The Revolt Against Formalism in - Morton White

The Revolt Against Formalism in American Social Thought of the Twentieth Century
Author(s): Morton G. White

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Apr., 1947), pp. 131-152
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2707153 .
Accessed: 22/09/2014 12:13
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
University of Pennsylvania Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Journal of the History of Ideas.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
VOLUME VIII, NUMBER 2 APRIL, 1947
THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM IN AMERICAN

SOCIAL THOUGHT OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY
BY MORTON G. WHITE
Historians of American thoughtand criticsof American culture
are only too aware of the kinship between some of our distinctive
intellectualcurrents-instrumentalismin philosophy,institutional-
ism in economics,legal realism in the law, economicdeterminismin
politics and literature,the new history. From a methodologicalas
well as a political and ethical point of view they unite to form the
distinctiveliberal Weltanschauung of twentieth-century America.
No great research is necessary in order to establish the surface
connectionsof these influentialpatterns of social thinkingin their
mature forms; nor, for that matter,does it require much effortto
show a striking similarity in the intellectual origins of Beard,
Dewey, Holmes, James Harvey Robinson, and Veblen. But the
unityin both cases is complex and can hardly be appreciated with-
out a study of the ideas against whichtheyrevoltedin the eighties
and ninetiesof the last century. A good deal has been said on this
matter,' but no one, I think,has put his fingeron a fundamental
patternin the early critical work of these figures. This, I think,is
theirjoint participationin a revolt against formalismand a conse-
quent acceptance of the centralimportanceof historicaland cultural
analysis.
It is very hard to give an exact definitionof "'formalism" in
advance of our discussion, but I think its meaning will become
clearer as we consider examples. It may be that the term as ap-
plied to movements in differentfields-in law, philosophy, and
economics-does not retainpreciselythe same meaning,but thereis
a strong family resemblance,strong enough to produce a feeling
of sympathyin all who opposed what theycalled formalismin their
respectivefields. Anti-formalistslike Holmes, Dewey, Veblen, and
Beard call upon social scientistsin all domains, ask themto unite,
and urge that theyhave nothingto lose but their deductive chains.
' See M. Curti, The Growthof American Thought,ch. 22; V. L. Parrington,
Main Currentsin American Thought,III, 401-13; J. Chamberlain,Farewell to
Reform,ch. 7; A. Kazin, On Native Grounds,ch. 5.
131

132 MORTON G. WHITE
This attackon formalism or abstractionismleads to twoimpor-

tantpositiveelementsin thethoughtofthesemen-' 'historicism,"
and whatI shallcall "culturalorganicism. " These are frequently
identifiedin discussionsofnineteenth-centurythought,butit seems
to me thattheycan be distinguished in a rathersimpleway. By
"historicism"I shallmeantheattemptto explainfactsbyreference
to earlierfacts; by "cultural organicism"I mean the attemptto
findexplanationsand relevantmaterialin social sciencesotherthan
the one whichis primarilyunderinvestigation.2The historicist
reachesback in timein orderto accountfor certainphenomena;
theculturalorganicistreachesintothe entiresocial space around
him. In manycases thesetwotendenciesexistside by side in the
thoughtof a singleman,and in factthisis preciselywhathappens
withmostofthefigureswe shalltreat. Theyare all underthespell
of historyand culture. Holmesis thelearnedhistorianof thelaw
and one of theheroesof sociologicaljurisprudence;Veblenis the
evolutionaryand sociologicalstudentof economicinstitutions;
Beard urges us to view politicalinstruments as morethan docu-
ments; Robinsonconstrueshistoryas the ally of all the social
disciplinesand thestudyofhowthingshavecometo be as theyare;
Deweydescribeshis philosophyalternatelyas "evolutionary"and
"cultural" naturalism. All of theminsistupon comingto grips
withlife,experience,process, growth,context,function. Theyare
all productsof the historicaland culturalemphasesof the nine-
teenthcentury,following,being influenced by, reactingfromits
greatphilosophersof changeand process-Darwin,Hegel, Maine,
Marx,Savigny,Spencer,and thehistoricalschoolof economics.
The presentessay is an attemptto delineatesomewhatspecifi-
cally the earlyrootsof thiscommunity of outlook. It lays great
stressuponthefactthatDeweyviolentlyattackedformallogic in
his earliestwritings,thatVeblen devotedgreat energyto depre-
catingtheabstract-deductive methodofclassicalpoliticaleconomy,
2 See M. G. White, "Historical Explanation," Mind, 52, N.S. (1943), 212-29,
and "The Attack on the Historical Method," Journal of Philosophy, 42 (1945),
314-31. I am aware that these termshave been used differently, and so I must
emphasizethat I mean only what I say I mean. In the light of the ambiguityof
these termsI suppose it would be desirable to findsomethingfresh and neutral.
I have searchedfor thesewithoutsuccess. It should be pointed out, however,that
the termsdo have thismuchvalue: theyindicatethe strongties whichexist between
theseAmericanthinkersand those whomwe should call historicistsand organicists
withoutmuch hesitation.

ANTI-FORMALISM IN 20TH CENTURY SOCIAL THOUGHT 133
thatBeard foughtagainst the formal-juridicalapproach to the Con-
stitution,that Holmes proclaimed in 1881 what later became the
slogan of generationsof legal realists: "The life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience."3
In the case of Dewey the roots are very clear. His early thought
begins underthe dominationof neo-Hegelianismwithits unqualified
condemnationof theformaland themechanical. It is supported (in
his own mind) by the results of Darwinian biology.4 Dewey was
firsta disciple of G. S. Mlorris,the obscure American idealist. His
first philosophical work was also under the influenceof T. H.
Green and Edward Caird. Not onlydid his views of logic and meta-
physics findtheir roots here,but also the earliest expression of his
political philosophy.5 Veblen, by an interestingcoincidence,was
also a graduate student at Johns Hopkins and he too listened to
MIorris.6 But there is no clear indication of any-influenceof Mor-
ris's Hegelianism upon Veblen. If there had been it would have
turned up in Veblen's firstpublication,"Kant's Critique of Judg-
ment," in the form of an Hegelian attack on Kant. Indeed this
essay would have been morelike Dewey's firstessay on Kant (which
appeared in the same volume of the Journal of Speculative Phi-
losophy as Veblen's essay-the 1884 volume) whichis an Hegelian
attack on Kant.
Although Veblen does not go throughan early Hegelian stage
with Dewey, he shares with Dewey a tremendous admiration for
Darwin. It is interestingto observe that Veblen constantlycom-
pared the Hegelian and Darwinian conceptions of change, always
to the detrimentof the former,whereas there was a period in
Dewey's developmentwhenhe tried to defendhis Hegelianism with
argumentsfromDarwinism.7 Both Dewey and Veblen are part of
a reactionagainst English and Scottish empiricism,and theirearly
thoughtexpresses this quite vividly. One berates the philosophical
wing of the tradition,the other attacks the economists. And some-
times, of course, they converge on the same figure,e.g., Hume,
Adam Smith,Bentham, John Stuart Mill.
It is extremelyimportantto take into account this aversion to
3 The CommonLaw (Boston, 1881), 1.
4 See M. G. White,The Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism(New York, 1943).
5 See Dewey's The Ethics of Democracy,Universityof Michigan Philosophical
Papers, Second Series, No. 1 (1888).
6 See J. Dorfman,ThorsteinVeblen and His America (New York, 1934), 39.
7 See Library of Living Philosophers,I, 18 (ed. Schilpp).

134 MORTON G. WHITE
British empiricism-a phenomenonwhich can only surprise those

who casually link Dewey and Veblen with all " empiricists." The
paradox, if any, was almost solved by Leslie Stephen when he re-
markedin his studyof the Utilitarians that althoughtheywere fre-
quentlyappealing to experience,theyhad a very low opinion of the
value of historical study. Now Holmes was certainlyless opposed
to the British tradition. Nevertheless Holmes selected for his
special attack the prime exponent of Utilitarian jurisprudence-
JohnAustin. Holmes was disputingas early as 1874 Austin's view
of the law as the commandof the sovereign.8 For if the law is the
commandof the sovereign,then the judge is to findit, rather than
make it, and clearly this conflictswithHolmes's main positive view.
I emphasize the fact that Austin is a Benthamitein order to indi-
cate the centralityof Bentham in the camp of the enemy. When
Dewey firstpublished books on ethics it was hedonism and utili-
tarianismwhichhe most severely attacked;9 when Veblen criticized
the foundations of classical economics it was Bentham's felicific
calculus that he was undermining;when Holmes was advancing his
own view of the law it was the traditionof Bentham he was fighting
against; whenBeard came to treat the Constitutionas a social docu-
mentand not simplyas an abstract systemto be logically analyzed,
he found Bentham's shadow, made longer by Austin upon his
shoulders. That Robinson, the historian, should not have found
a comparable sparring partner among the Utilitarians does not
destroythe generalityof my thesis; on the contrary,it confirmsit,
fortherewere no utilitarianhistoriansof comparable stature. And
it was preciselyits alleged failure to deal with social phenomenain
a historical-culturalmanner that led to the attack on the tradition
of Bentham and Mill. Dewey attacks its ethics, psychology and
logic for failing to study the actual workingsof the human mind;
Veblen attacks the felicificcalculus as well as the failure to study
economic institutionsin their wider cultural setting; Beard op-
poses the analytical school for treating the Constitutionas if it
were axiomatized geometryrather than a human,social document;
and Holmes regards Austin's theoryas an inaccurate account of law
as it was practiced.
These general reflectionsgive a fair idea of what I mean when I
Hlolmes-PollockCorrespondence (1921), I, 3; also H. C. Shriver, Justice
8
Oliver WendellHolmes: His Book Notices and UncollectedLettersand Papers, 21.

9 Outlinesof a Critical Theoryof Ethics (1891); The Study of Ethics (1894).

join all of these men as anti-formalistrevolutionaries. I want now

to turnto some concreteexpressions of this attitude in their early
writings,and in thisway to clarifyas well as confirmmycontention.
I. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
Because Holmes was the oldest of these men,and because he was
the firstof them to present a mature and clear statementof his
position,I want to treat him first. I want particularlyto consider
some of the more general aspects of his work The Common Law
(1881) in order to focus upon its important role in the revolt
against formalism.
His purpose, Holmes tells us on the firstpage, is to present "a
general view of the subject." And then,as if to dissociate himself
froma view whichhe mighthave expected his readers to assign to
him, he announces that "other tools are needed besides logic" in
order to accomplishthis task.'0 May we inferthat therewere some
expositors of the common law who believed that only logic was
necessary as a tool? I doubt it, but certainlytherewere some who
conceivedlogic as the fundamentaltool." Of what logic is Holmes
speaking? If it were not for the fact that he published his book in
1881 when the world was being swamped with two-volumestudies
in idealistic logic, such a question mightnot be raised. But I raise
it only to make explicit the fact that he was not referringto these
worksor to the disciplinewhichtheyclaimed to expound,but rather
thathe had in mindtraditionalAristotelianlogic. It was syllogistic
logic that did not sufficefor presentinga general view of the Com-
mon Law. Moreover,we can be sure that Holmes was not rejecting
Aristotelian logic because of any failures whichmightbe remedied
by modern,mathematicallogic. Of the latter he knew almost noth-
ing, and in it he had little interest.'2 No enrichmentof syllogistic
10
The CommonLaw (Boston, 1881), 1.
"John Stuart Mill, in his essay on Austin, says, "The purpose of Benthani
was to investigateprinciplesfromwhichto decide what laws ought to exist-what
legal rights,and legal duties or obligations,are fitto be establishedamong man-
kind. This was also the ultimateend of Mr. Austin's speculations; but the subject
of his special labors was theoreticallydistinct,though subsidiary,and practically
indispensable,to the former. It was what may be called the logic of law" (my
italics). "Austin on Jurisprudence,"Dissertationsand Discussions, IV. "Juris-
prudence,thusunderstood,is not so mucha scienceof law, as the applicationof logic
to law." Ibid., 167.
12 Holmes, like Dewey, never had a very high opinion of formal constructions.
In a letterto Pollock he has the followingto say of Hohfeld's attemptto classify

136 MORTON G. WHITE
logic in the modern manner would have changed the situation for
Holmes's purposes. It was simply his convictionthat deductive
logic did not suffice,no matter how enriched. Holmes was not
about to give a list of legal axioms in the manner of Euclid and
promptlyto deduce theoremswith the help of logic. If this were
his sole purpose, logic would have been the sole tool necessary in
addition to the legal principles expressed in his axioms. But on
this he says: "The law embodies the story of a nation's develop-
ment throughmany centuries,and it cannot be dealt with as if it
contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathe-
matics."'3
We see at once the historical emphasis in Holmes. It is because
the law embodies the historyof a nation that it cannot be treated
deductively. AlthoughHolmes does not explicitlyformulatethem,
we may indicate at least two questions which are introducedby his
statement,in order to be clearer about what he is saying. (1) Can
we formulatethe law accepted at a given time in a deductivefash-
ion, beginningwith legal axioms or fundamentalprinciples? (2)
Has the law in its actual historical course developed in a logico-
deductive manner? In other words, did the axioms, for example,
reveal themselvesto man before the theorems? Now we must not
forgetthat in this place Holmes is concernedwith the latter ques-
tion,and his answer is that we cannot explain legal historyin terms
of logical processes alone. Legal history does not unfold as if it
were created by a logician. The life of the law has not been logic in
this sense.'4 He follows this statementwith a statementof other
factorsto whichwe mustreferif we are to understandwhyand how
certain legal rules were developed: "The felt necessities of the
jural relations: "Hohfeld was as you surmisean ingeniousgent,making,as I judge
fromflyingglimpses,prettygood and keen distinctionsof the kind that are more
needed by a lowergrade of lawyerthan theyare by you and me. I thinkall those
systematicschematismsratherbores; and now Kocurek in the Illinois Law Review
and elsewhereadds epicycles-and I regard him civillybut as I have writtendon't
care muchfor the whole machinery." Holmes-PollockCorrespondence,II, 64.
13 The CommonLaw, 1.
14 I am not suggestingthat Holmes was not interestedin the firstquestion.
Indeed he has consideredit too. But I wish to suggest that the anti-formalismin
The CommonLaw was the productof a negativeanswerto the second question. On
this point it may be instructiveto examineMill's comparisonof Maine and Austin.
The latter is the logician of the law; the formerinvestigates"not properly the
philosophyof law, but the philosophyof the historyof law." Dissertations and
Discussions,IV, 161-64.

time,the prevalentmoral and political theories,intuitionsof public
policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges
share with their fellow-men,have a good deal more to do than the
syllogism in determiningthe rules by which men should be gov-
erned." The theory,we see, is predominantlya theory in the
philosophyof the historyof law, to use Mill's phrase in describing
Maine's work. And it is anti-formalisticinsofar as it rejects a cer-
tain theoryof the developmentof the law, the theorythat it evolved
in accordance with a logical pattern.'5 What Holmes insists is
that the law does not develop as formally as some thinkershave
maintained.
The positive implicationsof this attack on formalismare fairly
obvious. Holmes is led to an intensive study of the history and
theories of legislation in order to explain the meanings of certain
legal terms and rules and why they emerged when they did. The
firstchapter of The Common Law, for example, is an exercise in
historical explanation: it is a study of early forms of liability in
order to show that they are rooted in passion and vengeance. The
entirestudy,the details of whichwe need not consider,is permeated
withan historical outlook,specificallywiththe spirit of epoch-mak-
ing work in anthropology. The Common Law followed the publi-
cation of E. B. Tylor's Primitive Culture by ten years, and the
impact of the latter was still considerable. Not only is Tylor cited
on certainfactual questions'6but some of his general ideas are also
absorbed. For example, Holmes remarks on what he calls a very
15 It should be pointed out that althoughHolmes would probably answer the
firstquestionin the negative,it is not at all clear that this is entailedby a negative
answer to the second. One might formulate the two questions with the word
"physics" in place of "law" and concludethat the answer to the second is no, but
that the answerto the firstis yes. The entirequestionof Holmes's attitudetoward
logic in the law is a difficult
one. Fearful of the effectthat some of his statements
may have had in furtheringirrationalityand illogicality,philosopherslike Dewey
and MorrisR. Cohen have triedto interpretthesestatementsin a mannerconsistent
with theirown views. See Dewey's "JusticeHolmes and the Liberal Mind," New
Republic, 53 (1928), 210-12 (reprintedin Dewey's Charactersand Events), and
Cohen's "JusticeHolmes," New Republic, 82 (1935), 206-09. Other problemsare
raised concerninghis relations with C. C. Langdell, often described as the great
exponentof inductivemethodsin the law and yet someoneof whomHolmes says:
" . to my mind he [Langdell] representsthe powers of darkness. He is all for
logic and hates any refer?ence to anythingoutsideof it. ..." Holmes-Pollock Cor-
respondence,I, 17 (letterwrittenin 1881).
16 The CommonLaw, 11.

138 MORTON G. WHITE
"common phenomenon," and one which is "very familiar to the

studentof history":
The customs,beliefs,or needsof a primitive timeestablisha rule or
formula. In thecourseof centuries thecustom,belief,or necessitydisap-
pears,buttheruleremains. Thereasonwhichgaverisetotherulehas been
forgotten, and ingeniousmindsset themselves to inquirehow it is to be
accounted for. Somegroundofpolicyis thought of,whichseemsto explain
it and to reconcileit withthe presentstateof things;and thenthe rule
adaptsitselfto thenewreasonswhichhavebeenfoundforit,and enterson
a newcareer. The old formreceivesa newcontent, and in timeeventhe
formmodifies itselfto fitthemeaningwhichit has received.17
The point of view expressed here is closely related to Tylor's
conception of survival, treated at length in chapters 3 and 4 of
Primitive Culture. In the case of Tylor, the study of primitive
culture is motivated,in part, by a desire to ferret out just those
elements of his own culture which are mere survivals of a more
backward and less civilized age. The study of the past is not
archaeological or antiquarian for Tylor. He urges that we try to
get rid of those practices which have nothing to commend them
but the fact thattheyare survivals of the past. It is for this reason
thathe concludeshis great workwiththefollowingstatement:
It is a harsher,
and at timesevenpainfuloffice
ofethnography to expose
theremainsof crudeold culturewlhich have passedintoharmfulsupersti-
tion,and to marktheseout fordestruction.Yet thiswork,if less genial,
is notlessurgently needfulforthegoodofmankind. Thusactiveat oncein
aidingprogress and removinghindrance,thescienceofcultureis essentially
a reformer's science.18
Tylor's conception of the science of culture as a reformer's
sciencemustbe underscoredif we are to appreciate the linkbetween
the historicism and the liberalism of our American thinkers.
Tylor's view shows conclusivelythat historicismis not necessarily
associated witha venerationof the past. Here the studyof the past
is construedas instrumentalto the solution of present problems-
the eliminationof contemporaryirrationality. The student of the
past need not have a stake in the past.'9 If the example of Marx
17ibid., 5.
18PrimitiveCulture,1st Am. ed. (1874), II, 453.
19At a later date Holmes explicitlyannounced his sympathywith this point
of view when he said: "It is revoltingto have no betterreason for a rule of law
than so it was said in the time of Henry IV." "The Path of the Law" (1897),
CollectedLegal Papers, 187.

to show this, certainlythat of Tylor is worthmen-
is not sufficient
tioning. This fact is of great value in helping us to understandthe
evolutionaryand historical orientationof Holmes, Veblen, Dewey,
Beard, and Robinson. It helps us distinguish the motivation of
their historicismand organicismfrom that of European reaction-
aries in the nineteenthcentury.
II. JohnDewey
In 1882, one year after the publication of The Common Law,
Dewey's firstpublished contributionto philosophyappeared. With
it he began a series of investigationsin philosophyand psychology
under the influenceof British neo-idealism which was to continue
until the emergence of his distinctlyinstrumentalist,pragmatist,
or experimentalistoutlook.20Dewey was even more anti-formalist
than Holmes. Under the influenceof George S. Morris,his teacher
at JohnsHopkins, he came to scorn the epistemologyof the British
empiricists,and to single out for attack theirdualistic separation of
mind from the object of knowledge. This separation was con-
strued by Dewey as "formal" and "mechanical" and hence at-
tacked in the manner of Hegel. The "New Psychology" was a
movement,according to Dewey, whichwas to free psychologyfrom
the analytical dissections of associationism.21 Hegel provided him
with the concept of a universal consciousness which embraced
everythingand which provided the link between individual con-
sciousness and the objects of knowledge,the link which supposedly
showed themto be morethan formallyrelated. The objective mind
of idealism was made central,22and as Dewey tells us later, it was
the ancestor of his insistenceupon the "power exercised by cultural
environmentin shaping . . . ideas, beliefs, and intellectual atti-
tudes. '2 It was this which united him with the spirit of The
Common Law-this emphasis on the need for regarding human
action (in Holmes the special case of legal action) as part of what
Dewey later called a "cultural matrix." Although Holmes was
not an Hegelian, I thinkthere is no doubt that he and Dewey were
motivated by similar considerations in their attack on formalism.
In thelightof this great similarityin theirearly years, theirmutual
20
I have treatedthisperiodin detail in The Originof Dewey's Izstrumentalism.
21
"The New Psychology,"Andover Review (Sept. 1884), 278-89.
22 John Dewey, Psychology (1887).
23 Quoted in Volume I of the Library of Living Philosophers,(ed. P. Sehilpp),
18.

140 MORTON G. WHITE
respect in later years and the convergenceof pragmatismand legal

realism should occasion little surprise.24 It was in the eightiesthat
Dewey was also attacking formal logic.25 Now Holmes was no
admirer of Hegel's Logic; certainlyhe would not have agreed that
it represented "the quintessence of scientificspirit," as Dewey
maintainedin 1891. But theclassic excerptfromThe CommonLaw
about the life of the law not being logic can be matchedwith several
from Dewey, the most strikingbeing Dewey's claim in 1891 that
formallogic was "fons et origo malorumin philosophy."26
In addition to sharing Holmes's attitude toward the role of
formal logic, and to what I have called cultural organicism,Dewey
shared Holmes's respect for the historical or genetic method.27 I
have already stated brieflyhow this functionedin Holmes's early
work. I want to turnnow to its position in the early workof Dewey.
In Dewey's thoughtthe use of genetic method is positively moti-
vated, whereas his opposition to formalism is the product of a
polemic on Hegelian grounds against British empiricism. I do not
24
The connectionsbetween the later Holmes and the later Dewey are well
known. Indeed somethingof a literaturehas already grownup on the intellectual
links betweenpragmatismand legal realism. The most recent contributionto this
is H. W. Schneider'sHistory of AmericanPhilosophy (ch. 41). Dewey has written
of Holmes in severalplaces (see M. H. Thomas,A Bibliographyof the Writingsof
John Dewey). Holmes's admiration for Dewey is expressed throughout the
Holmes-Pollockcorrespondenceand also in H. C. Shriver,Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes: His Book Notices and UncollectedLetters and Papers. On some aspects
of their intellectuallinks see M. H. Fischy "Mr. Justice Holmes, the Prediction
Theory of the Law, and Pragmatism,"Journal of Philosophy (1942), 85-97. It
has neverbeen observed,so far as I know,that Dewey was familiar with Holmes's
The CommonLaw quite early, citing it in his The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus
(1894) for Holmes's treatmentof legal motiveand the "externalstandard." It is
also interestingto examinein this connectionDewey's early essay "Austin's Theory
of Sovereignty,"Political Science Quarterly,IX (1894), 31-52. In the latter
Dewey criticizesAustin in a manner quite consistentwith what I have called or-
ganicism. He objects to his view that "the residenceof sovereigntycan be found
in a definitely limitedportion of political society" (42), and also objects to it for
making"a completegap betweenthe social forceswhichdeterminegovernmentand
thatgovernmentitself" (43). There is a relatedattack on Maine in "The Ethics of
Democracy" (1888) citedabove.
25 Dewey, "The Present Position of Logical Theory,"Monist, II (1891), 1-17.
26
Ibid., 3. The communitywhich is expressed by these outbursts against
formal logic does a good deal to explain the ease with which RoscoO Pound has
unitedDewey, Hegel, and Holmes in his own attacks on mechanicaljurisprudence.
27 For a discussion of certain other aspects of this tendency in American
thought,see Schneider,op. cit.,ch. 33.

mean that the historicismto which I have referredhas no connec-
tions with his Hegelianism. What I wish to emphasize is the fact
that his Hegelianism directed him against formalism,but that his
Darwinism came later as a support to those tendencies in his
thoughtwhichhad already grown out of contact with idealism. It
is not surprising,therefore,to findhis use of geneticmethodtaking
on an evolutionarycast. For this reason we findamong his earliest
contributionswhich are historicist in character, attempts to ap-
proach moralityfrom an evolutionarypoint of view-e.g., his at-
tempt in the paper " The Evolutionary Method as Applied to
Morality."" This concern not only links him to Holmes but also
to Veblen, as we shall see when we examine the latter's regretful
complaint in 1898 that economics was not then an evolutionary
science.
Dewey's application of evolutionarymethod to moralityis not
onlyusefulfor establishinghis connectionwithHolmes and Veblen;
it also helps us to see some of the ties betweenhis experimentalism
and his historicism,betweenhis early Hegelian emphasis on change
and history and his later pragmatic emphasis on experimentand
control. In expoundingthe nature of evolutionarymethodhe tries
to formulate the sense in which experimental method is itself
genetic. His answer is rather simple. In conductingexperiments
on thenature of water,to use Dewey's example,we performcertain
acts of mixtureand we see that water is formedas a consequence.
The entire process is one in which water is "brought into being."
The experimentalprocess, therefore,is viewed as genetic in char-
acter, precisely because it "brings into being" certain phenomena
as a result of experimentalmanipulation. Now there are some do-
mains, Dewey thoughtat the time, in which experimentalcontrol
is impossible. We are able to use experiment in chemistry,he
argues, but we cannot apply it to "those facts with which ethical
science is concerned.v" " We cannot," he says, " take a present
case of parental care, or of a child's untruthfulness,and cut it into
sections or tear it into physical pieces, or subject it to chemical
analysis." What we can do, however,is study "how it came to be
what it is,," that is, study it historically. History, therefore,is
construed as "the only available substitutefor experiment," ac-
cordingto Dewey. "The early periods present us in their relative
28
PhilosophicalReview, XI (1902).
29 Ibid., 113.

142 MORTON G. WHITE
crudenessand simplicity witha substituteforthe artificialopera-

tion of an experiment:followingthe phenomenoninto the more
complicated and refinedformwhichit assumeslater,is a substitute
forthesynthesisof experiment."
We see thenthatfor Dewey at thistimehistorywas the only
available substitutefor experiment and, moreover,experiment it-
selfwas a kindofhistoricalenterprise.Now thenotionof history
as a possible substitutefor experimentwas not original with
Dewey; in fact the wholediscussionis reminiscent of the kindof
discussionone findsin A Systemof Logic, especiallywhereMill
considersthevariousmethods-experimental or chemical,physical
or directdeductive,historicalor inversedeductive-and theirap-
plicabilityin thesocial sciences.30Mill also concludedthatexperi-
mentwas not possible in at least one of the "moral sciences,"
namelyeconomics,but he arguedthatthebest substitutewas the
abstract-deductive method,and nothistory. That Mill and Dewey
shouldhave dividedin thiswayis quiteunderstandable in thelight
of Dewey's avowed oppositionto formalism. It is importantto
see,moreover, howthispermitsus to bringVeblenintothepicture.
For itwas'preciselythisaspectofMill's methodology whichVeblen
attackedin his own critiqueof classical economics. And Veblen,
like Dewey,appeals to history,to the need for an "evolutionary
science."
III. ThorsteinVeblen
Like Holmesand Dewey,Veblenwas strongly influenced bynew
developments in anthropology.If anything, he was moreinterested
and morelearnedin thatfieldthantheywere. So strongwas this
influence thathe beginshis famousattack3'on all previousschools
ofeconomics byapprovingthefollowing statement:"Anthropology
is destinedto revolutionizethe politicaland the social sciencesas
radicallyas bacteriologyhas revolutionized the scienceof medi-
cine." But economics,he complained,was not thenin tunewith
thisnewnote. In short,it was notan evolutionary science.
Now what, accordingto Veblen,is an evolutionaryscience?
Whatwas he opposing? To understandthiswe mightbest turnto
JohnStuartMill forthelighthe shedson Veblen's lament,and in
30See Book VI of the Logic, entitled"On the Logic of the Moral Sciences,"
in whichthesevarious methodsare compared.
31 "Why is economicsnot an evolutionaryscience?" (1898), reprintedin The
Place of Science in Modern Civilization.

this way observe concretelyhow he represents,with Bentham and
Austin, the ideology against which so many of the pioneers of
American social science revolted. The doctrineof economicmethod
associated with Mill is well expressed in the System of Logic, but
it is even more sharply definedin a brilliant essay which he wrote
in 1829 when he was twenty-three years old, "On the Definitionof
Political Economy; and the Method of Investigation Proper to
It. " 2For Mill, political economyis to be distinguishedfromwhat
he calls social economyor speculative politics-the latter treating
"the whole of man's nature as modified by the social state."
Political economyis rather a branch of social economybecause it
does not deal withthe whole of man's nature. It is concernedwith
man "solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is
capable of judging of the comparative efficacyof means for attain-
ing that end."33 "It predicts only such of the phenomena of the
social state as take place in consequence of the pursuit of wealth.
It makes entireabstractionof everyotherhumanpassion or motive;
except those which may be regarded as perpetually antagonizing
principles to the desire of wealth, namely, aversion to labor, and
the desire of the present enjoymentof costly indulgences."34 The
importantpoint in Mill's statementof the nature of political econ-
omy is his use of the subjunctiveconditional mode of assertion in
the followingpassage: "Political economy considers mankind as
occupied solely in acquiring and consuming wealth; and aims at
showingwhat is the course of action into which mankind,living in
a state of society,would [my italics] be impelled, if [my italics]
that motive,except in the degree in which it is checkedby the two
perpetual counter-motivesabove, were [my italics] absolute ruler
of all their actions."35 I emphasize the subjunctive mood of the
statement,for it is clear that Mill is not saying that in fact the
pursuit of wealth is the sole motive of man. Indeed he goes on to
say that the economistdoes not put this forthas a description of
man's actual behavior. He denies that any "political economist
was ever so absurd as to suppose that mankind are really thus
constituted."36 But futurecriticsof Mill, preeminentlyVeblen and
32
This appears in Mill's Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political
Economy.
33 Ibid., 137.
34
Ibid., pp. 137-38.
35 Idem.
36 Ibid.,139.

144 MORTON G. WHITE
his followers,have treated this view of the economicman as though

it were an unconditional assertion in the indicative mood about
man's actual psychology. We can see, therefore,why Veblen re-
jects the view and why he should findhimselfin agreement with
Dewey on this point. For Veblen this is the acme of "faulty psy-
chology," and what is worse than a faulty psychology for an in-
stitutionalist? It is simply not true to say that man is governed
by this single motive (even where the qualificationsabout counter-
motivesare made). And since this is an "assumption" of classical
economicswhichis false, everythingwhichis " deduced" fromit is
suspect in the eyes of Veblenian.
There are other aspects of Mill's methodology of economics
whichcontributeto an understandingof what was troublingVeblen.
Mill suggests that the economist ought to treat man much as the
astronomertreats planets. The astronomerfrequentlytalks about
what would happen to a planet if it were not subject to the sun's
attraction. (This, of course, occurs when he considers it as a
particle subject only to Newton's first law of motion.) In this
sense, Mill says, he abstracts and considers the planet as if it were
a body outside the sun's gravitational field (although he knows it
is not). Just as astronomerspursue this method successfully,so,
it is urged, may economists. By consideringfirsthow men would
behave if they were simply dominated by a single motive,Mill be-
lieves that economistswill come to a good approximation of how
theydo in fact behave. "This approximation," he points out, "is
then to be correctedby making proper allowance for the effectsof
any impulses of a differentdescription, which can be shown to
interferewith the result in any particular case.""
There can be no doubt that this was the traditionagainst which
Veblen was rebellingwhen he rejected the methodof classical eco-
nomics. I don't thinkhe ever clearly formulatedfor himself the
methodologicaltenets of Mill in a way that left them defensible,
but it was a doctrineof thiskindthathe rejected. I say of this kind,
not to exclude the possibility that there were classical economists
who were less able than Mill in methodologyand less cautious about
what they asserted about the actual psychology of man. In any
case, it should be evident that classical economics was formalistic
for Veblen in a sense related to that in which formal logic was
formalisticfor Dewey, and Austin's jurisprudence was formalistic
37 Ibid., 140.

for Holmes. Dewey in his earliest attacks on it construed formal

logic as a description of how we think,and contemptuouslydis-
missed it. Holmes insisted that when we study law "we are not
studyinga mysterybut a well-knownprofession," and what could
be more mysteriousthan the abstract dicta of Austin,formallycon-
ceived and having nothingto do withthe " bad man "-the man who
pays the lawyer to advise himhow to keep out of jail ? It is for this
reason that Holmes, Dewey, and Veblen found themselvesarrayed
against threeapostles of empiricism-Bentham, Mill, and Austin-
and for an ironic reason-they thought they weren't empirical
enough!
When Veblen complained that economicswas not an evolution-
ary science he was voicing precisely this attitude. Now -whatwas
evolutionaryscience as Veblen understood it? In his essay on it
he is, unfortunately,too occupied with asserting that all the tra-
ditional schools were not evolutionary,and little concerned with
saying what an evolutionaryscience is. He insists that some things
whichmightbe expectedto make a science evolutionaryreally don't.
Hence the historical school-Schmoller, Hildebrand, Ashley, Cliffe-
Leslie-was "realistic" insofar as it dealt with "facts," but this
is not enough, according to Veblen. They fail, in his opinion, to
formulatea theoryconcerningthose facts. For him an evolution-
ary science must present a "theory of a process, of an unfolding
sequence."38 When he comes to the classical economists he finds
that even where they do refer to empirical data, and even where
they try to present a theoryof process, they still fall short of the
evolutionaryideal.39 What, then,is the difference? As we press
38 Veblen, op. cit.,58; see also J. K. Ingram,A History of Political Economy,
on the "realism" of the historicalschool, esp. 213 (N. Y. edition, 1888). For a
recent discussion see H. Grossman, "The Evolutionist Revolt Against Classical
Economics,"The Journal of Political Economy,Vol. 51, Nos. 5 and 6 (1943); this
treats the revoltsin France and England. H. W. Schneider considersVeblen in
his discussionof geneticsocial philosophyin America,op. cit., ch. 33.
39Naturally,some membersof the classical school were sensitiveto the growing
historicismof the nineteenthcenturyand made many attemptsto connectwith this
tendency,e.g., Mill's attemptto deal withdynamiesin the Political Economy. But
evolutionistsand historicistswere not satisfied with these overtures. Veblen's
attitude on this point is very similar to Dewey's attitude toward the "inductive
logicians" of the nineteenthcentury-e.g., Jevons and Venn-who tried to go
beyondformallogic to formulatea theoryof scientificmethod,ostensiblya goal he
shared with them. Thus Dewey says, "that whereas we might expect 'empirical
logie to advance beyond formal logic, it virtually continLes the conception of

146 MORTON G. WHITE
on we finda statementto the effectthat the difference is one of

" spiritualattitude"-a rathertenderexpressionforone so tough-
mindedas Veblen. We press furtherand findthat what he is
disturbedabout in the classical economistsis theiraddictionto
natural law. He is opposedto theirformulating an ideal situation
and generalizingabout that situationwithoutattendingto actual
economicfacts. In some of Veblen's writingsthisamountsto an
objectionto theuse of a subjunctiveconditionallike thatused by
Mill. We cannot,Veblen seemsto urge,use hypotheseslike "If
manweresubjectto onlyonemotive, " "If perfectcompetitionpre-
vailed," becausetheyare false. At othertimesVeblenseemsto be
objectingnot so muchto theuse of suchhypothesesin sciencebut
ratherto thefactthatcertainclassicaleconomistsalso had a moral
attitudetowardthem. They thoughteitherthat theyformulated
sociallyand morallydesirablestates,or that societywas tending
towardthosestates. In bothcases Veblenheld thatsomekindof
beliefin naturallaw was present. The firstalternativeinvolveda
moraljudgmenton society;theseconda faithin progress.
We maybecomea littlecleareraboutVeblen's objectionif we
comparethesituationof thestudentof mechanicswiththatof the
classicalpoliticaleconomist.The formertellsus howthedistance
fallenby a freelyfallingbodydependson thetimeit takesto fall.
He pointsout,ofcourse,thatthislaw holdsonlyin a vacuum.Thus
farhis procedureis analogousto thatof theeconomistwhoinsists
thathis laws hold onlyfor economicvacuums,so to speak-cases
whereonlyone motiveis in operation. But thephysicistdoes not
add: "And indeedthevacuumis a highlyprizedstate," or "TIhe
atmospheretends more and more toward a vacuum." But the
analogouseconomist, accordingto Veblen,notonlyused ideal con-
cepts like "economicman" and "perfectcompetition,"' but also
admiredthesekindsof menand statesof society,and lookedupon
themas endstowardwhichmanand societyweremoving.
Thus far we have consideredVeblen's attackon the use of ab-
stractionin classicaleconomics,butwe have notconsideredhis at-
titudetowardtheuse of a priorimethodin economics. To under-
standthiswe mustreturnto Mill's view.
Mill distinguished betweentwo typesof minds-the practicals
thoughtas itself empty and formal,which characterizesscholastic logic." "The
Present Position of Logical Theory,"Monist,II, 5; White, The Origin of Dewey's
Instrumentalism, 91.

and the theorists,as he called them. The differencebetween them

may be exhibitedby an illustration. Suppose we were faced with
the following question: Are absolute kings likely to employ the
powers of governmentfor the welfare or for the oppression of their
subjects? How would the practicals go about settling it? They
would try,Mill says, to examine the conduct of particular despotic
monarchs in history and to find out how they behaved. But the
theorists,he says, "would contend that an observation of the ten-
dencies whichhuman nature has manifestedin the variety of situ-
ations in whichhuman beings have been placed, especially observa-
tion of what passes in our own minds,warrants us in inferringthat
a hunman being in the situation of a despotic king will make a bad
use of power; and that this circumstancewould lose nothing of
certaintyeven if absolute kings never existed, or if history fur-
nished us with no informationof the manner in which they had
conducted themselves."" The practical uses the a posteriori
method,the theoristthe a priori method.41
We see how Mill regarded economics as both abstract and a
priori in method. Abstract because it abstracted one aspect of
man's behavior and triedto discover how he would behave if he had
only one motive; a priori because it avoided the laborious and
painstaking methodsof statistical research. To verifyhypotheses
by referenceto historywas for Mill "not the business of science at
all, but the application of science." It should be evidentwhyMill's
doctrine was opposed by historicism and institutionalism. It is
plain how Dewey's early views also ran counterto Mill's. Dewey's
suggestionthat we use historyas a substitutefor experimentwhere
the latter is not available was clearly the method of the "practi-
cal" for Mill-an appellation which the later Dewey would have
accepted gladly.
It is evidentnow, I hope, how much the historical,evolutionary,
40 Mill, "On the Definitionof Political Economy," loc. cit., 142-43.
41 This distinction,it mustbe urged in fairnessto Mill, is not based upon the
fact that one method"appeals to experience" and that the other does not. Mill
is anxiots to disown any mysticism,authoritarianismor dogmatism. With refer-
ence to the phrase "a priori" he says in this essay: "We are aware that this ex-
pressionis somletimes used to characterizea supposed mode of philosophizingwhich
does not professto be foundedupon experienceat all. But we are not acquainted
with any miodeof philosophizing,on political subjects at least, to which such a
descriptionis fairly applicable." A similarpoint is made in the System of Logic,
Book VI, Chapter IX, section1.

148 MORTON G. WHITE
culturalattitudeunitedDeweyand Veblenagainsttheabstractand
a priorimethodof Mill. It is also clear whyAmericanthinkers
rejectedso muchof the "empiricism" of Benthamand Mill:-
becausetheywererevoltingagainsttheleast empiricalelementsof
thetradition-a priorism,abstractionism, thefelicific
calculus,the
formaljurisprudence ofAustin. The groundsofVeblen'srejection
ofthemethodofclassicaleconomicsare verysimilarto thosewhich
led Dewey to reject what he called scholasticformalismin psy-
chologyand logic. Theyalso resembletheconsiderations whichled
Holmes to reject the so-calledmechanicaltheoryof the law as
existingin advance and awaiting the judge's discoveryof it.
Furthermore, to completethepattern,Veblenalso turnsto history
and culture,to a cross-sectional
studyof the institutionalcontext
of economicbehavioras wellas to a studyof thetemporaldevelop-
mentof society.42Like Dewey and Holmes he looks to temporal
antecedentsand culturalconcomitants.For thisreasonwe maysay
thatDewey,Holmes,andVeblenare unitedin an attemptto destroy
whattheyconceiveas threefictions-thelogical,legal and economic
man. In thiswaytheybegina traditionin recentAmericanthought
which Beard and Robinson continuedin political science and
history.
IV. James Harvey Robinson and Charles A. Beard
The connectionsbetween Robinson,Beard, and the revolt
againstformalismare evidentas earlyas 1908-the year in which
theydeliveredlectureson politicsand historyrespectivelyat Co-
lumbiaUniversity, in a series devotedto science,philosophy,and
art.43 Consideredin termsof the revolt,Robinson'sworkis an
expressionofhistoricism, theevolutionary movement in social sci-
ence,and geneticmethod. Robinsonwas anxiousto establishthe
scientific
characterof history,but at the same timeto distinguish
his ownfromRanke's versionof scientific methodin history." Ac-
42
In addition to Dorfman's book see the recent study of John S. Gambs,
Beyond Supply and Demand: A Reappraisal of Institutional Economics. This
last came to my attentionafter this paper was prepared. For a succinct state-
menton Veblen's "system"see K. L. Anderson,"The Unity of Veblen's Theoretical
System,"QuarterlyJournal of Economics,48 (1933). Naturally thereis an enor-
mous literatureon Veblen,but I cite only itemsof general interest,especially since
I am concernedonly witha segmentof Veblen's career.
43 Dewey delivereda lectureentitled"Ethics" in the series.
44 For a recentdiscussionof the attitudesof Americanhistorianson this ques-
tion and others,see Theoryand Practice in Historical Study: A Report of the Com-

cording to Robinson the earliest historians from Thucydides to
Macaulay and Ranke examined the past "with a view of amusing,
edifying,or comfortingthe reader." None of these motives,how-
ever,can be describedas scientific,accordingto Robinson. He says:
To scanthepastwiththehopeof discovering recipesforthemakingof
statesmen and warriors,of discreditingthe pagan gods,of showingthat
CatholicorProtestant is right,ofexhibiting of
thestagesofself-realization
the Weltgeist,of demonstrating thatLibertyemergedfromtheforestsof
Germany, neverto returnthither,-none al-
of thesemotivesare scientific
thoughtheymaygo handin handwithmuchsoundscholarship.But by
themiddleofthenineteenth centurythemuseofhistory, sempermutabile,
beganto fallunderthepotentspellof naturalscience. She was no longer
thedeedsofheroesand nationswiththelyreand shrill
to celebrate
satisfied
fluteon thebreeze-swept slopesof Helicon;sheno longerdurstattemptto
vindicatethewaysof Godto man. She had alreadycometo recognize that
shewasill-prepared forherundertakings and hadbegunto spendhermorn-
ingsin thelibrary,collatingmanuscripts and makinglistsofvariantread-
ings. She aspiredto do evenmoreand beganto talkofraisingherchaotic
massofinformation totherankofa science.45
It is evident from this passage that Robinson was anxious to
free historical research from moralism and estheticism,and this
concernlinks him with Holmes and Veblen in their attemptto dis-
tinguishtheirdisciplines frommorals; it is also connectedwith the
early (though not the later) views of Beard, who held in 1908 that
" it is not thefunctionof the studentof politics to praise or condemn
institutions or theories, but to expound them; and thus for
scientific purposes it is separated from theology, ethics, and
patriotism.e 46
We must rememberthat this a-moralismoccurs at a time when
the confusionof factual and ethical questions was usually viewed
as an instrumentof conservatism and reaction. Objectivity was
eagerly sought. Social theorists wanted to expose, to rake the
facts,and so theywere movedby a desire to achieve scientificstatus.
mitteeon Historiography,published by the Social Science Research Council, es-
pecially chapter II by J. H. Randall, Jr., and Geo. Haines IV, "ControllingAs-
sumptionsin the Practice of AmericanHistorians" (1946).
45History (New York, Columbia UniversityPress, 1908); also see J. H.
Robinson,The New History,43-44, where this essay is reprinted,with alterations.
46 Politics (New York, ColumbiaUniversity Press,1908), 14-15. We must
betweenthis and Beard's later view concerningthe relation
note here the difference
betweenethicsand social science as expressedin The Nature of the Social Sciences.

150 MORTON G. WHITE
Indeed, on this point theywere not so violentlyopposed to the

traditionofBentham,Mill,and Austin. Like theUtilitarians,they
werepart of a reforming movement, and theytoo soughtto dis-
tinguishbetweenwhatwas and whatought-to-have-been. Never-
thelessit shouldbe remembered thatthe desire to make this dis-
tinctionwas notregardedas incompatible withtheviewthatmoral
judgmentsare theoretically capableof empiricalverification.Cer-
tainlythiswas Dewey'sviewat thetime.47
AlthoughRobinsonwas anxiousto excludemoralconsiderations
fromthe writingof history,he was also anxious to go beyonda
merereportof whatactuallyhappened. Past historians,he says,
"did take some pains to findout how thingsreallywere-wie es
eigentlichgewesen,to use Ranke's famousdictum.""48Moreover,
he says,"to thisextenttheywerescientific, althoughtheirmotives
weremainlyliterary, moral,or religious." Whattheyfailedto do,
however, was to "try to determine howthingshad comeabout-wie
es eigentlichgeworden." And so Robinsonconcludesthathistory
has remainedfor two or threethousandyears a recordof past
events-a definition, he says,whichstillsatisfies"the thoughtless."
"It is one thingto describewhatoncewas; it is quite anotherto
attemptto determine howit cameabout."
Robinson'sview of historyas itselfa geneticaccountof how
thingscometo be emphasizedtheconceptof development, and was
therefore part of themovement I have called historicism.It was
quite like Holmes's conceptionof historyas somethingwhich
furnishedexplanationsof the emergenceand meaningof legal
rules; it was whollysympatheticwith Veblen's critiqueof the
historicalschool;it was likeDewey's viewofhistoryas a statement
of "how thethingcame to be as it is." How did it comparewith
Beard's view? Let us turn to the latter's lecture on Politics,
deliveredin thesameyear,in thesameplace,and beforemuchthe
same audience.
Beard's majorcomplaintabouthis predecessorsrevolvedabout
theirerrorill studyingjuridical-formal relationsin the abstract
withoutattention to theirrootsin thesocialprocess. He warnshis
audience that "officialacts are not really separable fromother
47 See, for example, his "Logical Conditions of a ScientificTreatmiient of
Morality,"Decennial Publications of the Universityof Chicago, First Series, III
(Chicago, 1903), 113-39. This was recentlyreprintedin Dewey's Problems of Men
(New York, 1945).
48 History,15.

actions of the governmentalagents themselvesor frommany of the
actions of the citizens at large."49 Political facts are organically
related to the social process as a whole. "The jural test of what
constitutes a political action draws a dividing line where none
exists in fact, and consequently any study of government that
neglects the disciplines of history,economics, and sociology will
lack in realitywhat it gains in precision. Man as a political animal
actingupon political,as distinguishedfrommorevital and powerful
motives,is the most unsubstantialof all abstractions. The recogni-
tion of this truthhas induced studentsof politics to search in many
fieldsfor a surer footholdthan law alone can afford."50 And now
just one more quotation to give the flavorof Beard's early concep-
tion of political science: "We are coming to realize that a science
dealing with man has no special field of data all to itself, but is
rathermerelya way of looking at the same thing-a view of a cer-
tain aspect of human action. The human being is not essentially
differentwhen he is depositing his ballot from what he is in the
countinghouse or at the work bench. In the place of a 'natural'
man, an 'economic' man, a 'religious' man, or a 'political' man, we
now observe the whole man participating in the work of govern-
ment. s'51
Robinson and Beard taken togetherpresent us witha historicist
view of historyand an organic view of political science. The con-
nection with the others is only too obvious. In the case of Beard,
moreover,even the influenceof some of the others is evident. He
was younger than they and his work appeared later. I need only
pointto thefact thathe cites Holmes, Pound, Goodnow,and Bentley
in the Economic Interpretationof the Constitution(1913) in order
to show the intimateties betweenhis own cultural organicism and
that of the key figuresin some of the most importantintellectual
trends of the century-legal realism, sociological jurisprudence,
pragmatism. Many of them, of course, did not accept the main
thesis of his book on the Constitution; for example, Holmes did
not.52 But this mustnot obscure for us the broad grounds on wvhich
Beard was united with the rest in a struggle against what I have
called formalismand in an attemptto break down artificialbarriers
betweenthe social disciplines. Like themhe embarkedon a histori-
cal and cultural studyof man.
49Politics, 5.
50Ibid, 6.
51 Ibid., 6.
52 Holmes-PollockCorrespondence,I, 237; II, 222-23.

152 MORTON G. WHITE
The purposeof thepresentessay is simple. I have triedto de-

in theearlyworkof some
scribein somedetaila particularaffinity
of our outstanding Americansocial thinkers.I have insistedthat
theywereunitedin a commonrevoltagainstformalismwhichcul-
minatedin an emphasison historicaland culturalfactors. This
notonlyhelpsus understandsomeof theirearlydoctrinesbut also
accountsfora good deal of theirmutualattachment in lateryears.
I have notbeenconcernedherewiththevalue of theirworkor the
workof theirdisciples.53Their predilectionin favor of history
and cultureas central conceptsexplains a good deal of their
breadth. Theynecessarilyspread themselvesas a consequenceof
their methodologicalcredos, and so we find Holmes the most
eruditeand philosophicallawyerof his day; Veblena sociologist,
anthropologist, and economist;Deweya psychologist and educator
as wellas a philosopher;Beard an historianand politicalscientist.
For this reason (and others) they tower among their contem-
poraries in Americansocial thoughtof the twentiethcentury.
Their examplehas had many effects,some of whichhave been
salutary,othersquestionable. This essay has indicatedonlysome
of the historicaloriginsof their reactionfromthe formal,the
deductive,the mathematical,the mechanical,in favor of the
historical,culturalaspectsofhumansocialbehavior.
Universityof Pennsylvania.
53 I have avoided a detailed evaluationof this traditionfor two reasons. First,
because I have only formulatedthe doctrineexpressed in their earliest works,and
it would be grossly unfair to use these works as a basis for evaluating such an
importantgroup of thinkers. Second, because I am preparing a book which will
treat the whole problemin greaterdetail. The present essay is a chapter of that
book.


The Revolt Against Formalism in - Morton White

Diunggah oleh

Informasi Dokumen

Hak Cipta

Format Tersedia

Bagikan dokumen Ini

Bagikan atau Tanam Dokumen

Opsi Berbagi

Apakah menurut Anda dokumen ini bermanfaat?

Apakah konten ini tidak pantas?

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

The Revolt Against Formalism in - Morton White

Diunggah oleh

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

The Revolt Against Formalism in American Social Thought of the Twentieth Century

Author(s): Morton G. White

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM IN AMERICAN

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

This attackon formalism or abstractionismleads to twoimpor-

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

British empiricism-a phenomenonwhich can only surprise those

Oliver WendellHolmes: His Book Notices and UncollectedLettersand Papers, 21.

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

join all of these men as anti-formalistrevolutionaries. I want now

In a letterto Pollock he has the followingto say of Hohfeld's attemptto classify

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

"common phenomenon," and one which is "very familiar to the

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

23 Quoted in Volume I of the Library of Living Philosophers,(ed. P. Sehilpp),

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

respect in later years and the convergenceof pragmatismand legal

thought,see Schneider,op. cit.,ch. 33.

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

crudenessand simplicity witha substituteforthe artificialopera-

Place of Science in Modern Civilization.

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

his followers,have treated this view of the economicman as though

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

for Holmes. Dewey in his earliest attacks on it construed formal

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

on we finda statementto the effectthat the difference is one of

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

and the theorists,as he called them. The differencebetween them

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

Indeed, on this point theywere not so violentlyopposed to the

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

The purposeof thepresentessay is simple. I have triedto de-

This content downloaded from 200.54.110.132 on Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:13:04 PM

Anda mungkin juga menyukai