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West and Central Africa Regional Office

Mixed Migration in West and Central Africa


Key trends affecting children, challenges and
opportunities for advocacy and programming

September 2016

UNICEF WCARO - WORKING PAPER SERIES

PERSPECTIVES ON MIGRATION AND CHILDREN


In this Working Paper series sub-titled Perspectives on Migration, UNICEF West and Central Africa
Regional Office aims to encourage reflection and discussion on key migration trends, their impacts on
children, and policy shifts that further the best interests of children in West and Central Africa.
The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the policies or views of the United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF). Extracts from
this publication may be freely reproduced with due acknowledgement. Requests to utilize larger portions
or the full publication should be addressed to the UNICEF WCARO Office Social Policy Section.

Acknowledgments
The report was prepared jointly by the Social Policy and Emergency Sections of UNICEF West and Central
Africa Regional Office. The main authors of the report were Thi Minh-Phuong Ngo (Social Policy), Cairn
Verhulst (Emergency), Shameza Abdulla (Emergency) with contributions from Miranda Armstrong (Child
Protection). Significant inputs were provided by Andrew Brooks, George Abadjian and Pierre Ferry (Child
Protection), Francois Bellet and Kelly Ann Naylor (WASH), Jennifer Hofmann (Education), Cecilia
Meynet (Education in Emergencies), Felicite Tchibindat and Daniela Luciani (Cameroon CO), Isabelle
Bardem (Benin CO), Jacques Boyer and Michel Ikamba (Gabon CO), Felicite Mukantambara (Togo CO),
Serghei Buruiana (DRC CO), Laura Bill, Fosca Giulidori and Daniela Greg (Mauritania CO), Viviane van
Steirteghem, Brigitte Sonnois (Niger CO), Laeticia Bazzi and Yves Olivier Kassoka (Senegal CO). Key
data support was provided by Patrick Konan Nguessan (WCARO emergency section). Inputs and data from
IOM Regional Office in Dakar are also gratefully acknowledged.

Correspondence to:
United Nations Childrens Fund
West and Central Africa Regional Office
Social and Economic Policy Section
Dakar, Senegal
Tel: +221 33 831 0200

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Mixed Migration Trends in West and Central Africa
Key trends affecting children, challenges and opportunities
for advocacy and programming
UNICEF WCARO - West and Central Africa Regional Office, 01 September 20161

Executive Summary
West and Central Africa has a long history of population mobility, both regionally and internationally, with
migration representing an essential element of the regions social and economic fabric. Migration flows
follow networks and routes based on ethnic or religious ties, today facilitated by regional policy frameworks
to foster regional economic integration.
Overall, migration flows from West and Central Africa involve 2.4% of the population circa 12 million
people. Intra-regional movements are far more significant (75%) than migration to Europe (17% of migrant
flows, 2.2 million). Irregular migrants into Europe via Italy (56,533 migrants in 2015) are equivalent to just
2.5% of the flow of migrants to Europe. Greater migration risks are due to increased criminalisation linked
to international network affecting migration routes.
Migration involving children and young people from West and Central Africa is a reality that is only going
to intensify owing to a combination of powerful drivers, notably the regions rapid population growth and
the aspirations of its youth for greater life opportunities, compounded by the regions unequal economic
development, weak governance and the lack of priority to fight inequities facing the most vulnerable
populations. Social pressures associated with low revenues, and poor educational and economic
opportunities for adolescents and young people push many families to send their young children away as
coping mechanisms to expand their networks. All these factors push more and more young people to
migrate towards urban areas and across borders, mostly intra-regionally within Africa, and to a lesser but
increasing extent towards Europe and other continents.
In decades to come, climate change will continue to weigh on the security and well-being of vulnerable
populations and compound the effects of protracted conflicts and fragility. Intervening factors such as
increased regulation of migration flows (notably towards Europe) and the increased criminalization of
migration routes have pushed more migrants into irregular migration and exposed them (notably children
and women) to heightened risks of exploitation and abuse. At the same time, Africa is also rapidly changing
and migration is a powerful engine of development and progress, particularly for children and young people
seeking to fulfil their aspirations for better education and work opportunities
This analysis highlights the need for UNICEF to take a clear position on child migration that upholds the
rights of child mobility and brings awareness to the benefits of migration in receiving countries and

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communities. At the same time, migrant children are exposed to increasing risks of abuse, exploitation and
trafficking along their migration cycle from their country of origin, during transit or at destination which
also need to be addressed.
We highlight the situation of: (a) children on the move / child trafficking in the region, (b) forcibly displaced
children (refugees, IDPs) due to conflict, and (c) irregular migrants to Europe.
Children on the move. Child mobility is a widespread phenomenon in West and Central Africa with
children traditionally sent away as part of their education and socialization in the wider kinship network or
as coping strategies by families to cope with shocks. Children migrate from an early age for a variety of
reasons, accompanied or unaccompanied, regularly or irregularly.
Many children across the region undertake risky journeys to undertake arduous work in informal activities
with high child labour component and often exploitative working conditions. Two categories of children
on the move can be distinguished: (i) children in voluntary mobility and who run the risks of becoming
victims of child trafficking, (ii) children directly victims of child trafficking when traffickers hire or buy
children by making deals with families.
Many children are thus exposed to significant issues of child abuse, exploitation and trafficking along
known routes e.g. from Togo/Benin to the Gulf of Guinea countries, or from the south of Nigeria to Europe
via Italy. These children and youth, particularly those working and living in the streets, are often subject
to negative stereotypes in receiving countries. So far, efforts across the region to provide protective
measures and services for children in transiting countries (during the move) and receiving countries have
been insufficient due to weak implementation of protective legislation and measures, as well as inadequate
service provision and budget allocation for the protection of children on the move, whether in Africa or in
Europe.
The agency of children as well as their changing situation as they move from their place of origin, to transit
and destination countries, also need to be recognized if one is to avoid protective measures that backfire by
creating more opportunities for the exploitation, abuse and trafficking of migrant children. Policy and
programme responses should thus be mindful of the varieties and specificities of childrens migratory
motivations and experiences.
Children affected by forced displacement. Conflicts currently affecting migratory movement in Nigeria,
the Central African Republic, DRC and Mali and have resulted in the displacement of 5.8 million people
as of year-end 2015, including 4.2 million (73%) internally displaced persons (IDPs), 1.1 million (19%)
refugees, and 0.5 million returnees. Children represent 60% of displaced persons. Forced displacement due
to conflict in West and Central Africa is characterized by three key features: (i) Forcibly displaced persons
are likely to find themselves in protracted situations lasting more than 5 years and up to 13 years. (ii) The
vast majority of forcibly displaced migrants are children under 18 (60%) including 42% below the age of
11 and 17% who are teenagers. (iii) Just one in 10 displaced persons live in planned and managed camps;
9 out of 10 have recourse to their own means and live in host communities or in self-settled camps, mostly
in rural areas. The protracted nature of conflicts and population displacement raises important questions
about how to manage and respond to long-term displacements and their impacts on childrens development
and well-being. UNICEFs policy and programmatic guidance and operational frameworks for

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humanitarian and regular programs need to better address these situations in a coherent and mutually
reinforcing way to achieve long-term results for children.
Finally, among irregular migrants from West and Central Africa to Europe transiting via Italy, 20%
are women and children, including an extremely high percentage (90%) of unaccompanied children.
Although the percentage of children migrating from West and Central Africa to Europe is a small proportion
of the overall number of migrants within the region, these children are highly vulnerable due to their
unaccompanied status. This warrants active engagement by UNICEF and coordination between UNICEF
WCA and CEE/CIS Regional Offices.
Mobility among children and youth in West and Central Africa tends to be associated with forced migration
and illegal trafficking. Part of this stems from an acute lack of research into the variety of forms of migration
among young people. There is insufficient knowledge of why adolescents migrate, to what ends, who
their intermediaries are, and how they cope throughout their journeys and displacements. Up-to-date
studies and research actions are required to determine who are the most affected populations, their types of
migration, origin, destination and transit countries, and the impact on children, in particular girls - in terms
for instance of multidimensional deprivations. These studies will inform evidence-based programming and
the definition of effective long-term policies to combat the negative effects of the migration on the most
vulnerable children.
The role and responsibilities of governments in managing the increase in migratory flows are
paramount. As first duty-bearers towards their populations, governments are beholden to combating the
harmful effects of migration by addressing the root causes that push children, young people and families to
migrate from their country of origin in unsafe conditions. These include economic and social policies which
have failed to promote equitable, inclusive and distributive growth, social protection programmes which
benefit only a tiny minority of the vulnerable populations. Governments in origin, transit and destination
countries still need to put in place effective legislation against child exploitation and trafficking and allocate
sufficient resources to tackle it (e.g. for the training of judges and policemen or the strengthening of civil
society actors).
In promoting the best interests of migrant children, UNICEF can build on strong foundations laid by its
child protection programmes as part of its Children on the Move in West and Central Africa work, and
by its emergency programmes in support of refugee and displaced children across the region. However,
given the regions challenges and rapidly changing environment, several shifts are required if UNICEF is
to remain a relevant actor and become a strong advocate for the best interests of refugee, IDP, migrant
children and children in hosting communities.
Boldly articulate a clear position on child migration that is positive for development and
upholds the rights of child mobility, mitigates the risks of dangerous migration and maximizes
positive impacts on children.
Greater emphasis should be put on migration in UNICEFs country programs by strengthening
the focus on the protection of children on the move to prevent trafficking.
Promote equity and social cohesion for migrant children applying the migration cycle lens
(from origin / transit / destination / return countries) to regular programming. From a human

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rights-based and development-oriented perspective, countries of origin, transit and destination
share the responsibility for managing migration, particularly regarding the children on the move.
UNICEF can play a key role by advocating for a close cooperation between these countries.
o In countries of origin: promote policies and programmes that enhance education and
income generating prospects and contribute to create meaningful alternatives to risky
migration in areas with high levels of out-migration, with special focus on adolescents.
o In transit and destination countries: policies and programmes need to be made inclusive
of migrant children, i.e. ensure that access to education, health and social services, and
shelter is based on needs regardless of migrant status.
Promote linkages between the humanitarian and development aspects of migration.
o Secure the future of both displaced children and children in host communities affected by
protracted displacement situations. This includes not just carrying out critical life-saving
humanitarian interventions for children but also operationalizing interventions that bridge
with development programming. A special focus on adolescents and youth, often left out
in terms of specific interventions or innovative tools, may be particularly promising.
Enable or strengthen existing sub-regional (cross-country) programming, coordination,
operations; Strengthen coordination at decentralized levels across borders in order to maximise
field outreach
Maximise youth engagement / child participation in advocacy and programming. Improve
monitoring of migrant children with clear data-sharing protocols with partner agencies to share
data disaggregated by sex and by age, including age disaggregation for children under 18, and
make greater use of technology (social media platforms, mobile data collection) in support of
children on the move
Undertake sub-regional studies and action-based research to measure the magnitude of
abuse, exploitation and trafficking involving children and generate actionable information
on the many forms of migration involving children to protect their best interests during their
migration cycle.

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Contents
Executive Summary 2
1 Introduction 8
2 West and Central African migration in global perspective 9
3 Dynamics of mixed migration in West and Central Africa 12
3.1 Changing dynamics affecting migration flows 12
3.2 Climate change, environment degradation and urbanization as drivers of migration 15
3.3 Aspirations of the youth 15
3.4 How gender and age influence migration decisions 16
3.4.1 Gendered patterns of migration 16
3.4.2 Child mobility in West and Central Africa 17
4 Child trafficking from West and Central Africa 18
5 Irregular migration towards Europe through the Mediterranean (2014-16) 22
5.1 Main routes of irregular migration towards North Africa and Europe 22
5.2 Migrants from sub-Saharan Africa into Italy, 2014-2016 22
5.3 Women and children among irregular migrants in Italy (2015) 24
6 Forced displacement due to protracted conflict situations 28
6.1 Conflicts and displacement 28
6.2 Protracted refugee situations in West and Central Africa 32
6.3 Where displaced population live 33
6.4 Displaced persons and the impact on host communities 36
7 UNICEF programme response 40
7.1 Child Protection: Protecting Children on the Move 40
7.2 UNICEFs Humanitarian Response to Forced Displacement (Refugees/IDPs) 40
7.3 UNICEFs Response to Irregular Migration of Children from West and Central Africa through
Europe 41
7.4 UNICEFs experience in cross-border programming 42
7.4.1 WASH cross-border cholera response in West and Central Africa 42
8 Next Steps: UNICEFs engagement in West and Central Africa on mixed migration involving children
42
8.1 Advocacy and programmatic shifts 43

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8.1.1 Promoting equity and social cohesion for migrant children applying the migration cycle lens
43
8.1.2 Going beyond the country-based approach 45
8.1.3 Maximise migrant youth engagement / child participation in advocacy and policy 46
8.1.4 Improve monitoring of migrant children 47
8.2 Recommendations for WCARO 47
8.2.1 Communication and Advocacy 47
8.2.2 Evidence-generation 47
8.2.3 UNICEF Programming 48
9 Conclusion - key take-aways and recommendations 50
10 References 53
11 Annexes 58
11.1 Migration Definition (IOM) 58
11.2 Accommodation type for forcibly displaced populations 60
11.3 Sub-regional profiles for West and Central Africa 61
11.3.1 The Sahel region 61
11.3.2 Coastal Sub-Region 61
11.3.3 Central African Region [to update with Lake Chad studies] 62
11.4 Emigration rates from West and Central Africa - 2013 63

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1 Introduction
West and Central Africa has a long history of mobility both regionally and internationally. Migration is a
way of life for nomadic communities and people have moved short and long distances for economic and
social reasons long before current political borders were mapped out during colonial times. This paper
provides an overview of mixed migration patterns, trends and dynamics originating from West and Central
Africa (WCA), with particular focus on the situation of children. Mixed migration refers to the movement
of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population
movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it
includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other
purposes, including family reunification (IOM)2.
Our particular focus is on irregular migration (i.e. movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms
of the sending, transit and receiving countries3). We highlight the situation of: (a) children on the move /
child trafficking in the region, (b) forcibly displaced children (refugees, IDPs) due to conflict, and (c)
irregular migrants to Europe. Where data allows, we take a closer look at the situation of women and
children, notably unaccompanied minors and separated children.
To understand the situation of migrant children in West and Central Africa, we adopt the paradigm of
children on the move defined by the Regional Child Mobility Platform (a broad platform of child protection
partners including UNICEF, ENDA, Plan, MAEJT, Terre des hommes, Save the Children, ILO and IOM)
as follows:

Those children moving for a variety of reasons, voluntarily or involuntarily, within


or between countries, with or without their parents or other primary caregivers, and
whose movement, while it may open up opportunities, might also place them at risk
(or at an increased risk) of economic or sexual exploitation, abuse, neglect and
violence.

[]

The concept of children on the move intends to capture not only all the difficulties that
children experience when they change their place of residence, but also all the
opportunities they may come across. (IOM, Children on the Move, 2013, p.7)

This paper draws on migration data from IOM, UNHCR and the World Bank, as well as information on
UNICEFs programmes related to migration at country-level. We first put migration patterns from West
and Central Africa in global perspective. We then consider major dynamics of migration taking place in the
region as well as the situation of children on the move in the region. We then put the spotlight on three
major aspects of mixed migration involving children: child trafficking; irregular migration towards Europe;

2 http://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms
3 See Annex 1 for definition

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and forced displacement due to protracted conflicts situations. We conclude by reviewing UNICEFs
programmes and provide recommendations for UNICEF WCARO and COs most concerned with mixed
migration issues.

2 West and Central African migration in global perspective4


Over the past 15 years, the global stock of international migrants increased by 40% from 173 million in
2000 to 244 million in 2015. Migrants originating from Africa accounted for 14% of the global stock
of migrants in 2015 (23 million in 2000, 34 Figure 1
million in 2015), a proportion on the increase
since 2000 with the annual contribution in the
global stock of migrants attributable to Africa
rising from 3% during the period 2000-2010 to
14% during 2010-2013 (see Figure 1)
(UNDESA 2016). Overall, migration flows from
West and Central Africa involve 2.4% of the
regions population, circa 12 million in 2013
(Bilateral Estimates of Migrants Stocks 2013).
The actual magnitude of African migration into
Europe needs to be put in perspective. Migrants
from West and Central Africa in Europe
accounted for just 2.7% of migrants in Europe
(3.8% in Western Europe). As such, it is not
so massive, so new or so driven by African misery as is commonly assumed (de Haas 2008). African
migrants are often relatively well educated (OECD 2014 p.134) and from reasonably well-off backgrounds
(Shimeles 2010, de Haas 2008, MAFE 2013), in part because of the high costs of the migration journey.
Also, although migrants are commonly depicted as victims of traffickers and smugglers, empirical evidence
has indicated that the vast majority migrate on their own initiative. Nonetheless, recent trends point to
significant increases in irregular and mixed migrations, illustrated by the deadly seasonal crossings
across the Sahara and Mediterranean routes.
Motivations for migration are varied and commonly include work, trade, education, religion,
entrepreneurship, transit (OECD 2014, p.56). Traditionally, migration movements, which are part of
family strategies to diversify risks and improve livelihoods, are traditionally based on community or ethnic
solidarity and make use of networks and migrations routes which have long existed in the region (OECD
2014, Charriere and Fresia 2008).

4 This section makes use of data from UNDESAs Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision. The
2015 revision was released in 2016. Magnitudes and trends are not expected to change between the 2013 and 2015
revision.

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Migration to Europe accounted for 17% of migrants from West and Central Africa, with major European
destinations being France (6%), UK (3%), Italy and Spain (2%), Portugal, Belgium, Germany, the
Netherlands (1% each). Overall, migrants from WCA represent just 2.7% of the migrant stock in Europe
(3.8% in Western Europe) (see Table 1 below).
Intra-regional movements remain far more significant than migration to Europe and the rest of the
world. In 2013, 75% of migrants from West and Central Africa travelled within sub-Saharan Africa, 54%
within the region itself (Figure 2). Movements within West and Central Africa have traditionally clustered
around three migration hubs: the south-east area around Nigeria and the gulf of Guinea; the central area
around Ghana and Cote dIvoire; and the western area around Senegal. New destinations include natural
resource rich countries such as Gabon, or Congo or other poles of economic prosperity (Charriere & Fresia
2008, Lompo 2015). In 2013, the nine largest destination countries within sub-Saharan Africa include Cote
dIvoire (20%), Nigeria (8%), Burkina Faso (6%), Cameroon (5%), Ghana, Guinea, Gabon, Congo, and
Liberia (2-3% each) (see Figure 3).
Figure 2

Figure 3

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Table 1: Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin, 2013
Destination Global Number of % of migrants Number of % of migrants
migrants from from sub- migrants from from West
sub-Saharan Saharan West and Central and Central
Africa Africa Africa Africa
World 231 522 215 20 184 144 8.7% 10 928 471 4.7%

Europe 72 449 908 3 476 959 4.8% 1 949 666 2.7%


Eastern Europe 19 678 250 16 756 0.1% 8 447 0.0%

Northern Europe 12 429 626 1 265 175 10.2% 408 200 3.3%

Southern Europe 15 998 197 868 665 5.4% 598 547 3.7%

Western Europe 24 343 835 1 326 363 5.4% 934 472 3.8%
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2013). Trends in International Migrant
Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2013).
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimatesorigin.shtml

Several countries in the region see a disproportionately large share of their population emigrate such
as Cape Verde (25%), Sao Tome and Principe (16%), and Equatorial Guinea (13%), followed by Burkina
Faso (8%), Liberia (8%), CAR (7%), Guinea Bissau, Mali and Sierra Leone (5%). Senegal, Guinea, Ghana,
Gambia see 3% of their population emigrating. Two thirds of migrants from the WCA region originate (in
decreasing order of magnitude) from Burkina Faso, DRC, Nigeria, Cote dIvoire, Mali, Ghana, and Senegal
(Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2013).
Emigration rates are particularly high among educated people who are attracted by better work
opportunities and higher wages in richer countries.
Figure 4
In the year 2000, the emigration rate of tertiary
educated population was 22% average, 35% among
physicians, and 23% among nurses. Cape Verde,
Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Senegal,
Togo, and Congo have extremely high levels of
emigration (more than 45%) among their highest
skilled personnel (see Annex 3, Section 11.4 below).
Remittances from the African diaspora represent
the largest source of net foreign inflows after FDI
(Ratha 2011). In many countries, they are greater
than flows from overseas development assistance,
and because they tend to be counter-cyclical, they
have been found to enhance resilience against economic shocks for receiving households and communities
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(Naude 2012).

3 Dynamics of mixed migration in West and Central Africa


West and Central Africa has a long history of intra-regional migration following historical networks and
routes based on ethnic or religious ties, today facilitated by regional policy frameworks to facilitate entry,
residence and establishment in countries across the ECOWAS5 and ECCAS regions (four countries across
ECCAS only). Major push factors for migration are the lack of job opportunities at origin, social pressures
to support ones family and the consequent need to increase revenues (Altai consulting 2015, p.8). At the
global level, inequitable trade practices affecting the economic development and the lack of employment
compounded by the increased regulation and criminalization of migration routes, have contributed to push
migrants into clandestine routes. Other important drivers of migration include insecurity generated by
protracted conflicts as well as competition over natural resources as a result of unsustainable population
growth and climate change. Finally, we discuss the varied forms of child mobility in the region, which are
influenced by age and gender.

3.1 Changing dynamics affecting migration flows


Seasonal migration related to climate change (drought and desertification) are important drivers of
migration both internally (from rural to urban areas) as well as across borders and constitutes a vital coping
strategy for survival and food security (Zickgraf 2015, Altai Consulting 2015, p.7, OECD 2014, Waldinger
2015). According to Tacoli (2011),

Seasonal movements is largely determined by the lack of local non-farm


opportunities but also by the persistence of family farming as an essential element of
livelihoods. [] Temporary migration is more likely to be directed towards urban
centres, and increasingly towards smaller towns. Women are more likely to engage in
this type of movement to work in non-farm sectors provided that the nature of their
responsibilities in farming households allows them to move. Young people also move
to towns, with boys as young as 14 going to work in construction and services such as
watchmen. This is partly because of the important role of social networks in this type
of movement, which ensures access to job and accommodation and at the same time
social protection and control. (Tacoli 2011, based on case studies in Tanzania,
Senegal, Bolivia)

Mutations in pastoral nomadism. Movements undertaken by transnational nomadic communities (the


Moors, Tuareg, Tubu, Zaghawa, Fula) (Figure 5 below) are of critical importance for the region, with new
forms of mobility (semi-nomadism) and livelihoods diversification emerging since the 1960s. Pastoral
movements have shifted southwards and patterns of mobility today are characterized along different

5 ECOWAS Protocols on Free Movements of Persons and supplementary protocols, and the 2008 ECOWAS Common
Approach on Migration (Altai 2015)

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gradients or shades of nomadism occurring along a dual scale of mobility (from continual movement to
fixity) and pastoral movement (from the pure pastoralist living exclusively for and by means of his herd
to the crop-livestock farmer who keeps a few meat animals) (OECD 2014, p.147).
These changes can be attributed to a confluence of factors, notably desertification changing migration paths,
urbanization lessening the complementarity and leading to greater competition to control wells and
pastureland between farmers and pastoralists, and decentralization policies favouring sedentarism (OECD
2014, Chapter 6). Existing data indicate that nomadic and semi-nomadic communities tend to have lesser
access to social services with significant disparities between nomadic and settled populations (Sheik-
Mohamed and Velema 1999, Kratli 2000, Oxfam 2005). Another noted pattern is the intensification of
north-south trade movements with the revival of ancient trans-Saharan routes between the Sahel and the
Maghreb. According to the OECD, these flows are part of a regional grassroots integration movement
that takes place beyond state control, outside regulatory frameworks and governed by social relations
(OECD 2014).
Figure 5

Source: OECD 2014, Map 6.1, page 143


Migration flows have become increasingly diversified, individualised and circular. Within the region,
regular and irregular migrants flow from city to city, depending on the availability of employment
opportunities (Fall and Cisse 2013). The routes are often circular in that migrants frequently return home
to their families and home communities, before leaving again. Significant number of West African migrants
are forced to return home or to stay in transit countries for several years as a result of stricter immigration

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policies and expulsion measures from destination countries6 or repatriation as a result of conflicts - e.g. in
Libya or Cote dIvoire in recent years (Bredeloup 2015, Moukaila 2015, Lompo 2015). Migration has
grown more individualised and does not necessarily follow previous, historical networks and routes based
on ethnic or religious ties (Bredeloup 2013a). As a result, many migrants leave their communities lacking
sufficient information and arrive without strong linkages to communities that can ensure their protection
and support them with economic integration (Charriere and Fresia 2008). Studies undertaken in Ghana,
Mali, Mauritania, Senegal and Burkina Faso suggest that sibling and family rivalries, as well as parental
and community pressure and the desire for emancipation continue to encourage undocumented migration
(IRIN, 2008, Bardem 1993).
Tighter immigration policies in Europe since 2000 have considerably influenced the clandestine
nature of migration dynamics towards Europe. The Schengen arrangements for Europe have made it
impossible for countries within the European Union to negotiate individual migration agreements with
specific countries to satisfy their requirements for workers. This precludes possibilities for regular
migration in the context of expanding agricultural markets in Europe, resulting in irregular entry and
irregular stay. The closure of legal migration routes (via air) and the introduction of bilateral measures to
curb the entry of African migrants in Europe have pushed migrants to follow more dangerous routes run by
smugglers across the Sahara towards Southern Europe (Spain, Italy), and across the Mediterranean Sea and
the Atlantic Ocean (Reitano 2015).

Many reports have underlined the minimal impact of restrictive measures on the
number of departure attempts, due to the great flexibility of migration channels which
constantly adapt and renew themselves. The main result of the tightening of controls
and closing of the legal migration route to Europe is to turn formerly regular flows
into irregular movements. (UNHCR 2015)

Northern African countries (Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania) have become areas of transit, cities like Agadez,
Gao, Dakar, stopover towns for migrants as they pause on their journey to find ways to finance their
migration journey. Smugglers and traffickers are profiteering from the conflict in Syria and the collapse of
the Libyan State, with significant influx of profits from human smuggling and human trafficking, notably
in southern Libya and northern Niger, leading to conflicts over migrant routes.
Smugglers and traffickers who thrive in the context of lawlessness are responsible for many of the
abuses on migrants. Almost all irregular migrants from West and Central Africa require the assistance of
criminal networks at some point during their journeys in order to reach Europe. Many irregular migrants
from West and Central Africa (and among them, many women and children) finance their trip on a pay-as-
you-go basis, often making long stops along the way to work and save money in order to continue the
journey. As a result, journeys may take years during which migrants run a high risk of being exploited,

6 CEN-SAD, The Community of Sahel-Saharan States http://www.censad.org/

14
detained or exposed to other violations of their human rights.
In 2013 it was estimated that there were up to 12 major migrant smugglers networks based in Nigers
Agadez city. It is important to note that smugglers are the symptoms and not the cause of this situation -
this lies mainly in the policies put in place by States, including in relation to border protection and
surveillance and lack of accessible channels for regular migration. In addition, while it is clear that some
smugglers are abusing migrants (and in some cases they could more accurately be characterised as
traffickers), it is also a fact that the smugglers are providing a service to migrants and asylum-seekers.

3.2 Climate change, environment degradation and urbanization as drivers of


migration
In West and Central Africa, access to water is a driver of migration (seasonal or permanent, long or
short-distance) related to climate change (desertification, flooding, or drought), environmental
degradation (pollution, overuse / consumption of resources) and also economic migration linked to
water-intensive livelihoods such as agriculture, livestock raising, or fishing (Zickgraf 2015). Although
effects between climate change and migration dynamics are exceedingly diverse, in decades to come,
natural phenomena and man-made policy choices around water resources management and environmental
protection may impact the availability and equitable distribution of water for livelihoods, energy and human
consumption. These in turn will influence migration flows in highly complex and context-specific ways
(Gray and Wise 2016).
Of immediate concern is the fact that migration exacerbates pressures on services and resources in
areas with weak ecological carrying capacity.7 All countries in West and Central Africa the region are
experiencing rapid urbanization with large internal migration flows from rural areas into poor slum
environments with insufficient infrastructure to meet the needs of a dense and rapidly growing population.
In particular, migration puts additional pressure on already poorly performing water and sanitation systems.
This is the case for instance in the peri-urban / small town settlements which welcomed large influxes of
displaced persons but whose infrastructure is insufficient to accommodate both existing and new
populations (e.g. in refugee camps in northern Cameroon and in Diffa).

3.3 Aspirations of the youth


Migration is a reality that is going to intensify due to a combination of push and pull factors accentuated by
the regions extremely rapid population and urbanization growth rates. The population in West and Central
Africa is the youngest in the world with a median age of 17-18 years (15 years in Niger, 20 years in Cote
dIvoire), and is expected to increase by 48% within the next 15 years, and double within the next 25 to 30
years. By 2030, two-thirds of the population will live in urban areas (UNDESA, World Population
Prospects 2015) compared to half of the population today.
Just as young people are willing to migrate from rural to urban areas in search of better opportunities, many

7 The ecological carrying capacity of an area estimates the maximum population size of the species that the
environment can sustain indefinitely, given the food, habitat, water, and other necessities available in the environment.

15
are also willing to leave their homeland to search for prospects farther afield and outside their own countries
(Bredeloup 2013b, Bardem 1993). Migration has become a natural response by young people to lack of
economic opportunity and as a way to expand their life chances (Global Migration Group 2014). Migration
for employment is thus an important push factor, facilitated to a certain extent by old existing migration
networks, as well as eased movement as a result of weakened governance along migration routes (IOM
2014). Gabon and Equatorial Guinea have become important destination countries within the region
because of significant employment prospects generated by the oil windfall and in the lumber industry in
these countries.

Despite its informal nature, migratory movement was by no means confined to


marginal areas or limited to survival issues. It was driven by trade and business
opportunities, and by disparities in know-how (OECD 2014, p.56).

The emphasis must not centre exclusively on monitoring borders to make them less
vulnerable to terrorist threats and criminal networks. It must also address ways to
ensure freedom of movement and trade for people who live in this area, and whose
means of existence depends on the free cross-border movement of persons and goods.
(OECD 2014 p.216)

3.4 How gender and age influence migration decisions

3.4.1 Gendered patterns of migration


Gendered patterns of migration have changed at the global level, with notably increasing numbers of
women migrating not only for marriage or family reunification (as has traditionally been the case)
but also for education or employment reasons. Many women move from rural areas to take up work (e.g.
in trade or manufacturing) into cities or across border in response to increased demand for female workers
in the domestic and care sectors in countries with ageing population (Birchall 2016, p. 16).

Policy makers have yet to bring the challenges and risks faced by migrating women
and girls, as well as other groups such as unaccompanied boys, to the forefront of the
migration and development agenda (Birchall 2016, p.3)

In West and Central Africa, large numbers of adolescents have long migrated to find work in urban
areas. In south-west Mali, large proportions of boys and girls migrate at least once before their 18th birthday,
96% for girls, 85% for boys, mostly for work-related reasons (Hertrich 2014, p.286, Lesclingland 2004).
Girls who migrate from the age of 12, generally to take up domestic work in urban areas, view migration
as a way to experience different ways of life, open themselves to a wider world, and gain more autonomy

16
and greater self-realisation (Hertrich 2014, Lesclingland 2011, Bredeloup 2013a, Bredeloup 2013b, Bardem
1993). Work-related migration may also influence early marriage dynamics (by delaying marriage) and
divorce decisions (by reducing divorce) (Hertrich 2014).

3.4.2 Child mobility in West and Central Africa


Child mobility is a widespread phenomenon in West and Central Africa with children sent away as
part of their education and socialization in
the wider kinship network or as coping
strategies by families to cope with shocks
(Bredeloup 2013b, Lesclinguand 2004, 2014,
Fall and Cisse 2013, Hertrich 2014, Haas
2008, Altai Consulting 2015 and the literature
cited therein). Children in West and Central
Africa migrate from an early age for a variety
of reasons, accompanied or unaccompanied,
regularly or irregularly. Where longitudinal
data is available to trace the migration
histories of individuals (e.g. Mali), the vast
majority of children, boys and girls included,
have migrated at least once before the age of
18, mostly from rural areas to cities within
their own country or intra-regionally.
A widely-held view concerning children on
the move in West and Central Africa is that
unaccompanied migrant children are a
common feature, often at risk of abuse,
Source: Main forms of mobility of children in West Africa. Regional
exploitation or trafficking (IOM 2014, p. 6). Inter-Agency Working Group on Children on the Move (2012) Joint
In fact, migrant children fall under multiple Regional Study on the Mobility of Children and Youths in West and
categories spanning a wide continuum of Central Africa
voluntary and forced movements, regular or irregular, e.g. they can be independent migrant children,
children migrating with parents and families, children on the move, unaccompanied migrant children,
separated children, (internally) displaced children, asylum-seeking children, refugee children, children left
behind, trafficked hildren, smuggled children (Thatun and Heissler 2013, p.98).
Many children across the region undertake risky journeys to undertake arduous work in informal activities
with high child labour component and often exploitative working conditions, e.g. street vending, begging,
garbage scavenging, gold and diamond mines, stone quarries, or domestic work. These children and youth,
particularly those working and living in the streets, are often subject to negative stereotypes in receiving
countries. Changes in old cultural practices such as handing over a child to a third party and talib children
have tended to evolve negatively during economic crises, losing their social value in favour of economic
interests.

17
In these journeys, which may take up to several thousand kilometers over mountains, deserts, and through
violence-torn regions, children face challenges such as dehydration, kidnapping, robber, rape and extortion.
Being particularly at risk of abuse and exploitation, notably from the smugglers they rely on to get to
Europe, unaccompanied children often use a pay-as-you go system on their journey, where they need to
stop and work for days, weeks or months in order to pay their smugglers. During this period children are
also at risk of being physically and psychologically abused (UNICEF 2016).
Nonetheless, the agency of children and their families, as well as the changing situation of children as
they move from their place of origin, to transit and destination countries, also needs to be recognized
if one is to avoid protective measures that backfire by creating more opportunities for the exploitation,
abuse and trafficking of migrant children (IOM 2013).

Well-intentioned policies focused on protective measures that raise administrative


barriers for children often tip the balance away from protecting children from harm
to infringing on their rights. (Thatun and Heissler 2013)

As concluded by the regional initiative Mobility of children and youth in West Africa led by UNICEF
and IOM in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote dIvoire, Guinea and Togo in 2010, a nuanced understanding of
the many types of migration involving children and their underlying factors at macro, meso and
household/individual level by policy makers is critical if protection policies are to be effective while
ensuring that the best interests of children on the move are safeguarded (IOM 2013).

4 Child trafficking from West and Central Africa


The age and gender profile of irregular migrants from West Africa is not well-known as current data is
based on police apprehension data which provide biased evidence on the demographics of migrants8.
Nevertheless, qualitative evidence indicates that irregular migration from Africa is still mostly by young
men between 16 and 36, whose education backgrounds are varied (elementary school, professional
training in small trades, some with diplomas). However in stopover towns and on the routes towards Europe
(whether by sea or land), one also finds more and more women (sometimes pregnant) and children.
(Charriere and Fresa 2008).

8 See EU Clandestino project, Asian and European nationalities are constantly underestimated compared to
African nationalities which are overestimated, page 108 http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/wp-
content/uploads/2010/03/clandestino-final-report_-november-20091.pdf

18
Two categories of children on the move can be distinguished: (i) children in voluntary mobility and who
run the risks of becoming victims of child trafficking, (ii) children
directly victims of child trafficking when traffickers hire or buy
children by making deals with families (Benin-Togo report, 2008).
There is scant data on child trafficking in West and Central Africa.9
The most recent available data on the number of trafficked children
are from the UNODC report on human trafficking (2014) which
provides data for 2010-12.
Trafficking flows originating from sub-Saharan Africa occur
mostly within the region, with domestic trafficking as the main
trafficking motivation. In Africa and the Middle East, children
accounted for 62% of the share of detected trafficking victims,
the highest proportion in the world, against one-third globally.
A special survey on child trafficking in Africa conducted by
UNICEF (2005) indicates the spread of trafficking trajectories
involving children. The majority of cross-border trafficking flows Source: UNODC 2014
involving children remain of short range within the region (see table
below).

Source: UNICEF 2005

Most West African victims are detected in West Africa, most Southern Africans in
Southern Africa and so forth (UNODC 2014, p.11, p. 83).

Outside of the region, the two main trafficking destinations are Northern Africa and the Middle East, and
West and Central Europe (UNODC 2014, UNICEF 2005). About 19% of the victims of trafficking
detected in West and Central Europe were from sub-Saharan Africa, 14% from West Africa (2,340
out of 16,718 victims of trafficking, principally from Nigeria and Cameroon). The majority were
women and girls who were victims of sexual exploitation. Children from West Africa represented 3%

9 Interview with IOM Regional Office for West and Central Africa based in Dakar, June, 2016

19
of the total number of trafficking victims detected in West and Central Europe (UNODC 2014).
Gender and age intersect to determine migration patterns, experiences and specific vulnerabilities to abuse,
exploitation or trafficking with diverging migratory experiences between boys and girls. There are rising
numbers of women and girls from Nigeria trafficked to Italy as documented recently by UNICEF (2015b,
European Union 2016) through known routes of trafficking for sexual exploitation into Europe, notably
between Edo State in south Nigeria and Italy (see Section below on Women and children among irregular
migrants in Italy (2015)).

The types of discrimination and persecution that children face in countries of origin
are gendered in nature, and so are opportunities to move or escape. (Birchall 2016,
p.17)

Trafficking of children used to be a prominent development and child rights issue in the region during the
mid-2000s10. Advocacy led to the Abuja Accord on child trafficking, with several countries signing
bilateral accords to stem the trafficking of children and many countries supporting child trafficking projects.
As a result of the accord, Gabon rescued more than 850 trafficked children during the past 10 years. The
Abuja Agreement remains effective in countries where enforcement took place.
As discussed earlier (Section 2.3), starting in 2006, a number of studies assessed child trafficking
interventions and showed that these projects were not just ineffective. They also denied childrens rights to
freedom of movement. In their enthusiasm, community vigilance committees were preventing children
from moving, irrespective of whether they were leaving their village to study, join their parents or to work.
This led to the shift to the Children on the move paradigm with recommendations from the Regional
Child Protection Inter-Agency Working Group (Regional Inter-Agency Working Group on Protecting
Children on the Move 2012).

Despite growing evidence that recognizes childrens evolving capacities, resilience


and agency, childrens independent movements are generally viewed as an anomaly.
Programmes and policies developed on this assumption that aims to protect children
from violence, abuse and exploitation in the context of migration risk putting children
at harm and infringing on their rights. (Thatun and Heissler 2014)

Currently, there are bilateral agreements between Cote dIvoire and Mali (2000); Burkina Faso and Mali
(2004); Senegal and Mali (2004); Mali and Guinea (2005); and Benin and Nigeria (2005), and a multi-
lateral agreement between nine countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote dIvoire, Guinea, Liberia, Mali,

10 Some destination countries were reluctant to admit the existence of child trafficking in the 1990s and early 2000s.

20
Niger, Nigeria and Togo. The agreements notably set out cross-border cooperation for the repatriation of
trafficking victims, as well as the detection and tracking of traffickers. Niger, Senegal, Benin, Togo, Nigeria
and Cameroon have been working on child-friendly policing with the International Bureau of Childrens
Rights. Training of police and the judiciary on core competencies related to child victims, perpetrators and
witnesses will also benefit children on the move.
The Regional Inter-Agency advocacy position in West and Central Africa (presented in the report
Protecting Children on the Move: Our conclusions and recommendations, page 23) supports the
following 7 key positions.

Against the wider migration picture of West and Central Africa and the historical information on child
trafficking in the region (Regional Inter-Agency Working Group on Children on the Move 2012, IOM 2013,
UNODC 2014), further investigation and research is needed to have updated and actionable
information on the many forms of migration involving children: why they migrate, to what ends, who
are their intermediaries, how they cope throughout their journeys and displacements, not least by working
with young people to answer some of the questions posed above (GMC, 2010).

21
5 Irregular migration towards Europe through the Mediterranean
(2014-16)11
5.1 Main routes of irregular migration towards North Africa and Europe
While measures facilitating the free movement of ECCAS citizens are in place, freedom of movement and
establishment has not been a priority for ECCAS Member States as only 4 member states have signed the
free movement protocol (ICMPD and Figure 6
IOM 2015). Nevertheless, travel is
relatively straightforward and unhindered
until the northern reaches of Niger. From
the northern border of Niger onwards, the
journey becomes more difficult. The
journey for many migrants is not one trip,
but rather involves many stop-over points
in order to earn more income to afford the
next leg of the journey. Niger, Mali,
Libya and Algeria are major transit
countries while cities like Gao and
Agadez are major transit cities in the
region.
Currently, the most common route for
Source: IOM 2016, 31 May 2016
migrants from West and Central Africa to
Europe is the central Mediterranean route through Niger/Mali, Libya/Algeria to Italy (IOM 2016, Altai
consulting 2015). This has been facilitated in large part by the relative lawlessness in Libya following the
fall of the Quadaffi regime and subsequent political crisis in 2011, which eased movement across borders
but also presented more protection risks for migrants.
The Central Mediterranean route through Niger has Agadez, the gateway to the Sahara desert, as a major
hub for the smuggling of migrants. From Agadez, migrants take two main routes: through Libya (via
Dirkou, Seguidine, Madama, Tummo, Sebha) or through Algeria (via Arlit, Assamaka/In-Guezzam and
Tamanrasset) to the Libyan border or into Morocco. The Central Mediterranean route through Mali (Gao
to Borj, Mokhtar at the Algerian border, and Tamanrasset) is still active but more difficult for irregular
migrants due to the conflict and insecurity in Northern Mali (Altai consulting 2015).

5.2 Migrants from sub-Saharan Africa into Italy, 2014-2016


At present, the two main points of arrival in Europe for migrants crossing the Mediterranean are Greece

11 This section draws on data from IOM on the number of migrants arriving in Greece and Italy during 2015, and
during the first quarter of 2016.

22
and Italy.
Arrivals in Greece. Greece has seen the largest number of migrants in 2015, 847,075 during 2015. Just
0.5% percent of them were from West and Central Africa. Among these arrivals, migrants primarily
Figure 7 come from Congo, Niger and Cameroon, with other
arrivals from Mali, Ghana, Cote dIvoire, Gambia,
Senegal, and Mauritania.12
Arrivals in Italy. A large majority of migrants arriving
in Italy (78%) are from sub-Saharan Africa: 56,533
from West and Central Africa (37%), 63,450 (41%)
from East and Southern Africa during 2015. Migration
flows into Italy have not changed significantly since
2014 as shown in Figure 7 with 170,100 arrivals in
2014, 153,842 in 2015, and 47,851 from January to May
2016.
Three-quarters of migrants from West and Central
Africa are from Nigeria (39%) followed by Gambia (15%), Senegal (11%), Mali (10%), Ghana, Cote
dIvoire, and Guinea (5-8% each) (see Figure 9). 96% of migrants from East and Southern Africa are from
just three countries, Erithrea (62%), Somalia (20%), Sudan (14%) with the remainder from Ethiopia (Figure
8).
As of end of 2015, 3,768 migrant deaths and missing migrants had been registered in the Mediterranean.
While 40 per cent of these dead and missing were of unknown origin, nearly a third of the dead or missing
(32%) are from Sub-Saharan Africa. About one in ten (11%) are from the Horn of Africa (IOM 2016).
The crossing from North Africa to Italy is considered the deadliest with the death toll rising up to 2,427
between January 1 and June 5 in 2016, as compared with 1,786 in the first six months of 2015. (UNICEF
2016).

Figure 9 Figure 8

12 As of December 2015, out of 847,075 migrants registered in Greece, only 4,127 were from the West and Central
African region.

23
5.3 Women and children among irregular migrants in Italy (2015)
This section discusses the demographic features (age and sex) of migrants originating from sub-Saharan
Africa during 2015 (Tables 2 and 3 below).
Women and children feature prominently among migrants
from sub-Saharan Africa in Italy although there are
significant variations in terms of age and sex composition
between region and countries of origin. The vast majority of
migrants from West and Central Africa in 2015 were men
(80%), with women and children accounting for 11% and 9%
of migrants from West and Central Africa respectively.
Migrants from Gambia, Senegal, Mali, Ghana, and
Burkina Faso were mostly young men (91-96%) while
women comprised only 1-3% of their migrant group (Table
X below).
By contrast, the proportion of women was two to three times
higher compared to their regional average among migrants
from Cameroon (32%), Nigeria (25%), and Congo (22%), as
well as from Eritrea and Somalia (22%).
There is scant evidence on the reasons behind the large
prevalence of women originating from these countries. The
IOM counter-trafficking survey which collects information
on the extent of trafficking in migration flows to Europe does
not cover Italy.13 According to a recent report from the EU
published in May 2016, the larger presence of women may
be linked to increased risks of trafficking along migration
routes to EU countries and exploitation by criminal networks.
Women and girls from Nigeria are particularly at risk along
known routes of trafficking for sexual exploitation into
Europe, notably between Edo State in south Nigeria and Italy
(ICMPD and IOM 2015, Carling 2006), with a 300% increase
in the number of trafficked women and girls from Nigeria
during 2015 compared to 2013 (UNICEF 2015b, EU 2016).
Women and girls from Nigeria trafficked for sexual
exploitation are also taken to other European countries such
as Spain, the UK, Belgium, Finland, Russia, France and Source: IOM and UNICEF Data Brief:
Norway. Those trafficked for domestic work are taken to Migration of Children to Europe, 20 Nov 2015

13 The survey is conducted in Hungary, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM), Croatia, Serbia,
Slovenia and Greece. See IOM, Findings Counter-trafficking survey, 2016

24
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates or Kuwait. There is evidence of boys from Nigeria (in addition to young
girls) being trafficked for sexual exploitation to Belgium (Altai Consulting 2015, p.50).

A worryingly sharp increase in Nigerian women and girls leaving Libya has been
identified (4,371 in January-September 2015 compared to 1,008 in the previous year,
80 % of whom estimated by IOM Italy to be victims of trafficking), and there are
general concerns of an increasing risk of trafficking for sexual exploitation. (EU
2016) 14

Children alone accounted for close to one in ten migrants. The vast majority of migrant children were
unaccompanied: 90% among children from West and Central Africa; 72% among children from East and
Southern Africa. The largest contingents of children were from Nigeria (1,261), Gambia (1,360), Senegal
(440), and Mali (504). Children from East and Southern Africa came from just two countries: Eritrea (4,407)
and Somalia (1,613). The proportion of children is significantly higher among migrants from Gambia (16%)
and Guinea (14%) compared to the regional average (9%).
More than 300 children died at sea in the Eastern Mediterranean in 2015 - almost one in three deaths. Five
per cent were infants under 2 years of age (UNICEF 2015a). For children, who finally reach their
destination, an often difficult journey of adaptation/integration begins. Some children also face repatriation,
if their asylum request is rejected. As the scale of the crisis has strained welfare systems in many host
countries, unaccompanied children sometimes find themselves in overcrowded and decaying emergency
shelters for months, with little protection.
Overall, the actual number of children trafficked from West and Central Africa is unknown. However, the
protection risks for these children are of high concern.

Box 1: The Central Mediterranean route, a risky journey to an unknown future for children
A 17-year-old girl from Nigeria, who now faces an uncertain future in a government-administered
centre on the Italian island of Sicily. Fleeing Nigeria to avoid getting married to a 40 year old man:
the already traumatized unaccompanied girl arrived in Niger to continue her travel through the
Sahara to Sabratha in Libya, a major embarkation point for the sea crossing to Italy. There she got
locked up for weeks before she fortunately got on a boat, only barely surviving the trip to Europe
in which many lost their lives. (UNICEF 2016).
A boy from Gambia, who reached Sicily in an unaccompanied journey of 8 months: after paying
to cross several boarders without any ID, he finally reached Libya where he was forced to work
under harsh conditions to afford the next travel to Europe. Being sent to prison the first time he
wanted to take a boat, he managed to escape and reached his destination. (UNICEF 2016)

14 EU report on the progress made in the fight against trafficking in human beings (EU 2016)

25
Table 2

ITALY 12 months of 2015


From WCAR Total Women % of AM UAM AM % of % of % UAM
countries Italy women and children childr among
arrivals UAM and en children
women

NGA 22237 5633 25% 1261 1022 239 31% 6% 81%


GMB 8454 83 1% 1360 1303 57 17% 16% 96%

SEN 5981 36 1% 440 416 24 8% 7% 95%


MLI 5826 67 1% 504 461 43 10% 9% 91%

GHA 4431 155 3% 281 240 41 10% 6% 85%

CIV 3772 322 9% 327 296 31 17% 9% 91%

GIN 2629 20 1% 356 339 17 14% 14% 95%


CMR 662 214 32% 45 29 16 39% 7% 64%

BFA 470 7 1% 25 24 1 7% 5% 96%


GNB 456 4 1% 42 38 4 10% 9% 90%

BEN 396 3 1% 56 55 1 15% 14% 98%

TGO 360 8 2% 20 20 0 8% 6% 100%

SLE 250 31 12% 36 30 6 27% 14% 83%

COG 154 34 22% 39 23 16 47% 25% 59%


NER 154 5 3% 15 12 3 13% 10% 80%

LBR 137 7 5% 8 8 0 11% 6% 100%

MRT 87 2 2% 0 0 0 2% 0%
GNQ 74 3 4% 8 8 0 15% 11% 100%
GAB 3 0 0% 1 1 0 33% 33% 100%

TOTAL WCAR 56533 6634 12% 4824 4325 499 20% 9% 90%
TOTAL ITALY 153842

% from WCAR 37%

26
Table 3

ITALY 12 months of 2015


From ESAR Total Women % of AM and UAM AM % of % of % UAM
countries Italy women UAM children children among
arrivals and women children
ERI 39162 8798 22% 4407 3092 1315 34% 11% 70%

SOM 12433 2624 21% 1613 1296 317 34% 13% 80%
SDN 8932 341 4% 319 202 117 7% 4% 63%

ETH 2631 609 23% 114 81 33 27% 4% 71%

COM 192 43 22% 2 2 0 23% 1% 100%

YEM 48 8 17% 3 3 0 23% 6% 100%

MDG 25 10 40% 1 0 1 44% 4% 0%


KEN 19 12 63% 0 0 0 63% 0%

AGO 2 0 0% 1 1 0 50% 50% 100%

UGA 2 1 50% 0 0 0 50% 0%

ZWE 2 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 0%

RWA 1 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 0%

ZMB 1 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 0%

TOTAL 63450 12446 20% 6460 4677 1783 34% 10% 72%
ESAR
TOTAL 153842
ITALY
% from ESAR 41%

27
6 Forced displacement due to protracted conflict situations
Figure 10
Conflict can both act as a push
factor and facilitate migration;
however, conflict most typically
results in large numbers of
internally displaced persons
(IDPs) within national or state
borders. Those who escape
conflict by fleeing across national
borders into neighboring countries
become refugees, often settling in
highly vulnerable regions and
among host communities not far
from national borders. In West and
Central Africa, conflicts are
becoming increasingly sub-
regional with movement across
borders and among border regions.

6.1 Conflicts and displacement


Conflicts currently affecting migratory movement in West and Central Africa are in Nigeria, the Central
African Republic, DRC and Mali and have resulted in the displacement of 5.8 million people as of year-
end 2015, including 4.2 million (73%) internally displaced persons (IDPs), 1.1 million (19%) refugees, and
0.5 million returnees. Children represent 60% of Figure 11
displaced persons (Figure 12 and Table 4).
The majority of refugees from these conflicts do not
migrate beyond the borders of their home country or
much further than neighboring communities, often
residing in host communities in border areas. Major
host countries in West and Central Africa with more
than 25,000 displaced people include in decreasing
order of magnitude: Nigeria, DRC, Cameroon, CAR,
Chad, Niger, Mali, Congo, Mauritania and Burkina
Faso. There are four hotspots of forced displacement
involving extremely large numbers of people:
northeast Nigeria and the 3 neighboring countries
which come together as part of the Lake Chad Basin (southern Niger, western Chad and the Far North of
Cameroon); Central African Republic and its neighbors, principally eastern Cameroon, southern Chad
and DRC; and northern Mali and its neighbors, Mauritania, Niger and Burkina Faso, and DRC.

28
The largest numbers of people displaced across the region are internally displaced (Figure 11). The two
countries in the region hosting the highest proportion of refugees to overall displaced people are Cameroon
and Chad, both of whom are also hosting refugees from Nigeria and the Central African Republic. In
hotspots of forced migration as a result of conflict, crises intersect and overlap in host countries and sub-
regions that may already be characterized by challenging deprivations for children, including lack of
adequate access to school, lack of access to water and sanitation, inadequate health facilities, lack of access
to livelihoods, and poor nutritional status.
Figure 12

# of IDPs and children - end of 2015

Nigeria 1,013,433
1,818,469
DRC 966,000
1,665,027
CAR 226,000
451,986
Cameroon 83,000
137,735
Mali 18,000
61,920
Niger 35,000
58,926
Chad 21,700
36,157

# Children (est.) # IDPs 2015

Table 4: Displaced children (refugees, IDPs, returnees), as of end July 2016


Total Displaced Displaced % Total Displaced
Population children children
Nigeria Crisis 2,612,000 56% 1,458,270
Cameroon 262,000 61% 159,820

Chad 119,000 60% 71,400

Nigeria 1,950,000 55% 1,072,500

Niger 281,000 55% 154,550

29
Nigeria +. The crisis in
northeast Nigeria is
currently one of Africas
fastest-growing
displacement crises. As of
June 30 2016, nearly 2.4
million people, including 1.4
million children (58%), have
been displaced as a result of
Boko-Haram related
violence in northeast Nigeria
and across the borders in
neighboring south-western Source: OCHA (2016), Lake Chad Basin: Crisis Overview as of July 11,
Chad, the Far North of 2016
Cameroon and the southern
Diffa region of Niger. In addition, nearly 750,000 returnees have made their way back across state and
national borders, the largest proportion of whom have returned to and within Nigeria (est. 663,485 people).
The large majority of people are internally displaced within national borders in Nigeria2.1 million
displaced, including 1.8 million as a direct result of the ongoing conflict with Boko Haram (IOM DTM,
June 2016). Most acutely in Borno State alone, 1.4 million people are displaced. As of June 2016, an
additional 155,000 Nigerian refugees have moved across national borders into Chad, Cameroon, and Niger
around the Lake Chad Basin, joining an estimated 388,000 internally displaced people in the 3 countries
(UNHCR 2016, IOM, 2016). These displaced populations live in an estimated 120 disparate, spontaneous
sites and small villages spread across the vast region and in the Lake Chad islands.
In Niger, an estimated 280,000 people are now estimated to be displaced in Diffa region, which borders
two Nigerian local government areas under Boko Haram control (IOM 2015d, p.4). Most recently,
insecurity caused by Boko-Haram related violence in the area of Bosso and neighbouring localities and an
attack in early June 2016 resulted in the single most massive population displacement in Diffa region since
the beginning of the crisis in 2013. The displaced fled the localities of Toumour, Yebi, Kanblewa and
Bosso. Diffa region was already hosting an estimated 241,000 people (Nigerian refugees, returnees and
internally displaced) before this last event.
Cameroon has the second highest number of displaced people as a result of the conflict in northeast Nigeria.
Among the displaced population, the proportion of children under 18 is higher than the national average.
This population is at higher risk of abduction by Boko Haram. As of June 2016, over 65,000 refugees were
in the Far North of Cameroon, 81% of whom are living in the Minawao refugee camp, located in the Far
North approximately 56 miles from the Nigerian border. In addition to the refugees from Nigeria, the cross-
border conflict with Boko Haram has led to the internal displacement of over 158,000 people in the Far
North. To the east in Chad, the crisis has resulted in the displacement of an estimated 110,000 people as of
June 2016, including 7,000 Nigerian refugees. 5,300 of the refugees, or 75%, are living in the Dar-es-Salam
refugee camp (OCHA, June 2016). Chad is also hosting approximately 70,000 refugees from the Central
African Republic in the south, as well as over 300,000 refugees from Sudan in the east.

30
It is important to note that given the heightened insecurity, movements of IDPs within the Nigeria+ region
are very fluid and rapidly changing. Moreover, the crisis in Nigeria and neighboring countries is taking
place in a backdrop of the Sahel, a region long characterized by cyclical drought and desertification. These
factors have contributed to widespread food and agricultural insecurity, impacted land and livestock
cultivation, and influenced the movement of people for water and grazing territory (IOM 2015d).
This situation of underlying vulnerability has been compounded by recent conflicts affecting the sub-region.
The Libyan crisis provoked emergency returns of more than 200,000 migrants from Libya, putting an extra
burden on their communities of origin, notably in Chad and Niger (IOM 2014). Since 2013, the political
and security crises in northern Mali have led to the displacement of people internally and regionally, with
consequences for regional migration, border management and for community stabilization. Niger is also
witnessing the arrival of migrants attempting to reach Libya and being expelled at the border, and also
returnees who are fleeing the insecurity in northern Nigeria (IOM 2014).
CAR+. As a result of the recent conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR), which began in March of
2013, nearly half a million people, an estimated 50% of whom are children, have been forced to flee inter-
communal violence into Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Republic of Congo.
A peak of over 920,000 people were displaced at the height of displacement in 2014, with 469,000 people
internally displaced in CAR and over 450,000 people fleeing across borders as refugees, the majority to
eastern Cameroon (UNICEF 2015). As of June 30, 2016, 391,433 people were internally displaced in CAR,
with 473,407 Central African refugees in neighboring countries, 55% of whom are in Cameroon15.
While often cast along religious lines, conflicts in this region are also framed as intercommunal violence
and the result of increasing tensions between pastoralists and nomadic cattle herders with traditional routes
expanding further southwards from the Sahel region.
DRC+. The Democratic Republic of Congo has the second highest number of internally displaced persons
after Nigeria, with an estimated 1 million children displaced among 1.8 million people as of June 30, largely
as a result of protracted inter-communal conflict and armed attacks and violence between Force Arme de
la RDC (FARDC) and armed groups mainly in South and East Congo. DRC also hosts nearly 400,000
refugees, including 112,000 refugees from CAR, as well as refugees from Burundi and South Sudan. DRC
is also a source of origin of refugees, often living in protracted refugee situations, in Uganda, Tanzania and
Burundi.16
Mali+. Since 2013, the political and security crises in northern Mali have led to the displacement of people
internally and regionally, with consequences for regional migration, border management and for
community stabilization. The conflict in northern Mali led to a peak in June 2013 of over 500,000 people
displaced, including 334,500 people internally displaced and 175,000 refugees into neighboring Mauritania,
Niger and Burkina Faso. Since the crisis in 2012, as of May 2016, an estimated 89,000 children, among
37,000 IDPs in Mali and 134,000 refugees in Niger and Burkina Faso, continue to find themselves stranded

15 UNHCR, Rponse rgionale la crise des refugis en Rpublique Centrafricaine


http://data.unhcr.org/car/regional.php
16 http://data.unhcr.org/car/regional.php

31
in a protracted situation with diminishing humanitarian resources to fund their on-going needs (UNHCR
2016, OCHA 2016).
This situation of underlying vulnerability across the region has been compounded by recent, concurrent
conflicts affecting the sub-region. The Libyan crisis provoked emergency returns of more than 200,000
migrants from Libya, putting an extra burden on their communities of origin, notably in Chad and Niger
(IOM 2014). Niger is also witnessing the arrival of migrants attempting to reach Libya and being expelled
at the border, and also returnees who are fleeing the insecurity in northern Nigeria (IOM 2014).

6.2 Protracted refugee situations in West and Central Africa


Not only are people newly displaced year after year, but large numbers of people are caught in protracted
displacement situations for many years. To document the magnitude and duration of protracted
displacement situations in the region, we use data on refugees by country of origin and destination from
UNHCR since 196017 and adopt UNHCRs definition of protracted refugee situations (PRS), i.e.
situations where the number of refugees of a certain origin within a particular country of asylum has been
25,000 or more for at least five consecutive years.18 Globally, at the end of 2015, 41% of refugees under
HCRs mandate (6.7 million) were in a protracted situation with an average duration of 26 years (UNHCR
2015, p.20).
In West and Central Africa, 7 countries in the region receive more than 25,000 people seeking refuge from
conflicts in neighbouring countries, hosting a total of 1,131,381 refugees (see Table 5). Conflicts in CAR,
Cote dIvoire, Rwanda and Sudan have created refugee situations lasting 5 to 13 years. Chad has been
hosting more than 25,000 refugees from CAR and Sudan for 13 years. In 2015, it still hosted a total of
365,632 refugees: 67,000 refugees from CAR and nearly 300,000 people from Sudan. Similarly, Cameroon
has been hosting more than 25,000 refugees fleeing conflicts in CAR for a duration of 9 years. In 2015,
250,000 people from CAR were still displaced in camps in Cameroon. Overall, some 722 thousand refugees
(64%) found themselves in 6 protracted situations by year-end 2015. In addition, the Mali+ crisis is soon
to enter the category of protracted refugee situation with 62,000 IDPs and 140,000 refugees in Burkina
Faso, Niger and Mauritania. The Nigeria+ crisis now in its third year is likely to extend to five years and
qualify as being protracted.

17 http://www.unhcr.org/4a1d43986.html
18 On protracted refugee situations (PRS), definitions by HCR can be found here: http://www.unhcr.org/4444afcb0.pdf;
http://www.unhcr.org/40ed5b384.html. The repository of HCR documents on PRS can be found here:
http://www.unhcr.org/4a1d43986.html.This method looks at the year of arrival of the first significant number of refugees
of a given nationality and estimates the average duration of stay for all refugees of that nationality UNHCR 2015,
p.20).

32
Table 5: Number of consecutive year up to 2015 with more than 25,000 refugees
2015 Country of Origin
Country of Total # of Cote Western
Asylum Values refugees CAR d'Ivoire Mali Nigeria Rwanda Sudan Sahara
Burkina Faso # of Years 4
# of Refugees 34,211 34,221
Cameroon # of Years 9 2
# of Refugees 323,688 254,633 69,055
Chad # of Years 13 13
# of Refugees 365,632 66,959 298,673
DRC # of Years 3 7
# of Refugees 139,866 101,866 38,000
Liberia #Year 5
# of Refugees 38,000 38,000
Mauritania # of Years 4 9
# of Refugees 76,228 50,228 26,000
Niger # of Years 4 2
# of Refugees 153,756 56,012 97,744
Source: UNHCR Population Statistics Reference Database

6.3 Where displaced population live


Many children are growing up knowing displacement for large portions of their lives, life in formal or
informal camps, with limited access to services and dependent on humanitarian aid and the limited
resources of host communities. Globally, high proportions of displaced persons (notably IDPs) are not
living in formal camps but rather in host communities or spontaneous sites. In many cases formal and
informal sites are closely connected to neighboring villages, through which refugees and IDPs receive
access to basic services, such as medical care through local health clinics, education, and access to basic
water and sanitation. Access to these basic services may be limited and the added need for services of
refugees and internally displaced people to the existing needs of the host population warrants close attention
(Davies 2012).
This section analyses data on the location and accommodation of displaced populations across the seven
most important host countries using data from UNHCR on the location (rural vs urban) and the type of
accommodation in which displaced persons live: planned and managed camps; self-settled camps; or

33
individual accommodation.19,20
The majority of displaced persons (74%) have taken refuge in rural areas (See Figure 13). This is in
contrast with global trends with 60% of displaced persons reportedly located in urban areas (UNHCR 2016,
Table 6 p.53).
Figure 13

Overall, across the seven most important host countries, just 12% of displaced persons actually live in
planned and managed camps. Almost one in 10 displaced person (9%, mostly in CAR and Cameroon) are
in self-settled camps. 8 out of 10 (79%) displaced persons live in individual accommodation among host
families.
Where families and children who are forcibly displaced live varies by country and context (Table 6 below).
In DRC, 97% of the displaced live in individual accommodations; only 3% are in camps. Similarly, in
Niger, 85% of displaced persons live in individual accommodations, and 15% in managed camps. By
contrast, in the Central African Republic, 82% of displaced people are living in self-settled camps across
the country, as well as in enclaved areas for protection. In Chad, over three-quarters of displaced people are
living in planned and managed camps, with only 13% living in individual accommodations. Cameroon is
in an intermediate situation, with 44% of displaced population living in individual accommodation, 40% in
self-settled camps, and 16% only in planned camps.

19 See definition of accommodation type from IASC Guidelines on the Humanitarian Profile Common Operational
Dataset 2012-08-07, Annex 9.2
20 UNHCR datasets include refugees, people in refugee-like situations, returnees, asylum seekers, and IDPs under
UNHCR care. However, IDPs not under UNHCR care are not included and as such, numbers of IDPs included are a
proportion of the overall number of IDPs.

34
Table 6: Major locations of populations of concern to UNHCR, end-2015
Individual Planned / Self-settled Undefined Total Sum of Pop
accommodatio managed camp camp (unknown) of concern to
n UNHCR end-
2015
Cameroon 44% 16% 40% - 453,282

Central African Rep. 14% 4% 82% - 503,168

Chad 13% 85% 2% - 472,871

Dem. Rep. of the 97% 2% 1% - 2,695,040


Congo
Mali 76% 0% 0% 24% 135,195
Niger 85% 15% 0% 0% 332,012

Nigeria* 92% 8% 0% - 2,173,976

Grand Total 79% 12% 9% 0% 6,765,544


Source: UNHCR Global Refugee Database http://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends/2015-GlobalTrends-annex-tables.zip
Definition of Population of Concern according to UNHCR include refugees, IDPs, asylum-seekers; Returned Refugees, Returned
IDPs, stateless persons, other persons of concern. http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/country/45c06c662/unhcr-statistical-online-
population-database-sources-methods-data-considerations.html
(*) Information on the type of accommodation for Nigeria was obtained from IOMs Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Round
VII Report December 2015. According to the latest DTM Round 10 report (dated June 2016), 86% and 14% of forced migrants
were in host communities and camps respectively.
Figure 14
For displaced people who are living in individual
Location of Individual Accommodation
accommodations, i.e. outside of structured camps and among (Rural vs Urban)
host communities and sharing their resources, the majority of
100%
people are in rural areas, particularly in Niger (98%), Chad 80%
(94%), and Cameroon (78%). In DRC, we see more forced 60%
migrants living in individual accommodation settling in 40%
urban areas (36%) (Figure 14). 20%
0%
In four of the most important host countries where age- Chad Cameroon Mali DRC

disaggregated data are available, children under 18 account Rural Urban Unknown
for 60% of forced migrants, including 15% of under-five
children, 27% of children age 5 to 11, and 17% adolescents between the age of 12 to 17 (Table 7
below).

35
Table 7: Forcibly displaced children - Major locations of populations of concern to
UNHCR, end-2015, percentage of children
Type of Individual Planned/managed camp Self-settled camp Total
accommodation accommodation
Age group U5 5 to 11 U18 U5 5 to 11 U18 U5 5 to 11 U18 U5 5 to 11 U18
Cameroon 14% 23% 53% 18% 27% 59% 12% 28% 61% 13% 28% 60%

Chad 16% 29% 57% 14% 27% 58% 14% 26% 57% 14% 27% 58%

DRC 21% 25% 60% 24% 23% 58% 21% 24% 58% 22% 24% 59%
Niger 13% 26% 53% 16% 32% 62% 15% 30% 60%

Grand Total 18% 24% 56% 16% 27% 59% 12% 28% 61% 15% 27% 59%
Source: UNHCR, Global Trends 2015: Excel Annex tables, http://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends/2015-
GlobalTrends-annex-tables.zip

NB: Missing data on age and sex for displaced populations in CAR and Nigeria

6.4 Displaced persons and the impact on host communities


Forced displacement due to conflict in West and Central Africa is thus characterized by three key features:
1. Forcibly displaced persons are likely to find themselves in a protracted situation lasting more than
5 years and up to 13 years.
2. The vast majority of forcibly displaced migrants are children under 18 (60%) including 42%
below the age of 11 and 17% who are teenagers.
3. Just one in 10 displaced persons live in planned and managed camps; 9 out of 10 have recourse to
their own means and live in host communities or in self-settled camps, mostly in rural areas.
Forcibly displaced migrants are moving into already vulnerable host communities and regions. In many
cases formal and informal sites are closely connected to neighboring villages, through which refugees and
IDPs receive access to basic services, such as medical care through local health clinics, education, and
access to basic water and sanitation. Access to these basic services may already be severely limited, and
the need for services of refugees and internally displaced people added to the existing needs of the host
population creates additional strain on existing host communities which warrants close attention.
The burden on host communities cannot be understated as shown by Table X, which presents the density
of displaced persons relative to the number of inhabitants in districts around the Lake Chad Basin. The vast
majority of displaced population finds refuge in host communities sharing ethnic and family ties across the
North-East of Nigeria, the Extreme North in Cameroon, the Lac region in Chad, and Diffa in Niger (IOM
2015d). As of 11 July 2016, 2.6 million persons have been displaced in 8 districts across 4 countries around
the Lake Chad with a total population of 21.1 million inhabitants. This corresponds to 124 displaced
persons per 1,000 inhabitants on average. Niger (Diffa region) has the highest density of displaced

36
persons with a ratio of 411 per 1,000 inhabitants.

The majority of the displaced population is seeking refuge in host communities,


benefiting from prior links with them. Whilst host families have been very
accommodating, their means to support IDPs are meager and reaching a point of
exhaustion. There are insufficient programmes targeting the needs of IDPs outside
camps and seeking to increase the resilience of host communities. (IOM 2015d, p.1
on the Nigeria crisis)

Taking into account the prior vulnerability of hosting communities, the number of people in need
(comprising both displaced and hosting civilians)21 is considerably larger (9.2 million persons) than the
number of displaced persons. The average burden of persons in need of assistance increases 3.5 times to
437 per 1,000 inhabitants (673 per 1,000 inhabitants in the Diffa region).
The protracted nature of conflicts and population displacement raises important questions about how to
manage and respond to long-term displacements and their impacts on childrens development and well-
being. How forcibly displaced children and their families are received by host communities, the extent to
which they are able to integrate their new communities, and how host communities in turn cope with the
additional burden of hosting displaced populations are critical aspects of forced migration and need to be
better understood and addressed programmatically (Davies 2012, Zetter and Long 2012, Zetter 2015).
The situation may be particularly difficult for families and children living in formal camps (12% of
displaced people on average but 85% in Chad) with enforced idleness affecting self-esteem and high
dependency on humanitarian assistance (Davies 2012). Protection issues affecting displaced children living
in camps or in host communities are numerous. Adolescents face particularly challenging issues, including
risks of abduction, recruitment, forced marriage, rape (Kerner et al 2012).
From a humanitarian perspective, long-term or protracted displacement is a delicate, potentially volatile
situation which does not correspond to a post-conflict transitional context nor a full-blown crisis. In such
contexts, after the acute phase of the crisis has passed, questions emerge on how to plan and fund the on-
going or residual humanitarian needs of displaced populations. In Eastern DRC, for example, some 70% of
IDPs are estimated to be hosted in the communities. However, the resources might not be proportionally
distributed as more attention tends to be given to camp settings in terms of resource mobilization. In other
instances such as in northern Niger (Agadez and surrounding areas), people move and live into an area for
several years as they try to earn enough for the next leg of their journey towards Europe through Libya,
Algeria. The areas where they live lack adequate infrastructure and insufficient coverage of social services
to address the needs of the local population. UNICEFs policy and programmatic guidance and operational
frameworks for humanitarian and regular programs are not adequately addressing these situations in a

21 See definition in OCHA - Humanitarian Needs Overview Nigeria 2016, Nov 2015
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/nigeria_hno_2016_23122015.pdf

37
coherent or mutually reinforcing way to achieve long-term results for children.

Without development prospects and opportunities to enjoy social and economic


rights, refugees and IDPs are more likely to move outside their regions of origin.
Secondary and multiple displacements reflect a collective failure to address the
specific mid- to longer-term needs and vulnerabilities of forcibly displaced people
and their host communities and to provide them with durable solutions. (European
Commission, Lives in Dignity: from aid-dependence to self-reliance, 26 April 2016)

Table 8: Lake Chad Basin: Displaced population and Population in Need as of July 11, 2016 (OCHA)
Population in Total displaced People in Need Number of Number of
Affected (million) (million) displaced per people in need
Districts 1000 per 1000
(million) inhabitants inhabitants

Cameroon22 4.0 0.3 1.5 66 375

Chad 1.4 0.12 0.3 85 184


Niger 0.7 0.3 0.5 411 673

Nigeria 15.0 1.9 7.0 130 467

Lake Chad Basin 21.1 2.6 9.2 124 437


Source: OCHA (2016), Lake Chad Basin: Crisis Overview as of July 11, 2016

22 Three districts most affected by cross-border Boko Haram attacks are Mayo-Sava, Mayo- Tsanaga and Logone-et-
Chari areas in the extreme North (IOM 2015d). The Minawao refugee camp hosted 33,000 Nigerian refugees as of
Jan 2015.

38
Table 9: Lake Chad Basin, Access to basic social services and key child outcomes
Country of Region of Skilled DPT3 OOSC OOSC Pop - Pop - Stunting U5MR
asylum asylum attendan immuniz primary second Improve improved
t at ation (% ) ary d Source of
deliverie (%) sanitatio drinking
(% )
s (%) n facility water
Niger Diffa 32 52 22 75 42 41
National 40 68 38 11 58 43 96
Chad Lac 7 13 63 4 68 35 159
National 24 46 16 51 12 40 139

Cameroon Far-North 25 45 36 54 39 168


National 65 87 5 46 76 32 88

Nigeria Borno 22 12 73 69 51 61 49 100


Adamawa 36 50 33 30 46 62 45 100
Gombe 27 36 39 41 70 53. 46 160
Yobe 10 11 63 64 31 44 57 100
National 38 66 34 29 69 33 109
Source: Niger: DHS 2012; Chad MICS 4, Cameroon DHS 2011, Nigeria DHS 2013

39
7 UNICEF programme response
7.1 Child Protection: Protecting Children on the Move
To address the complex issues presented by child mobility in the region, UNICEF is working to strengthen
bilateral and multilateral agreements among countries, and provide operational guidance to authorities,
social services and law enforcement on how to address child protection concerns and risks posed by
mobility.
UNICEF also works closely with ECOWAS to ensure that child mobility is addressed at a regional level.
As a result of upstream efforts, some countries have a comprehensive legal framework harmonized with
international human rights instruments tackling child smuggling and trafficking (e.g. Togo, Senegal).
UNICEF also works to ensure that systems strengthening work takes into account the fact that children
move, i.e. that any new policies and laws also address this issue; new services developed take into account
the realities in their geographic location; and that the training of the social service workforce includes
modules on children on the move. However, a critical constraint lies in almost all countries having
limited law enforcement and implementation capacity owing to the absence of a strategy and costed
plan of action, insufficient budget allocation, and weak child protection systems.
Cross-border coordination has emerged as critical to UNICEFs programmatic response, both in order to
adequately respond to the increasing number of sub-regional crises, as well as for UNICEFs response to
more appropriately follow the cycle of migration, from the country of origin, to transit and destination
countries, and in some cases returning back to the country of origin. This is done through UNICEFs
involvement in the Regional Inter-Agency Child Protection Working Group which supports ECOWAS to
ensure issues of children on the move are dealt with at the regional level.

7.2 UNICEFs Humanitarian Response to Forced Displacement (Refugees/IDPs)


At the country level, coordination with UNHCR, ICRC and IOM is critical to ensuring a coherent
humanitarian response for children who are forcibly displaced. UNICEF works with partners to carry out a
multi-sector response for IDPs and refugees in formal and informal camps or settlements, as well as
in host communities as per UNICEFs Core Commitments to Children in Humanitarian Action
(CCCs).
UNICEFs humanitarian response includes nutrition support, i.e. community-based management of acute
malnutrition (CMAM), access to micronutrients, vitamin A and deworming, infant and young child feeding
(IYCF) support. UNICEF also provides displaced populations with access to water, sanitation and
hygiene, as well as to health services, including immunization, screening and treatment for common
childhood illnesses, which in some cases is provided through mobile health clinics. In conflict settings,
UNICEFs response provides families with access to child protection services, including support for
unaccompanied or separated children, multi-faceted psychosocial support, and advocacy for the release of
children from armed groups or from detention and reintegration. UNICEFs response also provides access
to education (formal and informal), including but not limited to temporary learning spaces in sites, and
where possible, the integration of displaced students into existing schools. Displaced populations may also
40
receive cash/vouchers, non-food items (NFIs) and water and sanitation kits through UNICEF support rapid
response mechanisms (RRM), notably in DRC, CAR and Niger.

Box 2: The challenge of providing access to education in protracted displacement situation and
continued insecurity the example of Mali (Source: Mali Education Cluster Group)
Major results were obtained to ensure continued access to education for forcibly displaced children
and children in host communities in Mali. Out of 454 schools closed in May 2015, 160 schools have
been reopened, as a result of advocacy, mobilization and sensitization activities with communities
conducted by the Education Cluster group. Specifically, 21 schools in the region of Kidal reopened
for 3,857 children with 83 teachers including 75 volunteers. Nevertheless, 294 schools remain closed
in 65 communes of the North and Central regions. Many teachers are still reluctant to come back.
During 2016, the security situation has further deteriorated in previously unaffected areas in the
region of Mopti.
The Education Cluster work in more than 900 learning spaces for displaced persons (schools,
temporary learning spaces, training centers, etc.). As of June 2016, 177,987 children benefited from
these interventions. 54,414 school children and 1,325 teachers received schooling and teaching kits.
10,106 out of school children as a result of the conflict were enrolled in an accelerated learning
programme animated by 348 educators, enabling them to reintegrate the formal schooling system.
85 temporary learning spaces were rehabilitated or built, and 100 classes were equipped, benefiting
4,583 children. 109,614 children in 587 schools in the North and Centre regions benefited from
school feeding enabling children to continue attending school.
Without further funding to the education sector, the 294 schools are at risk of closure. The 300 000
children covered by these schools will not have access to education and will be exposed to greater
risks of abuse and exploitation, including begging, child labour, sexual violence, early marriage,
drugs-taking, criminal activities and recruitment in armed groups.

7.3 UNICEFs Response to Irregular Migration of Children from West and Central
Africa through Europe
As highlighted above, unaccompanied children made up around 90% of children who crossed by sea to
Italy. These children are at particular risk of abuse and exploitation, including physical and psychological
abuse and child labour.
In countries of destination, UNICEF is responding to the crisis through a combination of advocacy,
technical assistance to governments, capacity building and delivery of services. UNICEF works with
governments and partners to improve standards, child protection systems, policies and practices, for the
best interests of children to be given primary consideration in any decision concerning the child (UNICEF
2016).
UNICEF also provides support for children and families along the routes to their final destinations by

41
setting up mother and child corners and child friendly spaces, where children can have an opportunity to
rest, play, receive psychosocial support, access specialized child protection services and benefit from health
referrals (UNICEF 2016).
To support the work in Italy, a Joint Declaration of Intent was recently signed between UNICEF and the
Italian Ministry of Interior (27 May 2016). Among others, UNICEF will monitor reception standards for
refugee and migrant children, especially those who are unaccompanied. UNICEF will also monitor the
situation in reception centers and actions aimed at the integration of migrant and refugee children. (Joint
Declaration of Intent, 2016).

7.4 UNICEFs experience in cross-border programming

7.4.1 WASH cross-border cholera response in West and Central Africa


UNICEF can build on its experience programming across borders to address cholera or HIV epidemics in
the region.
Lessons learned from the cross-border cholera programming include:
Leveraging existing sub-regional organisations across ECOWAS states such as the Commission for
Lake Chad Basin or Mano River Union, which are used by governments to plans and coordinate
across borders.
Need for transboundary analysis and evidence generation. Country data systems are not able to
capture and react quickly to transborder issues. Evidence is vital to building a common analysis and
understanding of the situation among stakeholders.
Programmatic approaches organized around natural basins to improve prevention. Programmes are
backed-up by Risk-informed prevention analysis which can anticipate epidemics using molecular
biology to determine the probable propagation pathways of epidemics.
Cross-border operations: staffing/ workplans/ funding covering these areas. UNICEFs cholera
programme is supported by WCARO with two dedicated sub-basin teams: one based in Niger
covering Lake Chad, and the other in Benin covering the South of Gulf of Guinea (Togo, Benin,
Ghana). Hosting arrangement and SOPs are agreed with UNICEF Country Offices.

8 Next Steps: UNICEFs engagement in West and Central Africa


on mixed migration involving children
Migration involving children and young people from West and Central Africa is a reality that is only going
to intensify owing to a combination of powerful drivers, notably the regions rapid population growth and
the aspirations of its youth for greater life opportunities, compounded by the regions unequal economic
development, climate change and protracted conflict situations. More and more young people choose or are
forced to migrate towards urban areas and across borders, mostly intra-regionally within Africa, and to a
lesser but increasing extent towards Europe and other continents. In decades to come, climate change will
continue to weigh on the security and well-being of vulnerable populations and compound the effects of

42
protracted conflicts and fragility. Intervening factors such as increased regulation of migration flows
(notably towards Europe) and the increased criminalization of migration routes have pushed more migrants
into irregular migration and exposed them (notably children and women) to heightened risks of exploitation
and abuse.
At the same time, Africa is also rapidly changing and migration is a powerful engine of development and
progress, particularly for children and young people seeking to fulfil their aspirations for better education
and work opportunities. As exemplified by the shift towards adopting the Children on the Move paradigm
(Section 2.3 and 3 above), UNICEF needs to take a clear position on child migration that upholds the rights
of child mobility and brings awareness to the benefits of migration in receiving countries and communities.
At the same time, migrant children are exposed to increasing risks of abuse, exploitation and trafficking
along their migration cycle from their country of origin, during transit or at destination which also need to
be addressed.

8.1 Advocacy and programmatic shifts


UNICEFs engagement with mixed migration issues involving children is significant. UNICEF can build
on strong foundations laid by its child protection programmes as part of its Children on the Move in West
and Central Africa work, and by its emergency programmes in support of refugee and displaced children
across the region. In terms of advocacy, UNICEF can leverage existing regional partnerships with
governments and sub-regional commissions (ECOWAS, ECCAS) for a common vision, aligned policy and
legislative frameworks and improved coordination on children on the move, as well as capitalize on data
collection and evidence generation on children and migration across agencies and across borders and
regions. As migration issues are of concern to countries from other regional economic regions, UNICEF
could help harmonize advocacy and facilitate collaborations across RECs, e.g. between ECOWAS and
ECCAS.
However, given the regions challenges and rapidly changing environment, several shifts are required if
UNICEF is to remain a relevant actor for the best interests of refugee, IDP, and migrant children as well as
children in hosting communities.

8.1.1 Promoting equity and social cohesion for migrant children applying the migration cycle
lens
UNICEFs programmes can be made more relevant and impactful by bringing a migration lens that follows
children along their migration cycle (origin / transit / destination / return countries). This means:
(a) Analyzing root causes and drivers of mixed migration involving children and young people (including
pull, push, and intervening factors)23, including structural issues such as the lack of social protection
measures for families and children or the lack of opportunities for adolescents and young people.
(b) Developing a deliberate advocacy strategy that brings out a positive narrative on the benefits of

23 See definitions in UNICEF (2016), Istanbul Migration and Children Workshop Report, July 2016

43
migration and promotes the best interests of migrant children.
(c) Developing sub-regional programmes (i.e. across borders) that take into account childrens migration
routes and address their age and gender-specific vulnerabilities and needs in transit and destination
countries.
UNICEFs equity agenda provides an entry point to adapt UNICEFs programmes and respond to
the needs of migrant children. Migrants when in transit or destination countries often fall into
marginalized groups, with their health, education, employment prospects, and access to services affected
by their migrant status. Age and gender also intersect to create further vulnerabilities and risks of abuse and
exploitation. New inequalities are thus created, which so far, have not fallen into the explicit purview of
UNICEFs equity refocus. At the same time, migrants create new opportunities for themselves and make
positive contributions to host countries and communities, e.g. financially through remittances, culturally by
bringing new perspectives and experiences (Birchall 2016).
Various programmatic shifts are required that take into account the migration cycle of migrant children and
their families.
In countries of origin, a special focus is warranted on areas with high levels of out-migration (see map
of areas of high emigration and migratory corridors in Section 4.1.1) to promote policies and programmes
that enhance education and income generating prospects and contribute to create meaningful alternatives to
risky migration.
In transit and destination countries:
1. Policies and programmes need to be inclusive of migrant children, i.e. ensure that access to
education, health and social services, and shelter is based on needs regardless of migrant
status, as well as take into account the specific vulnerabilities and needs of female migrants
and children (Birchall 2016).
2. Strengthen collaboration between states and between social services in countries of origin and
countries of transit. More sensitization and advocacy efforts with civil servants from
countries of origin and recipient countries about the migrant child rights are needed.
Collaboration between social affairs and authorities in charge of migration in receiving
countries should also be promoted.
3. Ensure risks for children and women in transit who are at an increased risk of abuse,
exploitation and trafficking are mitigated thanks to adequate legal assistance and protection,
and that child protection system reform takes into account the particular age- and gender-
specific vulnerabilities of children on the move. Address impunity as a key bottleneck
through the strengthening of the rule of law and the independence of justice.
4. Harmonize advocacy and facilitate collaborations across RECs, e.g. between ECOWAS and
ECCAS.
5. Enable UNICEF inter-regional collaboration (ESARO/WCARO/MENA) given routes of
migration across regions to enable smooth coordination between UNICEF country offices
across regions (e.g. between Niger CO and Algeria or Libya COs).
6. Securing the future of both displaced children and children in host communities

44
7. The magnitude, changing dynamics, and key features of forced displacements across the
region (Section 5) require UNICEF to develop more sustainable and flexible approaches to
meet the complex needs of children in situations of protracted displacement. This includes
not just carrying out critical life-saving humanitarian interventions for children but also
operationalizing interventions that bridge with development programming.
8. The protracted nature of displacement means that refugee and IDP children will have
evolving and differentiated needs during the duration of their displacement. Additionally,
many children belonging to host communities are also deprived of access to basic social
services. As per the application of the Do No Harm humanitarian principle in reference to
the Core Commitments for Children (CCC), UNICEF does not privilege providing assistance
to one group of children based on their legal status (internally displaced or refugee) as this
runs the risk of undermining social cohesion and render more difficult the social integration
of children in host communities. However, the situation on the ground requires that UNICEF
promotes more purposefully a development-led approach to protracted displacement (Council
of Europe 2016).
9. This reinforces the importance of (a) UNICEF response plans being fit-for purpose,
responding on the basis of vulnerability rather than on the basis of legal status and addressing
the needs of both displaced and local children; (b) operationalize strategies that enhance
social cohesion and empower displaced populations and their host communities affected by
situations of protracted displacement (European Commission 2016; Council of the EU 2016).
10. [] a development-led strategy to protracted forced displacement means helping to realise
the different rights of refugees, IDPs and voluntary returnees in host communities and
designing interventions that target the most vulnerable, including in the host communities. In
particular, in the context of protracted displacement, it is critical to move quickly from status-
based relief and development assistance towards a differentiated, vulnerability-based
assistance. (EC 2016 p.13)

8.1.2 Going beyond the country-based approach


The cross-border nature of displacement affecting children as a result of conflicts requires UNICEF to go
beyond the country-based approach and make possible programming, coordination and operations between
UNICEF country offices across borders at sub-regional level, and between regions. Field outreach can also
be maximized by strengthening sub-regional coordination between field offices across borders.
Such a sub-regional, cross-border approach has various organizational implications: (i) greater operational
accountability and decision-making at the sub-regional level for operations such as logistics, child
protection, and partnerships; (ii) greater decentralization at field-office level so that resources for
partnerships and programming can be engaged to respond to rapidly changing local needs. This would
require amending the table of authority to be fit for purpose; (iii) security access analysis not just within
countries, but across borders.
Such a refocus of UNICEFs humanitarian response would maximize the efficacy of UNICEFs
interventions on issues such as the exchange of detained children over borders, the cross-border movement

45
of children, and on-the-ground advocacy (with community level actors, include Non State Entities (NSEs)
where appropriate and with delegated authority24 ).
To take the example of the Nigeria+ crisis, to deal with the issues of child detention and handover, it is
necessary to exchange protocols and strengthen the MRM (Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism) across
borders. At the moment, this requires informal agreements among the UNICEF Nigeria Country Office and
country offices from other countries affected by Boko Haram conflict on sharing data to feed into Nigerias
GHN for SRSG Children Affected by Armed Conflict (CAAC) Report. The issue of the MRM and the sub-
regional approach would need to go beyond UNICEF and requires a formal recognition of the SRSG CAAC
and SCWG to extend the legitimacy beyond a single country (as was as done for Syria), on the ground that
these children highlight the need for cross-border humanitarian interventions.
Increased coordination between UNICEF field offices in Madaguiri (Nigeria), Maroua (northern
Cameroon), Diffa (Niger) and Bor/Bagasola (Chad) would go a long way towards better responding to the
needs of children displaced or affected by Boko Haram violence. An example is the inter-agency needs
assessment in the area of Banki in Bama LGA in Borno state which was carried out on the Cameroonian
side using the road access from Maroua to send an assessment team, at a time when it was extremely
difficult to do so on the Nigerian side.
This highlights the importance of cross-border security-access analysis to facilitate coherent humanitarian
response planning in high threat areas. Understanding security-access issues across borders would create a
shared understanding of the security measures needed to manage the risks of operating in high threat areas,
and provide an informed basis for operational decisions about which types of interventions to prioritize in
high threat areas, which team is best place to coordinate that assistance, and the actual deployment of field
teams (i.e. which field team to use) to deliver assistance. Such cross-border security analysis and
coordination would allow greater flexibility to deliver a ONE UNICEF response to people in need by
actually looking at the best ways to do so from an organizational perspective.

8.1.3 Maximise migrant youth engagement / child participation in advocacy and policy
UNICEFs advocacy and communication on migration and children should articulate a clear position on
child migration that is positive for development and upholds the rights of child mobility, thus contributing
to shift negatives attitudes towards migrants and promote social inclusion.
In doing so, the participation of migrant children and youth themselves can be powerful to influence
policies and programmes on the ground. Indeed, experience of involving migrant children in the region
has proved impactful at policy and programme levels. As noted by the Regional Inter-Agency Working
Group on Children on the Move, one needs to acknowledge [] the wealth of information that children

24 Delegated authority is an actual term in the existing NSE (non-State Entity) policy framework. It literally means
that no negotiation or dialogue with a non-state actor is taken without the delegated authority of the organization to
do so. And those with delegated authority have the full organizational backing to do so. Delegate authority can be
given to field office staff, etc. But the decision to engage or negotiate with an NSE is an organizational decision not
one undertaken by individuals in an ad hoc manner.

46
themselves are capable of collecting from other young people about their experiences while migrating, and
the relevance of this for both government policies and the approaches taken by international organisations
and NGOs. [] The same West African children who were involved in collecting information were also in
a position to respond immediately to the problems experienced by children on the move (p.9)

8.1.4 Improve monitoring of migrant children


UNICEF needs to better monitor the situation of children on the move in order to better respond to their
needs.
UNICEF should enter into clear data-sharing protocols with partner agencies to share data
disaggregated by sex and by age, including age disaggregation for children under 18.
UNICEF programmes can also seize the opportunity to make better use of technology, including
social media platforms, mobile outreach and mobile data collection, in support of children on the
move.

8.2 Recommendations for WCARO

8.2.1 Communication and Advocacy


WCARO to review the 5 organizational policy asks for children, to be shared with Member
States at the UN general Assembly on migration in September 2016, within a regional context
and develop key asks for regional entities and specific Member States
WCARO, jointly with UNICEF Country Offices to develop a regional communication and
public advocacy strategy on mixed migration issues to support advocacy for children affected
by migration and create a narrative on the impact of migration in children and the importance of
social inclusion measures to be taken by the authorities in both countries of origin and recipient
countries. The communication strategy will include inter alia stories on host communities,
positive aspects of movement across and within borders and protection of children. Public
advocacy strategy will include actionable recommendations to decision makers at national
regional and local levels, as well as to the religious and community leaders.

8.2.2 Evidence-generation
Action-research and in-depth studies on the changing forms of migration involving children
in West and Central Africa: why they migrate, to what ends, who are their intermediaries, how
they cope throughout their journeys and displacements, working with young people to answer
these questions and with increased engagement with civil society, media and academic partners.
This research will target a limited but specific number of countries which include countries of
origin (in zones with high levels of out migration), transition countries and destination countries
(e.g. Niger, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Gambia, Senegal, Gabon and Congo Brazzaville, Cameroon).
Multi-sectoral action-research on children (IDPs, Refugees) affected by protracted
displacement situations (including impacts on host communities, potentially in collaboration
with other UNICEF regional offices. It is important to pull out good practices and lessons learned

47
around coordination issues, and its impact on the assistance to children. This has been seen as a
major factor contributing to creating a gap in assistance or efficiency being compromised.
Moreover, it will be useful to understand the different situations of those in the camps and in out-
of-camp settings, and approaches adapted to respective situations.
Agree a partnership with IOM in order to:
o Take stock of what evidence and knowledge already exists in the region on child
migration and the programs in place to address it;
o Share age and gender-disaggregated data on migrant children on a regular basis;
o Implement the IOM counter-trafficking survey on the extent of trafficking among
migrants from sub-Saharan Africa entering Italy via the Mediterranean route.

8.2.3 UNICEF Programming


8.2.3.1 Enable cross-border/sub-regional programming, coordination and operations
a) Operationalise greater accountability and decision-making at sub-regional level for
UNICEFs operations such as logistics, Child Protection, partnerships, particularly in the context
of ongoing sub-regional humanitarian responses (Nigeria +).
b) For refugee situation, establish a mechanism with UNHCR that clarifies the accountability at
country level. In spite of the efforts made at HQ level to strengthen the bilateral cooperation,
such as a LoU Guidance Note issued in 2013, inter-agency coordination remains a major
challenge, particularly in situation where the UNHCR-led coordination process interacts with
clusters that often pre-exist the refugee influx.
c) In relation to the agenda for children on the move within the region, an assessment is required to
update existing knowledge on child migration routes within the region and the degree to which
bilateral and multilateral accords related to child trafficking are working for or against childrens
best interests. Based on this assessment, specific priorities for sub-regional programming within
the WCAR can be identified and developed and the advocacy agenda could be adjusted to
strengthen the asks of specific Member States, ECOWAS and ECCAS. There may be a
particular need to build on our current partnerships with the 2 Economic Communities to build
some common principles and agreements between them as some of the most vulnerable migration
routes are between countries in these 2 sub-regions.
d) A consultant with expertise in this area, preferably someone who worked actively on these areas
5 10 years ago, when the child trafficking/ children on the move paradigm shift took place
would be required to undertake this assessment.
e) Review and amend the table of authority in certain UNICEF Country Offices as
appropriate so that field offices are able to engage resources for partnerships and programming
to respond to rapidly changing situation and needs. E.g. coordination between Madaguiri,
Maroua, Diffa and Bor/Baggasola field offices (Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad). Amending the
table of authority needs to done in tandem with reprofiling UNICEF field offices as needed so
that decisions to engage UNICEF resources are made at the appropriate level for accountability.

48
f) Conduct and make available Security Access Analysis across borders. This means greater
investment in Security Access analysis and recruitment of staff with the adequate capacity. An
example of well-done security access analysis implementation is in Nigeria.
g) For countries dealing significant protracted displacement situations (refugees and IDPs) and
mixed migration, WCARO needs to provide guidance and support to bridge and
operationalize humanitarian and development interventions, including the issue of
integration in host communities, competition over scarce resources and the impact on social
cohesion, during UNICEFs overall response planning frameworks (MTRs , SMRs, CPD,
CPMP, HRPs)
8.2.3.2 Implications for Human Resources for WCARO
Mixed migration is a core issue affecting the future of children in West and Central Africa that requires
greater consideration and investments from UNICEF at regional and country level.
a) In a first instance, Child Protection would look to bring in an expert for 8 12 weeks to review
the status of current knowledge and programming related to children on the move (non-
humanitarian contexts) as per the recommendation under 7.2.3. above and assess the potential to
build partnerships in this area at both regional and sub-regional level as well as provide
recommendations on UNICEFs comparative advantage in this area.
b) The Child Protection Consultant recruited will also be in contact with CEE/CIS to address
specifically the issue mentioned above in the analysis in relation to the high percentage (90%) of
unaccompanied children who are arriving in Italy as a country of either transition or destination.
Although the share of children migrating from West and Central Africa to Europe is a small
proportion of the overall migrants within the region, the degree to which this small proportion
of children is vulnerable is very high given their unaccompanied status. This warrants
active engagement and coordination between WCARO and CEE/CIS.
c) In relation to sub-regional programming for children who have migrated due to conflict, Child
Protection will recruit a TA for a period of 6 months to focus on strengthening cross-border
programming between Niger, Cameroon, Chad and Nigeria as part of the Nigeria + crisis. The
person will focus on ensuring consistency in UNICEFs programming across key areas (separated
and unaccompanied children, detention, children associated with armed groups, MHPSS etc.) as
well as working with partners across countries, with a focus on border areas, to promote and
assure the protection of children moving across borders either away or towards their countries of
origin.

49
9 Conclusion - key take-aways and recommendations
Mobility among children and youth in West and Central Africa tends to be associated with forced migration
and illegal trafficking. Part of this stems from an acute lack of research into the variety of forms of migration
among young people. There is insufficient knowledge of why adolescents migrate, to what ends, who their
intermediaries are, and how they cope throughout their journeys and displacements. Up-to-date studies and
research actions are required to determine who are the most affected populations, their types of migration,
origin, destination and transit countries, and the impact on children, in particular girls - in terms for instance
of multidimensional deprivations. These studies will inform evidence-based programming and the
definition of effective long-term policies to combat the negative effects of the migration on the most
vulnerable children.
Nonetheless, it is important to have a clear picture of migration trends given both the current media climate
and commonly held, but ultimately incorrect, assumptions about the profile of people from West and
Central Africa who do make the journey as desperate, unskilled, and impoverished.
Although increasing, migration to Europe from West and Central Africa remains relatively small
within the broader migration picture, thus comprising less an area of concern than for other
regions.
Education and economic motivations are among the key drivers for migration, and a higher
proportion of the educated work forcedoctors and nurses, as examplesemigrating intra-
regionally.
The majority of migrants from war-torn countries are only able to move to the next
locality/province or just across the border of a neighboring country in order to reach safety.
Nonetheless, the higher proportion of migrants from the region who die along the journey, as well
as the protection risks for children along the way, are causes for concern.
The role and responsibilities of governments in managing the increase in migratory flows are
paramount. As first duty-bearers towards their populations, governments are beholden to combating the
harmful effects of migration by addressing the root causes that push children, young people and families to
migrate from their country of origin in unsafe conditions. These include economic and social policies which
have failed to promote equitable, inclusive and distributive growth, social protection programmes which
benefit only a tiny minority of the vulnerable populations. Governments in origin, transit and destination
countries still need to put in place effective legislation against child exploitation and trafficking and allocate
sufficient resources to tackle it (e.g. for the training of judges and policemen or the strengthening of civil
society actors).
In promoting the best interests of migrant children, UNICEF can build on strong foundations laid
by its child protection programmes as part of its Children on the Move in West and Central Africa
work, and by its emergency programmes in support of refugee and displaced children across the
region. However, given the regions challenges and rapidly changing environment, several shifts are
required if UNICEF is to remain a relevant actor and become a strong advocate for the best interests of
refugee, IDP, migrant children and children in hosting communities.

50
Boldly articulate a clear position on child migration that is positive for development and
upholds the rights of child mobility, mitigates the risks of dangerous migration and maximizes
positive impacts on children.
Greater emphasis should be put on migration in UNICEFs country programs by strengthening
the focus on the protection of children on the move to prevent trafficking.
Promote equity and social cohesion for migrant children applying the migration cycle lens
(from origin / transit / destination / return countries) to regular programming. From a human
rights-based and development-oriented perspective, countries of origin, transit and destination
share the responsibility for managing migration, particularly regarding the children on the move.
UNICEF can play a key role by advocating for a close cooperation between these countries.
o In countries of origin: promote policies and programmes that enhance education and
income generating prospects and contribute to create meaningful alternatives to risky
migration in areas with high levels of out-migration, with special focus on adolescents.
o In transit and destination countries: policies and programmes need to be made inclusive
of migrant children, i.e. ensure that access to education, health and social services, and
shelter is based on needs regardless of migrant status.
Promote linkages between the humanitarian and development aspects of migration.
o Secure the future of both displaced children and children in host communities affected by
protracted displacement situations. This includes not just carrying out critical life-saving
humanitarian interventions for children but also operationalizing interventions that bridge
with development programming. A special focus on adolescents and youth, often left out
in terms of specific interventions or innovative tools, may be particularly promising.
Enable or strengthen existing sub-regional (cross-country) programming, coordination,
operations; Strengthen coordination at decentralized levels across borders in order to maximise
field outreach
Maximise youth engagement / child participation in advocacy and programming Improve
monitoring of migrant children with clear data-sharing protocols with partner agencies to share
data disaggregated by sex and by age, including age disaggregation for children under 18, and
make greater use of technology (social media platforms, mobile data collection) in support of
children on the move
A clear gap lies in our knowledge concerning children the numbers of children who migrate,
the reasons for their migration and the conditions they face. Undertake sub-regional studies and
action-based research to measure the magnitude of abuse, exploitation and trafficking
involving children and generate actionable information on the many forms of migration
involving children to protect their best interests during their migration cycle.

While UNICEF develops more global guidance and policies, immediate actions to address migration
issues is possible given UNICEFs wide organizational mandate for humanitarian and development
programs and operational capacity. This includes specifically:

51
Planning and coordinating as ONE UNICEF in partnership with other UN agencies and
organizations to address protracted displacement and migration to have operational response.
which bridges humanitarian and development interventions, focusing on vulnerability rather than
the legal status of displaced persons.
Where appropriate, engage in programming and operations especially on cross-border issues at
sub-regional level and across sub-regions.
Investing in greater security access analysis capacity to inform cross border planning and
operational decisions.
Use our existing procedures for greater flexibility in adjusting levels of authority (i.e. table of
authority) and decision making, and the staffing profile/capacity of field offices therein to fit-for-
purpose as per sub-regional programs and operations.
Reinforce and strengthen Communication and Public Advocacy efforts on the impact of
migration on children both at regional and country levels.

52
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11 Annexes
11.1 Migration Definition (IOM)
Migrant - IOM defines a migrant as any person who is moving or has moved across an international border
or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the persons legal status;
(2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4)
what the length of the stay is. IOM concerns itself with migrants and migrationrelated issues and, in
agreement with relevant States, with migrants who are in need of international migration services.
Migration - The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within
a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length,
composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and
persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification.
Irregular migration - Movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and
receiving countries. There is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration. From the
perspective of destination countries it is entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary authorization
or documents required under immigration regulations. From the perspective of the sending country, the
irregularity is for example seen in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid
passport or travel document or does not fulfil the administrative requirements for leaving the country. There
is, however, a tendency to restrict the use of the term "illegal migration" to cases of smuggling of migrants
and trafficking in persons.
Circular migration - The fluid movement of people between countries, including temporary or long-term
movement which may be beneficial to all involved, if occurring voluntarily and linked to the labour needs
of countries of origin and destination.
Forced migration - A migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life
and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g. movements of refugees and
internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or
nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects).
Internally Displaced Person (IDP) - Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or
to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects
of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made
disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border (Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2.). See also de facto refugees, displaced person,
externally displaced persons, uprooted people.
Refugee - A person who, "owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country. (Art. 1(A)(2), Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1A(2), 1951 as modified by the
1967 Protocol). In addition to the refugee definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention, Art. 1(2), 1969

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Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention defines a refugee as any person compelled to leave his
or her country "owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing
public order in either part or the whole of his country or origin or nationality." Similarly, the 1984 Cartagena
Declaration states that refugees also include persons who flee their country "because their lives, security or
freedom have been threatened by generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive
violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order."
Smuggling - "The procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit,
of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent
resident (Art. 3(a), UN Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000). Smuggling, contrary to
trafficking, does not require an element of exploitation, coercion, or violation of human rights.
Trafficking in persons - "The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the
abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation" (Art.
3(a), UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
Supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000). Trafficking in persons
can take place within the borders of one State or may have a transnational character.

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11.2 Accommodation type for forcibly displaced populations
Source: IASC Guidelines on the Humanitarian Profile Common Operational Dataset 2012-08-07, page 7
Planned Camps - Planned camps are places
where displaced populations find
accommodation on purpose-built sites, and a
full services infrastructure is provided,
including water supply, food distribution,
non-food item distribution, education, and
health care, usually exclusively for the
population of the site.
Self-settled Camps - A displaced community
or displaced groups may settle in camps,
independent of assistance from local
government or the aid community. Self-
settled camps are often sited on state-owned,
private or communal land, usually after
limited negotiations with the local population
or private owners over use and access.
Private or Individual Accommodation the
sum of Privately Hosted and Non-hosted
Hosted - living in someone's else home with
Source: IASC Information Management Working Group (2016)
them, sharing resources and a hearth with Humanitarian Profile Support Guidance, April 2016
another household group https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/es/system/files/documents/files/h
umanitarianprofilesupportguidance_final_may2016.pdf
Non-hosted - living in ones own home

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11.3 Sub-regional profiles for West and Central Africa
With more than 50 per cent of the population under the age of 18, migration takes place against the backdrop
of rapidly increasing numbers of children born in Africa. The largest number of births in Africa takes place
in Nigeria25, which accounts for one-fifth of the continents births, or 5 per cent of all global births (UNICEF
2014). Mali, Niger and Nigeria are projected to have the largest population increase in terms of percentage
of children and adolescents in relation to the overall population between 2015 and 2050 (UNICEF 2014)26.

11.3.1 The Sahel region27


The Sahel region is characterized by cyclical drought, desertification, deforestation, rising sea level, and
coastal erosion. These factors have contributed to widespread food and agricultural insecurity, impacted
land and livestock cultivation, and influenced the movement of people for water and grazing territory.
This situation of underlying vulnerability has been compounded by recent conflicts affecting the sub-region.
The Libyan crisis provoked emergency returns of more than 200,000 migrants from Libya, putting an extra
burden on their communities of origin notably in Chad and Niger (IOM 2014). Since 2013, the political and
security crises in northern Mali have led to the displacement of people internally and regionally, with
consequences for regional migration, border management and for community stabilization. Niger is also
witnessing the arrival of migrants attempting to reach Libya and being expelled at the border, and also
returnees who are fleeing the insecurity in northern Nigeria (IOM 2014)

11.3.2 Coastal Sub-Region28


Nigeria straddles the Sahel and the Coastal region of West Africa. The northern part of the country falls
into the Sahelian belt, whereas the southern part of the country including the delta region presents a different
demography as well as climatic factors akin to coastal West Africa. Conflict and insecurity are drivers of
refugee movements from the Northeast into neighbouring countries around the lake Chad Basin, namely
Niger, Cameroun and Chad. However, the profile of Nigerians fleeing to Europe (as illustrated by IOM Oct
2015) indicate that they originate primarily from the coastal and delta regions of Nigeria, rather than from
the conflict-affected northern part of Nigeria. Further investigations are needed to uncover more detailed

25 It is estimated that from 2015 to 2030, 136 million births will take place in Nigeria 19 per cent of all African
babies and 6 per cent of the global total. By 2050, Nigeria alone will account for almost one tenth of all births in the
world (UNICEF 2014)
26 In 2015 the highest fertility in the world is estimated in Niger, with 7.5 children per woman, followed by Mali with
6.8 children per woman. In 2050, fertility levels are projected to remain the highest in Africa at 4.8 for Niger and 4.0
for Mali. Moreover, Niger is expected to have the largest percentage increase in the number of births more than
doubling from 1 million in 2015 to 2.5 million babies in 2050 (UNICEF 2014).
27 Sahel Subregion: Senegal, Mali, Gambia, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, northern Nigeria, northern Cameroon,
and Sahel belt Chad
28 Coastal Sub-region: Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote DIvoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria
and Cape Verde

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profiling of Nigerian migrants and their motivations to move to Europe.
Recent movements into Europe from countries like Ghana, Guinea, and Cote dIvoire tend to be driven by
economic reasons. Historically, at the heights of conflicts in Cote dIvoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone in the
1990s to early 2000s, there was significant cross-border population and refugee movements into each other
and neighboring countries such as Guinea and Mali. During the 2010-2011 crisis in Cote dIvoire, over
200,000 people were displaced in neighboring Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone and over 1 million people
were displaced internally (UNOWA 2014). Even during those conflicts, movements outside of the region
and into Europe were not as large as they are now in part due to the profile of irregular migrants (refugees,
returnees) during these conflicts, with the majority being the rural poor. The limited few who did migrate
outside the region, tended to be among the economic-political elite (UNOWA 2011).

11.3.3 Central African Region29 [to update with Lake Chad studies]
The vast majority of movements across the Central African region is across neighboring countries. The
humanitarian crisis in the Central African Republic has led to large numbers of displaced people both
internally and regionally. Large (and long-standing) numbers of refugees from Central African Republic
are in Chad, Cameroon and the Republic of Congo. Chad also witnesses the arrival of migrants from the
region attempting to reach Libya and being expelled at the border, returnees fleeing the insecurity in
northern Nigeria as well as returnees and refugees fleeing the inter-communal clashes in Sudan (Darfur
mostly) and the crisis in the Central African Republic. Eastern DRC, has significant numbers of internally
displaced people (movement from the Kivus and is source of origin of refugees (including longstanding
caseloads) in Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi.

29 Central Africa sub-region: DRC, Congo, Cameroun, Chad, CAR, Gabon, Sao Tome & Principe, Equatorial Guinea

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11.4 Emigration rates from West and Central Africa - 2013

Emigration
Annual %
Destination country Population Total number rate
Population population Emigrants
(across) 2015 of emigrants calculated
2015 growth from
- (thousands) (to the world), from
(UNDESA) (%) WCAR,
Source country (down) (UNDESA) 2013 migrant
UNDESA 2013
stocks 2013

10,880 2.6 486,756 4% 4%


Benin 10,879,829
18,106 2.8 1,642,594 14% 8%
Burkina Faso 18,105,570
521 1.2 173,048 1% 25%
Cabo Verde 520,502
23,344 2.4 360,642 3% 2%
Cameroon 23,344,179
4,900 2.0 342,019 3% 7%
Central African Republic 4,900,274
14,037 3.1 403,850 3% 3%
Chad 14,037,472
77,267 3.1 1,306,026 11% 2%
Congo, Dem. Rep. 77,266,814
4,620 2.6 177,294 2% 4%
Congo, Rep. 4,620,330
22,702 2.4 1,020,416 9% 4%
Cote d'Ivoire 22,701,556
845 2.8 126,069 1% 13%
Equatorial Guinea 845,060
1,725 2.1 48,886 0% 3%
Gabon 1,725,292
1,991 3.1 70,966 1% 3%
Gambia, The 1,990,924
27,410 2.2 737,217 6% 3%
Ghana 27,409,893
12,609 2.6 398,475 3% 3%
Guinea 12,608,590
1,844 2.3 91,216 1% 5%
Guinea-Bissau 1,844,325
4,503 2.5 370,453 3% 8%
Liberia 4,503,438
17,600 3.0 895,684 8% 5%
Mali 17,599,694
4,068 2.3 136,270 1% 3%
Mauritania 4,067,564
19,899 4.0 290,330 3% 1%
Niger 19,899,120
182,202 2.5 1,117,901 10% 1%
Nigeria 182,201,962
190 2.1 36,115 0% 16%
Sao Tome and Principe 190,344

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Emigration
Annual %
Destination country Population Total number rate
Population population Emigrants
(across) 2015 of emigrants calculated
2015 growth from
- (thousands) (to the world), from
(UNDESA) (%) WCAR,
Source country (down) (UNDESA) 2013 migrant
UNDESA 2013
stocks 2013

15,129 2.9 540,363 5% 3%


Senegal 15,129,273
6,453 2.1 336,003 3% 5%
Sierra Leone 6,453,184
7,305 2.5 461,101 4% 6%
Togo 7,304,578
WCAR 480,149,767 11,569,694 100%
Source: World Bank, Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2013

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