The facts are as follows:
Republic of the Philippines At 6:00 a.m. on April 26, 2001, operatives of the Sta. Cruz, Laguna Police Detectives
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 177148 June 30, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
RAUL NUEZ y REVILLEZA, Appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 dated January 19, 2007
of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR. H.C. No. 02420. The appellate court affirmed
the Decision2 dated February 11, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba,
Laguna, Branch 36, which convicted appellant in Criminal Case No. 8614-01-C for
violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, also known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659. 3
On June 25, 2001, Raul R. Nuez was formally charged with violation of Section 16,
Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended. The Information reads:
That at around 6:00 oclock in the morning of the 24th day of April 2001 4 at Brgy. San
Antonio, Municipality of Los Ba[]os, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, and in
a search conducted at his residence as stated above, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody thirty[-]one
(31) heat sealed transparent plastic sachets containing methamp[h]etamine
hydrochloride otherwise known as "shabu", a regulated drug, with a total weight
of 233.93 grams in violation of the aforementioned provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
in coordination with the Los Baos Police Station (LBPS) and IID Mobile Force
conducted a search in the house of Raul R. Nuez based on reports of drug
possession. The group, led by Commanding Officer Arwin Pagkalinawan, included
SPO1 Odelon Ilagan, SPO3 Eduardo Paz, PO1 Ronnie Orfano, PO2 Gerry
Crisostomo, PO2 Alexander Camantigue, PO2 Joseph Ortega and Senior Inspector
Uriquia.
Before proceeding to appellants residence in Barangay San Antonio, the group
summoned Barangay Captain Mario Mundin and Chief Tanod Alfredo Joaquin to
assist them in serving the search warrant. Upon arriving at appellants house, Mundin
called on appellant to come out. Thereafter, Commanding Officer Pagkalinawan
showed Nuez the warrant. SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Crisostomo then surveyed
appellants room in his presence while his family, PO2 Ortega and the two barangay
officials remained in the living room. SPO1 Ilagan found thirty-one (31) packets of
shabu, lighters, improvised burners, tooters, and aluminum foil with shabu residue
and a ladys wallet containing P4,610 inside appellants dresser. The group also
confiscated a component, camera, electric planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw, electric tester,
and assorted carpentry tools on suspicion that they were acquired in exchange for
shabu. Following the search, SPO1 Ilagan issued a Receipt for Property Seized 6 and
a Certification of Orderly Search7 which appellant signed.
In a Decision dated February 11, 2002, the RTC convicted appellant and sentenced
him as follows:
WHEREFORE, this court finds the accused guilty, beyond reasonable doubt for
Violation of Republic Act 6425 as amended and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and all its accessory penalties under the law. Accused
is ordered to pay the fine of two million pesos.
SO ORDERED.8
Appellant elevated the case to this Court on appeal, but the case was transferred to
the Court of Appeals on May 2, 2006, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.9 On
January 19, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming appellants
conviction. The appellate court dismissed appellants defense of frame-up and
upheld the credibility of SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Ortega. It observed that the
inconsistencies in their testimony were minor at best, and did not relate to the
elements of the crime.
The appellate court in its decision decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated February 11, 2002
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Calamba, Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.10
From the appellate courts decision, appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. This
Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desire. However,
both the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the appellant manifested that they
are adopting their briefs before the appellate court.
In his brief, appellant contends that
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCORDING GREATER WEIGHT TO THE
EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION AND DISREGARDING THE
DEFENSE OF FRAME-UP INTERPOSED BY [THE] ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE IMPUTED CRIME DESPITE THE
INHERENT WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE.11
Simply, the issue is whether appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Possession of Regulated Drugs under the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Appellant insists that the shabu found in his room was planted. He points out
variances in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which cast doubt on his
culpability: first, SPO1 Ilagan testified that they picked up the barangay officials
before going to appellants house but PO2 Ortega claimed that Chief Tanod Joaquin
was already with them when they left the police station; second, while SPO1 Ilagan
confirmed the presence of the accused during the search, PO2 Ortega related
otherwise. More importantly, appellant assails the validity of the search warrant as it
did not indicate his exact address but only the barangay and street of his residence.
He maintains that none of the occupants witnessed the search as they were all kept
in the living room. Finally, appellant questions why the prosecution did not call the
barangay officials as witnesses to shed light on the details of the search.
Conversely, the OSG argues that appellants guilt has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. It agrees with the trial court that appellant failed to overcome the
presumption that the law enforcement agents regularly performed their duties.
Further, the OSG brands the testimonies of appellant, his wife and their child as self-
serving, absent ill-motives ascribed to the search team. It brushes aside appellants
protest, on the validity of the search warrant, for having been belatedly made.
After considering carefully the contentions of the parties and the records of this case,
we are in agreement that appellants petition lacks merit.
Appellant was indicted for possession of regulated drugs under Section 16 of Rep.
Act No. 6425 as amended which provides:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug
without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section
20 hereof.
To be liable for the crime, the following elements must concur: (a) the accused is
found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by
duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is
a regulated drug.12 All these were found present in the instant case.
While appellant interposes the defense of frame-up, we view such claim with disfavor
as it can easily be fabricated and is commonly used as a facile refuge in drug
cases.13 In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given
to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are
police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner,
unless there is evidence to the contrary.14
In this case, SPO1 Ilagan found shabu in appellants room; but appellant retorts that
it was planted. The latters daughter, Liezel Nuez, testified on the alleged planting of
evidence as follows:
xxxx
Q: While you were walking towards the direction of your bath room at that time have
you notice anything which catches your attention?
A: I saw a man inside the room taking a plastic from his bag, sir.
Q: Did you also notice, what did that man do with that plastic in the bag?
A: He put under the bed fronting the door, sir.
xxxx
Q: Can you describe to this Honorable Court what was that something that the man
took out from his bag and placed the same underneath your parents bed?
A: It is a plastic containing like a tawas, sir.
Q: Have you noticed Miss Witness about how many plastic bag (sic) did the man take
from his bag?
A: Only one, sir.15 [Emphasis supplied.]
xxxx
Assuming arguendo that an officer placed a sachet of shabu under appellants bed,
appellant had not advanced any reason to account for the thirty-one (31) packets of
shabu and drug paraphernalia collected from the dresser in his room. Instead, he
readily signed the Receipt for Property Seized and the Certification of Orderly
Search. Neither did appellants daughter identify the police officer who allegedly
planted evidence. Absent any compelling proof why SPO1 Ilagan would falsely testify
against appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
stands and we agree that his testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.16
In a further effort to impeach the credibility of the policemen, appellant questions the
non-presentation of the barangay officials who purportedly observed the search. The
matter of presentation of witnesses, however, is neither for accused nor even for the
trial court to decide. Discretion belongs to the prosecutor as to how the State should
present its case. The prosecutor has the right to choose whom he would present as
witness.17 It bears stressing that by no means did the barangay officials become part
of the prosecution when they were asked to witness the search. Hence, even the
accused could have presented them to testify thereon.
Appellant alleges that SPO1 Ilagan verified his presence inside the room during the
search in contrast to PO2 Ortegas account. The records, however, disclose
otherwise. On direct examination, PO2 Ortega recounted:
FISCAL:
Q: What did you do next?
WITNESS:
A: Capt. Mundin together with Raul and then the three of us went to the room of Raul
Nuez, sir.
xxxx
Q: So, among the group that went to the room of Raul Nuez who went inside?
A: It was Raul Nuez, Sgt. Ilagan, Crisostomo who are inside the room. I stayed near
the door along with Brgy. Capt. Mundin and Chief Tanod who were looking at what
was going on, sir.18 [Emphasis supplied.]
On cross-examination, PO2 Ortega did not falter:
xxxx
Q: Who among you went inside the room of Raul Nuez?
A: Sgt. Ilagan, Crisostomo, Raul Nuez, myself, Chief Tanod Alfredo and Capt.
Mundin, sir.19 [Emphasis supplied.]
Besides, any objection to the legality of the search warrant and the admissibility of
the evidence obtained thereby was deemed waived when no objection was raised by
appellant during trial. For sure, the right to be secure from unreasonable searches
and seizures, like any other right, can be waived and the waiver may be made
expressly or impliedly.20
As regards the contradiction in the testimonies of SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Ortega as to
whether they picked up Chief Tanod Joaquin at the barangay hall, the same is
inconsequential. After all, the witnesses testimonies need only corroborate one
another on material details surrounding the actual commission of the crime. 21
Here, we find the testimonies of SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Ortega believable and
consistent on material points: appellant was shown the search warrant; the search
was conducted in the latters presence; and SPO1 Ilagan found shabu in appellants
dresser. It has been ruled that an affirmative testimony coming from credible
witnesses without motive to perjure is far stronger than a negative testimony.
Records show that appellant and the police officers were strangers to each other.
Hence, there is no reason to suggest that the police officers were ill-motivated in
apprehending appellant.22
Turning to the objects which may be confiscated during the search, Section 3, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court is pertinent:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
As a rule, only the personal properties described in the search warrant may be seized
by the authorities.23 In the case at bar, Search Warrant No. 4224 specifically
authorized the taking of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and
paraphernalia(s) only. By the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute describes
things of a particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the
generic word will usually be limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly
enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statement which would
repel such inference.25
Thus, we are here constrained to point out an irregularity in the search conducted.
Certainly, the ladys wallet, cash, grinder, camera, component, speakers, electric
planer, jigsaw, electric tester, saws, hammer, drill, and bolo were not encompassed
by the word paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the use or manufacture of
drugs. In seizing the said items then, the police officers exercised their own discretion
and determined for themselves which items in appellants residence they believed
were "proceeds of the crime" or "means of committing the offense." This is, in our
view, absolutely impermissible.26
The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be
particularly described in the warrant is to limit the things to be taken to those, and
only those particularly described in the search warrant -- to leave the officers of the
law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. A search warrant is
not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing
expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a
crime.27 Accordingly, the objects taken which were not specified in the search warrant
should be restored to appellant.1avvphi1
Lastly, we find the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the appellate
court proper. Under Section 20(3)28 of Rep. Act No. 6425 as amended by Rep. Act
No. 7659, possession of 200 grams or more of shabu (methamphetamine
hydrochloride) renders the accused liable to suffer the maximum penalty under
Section 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425, which is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from P500,000 to P10,000,000.
In the case at bar, appellant was found in possession of 233.93 grams of shabu.
Hence there being no modifying circumstance proven, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with its accessory penalties, and P2,000,000 fine which the Court of
Appeals meted on appellant is in order.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. CR. H.C. No. 02420 isAFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the official
custodian of the objects taken during the search which are not otherwise regulated
drugs or drug paraphernalia, is ORDERED to return them to appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes 13People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA
537, 551.
* Designated member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 645.
14Dimacuha v. People, G.R. No. 143705, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA
** Designated member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 658. 513, 522.

*** 15 TSN, November 15, 2001, pp. 4-5.

Designated member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 635.

1 16 Dimacuha v. People, supra at 525.

Rollo, pp. 3-12. Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with
Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Noel G. Tijam concurring.
17 Id. at 524.
2 CA rollo, pp. 18-23. Penned by Judge Norberto Y. Geraldez.
18 TSN, September 11, 2001, p. 6.
3 An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending
for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, As Amended, Other Special Penal 19 Id. at 12.
Laws, and for Other Purposes, approved on December 13, 1993.
20 People v. Torres, supra note 12, at 608.
4Records, p. 1. In the complaint, the date indicated for the commission of the
offense was 26th of April 2001. 21People v. Razul, G.R. No. 146470, November 22, 2002, 392 SCRA 553,
570.
5 Id. at 43.
22 People v. Dilao, G.R. No. 170359, July 27, 2007, 528 SCRA 427, 441.
6 Id. at 5-6, 29-30.
23People v. Go, G.R. No. 144639, September 12, 2003, 411 SCRA 81, 112-
7 Id. at 7. 113.

8 CA rollo p. 23. 24 Records, p. 4.

9 G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640. 25Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Government Service Insurance
System (KMG) v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 150769, August 31, 2004,
10 Rollo, p. 12. 437 SCRA 371, 381.

11 26 People v. Go, supra at 114.

CA rollo, p. 37.

12 27 Id. at 114-115.
People v. Torres, G.R. No. 170837, September 12, 2006, 501 SCRA 591,
610.
28 SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the G.R. No. 176066 August 11, 2010
Proceeds or Instrument of the Crime. The penalties for offenses under
Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any vs.
of the following quantities: ESTELA TUAN y BALUDDA, Accused-Appellant.

xxxx DECISION

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

hydrochloride; [Emphasis supplied.]
For review is the Decision1 dated September 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
xxxx G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00381, which affirmed with modification the Decision 2 dated April
9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Baguio City, finding accused-
appellant Estela Tuan y Baludda guilty in Criminal Case No. 17619-R, of illegal
possession of marijuana under Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," as amended; and in
Criminal Case No. 17620-R, of violating Presidential Decree No. 1866, otherwise
known as the "Illegal Possession of Firearms," as amended.

On April 5, 2000, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC against
accused-appellant for illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of
firearm. The Informations read:

Criminal Case No. 17619-R

The undersigned Public Prosecutor accuses ESTELA TUAN Y BALUDDA of the

crime of VIOLATION OF SEC. 8, ART. II OF REPUBLIC ACT 6425, AS AMENDED
(Illegal Possession of Marijuana), committed as follows:

That on or about 24th day of January 2000, at Barangay Gabriela Silang, in the City
of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused did then and there willfully and unlawfully have in her possession,
Republic of the Philippines custody, and control the following, to wit:
SUPREME COURT
Manila a) Nine (9) bricks of dried Marijuana leaves with an approximate total weight
of 18.750 kgs., and
FIRST DIVISION
 b) One (1) plastic bag containing dried Marijuana leaves weighing
approximately .3 kg.
without any authority of law to do so in violation of the above-cited provision of law.3
Criminal Case No. 17620-R
The undersigned Public Prosecutor accuses ESTELA TUAN Y BALUDDA of the
crime of VIOLATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1866, AS AMENDED (Illegal
Possession of Firearm), committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of January 2000, at Barangay Gabriela Silang, in the
City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused did then and there willfully and unlawfully have in her
possession, custody, and control one (1) Cal. .357 S & W revolver, a high-powered
firearm, without any license, permit or authority duly issued by the government to
possess or keep the same in violation of the above-cited law.4
Upon her arraignment on April 18, 2000, accused-appellant, assisted by her counsel
de parte, pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to both charges. 5 Pre-trial and trial proper then
ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented four witnesses: Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1
Modesto F. Carrera (Carrera), Police Officer (PO) 2 Jaime Chavez (Chavez), SPO2
Fernando Fernandez (Fernandez), and Forensic Chemist II Marina Carina Madrigal
(Madrigal).
The events, as recounted by the prosecution, are as follows:
At around nine oclock in the morning on January 24, 2000, two male informants
namely, Jerry Tudlong (Tudlong) and Frank Lad-ing (Lad-ing) arrived at the office of
the 14th Regional CIDG (Criminal Investigation and Detention Group) at DPS
Compound, Marcoville, Baguio City, and reported to SPO2 Fernandez, Chief of the
Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU), that a certain "Estela Tuan" had been selling
marijuana at Barangay Gabriela Silang, Baguio City. Present at that time were Police
Superintendent Isagani Neres, Regional Officer of the 14th Regional CIDG; Chief
Inspector Reynaldo Piay, Deputy Regional Officer; and other police officers. 6
SPO2 Fernandez set out to verify the report of Tudlong and Lad-ing. At around one
oclock in the afternoon of the same day, he gave Tudlong and Lad-ing P300.00 to
buy marijuana, and then accompanied the two informants to the accused-appellants
house. Tudlong and Lad-ing entered accused-appellants house, while SPO2
Fernandez waited at the adjacent house. After thirty minutes, Tudlong and Lad-ing
came out of accused-appellants house and showed SPO2 Fernandez the marijuana
leaves they bought. After returning to the CIDG regional office, SPO2 Fernandez
requested the laboratory examination of the leaves bought from accused-appellant.
When said laboratory examination yielded positive results for marijuana, SPO2
Fernandez prepared an Application for Search Warrant for accused-appellants
house.
SPO2 Fernandez, together with Tudlong and Lad-ing, filed the Application for a
Search Warrant before Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (Judge Cortes) of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Baguio City, Branch IV, at about one oclock
in the afternoon on January 25, 2000. Two hours later, at around three oclock, Judge
Cortes personally examined SPO2 Fernandez, Tudlong, and Lad-ing, after which,
she issued a Search Warrant, being satisfied of the existence of probable cause. The
Search Warrant read:
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned of the existence of facts upon
which the application for Search Warrant is based, after personally examining by
searching questions under oath SPO2 Fernando V. Fernandez of the CAR Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group with office address at DPS Compound, Utility
Road, Baguio City and his witnesses namely: Frank Lad-ing of Happy Hallow, Baguio
City and Jerry Tudlong, of Barangay Kitma, Baguio City, after having been duly
sworn to, who executed sworn statements and deposition as witneses, that there is a
probable cause to believe that a Violation of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659
has been committed and that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that
Estela Tuan, has in her possession and control at her resident at Brgy. Gabriela
Silang, Baguio City, the following:
- Undetermined Quantity of Marijuana Dried Leaves and/or Marijuana Hashish
xxxx
which are subject of the offense which should be seized and brought to the
undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at anytime in the day the
house of the accused Estela Tuan at Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, and
forthwith seize and take possession of the following:
- Undetermined Quantity of Marijuana Dried Leaves and/or Marijuana Hashish
x x x nothing follows x x x
and bring said items to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
This Search Warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from date of issue, thereafter, it
shall be void.
The officers must conduct the search and seize the above-mentioned personal items
in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of her family or in the
absence of the latter, in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality.
The officers seizing the items must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful
occupant of the house in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in
the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of the 2 witnesses mentioned,
leave a receipt in the place in which the seized items were found; thereafter, deliver
the items seized to the undersigned judge together with a true inventory thereof duly
verified under oath.
Baguio City, Philippines, this 25th day of January, 2000.
(SGD)ILUMINADA CABATO-CORTES
Executive Judge
MTCC, Branch IV7
Upon receipt of the Search Warrant, SPO2 Fernandez, his team supervisor Police
Senior Inspector Rodolfo Castel, SPO1 Carrera, Police Senior Inspector Ricarte
Marquez and PO2 Chavez implemented the warrant. Before going to the accused-
appellants house, SPO2 Fernandez invited barangay officials to be present when the
Search Warrant was to be served, but since no one was available, he requested one
Eliza Pascual (Pascual), accused-appellants neighbor, to come along.
The CIDG team thereafter proceeded to accused-appellants house. Even though
accused-appellant was not around, the CIDG team was allowed entry into the house
by Magno Baludda (Magno), accused-appellants father, after he was shown a copy
of the Search Warrant. SPO2 Fernandez and Police Senior Inspector Ricarte
Marquez guarded the surroundings of the house,8 while SPO1 Carrera and PO2
Chavez searched inside.
SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez began searching the rooms on the first floor in the
presence of Magno and Pascual. They continued their search on the second floor.
They saw a movable cabinet in accused-appellants room, below which they found a
brick of marijuana and a firearm. At around six oclock that evening, accused-
appellant arrived with her son. The police officers asked accused-appellant to open a
built-in cabinet, in which they saw eight more bricks of marijuana.9 PO2 Chavez
issued a receipt for the items confiscated from accused-appellant10 and a certification
stating that the items were confiscated and recovered from the house and in
accused-appellants presence.
The nine bricks of marijuana were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) for examination.
The defense, on the other hand, had an entirely different version of what transpired
that day. It presented four witnesses, namely, accused-appellant herself; Beniasan
Tuan (Beniasan), accused-appellants husband; Magno, accused-appellants father;
and Mabini Maskay (Maskay), the Barangay Captain of Barangay Gabriela
Silang.1avvphi1
In her testimony, accused-appellant declared that she worked as a vendor at Hangar
Market. Sometime in January 2000, while she was selling vegetables at Hangar
Market, her son arrived with two police officers who asked her to go home because of
a letter from the court.11 At about six oclock in the afternoon, she and her husband
Beniasan reached their residence and found a green paper bag with marijuana in
their sala. According to the police officers, they got the bag from a room on the first
floor of accused-appellants house. Accused-appellant explained that the room where
the bag of marijuana was found was previously rented by boarders. The boarders
padlocked the room because they still had things inside and they had paid their rent
up to the end of January 2000.12 The police officers also informed accused-appellant
that they got a gun from under a cabinet in the latters room, which accused-appellant
disputed since her room was always left open and it was where her children
play.13 Accused-appellant alleged that a Search Warrant was issued for her house
because of a quarrel with her neighbor named Lourdes Estillore (Estillore). Accused-
appellant filed a complaint for the demolition of Estillores house which was
constructed on the road.14
Beniasan supported the testimony of his wife, accused-appellant. He narrated that he
and accused-appellant were at their Hangar Market stall when two police officers
came and asked them to go home. Beniasan and accused-appellant arrived at their
residence at around six oclock in the evening and were shown the marijuana the
police officers supposedly got from the first floor of the house. The police officers
then made Beniasan sign a certification of the list of items purportedly confiscated
from the house.15
Magno testified that he resided at the first floor of accused-appellants residence. He
was present when the search was conducted but denied that the Search Warrant
was shown to him.16 He attested that the confiscated items were found from the
vacant room at the first floor of accused-appellants house which was previously
occupied by boarders. Said room was padlocked but was forced open by the police
officers. In the course of the police officers search, they pulled something from under
the bed that was wrapped in green cellophane, but Magno did not know the contents
thereof.17 The police officers also searched the rooms of accused-appellant and her
children at the second floor of the house, during which they allegedly found a gun
under the cabinet in accused-appellants room. Magno claimed that he did not
personally witness the finding of the gun and was merely informed about it by the
police officers.18
Maskay, the Barangay Captain of Barangay Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, was the
last to testify for the defense. He corroborated accused-appellants allegation that the
latter had a quarrel with Estillore, and this could be the reason behind the filing of the
present criminal cases. He further remembered that the members of the CIDG went
to his office on January 24, 2000 to ask about the location of accused-appellants
house.19
The RTC, in its Decision dated April 9, 2002, found accused-appellant guilty as
charged and adjudged thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 17619-R, the Court finds the accused Estela Tuan guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of marijuana (nine [9]
bricks of dried marijuana leaves with an approximate weight of 18.750 kilograms and
the one [1] plastic bag containing the dried marijuana weighing about .3 kilograms) in
violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Section 13
of Republic Act 7659 as charged in the information and sentences her to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine ofP500,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The nine (9) bricks of dried marijuana leaves with an approximate weight of 18.750
kilograms and one (1) plastic bag containing dried marijuana leaves weighing
approximately .3 kilograms (Exhibit F, F-1, F-1-A to F-1-J) are ordered confiscated
and forfeited in favor of the State to be destroyed immediately in accordance with
law.
The accused Estela Tuan being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of
her preventive imprisonment in the service of her sentence in accordance with Article
29 of the Revised Penal Code; and
2. In Criminal Case No. 17620-R, the Court finds the accused Estela Tuan guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms (one [1]
caliber .357 S & W revolver), a high powered firearm, without any license, permit or
authority issued by the Government to keep the same in violation of Section 1,
Republic Act No. 8294 which amended Section 1 of PD 1866 as charged in the
information and hereby sentences her, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to
imprisonment ranging from 4 years 9 months and 10 days of prision correccional in
its maximum period as Minimum to 6 years and 8 months of prision mayor in its
minimum period as Maximum and a fine of P30,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The firearm caliber .357 S & W revolver without serial number is ordered forfeited in
favor of the State to be disposed of immediately in accordance with law.
The accused Estela Tuan being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of
her preventive imprisonment in the service of her sentence in accordance with Article
29 of the Revised Penal Code.20
The records of the two criminal cases were forwarded to this Court by the RTC, but
the Court issued a Resolution21 dated October 13, 2004 transferring said records to
the Court of Appeals pursuant to People v. Mateo.22
On September 21, 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision.
The Court of Appeals held that the contested search and consequent seizure of the
marijuana bricks were done pursuant to the Search Warrant validly issued by the
MTCC. There was no showing of procedural defects or lapses in the issuance of said
Search Warrant as the records support that the issuing judge determined probable
cause only after conducting the searching inquiry and personal examination of the
applicant and the latters witnesses, in compliance with the requirements of the
Constitution. Hence, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant
for illegal possession of marijuana.
The Court of Appeals, however, modified the appealed RTC judgment by acquitting
accused-appellant of the charge for illegal possession of firearm. According to the
appellate court, the records were bereft of evidence that the gun supposedly
confiscated from accused-appellant was unlicensed. The absence of a firearm
license was simply presumed by the police officers because the gun was a defective
paltik with no serial number. That the said condition of the gun did not dispense with
the need for the prosecution to establish that it was unlicensed through the testimony
or certification of the appropriate officer from the Board of the Firearms and
Explosives Bureau of the Philippine National Police.
In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The
assailed Decision of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 6, dated April 9, 2002, is hereby
MODIFIED such that the conviction of accused-appellant for Violation of Section 8,
Art. II, RA 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED while her conviction for Violation of PD
1866, as amended, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant is
accordingly ACQUITTED of the latter offense.23
In its Resolution dated October 20, 2006, the Court of Appeals gave due course to
accused-appellants Partial Notice of Appeal and accordingly forwarded the records
of the case to this Court.
This Court then issued a Resolution24 dated February 28, 2007 directing the parties
to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30 days from
notice. Accused-appellant25 opted not to file a supplemental brief and manifested that
she was adopting her arguments in the Appellants Brief since the same had already
assiduously discussed her innocence of the crime charged. The People 26 likewise
manifested that it would no longer file a supplemental brief as the issues have all
been addressed in its Appellees Brief.
Accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors in her Brief: 27
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE
TO THE INCREDIBLE AND CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE
OFFICERS.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING AS VOID THE SEARCH
WARRANT ISSUED AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
Given that accused-appellant was already acquitted of the charge of violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 on the ground of reasonable doubt in Criminal Case
No. 17620-R, her instant appeal relates only to her conviction for illegal possession of
prohibited or regulated drugs in Criminal Case No. 17619-R. The Court can no longer
pass upon the propriety of accused-appellants acquittal in Criminal Case No. 17620-
R because of the rule that a judgment acquitting the accused is final and immediately
executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly, the State may not seek its
review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. Such acquittal is final and
unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial court
or on appeal at the Court of Appeals.28
In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, such as Criminal Case
No. 17619-R, a case becomes a contest of credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies. In such a situation, this Court generally relies upon the assessment by
the trial court, which had the distinct advantage of observing the conduct or
demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. Hence, its factual findings are
accorded respect even finality absent any showing that certain facts of weight
and substance bearing on the elements of the crime have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misapplied.29
The Court finds no reason to deviate from the general rule in the case at bar.
Illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs is committed when the following
elements concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug.30
All the foregoing elements were duly proven to exist in Criminal Case No. 17619-R.
The search conducted by SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez in accused-appellants
house yielded nine bricks of marijuana. Marijuana is a prohibited drug, thus, accused-
appellants possession thereof could not have been authorized by law in any way.
Accused-appellant evidently possessed the marijuana freely and consciously, even
offering the same for sale. The bricks of marijuana were found in accused-appellants
residence over which she had complete control. In fact, some of the marijuana were
found in accused-appellants own room.
Accused-appellant challenges the judgment of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, finding her guilty of illegal possession of marijuana, by pointing out certain
inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses that supposedly
manifested their lack of credibility, i.e., the date of the test buy and the manner by
which the doors of the rooms of the house were opened.
These alleged inconsistencies and contradictions pertain to minor details and are so
inconsequential that they do not in any way affect the credibility of the witnesses nor
detract from the established fact of illegal possession of marijuana by accused-
appellant at her house. The Court has previously held that discrepancies and
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and not in
actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility.
Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant
details concerning the principal occurrence.31
Inconsistencies as to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the credibility
of the witnesses nor the veracity or weight of their testimonies. Such minor
inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen their credibility as they negate any
suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed.32
Accused-appellant further questions the non-presentation as witnesses of Lad-ing
and Tudlong, the informants, and Pascual, the neighbor who supposedly witnessed
the implementation of the Search Warrant, during the joint trial of Criminal Case Nos.
17619-R and 17620-R before the RTC. This Court though is unconvinced that such
non-presentation of witnesses is fatal to Criminal Case No. 17619-R.
The prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to determine whom to present as
witnesses. The prosecution need not present each and every witness but only such
as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may,
therefore, be dispensed with if they are merely corroborative in nature. The Court has
ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative witnesses does not constitute
suppression of evidence and is not fatal to the prosecutions case.33
Although Criminal Case No. 17619-R involves illegal possession of marijuana, the
following pronouncement of this Court in People v. Salazar,34 relating to the illegal
sale of the same drug, still rings true:
Neither is her right to confront witnesses against her affected by the prosecution's
failure to present the informer who pointed to her as a drug pusher. The presentation
of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it
indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely
corroborative and cumulative. In a case involving the sale of illegal drugs, what
should be proven beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of the sale itself. Hence, like
the non-presentation of the marked money used in buying the contraband, the non-
presentation of the informer on the witness stand would not necessarily create a
hiatus in the prosecutions' evidence. (Emphasis ours.)
Lastly, accused-appellant insists that the items allegedly seized from her house are
inadmissible as evidence because the Search Warrant issued for her house was
invalid for failing to comply with the constitutional and statutory requirements.
Accused-appellant specifically pointed out the following defects which made said
Search Warrant void: (1) the informants, Lad-ing and Tudlong, made
misrepresentation of facts in the Application for Search Warrant filed with the MTCC;
(2) Judge Cortes of the MTCC failed to consider the informants admission that they
themselves were selling marijuana; and (3) the Search Warrant failed to particularly
describe the place to be searched because the house was a two-storey building
composed of several rooms.
The right of a person against unreasonable searches and seizure is recognized and
protected by no less than the Constitution, particularly, Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article
III which provide:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
SEC. 3. x x x
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Emphases ours.)
Accordingly, Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
laid down the following requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together
with the affidavits submitted.
Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following
factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in
the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4)
the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons
or things to be seized.35
There is no dispute herein that the second and third factors for a validly issued
search warrant were complied with, i.e., personal determination of probable cause by
Judge Cortes; and examination, under oath or affirmation, of SPO2 Fernandez and
the two informants, Lad-ing and Tudlong, by Judge Cortes. What is left for the Court
to determine is compliance with the first and fourth factors, i.e., existence of probable
cause; and particular description of the place to be searched and things to be seized.
In People v. Aruta,36 the Court defined probable cause as follows:
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts
and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or
object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction
by law is in the place to be searched.
It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man
weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of
evidence of which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of
common sense which all reasonable men have in abundance. The same quantum of
evidence is required in determining probable cause relative to search. Before a
search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the
items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity,
and that the items will be found in the place to be searched.
A magistrates determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant
is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis
for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining
judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in
connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be
searched.37 Such substantial basis exists in this case.
Judge Cortes found probable cause for the issuance of the Search Warrant for
accused-appellants residence after said judges personal examination of SPO2 Post in La Trinidad, Your Honor.
Fernandez, the applicant; and Lad-ing and Tudlong, the informants.
SPO2 Fernandez based his Application for Search Warrant not only on the
information relayed to him by Lad-ing and Tudlong. He also arranged for a test buy
and conducted surveillance of accused-appellant. He testified before Judge Cortes:
COURT:
Q. You are applying for a Search Warrant and you alleged in your application
that Estela Tuan of Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, is in possession of
dried marijuana leaves and marijuana hashish, how did you come to know
about this matter?
A. Through the two male persons by the name of Frank Lad-ing and Jerry
Tudlong, Your Honor.
Q. When did these two male persons report to your office?
A. January 22, Your Honor.
Q. This year?
A. Yes, your honor.
Q. To whom did they report?
A. To me personally, Your Honor.
Q. How did they report the matter?
A. They reported that a certain Estela Tuan is selling dried Marijuana leaves
and marijuana hashish, Your Honor.
Q. What else?
A. She is not only selling marijuana but also selling vegetables at the Trading
Q. They just told you, she is selling marijuana and selling vegetables, that is
already sufficient proof or sufficient probable cause she is in possession of
marijuana, what else did they report?
A. That they are also selling marijuana in large volume at their house.
Q. What did you do when you asked them regarding that matter?
A. They had a test buy and they were able to buy some commodities
yesterday, Your honor.
Q. Who bought?
A. Tudlong and Lad-ing, Your Honor.
Q. How did you go about it?
A. I accompanied the said persons and kept watch over them and gave them
money after which, they were able to purchase and when they purchased the
said items or drugs, they were even informed that if you wanted to sell then
you could come and get. Your Honor.
COURT:
Q. Where is that P300.00?
A. It is with them, Your Honor.
Q. You did not entrap her?
A. No, Your Honor, because it is only a test buy.
Q: And that was January 22. Why did you not apply immediately for search
warrant?
A: Because we still have to look at the area and see to it that there are really Q: In other words, Estela Tuan went with you and later on she became your
some buyers or people who would go and leave the place, Your Honor. partner in that business?

Q: What did you observe? A: Yes, Your Honor.

A: Well, there are persons who would go inside and after going inside, they Q: And so what happened when she became a partner of your business?
would come out bringing along with them something else.
A: When we were about to divide our profit, we then went at their residence
Q: Did you not interview these people? at Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, Your Honor.

A: No, Your Honor. We did not bother.38 Q: What happened?

Lad-ing and Tudlong affirmed before Judge Cortes that they were the ones A: While we then sitted ourselves at the sala, she told us that if we wanted to
who informed SPO2 Fernandez that accused-appellant was keeping and earn some more, she told us that she has in her possession marijuana which
selling marijuana at her house, and that they took part in the test buy. could be sold, Your Honor.

Lad-ing narrated: Q: And so, what happened?

COURT: A: After which, she showed the marijuana, Your Honor.

Q: Mr. Lad-ing, you said that you are working at the Trading Post. What kind Q: Where was the marijuana?
of work do you have there?
A: It was placed in a cellophane, in a newspaper, Your Honor.
A: I am a middleman of the vegetable dealers, Your Honor.
Q: How big?
COURT:
A: A dimension of 10 x 4 inches, Your Honor.
Q: Did you come to know of this person Estela Tuan?
Q: With that size, where did she show you the box of this cellophane?
A: Yes, Your Honor, because there was an incident wherein we were
conducting our line of business when they came and joined us and we A: At the place where we were sitted at the receiving room, Your Honor.
became partners, Your Honor.
Q: In other words, she went to get it and then presented or showed it to you?
Q: You said, they, how many of you?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
A: A certain Jerry Tudlong, Estela Tuan and myself, Your Honor.
Q: Where did she go, if you know?
A: Because at the sala, there is a certain room located at the side that is the Q: And she gave you that marijuana?
place where she got the same, Your Honor.
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Where is this house of Estela Tuan located, is it along the road or inside
the road or what? xxxx

A: It is near the road but you have to walk in a little distance, Your Honor. Q: How many rooms are there in the first floor of the house of Estela Tuan?

Q: Will you describe the place where Estela Tuan is residing? A: Three rooms, Your Honor, it has a dining room and beside the place is the
receiving room where we sitted ourselves, Your Honor.
A: Well, it is a two storey house, the walls are made of galvanized iron
Sheets, Your Honor. Q: When you already bought marijuana from her, what did she tell you, if
any?
COURT:
A; Well, if we would be interested to buy more, I still have stocks here, Your
Q: Do you know who are staying there? Honor.39

A: I do not know who is living with her, however, that is her residence, Your Tudlong recounted in more detail what happened during the test buy:
Honor.
COURT:
Q: How many times did you go there?
Q: My question is, when she told you that she has some substance for sale
A: It was my second time to go at that time we were sent by PO Fernandez for profit and you mentioned marijuana, did you talk immediately with Frank
to purchase marijuana, Your Honor. or what did you do?

Q: Where is the marijuana now? A: We reported the matter to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group,
your Honor.
A: It is in the possession of PO Fernandez, Your Honor.
xxxx
Q: Where is the marijuana placed?
Q: What time?
A: In a newspaper, Your Honor.
A: We went to the office at 9:00 9:30 oclock in the morning, Your Honor.
Q: What happened next?
Q: When you went there, what did you do?
A: We handed to her the amount of P300.00, your Honor.
A: The amount of P300.00 was given to Frank and we were instructed to xxxx
purchase, Your Honor.
Q: So, you did not actually see what is in the newspaper?
Q: Did you go?
A: No, Your Honor, however, I know that that is marijuana.
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Why?
xxxx
A: Because that was our purpose, to buy marijuana, Your Honor.
Q: Will you tell what happened when you went to the house of the woman?
Q: And you have not gotten marijuana without Estela Tuan informing you?
A: Well, we were allowed to go inside the house after which, we were made
to sit down at the receiving area or sala, Your Honor. A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: When you went there, you were allowed to enter immediately? Q: Will you tell us what kind of materials were used in the house of Estela
Tuan?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
A: Two storey, the walls are made of GI sheets, Your Honor.\
Q: Who allowed you to enter?
Q: Is the house beside the road or do you have to walk?
A: The female person, Your Honor.
A: It is near the road. Upon reaching the road, you still have to walk a short
Q: What happened when you were asked to be sitted? distance, Your Honor.

A: During that time, Frank and the female person were the ones conferring, Q: Where did Estela Tuan get the newspaper placed in a transparent plastic?
Your Honor.
A: She got it from a room because were then made to wait at the sala, Your
Q: Did you hear what they were talking about? Honor.

A: That Frank was purchasing marijuana, Your Honor. Q: Did she tell you how much she can sell marijuana?

Q: What did the woman tell you? A: She told us, Your Honor.

A: After we handed the money, a plastic which was transparent, was then Q: What?
handed to Frank, it was a plastic and there was a newspaper inside, Your
Honor.
 A: Well, the marijuana that we purchased was worth P300.00[.] However, we stated address, which was accused-appellants residence, consisting of a structure
could divide it into two small packs and we could sell it at P20.00 per piece with two floors and composed of several rooms.
so that you can also have some gain.
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the validity of the Search Warrant for
COURT: accused-appellants house issued by MTCC Judge Cortes, and any items seized as
a result of the search conducted by virtue thereof, may be presented as evidence
Q: After that, to whom did you sell? against the accused-appellant.

A: We did not sell the marijuana, Your Honor. Since it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the accused-appellant is, indeed, guilty of
violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the Court shall
now consider the appropriate penalty to be imposed upon her.
Q: I thought you are going to sell marijuana and so you went there?

Article II, Section 8, in relation to Section 20(3), of Republic Act No. 6425, as
A: We were just instructed by PO Fernandez to verify what we are telling him
amended, provides:
was true, Your Honor.40

SEC. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs.- The penalty of reclusion perpetua to

Accused-appellants contention that MTCC Judge Cortes failed to consider the
informants admission that they themselves were selling marijuana is utterly without death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use
merit. First, even after carefully reviewing the testimonies of Lad-ing and Tudlong
any prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof. (As amended by
before Judge Cortes, this Court did not find a categorical admission by either of the
R.A. 7659)
two informants that they themselves were selling marijuana. In fact, Tudlong
expressly denied that he and Lad-ing sold the marijuana, having only bought the
same from the accused-appellant for the test buy. Moreover, even if the informants Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or
were also selling marijuana, it would not have affected the validity of the Search Instruments of the Crime. - The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9
Warrant for accused-appellants house. The criminal liabilities of accused-appellant of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if
and the informants would be separate and distinct. The investigation and prosecution the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
of one could proceed independently of the other.
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
Equally without merit is accused-appellants assertion that the Search Warrant did
not describe with particularity the place to be searched. 2. 40 grams or more of morphine;

A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant 3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish
it from other places in the community. A designation or description that points out the 4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads
the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.41 In 5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana;
the case at bar, the address and description of the place to be searched in the
Search Warrant was specific enough. There was only one house located at the
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
 7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or 4 Id. at 16.

8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond 5 Records, p. 11.
therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous
Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose. 6 TSN, September 29, 2000, p. 4.
(Emphasis supplied.)
7 Records, pp. 80-81.
Pursuant to Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, illegal
possession of 750 grams or more of the prohibited drug marijuana is punishable by 8 TSN, September 29, 2000, p. 16.
reclusion perpetua to death. Accused-appellant had in her possession a total of
19,050 grams of marijuana, for which she was properly sentenced to reclusion 9
perpetua by the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals. TSN, February 5, 2001, pp. 14-16.

10 Id. at 19.
In the same vein, the fine of P500,000.00 imposed upon accused-appellant by the
RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is also correct, as the same is still within the
11 TSN, November 27, 2001, pp. 2- 3.
range of fines imposable on any person who possessed prohibited drugs without any
authority, under Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
12 Id. at 4-5.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 21, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00381, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No 13 Id. at 6.
costs.
14 Id. at 9-11.
SO ORDERED.
15 TSN, September 26, 2001, pp. 3-10.

16 TSN, October 25, 2001, p. 7.

Footnotes
17 Id. at 9, 15.
* Per Special Order No. 876 dated August 2, 2010.
18 Id. at 10.
1Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe with Associate
Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Rosmari D. Carandang, concurring; rollo, 19 TSN, January 21, 2002, p. 10.
pp. 3-13.
20 CA rollo, pp. 150-152.
2Penned by Judge Ruben C. Ayson (now Court of Appeals Justice);
CA rollo, pp. 129-152. 21 Rollo, p. 106.
3 CA rollo, p. 14.
22 G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640. 40 Id. at 76-78.

23 Rollo, p. 12. 41 People v. Tee, supra note 37 at 541.

24 Id. at 14.

25 Id. at 39-40.

26 Id. at 17.

27 Id. at 29-38. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
28
People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 168188-89, June 16, 2006, 491 Manila
SCRA 185, 206.
THIRD DIVISION
29 People v. Corpuz, 442 Phil. 405, 415 (2002).
G.R. No. 175783 September 3, 2007
30 People v. Lagata, 452 Phil. 846, 853 (2003).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
31 People v. Uy, 392 Phil. 773, 787 (2000). vs.
BERNARDO TUAZON Y NICOLAS, accused-appellant.
32 People v. Amazan, 402 Phil. 247, 261 (2001).
DECISION
33 People v. Pidoy, 453 Phil. 221, 228 (2003).
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
34 334 Phil. 556, 571 (1997).
For Review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 31 July 2006 in
35 Romer Sy Tan v. Sy Tiong Gue, G.R. No. 174570, February 22, 2010. CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01799 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Bernardo Tuazon y
Nicolas," affirming the Decision2 dated 14 October 2002 of the Regional Trial Court
36 (RTC), Antipolo City, Branch 71, in Criminal Case No. 99-16114, finding accused-
351 Phil. 868, 880 (1998).
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425,3 as amended.
37 People v. Tee, 443 Phil. 521, 539-540 (2003).
The Information filed against appellant alleged:
38 Records, pp. 71-72.

39 Id. at 72-74.
 The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses BERNARDO TUAZON y
NICOLAS of the crime of Violation of Section 16, Article III, R.A. 6425, as
amended, committed as follows:
That, on or about the 7th day of March, 1999, in the City of Antipolo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any regulated drug,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control seven (7) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags each
containing 97.92 grams, 95.46 grams, 40.47 grams, 5.36 grams, 5.41 grams,
2.95 grams and 3.17 grams for a total weight of 250.74 grams of white
crystalline substance, which after the corresponding laboratory examination
conducted gave positive result to the test for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride also known as "shabu" a regulated drug, in violation of the
above-cited law.4
Upon arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. 5
The prosecutions version of the case relied heavily on the testimony of PO3 Glenon
Bueno (PO3 Bueno) who testified that in the morning of 7 March 1999, the Antipolo
City Police Station received through telephone, a confidential information that a
Gemini car bearing plate number PFC 4116 would deliver an unspecified amount
ofshabu in Marville Subdivision, Antipolo City. Acting on said tip, Antipolo City Chief
of Police Major Rene Quintana dispatched a team of policemen to the area to
conduct a surveillance. When the team arrived in Marville Subdivision, they saw the
said Gemini car and immediately flagged it down. The driver of the car pulled to a
stop and opened a window of said vehicle giving the policemen the opportunity to
identify themselves as members of the Antipolo City Police Station. It was then that
PO1 Manuel Padlan (PO1 Padlan) saw a gun tucked on appellants waist. PO1
Padlan inquired about the gun and appellant allegedly replied it did not belong to him
nor could he produce any pertinent document relating to said firearm. This prompted
PO3 Bueno to order appellant to get down from the car. As soon as appellant
stepped down from the vehicle, PO3 Bueno saw five plastic sachets on the drivers
seat, the contents of which appellant allegedly admitted to be shabu. Appellant was
thereafter immediately brought to the police station.
In the Joint Affidavit executed by PO3 Bueno and PO1 Padlan, it was stated that
when they frisked appellant, they discovered "2 big plastic bag (sic) and 5 medium
size plastic (sic) and a 9 mm. pistol marked Parabellum bearing serial number C-
9890 with one loaded magazine with eleven ammunition."7
The white crystalline substance confiscated from appellant was then forwarded to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City for
examination. The test conducted on the specimen turned over to the crime laboratory
yielded the following:
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave
POSITIVE result to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
regulated drug. x x x.
CONCLUSION:
Specimens A-1 through A-7 contains Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
regulated drug. x x x.8
Expectedly, appellant presented a vastly different account of the events that led to
his indictment. According to him, he used to work as a caretaker of "Curacha," a beer
house/videoke bar located along Circumferential Road, Marville II Subdivision and
owned by a certain Bong Reyes. On 6 March 1999, he reported for work at six
oclock in the evening. Later that night, unidentified men walked up to him. One of
these men asked him regarding the ownership of the car parked outside the bar. He
allegedly accompanied the men outside so he could confirm the identity of the owner
of the car that the men were inquiring about. Thereupon, the men pointed to him a
green colored Isuzu Gemini car which according to him was driven by his employer,
Reyes. After revealing this information to the unidentified men, the latter purportedly
pointed guns at him and ordered him to board an owner-type jeepney. The men
allegedly asked him regarding the whereabouts of Reyes and threatened to include
him in whatever trouble Reyes was in. A few hours passed and he was then brought
to the police headquarters where he was asked regarding his address and the name
of his employer. After two days, he was allegedly forced to admit that he was in fact
the owner of the Gemini car as well as of the shabu and the gun recovered from said
vehicle. He learned later on that he was charged with violations of Republic Act No.
6425 for illegal possession ofshabu and Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal
possession of firearm. The latter case was eventually dismissed. At the end of his
direct examination, appellant reiterated that he should not have been the one
charged with illegal possession of shabu, but Reyes who was driving the Gemini car.
The trial court found the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to support
a guilty verdict and imposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay a fine of P500,000.00.9
On 17 September 2003, we resolved to accept the appeal interposed by appellant,
the records of the case having been forwarded to this Court by the RTC, Antipolo
City, Branch 71. We also required the parties to file their respective briefs. 10
In addition to the required brief, appellant filed a supplementary pleading in which he
questioned the validity of his arrest and the admissibility of the evidence presented
against him. He contends that at the time of his warrantless arrest, he was merely
driving within Marville Subdivision. He had not committed, was not committing, and
was not about to commit any crime which could have justified his apprehension. He
goes on to argue that even if he had waived the issue regarding the validity of his
arrest by his failure to raise the matter before entering his plea, such waiver did not
affect the unlawfulness of the search and seizure conducted by the police. Appellant
claims that as the confidential informant had been cooperating with the police for
three weeks prior to his arrest, the authorities were already informed of his identity
and his alleged illegal activities. They should have conducted a prior surveillance and
then sought a search warrant from the court. Absent said warrant, the shabu seized
from him should be excluded from evidence. 11
On 23 February 2005, we ordered the transfer of this case to the Court of Appeals
conformably with our decision in People v. Mateo, which modified the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court with respect to direct appeals from the RTCs to this
Court of cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment.12
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and conclusion of the court a quo. The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the October 14, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 71, Antipolo City, in Criminal Case No. 99-16114, is hereby
AFFIRMED.13
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals found PO3 Buenos testimony to be
"clear and unequivocal"14and should therefore prevail over appellants defense of
denial.15 The Court of Appeals likewise brushed aside appellants contention that he
was a victim of frame-up as this defense has been viewed with disfavor and has
become a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.16 It also took note of appellants failure to give any credible
reason why the police singled him out considering that they were strangers to one
another prior to the date of the incident.17
Appellant is again before this Court pleading his innocence by making a lone
assignment of error
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 16, ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC
ACT 6425, AS AMENDED.18
Appellant contends that the trial courts reliance on the prosecutions evidence was
erroneous considering that he, as a mere grade school graduate, could not have
concocted his narration of the events that led to his arrest.19 He also maintains that
he was an easy target of police operatives, since he was a new employee in the
videoke bar and was therefore unfamiliar with the people who frequented said
establishment. In addition, he insists that the prosecution failed to meet the exacting
test of moral certainty required for conviction and that the trial court should not have
applied the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties on the part of the
police officers. 20
Appellant likewise points out the trial courts supposed failure to substantiate the
factual and legal bases for his conviction. He notes that the court a quos evaluation
of the facts and evidence was contained in only two paragraphs and was utterly
lacking in substantial discussion, in contravention of this Courts edict that the
decisions must distinctly and clearly express their factual and legal bases.21
On 19 February 2007, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental
briefs, if they so desired. On 17 April 2007, appellant filed a Manifestation stating that
he would no longer file a supplemental brief as all relevant matters for his defense
were already discussed in his previous pleadings. 22 The Office of the Solicitor
General likewise manifested that it would no longer file a supplemental brief. 23
The appeal must fail.
In insisting that the trial court should not have given credence to the testimony of The witness is pointing to a male person inside the courtroom when
PO3 Bueno, appellant is basically making an issue about a witnesss credibility. In confronted give his name as Bernardo Tuazon.
this regard, we reiterate the rule that appellate courts will generally not disturb factual
findings of the trial court since the latter has the unique opportunity to weigh PROS. LUNA:
conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying.24 Thus, unless attended with arbitrariness or
Q: Do you recall where were you at about 12:10 in the morning of March 7,
plain disregard of pertinent facts or circumstances, the factual findings are accorded
1999?
the highest degree of respect on appeal.25 Our careful review of the records of this
case reveals that the trial court did not err in relying on the testimony of PO3 Bueno.
In open court, PO3 Bueno recounted their encounter with appellant as follows: WITNESS:

PROS. LUNA: A: At the Antipolo Police Station, sir.

Thank you, your honor. Q: What were you doing then at that time?

Q: Mr. Witness, where were you assigned as police officer sometime in the A: We were doing our duty as police investigator, sir.
month of March 1999?
Q: Who were your companions at that time?
WITNESS:
A: PO1 Manuel Padlan, and CA Ronald Naval, sir.
A: At the Antipolo Police Station, sir.
Q: While performing your functions, do you remember any unusual incident
Q: Mr. Witness, do you know accused Bernardo Tuazon? at that time?

A: Yes, sir. A: One of our confidential agents gave an information thru telephone, sir.

Q: How did you come to know him? Q: About what?

A: Because we arrested Bernardo Tuazon. A: About delivery of shabu of undetermined amount in the area of Marville
Subdivision, Antipolo City, sir.
Q: If the accused in this case is present before this Court, will you please
point him out? Q: Do you know that person involved or who is the person supposed to
deliver an undetermined amount of "shabu"?
A: He is that person wearing yellow T-shirt.
A: The asset did not say who will deliver the shabu but he only said on the
telephone that the car is a Gemini bearing plate number PFC 411 who will
LEGAL RESEARCHER ACTING AS INTERPRETER:
deliver at said place.
Q: Upon receipt of said information what did you do next? A: We flagged down the vehicle, sir.

A: We informed our Chief of Police Major Rene Quintana, sir. Q: What happened after flagging down the car?

Q: What was the reaction of Major Quintana? A: When we flagged down the vehicle, we identified ourselves as police
officers, sir.
A: Our Chief of Police told us to do surveillance in the area.
Q: What was the reaction of the driver of the vehicle?
Q: What did you do next?
A: The driver opened the window and we identified ourselves as members of
A: We immediately recorded the dispatch and we boarded a marked vehicle the Antipolo City Police Station, sir.
and proceeded to the area in Marville Subdivision, sir.
Q: What was the reaction of the driver?
Q: Where is this located?
A: When he opened the window, PO1 Padlan saw a gun tucked on his waist.
A: In Barangay San Roque fronting along the highway in Antipolo City.
Q: What did you do next? In your case what did you do?
Q: Upon reaching that place what happened?
A: We identified ourselves as policem[e]n.
A: When we arrived in the subdivision we saw a Gemini car with plate
number PFC 411, sir. COURT:

Q: If a picture of that car would be shown to you would you be able to identify Q: Did you know what Padlan did?
it?
WITNESS:
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I am showing to you a picture already marked as Exhibit B,. B-1 and B-2.
What relation has this to the one you mentioned? Q: What did he do?

A: This is the car where the accused was then on board, sir. A: He questioned his gun and it turned out that there is no pertinent
document for his gun.
Q: Upon seeing the car what did you do?
Q: What do you mean "he was asked"? Who was asked?
A: We immediately conduct a check point, sir.
A: The driver, Bernardo Tuazon, sir.
Q: Specifically, what did you do?
PROS. LUNA:
Q: What was the reaction of Bernardo Tuazon?
WITNESS:
A: He said that the gun is not his.
Q: Upon hearing that the gun was not owned by Bernardo Tuazon what did
you do as police officer?
A: I ordered him to get down from the car.
COURT:
Q: After he got down from the car, what happened?
WITNESS:
A: I saw five (5) plastic bags on the drivers seat.
Q: Upon seeing that plastic bag what did you do?
A: I asked him the contents of that plastic and he replied that it contained
shabu, sir.
Q: What did you do upon hearing the answer of the accused?
A: We immediately brought him to the headquarters together with the
evidence, sir.
Q: What did you do with the "shabu"?
A: We brought it to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, sir.
Q: What was the result of the examination, if you know?
A: It gave positive result to the tests for methylamphetamine hydrochloride
sir.26
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the foregoing testimony of PO3 Bueno
establishes beyond reasonable doubt appellants culpability. His testimony regarding
the circumstances that occurred in the early hours of 7 March 1999 from the
moment their office received a confidential tip from their informer up to the time they
accosted appellant deserved to be given significance as it came from the mouth of
a law enforcement officer who enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his duty. Police officers are presumed to have acted regularly in the
performance of their official functions in the absence of clear and convincing proof to
the contrary or that they were moved by ill-will.27
Appellants bare-faced defense of denial cannot surmount the positive and affirmative
testimony offered by the prosecution. It is well-settled that positive declarations of a
prosecution witness prevail over the bare denials of an accused.28 A defense of
denial which is unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence
becomes negative and self-serving, deserving no weight in law and cannot be given
greater evidentiary value over convincing, straightforward and probable testimony on
affirmative matters.29 Denial is an inherently weak defense which must be supported
by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.30
We shall now resolve the issue raised by appellant regarding the admissibility of the
physical evidence presented against him. No less than our Constitution recognizes
the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures. This right is encapsulated in Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Complementing this provision is the so-called exclusionary rule embodied in Section
3(2) of the same article
 (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
It is recognized, however, that these constitutional provisions against warrantless
searches and seizures admit of certain exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3)
search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search;
(6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.31
In the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing,32 this Court had the occasion to elucidate on
the rationale for the exemption of searches of moving vehicles from the requirement
of search warrant, thus:
[T]he rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily
liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis
of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained,
the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the
satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the
impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle
that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We
might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the
ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought."
Nevertheless, the exception from securing a search warrant when it comes to moving
vehicles does not give the police authorities unbridled discretion to conduct a
warrantless search of an automobile. To do so would render the aforementioned
constitutional stipulations inutile and expose the citizenry to indiscriminate police
distrust which could amount to outright harassment. Surely, the policy consideration
behind the exemption of search of moving vehicles does not encompass such
arbitrariness on the part of the police authorities. In recognition of the possible abuse,
jurisprudence dictates that at all times, it is required that probable cause exist in order
to justify the warrantless search of a vehicle.33
In Caballes v. Court of Appeals,34 the term "probable cause" was explained to mean
[A] reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of
such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to
seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. The required
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not
determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of the
case.
When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe prior to the search that they
would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be
searched.35
In this case, we hold that the police had probable cause to effect the warrantless
search of the Gemini car driven by appellant. A confidential informer tipped them off
that said car was going to deliver shabu at Marville Subdivision. Pursuing said lead,
the Antipolo City police sent a team to Marville Subdivision to monitor said vehicle.
The information provided by the informer turned out to be correct as, indeed, the
Gemini car was spotted in the place where it was said to be bringing shabu. When
they stopped the car, they saw a gun tucked in appellants waist. Appellant did not
have any document to support his possession of said firearm which all the more
strengthened the polices suspicion. After he was told to step out of the car, they
found on the drivers seat plastic sachets containing white powdery substance. These
circumstances, taken together, are sufficient to establish probable cause for the
warrantless search of the Gemini car and the eventual admission into evidence of the
plastic packets against appellant.
In any case, appellant failed to timely object to the admissibility of the evidence
against him on the ground that the same was obtained through a warrantless search.
His failure amounts to a waiver of the objection on the legality of the search and the
admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police. It was only proper for the trial
court to admit said evidence. 36
Appellant also faults the trial court for its failure to abide by the Constitutional
requirement that "(n)o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based."37 Again, we 6 In the Joint Affidavit of PO3 Glenon Bueno and PO1 Manuel Padlan as well as the picture of
disagree. the Gemini car marked as Exhibits "B," "B-1," and "B-2," the plate number of the car was

Faithful adherence to the aforementioned constitutional provision is a vital identified as PMZ 411; id.
component of due process and fair play.38 The rule takes an even more important 7 Id.
significance for the losing party who is entitled to know why he lost so that he may
appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision needs to be 8 Folder of Exhibits, p. 3.
reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on
9 Records, p. 89.
which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is
especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors 10 CA rollo, p. 22.
of the court for review by a higher tribunal.39
11 Id. at 88-104.

In this case, we find that the assailed decision of the trial court substantially complied 12 Id. at 105.
with the requirements of the Constitution. The decision contained a summary of the
facts of the case as presented by the prosecution and by the defense. It likewise 13 Rollo, p. 11.
contained an explanation as to why it found appellant guilty as charged. Admittedly, 14 Id. at 7.
the decision is brief but to our mind, it sufficiently informed appellant as regards the
bases for his conviction. It readily informs appellant that the trial court disregarded his 15 Id. at 9.
defense of bare denial in favor of the presumption of regularity in the performance of
16 Id.
duties enjoyed by police officers.
17 Id. at 8.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
18 CA rollo, p. 32.
G.R. CR-HC No. 01799 dated 31 July 2006, finding appellant Bernardo Tuazon y
Nicolas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of 19 Id. at 36-37.
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
20 Id.

SO ORDERED. 21 Id. at 38-39.

22 Rollo, pp. 14-15.

Footnotes
23 Id. at 17-18.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza with Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion
24 People v. Baygar, 376 Phil. 466, 473 (1999).
and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-12.
25 People v. Matito, 468 Phil. 14, 24 (2004).
2 Penned by Presiding Judge Felix S. Caballes. Records, pp. 84-89.
26 TSN, 14 February 2000, pp. 3-7.
3 Also known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972."
27 People v. Huang Zhen Hua, G.R. No. 139301, 29 September 2004, 439 SCRA 350, 381,
4 Records, p. 1.
cited in People v. Torres, G.R. No. 170837, 12 September 2006, 501 SCRA 591, 609.
5 Id. at 13.
 28 People v. Vargas, 327 Phil. 387, 397 (1996). DECISION
29 People v. Gonzales, 417 Phil. 342, 353 (2001).
TINGA, J.:
30 People v. Hivela, 373 Phil. 600, 605 (1999).

31 People v. Gonzales, supra note 29 at 357.
32 G.R. No. 88017, 21 January 1991, 193 SCRA 122, 128-129.
33 Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 263, 279 (2002).
34 Id.
35 People v. Bagista, G.R. No. 86218, 18 September 1992, 214 SCRA 63, 69.
36 Id.
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 22001 dated 12 November 2004, affirming the Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, Makati City, in Criminal Case No. 96-1498,
that found Andy Quelnan y Quino3 (petitioner) guilty of violating Section 16, Article III
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.
The accusatory portion of the Information against petitioner reads:

37 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 14.

38 Yao v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 86, 105 (2000).
39 Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88709, 11 February 1992, 206
SCRA 127, 132.
That on or about the 27th day of August, [sic] 1996, in the City of Makati, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his possession, custody and control 27.7458 grams of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu), a regulated drug.
Contrary to law.4

During arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.

Witnesses5 for the prosecution testified as to the following set of facts:

On 27 August 1996, a team from the Police Assistance and Reaction Against Crime
Republic of the Philippines (PARAC) of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), composed of
SUPREME COURT Chief Inspector Carlos Acosta, SPO4 Isagani Ilas, SPO2 Manubay, SPO2
Manila Sanggalang, SPO2 Teodoro Sinag, SPO2 Mario Magno, SPO2 de Leon, SPO2 Cecil
Fajardo, SPO3 Marcelo Alcancia, SPO3 Dennis Zarcal, and PO1 Eraldo
SECOND DIVISION Lectura,6 was formed to implement a search warrant issued by the RTC of Manila on
26 August 1996.7
G.R. No. 166061 July 6, 2007
At around 3:00 p.m., the team proceeded to the Cityland Condominium in South
ANDY QUELNAN y QUINO, Petitioner, Superhighway, Makati. Upon arrival, they went directly to the Security Office of said
vs. building to seek assistance in serving the warrant. Security Officer Celedonio
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Punsaran (Punsaran) accompanied the group and they proceeded to Unit 615.
At their knocking, a male person naked from the waist up opened the door. 8 He was
later identified as petitioner. SPO2 Sinag presented the search warrant to
petitioner.9 Upon entry, the police operatives searched the unit, which was composed
of a small room with a plywood divider separating the sala from the bedroom. 10 In the
presence of petitioner and Punsaran, the group started searching the place and
eventually found on top of the bedroom table three (3) pieces of transparent plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substances later confirmed by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) forensic chemist as shabu, plastic tubings, weighing
scales, an improvised burner, and empty transparent plastic sachets. 11 Thereafter,
the group prepared a receipt of the properties seized and an Affidavit of Orderly
Search allegedly signed by petitioner in their presence and that of Punsaran. 12
Meanwhile, the group also went to Unit 418 of the same building to serve the warrant
and search the place. The police operatives did not find any occupant in the room.
Petitioner was then brought to the PARAC office for investigation. The pieces of
evidence gathered by the police operatives were brought to the NBI for examination.
That same day, NBI Forensic Chemist Loreto F. Bravo issued a certification stating
that upon examination, the specimen submitted yielded positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.13 The following day, the Arrest Report and Joint
Affidavit of Apprehension were executed by the police operatives leading to the
arrest and charging of petitioner for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No.
6425.
In his defense, petitioner testified that he is a resident of 150 Legaspi Tower 300,
2600 Roxas Boulevard, Manila.14 He also happens to be the registered owner of Unit
615 of Cityland Condominium in Makati City, which he leased to Sung Kok Lee (Lee)
beginning May 1996.15 On 27 August 1996, at around 3:00 p.m., petitioner went to
Unit 615 to collect payment of rental from Lee. Upon knocking at the door, petitioner
was greeted by the maid. The maid told him to wait for Lee inside the room while she
went out to buy some refreshments. After a while, petitioner heard somebody
knocking at the door and he opened it. He saw around 15 to 20 armed men who
suddenly barged into the room. The officer in charge asked for a certain Bernard Kim
and petitioner introduced himself as the owner of the condominium unit. The police
operatives then proceeded to search the house for the next half hour while petitioner
was waiting in the sala. Petitioner was also forced to sign some documents at
gunpoint. Petitioner was then handcuffed and brought to the PARAC office. Two days
later, he was brought to the Makati Prosecutors Office for inquest and a case was
subsequently filed against him.16
In behalf of petitioner, Luis Alvarez, the administrator of Cityland Condominium,
testified that Lee was the actual occupant of Unit 615 at the time petitioner was
arrested.17 Celso Fiesta, petitioners driver, also stated in court that petitioner resides
at Legaspi Tower. On 27 August 1996, he dropped petitioner off at Cityland
Condominium between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m. Two and a half hours later, he went back
to pick him up. As he was about to park the car, somebody poked a gun at him and
introduced himself as PARAC. Fiesta was ordered to get out of the car and the
PARAC team searched the vehicle. They found a gun and brought Fiesta to the
DILG. He was released the following day.18
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment
of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum
to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional as
maximum.19 In convicting petitioner, the trial court relied heavily on the clear,
straightforward, and candid testimonies of the prosecution witnesses:
They were all present when the search warrant was implemented at Unit 615
Cityland Condominium. No infirmity or flaw affecting their credibility exists. Further,
the Court considered that they are public officers and there was no showing that they
were motivated by ill-will testimonies or bad faith to falsely testify against the
accused. There was no evidence of intent to harass the accused. The presumption of
regularity in the performance of their functions can be fairly applied.20
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling, modifying however
the penalty to be imposed on petitioner in that he shall suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to three (3) years and six (6)
months of prision correccional as maximum.21
Petitioner now seeks the reversal of said judgment. His conviction or acquittal rests
on the validity of the warrantless arrest. The prosecution proffers that petitioner was
caught in flagrante delicto in possession of the subject shabu justifying his
warrantless arrest. Another crucial issue arises, that of the validity of the enforcement
of the search warrant as basis for the presence of the police operatives in the
Cityland Condominium unit. Therefore, these matters may be summarized into two
issues for our resolution: whether the search warrant was properly enforced and
whether petitioner was validly arrested without warrant.
The issue as to whether the search warrant was validly implemented necessitates a GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF THIS COURT, this 26[th] day of August
review of the tenor of the search warrant, vis--vis the conduct of the police 1996 in Manila, Philippines.
operatives enforcing such warrant. Search Warrant No. 96-585 reads:
HON. WILLIAM M. BAYHON
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Executive Judge, RTC
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT Branch XXIII, Manila
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
NOTE: This Search Warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from date of issue. 23
PEOPLE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT NO.
PHILIPPINES, 96-585 Petitioner assails the improper enforcement of the search warrant in that despite the
Plaintiff FOR: VIOLATION OF R.A. knowledge that petitioner was not the subject of such warrant, the police operatives
- versus - 6425 proceeded anyway with the search and his resulting arrest. According to him, the
BERNARD LIM22 (Dangerous Drug Act 1972) Court of Appeals erred in declaring that where a search warrant is issued for the
Room 615 Cityland search of specifically described premises and not of a person, the omission of the
Condominium name of the owner or occupant of such property in the warrant does not invalidate
South Superhighway, Makati the same. Petitioner contends that this doctrine applies only if the search warrant
City does not indicate with all certainty the owner or occupant of the premises sought to
Respondent. be searched; on the contrary, the subject search warrant indicated with absolute
clarity that the person subject thereof is Kim.
SEARCH WARRANT
This argument is misplaced. Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER: Procedure provides for the requisites for the issuance of search warrant, to wit:

GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned under examining under oath PNP
SPO4 ISAGANI J. ILAS and his witness, that there are [sic] reasonable ground to
believe that VIOLATION OF R.A. [No.] 6425 has been committed or is about to be
committed and there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that still
undetermined Quantity of Met[h]amphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) has [sic] in his
possession and control.
You are commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day or night of the
premises abovementioned and forthwith seize and take possession of the
abovementioned MET[H]AMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU) subject of
the offense and bring to this Court said drugs and persons to be dealt with as the law
may direct. You are further directed to submit return within ten (10) days from today.
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.
Nowhere in said rule or any other provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure is it required that the search warrant must name the person who occupies
the described premises. In Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue,24 the Court has
definitively ruled that where the search warrant is issued for the search of specifically
described premises only and not for the search of a person, the failure to name the
owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and search warrant does not
invalidate the warrant; and where the name of the owner of the premises sought to
be searched is incorrectly inserted in the search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the
legal description of the premises to be searched is otherwise correct so that no
discretion is left to the officer making the search as to the place to be searched.
A cursory reading of the search warrant reveals that the police officers were ordered
to make an immediate search of the premises mentioned and to seize and take
possession of shabu. Furthermore, they were directed to bring "persons to be dealt
with as the law may direct." While petitioner may not be the person subject of the
search, the fact that he was caught in flagrante delicto necessitated his valid
warrantless arrest. Therefore, the fact that petitioners name was not indicated in the
search warrant is immaterial.
Turning to the second issue, petitioner insists that his apprehension cannot be
considered in flagrante delicto because he was not in possession of the forbidden
drug.
In every prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential
elements must be established: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated
drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c)
the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.25
More importantly, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to
possess the drug. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession,
but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the
immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand,
constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of
the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place
where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The fact of
possession may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any reasonable
inference drawn therefrom. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused
had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drug in the place under his
control and dominion, as well as the character of the drug. Since knowledge by the
accused of the existence and character of the drug in the place where he exercises
dominion and control is an internal act, the same may be presumed from the fact that
the dangerous drug is in the house or place over which the accused has control or
dominion, or within such premises in the absence of any satisfactory explanation. 26
For the trial court, the fact of possession was clearly and convincingly established by
the prosecution, to wit:
Prosecution has presented in Court the three (3) plastic sachet[s] containing 27.7458
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride as well as all paraphernalia seized from
the accused consisting of an improvised burner, two (2) pieces of weighing scale,
plastic tubing, aluminum foil, empty transparent plastic sachets, Icom radio,
Calculator, Cellular phone, disposable lighters, and two (2) pieces [of] blank
cartridge. SPO4 Ilas and SPO2 Sinag clearly testified that they were found on top of
a table in a room of [sic] Unit 615 in the afternoon of August 27, 1996 at a time when
only the accused was inside the premises. Thus, the fact of possession was clearly
and convincingly established.27
The Court of Appeals pointed out that possession necessary for conviction of the
offense of possession of controlled substances may be actual or constructive:
Although the shabu was not found by the searching team on his person but in the
bedroom of the subject premises, appellant is deemed in possession thereof since he
was the only person in said premises. Moreover, at the time of entry of the searching
team in the subject premises, appellant was half-naked from the waist up which, as
the trial court correctly concluded, only "indicates extreme familiarity and gives the
impression of he being at home" in the premises, of which he was the registered
owner.28
Petitioner counters that he was in all his right to be in the leased premises because
he had to collect the rentals due him from his tenant. He further argues that the
shabu was allegedly found on top of the table inside the bedroom and not within the
immediate location where he was positioned. When he was found half-naked by
police operatives in another persons house, petitioner defends his act by invoking
his "long bond of friendship" with Lee which made the former treat Lees home like
his own.29
In support of the appellate courts ruling, the Solicitor General maintained that
petitioner was in constructive possession of the subject shabu by citing several
circumstances showing petitioners control and dominion over the same. First, the
shabu was found on top of a table in Unit 615 of Cityland Condominium when and
where only petitioner was present inside the premises. Second, petitioner introduced
himself as the owner of the condominium. Third, petitioner admitted that he was at
the subject premises allegedly to collect rentals from the lessee. Fourth, petitioner
was found naked from the waist up by the police operatives upon entering Unit 615.
The Solicitor General stresses that petitioners actuation of being naked from the
waist up while opening the door to greet visitors is natural only to someone who owns
the premises.30 Fifth, Unit 615 is a studio unit with a divider and a sala. There was no A: At the second week of the month.
room with a door to be closed and locked which can prevent petitioner from having
free access to the shabu found on the table. Q: For what month was that rental where [sic] you were suppose to collect?

This Court is convinced that petitioners control and dominion over the shabu found A: June and July[,] your Honor.
on top of the table were sufficiently established by his questionable presence in Unit
615. Petitioners explanation that he went to Lees unit to collect rentals and was left Q: Is it not a practice[,] Mr. Witness[,] that now lessee should pay the deposit
by the maid to fend for himself while the latter went out to buy refreshments is highly and a few months in advance?
suspicious. The maid never came back. The maids testimony would have
corroborated that of petitioners.
A: Yes, but he promise he does not have any money and to produce later
on.[sic]
Despite the presentation of the testimonies of Cityland Condominium Administrator
Luis Alvarez and other witnesses tending to prove that petitioner is the owner and
lessor of Unit 615 and his actual place of residence is in Legaspi Tower, such pieces Q: Which rental he is going to pay?
of evidence do not necessarily prove that petitioner did not have access and control
over the subject premises. In fact, petitioners overt act of getting half-naked while A: The deposit and the monthly rental.
opening the door establishes intimate familiarity with and over his surroundings.
Petitioner seeks to justify such act by invoking his "long bond of friendship" with Lee. Q: What you are saying [sic] when he entered the premises of this property
This was, however, belied by the testimony of the building administrator which he does not paid [sic] anything?
showed that Lee was a mere walk-in applicant and he began renting Unit 615 only on
1 May 1996, barely three (3) months before petitioner was apprehended. 31 A: He just paid for the month of May.

Petitioner, in fact, affirmed this fact in his earlier testimony that he allowed Lee, whom Q: What you are saying you entered into a lease contract with a person you
he barely knew, to occupy the unit with only one month rental deposit: do not know during the said month, that he entered the unit he was not able
to pay you even the deposit [sic]?
Q: Is it your practice to go personally to that unit to receive the rental?
A: He paid me just one month.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you agreed?
Q: Thats your practice?
A: Yes, sir. [H]e promised to pay later on.32
A: Yes, sir.
Equally doubtful is the existence of the lease contract allegedly executed between
Q: How much is the lease price? petitioner and Lee which purportedly validates the presence of the former in Unit 615,
which was to collect rentals from the latter. As the Solicitor General correctly
A: P6,500.00. observed, the lease agreement is undated and unnotarized. 33 During cross-
examination, the building administrator who presented a copy of the lease agreement
Q: Payable monthly? could not even remember when the contract was executed.34 Petitioner also testified
that the rentals are payable at the second week of each month.35 His statement is Make of record that the witness stepped down on the witness stand and
inconsistent with his avowed effort to collect payment in the last week of the month, tapped the shoulder of a person seated on the gallery who when asked of his
particularly on 27 August 1996. name answered his name as Andy Quelman.

We further find the Solicitor Generals conclusion that petitioner was privy to the Q: You said that you conducted a search, when was this?
existence of the shabu on top of the table credible because the unit was a small room
with a piece of plywood dividing the sala and the bedroom. With petitioner seemingly A: August 27, 1996.
comfortable in moving about the unit, the shabu and other paraphernalia could not
have escaped his vision.
Q: What time?

Even more telling are the testimonies of the police operatives who conducted the
A: 3:00 oclock in the afternoon.
search and subsequent arrest of petitioner. Inspector Acosta testified that his team
conducted a search on Unit 615 and found petitioner inside the room alone and that
the search resulted in the discovery of the shabu, to wit: Q: Where did you conduct the search?

Q: In connection with your duties then as the member of the PARAC[,] do A: At room 615 Cityland Condominium[,] South Superhighway[,] Makati City.
you recall if there was any occasion if you meet a certain person whose
name [was] Andy Quelman? xxxx

A: Yes, sir.
Q: During what occasion did you meet this person?
A: During [sic] when we conducted the search of the
Condominium[,] South Superhighway[,] Makati City.
Q: By what authority did you conduct your search at room or [U]nit 615
Cityland Condominium[,] South Superhighway[,] Makati City.
A: We are armed with [a] search warrant.
Cityland
Q: Issued by whom?

Q: If this person Andy Quelman is present in this Courtroom[,] can you point A: The RTC Judge Hon. Bayhon, City of Manila.
him out in the Court?
xxxx
COURT:
Q: So upon arriving at the 6th floor what did you do, or what did you do?
Will you step down on the witness stand and tap on his shoulder?
A: We knocked at the door of [R]oom 615.
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: And what happened next?
COURT:
A: Somebody opened the door.
Q: And after the door was opened[,] what did you and your team do next? A: He was sitting at the table inside the room.

A: We presented our search warrant. xxxx

Q: To whom? Q: Now can you describe to this Court how you conducted the search[,] Mr.
Witness?
COURT:
A: First we proceeded to his room and I saw Mr. Quelman sitting at his table.
Would you know who open[ed] the door? Later on we found at his table all the paraphernalia.

A: Yes, sir. Q: Can you enumerate to this Court what[,] if any[,] did you find [sic] during
the search?
PROSECUTOR GARVIDA:
A: We found 3 transparent plastic containing white crystalline substance.
Q: Who?
Q: Where did you find [sic]?
A: Andy Quelman.
A: Atop the table.
PROSECUTOR GARVIDA:
xxxx
Q: Can you describe[,] Mr. Witness[,] the appearance of Mr. Andy Quelman
when he opened the door? Q: What did you do with Mr. Quelman after you found these items which you
[have] just enumerated?
A: He is half[-]naked wearing pants.
A: We bring [sic] Andy Quelman to our office.36
Q: What about the upper body?
The foregoing testimony was substantially corroborated by SPO4 Isagani Ilas and
A: Naked. SPO1 Teodoro Sinag who were both part of the arresting team. These witnesses
positively identified petitioner as the occupant of Unit 615 at the time the search was
conducted and that he was caught in flagrante delicto when the shabu was found in
Q: Upon presenting the search warrant[,] what did you do next? his constructive possession.

A: We proceeded to the room to conduct the search.
xxxx
Q: You said you proceeded to conduct the search. [W]hat was Mr. Quelman
doing while you are conducting the search?
The trial court placed great weight on the testimonies of these police officers and
accorded them the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
functions.37 The prosecution of drug cases largely depends on the credibility of the
police officers. The factual findings of the trial court especially those which revolve on
matters of credibility of witnesses deserve to be respected when no glaring errors
bordering on a gross misapprehension of the facts or no speculative, arbitrary, and
unsupported conclusions can be gleaned from such findings. The evaluation of the SO ORDERED.
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses' deportment, demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grilling examination.38 In this case, the RTC was upheld
by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner has not convinced this Court of the existence of
any of the recognized exceptions39 to the conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the
trial and appellate courts.

In sum, petitioners unlawful possession, as exhibited by his control and dominion

over the shabu found on top of the table, was duly established by the following
evidence: his presence in Unit 615 at the time of his arrest; 40 his representation to the
police that he was the owner of the unit;41 his half-naked state when he opened the
door, strongly implying that he had stayed in the house longer than he claimed to be;
and finally, the fact that the shabu was found on top of a table beside the bed which
appears to be within sight of petitioner as there was a mere divider between the sala
and bedroom.421avvphil

Having caught petitioner in flagrante delicto, the police operatives are obligated to
apprehend him even without a warrant of arrest.

We shall now determine the imposable penalty. Both the lower courts erred as to the
respective penalties they imposed. Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended, provides that if the quantity of the regulated drug involved, in this case,
shabu, is less than 200 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua. Since petitioner was charged

with the possession of 27.7458 grams of shabu, the imposable penalty is prision
correccional.43 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the petitioner is sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor in its medium period as minimum, to three (3) years of prision
correccional in its medium period as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Court of Appeals
Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 22001 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
petitioner ANDY QUELNAN y QUINO is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty Footnotes
of imprisonment ranging from Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of arresto mayor in
its medium period as minimum to Three (3) Years of prision correccional in its 1
medium period as maximum. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, and concurred in by
Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Jose C. Mendoza.
2 Penned by Judge Sixto Marella, Jr. 20 Id. at 26.

3 Also identified in the records as Andy Quelman y Quinoy. 21 Rollo, p. 34.

4 Records, p. 1. 22While the search warrant indicates Bernard Lim as respondent, it appears
that there is a typographical error in that Lim should have been spelled as
5The following witnesses testified for the prosecution: Inspector Carlos "Kim."
Acosta, SPO4 Isagani Ilas, SPO2 Teodoro L. Sinag, and NBI Forensic
Chemist Loreto Bravo. 23 Records, p. 81.

6 TSN, 13 January 1997, p. 11. 24 397 Phil. 892, 908-909 (2000).

7 Records, p. 81. 25Abuan v. People, G.R. No. 168773, 27 October 2006, 505 SCRA 799;
People v. Torres, G.R. No. 170837, 12 September 2006, 501 SCRA 591,
8 TSN, 9 December 1996, pp. 15-17. 610.

9 26People v. Tira, G.R. No. 139615, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 134, 152, citing
TSN, 13 January 1997, p. 14.
People v. Ramos, 186 SCRA 184 (1990).
10 Id. at 67-69.
27 CA rollo, p. 26.
11 Id. at 57-60.
28 Rollo, p. 31.
12 TSN, 9 December 1996, pp. 21-23.
29 Id. at 10-13.
13 Records, p. 12.
30 Id. at 50-55.
14 TSN, 21 July 1997, p. 2.
31 TSN, 14 August 1997, p. 10.
15 Id. at 15-16.
32 TSN, 21 July 1997, pp. 17-18.
16 Id. at 3-10.
33 Rollo, p. 57.
17 TSN, 14 August 1997, p. 10.
34 TSN, 14 August 1997, p. 15.
18 TSN, 6 October 1997, pp. 3-6.
35 TSN, 21 July 1997, p. 18.
19 CA rollo, pp. 27-28.
36 TSN, 9 December 1996, pp. 6-28. evidence on record." (Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1163,
1168 (1997); Geronimo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105540, 5 July
37 CA rollo, p. 26. 1993, 224 SCRA 494, 498-499; Angelo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
83392, 26 June 1992, 210 SCRA 402.
38 People v. Miguel, G.R. No. 173795, 4 April 2007.
40 TSN, 9 December 1996, p. 16.
39 These are some of the recognized exceptions:
41 TSN, 21 July 1997, p. 6.
"1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial
42 TSN, 13 January 1997, pp. 15-17.
court are contradictory;

43 Following the computation in People v. Tira, supra note 26, as follows:

2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises,
or conjectures;
QUANTITY IMPOSABLE PENALTY
3) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings
of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams prision correccional

4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of 49.26 grams to 98.50 grams prision mayor
facts; 98.51 grams to 147.75 grams reclusion temporal

5) when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the 147.76 grams to 199 grams reclusion perpetua
issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee;

6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a

misapprehension of facts;

7) when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts

which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion;

8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the

specific evidence on which they are based; and

10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the
 One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to be left
alone in the privacy of his own house. That right has ancient roots, dating back
through the mists of history to the mighty English kings in their fortresses of power.
Even then, the lowly subject had his own castle where he was monarch of all he
surveyed. This was his humble cottage from which he could bar his sovereign lord
and all the forces of the Crown.

That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian regimes. Their
number, regrettably, continues to dwindle against the onslaughts of authoritarianism.
We are among the fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the
past despotism. We must cherish and protect it all the more now because it is like a
prodigal son returning.

That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973

Constitution:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
Manila houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be
EN BANC violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
G.R. No. 71410 November 25, 1986 examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
JOSEFINO S. ROAN, petitioner, be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
vs.
THE HONORABLE ROMULO T. GONZALES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL SEC. 4. (1) The privacy of communication and cor- respondence
TRIAL COURT OF MARINDUQUE, BRANCH XXXVIII; THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL shag be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when
OF MARINDUQUE; THE PROVINCIAL COMMANDER, PC-INP public safety and order require otherwise.
MARINDUQUE, respondents.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

CRUZ, J:
Once again we are asked to annul a search warrant on the ground that it violates the
Constitution. As we can do no less if we are to be true to the mandate of the
fundamental law, we do annul.
Invoking these provisions, the petitioner claims he was the victim of an illegal search
and seizure conducted by the military authorities. The articles seized from him are
sought to be used as evidence in his prosecution for illegal possession of firearms.
He asks that their admission be temporarily restrained (which we have) 1 and
thereafter permanently enjoined.
The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10,
1984. 2 The petitioner's house was searched two days later but none of the articles
listed in the warrant was discovered. 3 However, the officers conducting the search
found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which they
confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner. 4
To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined
by the judge or some other authorized officer after examining the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce. No less important, there must be a specific
description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to prevent
arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant. 5
Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff 6 as
referring to "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." As
held in a long line of decisions, the probable cause must refer to only one specific
offense. 7
The inclusion of the requirement for the "examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce" was a refinement proposed by
Delegate Vicente J. Francisco in the1934 Constitutional Convention. His purpose
was the strengthening of the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Although the condition did not appear in the corresponding provision of the federa
Constitution of the United States which served as our model it was then already
embodied in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless, Delegate Jose P. Laurel,
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights of that body, readily accepted the
proposal and it was thereafter, following a brief debate, approved by the
Convention. 8
Implementing this requirement, the Rules of Court provided in what was then Rule
126:
SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. The municipal or city judge
must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and
take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits presented to him.
The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the respondent judge in
accordance with the above rule, but this is not entirely true. As a matter of fact,
depositions were taken of the complainant's two witnesses in addition to the affidavit
executed by them. 9 It is correct to say, however, that the complainant himself was
not subjected to a similar interrogation.
Commenting on this matter, the respondent judge declared:
The truth is that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed
his application for a search warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared
before me in the company of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael Morada
and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented to me their
respective affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police
investigator assigned to the PC-INP command at Camp Col. Maximo
Abad. As the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to, I
proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof to
ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same.
Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to the same before me. 10
By his own account, an he did was question Captain Quillosa on the contents of his
affidavit only "to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same," and
only because "the application was not yet subscribed and swom to." The suggestion
is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been
completed when it was submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his own
searching questions. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not
take the applicant's deposition in writing and attach them to the record, together with
the affidavit presented to him.
As this Court held in Mata v. Bayona: 11
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not
sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of
the complainant and the witnesses he niay produce and attach them
to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the
Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-
existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
giving it if it wifl be found later that his declarations are false.
 We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by
the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of
taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record,
rendering the search warrant invalid.
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant
Quillosa's deposition taken considering that he was applying for a search warrant on
the basis of the information provided by the aforenamed witnesses whose
depositions as aforementioned had already been taken by the undersigned." 12
In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on
the basis of mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as
required by settled jurisprudence." 13 The rationale of the requirement, of course, is to
provide a ground for a prosecution for perjury in case the applicant's declarations are
found to be false. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the
issuance of the warrant sought. It was therefore necessary for the witnesses
themselves, by their own personal information, to establish the apphcant's claims. 14
Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the depositions only of the
witnesses and not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency
of their depositions.
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely
routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The
examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must
make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. 15
A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida,
who both claimed to be "intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a
mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in
the form of answers to the questions put to them by the respondent judge.
Significantly, the meaningful remark made by Tohilida that they were suspicious of
the petitioner because he was a follower of the opposition candidate in the
forthcoming election (a "Lecarista") 16 did not excite the respondent judge's own
suspicions. This should have put him on guard as to the motivations of the witnesses
and alerted him to possible misrepresentations from them.
The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received the witnesses' statement that
they saw eight men deliver arms to the petitioner in his house on May 2, 1984. 17 This
was supposedly done overtly, and Tohilida said he saw everything through an open
window of the house while he was near the gate. 18 He could even positively say that
six of the weapons were.45 caliber pistols and two were.38 caliber revolvers. 19
One may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent judge to ask how the
witness could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from
the window, or whether it was on the first floor or a second floor, or why his presence
was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really done openly, in the full view of
the witnesses, considering that these acts were against the law. These would have
been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the
declarations of the witnesses were readily accepted and the search warrant sought
was issued forthwith.
The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrant invalid. Nonetheless,
the Solicitor General argues that whatever defect there was, was waived when the
petitioner voluntarily submitted to the search and manifested his conformity in
writing. 20
We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities,
who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty
against a possible challenge later to the validity of the search they were conducting.
Confronted with the armed presence of the military and the presumptive authority of a
judicial writ, the petitioner had no choice but to submit. This was not, as we held in a
previous case, 21 the manifestation merely of our traditional Filipino hospitality and
respect for authority. Given the repressive atmosphere of the Marcos regime, there
was here, as we see it, an intimidation that the petitioner could not resist.
The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum pistol and the eighteen have
bullets seized from the petitioner were illegal per se and therefore could have been
taken by the military authorities even without a warrant. Possession of the said
articles, it is urged, was violative of P.D. 1866 and considered malum
prohibitum. Hence, the Wegal articles could be taken even without a warrant.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case,
it was not because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a
warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military
officers who entered the petitioner's premises had no right to be there and therefore
had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets.
It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is
necessarily illegal per se.Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of
this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited.
A search warrant is still necessary. If the rule were otherwise, then the military
authorities could have just entered the premises and looked for the guns reportedly
kept by the petitioner without bothering to first secure a search warrant. The fact that
they did bother to do so indicates that they themselves recognized the necessity of
such a warrant for the seizure of the weapons the petitioner was suspected of
possessing.
It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be validly made without
warrant and articles may be taken validly as a result of that search. For example, a
warrantless search may be made incidental to a lawful arrest, 22 as when the person
being arrested is frished for weapons he may otherwise be able to use against the
arresting officer. Motor cars may be inspected at borders to prevent smuggling of
aliens and contraband 23 and even in the interior upon a showing of probable
cause. 24 Vessels and aircraft are also traditionally removed from the operation of the
rule because of their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the state's
jurisdiction. 25 The individual may knowingly agree to be searched or waive objections
to an illegal search. 26 And it has also been held that prohibited articles may be taken
without warrant if they are open to eye and hand and the peace officer comes upon
them inadvertently. 27
Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of the accepted
exceptions. The respondents cannot even claim that they stumbled upon the pistol
and bullets for the fact is that these things were deliberately sought and were not in
plain view when they were taken. Hence, the rule having been violated and no
exception being applicable, the conclusion is that the petitioner's pistol and bullets
were confiscated illegally and therefore are protected by the exclusionary principle.
Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was later expressly affirmed in the
1973 Constitution. While conceding that there may be occasions when the criminal
might be allowed to go free because "the constable has blundered," Chief Justice
Concepcion observed that the exclusionary rule was nonetheless "the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction" against abuse. The decision cited
Judge Learned Hand's justification that "only in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, know that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong
be repressed. "
The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as evidence against the petitioner in
the criminal action against him for illegal possession of firearms. Pending resolution
of that case, however, the said articles must remain incustodia legis.
Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before coming to this Court, filed a
motion for the quashal of the search warrant by the respondent judge in accordance
with the normal procedure. But as we said and did in Burgos, "this procedural flaw
notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and
urgency of the constitutional issues raised. 28
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1-84 issued by the respondent judge on May 10,
1984, is hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside. Our restraining
order of August 6,1985, is made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 21, 77-79.
2 Ibid, pp. 4.23.
3 Id, p. 5.
4 Annex "N", Petition.
5 Sec. 3, Art. IV, 1974 Constitution; Sec. 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court; Stonehill v.
Diokno, 20 SCRA 383; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299; Uy Kheytin v. VillareaL
42 Phil. 886; People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169; People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384; Bache &
Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823.
6 133 SCRA 800.
7 Stonehfll v. Diokno, supra Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera, 54 SCRA
312; Castro v. Pabalan, 70 SCRA 477; Secretary of Justice v. Marcos, 76 SCRA 301;
Oca v. Marquez, 14 SCRA 735.
8 Journal of the Constitutional Convention, VoL Ill, No. 22, pp. 1098-1105.
9 Rollo, pp. 102, 116-121.
10 Ibid, pp. 101-102.

11 128 SCRA 388, 391.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
12 Rollo, p. 102.
Manila
13 Alverez v. CFI, 64 Phil. 33; Rodriguez v. Villamiel, 65 Phil. 230; Garcia v. Locsin,
65 PhiL 689; Burgos v. Chief of Staff, supra, SECOND DIVISION

14 People v. Sy Juco, 64 Phil. 667; Rodriguez v. Villamiel, supra; Alvarez v. G.R. No. 165122 November 23, 2007
CFI, supra.

ROWLAND KIM SANTOS, Petitioner,

15 Mata v. Bayona, supra; cf. Sec. 4, Rule 126, Rules of Court.
vs.
PRYCE GASES, INC., VELASCO, JR., Respondent.
16 Rollo, pp. 119-120.

17 Ibid, pp. 26, 27, 117, 120. DECISION

18 Id, p. 120. TINGA, J.:

19 id This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure assailing the Decision dated 16 January 2004 1 and Resolution dated 26
20 Ibid, pp, 145, 151, 152. July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74563. The decision reversed
the twin orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 29, quashing
21 Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770. the search warrant it issued and ordering the return of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
cylinders seized from petitioner, whereas the resolution denied petitioners motion for
22 Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court. reconsideration of the said decision.

23 Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, cited in Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857; People v. CFI As culled from the records, the following antecedents appear:
of Rizal 101 SCRA 86.

24 Alineida-Sanchez v. U.S., 37 L. ed. 2ed. 596.

Respondent Pryce Gases, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture
of oxygen, acetylene and other industrial gases as well as in the distribution of LPG
25 Roldan v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336; Papa v. Mago, supra.
products in the Visayas and Mindanao regions. Its branch in Iloilo City has been
selling LPG products directly or through various dealers to hospitals, restaurants and
26 People vs. Malasigui, 63 Phil. 221.
other business establishments. The LPG products are contained in 11-kg, 22-kg or
50-kg steel cylinders that are exclusively manufactured for respondents use. The
27 Harris v. U.S., 390 U.S. 234.
LPG cylinders are also embossed with the Pryce marking and logo.2

28 Supra In the beginning of the year 2002, respondent noticed the decline in the return of its
LPG cylinders for refilling. Respondents employees suspected that the LPG
cylinders had been removed from market circulation and refilled by respondents
competitors, one of whom was Sun Gas, Inc. Petitioner Rowland Kim Santos is the
manager of Sun Gas, Inc.3
Arnold T. Figueroa, respondents sales manager for Panay, sought the assistance of
the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) to recover the LPG cylinders
allegedly in the possession of Sun Gas, Inc. Acting on Figueroas complaint, CIDG
operatives conducted surveillance on the warehouse of Sun Gas, Inc. located at 130
Timawa Avenue, Molo, Iloilo. The CIDG operatives requested the Bureau of Fire
Protection (BFP) to conduct a routine fire inspection at Sun Gas, Inc.s warehouse
with some of the CIDG operatives led by PO2 Vicente D. Demandara, Jr. posing as
BFP inspectors. The CIDG operatives entered the warehouse and were able to take
photographs of the LPG cylinders.
On 4 June 2002, PO2 Vicente D. Demandara, Jr. applied before the RTC of Iloilo City
for a warrant to search the premises described as No. 130, Timawa Avenue, Molo,
Iloilo. The application alleged that petitioner was in possession of Pryce LPG tanks,
the Pryce logos of some of which were scraped off and replaced with a Sun Gas, Inc.
marking, and other materials used in tampering Pryce gas tanks. 4 It also averred that
petitioner was illegally distributing Pryce LPG products without the consent of
respondent, in violation of Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 623, 5 as amended by
R.A. No. 5700.6
After conducting searching questions on witnesses PO1 Aldrin Ligan, a CIDG
operative, and Richard Oliveros, an employee of Pryce Gases, Inc., Hon. Rene B.
Honrado, the presiding judge of Branch 29, issued the corresponding search warrant.
The search warrant authorized the seizure of the following items:
1. Assorted sizes of PRYCE LPG GAS TANKS CYLINDERS in different
kilograms.
2. Suspected LPG gas tanks cylinders with printed/mark SUN GAS INC.,
trademark and embossed Pryce Gas Trademark scrapped off.
3. Other materials used in tampering the PRYCE LPG GAS TANKS
cylinders.7
On the same day, CIDG agents served the search warrant on petitioner and were
able to recover the following items:
- Five Hundred Forty Four (544) empty 11 Kgs[.] PRYCE LPG tank cylinders;
- Two (2) filled 11 Kgs. PRYCE LPG tank cylinders with seal;
- Seven (7) filled 11 Kgs. Pryce LPG tank cylinders without seal;
- Forty Four (44) empty 22 Kgs. PRYCE LPG tank cylinders;
- Ten (10) empty 50 Kgs. Pryce LPG tank cylinders; and
- One (1) filled 6 Kgs. PRYCE LPG tank cylinder without seal.8
On 7 June 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash9 the search warrant on the
grounds of lack of probable cause as well as deception and fraud employed in
obtaining evidence in support of the application therefor, in violation of Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution and Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent opposed petitioners Motion to Quash.
On the same day, the CIDG filed a criminal complaint before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Iloilo against petitioner, charging the latter with violation of R.A. No.
623, as amended.
After hearing, the trial court issued an Order10 dated 16 July 2002, granting
petitioners Motion to Quash. The trial court upheld the validity of the surveillance
conducted on petitioners warehouse in order to obtain evidence to support the
application for a search warrant and declared that based on the evidence gathered in
support of the application for search warrant, the CIDG was able to establish
probable cause that petitioner was tampering with Pryce LPG cylinders and making
them appear to be those of Sun Gas, Inc. This conclusion, notwithstanding, the trial
court made a turnaround, stating that the probable cause as found by it at the time of
the application for search warrant fell short of the requisite probable cause necessary
to sustain the validity of the search warrant.
The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the Motion To Quash is hereby GRANTED. PO2 Vicente Dernadara,
Jr. and the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, Region VI are hereby
directed to return the "Pryce" LPG cylinders enumerated in Return of Search Warrant
Seized by virtue of the invalid Search Warrant No. 02-16 to the Rowland Kim Santos
immediately upon receipt of this Order.
SO ORDERED.11
Respondent filed a manifestation and motion to hold in abeyance the release of the
seized items. It also filed a motion for reconsideration12 of the 16 July 2002 Order but
was denied in an Order13 dated 9 August 2002.
Respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for
certiorari,14 arguing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
quashing the search warrant. The petition essentially questioned the quashal of the
search warrant despite a prior finding of probable cause and the failure of petitioner
to prove that he bought the seized items from respondent. It also challenged
petitioners personality to file the motion to quash.
On 16 January 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, 15 which
set aside the two orders of the trial court dated 16 January 2002 and 9 August 2002.
The appellate court also ordered the return of the seized items to respondent.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but was denied in an order dated 16 July 2004. 16
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER PETITIONER ROWLAND KIM SANTOS HAS THE LEGAL
PERSONALITY TO ASSAIL THE SEARCH WARRANT FOR HE WAS
NAMED RESPONDENT THEREIN AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY CHARGED
FOR VIOLATION OF R.A. [No.] 623, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 5700, BEFORE
THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF ILOILO IN I.S. NO. 2015-
2000 ENTITLED "PNP-CIDG V. ROWLAND KIM SANTOS."
II.
WHETHER THE PETITIONER SHOULD RETURN THE SUBJECT PRYCE
LPG CYLINDER TO RESPONDENT DESPITE UNCONTROVERTED
EVIDENCE THAT THE SAME WERE SOLD BY THE LATTER TO ITS
CUSTOMERS.
III.
WHETHER THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY RESPONDENT
PRYCE WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR
NOT BEING THE PROPER REMEDY TO ASSAIL THE ORDERS OF THE
TRIAL COURT.17
Briefly, the petition raises the following issues: (1) whether or not petitioner has
authority to seek the quashal of the search warrant; (2) who has proper custody of
the seized items; and (3) whether or not respondent correctly availed of the special
civil action for certiorari to assail the quashal of the search warrant.
As to the first issue, the Court of Appeals ruled against petitioner and reversed the
trial courts quashal of the search warrant solely on the ground that petitioner, being a
mere manager of Sun Gas, Inc., failed to show his authority to act on behalf of the
corporation and, therefore, had no legal personality to question the validity of the
search warrant. Thus, it concluded that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in entertaining and subsequently granting petitioners motion to quash.
Petitioner takes exception to the Court of Appeals conclusion, contending that
petitioner may assail the questioned search warrant because he was named as
respondent in the application for search warrant and in the criminal complaint
subsequently filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo.
Well-settled is the rule that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search
and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 18
Petitioner is the real party-in-interest to seek the quashal of the search warrant for the
obvious reason that the search warrant, in which petitioner was solely named as
respondent, was directed against the premises and articles over which petitioner had
control and supervision. Petitioner was directly prejudiced or injured by the seizure of
the gas tanks because petitioner was directly accountable as manager to the
purported owner of the seized items. It is noteworthy that at the time of the
application for search warrant, respondent recognized the authority of petitioner as
manager of Sun Gas, Inc. when the application averred that petitioner had in his
possession and control the items subject of the alleged criminal offense. Respondent
should not be allowed thereafter to question petitioners authority to assail the search
warrant. Moreover, the search warrant was directed against petitioner for allegedly
using Pryce LPG cylinders without the authority of respondent.
The Court of Appeals misapplied the ruling in Stonehill, et al. v. Diokno, et al.19 that
only a corporation has the exclusive right to question the seizure of items belonging
to the corporation on the ground that the latter has a personality distinct from the
officers and shareholders of the corporation. Assuming arguendo that Sun Gas, Inc.
was the owner of the seized items, petitioner, as the manager of Sun Gas, Inc., had
the authority to question the seizure of the items belonging to Sun Gas, Inc. Unlike
natural persons, corporations may perform physical actions only through properly
delegated individuals; namely, their officers and/or agents. 20 As stated above,
respondent cannot belatedly question petitioners authority to act on behalf of Sun
Gas, Inc. when it had already acknowledged petitioners authority at the time of the
application of the search warrant.
The resolution of the second issue as to who has legal custody of the seized items
depends upon the determination of the existence of probable cause in the issuance
of the search warrant. In the questioned Order dated 16 July 2002, the trial court
reversed its earlier finding of probable cause on the ground that the failure of the
CIDG agents to seize other materials and tools used by petitioner to tamper with the
LPG cylinders invalidated the search warrant because "there would be nothing to
show or prove that accused had committed the offense."21 The trial court elaborated
that the mere possession of Pryce LPG cylinders seized from petitioner was not
illegal per se, absent any showing that petitioner illegally used the same without the
consent of respondent. Moreover, the trial court concluded that respondent had
already parted ownership of its gas cylinders upon their sale to customers who paid
not only for the contents but also for the value of the gas cylinders.
Although respondent advanced several arguments rebutting the aforementioned
conclusions in its petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals sidestepped those
arguments and reversed the trial courts quashal of the search warrant only on the
ground of the lack of legal personality on the part of petitioner to assail the search
warrant.
Supporting jurisprudence thus outlined the following requisites for a search warrants
validity, the absence of even one will cause its downright nullification: (1) it must be
issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the
judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of
probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant
and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. 22
The instant controversy pertains only to the existence of probable cause, which the
trial court found wanting after evaluating the items seized from petitioner. Petitioner
does not dispute that the items seized from him, consisting of Pryce LPG tanks of
assorted weights, were particularly enumerated in the search warrant. Petitioner is
neither assailing the manner by which the trial court conducted the determination of
probable cause.
The trial court retracted its earlier finding of probable cause because the seized items
were incomplete or insufficient to charge petitioner with a criminal offense, thus,
negating its previous determination of probable cause.
We disagree. In quashing the search warrant, it would appear that the trial court had
raised the standard of probable cause to whether there was sufficient cause to hold
petitioner for trial. In so doing, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion.
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. 23 A
finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely
than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.
Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence
which would justify conviction.24 The existence depends to a large degree upon the
finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. However, the findings of
the judge should not disregard the facts before him nor run counter to the clear
dictates of reason.25
The application for a search warrant was based on the alleged violation by petitioner
of certain provisions of R.A. No. 623, as amended by R.A. No. 5700. Respondent
claimed that petitioner was illegally using or distributing its LPG cylinders without its
authority. The amended provisions of R.A. No. 623 state:
Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the written consent of the
manufacturer, bottler, or seller, who has successfully registered the marks of
ownership in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section, to fill such
bottles, boxes, kegs, barrels, steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators, or other
similar containers so marked or stamped, for the purpose of sale, or to sell, dispose
of, buy or traffic in, or wantonly destroy the same, whether filled or not to use the
same for drinking vessels or glasses or drain pipes, foundation pipes, for any other
purpose than that registered by the manufacturer, bottler or seller. Any violation of
this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos or
imprisonment of not more than one year or both.
Sec. 3. The use by any person other than the registered manufacturer, bottler or
seller, without written permission of the latter of any such bottler, cask, barrel, keg,
box, steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators, or other similar containers, or the
possession thereof without written permission of the manufacturer, by any junk dealer
or dealer in casks, barrels, kegs, boxes, steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators,
or other similar containers, the same being duly marked or stamped and registered
as herein provided, shall give rise to a prima facie presumption that such use or
possession is unlawful.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 623, as amended, clearly creates a prima facie presumption of
the unlawful use of gas cylinders based on two separate acts, namely, the
unauthorized use of the cylinder by a person other than the registered manufacturer
and the possession thereof by a dealer. The trial courts conclusion that the mere
possession by petitioner of the seized gas cylinders was not punishable under
Section 2 of R.A. No. 623, as amended, is not correct. The trial court failed to
consider that petitioner was not only in possession of the gas cylinders but was also
distributing the same, as alleged by PO1 Aldrin Ligan in his answer to the searching
questions asked by the trial court.26
As pointed out by respondent in its petition for certiorari, the failure of the CIDG
operatives to confiscate articles and materials used in tampering with the Pryce
marking and logo did not negate the existence of probable cause. The confluence of
these circumstances, namely: the fact of possession and distribution of the gas
cylinders and the claim by respondent that it did not authorize petitioner to distribute
the same was a sufficient indication that petitioner is probably guilty of the illegal use
of the gas cylinders punishable under Section 2 of R.A. No. 623, as amended.
More importantly, at the hearing of the application for the search warrant, various
testimonies and documentary evidence based on the surveillance by the CIDG
operatives were presented. After hearing the testimonies and examining the
documentary evidence, the trial court was convinced that there were good and
sufficient reasons for the issuance of the same. Thus, it issued the search warrant.
The trial courts unwarranted turnabout was brought about by its notion that the
seized items were not sufficient to indict petitioner for the crime charged.
In La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez,27 it was held:
True, the lower court should be given the opportunity to correct its errors, if there be
any, but the rectification must, as earlier stated be based on sound and valid
grounds. In this case, there was no compelling justification for the about face.
xxxx
Moreover, an application for a search warrant is heard ex parte. It is neither a trial nor
a part of the trial. Action on these applications must be expedited for time is of the
essence. Great reliance has to be accorded by the judge to the testimonies under
oath of the complainant and the witnesses.28
A word of caution, though. In affirming the sufficiency of probable cause in the
issuance of the search warrant, this Court is not preempting the subsequent
determination by the investigating prosecutor if there is cause to hold the respondent
for trial. After all, the investigating prosecutor is the person tasked to evaluate all the
evidence submitted by both parties.
The Court of Appeals, however, erred in ordering the return of the seized items to
respondent.1wphi1 Section 4, Rule 12629 of the Revised Criminal Procedure
expressly mandates the delivery of the seized items to the judge who issued the
search warrant to be kept in custodia legis in anticipation of the criminal proceedings
against petitioner. The delivery of the items seized to the court which issued the
warrant together with a true and accurate inventory thereof, duly verified under oath,
is mandatory in order to preclude the substitution of said items by interested parties.
The judge who issued the search warrant is mandated to ensure compliance with the
requirements for (1) the issuance of a detailed receipt for the property received, (2)
delivery of the seized property to the court, together with (3) a verified true inventory
of the items seized. Any violation of the foregoing constitutes contempt of court. 30
The CIDG operatives properly delivered the seized items to the custody of the trial
court which issued the search warrant. Thereafter, the trial court ordered their return
to petitioner after quashing the search warrant. When the Court of Appeals reversed
the trial courts quashal of the search warrant, it erred in ordering the return of the
seized items to respondent because it would seem that respondent instituted the
special civil action for certiorari in order to regain
possession of its LPG tanks. This cannot be countenanced. The seized items should
remain in the custody of the trial court which issued the search warrant pending the
institution of criminal action against petitioner.
Last, the special civil action for certiorari was the proper recourse availed by
respondent in assailing the quashal of the search warrant. As aforementioned, the
trial courts unwarranted reversal of its earlier finding of probable cause constituted
grave abuse of discretion. In any case, the Court had allowed even direct recourse to
this Court31 or to the Court of Appeals32 via a special civil action for certiorari from a
trial courts quashal of a search warrant.
5Entitled "An Act to Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped or marked Bottles,
Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels and Other Similar Containers," effective 5 June
1951.
6Entitled "An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act Numbered Six
Hundred Twenty Three as to Include the Contaners of Compressed Gases
within the Purview of the said Act," effective 21 June 1969.
7 Rollo, p. 66.
8 Id. at 72.
9 CA rollo, pp. 37-51.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of 10 Rollo, pp. 161-165.
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74563 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
seized items should be kept in custodia legis. Costs against petitioner. 11 Id. at 165.
SO ORDERED. 12 CA rollo, pp. 63-73.

13 Id. at 77-80.

14 Id. at 93-116.
Footnotes 15 Supra note 1.
1Rollo, pp. 44-57. Penned by Court of Appeals Justice Buenaventura J. 16 Supra note 2.
Guerrero, Chairperson of the Second Division, and concurred in by Justices
Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Regalado E. Maambong.
17 Id. at 21-22.
2 CA rollo, p. 5.
18 Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 397 Phil. 892, 924 (2000).
3 Id.
19 126 Phil. 738 (1967).
4 Id. at 6.
20Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152392, 26 May
2005, 459 SCRA 147.
21 Rollo, p. 163.

22 Del Rosario v. People, 410 Phil. 642, 662 (2001).

23 Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 875, 903 (1996).

24Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 154239-41, 16 February 2005,

451 SCRA 533, 550.

25La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Hon. Fernandez, etc. et al., 214 Phil. 332,
349 (1984).

26 Rollo, p. 307.

27 214 Phil. 332 (1984).

28 Id. at 350.

29Sec. 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to the court; return and
proceedings thereon, - (a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property
seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory
thereof duly verified under oath.

30 People v. Benny Go, 451 Phil. 885, 912-913 (2003).

31See Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Flores, G.R. No. 78631, 29 June 1993,
2223 SCRA 761.

32See Washington Distillers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 650

(1996), 20th Century 3Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals, Nos. L-
76649-51, 19 August 1988, 164 SCRA 655.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 163858 June 28, 2005
UNITED LABORATORIES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ERNESTO ISIP and/or SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES and/or OCCUPANTS, Shalimar
Building, No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Rolando H. Besarra, Special Investigator III of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), filed an application, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, for the
issuance of a search warrant concerning the first and second floors of the Shalimar
Building, located at No. 1571, Aragon Street (formerly No. 1524, Lacson Avenue,
Sta. Cruz, Manila) occupied and/or used by Shalimar Philippines, owned/operated by
Ernesto Isip; and for the seizure of the following for violation of Section 4(a), in
relation to Section 8, of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8203:
a. Finished or unfinished products of UNITED LABORATORIES (UNILAB),
particularly REVICON multivitamins;
b. Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages, wrappers,
receptacles, advertisements and other paraphernalia used in the offering for
sale, sale and/or distribution of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins;
c. Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals,
purchase orders and all other books of accounts and documents used in
recording the manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or sales of
counterfeit REVICON multivitamins.1
The application was docketed as People v. Ernesto Isip, et al., Respondents, Search
Warrant Case No. 04-4916 and raffled to Branch 24 of the court. Appended thereto
were the following: (1) a sketch2 showing the location of the building to be searched;
(2) the affidavit3 of Charlie Rabe of the Armadillo Protection and Security Agency
hired by United Laboratories, Inc. (UNILAB), who allegedly saw the manufacture,
production and/or distribution of fake drug products such as Revicon by Shalimar
Philippines; (3) the letter-request of UNILAB, the duly licensed and exclusive
manufacturer and/or distributor of Revicon and Disudrin, for the monitoring of the
unauthorized production/manufacture of the said drugs and, if warranted, for their
seizure; (4) the letter-complaint4 of UNILAB issued through its Director of the Security
and Safety Group; and (5) the joint affidavit5 of NBI Agents Roberto Divinagracia and
Rolando Besarra containing the following allegations:
2. When learned that an Asset was already placed by ARMADILLO
PROTECTIVE AND SECURITY AGENCY named CHARLIE RABE, who was
renting a room since November 2003, at the said premises located at No.
1571 Aragon St., Sta. Cruz, Manila. MR. RABE averred that the owner of the
premises is a certain MR. ERNESTO ISIP and that the said premises which
is known as SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES, Shalimar Building, are being used to
manufacture counterfeit UNILAB products, particularly REVICON
multivitamins, which was already patented by UNILAB since 1985;
3. Upon verification of the report, we found out that the said premises is a
six-story structure, with an additional floor as a penthouse, and colored red-
brown. It has a tight security arrangement wherein non-residents are not
allowed to enter or reconnoiter in the premises;
4. We also learned that its old address is No. 1524 Lacson Avenue, Sta.
Cruz, Manila, and has a new address as 1571 Aragon St., Sta. Cruz, Manila;
and that the area of counterfeiting operations are the first and second floors
of Shalimar Building;
5. Since we cannot enter the premises, we instructed the Asset to take
pictures of the area especially the places wherein the clandestine
manufacturing operations were being held. At a peril to his well-being and
security, the Asset was able to take photographs herein incorporated into this
Search Warrant Application.6
A representative from UNILAB, Michael Tome, testified during the hearing on the
application for the search warrant. After conducting the requisite searching questions,
the court granted the application and issued Search Warrant No. 04-4916 dated
January 27, 2004, directing any police officer of the law to conduct a search of the
first and second floors of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon Street,
Sta. Cruz, Manila. The court also directed the police to seize the following items:
 a. Finished or unfinished products of UNITED LABORATORIES (UNILAB),
particularly REVICON multivitamins;
b. Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages, wrappers,
receptacles, advertisements and other paraphernalia used in the offering for
sale, sale and/or distribution of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins;
c. Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals,
purchase orders and all other books of accounts and documents used in
recording the manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or sales of
counterfeit REVICON multivitamins.7
The court also ordered the delivery of the seized items before it, together with a true
inventory thereof executed under oath.
The search warrant was implemented at 4:30 p.m. on January 27, 2004 by NBI
agents Besarra and Divinagracia, in coordination with UNILAB employees. No fake
Revicon multivitamins were found; instead, there were sealed boxes at the first and
second floors of the Shalimar Building which, when opened by the NBI agents in the
presence of respondent Isip, contained the following:
QUANTITY/UNIT DESCRIPTION
792 Bottles Disudrin 60 ml.
30 Boxes (100 pieces each) Inoflox 200 mg.8
NBI Special Investigator Divinagracia submitted an inventory of the things seized in
which he declared that the search of the first and second floors of the Shalimar
Building at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, the premises described in the
warrant, was done in an orderly and peaceful manner. He also filed a Return of
Search Warrant,9 alleging that no other articles/items other than those mentioned in
the warrant and inventory sheet were seized. The agent prayed that of the items
seized, ten boxes of Disudrin 60 ml., and at least one box of Inoflox be turned over to
the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. 10 The court
issued an order granting the motion, on the condition that the turn over be made
before the court, in the presence of a representative from the respondents and the
court.11
The respondents filed an "Urgent Motion to Quash the Search Warrant or to
Suppress Evidence."12 They contended that the implementing officers of the NBI
conducted their search at the first, second, third and fourth floors of the building at
No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila, where items in "open display" were
allegedly found. They pointed out, however, that such premises was different from
the address described in the search warrant, the first and second floors of the
Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The
respondents, likewise, asserted that the NBI officers seized Disudrin and Inoflox
products which were not included in the list of properties to be seized in the search
warrant.
UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the motion, insisting that the search
was limited to the first and second floors of the Shalimar building located at the
corner of Aragon Street and Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They averred that,
based on the sketch appended to the search warrant application, Rabes affidavit, as
well as the joint affidavit of Besarra and Divinagracia, the building where the search
was conducted was located at No. 1571, Aragon Street corner Lacson Avenue, Sta.
Cruz, Manila. They pointed out that No. 1524 Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila was
the old address, and the new address was No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila. They maintained that the warrant was not implemented in any other place.13
In reply, the respondents insisted that the items seized were different from those
listed in the search warrant. They also claimed that the seizure took place in the
building located at No. 1524-A which was not depicted in the sketch of the premises
which the applicant submitted to the trial court.14 In accordance with the ruling of this
Court in People v. Court of Appeals,15 the respondents served a copy of their
pleading on UNILAB.16
On March 11, 2004, the trial court issued an Order 17 granting the motion of the
respondents, on the ground that the things seized, namely, Disudrin and Inoflox,
were not those described in the search warrant. On March 16, 2004, the trial court
issued an advisory18 that the seized articles could no longer be admitted in evidence
against the respondents in any proceedings, as the search warrant had already been
quashed.
UNILAB, through the Ureta Law Office, filed a motion, in collaboration with the NBI
agents, for the reconsideration of the order, contending that the ground used by the
court in quashing the warrant was not that invoked by the respondents, and that the
seizure of the items was justified by the plain view doctrine. The respondents
objected to the appearance of the counsel of UNILAB, contending that the latter
could not appear for the People of the Philippines. The respondents moved that the
motion for reconsideration of UNILAB be stricken off the record. Disputing the claims
of UNILAB, they insisted that the items seized were contained in boxes at the time of
the seizure at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue corner Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila,
and were not apparently incriminating on plain view. Moreover, the seized items were
not those described and itemized in the search warrant application, as well as the
warrant issued by the court itself. The respondents emphasized that the Shalimar
Laboratories is authorized to manufacture galenical preparations of the following
products:
UNILAB prayed that an ocular inspection be conducted of the place searched by the
NBI officers.20 In their rejoinder, the respondents manifested that an ocular inspection
was the option to look forward to.21 However, no such ocular inspection of the said
premises was conducted.
In the meantime, the BFAD submitted to the court the result of its examination of the
Disudrin and Inoflox samples which the NBI officers seized from the Shalimar
Building. On its examination of the actual component of Inoflox, the BFAD declared
that the substance failed the test.22 The BFAD, likewise, declared that the examined
Disudrin syrup failed the test.23 The BFAD had earlier issued the following report:

Products:

PRODUCT NAME Manufacturer L.N. E.D. FINDINGS

- Povidone Iodine On May
28, 1.Phenylpropanolamine Unilab 21021552 3-06 -Registered,
- Chamomile Oil 2004, (Disudrin) however,
the trial 12.5 mg./5mL Syrup label/physical
appearance does
- Salicylic Acid 10 g. court not conform with
issued the BFAD
an approved label/
- Hydrogen Peroxide 3% Topical Solution registered
Order25 specifications.
denying
- Aceite de Alcamforado the
motion 2.Ofloxacin (Inoflox) Unilab 99017407 3-05 -Registered,
- Aceite de Manzanilla19 200 mg. tablet. however,
for label/physical
reconsid appearance does
In a manifestation and opposition, the respondents assailed the appearance of the eration not conform with
counsel of UNILAB, and insisted that it was not authorized to appear before the court filed by the BFAD
approved label/
under the Rules of Court, and to file pleadings. They averred that the BFAD was the UNILAB. registered
authorized government agency to file an application for a search warrant. The specifications.24
court
In its counter-manifestation, UNILAB averred that it had the personality to file the declared that:
motion for reconsideration because it was the one which sought the filing of the
application for a search warrant; besides, it was not proscribed by Rule 126 of the The Search Warrant is crystal clear: The seizing officers were only authorized to take
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure from participating in the proceedings and filing possession of "finished or unfinished products of United Laboratories (UNILAB),
pleadings. The only parties to the case were the NBI and UNILAB and not the State particularly REVICON Multivitamins, and documents evidencing the counterfeit
or public prosecutor. UNILAB also argued that the offended party, or the holder of a nature of said products. The Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized pursuant to the
license to operate, may intervene through counsel under Section 16 of Rule 110, in warrant does not, however, include REVICON but other products. And whether or not
relation to Section 7(e), of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. these seized products are imitations of UNILAB items is beside the point. No
evidence was shown nor any was given during the proceedings on the application for
search warrant relative to the seized products.
On this score alone, the search suffered from a fatal infirmity and, hence, cannot be
sustained.26
UNILAB, thus, filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, where the following issues are raised:
Whether or not the seized 792 bottles of Disudrin 60 ml. and 30 boxes of Inoflox 200
mg. are INADMISSIBLE as evidence against the respondents because they
constitute the "fruit of the poisonous tree" or, CONVERSELY, whether or not the
seizure of the same counterfeit drugs is justified and lawful under the "plain view"
doctrine and, hence, the same are legally admissible as evidence against the
respondents in any and all actions?27
The petitioner avers that it was deprived of its right to a day in court when the trial
court quashed the search warrant for a ground which was not raised by the
respondents herein in their motion to quash the warrant. As such, it argues that the
trial court ignored the issue raised by the respondents. The petitioner insists that by
so doing, the RTC deprived it of its right to due process. The petitioner asserts that
the description in the search warrant of the products to be seized "finished or
unfinished products of UNILAB" is sufficient to include counterfeit drugs within the
premises of the respondents not covered by any license to operate from the BFAD,
and/or not authorized or licensed to manufacture, or repackage drugs produced or
manufactured by UNILAB. Citing the ruling of this Court in Padilla v. Court of
Appeals,28 the petitioner asserts that the products seized were in plain view of the
officers; hence, may be seized by them. The petitioner posits that the respondents
themselves admitted that the seized articles were in open display; hence, the said
articles were in plain view of the implementing officers.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petition should have
been filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) because factual questions are raised.
They also assert that the petitioner has no locus standi to file the petition involving
the validity and the implementation of the search warrant. They argue that the
petitioner merely assisted the NBI, the BFAD and the Department of Justice; hence, it
should have impleaded the said government agencies as parties-petitioners. The
petition should have been filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf
of the NBI and/or the BFAD, because under the 1987 Revised Administrative Code,
the OSG is mandated to represent the government and its officers charged in their
official capacity in cases before the Supreme Court. The respondents further assert
that the trial court may consider issues not raised by the parties if such consideration
would aid the court in the just determination of the case.
The respondents, likewise, maintain that the raiding team slashed the sealed boxes
so fast even before respondent Isip could object. They argue that the seizure took
place at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 220778, and not at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila covered by TCT No. 174412 as stated in the search warrant. They assert that
the ruling of the Court inPeople v. Court of Appeals29 is applicable in this case. They
conclude that the petitioner failed to prove the factual basis for the application of the
plain view doctrine.30
In reply, the petitioner asserts that it has standing and is, in fact, the real party-in-
interest to defend the validity of the search warrant issued by the RTC; after all, it
was upon its instance that the application for a search warrant was filed by the NBI,
which the RTC granted. It asserts that it is not proscribed under R.A. No. 8203 from
filing a criminal complaint against the respondents and requesting the NBI to file an
application for a search warrant. The petitioner points out that the Rules of Criminal
Procedure does not specifically prohibit a private complainant from defending the
validity of a search warrant. Neither is the participation of a state prosecutor provided
in Rule 126 of the said Rules. After all, the petitioner insists, the proceedings for the
application and issuance of a search warrant is not a criminal action. The petitioner
asserts that the place sought to be searched was sufficiently described in the warrant
for, after all, there is only one building on the two parcels of land described in two
titles where Shalimar Philippines is located, the place searched by the NBI
officers.31 It also asserts that the building is located at the corner of Aragon Street
and Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila.32
The petitioner avers that the plain view doctrine is applicable in this case because the
boxes were found outside the door of the respondents laboratory on the garage
floor. The boxes aroused the suspicion of the members of the raiding team
precisely because these were marked with the distinctive UNILAB logos. The boxes
in which the items were contained were themselves so designated to replicate true
and original UNILAB boxes for the same medicine. Thus, on the left hand corner of
one side of some of the boxes33 the letters "ABR" under the words "60 ml," appeared
to describe the condition/quality of the bottles inside (as it is with genuine UNILAB
box of the true medicine of the same brand). The petitioner pointed out that "ABR" is
the acronym for "amber bottle round" describing the bottles in which the true and
original Disudrin (for children) is contained.
The petitioner points out that the same boxes also had their own "license plates"
which were instituted as among its internal control/countermeasures. The license
plates indicate that the items within are, supposedly, "Disudrin." The NBI officers had
reasonable ground to believe that all the boxes have one and the same data
appearing on their supposedly distinctive license plates. The petitioner insists that
although some of the boxes marked with the distinctive UNILAB logo were, indeed,
sealed, the tape or seal was also a copy of the original because these, too, were
marked with the distinctive UNILAB logo. The petitioner appended to its pleading
pictures of the Shalimar building and the rooms searched showing respondent
Isip;34 the boxes seized by the police officers containing Disudrin syrup; 35 and the
boxes containing Inoflox and its contents.36
The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether the petitioner is the proper
party to file the petition at bench; (2) whether it was proper for the petitioner to file the
present petition in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; and (3) whether the
search conducted by the NBI officers of the first and second floors of the Shalimar
building and the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin
syrup and Inoflox, were valid.
On the first issue, we agree with the petitioners contention that a search warrant
proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action37 or the commencement of a
prosecution.38 The proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely for the
discovery and to get possession of personal property. It is a special and peculiar
remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of public necessity. It
resembles in some respect with what is commonly known as John Doe
proceedings.39 While an application for a search warrant is entitled like a criminal
action, it does not make it such an action.
A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery
employed by the State to procure relevant evidence of crime. 40 It is in the nature of a
criminal process, restricted to cases of public prosecutions. 41 A search warrant is a
police weapon, issued under the police power. A search warrant must issue in the
name of the State, namely, the People of the Philippines.42
A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not a process for adjudicating
civil rights or maintaining mere private rights.43 It concerns the public at large as
distinguished from the ordinary civil action involving the rights of private persons. 44 It
may only be applied for in the furtherance of public prosecution.45
However, a private individual or a private corporation complaining to the NBI or to a
government agency charged with the enforcement of special penal laws, such as the
BFAD, may appear, participate and file pleadings in the search warrant proceedings
to maintain, inter alia, the validity of the search warrant issued by the court and the
admissibility of the properties seized in anticipation of a criminal case to be filed; such
private party may do so in collaboration with the NBI or such government agency.
The party may file an opposition to a motion to quash the search warrant issued by
the court, or a motion for the reconsideration of the court order granting such motion
to quash.46
In this case, UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the respondents motion
to quash the search warrant. The respondents served copies of their reply and
opposition/comment to UNILAB, through Modesto Alejandro, Jr. 47 The court a
quo allowed the appearance of UNILAB and accepted the pleadings filed by it and its
counsel.
The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court
to assail any adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the
People of the Philippines, through the OSG. However, inColumbia Pictures
Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 the Court allowed a private corporation (the
complainant in the RTC) to file a petition for certiorari, and considered the petition as
one filed by the OSG. The Court in the said case even held that the petitioners
therein could argue its case in lieu of the OSG:
From the records, it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were involved in the
proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano,
the Court declared that while the general rule is that it is only the Solicitor General
who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic
of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals,
if there appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due process,
the petition will be deemed filed by the private complainants therein as if it were filed
by the Solicitor General. In line with this ruling, the Court gives this petition due
course and will allow petitioners to argue their case against the questioned order in
lieu of the Solicitor General.49
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts.
However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by
the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before
it.50 In this case, the Court has opted to take cognizance of the petition, considering
the nature of the issues raised by the parties.
The Court does not agree with the petitioners contention that the issue of whether
the Disudrin and Inoflox products were lawfully seized was never raised in the
pleadings of the respondents in the court a quo. Truly, the respondents failed to raise
the issue in their motion to quash the search warrant; in their reply, however, they
averred that the seized items were not included in the subject warrant and, therefore,
were not lawfully seized by the raiding team. They also averred that the said articles
were not illegal per se, like explosives and shabu, as to justify their seizure in the
course of unlawful search.51 In their Opposition/Comment filed on March 15, 2004,
the respondents even alleged the following:
The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is limited to the determination of whether
there is a legal basis to quash the search warrant and/or to suppress the seized
articles in evidence. Since the articles allegedly seized during the implementation of
the search warrant Disudrin and Inoflux products were not included in the search
warrant, they were, therefore, not lawfully seized by the raiding team; they are not
illegal per se, as it were, like an arms cache, subversive materials or shabu as to
justify their seizure in the course of a lawful search, or being in plain view or some
such. No need whatever for some public assay.
The NBI manifestation is a glaring admission that it cannot tell without proper
examination or assay that the Disudrin and Inoflox samples allegedly seized from
respondents place were counterfeit. All the relevant presumptions are in favor of
legality.52
The Court, therefore, finds no factual basis for the contention of the petitioner that the
respondents never raised in the court a quo the issue of whether the seizure of the
Disudrin and Inoflox products was valid.
In any event, the petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the March 11,
2004 Order of the court a quoon the following claims:
2.01 The Honorable Court ERRED in ruling on a non-issue or the issue as to
the alleged failure to particularly describe in the search warrant the items to
be seized but upon which NO challenge was then existing
and/or NO controversy is raised;
2.02 The Honorable Court ERRED in its ruling that "finished or unfinished
products of UNILAB" cannot stand the test of a particular description for
which it then reasons that the search is, supposedly unreasonable; and,
2.03 The Honorable Court ERRED in finding that the evidence seized is
lawfully inadmissible against respondents.53
The court a quo considered the motion of the petitioner and the issue raised by it
before finally resolving to deny the same. It cannot thus be gainsaid that the
petitioner was denied its right to due process.
On the validity of the seizure of the sealed boxes and its contents of Disudrin and
Inoflox, the Court, likewise, rejects the contention of the petitioner.
A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized. The officers of the law are to seize only those things
particularly described in the search warrant. A search warrant is not a sweeping
authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and
confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The search is
limited in scope so as not to be general or explanatory. Nothing is left to the
discretion of the officer executing the warrant.54
Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant but on plain view of the
executing officer may be seized by him. However, the seizure by the officer of
objects/articles/papers not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain
view. The State must adduce evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
confluence of the essential requirements for the doctrine to apply, namely: (a) the
executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or
otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the
officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a
crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.55
The doctrine is not an exception to the warrant. It merely serves to supplement the
prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search as
an incident to a lawful arrest or some other legitimate reason for being present,
unconnected with a search directed against the accused. The doctrine may not be
used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges. It is a recognition of the fact that when
executing police officers comes across immediately incriminating evidence not
covered by the warrant, they should not be required to close their eyes to it,
regardless of whether it is evidence of the crime they are investigating or evidence of
some other crime. It would be needless to require the police to obtain another
warrant.56 Under the doctrine, there is no invasion of a legitimate expectation of
privacy and there is no search within the meaning of the Constitution.
The immediate requirement means that the executing officer can, at the time of
discovery of the object or the facts therein available to him, determine probable
cause of the objects incriminating evidence.57 In other words, to be immediate,
probable cause must be the direct result of the officers instantaneous sensory
perception of the object.58 The object is apparent if the executing officer had probable
cause to connect the object to criminal activity. The incriminating nature of the
evidence becomes apparent in the course of the search, without the benefit of any
unlawful search or seizure. It must be apparent at the moment of seizure.59
The requirement of inadvertence, on the other hand, means that the officer must not
have known in advance of the location of the evidence and intend to seize
it.60 Discovery is not anticipated.61
The immediately apparent test does not require an unduly high degree of certainty as
to the incriminating character of evidence. It requires merely that the seizure be
presumptively reasonable assuming that there is probable cause to associate the
property with criminal activity; that a nexus exists between a viewed object and
criminal activity.62
Incriminating means the furnishing of evidence as proof of circumstances tending to
prove the guilt of a person.63
Indeed, probable cause is a flexible, common sense standard. It merely requires that
the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution and
belief that certain items may be contrabanded or stolen property or useful as
evidence of a crime. It does not require proof that such belief be correct or more likely
than true. A practical, non-traditional probability that incriminating evidence is
involved is all that is required. The evidence thus collected must be seen and verified
as understood by those experienced in the field of law enforcement.64
In this case, Disudrin and/or Inoflox were not listed in the search warrant issued by
the court a quo as among the properties to be seized by the NBI agents. The warrant
specifically authorized the officers only to seize "counterfeit Revicon multivitamins,
finished or unfinished, and the documents used in recording, manufacture and/or
importation, distribution and/or sale, or the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of
the said vitamins." The implementing officers failed to find any counterfeit Revicon
multivitamins, and instead seized sealed boxes which, when opened at the place
where they were found, turned out to contain Inoflox and Disudrin.
It was thus incumbent on the NBI agents and the petitioner to prove their claim that
the items were seized based on the plain view doctrine. It is not enough to prove that
the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents; evidence should have
been adduced to prove the existence of all the essential requirements for the
application of the doctrine during the hearing of the respondents motion to quash, or
at the very least, during the hearing of the NBI and the petitioners motion for
reconsideration on April 16, 2004. The immediately apparent aspect, after all, is
central to the plain view exception relied upon by the petitioner and the NBI. There is
no showing that the NBI and the petitioner even attempted to adduce such evidence.
In fact, the petitioner and the NBI failed to present any of the NBI agents who
executed the warrant, or any of the petitioners representative who was present at the
time of the enforcement of the warrant to prove that the enforcing officers discovered
the sealed boxes inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were
incriminating and immediately apparent.It must be stressed that only the NBI
agent/agents who enforced the warrant had personal knowledge whether the sealed
boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were immediately
apparent.65 There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of the
sealed boxes before they were opened.
In sum then, the Court finds and so hold that the petitioner and the NBI failed to
prove the essential requirements for the application of the plain view doctrine.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed orders of the Regional Trial Court are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1 21
Rollo, p. 95. Id. at 214.

2 22
Id. at 108. Id. at 175.

3 23
Id. at 99. Id. at 177.

4 24
Id. at 103-104. Id. at 182.

5 25
Id. at 106-107. Rollo, pp. 18-19.

6 26
Rollo, p. 106. Id. at 19.

7 27
Id. at 112. Id. at 46.

8 28
Rollo, p. 114. G.R. No. 121917, 12 March 1997, 269 SCRA 402.

9 29
Id. at 116. G.R. No. 126379, 26 June 1998, 291 SCRA 400.

10 30
Id. Rollo, pp. 229-244.

11 31
Rollo, p. 115. Annexes "A" and "A-1," Rollo, p. 285.

12 32
Id. at 117-124. Annex "G," Id. at 125.

13 33
Rollo, pp. 125-128. Annexes "C-2" and "C-4," Id. at 288-289.

14 34
Id. at 129-136. Annexes "A" to "A-1" and "B-2," Rollo, pp. 286-287.

15 35
G.R. No. 126379, 26 June 1998, 291 SCRA 400. Annexes "C-2" and "C-4," Id. at 288-289.

16 36
Rollo, p. 138. Annexes "C-5," "C-6" and "C-7," Id. at 290-291.

17 37
Id. at 153-155. State v. Kieffer, 187 NW 164 (1922).

18 38
Id. at 157. Bevington v. United States, 35 F.2d 584 (1929).

19 39
Rollo, p. 195. State v. Kieffer, supra.

20 40
Rollo, p. 207. Lodyga v. State, 179 NE 542 (1932).
41 60
C.J.S., Searches and Seizures 63, p. 825, citing State v. Derry, 85 N.E. 765; Brooks v. Texas v. Brown, 460 US 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535 (1983).
Wyner, 46 So.2d 97; and Philipps v. Johns, 12 Tenn. App. 354.
61
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra.
42
Section 1, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
62
United States v. Beal, supra.
43
State v. Derry, 86 NE 482 (1908).
63
United States v. Truitt, Jr., 521 F.2d 1174 (1975).
44
Lodyga v. State, supra.
64
Texas v. Brown, supra.
45
State v. Derry, supra.
65
People v. Go, supra.
46
20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-76649-51, 19 August
1988, 164 SCRA 655.
Republic of the Philippines
47 SUPREME COURT
Rollo, p. 145.
Manila
48
G.R. No. 111267, 20 September 1996, 262 SCRA 219.
SECOND DIVISION
49
Id. at 224.
G.R. No. 170180 November 23, 2007
50
Ark Travel Express, Inc. v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 137010, 29 August 2003, 410 SCRA 148.
ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ, Petitioner,
51
Rollo, pp. 131-132. vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
52
Rollo, pp. 140-141.

53
DECISION
Id. at 23.

54
TINGA, J.:
People v. Go, G.R. No. 144639, 12 September 2003, 411 SCRA 81.

55
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971). The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is not only
ancient. It is also zealously safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the right of the
56
United States v. Gray, 484 F.2d 352 (1973). people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.1 Any evidence obtained in violation of said
57
United States v. Beal, 810 F.2d 574 (1987). right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Indeed, while the
power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it
58
Ibid. must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional
rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to
59
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra. justify indifference to the basic principles of government.2
On appeal is the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals dated 28 July 2005, affirming the
Judgment4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Agoo, La Union dated 31
March 2004 finding petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165) 5 and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion
temporal medium as maximum and ordering him to pay a fine ofP350,000.00.6
I.
On 26 June 2003, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, par. 2(2) of
R.A. No. 9165 in an Information7 which reads:
That on or about the 17th day of March 2003, in the Municipality of Aringay, Province
of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, control and custody dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a cellophane and
newspaper page, weighing more or less twenty-five (25) grams, without first securing
the necessary permit, license or prescription from the proper government agency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued
with the prosecution presenting the three (3) barangay tanods of San Benito Norte,
Aringay, La Union namely, Rogelio Bautista (Bautista), Nestor Aratas (Aratas) and
Eduardo Ordoo (Ordoo), who arrested petitioner.
Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was
conducting the routine patrol along the National Highway in Barangay San Benito
Norte, Aringay, La Union together with Aratas and Ordoo when they noticed
petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus. The tanods observed that petitioner,
who appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for something. They thus
approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to run away. They chased him,
put him under arrest and thereafter brought him to the house of Barangay Captain
Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by
Mercado to open his bag. Petitioners bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants,
eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and
cellophane. It was then that petitioner was taken to the police station for further
investigation.9
Aratas and Ordoo corroborated Bautistas testimony on most material points. On
cross-examination, however, Aratas admitted that he himself brought out the
contents of petitioners bag before petitioner was taken to the house of
Mercado.10 Nonetheless, he claimed that at Mercados house, it was petitioner
himself who brought out the contents of his bag upon orders from Mercado. For his
part, Ordoo testified that it was he who was ordered by Mercado to open petitioners
bag and that it was then that they saw the purported contents thereof.11
The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector Valeriano Laya II (Laya), the
forensic chemist who conducted the examination of the marijuana allegedly
confiscated from petitioner. Laya maintained that the specimen submitted to him for
analysis, a sachet of the substance weighing 23.10 grams and contained in a plastic
bag, tested positive of marijuana. He disclosed on cross-examination, however, that
he had knowledge neither of how the marijuana was taken from petitioner nor of how
the said substance reached the police officers. Moreover, he could not identify whose
marking was on the inside of the cellophane wrapping the marijuana leaves.12
The charges were denied by petitioner. As the defenses sole witness, he testified
that at around 8:30 p.m. on 17 March 2003, he arrived in Aringay from his place in
Curro-oy, Santol, La Union. After alighting from the bus, petitioner claimed that he
went to the house of a friend to drink water and then proceeded to walk to his
brothers house. As he was walking, prosecution witness Ordoo, a cousin of his
brothers wife, allegedly approached him and asked where he was going. Petitioner
replied that he was going to his brothers house. Ordoo then purportedly requested
to see the contents of his bag and appellant acceded. It was at this point that
Bautista and Aratas joined them. After inspecting all the contents of his bag,
petitioner testified that he was restrained by thetanod and taken to the house of
Mercado. It was Aratas who carried the bag until they reached their destination. 13
Petitioner maintained that at Mercados house, his bag was opened by the tanod and
Mercado himself. They took out an item wrapped in newspaper, which later turned
out to be marijuana leaves. Petitioner denied ownership thereof. He claimed to have
been threatened with imprisonment by his arrestors if he did not give the prohibited
drugs to someone from the east in order for them to apprehend such person. As
petitioner declined, he was brought to the police station and charged with the instant
offense. Although petitioner divulged that it was he who opened and took out the
contents of his bag at his friends house, he averred that it was one of the tanod who
did so at Mercados house and that it was only there that they saw the marijuana for
the first time.14
e. replied that he was going to his brother'en proceeded to walk to his brother'w
Finding that the prosecution had proven petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
the RTC rendered judgment against him and sentenced him to suffer indeterminate
imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium
as minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium as maximum and
ordered him to pay a fine of P350,000.00.15
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of
Appeals.1wphi1 On 28 July 2005, the appellate court affirmed the challenged
decision. The Court of Appeals, finding no cogent reason to overturn the presumption
of regularity in favor of the barangay tanod in the absence of evidence of ill-motive on
their part, agreed with the trial court that there was probable cause to arrest
petitioner. It observed further:
That the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana
is of no moment. Such circumstance finds prominence only when the existence of the
seized prohibited drugs is denied. In this case, accused-appellant himself testified
that the marijuana wrapped in a newspaper was taken from his bag. The corpus
delicti of the crime, i.e.[,] the existence of the marijuana and his possession thereof,
was amply proven by accused-appellant Valdezs own testimony.16
In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the crime
charged had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues, albeit for the first
time on appeal, that the warrantless arrest effected against him by the
barangay tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless search of his bag that followed
was likewise contrary to law. Consequently, he maintains, the marijuana leaves
purportedly seized from him are inadmissible in evidence for being the fruit of a
poisonous tree.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies are accorded great respect and weight, in the absence of any
clear showing that some facts and circumstances of weight or substance which could
have affected the result of the case have been overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied.17
After meticulous examination of the records and evidence on hand, however, the
Court finds and so holds that a reversal of the decision a quo under review is in
order.
II.
At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find any objection by
petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and
his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any
defect in his arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over his person.18Petitioners warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the
basis of his acquittal.
However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is
indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged
contraband was lawful. The search, conducted as it was without a warrant, is justified
only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest.19 Evaluating the evidence on record in its
totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner
without a warrant is not lawful as well.
Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was approached by the tanod and
asked to show the contents of his bag, he was simply herded without explanation and
taken to the house of the barangay captain. On their way there, it was Aratas who
carried his bag. He denies ownership over the contraband allegedly found in his bag
and asserts that he saw it for the first time at the barangay captains house.
Even casting aside petitioners version and basing the resolution of this case on the
general thrust of the prosecution evidence, the unlawfulness of petitioners arrest
stands out just the same.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions
on which a person may be arrested without a warrant, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
 (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
xxx
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not one
of these circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their
own admission, petitioner was not committing an offense at the time he alighted from
the bus, nor did he appear to be then committing an offense. 20 The tanod did not
have probable cause either to justify petitioners warrantless arrest.
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two
(2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer.21 Here, petitioners act of looking around after getting off the bus
was but natural as he was finding his way to his destination. That he purportedly
attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself
be construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal knowledge that
petitioner had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage
in criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away but
in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they approached him.
Even taking the prosecutions version generally as the truth, in line with our
assumption from the start, the conclusion will not be any different. It is not
unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking the street at night, after being closely
observed and then later tailed by three unknown persons, would attempt to flee at
their approach. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be
attributed to ones consciousness of guilt.22 Of persuasion was the Michigan
Supreme Court when it ruled in People v. Shabaz23 that "[f]light alone is not a reliable
indicator of guilt without other circumstances because flight alone is inherently
ambiguous." Alone, and under the circumstances of this case, petitioners flight lends
itself just as easily to an innocent explanation as it does to a nefarious one.
Moreover, as we pointed out in People v. Tudtud,24 "[t]he phrase in his presence
therein, connot[es] penal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer. The right of
the accused to be secure against any unreasonable searches on and seizure of his
own body and any deprivation of his liberty being a most basic and fundamental one,
the statute or rule that allows exception to the requirement of a warrant of arrest is
strictly construed. Its application cannot be extended beyond the cases specifically
provided by law."25
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared dubious,
cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity enough to
validate his warrantless arrest.26 If at all, the search most permissible for the tanod to
conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any
suspicion they have been harboring based on petitioners behavior. However, a stop-
and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio,27 must precede a warrantless arrest, be
limited to the persons outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine
reason, in light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. 28
Accordingly, petitioners waiver of his right to question his arrest notwithstanding, the
marijuana leaves allegedly taken during the search cannot be admitted in evidence
against him as they were seized during a warrantless search which was not
lawful.29 As we pronounced in People v. Bacla-an
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The following
searches and seizures are deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search of
moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches (4) waiver or consent
searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a
lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an
equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate
if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible
warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot
pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.30
When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante
delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot
therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless search conducted on petitioner
was incidental to a lawful arrest.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that apart from the
warrantless search being incidental to his lawful arrest, petitioner had consented to
the search. We are not convinced. As we explained in Caballes v. Court of
Appeals31
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures
is a personal right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to
validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal,
specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Hence,
consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. The question whether a consent to a search was in fact
voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the
person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of
the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he
objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of
the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's
belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State which
has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary
consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. 32
In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution albeit based on
conflicting testimonies on when petitioners bag was actually opened, it is apparent
that petitioner was already under the coercive control of the public officials who had
custody of him when the search of his bag was demanded. Moreover, the
prosecution failed to prove any specific statement as to how the consent was asked
and how it was given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his
alleged "consent." Even granting that petitioner admitted to opening his bag when
Ordoo asked to see its contents, his implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have
been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating
circumstances and hence, is considered no consent at all within the contemplation of
the constitutional guarantee.33 As a result, petitioners lack of objection to the search
and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary
submission to the warrantless search and seizure.34
III.
Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana leaves for being the
fruit of an unlawful search is not the lone cause that militates against the case of the
prosecution. We likewise find that it has failed to convincingly establish the identity of
the marijuana leaves purportedly taken from petitioners bag.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the following elements
must concur: (1) proof that the transaction took place; and (2) presentation in court of
the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.35 The existence of dangerous drugs is
a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it being
the very corpus delicti of the crime.36
In a line of cases, we have ruled as fatal to the prosecutions case its failure to prove
that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly
seized from the accused.37 There can be no crime of illegal possession of a
prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was
the same specimen examined and established to be the prohibited drug.38 As we
discussed in People v. Orteza39 , where we deemed the prosecution to have failed in
establishing all the elements necessary for conviction of appellant for illegal sale
of shabu
First, there appears nothing in the record showing that police officers complied with
the proper procedure in the custody of seized drugs as specified in People v. Lim,
i.e., any apprehending team having initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia
should, immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically
inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused, if there be any, and or
his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with the requirement raises
doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court
was actually recovered from appellant. It negates the presumption that official duties
have been regularly performed by the police officers.
In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana
immediately after the apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the deviation
from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the
origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecution
failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.
The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives
failed to place markings on the seized marijuana at the time the accused was
arrested and to observe the procedure and take custody of the drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material inconsistencies
with regard to when and where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of
inventory on the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the
corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the accused due to the prosecutions failure
to indubitably show the identity of the shabu.
In the case at bar, after the arrest of petitioner by the barangay tanod, the records
only show that he was taken to the house of the barangay captain and thereafter to
the police station. The Joint Affidavit40 executed by the tanod merely states that they
confiscated the marijuana leaves which they brought to the police station together
with petitioner. Likewise, the Receipt41 issued by the Aringay Police Station merely
acknowledged receipt of the suspected drugs supposedly confiscated from petitioner.
Not only did the three tanod contradict each other on the matter of when petitioners
bag was opened, they also gave conflicting testimony on who actually opened the
same. The prosecution, despite these material inconsistencies, neglected to explain
the discrepancies. Even more damning to its cause was the admission by Laya, the
forensic chemist, that he did not know how the specimen was taken from petitioner,
how it reached the police authorities or whose marking was on the cellophane
wrapping of the marijuana. The non-presentation, without justifiable reason, of the
police officers who conducted the inquest proceedings and marked the seized drugs,
if such was the case, is fatal to the case. Plainly, the prosecution neglected to
establish the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized marijuana leaves from
the time they were first allegedly discovered until they were brought for examination
by Laya.
The Court of Appeals found as irrelevant the failure of the prosecution to establish
the chain of custody over the seized marijuana as such "[f]inds prominence only
when the existence of the seized prohibited drug is denied."42We cannot agree.
To buttress its ratiocination, the appellate court narrowed on petitioners testimony
that the marijuana was taken from his bag, without taking the statement in full
context.43 Contrary to the Court of Appeals findings, although petitioner testified that
the marijuana was taken from his bag, he consistently denied ownership
thereof.44Furthermore, it defies logic to require a denial of ownership of the seized
drugs before the principle of chain of custody comes into play.
The onus of proving culpability in criminal indictment falls upon the State. In
conjunction with this, law enforcers and public officers alike have the corollary duty to
preserve the chain of custody over the seized drugs. The chain of evidence is
constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and recording, and must
exist from the time the evidence is found until the time it is offered in evidence. Each
person who takes possession of the specimen is duty-bound to detail how it was
cared for, safeguarded and preserved while in his or her control to prevent alteration
or replacement while in custody. This guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be
used against an accused goes to the very heart of his fundamental rights.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty invoked by the
prosecution and relied upon by the courts a quo cannot by itself overcome the
presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.45 Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the most primordial
yet often disregarded is the presumption of innocence. This elementary principle
accords every accused the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the burden of proving the guilt of the accused rests
upon the prosecution.
Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated. Nevertheless,
this "[c]annot be used to advance the cause of the prosecution as its evidence must
stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the defense."46 Moreover, where the circumstances are shown to yield
two or more inferences, one inconsistent with the presumption of innocence and the
other compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused for the
reason that the evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and is
inadequate to support a judgment of conviction.47
Drug addiction has been invariably denounced as "an especially vicious crime,"48 and
"one of the most pernicious evils that has ever crept into our society," 49 for those who
become addicted to it "not only slide into the ranks of the living dead, what is worse,
they become a grave menace to the safety of law-abiding members of
society,"50whereas "peddlers of drugs are actually agents of destruction."51 Indeed,
the havoc created by the ruinous effects of prohibited drugs on the moral fiber of
society cannot be underscored enough. However, in the rightfully vigorous campaign
of the government to eradicate the hazards of drug use and drug trafficking, it cannot
be permitted to run roughshod over an accuseds right to be presumed innocent until 2 People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868 (1998).
proven to the contrary and neither can it shirk from its corollary obligation to establish
such guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 3Rollo, pp. 76-89. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, and
concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Monina Arevalo-
In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to overcome the Zenarosa.
presumption of innocence which petitioner enjoys. The failure of the prosecution to
4
prove all the elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt must perforce result Id. at pp. 28-45. Penned by Executive Judge Clifton U. Ganaya.
in petitioners exoneration from criminal liability.
5 Entitled Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
IV.
6 Id. at 44-45.
A final word. We find it fitting to take this occasion to remind the courts to exercise 7
the highest degree of diligence and prudence in deliberating upon the guilt of Records, p. 1.
accused persons brought before them, especially in light of the fundamental rights at
8
stake. Here, we note that the courts a quo neglected to give more serious Id.
consideration to certain material issues in the determination of the merits of the case.
9
We are not oblivious to the fact that in some instances, law enforcers resort to the TSN, 24 February 2004, pp. 3-5, 7, 11-12. See also Records, p. 2.
practice of planting evidence to extract information or even harass civilians.
Accordingly, courts are duty-bound to be "[e]xtra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an 10 TSN, 3 March 2004, p. 11.
innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug
offenses."52 In the same vein, let this serve as an admonition to police officers and 11
Id. at 16.
public officials alike to perform their mandated duties with commitment to the highest
degree of diligence, righteousness and respect for the law. 12 TSN, 16 March 2004, pp. 4-7.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner 13 TSN, 17 March 2004, pp. 3-9.
Arsenio Vergara Valdez is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. The Director of the
Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of petitioner, unless 14 Id. at 10-12, 16-17.
the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of
15 Rollo, pp. 44-45.
the date of his release, or the reasons for his continued confinement, within ten (10)
days from notice. No costs. 16 Id. at 87.

SO ORDERED. 17
People v. Bacla-an, 445 Phil. 729, 746 (2003), citing People v. Mendoza, 327
SCRA 695 (2000). See also People v. Sevilla, 394 Phil. 125 (2000).
Footnotes
18See People v. Bacla-an, 445 Phil. 445 Phil. 729, 748 (2003) citing People v.
1 1987 Const., Art. III, Sec. 2. Lagarto, 326 SCRA 693 (2000) and People v. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283 (1995). See
also People v. Kimura, G.R. No. 130805, 27 April 2004, 428 SCRA 51.
19 People v. Sarap, 447 Phil. 642 (2003). 51, 61, citing People v. Mendiola, supra, People v. Macuto, 176 SCRA 762 (1989),
People v. Vocente, 188 SCRA 100 (1990) and People v. Mariano, 191 SCRA 136
20 TSN, 24 February 2004, p. 11; TSN, 3 March 2004, pp. 9, 19. (1990).

21People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752, 775 (2003), citing People v. Chua, G.R. Nos.
136066-67, 4 February 2003, 396 SCRA 657.
22
People v. Lopez, 371 Phil. 852, 862 (1999), citing People v. Bawar, 262 SCRA 325.
37
See People v. Mapa, G.R. No. 91014, 31 March 1993, 220 SCRA 670 (1993),
People v. Dismuke, G.R. No. 108453, 11 July 1994, 234 SCRA 51, People v.
Casimiro, 383 SCRA 400 (2002), People v. Pedronan, 452 Phil. 226 (2003), People v.
Kimura, G.R. No. 130805, 27 April 2004, 428 SCRA 51, People v. Ong, G.R. No.
137348, 21 June 2004, 432 SCRA 470.

23 424 Mich. 42, 378 N.W.2d 451 (1985). 38

See People v. Ong, supra at 488.

24 458 Phil. 752 (2003). 39 G.R. No. 173051, 31 July 2007.

25 Id. at 777. 40 Records, p. 2.

26 See People v. Mengote, G.R. No. 87059, 22 June 1992, 210 SCRA 174. 41 Id. at 5.

27 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2nd 889 [1968]. 42 Rollo, p. 87.

28 See People v. Chua, 444 Phil. 757 (2003). 43 Id.

29See People v. Bacla-an, supra note 16, citing People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 44 TSN, 17 March 2004, pp. 11-13.
42 (1999).
45
30
People v. Sevilla, 394 Phil. 125, 158 (2000), citing People v. Pagaura, 267 SCRA
Id. at 748-749. 17 (1997), People v. De los Santos, 314 SCRA 303 (1999).

31 424 Phil. 263 (2002). 46People v. Santos, G.R. No. 175593, 17 October 2007, citing People v. Samson,
421 Phil. 104 (2001).
32 Id. at 286.
47People v. Sapal, 385 Phil. 109, 126 (2000), citing People v. Delos Santos, G.R. No.
33 126998, 14 September 1999 and People v. Fider, 223 SCRA 117 (1993).
People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752, 788 (2003), citing People v. Compacion, 414 Phil.
68 (2001).
48Office of the Court Administrator v. Librado, 329 Phil. 432, 435 (1996), citing
34 People v. Nario, 224 SCRA 647 (1993).
Id.

35 49
People v. Hajili, 447 Phil. 283, 295 (2003). Id. citing People v. Policarpio, 158 SCRA 85 (1988).

36 50
People v. Almeida, 463 Phil. 637, 648 (2003), citing People v. Mendiola, 235 SCRA Id. at 436, citing People v. Bati, 189 SCRA 95 (1990), citing People v. Lamug, 172
116 (1994). See also People v. Kimura, G.R. No. 130805, 27 April 2004, 428 SCRA SCRA 349 (1989).
 51 Id. citing People v. Policarpio, supra. The facts are briefly stated as follows:

52People v. Sevilla, 394 Phil. 125, 159 (2000), citing People v. Pagaura supra. See Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as
also People v. Sapal, supra. follows:

That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his/her possession and under his/her custody and control

One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing serial no. 52315 with five (5) live
ammo.

without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper
authorities.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Republic of the Philippines When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded "not guilty."5 Trial on the merits ensued.
SUPREME COURT
Manila During trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses: Senior Police Officer (SPO)2
Antonio Disuanco (Disuanco) of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Central
THIRD DIVISION Police District Command; and Epifanio Deriquito (Deriquito), Records Verifier of the
Firearms and Explosives Division in Camp Crame. Their testimonies are summarized
as follows:
G.R. No. 164815 September 3, 2009

On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., Disuanco received a Dispatch Order from the
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, Petitioner,
desk officer directing him and three (3) other policemen to serve a Warrant of Arrest,
vs.
issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador, against Valeroso for a case of kidnapping with
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
ransom.6
RESOLUTION
After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on Valeroso checking
his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan. Eventually, the team members
NACHURA, J.: proceeded to the Integrated National Police (INP) Central Police Station in Culiat,
Quezon City, where they saw Valeroso about to board a tricyle. Disuanco and his
For resolution is the Letter-Appeal1 of Senior Inspector (Sr. Insp.) Jerry C. Valeroso team approached Valeroso. They put him under arrest, informed him of his
(Valeroso) praying that our February 22, 2008 Decision2 and June 30, 2008 constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. They found a Charter Arms revolver,
Resolution3 be set aside and a new one be entered acquitting him of the crime of bearing Serial No. 52315, with five (5) pieces of live ammunition, tucked in his waist. 7
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
Valeroso was then brought to the police station for questioning. Upon verification in
the Firearms and Explosives Division in Camp Crame, Deriquito presented a
certification8 that the subject firearm was not issued to Valeroso, but was licensed in
the name of a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.9
On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. (Timbol), and Adrian
Yuson testified for the defense. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in the boarding house of his
children located at Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He was
awakened by four (4) heavily armed men in civilian attire who pointed their guns at
him and pulled him out of the room.10 The raiding team tied his hands and placed him
near the faucet (outside the room) then went back inside, searched and ransacked
the room. Moments later, an operative came out of the room and exclaimed, "Hoy,
may nakuha akong baril sa loob!"11
Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a standing warrant for his arrest.
However, the raiding team was not armed with a search warrant.12
Timbol testified that he issued to Valeroso a Memorandum Receipt13 dated July 1,
1993 covering the subject firearm and its ammunition, upon the verbal instruction of
Col. Angelito Moreno.14
On May 6, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97, Quezon City, convicted
Valeroso as charged and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6) years, as
maximum. The gun subject of the case was further ordered confiscated in favor of the
government.15
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed16 the RTC decision but the minimum
term of the indeterminate penalty was lowered to four (4) years and two (2) months.
On petition for review, we affirmed17 in full the CA decision. Valeroso filed a Motion
for Reconsideration18 which was denied with finality19 on June 30, 2008.
Valeroso is again before us through this Letter-Appeal20 imploring this Court to once
more take a contemplative reflection and deliberation on the case, focusing on his
breached constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure. 21
Meanwhile, as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to timely file its
Comment on Valerosos Motion for Reconsideration, it instead filed a Manifestation in
Lieu of Comment.22
In its Manifestation, the OSG changed its previous position and now recommends
Valerosos acquittal. After a second look at the evidence presented, the OSG
considers the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense more credible and thus
concludes that Valeroso was arrested in a boarding house. More importantly, the
OSG agrees with Valeroso that the subject firearm was obtained by the police
officers in violation of Valerosos constitutional right against illegal search and
seizure, and should thus be excluded from the evidence for the prosecution. Lastly,
assuming that the subject firearm was admissible in evidence, still, Valeroso could
not be convicted of the crime, since he was able to establish his authority to possess
the gun through the Memorandum Receipt issued by his superiors.
After considering anew Valerosos arguments through his Letter-Appeal, together
with the OSGs position recommending his acquittal, and keeping in mind that
substantial rights must ultimately reign supreme over technicalities, this Court is
swayed to reconsider.23
The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration.
While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited pleading,
it is within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the same, provided it is filed with
prior leave whenever substantive justice may be better served thereby. 24
This is not the first time that this Court is suspending its own rules or excepting a
particular case from the operation of the rules. In De Guzman v.
Sandiganbayan,25 despite the denial of De Guzmans motion for reconsideration, we
still entertained his Omnibus Motion, which was actually a second motion for
reconsideration. Eventually, we reconsidered our earlier decision and remanded the
case to the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioners evidence. In
that case, we said that if we would not compassionately bend backwards and flex
technicalities, petitioner would surely experience the disgrace and misery of
incarceration for a crime which he might not have committed after all. 26 Also in
Astorga v. People,27 on a second motion for reconsideration, we set aside our earlier
decision, re-examined the records of the case, then finally acquitted Benito Astorga
of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt. And in Sta.
Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,28 by virtue of the January 13, 2004
En Banc Resolution, the Court authorized the Special First Division to suspend the
Rules, so as to allow it to consider and resolve respondents second motion for
reconsideration after the motion was heard on oral arguments. After a re-examination
of the merits of the case, we granted the second motion for reconsideration and set
aside our earlier decision.
Clearly, suspension of the rules of procedure, to pave the way for the re-examination
of the findings of fact and conclusions of law earlier made, is not without basis.
We would like to stress that rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. They are conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the
courts in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical
rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as
they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the other way around.
Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote
justice, it would always be within our power to suspend the rules or except a
particular case from its operation.29
Now on the substantive aspect.
The Court notes that the version of the prosecution, as to where Valeroso was
arrested, is different from the version of the defense. The prosecution claims that
Valeroso was arrested near the INP Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City,
while he was about to board a tricycle. After placing Valeroso under arrest, the
arresting officers bodily searched him, and they found the subject firearm and
ammunition. The defense, on the other hand, insists that he was arrested inside the
boarding house of his children. After serving the warrant of arrest (allegedly for
kidnapping with ransom), some of the police officers searched the boarding house
and forcibly opened a cabinet where they discovered the subject firearm.
After a thorough re-examination of the records and consideration of the joint appeal
for acquittal by Valeroso and the OSG, we find that we must give more credence to
the version of the defense.
Valerosos appeal for acquittal focuses on his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure alleged to have been violated by the arresting
police officers; and if so, would render the confiscated firearm and ammunition
inadmissible in evidence against him.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
From this constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that, as a general rule,
the procurement of a warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly search or
seize the person, house, papers, or effects of any individual.30
To underscore the significance the law attaches to the fundamental right of an
individual against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Constitution succinctly
declares in Article III, Section 3(2), that "any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding."31
The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The following are the well-
recognized instances where searches and seizures are allowed even without a valid
warrant:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. [Seizure] of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties; b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; and d) "plain view" justified mere
seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
 4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.32
8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]
9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire,
sanitary and building regulations.33
In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search
or seizure, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely
a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured.34
In light of the enumerated exceptions, and applying the test of reasonableness laid
down above, is the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition
valid?
We answer in the negative.
For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as an incident to a lawful arrest.
Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
We would like to stress that the scope of the warrantless search is not without
limitations. In People v. Leangsiri,35People v. Cubcubin, Jr.,36 and People v.
Estella,37 we had the occasion to lay down the parameters of a valid warrantless
search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person
arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist
arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officers safety might well be endangered,
and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting
officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestees person in order to
prevent its concealment or destruction.38
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the
apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the
suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latters reach. 39 Otherwise stated,
a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the
person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. 40 The phrase
"within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he might
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.41 A gun on a table or in a
drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as
one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. 42
In the present case, Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest allegedly
for kidnapping with ransom. At that time, Valeroso was sleeping inside the boarding
house of his children. He was awakened by the arresting officers who were heavily
armed. They pulled him out of the room, placed him beside the faucet outside the
room, tied his hands, and then put him under the care of Disuanco. 43 The other police
officers remained inside the room and ransacked the locked cabinet44 where they
found the subject firearm and ammunition.45 With such discovery, Valeroso was
charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that the arresting
officers served the warrant of arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They
placed him immediately under their control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing
him out of the room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to
Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be considered as an "area within his
immediate control" because there was no way for him to take any weapon or to
destroy any evidence that could be used against him.
The arresting officers would have been justified in searching the person of Valeroso,
as well as the tables or drawers in front of him, for any concealed weapon that might
be used against the former. But under the circumstances obtaining, there was no
comparable justification to search through all the desk drawers and cabinets or the
other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.46
It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless search as an
incident to a lawful arrest) is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the
person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the
latter from destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be
strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose.47 In the case before us, search
was made in the locked cabinet which cannot be said to have been within Valerosos
immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what may be
considered as an incident to a lawful arrest.48
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain view
doctrine."
The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find
evidence of defendants guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is
not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes
across an incriminating object.49
As enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr.50 and People v. Leangsiri:51
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them
had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which[,] he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being
present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate
only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.52
Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of Valerosos children,
because they were supposed to serve a warrant of arrest issued against Valeroso. In
other words, the police officers had a prior justification for the intrusion.
Consequently, any evidence that they would inadvertently discover may be used
against Valeroso. However, in this case, the police officers did not just accidentally
discover the subject firearm and ammunition; they actually searched for evidence
against Valeroso.
Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valerosos right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation
of said right is inadmissible in evidence against him.1avvphi1
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the
constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize
may at times be necessary for public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for no
enforcement of any statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the
basic principles of government. Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not
justified in disregarding the rights of an individual in the name of order. Order is too
high a price to pay for the loss of liberty.53
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers
who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions. 54
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped
naked of their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government
becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in
Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law
way above the articles on governmental power.55
Without the illegally seized firearm, Valerosos conviction cannot stand. There is
simply no sufficient evidence to convict him.56 All told, the guilt of Valeroso was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt measured by the required moral certainty for
conviction. The evidence presented by the prosecution was not enough to overcome
the presumption of innocence as constitutionally ordained. Indeed, it would be better
to set free ten men who might probably be guilty of the crime charged than to convict
one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.57
With the foregoing disquisition, there is no more need to discuss the other issues
raised by Valeroso.
One final note. The Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of
basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the awesome
investigative and prosecutory powers of the government.58
 16
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008 Decision and June Embodied in a decision dated May 4, 2004, penned by Associate Justice Andres B.
30, 2008 Resolution are RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Danilo B. Pine and Edgardo F. Sundiam,
is hereby ACQUITTED of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. concurring; rollo, pp. 16-31.

17
SO ORDERED. Rollo, pp. 148-165.

18 Id. at 169-177.
Footnotes
19
1 Id. at 227.
Rollo, pp. 229-232.
20
2 Supra note 1.
Id. at 148-165.
21
3 Rollo, p. 230.
Id. at 227.
22
4 Id. at 239-270.
Records, p. 1.
23
5 See De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 326 Phil. 182 (1996).
Id. at 33.
24
6 Astorga v. People, G.R. No. 154130, August 20, 2004, 437 SCRA 152, 155.
Rollo, p. 149.
25
7 Supra note 23.
Id.
26
8 De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 191.
Exh. "C," Folder of Exhibits.
27
9 Supra note 24.
Rollo, pp. 149-150.
28
10 G.R. Nos. 112526 and 118838, March 16, 2005, 453 SCRA 432.
Id. at 39.
29 Astorga v. People, supra note 24, at 155-156.
11 Valerosos testimony was corroborated by Yuson; id. at 151.
30
12 People v. Sevilla, 394 Phil. 125, 139 (2000).
Rollo, p. 152.
31
13 Id.
Exh. "1," Folder of Exhibits.
32
14 People v. Tudtud, G.R. No. 144037, September 26, 2003, 412 SCRA 142, 153-154;
Rollo, p. 152.
Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 263, 277 (2002); People v. Sevilla, supra note
30, at 139-140; People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 879-880 (1998).
15 The decision was penned by Judge Oscar L. Leviste; id. at 38-45.
33 51
Nachura, Antonio Eduardo B., Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2009, pp. 139- Supra note 35.
142.
52 People v. Cubcubin, Jr., supra note 36, at 272; People v. Leangsiri, supra note 35,
34 Caballes v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32, at 278. at 249-250.

35 53
322 Phil. 226 (1996). People v. Aruta, supra note 32, at 895.

36 54
413 Phil 249 (2001). People v. Cubcubin, Jr., supra note 36, at 270-271.

37 55
443 Phil. 669 (2003). People v. Tudtud, supra note 32, at 168.

38 56
People v. Estella, id. at 685. People v. Sarap, 447 Phil. 642, 652 (2003).

39 57
People v. Cueno, 359 Phil. 151, 163 (1998). Id. at 652-653.

40 58
People v. Cubcubin, Jr., supra note 36, at 271; see People v. Leangsiri, supra note People v. Januario, 335 Phil. 268, 304 (1997).
35.

41 People v. Estella, supra note 37, at 685.

42
Id.

43
Republic of the Philippines
TSN, February 19, 1997, pp. 21-25.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
44 TSN, March 17, 1997, p. 27.

45
EN BANC
Id. at 3.

46 G.R. No. 83988 May 24, 1990

People v. Estella, supra note 37, at 685.

47 Id.
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR
PEOPLES'S RIGHTS (ULAP),petitioners,
48 vs.
Id. at 686.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT
49
COMMAND, respondents.
People v. Cubcubin, Jr., supra note 40, at 271; People v. Leangsiri, supra note 35,
at 249.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for and in his own behalf and co-petitioners.
50 Supra note 40.
PADILLA, J.:
In the Court's decision dated 29 September 1989, petitioners' petition for prohibition
seeking the declaration of the checkpoints as unconstitutional and their dismantling
and/or banning, was dismissed.
Petitioners have filed the instant motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration
of said decision. Before submission of the incident for resolution, the Solicitor
General, for the respondents, filed his comment, to which petitioners filed a reply.
It should be stated, at the outset, that nowhere in the questioned decision did this
Court legalize all checkpoints, i.e. at all times and under all circumstances. What the
Court declared is, that checkpoints are not illegal per se.Thus, under exceptional
circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the balance, or
where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be
allowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when the
situation clears and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely
no reason to remain.
Recent and on-going events have pointed to the continuing validity and need for
checkpoints manned by either military or police forces. The sixth (6th)
attempted coup d' etat (stronger than all previous ones) was staged only last 1
December 1989. Another attempt at a coup d' etat is taken almost for granted. The
NPA, through its sparrow units, has not relented but instead accelerated its
liquidation of armed forces and police personnel. Murders, sex crimes, hold-ups and
drug abuse have become daily occurrences. Unlicensed firearms and ammunition
have become favorite objects of trade. Smuggling is at an all time high. Whether or
not effective as expected, checkpoints have been regarded by the authorities as a
security measure designed to entrap criminals and insurgents and to constitute a
dragnet for all types of articles in illegal trade.
No one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to share with the present
government its ideological beliefs and practices, or commend its political, social and
economic policies or performance. But, at least, one must concede to it the basic
right to defend itself from its enemies and, while in power, to pursue its program of
government intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the
government has the equal right, under its police power, to select the reasonable
means and methods for best achieving them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such
means it has selected.
Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist's
right to "free passage without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it
involves only a brief detention of travellers during which the vehicle's occupants are
required to answer a brief question or two. 1 For as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as
violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search.
These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. As
held by the U.S. Supreme Court:
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring
public. First, the potential interference with legitimate traffic is
minimal. Motorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as
they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the
checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second, checkpoint
operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary
enforcement activity. The regularized manner in which established
checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-
abiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to
serve the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not
chosen by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for making
overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited
enforcement resources. We may assume that such officials will be
unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or
oppressively on motorists as a class, and since field officers may
stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for
abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case
of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of
discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is
subject to post-stop judicial review. 2
The checkpoints are nonetheless attacked by the movants as a warrantless search
and seizure and, therefore, violative of the Constitution. 3
As already stated, vehicles are generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after a
routine inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively
searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of
the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of
the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Again, as held by the U.S.
Supreme Court
Automobiles, because of their mobility, may be searched without a
warrant upon facts not justifying a warrantless search of a residence
or office. Brinegar v. United States, 338 US 160, 93 L Ed 1879, 69 S
Ct 1302 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 69 L Ed
543,45 S Ct 280, 39 ALR 790 (1925). The cases so holding have,
however, always insisted that the officers conducting the search
have 'reasonable or probable cause to believe that they will find the
instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime before
they begin their warrantless search. ... 4
Besides these warrantless searches and seizures at the checkpoints are quite similar
to searches and seizures accompanying warrantless arrests during the commission
of a crime, or immediately thereafter. In People vs. Kagui Malasuqui it was held
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched
for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be
to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest the
most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their
escape in many instances. 5
By the same token, a warrantless search of incoming and outgoing passengers, at
the arrival and departure areas of an international airport, is a practice not
constitutionally objectionable because it is founded on public interest, safety, and
necessity.
Lastly, the Court's decision on checkpoints does not, in any way, validate nor
condone abuses committed by the military manning the checkpoints. The Court's
decision was concerned with power, i.e. whether the government employing the
military has the power to install said checkpoints. Once that power is acknowledged,
the Court's inquiry ceases. True, power implies the possibility of its abuse. But
whether there is abuse in a particular situation is a different "ball game" to be
resolved in the constitutional arena.
The Court, like all other concerned members of the community, has become aware of
how some checkpoints have been used as points of thievery and extortion practiced
upon innocent civilians. Even the increased prices of foodstuffs coming from the
provinces, entering the Metro Manila area and other urban centers, are largely
blamed on the checkpoints, because the men manning them have reportedly become
"experts" in mulcting travelling traders. This, of course, is a national tragedy .
But the Court could not a priori regard in its now assailed decision that the men in
uniform are rascals or thieves. The Court had to assume that the men in uniform live
and act by the code of honor and they are assigned to the checkpoints to protect,
and not to abuse, the citizenry. 6 The checkpoint is a military "concoction." It
behooves the military to improve the QUALITY of their men assigned to these
checkpoints. For no system or institution will succeed unless the men behind it are
honest, noble and dedicated.
In any situation, where abuse marks the operation of a checkpoint, the citizen is not
helpless. For the military is not above but subject to the law. And the courts exist to
see that the law is supreme. Soldiers, including those who man checkpoints, who
abuse their authority act beyond the scope of their authority and are, therefore, liable
criminally and civilly for their abusive acts; 7 This tenet should be ingrained in the
soldiery in the clearest of terms by higher military authorities.
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are
DENIED. This denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
The problem we face in the resolution of this petition arises from our knowledge that
law enforcement officers use checkpoints as opportunities for mulcting oppression,
and other forms of abuse. However, to completely ban checkpoints as
unconstitutional is to lose sight of the fact that the real objective behind their use is
laudable and necessary, If we say that ALL checkpoints are unconstitutional, we are
banning a law enforcement measure not because it is per se illegal but because it is
being used for evil purposes by the soldiers or police who man it.
This is another instance where the Supreme Court is urged to solve a problem of
discipline facing the executive and the military. My reluctant concurrence with the
majority opinion is premised on the hope that our top military and police officials will
devise effective measures which would insure that checkpoints are used only where
absolutely needed and that the officers who are assigned to these checkpoints
discharge their duties as professional soldiers or peace officers in the best traditions
of the military and the police. I repeat that this is a problem of enforcement and not
legality.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I reiterate my original dissent and add the following observations.
The majority would justify the checkpoints on the ground of rampant criminality, e.g.,
the failed coup, the "sparrow" killings, murders, sex crimes, drug abuse, smuggling,
etc. I was not aware that the failure of the authorities to suppress crime was an
excuse to suspend the Bill of Rights. It has always been my impression that even
criminals, and more so the innocent, are entitled to the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
The protection of the security of the State is a convenient pretext of the police state to
suppress individual rights. Constitutional shortcuts should not be allowed in a free
regime where the highest function of authority is precisely to exalt liberty.
The ponencia says that the Constitution is not violated because "the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search." Assuming that this is all the search entails, it
suffers from the additional defect of inefficaciousness, making it virtually useless. It
did not prevent the staging of the December 1 coup, where the rebels used all kinds
of high-powered weapons that were not detected by "a visual search."
Under Article 111, Section 2 of the Constitution, probable cause is determined
"personally by the judge," not by a soldier or a policeman. It is not for the peace
officer to decide when a warrantless search and seizure may be made save in the
exceptional instances allowed, as where a crime is being committed or before or after
its commission. I can hardly believe that the majority is seriously offering this
exception as a continuing situation to justify the regular warrantless searches at the
checkpoints.
It is easy to say that "where abuse marks the operation of a checkpoint, the citizen is
not helpless." Let us at least be realistic. This Court would be the first to dismiss the
complaint if not supported by hard evidence, which we know is not easily come by.
The remedy, in my view. is to remove the source of the evil instead of leaving it
unchecked and then simply suggesting a cure, which is not even effective. It is like
inoculating a patient after exposing him to contagion.
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
The majority states that checkpoints are justified by "grave peril." The question,
however, is whether or not the existence of such grave perils has the effect of
suspending the Bill of Rights, specifically, the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
Under the Constitution, "[a] state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution." (CONST., art. VII, sec. 18). If not even martial law can suspend the
fundamental law, I do not see how a mere executive act can.
That the State has the right to defend itself is a proposition difficult to argue against.
The query, again, is whether or not it may defend itself against its enemies at the
expense of liberty. After fourteen years of authoritarian rule, I think by now we should
have learned our lesson ' and known better.
Although "routine inspections" are another matter, I can not think that the checkpoints
in question have been meant to undertake routine inspections alone. As it is, no
ground rules have been given our law enforcers, which is to say that they have the
carte blanche to search vehicles and even persons without the benefit of a valid
judicial warrant. I do not believe that this can be done in a constitutional regime.
I find references to the case of People v. Kagui Malasugui [63 Phil. 221 (1936)] to be
inapt In that case, there was a waiver of the right against unreasonable search and
secondly, there existed a clear probable cause for search and arrest. Certainly, there
was reason for excepting the case from the rule. Malasugui, however, is an
exception. And obviously, the majority would make a general rule out of it.
Certainly, it is different where the authority has probable cause to believe that a crime
has been committed by a suspect, in which case, it may place him under arrest or
search his person (Malasugui, supra). But I do not think that it may claim the
existence of probable cause for every vehicle or person stopped and searched at a
checkpoint. And precisely, check-points are intended to allow the authorities to fish
for probable cause even if in the beginning there was none. This makes, to my
mind, the setting up of checkpoints unconstitutional.

Footnotes

1 U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 49 L Ed. 2d 1116 (1976).

2 Ibid.

3 Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution.

4 Dyke v. Taylor, 391 US 216, 20 L Ed 538, 88 S Ct 1472.

5 63 Phil. 221.

6 Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SEC. 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.
The Aimed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people
and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and
the integrity of the national territory.

7 Aberca v. Ver, G.R. No. 69866, 15 April 1988, 160 SCRA 590.
 Petitioners are incorporators and officers of MASAGANA GAS CORPORATION
(MASAGANA), an entity engaged in the refilling, sale and distribution of LPG
products. Private respondents Petron Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) are two of the largest bulk suppliers and
producers of LPG in the Philippines. Their LPG products are sold under the marks
"GASUL" and "SHELLANE," respectively. Petron is the registered owner in the
Philippines of the trademarks GASUL and GASUL cylinders used for its LPG
Republic of the Philippines products. It is the sole entity in the Philippines authorized to allow refillers and
SUPREME COURT distributors to refill, use, sell, and distribute GASUL LPG containers, products and its
Manila trademarks. Pilipinas Shell, on the other hand, is the authorized user in the
Philippines of the tradename, trademarks, symbols, or designs of its principal, Shell
THIRD DIVISION International Petroleum Company Limited (Shell International), including the marks
SHELLANE and SHELL device in connection with the production, sale and
G.R. No. 168306 June 19, 2007 distribution of SHELLANE LPGs. It is the only corporation in the Philippines
authorized to allow refillers and distributors to refill, use, sell and distribute
SHELLANE LPG containers and products.7
WILLIAM C. YAO, SR., LUISA C. YAO, RICHARD C. YAO, WILLIAM C. YAO JR.,
and ROGER C. YAO,petitioners,
vs. On 3 April 2003, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent Ritche N. Oblanca
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETRON CORPORATION and PILIPINAS (Oblanca) filed two applications for search warrant with the RTC, Branch 17, Cavite
SHELL PETROLEUM CORP., and its Principal, SHELL INTL PETROLEUM CO. City, against petitioners and other occupants of the MASAGANA compound located
LTD., respondents. at Governors Drive, Barangay Lapidario, Trece Martires, Cavite City, for alleged
violation of Section 155, in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293,
otherwise known as "The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines." 8 The two
DECISION applications for search warrant uniformly alleged that per information, belief, and
personal verification of Oblanca, the petitioners are actually producing, selling,
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: offering for sale and/or distributing LPG products using steel cylinders owned by, and
bearing the tradenames, trademarks, and devices of Petron and Pilipinas Shell,
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, without authority and in violation of the rights of the said entities.
petitioners William C. Yao, Sr., Luisa C. Yao, Richard C. Yao, William C. Yao, Jr.,
and Roger C. Yao pray for the reversal of the Decision dated 30 September In his two separate affidavits9 attached to the two applications for search warrant,
2004,2 and Resolution dated 1 June 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. Oblanca alleged:
79256,3affirming the two Orders, both dated 5 June 2003, of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 17, Cavite City, relative to Search Warrants No. 2-2003 and No. 3- 1. [That] on 11 February 2003, the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") received
2003.4 In the said Orders, the RTC denied the petitioners Motion to Quash Search a letter-complaint from Atty. Bienvenido I. Somera Jr. of Villaraza and Angangco, on
Warrant5 and Motion for the Return of the Motor Compressor and Liquified Petroleum behalf of among others, [Petron Corporation (PETRON)] and Pilipinas Shell
Gas (LPG) Refilling Machine.6 Petroleum Corporation (PSPC), the authorized representative of Shell International
Petroleum Company Limited ("Shell International"), requesting assistance in the
The following are the facts: investigation and, if warranted, apprehension and prosecution of certain persons
and/or establishments suspected of violating the intellectual property rights [of
PETRON] and of PSPC and Shell International.
2. [That] on the basis of the letter-complaint, I, together with Agent Angelo Zarzoso,
was assigned as the NBI agent on the case.
3. [That] prior to conducting the investigation on the reported illegal activities, he
reviewed the certificates of trademark registrations issued in favor of [PETRON],
PSPC and Shell International as well as other documents and other evidence
obtained by the investigative agency authorized by [PETRON], PSPC and Shell
International to investigate and cause the investigation of persons and
establishments violating the rights of [PETRON], PSPC and Shell International,
represented by Mr. Bernabe C. Alajar. Certified copies of the foregoing trademark
registrations are attached hereto as Annexes "A" to ":E".
4. [That] among the establishments alleged to be unlawfully refilling and unlawfully
selling and distributing [Gasul LPG and] Shellane products is Masagana Gas
Corporation ("MASAGANA"). Based on Securities and Exchange Commission
Records, MASAGANA has its principal office address at 9775 Kamagong Street, San
Antonio Village, Makati, Metro Manila. The incorporators and directors of
MASAGANA are William C. Yao, Sr., Luisa C. Yao, Richard C. Yao, William C. Yao,
Jr., and Roger C. Yao. x x x.
5. I confirmed that MASAGANA is not authorized to use [PETRON and] Shellane
LPG cylinders and its trademarks and tradenames or to be refillers or distributors of
[PETRON and] Shellane LPGs.
6. I went to MASAGANAs refilling station located at Governors Drive, Barangay
Lapidario, Trece Martires City (sic), Cavite to investigate its activities. I confirmed that
MASAGANA is indeed engaged in the unauthorized refilling, sale and/or distribution
of [Gasul and] Shellane LPG cylinders. I found out that MASAGANA delivery trucks
with Plate Nos. UMN-971, PEZ-612, WTE-527, XAM-970 and WFC-603 coming in
and out of the refilling plant located at the aforementioned address contained multi-
brand LPG cylinders including [Gasul and] Shellane. x x x.
7. [That] on 13 February 2003, I conducted a test-buy accompanied by Mr. Bernabe
C. Alajar. After asking the purpose of our visit, MASAGANAs guard allowed us to
enter the MASAGANA refilling plant to purchase GASUL and SHELLANE LPGs. x x
x. We were issued an order slip which we presented to the cashiers office located
near the refilling station. After paying the amount x x x covering the cost of the
cylinders and their contents, they were issued Cash Invoice No. 56210 dated
February 13, 2003. We were, thereafter, assisted by the plant attendant in choosing
empty GASUL and SHELLANE 11 kg. cylinders, x x x were brought to the refilling
station [and filled in their presence.] I noticed that no valve seals were placed on the
cylinders.
[That] while inside the refilling plant doing the test-buy, I noticed that stockpiles of
multi-branded cylinders including GASUL and SHELLANE cylinders were stored near
the refilling station. I also noticed that the total land area of the refilling plant is about
7,000 to 10,000 square meters. At the corner right side of the compound immediately
upon entering the gate is a covered area where the maintenance of the cylinders is
taking place. Located at the back right corner of the compound are two storage tanks
while at the left side also at the corner portion is another storage tank. Several
meters and fronting the said storage tank is where the refilling station and the office
are located. It is also in this storage tank where the elevated blue water tank
depicting MASAGANA CORP. is located. About eleven (11) refilling pumps and stock
piles of multi-branded cylinders including Shellane and GASUL are stored in the
refilling station. At the left side of the entrance gate is the guard house with small
door for the pedestrians and at the right is a blue steel gate used for incoming and
outgoing vehicles.
8. [That] on 27 February 2003, I conducted another test-buy accompanied by Mr.
Bernabe C. Alajar. x x x After choosing the cylinders, we were issued an order slip
which we presented to the cashier. Upon payment, Cash Invoice No. 56398 was
issued covering the cost of both GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders and their
contents. x x x Both cylinders were refilled in our presence and no valve seals were
placed on the cylinders.
Copies of the photographs of the delivery trucks, LPG cylinders and registration
papers were also attached to the aforementioned affidavits.10
Bernabe C. Alajar (Alajar), owner of Able Research and Consulting Services Inc.,
was hired by Petron and Pilipinas Shell to assist them in carrying out their Brand
Protection Program. Alajar accompanied Oblanca during the surveillance of and test-
buys at the refilling plant of MASAGANA. He also executed two separate affidavits
corroborating the statements of Oblanca. These were annexed to the two
applications for search warrant.11
After conducting the preliminary examination on Oblanca and Alajar, and upon
reviewing their sworn affidavits and other attached documents, Judge Melchor Q.C.
Sadang (Judge Sadang), Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 17, Cavite City, found
probable cause and correspondingly issued Search Warrants No. 2-2003 and No. 3-
2003.12 The search warrants commanded any peace officer to make an immediate
search of the MASAGANA compound and to seize the following items:
Under Search Warrant No. 2-2003:
a. Empty/filled LPG cylinder tanks/containers, bearing the tradename "SHELLANE",
"SHELL" (Device) of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation and the trademarks and
other devices owned by Shell International Petroleum Company, Ltd.;
b. Machinery and/or equipment being used or intended to be used for the purpose of
illegally refilling LPG cylinders belonging to Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation
bearing the latters tradename as well as the marks belonging to Shell International
Petroleum Company, Ltd., enumerated hereunder:
1. Bulk/Bullet LPG storage tanks;
2. Compressor/s (for pneumatic refilling system);
3. LPG hydraulic pump/s;
4. LPG refilling heads/hoses and appurtenances or LPG filling assembly;
5. LPG pipeline gate valve or ball valve and handles and levers;
6. LPG weighing scales; and
7. Seals simulating the shell trademark.
c. Sales invoices, ledgers, journals, official receipts, purchase orders, and all other
books of accounts, inventories and documents pertaining to the production, sale
and/or distribution of the aforesaid goods/products.
d. Delivery truck bearing Plate Nos. WTE-527, XAM-970 and WFC-603, hauling
trucks, and/or other delivery trucks or vehicles or conveyances being used or
intended to be used for the purpose of selling and/or distributing the above-
mentioned counterfeit products.
Under Search Warrant No. 3-2003:
a. Empty/filled LPG cylinder tanks/containers, bearing Petron Corporations (Petron)
tradename and its tradename "GASUL" and other devices owned and/or used
exclusively by Petron;
b. Machinery and/or equipment being used or intended to be used for the purpose of
illegally refilling LPG cylinders belonging to Petron enumerated hereunder;
1. Bulk/Bullet LPG storage tanks;
2. Compressor/s (for pneumatic filling system);
3. LPG hydraulic pump/s;
4. LPG filling heads/hoses and appurtenances or LPG filling assembly;
5. LPG pipeline gate valve or ball valve and handles levers;
6. LPG weighing scales; and
7. Seals bearing the Petron mark;
c. Sales invoices, ledgers, journals, official receipts, purchase orders, and all other
books of accounts, inventories and documents pertaining to the production, sale
and/or distribution of the aforesaid goods/products; and
d. Delivery trucks bearing Plate Nos. UMN-971, PEZ-612 and WFC-603, hauling
trucks, and/or other delivery trucks or vehicles or conveyances being used for the
purpose of selling and/or distributing the above-mentioned counterfeit products.
Upon the issuance of the said search warrants, Oblanca and several NBI operatives
immediately proceeded to the MASAGANA compound and served the search
warrants on petitioners.13 After searching the premises of MASAGANA, the following
articles described in Search Warrant No. 2-2003 were seized:
a. Thirty-eight (38) filled 11 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing the tradename of Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation and the trademarks and other devices owned by Shell
International Petroleum Company, Ltd.;
b. Thirty-nine (39) empty 11 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing the tradename of Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation and the trademarks and other devices owned by Shell
International Petroleum Company, Ltd.;
c. Eight (8) filled 50 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing the tradename of Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation and the trademarks and other devices owned by Shell
International Petroleum Company, Ltd.;
d. Three (3) empty 50 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing the tradename of Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation and the trademarks and other devices owned by Shell
International Petroleum Company, Ltd.;
e. One (1) set of motor compressor for filling system.
Pursuant to Search Warrant No. 3-2003, the following articles were also seized:
a. Six (6) filled 11 kg. LPG cylinders without seal, bearing Petrons tradename and its
trademark "GASUL" and other devices owned and/or used exclusively by Petron;
b. Sixty-three (63) empty 11 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing Petrons tradename and its
trademark "GASUL" and other devices owned and/or used exclusively by Petron;
c. Seven (7) tampered 11 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing Petrons tradename and its
trademark "GASUL" and other devices owned and/or used exclusively by Petron;
d. Five (5) tampered 50 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing Petrons tradename and its
trademark "GASUL" and other devices owned and/or used exclusively by Petron with
tampered "GASUL" logo;
e. One (1) set of motor compressor for filling system; and
f. One (1) set of LPG refilling machine.
On 22 April 2003, petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash Search Warrants
No. 2-2003 and No. 3-200314 on the following grounds:
1. There is no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant and the
conditions for the issuance of a search warrant were not complied with;
2. Applicant NBI Agent Ritchie N. Oblanca and his witness Bernabe C. Alajar do not
have any authority to apply for a search warrant. Furthermore, they committed
perjury when they alleged in their sworn statements that they conducted a test-buy
on two occasions;
3. The place to be searched was not specified in the Search Warrant as the place
has an area of 10,000 square meters (one hectare) more or less, for which reason
the place to be searched must be indicated with particularity;
4. The search warrant is characterized as a general warrant as the items to be seized
as mentioned in the search warrant are being used in the conduct of the lawful
business of respondents and the same are not being used in refilling Shellane and
Gasul LPGs.
On 30 April 2003, MASAGANA, as third party claimant, filed with the RTC a Motion
for the Return of Motor Compressor and LPG Refilling Machine.15 It claimed that it is
the owner of the said motor compressor and LPG refilling machine; that these items
were used in the operation of its legitimate business; and that their seizure will
jeopardize its business interests.
On 5 June 2003, the RTC issued two Orders, one of which denied the petitioners
Motion to Quash Search Warrants No. 2-2003 and No. 3-2003, and the other one
also denied the Motion for the Return of Motor Compressor and LPG Refilling
Machine of MASAGANA, for lack of merit.16
With respect to the Order denying the petitioners motion to quash Search Warrants
No. 2-2003 and No. 3-2003, the RTC held that based on the testimonies of Oblanca
and Alajar, as well as the documentary evidence consisting of receipts, photographs,
intellectual property and corporate registration papers, there is probable cause to
believe that petitioners are engaged in the business of refilling or using cylinders
which bear the trademarks or devices of Petron and Pilipinas Shell in the place
sought to be searched and that such activity is probably in violation of Section 155 in
relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293.
It also ruled that Oblanca and Alajar had personal knowledge of the acts complained
of since they were the ones who monitored the activities of and conducted test-buys
on MASAGANA; that the search warrants in question are not general warrants
because the compound searched are solely used and occupied by MASAGANA, and
as such, there was no need to particularize the areas within the compound that would
be searched; and that the items to be seized in the subject search warrants were
sufficiently described with particularity as the same was limited to cylinder tanks
bearing the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE.
As regards the Order denying the motion of MASAGANA for the return of its motor
compressor and LPG refilling machine, the RTC resolved that MASAGANA cannot
be considered a third party claimant whose rights were violated as a result of the
seizure since the evidence disclosed that petitioners are stockholders of MASAGANA
and that they conduct their business through the same juridical entity. It maintained
that to rule otherwise would result in the misapplication and debasement of the veil of
corporate fiction. It also stated that the veil of corporate fiction cannot be used as a
refuge from liability.
Further, the RTC ratiocinated that ownership by another person or entity of the
seized items is not a ground to order its return; that in seizures pursuant to a search
warrant, what is important is that the seized items were used or intended to be used
as means of committing the offense complained of; that by its very nature, the
properties sought to be returned in the instant case appear to be related to and
intended for the illegal activity for which the search warrants were applied for; and
that the items seized are instruments of an offense.
Petitioners filed Motions for Reconsideration of the assailed Orders, 17 but these were
denied by the RTC in its Order dated 21 July 2003 for lack of compelling reasons. 18
Subsequently, petitioners appealed the two Orders of the RTC to the Court of
Appeals via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.19 On 30 September 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision
affirming the Orders of the RTC.20 It adopted in essence the bases and reasons of
the RTC in its two Orders. The decretal portion thereof reads:
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds no reason to disturb the assailed Orders of
the respondent judge. Grave abuse of discretion has not been proven to exist in this
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed
orders both dated June 5, 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 21 of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, but this was denied in its Resolution dated 1 June 2005 for lack of merit.22
Petitioners filed the instant petition on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC CAVITE CITY HAD SUFFICIENT BASIS IN
DECLARING THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT NBI AGENT
(RITCHIE OBLANCA) CAN APPLY FOR THE SEARCH WARRANTS
NOTHWITHSTANDING HIS LACK OF AUTHORITY;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
REQUIREMENT OF GIVING A PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF THE PLACE TO
BE SEARCHED WAS COMPLIED WITH;
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
APPLICATIONS AND THE SEARCH WARRANTS THEMSELVES SHOW NO
AMBIGUITY OF THE ITEMS TO BE SEIZED;
V.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
COMPLAINT IS DIRECTED AGAINST MASAGANA GAS CORPORATION, ACTING
THROUGH ITS OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, HENCE MASAGANA GAS
CORPORATION MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED AS THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT
WHOSE RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED AS A RESULT OF THE SEIZURE.23
Apropos the first issue, petitioners allege that Oblanca and Alajar had no personal
knowledge of the matters on which they testified; that Oblanca and Alajar lied to
Judge Sadang when they stated under oath that they were the ones who conducted
the test-buys on two different occasions; that the truth of the matter is that Oblanca
and Alajar never made the purchases personally; that the transactions were
undertaken by other persons namely, Nikko Javier and G. Villanueva as shown in the
Entry/Exit Slips of MASAGANA; and that even if it were true that Oblanca and Alajar
asked Nikko Javier and G. Villanueva to conduct the test-buys, the information
relayed by the latter two to the former was mere hearsay.24
Petitioners also contend that if Oblanca and Alajar had indeed used different names
in purchasing the LPG cylinders, they should have mentioned it in their applications
for search warrants and in their testimonies during the preliminary examination; that it
was only after the petitioners had submitted to the RTC the entry/exit slips showing
different personalities who made the purchases that Oblanca and Alajar explained
that they had to use different names in order to avoid detection; that Alajar is not
connected with either of the private respondents; that Alajar was not in a position to
inform the RTC as to the distinguishing trademarks of SHELLANE and GASUL; that
Oblanca was not also competent to testify on the marks allegedly infringed by
petitioners; that Judge Sadang failed to ask probing questions on the distinguishing
marks of SHELLANE and GASUL; that the findings of the Brand Protection
Committee of Pilipinas Shell were not submitted nor presented to the RTC; that
although Judge Sadang examined Oblanca and Alajar, the former did not ask
exhaustive questions; and that the questions Judge Sadang asked were merely
rehash of the contents of the affidavits of Oblanca and Alajar. 25
These contentions are devoid of merit.
Article III, Section 2, of the present Constitution states the requirements before a
search warrant may be validly issued, to wit:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. (emphasis supplied).
Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, provides with
more particularity the requisites in issuing a search warrant, viz:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.
According to the foregoing provisions, a search warrant can be issued only upon a
finding of probable cause. Probable cause for search warrant means such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place to be searched.26
The facts and circumstances being referred thereto pertain to facts, data or
information personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he may
present.27 The applicant or his witnesses must have personal knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense being complained of.
"Reliable information" is insufficient. Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge
must depose in writing the complainant and his witnesses.28
Section 155 of Republic Act No. 8293 identifies the acts constituting trademark
infringement, thus:
SEC. 155. Remedies; Infringement. Any person who shall, without the consent of
the owner of the registered mark:
155.1. Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of
a registered mark or the same container or a dominant feature thereof in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, advertising of any goods or services
including other preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of any goods or
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive; or
155.2. Reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark or a 2. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 41789 for "SHELL
dominant feature thereof and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable (DEVICE) in the name of Shell International;
imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements
intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for 3. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 37525 for "SHELL
sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which (DEVICE) in the name of Shell International;
such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be
liable in a civil action for infringement by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
4. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. R-2813 for "SHELL" in the
set forth: Provided, That the infringement takes place at the moment any of the acts name of Shell International;
stated in Subsection 155.1 or this subsection are committed regardless of whether
there is actual sale of goods or services using the infringing material.
5. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 31443 for "SHELLANE" in
the name of Shell International;
As can be gleaned in Section 155.1, mere unauthorized use of a container bearing a
registered trademark in connection with the sale, distribution or advertising of goods
or services which is likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception among the 6. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 57945 for the mark
buyers/consumers can be considered as trademark infringement. "GASUL" in the name of Petron;

In his sworn affidavits,29 Oblanca stated that before conducting an investigation on 7. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. C-147 for "GASUL
the alleged illegal activities of MASAGANA, he reviewed the certificates of trademark CYLINDER CONTAINING LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS" in the name of Petron;
registrations issued by the Philippine Intellectual Property Office in favor of Petron
and Pilipinas Shell; that he confirmed from Petron and Pilipinas Shell that 8. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 61920 for the mark
MASAGANA is not authorized to sell, use, refill or distribute GASUL and SHELLANE "GASUL AND DEVICE" in the name of Petron;
LPG cylinder containers; that he and Alajar monitored the activities of MASAGANA in
its refilling plant station located within its compound at Governors Drive, Barangay 9. Certified true copy of the Articles of Incorporation of Masagana;
Lapidario, Trece Martires, Cavite City; that, using different names, they conducted
two test-buys therein where they purchased LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks 10. Certified true copy of the By-laws of Masagana;
GASUL and SHELLANE; that the said GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders were
refilled in their presence by the MASAGANA employees; that while they were inside
11. Certified true copy of the latest General Information Sheet of Masagana on file
the MASAGANA compound, he noticed stock piles of multi-branded cylinders
with the Securities and Exchange Commission;
including GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders; and that they observed delivery
trucks loaded with GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders coming in and out of the
MASAGANA compound and making deliveries to various retail outlets. These 12. Pictures of delivery trucks coming in and out of Masagana while it delivered
allegations were corroborated by Alajar in his separate affidavits. Gasul and Shellane LPG;

In support of the foregoing statements, Oblanca also submitted the following 13. Cash Invoice No. 56210 dated 13 February 2003 issued by Masagana for the
documentary and object evidence: Gasul and Shellane LPG purchased by Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar;

1. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 44046 for "SHELL 14. Pictures of the Shellane and Gasul LPGs covered by Cash Invoice No. 56210
(DEVICE)" in the name of Shell International; purchased from Masagana by Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar;
15. Cash Invoice No. 56398 dated 27 February 2003 issued by Masagana for the
Gasul and Shellane LPG purchased by Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar; and
16. Pictures of the Shellane and Gasul LPGs covered by Cash Invoice No. 56398
purchased from Masagana by Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar. 30
Extant from the foregoing testimonial, documentary and object evidence is that
Oblanca and Alajar have personal knowledge of the fact that petitioners, through
MASAGANA, have been using the LPG cylinders bearing the marks GASUL and
SHELLANE without permission from Petron and Pilipinas Shell, a probable cause for
trademark infringement. Both Oblanca and Alajar were clear and insistent that they
were the very same persons who monitored the activities of MASAGANA; that they
conducted test-buys thereon; and that in order to avoid suspicion, they used different
names during the test-buys. They also personally witnessed the refilling of LPG
cylinders bearing the marks GASUL and SHELLANE inside the MASAGANA refilling
plant station and the deliveries of these refilled containers to some outlets using mini-
trucks.
Indeed, the aforesaid facts and circumstances are sufficient to establish probable
cause. It should be borne in mind that the determination of probable cause does not
call for the application of the rules and standards of proof that a judgment of
conviction requires after trial on the merits. As the term implies, "probable cause" is
concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The standards of
judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a
judge after a full blown trial.31
The fact that Oblanca and Alajar used different names in the purchase receipts do
not negate personal knowledge on their part. It is a common practice of the law
enforcers such as NBI agents during covert investigations to use different names in
order to conceal their true identities. This is reasonable and understandable so as not
to endanger the life of the undercover agents and to facilitate the lawful arrest or
apprehension of suspected violators of the law.
Petitioners contention that Oblanca and Alajar should have mentioned the fact that
they used different names in their respective affidavits and during the preliminary
examination is puerile. The argument is too vacuous to merit serious consideration.
There is nothing in the provisions of law concerning the issuance of a search warrant
which directly or indirectly mandates that the applicant of the search warrant or his
witnesses should state in their affidavits the fact that they used different names while
conducting undercover investigations, or to divulge such fact during the preliminary
examination. In the light of other more material facts which needed to be established
for a finding of probable cause, it is not difficult to believe that Oblanca and Alajar
failed to mention that they used aliases in entering the MASAGANA compound due
to mere oversight.
It cannot be gainfully said that Oblanca and Alajar are not competent to testify on the
trademarks infringed by the petitioners. As earlier discussed, Oblanca declared under
oath that before conducting an investigation on the alleged illegal activities of
MASAGANA, he reviewed the certificates of trademark registrations issued by the
Philippine Intellectual Property Office in favor of Petron and Pilipinas Shell. These
certifications of trademark registrations were attached by Oblanca in his applications
for the search warrants. Alajar, on the other hand, works as a private investigator
and, in fact, owns a private investigation and research/consultation firm. His firm was
hired and authorized, pursuant to the Brand Protection Program of Petron and
Pilipinas Shell, to verify reports that MASAGANA is involved in the illegal sale and
refill of GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders.32 As part of the job, he studied and
familiarized himself with the registered trademarks of GASUL and SHELLANE, and
the distinct features of the LPG cylinders bearing the same trademarks before
conducting surveillance and test-buys on MASAGANA.33 He also submitted to
Oblanca several copies of the same registered trademark registrations and
accompanied Oblanca during the surveillance and test-buys.
As to whether the form and manner of questioning made by Judge Sadang complies
with the requirements of law, Section 5 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, prescribes the rules in the examination of the complainant and his
witnesses when applying for search warrant, to wit:
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record.- The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together
with the affidavits submitted.
The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses depend
largely on the discretion of the judge. Although there is no hard-andfast rule
governing how a judge should conduct his investigation, it is axiomatic that the
examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary, general,
peripheral, perfunctory or pro forma. The judge must not simply rehash the contents
of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the
application.34
After perusing the Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the preliminary examination,
we found the questions of Judge Sadang to be sufficiently probing, not at all
superficial and perfunctory.35 The testimonies of Oblanca and Alajar were consistent
with each other and their narration of facts was credible. As correctly found by the
Court of Appeals:
This Court is likewise not convinced that respondent Judge failed to ask probing
questions in his determination of the existence of probable cause. This Court has
thoroughly examined the Transcript of Stenographic Notes taken during the
investigation conducted by the respondent Judge and found that respondent Judge
lengthily inquired into the circumstances of the case. For instance, he required the
NBI agent to confirm the contents of his affidavit, inquired as to where the "test-buys"
were conducted and by whom, verified whether PSPC and PETRON have registered
trademarks or tradenames, required the NBI witness to explain how the "test-buys"
were conducted and to describe the LPG cylinders purchased from Masagana Gas
Corporation, inquired why the applications for Search Warrant were filed in Cavite
City considering that Masagana Gas Corporation was located in Trece Martires,
Cavite, inquired whether the NBI Agent has a sketch of the place and if there was
any distinguishing sign to identify the place to be searched, and inquired about their
alleged tailing and monitoring of the delivery trucks. x x x.36
Since probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge
who conducted the examination and who had the opportunity to question the
applicant and his witnesses, the findings of the judge deserves great weight. The
reviewing court can overturn such findings only upon proof that the judge disregarded
the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of reason. 37 We find no compelling
reason to disturb Judge Sadangs findings herein.
Anent the second issue, petitioners argue that Judge Sadang failed to require
Oblanca to show his authority to apply for search warrants; that Oblanca is a member
of the Anti-Organized Crime and not that of the Intellectual Property Division of the
NBI; that all complaints for infringement should be investigated by the Intellectual
Property Division of the NBI; that it is highly irregular that an agent not assigned to
the Intellectual Property Division would apply for a search warrant and without
authority from the NBI Director; that the alleged letter-complaint of Atty. Bienvenido
Somera, Jr. of Villaraza and Angangco Law Office was not produced in court; that
Judge Sadang did not require Oblanca to produce the alleged letter-complaint which
is material and relevant to the determination of the existence of probable cause; and
that Petron and Pilipinas Shell, being two different corporations, should have issued
a board resolution authorizing the Villaraza and Angangco Law Office to apply for
search warrant in their behalf.38
We reject these protestations.
The authority of Oblanca to apply for the search warrants in question is clearly
discussed and explained in his affidavit, viz:
[That] on 11 February 2003, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) received a
letter-complaint from Atty. Bienvenido I. Somera, Jr. of Villaraza and Angangco, on
behalf of among others, Petron Corporation (PETRON) [and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation (PSPC), the authorized representative of Shell International
Petroleum Company Limited (SHELL INTERNATIONAL)] requesting assistance in
the investigation and, if warranted, apprehension and prosecution of certain persons
and/or establishments suspected of violating the intellectual property rights of
PETRON [and of PSPC and Shell International.]
11. [That] on the basis of the letter-complaint, I, together with Agent Angelo Zarzoso,
was assigned as the NBI agent on the case.39
The fact that Oblanca is a member of the Anti-Organized Crime Division and not that
of the Intellectual Property Division does not abrogate his authority to apply for
search warrant. As aptly stated by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, there is nothing
in the provisions on search warrant under Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which specifically commands that the applicant law enforcer must be a
member of a division that is assigned or related to the subject crime or offense before
the application for search warrant may be acted upon. The petitioners did not also
cite any law, rule or regulation mandating such requirement. At most, petitioners may
only be referring to the administrative organization and/or internal rule or practice of
the NBI. However, not only did petitioners failed to establish the existence thereof,
but they also did not prove that such administrative organization and/or internal rule
or practice are inviolable.
Neither is the presentation of the letter-complaint of Atty. Somera and board
resolutions from Petron and Pilipinas Shell required or necessary in determining
probable cause. As heretofore discussed, the affidavits of Oblanca and Alajar,
coupled with the object and documentary evidence they presented, are sufficient to
establish probable cause. It can also be presumed that Oblanca, as an NBI agent, is
a public officer who had regularly performed his official duty.40 He would not have
initiated an investigation on MASAGANA without a proper complaint. Furthermore,
Atty. Somera did not step up to deny his letter-complaint.
Regarding the third issue, petitioners posit that the applications for search warrants of
Oblanca did not specify the particular area to be searched, hence, giving the raiding
team wide latitude in determining what areas they can search. They aver that the
search warrants were general warrants, and are therefore violative of the
Constitution. Petitioners also assert that since the MASAGANA compound is about
10,000.00 square meters with several structures erected on the lot, the search
warrants should have defined the areas to be searched.
The long standing rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if
the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation
or description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all
others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement.41
Moreover, in the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises
to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held that the executing officers
prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem
to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the
warrant had been issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant
intended the compound described in the affidavit.42
The search warrants in question commanded any peace officer to make an
immediate search on MASAGANA compound located at Governors Drive, Barangay
Lapidario, Trece Martires, Cavite City. It appears that the raiding team had
ascertained and reached MASAGANA compound without difficulty since MASAGANA
does not have any other offices/plants in Trece Martires, Cavite City. Moreover,
Oblanca, who was with the raiding team, was already familiar with the MASAGANA
compound as he and Alajar had monitored and conducted test-buys thereat.
Even if there are several structures inside the MASAGANA compound, there was no
need to particularize the areas to be searched because, as correctly stated by Petron
and Pilipinas Shell, these structures constitute the essential and necessary
components of the petitioners business and cannot be treated separately as they
form part of one entire compound. The compound is owned and used solely by
MASAGANA. What the case law merely requires is that, the place to be searched
can be distinguished in relation to the other places in the community. Indubitably, this
requisite was complied with in the instant case.
As to the fourth issue, petitioners asseverate that the search warrants did not indicate
with particularity the items to be seized since the search warrants merely described
the items to be seized as LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks GASUL and
SHELLANE without specifying their sizes.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when
the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or
when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant
officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; or when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued.43
While it is true that the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly
described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder, yet the description
is required to be specific only in so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. The
law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and
minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities;
otherwise it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant
as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Once
described, however, the articles subject of the search and seizure need not be so
invariant as to require absolute concordance, in our view, between those seized and
those described in the warrant. Substantial similarity of those articles described as a
class or specie would suffice.44
Measured against this standard, we find that the items to be seized under the search
warrants in question were sufficiently described with particularity. The articles to be
confiscated were restricted to the following: (1) LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks
GASUL and SHELLANE; (2) Machines and equipments used or intended to be used
in the illegal refilling of GASUL and SHELLANE cylinders. These machines were also
specifically enumerated and listed in the search warrants; (3) Documents which
pertain only to the production, sale and distribution of the GASUL and SHELLANE
LPG cylinders; and (4) Delivery trucks bearing Plate Nos. WTE-527, XAM-970 and
WFC-603, hauling trucks, and/or other delivery trucks or vehicles or conveyances
being used or intended to be used for the purpose of selling and/or distributing
GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders.45
Additionally, since the described items are clearly limited only to those which bear
direct relation to the offense, i.e., violation of section 155 of Republic Act No. 8293,
for which the warrant was issued, the requirement of particularity of description is
satisfied.
Given the foregoing, the indication of the accurate sizes of the GASUL and
SHELLANE LPG cylinders or tanks would be unnecessary.
Finally, petitioners claim that MASAGANA has the right to intervene and to move for
the return of the seized items; that the items seized by the raiding team were being
used in the legitimate business of MASAGANA; that the raiding team had no right to
seize them under the guise that the same were being used in refilling GASUL and
SHELLANE LPG cylinders; and that there being no action for infringement filed
against them and/or MASAGANA from the seizure of the items up to the present, it is
only fair that the seized articles be returned to the lawful owner in accordance with
Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC.
It is an elementary and fundamental principle of corporation law that a corporation is
an entity separate and distinct from its stockholders, directors or officers. However,
when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of
persons, or in the case of two corporations merge them into one. 46 In other words,
the law will not recognize the separate corporate existence if the corporation is being
used pursuant to the foregoing unlawful objectives. This non-recognition is
sometimes referred to as the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity or
disregarding the fiction of corporate entity. Where the separate corporate entity is
disregarded, the corporation will be treated merely as an association of persons and
the stockholders or members will be considered as the corporation, that is, liability
will attach personally or directly to the officers and stockholders.47
As we now find, the petitioners, as directors/officers of MASAGANA, are utilizing the
latter in violating the intellectual property rights of Petron and Pilipinas Shell. Thus,
petitioners collectively and MASAGANA should be considered as one and the same
person for liability purposes. Consequently, MASAGANAs third party claim serves no
refuge for petitioners.
Even if we were to sustain the separate personality of MASAGANA from that of the
petitioners, the effect will be the same. The law does not require that the property to
be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrants is
directed. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the
person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the
property sought to be seized.48 Hence, even if, as petitioners claimed, the properties
seized belong to MASAGANA as a separate entity, their seizure pursuant to the
search warrants is still valid.
Further, it is apparent that the motor compressor, LPG refilling machine and the
GASUL and SHELL LPG cylinders seized were the corpus delicti, the body or
substance of the crime, or the evidence of the commission of trademark infringement.
These were the very instruments used or intended to be used by the petitioners in
trademark infringement. It is possible that, if returned to MASAGANA, these items will
be used again in violating the intellectual property rights of Petron and Pilipinas
Shell.49 Thus, the RTC was justified in denying the petitioners motion for their return
so as to prevent the petitioners and/or MASAGANA from using them again in
trademark infringement.
Petitioners reliance on Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC,50 is not tenable. As
correctly observed by the Solicitor General, A.M. 02-1-06-SC is not applicable in the
present case because it governs only searches and seizures in civil actions for
infringement of intellectual property rights.51 The offense complained of herein is for
criminal violation of Section 155 in relation to Section 17052 of Republic Act No. 8293.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79256, dated 30 September 2004 and 1 June 2005,
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 8-28.
2Penned by Associate Justice Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente with Associate 20 Id. at 30-45.
Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Rebecca De Guia Salvador, concurring; id.
at 30-45. 21 Id. at 132-139.

3 Id. at 48-49. 22 Id. at 48-49.

4 Penned by Judge Melchor Q.C. Sadang; id. at 105-110. 23 Id. at 17.

5 Id. at 78-88. 24 Id. at 18.

6 Id. at 97-98. 25 Id. at 19-21.

7 Records, pp. 4-83. 26 Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP, 218 Phil. 754, 767 (1984).

8 Rollo, pp. 51-54 and 61-63. 27

Sony Music Entertainment (Phils.), Inc. v. Espaol, G.R. No. 156804, 14
March 2005, 453 SCRA 360, 371.
9 Id.
28Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc, G.R. No. 140946, 13 September
10 Records, pp. 45-58. 2004, 438 SCRA 224, 235.

11 Rollo, pp. 58-60 and 67-69. 29 Records, pp. 4-83.

12 Id. at 70-73. 30 Records, pp. 46-83.

13 Id. at 74-77. 31 People v. Choi, G.R. No. 152950, 3 August 2006, 497 SCRA 547, 556.

14 Id. at 78-89. 32 Rollo, pp. 55-57 and 64-66.

15 Id. at 97-99. 33 Id.

16 Id. at 105-110. 34 Supra note 31 at 555-556.

17 Records, pp. 223-233. 35 Records, pp. 91-129.

18 Rollo, p. 112. 36 Rollo, p. 41.

19 Id. at 113-131. 37 Supra note 31 at 559.

38 Rollo, pp. 21-22. court or authority within thirty-one (31) calendar days from the date of the
issuance of the writ.
39 Records, p. 3.
51RE: PROPOSED RULE ON SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN CVIL ACTIONS
40Revised Rules on Evidence, Rule 131, Section 3. Disputable FOR INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS. Section 1.
presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if Coverage. This Rule shall govern the provisional seizure and impounding
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: of documents and articles in pending and intended civil actions for the
purpose of preventing infringement and preserving relevant evidence in
regard to [the] alleged infringement under Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise
xxxx
known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, Article 50 of the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed; otherwise known as TRIPS and other related laws and international
conventions (emphasis supplied).
41 Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 397 Phil. 892, 907-908 (2000).
52 Republic Act No. 8293, Section 170. Penalties. Independent of the civil
42 Supra note 26 at 765. and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a criminal penalty of
imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from
43 Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz, 148 Phil. 794, 811 (1971). Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00), shall be imposed on any person who is found guilty of
44 Al-Ghoul v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 759, 770 (2001). committing any of the acts mentioned in Section 155, Section 168 and
Subsection 169.1. (Arts. 188 and 189, Revised Penal Code.) (Emphasis
45 supplied.)
Records, pp. 45-58.

46 Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals and Collector of

Internal Revenue, 110 Phil. 751, 756-757 (1961).

47
Umali v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89561, 13 September 1990, 189
SCRA 529, 542.

48 Supra note 26 at 766.

49 Yee Sue Koy v. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141, 148 (1940).

50RE: PROPOSED RULE ON SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN CVIL ACTIONS

FOR INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS. Section
20. Failure to file complaint. the writ shall also, upon motion of the
expected adverse party, be set aside and the seized documents and articles
returned to the expected adverse party if no case is filed with the appropriate