Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No.

191805, November 15, 2011

FACTS:
Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan),
a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the
military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to confess
to his membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and and Petition
for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of
Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et al. The writs
were granted but the CA dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case
during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.
Issue:
1. Whether former Pres GMA should be dropped as respondent on the basis of presidential
immunity from suit
2. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases.
3. Whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or
accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
4. Whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo is
responsible or accountable for his abduction.
Held:

1. No. It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability
in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or
accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing.

As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from
suit, even for acts committed during the latters tenure; that courts should look with disfavor upon the
presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication
of a right. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission also reveal that the intent of the framers is
clear that presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. (The term
means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after
which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the
incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the
power of the incumbent.) Therefore, former Pres. GMA cannot use such immunity to shield herself from
judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible
or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.

2. Yes. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the "responsibility

of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons
subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict." Although originally used for
ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has also found application
in civil cases for human rights abuses. This development in the use of command responsibility in
civil proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even to
cases not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may likewise find
application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo.
 Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether
respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable
the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from
applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and
accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify
those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo
court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely
pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party. Such
identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of
criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government
agency.

Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of
command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within
these foregoing definitions.

3. Yes.

To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must
obtain:

a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the
perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;

b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed;
and

c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or
punish the perpetrators thereof.84

The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the
military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine.

4. No. Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the "Melo
Commission" and the "Alston Report," respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had knowledge of
and information on, and should have known that a climate of enforced disappearances had been
perpetrated on members of the NPA. Without even attaching, or at the very least, quoting these
reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo Report points to rogue military men as the perpetrators.
While the Alston Report states that there is a policy allowing enforced disappearances and pins the
blame on the President, we do not automatically impute responsibility to former President Arroyo
for each and every count of forcible disappearance. Aside from Rodriguezs general averments,
there is no piece of evidence that could establish her responsibility or accountability for his
abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have known about the
violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or
prevent it.