G.R. No.
110120 March 16, 1994 After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint of
LLDA vs CA
The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to dispose off the
350 tons of garbage it collects daily and the growing concern and sensitivity to a pollution-free
environment of the residents of Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons
of garbage are dumped everyday is the hub of this controversy elevated by the protagonists to
the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) for adjudication.
The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA for short) docketed as G.R.
No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of November 10,
1992, this Court referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition.
Docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP
No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision 1 promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled that
the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping
of garbage in Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in this
petition, a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.
On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint 2 with the Laguna Lake Development Authority
seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and
the possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.
On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test
sampling of the leachate 3 that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a
tributary of the Marilao River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City
Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first
securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management
Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under
Presidential Decree No. 1586, 4 and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No.
4850, 5 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983. 6
Task Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water collected from the leachate and the
receiving streams could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it
indicates the presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated the
sample during collection or handling. 7 On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and
Desist Order 8 ordering the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their
contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or
kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However,
sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting held in July
1992 among the City Government of Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin
Dumpsite and LLDA at the Office of Environmental Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U.
Fuentes failed to settle the problem.
After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14, 1992, the LLDA
issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991, order and issued an Alias Cease and
Desist Order enjoining the City Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping
operations at the Camarin area.
On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police,
enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks
into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite.
Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September 17, 1992 with
the LLDA, the City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance
of writ of injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In its complaint, the City Government
of Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and
safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its
territorial jurisdiction. 9
On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City issued
a temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist order.
Subsequently, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan which,
at the time, was presided over by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
127, the pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding judge.
The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the ground, among
others, that under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984,
otherwise known as the Pollution Control Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which is
the subject matter of the complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the case
by the Court of Appeals and not by the Regional Trial Court. 10
On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order consolidating Civil Case No. C-
15598 with Civil Case No. C-15580, an earlier case filed by the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite
entitled "Fr. John Moran, et al. vs. Hon. Macario Asistio." The LLDA, however, maintained
during the trial that the foregoing cases, being independent of each other, should have been
treated separately.
On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in
the consolidated cases an order 11 denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and
on its behalf, from enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff
City of Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the pendency of this
case and/or until further orders of the court.
On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with
prayer for restraining order with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 107542, seeking to
nullify the aforesaid order dated October 16, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
127 of Caloocan City denying its motion to dismiss.
The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution 12 on November 10, 1992 referring the
case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition and at the same time, without giving due
course to the petition, required the respondents to comment on the petition and file the same
with the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from notice. In the meantime, the Court issued
a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from
it, ordering the respondents: (1) Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City to cease and desist from exercising jurisdiction over the case
for declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order issued by the Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA); and (2) City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to
cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. filed on November
12, 1992 a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash/recall the temporary restraining order
and an urgent motion for reconsideration alleging that ". . . in view of the calamitous situation
that would arise if the respondent city government fails to collect 350 tons of garbage daily for
lack of dumpsite (i)t is therefore, imperative that the issue be resolved with dispatch or with
sufficient leeway to allow the respondents to find alternative solutions to this garbage
problem."
On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution 13 directing the Court of Appeals to
immediately set the case for hearing for the purpose of determining whether or not the
temporary restraining order issued by the Court should be lifted and what conditions, if any,
may be required if it is to be so lifted or whether the restraining order should be maintained
or converted into a preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at 10:00 in the morning
at the Hearing Room, 3rd Floor, New Building, Court of Appeals. 14 After the oral argument, a
conference was set on December 8, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning where the Mayor of
Caloocan City, the General Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized
representative and the Secretary of DILG or his duly authorized representative were required
to appear.
It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15, 1992 to finish its study
and review of respondent's technical plan with respect to the dumping of its garbage and in
the event of a rejection of respondent's technical plan or a failure of settlement, the parties
will submit within 10 days from notice their respective memoranda on the merits of the case,
after which the petition shall be deemed submitted for resolution. 15 Notwithstanding such
efforts, the parties failed to settle the dispute.
On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the Regional
Trial Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for annulment of
LLDA's cease and desist order, including the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction in relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development Authority has no power and authority to issue a
cease and desist order under its enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No.
813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the preliminary injunction issued
in the said case was set aside; the cease and desist order of LLDA was likewise set aside and
the temporary restraining order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City
Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City was lifted, subject, however, to the condition that any future
dumping of garbage in said area, shall be in conformity with the procedure and protective
works contained in the proposal attached to the records of this case and found on pages 152-
160 of the Rollo, which was thereby adopted by reference and made an integral part of the
decision, until the corresponding restraining and/or injunctive relief is granted by the proper
Court upon LLDA's institution of the necessary legal proceedings.
Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari, now docketed as G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the temporary restraining order
lifted by the Court of Appeals be re-issued until after final determination by this Court of the
issue on the proper interpretation of the powers and authority of the LLDA under its enabling
law.
On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order 16 enjoining the City Mayor
of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its
garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, effective as of this date and
containing until otherwise ordered by the Court.
It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the need to protect the
environment and to maintain the ecological balance of the surrounding areas of the Camarin
open dumpsite, the question as to which agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the
matter remains highly open to question.
The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local government unit,
pursuant to the general welfare provision of the Local Government Code, 17 to determine the
effects of the operation of the dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that such balance
is maintained. On the basis of said contention, it questioned, from the inception of the dispute
before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the power and authority of the LLDA to issue
a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in the Barangay Camarin over which
the City Government of Caloocan has territorial jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the theory that Section
7 of Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control law, authorizing
the defunct National Pollution Control Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order
was not incorporated in Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended, the LLDA is instead required "to institute the necessary legal proceeding against any
person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or
program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the Authority."
The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned ruling of the Court of
Appeals, contending that, as an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and
adjudicatory powers and functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws,
Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested with the
power and authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f)
and (g) of Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus:
Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Executive
Order and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing.
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the
conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished.
(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be
reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage,
industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal
system or parts thereof.
(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend or modify any
permit issued under this Order whenever the same is necessary to prevent or abate pollution.
(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or
instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this Executive Order and its implementing rules
and regulations and the orders and decisions of the Authority.
The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded the
above provisions of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, which granted administrative
quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on pollution abatement cases.
In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are applicable in this case,
and the corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of government agencies implementing these
laws, the resolution of the issue of whether or not the LLDA has the authority and power to
issue an order which, in its nature and effect was injunctive, necessarily requires a
determination of the threshold question: Does the Laguna Lake Development Authority, under
its Charter and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the complaint against the
dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City
Government of Caloocan which is allegedly endangering the health, safety, and welfare of the
residents therein and the sanitation and quality of the water in the area brought about by
exposure to pollution caused by such open garbage dumpsite?
The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that requires
control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed
to the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16
of Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987, 18 has assumed the powers and functions of the
defunct National Pollution Control Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under
said Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR
Secretary now assumes the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission
with respect to adjudication of pollution cases. 19
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It
must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is
specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and
make effective the declared national policy 20 of promoting and accelerating the development
and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and
Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan 21 with due regard
and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the
quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority,
the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the
inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating
from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned
declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove
all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the
region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs
and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region. 22
In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes
Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-complaint before the LLDA, the latter's
jurisdiction under its charter was validly invoked by complainant on the basis of its allegation
that the open dumpsite project of the City Government of Caloocan in Barangay Camarin was
undertaken without a clearance from the LLDA, as required under Section 4, par. (d), of
Republic Act. No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there
is also an allegation that the said project was without an Environmental Compliance Certificate
from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction of
the LLDA over this case was recognized by the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR
when the latter acted as intermediary at the meeting among the representatives of the City
Government of Caloocan, Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to
discuss the possibility of re-opening the open dumpsite.
Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the following
issue: Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case,
enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.
The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to
stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done
in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws, 23
cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express
terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series
of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or
pollution." 24 (Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make
whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-parte cease and
desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the
express grant to the defunct National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No.
984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983.
However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the
power to issue the order in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring
the discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive
Order No. 927, series of 1983.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not expressly promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them." 28 It
conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
authority need not necessarily be express. 25 While it is a fundamental rule that an and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human
administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise right. 29
a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of
the exercise of its express powers. 26 In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under
procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority
its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna
under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA
Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied.
been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further
Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
legal steps would have been necessary.
In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et
The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA
al., 27 the Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power to issue an
the means of directly enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to
ex-parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment
institute "necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or
exceeding the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country. The ponente,
continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region
Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, declared:
without previous clearance from the LLDA."
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that
Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the
here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and
regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by the government or
untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made
the private sector, insofar as the implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant
to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has
to deal with cases which might possibly arise where decisions or orders issued pursuant to the
run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has
exercise of such broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe
taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and
objective. To meet such contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction which are
implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive,
beyond the power of the LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper courts.
sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public,
as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region and its
is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process surrounding provinces, cities and towns are concerned, the Court will not dwell further on the
yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the related issues raised which are more appropriately addressed to an administrative agency with
exercise of police power. . . . the special knowledge and expertise of the LLDA.
The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests" WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on
gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State July 19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan
Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides: from dumping their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby
made permanent.
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-
impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect and

Minors vs DENR
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-
generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the
issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation
or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's
vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66
(Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The
principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and
joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized
for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted
as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the
Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but
are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further
asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting
in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100
islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush
and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be
found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable;
they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and
flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a
balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a
ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural,
residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this
balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies,
such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as
the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a
result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found
in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the
consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded
estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size of
the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique,
rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities,
including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and
seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical
reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently
experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from
the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from
the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the
lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying
water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction
of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and
catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known
as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be
submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention
to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the
course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million
hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2
million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land
area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-
growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the
Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and
uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted
timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the
aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto
attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per
annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays
included the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of
this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and
irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff
minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and
incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated
in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the
generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest
the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to
plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their successors who may never
see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource
treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors
and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens
patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's
office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to
cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex
"B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the
continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act
violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left
with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the
wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been
abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly
contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy
which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State
 (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and
nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to
a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned
TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth"
and "make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article
XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)"
(Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article
II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the
natural law and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the
instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life
support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against
him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the
Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause
of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no
cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground
that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the
parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter
in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles
19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192
creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in
natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4
of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of
discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than
what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts.
They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well
settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint
a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by
law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state
in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be
permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the
executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners'
resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill
that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be
done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain
period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither
be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to
have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would
be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners
instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present
respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said
civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties
are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before
the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative
enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the
filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present
both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling
that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the
merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and
evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to
find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent
portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot
help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have
but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or
a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2,
RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs
fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being
impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not
be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred
principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the
Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we
stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and
 desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment
of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with
sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and
that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.
A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding
section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs
to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation
and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from
the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter,
it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too
far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between
Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section
in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions
against all forms of pollution air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic)
environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of
not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be
provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation
of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby
disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to
health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation,
development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C.
Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates
that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral,
resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain,
as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in
order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement
of policy:
 Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to
ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of
the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the
population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources,
not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also
the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including
social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code
of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of
the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of
the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas
and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a
sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and
utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different
segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes
into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the
utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the
other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section
provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural
Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the
foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the
State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve
as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific
statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152
(Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the
State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can
thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic
and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the
attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-
being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and
guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other
hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance
the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the
granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no
further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation
of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the
complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution
involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be
considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the
truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case
is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance
with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule
that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a
motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to
manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what
the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal
order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the
introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading
CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for.
It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is
the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable
parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not
squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies
already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the
political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial
power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz,
a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial
power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The
second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to
enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to
wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of
the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The
catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very
elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the
judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less
tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the
issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon
us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of
contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we
stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment
of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a
sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious
reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he
would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and
unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms
and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare.
He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must
be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses
or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It
is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of
the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or
municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation
(37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin,
54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly
be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right
to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may
be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive
when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts
within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20
of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R.
No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case
does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification
of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause.
This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the
exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be
absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative
regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare.
In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations
of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of
contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The
general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But
neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government
cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his
fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally
fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the
common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could
apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no
contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to
renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is
hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
The November 1986 inspections report concluded that:
Records of the Commission show that the plant under its previous owner, Fine Touch
Finishing Corporation, was issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing
same to cease and desist from conducting dyeing operation until such time the waste
treatment plant is already completed and operational. The new owner Solar Textile
Corporation informed the Commission of the plant acquisition thru its letter dated
March 1986 (sic).
The new owner was summoned to a hearing held on 13 October 1986 based on the
adverse findings during the inspection/water sampling test conducted on 08 August
1986. As per instruction of the Legal Division a re- inspection/sampling text should be
conducted first before an appropriate legal action is instituted; hence, this inspection.
Based on the above findings, it is clear that the new owner continuously violates the
directive of the Commission by undertaking dyeing operation without completing first
and operating its existing WTP. The analysis of results on water samples taken showed
that the untreated wastewater from the firm pollutes our water resources. In this
connection, it is recommended that appropriate legal action be instituted immediately
against the firm. . . .10
The September 1988 inspection report's conclusions were:
1. The plant was undertaking dyeing, bleaching and rinsing operations during the
inspection. The combined wastewater generated from the said operations was
estimated at about 30 gallons per minute. About 80% of the wastewater was traced
directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros river by
means of a bypass. The remaining 20% was channeled into the plant's existing
wastewater treatment plant (WTP).
2. The WTP was noted not yet fully operational- some accessories were not yet
installed.1wphi1 Only the sump pit and the holding/collecting tank are functional but
appeared seldom used. The wastewater mentioned channeled was noted held
indefinitely into the collection tank for primary treatment. There was no effluent
discharge [from such collection tank].
3. A sample from the bypass wastewater was collected for laboratory analyses. Result
of the analyses show that the bypass wastewater is polluted in terms of color units,
BOD and suspended solids, among others. (Please see attached laboratory resul .)11
From the foregoing reports, it is clear to this Court that there was at least prima facie evidence
before the Board that the effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the maximum
allowable levels of physical and chemical substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there
was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the Board. It is
also well to note that the previous owner of the plant facility Fine Touch Finishing Corporation
had been issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing it to cease and refrain
from carrying out dyeing operations until the water treatment plant was completed and
operational. Solar, the new owner, informed the NPCC of the acquisition of the plant on March
1986. Solar was summoned by the NPCC to a hearing on 13 October 1986 based on the results
of the sampling test conducted by the NPCC on 8 August 1986. Petitioner Board refrained from
issuing an ex parte cease and desist order until after the November 1986 and September 1988
re-inspections were conducted and the violation of applicable standards was confirmed. In
other words, petitioner Board appears to have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to
enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual
about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the Tullahan- Tinerejos
River, presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its Wastewater Treatment Plant
("WTP") in an operating condition.
In this connection, we note that in Technology Developers, Inc. v. Court of appeals, et al.,12 the
Court very recently upheld the summary closure ordered by the Acting Mayor of Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, of a pollution-causing establishment, after finding that the records showed that:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining
whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition
of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the then National Pollution
Control Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements, now the Environmental
Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it
must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its
inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the
application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless
appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the
residents of the community from the emission in the operation of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February l6, 1989, called the attention of petitioner
to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only
pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area," so
that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it was
required to bring the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-
Pollution permit. (Annex A-2, petition)
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of
Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through
channels (Annex A-B, petition).. . .
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was
made by Marivic Guina who in her report of December 8, 1988 observed that the
fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and
that no proper air pollution device has been installed. (Annex A-9, petition)
xxx xxx xxx
6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then
National Pollution Control Commission on December 15,1987, the permit was good
only up to May 25,1988 (Annex A-12, petition). Petitioner had not exerted any effort
to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution
and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community."
In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a local government
official but by the Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of the Government charged
with the task of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment
comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that
here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and
untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made
to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has
run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has
taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and
implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive,
sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public,
as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It
is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process
yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the
exercise of police power. The Board's ex parte Order and Writ of Execution would, of course,
have compelled Solar temporarily to stop its plant operations, a state of affairs Solar could in
any case have avoided by simply absorbing the bother and burden of putting its WTP on an
operational basis. Industrial establishments are not constitutionally entitled to reduce their
capitals costs and operating expenses and to increase their profits by imposing upon the public
threats and risks to its safety, health, general welfare and comfort, by disregarding the
requirements of anti- pollution statutes and their implementing regulations.
It should perhaps be made clear the Court is not here saying that the correctness of the ex
parte Order and Writ of Execution may not be contested by Solar in a hearing before the Board
itself. Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and desist order contests the
correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a public hearing
where such establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the basis of such ex
parte order. That such an opportunity is subsequently available is really all that is required by
the due process clause of the Constitution in situations like that we have here. The Board's
decision rendered after the public hearing may then be tested judicially by an appeal to the
Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984 and Section 42 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations. A subsequent public hearing is precisely what Solar
should have sought instead of going to court to seek nullification of the Board's Order and Writ
of Execution and instead of appealing to the Court of Appeals. It will be recalled the at the
Board in fact gave Solar authority temporarily to continue operations until still another
inspection of its wastewater treatment facilities and then another analysis of effluent samples
could be taken and evaluated.
Solar claims finally that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy as the questioned
Order and Writ of Execution issued by the Board were patent nullities. Since we have concluded
that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner
Board, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that
the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in
fact appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 7 February 1990 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1990 in A.C.-G.R. No. SP 18821
are hereby SET ASIDE. The Order of petitioner Board dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ
of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court dated 21 July 1989, are hereby
REINSTATED, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of
the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Order2 dated 7 November 1997 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 7 ("Manila RTC"), dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of cause of action
and lack of jurisdiction.
The Facts
On 30 June 1997, Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe ("RED Principe") of Region
IV, Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR"), issued an Environmental
Clearance Certificate ("ECC") in favor of respondent National Power Corporation ("NAPOCOR").
The ECC authorized NAPOCOR to construct a temporary mooring facility in Minolo Cove, Sitio
Minolo, Barangay San Isidro, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The Sangguniang Bayan of
Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a mangrove area and breeding ground for bangus fry,
an eco-tourist zone.3
The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of NAPOCOR's power barge,
which, due to turbulent waters at its former mooring site in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro,
required relocation to a safer site like Minolo Cove. The 14.4 megawatts power barge would
provide the main source of power for the entire province of Oriental Mindoro pending the
construction of a land-based power plant in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The ECC for the
mooring facility was valid for two years counted from its date of issuance or until 30 June 1999.4
Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto Galera, 5 sought
reconsideration of the ECC issuance. RED Principe, however, denied petitioners' plea on 15 July
1997. On 21 July 1997, petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 7, for the cancellation of the ECC and for the issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the
construction of the mooring facility. Impleaded as defendants were the following: (1)
NAPOCOR, (2) RED Principe, (3) DENR Region IV Technical Director for Environment Oscar
Dominguez, (4) Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative ("ORMECO"), which is engaged in the
distribution of electricity in Oriental Mindoro, and (5) certain officials of Puerto
Galera.6 Petitioners subsequently amended their complaint to include as additional defendants
the elective officials of Oriental Mindoro represented by then Governor Rodolfo G. Valencia.
Petitioners further prayed for the demolition of mooring structures that respondents had
already built.
On 28 July 1997, prior to the filing of the amended complaint, the trial court issued a 20-day
temporary restraining order enjoining the construction of the mooring facility. However, the
trial court lifted the same on 6 August 1997 on NAPOCOR's manifestation that the provincial
government of Oriental Mindoro was the one undertaking the construction of the mooring
facility.7
On 28 August 1997, before filing their answers, respondents ORMECO and the provincial
officials of Oriental Mindoro moved to dismiss the complaint. These respondents claimed that
petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies, rendering the complaint without cause
of action. They also asserted that the Manila RTC has no jurisdiction to enjoin the construction
of the mooring facility in Oriental Mindoro, which lies outside the Manila RTC's territorial
jurisdiction.
Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was no need to exhaust
administrative remedies. They argued that the issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1605, 8 Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160, 9 and the
provisions of DENR Department Administrative Order No. 96-37 ("DAO 96-37") on the
documentation of ECC applications. Petitioners also claimed that the implementation of the
ECC was in patent violation of its terms.
In its order of 7 November 1997, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed petitioners'
complaint.
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court's order dismissing the complaint reads in part:
After careful evaluation and analysis, this Court finds the Motion to Dismiss tenable
and meritorious.
Petitioners have clearly failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before taking this
legal action in Court x x x.
It is x x x worth mentioning that the decision of the Regional Director may still be x x x
elevated to the Office of the Secretary of the DENR to fully comply with the process of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. And well settled is the rule in our jurisdiction
that before bringing an action in or resorting to the Courts of Justice, all remedies of
administrative character affecting or determinative of the controversy at that level
should first be exhausted by the aggrieved party (Pestanas vs. Dyogi, L-25786, February
27, 1978). And petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies renders his [sic]
petition dismissible (Chia vs. Acting Collector of Customs, 177 SCRA 755). And a
dismissal on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies is tantamount to
a dismissal based on lack of cause of action (Baguiro vs. Basa, Jr., 214 SCRA 437; Pineda
vs. CFI of Davao, 111 Phil. 643; Sarabia vs. Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources,
L-16002, May 23, 1961; Gone, et al. vs. District Engineer, et. al., L-22782, August 29,
1975; Abe-Abe, et al. vs. Manta, et. al., L-4827, May 31, 1979) although it does not
affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter (Mun. of La Trinidad, et al.
vs. CFI of Baguio-Benguet, et al., L-33889, June 28, 1983).
Moreover, this Court finds the Opposition of the Petitioners highly untenable and
bereft of merits that the controverted act in question is patently illegal and there was
an immediate need for judicial intervention.
The ECC in question was issued by the Regional Office of the DENR which has
jurisdiction and authority over the same . . .. And corollary to this, the issue as to
whether or not the Minolo Cove is within the enclosed coves and waters embraced by
Puerto Galera bay and protected by Medio island is a clear question of fact which the
DENR may appropriately resolve before resorting to [the] Court[s].
This Court is likewise aware and cognizant of its territorial jurisdiction in the
enforcement of Writ of Injunction. That truly, [a] writ of injunction can only be
enforced within [the] territorial jurisdiction of this Court but not for acts which are
being or about to be committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. Thus, in Philippine
National Bank vs. Pineda, 197 SCRA 1, the Honorable Supreme Court ruled: "Regional
Trial Courts can only enforce their writs of injunction within their respective designated
territories. Furthermore, we find the issuance of the preliminary injunction directed
against the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental a jurisdictional paux [sic] pas (from
Black Dictionary means jurisdictional falsity) as the Courts of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court[s], can only enforce their writs of injunction within their respective
designated territories.
And finally, this Court is not unmindful of the relevant and square application in the
case at bar of Presidential Decree No. 1818, Executive Order No. 380 dated November
27, 1989, and Circular No. 2-91 of the Supreme Court that the National Power
Corporation (NPC) is a public utility, created under special legislation, engaged in the
generation and distribution of electric power and energy. The mooring site of NPC in
Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro is one of its infrastructure projects falling within the
mantle of Executive Order No. 380, November 27, 1989 x x x.
And as held by the Supreme Court in the case of National Power Corporation vs.
Honorable Abraham P. Vera, et al., 170 SCRA 721, courts are without jurisdiction to
issue injunctive writs against [the] National Power Corporation. The latter enjoys the
protective mantle of P.D. 1818, (Circular No. 2-91).
xxx xxx xxx
Injunction in this case is not a mere ancillary [sic] writ but the main action itself
together with the Annulment of the Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC). Even
assuming arguendo that the court [can] annul the ECC how can the latter enforce the
same against the Provincial Government of Oriental Mindoro which was impleaded by
the petitioners as a necessary party together with the Oriental Mindoro Electric
Cooperative and the government officials of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, whose
acts and functions are being performed outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court?
x x x Indisputably, the injunction and annulment of ECC as prayed for in the petition
are inseparable x x x.
 The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable that petitioners have failed to exhaust all the
available administrative remedies and this Court has no jurisdiction to issue the
injunctive writ prayed for in the Amended [Complaint].10
The Issue
The issue is whether the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of cause
action and lack of jurisdiction.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
Jurisdiction of the Manila RTC over the Case
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law. Such jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled
to all or some of the reliefs sought.11
A perusal of the allegations in the complaint shows that petitioners' principal cause of action is
the alleged illegality of the issuance of the ECC. The violation of laws on environmental
protection and on local government participation in the implementation of environmentally
critical projects is an issue that involves the validity of NAPOCOR's ECC. If the ECC is void, then
as a necessary consequence, NAPOCOR or the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro
could not construct the mooring facility. The subsidiary issue of non-compliance with pertinent
local ordinances in the construction of the mooring facility becomes immaterial for purposes
of granting petitioners' main prayer, which is the annulment of the ECC. Thus, if the court has
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, then it has jurisdiction to hear
and decide petitioners' complaint.
Petitioners' complaint is one that is not capable of pecuniary estimation. It falls within the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts under Section 19(1) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. The question of whether petitioners
should file their complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Manila or Oriental Mindoro then
becomes a matter of venue, to be determined by the residence of the parties.12
Petitioners' main prayer is the annulment of the ECC. The principal respondent, DENR Region
IV, has its main office at the L & S Building, Roxas Boulevard, Manila. Regional Executive
Director Principe of the DENR Region IV, who issued the ECC, holds office there. Plainly, the
principal respondent resides in Manila, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Manila
RTC. Thus, petitioners filed their complaint in the proper venue.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to issue injunctive writs is limited
to acts committed or about to be committed within their judicial region.13 Moreover,
Presidential Decree No. 1818 ("PD No. 1818") prohibited14 courts from issuing injunctive writs
against government infrastructure projects like the mooring facility in the present case.
Republic Act No. 8975 ("RA No. 8975"), which took effect on 26 November 2000, superseded
PD No. 1818 and delineates more clearly the coverage of the prohibition, reserves the power
to issue such writs exclusively with this Court, and provides penalties for its
violation.15 Obviously, neither the Manila RTC nor the Oriental Mindoro RTC can issue an
injunctive writ to stop the construction of the mooring facility. Only this Court can do so under
PD No. 1818 and later under RA No. 8975. Thus, the question of whether the Manila RTC has
jurisdiction over the complaint considering that its injunctive writ is not enforceable in Oriental
Mindoro is academic.
Clearly, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC,
although it could not issue an injunctive writ against the DENR or NAPOCOR. However, since
the construction of the mooring facility could not proceed without a valid ECC, the validity of
the ECC remains the determinative issue in resolving petitioners' complaint.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The settled rule is before a party may seek the intervention of the courts, he should first avail
of all the means afforded by administrative processes. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery is still available, with a procedure prescribed pursuant to law for an
administrative officer to decide the controversy, a party should first exhaust such remedy
before resorting to the courts. The premature invocation of a court's intervention renders the
complaint without cause of action and dismissible on such ground.16
RED Principe of the DENR Region IV Office issued the ECC based on (1) Presidential Decree No.
1586 ("PD No. 1586") and its implementing rules establishing the Environmental Impact
Statement System, (2) DAO 96-3717 and (3) the Procedural Manual of DAO 96-37. Section 418 of
PD No. 1586 requires a proponent of an environmentally critical project, or a project located
within an environmentally critical area as declared by the President, to secure an ECC prior to
the project's operation.19 NAPOCOR thus secured the ECC because the mooring facility in
Minolo Cove, while not an environmentally critical project, is located within an environmentally
critical area under Presidential Proclamation No. 2146, issued on 14 December 1981. 20
The rules on administrative appeals from rulings of the DENR Regional Directors on the
implementation of PD No. 1586 are found in Article VI of DAO 96-37, which provides:
SECTION 1.0. Appeal to the Office of the Secretary. Any party aggrieved by the final
decision of the RED may, within 15 days from receipt of such decision, file an appeal
with the Office of the Secretary. The decision of the Secretary shall be immediately
executory.
SECTION 2.0. Grounds for Appeal. The grounds for appeal shall be limited to grave
abuse of discretion and serious errors in the findings of fact which would cause grave
or irreparable injury to the aggrieved party. Frivolous appeals shall not be
countenanced.
SECTION 3.0. Who May Appeal. The proponent or any stakeholder, including but
not limited to, the LGUs concerned and affected communities, may file an appeal.
The DENR Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 explains these provisions thus:
Final decisions of the RED may be appealed. These decisions include those relating to
the issuance or non-issuance of an ECC, and the imposition of fines and penalties. By
inference, the decision of the Secretary on the issuance or non-issuance of the ECC
may also be appealed based on this provision. Resort to courts prior to availing of this
remedy would make the appellant's action dismissible on the ground of non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
The right to appeal must be exercised within 15 days from receipt by the aggrieved
party of such decision. Failure to file such appeal within the requisite period will result
in the finality of the RED's or Secretary's decision(s), which can no longer be disturbed.
An appeal shall not stay the effectivity of the RED's decision, unless the Secretary directs
otherwise.
The right to appeal does not prevent the aggrieved party from first resorting to the
filing of a motion for reconsideration with the RED, to give the RED an opportunity to
re-evaluate his decision. (Emphasis added)
Instead of following the foregoing procedure, petitioners bypassed the DENR Secretary and
immediately filed their complaint with the Manila RTC, depriving the DENR Secretary the
opportunity to review the decision of his subordinate, RED Principe. Under the Procedural
Manual for DAO 96-37 and applicable jurisprudence, petitioners' omission renders their
complaint dismissible for lack of cause of action.21 Consequently, the Manila RTC did not err in
dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of cause of action.
On the Alleged Patent Illegality of the ECC
Petitioners nevertheless contend that they are exempt from filing an appeal with the DENR
Secretary because the issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of existing laws and
regulations. These are (1) Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1605, as amended, (2) Sections
26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), and (3) the provisions
of DAO 96-37 on the documentary requirements for the zoning permit and social acceptability
of the mooring facility.
Petitioners' contention is without merit. While the patent illegality of an act exempts a party
from complying with the rule on exhaustion Of administrative remedies,22 this does not apply
in the present case.
Presidential Decree No. 1605
Presidential Decree No. 1605 ("PD No. 1605"),23 as amended by Presidential Decrees Nos.
1605-A and 1805, declares as ecologically threatened zone "the coves and waters embraced
by Puerto Galera Bay as protected by Medio Island." This decree provides in part:
Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the construction of
marinas, hotels, restaurants, other commercial structures; commercial or semi-
commercial wharfs [sic]; commercial docking within the enclosed coves of Puerto
Galera; the destruction of its mangrove stands; the devastation of its corals and
coastline by large barges, motorboats, tugboat propellers, and any form of destruction
by other human activities are hereby prohibited.
Section 2. x x x
No permit for the construction of any wharf, marina, hotel, restaurants and other
commercial structures in Puerto Galera shall be issued without prior approval of the
Office of the President upon the recommendation of the Philippine Tourism Authority.
(Emphasis supplied)
NAPOCOR claims that since Minolo Cove lies outside of "Puerto Galera Bay as protected by
Medio Island",24 PD No. 1605 does not apply to this case. However, petitioners assert that
Minolo Cove is one of the "enclosed coves of Puerto Galera"25 and thus protected under PD
No. 1605. This is a question of fact that the DENR Secretary should have first resolved. In any
event, there is no dispute that NAPOCOR will use the mooring facility for its power barge that
will supply 14.4 megawatts of electricity to the entire province of Oriental Mindoro, including
Puerto Galera. The mooring facility is obviously a government-owned public infrastructure
intended to serve a basic need of the people of Oriental Mindoro. The mooring facility is not a
"commercial structure; commercial or semi-commercial wharf or commercial docking" as
contemplated in Section 1 of PD No. 1605. Therefore, the issuance of the ECC does not violate
PD No. 1605 which applies only to commercial structures like wharves, marinas, hotels and
restaurants.
Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160
Congress introduced Sections 26 and 27 in the Local Government Code to emphasize the
legislative concern "for the maintenance of a sound ecology and clean environment."26 These
provisions require every national government agency or government-owned and controlled
corporation to hold prior consultations with the local government unit concerned and to secure
the prior approval of its sanggunian before implementing "any project or program that may
cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of cropland,
rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of animal or plant species." Sections 26 and 27
respectively provide:
Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological
Balance. It shall be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or
controlled corporation authorized or involved in the planning and implementation of
any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-
renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of
animal or plant species, to consult with the local government units, non-governmental
organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the
project or program, its impact upon the people and the community in terms of
environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to
prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.
Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. No project or program shall be
implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in
Section . . . 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian
concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects are to
be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been
provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
In Lina, Jr. v. Pao,27 the Court interpreted these provisions in this manner:
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof x x x.
Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to
mean projects and programs whose effects are among those enumerated in Sections
26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic
change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss
of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or plant
species; and (6) other projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a particular
group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented.
Again, Sections 26 and 27 do not apply to this case because as petitioners admit,28 the mooring
facility itself is not environmentally critical and hence does not belong to any of the six types
of projects mentioned in the law. There is no statutory requirement for the
concerned sanggunian to approve the construction of the mooring facility. It is another matter
if the operation of the power barge is at issue. As an environmentally critical project that causes
pollution, the operation of the power barge needs the prior approval of the
concerned sanggunian. However, what is before this Court is only the construction of the
mooring facility, not the operation of the power barge. Thus, the issuance of the ECC does not
violate Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160.
Documentary Requirements for ECC Applications
Under DAO 96-37, an ECC applicant for a project located within an environmentally critical area
is required to submit an Initial Environment Examination, which must contain a brief
description of the environmental setting and a documentation of the consultative process
undertaken, when appropriate.29 As part of the description of the environmental setting, the
ECC applicant must submit a certificate of locational clearance or zoning certificate.
Petitioners further contend that NAPOCOR, in applying for the ECC, did not submit to the DENR
Region IV Office the documents proving the holding of consultations and the issuance of a
locational clearance or zoning certificate. Petitioners assert that this omission renders the
issuance of the ECC patently illegal.
The contention is also without merit. While such documents are part of the submissions
required from a project proponent, their mere absence does not render the issuance of the
ECC patently illegal. To justify non-exhaustion of administrative remedies due to the patent
illegality of the ECC, the public officer must have issued the ECC "[without any] semblance of
compliance, or even an attempt to comply, with the pertinent laws; when manifestly, the
officer has acted without jurisdiction or has exceeded his jurisdiction, or has committed a grave
abuse of discretion; or when his act is clearly and obviously devoid of any color of authority."30
RED Principe, as chief of DENR Region IV, is the officer duly authorized under DAO 96-3731 to
issue ECCs for projects located within environmentally critical areas. RED Principe issued the
ECC on the recommendation of Amelia Supetran, the Director of the Environmental
Management Bureau. Thus, RED Principe acted with full authority pursuant to DENR
regulations. Moreover, the legal presumption is that he acted with the requisite
authority.32 This clothes RED Principe's acts with presumptive validity and negates any claim
that his actions are patently illegal or that he gravely abused his discretion. While petitioners
may present proof to the contrary, they must do so before the proper administrative forum
before resorting to judicial remedies.
On the Alleged Non-Compliance with the Terms of the ECC
Lastly, petitioners claim that they are justified in immediately seeking judicial recourse because
NAPOCOR is guilty of violating the conditions of the ECC, which requires it to secure a separate
ECC for the operation of the power barge. The ECC also mandates NAPOCOR to secure the
usual local government permits, like zoning and building permits, from the municipal
government of Puerto Galera.
The contention is similarly without merit. The fact that NAPOCOR's ECC is subject to
cancellation for non-compliance with its conditions does not justify petitioners' conduct in
ignoring the procedure prescribed in DAO 96-37 on appeals from the decision of the DENR
Executive Director. Petitioners vigorously insist that NAPOCOR should comply with the
requirements of consultation and locational clearance prescribed in DAO 96-37. Ironically,
petitioners themselves refuse to abide with the procedure for filing complaints and appealing
decisions laid down in DAO 96-37.
DAO 96-37 provides for a separate administrative proceeding to address complaints for the
cancellation of an ECC. Under Article IX of DAO 96-37, complaints to nullify an ECC must
undergo an administrative investigation, after which the hearing officer will submit his report
to the EMB Director or the Regional Executive Director, who will then render his decision. The
aggrieved party may file an appeal to the DENR Secretary, who has authority to issue cease and
desist orders. Article IX also classifies the types of violations covered under DAO 96-37,
including projects operating without an ECC or violating the conditions of the ECC. This is the
applicable procedure to address petitioners' complaint on NAPOCOR's alleged violations and
not the filing of the instant case in court.
A Final Word
The Court commends petitioners for their courageous efforts to safeguard and maintain the
ecological balance of Minolo Cove. This Court recognizes the utmost importance of protecting
the environment.33 Indeed, we have called for the vigorous prosecution of violators of
environmental laws.34 Legal actions to achieve this end, however, must be done in accordance
with established rules of procedure that were intended, in the first place, to achieve orderly
and efficient administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 110249. August 21, 1997]
Tano vs Socrates
Petitioners caption their petition as one for Certiorari, Injunction With Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction,with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and pray that this Court:
(1) declare as unconstitutional: (a) Ordinance No. 15-92, dated 15 December 1992, of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa; (b) Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, dated
22 January 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of Puerto Princesa City; and (c)
Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, dated 19 February 1993, of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan; (2) enjoin the enforcement thereof; and (3)
restrain respondents Provincial and City Prosecutors of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City and
Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts[1] and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in Palawan from assuming jurisdiction over and hearing cases concerning the violation of the
Ordinances and of the Office Order.
More appropriately, the petition is, and shall be treated as, a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition.
The following is petitioners summary of the factual antecedents giving rise to the petition:
1. On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted
Ordinance No. 15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING
THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM
JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF, the full text of which reads as follows:
Section 1. Title of the Ordinance. - This Ordinance is entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE
SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY
1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES THEREOF.
Section 2. Purpose, Scope and Coverage. - To effectively free our City Sea Waters from Cyanide
and other Obnoxious substance, and shall cover all persons and/or entities operating within
and outside the City of Puerto Princesa who is are [sic] directly or indirectly in the business or
shipment of live fish and lobster outside the City.
Section 3. Definition of terms. - For purpose of this Ordinance the following are hereby defined:
A. SEA BASS - A kind of fish under the family of Centropomidae, better known as APAHAP;
B. CATFISH - A kind of fish under the family of Plotosidae, better known as HITO-HITO;
C. MUDFISH - A kind of fish under the family of Orphicaphalisae better known as DALAG
D. ALL LIVE FISH - All alive, breathing not necessarily moving of all specie[s] use for food and
for aquarium purposes.
E. LIVE LOBSTER - Several relatively, large marine crustaceans of the genus Homarus that are
alive and breathing not necessarily moving.
Section 4. It shall be unlawful [for] any person or any business enterprise or company to ship
out from Puerto Princesa City to any point of destination either via aircraft or seacraft of any
live fish and lobster except SEA BASS, CATFISH, MUDFISH, AND MILKFISH FRIES.
Section 5. Penalty Clause. - Any person/s and or business entity violating this Ordinance shall
be penalized with a fine of not more than P5,000.00 or imprisonment of not more than twelve
(12) months, cancellation of their permit to do business in the City of Puerto Princesa or all of
the herein stated penalties, upon the discretion of the court.
Section 6. If the owner and/or operator of the establishment found vilating the provisions of
this ordinance is a corporation or a partnership, the penalty prescribed in Section 5 hereof shall
be imposed upon its president and/or General Manager or Managing Partner and/or Manager,
as the case maybe [sic].
Section 7. Any existing ordinance or any provision of any ordinance inconsistent to [sic] this
ordinance is deemed repealed.
Section 8. This Ordinance shall take effect on January 1, 1993.
SO ORDAINED.
xxx
2. To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office
Order No. 23, Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993 which reads as follows:
In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No. PD426-14-74, otherwise
known as AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN
ANY BUSINESS, TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION
ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A
MAYORS PERMIT and City Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF
ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO
JANUARY 1, 1998, you are hereby authorized and directed to check or conduct necessary
inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto
Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port within the jurisdiction of the City to any
point of destinations [sic] either via aircraft or seacraft.
The purpose of the inspection is to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the required
Mayors Permit issued by this Office and the shipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued
by the local office of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and as to compliance with
all other existing rules and regulations on the matter.
Any cargo containing live fish and lobster without the required documents as stated herein
must be held for proper disposition.
In the pursuit of this Order, you are hereby authorized to coordinate with the PAL Manager,
the PPA Manager, the local PNP Station and other offices concerned for the needed support
and cooperation.Further, that the usual courtesy and diplomacy must be observed at all times
in the conduct of the inspection.
Please be guided accordingly.
xxx
3. On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan
enacted Resolution No. 33 entitled: A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING,
POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC
ORGANISMS, TO WIT: FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS
FASCIATUS(SUNO). CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS (PANTHER OR SENORITA), LOBSTER BELOW 200
GRAMS AND SPAWNING, TRADACNA GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADA MARGARITEFERA(MOTHER
PEARL, OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER SPECIES), PENAEUS MONODON (TIGER PRAWN-
BREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) AND
FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND
COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS, the full text of which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, scientific and factual researches [sic] and studies disclose that only five (5) percent
of the corals of our province remain to be in excellent condition as [a] habitat of marine coral
dwelling aquatic organisms;
WHEREAS, it cannot be gainsaid that the destruction and devastation of the corals of our
province were principally due to illegal fishing activities like dynamite fishing, sodium cyanide
fishing, use of other obnoxious substances and other related activities;
WHEREAS, there is an imperative and urgent need to protect and preserve the existence of the
remaining excellent corals and allow the devastated ones to reinvigorate and regenerate
themselves into vitality within the span of five (5) years;
WHEREAS, Sec. 468, Par. 1, Sub-Par. VI of the [sic] R.A. 7160 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991 empowers the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to protect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties [upon] acts which endanger the environment
such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, among others.
NOW, THEREFORE, on motion by Kagawad Nelson P. Peneyra and upon unanimous decision of
all the members present;
Be it resolved as it is hereby resolved, to approve Resolution No. 33, Series of 1993 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and to enact Ordinance No. 2 for the purpose, to wit:
ORDINANCE NO. 2
Series of 1993
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN IN SESSION ASSEMBLED:
Section 1. TITLE - This Ordinance shall be known as an Ordinance Prohibiting the catching,
gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms, to wit: 1.Family: Scaridae (Mameng), 2. Epinephelus Fasciatus (Suno), 3.
Cromileptes altivelis (Panther or Senorita), lobster below 200 grams and spawning), 4. Tridacna
Gigas (Taklobo), 5. Pinctada Margaretefera (Mother Pearl, Oysters, Giant Clams and other
species), 6. Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn-breeder size or mother), 7. Epinephelus Suillus
(Loba or Green Grouper) and 8. Family: Balistidae (Topical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of five
(5) years in and coming from Palawan Waters.
Section II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
1. Sec. 2-A (Rep. Act 7160). It is hereby declared, the policy of the state that the territorial and
political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable
them to attain their fullest development as self reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide
for [a] more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers,
authority, responsibilities and resources.
2. Sec. 5-A (R.A. 7160). Any provision on a power of [a] local Government Unit shall be liberaly
interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of
devolution of powers and of the lower government units. Any fair and reasonable doubts as to
the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the Local Government Unit
concerned.
3. Sec. 5-C (R.A. 7160). The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted
to give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and
upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community.
4. Sec. 16 (R.A. 7160). General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance; and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
Section III. DECLARATION OF POLICY. - It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Province of
Palawan to protect and conserve the marine resources of Palawan not only for the greatest
good of the majority of the present generation but with [the] proper perspective and
consideration of [sic] their prosperity, and to attain this end, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
henceforth declares that is [sic] shall be unlawful for any person or any business entity to
engage in catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral
dwelling aquatic organisms as enumerated in Section 1 hereof in and coming out of Palawan
Waters for a period of five (5) years;
Section IV. PENALTY CLAUSE. - Any person and/or business entity violating this Ordinance shall
be penalized with a fine of not more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), Philippine
Currency, and/or imprisonment of six (6) months to twelve (12) months and confiscation and
forfeiture of paraphernalias [sic] and equipment in favor of the government at the discretion
of the Court;
Section V. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE. - If for any reason, a Section or provision of this Ordinance
shall be held as unconditional [sic] or invalid, it shall not affect the other provisions hereof.
Section VI. REPEALING CLAUSE. - Any existing Ordinance or a provision of any ordinance
inconsistent herewith is deemed modified, amended or repealed.
Section VII. EFFECTIVITY. - This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication.
SO ORDAINED.
xxx
4. The respondents implemented the said ordinances, Annexes A and C hereof thereby
depriving all the fishermen of the whole province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa
of their only means of livelihood and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan
and other marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation and trade;
5. Petitioners Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio
Tremocha, and Felipe Ongonion, Jr. were even charged criminally under criminal case no. 93-
05-C in the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Cuyo-Agutaya-Magsaysay, an original carbon
copy of the criminal complaint dated April 12, 1993 is hereto attached as Annex D; while xerox
copies are attached as Annex D to the copies of the petition;
6. Petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, on the other hand, were charged by the respondent
PNP with the respondent City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City, a xerox copy of the complaint
is hereto attached as Annex E;
Without seeking redress from the concerned local government units, prosecutors office
and courts, petitioners directly invoked our original jurisdiction by filing this petition on 4 June
1993. In sum, petitioners contend that:
First, the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly
restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections
2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the
Mayors permit could be granted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the absolute
authority to determine whether or not to issue permit.
Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan altogether prohibited the catching,
gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms,
without any distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method, the
Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways;
and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were
unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering into contracts which are proper,
necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion.
Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null and void, the criminal
cases based thereon against petitioners Tano and the others have to be dismissed.
In the Resolution of 15 June 1993 we required respondents to comment on the petition,
and furnished the Office of the Solicitor General with a copy thereof.
In their comment filed on 13 August 1993, public respondents Governor Socrates and
Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance
No.2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the Provincial Governments power under the general
welfare clause (Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 [hereafter, LGC]), and its
specific power to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which
endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing
under Section 447 (a) (1) (vi), Section 458 (a) (1) (vi), and Section 468 (a) (1) (vi), of the LGC.
They claimed that in the exercise of such powers, the Province of Palawan had the right and
responsibilty to insure that the remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells [sic], within its territory
remain healthy for the future generation. The Ordinance, they further asserted, covered
only live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms which were enumerated in the ordinance
and excluded other kinds of live marine aquatic organisms not dwelling in coral reefs; besides
the prohibition was for only five (5) years to protect and preserve the pristine coral and allow
those damaged to regenerate.
Aforementioned respondents likewise maintained that there was no violation of due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. As to the former, public hearings
were conducted before the enactment of the Ordinance which, undoubtedly, had a lawful
purpose and employed reasonable means; while as to the latter, a substantial distinction
existed between a fisherman who catches live fish with the intention of selling it live, and a
fisherman who catches live fish with no intention at all of selling it live, i.e., the former uses
sodium cyanide while the latter does not. Further, the Ordinance applied equally to all those
belonging to one class.
On 25 October 1993 petitioners filed an Urgent Plea for the Immediate Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order claiming that despite the pendency of this case, Branch 50 of the
Regional Trial Court of Palawan was bent on proceeding with Criminal Case No. 11223 against
petitioners Danilo Tano, Alfredo Tano, Eulogio Tremocha, Romualdo Tano, Baldomero Tano,
Andres Lemihan and Angel de Mesa for violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan. Acting on said plea, we issued on 11 November 1993 a temporary
restraining order directing Judge Angel Miclat of said court to cease and desist from proceeding
with the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 11223.
On 12 July 1994, we excused the Office of the Solicitor General from filing a comment,
considering that as claimed by said office in its Manifestation of 28 June 1994, respondents
were already represented by counsel.
The rest of the respondents did not file any comment on the petition.
In the resolution of 15 September 1994, we resolved to consider the comment on the
petition as the Answer, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.[2]
On 22 April 1997 we ordered impleaded as party respondents the Department of
Agriculture and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and required the Office of the
Solicitor General to comment on their behalf. But in light of the latters motion of 9 July 1997
for an extension of time to file the comment which would only result in further delay, we
dispensed with said comment.
After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolved to dismiss this petition for want
of merit, on 22 July 1997, and assigned it to the ponente for the writing of the opinion of the
Court.
I
There are actually two sets of petitioners in this case. The first is composed of Alfredo
Tano, Baldomero Tano, Danilo Tano, Romualdo Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa,
Eulogio Tremocha, Felipe Ongonion, Jr., Andres Linijan, and Felimon de Mesa, who were
criminally charged with violating Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 33 and Ordinance
No. 2, Series of 1993, of the Province of Palawan, in Criminal Case No. 93-05-C of the
1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Palawan;[3] and Robert Lim and Virginia Lim who
were charged with violating City Ordinance No. 15-92 of Puerto Princesa City and Ordinance
No. 2, Series of 1993, of the Province of Palawan before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Puerto Princesa.[4] All of them, with the exception of Teocenes Midello, Felipe Ongonion, Jr.,
Felimon de Mesa, Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, are likewise the accused in Criminal Case No.
11223 for the violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan,
pending before Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan.[5]
The second set of petitioners is composed of the rest of the petitioners numbering
seventy-seven (77), all of whom, except the Airline Shippers Association of Palawan -- an
alleged private association of several marine merchants -- are natural persons who claim to be
fishermen.
The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is, of course, to prevent the prosecution,
trial and determination of the criminal cases until the constitutionality or legality of the
Ordinances they allegedly violated shall have been resolved. The second set of petitioners
merely claim that they being fishermen or marine merchants, they would be adversely affected
by the ordinances.
As to the first set of petitioners, this special civil for certiorari must fail on the ground of
prematurity amounting to a lack of cause of action. There is no showing that the said
petitioners, as the accused in the criminal cases, have filed motions to quash the informations
therein and that the same were denied. The ground available for such motions is that the facts
charged therein do not constitute an offense because the ordinances in question are
unconstitutional.[6] It cannot then be said that the lower courts acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion to justify recourse to the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari or prohibition. It must further be stressed that even if the petitioners did file
motions to quash, the denial thereof would not forthwith give rise to a cause of action under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The general rule is that where a motion to quash is denied, the
remedy therefrom is not certiorari, but for the party aggrieved thereby to go to trial without
prejudice to reiterating special defenses involved in said motion, and if, after trial on the merits
of adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.[7] And ,
even where in an exceptional circumstance such denial may be the subject of a special civil
action for certiorari, a motion for reconsideration must have to be filed to allow the court
concerned an opportunity to correct its errors, unless such motion may be dispensed with
because of existing exceptional circumstances.[8] Finally, even if a motion for reconsideration
has been filed and denied, the remedy under Rule 65 is still unavailable absent any showing of
the grounds provided for in Section 1 thereof.[9] For obvious reasons, the petition at bar does
not, and could not have , alleged any of such grounds.
As to the second set of petitioners, the instant petition is obviously one for DECLARATORY
RELIEF, i.e., for a declaration that the Ordinances in question are a nullity ... for being
unconstitutional.[10] As such, their petition must likewise fail, as this Court is not possessed of
original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are
involved,[11] it being settled that the Court merely exercises appellate jurisdiction over such
petitions.[12]
II
Even granting arguendo that the first set of petitioners have a cause of action ripe for the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and
no special and important reason or exceptional or compelling circumstance has been adduced
why direct recourse to us should be allowed. While we have concurrent jurisdiction with
Regional Trial courts and with the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence gives
petitioners no unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum, so we held in People v.
Cuaresma:[13]
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the
writs an absolute unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor
will be directed. There is after all hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
(inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with
the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy necessary
to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted
to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the
Courts docket.
The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin strict adherence
thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on the part of litigants and
lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even
their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of
the land.
In Santiago v. Vasquez,[14] this Court forcefully expressed that the propensity of litigants
and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts must be put to a halt, not only because of the
imposition upon the precious time of this Court, but also because of the inevitable and
resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be
remanded or referred to the lower court, the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or
as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We reiterated
the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of [its] primary
jurisdiction.
III
Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural obstacles against the first set of petitioners, we
opt to resolve this case on its merits considering that the lifetime of the challenged Ordinances
is about to end. Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa is effective only up to 1
January 1998, while Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan, enacted on 19 February 1993,
is effective for only five (5) years. Besides, these Ordinances were undoubtedly enacted in the
exercise of powers under the new LGC relative to the protection and preservation of the
environment and are thus novel and of paramount importance. No further delay then may be
allowed in the resolution of the issues raised.
It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units)
enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.[15] To overthrow this presumption, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative
contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt.[16] Where doubt exists, even if well founded, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.[17]
After a scrunity of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the Constitution
petitioners claim to have been violated, we find petitioners contentions baseless and so hold
that the former do not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable
laws.
Petitioners specifically point to Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of the
Constitution as having been transgressed by the Ordinances.
The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article XII reads:
SEC. 2. x x x
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens,
as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in
rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide:
Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic
opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
xxx
SEC. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local
communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both
inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology
and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other
services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection
shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign
intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and
fishing resources.
There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or
marginal fisherman. In their petition, petitioner Airline Shippers Association of Palawan is
described as a private association composed of Marine Merchants; petitioners Robert Lim and
Virginia Lim, as merchants; while the rest of the petitioners claim to be fishermen, without any
qualification, however, as to their status.
Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the terms subsistence
or marginal fishermen,[18] they should be construed in their general and ordinary
sense. A marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or
reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a
profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish,[19] while a subsistence fisherman is one whose
catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood. [20] Section 131(p) of the LGC (R.A.
No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer or fisherman as an individual engaged in subsistence
farming or fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or marine
products produced by himself and his immediate family. It bears repeating that nothing in the
record supports a finding that any petitioner falls within these definitions.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence
fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nations marine wealth. What
the provision merely recognizes is that the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming,
with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. Our
survey of the statute books reveals that the only provision of law which speaks of the
preferential right of marginal fishermen is Section 149 of the LGC of 1991 which pertinently
provides:
SEC. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. -- x x x
(b) The sangguniang bayan may:
(1) Grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus
fry areas, within a definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by
it: Provided, however, That duly registered organizations and cooperatives of marginal
fishermen shall have preferential right to such fishery privileges ....
In a Joint Administrative Order No. 3, dated 25 April 1996, the Secretary of the Department of
Agriculture and the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government prescribed
the guidelines on the preferential treatment of small fisherfolk relative to the fishery right
mentioned in Section 149. This case, however, does not involve such fishery right.
Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing
resources, but of their protection, development, and conservation. As hereafter shown, the
ordinances in question are meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to
the end that their enjoyment by the people may be guaranteed not only for the present
generation, but also for the generations to come.
 The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine
resources is not at all absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources
belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, their exploration, development and utilization ... shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. Moreover, their mandated protection, development, and
conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution, imply certain
restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone. Thus, as to the
curtailment of the preferential treatment of marginal fisherman, the following exchange
between Commissioner Francisco Rodrigo and Commissioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., took place
at the plenary session of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. RODRIGO:
Let us discuss the implementation of this because I would not raise the hopes of our
people, and afterwards fail in the implementation. How will this be
implemented? Will there be a licensing or giving of permits so that government
officials will know that one is really a marginal fisherman? Or if policeman say that a
person is not a marginal fisherman, he can show his permit, to prove that indeed he
is one.
MR. BENGZON:
Certainly, there will be some mode of licensing insofar as this is concerned and this
particular question could be tackled when we discuss the Article on Local
Governments -- whether we will leave to the local governments or to Congress on
how these things will be implemented. But certainly, I think our Congressmen and
our local officials will not be bereft of ideas on how to implement this mandate.
xxx
MR. RODRIGO:
So, once one is licensed as a marginal fisherman, he can go anywhere in the
Philippines and fish in any fishing grounds.
MR. BENGZON:
Subject to whatever rules and regulations and local laws that may be passed, may be
existing or will be passed.[21] (underscoring supplied for emphasis).
What must likewise be borne in mind is the state policy enshrined in the Constitution
regarding the duty of the State to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.[22] On this score, in
Oposa v. Factoran,[23] this Court declared:
While the right to balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles the State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs
to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation
and self-perpetuation - aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners - the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from
the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter,
it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second , the day would not be too
far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
- generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it a correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment ...
The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely seek to give flesh and blood to
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In fact, the General Welfare Clause,
expressly mentions this right:
SEC. 16. General Welfare.-- Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity
and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order,
and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (underscoring supplied).
Moreover, Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of
the LGC shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to the local government units in
accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the
community.
The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters
and to impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the
use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other
deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable
fishery laws.[24] Further, the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod and
the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that [p]rotect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such
as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing ... and such other activities which
result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological
imbalance.[25]
Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization[26] as expressly mandated
by the Constitution.[27] Indispensable thereto is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that
[a]ny provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor,
and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers
and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of
the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned,[28]Devolution
refers to the act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the
various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.[29]
One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is the
enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of
mangroves.[30] This necessarily includes enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such
fishery laws within the municipal waters.
The term municipal waters, in turn, include not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within
the municipality, not being the subject of private ownership and not comprised within the
national parks, public forest, timber lands, forest reserves, or fishery reserves, but also marine
waters included between two lines drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline from points
where the boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line
parallel with the general coastline and fifteen kilometers from it. [31] Under P.D. No. 704, the
marine waters included in municipal waters is limited to three nautical miles from the general
coastline using the above perpendicular lines and a third parallel line.
These fishery laws which local government units may enforce under Section 17(b), (2), (i)
in municipal waters include: (1) P.D. No. 704; (2) P.D. No. 1015 which, inter alia, authorizes the
establishment of a closed season in any Philippine water if necessary for conservation or
ecological purposes; (3) P.D. No. 1219 which provides for the exploration, exploitation,
utilization, and conservation of coral resources; (4) R.A. No. 5474, as amended by B.P. Blg. 58,
which makes it unlawful for any person, association, or corporation to catch or cause to be
caught, sell, offer to sell, purchase, or have in possession any of the fish specie
called gobiidae or ipon during closed season; and (5) R.A. No. 6451 which prohibits and
punishes electrofishing, as well as various issuances of the BFAR.
To those specifically devolved insofar as the control and regulation of fishing in municipal
waters and the protection of its marine environment are concerned, must be added the
following:
1. Issuance of permits to construct fish cages within municipal waters;
2. Issuance of permits to gather aquarium fishes within municipal waters;
3. Issuance of permits to gather kapis shells within municipal waters;
4. Issuance of permits to gather/culture shelled mollusks within municipal waters;
5. Issuance of licenses to establish seaweed farms within municipal waters;
6. Issuance of licenses to establish culture pearls within municipal waters;
7. Issuance of auxiliary invoice to transport fish and fishery products; and
8. Establishment of closed season in municipal waters.
These functions are covered in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior and Local Government.
In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and
the powers granted to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause),
and under Sections 149, 447 (a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably
involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be
doubted.
Parenthetically, we wish to add that these Ordinances find full support under R.A. No.
7611, otherwise known as the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act, approved
on 19 July 1992. This statute adopts a comprehensive framework for the sustainable
development of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and
endangered environment of the province, which shall serve to guide the local government of
Palawan and the government agencies concerned in the formulation and implementation of
plans, programs and projects affecting said province.[32]
 At this time then, it would be appropriate to determine the relation between the assailed
Ordinances and the aforesaid powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto
Princesa and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan to protect the
environment. To begin, we ascertain the purpose of the Ordinances as set forth in the
statement of purposes or declaration of policies quoted earlier.
It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1)
to establish a closed season for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a
period of five years, and (2) to protect the corals of the marine waters of the City of Puerto
Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities.
The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power to enforce
fishery laws in municipal waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows the establishment of
closed seasons. The devolution of such power has been expressly confirmed in the
Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Interior and Local Government.
The realization of the second objective falls within both the general welfare clause of the
LGC and the express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment
and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment.[33]
The destruction of the coral reefs results in serious, if not irreparable, ecological
imbalance, for coral reefs are among the natures life-support systems.[34] They collect, retain,
and recycle nutrients for adjacent nearshore areas such as mangroves, seagrass beds, and reef
flats; provide food for marine plants and animals; and serve as a protective shelter for aquatic
organisms.[35] It is said that [e]cologically, the reefs are to the oceans what forests are to
continents: they are shelter and breeding grounds for fish and plant species that will disappear
without them.[36]
The prohibition against catching live fish stems, in part, from the modern phenomenon
of live-fish trade which entails the catching of so-called exotic tropical species of fish not only
for aquarium use in the West, but also for the market for live banquet fish [which] is virtually
insatiable in ever more affluent Asia.[37] These exotic species are coral-dwellers, and fishermen
catch them by diving in shallow water with corraline habitats and squirting sodium cyanide
poison at passing fish directly or onto coral crevices; once affected the fish are immobilized
[merely stunned] and then scooped by hand.[38] The diver then surfaces and dumps his catch
into a submerged net attached to the skiff . Twenty minutes later, the fish can swim
normally.Back on shore, they are placed in holding pens, and within a few weeks, they expel
the cyanide from their system and are ready to be hauled. Then they are placed in saltwater
tanks or packaged in plastic bags filled with seawater for shipment by air freight to major
markets for live food fish.[39] While the fish are meant to survive, the opposite holds true for
their former home as [a]fter the fisherman squirts the cyanide, the first thing to perish is the
reef algae, on which fish feed. Days later, the living coral starts to expire. Soon the reef loses
its function as habitat for the fish, which eat both the algae and invertebrates that cling to the
coral. The reef becomes an underwater graveyard, its skeletal remains brittle, bleached of all
color and vulnerable to erosion from the pounding of the waves.[40] It has been found that
cyanide fishing kills most hard and soft corals within three months of repeated application. [41]
The nexus then between the activities barred by Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto
Princesa and the prohibited acts provided in Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993 of the Province of
Palawan, on one hand, and the use of sodium cyanide, on the other, is painfully obvious. In
sum, the public purpose and reasonableness of the Ordinances may not then be controverted.
As to Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of
the City of Puerto Princesa, we find nothing therein violative of any constitutional or statutory
provision. The Order refers to the implementation of the challenged ordinance and is not the
Mayors Permit.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo relies upon the lack of authority
on the part of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa to enact Ordinance No. 15,
Series of 1992, on the theory that the subject thereof is within the jurisdiction and
responsibility of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under P.D. No. 704,
otherwise known as the Fisheries Decree of 1975; and that, in any event, the Ordinance is
unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources
(DNR), likewise in accordance with P.D. No. 704.
The majority is unable to accommodate this view. The jurisdiction and responsibility of
the BFAR under P. D. no. 704, over the management, conservation, development, protection,
utilization and disposition of all fishery and aquatic resources of the country is not all-
encompassing. First, Section 4 thereof excludes from such jurisdiction and responsibility
municipal waters, which shall be under the municipal or city government concerned, except
insofar as fishpens and seaweed culture in municipal in municipal centers are concerned. This
section provides, however, that all municipal or city ordinances and resolutions affecting
fishing and fisheries and any disposition thereunder shall be submitted to the Secretary of the
Department of Natural Resources for appropriate action and shall have full force and effect
only upon his approval.[42]
Second, it must at once be pointed out that the BFAR is no longer under the Department
of Natural Resources (now Department of Environment and Natural Resources). Executive
Order No. 967 of 30 June 1984 transferred the BFAR from the control and supervision of the
Minister (formerly Secretary) of Natural Resources to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food
(MAF) and converted it into a mere staff agency thereof, integrating its functions with the SO ORDERED.
regional offices of the MAF.
In Executive Order No. 116 of 30 January 1987, which reorganized the MAF, the BFAR was
retained as an attached agency of the MAF. And under the Administrative Code of 1987,[43]the
BFAR is placed under the Title concerning the Department of Agriculture.[44]
Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of Puerto
Princesa is invalid or unenforceable because it was not approved by the Secretary of the DENR.
If at all, the approval that should be sought would be that of the Secretary of the Department
of Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal ordinances affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal
waters has been dispensed with in view of the following reasons:
(1) Section 534 (Repealing Clause) of the LGC expressly repeals or amends Section 16 and
29 of P.D. No. 704[45] insofar that they are inconsistent with the provisions of the LGC.
(2) As discussed earlier, under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government G.R. No. 94759 January 21, 1991
units have the power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology. It likewise specifically vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery TDI vs CA.
privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by
appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, The authority of the local executive to protect the community from pollution is the center of
electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute other this controversy.
methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishing
laws.[46] Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and The antecedent facts are related in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to [p]rotect the environment and
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite Petitioner, a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of
fishing and other forms of destructive fishing and such other activities which result in pollution, charcoal briquette, received a letter dated February 16, 1989 from private respondent
acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance.[47] acting mayor Pablo N. Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation of the
In closing, we commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa petitioner's plant located at Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, until further order. The letter
and Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan for exercising the requisite political likewise requested Plant Manager Mr. Armando Manese to bring with him to the office
will to enact urgently needed legislation to protect and enhance the marine environment, of the mayor on February 20, 1989 the following: a) Building permit; b) Mayor's permit;
thereby sharing in the herculean task of arresting the tide of ecological destruction. We hope c) Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and
that other local government units shall now be roused from their lethargy and adopt a more of other document.
vigilant stand in the battle against the decimation of our legacy to future generations. At this
time, the repercussions of any further delay in their response may prove disastrous, if not, At the requested conference on February 20, 1989, petitioner, through its
irreversible. representative, undertook to comply with respondent's request for the production of
the required documents. In compliance with said undertaking, petitioner commenced
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the temporary to secure "Region III-Department of Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-
restraining order issued on 11 November 1993 is LIFTED. Pollution Permit," although among the permits previously secured prior to the
No pronouncement as to costs. operation of petitioner's plant was a "Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution
Installation" issued by the then National Pollution Control Commission (now
Environmental Management Bureau) and is now at a stage where the Environmental
Management Bureau is trying to determine the correct kind of anti-pollution devise to
be installed as part of petitioner's request for the renewal of its permit.
Petitioner's attention having been called to its lack of mayor's permit, it sent its
representatives to the office of the mayor to secure the same but were not
entertained.
On April 6, 1989, without previous and reasonable notice upon petitioner, respondent
acting mayor ordered the Municipality's station commander to padlock the premises
of petitioner's plant, thus effectively causing the stoppage of its operation.
Left with no recourse, petitioner instituted an action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction against private respondent with
the court a quo which is presided by the respondent judge. In its prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, it alleged therein that the
closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion.
During the hearing of the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
on April 14, 1989, herein parties adduced their respective evidences. The respondent
judge, April 19, 1989, found that petitioner is entitled to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, hence, it ordered as follows:
In view of the foregoing, upon petitioner's posting of a bond in the amount of
P50,000.00 to answer for such damages that respondents may sustain should
petitioner eventually be found not entitled to the injunctive relief hereby
issued, let a PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION issue ordering the
respondent Hon. Pablo N. Cruz, and other person acting in his behalf and stead
to immediately revoke his closure order dated April 6, 1989, and allow
petitioner to resume its normal business operations until after the instant case
shall have been adjudicated on the merits without prejudice to the inherent
power of the court to alter, modify or even revoke this order at any given time.
SO ORDERED.
The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued on April 28, 1989, upon
petitioner's posting a bond in the amount of P50,000.00.
Private respondent filed his motion for reconsideration dated May 3, 1989. Said
motion for reconsideration was heard on May 30, 1989. Petitioner's counsel failed to
appear and the hearing proceeded with the Provincial Prosecutor presenting his
evidence. The following documents were submitted:
a) Exhibit "A", Investigation report on the Technology Developers Inc., prepared by one
Marivic Guina, and her conclusion and recommendation read:
Due to the manufacturing process and nature of raw materials used, the fumes
coming from the factory may contain particulate matters which are hazardous
to the health of the people. As such, the company should cease operating until
such a time that the proper air pollution device is installed and operational.
b) Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2", three (3) sheets of coupon bond containing signatures of
residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan;
c) Exhibit "B-3", a letter addressed to Hon. Roberto Pagdanganan Governor of the
Province of Bulacan, dated November 22, 1988, complaining about the smoke coming
out of the chimney of the company while in operation.
Reassessing all the evidence adduced, the lower court, on June 14, 1989, issued an
order (a) setting aside the order dated April 28, 1989, which granted a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and (b) dissolving the writ consequently issued.
A motion for reconsideration dated July 6, 1989 was filed by petitioner. Said motion
drew an opposition dated July 19, 1989 from private respondent.
Resolving the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the respondent judge issued an
order dated August 9, 1989, denying said motion for reconsideration.1
Hence a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed by
petitioner in the Court of Appeals seeking to annul and set aside (a) the order issued by the
trial court on June 14, 1989, setting aside the order dated April 28, 1989, and (b) the order of
August 9, 1989, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order of June 14, 1989.
In due course the petition was denied for lack of merit by the appellate court in a decision
dated January 26, 1990. 2 A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by petitioner was denied
on August 10, 1990.
Thus, the herein petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court. Six errors are alleged to
have been committed by the appellate court which may be synthesized into the singular issue
of whether or not the appellate court committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering its
question decision and resolution.
The petition is devoid of merit.
The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is
addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its action shall not be disturbed
on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction
or otherwise, in grave abuse of its discretion. By the same token the court that issued such a
preliminary relief may recall or dissolve the writ as the circumstances may warrant.
To the mind of the Court the following circumstances militate against the maintenance of the
writ of preliminary injunction sought by petitioner:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining
whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition
of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the then National Pollution
Control Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements, now the Environmental
Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it
must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its
inhabitants from pollution, and by virture of his police power, he may deny the
application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless
appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the
residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February 16, 1989, called the attention of petitioner
to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only
pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area," so
that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it was
required to bring the following:
(1) Building permit;
(2) Mayor's permit; and
(3) Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-
Pollution permit. 3
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of
Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through
channels.4 The alleged NBI finding that some of the signatures in the four-page petition
were written by one person, 5 appears to be true in some instances, (particularly as
among members of the same family), but on the whole the many signatures appear to
be written by different persons. The certification of the barrio captain of said barrio
that he has not received any complaint on the matter 6 must be because the complaint
was sent directly to the Governor through the Acting Mayor.
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was
made by Marivic Guina who in her report of December 8, 1988 observed that the
fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and
that no proper air pollution device has been installed.7
5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria,
but instead presented a building permit issued by an official of Makati on March
6,1987.8
6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then
National Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was good
only up to May 25, 1988.9 Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate
its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any
hazard to the health of the residents of the community.
All these factors justify the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction by the trial court
and the appellate court correctly upheld the action of the lower court.
Petitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this dollar-
earning industry.1wphi1 It must be stressed however, that concomitant with the need to
promote investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally essential
imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people, from the deleterious effect
of the pollution of the environment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 148622. September 12, 2002]
REPUBLIC vs City of Davao
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review[1] on certiorari assailing the decision[2] dated May 28,
2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33, which granted the writ of mandamus
and injunction in favor of respondent, the City of Davao, and against petitioner, the Republic,
represented by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The trial court
also directed petitioner to issue a Certificate of Non-Coverage in favor of respondent.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On August 11, 2000, respondent filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage
(CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB), Region XI. Attached to the application were the required
documents for its issuance, namely, a) detailed location map of the project site; b) brief project
description; and c) a certification from the City Planning and Development Office that the
project is not located in an environmentally critical area (ECA). The EMB Region XI denied the
application after finding that the proposed project was within an environmentally critical area
and ruled that, pursuant to Section 2, Presidential Decree No. 1586, otherwise known as the
Environmental Impact Statement System, in relation to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No,
1151, also known as the Philippine Environment Policy, the City of Davao must undergo the
environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC), before it can proceed with the construction of its project.
Believing that it was entitled to a Certificate of Non-Coverage, respondent filed a petition
for mandamus and injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Davao, docketed as Civil Case No.
28,133-2000. It alleged that its proposed project was neither an environmentally critical
project nor within an environmentally critical area; thus it was outside the scope of the EIS
system. Hence, it was the ministerial duty of the DENR, through the EMB-Region XI, to issue a
CNC in favor of respondent upon submission of the required documents.
The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, judgment granting the writ of mandamus
and injunction is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner City of Davao and against
respondents Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the other respondents
by:
1) directing the respondents to issue in favor of the petitioner City of Davao a Certificate of
Non-Coverage, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586 and related laws, in connection with
the construction by the City of Davao of the Artica Sports Dome;
2) making the preliminary injunction issued on December 12, 2000 permanent.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.[3]
The trial court ratiocinated that there is nothing in PD 1586, in relation to PD 1151 and
Letter of Instruction No. 1179 (prescribing guidelines for compliance with the EIA system),
which requires local government units (LGUs) to comply with the EIS law. Only agencies and
instrumentalities of the national government, including government owned or controlled
corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities are mandated to go through
the EIA process for their proposed projects which have significant effect on the quality of the
environment. A local government unit, not being an agency or instrumentality of the National
Government, is deemed excluded under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
The trial court also declared, based on the certifications of the DENR-Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)-West, and the data gathered from the
Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS), that the site for the Artica
Sports Dome was not within an environmentally critical area. Neither was the project an
environmentally critical one. It therefore becomes mandatory for the DENR, through the EMB
Region XI, to approve respondents application for CNC after it has satisfied all the requirements
for its issuance. Accordingly, petitioner can be compelled by a writ of mandamus to issue the
CNC, if it refuses to do so.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied. Hence, the
instant petition for review.
With the supervening change of administration, respondent, in lieu of a comment, filed a
manifestation expressing its agreement with petitioner that, indeed, it needs to secure an ECC
for its proposed project. It thus rendered the instant petition moot and academic. However,
for the guidance of the implementors of the EIS law and pursuant to our symbolic function to undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first
educate the bench and bar,[4] we are inclined to address the issue raised in this petition. securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly
authorized representative. For the proper management of said critical project or area, the
Section 15 of Republic Act 7160,[5] otherwise known as the Local Government Code,
President may by his proclamation reorganize such government offices, agencies, institutions,
defines a local government unit as a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be
corporations or instrumentalities including the realignment of government personnel, and
exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it performs dual functions, governmental and
their specific functions and responsibilities.
proprietary. Governmental functions are those that concern the health, safety and the
advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the public generally. [6] Proprietary
Section 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that no person, partnership or corporation shall
functions are those that seek to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit and
undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first
intended for private advantage and benefit.[7] When exercising governmental powers and
securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly
performing governmental duties, an LGU is an agency of the national government. [8] When
authorized representative.[13] The Civil Code defines a person as either natural or juridical. The
engaged in corporate activities, it acts as an agent of the community in the administration of
state and its political subdivisions, i.e., the local government units[14] are juridical
local affairs.[9]
persons.[15] Undoubtedly therefore, local government units are not excluded from the
Found in Section 16 of the Local Government Code is the duty of the LGUs to promote the coverage of PD 1586.
peoples right to a balanced ecology.[10] Pursuant to this, an LGU, like the City of Davao, can not
Lastly, very clear in Section 1 of PD 1586 that said law intends to implement the policy of
claim exemption from the coverage of PD 1586. As a body politic endowed with governmental
the state to achieve a balance between socio-economic development and environmental
functions, an LGU has the duty to ensure the quality of the environment, which is the very
protection, which are the twin goals of sustainable development. The above-quoted first
same objective of PD 1586.
paragraph of the Whereas clause stresses that this can only be possible if we adopt a
Further, it is a rule of statutory construction that every part of a statute must be comprehensive and integrated environmental protection program where all the sectors of the
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part must be considered with other community are involved, i.e., the government and the private sectors. The local government
parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the enactment.[11] The trial court, in units, as part of the machinery of the government, cannot therefore be deemed as outside the
declaring local government units as exempt from the coverage of the EIS law, failed to relate scope of the EIS system.[16]
Section 2 of PD 1586[12] to the following provisions of the same law:
The foregoing arguments, however, presuppose that a project, for which an
Environmental Compliance Certificate is necessary, is environmentally critical or within an
WHEREAS, the pursuit of a comprehensive and integrated environmental protection program
environmentally critical area. In the case at bar, respondent has sufficiently shown that the
necessitates the establishment and institutionalization of a system whereby the exigencies of
Artica Sports Dome will not have a significant negative environmental impact because it is not
socio-economic undertakings can be reconciled with the requirements of environmental
an environmentally critical project and it is not located in an environmentally critical area. In
quality; x x x.
support of this contention, respondent submitted the following:
Section 1. Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to attain and maintain a rational
1. Certification from the City Planning and Development Office that the project is not located
and orderly balance between socio-economic growth and environmental protection.
in an environmentally critical area;
xxxxxxxxx
2. Certification from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO-West)
that the project area is within the 18-30% slope, is outside the scope of the NIPAS (R.A. 7586),
Section 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. The
and not within a declared watershed area; and
President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation of the National
Environmental Protection Council, by proclamation declare certain projects, undertakings or
3. Certification from PHILVOCS that the project site is thirty-seven (37) kilometers southeast of
areas in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or corporation shall
the southernmost extension of the Davao River Fault and forty-five (45) kilometers west of the
Eastern Mindanao Fault; and is outside the required minimum buffer zone of five (5) meters
from a fault zone.
The trial court, after a consideration of the evidence, found that the Artica Sports Dome
is not within an environmentally critical area. Neither is it an environmentally critical project. It
is axiomatic that factual findings of the trial court, when fully supported by the evidence on
record, are binding upon this Court and will not be disturbed on appeal. [17] This Court is not a
trier of facts.[18]
There are exceptional instances when this Court may disregard factual findings of the trial
court, namely: a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises,
or conjectures; b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; c)
where there is a grave abuse of discretion; d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; f) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court; h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; i) when the finding of fact of the Court
of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is contradicted by the
evidence on record; and j) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.[19] None of these exceptions, however, obtain in this case.
The Environmental Impact Statement System, which ensures environmental protection
and regulates certain government activities affecting the environment, was established by
Presidential Decree No. 1586. Section 2 thereof states:
There is hereby established an Environmental Impact Statement System founded and based
on the environmental impact statement required under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
1151, of all agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities, for every
proposed project and undertaking which significantly affect the quality of the environment.
Section 4 of PD 1151, on the other hand, provides:
Environmental Impact Statements. Pursuant to the above enunciated policies and goals, all
agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities shall prepare, file
and include in every action, project or undertaking which significantly affects the quality of the
environment a detailed statement on
(a) the environmental impact of the proposed action, project or undertaking
(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented
(c) alternative to the proposed action
(d) a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of the environment are
consistent with the maintenance and enhancement of the long-term productivity of the same;
and
(e) whenever a proposal involves the use of depletable or nonrenewable resources, a finding
must be made that such use and commitment are warranted.
Before an environmental impact statement is issued by a lead agency, all agencies having
jurisdiction over, or special expertise on, the subject matter involved shall comment on the
draft environmental impact statement made by the lead agency within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the same.
Under Article II, Section 1, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 1586, the
declaration of certain projects or areas as environmentally critical, and which shall fall within
the scope of the Environmental Impact Statement System, shall be by Presidential
Proclamation, in accordance with Section 4 of PD 1586 quoted above.
Pursuant thereto, Proclamation No. 2146 was issued on December 14, 1981, proclaiming
the following areas and types of projects as environmentally critical and within the scope of
the Environmental Impact Statement System established under PD 1586:
A. Environmentally Critical Projects
I. Heavy Industries
a. Non-ferrous metal industries
b. Iron and steel mills
c. Petroleum and petro-chemical industries including oil and gas
d. Smelting plants
II. Resource Extractive Industries
 a. Major mining and quarrying projects a. tapped for domestic purposes
b. Forestry projects b. within the controlled and/or protected areas declared by
appropriate authorities
1. Logging c. which support wildlife and fishery activities
2. Major wood processing projects
3. Introduction of fauna (exotic-animals) in public/private forests 11. Mangrove areas characterized by one or any combination of the following conditions:
4. Forest occupancy
5. Extraction of mangrove products a. with primary pristine and dense young growth;
6. Grazing b. adjoining mouth of major river systems;
c. near or adjacent to traditional productive fry or fishing grounds;
c. Fishery Projects d. which act as natural buffers against shore erosion, strong winds and
storm floods;
1. Dikes for/and fishpond development projects e. on which people are dependent for their livelihood.

III. Infrastructure Projects 12. Coral reefs, characterized by one or any combinations of the following conditions:

a. Major dams a. with 50% and above live coralline cover;

b. Major power plants (fossil-fueled, nuclear fueled, hydroelectric or b. spawning and nursery grounds for fish;
geothermal) c. which act as natural breakwater of coastlines.
c. Major reclamation projects
d. Major roads and bridges In this connection, Section 5 of PD 1586 expressly states:

B. Environmentally Critical Areas
1. All areas declared by law as national parks, watershed reserves, wildlife
preserves and sanctuaries;
2. Areas set aside as aesthetic potential tourist spots;
3. Areas which constitute the habitat for any endangered or threatened species
of indigenous Philippine Wildlife (flora and fauna);
4. Areas of unique historic, archaeological, or scientific interests;
5. Areas which are traditionally occupied by cultural communities or tribes;
6. Areas frequently visited and/or hard-hit by natural calamities (geologic
hazards, floods, typhoons, volcanic activity, etc.);
7. Areas with critical slopes;
8. Areas classified as prime agricultural lands;
9. Recharged areas of aquifers;
10. Water bodies characterized by one or any combination of the following conditions;
Environmentally Non-Critical Projects. All other projects, undertakings and areas not declared
by the President as environmentally critical shall be considered as non-critical and shall not be
required to submit an environmental impact statement. The National Environmental
Protection Council, thru the Ministry of Human Settlements may however require non-critical
projects and undertakings to provide additional environmental safeguards as it may deem
necessary.
The Artica Sports Dome in Langub does not come close to any of the projects or areas
enumerated above. Neither is it analogous to any of them. It is clear, therefore, that the said
project is not classified as environmentally critical, or within an environmentally critical
area. Consequently, the DENR has no choice but to issue the Certificate of Non-Coverage. It
becomes its ministerial duty, the performance of which can be compelled by writ of
mandamus, such as that issued by the trial court in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33, in Civil Case No. 28,133-2000, granting the writ
of mandamus and directing the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to issue in
favor of the City of Davao a Certificate of Non-Coverage, pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1586 and related laws, in connection with the construction of the Artica Sports Dome, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-41958 July 20, 1982
DONALD MEAD, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL A. ARGEL in his capacity as Presiding Judge in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXV and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon & Reyes & Associates for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Acting Solicitor General Hugo Gutierrez, Jr., Asst.
Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Solicitor Mariano M. Martinez for respondents.
VASQUEZ, J.:
The issue posed for determination in this case is whether or not a Provincial Fiscal has the
authority to file an information for a violation of Republic Act No. 3931, entitled "An Act
Creating a National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission."
On March 11, 1975, petitioner Donald Mead and a certain Isaac Arivas were charged by
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with a violation of Section 9, in relation to Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 3931, under an information reading as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of August, 1972, and for some time prior and
subsequent thereto, in the municipality of Malabon, province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then the president and the general manager,
respectively, of the Insular Oil Refinery Co. (INSOIL) a corporation duly
organized in accordance with existing laws, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise dispose into the
highway canal and/or cause, permit, suffer to be drained or allow to seep
into such waterway the industrial and other waste matters discharged due
to the operation of the said Insular Oil Refinery Co. so managed and
operated by them, thereby causing pollution of such waterway with the
resulting damage and/or destruction to the living plants in the vicinity and
providing hazard to health and property in the same vicinity.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-5984-75 and it was subsequently
assigned to Branch XXXV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Caloocan City) presided
over by the respondent Judge.
On August 11, 1975, petitioner Donald Mead, one of the accused in the criminal case, filed
a motion to quash on the grounds that the trial court has no jurisdiction and that the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal has no legal personality to file the above-quoted information. The
motion to quash was denied by the respondent Judge in an Order dated September 5,
1975. A Motion For Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was also denied by the
respondent Judge in his Order of November 10, 1965. Hence, this petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction to annul the said orders of the respondent Judge who allegedly
acted in excess of or without jurisdiction in issuing the same.
In Our Resolution dated November 28, 1975, the respondents were required to comment
on the petition and a temporary restraining order was issued to enjoin the respondent
Judge from enforcing his questioned orders until otherwise directed by this Court.
It is the principal contention of the petitioner that the National Water and Air Pollution
Control Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission") as created under
Republic Act No. 3931 has the exclusive authority to determine the existence of "pollution"
before a criminal case can be filed for a violation of the said law; and that it has the
exclusive authority to prosecute violations of the same. Petitioner further avers that the
Commission not having finally ruled that the petitioner has violated Republic Act No. 3931,
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal lacks the authority to prosecute the petitioner for a violation
of said law.
The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that while Republic Act No. 3931 grants the
power and duty to the Commission to investigate and prosecute violations of Republic Act
No. 3931, such grant of power and authority is not exclusive, and does not deprive fiscals
and other public prosecutors of their authority to investigate and prosecute violations of
the said law committed within their respective jurisdictions.
Before discussing the main issue on its merits, We deem it necessary to resolve a
procedural question raised by the respondents in support of their prayer that the instant
petition should not be entertained. Respondents advert to the rule that when a motion to
quash filed by an accused in a criminal case shall be denied, the remedy of the accused-
movant is not to file a petition for certiorari or mandamus or prohibition, the proper recourse
being to go to trial, without prejudice to his right to reiterate the grounds invoked in his
motion to quash if an adverse judgment is rendered against him, in the appeal that he may
take therefrom in the manner authorized by law. (Mill vs. People, et al., 101 Phil. 599;
Echarol us. Purisima, et al, 13 SCRA 309.)
There is no disputing the validity and wisdom of the rule invoked by the respondents.
However, it is also recognized that, under certain situations, recourse to the extraordinary
legal remedies of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus to question the denial of a motion to
quash is considered proper in the interest of "more enlightened and substantial justice", as
was so declared in "Yap vs. Lutero", G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1969, 105 Phil. 3007:
However, were we to require adherence to this pretense, the case at bar
would have to be dismissed and petitioner required to go through the
inconvenience, not to say the mental agony and torture, of submitting
himself to trial on the merits in Case No. 16443, apart from the expenses
incidental thereto, despite the fact that his trial and conviction therein would
violate one of this constitutional rights, and that, an appeal to this Court,
we would, therefore, have to set aside the judgment of conviction of the
lower court. This would, obviously, be most unfair and unjust. Under the
circumstances obtaining in the present case, the flaw in the procedure
followed by petitioner herein may be overlooked, in the interest of a more
enlightened and substantial justice.
To the same effect is the pronouncement in "Pineda and Ampil Manufacturing Co., vs.
Bartolome, et al.," 95 Phil., 930938, expressed as follows:
While a denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was held not to
be a proper basis for a petition for certiorari [Nico vs. Blanco, 46 Off. Gaz.,
Supp. (1) 88; 81 Phil., 2131, or an appeal not certiorari is the proper
remedy for correcting an error which a lower court may commit in denying
a motion to set aside a judgment, or in setting aside an order of dismissal,
[Rios vs. Ros et al., 45 Off. Gaz. (No. 3), 1265; 79 Phil. 243; Santos vs.
Pecson, 45 Off. Gaz. (No. 3), 1278; 79 Phil.754] however, in some
instances, the Supreme Court has departed from the general rule and has
entertained the writ notwithstanding the existence of an appeal. Thus, in
one case the Supreme Court took cognizance of a petition for certiorari
notwithstanding the fact that the accused could have appealed in due time
when it found that the action was necessary to promote public welfare and
public policy (People vs. Zulueta, 89 Phil. 880). In another case, a petition
for certiorari to annul an order of the trial judge admitting an amended
information was entertained although the accused had an adequate
remedy by appeal "inasmuch as the Surplus Property cases have attracted
nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the
consideration thereof. (People vs, Zulueta, supra. Citing Arevalo vs.
Nepomuceno, 63 Phil., 627.) And still in another case, the writ was
entertained where the appeal was found not to be adequate remedy, as
where the order which is sought to be reviewed is merely of interlocutory
or peremptory character, and the appeal therefrom can be interposed only
after final judgment and may therefore be of no avail. (Rocha vs.
Crossfield, 6 Phil., 355; Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phil., 182. See also
Mendoza vs. Parungao, 49 Phil., 271; Dais vs. Court of First Instance, 51
Phil., 36).
For analogous reasons it may be said that the petition for certiorari
interposed by the accused against the order of the court a quo denying the
motion to quash may be entertained, not only because it was rendered in
a criminal case, but because it was rendered, as claimed, with grave abuse
of discretion, as found by the Court of Appeals, it would be indeed unfair
and unjust, if not derogatory of their constitutional right, to force the
accused to go to trial under an information which, in their opinion, as was
found, accuses them of multiple offenses in contravention of law. And so,
in our opinion, the respondent court did not err in entertaining the petition
for certiorari instead of dismissing it, as claimed.
The motion to quash filed by the accused in Yap vs. Lutero was on the ground of double
jeopardy. In Pineda vs. Bartolome, the ground invoked was duplicity of offenses charged
in the information. In the case at bar, the petitioner assails the very jurisdiction of the court
wherein the criminal case was filed, Certainly, there is a more compelling reason that such
issue be resolved soonest, in order to avoid the court's spending precious time and energy
unnecessarily in trying and deciding the case, and to spare the accused from the
inconvenience, anxiety and embarrassment, let alone the expenditure of effort and money,
in undergoing trial for a case the proceedings in which could possibly be annuled for want
of jurisdiction. Even in civil actions, We have counselled that when the court's jurisdiction
is attacked in a motion to dismiss, it is the duty of the court to resolve the same as soon
as possible in order to avoid the unwholesome consequences mentioned above.
It is also advanced that the present petition is premature, since respondent
court has not definitely ruled on the motion to dismiss, nor held that it has
jurisdiction, but only argument is untenable. The motion to dismiss was
predicated on the respondent court's lack of jurisdiction to entertain the
action, and the rulings of this Court are that writs of certiorari or prohibition,
or both, may issue in case of a denial or deferment of action on such a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
 If the question of jurisdiction were not the main ground for this petition for
review by certiorari, it would be premature because it seeks to have a
review of an interlocutory order. But as it would be useless and futile to go
ahead with the proceedings if the court below had no jurisdiction this
petition was given due course.' (San Beda vs. CIA 51 O.G. 6636, 5638).
While it is true that action on a motion to dismiss may be deferred until the
trial and an order to that effect is interlocutory, still where it clearly appears
that the trial judge or court is proceeding in excess or outside of its
jurisdiction, the remedy of prohibition would lie since it would be useless
and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. (Philippine
International Fair, Inc., et al., vs. Ibanez, et al, 50 Off. Gaz. 1036; Enrique
vs. Macadaeg, et all 47 Off. Gaz. 1207; see also San Beda College vs.
CIR, 51 Off. Gaz. 5636.) (University of Sto. Tomas vs. Villanueva, L-13748,
30 October 1959.) (Time, Inc. vs. Reyes, 39 SCRA, pp. 315-316.)
An additional factor that induced Us to entertain the instant petition is the obvious merit
We find in the same. Our reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3931 has convinced
Us that the clear legislative intention is to vest in the Commission the exclusive authority
to determine the existence of "pollution" penalized thereunder and to prosecute violations
of said law.
The information filed against the herein petitioner charges him with a violation of Section
9, in relation to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3931. More specifically, it alleges that the
petitioner, with his co-accused Isaac Arivas, "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drain or
otherwise dispose into the highway canal and/or cause, permit, suffer to be drained or
allow to seep into such waterway the industrial and other waste matters discharged due to
the operation of the said Insular Oil Refinery Co. so managed and operated by
them, thereby causing pollution of such waterway with the resulting damage and/or
destruction to the arriving plants in the vicinity and providing hazard to health and property
in the same vicinity."
Section 9 in its first paragraph, supposedly the criminal act being imputed to the petitioner,
reads as follows:
SEC. 9. Prohibitions. No person shall throw, run, drain, or otherwise
dispose into any of the water and/or atmospheric air of the Philippines, or
cause, permit, suffer to be thrown, run, drain, allow to see or otherwise
dispose into such waters or atmospheric air, any organic or inorganic
matter or any substance in gaseous or liquid form that shall cause
pollution of such waters or atmospheric air.
It will be noted from the above-quoted provision that the prohibited act is to throw, run,
drain or otherwise dispose into any of the water and/or atmospheric air of the Philippines,
any organic or inorganic matter or substance "that shall cause pollution of such waters or
atmospheric air." Stated in simpler terms, the offense allegedly committed by the petitioner
was the act of causing pollution of a waterway (highway canal).
The term "pollution" as used in the law is not to be taken in its ordinary signification. In
Section 2, paragraph (a), of Republic Act No. 3931, "pollution" is defined in these words:
(a) Pollution' means such alteration of the physical, chemical and/or
biological properties of any water and/or atmospheric air of the Philippines,
or any such discharge of any liquid, gaseous or solid substance into any of
the waters and/or atmospheric air of the country as will or is likely to create
or render such waters and/or atmospheric air harmful or detrimental or
injurious to public health, safety or welfare, or to domestic, commercial,
industrial, agricultural, recreational or other legitimate uses, or to livestock,
wild animals, birds, fish or of her aquatic life.
The power to determine the existence of pollution is vested by the law in the Commission.
Section 6, among others, gives the Commission the authority to "determine whether a
pollution exists in any of the waters and/or atmospheric air of the Philippines." (Section
6(a), No. 1); to "hold public hearings, ... make findings of facts and determinations all with
respect to the violations of this Act or orders issued by the Commission." (Ibid., No. 3); to
"institute or cause to be instituted in the court of competent jurisdiction legal proceedings
to compel compliance with the provisions of this Act" (Ibid, No. 5); and, "after due notice
and hearing, revoke, suspend or modify any permit issued under this Act whenever
modifications are necessary to prevent or abate pollution of any water and/or atmospheric
air of the Philippines." (Ibid., No. 7.) Section 8 contains explicit provisions as to the authority
of the Commission to determine the existence of pollution and to take appropriate court
actions to abate or prevent the same. It provides:
SEC. 8. Proceedings before the Commission . The Commission may,
on its own motion, or upon the request of any person, investigate or may
inquire, in a manner to be determined by it, as to any alleged act of pollution
or the omission or failure to comply with any provisions of this Act or any
order of this Commission.
Whenever it appears to the Commission, after investigation, that there has
been a violation of any of the provisions of this Act or any order of the
Commission, it may order whoever causes such violation to show cause
before said Commission why such discharge of industrial wastes or any
waste should not be discontinued. A notice shall be served on the offending
 party directing him or it to show cause before the Commission, on a date
specified in such notice, why an order should not be made directing the
discontinuance of such violation. Such notice shall specify the time and the
place where a public hearing will be held by the Commission or its
authorized representatives, and notice of such hearing shall be served
personally or by registered mail, at least ten days before said hearing; and
in the case of a municipality or corporation such notice shall be served
upon the major or president thereof. The Commission shall take evidence
with reference to said matter and may issue an order to the party
responsible for such violation, directing that within a specified period of
time thereafter, such violation be discontinued unless adequate sewage
works or industrial wastes disposal system be properly operated to prevent
further damage or pollution.
No investigation being conducted or ruling made by the Commission shall
prejudice any action which may be filed in court by any person in
accordance with the provisions of the New Civil Code on nuisance. On
matters, however, not related to nuisance, no court action shall be initiated
until the Commission shall have finally ruled thereon and no order of the
Commission discontinuing the discharge of waste shall be stayed by the
filing of said court action, unless the court issues an injunction as provided
for in the Rules of Court.
The last paragraph of the above-quoted provision delineates the authority to be exercised
by the Commission and by the ordinary courts in respect of preventing or remedying the
pollution of the waters or atmospheric air of the Philippines. The provision excludes from
the authority of the Commission only the determination of and the filing of court actions
involving violations of the New Civil Code on nuisance. It is expressly directed that on
matters not related to nuisance "no court action shall be initiated until the Commission shall
have finally ruled thereon." This provision leaves little room for doubt that a court action
involving the determination of the existence of pollution may not be initiated until and
unless the Commission has so determined the existence of what in the law is considered
pollution.
It may not be argued that the above-cited provision refers only to the filing of civil actions,
and not to criminal cases as is the one herein involved, there being no basis either in the
context in law nor from a consideration of the purpose behind the enactment of the same
upon which such a distinction may be made. Indeed, respondents do not seriously question
that the court action contemplated in the last paragraph of Section 8 includes criminal
proceedings. Respondents merely aver that the aforementioned grant of authority to the
Commission is not exclusive of the power of Fiscals to file criminal actions for a violation
of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3931.
We are likewise not in accord with the view that the law intended to give concurrent
authority to the Commission and Fiscals to prosecute violations of Republic Act No. 3931.
It is true that there is no provision expressly declaring that the authority vested in the
Commission to prosecute violations of Republic Act No. 3931 is exclusive. Using the same
logic, there is neither a provision declaring such authority to be concurrent or may be
exercised jointly with Fiscals. The absence of an explicit declaration as to the exclusive
authority of the Commission to prosecute violations of the subject law does not detract
from the clear intention to make it so, as gathered from the philosophy of the law itself and
as gleaned from several provisions of the same. It is clearly deducible from the provision
of Section 8 expressly declaring that no court action shall be initiated, except those related
to nuisance, until the Commission shall have finally ruled on the alleged act of pollution;
and also from Section 6(a), No. 5, which authorizes the Commission to "initiate or cause
to be instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction legal proceedings to compel compliance
with the provisions of this Act."
As may be seen from the law, the determination of the existence of pollution requires
investigation, public hearings and the collection of various information relating to water and
atmospheric pollution. (Sections 6, 7, and 8.) The definition of the term "pollution" in itself
connotes that the determination of its existence requires specialized knowledge of
technical and scientific matters which are not ordinarily within the competence of Fiscals
or of those sitting in a court of justice. It is undoubtedly in recognition of this fact that in
Section 4 of the law, it is provided that "the basic personnel necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act shall be engineers, chemists, biochemists, physicists, and other
technicians"; and required in Section 3 that the Chairman of the Commission shall be the
Chairman of the National Science Development Board, one of the part-time commissioners
shall be a recommendee of the Philippine Council of Science and Technology, and one of
the two full-time commissioner shall be a sanitary engineer.
The vesting of authority in an administrative body to determine when to institute a criminal
action for a violation of the law entrusted to it for administration or enforcement, to the
exclusion of the regular prosecution service of the government, is not new in this
jurisdiction. It is recognized in Yao Lit vs. Geraldez et al., 106 Phil. 545 which upheld the
exclusive authority of the Commissioner of Immigration' to investigate and impose
administrative fines upon violators of the provisions of Republic Act No. 751 for the reason
that said official "has better facilities than the prosecuting officials to carry out the
provisions of the said Act, the former official being the keeper of the records pertaining to
aliens." The same principle has been recognized with respect to the prosecutions of
violations of the Anti-Dummy Law (Republic Act No. 1131.) In holding that the City Fiscal
of Manila has no authority to prosecute such violations independently of the Anti-Dummy
Board, it was said:
Were the city fiscal or the provincial fiscals who have the power or right to
prosecute violations of all laws and ordinances allowed to prosecute
 violations of the Anti- Dummy Board, there would be no order, concert,
cooperation, and coordination between the said agencies of the
government. The function of coordination which is entrusted to the Anti-
Dummy Board is evident from all the above-quoted provisions of Republic
Act No. 1130. There can be no coordination as envisioned in the law unless
the Anti-Dummy Board be given the power to direct and control the city
fiscal in the prosecutions of the violations of the Anti-Dummy Law. (Rollo,
p. 118; 5 SCRA 428,433.)
In R. B. Industrial Development Co., Ltd. vs. Enage (24 SCRA 365) involving the authority
of the Bureau of Forestry over the management and use of public forests and the transfer
of licenses for the taking of forest products, this Court has made this pronouncement:
A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines in an
administrative office the power to determine particular questions or
matters, upon the facts to be presented, the jurisdiction of such office shall
prevail over the courts. (p. 124, Rollo.)
It is our considered view that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal lacked the authority to file the
information charging the petitioner with a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No.
3931 there being no prior finding or determination by the Commission that the act of the
petitioner had caused pollution in any water or atmospheric air of the Philippines. It is not
to be understood, however, that a fiscal or public prosecutor may not file an information
for a violation of the said law at all. He may do so if the Commission had made a finding
or determination that the law or any of its orders had been violated. In the criminal case
presently considered, there had been no prior determination by the Commission that the
supposed acts of the petitioner had caused pollution to any water of the Philippines. The
filing of the information for the violation of Section 9 of the law is, therefore, premature and
unauthorized. Concommittantly, the respondent Judge is without jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the offense charged therein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the questioned Orders of the respondent
Judge are hereby annuled and set aside. The respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss
Criminal Case No. 5984-75 for lack of jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
G.R. Nos. L-66870-72 June 29, 1985
Magbanua vs IAC
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
A joint decision was rendered in CAR Case Nos. 827, 828 and 829 of the defunct Court of
Agrarian Relations stationed in San Carlos City (Negros Occidental) because the six plaintiffs
who are the petitioners at bar all alleged that they are share tenants of the defendants; that
the defendants diverted the free flow of water from their farm lots which caused portions of
their landholdings to dry up to their great damage and prejudice: and that they were told by
the defendants' overseer to vacate their respective areas for they could not plant palay any
longer due to lack of water. They prayed that they be declared as leasehold tenants and that
the defendants be ordered to pay attorney's fees and different kinds of damages.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs as follows:
WHEREFORE, coherent with the foregoing, this Court, in judgment, hereby:
1) Declares all the plaintiffs in the above-entitled cases to be maintained as
agricultural lessees in peaceful cultivation in their respective landholdings;
2) Prohibits defendants from closing and/or disrupting the free flow of water
supplying plaintiffs' landholdings;
3) Declares the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on February 23, 1982 to
be permanent;
4) Orders plaintiffs to seek the assistance of the Ministry of Agrarian Reforms
in the fixing of their lease rentals;
5) Orders the defendants to pay all the six plaintiffs in the above-entitled cases
individually moral and exemplary damages in the sum of TEN THOUSAND
(P10,000.00) PESOS, each;
6) Orders the defendants to pay the attorney's fees in the amount of
P5,000.00; and
 7) Dismiss all other claims and counterclaims of the parties for lack of merit
(Rollo, pp. 28-29.)
The defendants appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which in turn rendered the
following judgment:
WHEREFORE, with the modification above indicated, deleting the award of
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, the decision appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects, with costs against appellants.
(Rollo, pp. 37-38.)
In this petition, the prayer is for the reinstatement of the moral and exemplary damages and
the attorney's fees which had been awarded by the trial court on the ground that the
Intermediate Appellate Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in eliminating them.
In awarding damages and attorney's fees, the trial court said:
This Court has likewise noted the manifestation submitted by plaintiffs on June
3, 1982 wherein they have attached photographs of their dried-up
landholdings and wilted palay crops. The allegations in this pleading and the
accompanying pictures were never rebutted by the defendants.
In view of this circumstances, this Court holds the opinion that between the
period of the inspection by the PC Team on February 24, 1982 and June 13,
1982 when plaintiffs' manifestation was filed, there has been complete closure
of water supplying plaintiffs' landholdings which resulted to the drying up of
the same that greatly hampered the healthy growth of the palay crop. This
Court does not believe that the disruption of the water supply which led to the
very poor harvest is due to the fault/negligence of the plaintiffs.
Under the law, the landowner has an obligation to keep the tenant in the
peaceful and continuous cultivation of his landholding. A disturbance of
possession, such as the act complained of, is violative of the law.
The Honorable Court of Appeals, thru Associate Justice Porfirio V. Sison, in
June 23, 1982, promulgated a decision in the case of Buenaventura Garcia,
plaintiff-appellant, vs. Eduardo Jalandoni, Salud Garcia and Chester Garcia,
defendant-appellees, which ruling is relevant to the above-entitled cases
when the said Honorable Court state:
The law forbids the use of tenants like balls on a pool table,
whacked and volleyed and pocketed at the whim and caprice
of the player, or their positions placed on the auction block
like slaves to be sold to the highest bidder. Such a calamitous
situation erode wholehearted dedication to the soil; it is
destructive of the system itself, as such an attitude takes away
the freedom the emancipated tenants won under the aegis of
the New Republic.
The plaintiff-appellant is entitled to moral damages in the sum
of P5,000.00 and exemplary damages in the further sum of
P5,000.00 to be paid by defendant Eduardo Jalandoni. Let this
be a warning to those who flout the lofty purpose of the
agrarian reform program.
Plaintiffs have all their legal rights to protect their interests under the law in
filing these cases, for what the defendants have done to them, and as such
they are entitled attorney's fees. (Rollo, pp. 27-28.)
Upon the other hand, in deleting the questioned award the Intermediate Appellate Court said:
However, We are not inclined to sustain the award of moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees. There is no evidence showing that, in
dealing with plaintiffs, defendants acted fraudulently or in bad faith. There is
no showing either that attorney's fees are recoverable under Art: 2208, Civil
Code. (Rollo, P. 37.)
Under the facts of the case, the plaintiffs (now petitioners) are entitled to a measure of moral
damages. Article 2219 of the Civil Code permits the award of moral damages for acts
mentioned in Article 21 of the same code and the latter stipulates that: "Any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
It appears that the petitioners were denied irrigation water for their farm lots in order to make
them vacate their landholdings. The defendants violated the plaintiffs' rights and caused
prejudice to the latter by the unjustified diversion of the water.
The petitioners are also entitled to exemplary damages because the defendants acted in an
oppressive manner. (See Art. 2232. Civil Code.)
It follows from the foregoing that the petitioners are also entitled to attorney's fees but the
size of the fees as well as the damages is subject to the sound discretion of the court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the decision under review is modified and each of the
plaintiffs is entitled to the following to be paid by the defendants jointly and severally:
The costs shall be assessed against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1586
ESTABLISHING AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT SYSTEM, INCLUDING OTHER
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT RELATED MEASURES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, the pursuit of a comprehensive and integrated environment protection program
necessitates the establishment and institutionalization of a system whereby the exigencies of
socio-economic undertakings can be reconciled with the requirements of environmental
quality;
WHEREAS, the regulatory requirements of environmental Impact Statements and Assessments
instituted in pursuit of this national environmental protection program have to be worked into
their full regulatory and procedural details in a manner consistent with the goals of the
program.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the Constitution do hereby order and declare:
Section 1. Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to attain and maintain a rational
and orderly balance between socio-economic growth and environmental protection.
Section 2. Environmental Impact Statement System. There is hereby established an
Environmental Impact Statement System founded and based on the environmental impact
statement required, under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1151, of all agencies and
instrumentalities of the national government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities, for every proposed project and
undertaking which significantly affect the quality of the environment.
Section 3. Determination of Lead Agency. The Minister of Human Settlements or his designated
representative is hereby authorized to name the lead agencies referred to in Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1151 which shall have jurisdiction to undertake the preparation of the
necessary environmental impact statements on declared environmentally critical projects and
areas. All Environmental Impact Statements shall be submitted to the National Environmental
Protection Council for review and evaluation.
Section 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. The
President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation of the National
Environmental Protection Council, by proclamation declare certain projects, undertakings or
areas in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or corporation shall
undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first
securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly
authorized representative. For the proper management of said critical project or area, the
President may by his proclamation reorganize such government offices, agencies, institutions,
corporations or instrumentalities including the re-alignment of government personnel, and
their specific functions and responsibilities.
For the same purpose as above, the Ministry of Human Settlements shall: (a) prepare the
proper land or water use pattern for said critical project(s) or area (s); (b) establish ambient
environmental quality standards; (c) develop a program of environmental enhancement or
protective measures against calamituous factors such as earthquake, floods, water erosion and
others, and (d) perform such other functions as may be directed by the President from time to
time.
Section 5. Environmentally Non-Critical Projects. All other projects, undertakings and areas not
declared by the President as environmentally critical shall be considered as non-critical and
shall not be required to submit an environmental impact statement. The National
Environmental Protection Council, thru the Ministry of Human Settlements may however
require non-critical projects and undertakings to provide additional environmental safeguards
as it may deem necessary.
Section 6. Secretariat. The National Environmental Protection Council is hereby authorized to
constitute the necessary secretariat which will administer the Environmental Impact Statement
System and undertake the processing and evaluation of environmental impact statements.
Section 7. Management and Financial Assistance. The Ministry of Human Settlements is hereby
authorized to provide management and financial support to government offices and
instrumentalities placed under its supervision pursuant to this Decree financed from its existing
appropriation or from budgetary augmentation as the Minister of Human Settlements may
deem necessary.
Section 8. Rules and Regulations. The National Environmental Protection Council shall issue the
necessary rules and regulations to implement this Decree. For this purpose, the National
Pollution Control Commission may be availed of as one of its implementing arms, consistent
with the powers and responsibilities of the National Pollution Control Commission as provided
in P.D. No. 984.
Section 9. Penalty for Violation. Any person, corporation or partnership found violating Section
4 of this Decree, or the terms and conditions in the issuance of the Environmental Compliance
Certificate, or of the standards, rules and regulations issued by the National Environmental
Protection Council pursuant to this Decree shall be punished by the suspension or cancellation
of his/its certificate or and/or a fine in an amount not to exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) for every violation thereof, at the discretion of the National Environmental
Protection Council.
Section 10. Environmental Revolving Fund. Proceeds from the penalties prescribed in the
preceding Section 9 and other penalties imposed by the National Pollution Control Commission
as authorized in P.D. 984, shall be automatically appropriated into an Environment Revolving
Fund hereby created as an exemption to P.D. 711 and P.D. 1234. The fund shall be used
exclusively for the operation of the National Environmental Protection Council and the National
Pollution Control Commission in the implementation of this Decree. The rules and regulations
for the utilization of this fund shall be formulated by the Ministry of Human Settlements and
submitted to the President for approval.
Section 11. Repealing Clause. The Inter-Agency Advisory Council of the National Pollution
Control Commission created under Section 4 of P.D. 984 is hereby abolished and its powers
and responsibilities are forthwith delegated and transferred to the Control of the National
Environmental Protection Council.
All other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations inconsistent herewith are
hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.
Section 12. Effectivity Clause. This Decree shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 11th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and seventy-eight.
PROCLAMATION NO. 2146
PROCLAIMING CERTAIN AREAS AND TYPES OF PROJECTS AS ENVIRONMENTALLY
CRITICAL AND WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
SYSTEM ESTABLISHED UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1586.
WHEREAS, it is the national policy to attain and maintain a rational and orderly balance
between socio-economic growth and environmental conservation and protection;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to bring about an intensive, integrated program of
environmental protection through a requirement of environmental impact
assessments and statements;
WHEREAS, the environmental impact statement system established under Presidential
Decree No, 1586 calls for the proper management of environmentally critical areas;
WHEREAS, the pursuit of a comprehensive and integrated environmental protection
program necessitates the establishment and institutionalization of a system whereby
the exigencies of socio-economic undertakings can be reconciled with the
requirements of environmental protection and conservation;
WHEREAS, the national leadership mandates the establishment of such a system to
regulate and minimize the environmental impacts of projects and undertakings which
may significantly affect the quality of the environment in Presidential Decree No. 1586;
and
WHEREAS, in the effective implementation of such a system, there arises the need to
identify and declare certain projects determined to be environmentally critical;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of 6. Areas frequently visited and/or hard-hit by natural calamities (geologic hazards,
the powers vested in me by law, hereby proclaim the following areas and types of floods, typhoons, volcanic activity, etc.);
projects as environmentally critical and within the scope of the Environmental Impact 7. Areas with critical slopes;
Statement System; 8. Areas classified as prime agricultural lands;
9. Recharged areas of aquifers;
A. Environmentally Critical Projects 10. Water bodies characterized by one or any combination of the following
I. Heavy Industries conditions;
a. Non-ferrous metal industries a. tapped for domestic purposes
b. Iron and steel mills b. within the controlled and/or protected areas declared by appropriate authorities
c. Petroleum and petro-chemical industries including oil and gas c. which support wildlife and fishery activities
d. Smelting plants 11. Mangrove areas characterized by one or any combination of the following
II. Resource Extractive Industries conditions:
a. Major mining and quarrying projects a. with primary pristine and dense young growth;
b. Forestry projects b. adjoining mouth of major river systems;
1. Logging c. near or adjacent to traditional productive fry or fishing grounds;
2. Major wood processing projects d. which act as natural buffers against shore erosion, strong winds and storm floods;
3. Introduction of fauna (exotic-animals) in public/private forests e. on which people are dependent for their livelihood.
4. Forest occupancy 12. Coral reefs characterized by one or any combinations of the following conditions:
5. Extraction of mangrove products a. With 50% and above live coralline cover;
6. Grazing b. Spawning and nursery grounds for fish;
c. Fishery Projects c. which act as natural breakwater of coastlines.
1. Dikes for/and fishpond development projects
III. Infrastructure Projects
a. Major dams
b. Major power plants (fossil-fueled, nuclear fueled, hydroelectric or geothermal)
c. Major reclamation projects
d. Major roads and bridges
B. Environmentally Critical Areas
1. All areas declared by law as national parks, watershed reserves, wildlife preserves
and sanctuaries;
2. Areas set aside as aesthetic potential tourist spots;
3. Areas which constitute the habitat for any endangered or threatened species of
indigenous Philippine Wildlife (flora and fauna);
4. Areas of unique historic, archaeological, or scientific interests;
5. Areas which are traditionally occupied by cultural communities or tribes;