5/27/2017 A.C.No.

4808

RepublicofthePhilippines
SupremeCourt
Manila
ENBANC

TERESITAT.BAYONLA, A.C.No.4808
Complainant,
Present:
CORONA,C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO,JR.,
LEONARDODECASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
versus BERSAMIN,
DELCASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA,JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES,and
PERLASBERNABE,JJ.:
ATTY.PURITAA.REYES,
Respondent. Promulgated:

November22,2011
xx

DECISION

BERSAMIN,J.:

Rule16.03Alawyershalldeliverthefundsandpropertyofhisclientwhendueorupon
demand.However,heshallhavealienoverthefundsandmayapplysomuchthereofasmay
benecessarytosatisfyhislawfulfeesanddisbursements,givingnoticepromptlythereafterto
hisclient.Heshallalsohavealientothesameextentonalljudgmentsandexecutionshehas
securedforhisclientasprovidedforintheRulesofCourt.
CodeofProfessionalResponsibility.

Thiscanonofprofessionalresponsibilityisatthecenterofthisadministrativecomplaint
for disbarment for gross dishonesty, deceit, conversion, and breach of trust filed against Atty.
[1]
PuritaA.ReyesbyTeresitaT.Bayonla,herclient.

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Antecedents

PetraDurbanandPazDurbanweresisterswhohadjointlyownedaparceloflandsituated
in Butuan City in their lifetimes. They died without leaving a will. Their land was thereafter
expropriated in connection with the construction of the Bancasi Airport. An expropriation
compensationamountingtoP2,453,429.00wastobepaidtotheirheirs.Bayonlaandheruncle,
Alfredo Tabada (Alfredo), were the compulsory heirs of Paz, being, respectively, Pazs
[2]
granddaughterandson.

OnJune22,1997,BayonlachargedAtty.Reyeswithgrossdishonesty,deceit,conversion,
andbreachoftrust.BayonlaallegedthatonOctober21,1993,sheandAlfredohadengagedthe
legalservicesofAtty.Reyestocollecttheirshareintheexpropriationcompensationfromthe
[3]
AirTransportationOffice(ATO),CagayanDeOroCity, agreeingtoherattorneysfeesof10%
ofwhateveramountwouldbecollectedthatinNovember1993,Atty.ReyeshadcollectedP1
millionfromtheATOthatBayonlasshare,afterdeductingAtty.Reyesattorneysfees,wouldbe
P75,000.00,butAtty.ReyeshaddeliveredtoheronlyP23,000.00,andhadfailedtodeliverthe
balance of P52,000.00 despite repeated demands that on June 5, 1995, Atty. Reyes had
collectedtheamountofP121,119.11fromtheATOthatBayonlasshare,afterdeductingAtty.
Reyesattorneysfees,wouldbeP109,007.20,butAtty.ReyeshadhandedheronlyP56,500.00,
andhadfailedtodeliverthebalanceofP52,507.20andthatAtty.Reyesshouldbedisbarredfor
[4]
deprivingherofherjustshare.

[5]
In her comment dated February 10, 1998, Atty. Reyes admitted that Bayonla and
Alfredo had engaged her legal services for the purpose of collecting their share in the
expropriation compensation that as consideration for her services, Bayonla and Alfredo had
agreedupona40%contingentfeeforherthatshehadgiventoBayonlamorethanwhathad
been due to her that Alfredo had received from the ATO the check for the second release
corresponding to the share of both Bayonla and Alfredo that Alfredo had gotten more than
Bayonla out of the second release that on June 5, 1995 she had received out of the second
releasebytheATOonlyher40%contingentfeethatBayonlaandAlfredohadagreedtobear
theexpensesforthecollectionoftheirsharethatshehadincurredtravelandotherexpensesin
collectingsuchshareandthatsheshouldbeabsolvedfromliabilityarisingfromthecomplaint.
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On June 29, 1998, the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
[6]
Philippines(IBP)forinvestigation,report,andrecommendation.

On April 20, 1999, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro (Commissioner Navarro)
[7]
renderedareport, wherebyshefoundandrecommendedagainstAtty.Reyesasfollows:

Insofarasthiscaseofdisbarmentisconcerned,theissuehingesonlyonthecomplainants
positiononeoftheheirsofPazDurbanwhoselegalservicesoftherespondentwasnotrevoked.

The parties were required to submit documents relative to their respective defenses (sic)
speciallytheactualamountsreleasedbyATO,actualamountduetothecomplainantashershare,
theremittancesmadebytherespondenttothecomplainantofhershareandreceiptstoprovethe
same.

Unfortunately, only the respondent filed an answer without the necessary documents
requiredofthemandattachedonlyaxeroxcopyofthecomputationmadebyAtty.IsmaelLaya
fortheheirofPedroDurbanwhichhadalreadybeenpreviouslyattachedtotherecordsofthis
case.

In the said computation it appears that for the release on February 17, 1993, the heirs of
DurbanreceivedP84,852.00andforthesecondreleaseeachofthemaswellasthecomplainant
was entitled P121,119.11. It could be inferred from here that complainant was supposed to
received(sic)P205,971.11ashershare.

Inasmuch as the attorneys fees of 40% was (sic) supported by evidence instead of (sic)
complainants allegation of ten [10%] percent then respondent was entitled to P82,388.45 as
attorneysfeesleavingabalanceofP123,582.66duetothecomplainant.

Respondents allegation that she gave more than what was alleged by the complainant is
untenable for she did not submit evidence to prove the same, therefore, as it is complainants
allegationthatshereceivedonlyP79,000.00forhershareasawholeshallbeconsideredforthe
momentuntilsuchtimethatproofstothecontraryshallhavebeensubmitted.

Considering that complainant was supposed to receive the amount due her which was
P123,582.66 and actually received only P79,000.00 then respondent still has to remit to
complainanttheamountofP44,582.66.

Fromtherecordsofthiscaserespondentallegedthatsheonlycollectedthe40%attorneys
fees for the second release whereby Alfredo Tabada the other heir of Paz Durban received the
checkfromATOandgotalargepartofthesame.Respondentdidnotmentionhowmuchshegot
asattorneysfeesagainstcomplainantssharebutonthewholeamountingtoP496,895.00whichis
unfairtothecomplainant.

As counsel for the heirs of Paz Durban, complainant herein should have been advised by
the respondent and given a breakdown of whatever amount was received or came to her
knowledge as complainants counsel. Short of the foregoing, respondent violated Rule 16.01
Canon16ChapterIIIoftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilitytowit:

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Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
receivedfororfromtheclient.

Respondentwasgivenachancetorectifywhatevererrorsormisgivings(sic)shehaddone
for her client but she unfortunately failed to do so and did not comply with the Order dated
October29,1998.

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the Undersigned respectfully recommends that the
respondentberequiredtorenderanaccountingorinventorydulyconfirmedbythecomplainant
of all the collected shares due the complainant and remit to the latter the said amount of
P44.582.66

Until such time that respondent had complied with the aforementioned, she is suspended
fromthepracticeofherlegalprofession.

Respectfullysubmitted.


On June 19, 1999, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of
[8]
CommissionerNavarrothroughResolutionNo.XIII99165.

Atty. Reyes moved for reconsideration, but on September 27, 1999 the IBP Board of
[9]
GovernorsdeniedhermotionforreconsiderationthroughResolutionNo.XIV99117.

Atty.Reyesthenfiledamotionforreinvestigation.However,throughitsResolutionNo.
XV2001111 adopted on July 28, 2001, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for
reinvestigationforlackofjurisdiction,statingthatthematterhadalreadybeenendorsedtothe
[10]
Court.

On July 30, 2002, the Court directed the IBP Board of Governors to report on whether
[11]
Atty.ReyeshadalreadyaccountedforandremittedtheamountofP44,582.66toBayonla.

On August 22, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors informed the Court that per the
manifestationofBayonlascounselAtty.Reyeshadnotyetrenderedanaccountingandhadnot
[12]
yetremittedtheamountofP44,582.66toBayonla.

[13]
ThroughhermanifestationdatedSeptember4,2002totheCourt, Atty.Reyesposed
somequeries,asfollows:(a)whethershecouldbecompelledtopaytheamountofP44,582.66
to Bayonla even if the latters claims had been based on perjured statements (b) whether the
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payment of the amount would operate to dismiss the estafa case previously filed by Bayonla
against her for allegedly failing to deliver the balance of Bayonlas share and (c) whether she
coulddeposittheamountofP44,582.66witheithertheIBPBoardofGovernorsortheCourt.

Atty. Reyes also stated in the manifestation that the IBP Board of Governors did not
accordtohertherighttoconfrontBayonladuringtheinvestigationconductedbytheIBPBoard
ofGovernorsthatBayonlascounselhadinducedBayonlatofiletheestafachargeagainsther
[14]
andthatthishadpromptedhertoinitiateadisbarmentcomplaintagainstBayonlascounsel.

On May 24, 2010, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) recommended the final
[15] [16]
resolutionofthiscase. TherecommendationwasnotedbytheCourtonJune29,2010.

Issue

WhetherornotthefindingsandrecommendationsoftheIBPBoardofGovernorswere
proper.

Ruling

We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors, which were supported by the
records,butwemodifythesanctionstobeimposedonAtty.Reyes.

I
Respondentwasguiltyofviolatingthecanons
oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility

Canon16oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityrequiresthatalawyershallholdin
trustallmoneysandpropertiesofherclientthatmaycomeintoherpossession.Rule16.01of
Canon 16 imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for all money or property collected or
receivedfororfromtheclient.Rule16.03ofCanon16demandsthatthelawyershalldeliverthe
fundsandpropertyofhisclientwhendueorupondemand,subjecttothelawyerslienoverthe
funds,orthelawyersoptiontoapplysomuchofthefundsasmaybenecessarytosatisfythe
lawfulfeesanddisbursements,givingnoticepromptlythereaftertotheclient.

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The canons are appropriate considering that the relationship between a lawyer and her
clientishighlyfiduciary,andprescribesonalawyeragreatdegreeoffidelityandgoodfaith.
There is no question that the money or property received by a lawyer for her client properly
[17]
belongstothelatter. Conformablywiththesecanonsofprofessionalresponsibility,wehave
held that a lawyer is obliged to render an accounting of all the property and money she has
collected for her client. This obligation includes the prompt reporting and accounting of the
[18]
moneycollectedbythelawyerbyreasonofafavorablejudgmenttohisclient.

Based on the records, Bayonla and her uncle would each receive the amount of
P84,852.00outofthefirstrelease,andtheamountofP121,119.11outofthesecondrelease.Her
total share from the two releases was P205,971.11. With Atty. Reyes being entitled to
P82,388.44asattorneysfees,theequivalentof40%ofBayonlasshare,thenetshareofBayonla
[19]
was P123,582.67. Yet, Atty. Reyes actually delivered to her only P79,000.00, which was
shortbyP44,582.67.DespitedemandsbyBayonlaanddespitetheordersfromtheIBPBoardof
[20]
Governorsforhertoremittheshortage, Atty.Reyesrefusedtodoso.

BynotdeliveringBayonlassharedespiteherdemand,Atty.Reyesviolatedtheaforestated
canons. The money collected by Atty. Reyes as the lawyer of Bayonla was unquestionably
[21]
moneyheldintrusttobeimmediatelyturnedovertotheclient. Theunjustifiedwithholding
ofmoneybelongingtotheclientwarrantstheimpositionofdisciplinarysanctionsonthelawyer.
[22]
Without doubt, Atty. Reyes failure to immediately account for and to deliver the money
upondemandwasdeceit,foritsignifiedthatshehadconvertedthemoneytoherownuse,in
violationofthetrustBayonlahadreposedinher.Itconstitutedgrossmisconductforwhichthe
penaltyofsuspensionfromthepracticeoflawbecamejustifiedpursuanttoSection27,Rule138
oftheRulesofCourt,towit:

Section27.DisbarmentorsuspensionofattorneysbySupremeCourt,groundstherefor.A
memberofthebarmaybedisbarredorsuspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct,orbyreasonofhisconvictionofacrimeinvolvingmoralturpitude,orforanyviolation
oftheoathwhichheisrequiredtotakebeforeadmissiontopractice,orforawilfuldisobedience
appearingasanattorneyforapartytoacasewithoutauthoritysotodo.Thepracticeofsoliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutesmalpractice.

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ThedisbarmentorsuspensionofamemberofthePhilippineBarbyacompetentcourtor
otherdisciplinaryagencyinaforeignjurisdictionwherehehasalsobeenadmittedasanattorney
isagroundforhisdisbarmentorsuspensionifthebasisofsuchactionincludesanyoftheacts
hereinaboveenumerated.

Thejudgment,resolutionororderoftheforeigncourtordisciplinaryagencyshallbeprima
facieevidenceofthegroundfordisbarmentorsuspension.(AsamendedbySCResolutiondated
February13,1992.)

II
Pendencyofothercasesnotanobstacle
toadministrativeproceedingagainstrespondent

ThefilingoftheperjurychargebyAtty.ReyesagainstBayonlaandoftheestafacharge
by Bayonla against Atty. Reyes could not halt or excuse the duty ofAtty. Reyes to render an
accountingandtoremittheamountduetoBayonla.Nordidthependencyofsuchcasesinhibit
thisadministrativematterfromproceedingonitsduecourse.Itisindisputablethatthependency
of any criminal charges between the lawyer and her client does not negate the administrative
[23]
proceedingsagainstthelawyer.WeexplainedwhyinSuzukiv.Tiamson, towit:

The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are different from administrative
matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and
vice versa. In this light, we refer to this Courts ruling in Berbano vs. Barcelona, citing In re
Almacen,whereitwasheld:
Disciplinaryproceedings against lawyers aresuigeneris. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather
investigationsbytheCourtintotheconductofoneofitsofficers.Notbeingintendedto
inflictpunishment,[theyare]innosenseacriminalprosecution.Accordingly,thereis
neitheraplaintiffnoraprosecutortherein.[They]maybeinitiatedbytheCourtmotu
proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merelycallsuponamemberoftheBartoaccountforhisactuationsasanofficerof
theCourtwiththeendinviewofpreservingthepurityofthelegalprofessionand
the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
memberswhobytheirmisconducthaveprove[n]themselvesnolongerworthyto
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney.

Hence, our only concern in the instant case is the determination of respondents
administrativeliabilityandourfindingshereinshouldnotinanywaybetreatedashaving
any material bearing on any other judicial action which the parties may choose to file
againsteachother.[emphasissupplied]

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Relevantly, we have also emphasized in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v.

[24]
Naldoza that

xxxafindingofguiltinthecriminalcasewillnotnecessarilyresultinafindingofliability
intheadministrativecase.Conversely,respondentsacquittaldoesnotnecessarilyexculpatehim
administratively.Inthesamevein,thetrialcourtsfindingofcivilliabilityagainsttherespondent
willnotinexorablyleadtoasimilarfindingintheadministrativeactionbeforethisCourt.Neither
willafavorabledispositioninthecivilactionabsolvetheadministrativeliabilityofthelawyer.

Itserveswelltomention,lastly,thatthesimultaneouspendencyofanadministrativecase
andajudicialproceedingrelatedtothecauseoftheadministrativecase,evenifthechargesand
the evidence to be adduced in such cases are similar, does not result into or occasion any
[25]
unfairness,orprejudice,ordeprivationofdueprocesstothepartiesineitherofthecases.

III
Nodenialofdueprocesstorespondent

Atty.ReyescontendsthatshewasdeniedherrighttodueprocessbecausetheIBPBoard
ofGovernorsdidnotpermithertopersonallyconfrontthecomplainant.

WedonotconsiderAtty.Reyesscontentionvalid.Shewasaccordedfulldueprocess,for
sheinfactparticipatedinallstagesoftheproceedings.

Itistruethatalawyershallnotbedisbarredorsuspendedfromthepracticeoflawuntil
she has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against her, to
[26]
produce witnesses in her behalf, and to be heard by herself or counsel. Contrary to Atty.
Reyes insistence, however, the IBP Board of Governors was under no legal obligation to
conductatrialtypeproceedingatwhichshecouldhavepersonallyconfrontedBayonla.Inother
words,thelackofsuchproceedingneitherdiminishedherrighttodueprocessnordeprivedher
of the right. A formal investigation entailing notice and hearing is required in administrative
proceedingsfordisbarment,buttheimperativeneedofnoticeandhearingdoesnotalwaysmean
the holding of an adversarial trialtype proceeding. Due process is still satisfied when the
partiesareaffordedthereasonableopportunitytobeheardandtosubmitevidenceinsupportof
[27] [28]
theirrespectivesides. AstheCourtsaidinSamaliov.CourtofAppeals:

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Due process in an administrative context does not require trialtype proceedings

similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral
argumentsorthroughpleadingsisaccorded,thereisnodenialofproceduraldueprocess.A
formal or trialtype hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirementsaresatisfiedwherethepartiesareaffordedfairandreasonableopportunityto
explaintheirsideofthecontroversyathand.Thestandardofdueprocessthatmustbemet
in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not
ignored.Inotherwords,itisnotlegallyobjectionableforbeingviolativeofdueprocessfor
an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or
documentaryevidencesubmittedbythepartiesasaffidavitsofwitnessesmaytaketheplace
oftheirdirecttestimony.
In this case, petitioner was heard through the various pleadings which he filed with the
BoardofDisciplineoftheBIDwhenhefiledhisanswerandtwomotionstodismiss,aswellas
other motions and papers. He was also able to participate in all stages of the administrative
proceeding.HewasabletoelevatehiscasetotheSecretaryofJusticeand,subsequently,tothe
CSCbywayofappeal.
Wehaveconsistentlyheldthattheessenceofdueprocessissimplytheopportunityto
beheardor,asappliedtoadministrativeproceedings,theopportunitytoexplainonesside
ortheopportunitytoseekareconsiderationoftheactionorrulingcomplainedof.Andany
seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the
opportunitytobeheardonhismotionforreconsideration.[boldemphasissupplied]


Nevertheless, the IBP Board of Governors actually conducted a formal investigation of
thecomplaintagainstAtty.ReyesuponthedirectiveoftheCourt.Inherformalinvestigationof
thecomplaint,CommissionerNavarroallowedbothpartiestosubmittheirrespectiveproofson
theactualamountsreleasedbytheATO,theamountsduetoBayonlaashershare,Atty.Reyes
corresponding contingent fees, the remittances by Atty. Reyes to Bayonla, and the receipts
[29]
showing such remittances. In due course, Atty. Reyes submitted her written answer,
[30]
attachingtotheanswerthedocumentssupportingherdefenses. CommissionerNavarrotook
[31]
allofAtty.Reyessubmissionsintogoodandproperaccount,asborneoutbyherreport. And
even after the IBP Board of Governors had adopted Commissioner Navarros report (and its
recommendation), Atty. Reyes was still afforded the fair opportunity to challenge the adverse
findingsbyfilinghermotionforreconsideration,althoughsuchmotionwasultimatelyresolved
[32]
againsther.

IV
Sanction

Thepenaltyforgrossmisconductconsistinginthefailureorrefusaldespitedemandofa
lawyertoaccountforandtoreturnmoneyorpropertybelongingtoaclienthasbeensuspension

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[33]
from the practice of law for two years. In Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, the lawyer who
withdrewtherentalspertainingtohisclienttotalingP255,000.00withouttheknowledgeofthe
client and who ignored the demand of the client to account for and to return the amount was
[34]
suspended from the practice of law for two years. In Mortera v. Pagatpatan, the lawyer
received P155,000.00 from the adversary of his clients as partial payment of a final and
executorydecisioninfavoroftheclientspursuanttoasecretarrangementbetweenthelawyer
andtheadversary,anddepositedtheamounttothelawyerspersonalbankaccountwithoutthe
knowledgeoftheclientsthelawyerthereafterrefusedtosurrenderthemoneytohisclients.The
suspension of the lawyer for two years from the practice of law was ordered by the Court. In
[35]
Smallv.Banares, asimilarpenaltyofsuspensionforaperiodoftwoyearsfromthepractice
oflawwasimposedonalawyerwhohadfailedtofileacaseforthepurposeofwhichhehad
received an amount of P80,000.00, and to return the amount upon demand. In Barcenas v.
[36]
Alvero, theCourtsuspendedforaperiodoftwoyearsfromthepracticeoflawalawyerwho
hadfailedtoimmediatelyaccountforandtoreturnP300,000.00receivedfromaclientforthe
purpose of depositing it in court, after the lawyer had been found not to have deposited the
moneyincourt.

Considering that the sin of Atty. Reyes had striking resemblance with the sins thus
sanctionedintheaforementionedprecedents,theproperpenaltyforherissuspensionfromthe
practiceoflawfortwoyears,withwarningthatasimilaroffensebyherwillbedealtwithmore
severely.

Atty.ReyesisfurtherobligedtopaytoBayonlatheamountofP44,582.67,whichtheIBP
BoardofGovernorsfoundtobestillunpaid,bywayofrestitution.AlthoughtheCourtrenders
this decision in an administrative proceeding primarily to exact the ethical responsibility on a
memberofthePhilippineBar,theCourtssilenceabouttherespondentlawyerslegalobligation
to restitute the complainant will be both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical
misconductconcerningtheclientsfundsorpropertyshouldberequiredtostilllitigateinanother
proceeding what the administrative proceeding has already established as the respondents
liability.ThathasbeenthereasonwhytheCourthasrequiredrestitutionoftheamountinvolved
as a concomitant relief in the cited cases of Mortera v. Pagatpatan, supra, Almendarez, Jr. v.
Langit,supra,andSmallv.Banares,supra.

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Inaddition,Atty.Reyesisliableforinterestof12%perannumreckonedfromJune22,
1997, the date when she was formally charged with disbarment. This rate of interest was
prescribedbytheCourtinAlmendarez,Jr.v.LangitandSmallv.Banares.

WHEREFORE,theCourtFINDSANDPRONOUNCESATTY.PURITAA.REYES
guilty of violating Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,andSUSPENDSherfromthepracticeoflawforaperiodoftwoyearseffective
uponreceiptofthisDecision,withwarningthatasimilaroffensebyherwillbedealtwithmore
severely.

The Court ORDERS Atty. Reyes to pay to complainant Teresita T. Bayonla within 30
daysfromreceiptofthisDecisiontheamountofP44,582.67,withinterestof12%per annum
from June 22, 1997, and to render unto the complainant a complete written accounting and
inventory of: (a) the amounts she had collected from the Air Transportation Office as
expropriationcompensation(b) the total amount due to the complainant (c) the total amount
she had actually remitted to the complainant and (d) the amount she had deducted as her
contingentfeevisvisthecomplainant.

Withinthesameperiodofcompliance,Atty.ReyesshallsubmittotheCourt,throughthe
OfficeoftheBarConfidant,authenticwrittenproofthatheraccounting,inventory,andpayment
werefurnishedtoandreceivedbythecomplainantinduecourse.

This Decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings against
Atty.Reyes.

Let this Decision be disseminated to all lower courts and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, with a copy of it to be included in Atty. Reyes file in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.

SOORDERED.





LUCASP.BERSAMIN
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AssociateJustice


WECONCUR:




RENATOC.CORONA
ChiefJustice







ANTONIOT.CARPIOPRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice




(OnLeave)
TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTROARTUROD.BRION
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice




DIOSDADOM.PERALTAMARIANOC.DELCASTILLO
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice




ROBERTOA.ABADMARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice




JOSEPORTUGALPEREZJOSECATRALMENDOZA
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice
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MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENOBIENVENIDOL.REYES
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice




ESTELAM.PERLASBERNABE
AssociateJustice

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[2]
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[3]
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[4]
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[5]
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[6]
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[7]
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[8]
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[9]
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[10]
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[11]
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[12]
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[13]
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[14]
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[15]
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[16]
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[17]
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[18]
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[19]
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[20]
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