76 Definitions of The Sign by C. S.

Peirce
collected and analyzed by
Robert Marty
Department of Mathematics
University of Perpignan
Perpignan, France

With an Appendix of
12 Further Definitions or Equivalents
proposed by
Alfred Lang
Dept of Psychology
University of Bern
Bern, Switzerland

NOTE: This is a copy, with slight changes in

formatting, of a document the original of which
is to be found at Robert Marty's website, as part
of a larger project on Peircean semiotics which
Professor Marty has underway there. The
present material is available at Marty's website
in French and Spanish as well as English.
- Original
Quotations from the present document should
paper at
be verified against the version at the website: we
current
will try to keep them in agreement by updating
location
one whenever the other is modified, if it involves
- Marty's
a scholarly correction, but this is not
current
guaranteed at a given time. It should also be
website
understood that these have not yet been
- Albert
proofread here at Arisbe against the originals in
Lang's
Peirce.
additional
Also included below is Marty's global
material at
analysis of these definitions, and, in addition,
current
some further definitions supplied by Alfred
location there
Lang from his own research into Peirce. The
B.U.
latter originally appear on a separate webpage
August 6, 2011
in Marty's website but are reproduced here on
this same page below, rather than made
accessible by an external link, to help insure
accessibility in case of bad network connections.
The possibility of transcriptional error should
be borne in mind here, too, as mentioned above.
[Ed. Note, J. Ransdell, 7/1/97]

Abbreviations:
MS = Manuscripts
CP = Collected Papers of Charles Peirce
NEM = New Elements of Mathematics
SS = Semiotics and Significs: Letters to Lady Welby

DATED TEXTS (dates according to R. Robin)

1 - 1865 - MS 802 - Teleogical logic .

Representation is anything which is or is represented to stand for another and

by which that other may be stood for by something which may stand for the
representation.

Thing is that for which a representation stand prescinded from all that can
serve to establish a relation with any possible relation.

Form is that respect in which a representation stands for a thing prescinded

from all that can serve as the basis of a representation, therefore from its
connection with the thing.

2 - 1867 - C.P. 1-554 - On a new list of categories .

[...] every comparison requires, besides the related thing, the ground, and the
correlate, also a (mediating representation which) (represents the relate to be a
representation of the same correlate) (which this mediating representation
itself represents). Such a mediating representation may be termed an
(interpretant), who says that a foreigner says the same thing which he himself
says.

3 - 1868 - C.P. 5-283 - Consequences of four incapacities .

[...] Now a sign has, as such, three references : first, it is a sign to some
thought which interprets it; second, it is a sign for some object to which in that
thought it is equivalent, third, it is a sign, in some respect or quality, which
brings it into connection with its object. Let us ask what the three correlates
are to which a thought-sign refers.

4 - 1873 - MS 380 - Of logic as a study of signs .

A sign is something which stands for another thing to a mind. To it existence

as such three things are requisite. On the first place, it must have characters
which shall enable us to distinguish it from other objects. In the second place,
it must be affected in some way by the object which it signified or at least
something about it must vary as a consequence of a real causation with some
variation of its object.

5 - 1873 - C.P. 7-356 - Logic. Chapter 5 .

Let us examine some of the characters of signs in general. A sign must in the
first place have some qualities in itself which serve to distinguish it, a word
must have a peculiar sound different from the sound of another word; but it
makes no difference what the sound is, so long as it is something
distinguishable. In the next place, a sign must have a real physical connection
with the thing it signifies so as to be affected by that thing. A weather-cock,
which is a sign of the direction of the wind, must really turn with the wind.
This word in this connection is an indirect one; but unless there be some way
or other which shall connect words with the things they signifie, and shall
ensure their correspondance with them, they have no value as signs of those
things. Whatever has these two characters is fit to become a sign. It is at least
a symptom, but it is not actually a sign unless it is used as such; that is unless
it is interpreted to thought and addresses itself to some mind. As thought is
itself a sign we may express this by saying that the sign must be interpreted as
another sign. [...]

6 - v. 1873,- MS 389 - On representations .

A representation is an object which stands for another so that an experience of

the former affords us a knowledge of the latter. There are three essential
conditions to which every representation must conform. It must in the first
place like any other object have qualities independent of its meaning. It is only
through a knowledge of these that we acquire any information concerning the
object it represents.[...] In the second place, representation must have a real
causal connection to its object. [...] In the third place, every representation
addresses itself to a mind. It is only in as far as it does it that it is a
representation. The idea of the representation itself excites in the mind another
idea and in order that it may do this it is necessary that some principle of
association between the two ideas should already be established in that mind.
[...]

7 - 1885 - 3-360 - On the algebra of logic .

A sign is in a conjoint relation tothe thing denoted and to the mind. If this
triple relation is not of a degenerate species, the sign is related to its object
only in consequence of a mental association, and depend upon a habit. Such
signs are always abstract and general, because because habits are general rules
to which the organism has become subjected. They are, for the most part,
conventional or arbitrary. They include all general words, the main body of
speech, and any mode of conveying a judgement. For the sake of brevity I will
call them tokens.

8 - 1896 - C.P. 1-480 - The logic of mathematics .

[...] Indeed, representation necessary involves a genuine triad. For it involves a

sign, or representamen, of some kind, inward or outward, mediating between
an object and an interpreting thought. [...]

9 - v. 1897_- C.P. 2-228 - Division of signs .

A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for

something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates
in the mind of that person an equivalent sign or perhaps a more developed
sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign
stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but
in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the
representamen. [...]

10 - v 1899 - C.P. 1-564 - Notes on "A new list of categories" .

[...] A very broad and important class of triadics characters [consist of]
representations. A representation is that character of a thing by virtue of
which, for the production of a certain mental effect, it may stand in place of
another thing. The thing having this character I term a representamen, the
mental effect, or thought, its interpretant, the thing for which it stands, its
object.

11 -l901- C.P. 5-569 -CP 5-569. Truth and falsity and error .

[...] A sign is only a sign in actu by virtue of its receiving an interpretation,

that is, by virtue of its determining another sign of the same object. This is as
true of mental judgments as it is of external signs.[...]

12 - 1902 - C.P. 2.303 - Dictionary Baldwin - "Sign" .

Anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an

object to which itself refers (its object) in the same way, the interpretant
becoming in turn a sign, and so on an infinitum.

No doubt, intelligent consciousness must enter into the series. If the series of
successive interpretants comes to an end, the sign is thereby rendered
imperfect, at least. If, an interpretant idea having been determined in an
individual consciousness it determines no outward sign, but that consciousness
becomes annihilated, or otherwise loses all memory or other significant effect
of the sign, it becomes absolutely undiscoverable that there ever was such an
idea in that consciousness; and in that case it is difficult to see how it could
have any meaning to say that that consciousness ever had the idea, since the
saying so would be an interpretant of that idea.

13 - 1902-2.92 - Partial synopsis of a proposed work in logic .

[...] Genuine mediation is the character of a Sign. A sign is anything which is

related to a Second thing, its Object, in respect to a Quality, in such a way as
to bring a Third thing, its Interpretant, into relation to the same Object, and
that in such a way as to bring a Fourth into relation to that Object in the same
form, ad infinitum. If the series is broken off, the Sign, in so far, falls short of
the perfect significant character. It is not necessary that the Interpretant should
actually exist. A being in futuro will suffice.

14 - 1902 - NEM IV pp. 20 - 2. Parts of Carnegie Applications .

On the definition of Logic.

Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. A definition of a sign will be

given which not more refers to human thought than does the definition of a
line as the place with a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time.
Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant
sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with
something, C, its object, as that in which itself stand to C. It is from this
definition, together with a definition of "formal", thah I deduce
mathematically the principles of logic. [...]

15 - v. 1902 - C.P. 2-274- Syllabus .

A sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic

relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third,
called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in
which it stand itself to the same Object. The triadic relation is genuine, that is
its three members are bound together by it in a way that does not consist in
any complexus of dyadic relations. That is the reason the Interpretant, or
Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to the Object, but must stand in
such a relation to it as the Representamen itself does. Nor can the triadic
relation in which the third stands be merely similar to that in which the First
stands, for this would make the relation of the THird to the First a degenerate
Secondness merely. The Third must indeed stand in such a relation, and thus
be capable of determining a Third of its own; but besides that, it must have a
second triadic relation in which the Representamen, or rather the relation there
of to its Object, shall be its own (the Thrid's) Object, and must be capable of
determining a Third to this relation. All ths must be equally be true of the
Third's Third and so on endlessly; and this, and more, is involved in the
familiar idea of a Sign; and the term Representamen is here used, nothing
more is implied. A Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant.

Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs. Thus, if a

sunflower, in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable,
without further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely
way toward the sun, and of doing so with the same reproductive power, the
sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun. But thought is the chief,
if not the only, mode of representation.

16 - v. 1902 - MS 599 -Reason's rules .

A Sign does not function as a sign unless it be understood as a sign. It is

impossible, in the present state of knowledge, to say, at once fully precisely
and with a satisfactory approach to certitude, what is to understand of a sign.
..., it does not seem that conciousness can be considered as essential to the
understanding of a sign. But what is indispensable is that there should,
actually or virtually, bring about a determination of a sign of the same object
of which it is itself a sign. This interpreting sign, like every sign, only
functions of a sign so for as it again is interpreted, that is, actually or virtually,
determines a sign of the same object of which it is itself a sign. Thus there is a
virtual endless series of signs when a sign is understood; and a sign neveer
understood can hardly be said to be a sign.

17 - 1903 - C.P. 1=53B- - Lowell Lectures: Lecture III, vol. 21, 3d Draught .

Every sign stands for an object independent of itself; but it can only be a sign
of that object in so far as that object is itself of the nature of a sign or thought.
For the sign does not affect the object but is affected by it; so that the object
must be able to convey thought, that is, must be of the nature of thought or a
sign. [...]

18 - 1903 - C.P. 1-346 - Lowel Lectures: vol. I, 3d Draught .

[...] Now a sign is something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to

some interpretant thought, C.

19 - 1903 - C.P. 1-540 - Lowell Lectures: Lecture III, vol. 21, 3d Draught.

[...] In the first place, as to my terminology I confine the word representation

to the operation of a sign or its relation to the object for the interpreter of the
representation. The concrete subject that represents I call a sign or
representamen. I use these two words, sign and representamen, differently. By
a sign I mean anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any
way, as such conveyers of thought are familiarly known tous. Now I start with
this familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is essential to a
sign, and I define a representamen as being whatever that analysis applies to.
[...]

20 - 1903 - C.P. 1-541 - Lowell Lectures: Lecture III, vol. 21, 3d Draught .

My definition of a representamen is as follow:

A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its

OBJECT, FOR a third, called is INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being
such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the
same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant.

21 - 1903 - C.P. 5-138 - Lowell Lectures: Lecture V .

The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of

repetition.[...] This repetitory character of the

representamen involves as a consequence that it is essential to a representamen

that it should contribute to the determination of another representamen distinct
from itself. [...] I call a representamen which is determined by another
representamen, an interpretant of the latter. Every representamen is related or
is capable of being related to a reacting thing, its object, and every
representamen embodies, in some sense, some quality, which may be called its
signification, what in the case of a common name J.S. Mill call its
connotation, a particularly objectionable expression.

22 - 1903 - C.P. 2_242 - Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, as

far as they are determined .

A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second

Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being
termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is
determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same
Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A Sign is a representamen of
which some interpetant is a cognition of a mind. Signs are the only
representamens that have been much studied.

23 - v. 1903 - Dichotomic Mathematics .

[...] As we know a sign, it is something which represents the real Truth, in

some aspect of it, to somebody; that is, determines a knowledge of that Truth.
This knowledge is itself of the nature of a sign. In its more perfect forms, it
involves consciousness, or a representation in the conscious sign of itself to
itself, somewhat as a map covering a country may represent itself. But
knowledge is nothing, quite nothing but a counterfeit unless it would under
some circumstances, determine conduct. It must have real effects. In fact any
outward sign must, not merely as a thing, but as a sign produce physical
effects in order to be communicated. [...]

24 - v. 1903 - MS 9. Foundations of Mathematics .

[...] A sign is intended to correspond to a real thing, or fact, or to something

relatively real; and this object of the sign may be the very sign itself, as when
a map is precisely superposed upon that which it maps. [...] A sign is also
intended to determine, in a mind or elsewhere, a sign of the same object; and
this interpretant of the sign may be the very sign itself; but as a general rule it
will be different. [...]

25 - v. 1903 - MS 11. Foundations of Mathematics .

A sign is supposed to have an object or meaning, and also to determine an

interpretant sign of the same object. It is convenient to speak as if the sign
originated with an utterer and determined its interpretant in the mind of an
interpreter.

26 - 1903 - MS 462. Lowell Lectures, 2nd Draught of 3rd lecture .

[...] Conversely, every thought proper involves the idea of a triadic relation.
For every thought proper involves the idea of a sign. Now a sign is a thing
related to an object and determining in the interpreter an interpreting sign of
the same object. It involves the relation between sign, interpreting sign, and
object. There is a threefold distinction between signs, which is not in the least
psuchological in its nature, but is purely logical, and is of the atmost
importance in logic.

27 - v. 1903 - MS 491. Logical Tracts (note) .

I call that which represents, a representamen. A Representation is that relation

of the representamen to its object which consists in it determining a third (the
interpretant representamen) to be in the same relation to that object.

28 - 1904 - C.P. 8-832 - Letter to Lady Welby dated "1904 Oct.12 .

[...] In its genuine form, thirdness is the triadic relation existing between a
sign, its object, and the interpreting thought, itself a sign, considered as
constituting the mode of being of a sign. A sign mediates between the
interpretant sign and its object. Taking sign in its broadest sense, its
interpretant is not necessarily a sign. [...]

A sign therefore is an object which is in relation to its object on the one hand
and to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring the interpretant
into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own relation to the object. I
might say similar to its own for a correspondence consist in a similarity; but
perhaps correspondence is narrower.

29- 1905 - MS 939 - Notes on Portions of Hume's "Treatise of1 Human

Nature" .

[...] It is difficult to define a sign in general. It is something which is in such a

relation to an object that it determines, or might determine, another sign of the
same object. This is true but considered as a definition it would involve a
vicious circle, since it does not say what is meant by the interpretant being a
"sign" of the same object. However, this much is clear ; that a sign has
essentially two correlates, its object and its possible Interpretant sign. Of these
three, Sign, Object, Interpretant, the sign as being the very thing under
consideration is Monadic, the object is Dyadic, and the Interpretant is Triadic.
We therefore look to see, whether there be not two Objects, the object as it is
in itself (the Monadic Object), and the object as the sign represents it to be
(the Dyadic Object). There are also three Interpretants; namely, 1, the
Interpretant considered as an independent sign of the Object, 2, the
Interpretant as it is as a fact determined by the Sign to be, and 3 the
Interpretant as it is intended by, or is represented in, the Sign to be. [...]

30 - 1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) presumably July
1905 .

So then anything (generally in a mathematical sense) is a priman (not a priman

element generally) and we might define a sign as follows:

A "sign" is anything, A, which,

(1) in addition to other characters of its own,

(2) stands in a dyadic relation , to a purely active correlate, B,

(3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive correlate, C, this
triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a dyadic relation, , to B,
the relation corresponding in a recognized way to the relation .

In the which statement the sense in which the words active and passive are
used is that in a given relationship considering the various characters of all or
some of the correlates with the exclusion of those only which involve all the
correlates and are immediately implied in the statement of the relationship,
none of those which involve only non-passive correlates will by immediately
essential necessity vary with any variation of those involving only passive
correlates; while no variation of characters involving only non-active elements
will by immediately essential necessity involve a variation of any character
involving only active elements. And it may be added that by active-passive is
meant active and passive if the entire collection of correlates excluding the
correlates under consideration be divided into two parts and one part and the
other be alternately excluded from consideration; while purely active or
passive means active or passive without being active-passive.

31 - 1905 - S.S. pp. 193 -Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) presumably July 1905 .

This definition avoids the niceties for the sake of emphasizing the principal
factors of a sign. Nevertheless, some explanations may be desirable. But first
for the terminology. I use "sign" in the widest sense of the definition. It is a
wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the
exact sense of the scientific definition. [...]

I formerly preferred the word representamen. But there was no need of this
horrid long word. [...]

My notion in preferring "representamen" was that it would seem more natural

to apply it to representatives in legislatures, to deputies of various kinds, etc...
I admit still that it aids the comprehension of the definition to compare it
carefully with such cases. But they certainly depart from the definition, in that
this requires that the action of the sign as such shall not affect the object
represented. A legislative representative is, on the contrary, expected in his
functions to improve the condition of this constituents; and any kind of
attorney, even if he has no discretion, is expected to affect the condition of his
principal. The truth is I went wrong from not having a formal definition all
drawn up. This sort of thing is inevitable in the early stages of a strong logical
study; for if a formal definition is attempted too soon, it will only shackle
thought. [...]

I thought of a representamen as taking the place of the thing; but a sign is not a
substitute. Ernst Mach has also fallen into that snare.
32 - v. 1905 - MS 283. p.125, 129, 131. The basis of Pragmaticism .

[...] A sign is plainly a species of medium of communication and medium of

communication is a species of medium, and a medium is a species of third.[...]

A medium of communication is something, A, which being acted upon by

something else, N, in its turn acts upon something, I, in a manner involving its
determination by N, so that I shall thereby, through A and only through A, be
acted upon by N. [...] A Sign, on the other hand, just in so far as it fulfill the
function of a sign, and none other, perfectly conforms to the definition of a
medium of communication. It is determined by the object, but in no other
respect than goes to enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi mind ; and the
more perfectly it fulfill its function as a sign, the less effect it has upon that
quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object itself had acted
upon it. [...]

It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a quasi-mind; for if we

regard it as an outward object, and as addressing itself to a human mind, that
mind must first apprehend it as an object in itself, and only after that consider
it in its significance; and the like must happen if the sign addresses itself to
any quasi-mind. It must begin by forming a determination of that quasi-mind,
and nothing will be lost by regarding that determination as the sign.

33 - 1906 - S.S. 196 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) dated "1906 March 9" .

I use the word "Sign" in the widest sense for any medium for the
communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is
determined by something, called its Object, and determines something, called
its Interpretant or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be borne in mind
in order rightly to understand what is meant by the Object and by the
Interpretant. In order that a Form may be extended or communicated, it is
necessary that it should have been really embodied in a Subject independently
of the communication; and it is necessary that there should be another subject
in which the same form is embodied only in consequence of the
communication. The Form, (and the Form is the Object of the Sign), as it
really determines the former Subject, is quite independent of the sign; yet we
may and indeed must say that the object of a sign can be nothing but what that
sign represents it to be. Therefore, in order to reconcile these apparently
conflicting Truths, it is indispensible to distinguish the immediate object from
the dynamical object.

The same form of distinction extends to the interpretant; but as applied to the
interpretant, it is complicated by the circumstance that the sign not only
determines the interpretant to represent (or to take the form of) the object, but
also determines the interpretant to represent the sign. Indeed in what we may,
from one point of view, regard as the principal kind of signs, there is one
distinct part appropriated to representing the object, and another to
representing how this very sign itself represents that object. The class of signs
I refer to are the dicisigns. In "John is in love with Helen" the object signified
is the pair, John and Helen. But the "is in love with" signifies the form this
sign represents itself to represent John and Helen's Form to be. That this is so,
is shown by the precise equivalence between any verb in the indicative and the
same made the object of "I tell you". "Jesus wept" = "I tell you that Jesus
wept".

34 - 1906 - C.P. 4-531 - Apology for pragmaticism .

First, an analysis of the essence of a sign, (stretching that word to its widest
limits, as anything witch, being determined by an object, determines an
interpretation to determination, through it, by the same object), leads to a
proof that every sign is determined by its object, either first, by partaking in
the characters of the object, when I call the sign an Icon; secondly, by being
really and in its individual existence connected with the individual object,
when I call the sign an Index; thirdly, by more or less approximate certainty
that it will be interpreted as denoting the object, in consequence of a habit
(which term I use as including a natural disposition), when I call the sign a
Symbol.

35 - v, 1906 - C.P. 5-473 - Pragmatism .

[...] That thing which causes a sign as such is called the object (according to
the usage of speech, the "real", but more accurately, the existent object)
represented by the sign : the sign is determined to some species of
correspondence with that object.[...]

For the proper significate outcome of a sign, I propose the name, the
interpretant of the sign. [...]

Whether the interpretant be necessarily a triadic result is a question of words,

that is, of how we limit the extension of the term "sign"; but it seems to me
convenient to make the triadic production of the interpretant essential to a
"sign", calling the wider concept like a Jacquard loom, for example, a "quasi-
sign". [...]

36 - v. 1906 - MS 292. Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism .

A sign may be defined as something (not necessarily existent) which is so

determined by a second something called its Object that it will tend in its turn
to determine a third something called its Interpretant in such a way that in
respect to the accomplishment of some end consisting in an effect made upon
the interpretant the action of sign is (more or less) equivalent to what that of
the object might have been had the circumstances been different.

37 - 1907 -MS 321. Pragmatism, pp. 15-16 .

[...] How any sign, of whatsoever kind, mediates between an Object to some
sort of conformity with which it is moulded, and by which it is thus
determined, and an effect which the sign is intended to bring about and which
it represents to be the outcome of the object influence upon it. It is of the first
importance in such studies as these that the two correlates of the sign should
be clearly distinguished : the Object by which the sign is determined and the
Meaning, or as I usually call it, the Interpretant, which is determined by the
sign, and through it by the object. The meaning may itself be a sign, a concept,
for exemple, as may also the object. But everyboby who looks out of his eyes
well knows that thoughts bring about tremendous physical effects, that are not,
as such, signs. Feelings, too, may be excited by signs without thereby and
theorein being themselves signs. We observe that the very same object may be
several entirely different signs ; or in some way in other sign. [...] There are
meanings that are feelings, meanings that are existent things or facts, and
meanings that are concepts. [...]

38 - 1907 - MS 612. Chapter I - Common Ground (Logic) .

[...] By a Sign, I mean anything that is, on the one hand, in some way
determined by an object and, on the other hand, which determines some
awareness, and this in such manner that the awareness is thus determined by
that object. [...]

39 - 1907 - MS 277. The Prescott Book .

Of the distinction between the Objects, or better the "Originals" and the
Interpretant of a Sign.

By "Sign" is meant any Ens which is determined by a single object or set of

Objects called its Originals, all other than the Sign itself, and in its turn is
capable of determining in a Mind something called its Interpretant, and that in
such a way that the Mind is thereby mediately determined to some mode of
conformity to the original or Set of originals. This is particularly intended to
define (very imperfectly as yet) a complete Sign. But a complete sign has or
may have Parts which partake of the nature of their whole; but often in a
truncated fashion.

A Sign is in regard to its Interpretant in one or other of three grades of

completeness, which may be called the Barely Overt, the Overter, and the
Overtest. The Barely Overt of which a Name is an example does not expressly
distinguish its original from its interpretant; nor its reference to either from the
sign itself. The Overter sign of which an assertion is an exemple,... [phrase
inacheve] Thus the Sign has a double function

1/ to affect a mind which understands its "Grammar" or method of

signification, which signification is its substance significate or Interpretant.

2/ to indicate how to identify the conditions under which .... significate has
the mode of being it is represented having [text unfinshed].

40 - v.1907 - MS 318, Pragmatism.

[...] Now any sign, of whatsoever kind, professes to mediate between an

object, on the one hand, that to which it applies, and which is thus in a sense
the cause of the sign, and, on the other hand, a Meaning, or to use a preferable
technical term, an Interpretant, that which the sign expresses, the result which
it produces in its capacity as sign. [...]

b - [...] Now any sign, of whatever kind, mediates between an object to some
sort of conformity with which it is moulded, and which thus determines it, and
an effect which it is intended to produce, and which it represents to be the
outcome of the object. These two correlates of the sign have to be carefully
distinguished. The former is called the object of the sign; the latter is the
"meaning", or, as I usually term it, the "interpretant" of the sign. [...]

c - [...] Now the essential nature of a sign is that it mediates between its object
which is supposed to determine it and to be, in some sense, the cause of it, and
its meaning, or, as I prefer to say, in order to avoid certains ambiguities, its
Interpretant which is determined by the sign, and is, in a sense, the effect of it;
and which the sign represents to flow as an influences, from the object. [...]

d - [...] ...to which it is, therefore, conceived to be moulded, and by which to

be determined, and an effect; on the other hand, which the sign is intended to
bring about, representing it to be the outcome of the object influence upon it. I
need not say that this influence is usually indirect and not of the nature of a
force. [...]

e - [...] A sign is whatever there may be whose intent is to mediate between an

utterer of it and an interpreter of it, both being repositories of thought, or
quasi-minds, by conveying a meaning from the former to the latter. We may
say that the sign is moulded to the meaning in the quasi-mind that utters it,
where it was, virtually at least (i.e. if not in fact, yet the moulding of the sign
took place as if it had been there) already an ingredient of thought.

But thought being itself a sign the meaning must have been conveyed to that
quasi-mind, from some anterior utterer of the thought, of which the utterer of
the moulded sign had been the interpreter. The meaning of the moulded sign
being conveyed to its interpreter, became the meaning of a thought in that
quasi-mind; and as these conveyed in a thought-sign required an interpreter,
the interpreter of the moulded sign becoming the utterer of this new thought-
sign".

f - I am now prepared to risk an attempt at defining a sign, -since in scientific

inquiry, as in other enterprises, the maxim holds : nothing hazard, nothing
gain. I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which
mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by
the object relatively to the interpretant, and determining the interpretant in
reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be
determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign".

The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates of the sign;
the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign. Moreover, the sign
being defined in terms of these correlative correlates, it is confidently to be
expected that object and interpretant should precisely correspond, each to the
other. In point of fact, we do find that the immediate object and emotional
interpretant correspond, both being apprehensions, or are "subjective"; both,
too, pertain to all signs without exception. The real object and energetic
interpretant also correspond, both being real facts or things. But to our
surprise, we find that the logical interpretant does not correspond with any
kind of object. This defect of correspondance between object and interpretant
must be rooted in the essential difference there is between the nature of an
object and that of an interpretant; which difference is that former antecedes
while the latter succeeds. The logical interpretant must, therefore, be in a
relatively future tense.

46 - 1908 -_NEM III/2 p. 886 - Letter to P.E.B. Jourdain dated "1908 Dec 5" .

[...] My idea of a sign has been so generalized that I have at length despaired
of making anybody comprehend it, so that for the sake of being understood, I
now limit it, so as to define a sign as anything which is on the one hand so
determined (or specialized) by an object and on the other hand so determines
the mind of an interpreter of it that the latter is thereby determined mediately,
or indirectly, by that real object that determines the sign. Even this may well
be thought an excessively generalized definition. The determination of the
Interpreter's mind I term the Interpretant of the sign. [...]

47 - 1908 - S.S. .p. 80 - Letter to Lady Welby dated "1908 Dec.23" .

It is clearly indispensable to start with an accurate and broad analysis of the

nature of a Sign. I define a sign as an thing which is so determined by
something else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person,
which effect I call its interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately
determined by the former. My insertion of "upon a person" is a sop to
Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception
understood. [...]

48 - 1909 - C.P. 8-177 ou NEM III/2 p. 839 - Letter to William James dated
"1909 Feb.26" .

A sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so determined (i.e.

Specialized, bestimmt ), by something other than itself, called its object (or, in
some cases, as if the Sign be the sentence "Cain killed Abel", in which Cain
and Abel are equally Partial Objects, it may be more convenient to say that
that which determines the Sign is the Complexus, or Totality, of Partial
Objects. And in every case the object is accurately the Universe of which the
special object is member, or part), while, on the other hand, it so determines
some actual or potential Mind, the determination whereof I term the
Interpretant created by the sign, that that interpreting mind is therein
determined mediately by the Object.

49 - 1909 - NEM III/2 p. 840-1 - Letter to William James dated "1909 Feb.26"
.

A sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so determined (i.e.

Specialized, bestimmt ), by something other than itself, called its object (or, in
some cases, as if the Sign be the sentence "Cain killed Abel", in which Cain
and Abel are equally Partial Objects, it may be more convenient to say that
that which determines the Sign is the Complexus, or Totality, of Partial
Objects. And in every case the object is accurately the Universe of which the
special object is member, or part), while, on the other hand, it so determines
some actual or potential Mind, the determination whereof I term the
Interpretant created by the sign, that that interpreting mind is therein
determined mediately by the Object.

50 - 1909 - MS 278 : [Unidentified fragments] .

l909 Oct.28

Another endeavour to analyze a Sign.

A Sign is anything which represents something else (so far as it is complete)

and if it represents itself it is as a part of another sign which represents
something other than itself, and it represents itself in other circumstances, in
other connections. A man may talk and he is a sign of that he relates, he may
tell about himself as he was at another time. He cannot tell exactly what he is
doing at that very moment. Yes, he may confess he is lying, but he must be a
false sign, then. A sign, then, would seem to profess to represent something
else.

Either a sign is to be defined as something which truly represents something or

else as something which professes to represent something.

51 - 1909 - NEM III/2 p.867 - Letter to William James dated "1909 Dec 25".

[...] I start by defining what I mean by a sign. It is something determined by

something else its object and itself influencing some person in such a way that
that person becomes thereby mediately influenced or determined in some
respect by that Object.[...]

52 - v. 1909 - C.P. 6-347 -Some Amazing Mazes, Fourth Curiosity.

[...] Suffice it to say that a sign endeavours to represent, in part at least, an

Object, which is therefore in a sense the cause, or determinant, of the sign
even if the sign represents its object falsely. But to say that it represents its
object implies that it affects a mind, and so affects it as, in some respect, to
determine in that mind something that is mediately due to the Object.

That determination of which the immediate cause, or determinant, is the sign,

and of which the mediate cause is the Object may be termed the Interpretant
[...]

53 - v. 1909 - C.P. 6-344 - Some Amazing Mazes, Fourth Curiosity .

Signs, the only thing swith which a human being can, without derogation,
consent to have any transaction, being a sign himself, are triadic; since a sign
denotes a subject, and signifies a form of fact, which latter it brings into
connexion with the former. [...]

54 - 1910 - MS 654 : Essays (Essays 1st Pref.)

Bya sign I mean anything whatever, real or fictive, which is capable of a

sensible form, is applicable to something other than itself, that is already
known, and that is capable of being so interpreted in another sign which I call
its interpretant as to communicate something that may not have been
previously known about its object there is thus a triadic relation between an
sign, an Object, and an Interpretant.

55 - 1910 - C.P. 2-230 - Meaning .

The word sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only

imaginable, or even unimaginable in one sense -for the word "fast", which is a
sign, is not imaginable, since it is not this word itself that can be set down on
paper or pronounced, but only an instance of it, and since it is the very same
word when it is written as it is when it is pronounced, but is one word when it
means "rapidly" and quite another when it means "immovable", and a third
when it refers to abstinence. But in order that anything should be a Sign, it
must "represent" , as we say, something else, called its Object, although the
condition that a sign must be other than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if
we insist upon it we must at least make an exception in the case of a sign that
is a part of a sign. [...] A sign may have more than one Object.

Thus, the sentence "Cain killed Abel", which is a sign, refers at least as much
to Abel as to Cain, even if it be not regarded as it should, as having "a killing"
as a third object. But the set of objects may be regarded as making up one
complex Object. In what follows and often elsewhere signs will be treated as
having but one object each for the sake of dividing difficulties of the study. If
a Sign is other than its object, there must exist, either in thought or in
expression, some explanation or argument or other context, showing how -
upon what system or for what reason the sign represents the Object or set of
Objects that it does. Now the sign and the Explanation together make up
another sign, and since the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require
an additional explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged Sign
will make up a still larger sign; and proceeding in the same way, we shall, or
should, ultimately reach a sign of itself, containing its own explanation and
those of all its significant parts; and according to this explanation each such
part has some other part as its Object. According to this every sign has,
actually or virtually, what we may call a Precept of explanation according to
which it is to be understood as a sort of emanation, so to speak, of its Object.

56 - 1911 - MS 849 :

A logical Criticism of some articles of Religious Faith .

The word sign, as it will here be used, denotes any object of thought which
excites any kind of mental action, whether voluntary or not, concerning
something otherwise recognized. [...] Every sign denotes something, and the
anything it denotes is termed an object of it. [... ] I term the idea or mental
action that a sign exites and which it causes the interpreter to attribute to the
Object or Objects of it, its interpretant. [...] For a Sign cannot denote an object
not otherwise known to its interpreter, for the obvious reason that if he does
not already know the Object at all, he cannot possess these ideas by means of
which alone his attention can be narrowed to the very object denoted. Every
object of experience excites an idea of some sort; but if that idea is not
associated sufficiently and in the right way so with some previous experience
so as to narrow the attention, it will not be a sign.

A Sign necessarily has for its Object some fragment of history, that is, of
history of ideas. It must excite some idea. That idea may go wholly to
narrowing the attention, as in such sign as "man", "virtue", "manner".

57 - v. 1911 - MS 675

A Sketch of logical critic .

[...] In the first place, a "Representamen", like a word, -indeed, most words are
representamens-, is not a single thing, but is of the nature of a mental habit, it
consists in the fact that, something would be. The twenty odd "the" on
ordinary page are all one and the same word, - that is, they are so many
instances of a single word. Here are two instances of Representamens: "--
killed--", "a man". The first of several characters which are each of them either
essential to a sign being truly an instance of a Representamen or else
necessary properties of such an object, is that it should have power to draw the
attention of any mind that is fit to "interpret" it to two or more "Objects" of it.
[ The first of the above examples of instances of representamens has four
objects ; the second has two.] The second such character is that at least two of
the objects must be other than the representamen. A closer examination than I
have made would I am sure lead to a fuller description of the character. The
third is the property that the interpreter of the representamen must have some
collateral experiential acquaintance, direct or indirect, with each object of the
Representamen before he can perform his function [...]

58 - v. 1911 - MS 676 : A Sketch of logical critics .

[...] If by a "sign" we mean anything of whatsoever nature that is apt to

produce a special mental effect upon a mind in which certain associations
have been produced -and I invariably use the word "association" as the
original associationists did, for a mental habit, and never for the act or effect
of associational suggestion when we must admit that a musical air and a
command given to a soldier by his officer are signs, although it would seem
that a logician is hardly otherwise concerned with such emotional and
imperative signs, than that, as long as nobody else concerns himself with the
analysis of the action of such signs, the logician is obliged to assume that
office in order by the did of its contrast with the action of cognitional signs to
perfect the definition of this latter. [...]
59 - 1911 - MS 854 - Notes on logical critique of the essential Articles of
religious Faith (20.11.1911) .

Nature of a Sign . Its object is all that the sign recognize; since the sign cannot
be understood until the Object is already identically known, though it may be
indefinite. It so, it need only be known in its indefiniteness. The interpretant is
the mental action on the Object that the sign excites.

For instance the word dog -meaning some dog, implies the knowledge that
there is some dog, but it remains indefinite. The Interpretant is the somewhat
indefinite idea of the characters that the "some dog" referred to has. And we
have to distinguish between the Real Object and the Object as implied in the
sign. The latter is some one of the dogs known already by direct experience or
some one of the dogs which we more or less believe to exist.

The word dog does not excite any other notion than of the characters that .....
to possess.

The "Object" dog causes us to think of is such a dog as the person addressed
has any notion of. But the real Object includes alternatively other dogs which
are not known to the party addressed as yet but which he may come to know .

As to the characters we know it has four legs, is a carnivorous animal, etc..

and here we must distinguish then

- first the essential characters which the word implies -the essential
interpretant.

- second the idea it actually does excite in the particular interpreter.

- third the characters it was intended specially to excite -perhaps only a part of
the essential characters perhaps others not essential and which the word now
excites though no such thing has hitherto been known.

In order to understand a Sign better we must consider that what it excites some
sort of mental action about is in its Real Being either a history or a Part of a
history and one part of it may be a Sign of another part.

Some Dog is a ....

Excites the idea of a Dog....is sign of a Dog and its Interpretant is forced by
the interpreter own belief in the truth of the sign to regard its being a dog to
admit that it is possible a ratter.

The sign may appeal to the Interpreter himself to assert that the Matter of Fact
denoted does call for the....of certain character... or the Sign may exert a Force
to cause the Interpreter to attach some Idea to the Object of the Sign.

60 - MS 670 :
A Sign, then, is anythin whatsoever -whether an Actual or a May-be or a
Would-be,- which affects a mind, its Interpreter, and draw that interpreter's
attention to some Object whether Actual, May-be or Would-be) which has
already come within the sphere of his experience; and beside this purely
selective action of a sign, it has a power of exciting the mind (whether directly
by the image or the sound or indirectly) to some kind of feeling, or to effort of
some kind or to thought; [...]

NON DATED TEXTS

61- C.P. 1-339 - unidentified fragment1.

The easiest of those which are of philosophical interest is the idea of a sign, or
representation. A sign stands for something to the idea which it produces, or
modifies. Or, it is a vehicle conveying into the mind something from without.
That for which it stands is called its object; that which it conveys, its meaning;
and the idea to which it gives rise, its interpretant. The object of representation
can be nothing but a representation of which the first representation is the
interpretant. But an endless series of representations, each representing the one
behind it, may be conceived to have an absolute object at its limit. The
meaning of a representation can be nothing but a representation. In fact, it is
nothing but the representation itself conceived as stripped of irrelevant
clothing. But this clothing never can be completely stripped off; it is only
changed for something more diaphanous. So there is an infinite regression
here. Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which
the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretant
again. Lo, another infinite series.

62 - NEM IV - p. XXI - From MS.142.

A sign is a thing which is the representative, or deputy, of another thing for the
purpose of affecting a mind [...]

63 - NEM IV - P. 239 - Kaina stocheia.

Any sign, B, which a sign, A, is fitted so to determine, without violation of its

A's, purpose, that is, in accordance with the "Truth", even though it, B,
denotes but a part of the objects of the sign, A, and signifies but a part of its,
A's characters, I call an interpretant of A.

64 - MS 381 -On the nature of Signs .

A sign is an object which stands for another to some mind. I propose to

describe the characters of a sign. In the first place like any other thing it must
have qualities which belong to it whether it be regarded as a sign or not thus a
printed word is black, has a certain number of letters and those letters have
certain shapes. Such characters of a sign I call its material quality. In the next
place a sign must have some real connection with the thing it signifies so that
when the object is present or is so as the sign signifies it to be the sign shall so
signify it and otherwise not. [...] In the first place it is necessary for a sign to
be a sign that it should be regarded as a sign for it is only a sign to that mind
which so considers and if it is not a sign to any mind it is not a sign at all. It
must be known to the mind first in its material qualities but also in its pure
demonstrative application. That mind must conceive it to be connected with its
object so that it is possible to reason from the sign to the thing. [...]

65 - MS 793 : [On Signs] .

But at this point certain distinctions are called for. That which is
communicated from the object through the Sign to the interpretant is a Form;
that is to say, it is nothing like an existent, but is a power, is the fact that
something would happen under certain conditions. This form is really
embodied in the object, meaning that the conditional relation which constitutes
the form is true of the form or it is in the Object. In the Sign it is embodied
only in a representative sense, meaning that whether by virtue of some real
modification of the Sign, or otherwise, the Sign becomes endowed with the
power of communicating it to an interpretant. It may be in the interpretant
directly, as it is in the Object, or it may be in the Interpretant dynamically, as
behaviour of the Interpretant (this happens when a military officer uses the
sign "Halt !" or "Forward march !" and his men simply obey him, perhaps
automatically) or it may be in the Interpretant likewise only representatively.
In existential graphs the Interpretant is affected in the last way; but for the
present, it is best to consider only the common characters of all signs.

66 - MS 793 - [On Signs] .

A Sign is an thing, A, which

(1) in addition to others characters of its own,

(2) stands in a dyadic relation to a purely active correlate, B, and is also

(3) in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive correlate, C, this triadic

relation being such as to determine C to be in a relation, , to B, the relation
corresponding in a recognized way to the relation , its dyadic relation to A
would belong to it just the same even if A did not exist.

For instance, ...... the sign, the sentence "Let'songster of `Heliopolis' be our
designation of the phenix" we may variously regard as B, either the phenix or
the writer's determination, etc.. In any case howewer what is essential to the
relation between the sentence and B is the writer's determination of mind to
have the phenix called the songster of Heliopolis. This determination would be
so shaped howewer whether expressed in this sentence or not. And the
subsequent statement the sense in which certain correlates of a given
relationship are said to be `active' or `passive' is that considering the different
characters of all the correlates excepting only these that are immediately
implied in the statement of the relationship none which involves only non-
passives correlates will by immediate essential necessity vary with a variation
of those involving only passive correlates; while no variation of which involve
only non-active correlates will by immediate essential necessity carry with
them variation of those which involve only active correlates; while by `active-
passive' is meant active in respect to some correlates and passive in respect to
others ........`active or passive' meaning........ active and ......without being
active passive.

67 - MS 793 -[On Signs]1.

[...] which is communicated from the Object through the Sign to the
Interpretant is a Form. It is not a singular thing; for if a Singular thing were
first in the Object and afterward in the Interpretant outside the Object, it must
thereby cease to be in the Object. The form that is communicated does not
necessarily cease to be in one thing when it comes to be in a different thing,
because its being is the being of a predicate. The Being of a Form consist in
the truth of a conditional proposition. Under given circumstances something
would be true. The Form is in the Object, one may say, entitatively, meaning
that that conditional relation, or following of consequent upon reason, which
constitutes the Form is literally true of the Object. In the Sign the Form may
.... be embodied entitatively, but it must be embodied representatively, that is,
in respect to the Form communicated, the Sign produce upon the interpretant
an effect similar to that which the Object would under favorable
circumstances.

68 - MS 793[On Signs] .

For the purpose of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium for the
communication of a Form. It is not logically necessary that any thing
possessing consciousness, that is, feeling or the peculiar commun quality of all
our feeling should be concerned. But it is necessary that there should be two,
if not three, quasi-minds, meaning things capable of varied determinations as
to forms of the kind communicated.

As a medium the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which

determines it and to its Interpretant which it determines. In its relation to the
Object, the sign is passive, that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is
brought about by on effect upon the sign, the Object remaining unaffected. On
the other hand, in its relation to the Interpretant the sign is active determining
the interpretant without bein itself thereby affected.

69 - MS 793 -[On Signs, quatre versions d'une certaine page 11] .

a - A Sign would be a Priman Secundan to something termed its Object and if

anything were to be in a certain relation to the sign called being Interpretant to
it, the Sign actively determines the Interpretant to be itself in a relation to the
same Object, corresponding to its own.
b - b - A "Sign" is a genuinely genuine Tertian. It would generally be Priman
in some characters, called its "Material Characters". But in addition, it is
essentially (if only formally) Second to something termed its "Real Object",
which is purely active in the Secundanity, being immediately unmodified by
this secundanity; and these characters of the Real Object which are essential to
the identity of the Sign constitute an ens rationis called the "Immediate
Object". Moreover, the Sign is conceivably adapted to being Third to its
Immediate Object for an ens rationis constituted thereby in the same (generic)
relation to that Object in which the Sign itself stands to the same ; and this
Third is termed the "Intended Interpretant", but the ... [unfinished]

c - A Sign would be in some respects Priman, and its determination as Priman

are called its Material characters. But in addition it is Second to what is termed
its Real Object, which is altogether active, and immediately unmodified by
this Secundanity, and in so far as the Sign is second to it, it is termed the
immediate Object. The Sign is conceivably adapted to being third to its
Immediate Object for something in so far termed its Intended Interpretant; and
the Sign only functions as such so far as the Intended Interpretant is Second to
it for an Actual Interpretant which thus becomes adapted become a sign of the
Immediate [there is a question mark above this word] Object for a further
intended Interpretant, and in so far as the Interpretant is such Third it is termed
Reflex Interpretant.

d - A "Sign" would be in some respects Priman, and its determinations as such

are called its "Material characters". But in addition, it is Second to something
termed its "Real Object", which is purely active being immediately
unmodified by this Secundanity; and in so for as the sign is Second to it, it is
termed the "Immediate Object" thereof. The Sign is conceivably adapted bo
being Third to its Immediate Object for something which should thereby be
brought into the generically same dyadic relation to that Object in which the
Sign itself stands to that Object, and this Third is called the "Intended
Interpretant"; but the Sign functions as such only in so far as the Intended
Interpretant is Second to it and is Third to it for an existent termed the "Actual
Interpretant", the modes of... [unfinished]

73 - MS 801 : Logic: Regarded as a Study of the general nature of Signs

(Logic) .

By a sign I mean any thing which is in any way, direct or indirect, so

influenced by any thing (which I term its object) and which in turn influence a
mind that this mind is thereby influenced by the Object; and I term that which
is called forth in the mind the Interpretant of the sign. This explanation will
suffice for the present; but distinctions will have to be drawn are long.

74 - MS 810 :[On the formal Principles of Deductive Logic] .

A mental representation is something which puts the mind into relation to an

object. A representation generally (I am here defining my use of the term) is
something which brings one thing into relation with another. The conception
of third is here involved, and therefore, also, the conceptions of second or
other and of first or an. A representation is in fact nothing but a something
which has a third through an other. We may therefore consider an object :

1. as a something, with inward determinations;

2. as related to an other;

3. as bringing a second into relation to a third.

75 - MS 914 : [ Firstness, Secondness, Thirness, and the Reductibility of

Fourthness] .

The most characteristic form of thirdness is that of a sign; and it is shown that
every cognition is of the nature of a sign. Every sign has an object, which may
be regarded either as it is immediately represented in the sign to be, and as it is
in its own firstness. It is equally essential to the function of a sign that it
should determine an Interpretant, or a second correlate related to the object of
the sign as the sign is itself related to that object; and this interpretant may be
regarded as the sign represents it to be, as it is in its pure secondness to the
object, and as it is in its own firstness.

76 - MS 1345.

On the Classification of the Sciences .

A Representamen can be considered from three formal points of view, namely,

first, as the substance of the representation, or the vehicle of the Meaning
which is common to the three representamen of the triad, second, as the quasi-
agent in the representation, conformity to which makes its Truth, that is, as the
Natural Object, and third, as the quasi-patient in the representation, or that
which modification in the representation make its Intelligence, and this may
be called the Interpretant. Thus, in looking at a map, the map itself is the
vehicle, the country represented is the Natural Object, and the idea excited in
the mind is the Interpretant.

Furthermore, every representamen may be considered as a reagent, its

intellectual character being neglected; and both representamen and reagent
may be considered as quales, their relative character being neglected. This we
do, for example, when we say that the word man has three letters.

ANALYSIS OF THE 76 DEFINITIONS OF THE SIGN

by Robert Marty

ABSTRACT: We show that one can clearly distinguish two successive

conceptions. The first (before 1905) which we qualify as "global triadic"
and the second, more precise than the first, that we qualify as "analytic
triadic" .

The 76 texts on the sign spread from1865 to 1911 (for 60 of them that are
dated or whose dates are estimated). A brief study of the dispersion of the
dated texts shows that more than 80% of them were produced after 1902, that
is to say when Peirce was in his sixties. The production reaches a climax in
l903, the year of the Lowell conferences. In addition, if one assesses them by
their content, most of the non dated texts, and notably the eight definitions
grouped in MS 793 are from the same period. Our purpose not being to study
the evolution of Peirce's thinking in general, we will be interested only in the
different conceptions of the sign that he proposes if, nevertheless, one can
speak first of their differences before underlining their unity. Is it necessary to
remind ourselves that the fundamental unity of these conceptions is confirmed
by the constant reaffirmation of the triadic character of the sign? By
describing the Peircean sign as triadic we simply highlight the presence in all
implicit or explicit definition of the sign according to Peirce, three constitutive
elements (but the datum of these three elements does not exhaust the Peircean
concept of the sign since the relationship that links them together is lacking).

Peirce has varied the denomination of these three elements for reasons that he
has sometimes clarified. We should not forget that he is the author of a very
rigorous moral terminological (C.P.2-219 to 2 - 226). To designate the object
of direct experience necessarily at the origin of all semiotic phenomena, Peirce
uses the words "representation", "representamen" and especially "sign". He
uses the term "representation" to this end only in texts n1(1865), 6(1873) et
74 (n.d.), the other utilizations of the term designating the act or the fact of
representing, as found in texts 10, 19, 27, 50, 52. In the text n61, this word is
given as a synonym for "sign ". There is thus no reason to retain this term.

On the other hand, it is interesting to examine very closely the different uses
and distinctions between sign and representamen that Peirce first considers as
synonymous (n 9,1897) before making a distinction (n19, l903) and finally
deciding to abandon "representamen" (n31, l905) since he explains that the
popular usage of the word "sign" is very close to the exact sense of the
scientific definition. In saying this, he makes the decision to put aside the
formal distinction clearly established in l903 (n 22, l903). We find the
fundamental reason for abandoning this distinction in the statement, so often
repeated by Peirce, that it was impossible to observe a single representamen
that was not a sign. This conclusion is at odds with a number of authors, but in
agreement, it seems to me, with Peirce (since from l905 he no longer uses the
word representamen in any definitions except towards 1911 in the text n57.
However, the date attributed to this text being an estimation, it is possible to
put it in doubt, and as in any event Peirce uses it in this text in a restricted
sense, equivalent to legisign, there is no need to preserve this " horrible word "
and "sign" should be quite suitable. There would have perhaps been some
interest, on the other hand, in preserving representamen so as to concretize the
different conceptualizations of semiotic phenomena as between the Saussuro-
hjelmslevian tradition and the Peircean tradition. But the adoption of this
viewpoint would be a sort of renunciation of the debates on the profound
nature of these phenomena according to these two traditions ; the passive
acceptance of the fact that both traditions should develop independently would
thus deprive us of the clarity that the opening of conflicts can bring about in
the semiotic field.

To designate the object of the sign, Peirce employs on nearly every occasion
the word "object" accompanied with considerations that render it, explicitly or
implicitly, that which is connected to this object of direct experience that is the
sign. Sometimes Peirce designates it by the expression "some thing " and even
in the text n23 the sign is said to represent an aspect of the "True" (the
"Truth", the true universe), another representamen in the text n21, and a
subject in the n53. Moreover, the object is often qualified: Real, Natural or
Original in addition to the distinction between immediate object and dynamic
objects.

Despite these remarks, there is no problem in denominating as "Object" this

other object whose presence to the mind produced by the perception of the
sign is characteristic of semiotic phenomena. It is clear that a third element is
needed because it is essential in semiotic phenomena to define an element
capable of explaining the necessary connection of the two objects that are
potentially present to the mind (the perceived sign, as such, and the object to
which it is connected). For if the sign, an object of direct experience, is
distinguishable because it evokes another object different from itself, because
it enables a supplementary perceptive choice (at least) it constitutes, by this
very fact, an association between these two objects. That the sign is one of the
two objects does not change anything in the matter; it both exists for itself and
exists for another. But this association can be conceived only in the mind and
by the mind to which the two objects are present. In a sign in actu this
association is truly a matter of fact; it is a psychic fact that the mind that
constructs two different perceptual judgements on the same percept is in a
special state, different from that which it is in, in the case of ordinary
phenomena, that is to say in the simple presentation of an object, due to the
fact of this dual presence (it is the thesis that I develop in my work in French
"The Algebra of signs" (1990, John Benjamins, Amsterdam/Philadelphia).
One can say that this special state of mind gives at this very instant a real
existence to this association, even in the most "natural " cases. Friday's
footprint in the sand stands for a human presence only because of the
association in Robinson's mind, even if its production and therefore its
existence are totally independent of his mind. In every sign there intervenes
therefore the determination of a mind, distinct from the two objects, which is
therefore an element necessarily implied in the factuality of the sign and
without which one cannot hope to describe semiotic phenomena correctly. The
subject is therefore implied in a certain manner in this approach. It is
necessary therefore to attach a third element to the Sign and to the Object.
Peirce gives it the name of Interpretant. Now, let us examine the various
denominations by which he himself grasped this necessity. Note immediately
that the last sentence of the textn6 (1873) covers exactly the argument we
have just developed: "The idea of the representation itself excites in the mind
another idea and in order that it may do this it is necessary that some principle
of association between the two ideas should already be established in that
mind". One finds again this idea in the text n64 (n.d) :

That mind must conceive it to be connected with its object so that it is possible
to reason from the sign to the thing.

and in the text n 58 (v.1911), the Interpretant is

"a special mental effect upon a mind in which certain associations have been
produced".

A systematic list of the words that Peirce uses to give content to the concept of
the interpretant shows that he attributes the following characteristics,
according to what he is saying at that moment and to the maturation of his
thinking: - it is a thought or interpretant thought in texts n,8, l0, 18, 28.

- - it is an effect created or determined or modelled by the sign on a person, a

mind or a quasi -mind in textsn9, 12, 14, 16, 21, 32, 33,39, 40 (b,c,d, e),46,
47, 48, 49, 51, 56, 58,61, 73, 75.

-- it is a determination of a mind or quasi -mind or an influence on a person or

a mind, this determination or influence being realised through the sign, the
object by being the mediate cause in texts n34, 37, 40(a,b,c,e,f,) 52.

- It is a Third that according to the case is a third correlate of a triadic

relationship or a "Tertian", (that is to say a member of the Third universe, a
Thirdness) in texts n13,15, 20, 22, 36, 69(b,c,d,e). Moreover, in n30 iit is
described as a "passive" correlate and in n76 it is a quasi - patient.

- it is a meaning, or cognition, or a result which it produces in textsn35,37,

38, 40(a,b).

- it is a sign of the same object in 11, 12, 16, 24,25, 26, 27, 29, 54.

One sees that these characteristics (by excluding the last that is of a radically
different nature), can be classified in two groups:

- Those that refer to a sign in actu, that describe therefore this third element of
the semiotic phenomenon in its particularity and that are practically reducible
to an effect on a person or again to a determination of a mind, in the here and
now of the perception.

- Those that refer to an abstract sign which come from the logical analysis of
the phenomenon and form part of a formal construction, in which the
interpretant is described as a correlate of a triadic relationship.

Peirce had a great deal of difficulty getting people to accept this conception,
quite banal today, of a formal model of the sign. In his letter to Lady Welby
dated 23 December l908 he complains about his difficulties by writing : "I
have added 'on a person' so as to throw a cake to Cerberus, because I despair
of making people understand my own conception which is larger. " In
conclusion then, peircean conceptions of the sign lead us to retain three
fundamental elements as theoretical universals resulting from the logical
analysis of semiotic phenomena,:

- the Sign S, an object of direct experience ("external"or "internal"object").

- the Object O, present in the semiotic phenomenon because it is connected

with the sign.

- the Interpretant I, present because it is a mental element which ensures this

connection.

The reader will have noticed that these groups and subgroups of definitions
possess common elements since the characteristics fundamental to them are
not exclusive of each other. However by observing the placings of texts
constituting the subgroups and by reminding ourselves that numbers l to 60
are classified by chronological order, this distribution shows a significant
change, if not of doctrine, at least of his approach to this connection of the
Sign to its Object. It suffices indeed to observe the pre-eminence from n29
(l905) of the characterization of this connection in terms of determination of S
by O to arrive at the conclusion that Peirce has decided to take into account,
round about l905, the dissymetric character of this relationship, which he has
expressed by writing that if, in a sign, O acts on S, the reverse is not
necessarily true. The consequence of this change will be the abandoning of the
central position granted to the triad in the global approach to the sign. Indeed,
to define a priori the sign as triadic implies that diadic relationships between
two elements that are induced by the triadic relationship are symmetrical.
Therefore if one wants to preserve the dissymmetry of this relationship, it is
necessary either to abandon the idea of basing the sign on the notion of triad,
or to add correctives (which would be difficult), or to change the perspective,
which does not imply the renunciation of the triadicity but simply causes it to
intervene at another level. We will see later, that a third approach, based on
the notion of communication, will tend to unify the two precedent
perspectives.

With regard to the connection between Sign and Interpretant, it is invariably

conceived, each time than it is evoked, as a relationship of determination
(when it is evoked in a formal model), an effect on interpreter or a
determination of the mind of an interpreter (when it concerns the description
of a sign in actu). In text n49 (l909) lthe Interpretant is even called "a creature
of the sign ", a conception which is problematic if one thinks of the necessity,
many time underlined by Peirce, that an association is a prerequisite in the
mind in order that a sign might function as such, which obviously excludes the
possibility that the sign could create the Interpretant ex-nihilo. It is what
Peirce resumed in this text by specifying that the Interpretant is created by the
Sign "in its capacity to support its determination by the Object". In one of his
most formal approaches in which the triadic relationship is his point of
departure, (C.P.2-233 and s.q.q., Division of Triadic Relations) Peirce defines
the Representamen ( see n22, v.l903) as the first correlate of an authentic
triadic relationship. In other words he considers that this first correlate
determines the third correlate. Thus, at that moment, he approaches the sign
through its triadicity to which he adds a corrective: the determination of the
interpretant by the sign, the connections signs-object and object-interpretant
being induced by the triadic relationship, the sign itself being a particular
representamen , namely a representamen that determines a particular
interpretant that is the "act of cognition of a mind".

By taking into account the dissymmetry of the relationship Object-Sign he has

therefore, as we have noticed, abandoned the triadicity as founder principle
and has resorted to a new notion, linked to the higthlighting of successive
determinations (of the Sign by the Object and the Interpretant by the Sign) in
the analysis of the sign in actu, the notion of mediation. It concerns a
resumption of this notion already present in 1867 (" mediate representation "in
text n8) and in l902 (" the authentic mediation is the character of a sign"in
text n13).In l904, triadicity and mediation appear in the same text (n28).
However one can observe that in the majority of texts after l905 that mention
the two determinations cited above, one of words "mediation"or"medium "or
the verb"to mediate"is present (texts n: 33, 37, 39, 40 (a,b,c,e,f) 46, 47, 48,
49,51, 52). It concerns a new theoretical approach (because the term"
triad"does not figure in any of these texts) that is based this time on the
determination of the Interpretant by the Object through the sign. This
conception is partially clarified and formalized in text n 30 (l905) in which
the triad is still present: the Sign is presented there as a passive correlate in its
relationship to the Object, which relationship is incorporated in a triadic
relationship in such a manner that the Interpretant is put in a diadic
relationship with the Object, induced by this triadic relationship. What does
not figure in this definition assuredly the most formalized of all, (and that one
finds in text n66 in the undated manuscript n793) is precisely the
determination of the Interpretant by the Sign.

It is in text n32 that the change appears fully with the notion of "medium of
communication ". The next text (n33) is more precise: a sign is"a medium for
the communication or the extension of a form (or figure)". One finds this idea
of form in n 53 and 54 (19l0). It would seem that Peirce has attempted to
explain the fact that the determination of the Sign by the Object was such that
it produced the indirect determination of the Interpretant by the Object taking
into account that a certain "form"was present in each of the three elements of
the sign, as soon as the sign was established, and that the process of
establishment of the sign consisted in communicating (or conveying) this form
from the Object to the Interpreter through the Sign. This step does not exclude
triadicity insofar as it is precisely the presence of this "form"that, we think,
allows us to link triadically the three elements of the semiotic phenomenon
(by being incorporated in each of them). It would be the ground evoked by
Peirce in 2-228 (text n9, v.1897). One sees therefore that the two main
theoretical approachs that we have just elucidated in this group of texts, are
not exclusive. In conclusion we will distinguish therefore, without opposing
them, two Peircean conceptions of the sign: - a conception that, for
convenience, we will call "global triadic " derived from an analysis of
semiotic phenomena which considers as essential the fact that the three
elements therein are necessarily linked by a triadic relationship. - a conception
that we will call" analytic triadic" derived from a finer analysis in terms of the
determination of some elements by others (of the sign by the object and the
interpretant by the sign), the interplay of these two determinations leading to
the establishment of a triadic relationship between the three elements
necessarily present in semiotic phenomena (it is the presence of the conveyed
Form in the course of these successive determination that creates the triadic
relationship). To grasp this second conception better it is necessary to clarify
what Peirce understands by "determination" in the precise case of the sign, or,
in view of the difficulty of the task, to try to discern this notion better. Because
the explanations given by Peirce as to the sense in which he uses the words
"active" and "passive"in texts n30 and 66 appear to us to be no longer
operative. To the extent that we have been able to understand his thinking, it
seems to us that Peirce considers that there is character determination of one
correlate by those of another, the correlate B being active with reference to the
correlate A, if all characters of this latter which are involved in the semiotic
phenomenon are implied by the characters of B. Friday's footprint in the sand
perfectly illustrates this notion since it is just what it is, that is to say possessed
of characters that make it a sign, because the foot that has produced it has
communicated them without being modified itself, and it is thus a purely
active correlate. The imprint itself is a purely passive correlate for opposite
reasons . However if now one photographs this imprint, it is going to produce
an image on the film which owes all its characters to the imprint itself. In
relation to this photographic image the imprint will be therefore an active
correlate and it is clear that, for Peirce, the interpretant C is a purely passive
correlate determined by the imprint, this interpretant, triadic in nature, being
such that it incorporates, as an induced diadic relationship, the diadic
relationship established between Friday's foot and its imprint. However the
example that we quote is particular, it is a scholastic example. Nevertheless it
is, we think, by generalizing the case of signs of this type ( index) that Peirce
obtained the definition n 30.In others texts he has used terms that allow us to
higthlight somewhat this conception:

- in texts n37 and 40a, the sign is said to be "modeled to a sort of conformity
with its object".

- in 40c the Object is, in a certain sense, the cause of the sign which represents
the influence of this object, and that this influence is "indirect and is not of the
nature of a force" (40 d).

-in 46 and 48 the sign is said to be specialized (that Peirce strengthens by

calling it in German "bestimmt") and in 47 and 48 he writes that the
determination of the Sign by the Object is such that consequently it determines
the Interpretant, what means that if the Sign is passive in relation to the Object
and active when related to the Interpretant, it owes this last possibility to the
action of the Object, as a pool ball becomes capable of moving another after
having itself been knocked by another one. Moreover, in text n65, Peirce
makes it clear that when the Form which comes from the Object is
incorporated in the Sign the former becomes "endowed with the power to
communicate it to an Interpretant".

- but it is certainly in text n 40 f, that Peirce clearly presents as an attempt to

define the sign, that his conception of determination in semiotic phenomena is
best expressed while being probably the most difficult to formalize: the sign,
he writes, is both " determined by the object with respect to the interpretant
and it determines the interpretant in reference to the object, in such a manner
that the interpretant is determined by the object as a cause through the
mediation of this sign". One sees that the determinations of elements one by
other (of the Sign by the Object, the Interpretant by the Sign) are constructed
dependant on the third, for lack of which, the semiotic phenomenon would be
reduced to the compositionof two independent successive determinations, in
contradiction with the consistant doctrine of Peirce. It is by taking into account
the whole of Peirce's contributions, of which it is unnecessary to underline the
wealth, the power but also the difficulty, that we have taken the risk (since we
are agreement with Peirce -cf 40 f - that in scientific matters, as in other
enterprises the maxim:"no risk, no profit" is valid ") of putting forward a
formal definition of the sign that is operative and also mathematically
formalizable, to reach as far as possible towards authentically scientific
semiotics (cf " The Algebra of Signs " an essay in scientific semiotics
according to Charles Sanders Peirce)

APPENDIX
12 Further Sign Definitions or Equivalent
proposed by Alfred Lang
Psychology, Univ. Bern, Switzerland (lang@psy.unibe.ch)

======================================

All texts proposed by Alfred Lang are not,

stricto sensu, definitions of the sign;
however they present aspects that relate
closely to them. They confirm in all cases
analyzes that I have proposed to the
continuation of 76 definitions.[R. Marty]

[1] W1:307f. 1865 (An Unpsychological view of logic [...])

There are three aspects under which every phenomenon may be considered
and which may be regarded also as three elements of the phenomenon. Every
phenomenon is in the first place an image; so that it may be considered to be
or to contain a representation. In the second place, the phenomenon may be
objectified, or looked upon as a reality; in this way it is said to be or (more
usually) to contain _matter_. For matter is that by virtue of which everything
is. In the third place, the differences of its parts and its qualities may be
considered, and in this point of view, it is said to be or (more usually) to
contain _form_. For form is that by virtue of which anything is such as it is.
[...] Corresponding, then, to internal representation we have a representation,
in general, internal or external; which is a supposed thing standing for
something else. Corresponding to the matter of phenomena we have the
supposition of external realities or _things_; and corresponding to the matter
of phenomena we have _qualities_. Of these, representation is not altogether
hypothetical since we have at least something precisely similar in
consciousness. _Things_ are legitimate hypotheses, as we shall see when we
have developed the logic of hypothesis. _Qualities_ are fictions; for though it
is true that roses are red, yet redness is nothing, but a fiction framed for the
purpose of philosophizing; yet harmless so long as we remember that the
scholastic realism it implies is false. When the element of quality is eliminated
from _things_ by abstraction,; we have noumenal matter. When the
connection with things is eliminated from qualities, we have Pure Forms.
When the material and mental element is eliminated from representations we
have Concepts or, as I prefer to say in order to avoid the apparent connection
with the mind, Logoi. The three prescinced elements are fictions. The
embodiment of a pure form in noumenal matter makes a thing with qualities.
The realization of a pure form in the mind makes a mental representation. The
embodiment of a pure form in a _logos_ united with noumenal matter gives an
outward representation. The use of these phrases is to formulate the analysis of
a thing, a thougth, and a representation into three several elements on the one
side and one common element on the other.

The relevancy of this analysis consists in this, that if logic deals with the form
of thought, it can be studied just as well in external as in internal
representations, while by so doing we shall avoid all possible entanglement in
the meshes of psychological controversy. Logic then deals with
representations. But not with all kinds of representations.

Representations are of three sorts.

1st _Marks_ [Indexes, AL], by which I mean such representations as denote

without connoting. if the applicability of a representation to a thing depends
upon a convention which establihed precisely what it should denote, it would
be a _mark_. A proper name is an instance.

2nd _Analogues_, why which I mean such representations as connote without

denoting. A picture for instance which is a representation (whether intentional
or not) of whatever looks like, really resembles everything more or less, and
so denotes nothing; althoughjwe may infer what was intended.

3rd _Symbols_, by which I mean such representation as denote by connoting.

Of these three kinds of representations logic evidently refers only to the last,
taking account of signs and analogues only when their laws happen to
coincide with those of symbols or when combinations of symbols produces
non-denotative or non-connotative representations.

[2] W1:311f. 1865 An unpsychological view of logic [...], 2nd version

What else is a thing but that which a _perception_ or _sign_ stands for? To say
that a quality is denoted is to say it is a thing. And this gives a hint of the
veritable nature of such terms. They were framed at a time when all men were
realists in the scholastic sense and consequently things were meant by them,
entities which had not quality but that expressed by the word. They, therefore,
must denote these things and connote the qualities they relate to.

[2'] And similarly, in a somewhat changed form, less explicitly semiotically,

in another version of the same title: W1:313f. 1865, 2nd version]

[3] W1:490-504, 1866, Lowell Lecture XI, most of it, but with omission, also
in CP 7.579-596 [The lecture is sort of studies for Some Consequences of the
Four Incapacities and related papers and quite extensely deal with semiotic
topics such as the true analogy between man and word and so of signs,
symbols, things, meaning, stories etc.]

[4] Robin 404 1893 (Grand Logic -- The art of reasoning. Chapter II. What is
a sign?) [Selected parts of it appear in CP 2.281, 2.285, 2.297-302 and a
complete German translation is in Kloesel & Pape, Semiotische Schriften,
Vol. 1:191-201. This text presents Similies, Indices and Symbols and their
role in reasoning.]

[5] CP 2.302 1895? The art of reasoning, Ch. 2

Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs,
particularly from icons, or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of icons
and symbols. We think only in signs. These mental signs are of mixed nature;
the symbol-parts of them are called concepts. If a man makes a new symbol, it
is by thoughts involving concepts. So it is only out of symbols that a new
symbol can grow. _Omne symbolum de symbolo_. A symbol, once in being,
spreads among the peoples. In use and in experience, its meaning grows. Such
words as _force, law, wealth, marriage_, bear for us very different meanings
from those they bore to our barbarous ancestors. The symbol may, with
Emerson's sphynx, say to man, Of thine eye I am eyebeam.

[6] CP 3.433 1896.10

The regenerated logic When an assertion is made, there really is some speaker,
writer, or other signmaker who delivers it; and he supposes there is, or will be,
some hearer, reader, or other interpreter who will receive it. It may be a
stranger upon a different planet, an aeon later; or it may be that very same man
as he will be a second alter. In any case, the deliverer makes signals to the
receiver. Some of these signs (or at least one of them) are supposed to excite
in the mind of the receiver familiar images, pictures, or, we might almost say,
dreams -- that is, reminiscences of sights, sounds, feelings, tastes, smells, or
other sensations, now quite detached from the original circumstances of their
first occurrence, so that they are free to be attached to new occasions. The
deliverer is able to call up these images at will (with more or less effort) in his
own mind; and he supposes the receiver can do the same.

[7] L75:235-237 draft D, 1902 Carnegie Application

I define logic very broadly as the tudy of the formal laws of signs, or formal
semiotic. I define a sign as something, A, which brings something, B, its
interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of
correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to
C. In this definition I make no more reference to anything like the human
mind than I do when I define a line as the place within which a particle lies
during a lapse of time. At the same time, by virtue of this definition, has some
sort of meaning. That is implied in correspondence. Now meaning is mind in
the logical sense.

[8] L107 1904.10.26 (Letter to M.M. Curtis [a philosophical autobiography of

25pp.)

Every sign is in a triadic relation to an object and to an interpretant, which is

brought by the sign into a relation to the object similar to the sign's relation to
the object.

[9] CP 8.225n10 1904.07 [Draft probably of a letter probably to Paul Carus]

No sign can function as such except so far as it is interpreted in another sign

(for example, in a "thought," whatever that may be). Consequently it is
absolutely essential to a sign that it should _affect_ another sign. In using this
causal word, 'affect,' I do not refer to invariable accompaniment or sequence,
merely, or necessarily. What I mean is that when there is a sign there _will be_
an interpretation in another sign. The essence of the relation is in the
conditional futurity; but it is not essential that there should be absolutely no
exception. If, for example, in the 'long run' (that is, in an endless series of
experiences taken in their experiential order) there WOULD BE as many cases
of interpreted signs as of signs, I should say that this 'would be' constitutes a
causal relation, even though there were, as there might be, an infinite number
of exceptions. If the exceptions are, as they occur, as many or nearly as many
as the cases of following the rule, the causality would be in my terminology
'very weak.' But if there is any WOULD BE at all, there is more or less
causation; for that is all I mean by causation.

[10] CP 5.554 1906 The basis of pragmaticism (Robin 283)

There must be an action of the object upon the sign to render the latter true.
Without that, the object is not the representamen's object. [] So, then, a sign,
in order to fulfill its office, to actualize its potency, must be compelled by its
object. This is evidently the reason of the dichotomy between the true and the
false. For it takes two to make a quarrel, and a compulsion involves as large a
dose of quarrel as is requisite to make it quite impossible that there should be
compulsion withouth resistance.

[11] CP 5.484 ,1907 (Robin 318, Pragmatism)

But by "semiosis" I mean, on the contrary, an action, or influence, which is, or

involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its
interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into
actions between pairs. <<Semeiosis [Greek letters]>> in Greek of the Roman
period, as early as Cicero's time, if I remember rightly, meant the action of
almost any kind of sign; and my definition confers on anything that so acts the
title of a "sign.")

[12] MS 278 1909

There are three kinds of interest we may take in a thing. First we may have a
primary interest in it for itself. Second, we may have a secondary interest in it,
on account of its reactions with other things. Third, we may have a mediatory
interest in it, in so far as it conveys to a mind an idea about a thing. In so far as
it does this, it is a sign; or representamen. (MS 278, p. 34; 1909)