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1. No their objection is not valid and constitutional. The ban on nuclear weapons in our country is
not absolute. An exception to this policy may be made by the political departments and is justified
by the national interest. As can be seen in the case at bar, Congress and the President has already
allowed the US Carrier to dock in our ports considering that it could ease up the tension in the
Kalayaan Group of Islands between the Philippines and China. Lastly, it is also justified under the
national interest and security of the nation as it can serve as added protection for the Philippine
Navy in case Chinese Navy Boats decide to confront again the former.

2. The refusal of the GSIS is not in accordance with the Constitution. The GSIS is a trustee of
contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance
programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. The
supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves
appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the
GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that all its transactions were
above board. In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held
by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and
concern. The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their
right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged
to have been granted

Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost
prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent rules and regulations. It is therefore the
legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with end in
view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. (Valmonte v.
Belmonte, G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989)

3. The BOCs argument is correct. The fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a
function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-
governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no
waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity.

The Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is part of the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Rev. Adm. Code),
with no personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is
governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all
other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this
function, arrastre service is a necessary incident.

Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary
incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in
the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not
perform its governmental function without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity,
granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end.

The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the
operation of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary
incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the
contrary. (Mobil v. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE & BOCG.R. No. L-23139, December 17, 1966)

4. The argument of PVTA and PNB is NOT correct. It is a general rule that suability does not mean
liability. Funds of public corporations could properly be made the object of a notice of
garnishment. The allegation to the effect that the funds of the PVTA are public funds of the
government, and that, as such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is
untenable for, as a government owned and controlled corporation, the NASSCO has a personality
of its own distinct and separate from that of the Government. Accordingly, it may be sue and be
sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation Funds belonging to
government corporations which can sue and be sued and are deposited with a bank can be
garnished. (PNB v. Pabalan, G.R. No. L-33112, June 15, 1978)

a. The opposition of Pedro is not supported by the Constitution. The residence requirement
is satisfied if one is domiciled in the Philippines even if not physically present in the
country during the two-year period.
b. His appointment and assumption into office is unconstitutional. No senator or a member
of the House of Representatives shall be appointed to any office which may have been
created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
(Sec. 13, Art. VI) The Office of Gay Affairs was created during the second term of Pido as
the term of office of every Senator begins at June 30 at noon following their election. (Art.
VI, Section 4) Thus, the Office of Gay Affairs is a forbidden office to which Pido may not
assume office into even if he would opt to forfeit his seat as Senator. Thus, the mere fact
that Pido resigned from Congress will not validate his assumption into the Office of Gay
c. The arrest was in accordance with the Constitution. A Senator or Member of the House
of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. (Section 11, Art.
VI) Thus, since the imposable penalty for abusing a minor is six years and one day, Pido is
not immune from arrest. A senator or house representative is only immune from arrest
when Congress is in session and the imposable penalty does not exceed six years. The
same does not obtain in the case at bar.

2. Their argument and refusal to appear before the committee is not valid. In inquiries in aid of
legislation, any person may be made to appear before Congress and be questioned on matters
which would aid Congress to formulate new laws or improve existing legislation.

The need to secure the consent of the President is only valid during question hour (Section 22,
Art. VI) but it cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid
of legislation. (Section 21, Art. VI) Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal
of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently
made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

The Court in Senate v. Ermita (GR No. 169777) declared that the executive privilege is the power
of the government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. But this
is recognized only for certain types of information of a sensitive character. When Congress
exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one official may be exempted from this power -- the President.

3. The objection is not valid. To begin with, it is not the law - but the revenue bill - which is required
by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. It is important to
emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in
the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by
the conference committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is important to note is that,
as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute -
and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the
law - must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not
only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. It would be to violate the
coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior
to the Senate.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax
bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must
come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts,
the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems.
On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same
problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment
of such laws.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending
receipt of the House bill. (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630, 661-663, Aug. 25, 1994)

a. A bill calling a special election for President and Vice-President under Sec. 10. Art. VII
becomes a law upon its approval on the third reading and final reading;
b. Failure of the President to veto the bill and to return it with his objections to the House
where it originated, within 30 days after the date of receipt;
c. Presidential veto overridden by 2/3 vote of all members of both Houses;
d. Initiative