioner further argues that to hold that P.D. 1281 retroactively applies to its mining claims
which according to it is private property would constitute impairment of vested rights since by
shifting the forum of the petitioner's case from the courts to the Bureau of Mines, as urged by private
respondent, the substantive rights to full protection of its property rights shall be greatly impaired
and prejudiced. The judicial relief available for the redress of private property rights violated, now
being enjoyed by petitioner shall be lost altogether.
This argument does not merit Our approval. There can be no vested right in a judicial relief for this
is a mere statutory privilege and not a property right. The distinction between statutory privileges
and vested rights must be borne in mind for persons have no vested rights in statutory privileges. The
state may change or take away rights which were created by the law of the state, although it may not
take away property which was vested by virtue of such rights. 9 Besides, the right to judicial relief is
not a right which may constitute vested right because to be vested, a right must have become a title,
legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of property, or to the present or future
enforcement of a demand or legal exemption from a demand made by another. 10 Definitely, the
judicial relief herein referred to by the petitioner does not fall under any of these.
The case at bar falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines, hence, the
trial court did not err in dismissing the petitioner's complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
G.R. Nos. 63786-87
In these petitions filed by petitioners United Paracale Mining Company, Inc. and Coco Grove, Inc.,
petitioners seek to set aside the Order of dismissal of the case they filed with the trial court for the
ejectment of their respective defendants from the mining claims which were allegedly privately
owned by them having been located and perfected under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 624.
The heart of these twin petitions is the question of constitutionality of P.D. 1214. Unless P.D. 1214
is successfully assailed, the petitioners will be but mere applicants for the lease of the mining claims
involved and would thus have no causes of action against private respondents.
This question has been resolved by this Court in Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc. vs. Leido, Jr. 11
thus:
"(W)e hold that Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not unconstitutional. ** It is a valid exercise of the
sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands of the public domain, of which petitioner's mining
claims still form a part, and over the patrimony of the nation, of which mineral deposits are a
valuable asset. It may be underscored, in this connection, that the Decree does not cover all mining
claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims over which their locators had failed
to obtain a patent. And even then, such locators may still avail of the renewable twenty-five year
(25) lease prescribed by Pres. Decree No. 463, the Mineral Development Resources Decree of 1974.
Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the affected land or the mining claim. It
merely segregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring other would-be
locators from locating the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals found therein. To rule
otherwise would imply that location is all that is needed to acquire and maintain rights over a located
mining claim. This, we cannot approve or sanction because it is contrary to the intention of the
lawmaker that the locator should faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements for annual
work and improvements in the located mining claim.
Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution which
states:
'All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential and resettlement lands
of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for
the exploration, development, and exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be
granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
development of water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the
grant.'
The same Constitutional mandate is found in Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution, which
declares:
'All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not
be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State . . .'"
Notwithstanding Our ruling , in favor of the constitutionality of P.D. 1214, petitioners contend that
having filed mining lease applications on the mining claims they have previously located and
registered under then existing laws, pursuant to the requirements of this Presidential Decree, and
despite the waiver of their rights to the issuance of mining patents therefor (emphasis theirs), they
cannot be placed in equal footing with those who forfeit all rights by virtue of non-filing of an
application within the prescribed period such that they (petitioners) have no causes of action against
private respondents.
We are not persuaded by this contention.
Although We may agree that those who filed their mining lease applications have better rights than
those who forfeited all their right by not filing at all, this, however, does not amount to any vested
right which could be the basis for their cause of action against herein private respondents. What is
precisely waived is their right to the issuance of a mining patent upon application. This in effect
grants the government the power, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to award the patent to the
applicant most qualified to explore, develop and exploit the mineral resources of the country in line
with the objectives of P.D. 463, and not necessarily to the original locator of the mining claim. To
sustain their contention that they can question the award of mining patents to applicants other than
them would put to naught the objectives of P.D. 1214 as enunciated in its WHEREAS clauses.
We agree with the trial court that with the waiver of their right to the issuance of a mining patent
upon their application for a mining lease, their status is reduced to a mere applicant, their only
advantage over the others is the fact that they have already conducted explorations at the site and this
exploration may he ongoing. But still, this credential, so to speak, is not intended to tie the hands of
the government so as to prevent it from awarding the mining patent to some other applicants, which
in its belief may he more qualified than them.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 73931 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit; the Order of
dismissal assailed in G.R. No. 70423 is AFFIRMED and this petition is hereby likewise
DISMISSED; the Order of dismissal assailed in G.R. Nos. 63786-87 is AFFIRMED and these
petitions are hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ ., concur.
Feliciano, J ., took no part.