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Referencias bibliogrficas.

Bsquedas realizadas en Philosophers Index.

1. Bar-On^Self-knowledge (Ninguna restrincin temporal)
2. Neo-expressivism^Self-knowledge (Ninguna restriccin temporal)
3. Expressivism^Bar-On (Ninguna restriccin temporal)
4. Expressivism^Self-knowledge (1980-Actualidad)
5. Avowal^Expressivism (Ninguna restriccin temporal)

Bsquedas realizadas en Google Scholar

1 self-knowledge, Bar-On
2 self-knowledge^expressivism^Bar-On

MIRAR (2007) (2008) (2010) (2012) Chrisman


(3)Bar-On, Dorit. (2004). Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge.

Bar-On proposes a neo-expressivist view according to which avowals are
expressive acts that have truth-accessible self-ascriptions as their products. When
avowing, a person directly expresses, rather than merely reports, the very mental
condition that the avowal ascribes. She argues that this expressivist idea, coupled with an
adequate characterization of expression and a proper separation of the semantics of
avowals from their pragmatics and epistemology, explains the special status we assign to
avowals. As against many expressivists and their critics, she maintains that such an
expressivist explanation is consistent with a nondeflationary view of self-knowledge and
a robust realism about mental states. The view that emerges preserves many insights of
the most prominent contributors to the subject, while offering a new perspective on our
special relationship to our own minds. (publisher, edited)

BarOn, D. (2004). Externalism and SelfKnowledge: Content, Use, and

Expression. Nous, 38(3), 430-455.

In this paper, I would like to canvass the second option, that of rejecting the
recognitional conception. However, while rejecting the recognitional conception may
help rebut content skepticism, the price may be a deflat- ionary view of self-knowledge.
Ordinary mental self-ascriptions are not open to epistemic doubt, says the deflationist, but
they also do not represent genuine knowledge. In sections 2 and 3 below, I sketch a
position on content self-knowledge that purports to meet the threat of external content
skepti- cism without deflating self-knowledge. On the view I favor, ordinary self-
ascriptions of contentful mental states do not rest on recognitional judg- ments. They
enjoy a special kind of immunity to error, which explains why they seem invulnerable to
content skepticism. However, this immunity to error is consistent with their being
instances of genuine knowledge. So even if externalism is true, ordinary self-knowledge
as represented by self- ascriptions of contentful states could withstand deflation. Now,
however, a certain inflation of ordinary knowledge of content may seem in order. For if
we combine content-externalism with the claim that we do have genuine knowledge of
the content of our present mental states, it looks as though ordinary knowledge of content
is very powerful indeed. From the simple, effortless knowledge of what we are thinking,
combined with the knowledge that content-externalism is true, it seems that we can
derive knowledge of the external world determiners of our thought contents by pure
reflection. But surely, external-world knowledge cannot be obtained in that way. In
Section 4, I discuss the inflation argument and explain why, once we reject the
recognitional conception of content self-knowledge, the inflation of ordinary self-
knowledge should be no more warranted than its deflation.

Bar-On, Dorit. (2009). First-Person Authority: Dualism, Constitutivism, and Neo-

Expressivism. Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 71(1),

What I call "Rorty's dilemma" has us caught between the Scylla of Cartesian
dualism and the Charybdis of eliminativism about the mental. Proper recognition of what
is distinctively mental requires accommodating incorrigibility about our mental states,
something Rorty thinks materialists cannot do. So we must either countenance mental
states over and above physical states in our ontology, or else give up altogether on the
mental as a distinct category. In section 2, "Materialist Introspectionism -- Independence
and Epistemic Authority", I review reasons for being dissatisfied with materialist
introspectionism as a way out of the dilemma. In section 3, "Constitutivism", I outline
two constitutivist alternatives to materialist introspectionism. In section 4, "A Neo-
Expressivist View", I offer my neoexpressivist view according to which the distinctive
status of mental self-ascriptions is to be explained by appeal to the expressive character
of acts of issuing them. This view, I argue, allows us to stay clear of eliminativism
without committing to Cartesian substance dualism, thereby offering a viable way of
slipping between the horns of Rorty's dilemma.


MITCHELL GREEN'S, SELF-EXPRESSIONOUP 2007. Philosophical Books, 51:
212227. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.2010.00512.x

Greens Self-Expression (SE henceforth) is a bold and ambitious attempt to
remedy this situation. Green is after no less than a unified view of all the myriad ways we
have of expressing ourselves: through wincing or crying, as well as through culturally
acquired gestures; by engaging in convention-governed speech-acts, and in works of art
or music, as well as in various idiosyncratic ways.1 It is his aim to portray what he terms
self-expression, wherever it occurs, and however it is carried out, as a matter of the
production of a signal that also shows an expressers state of mind.2 The book provides a

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clear defense and development of this idea. It makes a distinct and significant
contribution to our understanding of an important topic that lies at the intersection of
philoso- phy of language, mind, and action, metaethics, linguistics, ethology, biology of
communication, and aesthetics. I have great sympathy to Greens general approach to his
topic, as well as to many of the details of his view of expression. Partly for this reason,
my effort in what follows will be more constructive than critical. Offering my own spin
on some key elements in Greens view, I will highlight a difficulty I see for Greens
official account of expression, but will suggest that his overall view has resources to
handle it.

Bar-On, D. (2010). Avowals: expression, security, and knowledge: reply to Matthew

Boyle, David Rosenthal, and Maura Tumulty. Acta Analytica. 25:1, 47-63.

In my reply to Boyle, Rosenthal, and Tumulty, I revisit my view of avowals
security as a matter of a special immunity to error, their character as intentional
expressive acts that employ self-ascriptive vehicles (without being grounded in self-
beliefs), Moores paradox, the idea of expressing as contrasting with reporting and its
connection to showing ones mental state, and the performance equivalence between
avowals and other expressive acts.

(1)Bar-On, Dorit. (2011). "Neo-expressivism: Avowals' Security and Privileged Self-

Knowledge" in Self-Knowledge, Hatzimoysis, Anthony (ed.), 189-201.

This chapter is a reply too Anthony Brueckner's critique of the Neo-Expressivist
interpretation of avowals and its ramifications for the philosophical analysis of self-

Bar-On, D. (2012). Externalism and skepticism: recognition, expression, and self-

knowledge. The Self & Self-Knowledge, 189-211.

According to external-world skepticism, were I now to think: There's water in this
glass, I wouldnt know that there is water in the glass, even if there was water in the
glass, my eyes were wide-open, etc. This is because, for all I know, my way of telling
what is in front of me does not allow me to rule out the possibility that I am only under
some kind of illusion about what is in front of me. Surely, though, I know that Im now
thinking that theres water in the glass? According to content skepticism, I do not. This is
because, for all I know, my way of telling what I am thinking does not allow me to rule
out the possibility that I am only under some kind of illusion about what I am thinking.
Yet, as commonsense would have it, my ordinary belief about what I am presently
thinking is remarkably secure at least much more secure than my ordinary beliefs about
my extra-mental world. My first aim in this paper is to examine whether the

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commonsense confidence about ordinary knowledge of content can be sustained in the
face of a skepticism that proceeds by analogy to external-world skepticism. It might seem
that we could get the right analogue, by enlisting the doctrine known as content
externalism (externalism, for short). But I will argue that, for the analogy to work, the
external-content skeptic must rely on a certain recognitional conception of our ordinary
knowledge of content in particular and of ordinary self-knowledge more generally. I think
there are good reasons to reject this conception. And my second aim will be to sketch an
alternative to it, which would allow us to sustain the idea that ordinary self-knowledge is
not threatened by a skepticism that is analogous to external-world skepticism.

Bar-On, D. (2012). Expression, truth, and reality: Some variations on themes from
Wright. Mind, meaning, and knowledge: Themes from the philosophy of Crispin
Wright, 162-192.

I begin by discussing one kind of expressivism, concerning avowals and self-
knowledgeavowal expressivism, for short. I present a simple version of avowal
expressivism and some reasons canvassed by Wright for rejecting it (Section 2). Wright,
however, maintains that avowal expressivism fares better than ethical expressivism. In
Section 3, I take up the comparison between these two expressivist views and argue that,
understood as a radical anti-realist view, simple avowal expressivism is in fact
incoherent. In Section 4, I consider an alternative anti-realist view of first-person
authority that Wright himself flirts with in several places under the title the default
view. I argue that it shares a defect with simple avowal expressivism. I then turn (in
Section 5) to my own neo-expressivist view of avowals, which, I submit, is not only
independently plausible but also superior to the default view. I will not here argue for the
independent plausibility of this neo-expressivist view. Instead, in Section 6, I will explain
how the view avoids the incoherence of simple avowal expressivism, and indicate how it
can be generalized to other cases so as to yield a new expressivist paradigm, one that
allows for truth-evaluablity and avoids anti-realist commitments. In all this, I take myself
to be offering some variations on themes near and dear to Wrights heart. I do not expect
to be doing justice to the richness of Wrights own treatment of these themes, nor will I
be attempting a careful exegesis. Nonetheless, I do hope to be articulating a view that
Wright himself may find congenialor else learn why he does not.

(1)Bar-On, D. (2015). Transparency, expression, and self-knowledge. Philosophical

Explorations, 18(2), 134152.

Contemporary discussions of self-knowledge share a presupposition to the effect
that the only way to vindicate so-called first-person authority as understood by our folk-
psychology is to identify specific good-making epistemic features that render our self-
ascriptions of mental states (avowals) especially knowledgeable. In earlier work, I
rejected this presupposition. I proposed that we separate two questions:
(i) How is first-person authority to be explained?
(ii) What renders avowals instances of a privileged kind of knowledge?

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In response to question (i), I offered a neo-expressivist account that, I argued, is
compatible with a variety of non-deflationary, substantive answers to question (ii). Here I
re-evaluate the relative merits of the neo-expressivist account in light of some recent
attempts to capture first-person authority by appealing to the so-called transparency of
mental self-attributions. I then canvass two recent appeals to transparency that give
priority to question (ii). Bearing in mind difficulties with the recent attempts, I return (in
Section 3) to relevant aspects of my own neo-expressivist account, which, instead, begins
with question (i). I conclude by offering reasons for thinking that the neo-expressivist
approach is better suited for integration with a folk-psychologically grounded
understanding of ourselves than the alternatives canvassed.

(2)Bar-On, D., & Chrisman, M. (2009). Ethical neo-expressivism. Oxford studies in

metaethics, 4, 133-165

Bar-On, D., & Long, D. C. (2001). Avowals and FirstPerson Privilege. Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 62(2), 311-335.

When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy
what may be called first-person privilege. If I now said: I have a headache, or I'm
thinking about Venice, I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be
challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special
epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative,
deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio-linguistic convention
governing avowals. We reject both approaches. On our proposed account, a full
explanation of the privilege must recognize avowals as expressive performances, which
can be taken to reveal directly the subject's present mental condition. We are able to
improve on special access accounts and deflationary accounts, as well as familiar
expressive accounts, by explaining both the asymmetries and the continuities between
avowals and other pronouncements, and by locating a genuine though non-epistemic
source for first-person privilege.

(2)Bar-On, D. and Sias, J. (2013), Varieties of Expressivism. Philosophy Compass, 8:

699713. doi:10.1111/phc3.12051

After offering a characterization of what unites versions of expressivism, we
highlight a number of dimensions along which expressivist views should be
distinguished. We then separate four theses often associated with expressivism a
positive expressivist thesis, a positive constitutivist thesis, a negative ontological thesis,
and a negative semantic thesis and describe how traditional expressivists have
attempted to incorporate them. We argue that expressivism in its traditional form may be
fatally flawed, but that expressivists nonetheless have the resources for preserving what is
essential to their view. These resources comprise a re-configuring of expressivism, the
result of which is the view we call neo-expressivism. After illustrating how the neo-

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expressivist model works in the case of avowals and ethical claims, we explain how it
avoids the problems of traditional expressivism.

Blackwood, Stephen. (2010). Self-Knowledge and Rationality.

Several basic asymmetries are normally thought to exist between first- and third-
person present-tense ascriptions of mental states. First of all, when a speaker ascribes, for
instance, a belief that p to another, she must do so on the evidence provided by the
utterances and actions of the other. However, it at least appears that typically she need not
do so when ascribing a belief to herself. In other words, there is an immediacy to a self-
ascription of a belief (that is, an utterance of the form 'I believe that p') that third-person
ascriptions ('He believes that p') lack. Secondly, our self-ascriptions are groundless -
demands that we justify our self-ascriptions, or explain how we know that we are in the
mental states we self-ascribe, are generally deemed inappropriate. Thirdly, assuming
sincerity on the part of the speaker, a self-ascription of a mental state is highly likely to
be correct. This likelihood of correctness is not thought to extend to her ascription of
similar beliefs to others. Thus, it is claimed, speakers possess a level of authority with
respect to their self-ascriptions that they do not enjoy with regard to their attribution of
beliefs to others. Discussions of 'the problem' of self-knowledge often focus on these
asymmetries and the prima facie tension between the idea that the first person needs none
of the evidence on which the third person depends, and yet is more likely to be correct. In
what does this apparently special way of knowing our own minds consist? In recent times
a number of philosophers (for example, Sydney Shoemaker, Tyler Burge, Akeel Bilgrami,
Richard Moran and Dorit Bar-On) have pursued this goal by linking self-
knowledgeclaims (authoritative self-ascriptions of mental states) to the critical rationality
and rational agency taken as essential to the first-person perspective. While their
approaches differ in various respects, each argues that (I) self-ascriptions express second-
order beliefs about first-order mental states, and that (2) the explanation of the truth of,
and warrant for, these beliefs that qualifies them as knowledge is to be found in the
requirement for self-knowledge that the possibility of rationality demands. Looking at
how (1) is understood is essential for assessing the plausibility of this normative turn in
the explanation of self-knowledge, and arguments for a substantial epistemic account
of self-knowledge more generally. Determining in what sense, if any, (i) self-ascriptions
may be thought to count as expressions of second-order beliefs, and (ii) the role second-
order belief might play in securing the truth of self-ascriptions, will have consequences
for understanding what role, if any, normative second-order judgement (that is,
judgement about what first-order state one ought to have) may play in what is normally
called self-knowledge. I argue that various problems with the views of each of the
philosophers mentioned above points to the need for a non-epistemic explanation

Boyle, Matthew. (2010). Bar-On on Self-Knowledge and Expression. Acta Analytica:

International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition, 25(1), 9-20.


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I critically discuss the account of self-knowledge presented in Dorit Bar-
On's Speaking My Mind (OUP 2004), focusing on Bar-On's understanding of what makes
our capacity for self-knowledge puzzling and on her 'neoexpressivist' solution to the
puzzle. I argue that there is an important aspect of the problem of self-knowledge that
Bar-On's account does not sufficiently address. A satisfying account of self-
knowledge must explain not merely how we are able to make accurate avowals about our
own present mental states, but how we can reasonably regard ourselves as entitled to
claim self-knowledge. Addressing this aspect of the problem of self-knowledge requires
confronting questions about the metaphysical nature of mental states, questions that Bar-
On's approach seeks to avoid.

(3)Brueckner, Anthony. (2011). "Neo-Expressivism" in Self-Knowledge, Hatzimoysis,

Anthony (ed), 170-188.

This is a critique of Dorit Bar-On's Speaking Your Mind, which espouses an
expressivist view of self-knowledge, according to which the epistemic status of self-
knowledge is explained by expressive nature of avowals of one's own mental states.

Byrne, Alex. (2011). Review Essay of Dorit Bar-On's Speaking My Mind.. Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 83(3), 705-717.

Cassam, Q. (2009). The basis of self-knowledge. In Erkenntnis (Vol. 71, pp. 318).

I discuss the claim what makes self-knowledge epistemologically distinctive is the
fact that it is baseless or groundless. I draw a distinction between evidential and
explanatory baselessness and argue that self-knowledge is only baseless in the first of
these senses. Since evidential baselessness is a relatively widespread phenomenon the
evidential baselessness of self-knowledge does not make it epistemologically distinctive
and does not call for any special explanation. I do not deny that self-knowledge is
epistemologically distinctive. My claim is only that talk of its evidential baselessness is
insufficient to account for its epistemological distinctiveness.

Chrisman, Matthew. (2009). Expressivism, Truth, and (Self-) Knowledge.

Philosophers' Imprint, 9(3), 1-26.

In this paper, I consider the prospects of two different kinds of expressivism -
ethical expressivism and avowal expressivism - in light of two common objections. The
first objection stems from the fact that it is natural to think of ethical statements and
avowals as at least potential manifestations of knowledge. The second objection stems
from the fact that it is natural to treat ethical statements and avowals as truth-evaluable. I
argue that, although a recent avowal expressivist attempt (Bar-On 2004) to meet the
second objection may succeed, the related response to the first objection threatens to

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undermine the principal advantages of that view. Then, I argue that although recent
ethical expressivist attempts (especially Blackburn 1998 and Gibbard 2003) to meet the
first objection are successful, the related response to the second objection threatens to
undermine the principal advantages of that view. This suggests a cross-pollination of
defensive strategies, which I go on to explore in order to articulate the theoretical
commitments one must take on to make either cross-pollinated position work in the face
of both objections. In light of this, I suggest that the prospects for the resulting ethical
expressivist position are considerably better than the prospects for the resulting avowal
expressivist position, though both positions involve significant theoretical costs.

(2)Finkelstein, D. H. (2012). From transparency to expressivism. Rethinking

Epistemology, 2, 101-18.

Fricke, Martin F. (2012). Rules of Language and First Person Authority. Polish Journal
of Philosophy, 6(2), 15-32.

This paper examines theories of first person authority proposed by Dorit Bar-
On (2004), Crispin Wright (1989a) and Sydney Shoemaker (1988). What all three
accounts have in common is that they attempt to explain first person authority by
reference to the way our language works. Bar-On claims that in our language self-
ascriptions of mental states are regarded as expressive of those states; Wright says that in
our language such self-ascriptions are treated as true by default; and Shoemaker suggests
that they might arise from our capacity to avoid Moore paradoxical utterances. I argue
that Bar-On's expressivism and Wright's constitutive theory suffer from a similar
problem: They fail to explain how it is possible for us to instantiate the language
structures that supposedly bring about first person authority. Shoemaker's account does
not suffer from this problem. But it is unclear whether the capacity to avoid Moore
paradoxical utterances really yields self-knowledge. Also, it might be that self-
knowledgeexplains why we have this capacity rather than vice versa.

Jacobsen, Rockney. (1996). Wittgenstein on Self-Knowledge and Self-Expression..

Philosophical Quarterly, 46(182), 12-30.

Wittgenstein advocated both expressivism about self-ascriptions of mental states
and minimalism about truth. Since these are widely thought to be inconsistent doctrines,
sympathetic interpreters ignore or discount one or the other of these strands in his
thought. I argue that Wittgenstein's version of expressivism is consistent with his
minimalism. Furthermore, when the reconciliation between expressivism and
minimalism is made in the way envisioned by Wittgenstein, we acquire a straightforward
account of our authoritative first person knowledge of mental states.

Lawlor, Krista. (2009). Knowing What One Wants.. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 79(1), 47-75.

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A familiar view in ethical theory is that ethical claims do not literally describe the
world; they do not -- in at least one sense -- state facts. Rather, they express our
sentiments, or emotional attitudes, or convey our moral stances and commitments.
Variations on this view are now legion. I'll call this general family of
views expressivism. Expressivism, isn't confined to ethics. One might adopt it towards
any type of value and claims about that value. In this paper, I want to examine whether
we can adopt it towards the value of truth. I shall argue that we lack any standpoint from
which we can make expressivism about the value of truth intelligible. This turns out to
tell us something important both about truth and about value.
Parrott, Matthew. (2015). Expressing First-Person Authority. Philosophical Studies: An
International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 172(8), 2215-2237.

Ordinarily when someone tells us something about her beliefs, desires or
intentions, we presume she is right. According to standard views, this deferential trust is
justified on the basis of certain epistemic properties of her assertion. In this paper, I offer
a nonepistemic account of deference. I first motivate the account by noting two
asymmetries between the kind of deference we show psychological self-ascriptions and
the kind we grant to epistemic experts more generally. I then propose a novel agency-
based account of deference. Drawing on recent work on self-knowledge, I argue that a
person normally has a distinctive type of cognitive agency; specifically she is able to
constitute her psychological attitudes by making judgments about what they ought to be. I
then argue that a speaker expresses this agentive authority when she self-ascribes a
psychological attitude and this is what justifies deferentially trusting what she says.
Because the notion of expression plays a central role in this account, I contrast it with
recent neoexpressivist theories.

Rosenthal, David M. (2010). Expressing Ones Mind. Acta Analytica: International

Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition. Spr 2010. 25(1), 21-34.

Remarks such as "I am in pain" and "I think that it's raining" are puzzling, since
they seem to literally describe oneself as being in pain or having a particular thought, but
their conditions of use tend to coincide with unequivocal expressions of pain or of that
thought. This led Wittgenstein, among others, to treat such remarks as expressing, rather
than as reporting, one's mental states. Though such expressivism is widely recognized as
untenable, Bar-On has recently advanced a neoexpressivist view, on which such remarks
exhibit characteristics of both expressions of mental states and reports of those states. I
argue against any attempt to see such remarks as both reporting and expressing the same
mental states, and that a correct account rests on distinguishing the truth conditions of
such remarks from their conditions of use.

Samoilova, Kateryna (2015). First-Person Priviledge, Judgment and Avowal.

Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind
and Action. June 2015. 18(2), 169-182.

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It is a common intuition that I am in a better position to know my own mental
states than someone else's. One view that takes this intuition very seriously is
neoexpressivism, providing a "nonepistemic" account of first-person privilege. But some
have denied that we enjoy any principled first-person privilege, as do those who have the
third-person view, according to which there is no deep difference in our epistemic
position with regard to our own and others' mental states. Despite their apparently deep
differences, I argue that neoexpressivism and the third-person view differ in their location
of first-person privilege. This difference in the source of first-person privilege allows the
key elements of each of these views to be compatible, and can even be combined into a
single view about the nature of introspection and self-knowledge. The compatibility of
these two views that otherwise appear to be in direct opposition is methodologically
significant, highlighting several dialectical lessons that clarify the existing debate about
first-person privilege. The main lesson to take away is that there are likely other
underexplored possibilities for careful synthesis of already existing views, which could
shed new light on the nature of first-person privilege, introspection, and self-knowledge.

Sankowski, E. (1978). Wittgenstein on self-knowledge. Mind.

This paper discusses self-Knowledge expressible in first-Person present-Tense
psychological statements, Or avowals. The author considers such self-Knowledge a
philosophically interesting possibility, And agrees with some of wittgenstein's views
(especially in "philosophical investigations"). But Kenny, Like others, Construes
wittgenstein as rejecting the possibility of self-Knowledge for a significant range of
avowals. I criticize this misinterpretation; wittgenstein really stresses that context must be
supplied to speak of such self-Knowledge, And this point is meant to count against many
foundationalist epistemologists.

(3)Sen, Manidipa. (2004). Knowing Our Own Minds: Ascriptions versus Expressions.
Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 21(1), 49-70.
Philosophers have usually held the view that self-knowledge, as articulated in
sincere avowals concerning our present mental states, possesses an authority that no
second -- or their-person claims -- or for that matter first-person other tense claims -- can
ever have. This idea is strongly accepted and argued for by those who accept the
Cartesian view of mind, the view that mental states constitute an inner realm which is
directly available to the subject whose mental states they are. There seems to be, as it
were, a profound asymmetry between the first-person and the other-person points of
view. Taking avowals to be the basic form of self-ascription, this paper is an attempt to
address the problem of self-knowledge by defending a form of expressivism in the
philosophy of mind. After explaining three basic characteristics of avowals, and pointing
out the deficiencies of the observational and the nonobservational models of self-

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ascription, this article tries to argue for a hybrid character of avowals taking clue from the
expressivist account of self-knowledge.

Vaaja, Tero. (2014). Expressivism, Self-Knowledge, and Describing One's

Experiences. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 35(3), 151-166.

In this article, I defend an account of self-knowledge that allows us a
considerable first person authority regarding our subjective experiences without invoking
privileged access. I examine expressivism about avowals by contrasting it with
"detectivist" and "constitutivist" accounts of self-knowledge, following the use of these
terms by David Finkelstein. I proceed to present a version of expressivism that preserves
some of the valid motivating insights of detectivism and constitutivism as essential parts.
Finally, I point out how my account views self-knowledge as a cognitive and conceptual
ability that can be cultivated; the account construes self-knowledge as a process.

(2)Vega-Encabo, Jesus. (2011). Self-Knowledge as Knowledge?. Teorema, 30(3), 35-


David Finkelstein, in his book Expression and the Inner, offers a nonepistemic
account of first-person authority that could fall under the label of
sophisticated expressivism. I discuss Hank's case, introduced in the final chapter of his
book to support the idea that there is no necessary philosophical disagreement between
those that consider to be sheer nonsense to describe Hank's avowals in epistemic terms,
those that deny that he knows because he is not justified, and those that accept an
epistemic description under a concept of knowledge that does not entail justification. In
my comments, I argue that insofar as sophisticated expressivism takes seriously the idea
that avowals are also assertions, it should be committed to an epistemic description of
first-person self-ascriptions, even if that description departs from traditional
epistemological conceptions. Cases of gaining and losing what I will dub expressiveness
show the epistemic continuity between self-ascriptions that could differ in first-person
authority. So there is serous philosophical disagreement between our three types of

Villanueva Fernandez, Neftali. (2014). Know Thyself: A Tale of Two Theses and Two
Theories.. Teorema, 33(3), 49-65.

The purpose of this paper is to defend an expressivist analysis for the truth-
conditional meaning of self-knowledgeascriptions. First, we present the two theses
about self-knowledge on which we shall focus, strong authority and presumptive
authority; thereafter, we offer a contrast between the kind of expressivism which we will
be advancing and some of its major competitors, grouped under the label "descriptivism".
Through the introduction of several different cases, we present some of the data that a
theory needs to accommodate in order to successfully analyze attitudinal avowals: self-
knowledge ascriptions are not always authoritative, or nonauthoritative, in any sense.

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Finally, we will argue that the kind of expressivism that we favor gives the most
parsimonious analysis of these attributions and, thus, should be considered better than its

(2)Wright, C. (1998). Self-knowledge: the Wittgensteinian legacy. Royal Institute of

Philosophy Supplement, 43, 101-122.

It is only in fairly recent philosophy that psychological self-knowledge has come
to be seen as problematical; once upon a time the hardest philosophical difficulties all
seemed to attend our knowledge of others. But as philosophers have canvassed various
models of the mental that would make knowledge of other minds less intractable, so it
has become unobvious how to accommodate what once seemed evident and
straightforwardthe wide and seemingly immediate cognitive dominion of minds over

Wright, C. (2015). Self-knowledge: the Reality of Privileged Access. In: S. Goldberg

(ed.). Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Scepticism: New Essays, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 49-74.

Paul Snowdon's [2012] ( How to Think about Phenomenal Self-Knowledge in
A.Coliva, ed., The Self and Self-knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 243-
262) develops a range of careful and interesting criticisms of ideas about the problem of
self-knowledge, and about what I interpreted as the broad contribution to it made
byWittgenstein's later work, that I presented in Whitehead lectures at Harvard almost
twenty years ago. Snowdon questions whether Wittgenstein's characteristic focus upon
the linguistic expressions of self-knowledge holds out any real prospect of philosophical
progress, and charges that my discussion is guilty in any case of distortion and over-
simplification of the 'data', whether conceived as linguistic or otherwise, that set the
problem of self-knowledge in the first place. In this paper, I take the opportunity to

(2)Zimmerman, A. Z. (2008). Self-Knowledge: Rationalism vs. Empiricism.

Philosophy Compass, 3(2), 325352.

Recent philosophical discussions of self-knowledge have focused on basic cases:
our knowledge of our own thoughts, beliefs, sensations, experiences, preferences, and
intentions. Empiricists argue that we acquire this sort of self-knowledge through inner
perception; rationalists assign basic self-knowledge an even more secure source in reason
and conceptual understanding. I try to split the difference. Although our knowledge of our
own beliefs and thoughts is conceptually insured, our knowledge of our experiences is
relevantly like our perceptual knowledge of the external world.

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