The Attack On The Historical Me - Morton White

Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
The Attack on the Historical Method

Author(s): Morton G. White
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 42, No. 12 (Jun. 7, 1945), pp. 314-331
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314 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
be known. The illusion of the bent stick is kept frombecoming
a delusion by a knowledgeof elementaryoptics. But the poor
dog described in Aesop's fable had no such knowledge,so when
he dropped the bone he was carryingto seize the apparentlylarger
bone reflectedin the stream, he lost his dinner. In perception
there are always errors or aberrations in quality, in space, and
especially in time. Auditory and visual effectscarry with them
no sensorysigns of the timethat the stimulihave taken to traverse
the distance from the object that is their original cause to the
organism. The thunderthat we hear and the stars that we see
appear to be contemporary with our experienceof them; but their
true times are actually seconds or years prior to the time of our
perception.
Third corollary. Our epistemologicaltheoryof the relationof
consciousnessto its objects is quite independentof any psycho-
physical theoryof the relationof consciousnessto the brain. It is
the effectsin the cognizingindividual that reveal their causes as
the objects cognized. For a materialistthose effectswill be states
of thebody. For a spiritualisttheywill be statesof the soul. For
a phenomenalist,they will be states produced in the present ex-
perience (what James calls "the passing thought") by prior ex-
periences. For an agnostic,theywill be states of the unknowable
to which consciousnesspertains.
In short,the theoryof knowledgehere proposed is compatible
with all psychophysicaltheories,and does not commitus in ad-
vance to any one of them. The Ways of Knowing with which
epistemologyis concernedare only a prelude to the Ways of Being
dealt with by metaphysics. And what we have called the first
mysteryof consciousnesshas its sequel in the second and greater
mysteryof the ultimatenatureof mind and its connectionwiththe
material organism. That is the mysterythat lies at the heart of
all high philosophy.
WM. PEPPERELL MONTAGUE
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
THE ATTACK ON THE HISTORICAL METHOD'

THE historicalor geneticmethodhas not been a popular sub-
ject amongrecentAmericanand Britishphilosophers. Even
those who have been primarilyconcernedwith methodologyhave
1 Afterthis articlewas preparedfor publicationmy attentionwas called
to a veryinteresting articleby Karl Popper,entitled"The Povertyof His-
" Parts I and II, Economica,N.S., Vol. XI (1944), pp. 86-103,
toricism,
119-137. Had I read this earlier,I wouldhave wantedto considersome of
Popper'sviewsat length;I stillhopeto do so in thenear future.

THE ATTACK ON THE HISTORICAL METHOD 315
focusedmost of theirattentionon the more theoreticaldisciplines,

shunninghistoryand allied studies. In a way, it is surprisingto
find this among contemporaryAmerican philosophers,especially
in view of the powerful influenceexerted by the historicismof
the nineteenthcentury on American thought of the twentieth.
Dewey was, of course,influencedby Darwin and Hegel; Veblen by
Spencer, Darwin, and the historicalschool of economics; Holmes
was steepedin the writingsof Savigny and Maine while preparing
The CommonLaw; and Beard's early work representsa reaction
to formalist,deductiveapproachesto the Constitution.
No doubt the recentsilence on the subject may be viewed as a
new reactionagainst this early and hectic admirationfor the dy-
namic. But the silence,the lack of interestin the methodof his-
tory,was also preceded by a carefullylaid barrage-a philosophi-
cal attempt to discredit the method. In England Bradley and
Henry Sidgwick were among the most critical. On the continent
Karl Mengerled the attack on Schmollerand the historicalschool
of economics. More recently in America, Professor Morris R.
Cohen and Professor Sidney Hook have been critical of the
method.2 Discussion of the problem on a general scale has lan-
guished since then, no doubt for many reasons. Very recently,
however,there seems to have been a revival of interest. Because
of this, and because of my own special concernwith the work of
the AmericanthinkersI mentionedearlier,I would like to re-open
the controversy. It seems to me that the issues have never been
fully aired, and that the whole debate lies in a mist that ought
to be lifted.
The methodhas been interpretedand attacked in many differ-
ent ways, and it would be futile to attemptan exact definitionof
the historicalmethodhere. I shall assume that it is betterto con-
sider the conceptionused by the particular philosophermaking
the attack, for obviouslythis is the only way to get a solution of
whateverproblemsare involved. The writingsof those who criti-
cize what they call "the pretensionsof history" have much in
common,but there are also serious differences,differencesthat
would necessarilyturn up in philosophiesas diverse as idealism,
pragmatism,and realism. Not only do they level differentargu-
ments,but theyconceivethe object of theirattack differently.In
this paper I hope to treat only some of the major criticismsin
2 Professor Cohen's essay "History versus Value" was published in 1914,
and reprintedin his Reason and Nature (1931), pp. 369-385; Professor Hook's
essay "A Pragmatic Critique of the Historico-Genetie Method" appeared in
Essays in Honor of John Dewey, New York, 1929.

detail,tryingto indicatewhichare valid, whichinvalid, and which

obscure in a way that preventsproper evaluation.
I. HISTORY AND EXPLANATION
One of the mostcommoncriticismsof the historicalmethodhas

been that it can not explain thingsas theyare now. Here history
is conceivedas the narrationof events. We findphilosophersde-
nyingthat the past is the key to the understandingof the present,
and with gleefulparadox turningthe tables; the present,theysay,
is the key to the understandingof the past. I thinkthat the issue
is relativelyvague when put in this second way, and so I prefer
to examine firstthe view that historydoesn't explain. It is ob-
vious that much turns on what we understandby the terms"his-
tory" and "explanation."
The traditional view of historynever allows it to transcend
facts or particulars-by definition. Thus the learned Sir William
Hamilton says: "The informationwhichwe thus receive,that cer-
tain phaenomena are, or have been, is called Historical, or Em-
pirical knowledge. It is called historical,because, in this knowl-
edge, we know only the fact, only that the phaenomenonis; for
historyis properly only the narration of a consecutiveseries of
phaenomena in time, or the descriptionof a coexistentseries of
phaenomena in space. Civil historyis an example of the one;
natural history,of the other." 3 But one view of scientificexpla-
nation is that it involves generalizationsor laws-that a fact is
explained when it can be predictedby referenceto otherfacts and
generalizations. It is evident that these two views, combined,
yield the obvious and trivial conclusion that historycan not ex-
plain. There can be no doubt that if explanation requires laws,
and if historyis definitionally
strippedof laws, then historyyields
no explanations. Much of the attackstemsfromjust such an argu-
ment. Thus ProfessorCohen says: "History deals with particu-
lar events,withwhat has happened at a particulartime and place.
The considerationof general laws apart from temporal embodi-
ment is not the concern of history."4 In the same vein, Hook
says that the geneticmethodgives us chronicle.5
3 Lectureson Metaphysics,p. 38 of the one-volume
edition. I cite Hamil-
ton,notbecausehe is originalin thisregard,but becausehe usuallyrepresents
a large segmentof philosophicalthoughtin his terminology.He was learned,
and so he representshis predecessors;he was influential,
and so he represents
his successors.
4Eleven Twenty-Six, A Decade of Social ScienceResearch,ed. L. Wirth,
p. 241; also see Cohen'srecentwork,A Preface to Logic, p. 128.
5 Op. cit., p. 161.

There can be no doubt that there is a traditionof interpreting

historical investigationin just this way, one that may be traced
to Aristotle, I suppose. But it is hardly the view of history
adopted by those thinkersusually associated with the traditionof
historicism. Condorcet,for example, in speaking of the progress
of the intellect,says:
This progress is subject to the same general laws, observable in the indi-
vidual developmentof our faculties; being the result of that very development
considered at once in a great number of individuals united in society. But
the result which every instant presents, depends upon that of the preceding
instants, and has an influenceon the instants which follow.
This picture, therefore,is historical; since, subjected as it will be to per-
petual variations, it is formedby the successive observation of human societies
at the differenteras through which they have passed. It will accordingly ex-
hibit the order in which the changes have taken,place, explain the inflnuence of
every past period upon that which follows it, and thus show, by the modifica-
tions which the human species has experienced, in its incessant renovation
throughthe immensityof ages, the course which it has pursued, and the steps
which it has advanced towards knowledge and happiness.6
I quotethispassage to showthatCondorcetdistinguishes between

exhibitingthe orderin whichchangeshave takenplace and explain-
ing the influenceof past periods upon periods whichfollowit, and
that his belief in law is integralto his historicism. Both of these
tasks, although distinguished,are parts of the historicalmethod.
I don't think that the accomplishmentof the firsttask explains
anything. Moreover,to construethe historicalmethodas though
it involved only this firsttask is to emasculate it and to make it
an easy prey to the kind of objections raised by some of its op-
ponents. Taking the theoreticaltask out of the historicalmethod
is like construingthe methodof Darwinismapart fromthe theory
of natural selection.
It seems to me that certain historicistsintendedto assert that
there were laws of a certain kind, namely, laws that connected
states prevailing at one time with states prevailing at another
time. These are the so-called dynamic laws-the laws of succes-
sion. In Comteand Mill theyare distinguishedfromstatic laws-
laws of coexistence. Comte's distinctioncuts across all the sci-
ences, as his examples fromsociology,biology,and physics show.
Notice that if one believes there are laws of coexistence,one ac-
cepts the fact that there are non-historicalexplanationstoo. One
is not led to deny the obvious. Explanations whichconnectstates
or facts prevailing at differenttimes are historical in so far as
a past fact together with a dynamic generalization sufficesto
6Esquisse d'un tableaushistorique des progres de V'esprithumain, English
translationof 1795,pp. 3-4. The italicsare mine.

explain or predict a later state. I think this is a firstapproxi-

mation to what is meant by saying that the past explains the
present, and, to be sure, it does not prevent us from agreeing
that the presenthelps us understandthe past.
The view that we know the past throughour knowledgeof the
present is wholly correct. It is to be found in the writings of
Bradley7 and Sidgwick8; variants of it appear in the writingsof
Woodbridge,9Cohen, and Hook. I mean the view that since we
reconstructthe past on the basis of present remains and docu-
ments,we understandthe past in termsof the present. No doubt
we are limitedto our own presentexistencein what we can directly
observe. It is also true that our evaluation and interpretation
of the documentsand remains are carried out in the present on
the basis of currentlyverifiablegeneralizations. But generaliza-
tions have a two-waycharacter,and I see no reason for denying
that our knowledgeof the past helps us explain the present. I
cite one instructiveexample. When we receive a flash of light
on the earth fromone of the stars, no doubt we use this present
observationas a basis for asserting that there is a star in the
heavens. But obviously the fact that a source emitted light so
many light-yearsago explains why we receivethe flashnow.
I want to turn now to another argumentwhich has been of-
fered in criticismof the historicalmethod. It has been said that
"the notion that the present charactersof the system of matri-
mony,or any other'social constellationof forces,'can be explained
by reducingit to a previoussystem,overlooksthe fact that no mat-
ter how far back we go, we must somewherebegin with characters
whichare not so derivable." 10 Now, so far as I can see, the "log-
ical difficulty"offeredhere amountsto the fact that thereare first
social states. Presumably we are unable to explain a later sys-
tem of social relations by referenceto an earlier one, because at
some point in time thereare systemshaving no predecessors. But
7 Presuppositions of a Critical History, 1874; reprinted in Volume I of
Collected Essays, Oxford, 1935. "The history . . . which is for us, is mat-
ter of inference,and in the last resort has existence as history,as a record of
events,by means of an inference of our own. And this inference furthermore
can never start from a background of nothing; it is never a fragmentaryiso-
lated act of our mind, but is essentially connected with, and in entire de-
pendence on, the character of our general consciousness. And so the past
varies with the present, and can never do otherwise, since it is always the
present upon which it rests. This present is presupposed by it, and is its neces-
sary preconception" (p. 20).
8 Philosophy, its Scope and Relations, p. 138. (New York, 1902, post-
humous.)
9 The Purpose of History, New York, 1916.
10Hook, op. cit., p. 158.

this argumentis not very strong. Does it simplymean that there
is a firstsocial systemin time,and that thereforeit can't be ex-
plained by referenceto a systemearlier than it? Granted. But
does it follow fromthis admission that later social systemscan't
be explained by referenceto earlier ones where they exist? Not
at all. It simply followsthat the firstsystemcan not be geneti-
cally explained. The argumentis strikinglyanalogous to the view
that science explains nothingbecause it begins with axioms, and
is equally invalid. It only proves that there are some things
which can't be explained genetically,and is effectiveonly against
the extremistwho wronglyargues that only historyexplains. By
a strangelogic, some opponentsof historyhave concluded that it
explains nothingbecause it doesn't explain everything.
This last argumentis very much like one offeredby Sidgwick,
except that he applied it to physical phenomena. In speaking of
the nebular hypothesisand what he called speculative geology
and astronomy,he said:
If we take as given-as our point of departure-the positions and veloci-
ties of all parts of the physical world at any point of time, present or past,
we may reasonably regard all subsequent changes as ultimately explicable by
the known laws of physical motion, and partially known laws of chemical
combination. . . . But however far back we go, the state of matter at the
point of time that we began with is exactly as inexplicable as the state of
matter now; it presents the same unsolved problem to Philosophy, which aims
at an explanation of the world as a whole.1"
But if one rejects the grandiosetask of "explaining the world as

a whole" (as I do) one need not fear the impact of Sidgwick's
argument. He admits enough for my purposes,and the supposed
inexplicabilityof the firststate in no way preventsus fromusing
the firststate to explain later ones.
To illustrate what I mean by a historical explanation in the
fieldof human historyI want to considera well-knownarticle by
the great Belgian historian,Henri Pirenne, whose ability to in-
vestigate the most minute aspects of medieval society in no way
preventedhim from directinghimselfto more general considera-
tions. The article is his "Stages in the Social History of Capital-
ism." 12 Before I turn to the thesis I want to quote his opening
words:
In the pages that follow I wish only to develop a hypothesis. Perhaps
after having read them, the reader will find the evidence insufficient. I do
not hesitate to recognize that the scarcity of special studies bearing upon
my subject, at least for the period since the end of the Middle Ages, is of a
11 Sidgwick, op. cit., pp. 132-133.

12 The American Historical Review, Vol. XIX (1914), pp. 494-515.

nature to discourage more than one cautious spirit. But . . . I am con-

vinced that every effortat synthesis,however premature it may seem, cannot
fail to react usefully on investigations,provided one offersit in all frankness
for what it is.13
I quote this in order to emphasizethat the issue as to whetherhis-

tory can explain is not identical with the question as to whether
there are uniformitiesin human history. What I am chieflyoc-
cupied with is showing that few of the phiZosophicalobjections
hold. Someone may ask: why waste so much time showingthat
historicalexplanationis possible? To this I should reply: because
some have denied it and because such denials, if left unchallenged,
may destroyany potentialitieshistorymay have in this direction.
Thereforethese argumentsshould be met, lest the historian be
dissuaded by fallacious argumentsfrompursuinga proper end.
To return to Pirenne's hypothesis. He believes, firstof all,
that "for each period into which our economichistorymay be di-
vided, thereis a distinctand separate class of capitalists. In other
words, the group of capitalists of a given epoch does not spring
from the capitalist group of the preceding epoch." 14 "Every
class of capitalists," he says, "is at the beginninganimated by a
clearly progressiveand innovating spirit but becomes conserva-
tive as its activitiesbecome regulated."'15 I believe that this is
what I have called a dynamicgeneralization. Pirenne goes further
and derives this generalization from another, namely, that the
ancestor of the capitalist is a parvenu, embarrassed by neither
custom nor routine. Pirenne's readers will recall St. Godric of
Finchale-his most frequent example. The parvenu's descend-
ants relax, and "wish to preserve the situation which they have
acquired, provided public authoritywill guarantee it to them,
even at the price of a troublesomesurveillance; they do not hesi-
tate to place their influenceat its service,and wait for the mo-
ment when, pushed aside by new men, they shall demand of the
state that it recognizeofficially the rank to whichtheyhave raised
their families,shall on their entrance into the nobility become
a legal class and no longer a social group, and shall consider it
beneath them to carry on that commercewhich in the beginning
made theirfortunes." 16
Pirenne's hypothesisis a theoryof a process. Using his theory,
with a knowledgeof earlier states one can explain later states.
ThorsteinVeblen describesthis kind of a theoryas a "theory of a
13 Ibid., p. 494.
'4 Ibid., p. 494.
'5 Ibid., p. 515.
la Ibid., p. 515.

process of cultural growth. . . a theoryof cumulativesequence

of economic institutionsstated in terms of the process itself."
Such theories,when true, provide explanations-historical expla-
nations,because theydraw upon the past in order to explain later
events.17
II. HISTORY AND "THE NATURE OF A THING"
Discussion of the issues in this fieldis frequentlyvitiatedby a

confusionbetween explanation and what I shall call analysis or
stating the nature of an entity. At several points in Professor
Hook's essay there is a tendencyto regard the nature of a thing
as thatwhichwe statewhenwe answerthe question"why ? " 18 But
it seemsobviousto me that when I ask for the nature of something
like the systemof monogamousmarriage,to use Hook's example,
I don't intend therebyto ask why it exists now in certain places.
When I ask someoneto explain whysomethingis the case, I usually
want him to give reasons for its being the case. The distinction
is importantfor the discussionbecause, obviously,we have to be
clear about what historicistsare being charged with before judg-
ing the meritsof the charge. As we mightexpect,theyare alter-
nately charged with making two errors: (1) believing that the
historyof a thing can explain why it exists now; (2) believing
that the historyof a thing is the same thingas statingits nature.
17 ProfessorBeard has recentlycometo speak of a "now out-moded sci-
ence in whichit was assumedthat an eventwas explainedwhenthe 'right
cause' was assigned for it" (see his introduction to the 1943 edition of
BrooksAdams' The Law of Civilizationand Decay, p. 15, note 7). He cites
E. W. Hobson,the eminentmathematician, in defenseof this view. Hobson
had writtenin his Domain of Natural Science,New York, 1923, that science
states how and not whythingshappen. It shouldbe added, however,that
Hobson qualifiesthis. He says: " The very commonidea that it is the
functionof naturalscienceto explainphysicalphenomenacannotbe accepted
as true unlessthe word'explain' is used in a verylimitedsense" (op. cit.,
p. 81). What the limitsare is not made clear. It shouldalso be pointed
out that one can accept explanationas a functionof sciencewithoutconstru-
ing it as the givingof "the rightcause." The issues raised by Hobson and
Beard wouldtake us well beyondthe limitsof this paper, into a discussion
of thelogic of explanation.
18 "Those who believe that the presentationof a series of spatio-tem-
poral continuitiescan serveas a solutionto an inquiryintothe natureof any
given institutionor event,are guilty of a special formof the fallacy of
ignoratioelenchi. We ask 'why' and are answeredas if we had asked
'wherefrom' or 'what. "' It wouldseemas thoughtheinquiryintothenature
of an institutiongivesan answerto thequestion" why," on Hook's view. (It
shouldbe notedthatthepassage quotedprobablycontainsa misprint, and that
Hook intendedto have "fromwhat" insteadof "what.") See Hook,op. cit.,
p. 158.

But these two criticismsare quite different.When, in certain

weak moments,critics of the historicalmethodgrant that it can
explain, in the sense of findingpast causes of events,they follow
this with a qualification. "But to explain," they say, "is not
to understand." Thus it is said of historical types: "Knowing
what causes their developmentI no more know what they are,
than knowingthe bodily changeswhich conditionthe development
of affectionin a human being, I know what an affectionis."'19
But if there is a difference between giving causes, i.e, explaining,
and stating the nature of things or understandingthem, which
does historyfail to accomplish? Let me say somewhatdogmati-
cally that I thinkhistorydoes give reasons or causes; whetherit
can presentthe nature of a thingor provide us with "understand-
ing" raises some extremelyimportant questions. I might add
that the notions of understandingwhich have been offeredare
far fromclear. Here is a sample, taken fromcontextno doubt:
"We understand an institution,a personality,and emotion by
relating them to a purpose which definessome value or meaning
whole; we explain themin termsof the structureof value-neutral
determinants. " 20
Let us considerthe question ontologically. What entitiesmay
be said to have histories? One philosophical tradition answers:
concrete things. This chair has had a history,that man, that
star. And when I ask for the nature of something,what onto-
logical status is that thing usually assigned? Many philosophers
answer: it is abstract, or universal. In other words, there is a
view that only concretesubstances have histories,and that only
abstract entitieshave natures, so to speak. It becomes nonsense
on this view, a sort of violation of the theoryof types, to speak
of the nature of this concreteobject; it is equally nonsensicalto
ask for the historyof a universal-despite historianslike Bury
who are interestedin the origin and growthof ideas. Exceptions
like the idea of progresshave historiesin another sense if ideas
are understoodas universals.
If he proceeds fromsuch an ontology,it is evidentwhy a phi-
losopherwill argue that historythrowsno light on the nature of
a thing. But such an ontologyexcludes more than history. All
empirical knowledgewill fail to state essences or natures. For
consider the discipline which is supposed to investigatethe na-
ture of abstractthings. Some philosophersregard it as the heart
19Hook, op. cit., p. 171.
20 Hook, op. cit., p. 171. I mightadd the guess,in all fairnessto Pro-
fessorHook,that his viewshave changedon this matter. The essay in ques-
tion,it is to be remembered, was writtenin 1929.

of philosophy; it issues in definitionsor analyses, which are dif-

ferentfrom mere empirical propositions. But if the philosophi-
cal analysis of abstract entities is what reveals their natures, it
is clear that not only will historyfail, but any kind of empirical
knowledgewill fail to state natures. The experimentalmethodis
just as inadequate as the historico-genetic method if it is philo-
sophical analysis in the technicalsense that we want.2'
There are some philosopherswho will permitus to talk of the
nature of concreteentities,but only by forcingus into a kind of
relativism. Thus if I point to a concreteobject, and I ask, what
is that? they will always shrug their shouldersand say that they
don't understand. They will suggest that I reformulate my
question. I must ask, they will insist,what is the shape of that?
or what is its color? or what is its weight? etc. Things will not
have natures absolutely,but only relatively-with respect to cer-
tain points of view. Now it seems to me perfectlyreasonable on
one of these occasions-that is, after the relativisthas shrugged
his shoulders-to add "why of course I mean, what's the origin
or historyof that?" In other words, the historicalapproach is
just one of those different respectsin which the nature of a thing
may be considered. I shall not pursue this point any further,
but suggest it as a way of breaking down this sharp distinction
between the historyof a concretething and its nature. I take
it that we get more and more knowledgeof how the object will
behave after we have approached it from many points of view;
in other words, our ability to predict its behavior is increased
the more perspectiveswe view it from. I suggestthat knowledge
of the object's past functionsin exactly that way; it is an addi-
tional perspectivefromwhich we view things,a perspectivethat
yields importantinformationfor purposes of predictionand con-
trol.
III. THE HISTORICAL METHOD IN ECONOMICS-ANOTHER MATTER
The historicalmethodhas had a long historyin economics,and

I should like to point out brieflyhow the issue in this fieldis re-
21 Sidgwick was very explicit on this point, more so than any of his suc-
cessors in this controversy. He insisted, for instance, that Darwinian biology

in no way bore upon the issue as to whether "the nature of man is dual,"
"a mysterious combination of spirit and body." He was equally sure that
historical psychology,or psychogony,could not replace "subjective analysis"
and he argued against a confusion of psychical antecedents and psychical ele-
ments. The psychologist who traces the history of beliefs can only ascer-
tain conditions, antecedents, and concomitants, and they, Sidgwick insists,
must be distinguished from the constituents of the mental process, op. cit.,
p. 151.

lated (or unrelated) to what has gone before. The claims of

historicismin economicshave oftenbeen presentedas thoughthey
were trivial. That is, one sometimesgets the impressionthat the
historicalschool was the firstto look at the economicworld. The
contrastbetweenit and the classical school is frequentlypresented
as though the classicists were the most incredible opponents of
empiricism. But if the historical method is interpretedin this
way, then Sidgwick is perfectlyrightwhen he says: "the histori-
cal method could hardly be distinguished from the inductive
method."e22 And to urge the importanceof history,then,is simply
to argue that we "pay more attentionto facts and less to deduc-
tive reasoningfromgeneral premisses,assumed or supposed to be
self-evident." 23 When Sidgwick distinguishedbetween the in-
ductive methodand the historicalmethod-a distinctionhe made
simply because he felt that the claims of historicismwere not
identicalwiththose of empiricism-he was undoubtedlyinfluenced
by his own acquaintance withthe controversybetweenthe classical
and historicalschools-the Methodenstreit of the eighteen-seventies
and 'eighties.24 Sidgwiek was not only a philosopherbut also the
authorof a treatiseon political economy,25 whose opening chapters
on method are very interestingand acute. When he insisted
that "historical method" was not synonymouswith "respect for
fact," he was aware that John Stuart Mill, althoughan empiricist,
was a classical a priori economist. AlthoughMill was opposed by
the historicalschool,by no means did he deny that economicswas
a sciencegroundedupon experience. (There is somethingstrange
in the fact that Mill, whose views on mathematicsmade him the
symbol of extremeempiricism,should have been identifiedwith
the opposite view in economics.) But many of the historicists
did not thinkof themselvesas mere empiricists. There can be no
doubt that some of them talked as thoughthey were only urging
the use of inductivemethodsin the social sciences. For instance,
CliffeLeslie attacked the classical school for being too abstract
and a priori in its method,and, so far as I can see, his historicism
sometimes2" amounts to nothingmore than a respect for empiri-
cal data. Sidgwick did not deny that economicswas an empirical
science,nor did Mill. Mill makes this quite explicit not only in
22Sidgwick, op. cit., p. 126.
23Ibid., p. 126.
24 See Roll, E., A History of Economic Thought, New York, 1942, p. 336.
25 The Principles of Political Economy, 1st ed. 1883 (all referencesin this
paper are to the 3rd ed. of 1901).

26 "On the Philosophical Method of Political Economy," Essays in Po-
litical and Moral Philosophy (1879), p. 226.

his System of Logic, but also in his essay "On the Definitionof
Political Economy," whichappeared in his volume,Essays on Some
UnsettledQuestionsof Political Economy.
To use the a priori methodin economics,as Mill conceivedit,
was not to deny that economichypothesesare groundedin experi-
ence. He says: "the ground of confidencein any concretededuc-
tive scienceis not the a priori reasoningitself,but the accordance
between its results and those of observation a posteriori."27
Mill's apriorismwas a view concerningthe order in which the
deductive and observationalparts of the scientificprocess are to
be carriedout. In talkingof the possibilityof shiftsin this order
he says:
Nothing more results than a disturbance in the order of precedency of the
two processes, sometimes amounting to its actual inversion: insomuch that in-
stead of deducing our conclusions by reasoning, and verifying them by ob-
servation, we in some eases begin by obtaining them provisionally from
specific experience, and afterward connect them with the principles of human
nature by a priori reasonings,which reasonings are thus a real Verification.28
The difference betweenthe a priori and historicalmethoddepends

on whetherone uses the direct deductive method or the inverse
deductivemethod,to use Mill's language. Thereforethe histori-
cist, on this view, is one who argues that one must firststudy
narrativehistoryand then formulategeneral laws.29 Historicists,
in this sense, are disputingwith Mill over the order of different
parts of science. It should be noticed,however,that this view is
independentof the view defendedearlier in this paper. One may
very well believe that there are historicalexplanations-explana-
tions in which past events explain later ones-without adopting
the view that the study of particularsalways precedes the formu-
lation of laws, or that the inductiveprocess is temporallyprior to
the deductive.
Historicism,as defendedearlier in this paper, involvesno at-
tack on abstractionor deduction. This was made explicitby Mill.
It was also stated clearly by Sidgwick,who criticizedhistoricism,
and by JohnKells Ingram,who defendedit. Ingram pointed out
that historicaleconomicswas in no way forced to deny the exist-
ence of economiclaw, and spoke criticallyof that part of the Ger-
man historical school which substitutedfor theory "a mere de-
27 A System of Logic, Book VI, Chapter IX, section 1.
28 Ibid., Book VI, Chapter IX, section 1.
29 Professor Wesley C. Mitchell, in discussing the work of Schmoller,indi-
cates that this was his general idea. See Mitchell's Lecttureson CurrentTypes
of Economic Theory, delivered at Columbia University, Volume II, p. 548
(1935 edition, mimeographed).

scriptionof differentnational economies."30 Ingram is also quite

directon the subjects of abstractionand deduction:
The name "Realistic" which has sometimes been given to the historical
school, especially in its more recent form, appears to be injudiciously chosen.
It is intended to mark the contrast with the "abstract" complexion of the
orthodox economics. But the error of these economics lies, not in the use, but
in the abuse of abstraction. All science implies abstraction, seeking as it
does, for unity in variety; the question in every branch is as to the right con-
stitution of the abstract theory in relation to the concrete facts. Nor is the
new school correctly distinguished as "inductive." IIDeduction doubtless un-
duly preponderates in the investigations of the older economists; but it must
be rememberedthat it is a legitimate process, when it sets out, not from a
priori assumptions, but from proved generalizations.31
The familiarobservationthatMarx was a historicistas well as a de-

ductiveeconomistis also quite relevanthere.
Marx's name raises another,central elementof historicismin
economics,a doctrine which is well illustrated in the following
passage. Marx says:
Ricardo considers the capitalist form of labour as the eternal, natural
form of labour. He makes the primitive fishermanand the primitive hunter
straightaway exchange their fish and game as owners of commodities,in pro-
portion to the labour-time embodied in these exchange-values.32
That capitalist economy,as Marx describes it, is transitoryand

fundamentallydifferent fromprecedingeconomiesis a questionof
economic fact-intimately bound up, of course, with a question
of definition,i.e., the definitionof the various economiessaid to
differ. I do not want to considerthis question at length. I only
want to point out that some historiciststalk as if historicismcon-
sisted simply in the recognitionof these fundamental changes,
whereasit seemsto me that the mostimportantelementin Marxian
historicismis its attemptto explatn these changes.33 I think of
30 Ingram, J. K., A History of Political Economy, pp. 205-206; firstedi-
tion, 1887; my referencesare to the 1905 ed., New York.
31 Ibid., p. 213.
32 Critique of Political Economy, Chicago, 1904, p. 69. For an excellent

discussion of this aspect of Marx's work and its historical background, see
Henryk Grossman, "The Evolutionist Revolt Against Classical Economics,"
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LI (1943), Nos. 5 and 6. Also see Karl
Korsch, Karl Marx (London, 1938), especially chapters II and III on "The
Principle of Historical Specification."
33 To be sure, the discovery of change is necessary, and itself marks a
contribution. What I want to emphasize is the greater scientificimportance

involved in showing how present economic phenomena are explained by ref-
erence to times at which differenteconomies prevailed. I am emphasizing
here the centrality of what Korsch has called the principle of change as dis-
tinct from the principle of historical specification (op. cit., chapter IV), in
Marx 's work.

the fact of change as on the same theoreticallevel as the fact of

biological evolution, whereas the explanation of change corre-
sponds to a theorylike that of natural selection,from a logical
point of view. It should also be rememberedthat CliffeLeslie
was not willing to stop attacking classical economics even after
Walter Bagehot restrictedit to "a single kind of society-a so-
ciety of grown-upcompetitivecommerce,such as we have in Eng-
land.' 34 Leslie insisted that classical political economy"is, in
fact, as inapplicable to the most advanced stage of commerceas
to thatprimitivestate of naturefromwhichRicardo deduced it." 35
Althoughjudgmentsabout the transitorycharacterof one type
of economy are judgments about fact, rather than method-in
one sense of the word "method'-I do not want to deny the im-
portance of this element of historicism,which was more than a
methodologicaldoctrine. It will be recalled that Mill, in one of
the passages I have quoted,36spoke of deducing certainlaws from
the "principles of human nature." He combined this with the
view that "Human beings in societyhave no propertiesbut those
whichare derivedfrom,and may be resolvedinto,the laws of na-
ture of individual man" and the view that "Men, however,in a
state of societyare still men; their actions and passions are obedi-
ent to the laws of individual human nature. Men are not, when
brought together,convertedinto another kind of substance with
differentproperties; as hydrogenand oxygen are differentfrom
water."37 Now, I take it that one brand of historicismintends
to deny this or most of it. In this case historicismis a doctrine
concerningthe influenceof the cultural or the social, ratherthan
a doctrinewhichemphasizesonly the need for studyingthe past.38
34 Bagehot, W., " The Postulates of English Political Economy," Fort-
nightlyReview, Vol. XIX (1876), new series, p. 226.

35 Cliff
e Leslie, op. cit., p. 232.
36 Above, see footnote 28.
37 System of Logic, Book VI, Chapter VII, section 1.
38 Thus Cliffe Leslie expresses a kind of cultural organicism. He says:
"A priori political economy has sought to deduce the laws which govern the
directions of human energies, the division of employments,the modes of pro-
duction, and the nature, amount and distribution of wealth, from an assump-
tion respecting the course of conduct prompted by individual interest; but
the conclusion which the study of society makes every day more irresistible
is, that the germ from which the existing economy of every nation has been
evolved is not the individual, still less the mere personificationof an abstrae-
tion, but the primitive community-a community one in blood, property,
thought,moral responsibility,and manner of life; and that individual interest
itself, and the desires, aims, and pursuits of every man and woman in the
nation have been moulded by, and received their direction and form from,the
historyof that community" (op. cit., p. 230).

Now I have not discussed this featureof historicism. I have con-

finedmyselfto the attack on the historicalmethodas a thesis con-
cerning the importanceof studies of the past only because it is
this version that has been criticizedby the philosophersI have
mentioned. Sidgwick, for example, does not criticize the insist-
ence upon the social so much as the concernwith the past. He
rejected the view of Mill that all social science was reducible to
individual psychology,and he commentsas followsupon the pas-
sage in which Mill expressesthis view:
Now it is undeniable that the aggregate of the actions of man in society
constitutea more complex fact than the aggregate of the actions of any single
individual; society being the whole of which individuals are parts. But it
does not follow that, as Mill conceives, a psychology exists or can be con-
structed independent of sociology, and such that all the laws ascertained by
the latter are capable of being resolved into the more elementarylaws of the
former.39
Sidgwick also says that thereis "not . . . any doubt that the in-
vestigationof the laws of change in prevalent beliefs of human
societiesis a most importantelementof the whole study of sociol-
ogy-or of history,in the ordinarysense." 40 But Sidgwickwould
grant only so much. He added:
But much more than this seems to be maintained by the writerswho have
recently emphasized the claims of Historical Method. . . . They have meant
by it not merelyan investigation of the sequence in which beliefs have actually
succeeded one another as social phenomena, and the causes or laws of this
sequence; but also a method for determining-what after all is the most in-
teresting question with regard to any class of human beliefs-viz., how far
they are true or false.41
I now pause at the brink of one other vital controversyover

history: its connectionwith validity or norms; the controversy
ProfessorCohen has labeled "History versus Value." I will not
tryto discuss this here; instead,I will turn to the considerationof
a view very close to the one I defendedin the beginningof this
paper-a view stated by ProfessorDewey over fortyyears ago.
IV. DEwEY ON THE GENETIC METHOD
I have pointed out that historyaffordsexplanations if there

are what I have called dynamicgeneralizations-thosewhich take
the form: if somethingis the case at time t1,then somethingelse
is the case at time t2 (where t2 is later than t,). However, I did
not argue that all generalizationshave this form; I think some
39 Philosophy, pp. 153-154.
40 Ibid., p. 155.
41 Ibid., pp. 155-156.

surely don't. If I ask, for example, why this volume of dry air
is heavier than that equal volume of moist air, and someone an-
swers: because the densityof dry air is greaterthan that of moist
air, he is not appealing to any dynamic generalizations. Some
philosophers,however,in defendinga point of view similar to my
own, have, I think,overstatedthe position. I want to discuss just
such an argumentas offeredby ProfessorDewey in 1902.43 At
the momentI am not concernedwith the position he holds today,
or whetherit is identicalwiththe one I shall examine.
ProfessorDewey tried to show that the experimentalmethod
is identicalwiththe geneticmethod.
The essence of the experimentalmethodI take to be control of the analysis
or interpretationof any phenomenonby bringing to light the exact conditions,
and the only conditions,which are involved in its coming into being.44
When we generate somethinglike water in the course of an ex-

periment,we
single out the precise and sole conditions which have to be fulfilledthat water
may present itself as an experienced fact. If this case be typical, then the
experimental method is entitled to rank as genetic method; it is concerned
with the manner or process by which anything comes into experienced exist-
ence.45
This passage suggeststwo remarks. First: it shows that Dewey

also conceivedof the geneticmethodas involvinggeneralization-
a point stressedearlier. Second: on Dewey's view, as expressed
here, there are many more dynamical generalizationsthan there
are on mine. This is true because he construesthe generalizations
of science (at least what he calls the experimentalgeneralizations,
and there is reason to believe that he thought these exhausted
science) as taking the form: If an experimenterinstitutescertain
conditionsat timet1,thenhe will experiencecertainphenomenaat
timet2 (wheret2is later than t1). If Dewey is righthere,a fortiori
I am right,but not conversely. I shall not argue the meritsof
Dewey's view here, because I would undoubtedlybe brought to
considersomefundamentaltenetsof his theoryof inquiry,if I did.
I think,however,that his positionas stated in that paper is wrong,
simply because it seems to exclude the possibilityof what I shall
call static generalizationsin all branches of empiricalknowledge.
42 For a verypenetrating discussionof this question,withspecial refer-
ence to physicalexplanations,see NormanCampbell,Physics: The Elements,
ChapterIII (Cambridge,England,1920).
43 "The Evolutionary Methodas Appliedto Morality. I," Philosophical
Beview,Vol. XI (1902), p. 107.
44 Ibid., pp. 108-109.
45 Ibid., p. 109.

There are several otherpoints in Dewey's paper which are of

great interest. He is concernedwith value and morality,and his
whole argumentis introducedto supportthe view
that there is an exact identitybetween what the experimentalmethod does for
our physical knowledge, and what the historical method in a narrower sense
may do for the spiritual region. . . . History is for the individual and for
the unending procession of the universe what the experimentis to the detached
field of physics. . . . History offersus the only available substitute for the
isolation and for the cumulative recombination of experiment. The early
periods present us in their relative crudeness and simplicitywith a substitute
for the artificial operation of an experiment: following the phenomenoninto
the more complicated and refinedform which it assumes later is a substitute
for the synthesisof the experiment.46
This view is interestinghistorically,and I shall digress frommy

main themein orderto mentionsome of its connections.
First of all theview was veryinfluentialamongsomeof Dewey's
followersand colleagues in the social sciences. It is exactly the
view advanced by William Isaac Thomas47 in defense of the ge-
netic method. Also, it is fascinatingto observe that Dewey was
led to regard historyas a substitutefor experimentin the social
realm,whereasMill was led to a priori classical economicsfor simi-
lar reasons. In describingthe functionof historyin cases where
experimentis not available, Dewey says:
That which is presented to us in later terms of the series in too compli-
cated and confused a form to be unravelled, shows itself in a relatively simple
and transparent mode in the earlier members. Their relative fewness and
superficialitymakes it much easier to secure the mental isolation needful.48
Mill, impressedby the same difficulties,

suggests a very different
alternative:
Since, therefore,it is vain to hope that truth can be arrived at, either in
Political Economy or in any other department of the social science, while we
look at the facts in the concrete, clothed in all the complexity with which
nature has surroundedthem,and endeavor to elicit a general law by a process
of induction from a comparison of details; there remains no other method than
the a priori one, or that of " abstract speculation." 49
It is of some interestto findthat the two polar traditionsin social

science of the nineteenthcentury-historicismand classicism-
stem froma feelingthat a substitutefor experimentis necessary.
The substituteofferedconstitutesthe fundamentaldifferencein
both approaches. Finally, it should be realized that far fromsug-
46 Ibid., p. 113.
47 See his Source Book of Social Origins (Boston, 1909), p. 3.
48 Dewey, op. cit., p. 114.
49 Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy, pp. 148-149.

gesting a dichotomybetween experimentand history,Dewey re-

gards them as intimately related. I stress this because some
pragmatistcriticsof the genetic methodhave suggesteda radical
oppositionbetween the "historico-genetic"methodand the prag-
matic or experimentalmethod.
V. SUMMARY
I have tried to show the following:

(1) That the historicalmethodwas not conceived by its pro-
ponentsas somethingwhich issued in chroniclealone; on the con-
trary, they conceived of history as including generalizations-
particularlydynamic generalizations. Because of this they held
that historycould explain.
(2) That scientificexplanation and stating the nature of con-
cepts are different;that there is a sense in which historymay be
said to state the nature of concreteobjects. More particularly,if
what is wanted is the definitionor analysis of abstract concepts,
then all empirical disciplines may be found lacking. In short,
historymay be distinguishedfromphilosophicalanalysis.
(3) That the dispute over historicalmethod in economicshas
peculiar characteristics,and that this dispute is about the order
of scientificinquiry. It follows that one may see virtues in the
methodof abstractpolitical economy,and still believe in the possi-
bility of historicalexplanation.
In this paper historyhas been construedas a discipline pri-
marily concernedwith the past because those criticswhomI have
criticizedconstrueit in this way. I have tried to meet them on
their own ground. History has not been dealt with as specifically
social 50for this reason. In addition,it is clear that several prob-
lems normallydiscussed in connectionwith the philosophyof his-
torical methodhave not been dealt with in this paper. The rela-
tion betweenhistoryand value, the issues whicharise in the history
of ideas, like those between ProfessorsLovejoy and Spitzer 5-1
these have not been argued. For these omissionsI can only make
the usual excuses. I list themto call attentionto theirimportance,
and to suggest that there are many similar problemsin this field
worthyof the attentionof philosophers.
MORTON G. WHITE
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
50For a discussion of this aspect of the problem, see my article "His-

torical Explanation," IMind, Vol. LII (1943), N.S., pp. 212-229.
51 Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. V (1944), pp. 191-203, 204-219.


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The Attack on the Historical Method

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THE ATTACK ON THE HISTORICAL METHOD'

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focusedmost of theirattentionon the more theoreticaldisciplines,

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detail,tryingto indicatewhichare valid, whichinvalid, and which

I. HISTORY AND EXPLANATION

One of the mostcommoncriticismsof the historicalmethodhas

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There can be no doubt that there is a traditionof interpreting

I quotethispassage to showthatCondorcetdistinguishes between

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explain or predict a later state. I think this is a firstapproxi-

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But if one rejects the grandiosetask of "explaining the world as

11 Sidgwick, op. cit., pp. 132-133.

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nature to discourage more than one cautious spirit. But . . . I am con-

I quote this in order to emphasizethat the issue as to whetherhis-

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process of cultural growth. . . a theoryof cumulativesequence

II. HISTORY AND "THE NATURE OF A THING"

Discussion of the issues in this fieldis frequentlyvitiatedby a

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But these two criticismsare quite different.When, in certain

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of philosophy; it issues in definitionsor analyses, which are dif-

III. THE HISTORICAL METHOD IN ECONOMICS-ANOTHER MATTER

The historicalmethodhas had a long historyin economics,and

cessors in this controversy. He insisted, for instance, that Darwinian biology

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lated (or unrelated) to what has gone before. The claims of

paper are to the 3rd ed. of 1901).

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The difference betweenthe a priori and historicalmethoddepends

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scriptionof differentnational economies."30 Ingram is also quite

The familiarobservationthatMarx was a historicistas well as a de-

That capitalist economy,as Marx describes it, is transitoryand

32 Critique of Political Economy, Chicago, 1904, p. 69. For an excellent

contribution. What I want to emphasize is the greater scientificimportance

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the fact of change as on the same theoreticallevel as the fact of

nightlyReview, Vol. XIX (1876), new series, p. 226.

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:06 PM

Now I have not discussed this featureof historicism. I have con-

I now pause at the brink of one other vital controversyover

IV. DEwEY ON THE GENETIC METHOD

I have pointed out that historyaffordsexplanations if there

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:06 PM

When we generate somethinglike water in the course of an ex-

This passage suggeststwo remarks. First: it shows that Dewey

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:06 PM

There are several otherpoints in Dewey's paper which are of

This view is interestinghistorically,and I shall digress frommy

Mill, impressedby the same difficulties,

It is of some interestto findthat the two polar traditionsin social

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:06 PM

gesting a dichotomybetween experimentand history,Dewey re-

I have tried to show the following:

50For a discussion of this aspect of the problem, see my article "His-