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Compressor Over-Pressure Analysis

ABB Lummus Global Technical Safety Bulletin


1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Following an incident in the propylene refrigeration system at a licensees ethylene plant,


ABB Lummus Global Inc. has analyzed the potential for over-pressuring the charge gas,
propylene refrigerant, and ethylene refrigeration compressor systems during various related
failure scenarios. In the licensees incident, although the system was over-pressured, no
equipment damage or loss of hydrocarbon containment occurred. There have been no reports
from any other Lummus clients of this scenario occurring.

You should already have received the safety notice entitled Technical Safety Bulletin
Propylene Compressor Over-Pressure Analysis (ALR_ETH_003, June, 2004) that provides
a description and remedial actions for the incident noted above. This current notice addresses
the other potential issues that were found. These issues may or may not affect your plant
depending on the specific design parameters.

Two issues were found and are specifically addressed:

Over-pressure resulting from failure of the minimum flow recycle valves


Over-pressure resulting from failure of the 4th stage suction or 5th stage discharge check
valves on the charge gas compressor (CGC)

1.1 Minimum Flow Recycle Valve Failure

1.1.1 Charge Gas Compressor System:

Analysis has shown that there is potential for over-pressure of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and or 5th stage
suction (the 5th stage over-pressure can occur only on 5-stage compressors). The problem can
occur if a minimum flow (surge protection recycle) valve fails open during normal operation.
This can lead to a pressure increase in the compressor system that may exceed the design
pressure and potentially the test pressure of the equipment.

Steady-state simulations were performed to estimate the pressure response of a typical


system to the failure of the low-pressure minimum flow valve (protecting the first 3 stages)
and separately to the high-pressure minimum flow valve (protecting 4th and 5th stages).
Failure of both valves simultaneously was judged to be a double jeopardy event and was
not considered.

The stages that are affected can only be determined by a detailed analysis of the specific
compressor performance and your plant may or may not be adequately protected. If the

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current protection is not adequate, two acceptable solutions are available to protect the
affected stages:

Installation of a high integrity safety instrumented system (SIS)


Installation of pressure relief valves (PSVs)

1.1.2 Propylene Refrigeration Compressor System:

Analysis has shown that there is no potential for over-pressure, except as noted in the
previous safety notice (June 2004) and no further action is required.

1.1.3 Ethylene Refrigeration Compressor System:

Analysis has shown that there is no potential for over-pressure and no further action is
required.

1.2 Check Valve Failure

In all Lummus designs, a check valve is provided on the discharge of the CGC 5th stage in
order to prevent back-flow from the chilling train when the CGC is shutdown. If this check
valve fails, the 4th stage suction can be over-pressured. API RP521 Guidelines recommend
that if the over-pressure can exceed the test pressure of the system then you should consider
providing a secondary device to minimize the potential for a reversal of flow. We
recommend that you should consider adding a redundant check valve. We do not recommend
using a safety valve for protection since as noted in API RP521, reverse flow through
rotating machinery may result in centrifugal forces that are sufficient to destroy mechanical
equipment. In addition, the back-flow rate through the compressor cannot be calculated
accurately, making sizing of the PSV uncertain.

In some designs, there is also a check valve in the caustic tower overhead at the 4th stage
suction. This valve also prevents back-flow in the event of a CGC shutdown. If this valve
fails, it is possible to over-pressure the caustic tower. Over-pressure will only occur if there is
also a check valve at the 3rd stage discharge (in the feed to the caustic tower). In the plants
that we have checked, the over-pressure would not exceed the system test pressure and
therefore, based on API RP521, a redundant check valve need not be considered. You should
however check your specific design.

Lummus has had no actual reports of check valve failures of this type.

2.0 DISCUSSION

2.1 Minimum Flow Recycle Valve Failure

2.1.1 Charge Gas Compressor System

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A minimum flow recycle valve is provided to protect the first three stages from operating in a
surge condition. A similar valve is provided to protect the 4th and 5th stages (note that some
plants have a 4-stage compressor so this second valve protects only the 4th stage).

If the minimum flow valve protecting the first three stages fails to the 100 % open or in some
cases a lesser open position during normal operation, the system can be over-pressured. The
suction pressure will rise causing the 2nd and 3rd suction and discharge pressures to rise,
resulting in pressures that may exceed the design or potentially the test pressure of parts of
the system. Where the over-pressure occurs depends on the specific compressor head curves
and interstage design pressures. The problem would be most severe if the failure occurs
while the charge gas compressor is operating at full capacity. This is because the turbine
would be unable to increase power to the machine to compensate for the increased flow to
the compressor. Even if the turbine had enough power, the dynamic response might be too
slow to prevent over-pressure.

A similar problem will occur if the minimum flow valve protecting the 4th and 5th stages fails
open during normal operation. The 4th stage may already be protected by a PSV. You should
verify that this PSV is adequately sized to pass the full flow from the recycle valve and that
the set point is adequate to protect the 5th stage suction.

Many systems are equipped with pressure control B valves. These valves are typically located
on the first stage and fourth stage suctions. They are intended to vent the charge gas to flare in
emergency situations and prevent the PSVs from lifting. Depending on the size and set point of
the B valves, they may protect the system against over-pressure. However, Lummus follows
API recommended practices, which do not allow taking credit for process control actions that
reduce the required relief load. So while the B valves may provide some protection for the
plant, per API practices they cannot be relied upon in evaluating the adequacy of the over-
pressure protection system. There is a significant concern that the B valves could be set at too
high a pressure, be in manual mode, or not meet the reliability requirements needed. In addition,
the response rate of the valve will depend upon the controller tuning.

Therefore to manage possible system over-pressure issues, two approaches are possible:

Provide adequate emergency relief capacity via suitably sized PSVs


Provide an SIS to trip the compressor upon detection of high pressure.

We caution that the use of an SIS for over-pressure protection may or may not be accepted
by local safety regulatory authorities. You should determine what solutions are accepted per
safety regulations governing your plant.

Analysis has shown that the specific head-capacity curves of the purchased CGC will
determine which parts of the system could be over-pressured and must be protected. You
must therefore protect the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th stage suctions or evaluate exactly if and where
an over-pressure can occur.

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If an SIS is utilized to mitigate the over-pressure scenario, it should be designed to have at
least the reliability of a conventional relief valve. A Safety Integrity Level (SIL) of 3 is
therefore recommended by Lummus. High-pressure detection should initiate the shutdown of
the compressor to avoid over-pressure.

If new PSVs are used, they should be sized for the maximum capacity that can flow through
the minimum flow valve or be sized based on a detailed analysis.

Analysis Method

Steady-state simulations were performed to estimate the pressure response of a typical


system as each minimum flow valve failed (assuming that the B valves failed to open). A
series of simulations was performed for each valve failure case to approximate the steady-
state as additional flow was passed through the minimum flow recycle valve while full plant
forward flow was maintained.

Dynamic simulations were also run. The results from this dynamic modeling agreed with the
results of the steady-state simulations.

2.1.2 Propylene Refrigeration Compressor System

Based on an evaluation of several typical designs, Lummus has determined that the system
pressure will not exceed the design pressure plus ASME Code allowable accumulation
following an individual failure of any of the minimum flow valves to the fully open position.

Steady-state simulations were performed to estimate the pressure response of the systems as
each minimum flow valve failed (assuming that the B valves failed to open). A series of
simulations was performed for each valve failure case to approximate the steady-state as
additional flow was passed through the minimum flow recycle valve while full plant forward
flow was maintained. The results indicated that the predicted pressures would not cause
over-pressure beyond that allowed by ASME Code.

Dynamic simulations were also run. The results from this dynamic modeling agreed with the
results of the steady-state simulations.

2.1.3 Ethylene Refrigeration Compressor System

Based on an evaluation of several typical designs, Lummus has determined that the system
pressure will not exceed the design pressure plus ASME Code allowable accumulation
following an individual failure of any of the minimum flow valves to the fully open position.

Steady-state simulations were performed to estimate the pressure response of the systems as
each minimum flow valve failed (assuming that the B valves failed to open). A series of
simulations was performed for each valve failure case to approximate the steady-state

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Confidential July 20, 2004
simulation as additional flow was passed through the minimum flow recycle valve while full
plant forward flow was maintained.

3.0 CHECK VALVE FAILURE

As noted in the Executive Summary above, it is possible for check valves to fail to close. If a
valve fails to close, it is possible to over-pressure the CGC system. API RP521 recommends
that if the over-pressure exceeds the system test pressure, then you should consider a
secondary method of preventing over-pressure. A PSV will be very large, difficult to size and
will allow significant back-flow through the CGC potentially causing damage. Therefore,
Lummus, consistent with API, recommends that you consider a second check valve to
improve system reliability.

Lummus has not had a report of this type of failure but one is of course possible. It is difficult
to estimate the probability of failure on demand, which would depend upon the type of valve
and the period between proof tests. Lummus has estimated that to provide protection against
over-pressure with an equivalent reliability to a PSV typically requires two check valves.

If you have questions or require assistance regarding the above subjects please feel free to
contact Steve De Haan via email at stephen.de_haan@us.abb.com or phone 1-973-893-2325
(USA). You may also contact the ABB Lummus Global Plant Performance Improvement
(PPI) Group by email at lummus.ethylene.techserv@us.abb.com.

"This Technical Safety Bulletin is an advisory only. Lummus makes no guarantees or


warranties of any kind, express or implied, with respect to the information contained
herein. Further, Lummus assumes no obligations or liabilities of any kind for any
claims, losses or damages (whether direct, indirect, incidental, special or consequential)
arising from, or related to, the information provided or however arising, whether in
contract, tort (including negligence), strict liability or any other legal or equitable
theory whatsoever."

This Technical Safety Bulletin contains confidential information. No part may be


duplicated nor disclosed to others without the prior written consent of ABB Lummus
Global.

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Confidential July 20, 2004

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