This report features research and insights by Linklaters LLP, with research and analysis
by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI).
Linklaters 3
Executive summary
>> As the cost of delivering low-carbon development decreases, it Between now and 2030,
Africas renewable energy
should become easier for negotiators at COP 211 to reach consensus
capacity is forecast to grow
(regardless of whether the outcome of the negotiations is a legally at least five-fold
binding agreement) on financial support for developing countries
transition to low-carbon economies, as well as commitments by
developing countries to such low-carbon development.
>> This trend also means that the G77s2 historical concerns expressed at
climate negotiations that restrictions imposed by an international climate
deal on the use of, or access to finance for fossil fuels, could impede the
speed of African development, should be mitigated.
290m
>> An ambitious outcome in Paris which provides long-term price only 290 million out of
signals can help create a virtuous cycle of unlocking investment 915 million people in
sub-Saharan Africa have
in renewables3. Consequently, the outcome of COP 21 offers an
access to electricity
opportunity to achieve economic development in Africa more rapidly
than might otherwise have occurred, rather than a risk to development
through restrictions on the rapid deployment of fossil fuel technology.
>> Despite the forecast of the decreasing costs of renewables, there are still
numerous risks and barriers to investment in renewables in Africa which
still need to be overcome, largely through domestic de-risking policies,
to fully enable investment. Multilateral and regional banks and the Green
Climate Fund will continue to play an important role in this respect. 45%
Energy use in sub-Saharan
Africa has risen 45%
since 2000
1
21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.
2
The G77 is a negotiating bloc of developing countries which includes African states on most matters atclimate negotiations.
3
International Energy Agency (IEA) Renewable Energy Medium-Term Market Report, 2015.
4 Renewable Energy in Africa. Trending rapidly towards cost-competitiveness with fossil fuels
The levelised costs of power4 Costs for renewables are forecast to a substantial decline between 2014
continue to fall significantly, driven by and 2025 in the cost of solar PV and
(LCOE) for renewable energy increasing technological maturity, better Concentrated Solar Power (CSP), and
technologies are trending towards access to finance, economies of scale onshore and offshore wind over the next
andincreasing projectexperience. 10 years. Solar has already decreased
cost-competitiveness with fossil dramatically, with solar PV module costs
Figure 1 shows that, at least at the lower
fuels, and there is evidence end of the range, onshore wind, solar
falling 75% from 2009-2014 and the
cost of electricity from utility-scale solar
to support parity in certain photovoltaic (PV), biomass, hydropower
PV falling 50% from 2010-20145. The
and geothermal are all cost-competitive
assetclasses. with fossil fuels, based on todays costs
striking increase in cost-competitiveness
of solar technology should encourage
and taking into account any future
significant uptake of this opportunity in
cost decreases. Figure 1 also projects
itsvarious forms.
Figure
Figure 1. Global
G Levelised Costs
lobal Levelised Costs of
ofEnergy
Energy(LCOE)
(LCOE)Ranges
Rangesby
byRenewable
RenewablePower
PowerGeneration
Generation Technology,
Technology, 2014
2014 andand 2025
20256
0.40
0.35
0.30
0.25
2014 $US/kWh
0.20
0.10
0.05
0.00
er
re
re
id
e)
e)
e)
al
in
tio
CF
-A
EC
gr
w
ho
ho
ag
ag
ag
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fir
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ca
er
or
or
or
B/
-O
s
fs
PV
-
s
on
co
ifi
ro
as
of
h
st
st
st
BF
ot
as
ar
no
yd
om
d
Ge
as
l
(n
(6
-G
in
in
er
H
So
s
1
Bi
W
om
ok
as
C
s
(6
PT
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om
st
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om
P
Bi
PT
as
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CS
Bi
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CS
Bi
4
evelised cost of power or (LCOE) is a unit to represent
L associated with renewables, or system-wide cost savings from 5
IRENA 2015 Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2014.
the per-kilowatt hour cost of building and operating a plant merit order (i.e. prioritising one source over another for power
6
IRENA 2015 Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2014.
over its assumed life cycle and at an assumed utilisation dispatch). The analysis of LCOE also does not take into account
rate. It includes: capital costs, fuel costs, operations and indirect subsidies to fossil fuels, such as those that government
maintenance (O&M) costs (fixed and variable) and financing support that reduces exploration and production costs and
costs. The IEA data and the International Renewables thus fuel costs, or other such support.
Agency (IRENA) data used for this analysis do not include
government incentives or subsidies, system balancing costs
Linklaters 5
Figure 2. Levelised Cost of Energy (LCOE) for Renewables and Fossil Fuels (2014 US$/kWh)
Figure 2. Levelised Cost of Energy (LCOE) for Renewables and Fossil Fuels (2014 US$/kWh)7
Biomass
Geothermal
Hydro
17%
Wind power contracted
Solar PV
CSP
7
Interpreted by Overseas Development Institute (ODI) from IRENA Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2014. Africa-specific data
were not available for geothermal, Offshore Wind and CSP. Although projects such as the two coal-fired IPPs Jorf (700MW) and
Safi (1230 MW) have been financed in the last three years, relatively few projects involving other asset classes are being built and
there is relatively poor data availability to break down the LCOE for fossil fuel generation across different asset classes in Africa
inmore detail.
8
IEA Africa Energy Outlook 2015 The Current Policies 11
IEA Energy Outlook 2014.
Scenario assumes business-as-usual, with no changes
12
IEA Energy Outlook 2014.
in policies from the mid-point of the year. The New
Policies Scenario of the World Energy Outlook broadly 13
ODI analysis of IEA and IRENA scenarios.
serves as the IEA baseline scenario. It takes broad policy
commitments and plans that have been announced by
countries into account, including national pledges to reduce
greenhouse-gas emissions and plans to phase out fossil-
energy subsidies, even if the measures to implement these
commitments have yet to be identified orannounced.
9
IEA Africa Energy Outlook 2015.
10
IEA Renewable Energy Medium-Term Market Report,2015.
Linklaters 7
14
IRENA Africa 2030 Renewable Energy Map 2015. 17
his is the state-owned agency in charge of solar IPP
T
projects which acts as a vehicle for risk allocation,
15
On which Linklaters advised the sponsors.
mobilising resources, feasibility assessments, project design,
16
Dahir no. 1-63-226 dated 5 August 1963 (as amended). development and financing of solar projects.
18
On which Linklaters advised MASEN
19
he contract for which was won by a consortium involving
T
SENER and ACWA International Power (announced in
early2015).
8 Renewable Energy in Africa. Trending rapidly towards cost-competitiveness with fossil fuels
Although the costs of renewables Historically, financing costs and hurdle todocumentation (so that bidders
rates have been higher in Africa than in know when they examine a particular
and fossil fuels are approaching developed countries due to perceived project exactly what it is going to look
parity, the renewable energy and actual political, regulatory, financial like because they have seen it before),
and administrative barriers and risks. and a process of pre-diligencing sites
market in Africa is relatively new To attract private investment, de- and projects and making this diligence
and many of the risks associated risking policies are required both at an available to bidders to reduce their
institutional level (for example, support transaction costs. This allows investors to
with investment are still considered for policy design, institutional capacity- take part in power procurement processes
to be barriers to investment for building, skills development for local without putting a significant amount of
operations and maintenance and their own capitalatrisk.
some, particularly new investors. resource assessments) but also at the
Some of the risks associated with
finance level to incentivise investors to
energy investment in Africa and the
justify taking on the perceived or actual
potential policies to mitigate them
risk20. See the Case Studies on Morocco
aresetoutinTable 1.
The fundamentals of and South Africa for moredetail.
investing in renewables In the short to medium term, while the
International Financial Institutions
costs of renewables are approaching a
are the same as they (IFIs) will play a key role in supporting
level which will provide an acceptable
are for investment more the rapid deployment of renewables in
level of remuneration for investors,
Africa. Inaddition to providing financial
generally in Africa. assistance, they can assist with the
government policies that decrease
the cost of developing renewables still
Involvement of the World institutional capacity and credibility
play an important role to encourage
Bank or other IFIs can building required to attract international
investment. These policies may include
investment. There have already been
be key to enhancing some promising examples of such
financial guarantees, transparent tariff
governments credit cost structures, market reform to enable
assistance such as the International
independent power providers (IPPs)
or to putting in place Finance Corporation (IFC)s Scaling
to enter the market, integration of
security to ensure that Solar programme21 which seeks to
regional power pools, implementation
transform the way these projects take
payment obligations to place through a package of donor funding
and improvement of transmission
investors are met. anddistribution infrastructure,
(to help countries develop projects
andsupport fordecentralised power
to a sufficient level to get investors
Andrew Jones, Partner, London centres. Continued on p12
interested), a standardised approach
20
NDP Derisking Renewable Energy Investment: A
U
Framework to Support Policymakers in Selecting Public
Instruments to Promote Renewable Energy Investment in
Developing Countries (2013).
21
Linklaters advises IFC on its Scaling Solar programme.
Linklaters 9
1 Political Risk Political risk remains a significant issue for Political risk is best managed through a range of
emerging markets projects of all kinds, though measuresincluding:
> rule of law;
there is a high degree of variability depending on
> careful choice of partners;
> expropriation; the country. It can be intertwined with concerns
over performance of state-owned counterparties, > good diligence, structuring and contingency planning;
> war/civil the court system and the relative support for
disturbance; renewables projects relative to fossil fuel power. > a strong and fair PPA/investment agreement;
> convertibility/ That said, recent research for the UKs DECC22 > clear government commitments;
remittability risk; suggests that the principal concern relates to
payment delays under PPAs rather than real or > political risk insurance such as MIGA;
>p
olitical Force stealth expropriation or total non-performance. > access to BIT and use of offshore arbitration; and
Majeure (FM) (war,
including civil war); > involvement of multilateral and development finance
and institutionsand export credit agencies.
> c ompliance with
contracts.
2 Support regimes Change in policy reducing the economic This can be less of a risk in African projects than in Europe,
viability of the renewables project (e.g. by because (i) depending on the fossil fuel alternative, the cost
lossofsubsidy). may be at or close to parity (e.g. diesel relative to small scale
renewables generation; and (ii) for larger scale projects,
payment (including any incentives) is typically provided under
the PPA rather than by regulation. Where incentive regimes
exist at law, some export credit agencies (ECAs) and IFIs will
offer policy risk insurance (e.g. Overseas Private Investment
Corporation(OPIC)).
3 Change of law risk Change of law adversely affecting the viability As for political risk above. In addition, clear stabilisation regimes
ofthe project may be appropriate on a case by case basis.
4 Corruption Avoiding corruption risk remains a challenging Ensure robust ABC due diligence and know your client work is
issue for project companies and their investors, undertaken early, and that politically exposed persons (PEPs) are
particularly given the extra-territorial reach of US identified. Projects should have robust and effective compliance
and UK anti-bribery legislation and regulators. It systems to manage this, particularly with regard to government
is critical to ensure that PPAs and concessions officials and PEPs.
are obtained in a fair, transparent way.
5 Counterparty risk Perhaps the biggest focus is whether the Counterparty credit risk can be managed through a range of
counterparty (typically a state-owned utility) can measures including:
meet the contract payment obligations under any
> credit enhancement from Government and/or under schemes
PPA/investment agreement.
such as World Bank credit enhancement;
> derisking through leverage including multilateral and
development finance institutions and export credit agencies;
> political risk insurance; and
> contractual terms (such as set off or payment terms).
6 Currency risk Exposure to volatile local currencies may not Given limited market capacity for affordable long-term FX hedging,
provide for sufficient long-term certainty for it is still the norm in many countries for project revenues to be in
equity investors or lenders. hard currency.
7 Local content and Most projects must satisfy local content Often the solution is to train local workers but this may require
skills capacity requirements. This can pose material challenges focus by the developer not just on the adequacy of its own training
to project delivery and reliability given frequent but also that of its contractors. Skills gaps can also create project
problems associated with access to enough risk (safety breaches) and delays. It is an area scrutinised by
skilled workers. Similarly, a lack of skills in international financial institutions and ECAs. Multilateral and
government and among regulators can impose other funding can also be provided to give governments access to
constraints on the development and operation suitable specialist resources. Finally, the development of standard
ofprojects. form bankable documentation by entities (as has been done
by IFC, KfW and the South African government) should help to
unblock bottlenecks caused by insufficient government capacity
duringnegotiations.
8 Technology, No prior use/regime for use of the technology or Assess country track record and adequacy of infrastructure and
transmission and inadequate supporting transmission systems (or (if no infrastructure) adequacy of funding for new infrastructure.
distribution other infrastructure) can be a major risk. Build in upgrade requirements and ensure adequate contingency
for delays and patching works. Clear allocation of risk is needed
in relation to failures of infrastructure. Inadequate transmission
infrastructure may also favour off-grid solutions.
22
Policy Risk in Renewable Energy Investments in Developing Countries dated July 2014 by Cambridge Economic Policy Associates Ltd, for the UK Department of Energy and Climate Chance (DECC).
10 Renewable Energy in Africa. Trending rapidly towards cost-competitiveness with fossil fuels
It has taken time for domestic energy deployment scenarios (RE- below are based on, do not break
transmission and consumer demand MAP 2030) suggested that cumulative down transmission figures to a level of
for electricity in Africa to grow to a point investment between 2015 and 2030 detail to indicate whether it takes into
which is sufficient for large-scale power would be US$1055 billion, of which account these differences. Overall, the
investment and many African countries US$486 billion would be for renewable costs associated with renewable energy
are at or approaching that point today. energy capacity. In the high ambition transmission and distribution appear
The renewables market in Africa is scenarios, more renewables are deployed, on balance to be fairly similar to fossil
growing rapidly and that rate of growth but more power capacity is also built and fuels. A good deal of power demand
in the medium to long term will, in part, more power supplied. Total electricity will be driven by industrial production
be driven by policy frameworks adopted actually supplied by renewables in 2030 requirements and the increasing
at a domestic level and supported (in TWh) is projected to be between 20- demands of existing consumers (growing
by ambitious signals from COP 21 30% of total power generation depending middle class) rather than new low income
negotiations and an international climate on the scenario, albeit that the absolute rural users, so the transmission and
agreement going forward. In 2014, value of both total generation and distribution costs will not necessarily be
IEA reported a base case scenario (the renewable output is significantly higher in higher due to a need to set up linking
New Policies Scenario or NPS) that the high ambition or RE-MAP scenario. networks in rural areas, for example. n
projected that, between 2014 and 2030
Transmission and distribution
cumulative investment would be US$827
requirements are different depending
billion in the power sector, of which
onwhether there is a lot of renewable
US$255 billion would be for renewable
energy in the mix. However, the IEA
energy capacity. A year later, in 2015,
and IRENA data, which the figures
one of IRENAs more ambitious renewable
Linklaters 11
North
West
IEA New Policy Scenario
Central
(20142030)
East
Southern
North
West
IRENA REMAP 2030
Central
(20152030)
East
Southern
In the lead-up to COP 21, more If implemented, the INDCs will require development through restrictions on the
US$13.5 trillion investment in energy use or access to finance of fossil fuels.
than 170 countries (including efficiency and low-carbon technologies This concern should at least be partially
European Member states), from 2015 to 2030 globally. Some INDCs alleviated as the competitive environment
are conditional upon receiving financial for clean energy has improved. The
accounting for at least 90% of support under a global climate agreement downward trend of renewables costs
global emissions, submitted which would come into force in 2020. confirms that economic development
and low-carbon development goals are
national climate pledges (known as This downward trend in cost of
not necessarily in conflict. This has
renewables could have a positive
Intended Nationally Determined impact on COP 21 negotiations in Paris
often been a highly contentious aspect
ofnegotiations.
Contributions orINDCs) setting commencing in November 2015 and
beyond, as it is hoped ambition levels It also means that as the trend of
out commitments on national will continue to ramp up. As renewable decreasing renewable energy costs
emissions reductionsstrategies. energy becomes more affordable, analysts continues, the level of subsidy
have started to predict that some markets required by Africa from the negotiations
in sub-Saharan Africa may leapfrog (in addition to existing development
fossil fuels technology supported by an assistance) decreases. This does not
appropriate policy framework to enable ignore the fact that many countries in
investment, and that Africas economic Africa need development assistance
development could actually be driven and support for adaptation to, and the
by renewable technology23. The G77 mitigation of the impacts of, climate
negotiating bloc in global climate change change which cannot be avoided.
negotiations, which includes the African However, as the cost of delivering
States in most matters, has voiced low-carbon development decreases
concerns in previous climate negotiations, it may be easier for parties to reach
that an international climate deal consensus (regardless of whether the
restricting global greenhouse emissions outcome of the international climate
could impede the speed of African negotiations is a legally binding
agreement) on financial support for
developing countries transition to low-
carbon economies andcommitments
by developing countries tosuch low-
carbondevelopment.
23
IEA Renewable Energy Medium-Term Market Report, 2015.
Linklaters 13
24
IEA Renewable Energy Medium-Term Market Report, 2015. 25
n which Linklaters and Webber Wentzel advised
O
the South African government.
14 Renewable Energy in Africa. Trending rapidly towards cost-competitiveness with fossil fuels
Which renewable energy sources have greater potential indifferent regions of Africa?
26
AFP, 2015; Davis Jr., 2015.
Linklaters 15
North Biomass
Hydro
West
Solar PV
Central CSP
Wind
East
Geothermal
Southern
Small Hydro
These figures are interpreted by ODI from IRENA (2015) Africa 2030: Roadmap for a renewable energy future Abu Dhabi: International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).
Regional co-operation It is also worth noting that some large- ofamarket in Central Africa that is
The need for increased regional scale projects and interconnection could capable of absorbing the levels of
integration and co-operation in order substantially change how the African electricity produced. Its implementation is
to develop many renewable energy power sector develops. For example, if also largely contingent on the expansion
resources compounds political and the planned 4.8 GW Inga III project in of transmission and distribution
regulatory risks, because state utilities are DRC and the widely discussed ~44 GW infrastructure to unlock electricity trade.
hesitant to become reliant on imports to Grand Inga project come online, the The uncertainty surrounding such a large
meet their domestic needs27. To mitigate electricity produced could displace fossil project illustrates the problems involved in
these risks and improve the enabling fuels and renewable energy in Central, modelling future energy scenarios. n
environment for RE, infrastructure West and Southern Africa. Barriers to the
planning must be carried out at the development of the Grand Inga project
regional level. The ongoing construction include political instability in the region,
of the West African Power Transmission securing the regional governments and
Corridor and plans to develop an Africa stakeholders consensus, complexities
Clean Energy Corridor from Egypt to surrounding the scale of upfront costs
South Africa are promising steps in and financing capacity, the need for
theright direction. associated infrastructure and the lack
27
IEA, 2014; APP, 2015
16 Renewable Energy in Africa. Trending rapidly towards cost-competitiveness with fossil fuels
About Linklaters
460
Over 460 qualified
lawyers with Africa
200
experience from across Over 200 live
21 of our offices matters in Africa
50
Experience
in 50 African
jurisdictions
18 Renewable Energy in Africa. Trending rapidly towards cost-competitiveness with fossil fuels
Contacts
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Managing Associate, London Partner, London
Tel: (+44) 20 7456 2994 Tel: (+44) 20 7456 5892
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UK UK
Vanessa Havard-Williams Jeremy Gewirtz
Partner, London Partner, London
Tel: (+44) 20 7456 4280 Tel: (+44) 20 7456 5900
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UK UK
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Partner, London Partner, London
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Portugal Dubai
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