G.R. No.

L-13250 October 29, 1971

THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA, respondent..

Assistant Solicitor General Jose P. Alejandro and Special Attorney Jose G. Azurin, (O.S.G.) for petitioner.

Ramirez and Ortigas for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:

The basic issue posed by petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue in this appeal from a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals as to whether
or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of an international personality, must
be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code 1 is now ripe for
adjudication. The Court of Tax Appeals answered the question in the negative, and thus reversed the action taken by petitioner Collector,
who would hold respondent Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of the estate of the late Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, liable for
the sum of P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes for the transfer of intangible personal properties in the Philippines, the
deceased, a Spanish national having been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to the time of her death in 1955. In an earlier
resolution promulgated May 30, 1962, this Court on the assumption that the need for resolving the principal question would be obviated,
referred the matter back to the Court of Tax Appeals to determine whether the alleged law of Tangier did grant the reciprocal tax exemption
required by the aforesaid Section 122. Then came an order from the Court of Tax Appeals submitting copies of legislation of Tangier that
would manifest that the element of reciprocity was not lacking. It was not until July 29, 1969 that the case was deemed submitted for
decision. When the petition for review was filed on January 2, 1958, the basic issue raised was impressed with an element of novelty. Four
days thereafter, however, on January 6, 1958, it was held by this Court that the aforesaid provision does not require that the "foreign
country" possess an international personality to come within its terms. 2 Accordingly, we have to affirm.

The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, now under review, sets forth the background facts as follows: "This is an appeal interposed by
petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda as administrator of the estate of the deceased Doa Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, from
the decision of the respondent Collector of Internal Revenue, assessing against and demanding from the former the sum P161,874.95 as
deficiency estate and inheritance taxes, including interest and penalties, on the transfer of intangible personal properties situated in the
Philippines and belonging to said Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira. Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira (Maria
Cerdeira for short) is a Spanish national, by reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931
up to her death on January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise she left, among others, intangible personal properties in the
Philippines." 3 Then came this portion: "On September 29, 1955, petitioner filed a provisional estate and inheritance tax return on all the
properties of the late Maria Cerdeira. On the same date, respondent, pending investigation, issued an assessment for state and inheritance
taxes in the respective amounts of P111,592.48 and P157,791.48, or a total of P369,383.96 which tax liabilities were paid by petitioner ... .
On November 17, 1955, an amended return was filed ... wherein intangible personal properties with the value of P396,308.90 were claimed
as exempted from taxes. On November 23, 1955, respondent, pending investigation, issued another assessment for estate and inheritance
taxes in the amounts of P202,262.40 and P267,402.84, respectively, or a total of P469,665.24 ... . In a letter dated January 11, 1956,
respondent denied the request for exemption on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code. Hence, respondent demanded the payment of the sums of P239,439.49 representing deficiency estate and inheritance
taxes including ad valorem penalties, surcharges, interests and compromise penalties ... . In a letter dated February 8, 1956, and received
by respondent on the following day, petitioner requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for tax exemption of the
intangible personal properties and the imposition of the 25% and 5% ad valorem penalties ... . However, respondent denied request, in his
letter dated May 5, 1956 ... and received by petitioner on May 21, 1956. Respondent premised the denial on the grounds that there was no
reciprocity [with Tangier, which was moreover] a mere principality, not a foreign country. Consequently, respondent demanded the payment
of the sums of P73,851.21 and P88,023.74 respectively, or a total of P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including
surcharges, interests and compromise penalties." 4

The matter was then elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals. As there was no dispute between the parties regarding the values of the
properties and the mathematical correctness of the deficiency assessments, the principal question as noted dealt with the reciprocity aspect
as well as the insisting by the Collector of Internal Revenue that Tangier was not a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122. In
ruling against the contention of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the appealed decision states: "In fine, we believe, and so hold, that the
expression "foreign country", used in the last proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that
foreign power which, although not an international person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death upon
intangible person properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not
necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our Government order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the
proviso of Section 122 of our Tax. Code." 5

Hence appeal to this court by petitioner. The respective briefs of the parties duly submitted, but as above indicated, instead of ruling
definitely on the question, this Court, on May 30, 1962, resolve to inquire further into the question of reciprocity and sent back the case to
the Court of Tax Appeals for the motion of evidence thereon. The dispositive portion of such resolution reads as follows: "While section 122
of the Philippine Tax Code aforequoted speaks of 'intangible personal property' in both subdivisions (a) and (b); the alleged laws of Tangier
refer to 'bienes muebles situados en Tanger', 'bienes muebles radicantes en Tanger', 'movables' and 'movable property'. In order that this
Court may be able to determine whether the alleged laws of Tangier grant the reciprocal tax exemptions required by Section 122 of the Tax
Code, and without, for the time being, going into the merits of the issues raised by the petitioner-appellant, the case is [remanded] to the
Court of Tax Appeals for the reception of evidence or proof on whether or not the words `bienes muebles', 'movables' and 'movable
properties as used in the Tangier laws, include or embrace 'intangible person property', as used in the Tax Code." 6 In line with the above
resolution, the Court of Tax Appeals admitted evidence submitted by the administrator petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda, consisting of
exhibits of laws of Tangier to the effect that "the transfers by reason of death of movable properties, corporeal or incorporeal, including
furniture and personal effects as well as of securities, bonds, shares, ..., were not subject, on that date and in said zone, to the payment of
any death tax, whatever might have been the nationality of the deceased or his heirs and legatees." It was further noted in an order of such
Court referring the matter back to us that such were duly admitted in evidence during the hearing of the case on September 9, 1963.
Respondent presented no evidence." 7

The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. It reads thus: "That no tax shall
be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign
country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible person property of
the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time
of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned
by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country." 8 The only obstacle therefore to a definitive ruling is whether or not as
vigorously insisted upon by petitioner the acquisition of internal personality is a condition sine qua non to Tangier being considered a
"foreign country". Deference to the De Lara ruling, as was made clear in the opening paragraph of this opinion, calls for an affirmance of the
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.

It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a
politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its
territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of
law. 9 It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a government with the
legal competence to exact obedience to its commands. 10 It has been referred to as a body-politic organized by common consent for mutual
defense and mutual safety and to promote the general welfare. 11 Correctly has it been described by Esmein as "the juridical personification
of the nation." 12 This is to view it in the light of its historical development. The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite
territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its
separate international personality. Laski could speak of it then as a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within
its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. 13 McIver similarly would point to the power entrusted to its government to maintain
within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international relations. 14 With the latter requisite satisfied, international law
do not exact independence as a condition of statehood. So Hyde did opine. 15

Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality, petitioner has not successfully made out a case. It bears
repeating that four days after the filing of this petition on January 6, 1958 in Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara, 16 it was specifically
held by us: "Considering the State of California as a foreign country in relation to section 122 of our Tax Code we believe and hold, as did
the Tax Court, that the Ancilliary Administrator is entitled the exemption from the inheritance tax on the intangible personal property found in
the Philippines." 17 There can be no doubt that California as a state in the American Union was in the alleged requisite of international
personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. 18

What is undeniable is that even prior to the De Lara ruling, this Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality, that of
Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the sense, did fall under this exempt category. So it appears in an opinion of the Court
by the then Acting Chief Justicem Bengson who thereafter assumed that position in a permanent capacity, in Kiene v. Collector of Internal
Revenue. 19 As was therein noted: 'The Board found from the documents submitted to it proof of the laws of Liechtenstein that said
country does not impose estate, inheritance and gift taxes on intangible property of Filipino citizens not residing in that country. Wherefore,
the Board declared that pursuant to the exemption above established, no estate or inheritance taxes were collectible, Ludwig Kiene being a
resident of Liechtestein when he passed away." 20 Then came this definitive ruling: "The Collector hereafter named the respondent
cites decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of this Court, holding that intangible personal property in the Philippines belonging
to a non-resident foreigner, who died outside of this country is subject to the estate tax, in disregard of the principle 'mobilia sequuntur
personam'. Such property is admittedly taxable here. Without the proviso above quoted, the shares of stock owned here by the Ludwig
Kiene would be concededly subject to estate and inheritance taxes. Nevertheless our Congress chose to make an exemption where
conditions are such that demand reciprocity as in this case. And the exemption must be honored." 21

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals of October 30, 1957 is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON, G.R. No. 175888- versus -

ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; RAUL GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice;
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Interior and
Local Government; SERGIO APOSTOL, in his capacity as Presidential Legal Counsel; and L/CPL. DANIEL SMITH,

AZCUNA, J.:

These are petitions for certiorari, etc. as special civil actions and/or for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in Lance Corporal
Daniel J. Smith v. Hon. Benjamin T. Pozon, et al., in CA-G.R. SP No. 97212, dated January 2, 2007.

The facts are not disputed.

Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the United States Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape
committed against a Filipina, petitioner herein, sometime on November 1, 2005, as follows:

The undersigned accused LCpl. Daniel Smith, Ssgt. Chad Brian Carpentier, Dominic Duplantis, Keith Silkwood and Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr.
of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353, upon a complaint under oath filed
by Suzette S. Nicolas, which is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as Annex A, committed as follows:

That on or about the First (1st) day of November 2005, inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Olongapo City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accuseds (sic), being then members of the United States Marine Corps, except Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr.,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with lewd design and by means of force, threat and intimidation, with
abuse of superior strength and taking advantage of the intoxication of the victim, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sexually abuse and have sexual intercourse with or carnal knowledge of one Suzette S. Nicolas, a 22-year old unmarried woman inside a
Starex Van with Plate No. WKF-162, owned by Starways Travel and Tours, with Office address at 8900 P. Victor St.,
Guadalupe, Makati City, and driven by accused Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., against the will and consent of the said Suzette S. Nicolas, to her
damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]

Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered into on February
10, 1998, theUnited States, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings.

During the trial, which was transferred from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zambales to the RTC of Makati for security reasons, the
United States Government faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court every time his presence was
required.

On December 4, 2006, the RTC of Makati, following the end of the trial, rendered its Decision, finding defendant Smith guilty, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to adduce sufficient evidence against accused S/SGT. CHAD BRIAN
CARPENTER, L/CPL. KEITH SILKWOOD AND L/CPL. DOMINIC DUPLANTIS, all of the US Marine Corps assigned at the USS Essex, are
hereby ACQUITTED to the crime charged.

The prosecution having presented sufficient evidence against accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH, also of the US Marine Corps at the USS
Essex, this Court hereby finds him GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of RAPE defined under Article 266-A, paragraph
1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, and, in accordance with Article 266-B, first paragraph thereof, hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with the accessory penalties provided for under Article 41 of the same
Code.

Pursuant to Article V, paragraph No. 10, of the Visiting Forces Agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States, accused
L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH shall serve his sentence in the facilities that shall, thereafter, be agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and
United States authorities. Pending agreement on such facilities, accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH is hereby temporarily committed to the
Makati City Jail.

Accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH is further sentenced to indemnify complainant SUZETTE S. NICOLAS in the amount of P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages plus P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[2]

As a result, the Makati court ordered Smith detained at the Makati jail until further orders.

On December 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law enforcement agents,
purportedly acting under orders of the Department of the Interior and Local Government, and brought to a facility for detention under the
control of the United States government, provided for under new agreements between the Philippines and the United States, referred to as
the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 19, 2006 which states:

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America agree that, in accordance with the
Visiting Forces Agreement signed between our two nations, Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, be returned to
U.S. military custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.

(Sgd.) KRISTIE A. KENNEY (Sgd.) ALBERTO G. ROMULO

Representative of the United States Representative of the Republic

of America of the Philippines

DATE: 12-19-06 DATE: December 19, 2006__

and the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 22, 2006 which states:

The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines and the Embassy of the United States of America agree that, in
accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between the two nations, upon transfer of Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United
States Marine Corps, from the Makati City Jail, he will be detained at the first floor, Rowe (JUSMAG) Building, U.S. Embassy Compound in
a room of approximately 10 x 12 square feet. He will be guarded round the clock by U.S. military personnel. The Philippine police and jail
authorities, under the direct supervision of the Philippine Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) will have access to the place
of detention to ensure the United States is in compliance with the terms of the VFA.

The matter was brought before the Court of Appeals which decided on January 2, 2007, as follows:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, we resolved to DISMISS the petition for having become moot. [3]

Hence, the present actions.

The petitions were heard on oral arguments on September 19, 2008, after which the parties submitted their memoranda.

Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defendant L/CPL Smith because, first of all, the VFA is void and
unconstitutional.

This issue had been raised before, and this Court resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the VFA. This was in Bayan v.
Zamora,[4] brought by Bayan, one of petitioners in the present cases.

Against the barriers of res judicata vis--vis Bayan, and stare decisis vis--vis all the parties, the reversal of the previous ruling is sought on
the ground that the issue is of primordial importance, involving the sovereignty of the Republic, as well as a specific mandate of the
Constitution.

The provision of the Constitution is Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 which states:

Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases,
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and,
when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

The reason for this provision lies in history and the Philippine experience in regard to the United States military bases in the country.

It will be recalled that under the Philippine Bill of 1902, which laid the basis for the Philippine Commonwealth and, eventually, for the
recognition of independence, the United States agreed to cede to the Philippines all the territory it acquired from Spain under the Treaty of
Paris, plus a few islands later added to its realm, except certain naval ports and/or military bases and facilities, which the United States
retained for itself.

This is noteworthy, because what this means is that Clark and Subic and the other places in the Philippines covered by the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement of 1947 were not Philippine territory, as they were excluded from the cession and retained by the US.

Accordingly, the Philippines had no jurisdiction over these bases except to the extent allowed by the United States. Furthermore, the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement was never advised for ratification by the United States Senate, a disparity in treatment, because
the Philippines regarded it as a treaty and had it concurred in by our Senate.

Subsequently, the United States agreed to turn over these bases to the Philippines; and with the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement in 1991, the territory covered by these bases were finally ceded to the Philippines.

To prevent a recurrence of this experience, the provision in question was adopted in the 1987 Constitution.

The provision is thus designed to ensure that any agreement allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in Philippine
territory shall be equally binding on the Philippines and the foreign sovereign State involved. The idea is to prevent a recurrence of the
situation in which the terms and conditions governing the presence of foreign armed forces in our territory were binding upon us but not
upon the foreign State.
Applying the provision to the situation involved in these cases, the question is whether or not the presence of US Armed Forces in
Philippine territory pursuant to the VFA is allowed under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate xxx and recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting State.

This Court finds that it is, for two reasons.

First, as held in Bayan v. Zamora,[5] the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by
the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States government.

The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its status as a binding
international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can be taken of the
internationally known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in
nature, whereas those that carry out or further implement these policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under the
provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification. [6]

The second reason has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951. This earlier
agreement was signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United States Senate.

The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty states:[7]

MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Signed
at Washington, August 30, 1951.

The Parties of this Treaty

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples
and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area.

Recalling with mutual pride the historic relationship which brought their two peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual
ideals to fight side-by-side against imperialist aggression during the last war.

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination to defend themselves against
external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area.

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the
development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area.

Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument shall be considered or interpreted as in any way or sense altering or diminishing any
existing agreements or understandings between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America.

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I. The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be
involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their
international relation from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II. In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual
aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE III. The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding the
implementation of this Treaty and whenever in the opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of
either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific.
ARTICLE IV. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace
and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United
Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain
international peace and security.

ARTICLE V. For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the
metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean, its armed forces, public
vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

ARTICLE VI. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under
the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VII. This Treaty shall be ratified by the Republic of the Philippines and the United Nations of America in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them
at Manila.

ARTICLE VIII. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other
party.

IN WITHNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington this thirtieth day of August, 1951.

For the Republic of the Philippines:

(Sgd.) CARLOS P. ROMULO

(Sgd.) JOAQUIN M. ELIZALDE

(Sgd.) VICENTE J. FRANCISCO

(Sgd.) DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL

For the United States of America:

(Sgd.) DEAN ACHESON

(Sgd.) JOHN FOSTER DULLES

(Sgd.) TOM CONNALLY

(Sgd.) ALEXANDER WILEY[8]

Clearly, therefore, joint RP-US military exercises for the purpose of developing the capability to resist an armed attack fall squarely under
the provisions of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to provide for the joint RP-US military
exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US Military Defense Treaty. The Preamble of the VFA states:

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to strengthen international and
regional security in the Pacific area;

Reaffirming their obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951;

Noting that from time to time elements of the United States armed forces may visit the Republic of the Philippines;
Considering that cooperation between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines promotes their common security
interests;

Recognizing the desirability of defining the treatment of United States personnel visiting the Republic of the Philippines;

Have agreed as follows:[9]

Accordingly, as an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, it was not necessary to submit the VFA to the US Senate
for advice and consent, but merely to the US Congress under the CaseZablocki Act within 60 days of its ratification. It is for this reason that
the US has certified that it recognizes the VFA as a binding international agreement, i.e., a treaty, and this substantially complies with the
requirements of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of our Constitution.[10]

The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is complied with by virtue of the fact that the presence of the US Armed Forces
through the VFA is a presence allowed under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty itself has been
ratified and concurred in by both the Philippine Senate and the US Senate, there is no violation of the Constitutional provision resulting from
such presence.

The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions.

The VFA provides that in cases of offenses committed by the members of the US Armed Forces in the Philippines, the following rules apply:

Article V

Criminal Jurisdiction

xxx

6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United
States military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings. United
States military authorities shall, upon formal notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel available to
those authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which the person has been charged. In
extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall present its position to the United States Government regarding custody, which the
United States Government shall take into full account. In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year,
the United States shall be relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one year period will not include the time necessary to
appeal. Also, the one year period will not include any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United
States authorities, after timely notification by Philippine authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.

Petitioners contend that these undertakings violate another provision of the Constitution, namely, that providing for the exclusive power of
this Court to adopt rules of procedure for all courts in the Philippines (Art. VIII, Sec. 5[5]). They argue that to allow the transfer of custody of
an accused to a foreign power is to provide for a different rule of procedure for that accused, which also violates the equal protection clause
of the Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 1.).

Again, this Court finds no violation of the Constitution.

The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign military
armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused. [11]

The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter ones territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the
extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms and conditions,
according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can
exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties.[12]

As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure is curtailed or violated, but rather
one in which, as is normally encountered around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of one State do not extend or
apply except to the extent agreed upon to subjects of another State due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies
as visiting foreign armed forces.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction (such as
custody), in relation to long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and members of the armed forces
contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another States territory. On the contrary, the Constitution states that the Philippines adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2).

Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as against
custody. The moment the accused has to be detained, e.g., after conviction, the rule that governs is the following provision of the VFA:

Article V

Criminal Jurisdiction

xxx

Sec. 10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by
appropriate Philippines andUnited States authorities. United States personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to
visits and material assistance.

It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial and detention after conviction, because they
provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this specific arrangement clearly states not only that the detention shall be
carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that the detention shall be by Philippine authorities. Therefore, the
Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the United
States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not by Philippine authorities.

Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with representatives of the United States towards an agreement on
detention facilities under Philippine authorities as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA.

Next, the Court addresses the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Medellin v. Texas ( 552 US ___ No. 06-984, March 25,
2008), which held that treaties entered into by the United States are not automatically part of their domestic law unless these treaties are
self-executing or there is an implementing legislation to make them enforceable.

On February 3, 2009, the Court issued a Resolution, thus:

G.R. No. 175888 (Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon v. Alberto Romulo, et al.); G.R. No. 176051 (Jovito R. Salonga, et al. v. Daniel Smith, et al.);
and G.R. No. 176222 (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan [BAYAN], et al. v. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.).

The parties, including the Solicitor General, are required to submit within three (3) days a Comment/Manifestation on the following points:

1. What is the implication on the RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement of the recent US Supreme Court decision in Jose Ernesto
Medellin v. Texas, dated March 25, 2008, to the effect that treaty stipulations that are not self-executory can only be enforced pursuant to
legislation to carry them into effect; and that, while treaties may comprise international commitments, they are not domestic law unless
Congress has enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be self-executory and is ratified on these terms?

2. Whether the VFA is enforceable in the US as domestic law, either because it is self-executory or because there exists
legislation to implement it.

3. Whether the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951 was concurred in by the US Senate and, if so, is there proof of
the US Senate advice and consent resolution? Peralta, J., no part.

After deliberation, the Court holds, on these points, as follows:

First, the VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as that term is defined in Medellin itself, because the parties intend its provisions to be
enforceable, precisely because the Agreement is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce
L/CPL Smith before the court during the trial.
Secondly, the VFA is covered by implementing legislation, namely, the Case-Zablocki Act, USC Sec. 112(b), inasmuch as it is the very
purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be
immediately implemented. The parties to these present cases do not question the fact that the VFA has been registered under the Case-
Zablocki Act.

In sum, therefore, the VFA differs from the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Avena decision of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), subject matter of the Medellin decision. The Convention and the ICJ decision are not self-executing and are not registrable
under the Case-Zablocki Act, and thus lack legislative implementing authority.

Finally, the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and consented to by the US Senate on March 20, 1952, as reflected in the US
Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, Second Session, Vol. 98 Part 2, pp. 2594-2595.

The framers of the Constitution were aware that the application of international law in domestic courts varies from country to country.

As Ward N. Ferdinandusse states in his Treatise, DIRECT APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS,
some countries require legislation whereas others do not.

It was not the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting Article XVIII, Sec. 25, to require the other contracting State to
convert their system to achieve alignment and parity with ours. It was simply required that the treaty be recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State. With that, it becomes for both parties a binding international obligation and the enforcement of that obligation is left to the
normal recourse and processes under international law.

Furthermore, as held by the US Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Rossi,[13] an executive agreement is a treaty within the meaning of that
word in international law and constitutes enforceable domestic law vis--vis the United States. Thus, the US Supreme Court
in Weinberger enforced the provisions of the executive agreement granting preferential employment to Filipinos in the US Bases here.

Accordingly, there are three types of treaties in the American system:

1. Art. II, Sec. 2 treaties These are advised and consented to by the US Senate in accordance with Art. II, Sec. 2 of
the US Constitution.

2. ExecutiveCongressional Agreements: These are joint agreements of the President and Congress and need not be submitted to
the Senate.

3. Sole Executive Agreements. These are agreements entered into by the President. They are to be submitted to Congress within
sixty (60) days of ratification under the provisions of the Case-Zablocki Act, after which they are recognized by the Congress and may be
implemented.

As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and this can only be
done through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of its provisions.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED, and the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97212 dated January 2,
2007 isMODIFIED. The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered into on
February 10, 1998, isUPHELD as constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not
in accordance with the VFA, and respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered to forthwith negotiate with the United States
representatives for the appropriate agreement on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA,
pending which the status quo shall be maintained until further orders by this Court.

The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve without delay the related matters pending therein, namely, the petition for contempt and
the appeal of L/CPL Daniel Smith from the judgment of conviction.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-10280 September 30, 1963

QUA CHEE GAN, JAMES UY, DANIEL DY alias DEE PAC, CHAN TIONG YU, CUA CHU TIAN, CHUA LIM PAOalias JOSE CHUA and
BASILIO KING, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent-appellee.

Sabido and Sabido Law Offices and Ramon T. Oben for petitioners-appellants.
Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.

BARRERA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in Sp. Proc. No. 20037) denying the petition for writs of habeas
corpus and/or prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus filed by Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy alias Dee Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua
Chu Tian, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are as follows:.

On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged the above-named petitioners before the Deportation Board, with having
purchased U.S. dollars in the total sum of $130,000.00, without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, and of
having clandestinely remitted the same to Hongkong and petitioners, Qua Chee Gan, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King, with
having attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine and United States Governments (Antonio Laforteza, Chief of the Intelligence Division of
the Central Bank, and Capt. A. P. Charak of the OSI, U.S. Air Force) in order to evade prosecution for said unauthorized purchase of U.S.
dollars.1

Following the filing of said deportation charges, a warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued by the presiding member of the
Deportation Board. Upon their filing surety bond for P10,000.00 and cash bond for P10,000.00, herein petitioners-appellants were
provisionally set at liberty.

On September 22, 1952, petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges presented against them in the Deportation Board
for the reason, among others, that the same do not constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens from this country, and that said Board
has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges. This motion to dismiss having been denied by order of the Board of February 9, 1953,
petitioners-appellants filed in this Court a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition, which petition was given due course in our resolution
of July 7, 1953, but made returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila (G.R. No. L-6783). The case was docketed in the lower court as
Special Proceeding No. 20037.

At the instance of petitioners and upon their filing a bond for P5,000.00 each, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the lower court,
restraining the respondent Deportation Board from hearing Deportation charges No. R-425 against petitioners, pending final termination of
the habeas corpus and/or prohibition proceedings.

On July 29, 1953, the respondent Board filed its answer to the original petition, maintaining among others, that the Deportation Board, as an
agent of the President, has jurisdiction over the charges filed against petitioners and the authority to order their arrest; and that, while
petitioner Qua Chee Gan was acquitted of the offense of attempted bribery of a public official, he was found in the same decision of the trial
court that he did actually offer money to an officer of the United States Air Force in order that the latter may abstain from assisting the
Central Bank official in the investigation of the purchase of $130,000.00 from the Clark Air Force Base, wherein said petitioner was involved.

After due trial, the court rendered a decision on January 18, 1956, upholding the validity of the delegation by the president to the
Deportation Board of his power to conduct investigations for the purpose of determining whether the stay of an alien in this country would be
injurious to the security, welfare and interest of the State. The court, likewise, sustained the power of the deportation Board to issue warrant
of arrest and fix bonds for the alien's temporary release pending investigation of charges against him, on the theory that the power to arrest
and fix the amount of the bond of the arrested alien is essential to and complement the power to deport aliens pursuant to Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Consequently, the petitioners instituted the present appeal. .

It may be pointed out at the outset that after they were provisionally released on bail, but before the charges filed against them were actually
investigated, petitioners-appellant raised the question of jurisdiction of the Deportation Board, first before said body, then in the Court of
First Instance, and now before us. Petitioners-appellants contest the power of the President to deport aliens and, consequently, the
delegation to the Deportation Board of the ancillary power to investigate, on the ground that such power is vested in the Legislature. In other
words, it is claimed, for the power to deport to be exercised, there must be a legislation authorizing the same.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940), the Commissioner of Immigration was empowered to effect the arrest and
expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of ground or grounds therefor (Sec- 37).
With the enactment of this law, however, the legislature did not intend to delimit or concentrate the exercise of the power to deport on the
Immigration Commissioner alone, because in its Section 52, it provides:.

SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all previous laws relating to the entry of aliens into the Philippines, and their
exclusion, deportation, and repatriation therefrom, with the exception of section sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and
eleven which shall continue in force and effect: ..." (Comm. Act No. 613).

Section 69 of Act No. 2711 (Revised Administrative Code) referred to above reads:.

SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled,
or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation,
conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such action is contemplated. In such case the person
concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation of
his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine
the opposing witnesses."

While it may really be contended that the aforequoted provision did not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport undesirable
aliens, unlike the express grant to the Commissioner of Immigration under Commonwealth Act No. 613, but merely lays down the procedure
to be observed should there be deportation proceedings, the fact that such a procedure was provided for before the President can deport an
alien-which provision was expressly declared exempted from the repealing effect of the Immigration Act of 1940-is a clear indication of the
recognition, and inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of the existence of such power in the Executive. And the, exercise of this power
by the chief Executive has been sanctioned by this Court in several decisions. 2
Under the present and existing laws, therefore, deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in two ways: by order of the President,
after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon
recommendation by the Board of Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.

Petitioners contend, however, that even granting that the President is invested with power to deport, still he may do so only upon the
grounds enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, and on no other, as it would be unreasonable and undemocratic to hold
that an alien may be deported upon an unstated or undefined ground depending merely on the unlimited discretion of the Chief Executive.
This contention is not without merit, considering that whenever the legislature believes a certain act or conduct to be a just cause for
deportation, it invariably enacts a law to that effect. Thus, in a number of amendatory acts, grounds have been added to those originally
contained in Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as justifying deportation of an alien, as well as other laws which provide deportation
as part of the penalty imposed on aliens committing violation thereof.

Be this as it may, the charges against the herein petitioners constitute in effect an act of profiteering, hoarding or blackmarketing of U.S.
dollars, in violation of the Central Bank regulations an economic sabotage which is a ground for deportation under the provisions of
Republic Act 503 amending Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. The President may therefore order the deportation of
these petitioners if after investigation they are shown to have committed the act charged.

There seems to be no doubt that the President's power of investigation may be delegated. This is clear from a reading of Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code which provides for a "prior investigation, conducted by said Executive (the President) or his authorized agent."
The first executive order on the subject was that of Governor General Frank Murphy (No. 494, July 26, 1934), constituting a board to take
action on complaints against foreigners, to conduct investigations and thereafter make recommendations. By virtue of Executive Order No.
33 dated May 29, 1936, President Quezon created the Deportation Board primarily to receive complaints against aliens charged to be
undesirable, to conduct investigation pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and the rules and regulations therein
provided, and make the corresponding recommendation. 3 Since then, the Deportation Board has been conducting the investigation as the
authorized agent of the President.

This gives rise to the question regarding the extent of the power of the President to conduct investigation, i.e., whether such authority
carries with it the power to order the arrest of the alien complained of, since the Administrative Code is silent on the matter, and if it does,
whether the same may be delegated to the respondent Deportation Board.1awphl.nt

Let it be noted that Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, unlike Commonwealth Act No. 613 wherein the Commissioner of
Immigration was specifically granted authority, among others, to make arrests, fails to provide the President with like specific power to be
exercised in connection with such investigation. It must be for this reason that President Roxas for the first time, saw it necessary to issue
his Executive Order No. 69, dated July 29, 1947, providing

For the purpose of insuring the appearance of aliens charged before the Deportation Board created under Executive Order No. 37, dated
January 4, 1947, and facilitating the execution of the order of deportation whenever the President decides the case against the respondent.
I, Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order that all respondents in
deportation proceedings shall file a bond with the Commissioner of Immigration in such amount and containing such conditions as he may
prescribe. .

xxx xxx xxx

Note that the executive order only required the filing of a bond to secure appearance of the alien under investigation. It did not authorize the
arrest of the respondent.

It was only on January 5, 1951, when President Quirino reorganized the Deportation Board by virtue of his Executive Order No. 398, that
the Board was authorized motu proprio or upon the filing of formal charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the warrant for
the arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless he files a bond for his provisional
release in such amount and under such conditions as may be prescribed by the Chairman of the Board.

As has been pointed out elsewhere, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon whose authority the President's power to deport
is predicated, does not provide for the exercise of the power to arrest. But the Solicitor General argues that the law could not have denied to
the Chief Executive acts which are absolutely necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation granted him, such as the authority to
order the arrest of the foreigner charged as undesirable.

In this connection, it must be remembered that the right of an individual to be secure in his person is guaranteed by the Constitution in the
following language:.

3. The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights, Philippine Constitution).

As observed by the late Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion in the case of Rodriguez, et al. v. Villamiel, et al. (65 Phil. 230, 239), this
provision is not the same as that contained in the Jones Law wherein this guarantee is placed among the rights of the accused. Under our
Constitution, the same is declared a popular right of the people and, of course, indisputably it equally applies to both citizens and foreigners
in this country. Furthermore, a notable innovation in this guarantee is found in our Constitution in that it specifically provides that the
probable cause upon which a warrant of arrest may be issued, must be determined by the judge after examination under oath, etc., of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. This requirement "to be determined by the judge" is not found in the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, in the Philippine Bill or in the Jones Act, all of which do not specify who will determine the existence of
a probable cause. Hence, under their provisions, any public officer may be authorized by the Legislature to make such determination, and
thereafter issue the warrant of arrest. Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is, therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an
individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause,
leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative
warrants in administrative proceedings. And, if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable
cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is
different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly
authorized for the purpose, as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause. Such, for
example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation, or to effect compliance of an order of contempt.
The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only
when, as already stated, there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the
power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. It is
enough, as was true before the executive order of President Quirino, that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during
the investigation, as was authorized in the executive order of President Roxas. Be that as it may, it is not imperative for us to rule, in this
proceeding - and nothing herein said is intended to so decide on whether or not the President himself can order the arrest of a foreigner
for purposes of investigation only, and before a definitive order of deportation has been issued. We are merely called upon to resolve herein
whether, conceding without deciding that the President can personally order the arrest of the alien complained of, such power can be
delegated by him to the Deportation Board.

Unquestionably, the exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the exercise of discretion by the one issuing the
same, to determine whether under specific circumstances, the curtailment of the liberty of such person is warranted. The fact that the
Constitution itself, as well as the statute relied upon, prescribe the manner by which the warrant may be issued, conveys the intent to make
the issuance of such warrant dependent upon conditions the determination of the existence of which requires the use of discretion by the
person issuing the same. In other words, the discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon whom
the authority devolves. And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be delegated, official functions requiring the
exercise of discretion and judgment, may not be so delegated. Indeed, an implied grant of power, considering that no express authority was
granted by the law on the matter under discussion, that would serve the curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such
as his security to life and liberty, must be viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning to the guarantee contained in the Constitution. If
this is so, then guarantee a delegation of that implied power, nebulous as it is, must be rejected as inimical to the liberty of the people. The
guarantees of human rights and freedom can not be made to rest precariously on such a shaky foundation.

We are not unaware of the statements made by this Court in the case of Tan Sin v. Deportation Board (G.R. No. L-11511, Nov. 28,1958). It
may be stated, however, that the power of arrest was not squarely raised in that proceeding, but only as a consequence of therein
petitioner's proposition that the President had no inherent power to deport and that the charges filed against him did not constitute ground
for deportation. .

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue warrant of
arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of
said aliens, is declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void
and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled. With the foregoing modification, the decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed. No costs. So ordered.

[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN
KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a precious heritage,
as well as an inestimable acquisition,[1] that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those who
dispute it.

Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of profound importance to the nation. The issue of
citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our people are
waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders
for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?

The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law
and common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.

Antecedent Case Settings

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the
forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated
his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939and his place of birth to be Manila.

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-
003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy
upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen
when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe,
was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based
the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita
Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly
only a year after the birth of respondent.

In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several
documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe
y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering
his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of
birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there
was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a
certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available information could be
found in the files of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.

On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a certification issued
by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available information regarding the
birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives
Division of the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a
certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in
the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a
copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and
h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during
the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.

On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his
motion for reconsideration.The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner
assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any
other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.

The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and
Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and
the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both
challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the
Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Jurisdiction of the Court

In G. R. No. 161824

In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of
candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier
invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code

Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false

in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code -

Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections -

and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or
cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.

Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 [2] in an action for certiorari under
Rule 65[3] of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads

"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of
its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself.Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution
or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."

Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law which power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this
Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on
who could or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.

In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634

Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7,
of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the
Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:

"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."

The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be
the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,[4] as not (being)
justiciable controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The
constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent
Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect
of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of
government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now
be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest
or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from
office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by
the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -

Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President
or Vice-President of the Philippines.

Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President
or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election
protest.

Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or
third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition
with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is
generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. [5] In such
context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have
received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-
electionscenario.

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not
include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held.

Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634,
entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The Citizenship Issue

Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on the concept of citizenship.

Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to
refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office. [6] Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine
the constituency of the "State," which he described as being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a
self-sufficient existence.[7] The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy,
judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant
obligations, on the other.[8] In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the
general interest of society.

The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil
citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice. [9] Its
meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of
political power.[10] The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the
citizen to economic well-being and social security.[11] The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so
developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be
the internationalization of citizenship.[12]

The Local Setting - from Spanish

Times to the Present

There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."[13] In church
records, the natives were called'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became
highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship
laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees. [14]

Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the
law was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among experts;[15] however, three royal decrees were
undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,[16] the Royal Decree of 23
August 1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands, [17] and finally, the Ley Extranjera de
Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870. [18]

The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according
to which the provisions of the Ultramar among which this country was included, would be governed by special laws. [19]

It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out with the first categorical
enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -

(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,

(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,

(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy. [20]

The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede
her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law dictated that a change
in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain
virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United States.[21] Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil
rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its Congress -

"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to
sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions,
being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this
treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and
to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.

Thus

"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
Congress."[22]

Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the
Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens"
under American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the
United States.

The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the
Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines -

".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and
then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December
tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight."[23]

Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day
of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain,
and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. [24]

Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship
law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law
principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed those born
in the Philippine Archipelago within that period.[25] More about this later.

In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -

"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives
of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United States, and
such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if
residing therein."[26]

With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was
used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines
for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of
1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -

That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with
the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-
eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein
provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not
come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United
States, if residing therein."

Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was
1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other
country.

While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution
brought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of
Filipino citizenship -

Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines -

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution

(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in
the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women
would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that
effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of
Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant
of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new
Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -

Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that

"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed,
under the law to have renounced her citizenship."

The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the
irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.

Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:

The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

The Case Of FPJ

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at
least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election."

The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." [27]

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history,
four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis[28] had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus
soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs[29] (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa inTan Chong vs. Secretary of
Labor[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.

Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal
grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been
presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old
at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17
May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an uncertified copy of
a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe
and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be
twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American
citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old,
married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.

Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the
marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be
that -

1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;

2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;

3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;

4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and

5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.

Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the
custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the
COMELEC.

The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to
Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his
Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to
the facts which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and
the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner,
who had utilized those material statements in his argument. All three documents were certified true copies of the originals.

Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -

Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

xxxxxxxxx

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office.

Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth
certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:

Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty
in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested
origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have
occurred.[31]

The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos,
Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of
Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that
there was no existing record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show
that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be
San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the
place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records
Management and Archives Office would have had complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.

Proof of Paternity and Filiation

Under Civil Law.

Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity
(relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to petitioner,
the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.

Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when
the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either
judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative
parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document. [32] Complementary to the new code
was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if
the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be identified.

In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required
to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of
recognition.[33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,[34] the Court ruled -

"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit
1), which is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily
recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that
they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it was
not even they or either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate
is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same Article 131.
True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her own."

In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe
found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of
voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public document."In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this Court defined what could constitute such a
document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:

"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by private individuals which must be
authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out in
Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."

Let us leave it at that for the moment.

The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary
recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic
writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially
declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to
prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs
of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of
voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public instrument (one duly
acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.

The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the
child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.

x x x x x x x x x.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of
Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:

"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.

Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,[36] the Court has ruled:

"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even
if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive
effect."

It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break
away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater
interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if
any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his
relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the
context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly -

"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus
[been] defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members
of a family, and those which exist among members of a society for the protection of private interests." [37]

In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held:

"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature,
such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between
them, the separation of their properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of
their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and
divorce upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and
wife."

The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -

"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad" -

that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is
significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code,[39] such as on successional rights and family relations.[40] In
adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their
legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law[41] and not his political status.

Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and
property laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of
legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly
according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.

These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived
when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain only
in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.

The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from and not
inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity,
although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could
well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or
Family Code provisions.

Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -

Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces
also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person
must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the
controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.

Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the
COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with
Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -

"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance
with law do hereby declare that:

1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.

2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.

3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or
`FPJ.

4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.

xxxxxxxxx

7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were students at the University of the Philippines in
1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.

8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.

9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with
our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some
months between 1943-1944.

10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after Ronald Allan Poe.

xxxxxxxxx

18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the
legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.

Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.

Ruby Kelley Mangahas

Declarant

DNA Testing

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines
genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A
positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA
testing -

"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we
have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural
Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat
(STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other
from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel
scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not
hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently
obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress."

Petitioners Argument For

Jurisprudential Conclusiveness

Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the
latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted
marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate
child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the
documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage
certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to
each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended
that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling
of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,[43] citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon[44] and Serra vs. Republic.[45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states -

"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on
the lis mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was
irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictumwhich did not establish doctrine. I therefore
invite the Court to look closely into these cases.

First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who
was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the
stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.

Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father
who had become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935
Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.

Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father
and a Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be
naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.

Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio
Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore
argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact
the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son
Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.

The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's
father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to
fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum
in Morano vs. Vivo.

xxxxxxxxx

"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an
illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate
child of a Filipino mother.

The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People vs. Cayat.[47] I would grant that the distinction
between legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious
distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.

x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying
an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of
the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him
for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction,
then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated.

The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona,
at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.

Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to
ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would
exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against
him.

The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day,
month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the
Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. There utterly is no
cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.

In Sum

(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule
64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification of
respondent FPJ from running for the position of President in the 10 th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has committed
material representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been
directly elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest under
the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.

(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on
the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent,
Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent
prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could
only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870,
when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby
extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light,
confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner
has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their
position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC,[48] must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS

1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a."Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez,
Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a.Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.

2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing
the petition in SPA No. 04-003.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

CARLOS T. GO, SR.,- versus -

LUIS T. RAMOS,

September 4, 2009

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us are three petitions. G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 are petitions for review on certiorari to set aside the October 25, 2004
Decision[1] and February 16, 2005 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143 that affirmed the Decision[3] dated
January 6, 2004 and Order[4] dated May 3, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167 in SCA No. 2218 upholding the
preparation and filing of deportation charges against Jimmy T. Go, the corresponding Charge Sheet [5] dated July 3, 2001, and the
deportation proceedings thereunder conducted.

On the other hand, G.R. No. 171946, also a petition for review on certiorari, seeks to set aside the December 8, 2005 Decision[6] and March
13, 2006Resolution[7] of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 88277.

Considering that the three cases arose from the same factual milieu, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 167570 and 167569 with
G.R. No. 171946 per Resolution[8] dated February 26, 2007.

These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit[9] for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that
while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so. To prove
his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmys
citizenship as FChinese. Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are
Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries
were typewritten. He also averred that in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming managed to
cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport
from the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit,[10] averring that the complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was merely a
harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings. Jimmy maintained that there is no truth to the
allegation that he is an alien, and insisted that he is a natural-born Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a
Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1, paragraph 4 [11] of the 1935
Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625[12] (Com. Act No. 625), as evidenced by his having taken the Oath of Allegiance on July 11,
1950 and having executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine citizenship on July 12, 1950. Although the said oath and affidavit were
registered only on September 11, 1956, the reason behind such late registration was sufficiently explained in an affidavit. Jimmy added that
he had even voted in the 1952 and 1955 elections. [13] He denied that his father arrived in the Philippines as an undocumented alien,
alleging that his father has no record of arrival in this country as alleged in the complaint-affidavit precisely because his father was born and
raised in the Philippines, and in fact, speaks fluent Ilonggo and Tagalog. [14]

With regard to the erroneous entry in his birth certificate that he is FChinese, he maintained that such was not of his own doing, but may be
attributed to the employees of the Local Civil Registrars Office who might have relied on his Chinese-sounding surname when making the
said entry. He asserted that the said office has control over his birth certificate; thus, if his fathers citizenship appears to be handwritten, it
may have been changed when the employees of that office realized that his father has already taken his oath as a Filipino. [15] As regards
the entry in his siblings certificates of birth, particularly Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr., that their father is Chinese, Jimmy averred that the
entry was erroneous because it was made without prior consultation with his father. [16]

In a Resolution[17] dated February 14, 2001, Associate Commissioner Linda L. Malenab-Hornilla dismissed the complaint for deportation
against Jimmy.Associate Commissioner Hornilla affirmed the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation tasked to investigate the case
that Jimmys father elected Filipino citizenship in accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. By operation of law,
therefore, the citizenship of Carlos was transmitted to Jimmy, making him a Filipino as well.

On March 8, 2001,[18] the Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed said dismissal, holding that Carlos election of Philippine citizenship
was made out of time.Finding Jimmys claim to Philippine citizenship in serious doubt by reason of his fathers questionable election thereof,
the Board directed the preparation and filing of the appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy.
On July 3, 2001, the corresponding Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy, charging him of violating Section 37(a)(9) [19] in relation to
Section 45(c)[20] of Com. Act No. 613, otherwise known as The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940,[21] as amended, committed as follows:

xxxx

1. That Respondent was born on October 25, 1952 in Iloilo City, as evidenced by a copy of his birth certificate wherein his citizenship was
recorded as Chinese;

2. That Respondent through some stealth machinations was able to subsequently cover up his true and actual citizenship as Chinese and
illegally acquired a Philippine Passport under the name JAIME T. GAISANO, with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations,
in violation of the above-cited provisions of the Immigration Act[;]

3. That [R]espondent being an alien, has formally and officially represent[ed] and introduce[d] himself as a citizen of the Philippines, for
fraudulent purposes and in order to evade any requirements of the immigration laws, also in violation of said law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[22]

On November 9, 2001, Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition [23] with application for injunctive reliefs before the RTC
of Pasig City, Branch 167, docketed as SCA No. 2218, seeking to annul and set aside the March 8, 2001 Resolution of the Board of
Commissioners, the Charge Sheet, and the proceedings had therein. In essence, they challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to continue
with the deportation proceedings.

In the interim, the Board issued a Decision[24] dated April 17, 2002, in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-117, ordering the apprehension and deportation
of Jimmy.The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Board of Commissioners hereby Orders the apprehension of respondent JIMMY T. GO @
JAIME T. GAISANO and that he be then deported to CHINA of which he is a citizen, without prejudice, however, to the continuation of any
and all criminal and other proceedings that are pending in court or before the prosecution arm of the Philippine Government, if any. And that
upon expulsion, he is thereby ordered barred from entry into the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.[25]

In view of the said Decision, Carlos and Jimmy filed on June 13, 2002 a supplemental petition for certiorari and prohibition[26] before the trial
court and reiterated their application for injunctive reliefs. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction pending litigation
on the main issue, enjoining the Bureau from enforcing the April 17, 2002 Decision. [27] Later, however, the trial court dissolved the writ in a
Decision[28] dated January 6, 2004 as a consequence of the dismissal of the petition.

Carlos and Jimmy moved for reconsideration. But their motion was likewise denied.[29]

Following the dismissal of the petition in SCA No. 2218, the Board issued a warrant of deportation [30] which led to the apprehension of
Jimmy. Jimmy commenced a petition for habeas corpus, but the same was eventually dismissed by reason of his provisional release on
bail.[31]

Carlos and Jimmy then questioned the Decision in SCA No. 2218 as well as the Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration by way
of a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85143. They imputed grave abuse of discretion by the
trial court for passing upon their citizenship, claiming that what they asked for in their petition was merely the nullification of the March 8,
2001 Resolution and the charge sheet.

The appellate tribunal dismissed the petition.[32] It did not find merit in their argument that the issue of citizenship should proceed only before
the proper court in an independent action, and that neither the Bureau nor the Board has jurisdiction over individuals who were born in
the Philippines and have exercised the rights of Filipino citizens. The appellate tribunal also rejected their claim that they enjoy the
presumption of being Filipino citizens.

The Court of Appeals held that the Board has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in
the process, determine their citizenship.

The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the principle of jus soli was never extended to the Philippines; hence, could not be made
a ground to ones claim of Philippine citizenship. Like the trial court, the appellate tribunal found that Carlos failed to elect Philippine
citizenship within the reasonable period of three years upon reaching the age of majority. Furthermore, it held that the belated submission to
the local civil registry of the affidavit of election and oath of allegiance in September 1956 was defective because the affidavit of election
was executed after the oath of allegiance, and the delay of several years before their filing with the proper office was not satisfactorily
explained.

The course of action taken by the trial court was also approved by the appellate tribunal. The Court of Appeals stated that the trial court
necessarily had to rule on the substantial and legal bases warranting the deportation proceeding in order to determine whether the Board
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, the appellate court found that due process was
properly observed in the proceedings before the Board, contrary to the claim of Jimmy.

Unfazed with the said ruling, they moved for reconsideration. Their motion having been denied,[33] Carlos and Jimmy each filed a petition for
review on certiorari before this Court, respectively docketed as G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570.

Meanwhile, in view of the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP. No. 85143, Bureau of Immigration Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr. issued
Warrant of Deportation No. AFF-04-003[34] dated November 16, 2004 to carry out the April 17, 2002 Decision in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-
117. This resulted in the apprehension and detention of Jimmy at the Bureau of Immigration Bicutan Detention Center, pending his
deportation to China.[35]

On account of his detention, Jimmy once again filed a petition for habeas corpus [36] before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 167, docketed as
SP. Proc. No. 11507 assailing his apprehension and detention despite the pendency of his appeal and his release on recognizance.

In an Order[37] dated December 6, 2004, the trial court dismissed the said petition ruling that the remedy of habeas corpus cannot be availed
of to obtain an order of release once a deportation order has already been issued by the Bureau. Jimmy moved for reconsideration of the
Order, but this was also denied by the trial court in an Order [38] dated December 28, 2004.
Jimmy assailed the Orders of the trial court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the appellate court, docketed as CA-G.R. No.
88277. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and enjoined the deportation of Jimmy until the issue of his citizenship is settled with
finality by the court. The Court of Appeals held as follows:

xxxx

the issuance of a warrant to arrest and deport the petitioner without any proof whatsoever of his violation of the bail conditions [that he was
previously granted] is arbitrary, inequitable and unjust, for the policies governing the grant of his bail should likewise apply in the
cancellation of the said bail. Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, yet considering that it is
such a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person who all his life has always lived in
the Philippines, where he has established his family and business interests, one who appears to be not completely devoid of any claim to
Filipino citizenship, being the son of a Filipina, whose father is alleged to also have elected to be a Filipino, the constitutional right of such
person to due process cannot be peremptorily dismissed or ignored altogether, and indeed should not be denied. If it later turns out that the
petitioner is a Filipino after all, then the overly eager Immigration authorities would have expelled and relegated to statelessness one who
might in fact be a Filipino by blood.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition with reference to the Warrant of Deportation issued by the BID is
hereby GRANTED. The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, through Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr., Atty. Faizal Hussin and
Ansari Maca Ayan, and any of their deputized agents, are ENJOINEDfrom deporting petitioner Jimmy T. Go, a.k.a. Jaime T. Gaisano, until
the issue of petitioners citizenship is finally settled by the courts of justice.

SO ORDERED.[39]

Their motion for reconsideration[40] having been denied on March 13, 2006, Hon. Alipio Fernandez, in his capacity as the Commissioner of
the Bureau of Immigration, and Atty. Faisal Hussin and Ansari M. Macaayan, in their capacity as Intelligence Officers of the Bureau of
Immigration, are before this Court as petitioners in G.R. No. 171946.

The parties have raised the following grounds for their respective petitions:

G.R. No. 167569

I.

THE PROCEEDINGS HAD BEFORE THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION (B.I.D.) ARE NULL AND VOID FOR ITS
FAILURE TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THE PERSON OF PETITIONER CARLOS GO, SR.

II.

GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE HEREIN PETITIONER CARLOS GO SR.S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, A FULL BLOWN
TRIAL UNDER THE MORE RIGID RULES OF EVIDENCE PRESCRIBED IN COURT PROCEEDINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN
CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AND NOT THROUGH MERE SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS SUCH AS THE
ONE HAD BEFORE THE B.I.D. AS WELL AS IN THE COURT A QUO.

III.

A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS NOT REQUIRED TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.

IV.

ASSUMING CARLOS GO, SR. STILL NEEDS TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP, HE HAD COMPLIED WITH ALL THE
REQUIREMENTS OF COM. ACT NO. 625.

V.

PETITIONER CARLOS GO, SR. ENJOYS THE PRESUMPTION OF CITIZENSHIP.

VI.

RESPONDENTS CAUSE OF ACTION HAD LONG PRESCRIBED.[41]

G.R. No. 167570

I.

THE PROCEEDINGS HAD BEFORE THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION (B.I.D.) ARE NULL AND VOID FOR ITS
FAILURE TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THE PERSON OF PETITIONERS FATHER, CARLOS GO, SR.

II.

THE DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE B.I.D. ARE NULL AND VOID FOR ITS FAILURE TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS.

III.

THE B.I.D.S CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER JIMMY T. GO HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

IV.

GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE HEREIN PETITIONERS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, A FULL BLOWN TRIAL UNDER
THE MORE RIGID RULES OF EVIDENCE PRESCRIBED IN COURT PROCEEDINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED TO
DETERMINE HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AND NOT THROUGH MERE SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS SUCH AS THE ONE HAD BEFORE
THE B.I.D.[42]

G.R. No. 171946

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN ENJOINING RESPONDENTS DEPORTATION.[43]

Succinctly stated, the issues for our resolution are: (a) whether the cause of action of the Bureau against Carlos and Jimmy had prescribed;
(b) whether the deportation proceedings are null and void for failure to implead Carlos as an indispensable party therein; (c) whether the
evidence adduced by Carlos and Jimmy to prove their claim to Philippine citizenship is substantial and sufficient to oust the Board of its
jurisdiction from continuing with the deportation proceedings in order to give way to a formal judicial action to pass upon the issue of
alienage; (d) whether due process was properly observed in the proceedings before the Board; and (e) whether the petition for habeas
corpus should be dismissed.

The arguments raised by Carlos and Jimmy in their respective petitions are merely a rehash of the arguments they adduced before the
appellate tribunal and the trial court. Once again, they raised the same argument of prescription. As to Carlos, it is his position that being
recognized by the government to have acquired Philippine citizenship, evidenced by the Certificate of Election issued to him on September
11, 1956, his citizenship could no longer be questioned at this late date. As for Jimmy, he contends that the Boards cause of action to
deport him has prescribed for the simple reason that his arrest was not made within five (5) years from the time the cause of action arose,
which according to him commenced in 1989 when he was alleged to have illegally acquired a Philippine passport.

In any event, they argue that the deportation proceeding should be nullified altogether for failure to implead Carlos as an indispensable
party therein.Jimmy posits that the deportation case against him was made to depend upon the citizenship of his father, Carlos, in that the
Board found justification to order his deportation by declaring that his father is a Chinese citizen even though the latter was never made a
party in the deportation proceedings. They argue that the Board could not simply strip Carlos of his citizenship just so they could question
the citizenship of Jimmy. To do so without affording Carlos the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove his claim to Philippine citizenship
would be the height of injustice. For failing to accord him the requisite due process, the whole proceeding should perforce be stuck down.

While they concede that the Board has jurisdiction to hear cases against an alleged alien, they insist that judicial intervention may be
resorted to when the claim to citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct, like in this
case. Their claim to Philippine citizenship, they said, is clearly shown by the fact that they were born, had been raised and had lived in this
country all their lives; they speak fluent Tagalog and Ilonggo; they engage in businesses reserved solely for Filipinos; they exercise their
right to suffrage; they enjoy the rights and privileges accorded only to citizens; and they have no record of any Alien Certificate of
Registration. More importantly, they contend that they were validly issued Philippine passports. They further posit that the judicial
intervention required is not merely a judicial review of the proceedings below, but a full-blown, adversarial, trial-type proceedings where the
rules of evidence are strictly observed.

Considering that his citizenship affects that of his son, Carlos opted to present controverting arguments to sustain his claim to Philippine
citizenship, notwithstanding the fact that according to him, he was never impleaded in the deportation proceedings.

Carlos takes exception to the ruling of the appellate court that the doctrine of jus soli failed to accord him Philippine citizenship for the
reason that the same was never extended to the Philippines. He insists that if his Philippine citizenship is not recognized by said doctrine, it
is nonetheless recognized by the laws enforced prior to the 1935 Constitution, particularly the Philippine Bill of 1902 [44] and the Philippine
Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916 (Jones Law of 1916).[45]

According to Carlos, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916 deemed all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands as well as their
children born after the passage of said laws to be citizens of the Philippines. Because his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of
the Philippines at the time of the passage of the Jones Law of 1916, he (Carlos) undoubtedly acquired his fathers citizenship. Article IV, first
paragraph, of the 1935 Constitution therefore applies to him. Said constitutional provision reads:

ARTICLE IV. Citizenship

SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

xxxx

Even assuming that his father remained as a Chinese, Carlos also claims that he followed the citizenship of his Filipina mother, being an
illegitimate son, and that he even validly elected Philippine citizenship when he complied with all the requirements of Com. Act No. 625. He
submits that what is being disputed is not whether he complied with Com. Act No. 625, but rather, the timeliness of his compliance. He
stresses that the 3-year compliance period following the interpretation given by Cuenco v. Secretary of Justice[46] to Article IV, Section 1(4)
of the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 when election must be made, is not an inflexible rule. He reasoned that the same decision
held that such period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino, like in his case.[47]

We deny the appeal of Carlos and Jimmy for lack of merit.

Carlos and Jimmys claim that the cause of action of the Bureau has prescribed is untenable. Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui
generis. Once the citizenship of an individual is put into question, it necessarily has to be threshed out and decided upon. In the case
of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,[48]we said that decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a persons
future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the
modes recognized by law for the purpose.[49] Indeed, if the issue of ones citizenship, after it has been passed upon by the courts, leaves it
still open to future adjudication, then there is more reason why the government should not be precluded from questioning ones claim to
Philippine citizenship, especially so when the same has never been threshed out by any tribunal.

Jimmys invocation of prescription also does not persuade us. Section 37 (b) of Com. Act No. 613 states:

Section 37.

xxxx

(b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of this section at any time after entry, but shall not be effected under any
other clause unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause of deportation arises.

xxxx

As shown in the Charge Sheet, Jimmy was charged for violation of Section 37(a)(9), [50] in relation to Section 45(e)[51] of Com. Act No.
613. From the foregoing provision, his deportation may be effected only if his arrest is made within 5 years from the time the cause for
deportation arose. The court a quo is correct when it ruled that the 5-year period should be counted only from July 18, 2000, the time when
Luis filed his complaint for deportation. It is the legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting point for the computation
of the period of prescription.[52] Additionally, Section 2 of Act No. 3326,[53] as amended, entitled An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription
for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run, provides:

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

xxxx

The counting could not logically start in 1989 when his passport was issued because the government was unaware that he was not a
Filipino citizen. Had the government been aware at such time that he was not a Filipino citizen or there were certain anomalies attending his
application for such passport, it would have denied his application.

As to the issue of whether Carlos is an indispensable party, we reiterate that an indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no
final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant. [54] To be indispensable, a person must
first be a real party in interest, that is, one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit.[55] Carlos clearly is not an indispensable party as he does not stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit. What is
sought is the deportation of Jimmy on the ground that he is an alien. Hence, the principal issue that will be decided on is the propriety of his
deportation. To recall, Jimmy claims that he is a Filipino under Section 1(3), [56]Article IV of the 1935 Constitution because Carlos, his father,
is allegedly a citizen.[57] Since his citizenship hinges on that of his fathers, it becomes necessary to pass upon the citizenship of the
latter. However, whatever will be the findings as to Carlos citizenship will in no way prejudice him.

Citizenship proceedings, as aforestated, are a class of its own, in that, unlike other cases, res judicata does not obtain as a matter of
course. In a long line of decisions, this Court said that every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered as res judicata; hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. [58] Res judicata may be applied
in cases of citizenship only if the following concur:

1. a persons citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;

2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and

3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.[59]

In the event that the citizenship of Carlos will be questioned, or his deportation sought, the same has to be ascertained once again as the
decision which will be rendered hereinafter shall have no preclusive effect upon his citizenship. As neither injury nor benefit will redound
upon Carlos, he cannot be said to be an indispensable party in this case.

There can be no question that the Board has the authority to hear and determine the deportation case against a deportee and in the
process determine also the question of citizenship raised by him.[60] However, this Court, following American jurisprudence, laid down the
exception to the primary jurisdiction enjoyed by the deportation board in the case of Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board[61] wherein we
stressed that judicial determination is permitted in cases when the courts themselves believe that there is substantial evidence supporting
the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct. [62] Moreover, when the
evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts
shall promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings.[63]

While we are mindful that resort to the courts may be had, the same should be allowed only in the sound discretion of a competent court in
proper proceedings.[64] After all, the Boards jurisdiction is not divested by the mere claim of citizenship. [65] Moreover, a deportee who claims
to be a citizen and not therefore subject to deportation has the right to have his citizenship reviewed by the courts, after the deportation
proceedings.[66] The decision of the Board on the question is, of course, not final but subject to review by the courts. [67]

After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the appellate court was not convinced that the same was sufficient to oust the Board of its
jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings considering that what were presented particularly the birth certificates of Jimmy, as
well as those of his siblings, Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr. indicate that they are Chinese citizens. Furthermore, like the Board, it found the
election of Carlos of Philippine citizenship, which was offered as additional proof of his claim, irregular as it was not made on time.

We find no cogent reason to overturn the above findings of the appellate tribunal. The question of whether substantial evidence had been
presented to allow immediate recourse to the regular courts is a question of fact which is beyond this Courts power of review for it is not a
trier of facts.[68] None of the exceptions[69] in which this Court may resolve factual issues has been shown to exist in this case. Even if we
evaluate their arguments and the evidence they presented once again, the same conclusion will still be reached.

One of the arguments raised to sustain Carlos claim to Philippine citizenship is the doctrine of jus soli, or the doctrine or principle of
citizenship by place of birth. To recall, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that the doctrine of jus soli was never extended to
the Philippines. We agree. The doctrine ofjus soli was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of ones citizenship.[70] However, the
Supreme Court abandoned the principle of jus soli in the case ofTan Chong v. Secretary of Labor.[71] Since then, said doctrine only
benefited those who were individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a final court decision on the mistaken application of jus
soli.[72]

Neither will the Philippine Bill of 1902[73] nor the Jones Law of 1916[74] make Carlos a citizen of the Philippines. His bare claim that his
father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the said laws, without any supporting evidence whatsoever
will not suffice.

It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental
authority of the mother and follow her nationality. [75] Moreover, we have also ruled that an illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform
any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen
himself.[76] However, it is our considered view that absent any evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the
aforestated established rule could not be applied to him.

As to the question of whether the election of Philippine citizenship conferred on Carlos Filipino citizenship, we find that the appellate court
correctly found that it did not.

Com. Act No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be
followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may
elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with
the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of thePhilippines. [77]

However, the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship
should be made.The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made upon reaching the age of majority. The age of majority
then commenced upon reaching 21 years. In the opinions of the then Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of
Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the
Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made within a reasonable time after attaining
the age of majority. The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from
reaching the age of majority.[78]

It is true that we said that the 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be extended as when the person has always regarded
himself as a Filipino. Be that as it may, it is our considered view that not a single circumstance was sufficiently shown meriting the extension
of the 3-year period. The fact that Carlos exercised his right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955 does not demonstrate such belief, considering
that the acts were done after he elected Philippine citizenship. On the other hand, the mere fact that he was able to vote does not validate
his irregular election of Philippine citizenship. At most, his registration as a voter indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining
exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not alter his real citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The
exercise of the rights and privileges granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may misrepresent
himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens of this country. [79]

It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption
can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the
state.[80]

As Carlos and Jimmy neither showed conclusive proof of their citizenship nor presented substantial proof of the same, we have no choice
but to sustain the Boards jurisdiction over the deportation proceedings. This is not to say that we are ruling that they are not Filipinos, for
that is not what we are called upon to do.This Court necessarily has to pass upon the issue of citizenship only to determine whether the
proceedings may be enjoined in order to give way to a judicial determination of the same. And we are of the opinion that said proceedings
should not be enjoined.

In our considered view, the allegation of Jimmy that due process was not observed in the deportation proceedings must likewise fail.

Deportation proceedings are administrative in character, summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in accordance with the rules
of ordinary court proceedings.[81] The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[82] As long
as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently
met.[83] Although Jimmy was not furnished with a copy of the subject Resolution and Charge Sheet as alleged by him, the trial court found
that he was given ample opportunity to explain his side and present controverting evidence, thus:

x x x It must be stressed that after receiving the Order dated September 11, 2001 signed by BSI Chief Ronaldo P. Ledesma on October 4,
2001, petitioner Jimmy T. Go admitted that when his representative went to the B.I.D. to inquire about the said Order, the latter chanced
upon the Resolution dated February 14, 2001 and March 8, 2001 as well as the Charge Sheet dated July 3, 2001. Hence on October 5,
2001, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum and as such, was allowed by Ronaldo P. Ledesma an extension of ten
(10) days to submit his required memorandum. x x x[84]

This circumstance satisfies the demands of administrative due process.

As regards the petition in G.R. No. 171946, petitioners contend that the appellate tribunal erred in enjoining Jimmys deportation. [85]

Petitioners question the remedy availed of by Jimmy. They argue that the existence of the remedy of an ordinary appeal proscribes the filing
of the petition for certiorari as was done in this case. They point out that the appeal period in habeas corpus cases is only 48 hours,
compared to a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which is 60 days. This clearly shows that an ordinary appeal is the
more plain, speedy and adequate remedy; hence, it must be the one availed of. [86] Since the decision of the trial court was not properly
appealed, the same may be said to have attained finality, and may no longer be disturbed. [87]

They maintain that the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus by the trial court was proper. A petition for habeas corpus has for its
purpose only the determination of whether or not there is a lawful ground for Jimmys apprehension and continued detention. They urge that
the decision of the Board dated April 17, 2002 that ordered Jimmys deportation has already attained finality by reason of the belated appeal
taken by Jimmy from the said decision on April 2, 2004before the Office of the President, or after almost two years from the time the
decision was rendered. Said decision of the Board, they insist, is the lawful ground that sanctions Jimmys apprehension and detention. [88]

Petitioners in G.R. No. 171946 also argue that Jimmy cannot rely on the bail on recognizance he was previously granted to question his
subsequent apprehension and detention. Under the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, the power to grant bail can only be exercised while
the alien is still under investigation, and not when the order of deportation had already been issued by the Board. [89] Hence, the bail granted
was irregular as it has no legal basis.Furthermore, they said the petition for habeas corpus necessarily has to be dismissed because the
same is no longer proper once the applicant thereof has been charged before the Board, which is the case with Jimmy. [90] Nonetheless,
they claim that the habeas corpus case is rendered moot and academic as Jimmy is no longer being detained. [91]

On the other hand, Jimmy counters that the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is the most appropriate, speedy and adequate
remedy in spite of the availability of ordinary appeal considering that what is involved in this case is his cherished liberty. Grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the petitioners in ordering his arrest and detention, he argues, all the more justifies the avails of the extraordinary
writ.[92] Contrary to the petitioners stand, Jimmy argues that the April 17, 2002 Decision of the Board has not attained finality owing to the
availability of various remedies, one of which is an appeal, and in fact is actually void because it was rendered without due process.[93] He
also insists that the bail issued to him is valid and effective until the final determination of his citizenship before the proper
courts.[94] Moreover, he maintains that the petition for habeas corpus was proper since its object is to inquire into the legality of ones
detention, and if found illegal, to order the release of the detainee.[95] As in his petition in G.R. No. 167570, Jimmy also contends that the
proceedings before the Board is void for failure to implead therein his father, and that he should have been given a full blown trial before a
regular court where he can prove his citizenship.[96]

Considering the arguments and contentions of the parties, we find the petition in G.R. No. 171946 meritorious.
We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are available only when there is
no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The writ of certiorari does not lie where an appeal may
be taken or where another adequate remedy is available for the correction of the error. [97]

The petitioners correctly argue that appeal should have been the remedy availed of as it is more plain, speedy and adequate. The 48-hour
appeal period demonstrates the adequacy of such remedy in that no unnecessary time will be wasted before the decision will be re-
evaluated.

A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be
inquired into is the legality of a persons detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if
the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4[98] of
Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.[99]

Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be
allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term court in this context includes quasi-judicial
bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the persons confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of
Immigration.[100] Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the
Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no
power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it. [101]

Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested pending his deportation, coupled by this Courts
pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus
is rendered moot and academic. This being so, we find it unnecessary to touch on the other arguments advanced by respondents regarding
the same subject.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 are DENIED. The Decision dated October 25, 2004 and Resolution
dated February 16, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143 are AFFIRMED. The petition in G.R. No. 171946 is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated December 8, 2005 and Resolution dated March 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 88277 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 6, 2004 andDecember 28, 2004 Orders of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167 are hereby REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

RENALD F. VILANDO, -versus-

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG AND HON. SPEAKER PROSPERO
NOGRALES

August 23, 2011

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the March 24, 2010 Decision[1] of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) dismissing the petitions for quo warranto and declaring private respondent Jocelyn Sy
Limkaichong (Limkaichong) not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing the First District of Negros Oriental
and its Resolution[2] dated May 17, 2010, denying the motion for reconsideration.

In the May 14, 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Negros
Oriental.She won over the other contender, Olivia Paras.

On May 25, 2007, she was proclaimed as Representative by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on the basis of Comelec Resolution No.
8062[3] issued onMay 18, 2007.

On July 23, 2007, she assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives.

Meanwhile, petitions involving either the disqualification or the proclamation of Limkaichong were filed before the Commission on
Elections(COMELEC) which reached the Court.

The petitions, which questioned her citizenship, were filed against Limkaichong by her detractors: Louis Biraogo (G.R. No. 179120);[4] Olivia
Paras (G.R. Nos. 179132-33);[5] and Renald F. Vilando (G.R. Nos. 179240-41).[6] These three (3) petitions were consolidated with the
petition for certiorari filed by Limkaichong (G.R. Nos. 178831-32) assailing the Joint Resolution issued by the COMELEC which resolved the
disqualification cases against her.
On April 1, 2009, the Court granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong, reversed the Joint Resolution of the Comelec, dismissed the three
(3) other petitions, and directed the petitioners to seek relief before the HRET by way of a petition for Quo Warranto.

On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F. Vilando (Vilando), as taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered voter of the
congressional district concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET. These petitions were
consolidated by the HRET as they both challenged the eligibility of one and the same respondent. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong
was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed. They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy),
whose naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her
marriage to the latter. Also, they invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of Limkaichongs citizenship, which necessarily
included an inquiry into the validity of the naturalization certificate of Julio Sy.

For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. She averred that the acquisition of Philippine citizenship
by her father was regular and in order and had already attained the status of res judicata. Further, she claimed that the validity of such
citizenship could not be assailed through a collateral attack.

On March 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the House of
Representatives. Pertinent portions of the HRET decision reads:

By and large, petitioners failed to satisfy the quantum of proof to sustain their theory that respondent is not a natural-born Filipino citizen
and therefore not qualified as Representative of the First District, Negros Oriental. This being so, their petitions must fail.

WHEREFORE, the Tribunal DISMISSES the instant petition for lack of merit and declares that respondent Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong is not
disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing the First District, Negros Oriental.

As soon as the Decision becomes final and executory, notice of copies thereof shall be sent to the President of the Philippines, the House
of Representatives through the Speaker, the Commission on Audit through the Chairman, pursuant to Rule 96 of the 2004 Rules of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Chairman, Commission on Elections, for his
information and appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.[7]

The petitioners sought reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, but it was denied by the HRET in its Resolution dated May 17, 2010.

Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by Vilando anchored on the following

GROUNDS:

THE ONE-SIDED RESOLUTION OF THE SUBJECT PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO AND THE UTTER FAILURE OF THE HRET TO
DISQUALIFY LIMKAICHONG AS MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DESPITE MANIFEST EVIDENCE THAT SHE IS
NOT A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN IS WHIMSICAL, CAPRICIOUS AND ARBITRARY BECAUSE:

1. THE PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO DOES NOT OPERATE AS A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE CITIZENSHIP OF
LIMKAICHONGS FATHER FOR THE REASON THAT HER FATHERS CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION IS OF NO FORCE AND
EFFECT FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, HENCE, THERE IS ACTUALLY NOTHING BEING ATTACKED OR ASSAILED BY THE SAME.

2. LIMKAICHONG CANNOT DERIVE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP FROM HER MOTHER GIVEN THAT AT THE TIME OF HER BIRTH,
HER MOTHER IS NOT ALREADY A FILIPINO CITIZEN AS A RESULT OF HER MARRIAGE TO HER FATHER AS PROVIDED FOR
UNDER SECTION 1 (7) OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 2 (1) CHAPTER II OF THE CHINESE REVISED
NATIONALITY LAW OF FEBRUARY 5, 1959.

3. HAVING THE PLENARY, ABSOLUTE AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE, AMONG OTHERS, THE
QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE HRET CAN LOOK INTO THE ELIGIBILITY OF
LIMKAICHONG EVEN IF, AS AN INCIDENT THERETO, IT WOULD MEAN LOOKING INTO THE VALIDITY OF THE CERTIFICATE OF
NATURALIZATION.[8]

It should be noted that Limkaichongs term of office as Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental from June 30, 2007 to June 30,
2010 already expired. As such, the issue questioning her eligibility to hold office has been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of
her term. Whatever judgment is reached, the same can no longer have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no longer be
enforced.[9] Thus, the petition may be dismissed for being moot and academic.

Moreover, there was the conduct of the 2010 elections, a supervening event, in a sense, has also rendered this case moot and academic. A
moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness. [10]

Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, however, may be questioned at anytime.[11] For
this reason, the Court deems it appropriate to resolve the petition on the merits. This position finds support in the rule that courts will decide
a question, otherwise moot and academic, if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. [12] The question on Limkaichongs citizenship is
likely to recur if she would run again, as she did run, for public office, hence, capable of repetition.

In any case, the Court is of the view that the HRET committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding that Limkaichong is not disqualified to
sit as Member of the House of Representatives.

Vilandos argument, that the quo warranto petition does not operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of Limkaichongs father as the
certificate of naturalization is null and void from the beginning, is devoid of merit.

In this petition, Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen. To prove his point, he makes reference
to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichongs father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral
attack on the citizenship of the father. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its
nullity.[13]

The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of Limkaichongs father should be in accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No.
473. As held inLimkaichong v. Comelec,[14] thus:

As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico,[15] where the Court of First Instance judge motu propio and not in the proper denaturalization
proceedings called to court various grantees of certificates of naturalization (who had already taken their oaths of allegiance) and cancelled
their certificates of naturalization due to procedural infirmities, the Court held that:

x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings for naturalization were tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or
otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be properly
invoked in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is the cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section
1(5), Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon
motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal." In other words, the
initiative must come from these officers, presumably after previous investigation in each particular case.

Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally or
invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by
private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizens descendant.

Vilando asserts that as an incident in determining the eligibility of Limkaichong, the HRET, having the plenary, absolute and exclusive
jurisdiction to determine her qualifications, can pass upon the efficacy of the certificate of naturalization.

True, the HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on the ground of lack of
citizenship. No less than the 1987 Constitution vests the HRET the authority to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of its Members. This constitutional power is likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the HRET. Rule 14 thereof
restates this duty, thus:

Rule 14. Jurisdiction. The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the
House of Representatives.

Time and again, this Court has acknowledged this sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET. [16] The power granted to HRET by the
Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. [17] Such power is regarded as
full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or
even affect the same.[18]

Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the
judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the
citizenship of the father which, as already stated, is not permissible. The HRET properly resolved the issue with the following ratiocination:

xxx We note that Jocelyn C. Limkaichong, not the father Julio Ong Sy, is the respondent in the present case. The Tribunal may not dwell on
deliberating on the validity of naturalization of the father if only to pursue the end of declaring the daughter as disqualified to hold office.
Unfortunately, much as the Tribunal wants to resolve said issue, it cannot do so because its jurisdiction is limited to the qualification of the
proclaimed respondent Limkaichong, being a sitting Member of the Congress.

Evidently, there is no basis to oblige the Tribunal to reopen the naturalization proceedings for a determination of the citizenship of the
ascendant of respondent. A petition for quo warranto is not a means to achieve that purpose. To rule on this issue in this quo
warranto proceeding will not only be a clear grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction, but also a blatant
violation of due process on the part of the persons who will be affected or who are not parties in this case. [19]

Thus, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) wrote that a collateral attack against a judgment is generally not allowed, unless the
judgment is void upon its face or its nullity is apparent by virtue of its own recitals. [20] Under the present situation, there is no evidence to
show that the judgment is void on its face:

As to the Order of the CFI, Negros Oriental dated July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 that were offered in evidence, far from proving an
invalid oath of allegiance and certificate of naturalization, being public records, they do in fact constitute legitimate source of authority for the
conferment of status of the father of respondent as naturalized Filipino. Absent any contrary declaration by a competent court, the Tribunal
presumes the validity of the CFI Orders ofJuly 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959, and the resulting documentations of Julio Sys acquisition
of Filipino citizenship by naturalization as valid and of legal effect. The oath of allegiance and certificate of naturalization are themselves
proofs of the actual conferment of naturalization.[21]

The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First
Instance (CFI)Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary.

Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law is the citizenship provision of the
1935 Constitution, the pertinent portion thereof, reads:

Article IV

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxx

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

xxx

Indubitably, with Limkaichongs father having been conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a Filipino citizen born
to a Filipino father.

Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent issuance of certificate of naturalization were invalid,
Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother and having impliedly elected
Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age. The HRET is, thus, correct in declaring that Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino
citizen:

Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV,
1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of
transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy
and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Likewise, the citizenship of respondent Limkaichong finds support in paragraph 4, Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution.

Having failed to prove that Anesia Sy lost her Philippine citizenship, respondent can be considered a natural born citizen of the Philippines,
having been born to a mother who was a natural-born Filipina at the time of marriage, and because respondent was able to elect citizenship
informally when she reached majority age. Respondent participated in the barangay elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished
voters affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate and was elected as Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive
acts of election of Philippine citizenship. The case of In re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested in actions
indubitably showing a definite choice. We note that respondent had informally elected citizenship after January 17, 1973 during which time
the 1973 Constitution considered as citizens of the Philippines all those who elect citizenship in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. The
1987 Constitution provisions, i.e., Section 1(3), Article [IV] and Section 2, Article [IV] were enacted to correct the anomalous situation where
one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically accorded the status of a natural-born citizen, while one born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship yet if so elected, was not conferred natural-born status. It was the
intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to treat equally those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority either before or after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. Thus, those who would elect
Philippine citizenship under par. 3, Section 1, Article [IV] of the 1987 Constitution are now, under Section 2, Article [IV] thereof also natural-
born Filipinos. The following are the pertinent provisions of the 1987 Constitution:

Article IV

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall
be deemed natural-born citizens.[22]

Vilandos assertion that Limkaichong cannot derive Philippine citizenship from her mother because the latter became a Chinese citizen when
she married Julio Sy, as provided for under Section 1 (7) of Commonwealth Act No. 63 in relation to Article 2 (1) Chapter II of the Chinese
Revised Nationality Law of February 5, 1959, must likewise fail.

As aptly pointed out by the HRET, Vilando was not able to offer in evidence a duly certified true copy of the alleged Chinese Revised Law of
Nationality to prove that Limkaichongs mother indeed lost her Philippine citizenship. Verily, Vilando failed to establish his case through
competent and admissible evidence to warrant a reversal of the HRET ruling.

Also, an application for an alien certificate of registration (ACR) is not an indubitable proof of forfeiture of Philippine citizenship. It is well to
quote the ruling of the HRET on this matter, to wit:

An alien certificate of registration is issued to an individual who declares that he is not a Filipino citizen. It is obtained only when applied
for. It is in a form prescribed by the agency and contains a declaration by the applicant of his or her personal information, a photograph, and
physical details that identify the applicant. It bears no indication of basis for foreign citizenship, nor proof of change to foreign citizenship. It
certifies that a person named therein has applied for registration and fingerprinting and that such person was issued a certificate of
registration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 or other special law. It is only evidence of registration.

Unlike birth certificates registered pursuant to Act 3753 (The Civil Register Law), and much less like other public records referred to under
Section 23, Rule 132, an alien certificate of registration is not a public document that would be prima facie evidence of the truth of facts
contained therein. On its face, it only certifies that the applicant had submitted himself or herself to registration. Therefore, there is no
presumption of alienage of the declarant. This is especially so where the declarant has in fact been a natural-born Filipino all along and
never lost his or her status as such.[23]

Thus, obtaining an ACR by Limkaichongs mother was not tantamount to a repudiation of her original citizenship. Neither did it result in an
acquisition of alien citizenship. In a string of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an application for, and the holding of, an alien
certificate of registration is not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship. [24] For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of
citizenship, the same must be express.[25] Such express renunciation is lacking in this case.

Accordingly, Limkaichongs mother, being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her daughter.

Well-settled is the principle that the judgments of the HRET are beyond judicial interference. The only instance where this Court may
intervene in the exercise of its so-called extraordinary jurisdiction is upon a determination that the decision or resolution of the HRET was
rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident
use of its power to constitute a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly
constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.[26] In this case, there is no showing of any such
arbitrariness or improvidence. The HRET acted well within the sphere of its power when it dismissed thequo warranto petition.

In fine, this Court finds sufficient basis to sustain the ruling of the HRET which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of Limkaichong.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Court affirms the March 24, 2010 Decision of the HRET declaring that Limkaichong
is not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing the First District, Negros Oriental.

SO ORDERED.

BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,

vs.

VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine
citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This is the question sought to be resolved in the
present case involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.

The facts of this case are as follows:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born
in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.

On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an
application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take
the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.

In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following documents:

1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the Professional Regulations Commission showing
that Ching is a certified public accountant;

2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and

3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a member of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.

On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the successful Bar
examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of the
questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated
20 April 1999, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing
his Philippine citizenship.

The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of
majority he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An
Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother
is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he
could perfect by election upon reaching the age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must
concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the
election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The
OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"

The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of
majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec.
of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s.
1953). But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time.

In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would
already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances
surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase
"reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking
his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.

On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his
Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:

1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;

2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school records and other official documents;

3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens;

4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;

5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;

6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625;

7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a notary public;

8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of
the Philippines;

9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and

10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.

Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is whether he has elected
Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time
he took the bar examination.

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the
father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine
citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this
recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January
17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It
should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should
not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935
Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge
under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution. 8

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that
should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born
of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by
the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The
said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines."

However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine
citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of
majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of
Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time
period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for
electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States
Government to the effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. 10 The
phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching
the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We
said:

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and that the
Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional
provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has
always considered himself a Filipino. 13

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16, 1944. His election
of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he
had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority." 14

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with
the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority.
Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any
reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that
the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a
certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as
the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as informal election of
citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:

And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of
suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that
Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old),
Esteban was already participating in the elections and campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show
his preference for Philippine citizenship. 16

Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very different from those in the
present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, EstebanMallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and
the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A.
No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as
correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was
already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary
to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co
vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic,
L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief
that he is a non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled. 17

The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, 18 where we held:

We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.

In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of
the Court, we held:

Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52:
emphasis supplied)

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.

For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be excepted to have elected Philippine citizenship as they
were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.

xxx xxx xxx

The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those
already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a
profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time,
running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations for these persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a
national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).

We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only have been
superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? 19

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the special circumstances in
the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling
statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching
failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of
majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the
requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his
election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and
painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and,
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election
cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when
convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he
should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect
Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine
Bar.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CHULE Y. LIM, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court stemmed from a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court filed by respondent Chule Y. Lim with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4, docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
4933.

In her petition, respondent claimed that she was born on October 29, 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered in Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to Iligan City. She alleged that both her
Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous entries, and prays that they be corrected.

The trial court then issued an Order,[1] which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, let the hearing of this case be set on December 27, 1999 before
this Court, Hall of Justice, Rosario Heights, Tubod, Iligan City at 8:30 oclock in the afternoon at which date, place and time any interested
person may appear and show cause why the petition should not be granted.

Let this order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Iligan and the Province of Lanao del Norte once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of the petitioner.

Furnish copies of this order the Office of the Solicitor General at 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Vill., Makati City and the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Iligan City at Quezon Ave., Pala-o, Iligan City.

SO ORDERED.

During the hearing, respondent testified thus:

First, she claims that her surname Yu was misspelled as Yo. She has been using Yu in all her school records and in her marriage
certificate.[2] She presented a clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) [3] to further show the consistency in her use of the
surname Yu.

Second, she claims that her fathers name in her birth record was written as Yo Diu To (Co Tian) when it should have been Yu Dio To (Co
Tian).

Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her father and mother never got
married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter attests to the fact
that she is a Filipino citizen.

Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when she should have been described as
illegitimate considering that her parents were never married.

Placida Anto, respondents mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as her parents were both Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that
she and her daughters father were never married because the latter had a prior subsisting marriage contracted in China.

In this connection, respondent presented a certification attested by officials of the local civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte that there is no record of marriage between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the present.

The Republic, through the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, did not present any evidence although it actively participated in the proceedings by
attending hearings and cross-examining respondent and her witnesses.

On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted respondents petition and rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, to set the records of the petitioner straight and in their proper perspective, the petition is
granted and the Civil Registrar of Iligan City is directed to make the following corrections in the birth records of the petitioner, to wit:

1. Her family name from YO to YU;

2. Her fathers name from YO DIU TO (CO TIAN) to YU DIOTO (CO TIAN);

3. Her status from legitimate to illegitimate by changing YES to NO in answer to the question LEGITIMATE?; and,

4. Her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino.

SO ORDERED.[4]

The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial courts decision. [5]

Hence, this petition on the following assigned errors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE CORRECTION OF THE CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT CHULE Y. LIM FROM
CHINESE TO FILIPINO DESPITE THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT NEVER DEMONSTRATED ANY COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTION OF CITIZENSHIP.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO CONTINUE USING HER FATHERS SURNAME DESPITE ITS
FINDING THAT RESPONDENT IS AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD.[6]

To digress, it is just as well that the Republic did not cite as error respondents recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to effect what
indisputably are substantial corrections and changes in entries in the civil register. To clarify, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary
or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is
adversary. This is our ruling in Republic v. Valencia[7] where we held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the
true facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts
have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and
where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. [8]

As likewise observed by the Court of Appeals, we take it that the Republics failure to cite this error amounts to a recognition that this case
properly falls under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court considering that the proceeding can be appropriately classified as adversarial.

Instead, in its first assignment of error, the Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of electing
Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the
age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. [9] Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines.[10]

Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not
apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were
never married. As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By
being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino
since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.

In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the Bar,[11] citing In re Florencio Mallare,[12] we held:

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on
him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs.
Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the
citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled. [13]

This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. She registered as
a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old. [14] The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. [15]

In its second assignment of error, the Republic assails the Court of Appeals decision in allowing respondent to use her fathers surname
despite its finding that she is illegitimate.

The Republics submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use her fathers surname. What it did allow was
the correction of her fathers misspelled surname which she has been using ever since she can remember. In this regard, respondent does
not need a court pronouncement for her to use her fathers surname.

We agree with the Court of Appeals when it held:

Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old. To bar her at this time from using her fathers surname which she has used for four decades
without any known objection from anybody, would only sow confusion. Concededly, one of the reasons allowed for changing ones name or
surname is to avoid confusion.

Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, the law regulating the use of aliases, a person is allowed to use a name by which
he has been known since childhood.

Thirdly, the Supreme Court has already addressed the same issue. In Pabellar v. Rep. of the Phils.,[16] we held:

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, which regulates the use of aliases, allows a person to use a name by which he has been known
since childhood (Lim Hok Albano v. Republic, 104 Phil. 795; People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679; Republic v. Taada, infra). Even legitimate
children cannot enjoin the illegitimate children of their father from using his surname (De Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84 Phil. 222).[17]

While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname, [18] there is no such requirement for the continued use of a surname
which a person has already been using since childhood.[19]

The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the
extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that
is involved or to the community in general.[20] In this case, the Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China would probably be
prejudiced or be the object of future mischief. In respondents case, the change in the surname that she has been using for 40 years would
even avoid confusion to her community in general.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
68893 dated May 29, 2002, is AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the Civil Registrar of Iligan City is DIRECTED to make the following corrections in
the birth record of respondent Chule Y. Lim, to wit:

1. Her family name from YO to YU;

2. Her fathers name from YO DIU TO (CO TIAN) to YU DIOTO (CO TIAN);

3. Her status from legitimate to illegitimate by changing YES to NO in answer to the question LEGITIMATE?; and,

4. Her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino.

SO ORDERED.
BALGAMELO CABILING MA, FELIX CABILING MA, JR., andVALERIANO CABILING MA, -versus-

COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARTHEL B. CARONOGAN, ASSOCIATE

COMMISSIONER JOSE DL. CABOCHAN, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER TEODORO B. DELARMENTE AND ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, in their capacities as Chairman and Members of the Board of Commissioners (Bureau of
Immigration), and MAT G. CATRAL

July 26, 2010

PEREZ, J.:

Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father, who executed an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the government upon reaching the age of majority, but who failed to immediately file the
documents of election with the nearest civil registry, be considered foreign nationals subject to deportation as undocumented aliens for
failure to obtain alien certificates of registration?

Positioned upon the facts of this case, the question is translated into the inquiry whether or not the omission negates their rights to Filipino
citizenship as children of a Filipino mother, and erase the years lived and spent as Filipinos.

The resolution of these questions would significantly mark a difference in the lives of herein petitioners.

The Facts

Balgamelo Cabiling Ma (Balgamelo), Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr. (Felix, Jr.), Valeriano Cabiling Ma (Valeriano), Lechi Ann Ma (Lechi Ann), Arceli
Ma (Arceli), Nicolas Ma (Nicolas), and Isidro Ma (Isidro) are the children of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, [1] a Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona
Cabiling, a Filipina.[2]

Records reveal that petitioners Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born under aegis of the 1935 Philippine Constitution in the years
1948, 1951, and 1957, respectively.[3]

They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for almost sixty (60) years; they spent their whole lives, studied and
received their primary and secondary education in the country; they do not speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in
Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their father; they have not even traveled abroad; and they have already raised their respective
families in the Philippines.[4]

During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration (ACRs). [5]

Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship in accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the
1935 Constitution, which provides that (t)hose whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship are citizens of the Philippines. Thus, on 15 August 1969, Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and took his oath of allegiance before then Judge Jose L. Gonzalez, Municipal Judge, Surigao, Surigao del Norte.[6] On 14
January 1972, Balgamelo did the same before Atty. Patrocinio C. Filoteo, Notary Public, Surigao City, Surigao del Norte.[7] In 1978,
Valeriano took his oath of allegiance before then Judge Salvador C. Sering, City Court ofSurigao City, the fact of which the latter attested to
in his Affidavit of 7 March 2005.[8]

Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the necessary documents registered in the
civil registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625 (An Act Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect
Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen). It was only on 27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30)
years after they elected Philippine citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so. [9] On the other hand, there is no showing that Valeriano
complied with the registration requirement.

Individual certifications[10] all dated 3 January 2005 issued by the Office of the City Election Officer, Commission on Elections, Surigao City,
show that all of them are registered voters of Barangay Washington, Precinct No. 0015A since June 1997, and that records on previous
registrations are no longer available because of the mandatory general registration every ten (10) years. Moreover, aside from exercising
their right of suffrage, Balgamelo is one of the incumbentBarangay Kagawads in Barangay Washington, Surigao City.[11]

Records further reveal that Lechi Ann and Arceli were born also in Surigao City in 1953[12] and 1959,[13] respectively. The Office of the City
Civil Registrar issued a Certification to the effect that the documents showing that Arceli elected Philippine citizenship on 27 January
1986 were registered in its Office on 4 February 1986. However, no other supporting documents appear to show that Lechi Ann initially
obtained an ACR nor that she subsequently elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Likewise, no document exists
that will provide information on the citizenship of Nicolas and Isidro.

The Complaint
On 16 February 2004, the Bureau of Immigration received the Complaint-Affidavit[14] of a certain Mat G. Catral (Mr. Catral), alleging that
Felix (Yao Kong) Ma and his seven (7) children are undesirable and overstaying aliens. Mr. Catral, however, did not participate in the
proceedings, and the Ma family could not but believe that the complaint against them was politically motivated because they strongly
supported a candidate in Surigao City in the 2004 National and Local Elections.[15]

On 9 November 2004, the Legal Department of the Bureau of Immigration charged them for violation of Sections 37(a)(7) [16] and 45(e)[17] of
Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. The Charge Sheet[18] docketed as
BSI-D.C. No. AFF-04-574 (OC-STF-04-09/23-1416) reads, in part:

That Respondents x x x, all Chinese nationals, failed and continuously failed to present any valid document to show their respective status
in the Philippines. They likewise failed to produce documents to show their election of Philippines (sic) citizenship, hence, undocumented
and overstaying foreign nationals in the country.

That respondents, being aliens, misrepresent themselves as Philippine citizens in order to evade the requirements of the immigration laws.

Ruling of the Board of Commissioners, Bureau of Immigration

After Felix Ma and his seven (7) children were afforded the opportunity to refute the allegations, the Board of Commissioners (Board) of the
Bureau of Immigration (BI), composed of the public respondents, rendered a Judgment dated 2 February 2005 finding that Felix Ma and his
children violated Commonwealth Act No. 613, Sections 37(a)(7) and 45(e) in relation to BI Memorandum Order Nos. ADD-01-031 and ADD-
01-035 dated 6 and 22 August 2001, respectively.[19]

The Board ruled that since they elected Philippine citizenship after the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 625, which was approved on 7
June 1941,they were governed by the following rules and regulations:

1. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, providing that the election of Philippine citizenship embodied in a statement sworn before any
officer authorized to administer oaths and the oath of allegiance shall be filed with the nearest civil registry; [20] and Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID, now Bureau of Immigration [BI]) Circular dated 12 April 1954,[21] detailing the procedural requirements in
the registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.

2. Memorandum Order dated 18 August 1956[22] of the CID, requiring the filing of a petition for the cancellation of their alien certificate of
registration with the CID, in view of their election of Philippine citizenship;

3. Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 182, 19 August 1982; and DOJ Guidelines, 27 March 1985, requiring that the records of the
proceedings be forwarded to the Ministry (now the Department) of Justice for final determination and review. [23]

As regards the documentation of aliens in the Philippines, Administrative Order No. 1-93 of the Bureau of Immigration[24] requires that ACR,
E-series, be issued to foreign nationals who apply for initial registration, finger printing and issuance of an ACR in accordance with the Alien
Registration Act of 1950.[25]According to public respondents, any foreign national found in possession of an ACR other than the E-series
shall be considered improperly documented aliens and may be proceeded against in accordance with the Immigration Act of 1940 or the
Alien Registration Act of 1950, as amended.[26]

Supposedly for failure to comply with the procedure to prove a valid claim to Philippine citizenship via election proceedings, public
respondents concluded that Felix, Jr. Balgamelo, Arceli, Valeriano and Lechi Ann are undocumented and/or improperly documented
aliens.[27]

Nicolas and Isidro, on the other hand, did not submit any document to support their claim that they are Philippine citizens. Neither did they
present any evidence to show that they are properly documented aliens. For these reasons, public respondents likewise deemed
them undocumented and/or improperly documented aliens.[28]

The dispositive portion[29] of the Judgment of 2 February 2005 reads:

1. Subject to the submission of appropriate clearances, summary deportation of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma,
Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma, Taiwanese [Chinese], under C.A. No. 613, Sections 37(a)(7), 45(e) and
38 in relation to BI M.O. Nos. ADD-01-031 and ADD-01-035 dated 6 and 22 August 2001, respectively;

2. Issuance of a warrant of deportation against Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma,
Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma under C.A. No. 613, Section 37(a);
3. Inclusion of the names of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma
and Isidro Ma in the Immigration Blacklist; and

4. Exclusion from the Philippines of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma,
Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma under C.A. No. 613, Section 29(a)(15). (Emphasis supplied.)

In its Resolution[30] of 8 April 2005, public respondents partially reconsidered their Judgment of 2 February 2005. They were convinced that
Arceli is an immigrant under Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section 13(g). [31] However, they denied the Motion for Reconsideration with
respect to Felix Ma and the rest of his children.[32]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On 3 May 2005, only Balgamelo, Felix, Jr., and Valeriano filed the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure before the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 89532. They sought the nullification of the issuances of the
public respondents, to wit: (1) the Judgment dated 2 February 2005, ordering the summary deportation of the petitioners, issuance of a
warrant of deportation against them, inclusion of their names in the Immigration Blacklist, and exclusion of the petitioners from the
Philippines; and (2) the Resolution dated 8 April 2005, denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition [33] after finding that the petitioners failed to comply with the exacting
standards of the law providing for the procedure and conditions for their continued stay in the Philippines either as aliens or as its
nationals.[34]

On 29 May 2008, it issued a Resolution[35] denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated 20 September 2007.

To reiterate, a persons continued and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, his being a registered voter or an elected public official cannot
vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election. The
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is
to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. The constitutional
mandate concerning citizenship must be adhered to strictly. Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be
claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to
such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. [36]

Our Ruling

The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. The mandate states:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) xxx;

xxxx

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. [37]

In 1941, Commonwealth Act No. 625 was enacted. It laid down the manner of electing Philippine citizenship, to wit:

Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), Section 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be
expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be
filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution
and the Government of the Philippines.
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil
registry.

In Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching,[38] we determined the meaning of the period of election described by
phrase upon reaching the age of majority. Our references were the Civil Code of the Philippines, the opinions of the Secretary of Justice,
and the case of Cueco v. Secretary of Justice.[39] We pronounced:

x x x [T]he 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be
made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made upon reaching the age of majority. The age of majority then
commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years.[40] In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of
Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the
Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made within a reasonable time after attaining
the age of majority.[41] The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the elections should be made within three (3) years
from reaching the age of majority.[42] However, we held inCue[n]co vs. Secretary of Justice,[43] that the three (3) year period is not an
inflexible rule. We said:

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice
has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above,
which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.

However, we cautioned in Cue[n]co that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite.

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship
was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of
majority. It is clear that said election has not been made upon reaching the age of majority. [44]

We reiterated the above ruling in Go, Sr. v. Ramos,[45] a case in which we adopted the findings of the appellate court that the father of the
petitioner, whose citizenship was in question, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within the reasonable period of three (3) years upon
reaching the age of majority; and that the belated submission to the local civil registry of the affidavit of election and oath of allegiance x x x
was defective because the affidavit of election was executed after the oath of allegiance, and the delay of several years before their filing
with the proper office was not satisfactorily explained.[46]

In both cases, we ruled against the petitioners because they belatedly complied with all the requirements. The acts of election and their
registration with the nearest civil registry were all done beyond the reasonable period of three years upon reaching the age of majority.

The instant case presents a different factual setting. Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of
majority. It was only the registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done.

We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed
to complete the statutory requirements for such election.

Such conclusion, contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, is in line with our decisions in In Re:Florencio Mallare,[47] Co v. Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives,[48] and Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching.[49]

In Mallare, Estebans exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age was deemed to be a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship.[50] The Court of Appeals, however, said that the case cannot support herein petitioners cause, pointing out that, unlike petitioner,
Esteban is a natural child of a Filipina, hence, no other act would be necessary to confer on him the rights and privileges of a Filipino
citizen,[51] and that Esteban was born in 1929[52] prior to the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of Commonwealth Act No.
625.[53]

In the Co case, Jose Ong, Jr. did more than exercise his right of suffrage, as he established his life here in the Philippines.[54] Again, such
circumstance, while similar to that of herein petitioners, was not appreciated because it was ruled that any election of Philippine citizenship
on the part of Ong would have resulted in absurdity, because the law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship for him [55] as,
apparently, while he was still a minor, a certificate of naturalization was issued to his father. [56]

In Ching, it may be recalled that we denied his application for admission to the Philippine Bar because, in his case, all the requirements, to
wit: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3)
registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry were complied with only fourteen (14) years after he
reached the age of majority. Ching offered no reason for the late election of Philippine citizenship. [57]
In all, the Court of Appeals found the petitioners argument of good faith and informal election unacceptable and held:

Their reliance in the ruling contained in Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, [which was decided on 1
October 1999], is obviously flawed. It bears emphasis that the Supreme Court, in said case, did not adopt the doctrine laid down in In Re:
Florencio Mallare. On the contrary, the Supreme Court was emphatic in pronouncing that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e.,
his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected
public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by election.[58]

We are not prepared to state that the mere exercise of suffrage, being elected public official, continuous and uninterrupted stay in
the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship can take the place of election of citizenship. What we now
say is that where, as in petitioners case, the election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the constitutional and
statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of election beyond the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of
citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done. The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by
the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine
citizenship.

For what purpose is registration?

In Pascua v. Court of Appeals,[59] we elucidated the principles of civil law on registration:

To register is to record or annotate. American and Spanish authorities are unanimous on the meaning of the term to register as to enter in a
register; to record formally and distinctly; to enroll; to enter in a list. [60] In general, registration refers to any entry made in the books of the
registry, including both registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation, annotation, and even the marginal notes. In strict
acceptation, it pertains to the entry made in the registry which records solemnly and permanently the right of ownership and other real
rights.[61] Simply stated, registration is made for the purpose of notification.[62]

Actual knowledge may even have the effect of registration as to the person who has knowledge thereof. Thus, [i]ts purpose is to give notice
thereof to all persons (and it) operates as a notice of the deed, contract, or instrument to others. [63] As pertinent is the holding that
registration neither adds to its validity nor converts an invalid instrument into a valid one between the parties. [64] It lays emphasis on the
validity of an unregistered document.

Comparable jurisprudence may be consulted.

In a contract of partnership, we said that the purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties; that failure to register the contract does
not affect the liability of the partnership and of the partners to third persons; and that neither does such failure affect the partnerships
juridical personality.[65] An unregistered contract of partnership is valid as among the partners, so long as it has the essential requisites,
because the main purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties, and it can be assumed that the members themselves knew of the
contents of their contract.[66] The non-registration of a deed of donation does not also affect its validity. Registration is not a requirement for
the validity of the contract as between the parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons.[67]

Likewise relevant is the pronouncement that registration is not a mode of acquiring a right. In an analogous case involving an unrecorded
deed of sale, we reiterated the settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.

Registration does not confer ownership. It is not a mode of acquiring dominion, but only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with
notice to the world at large.[68]

Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case, registration is the confirmation of election as such
election. It is not the registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer
Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed.

Indeed, we even allow the late registration of the fact of birth and of marriage. [69] Thus, has it been admitted through existing rules that the
late registration of the fact of birth of a child does not erase the fact of birth. Also, the fact of marriage cannot be declared void solely
because of the failure to have the marriage certificate registered with the designated government agency.

Notably, the petitioners timely took their oath of allegiance to the Philippines. This was a serious undertaking. It was commitment and fidelity
to the state coupled with a pledge to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance to any other state. This was unqualified acceptance of
their identity as a Filipino and the complete disavowal of any other nationality.
Petitioners have passed decades of their lives in the Philippines as Filipinos. Their present status having been formed by their past,
petitioners can no longer have any national identity except that which they chose upon reaching the age of reason.

Corollary to this fact, we cannot agree with the view of the Court of Appeals that since the ACR presented by the petitioners are no longer
valid on account of the new requirement to present an E-series ACR, they are deemed not properly documented.[70] On the contrary,
petitioners should not be expected to secure E-series ACR because it would be inconsistent with the election of citizenship and its
constructive registration through their acts made public, among others, their exercise of suffrage, election as public official, and continued
and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines since birth. The failure to register as aliens is, obviously, consistent with petitioners election of
Philippine citizenship.

The leanings towards recognition of the citizenship of children of Filipino mothers have been indicated not alone by the jurisprudence that
liberalized the requirement on time of election, and recognized positive acts of Philippine citizenship.

The favor that is given to such children is likewise evident in the evolution of the constitutional provision on Philippine citizenship.

Thus, while the 1935 Constitution requires that children of Filipino mothers elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching their age of
majority,[71] upon the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, they automatically become Filipinos [72] and need not elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. The 1973 provision reads:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) xxx.

(2) Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines.[73]

Better than the relaxation of the requirement, the 1987 Constitution now classifies them as natural-born citizens upon election of Philippine
citizenship.Thus, Sec. 2, Article IV thereof provides:

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof [74] shall
be deemed natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied.)

The constitutional bias is reflected in the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.

MR. CONCEPCION. x x x.

xxxx

x x x x As regards those born of Filipino mothers, the 1935 Constitution merely gave them the option to choose Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority, even, apparently, if the father were an alien or unknown. Upon the other hand, under the 1973 Constitution,
children of mixed marriages involving an alien father and a Filipino mother are Filipino citizens, thus liberalizing the counterpart provision in
the 1935 Constitution by dispensing with the need to make a declaration of intention upon reaching the age of majority. I understand that
the committee would further liberalize this provision of the 1935 Constitution. The Committee seemingly proposes to further liberalize the
policy of the 1935 Constitution by making those who became citizens of the Philippines through a declaration of intention to choose their
mothers citizenship upon reaching the majority age by declaring that such children are natural-born citizens of the Philippines.[75]

xxxx

xxx Why does the draft resolution adopt the provision of the 1973 Constitution and not that of the 1935? [76]

xxxx
FR. BERNAS. x x x Precisely, the reason behind the modification of the 1935 rule on citizenship was a recognition of the fact that it reflected
a certain male chauvinism, and it was for the purpose of remedying that this proposed provision was put in. The idea was that we should not
penalize the mother of a child simply because she fell in love with a foreigner. Now, the question on what citizenship the child would prefer
arises. We really have no way of guessing the preference of the infant. But if we recognize the right of the child to choose, then let him
choose when he reaches the age of majority. I think dual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws
on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country
is something completely beyond our control. But certainly it is within the jurisdiction of the Philippine government to require that [at] a certain
point, a child be made to choose. But I do not think we should penalize the child before he is even able to choose. I would, therefore,
support the retention of the modification made in 1973 of the male chauvinistic rule of the 1935 Constitution. [77]

xxxx

MR. REGALADO. With respect to a child who became a Filipino citizen by election, which the Committee is now planning to consider a
natural-born citizen, he will be so the moment he opts for Philippine citizenship. Did the Committee take into account the fact that at the time
of birth, all he had was just an inchoate right to choose Philippine citizenship, and yet, by subsequently choosing Philippine citizenship, it
would appear that his choice retroacted to the date of his birth so much so that under the Gentlemans proposed amendment, he would be a
natural-born citizen?[78]

FR. BERNAS. But the difference between him and the natural-born who lost his status is that the natural-born who lost his status, lost it
voluntarily; whereas, this individual in the situation contemplated in Section 1, paragraph 3 never had the chance to choose. [79]

xxxx

[on the period within which to elect Philippine citizenship]

MR. RODRIGO. [T]his provision becomes very, very important because his election of Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino
citizen but a natural-born Filipino citizen, entitling him to run for Congress, to be a Justice of the Supreme Court x x x.[80]

We are guided by this evolvement from election of Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority under the 1935 Philippine
Constitution todispensing with the election requirement under the 1973 Philippine Constitution to express classification of these children as
natural-born citizens under the 1987 Constitution towards the conclusion that the omission of the 1941 statutory requirement of registration
of the documents of election should not result in the obliteration of the right to Philippine citizenship.

Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected
Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and
resultingly negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the
imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any. The documents they submitted supporting their allegations that they have already
registered with the civil registry, although belatedly, should be examined for validation purposes by the appropriate agency, in this case, the
Bureau of Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the administrative orders and other issuances of the Bureau of Immigration and the
Department of Justice shall be complied with within a reasonable time.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007, and the Resolution dated 29 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
89532 affirming the Judgment dated 2 February 2005, and the Resolution dated 8 April 2005 of the Bureau of Immigration in BSI-D.C. No.
AFF-04-574 OC-STF-04-09/23-1416 are hereby SET ASIDE with respect to petitioners Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr., and
Valeriano Cabiling Ma. Petitioners are given ninety (90) days from notice within which to COMPLY with the requirements of the Bureau of
Immigration embodied in its Judgment of 2 February 2005. The Bureau of Immigration shall ENSURE that all requirements, including the
payment of their financial obligations to the state, if any, have been complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative
fines; REVIEW the documents submitted by the petitioners; and ACT thereon in accordance with the decision of this Court.

SO ORDERED.

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, -versus-

NORA FE SAGUN

February 15, 2012

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, seeking the reversal
of the April 3, 2009 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, of Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Case No. 17-R. The RTC granted
the petition[2] filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun entitled In re: Judicial Declaration of Election of Filipino Citizenship, Nora Fe Sagun v. The
Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
The facts follow:

Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8,
1959 in Baguio City[3] and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting
married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance [4] to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty.
Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.

Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denied due to the citizenship of her father
and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial
declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same
on her birth certificate.

In her petition, respondent averred that she was raised as a Filipino, speaks Ilocano and Tagalog fluently and attended local schools in
Baguio City, including Holy Family Academy and the Saint Louis University. Respondent claimed that despite her part-Chinese ancestry,
she always thought of herself as a Filipino. She is a registered voter of Precinct No. 0419A of Barangay Manuel A. Roxas in Baguio City
and had voted in local and national elections as shown in the Voter Certification [5] issued by Atty. Maribelle Uminga of the Commission on
Elections of Baguio City.

She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her
record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.

On August 7, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines and
authorized the City Prosecutor of Baguio City to appear in the above mentioned case.[6] However, no comment was filed by the City
Prosecutor.

After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision on April 3, 2009 granting the petition and declaring respondent a
Filipino citizen. Thefallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y Chan is hereby DECLARED [a] FILIPINO CITIZEN,
having chosen or elected Filipino citizenship.

Upon payment of the required fees, the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City is hereby directed to annotate [on] her birth certificate, this
judicial declaration of Filipino citizenship of said petitioner.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[7]

Contending that the lower court erred in so ruling, petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed the instant recourse via a petition for review
on certiorari before us.Petitioner raises the following issues:

Whether or not an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is procedurally and jurisdictionally permissible; and,

II

Whether or not an election of Philippine citizenship, made twelve (12) years after reaching the age of majority, is considered to have been
made within a reasonable time as interpreted by jurisprudence. [8]

Petitioner argues that respondents petition before the RTC was improper on two counts: for one, law and jurisprudence clearly contemplate
no judicial action or proceeding for the declaration of Philippine citizenship; and for another, the pleaded registration of the oath of
allegiance with the local civil registry and its annotation on respondents birth certificate are the ministerial duties of the registrar; hence, they
require no court order. Petitioner asserts that respondents petition before the trial court seeking a judicial declaration of her election of
Philippine citizenship undeniably entails a determination and consequent declaration of her status as a Filipino citizen which is not allowed
under our legal system. Petitioner also argues that if respondents intention in filing the petition is ultimately to have her oath of allegiance
registered with the local civil registry and annotated on her birth certificate, then she does not have to resort to court proceedings.

Petitioner further argues that even assuming that respondents action is sanctioned, the trial court erred in finding respondent as having duly
elected Philippine citizenship since her purported election was not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and was not made
within a reasonable time.Petitioner points out that while respondent executed an oath of allegiance before a notary public, there was no
affidavit of her election of Philippine citizenship.Additionally, her oath of allegiance which was not registered with the nearest local civil
registry was executed when she was already 33 years old or 12 years after she reached the age of majority. Accordingly, it was made
beyond the period allowed by law.

In her Comment,[9] respondent avers that notwithstanding her failure to formally elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority,
she has in fact effectively elected Filipino citizenship by her performance of positive acts, among which is the exercise of the right of
suffrage. She claims that she had voted and participated in all local and national elections from the time she was of legal age. She also
insists that she is a Filipino citizen despite the fact that her election of Philippine citizenship was delayed and unregistered.

In reply,[10] petitioner argues that the special circumstances invoked by respondent, like her continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines, her having been educated in schools in the country, her choice of staying here despite the naturalization of her parents as
American citizens, and her being a registered voter, cannot confer on her Philippine citizenship as the law specifically provides the
requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether respondents petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is
sanctioned by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence; (2) whether respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with
the procedure prescribed by law.

The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions, final resolutions and orders of the RTC may be
taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants.
On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put,
when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is a question of law. [11]
In the present case, petitioner assails the propriety of the decision of the trial court declaring respondent a Filipino citizen after finding that
respondent was able to substantiate her election of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner contends that respondents petition for judicial declaration
of election of Philippine citizenship is procedurally and jurisdictionally impermissible. Verily, petitioner has raised questions of law as the
resolution of these issues rest solely on what the law provides given the attendant circumstances.

In granting the petition, the trial court stated:

This Court believes that petitioner was able to fully substantiate her petition regarding her election of Filipino citizenship, and the Local Civil
Registrar of Baguio City should be ordered to annotate in her birth certificate her election of Filipino citizenship. This Court adds that the
petitioners election of Filipino citizenship should be welcomed by this country and people because the petitioner has the choice to elect
citizenship of powerful countries like the United States of America and China, however, petitioner has chosen Filipino citizenship because
she grew up in this country, and has learned to love the Philippines. Her choice of electing Filipino citizenship is, in fact, a testimony that
many of our people still wish to live in the Philippines, and are very proud of our country.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y Chan is hereby DECLARED as FILIPINO CITIZEN,
having chosen or elected Filipino citizenship. [12]

For sure, this Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual.[13] There is no specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given
person is part of our citizenry.[14] This was our ruling in Yung Uan Chu v. Republic[15] citing the early case of Tan v. Republic of the
Philippines,[16] where we clearly stated:

Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for
settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said
right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties
to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond
judicial power. x x x

Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondents Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not
within the courts competence.

As to the propriety of respondents petition seeking a judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship, it is imperative that we
determine whether respondent is required under the law to make an election and if so, whether she has complied with the procedural
requirements in the election of Philippine citizenship.

When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution, which declares as citizens of the
Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1,
Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxxx

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect
Philippine citizenship was recognized in the1973 Constitution when it provided that [t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five are citizens of the Philippines.[17] Likewise, this recognition by the 1973
Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that [t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are Philippine citizens. [18] It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987
Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in
the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old
charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity
of the new Constitution.[19]

Being a legitimate child, respondents citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she
elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children
are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. [20] An illegitimate child of Filipina need not perform any act to confer
upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. [21] But in the case
of respondent, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.

Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625,[22] enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that
should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship, to wit:

Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), [S]ection 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be
expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be
filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution
and the Government of the Philippines.

Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the
nearest civil registry.[23]

Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under C.A. No. 625 unless the party exercising the right
of election has complied with the requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be required to register as
an alien.[24] Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship is required to file a petition with the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration based on his aforesaid election of
Philippine citizenship and said Office will initially decide, based on the evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said
election.[25] Afterwards, the same is elevated to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and review. [26]
It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of
election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation or
correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the respondent.

Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial courts conclusion that respondent duly elected Philippine
citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably show that respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid
election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary
evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years after she
reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondents oath
of allegiance suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and was not registered
with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that
the election should be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. [27] Moreover, there was no satisfactory
explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the nearest local civil registry.

Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid and effective
election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing
exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to
seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine
citizenship. As we held in Ching,[28] the prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking
process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry.Having failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondents petition before the trial court must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 3, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Baguio City in Spcl. Pro.
Case No. 17-R is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship filed by respondent
Nora Fe Sagun is herebyDISMISSED for lack of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177721 July 3, 2007

KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION, petitioners,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA; SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG,respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

Filed on May 23, 2007 was this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioners are peoples and/or non-governmental organizations engaged in public and civic causes aimed at protecting the peoples rights
to self-governance and justice.

Respondent Executive Secretary is the head of the Office of the President and is in charge of releasing presidential appointments including
those of Supreme Court Justices.

Respondent Gregory S. Ong is allegedly the party whose appointment would fill up the vacancy in this Court.

Petitioners allege that:

On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, announced an appointment in favor of
respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of
Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The appointment was reported the following day, May 17, 2007, by the major daily publications.

On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reported that the appointment was "recalled" or "held in abeyance" by Malacaang in view of
the question relating to the citizenship of respondent Gregory S. Ong. There is no indication whatever that the appointment has been
cancelled by the Office of the President.

On May 19, 2007, the major daily publications reported that respondent Executive Secretary stated that the appointment is "still there
except that the validation of the issue is being done by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)."

Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong through respondent Executive Secretary is patently unconstitutional,
arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate
indicates his Chinese citizenship. Petitioners attached a copy of said birth certificate as Annex "H" to the petition. The birth certificate,
petitioners add, reveals that at the time of respondent Ongs birth on May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese and his mother was also
Chinese.

Petitioners invoke the Constitution:

Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower
collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines." Sec. 2 of Art. IV defines "natural-born citizens as those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship."1
Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ongs birth his father was finally granted Filipino
citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Petitioners further argue that respondent Ongs birth certificate speaks for itself and it states his nationality as "Chinese" at birth. They
invoke the Civil Code:

Article 410 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto x x x shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts therein contained." Therefore, the entry in Ongs birth certificate indicating his nationality as Chinese is prima
facie evidence of the fact that Ongs citizenship at birth is Chinese.

Article 412 of the Civil Code also provides that "[N]o entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order." Thus, as
long as Ongs birth certificate is not changed by a judicial order, the Judicial & Bar Council, as well as the whole world, is bound by what is
stated in his birth certificate.2

This birth certificate, petitioners assert, prevails over respondent Ongs new Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration
dated October 16, 1996, stating that he is a natural-born Filipino and over the opinion of then Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona that he
is a natural-born Filipino. They maintain that the Department of Justice (DOJ) does not have the power or authority to alter entries in a birth
certificate; that respondent Ongs old Identification Certificate did not declare that he is a natural-born Filipino; and that respondent Ongs
remedy is an action to correct his citizenship as it appears in his birth certificate.

Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling the appointment issued to respondent Ong as Associate Justice of
this Court.

Subsequently, on May 24, 2007, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), praying that a
TRO be issued, in accordance with the Rules of Court, to prevent and restrain respondent Executive Secretary from releasing the
appointment of respondent Ong, and to prevent and restrain respondent Ong from assuming the office and discharging the functions of
Associate Justice of this Court.

The Court required respondents to Comment on the petition.

Respondent Executive Secretary accordingly filed his Comment, essentially stating that the appointment of respondent Ong as Associate
Justice of this Court on May 16, 2007 was made by the President pursuant to the powers vested in her by Article VIII, Section 9 of the
Constitution, thus:

SEC. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and Judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

Respondent Executive Secretary added that the President appointed respondent Ong from among the list of nominees who were duly
screened by and bore the imprimatur of the JBC created under Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution. Said respondent further stated:
"The appointment, however, was not released, but instead, referred to the JBC for validation of respondent Ongs citizenship."3 To date,
however, the JBC has not received the referral.

Supporting the Presidents action and respondent Ongs qualifications, respondent Executive Secretary submits that:

1. The President did not gravely abuse her discretion as she appointed a person, duly nominated by the JBC, which passed upon the
appointees qualifications.

2. Justice Gregory S. Ong is a natural-born citizen as determined by the Bureau of Immigration and affirmed by the Department of Justice,
which have the authority and jurisdiction to make determination on matters of citizenship.

3. Undisputed evidence disclosed that respondent Ong is a natural-born citizen.

4. Petitioners are not entitled to a temporary restraining order. 4

Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, maintaining that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen; that petitioners have no
standing to file the present suit; and that the issue raised ought to be addressed to the JBC as the Constitutional body mandated to review
the qualifications of those it recommends to judicial posts. Furthermore, the petitioners in his view failed to include the President who is an
indispensable party as the one who extended the appointment.

As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces his ancestral lines to one Maria Santos of Malolos, Bulacan, born on November 25, 1881, who
was allegedly a Filipino citizen5 who married Chan Kin, a Chinese citizen; that these two had a son, Juan Santos; that in 1906 Chan Kin
died in China, as a result of which Maria Santos reverted to her Filipino citizenship; that at that time Juan Santos was a minor; that Juan
Santos thereby also became a Filipino citizen; 6 that respondent Ongs mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the daughter of the spouses Juan
Santos and Sy Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen, who were married in 1927; that, therefore, respondents mother was a Filipino citizen at birth;
that Dy Guiok Santos later married a Chinese citizen, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, thereby becoming a Chinese citizen; that when respondent
Ong was eleven years old his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was naturalized, and as a result he, his brothers and sisters, and his mother
were included in the naturalization.

Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ a certification and an identification that he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution, since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born.

Summarizing, his arguments are as follows:

I. PETITIONERS LACK OF STANDING AND INABILITY TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY WHOSE OFFICIAL ACTION IS THE
VERY ACT SOUGHT TO BE ANNULLED CONSTITUTE INSUPERABLE LEGAL OBSTACLES TO THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER
AND SHOULD PREVENT THIS CASE FROM PROCEEDING FURTHER FOR DETERMINATION ON THE MERITS BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT.

II. RESPONDENT ONG IS, IN TRUTH AND IN FACT, A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, CONSIDERING THAT:

A. DY GUIOK SANTOS WAS A FILIPINO CITIZEN AT THE TIME OF HER MARRIAGE TO EUGENIO; and
B. HAVING BEEN BORN BEFORE JANUARY 17, 1973 OF A FILIPINO MOTHER AND WHO ELECTED FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP UPON
REACHING THE AGE OF MAJORITY, RESPONDENT ONG MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER ARTICLE IV, SECTIONS 1 AND 2
OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

III. THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF RESPONDENT ONG AS PRESENTED BY PETITIONERS CAN, IN NO WAY, WITHOUT MORE,
ESTABLISH WITH FINALITY THAT HE IS A CHINESE NATIONAL, OR DISPROVE CONCLUSIVELY THAT HE IS, IN FACT, A
NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, DESCENDED FROM "INDIOS."

IV. IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR RESPONDENT ONG TO RESORT TO JUDICIAL ACTION UNDER RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF
COURT FOR HIM TO BE ABLE TO CLAIM AND ENJOY HIS RIGHTFUL STATUS AS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO.

V. THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION HAS PREEMPTIVE LEGAL AUTHORITY OR PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE JURIDICTION TO MAKE
A DETERMINATION AS REGARDS THE CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT ONG, AND UPON SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION BY THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES, ISSUE A DECLARATION (I.E., IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATE NO.
113878) RECOGNIZING THAT RESPONDENT ONG IS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, THEREBY RENDERING NONEXISTENT ANY
CONTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENT FOR HIM TO ASSUME THE POSITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT. 7

Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in which they asserted their standing to file this suit on the strength of previous decisions of
this Court, e.g., Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona8 and Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,9 on the ground that the case is one of
transcendental importance. They claim that the Presidents appointment of respondent Ong as Supreme Court Justice violates the
Constitution and is, therefore, attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Finally, they reiterate that
respondent Ongs birth certificate, unless corrected by judicial order in non-summary proceedings for the purpose, is binding on all and
is prima facie evidence of what it states, namely, that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen. The alleged naturalization of his father when he
was a minor would not make him a natural-born Filipino citizen.

The petition has merit.

First, as to standing. Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as peoples organizations and taxpayers since the matter involves an
issue of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance, namely, the qualification nay, the citizenship of a person to be appointed a
member of this Court. Standing has been accorded and recognized in similar instances. 10

Second, as to having to implead the President as an alleged necessary party. This is not necessary since the suit impleads the Executive
Secretary who is the alter ego of the President and he has in fact spoken for her in his Comment. Furthermore, the suit does not seek to
stop the President from extending the appointment but only the Executive Secretary from releasing it and respondent Ong from accepting
the same.

Third, as to the proper forum for litigating the issue of respondent Ongs qualification for memberhip of this Court. This case is a matter of
primordial importance involving compliance with a Constitutional mandate. As the body tasked with the determination of the merits of
conflicting claims under the Constitution,11 the Court is the proper forum for resolving the issue, even as the JBC has the initial competence
to do so.

Fourth, as to the principal issue of the case is respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen?

On this point, the Court takes judicial notice of the records of respondent Ongs petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar.

In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, docketed as B.E. No. 1398-N filed on September 14, 1979, under O.R. No. 8131205 of
that date, respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the Philippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen;
and that he is a Filipino citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent
Ong, was a minor of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, in support of his petition, be
submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father. His birth certificate 12 states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth
and that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese citizen.

Specifically, the following appears in the records:

PETITION

COMES now the undersigned petitioner and to this Honorable Court respectfully states:

1. That he is single/married/widower/widow, Filipino citizen and 26 years of age, having been born on May 25, 1953, at SAN JUAN RIZAL,
to spouses Eugenio Ong Han Seng and Dy Guiok Santos who are citizens of the Philippines, as evidenced by the attached copy of his birth
certificate marked as Annex A (if born outside of wedlock, state so; or if Filipino citizen other than natural born, state how and when
citizenship was acquired and attach the necessary proofs: By Nat. Case #584 of Eugenio Ong Han Seng (Father) See Attached documents
Annex B, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4.

xxx

VERIFICATION

Republic of the Philippines )

City of Manila ) S.S.

I, GREGORY SANTOS ONG, after being sworn, depose and state: that I am the petitioner in the foregoing petition; that the same was
prepared by me and/or at my instance and that the allegations contained therein are true to my knowledge.

(Sgd.) GREGORY SANTOS ONG

Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28th day of August, 1979, City of Manila, Philippines, affiant exhibiting his/her Residence
Certificate No. A-___________, issued at ________________, on __________________, 19__.

(Sgd.)
Notary Public
 Until December 31, 1979
PTR No. 3114917
January 19, 1979, Pasig, MM

Doc. No. 98;

Page No. 10;
Book No. VIII;
Series of 1979.13

In fact, Emilio R. Rebueno, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, wrote respondent Ong a letter dated October 3, 1979 stating that in
connection with his Petition for Admission to the 1979 Bar Examinations, he has to submit:

1) A certified clear copy of his Birth Certificate; and

2) A certification of non-appeal re his citizenship from the Office of the Solicitor General.

Respondent Ong complied with these requirements.

It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of naturalization that this Court allowed respondent Ong to
take the oath as a lawyer.

It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition
of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that
respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.

Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial
order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial change. In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,14 this Court held that:

Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action
depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted.15

Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary administrative proceeding to correct clerical or typographical errors in a
birth certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality. Substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the
civil registry should, therefore, be effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.16

The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ongs ancestors, by various births, marriages and
deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his
birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ongs mother, was a Filipino citizen,
contrary to what still appears in the records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as
well as his citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions.17 Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to this
Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED as one of injunction directed against respondent Gregory S. Ong, who is hereby ENJOINED from
accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming the position and discharging the functions
of that office, until he shall have successfully completed all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to
show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship.

This Decision is FINAL and IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 202809, July 02, 2014

DENNIS L. GO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the January 18, 2012
Decision1 and the July 23, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95120, which reversed and set aside the
November 18, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Manila (RTC), by dismissing, without prejudice, the petition for
naturalization filed by Dennis L. Go (petitioner).

The Facts

On October 13, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, the Revised Naturalization
Law,3 with the RTC, where it was docketed as Naturalization Case No. 03-107591.

Petitioner made the following allegations in his petition: 1] that he was born on May 7, 1982 in Manila to spouses Felix and Emma Go, both
Chinese nationals; 2] that he was of legal age, Chinese national, single, with residence address at No. 1308-1310 Oroquieta Street, Sta.
Cruz, Manila, where he had been residing since birth; 3] that he spoke English and Tagalog and has spent his elementary, secondary and
tertiary education in Philippine schools where subjects on Philippine history, government and civics were taught as part of the school
curriculum; 4] that he believed in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, was of good moral character and had conducted
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relations with the constituted
government as well as with the community; 5] that he is not opposed to organized government or is affiliated with any association or group
of persons that uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; 6] that he did not defend or teach the necessity or
propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of mens ideas; 7] that he was neither a
polygamist nor a believer in polygamy; 8] that he had never been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude and was not suffering
from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases; 9] that he was not a citizen or subject of a nation at war with the Philippines; 10]
that it was his intention in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity
to any foreign state or sovereignty, particularly to China of which he was a citizen; 11] that he would reside continuously in the Philippines
from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship; and 12] that he was exempt from the filing
of the Declaration of Intention with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) under C.A. No. 473, Section 5, as he was born in the
Philippines and received his primary, secondary and tertiary education in the country.

On September 11, 2003, the RTC set the initial hearing of his petition on August 17, 2004. In compliance with the jurisdictional requirements
under Section 9 of C.A. No. 473,4 the notice was published in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, and was posted in a conspicuous place at the Office of the Clerk of Court.

During the hearings, petitioner testified to prove his compliance with all the requirements for naturalization and presented, as witnesses, Dr.
Joseph Anlacan (Dr. Anlacan), Dr. Edward C. Tordesillas (Dr. Tordesillas), Silvino J. Ong (Ong), Teresita M. Go (Teresita), and Juan C. Go
(Juan).

Dr. Anlacan testified that based on the psychiatric examination he conducted on petitioner, he had no psychiatric abnormality at the time of
the test.5 Dr. Tordesillas, on the other hand, reported that petitioners medical examination results were normal. Ong, a friend of petitioners
family, stated that being their neighbor in Sto. Cristo Street, he had known petitioner since childhood through his association with the family
in times of celebration. Teresita claimed that she had personally known petitioner since birth because he was the son of her brother-in-law.
She described him as a peace-loving person who participated in activities sponsored by his school and the barangay. Lastly, Juan, a
businessman by profession, also claimed that he knew petitioner personally and that he had executed an Affidavit of Support in his favor.

After petitioner presented his evidence and formally offered the same,6 the Republic, through the OSG, posed no objection as to the
relevancy and competence of his documentary evidence. The OSG further manifested that it had no evidence to present and requested that
the case be submitted for decision based on petitioners evidence. 7

The OSG, however, later moved for the reopening of trial for the admission of its documentary evidence. 8 It informed the RTC that it had
received a report, dated November 23, 2006, issued by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),9 tending to prove petitioners non-
compliance with the requirements of the law on naturalization.

On April 3, 2007, petitioner manifested to the RTC that he had a clearance issued by the NBI as proof of his lack of criminal record, and that
he was not the same Dennis Go who was the subject of the NBI Investigation Report being offered in evidence by the OSG.

After the conduct of a clarificatory hearing, the RTC issued its October 24, 2008 Order10 admitting the evidence adduced by both parties,
but denying the motion of the OSG to re-open trial.

On November 18, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision granting the petition for naturalization ruling that the petitioner possessed the
qualifications set forth by law. Among these were petitioners lack of a derogatory record, his support for an organized government, his
being in perfect health, his mingling with Filipinos since birth and his ability to speak their language, and his being a law abiding citizen. The
RTC likewise found that petitioner presented convincing evidence that he was not disqualified for naturalization as provided for under
Section 4 of C.A. No. 473.11 The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition of DENNIS L. GO for Naturalization as a Filipino Citizen is hereby GRANTED. Upon
finality of this Decision, before a Certificate of Naturalization may be issued to him pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 530, Petitioner
must take his oath of allegiance and fidelity to the Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.12

Not in conformity, the OSG moved for reconsideration and the re-opening of trial for the second time. This time, it sought to be admitted, as
evidence, a background investigation report13 issued by the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) stating the following reasons to oppose the
petition, among others: that petitioners parents remained as Chinese citizens up to the present; that petitioners aunt arrogantly refused to
allow them to engage in an interview while at their residence; and that the retail business of petitioners family must be subjected to an
investigation for unexplained wealth and tax deficiencies.

On May 18, 2009, after an exchange of pleadings by the parties, the RTC denied the OSGs motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

On appeal to the CA, the OSG raised the following arguments:

1) Evidence proving that petitioner did not possess the qualifications or was disqualified from acquiring
Philippine citizenship may be received anytime prior to the finality of judgment granting the application
for naturalization;

2) Petitioner failed to prove that he had all the qualifications entitling him to the grant of Philippine
citizenship;

3) Petitioner failed to prove that his witnesses were credible;

4) Petitioners character witnesses failed to prove that he had all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for the grant of Philippine citizenship; and
5) Failure to state all former places of residence was fatal to petitioners application for naturalization.

Petitioner countered that the RTC correctly denied the OSGs motion for reconsideration as it was given several opportunities to present its
evidence and oppose the petition, but did not. The OSG may not file a motion for the purpose of re-opening the case on a piece-meal basis
on the pretext that the government could, at all stages of the proceedings, raise the issue of non-compliance with naturalization laws. In any
case, the background investigation by the BOI yielded no reasonable ground to deny the petition for naturalization because the citizenship
of his parents had nothing to do with it. The RTC decision contained an exhaustive discussion showing that he possessed all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided for by law.

In its assailed decision, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed, without prejudice, the petition for naturalization.
According to the CA, while there was sufficient evidence from which petitioners ability to write English or any of the principal Philippine
languages, may be inferred, he failed to adduce evidence to prove that his witnesses were credible. He was not able to prove that the
persons he presented in court had good standing in the community, known to be honest and upright, reputed to be trustworthy and reliable,
and that their word could be taken at face value, as a good warranty of his worthiness.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner insists that the findings of facts by the RTC are fully supported by the evidence extant in the records of the case, rendering its
reversal by the CA, as unwarranted and erroneous. The RTC was in a better position to examine the real evidence and observe the
demeanor of the witnesses presented.

Citizenship is personal and more or less permanent membership in a political community. It denotes possession within that particular
political community of full civil and political rights subject to special disqualifications. Reciprocally, it imposes the duty of allegiance to the
political community.14 The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in government principally
through the right to vote, the right to hold public office and the right to petition the government for redress of grievance. 15

No less than the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens.16 Among those listed are citizens by naturalization, which refers to
the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the privilege of a native-born citizen. Under the present laws, the process of
naturalization can be judicial or administrative. Judicially, C.A. No. 473 provides that after hearing the petition for citizenship and receipt of
evidence showing that the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by law, the competent court may
order the issuance of the proper naturalization certificate and the registration thereof in the proper civil registry. On the other hand, Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9139 provides that aliens born and residing in the Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by administrative
proceeding by filing a petition for citizenship with the Special Committee, which, in view of the facts before it, may approve the petition and
issue a certificate of naturalization.17 In both cases, the petitioner shall take an oath of allegiance to the Philippines as a sovereign nation.

It is a well-entrenched rule that Philippine citizenship should not easily be given away. All those seeking to acquire it must prove, to the
satisfaction of the Court, that they have complied with all the requirements of the law. 18 The reason for this requirement is simple.
Citizenship involves political status; hence, every person must be proud of his citizenship and should cherish it. Verily, a naturalization case
is not an ordinary judicial contest, to be decided in favor of the party whose claim is supported by the preponderance of the evidence.
Naturalization is not a right, but one of privilege of the most discriminating, as well as delicate and exacting nature, affecting, as it does,
public interest of the highest order, and which may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions prescribed by law therefor. 19

Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization, the application must show substantial and formal compliance with C.A. No. 473. In
other words, an applicant must comply with the jurisdictional requirements, establish his or her possession of the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications enumerated under the law, and present at least two (2) character witnesses to support his allegations. 20 In Ong v.
Republic of the Philippines,21 the Court listed the requirements for character witnesses, namely:

1. That they are citizens of the Philippines;

2. That they are credible persons;

3. That they personally know the petitioner;

4. That they personally know him to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by law;

5. That they personally know him to be a person of good repute;

6. That they personally know him to be morally irreproachable;

7. That he has, in their opinion, all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines; and

8. That he is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of the Naturalization Law.

In vouching for the good moral character of the applicant for citizenship, a witness, for purposes of naturalization, must be a credible
person as he becomes an insurer of the character of the candidate. 22 The Court, in Ong, explained:

a credible person is, to our mind, not only an individual who has not been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character
and has no police record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must be credible is not
the declaration made, but the person making it. This implies that such person must have a good standing in the community; that he is
known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a
good warranty of the worthiness of the petitioner.

In consonance with the above dictum, in Lim Ching Tian v. Republic,23 the Court explained that the law requires that a vouching witness
should have actually known an applicant for whom he testified for the requisite period prescribed therein to give him the necessary
competence to act as such. The reason behind this requirement is that a vouching witness is in a way an insurer of the character of
petitioner because on his testimony the court is of necessity compelled to rely in deciding the merits of his petition. It is, therefore,
imperative that he be competent and reliable. And he is only competent to testify on his conduct, character and moral fitness if he has had
the opportunity to observe him personally, if not intimately, during the period he has allegedly known him. The law, in effect, requires that
the character witnesses be not mere ordinary acquaintances of the applicant, but possessed of such intimate knowledge of the latter as to
be competent to testify of their personal knowledge; and that they have each one of the requisite qualifications and none of the statutory
disqualifications.

In this case, the OSG mainly harps on the petitioners failure to prove that his witnesses are credible.

The Court agrees.

The records of the case show that the joint affidavits executed by petitioners witnesses did not establish their own qualification to stand as
such in a naturalization proceeding. In turn, petitioner did not present evidence proving that the persons he presented were credible. In the
words of the CA, he did not prove that his witnesses had good standing in the community, known to be honest and upright, reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable, and that their word may be taken at face value, as a good warranty of the worthiness of petitioner. 24

While there is no showing that petitioners witnesses were of doubtful moral inclinations, there was likewise no indication that they were
persons whose qualifications were at par with the requirements of the law on naturalization. Simply put, no evidence was ever proffered to
prove the witnesses good standing in the community, honesty, moral uprightness, and most importantly, reliability. As a consequence, their
statements about the petitioner do not possess the measure of credibility demanded of in naturalization cases. This lack of credibility on
the part of the witnesses, unfortunately, weakens or renders futile petitioners claim of worthiness. An applicant for Philippine citizenship
would carefully testify as to his qualifications, placing emphasis on his good traits and character. This is expected of a person who longs to
gain benefits and advantages that Philippine citizenship bestows. Therefore, a serious assessment of an applicants witnesses, both as to
the credibility of their person and their very testimony, is an essential facet of naturalization proceedings that may not be brushed aside.

Further, petitioners witnesses only averred general statements without specifying acts or events that would exhibit petitioners traits worthy
of the grant of Philippine citizenship. For instance, a statement in their affidavits as to petitioners adherence to the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution is not evidence, per se, of petitioners agreement and zeal to Philippine ideals. These appear to be empty
declarations if not coming from credible witnesses.

It bears stressing that the CA was correct in finding that the testimonies of petitioners witnesses only proved that he mingled socially with
Filipinos. While almost all of the witnesses testified that they knew petitioner since birth and that they had interacted with petitioners family
in times of celebration, this did not satisfy the other requirements set by law, that is, a genuine desire to learn and embrace the Filipino
ideals and traditions. Besides, both the NBI and BOI reports cast doubt on petitioners alleged social interaction with Filipinos. The
background checks done on petitioner yielded negative results due to the uncooperative behavior of the members of his household. In fact,
petitioner himself disobliged when asked for an interview by BOI agents.

To the Court, this is a display of insincerity to embrace Filipino customs, traditions and ideals. This leads to the inescapable conclusion that
petitioner failed to prove that he has all the qualifications entitling him to the grant of Philippine citizenship. Filipino citizenship is predicated
upon oneness with the Filipino people. It is indispensable that an applicant for naturalization shows his identification with the Philippines as
a country deserving of his wholehearted allegiance. Until there is a positive and unequivocal showing that this is so in the case of petitioner,
the Court must selfishly decline to confer Philippine citizenship on one who remains an alien in principles and sentiment.

Finally, it is noteworthy that the OSG was correct in arguing that petitioners failure to state his former residence in the petition was fatal to
his application for naturalization. Indeed, this omission had deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Differently
stated, the inclusion of present and former places of residence in the petition is a jurisdictional requirement, without which the petition
suffers from a fatal and congenital defect which cannot be cured by evidence on the omitted matter at the trial. 25

Here, a character witness had unwittingly revealed that he and petitioner were neighbors in Sto. Cristo Street before the latters family
transferred to their declared residential address in Oroquieta Street. This proves that petitioners former residence was excluded in his
allegations contained in the published petition. In effect, there was an unpardonable lapse committed in the course of petitioners
compliance to the jurisdictional requirements set be law, rendering the trial courts decision, not only as erroneous, but void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 18, 2012 Decision and the July 23, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 95120 are AFFIRMED. As stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the dismissal is without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 197450 March 20, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LI CHING CHUNG, a.k.a. BERNABE LUNA LI, a.k.a. STEPHEN LEE KENG, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), challenges the June 30, 2011 Decision 2of the Court of Appea1s (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 93374, which affirmed the June 3, 2009 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Manila (RTC), granting the petition for
naturalization of respondent Li Ching Chung (respondent).

On August 22, 2007, respondent, otherwise known as Bernabe Luna Li or Stephen Lee Keng, a Chinese national, filed his Declaration of
Intention to Become a Citizen of the Philippines before the OSG.4

On March 12, 2008 or almost seven months after filing his declaration of intention, respondent filed his Petition for Naturalization before the
RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 08-118905.5 On April 5, 2008, respondent filed his Amended Petition for Naturalization, 6 wherein he
alleged that he was born on November 29, 1963 in Fujian Province, Peoples Republic of China, which granted the same privilege of
naturalization to Filipinos; that he came to the Philippines on March 15, 1988 via Philippine Airlines Flight PR 311 landing at the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport; that on November 19, 1989, he married Cindy Sze Mei Ngar, a British national, with whom he had four (4)
children, all born in Manila; that he had been continuously and permanently residing in the country since his arrival and is currently a
resident of Manila with prior residence in Malabon; that he could speak and write in English and Tagalog; that he was entitled to the benefit
of Section 3 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473 reducing to five (5) years the requirement under Section 2 of ten years of continuous
residence, because he knew English and Filipino having obtained his education from St. Stephens High School of Manila; and that he had
successfully established a trading general merchandise business operating under the name of "VS Marketing Corporation." 7As an
entrepreneur, he derives income more than sufficient to be able to buy a condominium unit and vehicles, send his children to private
schools and adequately provide for his family.8

In support of his application, he attached his barangay certificate,9 police clearance,10 alien certification of registration,11 immigration
certificate of residence,12 marriage contract,13 authenticated birth certificates of his children,14 affidavits of his character
witnesses,15 passport,16 2006 annual income tax return,17 declaration of intention to become a citizen of the Philippines18 and a
certification19 from the Bureau of Immigration with a list of his travel records from January 30, 1994. 20

Consequently, the petition was set for initial hearing on April 3, 2009 and its notice21 was posted in a conspicuous place at the Manila City
Hall and was published in the Official Gazette on June 30, 2008, 22 July 7, 200823 and July 14, 2008,24 and in the Manila Times,25 a
newspaper of general circulation, on May 30, 2008, 26 June 6, 200827 and June 13, 2008.28

Thereafter, respondent filed the Motion for Early Setting 29 praying that the hearing be moved from April 3, 2009 to July 31, 2008 so he could
acquire real estate properties. The OSG filed its Opposition, 30 dated August 6, 2008, arguing that the said motion for early setting was a
"clear violation of Section 1, RA 530, which provides that hearing on the petition should be held not earlier than six (6) months from the date
of last publication of the notice."31 The opposition was already late as the RTC, in its July 31, 2008 Order,32 denied respondents motion and
decreed that since the last publication in the newspaper of general circulation was on June 13, 2008, the earliest setting could only be
scheduled six (6) months later or on December 15, 2008.

On December 15, 2008, the OSG reiterated, in open court, its opposition to the early setting of the hearing and other grounds that would
merit the dismissal of the petition. Accordingly, the RTC ordered the suspension of the judicial proceedings until all the requirements of the
statute of limitation would be completed.33

The OSG filed a motion to dismiss,34 but the RTC denied the same in its Order,35 dated March 10, 2009, and reinstated the original hearing
date on April 3, 2009, as previously indicated in the notice.

Thereafter, respondent testified and presented two character witnesses, Emelita V. Roleda and Gaudencio Abalayan Manimtim, who
personally knew him since 1984 and 1998, respectively, to vouch that he was a person of good moral character and had conducted himself
in a proper and irreproachable manner during his period of residency in the country.

On June 3, 2009, the RTC granted respondents application for naturalization as a Filipino citizen. 36

The decretal portion reads:

WHEREFORE, petitioner LI CHING CHUNG a.k.a. BERNABE LUNA LI a.k.a STEPHEN LEE KENG is hereby declared a Filipino citizen by
naturalization and admitted as such.

However, pursuant to Section 1 of Republic Act No. 530, this Decision shall not become executory until after two (2) years from its
promulgation and after the Court, on proper hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his representative, is satisfied, and so
finds, that during the intervening time the applicant has: (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling
or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; (4) or committed any act prejudicial
to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.

As soon as this decision shall have become executory, as provided under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 530, the Clerk of Court of this
Branch is hereby directed to issue to the Petitioner a Naturalization Certificate, after the Petitioner shall have subscribed to an Oath, in
accordance with Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 472, as amended.

The Local Civil Registrar of the City of Manila is, likewise directed to register the Naturalization Certificate in the proper Civil Registry.

SO ORDERED.37

The OSG appealed the RTC decision to the CA.38

On June 30, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.39 The CA held that although the petition for naturalization was filed less than one (1)
year from the time of the declaration of intent before the OSG, this defect was not fatal. Moreover, contrary to the allegation of the OSG that
respondent did not present his Certificate of Arrival, the fact of his arrival could be easily confirmed from the Certification, dated August 21,
2007, issued by the Bureau of Immigration, and from the stamp in the passport of respondent indicating his arrival on January 26,
1981.40 The CA further stated that "the Republic participated in every stage of the proceedings below. It was accorded due process which it
vigorously exercised from beginning to end. Whatever procedural defects, if at all they existed, did not taint the proceedings, let alone the
Republics meaningful exercise of its right to due process." 41

Moreover, the CA noted that the OSG did not in any way question respondents qualifications and his lack of disqualifications to be admitted
as citizen of this country. Indeed, the CA was convinced that respondent was truly deserving of this privilege. 42

Hence, this petition.43

To bolster its claim for the reversal of the assailed ruling, the OSG advances this pivotal issue of

x x x whether the respondent should be admitted as a Filipino citizen despite his undisputed failure to comply with the requirements
provided for in CA No. 473, as amended which are mandatory and jurisdictional in character particularly: (i) the filing of his petition for
naturalization within the one (1) year proscribed period from the date he filed his declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen; (ii) the
failure to attach to the petition his certificate of arrival; and (iii) the failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements prescribed
by CA No. 473.44

The OSG argues that "the petition for naturalization should not be granted in view of its patent jurisdictional infirmities, particularly because:
1) it was filed within the one (1) year proscribed period from the filing of declaration of intention; 2) no certificate of arrival, which is
indispensable to the validity of the Declaration of Intention, was attached to the petition; and 3) respondents failure to comply with the
publication and posting requirements set under CA 473." 45 In particular, the OSG points out that the publication and posting requirements
were not strictly followed, specifically citing that: "(a) the hearing of the petition on 15 December 2008 was set ahead of the scheduled date
of hearing on 3 April 2009; (b) the order moving the date of hearing (Order dated 31 July 2008) was not published; and, (c) the petition was
heard within six (6) months (15 December 2008) from the last publication (on 14 July 2008)." 46

The petition is meritorious.

Section 5 of CA No. 473,47 as amended,48 expressly states:

Section 5. Declaration of intention. One year prior to the filing of his petition for admission to Philippine citizenship, the applicant for
Philippine citizenship shall file with the Bureau of Justice (now Office of the Solicitor General) a declaration under oath that it is bona fide his
intention to become a citizen of the Philippines. Such declaration shall set forth name, age, occupation, personal description, place of birth,
last foreign residence and allegiance, the date of arrival, the name of the vessel or aircraft, if any, in which he came to the Philippines, and
the place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making the declaration. No declaration shall be valid until lawful entry for permanent
residence has been established and a certificate showing the date, place, and manner of his arrival has been issued. The declarant must
also state that he has enrolled his minor children, if any, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private
Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government, and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum,
during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine
citizen. Each declarant must furnish two photographs of himself. (Emphasis supplied)

As held in Tan v. Republic,49 "the period of one year required therein is the time fixed for the State to make inquiries as to the qualifications
of the applicant. If this period of time is not given to it, the State will have no sufficient opportunity to investigate the qualifications of the
applicants and gather evidence thereon. An applicant may then impose upon the courts, as the State would have no opportunity to gather
evidence that it may present to contradict whatever evidence that the applicant may adduce on behalf of his petition." The period is
designed to give the government ample time to screen and examine the qualifications of an applicant and to measure the latters good
intention and sincerity of purpose.50 Stated otherwise, the waiting period will unmask the true intentions of those who seek Philippine
citizenship for selfish reasons alone, such as, but not limited to, those who are merely interested in protecting their wealth, as distinguished
from those who have truly come to love the Philippines and its culture and who wish to become genuine partners in nation building.

The law is explicit that the declaration of intention must be filed one year prior to the filing of the petition for naturalization. Republic v. Go
Bon Lee51 likewise decreed that substantial compliance with the requirement is inadequate. In that case, Go filed his declaration of intention
to become a citizen of the Philippines on May 23, 1940. After eleven months, he filed his petition for naturalization on April 18, 1941. In
denying his petition, the Court wrote:

The language of the law on the matter being express and explicit, it is beyond the province of the courts to take into account questions of
expediency, good faith and other similar reasons in the construction of its provisions (De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil., 289; 48 Off. Gaz.,
1787). Were we to accept the view of the lower court on this matter, there would be no good reason why a petition for naturalization cannot
be filed one week after or simultaneously with the filing of the required declaration of intention as long as the hearing is delayed to a date
after the expiration of the period of one year. The ruling of the lower court amounts, in our opinion, to a substantial change in the law,
something which courts can not do, their duty being to apply the law and not tamper with it. 52

The only exception to the mandatory filing of a declaration of intention is specifically stated in Section 6 of CA No. 473, to wit:

Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention. Persons born in the Philippines and have received their
primary and secondary education in public schools or those recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality, and
those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or more before filing their application, may be naturalized
without having to make a declaration of intention upon complying with the other requirements of this Act. To such requirements shall be
added that which establishes that the applicant has given primary and secondary education to all his children in the public schools or in
private schools recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality. The same shall be understood applicable with
respect to the widow and minor children of an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, and dies before he
is actually naturalized. (Emphases supplied)

Unquestionably, respondent does not fall into the category of such exempt individuals that would excuse him from filing a declaration of
intention one year prior to the filing of a petition for naturalization. Contrary to the CA finding, respondents premature filing of his petition for
naturalization before the expiration of the one-year period is fatal.53

Consequently, the citation of the CA of the ruling in Tam Tan v. Republic 54 is misplaced. In that case, the Court did not excuse the non-
compliance with the one-year period, but reiterated that the waiting period of one (1) year is mandatory. In reversing the grant of
naturalization to Tam Tan, the Court wrote:

The appeal is predicated on the fact that the petition for naturalization was filed (26 October 1950) before the lapse of one year from and
after the filing of a verified declaration of his bona fide intention to become a citizen (4 April 1950), in violation of Section 5 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.1wphi1

The position of the Government is well taken, because no petition for naturalization may be filed and heard and hence no decree may be
issued granting it under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, before the expiration of one year from and after the
date of the filing of a verified declaration of his bona fide intention to become a citizen of the Philippines. This is mandatory.55 Failure to
raise in the lower court the question of non-compliance therewith does not preclude the Government from raising it on appeal. 56

Nevertheless, after the one-year period, the applicant may renew his petition for naturalization and the evidence already taken or heard may
be offered anew without the necessity of bringing to court the witnesses who had testified. And the Government may introduce evidence in
support of its position.57

The decree granting the petition for naturalization is set aside, without costs.

In naturalization proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of the
law.58 The opportunity of a foreigner to become a citizen by naturalization is a mere matter of grace, favor or privilege extended to him by
the State; the applicant does not possess any natural, inherent, existing or vested right to be admitted to Philippine citizenship. The only
right that a foreigner has, to be given the chance to become a Filipino citizen, is that which the statute confers upon him; and to acquire
such right, he must strictly comply with all the statutory conditions and requirements.59 The absence of one jurisdictional requirement is fatal
to the petition as this necessarily results in the dismissal or severance of the naturalization process.
Hence, all other issues need not be discussed further as respondent failed to strictly follow the requirement mandated by the statute.

It should be emphasized that "a naturalization proceeding is so infused with public interest that it has been differently categorized and given
special treatment. x x x Unlike in ordinary judicial contest, the granting of a petition for naturalization does not preclude the reopening of that
case and giving the government another opportunity to present new evidence. A decision or order granting citizenship will not even
constitute res judicata to any matter or reason supporting a subsequent judgment cancelling the certification of naturalization already
granted, on the ground that it had been illegally or fraudulently procured. For the same reason, issues even if not raised in the lower court
may be entertained on appeal. As the matters brought to the attention of this Court x x x involve facts contained in the disputed decision of
the lower court and admitted by the parties in their pleadings, the present proceeding may be considered adequate for the purpose of
determining the correctness or incorrectness of said decision, in the light of the law and extant jurisprudence." 60

Ultimately, respondent failed to prove full and complete compliance with the requirements of the Naturalization Law. As such, his petition for
naturalization must be denied without prejudice to his right to re-file his application.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93374 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The petition for naturalization of respondent Li Ching Chung, otherwise known as Bernabe Luna Li or Stephen Lee Keng,
docketed as Civil Case No. 08-118905 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Manila, is DISMISSED, without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 138496. February 23, 2004]

HUBERT TAN CO and ARLENE TAN CO, petitioners, vs. THE CIVIL REGISTER OF MANILA and any person having or claiming an
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought, respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by Hubert Tan Co and Arlene Tan Co seeking to reverse and set aside the
Order[1] dated September 23, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, dismissing their petition for correction of entries in the
Civil Register. Likewise sought to be reversed and set aside is the Order dated April 27, 1999 of the court a quo denying the petitioners
motion for reconsideration of the said order.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

Hubert Tan Co was born on March 23, 1974. His sister, Arlene Tan Co, was born on May 19, 1975. In their respective certificates of birth, it
is stated that their parents Co Boon Peng and Lourdes Vihong K. Tan are Chinese citizens.

Thereafter, Co Boon Peng filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with the Special Committee on
Naturalization under Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 270. His application was granted and he was conferred Philippine citizenship under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1055. The Chairman of the Committee issued on February 15, 1977 Certificate of Naturalization No. 020778
in his favor. Thus, on February 15, 1977, Co Boon Peng took his oath as a Philippine citizen. In the meantime, Hubert and Arlene Co
finished college and earned their respective degrees in architecture and accountancy in Philippine schools.

On August 27, 1998, they filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for correction of
entries in their certificates of birth. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. Case No. 98-90470. They alleged, inter alia, in their petition that:

(3) They were born in the Philippines and the legitimate children of CO BOON PENG;

(4) Co Boon Peng, who is formerly a citizen of China, was conferred Philippine citizenship by naturalization under Presidential Decree No.
1055 and had taken his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 15 th February, 1977 in the City of Manila;

(5) At the time of birth of [the] petitioners, their father CO BOON PENG was still a Chinese citizen that is why entry in their respective birth
certificates as to their fathers citizenship was Chinese;

(6) Upon granting of Philippine citizenship by naturalization to Co Boon Peng in 1977, [the] petitioners who were born in the Philippines and
still minors at that time became Filipino citizens through the derivative mode of naturalization. Our Naturalization Law, specifically Section
15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 535 which provides:

Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof;

(7) The naturalization of petitioners father in 1977 was an act or event affecting and concerning their civil status that must be recorded in the
Civil Register, Article 407 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:

Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the Civil Register.[2]

The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, the trial court render judgment correcting and changing the entries in their respective
birth certificates as to the citizenship of their father Co Boon Peng, from Chinese to Filipino. [3]

On September 23, 1998, the court a quo issued an order dismissing the petition outright on the ground that the petition was insufficient,
solely because the petitioners father Co Boon Peng applied for naturalization under LOI No. 270 and was conferred Philippine citizenship by
naturalization under PD No. 1055 and not under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473. [4]

The petitioners sought the reconsideration of the assailed order arguing that LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 were designed to grant
citizenship to deserving aliens; hence, should be construed together. They averred that the benefit of Section 15 of CA No. 473 should also
be granted to the petitioners whose father was granted naturalization under LOI No. 270. However, the RTC issued an Order on April 27,
1999, denying their motion for reconsideration for the following reasons: (a) although Commonwealth Act No. 473 and Letter of Instructions
No. 270 are statutes relating to the same subject matter, they do not provide the same beneficial effects with respect to the minor children of
the applicant. Section 15 of CA No. 473 expressly provides for the effect of the naturalization on the wife and children of the applicant while
LOI No. 270 does not have any proviso to that effect; (b) LOI No. 270 clearly refers to qualified individuals only. The rules and regulations
promulgated by the Committee established pursuant to LOI No. 270 and the amendments issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(LOI Nos. 292 and 491) clearly speak of qualified individuals only; no proviso therein referred to its effect on the wife and children of the
individual; (c) Section 15 of CA No. 473 should not be deemed and incorporated in and applied to LOI No. 270; and, (d) the application of
the so-called pari materia rule of construction made by the petitioners is misplaced, as what should be applied in the instant case is the rule
on strict construction of legislative grants or franchise. The court a quo stressed that legislative grants, whether they be of property, rights or
privileges, whether granted to corporations or individuals, must be strictly construed against the grantee and in favor of the grantor.

Aggrieved, the petitioners now come to this Court assailing the court a quos Order dismissing their petition outright and its Order denying
their motion for the reconsideration of the same.

The petitioners contend that the trial court erred in holding that their petition was insufficient. They assert that contrary to the ruling of the
trial court, they are qualified to claim the benefit of Section 15 of CA No. 473, which provides that minor children of persons naturalized
thereunder who were born in the Philippines shall likewise be considered citizens thereof. They contend that although LOI No. 270, under
which the petitioners father was naturalized does not contain a provision similar to Section 15 of CA No. 473, the latter provision should be
deemed incorporated therein. They point out that both laws have the same purpose and objective, i.e., to grant Philippine citizenship to
qualified aliens permanently residing in the Philippines. The petitioners invoke the rule that statutes in pari materia are to be read
together.[5] They posit that CA No. 473 and LOI No. 270 should be harmonized and reconciled since all statutes relating to the same
subject, or having the same general purpose, should be read in connection with it, and should be construed together as they constitute one
law.[6]

The petitioners maintain that the letter and spirit of LOI No. 270 was to grant the privilege of Philippine citizenship not only to qualified aliens
but also to their minor children who were born in the country. They assert that this is apparent from paragraph 4-A thereof, which extends
the option to adopt Filipino names not only to qualified applicants for naturalization but also to their wives and minor children. They submit
that when then President Ferdinand E. Marcos enacted LOI No. 270, he must be presumed to have been acquainted with the provisions of
CA No. 473 and did not intend to abrogate and discontinue the beneficial effects of Section 15 thereof; otherwise, Pres. Marcos would have
expressly repealed Section 15 of CA No. 473 in relation to LOI No. 270. Thus, according to the petitioners, the naturalization of their father
during their minority is an act or event affecting their civil status that must be recorded in the Civil Register pursuant to Article 407 of the
Civil Code.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that the court a quo did not err in issuing the assailed orders. Contrary to the petitioners
theory, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are separate and distinct laws; therefore, are not in pari materia. He points out that although LOI No.
270 and CA No. 473 both govern the naturalization of aliens, CA No. 473 deals with the requirements and procedure for naturalization by
judicial decree; LOI No. 270, on the other hand, deals with the requirements and procedure for naturalization by presidential decree.

The Solicitor General further asserts that the petitioners contention that the naturalization of their father is an event affecting and concerning
their civil status envisaged in Article 407 of the Civil Code has no legal basis. The correction sought and allowed under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court must be one that reflects a fact existing before or at the time of birth. In the petitioners case, the naturalization of their father
in 1977 took place long after they were born. Moreover, according to the Solicitor General, under LOI No. 270 and its amendatory laws, the
naturalization of a father did not ipso facto render his children also naturalized. The petitioners thus cannot invoke Article 407 of the Civil
Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to avoid strict compliance with the naturalization laws.

The petition is meritorious.

The rule on statutory construction provides that:

Statutes in pari materia should be read and construed together because enactments of the same legislature on the same subject are
supposed to form part of one uniform system; later statutes are supplementary or complimentary (sic) to the earlier enactments and in the
passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislations on the subject and to have enacted its new act with
reference thereto.[7]

Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain the purpose of an expressed national policy, thus:

On the presumption that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter,
it is held that in the absence of any express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision was enacted in accord with the legislative
policy embodied in those prior statutes, and they all should be construed together. Provisions in an act which are omitted in another act
relating to the same subject matter will be applied in a proceeding under the other act, when not inconsistent with its purpose. Prior statutes
relating to the same subject matter are to be compared with the new provisions; and if possible by reasonable construction, both are to be
construed that effect is given to every provision of each. Statutes in pari materia, although in apparent conflict, are so far as reasonably
possible construed to be in harmony with each other. [8]

LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are laws governing the naturalization of qualified aliens residing in the Philippines. While they provide for
different procedures, CA No. 473 governs naturalization by judicial decree while LOI No. 270 governs naturalization by presidential decree;
both statutes have the same purpose and objective: to enable aliens permanently residing in the Philippines, who, having demonstrated and
developed love for and loyalty to the Philippines, as well as affinity to the culture, tradition and ideals of the Filipino people, and contributed
to the economic, social and cultural development of our country, to be integrated into the national fabric by being granted Filipino
citizenship. Under the LOI, the procedure for the acquisition of citizenship by naturalization is more expeditious, less cumbersome and less
expensive. The sooner qualified aliens are naturalized, the faster they are able to integrate themselves into the national fabric, and are thus
able to contribute to the cultural, social and political well- being of the country and its people.

Clearly, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are, as the petitioners correctly posit, statutes in pari materia. Absent any express repeal of Section
15 of CA No. 473 in LOI No. 270, the said provision should be read into the latter law as an integral part thereof, not being inconsistent with
its purpose. Thus, Section 15 of CA No. 473,[9] which extends the grant of Philippine citizenship to the minor children of those naturalized
thereunder, should be similarly applied to the minor children of those naturalized under LOI No. 270, like the petitioners in this case.

It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of naturalization of their father, Co Boon Peng, and of his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They are likewise mandated to prove the following
material allegations in their petition: (a) that they are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng; (b) that they were born in the Philippines; and,
(c) that they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen;

The petitioners recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is appropriate. Under Article 412 of the New Civil Code, no entry in
a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The law does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be
followed. But the Court approved Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to provide for a procedure to implement the law. [10] The entries envisaged
in Article 412 of the New Civil Code are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the New Civil Code which reads:

Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.

Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) Marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

Specific matters covered by the said provision include not only status but also nationality. [11] The acts, events or factual errors envisaged in
Article 407 of the New Civil Code include even those that occur after the birth of the petitioner. However, in such cases, the entries in the
certificates of birth will not be corrected or changed. The decision of the court granting the petition shall be annotated in the certificates of
birth and shall form part of the civil register in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. [12]

To correct simply means to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from. To change means to replace something with something
else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute. Article 412 of the New Civil Code does not qualify as to the kind of entry
to be changed or corrected or distinguished on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may be. [13] Such entries include not only
those clerical in nature but also substantial errors. After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is to ascertain the
truths about the facts recorded therein.[14]

The proceedings in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are summary if the entries in the civil register sought to be corrected are clerical or
innocuous in nature. However, where such entries sought to be corrected or changed are substantial: i.e., the status and nationality of the
petitioners or the citizenship of their parents,[15] the proceedings are adversarial in nature as defined by this Court in Republic v. Valencia,
thus:

One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding.[16]

In such a proceeding, the parties to be impleaded as respective defendants are (a) the local civil registrar; and, (b) all persons who have
claims any interest which would be affected thereby.[17]

In this case, the petitioners alleged in their petition that they are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng, who was naturalized as a Filipino
citizen, but that their certificates of birth still indicate that he is a Chinese national. In view of their fathers naturalization, they pray that the
entries in their certificates of birth relating to the citizenship of their father be changed from Chinese to Filipino.

The petitioners recourse to the procedure in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as amended, being appropriate, it behooved the trial court to do
its duty under Section 4, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, namely:

Sec. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same,
and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the person named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

After hearing, the court shall issue an order either dismissing the petition or issue an order granting the same. In either case, a certified copy
of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in the certificates of birth of the
petitioners. The judgment of the court shall form part of the records of the local civil register. [18]

In this case, the trial court dismissed the petition outright in violation of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Patently, then, the trial court erred in
so doing.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, are
SET ASIDE and REVERSED. The trial court is DIRECTED to reinstate the petition in Special Proceedings NO. 98-90470 in the court
docket, and ORDERED to continue with the proceedings in the said case under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES versus-

KERRY LAO ONG

June 18, 2012

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Naturalization laws are strictly construed in the governments favor and against the applicant.[1] The applicant carries the burden of proving
his full compliance with the requirements of law.[2]

Before the Court is the Republics appeal of the appellate courts Decision [3] dated May 13, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 74794, which affirmed
the trial courts grant of citizenship to respondent Kerry Lao Ong (Ong). The Court of Appeals (CA) held:

With all the foregoing, We find no cogent reason to reverse the decision of the court a quo.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 9 in its Decision dated November 23,
2001, is AFFIRMED in toto and the instant appeal is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[4]

Factual Antecedents

On November 26, 1996, respondent Ong, then 38 years old, [5] filed a Petition for Naturalization.[6] The case was docketed as Nat. Case No.
930 and assigned to Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. As decreed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended by
Republic Act No. 530, known as the Revised Naturalization Law, [7] the petition was published in the Official Gazette[8] and a newspaper of
general circulation,[9] and posted in a public place for three consecutive weeks,[10] six months before the initial hearing.[11] The Office of the
Solicitor General entered its appearance and authorized[12] the city prosecutor to appear on its behalf.[13] Accordingly, Fiscals Ester Veloso
and Perla Centino participated in the proceedings below.

Respondent Ong was born at the Cebu General Hospital in Cebu City to Chinese citizens Siao Hwa Uy Ong and Flora Ong on March 4,
1958.[14] He is registered as a resident alien and possesses an alien certificate of registration [15] and a native-born certificate of
residence[16] from the Bureau of Immigration. He has been continuously and permanently residing[17] in the Philippines from birth up to the
present.[18] Ong can speak[19] and write in Tagalog, English, Cebuano, and Amoy.[20] He took his elementary[21] and high school[22] studies at
the Sacred Heart School for Boys in Cebu City, where social studies, Pilipino, religion, and the Philippine Constitution are taught. He then
obtained a degree in Bachelor of Science in Management from the Ateneo De Manila University on March 18, 1978. [23]

On February 1, 1981, he married Griselda S. Yap, also a Chinese citizen.[24] They have four children,[25] namely, Kerri Gail (born on April 15,
1983),[26] Kimberley Grace (born on May 15, 1984),[27] Kyle Gervin (born on November 4, 1986),[28] and Kevin Griffith (born on August 21,
1993),[29] who were all born and

raised in the Philippines. The children of school age were enrolled[30] at the Sacred Heart School for Boys[31] and Sacred Heart School for
Girls.[32] At the time of the filing of the petition, Ong, his wife, and children were living at No. 55 Eagle Street, Sto. Nio Village,
Banilad, Cebu City.

Ong has lived at the following addresses:[33]

1. Manalili Street, Cebu City (when Ong was in Grade 2)[34]

2. Crystal Compound Guadalupe, Cebu City (until 1970)[35]

3. No. 671 A.S. Fortuna Street, Cebu City (until 1992)[36]

4. No. 55 Eagle Street, Sto. Nio Village, Banilad, Cebu City (until 1998);[37] and

5. No. 50 Roselle Street, North Town Homes, Nasipit, Talamban, Cebu City (present).[38]

Ong alleged in his petition that he has been a businessman/business manager since 1989, earning an average annual income
of P150,000.00.[39] When he testified, however, he said that he has been a businessman since he graduated from college
in 1978.[40] Moreover, Ong did not specify or describe the nature of his business. [41]

As proof of his income, Ong presented four tax returns for the years 1994 to 1997.[42] Based on these returns, Ongs gross annual income
was P60,000.00 for 1994;P118,000.00 for 1995; P118,000.00 for 1996; and P128,000.00 for 1997.

Respondent further testified that he socializes [43] with Filipinos; celebrates the Sinulog, fiestas, birthdays, and Christmas.[44] He is a member
of the Alert/ React VII Communications Group and the Masonic organization. [45]

Respondent Ong presented a health certificate to prove [46] that he is of sound physical and mental health.[47] As shown by the clearances
from the National Bureau of Investigation,[48] the Philippine National Police,[49] the trial courts,[50] and the barangay,[51] he has no criminal
record or pending criminal charges.[52]

Respondent presented Rudy Carvajal (Carvajal) and Bernard Sepulveda (Sepulveda) as his character witnesses. At that time, Sepulveda
was the vice-mayor of Borbon, Cebu.[53] He has known Ong since 1970 because Ong is the close friend of Sepulvedas brother. [54] He
testified that Ong is very helpful in the community and adopts the Filipino culture.[55] Meanwhile, Carvajal testified that he has known Ong
since the 1970s because they were high school classmates. [56] He testified that Ong is morally irreproachable and possesses all the
qualifications to be a good citizen of the Philippines.[57] Carvajal is a businessman engaged in leasing office spaces. [58]

On November 23, 2001, the trial court granted Ongs petition. Among other things, the trial court held that:

xxxx

By the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by the [respondent], the following facts had been established. [59]

xxxx
x x x [Respondent] is a businessman/business manager engaged in lawful trade and business since 1989 from which he derives an
average annual income of more than One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Exhibit U, V, W, and X with sub-markings); x x x[60]

The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:

From the evidence presented by [respondent], this Court believes and so holds that [respondent] possesses all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications provided for by law to become a citizen of the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, [respondent] KERRY LAO ONG is hereby admitted as
citizen of the Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.[61]

Republics Appeal

On January 31, 2003, the Republic, through the Solicitor General, appealed

to the CA. The Republic faulted the trial court for granting Ongs petition despite his failure to prove that he possesses a known lucrative
trade, profession or lawful occupation as required under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law. [62]

The Republic posited that, contrary to the trial courts finding, respondent Ong did not prove his allegation that he is a businessman/business
manager earning an average income of P150,000.00 since 1989. His income tax returns belie the value of his income. Moreover, he failed
to present evidence on the nature of his profession or trade, which is the source of his income. Considering that he has four minor children
(all attending exclusive private schools), he has declared no other property and/or bank deposits, and he has not declared owning a family
home, his alleged income cannot be considered lucrative. Under the circumstances, the Republic maintained that respondent Ong is not
qualified as he does not possess a definite and existing business or trade. [63]

Respondent Ong conceded that the Supreme Court has adopted a higher standard of income for applicants for naturalization. [64] He
likewise conceded that the legal definition of lucrative income is the existence of an appreciable margin of his income over his
expenses.[65] It is his position that his income, together with that of his wife, created an appreciable margin over their
expenses.[66] Moreover, the steady increase in his income, as evidenced in his tax returns, proved that he is gainfully employed.[67]

The appellate court dismissed the Republics appeal. It explained:

In the case at bar, the [respondent] chose to present [pieces of evidence] which relates [sic] to his lucrative trade, profession or lawful
occupation. Judging from the present standard of living and the personal circumstances of the [respondent] using the present time as the
index for the income stated by the [respondent], it may appear that the [respondent] has no lucrative employment. However, We must be
mindful that the petition for naturalization was filed in 1996, which is already ten years ago. It is of judicial notice that the value of the peso
has taken a considerable plunge in value since that time up to the present. Nonetheless, if We consider the income earned at that time, the
ages of the children of the [respondent], the employment of his wife, We can say that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his
expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support. [68]

The appellate court denied the Republics motion for reconsideration [69] in its Resolution dated November 7, 2006.[70]

Issue

Whether respondent Ong has proved that he has some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation in accordance with Section 2,
fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.

Petitioners Arguments

Petitioner assigns as error the appellate courts ruling that there is an appreciable margin of (respondents) income over his expenses as to
be able to provide for an adequate support. [71] The Republic contends that the CAs conclusion is not supported by the evidence on record
and by the prevailing law.[72]

The only pieces of evidence presented by Ong to prove that he qualifies under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization
Law, are his tax returns for the years 1994 to 1997, which show that Ong earns from P60,000.00 to P128,000.00 annually. This declared
income is far from the legal requirement of lucrative income. It is not sufficient to provide for the needs of a family of six, with four children of
school age.[73]
Moreover, none of these tax returns describes the source of Ongs income, much less can they describe the lawful nature thereof. [74] The
Republic also noted that Ong did not even attempt to describe what business he is engaged in. Thus, the trial and appellate courts shared
conclusion that Ong is a businessman is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures. [75]

The Republic thus prays for the reversal of the appellate courts Decision and the denial of Ongs petition for naturalization. [76]

Respondents Arguments

Respondent asks for the denial of the petition as it seeks a review of factual findings, which review is improper in a Rule 45 petition.[77] He
further submits that his tax returns support the conclusion that he is engaged in lucrative trade. [78]

Our Ruling

The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest.[79] Naturalization laws should
be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the
applicant.[80] The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and

complete compliance with the requirements of law. [81]

In the case at bar, the controversy revolves around respondent Ongs compliance with the qualification found in Section 2, fourth paragraph
of the Revised Naturalization Law, which provides:

SECTION 2. Qualifications. Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following qualifications may become a citizen of
the Philippines by naturalization:

xxxx

Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known
lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;

x x x x[82]

Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation means not only that the person
having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such
that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of
unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones becoming the object of charity or a public charge. [83] His income should
permit him and the members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and
consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization. [84]

Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative

income, the courts should consider only the applicants income; his or her spouses income should not be included in the assessment. The
spouses additional income is immaterial for under the law the petitioner should be the one to possess some known lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen. [85] Lastly, the Court has consistently held that the applicants
qualifications must be determined as of the time of the filing of his petition.[86]

Going over the decisions of the courts below, the Court finds that the foregoing guidelines have not been observed. To recall, respondent
Ong and his witnesses testified that Ong is a businessman but none of them identified Ongs business or described its nature. The Court
finds it suspect that Ong did not even testify as to the nature of his business, whereas his witness Carvajal did with respect to his own
(leasing of office space). A comparison of their respective testimonies is reproduced below:

Carvajals testimony

Q: You said earlier that you are a businessman?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: How long have you been a businessman?

A: Since 1980.
Q: And what is the business you are engaged in?

A: I am into leasing of office spaces.[87]

Kerry Lao Ongs testimony

Q: What is your present occupation, Mr. Ong?

A: Businessman.

Q: Since when have you engaged in that occupation?

A: After graduation from college.[88]

The dearth of documentary evidence compounds the inadequacy of the testimonial evidence. The applicant provided no documentary
evidence, like business permits, registration, official receipts, or other business records to demonstrate his proprietorship or participation in
a business. Instead, Ong relied on his general assertions to prove his possession of some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful
occupation. Bare, general assertions cannot discharge the burden of proof that is required of an applicant for naturalization.

The paucity of evidence is unmistakable upon a reading of the trial courts decision. The trial court held that respondent Ong is a
businessman engaged in lawful trade and business since 1989 [89] but did not cite the evidence, which supports such finding. After poring
over the records, the Court finds that the reason for the lack of citation is the absence of evidence to support such conclusion. The trial
courts conclusion that Ong has been a businessman since 1989 is only an assertion found in Ongs petition for naturalization. [90] But, on the
witness stand, Ong did not affirm this assertion. Instead, he testified that he had been a businessman since he graduated from college,
which was in 1978.[91]

Further, the trial court, citing Exhibits U, V, W, and X (which are Ongs tax returns), mistakenly found that Ong derives an average annual
income of more than One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos. [92] This conclusion is not supported by the evidence. The cited tax returns show
that Ongs gross annual income for the years 1994 to 1997 were P60,000.00, P118,000.00, P118,000.00, and P128,000.00,
respectively. The average annual income from these tax returns is P106,000.00 only, not P150,000.00 as the trial court held. It appears that
the trial court again derived its conclusion from an assertion in Ongs petition, [93] but not from the evidence.

As for the CA, it no longer ruled on the question whether Ong has a known business or trade. Instead, it ruled on the issue whether Ongs
income, as evidenced by his tax returns, can be considered lucrative in 1996. In determining this issue, the CA considered the ages of Ongs
children, the income that he earned in 1996, and the fact that Ongs wife was also employed at that time. It then concluded that there is an
appreciable margin of Ongs income over his expenses. [94]

The Court finds the appellate courts decision erroneous. First, it should not have included the spouses income in its assessment of Ongs
lucrative income.[95] Second, it failed to consider the following circumstances which have a bearing on Ongs expenses vis--vis his income:
(a) that Ong does not own real property; (b) that his proven average gross annual income around the time of his application, which was
only P106,000.00, had to provide for the education of his four minor children; and (c) that Ongs children were all studying in exclusive
private schools in Cebu City. Third, the CA did not explain how it arrived at the conclusion that Ongs income had an appreciable margin
over his known expenses.

Ongs gross income might have been sufficient to meet his familys basic needs, but there is simply no sufficient proof that it was enough to
create an appreciable margin of income over expenses. Without an appreciable margin of his income over his familys expenses, his income
cannot be expected to provide him and his family with adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work.[96]

Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the qualification of a known lucrative trade provided in Section 2,
fourth paragraph, of

the Revised Naturalization Law.[97]

The Court finds no merit in respondents submission that a Rule 45 petition precludes a review of the factual findings of the courts
below.[98] In the first place, the trial court and appellate courts decisions contain conclusions that are bereft of evidentiary support or factual
basis, which is a known exception[99] to the general rule that only questions of law may be entertained in a Rule 45 petition.

Moreover, a review of the decisions involving petitions for naturalization shows that the Court is not precluded from reviewing the factual
existence of the applicants qualifications. In fact, jurisprudence holds that the entire records of the naturalization case are open for
consideration in an appeal to this Court.[100] Indeed, [a] naturalization proceeding is so infused with public interest that it has been differently
categorized and given special treatment. x x x [U]nlike in ordinary judicial contest, the granting of a petition for naturalization does not
preclude the reopening of that case and giving the government another opportunity to present new evidence. A decision or order granting
citizenship will not even constitute res judicata to any matter or reason supporting a subsequent judgment cancelling the certification of
naturalization already granted, on the ground that it had been illegally or fraudulently procured. For the same reason, issues even if not
raised in the lower court may be entertained on appeal. As the matters brought to the attention of this Court x x x involve facts contained in
the disputed decision of the lower court and admitted by the parties in their pleadings, the present proceeding may be considered adequate
for the purpose of determining the correctness or incorrectness of said decision, in the light of the law and extant jurisprudence.[101]In the
case at bar, there is even no need to present new evidence. A careful review of the extant records suffices to hold that respondent Ong has
not proven his possession of a known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation to qualify for naturalization.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition of the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 13, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74794 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Naturalization of Kerry Lao Ong is DENIED for
failure to comply with Section 2, fourth paragraph, of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183110 October 7, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

"It is universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of one of its citizens could have had no other
objective than to maintain a unity of allegiance among the members of the family." 1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assails the May 23, 2008 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) G.R. CV No. 00523, which affirmed
the January 31, 2005 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, Zamboanga del Sur that granted the Petition for
Naturalization5 of respondent Azucena Saavedra Batuigas (Azucena).

Factual Antecedents

On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. The case was docketed as
Naturalization Case No. 03-001 and raffled to Branch 29 of said court.

Azucena alleged in her Petition that she believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; that she has conducted herself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the period of her stay in the Philippines, as well as in her relations with the constituted
Government and with the community in which she is living; that she has mingled socially with the Filipinos and has evinced a sincere desire
to learn and embrace their customs, traditions, and ideals; that she has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (CA473); 6 that she is not opposed to organized government nor is
affiliated with any association or group of persons that uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; that she is not
defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of mens
ideas; that she is neither a polygamist nor believes in polygamy; that the nation of which she is a subject is not at war with the Philippines;
that she intends in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and that she will reside continuously in the Philippines from the
time of the filing of her Petition up to the time of her naturalization.

After all the jurisdictional requirements mandated by Section 9 7 of CA 473had been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
filed its Motion to Dismiss8 on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative
trade. Finding the grounds relied upon by the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said Motion. 9 Thereafter, the hearing for the
reception of Azucenas evidence was then set on May 18, 2004. 10

Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor appeared on the day of the hearing. Hence, Azucenas counsel moved that the
evidence be presented ex-parte, which the RTC granted. Accordingly, the RTC designated its Clerk of Court as Commissioner to receive
Azucenas evidence.11 During the November 5, 2004 ex-parte hearing, no representative from the OSG appeared despite due notice. 12

Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents, 13 Azucena has never departed the Philippines since
birth. She has resided in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur from 1941-1942; in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur from 1942-1968; in Bogo
City for nine months; in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur from 1969-1972; in Talisayan, Misamis Oriental from 1972-1976; and, in Margosatubig,
Zamboanga del Sur, thereafter, up to the filing of her Petition.

Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her primary, secondary, and tertiary education were taken in Philippine
schools,i.e., Margosatubig Central Elementary School in 1955, 14 Margosatubig Academy in1959,15 and the Ateneo de Zamboanga in
1963,16 graduating with a degree in Bachelor of Science in Education. She then practiced her teaching profession at the Pax High School
for five years, in the Marian Academy in Ipil for two years, and in Talisayan High School in Misamis Oriental for another two years. 17

In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas 18 (Santiago),a natural-born Filipino citizen.19 They have five children, namely
Cynthia, Brenda, Aileen, Dennis Emmanuel, and Edsel James. 20 All of them studied in Philippine public and private schools and are all
professionals, three of whom are now working abroad.21

After her stint in Talisayan High School, Azucena and her husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in the retail business of and later on in
milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra. As proof of their income, Azucena submitted their joint annual tax returns and balance sheets from
2000-200222 and from 2004-2005.23 The business name and the business permits issued to the spouses store, Azucenas General
Merchandising, are registered in Santiagos name,24 and he is also the National Food Authority licensee for their rice and corn
business.25 During their marital union, the Batuigas spouses bought parcels of land in Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig. 26

To prove that she has no criminal record, Azucena submitted clearances issued by the Philippine National Police of Zamboanga del Sur
Provincial Office and by the National Bureau of Investigation. 27 She also presented her Health Examination Record28 declaring her as
physically and mentally fit.
To further support Azucenas Petition, Santiago and witnesses Eufemio Miniao and Irineo Alfaro testified.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On January 31, 2005, the RTC found that Azucena has amply supported the allegations in her Petition. Among these are her lack of a
derogatory record, her support for an organized government, that she is in perfect health, that she has mingled with Filipinos since birth and
can speak their language, that she has never had any transgressions and has been a law abiding citizen, that she has complied with her
obligations to the government involving her business operations, and that the business and real properties she and Santiago own provide
sufficient income for her and her family. Thus, the RTC ruled:

x x x In sum, the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to be admitted as citizen of the Philippines in
accordance with the provisions of the Naturalization Law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted.

SO ORDERED.29

In its Omnibus Motion,30 the OSG argued that the ex-parte presentation of evidence before the Branch Clerk of Court violates Section 10 of
CA 473,31 as the law mandates public hearing in naturalization cases.

Rejecting this argument in its March 21, 2005 Order,32 the RTC held that the public has been fully apprised of the naturalization proceedings
and was free to intervene. The OSG and its delegate, the Provincial Prosecutor, are the only officers authorized by law to appear on behalf
of the State, which represents the public. Thus, when the OSG was furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing for the reception of
evidence ex-parte, there was already a sufficient compliance with the requirement of a public hearing.

The OSG then appealed the RTC judgment to the CA,33 contending that Azucena failed to comply with the income requirement under CA
473. The OSG maintained that Azucena is not allowed under the Retail Trade Law (Republic Act No. 1180) to engage directly or indirectly
in the retail trade. Hence, she cannot possibly meet the income requirement. And even if she is allowed, her business is not a "lucrative
trade" within the contemplation of the law or that which has an appreciable margin of income over expenses in order to provide for adequate
support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work. The OSG likewise disputed Azucenas claim that she owns real
property because aliens are precluded from owning lands in the country.

The OSG further asserted that the ex-parte proceeding before the commissioner is not a "public hearing" as ex-parte hearings are usually
done in chambers, without the public in attendance. It claimed that the State was denied its day in court because the RTC, during the May
18, 2004 initial hearing, immediately allowed the proceeding to be conducted ex-parte without even giving the State ample opportunity to be
present.

Azucena countered that although she is a teacher by profession, she had to quit to help in the retail business of her husband, and they were
able to send all their children to school.34 It is highly unlikely that she will become a public charge as she and her spouse have enough
savings and could even be given sufficient support by their children. She contended that the definition of "lucrative trade/income" should not
be strictly applied to her. Being the wife and following Filipino tradition, she should not be treated like male applicants for naturalization who
are required to have their own "lucrative trade."

Azucena denied that the hearing for her Petition was not made public, as the hearing before the Clerk of Court was conducted in the courts
session hall. Besides, the OSG cannot claim that it was denied its day in court as notices have always been sent to it. Hence, its failure to
attend is not the fault of the RTC.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In dismissing the OSGs appeal,35 the CA found that Azucenas financial condition permits her and her family to live with reasonable comfort
in accordance with the prevailing standard of living and consistent with the demands of human dignity. It said:

Considering the present high cost of living, which cost of living tends to increase rather than decrease, and the low purchasing power of the
Philippine currency, petitioner-appellee, together with her Filipino husband, nonetheless, was able to send all her children to college, pursue
a lucrative business and maintain a decent existence. The Supreme Court, in recent decisions, adopted a higher standard in determining
whether a petitioner for Philippine citizenship has a lucrative trade or profession that would qualify him/her for admission to Philippine
citizenship and to which petitioner has successfully convinced this Court of her ability to provide for herself and avoid becoming a public
charge or a financial burden to her community. x x x36

As for the other issue the OSG raised, the CA held that the RTC had complied with the mandate of the law requiring notice to the OSG and
the Provincial Prosecutor of its scheduled hearing for the Petition.

Thus, the instant Petition wherein the OSG recapitulates the same arguments it raised before the CA, i.e., the alleged failure of Azucena to
meet the income and public hearing requirements of CA 473.

Our Ruling

The Petition lacks merit.

Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative
naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the "Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third option, called derivative naturalization,
which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:

"any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines."

Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither
necessary for them to prove that they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit
themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying from similar laws in the United States which has since been amended, the Philippine
legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473, which then reflects its intent to confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru derivative
naturalization.37

Thus, the Court categorically declared in Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration: 38
Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth
Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be
a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized
here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer
from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.39

As stated in Moy Ya Lim Yao, the procedure for an alien wife to formalize the conferment of Filipino citizenship is as follows:

Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the
procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate
of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her
husbands citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be
accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to
any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen x x x, the Bureau of Immigration conducts an
investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition. 40

Records however show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the
cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. 030705 41 by reason of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. The CID granted her
application. However, the Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it found no sufficient evidence that Azucenas husband is a
Filipino citizen42 as only their marriage certificate was presented to establish his citizenship.

Having been denied of the process in the CID, Azucena was constrained to file a Petition for judicial naturalization based on CA 473. While
this would have been unnecessary if the process at the CID was granted in her favor, there is nothing that prevents her from seeking
acquisition of Philippine citizenship through regular naturalization proceedings available to all qualified foreign nationals. The choice of what
option to take in order to acquire Philippine citizenship rests with the applicant. In this case, Azucena has chosen to file a Petition for judicial
naturalization under CA 473. The fact that her application for derivative naturalization under Section 15 of CA 473 was denied should not
prevent her from seeking judicial naturalization under the same law. It is to be remembered that her application at the CID was denied not
because she was found to be disqualified, but because her husbands citizenship was not proven. Even if the denial was based on other
grounds, it is proper, in a judicial naturalization proceeding, for the courts to determine whether there are in fact grounds to deny her of
Philippine citizenship based on regular judicial naturalization proceedings.

As the records before this Court show, Santiagos Filipino citizenship has been adequately proven. Under judicial proceeding, Santiago
submitted his birth certificate indicating therein that he and his parents are Filipinos. He also submitted voters registration, land titles, and
business registrations/licenses, all of which are public records. He has always comported himself as a Filipino citizen, an operative fact that
should have enabled Azucena to avail of Section 15 of CA473. On the submitted evidence, nothing would show that Azucena suffers from
any of the disqualifications under Section 4 of the same Act.

However, the case before us is a Petition for judicial naturalization and is not based on Section 15 of CA 473 which was denied by the then
Ministry of Justice. The lower court which heard the petition and received evidence of her qualifications and absence of disqualifications to
acquire Philippine citizenship, has granted the Petition, which was affirmed by the CA. We will not disturb the findings of the lower court
which had the opportunity to hear and scrutinize the evidence presented during the hearings on the Petition, as well as determine, based on
Azucenas testimony and deportment during the hearings, that she indeed possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
for acquisition of Philippine citizenship.

The OSG has filed this instant Petition on the ground that Azucena does not have the qualification required in no. 4 of Section 2 of CA 473
as she does not have any lucrative income, and that the proceeding in the lower court was not in the nature of a public hearing. The OSG
had the opportunity to contest the qualifications of Azucena during the initial hearing scheduled on May 18, 2004.However, the OSG or the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor failed to appear in said hearing, prompting the lower court to order ex parte presentation of evidence
before the Clerk of Court on November 5, 2004. The OSG was also notified of the ex parte proceeding, but despite notice, again failed to
appear. The OSG had raised this same issue at the CA and was denied for the reasons stated in its Decision. We find no reason to disturb
the findings of the CA on this issue. Neither should this issue further delay the grant of Philippine citizenship to a woman who was born and
lived all her life, in the Philippines, and devoted all her life to the care of her Filipino family. She has more than demonstrated, under judicial
scrutiny, her being a qualified Philippine citizen. On the second issue, we also affirm the findings of the CA that since the government who
has an interest in, and the only one who can contest, the citizenship of a person, was duly notified through the OSG and the Provincial
Prosecutors office, the proceedings have complied with the public hearing requirement under CA 473.

No. 4, Section 2 of CA 473 provides as qualification to become a Philippine citizen:

4. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have known lucrative
trade, profession, or lawful occupation.

Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually exercised her profession before she had to quit her teaching job to assume her family
duties and take on her role as joint provider, together with her husband, in order to support her family. Together, husband and wife were
able to raise all their five children, provided them with education, and have all become professionals and responsible citizens of this country.
Certainly, this is proof enough of both husband and wifes lucrative trade. Azucena herself is a professional and can resume teaching at
anytime. Her profession never leaves her, and this is more than sufficient guarantee that she will not be a charge to the only country she
has known since birth.

Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to maintain a unity of
allegiance among family members, thus:

It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a husband should be a citizen and the wife an
alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husbands interests in
property and business activities reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership and be denied to the wife, nor
that she herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare instances should
the identity of husband and wife be refused recognition, and we submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the
instances where the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law. 43

We are not unmindful of precedents to the effect that there is no proceeding authorized by the law or by the Rules of Court, for the judicial
declaration of the citizenship of an individual.44 "Such judicial declaration of citizenship cannot even be decreed pursuant to an alternative
prayer therefor in a naturalization proceeding." 45
This case however is not a Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship but rather a Petition for judicial naturalization under CA
473. In the first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the
second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire the privilege of be coming a Philippine citizen
based on requirements required under CA 473.Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of
that privilege, and this Court will not stand in the way of making her a part of a truly Filipino family.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 23, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00523 which affirmed the
January 31,2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Zamboanga del Sur that granted the Petition for Naturalization, is hereby

AFFIRMED. Subject to compliance with the period and the requirements under Republic Act No. 530which supplements the Revised
Naturalization Law, let a Certificate of Naturalization be issued to AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS after taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, her Alien Certificate of Registration should be cancelled.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 160869 May 11, 2007

AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER -
HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of Justice,Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws
governing citizenship.1 Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225,
entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose
Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates
Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law."

Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29, 2003, reads:

SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003."

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this
obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those
who reacquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic
Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly
constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they
took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or

(b) are in the active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized
citizens.
SEC. 6. Separability Clause. - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not
affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.

SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.

SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.

In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been raised: (1) Is Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional? (2) Does this Court have
jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance?

We shall discuss these issues jointly.

Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together,
allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who
become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance
because said law allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance
without forfeiting their foreign allegiance.2 The Constitution, however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a state policy that "Philippine citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3
does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign
citizenship. The fact that the applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable
and categorical affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.3

In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations of Congress is necessary to determine the intent of the legislative
branch in drafting the assailed law. During the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No. 9225 would allow dual allegiance had in fact
been the subject of debate. The record of the legislative deliberations reveals the following:

xxxx

Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two situations exist - - the retention of foreign citizenship, and the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In this case, he observed that there are two citizenships and therefore, two allegiances. He pointed
out that under the Constitution, dual allegiance is inimical to public interest. He thereafter asked whether with the creation of dual allegiance
by reason of retention of foreign citizenship and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, there will now be a violation of the Constitution

Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the constitutional injunction on dual allegiance as inimical to public
interest. He said that the proposed law aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by speedy means. However, he said that
in one sense, it addresses the problem of dual citizenship by requiring the taking of an oath. He explained that the problem of dual
citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country because the latest oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of
allegiance to the Philippines and not to the United States, as the case may be. He added that this is a matter which the Philippine
government will have no concern and competence over.

Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern, when dual allegiance is involved.

Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original version of the bill, which did not require an oath of allegiance. Since
the measure now requires this oath, the problem of dual allegiance is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country concerned, he
explained.

xxxx

Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not denounce his foreign citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance
to the foreign government, and at the same time, owes his allegiance to the Philippine government, such that there is now a case of dual
citizenship and dual allegiance.

Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship.
However, he said that this is not a matter that he wishes to address in Congress because he is not a member of a foreign parliament but a
Member of the House.

xxxx

Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance contrary to national interest should be dealt with by law.
However, he said that the dual allegiance problem is not addressed in the bill. He then cited the Declaration of Policy in the bill which states
that "It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act." He stressed that what the bill does is recognize Philippine citizenship but says
nothing about the other citizenship.

Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created wherein a natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath
of allegiance to another country and in that oath says that he abjures and absolutely renounces all allegiance to his country of origin and
swears allegiance to that foreign country. The original Bill had left it at this stage, he explained. In the present measure, he clarified, a
person is required to take an oath and the last he utters is one of allegiance to the country. He then said that the problem of dual allegiance
is no longer the problem of the Philippines but of the other foreign country.4 (Emphasis supplied.)

From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with
the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized
citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to
the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225
stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance
to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has not yet passed any law on the matter of dual allegiance, such
absence of a law should not be justification why this Court could not rule on the issue. He further contends that while it is true that there is
no enabling law yet on dual allegiance, the Supreme Court, through Mercado v. Manzano,6 already had drawn up the guidelines on how to
distinguish dual allegiance from dual citizenship.7

For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law.
Thus, until a law on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to entertain issues regarding dual
allegiance.8

To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still
has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per
se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization.9 Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual
allegiance.10 Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual
allegiance.

Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed since the case of Mercado had already set the guidelines
for determining dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but
merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.

Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,11 we said that the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and
edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing
the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed
with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. 12 The doctrine of separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate
the duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of
determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ, G.R. No. 182701- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA,

July 23, 2008

REYES, R.T., J.:

A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a
renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy.

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules on Civil Procedure assailing the (1) Resolution [1] and (2)
Omnibus Order[2] of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division, disqualifying petitioner from running as Barangay
Chairman.

Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the
synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007.

On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition[3] before the Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo,
praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is an American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any public
office. In his Answer,[4] petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.[5] He returned to the Philippines and resided
in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.

After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the winner. [6]

On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution granting the petition for disqualification, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Disqualification is GRANTED and respondent Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez is
DISQUALIFIED from running as Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo.

SO ORDERED.[7]
In ruling against petitioner, the COMELEC found that he was not able to regain his Filipino citizenship in the manner provided by
law. According to the poll body, to be able to qualify as a candidate in the elections, petitioner should have made a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.This, petitioner failed to do.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner resorted to the present petition, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the COMELEC for disqualifying him from running and assuming the office of Barangay Chairman.

We dismiss the petition.

Relying on Valles v. Commission on Elections,[8] petitioner argues that his filing of a certificate of candidacy operated as an effective
renunciation of foreign citizenship.

We note, however, that the operative facts that led to this Courts ruling in Valles are substantially different from the present case. In Valles,
the candidate, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, was a dual citizen by accident of birth on foreign soil. [9] Lopez was born of Filipino parents
in Australia, a country which follows the principle of jus soli. As a result, she acquired Australian citizenship by operation of Australian law,
but she was also considered a Filipino citizen under Philippine law. She did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than
the Philippines.

In contrast, petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship and renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on
became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.

More importantly, the Courts 2000 ruling in Valles has been superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 [10] in 2003. R.A. No. 9225
expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines. Section
5 of the said law states:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full
civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:

xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. (Emphasis added)

Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly provides that should one seek elective public office,
he should first make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath.

Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. We quote with approval the COMELEC observation on this point:

While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before
the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate Generals Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is not enough to allow him to run for a
public office. The above-quoted provision of law mandates that a candidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. There is no evidence presented
that will show that respondent complied with the provision of R.A. No. 9225. Absent such proof we cannot allow respondent to run for
Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay.

For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of law who is authorized to administer an
oath. The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the
instant case, respondent Lopezs failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will
prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law. For failure of
respondent to prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the United States, this Commission holds him disqualified from running for an
elective position in the Philippines.[11] (Emphasis added)

While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory can
not cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because
the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. [12]
In sum, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner as candidate for Chairman in the Barangay
elections of 2007.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

NESTOR A. JACOT, -versus-

ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

November 27, 2008

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution[1] dated 28 September 2007 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA
No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division [2] disqualifying him from running for the position
of Vice-Mayor of Catarman,Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal
renouncement of his United States (US) citizenship.

Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. [3]

Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine
Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval[4] of petitioners
request, and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward
C. Yulo. [5] On 27 September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a
citizen of the Philippines.[6]

Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of
the Municipality of Catarman,Camiguin. [7]

On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification[8] before the COMELEC Provincial Office in Camiguin against
petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225, which reads
as follows:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:

xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

In his Answer[9] dated 6 May 2007 and Position Paper[10] dated 8 May 2007, petitioner countered that his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of thePhilippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and the oath contained in his Certificate of Candidacy operated as an effective
renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the position
of Vice Mayor.

On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution [11] disqualifying the petitioner from running for the position of
Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division
explained that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 does not automatically bestow upon any person the
privilege to run for any elective public office. It additionally ruled that the filing of a Certificate of Candidacy cannot be considered as a
renunciation of foreign citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division did not consider Valles v. COMELEC[12] and Mercado
v. Manzano[13] applicable to the instant case, since Valles and Mercado were dual citizens since birth, unlike the petitioner who lost his
Filipino citizenship by means of naturalization. The COMELEC, thus, decreed in the aforementioned Resolution that:

ACCORDINGLY, NESTOR ARES JACOT is DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin for the May 14,
2007 National and Local Elections. If proclaimed, respondent cannot thus assume the Office of Vice-Mayor of said municipality by virtue of
such disqualification.[14]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 29 June 2007 reiterating his position that his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines before the Los Angeles PCG and his oath in his Certificate of Candidacy sufficed as an effective renunciation of
his US citizenship. Attached to the said Motion was an Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and
All Foreign Citizenship dated 27 June 2007, wherein petitioner explicitly renounced his US citizenship.[15] The COMELEC en banc dismissed
petitioners Motion in a Resolution[16] dated 28 September 2007 for lack of merit.

Petitioner sought remedy from this Court via the present Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,
where he presented for the first time an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Any and All Foreign
Citizenship[17] dated 7 February 2007. He avers that he executed an act of renunciation of his US citizenship, separate from the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines he took before the Los Angeles PCG and his filing of his Certificate of Candidacy, thereby
changing his theory of the case during the appeal. He attributes the delay in the presentation of the affidavit to his former counsel,
Atty. Marciano Aparte, who allegedly advised him that said piece of evidence was unnecessary but who, nevertheless, made him execute
an identical document entitled Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship
on 27 June 2007 after he had already filed his Certificate of Candidacy. [18]

Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution of this Court:

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. 9225, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CITIZENSHIP RETENTION AND RE-
ACQUISITION ACT OF 2003, SPECIFICALLY SECTION 5(2) AS TO THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THOSE SEEKING ELECTIVE PUBLIC
OFFICE;

II

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE AS REGARDS THE PAYMENT OF THE
NECESSARY MOTION FEES; AND

III

WHETHER OR NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT WOULD RESULT IN THE FRUSTRATION OF THE WILL
OF THE PEOPLE OF CATARMAN, CAMIGUIN.[19]

The Court determines that the only fundamental issue in this case is whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14
May 2007 local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.

This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified.

Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los
Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of
foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a
foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine
citizenship:

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

I __________ solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws
and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his
renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation might arise under Republic Act No. 9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship
by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship.

The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in the Certificate of Candidacy which must be executed
by any personwho wishes to run for public office in Philippine elections. Such an oath reads:

I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; that I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the
Philippines; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. I hereby certify that
the facts stated herein are true and correct of my own personal knowledge.

Now, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 specifically provides that:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:

xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired
it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath
simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy. [20]

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign
country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship)
requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have
presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the
discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18
August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative
Arthur Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign
citizenship:

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Okay. So, No. 2. Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. I think its very good, ha?
No problem?

REP. JAVIER. I think its already covered by the oath.

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Renouncing foreign citizenship.

REP. JAVIER. Ah but he has taken his oath already.

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Nono, renouncing foreign citizenship.

xxxx

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Can I go back to No. 2. Whats your problem, Boy? Those seeking elective office in the Philippines.

REP. JAVIER. They are trying to make him renounce his citizenship thinking that ano

CHAIRMAN DRILON. His American citizenship.

REP. JAVIER. To discourage him from running?

CHAIRMAN DRILON. No.

REP. A.D. DEFENSOR. No. When he runs he will only have one citizenship. When he runs for office, he will have only
one. (Emphasis ours.)

There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign
citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have
one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.

By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the one contained in
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No.
9225. It bears to emphasize that the said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in
Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having
more than one citizenship.

Petitioner erroneously invokes the doctrine in Valles[21] and Mercado,[22] wherein the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of
candidacy, containing an oath of allegiance, was already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship. The ruling of this Court
in Valles and Mercado is not applicable to the present case, which is now specially governed by Republic Act No. 9225, promulgated on 29
August 2003.

In Mercado, which was cited in Valles, the disqualification of therein private respondent Manzano was sought under another law, Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code, which reads:

SECTION 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
xxxx

(d) Those with dual citizenship.

The Court in the aforesaid cases sought to define the term dual citizenship vis--vis the concept of dual allegiance. At the time this Court
decided the cases ofValles and Mercado on 26 May 1999 and 9 August 2000, respectively, the more explicitly worded requirements of
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 were not yet enacted by our legislature.[23]

Lopez v. Commission on Elections[24] is the more fitting precedent for this case since they both share the same factual milieu. In Lopez,
therein petitioner Lopez was a natural-born Filipino who lost his Philippine citizenship after he became a naturalized US citizen. He later
reacquired his Philippine citizenship by virtue of Republic Act No. 9225. Thereafter, Lopez filed his candidacy for a local elective position,
but failed to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship. This Court unequivocally declared that despite having
garnered the highest number of votes in the election, Lopez is nonetheless disqualified as a candidate for a local elective position due to his
failure to comply with the requirements of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225.

Petitioner presents before this Court for the first time, in the instant Petition for Certiorari, an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to
the United States and Any and All Foreign Citizenship,[25] which he supposedly executed on 7 February 2007, even before he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March 2007.With the said Affidavit, petitioner puts forward in the Petition at bar a new theory of his casethat
he complied with the requirement of making a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship before filing his Certificate of
Candidacy. This new theory constitutes a radical change from the earlier position he took before the COMELECthat he complied with the
requirement of renunciation by his oaths of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and in his
Certificate of Candidacy, and that there was no more need for a separate act of renunciation.

As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body need not be considered by a
reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this
rule.[26] Courts have neither the time nor the resources to accommodate parties who chose to go to trial haphazardly. [27]

Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of evidence.[28] Petitioner should have offered the Affidavit dated 7 February
2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC.

Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that In the absence of any applicable provisions of these Rules, the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in suppletory character and effect. Section 34
of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court categorically enjoins the admission of evidence not formally presented:

SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. - The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence
is offered must be specified.

Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC, respondent had no opportunity to examine and controvert it. To
admit this document would be contrary to due process. [29] Additionally, the piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly
justice.[30]

The Court further notes that petitioner had already presented before the COMELEC an identical document, Oath of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship executed on 27 June 2007, subsequent to his filing of
his Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March 2007. Petitioner attached the said Oath of 27 June 2007 to his Motion for Reconsideration with the
COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en banceventually refused to reconsider said document for being belatedly executed. What was
extremely perplexing, not to mention suspect, was that petitioner did not submit the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 or mention it at all in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, considering that it could have easily won his case if it was actually executed on and in existence before
the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy, in compliance with law.

The justification offered by petitioner, that his counsel had advised him against presenting this crucial piece of evidence, is lame and
unconvincing. If the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 was in existence all along, petitioners counsel, and even petitioner himself, could have
easily adduced it to be a crucial piece of evidence to prove compliance with the requirements of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No.
9225. There was no apparent danger for petitioner to submit as much evidence as possible in support of his case, than the risk of
presenting too little for which he could lose.

And even if it were true, petitioners excuse for the late presentation of the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 will not change the outcome of
petitioners case.
It is a well-settled rule that a client is bound by his counsels conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the case, and the client cannot
be heard to complain that the result might have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently. [31] The only exceptions to the general
rule -- that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel -- which this Court finds acceptable are when the reckless or gross negligence of
counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the application of the rule results in the outright deprivation of ones property
through a technicality.[32] These exceptions are not attendant in this case.

The Court cannot sustain petitioners averment that his counsel was grossly negligent in deciding against the presentation of the Affidavit
of 7 February 2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC. Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness; the sufficiency,
relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence; the proper defense or the burden of proof, failure to introduce evidence, to summon witnesses
and to argue the case -- unless they prejudice the client and prevent him from properly presenting his case -- do not constitute gross
incompetence or negligence, such that clients may no longer be bound by the acts of their counsel.[33]

Also belying petitioners claim that his former counsel was grossly negligent was the fact that petitioner continuously used his former
counsels theory of the case. Even when the COMELEC already rendered an adverse decision, he persistently argues even to this Court
that his oaths of allegiance to the Republic of thePhilippines before the Los Angeles PCG and in his Certificate of Candidacy amount to the
renunciation of foreign citizenship which the law requires. Having asserted the same defense in the instant Petition, petitioner only
demonstrates his continued reliance on and complete belief in the position taken by his former counsel, despite the formers incongruous
allegations that the latter has been grossly negligent.

Petitioner himself is also guilty of negligence. If indeed he believed that his counsel was inept, petitioner should have promptly taken action,
such as discharging his counsel earlier and/or insisting on the submission of his Affidavit of 7 February 2007 to the COMELEC, instead of
waiting until a decision was rendered disqualifying him and a resolution issued dismissing his motion for reconsideration; and, thereupon, he
could have heaped the blame on his former counsel. Petitioner could not be so easily allowed to escape the consequences of his former
counsels acts, because, otherwise, it would render court proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening at any time by the mere
subterfuge of replacing counsel. [34]

Petitioner cites De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,[35] where therein petitioner De Guzman was unable to present a piece of evidence because
his lawyer proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence, despite the Sandiganbayans denial of his prior leave to do so. The wrongful insistence
of the lawyer in filing a demurrer to evidence had totally deprived De Guzman of any chance to present documentary evidence in his
defense. This was certainly not the case in the Petition at bar.

Herein, petitioner was in no way deprived of due process. His counsel actively defended his suit by attending the hearings, filing the
pleadings, and presenting evidence on petitioners behalf. Moreover, petitioners cause was not defeated by a mere technicality, but because
of a mistaken reliance on a doctrine which is not applicable to his case. A case lost due to an untenable legal position does not justify a
deviation from the rule that clients are bound by the acts and mistakes of their counsel. [36]

Petitioner also makes much of the fact that he received the highest number of votes for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman during the
2007 local elections. The fact that a candidate, who must comply with the election requirements applicable to dual citizens and failed to do
so, received the highest number of votes for an elective position does not dispense with, or amount to a waiver of, such requirement.[37] The
will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed that the
candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate must be strictly applied. If a person seeks to serve the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other
state.[38] The application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. [39]

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 28 September 2007 of the COMELEC en banc in SPA No. 07-361,
affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division, is AFFIRMED. Petitioner is DISQUALIFIED to run for the
position of Vice-Mayor ofCatarman, Camiguin in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, and if proclaimed, cannot assume the Office
of Vice-Mayor of said municipality by virtue of such disqualification. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 129118. July 19, 2000]

AGRIPINO A. DE GUZMAN, JR., et al, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

PURISIMA, J.:

At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voters Registration Act
of 1996".

RA 8189 was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1996. Section 44 thereof provides:
"SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for more than four (4)
years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a
particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional
district."

By virtue of the aforequoted provision of law, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated Resolution Nos. 97-0002[1] and 97-
0610[2] for the implementation thereof. Thereafter, the COMELEC issued several directives [3] reassigning the petitioners, who are either City
or Municipal Election Officers, to different stations.

Aggrieved by the issuance of the aforesaid directives and resolutions, petitioners found their way to this Court via the present petition
assailing the validity of Section 44 of RA 8189, contending that:

SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION;

II

SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE ON SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL
SERVANTS;

III

SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 CONSTITUTES A DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW;

IV

SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 UNDERMINES THE CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF COMELEC AND COMELECS
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO NAME, DESIGNATE AND APPOINT AND THEN REASSIGN AND TRANSFER ITS VERY OWN
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES;

SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 CONTRAVENES THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEPT [Article VI, SECTION 26(1), Phil.
Constitution] THAT EVERY BILL PASSED BY CONGRESS SHALL EMBRACE ONLY ONE SUBJECT WHICH MUST BE EXPRESSED IN
THE TITLE THEREOF; and

VI

SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT
[ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26 (2)] OF THREE READINGS ON SEPARATE DAYS AND DISTRIBUTION OF PRINTED COPIES IN ITS FINAL
FORM THREE DAYS BEFORE ITS PASSAGE.

Petitioners contentions revolve on the pivotal issue, whether Section 44 of RA 8189 is valid and constitutional.

The petition is barren of merit. Section 44 of RA 8189 enjoys the presumption of validity, and the Court discerns no ground to invalidate it.

Petitioners theorize that Section 44 of RA 8189 is violative of the "equal protection clause" of the 1987 Constitution because it singles out
the City and Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the same city or municipality for more than
four (4) years. They maintain that there is no substantial distinction between them and other COMELEC officials, and therefore, there is no
valid classification to justify the objective of the provision of law under attack.

The Court is not persuaded by petitioners arguments. The "equal protection clause" of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification
under the following conditions:

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;

2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.[4]

After a careful study, the ineluctable conclusion is that the classification under Section 44 of RA 8189 satisfies the aforestated requirements.

The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with
the people of their place of assignment" does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

In Lutz vs. Araneta,[5] it was held that "the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of all or none". This is so for
underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. It may be true that all the other officers of COMELEC referred to by
petitioners are exposed to the same evils sought to be addressed by the statute. However, in this case, it can be discerned that the
legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of corruption than by
breaking up each and every link thereof. Verily, under Section 3(n) of RA 8189, election officers are the highest officials or authorized
representatives of the COMELEC in a city or municipality. It is safe to say that without the complicity of such officials, large scale anomalies
in the registration of voters can hardly be carried out.

Moreover, to require the COMELEC to reassign all employees (connected with the registration of voters) who have served at least four
years in a given city or municipality would entail a lot of administrative burden on the part of the COMELEC.

Neither does Section 44 of RA 8189 infringe the security of tenure of petitioners nor unduly deprive them of due process of law. As held
in Sta. Maria vs. Lopez.[6]

"xxx the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed - not merely
assigned - to a particular station. Such a rule does not pr[o]scribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of
an agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency. xxx" (italics supplied)
The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. It only means that an employee
cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the service for causes other than those provided by law and after due process is accorded the
employee. What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise of the power to dismiss. But, where it is the law-making authority itself which
furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy proposed to
cure a perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law.

Untenable is petitioners contention that Section 44 of RA 8189 undermines the authority of COMELEC to appoint its own officials and
employees. As stressed upon by the Solicitor General, Section 44 establishes a guideline for the COMELEC to follow. Said section provides
the criterion or basis for the reassignment or transfer of an election officer and does not deprive the COMELEC of its power to appoint, and
maintain its authority over its officials and employees. As a matter of fact, the questioned COMELEC resolutions and directives illustrate that
it is still the COMELEC which has the power to reassign and transfer its officials and employees. But as a government agency tasked with
the implementation and enforcement of election laws, the COMELEC is duty bound to comply with the laws passed by Congress.

The independence of the COMELEC is not at issue here. There is no impairment or emasculation of its power to appoint its own officials
and employees. In fact, Section 44 even strengthens the COMELECs power of appointment, as the power to reassign or transfer is within
its exclusive jurisdiction and domain.

Petitioners contention that Section 44 has an isolated and different subject from that of RA 8189 and that the same is not expressed in the
title of the law, is equally untenable.

The objectives of Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof", are:

1. To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation;

2. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no information, and which might
therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and

3. To fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are
being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire.[7]

Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is sufficiently complied with where, as in this case, the title is comprehensive enough to
embrace the general objective it seeks to achieve, and if all the parts of the statute are related and germane to the subject matter embodied
in the title or so long as the same are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. [8] Section 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated
considering that it is related and germane to the subject matter stated in the title of the law. The title of RA 8189 is "The Voters Registration
Act of 1996" with a subject matter enunciated in the explanatory note as "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL REGISTRATION OF
VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND
AUTHORIZING THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR." Section 44, which provides for the reassignment of election officers, is
relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process by providing a guideline for the
COMELEC to follow in the reassignment of election officers. It is not an alien provision but one which is related to the conduct and
procedure of continuing registration of voters. In this regard, it bears stressing that the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in
the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue, all the contents and the minute details therein. [9]

In determining the constitutionality of a statute dubbed as defectively titled, the presumption is in favor of its validity. [10]

As regards the issue raised by petitioners - whether Section 44 of RA 8189 was enacted in accordance with Section 26 (2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, petitioners have not convincingly shown grave abuse of discretion on the part of Congress. Respect due to co-equal
departments of the government in matters entrusted to them by the Constitution, and the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion suffice to stay the judicial hand.[11]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED; and the constitutionality and validity of Section 44 of RA 8189 UPHELD. No pronouncement as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198742 August 10, 2012

TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M. BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUAN,Respondents.

REYES, J.:

Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual
citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office.

The Case

At bar is a special civil action for certiorari1 under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify Resolution 2dated September 6, 2011 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in EAC (AE) No. A-44-2010. The assailed resolution (a) reversed the Order 3 dated
November 30, 2010 of COMELEC Second Division dismissing petitioners appeal; and (b) affirmed the consolidated Decision 4 dated
October 22, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, declaring petitioner Teodora Sobejana-Condon
(petitioner) disqualified and ineligible to her position as Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union.

The Undisputed Facts

The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became
a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia
pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The application
was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.

On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of
Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has
ceased to be an Australian citizen.6

The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office
during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed
as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.

Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista,8 (private respondents) all registered
voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioners eligibility before the RTC. The petitions
similarly sought the petitioners disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to
execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as
imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed
that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No.
9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship.

Ruling of the RTC

In its consolidated Decision dated October 22, 2010, the trial court held that the petitioners failure to comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No.
9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. As admitted by the petitioner herself during trial, the personal declaration of
renunciation she filed in Australia was not under oath. The law clearly mandates that the document containing the renunciation of foreign
citizenship must be sworn before any public officer authorized to administer oath. Consequently, the RTCs decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment in FAVOR of [private respondents] and AGAINST (petitioner):

1) DECLARING [petitioner] TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, disqualified and ineligible to hold the office of Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union;

2) NULLIFYING her proclamation as the winning candidate for Vice-Mayor of said municipality; and

3) DECLARING the position of Vice-Mayor in said municipality vacant.

SO ORDERED.9

Ruling of the COMELEC

The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC but the appeal was dismissed by the Second Division in its Order10dated November 30, 2010 for
failure to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period. On motion for reconsideration, the appeal was reinstated by the COMELEC en
banc in its Resolution11 dated September 6, 2011. In the same issuance, the substantive merits of the appeal were given due course. The
COMELEC en banc concurred with the findings and conclusions of the RTC; it also granted the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed
by the private respondents.

The decretal portion of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered the Commission RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES as follows:

1. To DISMISS the instant appeal for lack of merit;

2. To AFFIRM the DECISION dated 22 October 2010 of the court a quo; and

3. To GRANT the Motion for Execution filed on November 12, 2010.

SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC en banc.

The Petitioners Arguments

The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no longer held dual citizenship and
was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not apply to her.

She further argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and not a mandatory requirement. In support thereof, she cites portions of the
Journal of the House of Representatives dated June 2 to 5, 2003 containing the sponsorship speech for House Bill (H.B.) No. 4720, the
precursor of R.A. No. 9225.

She claims that the private respondents are estopped from questioning her eligibility since they failed to do so when she filed certificates of
candidacy for the 2007 and 2010 elections.

Lastly, she disputes the power of the COMELEC en banc to: (a) take cognizance of the substantive merits of her appeal instead of
remanding the same to the COMELEC Second Division for the continuation of the appeal proceedings; and (b) allow the execution pending
appeal of the RTCs judgment.

The Issues

Posed for resolution are the following issues: I) Whether the COMELEC en banc may resolve the merits of an appeal after ruling on its
reinstatement; II) Whether the COMELEC en banc may order the execution of a judgment rendered by a trial court in an election case; III)
Whether the private respondents are barred from questioning the qualifications of the petitioner; and IV) For purposes of determining the
petitioners eligibility to run for public office, whether the "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a
mere pro-forma requirement.
The Courts Ruling

I. An appeal may be simultaneously

reinstated and definitively resolved
by the COMELEC en banc in a
resolution disposing of a motion for
reconsideration.

The power to decide motions for reconsideration in election cases is arrogated unto the COMELEC en banc by Section 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, viz:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

A complementary provision is present in Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to wit:

Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc except motions
on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved by the division which issued the order.

Considering that the above cited provisos do not set any limits to the COMELEC en bancs prerogative in resolving a motion for
reconsideration, there is nothing to prevent the body from directly adjudicating the substantive merits of an appeal after ruling for its
reinstatement instead of remanding the same to the division that initially dismissed it.

We thus see no impropriety much more grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en banc when it proceeded to decide the
substantive merits of the petitioners appeal after ruling for its reinstatement.

Further, records show that, in her motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, the petitioner not only proffered arguments on
the issue on docket fees but also on the issue of her eligibility. She even filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration attaching therewith
supporting documents13 to her contention that she is no longer an Australian citizen. The petitioner, after obtaining an unfavorable decision,
cannot be permitted to disavow the en bancs exercise of discretion on the substantial merits of her appeal when she herself invoked the
same in the first place.

The fact that the COMELEC en banc had remanded similar appeals to the Division that initially dismissed them cannot serve as a precedent
to the disposition of the petitioners appeal. A decision or resolution of any adjudicating body can be disposed in several ways. To sustain
petitioners argument would be virtually putting a straightjacket on the COMELEC en bancs adjudicatory powers.

More significantly, the remand of the appeal to the COMELEC Second Division would be unnecessarily circuitous and repugnant to the rule
on preferential disposition of quo warranto cases espoused in Rule 36, Section 15 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. 14

II. The COMELEC en banc has the

power to order discretionary
execution of judgment.

We cannot subscribe to petitioners submission that the COMELEC en banc has no power to order the issuance of a writ of execution and
that such function belongs only to the court of origin.

There is no reason to dispute the COMELECs authority to order discretionary execution of judgment in view of the fact that the suppletory
application of the Rules of Court is expressly sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. 15

Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal may be issued by an appellate court after the trial court has lost
jurisdiction. In Batul v. Bayron,16 we stressed the import of the provision vis--vis election cases when we held that judgments in election
cases which may be executed pending appeal includes those decided by trial courts and those rendered by the COMELEC whether in the
exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.

III. Private respondents are not

estopped from questioning
petitioners eligibility to hold public
office.

The fact that the petitioners qualifications were not questioned when she filed certificates of candidacy for 2007 and 2010 elections cannot
operate as an estoppel to the petition for quo warranto before the RTC.

Under the Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code), there are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of
a registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised, to wit:

(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election; and

(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:

Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or
city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the
Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. (Emphasis ours)

Hence, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition within the twenty-five (25)-day period
prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code for whatever reasons, the elections laws do not leave him completely helpless as
he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the
proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. 17
The above remedies were both available to the private respondents and their failure to utilize Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
cannot serve to bar them should they opt to file, as they did so file, a quo warranto petition under Section 253.

IV. Petitioner is disqualified from

running for elective office for
failure to renounce her Australian
citizenship in accordance with
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic, thus:

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-
acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I, _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize
and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores ones Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations
concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5, viz:

Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic
Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly
constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they
took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized
citizens. (Emphasis ours)

Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.

On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in
Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation
of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.

To obviate the fatal consequence of her inutile renunciation, the petitioner pleads the Court to interpret the "sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) to be a mere pro forma requirement in conformity with the intent of the Legislature. She anchors her
submission on the statement made by Representative Javier during the floor deliberations on H.B. No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No.
9225.

At the outset, it bears stressing that the Courts duty to interpret the law according to its true intent is exercised only when the law is
ambiguous or of doubtful meaning. The first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law. As such, when the law is clear and free
from any doubt, there is no occasion for construction or interpretation; there is only room for application. 19 Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is
one such instance.

Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or more things
at the same time. For a statute to be considered ambiguous, it must admit of two or more possible meanings. 20

The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC,21 we declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino
American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a
renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the renunciation and
held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to
administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.

The same meaning was emphasized in Jacot v. Dal,22 when we held that Filipinos re-acquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 9225 must explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines, thus:

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired
it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath
simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country,
but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and
(2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as
candidates in Philippine elections.

Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship)
requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have
presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the
discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18
August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur Defensor
explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship;

xxxx

The intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take
their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for
elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely,
Philippine citizenship.23 (Citation omitted and italics and underlining ours)

Hence, in De Guzman v. COMELEC,24 we declared petitioner therein to be disqualified from running for the position of vice-mayor for his
failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his American citizenship.

We find no reason to depart from the mandatory nature infused by the above rulings to the phrase "sworn renunciation". The language of
the provision is plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning and must thus be read literally.25 The foreign
citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.

It is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey. 26 Even a resort to the Journal of the House of
Representatives invoked by the petitioner leads to the same inference, viz:

INTERPELLATION OF REP. JAVIER

Rep. Javier initially inquired whether under the Bill, dual citizenship is only limited to natural-born Filipinos and not to naturalized Filipinos.

Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative.

Rep. Javier subsequently adverted to Section 5 of the Bill which provides that natural-born Filipinos who have dual citizenship shall continue
to enjoy full civil and political rights. This being the case, he sought clarification as to whether they can indeed run for public office provided
that they renounce their foreign citizenship.

Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that these citizens will only have to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship before any authorized public officer.

Rep. Javier sought further clarification on this matter, citing that while the Bill provides them with full civil and political rights as Filipino
citizens, the measure also discriminates against them since they are required to make a sworn renunciation of their other foreign citizenship
if and when they run for public office. He thereafter proposed to delete this particular provision.

In his rejoinder, Rep. Libanan explained that this serves to erase all doubts regarding any issues that might be raised pertaining to
the citizenship of any candidate. He subsequently cited the case of Afroyim vs. Rusk, wherein the United States considered a
naturalized American still as an American citizen even when he cast his vote in Israel during one of its elections.

Rep. Javier however pointed out that the matter of voting is different because in voting, one is not required to renounce his foreign
citizenship. He pointed out that under the Bill, Filipinos who run for public office must renounce their foreign citizenship. He pointed out
further that this is a contradiction in the Bill.

Thereafter, Rep. Javier inquired whether Filipino citizens who had acquired foreign citizenship and are now entitled to reacquire their
Filipino citizenship will be considered as natural-born citizens. As such, he likewise inquired whether they will also be considered qualified to
run for the highest elective positions in the country.

Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that the only requirement is that they make a sworn renunciation of their foreign citizenship
and that they comply with the residency and registration requirements as provided for in the Constitution.

Whereupon, Rep. Javier noted that under the Constitution, natural-born citizens are those who are citizens at the time of birth without
having to perform an act to complete or perfect his/her citizenship.

Rep. Libanan agreed therewith, citing that this is the reason why the Bill seeks the repeal of CA No. 63. The repeal, he said, would help
Filipino citizens who acquired foreign citizenship to retain their citizenship. With regard then to Section 5 of the Bill, he explained that the
Committee had decided to include this provision because Section 18, Article XI of the Constitution provides for the accountability of public
officers.

In his rejoinder, Rep. Javier maintained that in this case, the sworn renunciation of a foreign citizenship will only become a pro forma
requirement.

On further queries of Rep. Javier, Rep. Libanan affirmed that natural-born Filipino citizens who became foreign citizens and who have
reacquired their Filipino citizenship under the Bill will be considered as natural-born citizens, and therefore qualified to run for the
presidency, the vice-presidency or for a seat in Congress. He also agreed with the observation of Rep. Javier that a natural-born citizen is
one who is a citizen of the country at the time of birth. He also explained that the Bill will, in effect, return to a Filipino citizen who has
acquired foreign citizenship, the status of being a natural-born citizen effective at the time he lost his Filipino citizenship.

As a rejoinder, Rep. Javier opined that doing so would be discriminating against naturalized Filipino citizens and Filipino citizens by election
who are all disqualified to run for certain public offices. He then suggested that the Bill be amended by not considering as natural-born
citizens those Filipinos who had renounced their Filipino citizenship and acquired foreign citizenship. He said that they should be considered
as repatriated citizens.
In reply, Rep. Libanan assured Rep. Javier that the Committee will take note of the latters comments on the matter. He however stressed
that after a lengthy deliberation on the subject, the Committees on Justice, and Foreign Affairs had decided to revert back to the status of
being natural-born citizens those natural-born Filipino citizens who had acquired foreign citizenship but now wished to reacquire their
Filipino citizenship.

Rep. Javier then explained that a Filipina who loses her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to a foreigner can regain her
repatriated Filipino citizenship, upon the death of her husband, by simply taking her oath before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

Rep. Javier said that he does not oppose the Bill but only wants to be fair to other Filipino citizens who are not considered natural-born. He
reiterated that natural-born Filipino citizens who had renounced their citizenship by pledging allegiance to another sovereignty should not be
allowed to revert back to their status of being natural-born citizens once they decide to regain their Filipino citizenship. He underscored that
this will in a way allow such Filipinos to enjoy dual citizenship.

On whether the Sponsors will agree to an amendment incorporating the position of Rep. Javier, Rep. Libanan stated that this will defeat the
purpose of the Bill.

Rep. Javier disagreed therewith, adding that natural-born Filipino citizens who acquired foreign citizenships and later decided to regain their
Filipino citizenship, will be considered as repatriated citizens.

Rep. Libanan cited the case of Bengzon vs. HRET wherein the Supreme Court had ruled that only naturalized Filipino citizens are not
considered as natural-born citizens.

In reaction, Rep. Javier clarified that only citizens by election or those whose mothers are Filipino citizens under the 1935 Constitution and
who elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of maturity, are not deemed as natural-born citizens.

In response, Rep. Libanan maintained that in the Bengzon case, repatriation results in the recovery of ones original nationality and only
naturalized citizens are not considered as natural-born citizens.

On whether the Sponsors would agree to not giving back the status of being natural-born citizens to natural-born Filipino citizens who
acquired foreign citizenship, Rep. Libanan remarked that the Body in plenary session will decide on the matter.27

The petitioner obviously espouses an isolated reading of Representative Javiers statement; she conveniently disregards the preceding and
succeeding discussions in the records.

The above-quoted excerpts of the legislative record show that Representative Javiers statement ought to be understood within the context
of the issue then being discussed, that is whether former natural-born citizens who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship under the proposed
law will revert to their original status as natural-born citizens and thus be qualified to run for government positions reserved only to natural-
born Filipinos, i.e. President, Vice-President and Members of the Congress.

It was Representative Javiers position that they should be considered as repatriated Filipinos and not as natural-born citizens since they will
have to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Natural-born citizens are those who need not perform an act to
perfect their citizenship. Representative Libanan, however, maintained that they will revert to their original status as natural-born citizens. To
reconcile the renunciation imposed by Section 5(2) with the principle that natural-born citizens are those who need not perform any act to
perfect their citizenship, Representative Javier suggested that the sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship be considered as a mere pro
forma requirement.

Petitioners argument, therefore, loses its point. The "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" must be deemed a formal requirement only
with respect to the re-acquisition of ones status as a natural-born Filipino so as to override the effect of the principle that natural-born
citizens need not perform any act to perfect their citizenship. Never was it mentioned or even alluded to that, as the petitioner wants this
Court to believe, those who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship and thereafter run for public office has the option of executing an unsworn
affidavit of renunciation.

It is also palpable in the above records that Section 5 was intended to complement Section 18, Article XI of the Constitution on public
officers primary accountability of allegiance and loyalty, which provides:

Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee who
seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.

An oath is a solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing to God or a revered person or thing, that ones statement is true or that one
will be bound to a promise. The person making the oath implicitly invites punishment if the statement is untrue or the promise is broken. The
legal effect of an oath is to subject the person to penalties for perjury if the testimony is false. 28

Indeed, the solemn promise, and the risk of punishment attached to an oath ensures truthfulness to the prospective public officers
abandonment of his adopted state and promise of absolute allegiance and loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.

To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is to say that it is only for ceremonial purposes; it would also accommodate a mere
qualified or temporary allegiance from government officers when the Constitution and the legislature clearly demand otherwise.

Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under which she is already deemed to have lost her citizenship, is entitled to
judicial notice. We disagree.

Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven. 29 To prove a foreign law, the party
invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:

Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by
his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice- consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis ours)

Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal
of such court.

The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the existence of a foreign law may also be established through:
(1) a testimony under oath of an expert witness such as an attorney-at-law in the country where the foreign law operates wherein he quotes
verbatim a section of the law and states that the same was in force at the time material to the facts at hand; and (2) likewise, in several
naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of
citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all
the circumstances, the Court is "satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered." Thus, in a number of decisions, mere
authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to be a competent proof of that
law.30

The petitioner failed to prove the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948 through any of the above methods. As uniformly observed by the RTC
and COMELEC, the petitioner failed to show proof of the existence of the law during trial. Also, the letter issued by the Australian
government showing that petitioner already renounced her Australian citizenship was unauthenticated hence, the courts a quo acted
judiciously in disregarding the same.

We are bound to arrive at a similar conclusion even if we were to admit as competent evidence the said letter in view of the photocopy of a
Certificate of Authentication issued by Consular Section of the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia attached to the petitioners motion
for reconsideration.

We have stressed in Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied Workers (AASJS) Member v.
Datumanong31 that the framers of R.A. No. 9225 did not intend the law to concern itself with the actual status of the other citizenship.

This Court as the government branch tasked to apply the enactments of the legislature must do so conformably with the wisdom of the latter
sans the interference of any foreign law. If we were to read the Australian Citizen Act of 1948 into the application and operation of R.A. No.
9225, we would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed wise to require. To do so would be a brazen encroachment
upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic. 32

The petitioners act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While this
Court has previously declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a
renunciation of foreign citizenship,33 such ruling was already adjudged superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003
which provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.34

The fact that petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate
the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a
matter of popularity.35

In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. 36 The rule applies to all those who have re-acquired their
Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise
of the right to run for public office.

Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores their right to run for public office. The petitioner's failure to comply therewith
in accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed
on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of
her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated September 6, 2011 of the Commission
on Elections en bane in EAC (AE) No. A-44-2010 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 195649 July 2, 2013

CASAN MACODE MACQUILING, PETITIONER,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA. RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:

This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on May 10, 2013 and the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration filed on May 20, 2013.

We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May 2010 elections has already ended on June 30, 2010.
Arnado, therefore, has successfully finished his term of office. While the relief sought can no longer be granted, ruling on the motion for
reconsideration is important as it will either affirm the validity of Arnados election or affirm that Arnado never qualified to run for public
office.

Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of this Courts Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he
presented his accomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not
only twice but six times. It must be stressed, however, that the relevant question is the efficacy of his renunciation of his foreign citizenship
and not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the question
before this Court.
Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as having the effect of expatriation when he
executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus claims that he was divested of his American
citizenship. If indeed, respondent was divested of all the rights of an American citizen, the fact that he was still able to use his US passport
after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates this claim.

The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, 1 which must be presented as public documents2 of a foreign country and must be
"evidenced by an official publication thereof."3 Mere reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in
deciding a case.

Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the United States "providing that a person who is divested of American
citizenship thru an Affidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such American citizenship by using a US Passport issued prior to expatriation."4

American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code calls for application in the case
before us, given the fact that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he was not only a Filipino citizen but, by his own
declaration, also an American citizen. It is the application of this law and not of any foreign law that serves as the basis for Arnados
disqualification to run for any local elective position.

With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA) 9225 is that "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act." 5 This policy pertains to the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2) 6 requires those who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who seek elective public
office, to renounce any and all foreign citizenship.

This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read together with Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code7 which disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for any elective local position, indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to
run for public office must be solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to
continue using a foreign passport which indicates the recognition of a foreign state of the individual as its national even after the Filipino
has renounced his foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.

Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority decision rules on a situation of doubt.

Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for local
elective positions.

There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citizen of the country which issued the passport,
or that a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the person named therein as its national.

It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American citizenship by naturalization. There is no doubt
that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship.
It is also indubitable that after renouncing his American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at least six times.

If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnados renunciation of his American citizenship when he subsequently used
his U.S. passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation must be
made through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to.
Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It
devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality.

The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man without a country".1wphi1 On the contrary, this Court has, in fact,
found Arnado to have more than one. Nowhere in the decision does it say that Arnado is not a Filipino citizen. What the decision merely
points out is that he also possessed another citizenship at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy.

Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 8 They are
accorded not only great respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body had
arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been
properly appreciated.9

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First Division found that Arnado used his U.S. Passport at least six times after he
renounced his American citizenship. This was debunked by the COMELEC En Banc, which found that Arnado only used his U.S. passport
four times, and which agreed with Arnados claim that he only used his U.S. passport on those occasions because his Philippine passport
was not yet issued. The COMELEC En Banc argued that Arnado was able to prove that he used his Philippine passport for his travels on
the following dates: 12 January 2010, 31 January 2010, 31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 4 June 2010.

None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration showing that on 21
January 2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado arrived in the Philippines using his U.S. Passport No. 057782700 which also indicated therein
that his nationality is USA-American. Adding these two travel dates to the travel record provided by the Bureau of Immigration showing that
Arnado also presented his U.S. passport four times (upon departure on 14 April 2009, upon arrival on 25 June 2009, upon departure on 29
July 2009 and upon arrival on 24 November 2009), these incidents sum up to six.

The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet
issued to him for his use."10 This conclusion, however, is not supported by the facts. Arnado claims that his Philippine passport was issued
on 18 June 2009. The records show that he continued to use his U.S. passport even after he already received his Philippine passport.
Arnados travel records show that he presented his U.S. passport on 24 November 2009, on 21 January 2010, and on 23 March 2010.
These facts were never refuted by Arnado.

Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a misapprehension of the facts that the use of the U.S. passport was discontinued
when Arnado obtained his Philippine passport. Arnados continued use of his U.S. passport cannot be considered as isolated acts contrary
to what the dissent wants us to believe.

It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only those who are exclusively Filipinos are qualified to run for public
office. If we allow dual citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce their foreign citizenship and afterwards continue using their
foreign passports, we are creating a special privilege for these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED with finality.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104654 June 6, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, MANILA and JUAN G.
FRIVALDO, respondents.

QUIASON, J.:

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), this Court declared private respondent, Juan G. Frivaldo, an alien and
therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.

Once more, the citizenship of private respondent is put in issue in

these petitions docketed as G.R. No.104654 and G.R. No. 105715 and G.R. No. 105735. The petitions were consolidated since they
principally involve the same issues and parties.

G.R. No. 104654

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules,
filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision dated February 27, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, in
SP Proc. No. 91-58645, which re-admitted private respondent as a Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 63 as
amended by C.A. No. 473); and (2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private respondent on February 27, 1992.

On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned: "In the Matter of Petition of Juan G. Frivaldo to be Re-
admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63" (Rollo, pp. 17-23).

In an Order dated October 7, 1991 respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the publication of the said
order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive weeks, the last publication of which
should be at least six months before the said date of hearing. The order further required the posting of a copy thereof and the petition in a
conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Manila (Rollo, pp. 24-26).

On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule," where he manifested his intention to run for
public office in the May 1992 elections. He alleged that the deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy was March 15, one day before the
scheduled hearing. He asked that the hearing set on March 16 be cancelled and be moved to January 24 (Rollo, pp. 27-28).

The motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992, wherein the hearing of the petition was moved to February 21, 1992. The said
order was not published nor a copy thereof posted.

On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent as the sole witness. He submitted the following documentary evidence: (1)
Affidavit of Publication of the Order dated October 7, 1991 issued by the publisher of The Philippine Star (Exh. "A"); (2) Certificate of
Publication of the order issued
by the National Printing Office (Exh. "B"); (3) Notice of Hearing of Petition (Exh. "B-1"); (4) Photocopy of a Citation issued by the National
Press Club with private respondents picture (Exhs. "C" and "C-2"); (5) Certificate of Appreciation issued by the Rotary Club of Davao (Exh.
"D"); (6) Photocopy
of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Republican College, Quezon City (Exh. "E"); (7) Photocopy of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by
the Davao-Bicol Association (Exh. "F"); (8) Certification issued by the Records Management and Archives Office that the record of birth of
private respondent was not on file (Exh. "G"); and (8) Certificate of Naturalization issued by the United States District Court (Exh. "H").

Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by
naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen (Rollo, p. 33).

On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before respondent Judge (Rollo, p. 34).

On March 16, a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Motion for Reconsideration" was filed by Quiterio H. Hermo. He
alleged that the proceedings were tainted with jurisdictional defects, and prayed for a new trial to conform with the requirements of the
Naturalization Law.

After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal directly with the Supreme Court.

G.R. No. 105715

This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus with injunction under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) of Article
VIII of the Constitution with prayer for temporary restraining order filed by Raul R. Lee against the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
and private respondent, to annul the en banc Resolution of the COMELEC, which dismissed his petition docketed as SPC Case No. 92-273.
The said petition sought to annul the proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon.

Petitioner was the official candidate of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for the position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon
in the May 1992 elections. Private respondent was the official candidate of the Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD)
for the same position.

Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992.

On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of the Province
of Sorsogon on the grounds: (1) that the proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with
law; (2) that private respondent is an alien, whose grant of Philippine citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and
(3) that private respondent is not a duly registered voter. Petitioner further prayed that the votes case in favor of private respondent be
considered as stray votes, and that he, on the basis of the remaining valid votes cast, be proclaimed winner.

On June 10, the COMELEC issued the questioned en banc resolution which dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time, citing
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166. Said section provides that the period to appeal a ruling of the board of canvassers on questions affecting its
composition or proceedings was three days.

In this petition, petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ignored the fundamental issue of private
respondents disqualification in the guise of technicality.

Petitioner claims that the inclusion of private respondents name in the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon was invalid
because at the time he registered as a voter in 1987, he was as American citizen.

Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to private respondent is not yet conclusive because the case is still on appeal
before us.

Petitioner prays for: (1) the annulment of private respondents proclamation as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon; (2) the deletion of
private respondents name from the list of candidates for the position of governor; (3) the proclamation of the governor-elect based on the
remaining votes, after the exclusion of the votes for private respondent; (4) the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin private
respondent from taking his oath and assuming office; and (5) the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the COMELEC to resolve the
pending disqualification case docketed as SPA Case No. 92-016, against private respondent.

G.R. No. 105735

This is a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, with
prayer for temporary restraining order. The parties herein are identical with the parties in G.R. No. 105715.

In substance, petitioner prays for the COMELECs immediate resolution of SPA Case No. 92-016, which is a petition for the cancellation of
private respondents certificate of candidacy filed on March 23, 1992 by Quiterio H. Hermo, the intervenor in G.R. No. 104654 (Rollo, p. 18).

The petition for cancellation alleged: (1) that private respondent is an American citizen, and therefore ineligible to run as candidate for the
position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon; (2) that the trial courts decision
re-admitting private respondent as a Filipino citizen was fraught with legal infirmities rendering it null and void; (3) that assuming the
decision to be valid, private respondents oath of allegiance, which was taken on the same day the questioned decision was promulgated,
violated Republic Act No. 530, which provides for a two-year waiting period before the oath of allegiance can be taken by the applicant; and
(4) that the hearing of the petition on February 27, 1992, was held less than four months from the date of the last publication of the order
and petition. The petition prayed for the cancellation of private respondents certificate of candidacy and the deletion of his name from the
list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon.

In his answer to the petition for cancellation, private respondent denied the allegations therein and averred: (1) that Quiterio H. Hermo, not
being a candidate for the same office for which private respondent was aspiring, had no standing to file the petition; (2) that the decision re-
admitting him to Philippine citizenship was presumed to be valid; and (3) that no case had been filed to exclude his name as a registered
voter.

Raul R. Lee intervened in the petition for cancellation of private respondents certificate of candidacy (Rollo, p. 37.).

On May 13, 1992, said intervenor urged the COMELEC to decide the petition for cancellation, citing Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, which provides that all petitions on matters involving the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be decided "not later than
fifteen days before election," and the case of Alonto v. Commission on Election, 22 SCRA 878 (1968), which ruled that all pre-proclamation
controversies should be summarily decided (Rollo,
p. 50).

The COMELEC concedes that private respondent has not yet reacquired his Filipino citizenship because the decision granting him the
same is not yet final and executory (Rollo, p. 63). However, it submits that the issue of disqualification of a candidate is not among the
grounds allowed in a
pre-proclamation controversy, like SPC Case No. 92-273. Moreover, the said petition was filed out of time.

The COMELEC contends that the preparation for the elections occupied much of its time, thus its failure to immediately resolve SPA Case
No. 92-016. It argues that under Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, it is excused from deciding a disqualification
case within the period provided by law for reasons beyond its control. It also assumed that the same action was subsequently abandoned
by petitioner when he filed before it a petition for quo warranto docketed as EPC No. 92-35. The quo warranto proceedings sought private
respondents disqualification because of his American citizenship.

II

G.R. No. 104654

We shall first resolve the issue concerning private respondents citizenship.

In his comment to the States appeal of the decision granting him Philippine citizenship in G.R. No. 104654, private respondent alleges that
the precarious political atmosphere in the country during Martial Law compelled him to seek political asylum in the United States, and
eventually to renounce his Philippine citizenship.

He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available remedy for his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He tried to reacquire
his Philippine citizenship through repatriation and direct act of Congress. However, he was later informed that repatriation proceedings were
limited to army deserters or Filipino women who had lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to foreigners (Rollo, pp. 49-50). His
request to Congress for sponsorship of a bill allowing him to reacquire his Philippine citizenship failed to materialize, notwithstanding the
endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives in his favor (Rollo, p. 51). He attributed this to the maneuvers of his
political rivals.
He also claims that the re-scheduling of the hearing of the petition to an earlier date, without publication, was made without objection from
the Office of the Solicitor General. He makes mention that on the date of the hearing, the court was jam-packed.

It is private respondents posture that there was substantial compliance with the law and that the public was well-informed of his petition for
naturalization due to the publicity given by the media.

Anent the issue of the mandatory two-year waiting period prior to the taking of the oath of allegiance, private respondent theorizes that
the rationale of the law imposing the waiting period is to grant the public an opportunity to investigate the background of the applicant and to
oppose the grant of Philippine citizenship if there is basis to do so. In his case, private respondent alleges that such requirement may be
dispensed with, claiming that his life, both private and public, was well-known. Private respondent cites his achievement as a freedom
fighter and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.

The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in SP Proc.
No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly.

Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound
to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements which he
believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which be believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The
law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide
a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost
her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.

The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The proceedings conducted, the
decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the publication and posting
requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.

Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be published once a week for
three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation respondent cites his achievements as a freedom
fighter and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.

The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of

the Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in SP Proc.
No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly.

Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound
to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements which he
believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which he believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The
law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide
a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost
her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.

The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The proceedings conducted, the
decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the publication and posting
requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.

Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be published once a week for
three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation. Compliance therewith is jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v.
Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]). Moreover, the publication and posting of the petition and the order must be in its full test for the court to
acquire jurisdiction (Sy v. Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).

The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that
the petitioner is of good moral character; (2) that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to speak
and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the
petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the
justification therefor.

The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]).

Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons who vouched for the good moral character of private
respondent as required by Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of his certificate of
arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the said law.

The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled
date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six
months from the last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment;
and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.

A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor General is
concerned, that period is counted from the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of First Instance of Albay, 60
SCRA 195 [1974]).

Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be executory until after two years
from its promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself
continuously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government
promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to government
announced policies.

Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any decision granting the petition for naturalization before its
finality.

G.R. No. 105715

In view of the finding in G.R. No. 104654 that private respondent is not yet a Filipino citizen, we have to grant the petition in G.R. No.
105715 after treating it as a petition for certiorari instead of a petition for mandamus. Said petition assails the en banc resolution of the
COMELEC, dismissing SPC Case No. 92-273, which in turn is a petition to annul private respondents proclamation on three grounds: 1)
that the proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with law; 2) that private respondent is
an alien, whose grant of Filipino citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and 3) that private respondent is not a duly
registered voter. The COMELEC dismissed the petition on the grounds that it was filed outside the three-day period for questioning the
proceedings
and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166.

The COMELEC failed to resolve the more serious issue the disqualification of private respondent to be proclaimed Governor on grounds
of lack of Filipino citizenship. In this aspect, the petition is one for quo warranto. In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245
(1989), we held that a petition for quo warranto, questioning the respondents title and seeking to prevent him from holding office as
Governor for alienage, is not covered by the ten-day period for appeal prescribed in Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Furthermore, we explained that "qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure; once any of the required qualification is lost, his title
may be seasonably challenged."

Petitioners argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the will of the electorate, is untenable. Both the Local Government Code and the
Constitution require that only Filipino citizens can run and be elected to public office. We can only surmise that the electorate, at the time
they voted for private respondent, was of the mistaken belief that he had legally reacquired Filipino citizenship.

Petitioner in G.R. No. 105715, prays that the votes cast in favor of private respondent be considered stray and that he, being the candidate
obtaining the second highest number of votes, be declared winner. In Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989), we ruled that where the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified to hold the office to which he was elected, the
candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes is not entitled to be declared winner (See also Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA
435 [1985]; Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 [1912]).

G.R. No. 105735

In view of the discussions of G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715, we find the petition in G.R. No. 105735 moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715 are both GRANTED while the petition in G.R. No. 105735 is
DISMISSED. Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as
GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE his office and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167824 July 2, 2010

GERALDINE GAW GUY and GRACE GUY CHEU, Petitioners,

vs.
ALVIN AGUSTIN T. IGNACIO, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 168622

GERALDINE GAW GUY and GRACE GUY CHEU, Petitioners,

vs.
THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, HON. MARICEL U. SALCEDO, MAYNARDO MARINAS,
RICARDO CABOCHAN and ELISEO EXCONDE, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking, among others, to annul and set aside
the Decisions dated January 6, 20052 and April 20, 20053 and Resolutions dated March 10, 20054 and June 29, 20055 rendered by the
Court of Appeals (CA), reversing and setting aside the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court 6 (RTC), Branch 37,
Manila.

The antecedent facts follow.

The father of petitioners Geraldine Gaw Guy and Grace Guy Cheu became a naturalized7 Filipino citizen sometime in 1959. The said
petitioners, being minors at that time, were also recognized8 as Filipino citizens.

Respondent Atty. Alvin Agustin T. Ignacio, filed a Complaint 9 dated March 5, 2004 for blacklisting and deportation against petitioners
Geraldine and Grace before the Bureau of Immigration (BI) on the basis that the latter two are Canadian citizens who are illegally working in
the Philippines, petitioners having been issued Canadian passports.

Acting upon the Complaint, respondent Maricel U. Salcedo, Special Prosecutor, Special Task Force of the BI Commissioner, directed the
petitioners, through the issuance of a subpoenae,10 to appear before her and to bring pertinent documents relative to their current
immigration status, to which the petitioners objected by filing with the Special Task Force of the BI Commissioner a Comment/Opposition
with Motion Ad Cautelam to Quash Re: Subpoena11 dated 30 April 2004 (Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum), which was eventually denied by
respondent Salcedo in an Order12 dated May 14, 2004.

Respondent Board of Commissioners (BOC) filed a Charge Sheet 13 dated June 1, 2004 for Violation of Sections 37 (a) 7, 45 (e) and 45-A of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, which reads as follows:
The undersigned Special Prosecutor charges GRACE GUY CHEU and GERALDINE GAW GUY, both Canadian citizens, for working
without permit, for fraudulently representing themselves as Philippine citizens in order to evade immigration laws and for failure to comply
with the subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum, in violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, committed as follows:

That respondents GRACE GUY CHEU and GERALDINE GAW GUY, knowingly, willfully and unlawfully engage in gainful activities in the
Philippines without appropriate permit by working as the Vice-President for Finance & Treasurer and General Manager, respectively, of
Northern Islands Company, Inc., with office address at No. 3 Mercury Avenue, Libis, Quezon City;

That both respondents, knowingly, willfully and fraudulently misrepresent themselves as Philippine citizens as reflected in the general
Information Sheet of Northern Islands Company, Inc., for 2004, in order to evade any requirement of the Philippine Immigration Laws;

That both respondents, duly served with subpoenas duces tecum/ad testificandum, dated April 20, 2004, knowingly, willfully and unlawfully
failed to comply with requirements thereof.1avvphi1

CONTRARY TO LAW.

As a remedy, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with Damages and a Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction14 dated May 31, 2004 before the RTC of Manila, Branch 37. 15

The trial court, after hearing petitioner's application for issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction,
issued an Order16 dated June 28, 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for temporary restraining order is hereby GRANTED. The respondents and all persons
acting in their behalf and those under their instructions are directed to cease and desist from continuing with the deportation proceedings
involving the petitioners. In the meantime set the case for hearing on preliminary injunction on July 5 and 6, 2004, both at 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon and the respondents are directed to show cause why writ of preliminary injunction should not issue.

SO ORDERED.

On July 5, 2004, public respondents filed their Answer 17 and on July 13, 2004, filed a Supplement (To the Special and Affirmative
Defenses/Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction). 18 The parties were then directed to file their respective memoranda
as to the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and public respondents' special and affirmative defenses. On July 16,
2004, public respondents as well as the petitioners, 19 filed their respective Memoranda.20 On the same day, respondent Atty. Ignacio filed
his Answer21 to the petition.

In an Order22 dated July 19, 2004, the trial court granted the application for preliminary injunction enjoining public respondents from further
continuing with the deportation proceedings. The Order reads, in part:

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that, indeed, there exists a pressing reason to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to protect the
rights of the petitioners pending hearing of the main case on the merits and unless this Court issues a writ, grave irreparable injury would be
caused against the petitioners.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for the Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby GRANTED. The respondents and all
persons acting on their behalf and those under their instructions are directed to cease and desist from continuing with the deportation
proceedings involving the petitioners during the pendency of the instant case. The petitioners are directed to post a bond in the amount
of P50,000.00 to answer for whatever damages that may be sustained by the respondent should the court finally resolve that the petitioners
are not entitled thereto.

SO ORDERED.

As a consequence, public respondents, on September 10, 2004, filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction23 before the CA24 and, on September 17, 2004, respondent Atty. Ignacio filed a Petition
for Certiorari,25 also with the CA.26 Both petitions prayed for the nullification of the Orders dated June 28, 2004 and July 19, 2004 issued by
the RTC in Civil Case No. 04-110179 and for the dismissal of the petition therein. Later on, petitioner Geraldine filed a Motion to
Consolidate both petitions.

On January 6, 2005, the Ninth Division of the CA granted the petition filed by respondent Atty. Ignacio and annulled the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court, the dispositive portion of the Decision27 reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Manila, dated July 19, 2004, is
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

On January 21, 2005, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 28

On March 1, 2005, petitioners reiterated29 their prayer for the consolidation of the petitions in the Eighth and Ninth Divisions. In its
Resolution30 dated March 10, 2005, the CA Ninth Division denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, petitioners filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari31 dated March 31, 2005 praying for the reversal of the Decision
rendered by the CA's Ninth Division, which is now docketed as G.R. No. 167824.

Thereafter, the CA's Eighth Division rendered its own Decision32 dated April 29, 2005 granting the petition therein and nullifying the Orders
dated June 28 and July 19, 2004 in Civil Case No. 04-110179, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition impressed with merit and in accordance with our decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 86432, the same is
GIVEN DUE COURSE and is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the respondent court dated 28 June and 19 July 2004 are hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration 33 from the said Decision, which the CA denied in its Resolution 34dated June 21, 2005.

Thus, petitioners filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari 35 dated July 12, 2005 seeking to reverse and set aside the said
Decision and Resolution rendered by the Eighth Division of the CA and is now docketed as G.R. No. 168622. In its Resolution36 dated
August 10, 2005, the Court dismissed the said petition and said dismissal, despite petitioners' motion for reconsideration, 37 was affirmed in
a Resolution38 dated October 17, 2005. This Court, however, upon another motion for reconsideration39 filed by the petitioners, reinstated
the petition and ordered its consolidation with G.R. No. 167824. 40

On September 7, 2007, a Manifestation41 was filed informing this Court that petitioner Grace Guy Cheu died intestate on August 12, 2007 in
the United States of America.

Petitioners raised the following grounds in their Consolidated Memorandum 42 dated March 27, 2007:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LOWER COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL CASE NO. 04-110179 AND ISSUE A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION THEREIN CONSIDERING
THAT THE INSTANT CASE IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE ON PRIMARY JURISDICTION DOCTRINE AND WARRANTS
PETITIONERS' IMMEDIATE RESORT TO JUDICIAL INTERVENTION.

A.

CONSIDERING THAT PROOF OF PETITIONERS' PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP IS SUBSTANTIAL, PETITIONERS ARE ALLOWED UNDER
THIS HONORABLE COURT'S RULING IN BID V. DELA ROSA, SUPRA, TO SEEK INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT TO ENJOIN THE DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS CONDUCTED AGAINST THEM.

B.

LIKEWISE, CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONERS STAND TO SUFFER GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE INJURIES SHOULD THE
DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THEM BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE, PETITIONERS ARE ALLOWED UNDER TE LAW TO
IMMEDIATELY SEEK JUDICIAL RELIEF DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS.

II.

FURTHER, IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THAT THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN DWIKARNA V. DOMINGO, 433
SCRA 748 (2004) DID NOT STRIP THE LOWER COURT OF ITS AUTHORITY TO ENTERTAIN THE PETITION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 04-
110179 AND TO ISSUE A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN THE AFORESAID CASE.

III.

EVEN IF THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN DWIKARNA V. DOMINGO, SUPRA, DID STRIP THE LOWER COURT OF ITS
JURISDICTION IN BID V. DELA ROSA, SUPRA, TO ENJOIN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS, THE RULING CAN ONLY HAVE
PROSPECTIVE EFFECT.

Basically, petitioners argue that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, relied upon by the CA in its decision, does not apply in the present case
because it falls under an exception. Citing Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa,43 petitioners assert that immediate judicial
intervention in deportation proceedings is allowed where the claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the claim is correct. In connection therewith, petitioners assail the applicability of Dwikarna v. Domingo in the present
case, which the CA relied upon in ruling against the same petitioners.

After a careful study of the arguments presented by the parties, this Court finds the petition meritorious.

Petitioners rely on Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa,44 wherein this Court ruled that when the claim of citizenship is so
substantial as to reasonably believe it to be true, a respondent in a deportation proceeding can seek judicial relief to enjoin respondent BOC
from proceeding with the deportation case. In particular, petitioners cited the following portions in this Court's decision:

True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged
alien, and in the process, determine also their citizenship (Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 756 [1089]. And a mere claim of citizenship
cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings (Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil.
531 [1951]).

However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases admits of an exception, at least insofar as deportation proceedings are
concerned. Thus, what if the claim to citizenship of the alleged deportee is satisfactory? Should the deportation proceedings be allowed to
continue or should the question of citizenship be ventilated in a judicial proceeding? In Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665
[1955]), this Court answered the question in the affirmative, and We quote:

When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be
recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. A citizen is entitled to live in peace, without
molestation from any official or authority, and if he is disturbed by a deportation proceeding, he has the unquestionable right to
resort to the courts for his protection, either by a writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on the legal ground that the Board lacks
jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation proceedings to
continue, granting him the remedy only after the Board has finished its investigation of his undesirability.

x x x And if the right (to peace) is precious and valuable at all, it must also be protected on time, to prevent undue harassment at
the hands of ill-meaning or misinformed administrative officials. Of what use is this much boasted right to peace and liberty if it
can be availed of only after the Deportation Board has unjustly trampled upon it, besmirching the citizen's name before the bar of
public opinion?

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of Commissioners over deportation proceedings is, therefore, not
without exception (Calayday vs. Vivo, 33 SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 [1967]). Judicial intervention, however,
should be granted in cases where the claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is
correct. In other words, the remedy should be allowed only on sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding (Chua
Hiong v. Deportation Board, supra; Co vs. Deportation Board, 78 SCRA 107 [1977]). It appearing from the records that
respondent's claim of citizenship is substantial, as We shall show later, judicial intervention should be allowed.45

The present case, as correctly pointed out by petitioners and wrongfully found by the CA, falls within the above-cited exception considering
that proof of their Philippine citizenship had been adduced, such as, the identification numbers 46 issued by the Bureau of Immigration
confirming their Philippine citizenship, they have duly exercised and enjoyed all the rights and privileges exclusively accorded to Filipino
citizens, i.e., their Philippine passports47issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs.

In BOC v. Dela Rosa, it is required that before judicial intervention is sought, the claim of citizenship of a respondent in a deportation
proceeding must be so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such claim is correct. In the said case, the proof
adduced by the respondent therein was so substantial and conclusive as to his citizenship that it warranted a judicial intervention. In the
present case, there is a substantial or conclusive evidence that petitioners are Filipino citizens. Without necessarily judging the case on its
merits, as to whether petitioners had lost their Filipino citizenship by having a Canadian passport, the fact still remains, through the evidence
adduced and undisputed by the respondents, that they are naturalized Filipinos, unless proven otherwise.

However, this Court cannot pass upon the issue of petitioners' citizenship as this was not raised as an issue. The issue in this petition is on
the matter of jurisdiction, and as discussed above, the trial court has jurisdiction to pass upon the issue whether petitioners have abandoned
their Filipino citizenship or have acquired dual citizenship within the confines of the law.

In this regard, it must be remembered though that this Court's ruling in Dwikarna v. Domingo did not abandon the doctrine laid down in BOC
v. Dela Rosa. The exception remains. Dwikarna merely reiterated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction when this Court ruled that if the
petitioner is dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, he can move for its
reconsideration and if his motion is denied, then he can elevate his case by way of a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. However, utmost caution must be exercised in availing of the
exception laid down in BOC v. Dela Rosa in order to avoid trampling on the time-honored doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The court cannot
or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to resolving the
same, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and services in
determining technical and intricate matters of fact.48 In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.49

Above all else, this Court still upholds the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. As enunciated in Republic v. Lacap: 50

The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him by
administrative processes.51 The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them
and submitted to a court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.52

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that
question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. 53

Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on
sound public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is
estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount
involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; 54 (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
has been rendered moot;55 (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and,
(l) in quo warranto proceedings. x x x56

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Consequently, the Decisions dated January 6, 2005 and April 20, 2005, and the Resolutions
dated March 10, 2005 and June 29, 2005 of the Court of Appeals, nullifying and setting aside the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Manila, are herebyNULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings, with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989

IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner,

vs.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR PABALAN, DELEO HERNANDEZ, BLODDY HERNANDEZ,
BENNY REYES and JUN ESPIRITU SANTO, respondent.

Pelaez, Adriano and Gregorio and Bonifacio A. Alentajan for petitioner.

Chavez, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioner.

Augusto Jose y. Arreza for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court on 4 July 1988 seeking the release from detention
of herein petitioner. 1 After manifestation and motion of the Solicitor General of his decision to refrain from filing a return of the writ on behalf
of the CID, respondent Commissioner thru counsel filed the return. 2Counsel for the parties were heard in oral argument on 20 July 1988.
The parties were allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to file memoranda. 3 An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case
to the Court en banc. In its 10 November 1988 resolution, denying the petition for habeas corpus, the Court disposed of the pending issues
of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of warrantless arrest and detention of the same person.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order dated 24 November 1988. 4 On 29 November 1988, the Court
resolved to deny with finality the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, and further resolved to deny the urgent motion for issuance of a
restraining order dated 28 November 1988. 5

Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order on 5 December 1988.

Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court on 7 December 1988. 6 Respondent Commissioner filed a
motion to lift TRO on 13 December 1988, the basis of which is a summary judgment of deportation against Yu issued by the CID Board of
Commissioners on 2 December 1988. 7 Petitioner also filed a motion to set case for oral argument on 8 December 1988.

In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention 8 was filed by petitioner on 13 December 1988. A memorandum in
furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December 1988 was filed on 15 December 1988 together with a vigorous opposition to the
lifting of the TRO.

The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 7 December 1988 is urgently sought by respondent Commissioner
who was ordered to cease and desist from immediately deporting petitioner Yu pending the conclusion of hearings before the Board of
Special Inquiry, CID. To finally dispose of the case, the Court will likewise rule on petitioner's motion for clarification with prayer for
restraining order dated 5 December 1988, 9 urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention dated 13 December 1988, 10 the
memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December 1988, 11 motion to set case for oral argument dated 8 December
1988. 12

Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order (issued on 7 December 1988) dated 9 December 1988, 13 and the vigorous
opposition to lift restraining order dated 15 December 1988, 14 the Court resolved to give petitioner Yu a non-extendible period of three (3)
days from notice within which to explain and prove why he should still be considered a citizen of the Philippines despite his acquisition and
use of a Portuguese passport. 15

Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15 December 1988 on 20 December 1988 16 followed by an earnest request for
temporary release on 22 December 1988. Respondent filed on 2 January 1989 her comment reiterating her previous motion to lift
temporary restraining order. Petitioner filed a reply thereto on 6 January 1989.

Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, 17 valid for five (5) years and renewed for
the same period upon presentment before the proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10
February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular
Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. 18 While
still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," 19 he declared
his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in
Hongkong sometime in April 1980.

To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship
acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano, 21express renunciation was held to mean a
renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal
capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen 22 resumed or reacquired his prior status
as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport 23 and represented himself as such in official documents even
after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with
his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.

This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. However, pleadings submitted before
this Court after the issuance of said TRO have unequivocally shown that petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The
material facts are not only established by the pleadings they are not disputed by petitioner. A rehearing on this point with the CID would
be unnecessary and superfluous. Denial, if any, of due process was obviated when petitioner was given by the Court the opportunity to
show proof of continued Philippine citizenship, but he has failed.

While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law
in adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts
and satisfy itself on whether or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious.

Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient.
This then resolves adverse to the petitioner his motion for clarification and other motions mentioned in the second paragraph, page 3 of this
Decision.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for release from detention is DENIED. Respondent's motion to lift the temporary
restraining order is GRANTED. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990

JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu), petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEA, respondents.

Rufino B. Requina for petitioner.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which
dismissed the petition for the disqualification of private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea as candidate for Provincial Governor of Cebu
Province.

The facts of the case are briefly as follows:

On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of
Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.

On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in
his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the
ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.

On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation
Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration
(ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively.
(Annex "B-1").

The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the
Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private respondent and proclaiming him until the
final resolution of the main petition.

Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to continue canvassing but to suspend the proclamation.

At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner presented the following exhibits tending to show that private respondent
is an American citizen: Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration signed by private respondent dated
November 21, 1979 (Exh. "B"); Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 in the name of private respondent dated November 21, 1979
(Exh. "C"); Permit to Re-enter the Philippines dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "D"); Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3,
1980 (Exh. "E"). (pp. 117-118, Rollo)

Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D.
Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No.
0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the
country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)

On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the
highest number of votes, private respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.

Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for
lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.

Hence, the present petition.

The petition is not meritorious.

There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate
of candidacy was filed can be raised under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:

(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:

'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after the notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

and

(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:

'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or
city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the
Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.

The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on November 19, 1987 and that the petitioner filed its petition for
disqualification of said private respondent on January 22, 1988. Since the petition for disqualification was filed beyond the twenty five-day
period required in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said petition was filed out of time.

The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be treated as a petition for quo warrantounder Section 253 of the same
Code as it is unquestionably premature, considering that private respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor of Cebu only on March 3,
1988.

However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's citizenship and qualification to hold the public office to
which he has been proclaimed elected. There is enough basis for us to rule directly on the merits of the case, as the COMELEC did below.

Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the
office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence.

In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship
by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the
evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by
any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.

In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the
fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being
an American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81,
Rollo)

Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or not a person is considered an
American under the laws of the United States does not concern Us here.

By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the
petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively
establish this fact.

The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989) and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al (G.R.
No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are not applicable to the case at bar.

In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per certification from the United
States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate
General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the United States but claimed that he was forced to embrace American
citizenship to protect himself from the persecution of the Marcos government. The Court, however, found this suggestion of involuntariness
unacceptable, pointing out that there were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo who did not find it
necessary to abandon their status as Filipinos.

Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was married to an Australian citizen and that he was naturalized as an Australian
citizen in 1976, per certification from the Australian Government through its Consul in the Philippines. This was later affirmed by the
Department of Foreign Affairs.

The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Labo. In fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that
he was a citizen of Australia.

In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines, therefore, disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon and Mayor of Baguio City, respectively, the Court considered the fact that by their own admissions, they are indubitably aliens, no
longer owing any allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines since they have sworn their total allegiance to a foreign state.

In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a
holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up
to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his
Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.

In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because Osmea obtained Certificates of Alien Registration
as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmea should be regarded as having
expressly renounced Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow). Considering the fact that
admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean
that he is not still a Filipino. Thus, by way of analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario states or certifies that he has
a brother named Jose, this does not mean that he does not have a brother named Mario; or if a person is enrolled as student
simultaneously in two universities, namely University X and University Y, presents a Certification that he is a student of University X, this
does not necessarily mean that he is not still a student of University Y. In the case of Osmea, the Certification that he is an American does
not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here
of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation
needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when
there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied".

Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And while it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our country had already
frowned upon the concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further that under the aforecited proviso,
the effect of such dual citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet been enacted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000]

CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.

PURISIMA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions
dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for
disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections
for governor of Davao Oriental.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a
Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia
and came to settle in the Philippines.

On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has
continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was
contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor her
alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the
Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:

A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution shows that respondent was able to produce documentary
proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her late father... and consequently, prove her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the Principle of Jus
Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner to the contrary notwithstanding.

On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . . no other evidence substantial in nature surfaced to confirm the
allegations of petitioner that respondent is an Australian citizen and not a Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing
citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an equivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and consequence. The
evidence adduced by petitioner are inadequate, nay meager, to prove that respondent contemplated renunciation of her Filipino
citizenship.[1]

In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco
Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino
citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.

The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the
May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.

On July 17, 1998, the COMELECs First Division came out with a Resolution dismissing the petition, and disposing as follows:

Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to dispose the instant case on the merits trying it de novo, the above table
definitely shows that petitioner herein has presented no new evidence to disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No. 95-066. The
present petition merely restates the same matters and incidents already passed upon by this Commission not just in 1995 Resolution but
likewise in the Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth any new evidence and matter substantial in nature, persuasive in
character or sufficiently provocative to compel reversal of such Resolutions, the dismissal of the present petition follows as a matter of
course.

xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and issues tendered, We find no convincing reason or impressive
explanation to disturb and reverse the Resolutions promulgated by this Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-066. This Commission
RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the present petition.

SO ORDERED.[2]

Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution but to no avail. The same was denied by the COMELEC in
its en bancResolution of January 15, 1999.

Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition; questioning the citizenship of private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez.

The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a
public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino
citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy
in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino
citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.

Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that:

a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate
of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;

b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and

c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.

Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private respondent had renounced her Filipino citizenship. He
contends that in her application for alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence, private respondent expressly
declared under oath that she was a citizen or subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and operated to
disqualify her to run for elective office.

As regards the COMELECs finding that private respondent had renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by
the Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner argues that the said acts did not automatically restore the status of private respondent as
a Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship she must comply with the mandatory
requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the election of private respondent to public office did not mean the restoration of
her Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally repatriated. Coupled with her alleged renunciation of Australian
citizenship, private respondent has effectively become a stateless person and as such, is disqualified to run for a public office in the
Philippines; petitioner concluded.

Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying the principle of res judicata to the case under consideration;
citing the ruling inMoy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration,[3] that:

xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court
or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed
out again and again as the occasion may demand. xxx

The petition is unmeritorious.

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the
parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis
of place of birth.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses,
Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year
before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic
acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of
August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine
citizens as:

SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)

The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:

SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-
nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty
of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others
as have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to
provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who cannot come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are
citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing therein.
(underscoring ours)

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their
children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet,
Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen.By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the
time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship, to wit:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in
the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the
1973[4] and 1987[5]Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a
Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the
principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her
Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited private respondents application for an Alien Certificate of Registration
(ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3,
1988.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:

(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;

(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;

(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or
more;

(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;

(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;

(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a
plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted: and

(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husbands country, she acquires his
nationality.

In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioners contention that the application of
private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case
of Aznar vs. COMELEC[6] and in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.[7]
In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an American
did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation
of his Philippine citizenship.

And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate
of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship.

Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of
registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For
renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. [8] As held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar,
an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of ones citizenship. The
application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case
of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the
most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.

Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a
ground for losing ones Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioners claim
that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water.

Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for
governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which states:

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

xxx(d) Those with dual citizenship;

xxx

Again, petitioners contention is untenable.

In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified dual citizenship as used in the Local Government Code and reconciled
the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance. [9] Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may,
without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another
state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly
pronounced:

xxx the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from running for a public
office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of
their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship.[10] The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to
renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. [11] This is so because in the certificate of candidacy,
one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore,
when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.

Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February
11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the
Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged
dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective, petitioners claim that private respondent must go through
the whole process of repatriation holds no water.

Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision
thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs.
Commissioner of Immigration.[12] He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.

Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on
the issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic,[13] an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in
that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:

1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;

2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and

3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It
elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or
simpler.[14] Indeed, there appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC
92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially
the same evidence presented in these two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a
reversal of such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively,
in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001]

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a
Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen."[1]

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino
parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. [2]

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of
the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth
Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:

Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:

xxx

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to,
or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is
present:

(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign country; or

(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and
taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country;And provided,
finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of the
Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of
the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5,
1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. [3] He ran for
and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin
of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen
as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.[4]

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision [5] dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the duly
elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000. [6]

Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds:

1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private
respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippinesdespite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of
such citizenship on his part.

2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private
respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.

3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and
constitutionally restore his natural-born status.[7]

The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his Philippine citizenship when he
swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the
Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect such citizenship.

Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase
"from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.

The petition is without merit.

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. [8]

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two
kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country,
is a natural-born citizen thereof.[9]

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." [10]

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth
Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by
Republic Act No. 530.[11] To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications [12] and none of the
disqualifications[13] provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after
two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the
Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government
promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies. [14]

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63
(C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2)
by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.[15]

Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship,
naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring
Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. [16] Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire
Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications [17] and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. [18]

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed
forces;[19] (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;[20] (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time;[21] (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;[22] and (5) political and economic necessity.[23]

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

In Angat v. Republic,[24] we held:

xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship
would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics
in the original.][25]

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.[26] This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship
will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost
his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he
subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the
United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place
where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem,
Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. [27] It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him
to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is
untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the
1973 Constitution as follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship.

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not
have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who
were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, [28] of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected
Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipinos at birth and
had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were
likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of
Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration
of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those
who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed
by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in
order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected
as member of the House of Representatives.

A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the House.[29] The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.[30] In the absence thereof, there is no occasion
for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgment for that of the latter
for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision.[31] There is no
such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

[G.R. No. 132244. September 14, 1999]

GERARDO ANGAT, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

The instant petition for review under Rule 45 assails the orders, dated 22 September 1997 and 29 December 1997, issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City in Case No. N-96-03-MK, entitled In the Matter of the Petition of Gerardo Angat y Legaspi to be Re-
admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended, and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 965 and 263[0].

Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines until he lost his citizenship by naturalization in the United States of
America. Now residing at No. 69 New York Street, Provident Village, Marikina City, Angat filed on 11 March 1996 before the RTC of
Marikina City, Branch 272, a petition to regain his status as a citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Republic Act No.
965 and Republic Act No. 2630 (docketed as N-96-03-MK). In his petition, applying for naturalization, he averred that -

FIRST. - His full name is GERARDO LEGASPI ANGAT. Copy of his latest picture is hereto attached and made an integral part of this
petition.

SECOND. - His present place of residence is #69 New York St., Provident Village, Marikina, Metro Manila and his former residence was in
Las Vegas, U.S.

THIRD. - His trade or profession is in buy and sell and managing the properties of his parents which he has been engaged since his arrival
here in the Philippines.

FOURTH. - He was born on the 22nd day of June 1954 at Tondo, Manila. He was formerly a citizen of the Philippines. He lost his Philippine
citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. He is at present a citizen or subject of the United States of America. Copy of his birth
certificate is hereto attached as Annex A.

FIFTH. - He is newly married to Zenaida Lim who was born in Tondo, Manila and now resides at petitioners residence at Marikina, Metro
Manila. Copy of their marriage contract is hereto attached as Annex B.

SIXTH. - He returned to the Philippines from the United States of America in 1991. Copy of his alien registration is hereto attached as
Annex C.

SEVENTH. - He has the qualifications required by Commonwealth Act No. 63 as amended, and Republic Act Nos. 965 and 2639 to
reacquire Philippine citizenship, and possesses none of the disqualification prescribed in Commonwealth Act No. 473. He has resided in the
Philippines at least six months immediately preceding the date of this petition, to wit: since 1991. He has conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted government as well as
with the community in which he is living.

EIGHT. - He is not opposed to an organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing all organized government. He is not defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success and predominance of mens ideas. He is not a polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy. He has not
been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not suffering from any mental alienation or incurable contagious disease. The
nation of which he is a citizen or subject is not at war with the Philippines.

NINTH. - It is his intention to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly to the United State of America to which at this time he is a citizen.[1]

On 30 April 1996, the trial court, through the branch clerk of court, issued a notice setting the case for initial hearing on 27 January
1997[2] which, along with the petition and its annexes, was received by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on 10 May 1996.

On 13 June 1996, petitioner sought to be allowed to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A.
8171. The motion was denied by the trial judge in his order of 12 July 1996. Another motion filed by petitioner on 13 August 1996 to have
the denial reconsidered was found to be meritorious by the court a quo in an order, dated 20 September 1996, which stated, among other
things, that -

A close scrutiny of R.A. 8171 shows that petitioner is entitled to the benefits of the said law considering that herein petitioner is a natural
born Filipino citizen who lost his citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. The petition and motion of the petitioner to take his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines likewise show that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications under R.A. 8171.[3]

Concluding, the court ruled:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Order of the Court dated July 12, 1996 is hereby set aside. The petitioner is ordered to
take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 8171 before the undersigned on October 03, 1996 at 11:00 in
the morning.

SO ORDERED.[4]

After taking his Oath of Allegiance on 03 October 1996, another order was issued by the trial judge on 04 October 1996 to the following
effect; viz:

After the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines had been taken by the petitioner, Gerardo Angat y Legaspi before the
undersigned, the petitioner is hereby repatriated and declared as citizen of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic
Act No. 8171.

The Bureau of Immigration is ordered to cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as
Filipino citizen to the petitioner upon the finality of this order.

Likewise, let a copy of this Order be registered in the Local Civil Registry of the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila and the General Civil
Registrar, Sta. Mesa, Manila, after its finality.

SO ORDERED.[5]

On 19 March 1997, a Manifestation and Motion (virtually a motion for reconsideration) filed by the OSG asserted that the petition itself
should have been dismissed by the court a quofor lack of jurisdiction because the proper forum for it was the Special Committee on
Naturalization consistently with Administrative Order No. 285 (AO 285), dated 22 August 1996, issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. AO 285
had tasked the Special Committee on Naturalization to be the implementing agency of R.A. 8171. The motion was found to be well taken by
the trial court; thus, in an order, dated 22 September 1997, it adjudged:

"This resolves the Manifestation and Motion filed by the Office of the Solicitor General on March 19, 1997.

"The motion alleges that pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 dated August 22, 1996 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos, any person
desirous of repatriating or reacquiring Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. 8171 shall file a petition with the Special Committee on
Naturalization, which is composed of the Solicitor General as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director-General of
the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as members, which shall process the application; that if their applications are approved they
shall take the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired their
Philippine citizenship and the Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.

"The motion prays that the herein petition be dismissed on the ground that the same should be filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization.

"The records show that on September 20, 1996, the Court granted the herein petition and as a consequence thereof, the petitioner Gerardo
Angat y Legaspi took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Presiding Judge of this Court on October 03, 1996
and on October 04, 1996, the petitioner was ordered repatriated and declared as citizen of the Philippines.

"On February 21, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance as counsel of the State in the subject petition and on
March 19, 1997 filed the herein manifestation and motion.

"The allegations in the manifestation and motion of the Office of the Solicitor General clearly shows that this Court has no jurisdiction over
the herein petition as the same falls within the jurisdiction of the Special Committee on Naturalization. Considering that this court has no
jurisdiction over this case, the order granting the same is therefore null and void.

"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion to dismiss filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is hereby granted. The
orders of this Court dated September 20, 1996 and October 04, 1996 are hereby set aside and the herein petition is ordered DISMISSED
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to its re-filing before the Special Committee on Naturalization.

"SO ORDERED."[6]

A motion for reconsideration, filed by petitioner on 13 October 1997, questioned the aforequoted order asseverating that since his petition
was filed on 14 March 1996, or months before the Special Committee on Naturalization was constituted by the President under AO 285 on
22 August 1996, the court a quo had the authority to take cognizance of the case.

In the Order, dated 29 December 1997, the trial judge denied the motion for reconsideration.

The instant appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure submits the lone assignment of error that -

The Regional Trial Court (has) seriously erred in dismissing the petition by giving retroactive effect to Administrative Order No. 285, absent
a provision on Retroactive Application.

Petitioner would insist that the trial court had jurisdiction over his petition for naturalization [7] filed on 11 March 1996, and that he had
acquired a vested right as a repatriated citizen of the Philippines when the court declared him repatriated following the order, dated 20
September 1996, allowing him to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines which was, in fact, administered to him on 03
October 1996.

The contention is not meritorious.

R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity. The pertinent provisions of the law read:

SECTION 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship
through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:

(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines
opposing organized government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas;

(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or

(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.

SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the
proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of
registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.

Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 725,[8] dated 05 June 1975, amending Commonwealth Act No. 63, an application for
repatriation could be filed by Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens, as well as by natural born Filipinos
who lost their Philippine citizenship, with the Special Committee on Naturalization. The committee, chaired by the Solicitor General with the
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency as the other members, was created
pursuant to Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 270, dated 11 April 1975, as amended by LOI No. 283 and LOI No. 491 issued, respectively, on
04 June 1975 and on 29 December 1976.Although the agency was deactivated by virtue of President Corazon C. Aquinos Memorandum of
27 March 1987, it was not, however, abrogated. In Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections,[9] the Court observed that the aforedated
memorandum of President Aquino had merely directed the Special Committee on Naturalization to cease and desist from undertaking any
and all proceedings x x x under Letter of Instruction (`LOI) 270. [10] The Court elaborated:

This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a
repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express
repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum-based on the copy furnished us by Lee-did not categorically and/or
impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it
specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An
implied repeal will not be allowed `unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clear repugnant and
patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist.

The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief
Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-making
powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of
applications for repatriation pending whatever 'judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution' might make. In other words, the
former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress - once created - to deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal
such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her
presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of 'the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound
discretion to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now
being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory construction but on common sense as well.[11]

Indeed, the Committee was reactivated on 08 June 1995;[12] hence, when petitioner filed his petition on 11 March 1996, the Special
Committee on Naturalization constituted pursuant to LOI No. 270 under P.D. No. 725 was in place. Administrative Order
285,[13] promulgated on 22 August 1996 relative to R.A. No. 8171, in effect, was merely then a confirmatory issuance.

The Office of the Solicitor General was right in maintaining that Angats petition should have been filed with the Committee, aforesaid, and
not with the RTC which had no jurisdiction thereover. The courts order of 04 October 1996 was thereby null and void, and it did not acquire
finality[14] nor could be a source of right on the part of petitioner.[15] It should also be noteworthy that the petition in Case No. N-96-03-MK
was one for repatriation, and it was thus incorrect for petitioner to initially invoke Republic Act No. 965 [16] and R.A. No. 2630[17]since these
laws could only apply to persons who had lost their citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of an
allied foreign country or the armed forces of the United States of America, a factual matter not alleged in the petition. Parenthetically, under
these statutes, the person desiring to re-acquire Philippine citizenship would noteven be required to file a petition in court, and all that he
had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his
residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED, and the Order, dated 22 September 1996, issued by the court a quo, dismissing the
petition of petitioner in Civil Case No. N-96-03-MK for want of jurisdiction, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 163256. November 10, 2004]

CICERON P. ALTAREJOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JOSE ALMIE and VERNON VERSOZA, respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of prohibitory and mandatory
injunction, to set aside the Resolution promulgated by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), First Division, on March 22, 2004
disqualifying petitioner Ciceron P. Altarejos from running as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate, and another resolution of the COMELEC en
banc promulgated on May 7, 2004 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections.

On January 15, 2004, private respondents Jose Almie Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the
COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground that he is not a
Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy that [he] was not a permanent resident of or immigrant
to a foreign country.
Private respondents alleged that based on a letter [1] from the Bureau of Immigration dated June 25, 2001, petitioner was a holder of a
permanent U.S. resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration No. E139507 issued on November 3, 1997, and an Immigration Certificate
of Residence No. 320846 issued on November 3, 1997 by the Bureau of Immigration. [2]

On January 26, 2004, petitioner filed an Answer[3] stating, among others, that he did not commit false representation in his application for
candidacy as mayor because as early as December 17, 1997, he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee
on Naturalization, after he filed a petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. Thus, petitioner claimed that his Filipino
citizenship was already restored, and he was qualified to run as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the
petition.

On the date of the hearing, the parties were required to submit their Memoranda within three days. Private respondents filed their
Memorandum, while petitioner did not file one within the required period. [4] Petitioner, however, filed a Reply Memorandum [5] subsequently.

Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director for Region V and hearing officer of this case, recommended that petitioner
Altarejos be disqualified from being a candidate for the position of mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local
elections. He found, thus:

xxx

The provisions of law governing the qualifications and disqualifications of elective local officials are found in Sections 39 and 40 of Republic
Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which provide as follows:

SEC. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city or province or, in the case of member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan,
the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and
able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

xxx.

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component cities or municipalities must be at least
twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

[SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective position:]

xxx.

(d) Those with dual citizenship.

xxx.

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right
after the effectivity of this Code; xxx

Under the terms of the above quoted statutory provisions, it is required that an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, and
he must not have a dual citizenship; must not be a permanent resident in a foreign country or must not have acquired the right to reside
abroad.

In the present case, it has been established by clear and convincing evidence that respondent is a citizen of the United States of America.
Such fact is proven by his Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. E139507 issued on 3 November 1997 and Immigration Certificate of
Residence (ICR) with No. 320846 issued on 3 November 1997 by the Alien Registration Division, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.
This was further confirmed in a letter dated 25 June 2001 of then Commissioner ANDREA D. DOMINGO of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation.

Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation as a Filipino citizen under Republic Act No. 8171 on 17 December 1997, this did not
restore to respondent his Filipino citizenship, because Section 2 of the aforecited Republic Act No. 8171 specifically provides
that repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in
the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.

It appears from the records of this case that respondent failed to prove that he has fully complied with requirements of the above-quoted
Section 2 of Republic Act 8171 to perfect his repatriation and reacquire his Filipino citizenship. Respondent has not submitted any
document to prove that he has taken his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and that he has registered his fact of
repatriation in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. In fact, in a letter date 25 June 2001, Commissioner ANDREA
DOMINGO stated that RESPONDENT is still a holder of visa under Section 13 (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended,
with an indefinite authorized stay in the Philippines, implying that respondent did not register his supposed Certificate of Repatriation with
the Bureau of Immigration otherwise his Alien Visa would have already been cancelled. The rule is that in case of doubt concerning the
grant of citizenship, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the State and against the applicant (Cheng vs. Republic, L-16999, 22 June
1965).

xxx

Not having been able to prove that he has fully reacquired his Filipino citizenship after being naturalized as a citizen of the United States, it
is clear that respondent is not qualified to be candidate for the position of Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate, in the 10 May 2004 National and
Local Elections, pursuant to the aforequoted Sections 39 and 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

As a further consequence of his not being a Filipino citizen, respondent has also committed false representation in his certificate of
candidacy by stating therein that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen, when in fact, he has not yet even perfected the reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship. Such false representation constitutes a material misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as a candidate for public
office, which could be a valid ground for the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code x x
x. [6]

In its Resolution promulgated on March 22, 2004, the COMELEC, First Division, adopted the findings and recommendation of Director
Zaragoza. The dispositive portion of said Resolution stated, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent CICERON PEREZ ALTAREJOS is hereby disqualified to run as Mayor of San Jacinto,
Masbate. Accordingly, his certificate of candidacy for the position of Municipal Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate is denied due course and
cancelled and his name deleted from the certified list of candidates for the May 10, 2004 elections. [7]

On March 25, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and attached the following documents to prove that he had completed all
the requirements for repatriation which thus entitled him to run for an elective office, viz:

(1) Oath of Allegiance dated December 17, 1997;

(2) Identification Certificate No. 116543 issued by the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004;

(3) Certification from the City Civil Registration Office, Makati City, that the Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance of petitioner
was received by said office and registered, with the corresponding fee paid, on February 18, 2004;

(4) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on Naturalization to the Bureau on Immigration and Deportation that it
was furnishing said office with the Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Repatriation of petitioner for the cancellation of petitioners
registration in said office as an alien, and the issuance to him of the corresponding Identification Card as Filipino citizen;

(5) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on Naturalization to the Local Registrar of San Jacinto, Masbate that it
was sending petitioners Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Repatriation for registration in their records and for petitioners reacquisition of
his former Philippine citizenship.

On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc) RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to DENY the Motion for
Reconsideration for UTTER LACK OF MERIT andAFFIRMS the Resolution of the First Division.[8]

The Comelec en banc held, thus:

The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision is a ground for a motion for
reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1). The evidence referred to in the above provision and to be considered in the Motion for
Reconsideration are those which were submitted during the hearing and attached to the respective Memoranda of the parties which are
already part of the records of the case. In this regard, the evidence of the respondent were not able to overcome the evidence of the
petitioners.

When the entire records of the case was forwarded to the Commission (First Division) the respondents only evidence was his Certificate of
Repatriation dated 17 December 1977 and marked as Annex 1 of his answer. This piece of evidence was not enough to controvert the
evidence of the petitioners which consist of the letter of the then Bureau of Immigration Commissioner Andrea Domingo dated 25 June 2001
which stated that as of the even date respondent is a holder of permanent resident visa (page 15 of the records) and the certification of
Josephine C. Camata dated 28 January 2004 certifying, that the name of the respondent could not be found in the records of
repatriation. (page 42 of the records) The questioned resolution, is therefore, in order as the evidence submitted by the respondent were
insufficient to rebut the evidence of the petitioner.

Now, the respondent, in his Motion for Reconsideration, attempted to introduce to the record new pieces of evidence, which introduction is
not anymore allowed in a Motion for Reconsideration. These are the following a) Annex 2 Oath of Allegiance; b) Annex 3 Bureau of
Immigration Identification Certificate; c) Annex 4 Certification of the City Civil Registrar of Makati City; d) Annex 5 Letter addressed to the
Local Civil Registrar of San Jacinto, Masbate by Aurora P. Cortes of Special Committee on Naturalization; and e) Annex 6 Letter addressed
to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation by Aurora P. Cortes of Special Committee on Naturalization.

Assuming that the new evidence of the respondent are admitted, with more reason should we cancel his certificate of candidacy for his act
of [misrepresenting] himself as a Filipino citizen when at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, he has not yet perfected the process of
repatriation. He failed to comply with the requirements under Section 2 of [Republic Act No.] 8171 which provides that repatriation shall be
effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in
the Bureau of Immigration.

The certification was issued by the same Ms. Josephine C. Camata, City Civil Registrar, dated February 18, 2004. This time, she certifies
that Ciceron Perez Altarejos was registered under Registry No. 1, Page 19, Book No. 1, Series of 2004 and paid under OR nos.
88325/8833256 dated February 18, 2004. (page 65 of the records). Obviously, he was able to register in the proper civil registry only on
February 18, 2004.

The respondent was able to register with the Bureau of Immigration only on March 1, 2004 as evidenced by the Bureau of Immigration
Identification Certificate attached to the Motion as Annex 3.

This fact confirms the finding of the Commission (First Division) that at the time respondent filed his certificate of candidacy he is yet to
complete the requirement under section two (2) of RA 8171.

As a consequence of not being a Filipino citizen, he has committed false representation in his certificate of candidacy. Such false
representation constitutes a material misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as a candidate. As such the certificate of candidacy
may be cancelled on such ground. (Ycain vs. Caneja, 18 Phil. 778)[9]

On May 10, 2004, the election day itself, petitioner filed this petition praying that: (1) The petition be given due course and a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte restraining the respondents and all persons acting on their behalf,
from fully implementing the questioned COMELEC Resolutions promulgated on March 22, 2004 and May 7, 2004; (2) a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction be issued ordering the COMELEC and all persons acting on its behalf to allow petitioner to run as Mayor of San
Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 elections, and to count and canvass the votes cast in his favor and to proclaim him as the winning
mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate; and (3) after proper proceedings, judgment be rendered declaring null and void and setting aside the
COMELEC Resolutions promulgated on March 22, 2004 and May 7, 2004 and other related Orders of the COMELEC or its representatives
which have the effect of illegally preventing petitioner from running as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.

In its Comment,[10] the Office of the Solicitor General stated that, based on the information relayed to it by the COMELEC, petitioners name,
as a mayoralty candidate in San Jacinto, Masbate, was retained in the list of candidates voted upon by the electorate in the said
municipality. Hence, the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy was never implemented. The COMELEC also informed the Office
of the Solicitor General that petitioners opponent, Dr. Emilio Aris V. Espinosa, was already proclaimed duly elected Mayor of San Jacinto,
Masbate.

The Office of the Solicitor General contends that said supervening event has rendered the instant petition moot and academic, and it prayed
for the dismissal of the petition.

In his Reply,[11] petitioner opposed the dismissal of his petition. He claims that the COMELEC resolutions disqualifying him from running as
a mayoralty candidate adversely affected his candidacy, since his supporters were made to believe that his votes would not be counted.
Moreover, he stated that said COMELEC resolutions cast a doubt on his Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner points out that he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 17, 1997. In view thereof, he ran
and was even elected as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate during the 1998 elections. He argues that if there was delay in the registration of
his Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration and with the proper civil registry, the same was brought about by the inaction
on the part of said offices since the records of the Special Committee on Naturalization show that his Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of
Allegiance have long been transmitted to said offices.

Petitioner also asserts that the subsequent registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration and with the Civil
Registry of Makati City prior to the May 10, 2004 elections has the effect of curing the defect, if any, in the reacquisition of his Filipino
citizenship as his repatriation retroacted to the date of his application for repatriation as held in Frivaldo v. Comelec.

The pertinent issues raised are the following: (1) Is the registration of petitioners repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the
Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation; and (2) whether or not the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in affirming the Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division.

As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy,
thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value. [12] Nonetheless, courts will decide a question otherwise moot and
academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. [13]

First Issue: Is the registration of petitioners repatriation

with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of

Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation?

The provision of law applicable in this case is Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8171, [14] thus:

SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the
proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of
registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.

The law is clear that repatriation is effected by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper
civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the
repatriation of a citizen.

In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on December 17, 1997, but his Certificate of Repatriation was registered with the Civil
Registry of Makati City only after six years or on February 18, 2004, and with the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004. Petitioner,
therefore, completed all the requirements of repatriation onlyafter he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position,
but before the elections.

When does the citizenship qualification of a candidate for an elective office apply?

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,[15] the Court ruled that the citizenship qualification must be construed as applying to the time of
proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term. The Court, through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, discussed, thus:

Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, (a)n elective local official must be:

* a citizen of the Philippines;

* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected;

* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;

* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

* In addition, candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship,
unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one years residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least
twenty three years of age on election day).

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is
none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit
of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law
mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995the very day the term of office of governor
(and other elective officials) beganhe was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions
and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal
interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was
enacted. x x x Paraphrasing this Courts ruling in Vasquez v. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is
to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or
purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of
proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term. [16] (Emphasis supplied.)

Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of
the filing of his application. In said case, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 725, which took effect on June
5, 1975. The Court therein declared that Presidential Decree No. 725 was a curative statute, which is retroactive in nature. The retroactivity
of Frivaldos repatriation to the date of filing of his application was justified by the Court, thus:

xxx

The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past eventsi.e.,
situations and transactions existing even before the law came into beingin order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible
thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given
the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to
situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo x x x can and should
be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a
contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or
injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any
contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.

xxx

Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given
retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of
time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldohaving already renounced his American citizenshipwas, may be prejudiced
for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the
law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.[17]

Republic Act No. 8171[18] has impliedly repealed Presidential `Decree No. 725. They cover the same subject matter: Providing for the
repatriation of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos. The Courts ruling
in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of ones application for repatriation subsists for the
same reasons quoted above.

Accordingly, petitioners repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997. Petitioner was, therefore, qualified to run for a
mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections. Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since it did not
implement the assailed Resolutions disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.

Second Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc

gravely abused its discretion in affirming the

Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division?

The Court cannot fault the COMELEC en banc for affirming the decision of the COMELEC, First Division, considering that petitioner failed to
prove before the COMELEC that he had complied with the requirements of repatriation. Petitioner submitted the necessary documents
proving compliance with the requirements of repatriation only during his motion for reconsideration, when the COMELEC en banc could no
longer consider said evidence. As the COMELEC en banc correctly stated:

The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision is a ground for a motion for
reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1). The evidence referred to in the above provision and to be considered in the Motion for
Reconsideration are those which were submitted during the hearing and attached to the respective Memoranda of the parties which are
already part of the records of the case. In this regard, the evidence of the respondent were not able to overcome the evidence of the
petitioners.[19]

It is, therefore, incumbent upon candidates for an elective office, who are repatriated citizens, to be ready with sufficient evidence of their
repatriation in case their Filipino citizenship is questioned to prevent a repetition of this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition seeking the nullification of the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc of May 7, 2004, affirming the Resolution of
its First Division dated March 22, 2004, is hereby DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 125793 August 29, 2006

JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION and WILSON SOLUREN,Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Citizenship is a priceless possession. Former U.S. Chief Justice Earl Warren fittingly emphasized its crowning value when he wrote that "it
is mans basic right for it is nothing less than to have rights." 1 When a person loses citizenship, therefore, the State sees to it that its
reacquisition may only be granted if the former citizen fully satisfies all conditions and complies with the applicable law. Without doubt,
repatriation is not to be granted simply based on the vagaries of the former Filipino citizen.

The Case

The instant petition for review 2 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure contests the denial by the Court of Appeals (CA) of the
Petition for Habeas Corpus interposed by petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa from the Order of Summary Deportation issued by the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) for his return to the United States.

The Facts
The facts as culled by the CA from the records show that petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
In 1968, 3 when petitioner was seven years old, 4 his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen 5 of the United States. By
derivative naturalization (citizenship derived from that of another as from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of naturalization 6),
petitioner also acquired American citizenship.

Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995, and was admitted as a "balikbayan" for one year. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested
and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of the BID on May 23, 1996, pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72 in Baybay, Malay, Aklan;
subsequently, he was brought to the BID Detention Center in Manila. 7

Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty. Edy D. Donato at the Law and Investigation Division of the BID on May 28, 1996;
and on the same day, Tabasa was accused of violating Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code, in a charge
sheet which alleged:

1. That on 3 August 1995, respondent (petitioner herein [Tabasa]) arrived in the Philippines and was admitted as a balikbayan;

2. That in a letter dated 16 April 1996, Honorable Kevin Herbert, Consul General of [the] U.S. Embassy, informed the Bureau that
respondents Passport No. 053854189 issued on June 10, 1994 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., had been revoked by the U.S.
Department of State;

3. Hence, respondent [petitioner Tabasa] is now an undocumented and undesirable alien and may be summarily deported pursuant to Law
and Intelligence Instructions No. 53 issued by then Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago to effect his deportation (Exhibit 3). 8

The pertinent portion of the Herbert letter is as follows:

The U.S. Department of State has revoked U.S. passport 053854189 issued on June 10, 1994 in San Francisco, California under the name
of Joevanie Arellano Tabasa, born on February 21, 1959 in the Philippines. Mr. Tabasas passport has been revoked because he is the
subject of an outstanding federal warrant of arrest issued on January 25, 1996 by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, for violation of Section 1073, "Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution," of Title 18 of the United States Code. He is charged with one
count of a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of California Penal Code, Section 12021(A)(1), and one count of sexual battery, in
violation of California Penal Code, Section 243.4 (D). 9

The BID ordered petitioners deportation to his country of origin, the United States, on May 29, 1996, in the following summary deportation
order:

Records show that on 16 April 1996, Mr. Kevin F. Herbert, Consul General of the U.S. Embassy in Manila, filed a request with the Bureau to
apprehend and deport the abovenamed [sic] respondent [petitioner Tabasa] on the ground that a standing warrant for several federal
charges has been issued against him, and that the respondents Passport No. 053854189 has been revoked.

By reason thereof, and on the strength of Mission Order No. LIV-96-72, Intelligence operatives apprehended the respondent in Aklan on 23
May 1996.

In Schonemann vs. Commissioner Santiago, et al., (G.R. No. 81461 [sic, 81461 should be 86461], 30 May 1989), the Supreme Court
ruled that if a foreign embassy cancels the passport of an alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to
remain in the country. Further, under Office Memorandum Order No. 34 issued on 21 August 1989, summary deportation proceedings lie
where the passport of the alien has expired.

It is, thus, apparent that respondent has lost his privilege to remain in the country. 10

Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order 11 on May 29,
1996, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40771. Tabasa alleged that he was not afforded due process; that no warrant of arrest for
deportation may be issued by immigration authorities before a final order of deportation is made; that no notice of the cancellation of his
passport was made by the U.S. Embassy; that he is entitled to admission or to a change of his immigration status as a non-quota immigrant
because he is married to a Filipino citizen as provided in Section 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940; and that he
was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines prior to his derivative naturalization when he was seven years old due to the naturalization of
his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968.
12
At the time Tabasa filed said petition, he was already 35 years old.

On May 30, 1996, the CA ordered the respondent Bureau to produce the person of the petitioner on June 3, 1996 and show the cause of
petitioners detention, and restrained the Bureau from summarily deporting him. On June 3, 1996, the BID presented Tabasa before the CA;
and on June 6, 1996, the CA granted both parties ten (10) days within which to file their memoranda, after which the case would be
considered submitted for decision. 13Meanwhile, the Commissioner of Immigration granted the petitioners temporary release on bail on a
PhP 20,000.00 cash bond. 14

However, on June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in
accordance with Republic Act No. 8171 (RA 8171), and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the
respondent Bureau. 15

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA, in its August 7, 1996 Decision, 16 denied Tabasas petition on the ground that he had not legally and successfully acquiredby
repatriationhis Filipino citizenship as provided in RA 8171. The court said that although he became an American citizen by derivative
naturalization when his father was naturalized in 1968, there is no evidence to show that he lost his Philippine citizenship "on account of
political or economic necessity," as explicitly provided in Section 1, RA 8171the law governing the repatriation of natural-born Filipinos
who have lost their citizenship. The affidavit does not state that political or economic necessity was the compelling reason for petitioners
parents to give up their Filipino citizenship in 1968. Moreover, the court a quo found that petitioner Tabasa did not dispute the truth of the
April 16, 1996 letter of the United States Consul General Kevin F. Herbert or the various warrants issued for his arrest by the United States
court. The court a quo noted that after petitioner was ordered deported by the BID on May 29, 1996, he successively executed an Affidavit
of Repatriation on June 6, 1996 and took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on June 13, 1996more than ten months
after his arrival in the country on August 3, 1995. The appellate court considered petitioners "repatriation" as a last ditch effort to avoid
deportation and prosecution in the United States. The appellate court concluded that his only reason to want to reacquire Filipino citizenship
is to avoid criminal prosecution in the United States of America. The court a quo, therefore, ruled against Tabasa, whose petition is now
before us.
The Issue

The only issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171. If there is no valid
repatriation, then he can be summarily deported for his being an undocumented alien.

The Courts Ruling

The Court finds no merit in this petition.

RA 8171, "An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of
Natural-Born Filipinos," was enacted on October 23, 1995. It provides for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of persons, viz:

Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through
repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:

(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines
opposing organized government;

(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas;

(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or

17
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases. (Emphasis supplied.)

Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity
under RA 8171?

He does not.

Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171

To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following:

a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and

b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.

Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his
Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when he was still a minor.

Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent
who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation
will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a situation where a former Filipino subsequently had children while he
was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship and
automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship:18 the children acquire the citizenship of their
parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition
for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the
capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or
naturalization separately from their parents.

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still a minor, his father was naturalized as
an American citizen; and by derivative naturalization, petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to believe that he is
entitled to automatic repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to political or economic necessity. This is
absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his "repatriation" on June 13, 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children
who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation.

Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or economic necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine
citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by
economic or political reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parents and not his. The privilege of repatriation
under RA 8171 is extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to
political and economic reasons, and extended indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation.

In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. However, he can possibly reacquire Philippine citizenship
by availing of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225) by simply taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.

Where to file a petition for repatriation pursuant to RA 8171

Even if we concede that petitioner Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA 8171, still he failed to follow the procedure for reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. He has to file his petition for repatriation with the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN), which was designated
to process petitions for repatriation pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No. 285) dated August 22, 1996, to wit:

Section 1. Composition.The composition of the Special Committee on Naturalization, with the Solicitor General as Chairman, the
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director-General of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as members, shall remain as
constituted.

Sec. 2. Procedure.Any person desirous of repatriating or reacquiring Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 8171 shall file a petition with
the Special Committee on Naturalization which shall process the same. If their applications are approved[,] they shall take the necessary
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The
Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration (emphasis supplied).

Sec. 3. Implementing Rules.The Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations and prescribe the
appropriate forms and the required fees for the processing of petitions.
Sec. 4. Effectivity.This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.

In the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171 issued by the SCN on August 5, 1999, applicants for repatriation are
required to submit documents in support of their petition such as their birth certificate and other evidence proving their claim to Filipino
citizenship. 19 These requirements were imposed to enable the SCN to verify the qualifications of the applicant particularly in light of the
reasons for the renunciation of Philippine citizenship.

What petitioner simply did was that he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; then, executed an affidavit of
repatriation, which he registered, together with the certificate of live birth, with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The said
office subsequently issued him a certificate of such registration. 20At that time, the SCN was already in place and operational by virtue of the
June 8, 1995 Memorandum issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. 21 Although A.O. No. 285 designating the SCN to process petitions filed
pursuant to RA 8171 was issued only on August 22, 1996, it is merely a confirmatory issuance according to the Court in Angat v.
Republic. 22 Thus, petitioner should have instead filed a petition for repatriation before the SCN.

Requirements for repatriation under RA 8171

Even if petitionernow of legal agecan still apply for repatriation under RA 8171, he nevertheless failed to prove that his parents
relinquished their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity as provided for in the law. Nowhere in his affidavit of
repatriation did he mention that his parents lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic reasons. It is notable that
under the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171, the SCN requires a petitioner for repatriation to set forth, among others,
"the reason/s why petitioner lost his/her Filipino citizenship, whether by marriage in case of Filipino woman, or whether by political or
economic necessity in case of [a] natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his/her Filipino citizenship. In case of the latter, such political or
economic necessity should be specified." 23

Petitioner Tabasa asserts, however, that the CA erred in ruling that the applicant for repatriation must prove that he lost his Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. He theorizes that the reference to political or economic reasons is "merely
descriptive, not restrictive, of the widely accepted reasons for naturalization in [a] foreign country." 24

Petitioners argument has no leg to stand on.

A reading of Section 1 of RA 8171 shows the manifest intent of the legislature to limit the benefit of repatriation only to natural-born Filipinos
who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, in addition to Filipino women who lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens. The precursor of RA 8171, Presidential Decree No. 725 (P.D. 725), 25 which was enacted on June 5, 1975
amending Commonwealth Act No. 63, also gives to the same groups of former Filipinos the opportunity to repatriate but without the limiting
phrase, "on account of political or economic necessity" in relation to natural-born Filipinos. By adding the said phrase to RA 8171, the
lawmakers clearly intended to limit the application of the law only to political or economic migrants, aside from the Filipino women who lost
their citizenship by marriage to aliens. This intention is more evident in the following sponsorship speech of Rep. Andrea B. Domingo on
House Bill No. 1248, the origin of RA 8171, to wit:

Ms. Domingo: x x x

From my experience as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, I observed that there are only four types of
Filipinos who leave the country.

The first is what we call the "economic refugees" who go abroad to work because there is no work to be found in the country. Then we have
the "political refugees" who leave the country for fear of their lives because they are not in consonance with the prevailing policy of
government. The third type is those who have committed crimes and would like to escape from the punishment of said crimes. Lastly, we
have those Filipinos who feel that they are not Filipinos, thereby seeking other citizenship elsewhere.

Of these four types of Filipinos, Mr. Speaker, the first two have to leave the country not of choice, but rather out of sacrifice to look for a
better life, as well as for a safer abode for themselves and their families. It is for these two types of Filipinos that this measure is being
proposed for approval by this body. (Emphasis supplied.)

xxxx

x x x [I]f the body would recall, I mentioned in my short sponsorship speech the four types of Filipinos who leave their country. And the two
typesthe economic and political refugeesare the ones being addressed by this proposed law, and they are not really Filipino women
who lost their citizenship through marriage. We had a lot of problems with these people who left the country because of political persecution
or because of pressing economic reasons, and after feeling that they should come back to the country and get back their citizenship and
participate as they should in the affairs of the country, they find that it is extremely difficult to get their citizenship back because they are
treated no different from any other class of alien. 26

From these two sources, namely, P.D. 725 and the sponsorship speech on House Bill No. 1248, it is incontrovertible that the intent of our
legislators in crafting Section 1 of RA 8171, as it is precisely worded out, is to exclude those Filipinos who have abandoned their country for
reasons other than political or economic necessity.

Petitioner contends it is not necessary to prove his political or economic reasons since the act of renouncing allegiance to ones native
country constitutes a "necessary and unavoidable shifting of his political allegiance," and his fathers loss of Philippine citizenship through
naturalization "cannot therefore be said to be for any reason other than political or economic necessity." 27

This argument has no merit.

While it is true that renunciation of allegiance to ones native country is necessarily a political act, it does not follow that the act is inevitably
politically or economically motivated as alleged by petitioner. To reiterate, there are other reasons why Filipinos relinquish their Philippine
citizenship. The sponsorship speech of former Congresswoman Andrea B. Domingo illustrates that aside from economic and political
refugees, there are Filipinos who leave the country because they have committed crimes and would like to escape from punishment, and
those who really feel that they are not Filipinos and that they deserve a better nationality, and therefore seek citizenship elsewhere.

Thus, assuming petitioner Tabasa is qualified under RA 8171, it is incumbent upon him to prove to the satisfaction of the SCN that the
reason for his loss of citizenship was the decision of his parents to forfeit their Philippine citizenship for political or economic exigencies. He
failed to undertake this crucial step, and thus, the sought relief is unsuccessful.
Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a privilege granted by the State. This is mandated by the 1987 Constitution under Section 3,
Article IV, which provides that citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. The State has the power to prescribe by
law the qualifications, procedure, and requirements for repatriation. It has the power to determine if an applicant for repatriation meets the
requirements of the law for it is an inherent power of the State to choose who will be its citizens, and who can reacquire citizenship once it is
lost. If the applicant, like petitioner Tabasa, fails to comply with said requirements, the State is justified in rejecting the petition for
repatriation.

Petitioner: an undocumented alien subject to summary deportation

Petitioner claims that because of his repatriation, he has reacquired his Philippine citizenship; therefore, he is not an undocumented alien
subject to deportation.

This theory is incorrect.

As previously explained, petitioner is not entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 for he has not shown that his case falls within the coverage
of the law.

Office Memorandum No. 34 dated August 21, 1989 of the BID is enlightening on summary deportation:

2. The Board of Special Inquiry and the Hearing Board IV shall observe summary deportation proceedings in cases where the charge
against the alien is overstaying, or the expiration or cancellation by his government of his passport. In cases involving overstaying aliens,
BSI and the Hearing Board IV shall merely require the presentation of the aliens valid passport and shall decide the case on the basis
thereof.

3. If a foreign embassy cancels the passport of the alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain
in the country, under the Immigration Act, Sections 10 and 15 (Schonemann v. Santiago, et al., G.R. No. 81461 [sic, should be 86461], 30
May 1989). The automatic loss of the privilege obviates deportation proceedings. In such instance, the Board of Commissioners may issue
summary judgment of deportation which shall be immediately executory. 28

In addition, in the case of Schonemann v. Defensor Santiago, et al., this Court held:

It is elementary that if an alien wants to stay in the Philippines, he must possess the necessary documents. One of these documents is a
valid passport. There are, of course, exceptions where in the exercise of its sovereign prerogatives the Philippines may grant refugee
status, refuse to extradite an alien, or otherwise allow him or her to stay here even if he [the alien] has no valid passport or Philippine visa.
"Boat people" seeking residence elsewhere are examples. However, the grant of the privilege of staying in the Philippines is discretionary
on the part of the proper authorities. There is no showing of any grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or whimsicality in the questioned
summary judgment. x x x 29

Petitioner Tabasa, whose passport was cancelled after his admission into the country, became an undocumented alien who can be
summarily deported. His subsequent "repatriation" cannot bar such deportation especially considering that he has no legal and valid
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

WHEREFORE, this petition for review is DISMISSED, and the August 7, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals isAFFIRMED. No costs to
the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.