Greimas's Narrative Grammar

Greimas's Narrative Grammar
Author(s): Paul Ricoeur, Frank Collins and Paul Perron

Source: New Literary History, Vol. 20, No. 3, Greimassian Semiotics (Spring, 1989), pp. 581-608
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/469355
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Greimas's NarrativeGrammar*
Paul Ricoeur
WHAT IS INTERESTING grammaris

about Greimas'snarrative
the wayitconstructs,degree by degree, the necessarycon-
ditionsfornarrativity,startingfroma logical model which
is the least complex possible and which,initially,includes no chrono-
logical importat all. The question is whether,in the attemptto arrive
at the structureof thosestorieswhichare in factproduced byoral and
writtentraditions,the author, in the successiveadditions withwhich
he enricheshis initialmodel, does indeed build upon the specifically
narrativecharacteristicsof the initialmodel or whetherhis develop-
mentincludesextrinsicpresuppositions.Greimasbelievesthatdespite
these additions to the initial model, an equivalence is maintained,
frombeginningto end, between that initialmodel and the final ma-
trix.The validityof thisbelief mustbe testedtheoreticallyand prac-
tically.Here this will be done at the theoreticallevel, that is, by fol-
lowing the author step by step as he constructshis final model,
withoutincludingexamples whichmightverifya posteriorithe fruit-
fulnessof the method.
The question concerningthe equivalence betweenthe initialmodel
and the finalmatrixcan be brokendown intoseveralstages,following
the order the author himselfsets out in "l1ments d'une grammaire
narrative."
In the model we can identifyfour stages of narrativization:
The firstis at the level which the author calls fundamentalgram-
mar, where he introduces for the firsttime the notion of "narra-
tivization,"'this being somethingcontained withinthe fundamental
grammar.
The second is found as we move fromthe fundamentalgrammarto
the "surface narrative grammar." Here the author introduces the
notion of "doing," then those of "wantingto do" and "being able to
do." On these he bases the notion of "narrativeutterance."
We find the thirdin the course of the developmentof the surface
* This
essay firstappeared as La grammaire narrativede Greimas,in Actesstmiotiques-
Documents,15 (1980) ; this translationis authorized by Actessimiotiques-Documents.
582 NEW LITERARY HISTORY
grammar, where a polemicalfactor is introduced which shapes the

notion of "performance,"taken to be an exemplary"narrativeunit."
The fourth is found in the furtherdevelopment of the surface
grammar,where the exchange structureprovides the author with a
"topological" way of representingnarrative phenomena. Here we
have a reformulationof all the generativeoperationsof narrativity in
termsof transfer fromone place to another: the "performanceseries"
thus obtained provide the semioticfoundationof the narrativestruc-
ture itself.
At each stage the question is whether equivalence to the initial
model is maintained-that is,whetheror not the successivedegrees of
narrativizationare limitedto a developmentof the logical forces of
the initialmodel alone, making them explicitin such a way as to be
theirmanifestation,making the deep structureapparent.
This simple presentationof the skeletaloutline of the author's ar-
gument gives an idea of the rigorous and fine distinctionsused to
bridge graduallythe distance betweenwhat the author calls "funda-
mentalab quo instances"and "finalad queminstances."2The intellec-
tual process we are going to describe here is, strictlyspeaking,a pro-
cess of mediationwhose progressivestages mustbe understood before
itsvalue isjudged. We mustthereforebe veryattentiveto such highly
refineddistinctionsas: (1) "narrativization"(of the taxonomicmodel);
(2) "narrative utterance"; (3) "narrativeunit" or "performance";(4)
"performance series." These will now become the titlesof our four
levels of descriptionand discussionof thisbody of theory.
I. At the Fundamental Grammar Level: The FirstStage

of "Narrativization"
We have to rememberthe requirementsmade of the initialmodel:

it must firstbe constructedat the so-called "immanent"level, thatis,
a stage thatprecedes its"manifestation"by some linguisticsubstance,
or even by a nonlinguisticsubstance (painting,cinema, and so on);
then it mustshow a discursivecharacter,thatis, it mustbe constructed
of units thatare much larger than utterance(whichis manifestedas
sentence).These tworequirementsdictatethesemiotic level of analysis.
We must say rightaway that the second requirementintroducesthe
minimal condition of narrativity-namely,that it, of its essence, in-
cludes a characteristicof "composition"(to use Aristotle'sterm) of
sentencesused in discourse,a characteristicthatis not deducible from
the phrasticstructure(that is, from the predicativerelationship,as
indeed is the case in the theoryof metaphor).3
GREIMAS'S NARRATIVE GRAMMAR 583
Thus the initialmodel mustfromthe outset presentan articulated

character,ifindeed itis going to be able to be narrativized.The stroke
of genius-and this is not too strong-is to have sought this already
articulatednature in a logical structurethat is as simple as possible,
that is, in the "elementarystructureof signification."This structure
has to do withthe conditionsof graspingof meaning,any meaning. If
something-anythingat all-signifies,it is not because one mighthave
some intuitionas to whatitsignifies,but because one can lay out in the
followingwayan absolutelyelementarysystemof relations:a relation
of contradiction-white/nonwhite;a relation between contraries-
white/black;and one of implicationor presupposition-nonwhite/
black. Here we have the famous semiotic square,whose logical force
is supposed to bring about all subsequent enrichmentof the model.
To understand primarynarrativization, thatis, narrativizationwhich
occurs at thisso-calleddeep level,we mustunderstandthe manner in
which semanticsand syntaxare linked at thisverylevel. The consti-
tutivemodel is semanticin that what it structuresis a signification.
More precisely,"thiselementarystructureof significationgives us a
semioticmodel whichallows us to explain the articulationof meaning
withina semantic microuniverse"(161). By semantic microuniverse
let us agree that we refer to the capacity of a simple element of
signification-the "seme"-to be part of the triple relation that we
have just mentioned.4This elementarystructure,the author tellsus,
"is capable of enabling meaning to signify"(162). In other words, it
makes a microuniverseof the unit of meaning, that is, a relational
microsystem.What constitutesit is also what organizes it. It is also
what, subsequently,will allow for the "manipulation" of meaning.
It is what shapes all of the transformationswe are now going to
present.5
How does thisconstitutivemodel enter into narrativization?
Semanticallyspeaking-or, to say the same thingdifferently, from
the pointof viewof morphology-the model is rigorouslyachronic.It
is a taxonomy,that is, a systemof unorientedrelations.The mutual
defining of its four poles presents an absolutely static network of
relations.But one can representthe model dynamically.One just has
to move from the morphologicalpoint of view to the syntacticone,
thatis, treatthe constituentrelations
of the taxonomicmodel as being
operations.Indeed, syntaxis no more than a regulatingof these oper-
ations. Treating relationsas operationsamounts to viewingsignifica-
tion "as a graspingor a productionof meaning by the subject" (164).
This mustbe emphasized: semanticsis taxonomic,syntaxhas to do
withoperations.The operationstakingplace are transformations. By so
saying,we prepare the way for the introductionof the key notion
whichwillunderlieall subsequentdevelopmentsof the model, thatis,

the notionof a "syntacticdoing." But, as we shall see, thereis more in
"doing" thanthereis in "operation."Neverthelessthe idea of a subject
who is a producer of meaning alreadyunderlinesthe "dynamization"
of the constitutivemodel which shapes that meaning. Reformulated
in termsof operations,our threerelationsof contradictions,contrar-
ies, and presuppositionscan appear as transformations bywhicha given
contentis negatedand othersaffirmed. We willcall the transformation
by negation "disjunction,"and the transformationby affirmation
"conjunction."If we view these transformations as orientedoperations
we end up withthe primaryconditionof narrativity. This is nothing
more than the settinginto motionof the taxonomicmodel.6
Discussion
Before moving from the deep grammar to the surface narrative

grammar,let us pause to make a criticalcomment.Three questions
are raised. The firsthas to do with the principle itselfby which a
distinctionis made betweena deep grammarand a surfacenarrative
grammar.The second has to do withthe logical rigor of the consti-
tutivemodel. The thirddeals withthe "narrativization" of thatmodel.
1. As for the general relation between fundamental (or deep)
grammar and surface grammar,one might ask if in fact this is a
relation of the "immanent" (that is, as premanifestation) to the
"manifest."The complete answer to thisquestion cannot be given at
thisstage of the discussioninasmuchas it amounts to askingwhether
or not the surfacegrammaris richerthan the deep grammarin terms
of relationsand operations.But giventhe extentto whichthe distinc-
tion between immanentstructureand manifestationbringsinto play
the general relationsbetweenthesemiotic and the linguistic,
one might
wonder whetherthe hierarchyof these two levels does not a priori
bringinto play relationsof anotherorder,already noted by Saussure:
thatis, thatthe linguisticorder is at the same timeone semioticsystem
among othersemioticsystemsand the paradigmwithinwhichone can
discoverthe general characteristics of semioticsin general. Proof for
this is found in the analysis of Greimas's constitutivemodel which
showsitselfto be, of itsessence,"semic"(the binaryschema sl/non-sl).
I do not contest,the rightnessof reaching the semioticthroughthe
linguistic.I do contestthe correctnessof a procedure thatarticulates
the semioticbeforeit articulatesthe linguistic.This way the semiotic
and the linguisticreciprocallyprecede each other: the firstby virtue
of its general nature, the second by virtueof its exemplarystatus.
This objection is not inconsequentialas far as narrativityis con-

cerned. If, in fact,the semioticand the linguisticprecede each other
according to differentpoints of view, it is possible that sometimesa
semioticanalysis,operating in the contextof a preliminarynarrative
intelligibility,
mightlegitimately constructa priorithe semioticsquare
(or squares) which structurethat text. In this case, semioticanalysis
has a real heuristicvalue and reallycan show how the textshould be
read. But itcan happen thata semioticanalysismightalso be feigned.
What I mean is that the analysis,shaped by a narrativeforce which
establishesitsown criteria,mightbe not so much constructeda priori,
but reconstructedinsteadafterthe fact,in order to meet the demands
of the semioticapproach. Finally-and thisis, in myopinion, the most
frequentcase, ifindeed not the norm-the constitutivemodel forthe
semioticlevel and the specificcriteriafor narrativitywhich the fol-
lowing discussionwill identify,can come togetherin a mixedor com-
plex conceptual understandingof narrativitywhich is an accurate
reflectionof the complex relationshipaccordingto whichthe semiotic
and the linguisticmutuallyprecede each other fromdifferentpoints
of view.
2. As for the logical rigorof the constitutivemodel, the constraints
thatitimposes upon semioticanalysis,and even more understandably
upon subsequent linguisticanalysis,are perhaps those thatone would
expect froma model thatis too rigid for what must subsequentlybe
codified by it, and, as oftenhappens when one interpretsin a given
area according to models constructeda priori,certainof the model's
requirementsmighthave to be attenuatedin order to functionwell in
subsequent applications.
We note immediatelythatall is based upon semicanalysis,'and that
while indeed thisanalysisidentifiescertaindiscursivecharacteristics,
in the sense of articulations,which lend themselvesto being narra-
tivized,theyare not establishedat the transphrasticlevel as had been
promised. The analysisdoes not begin at a point beyond utterance,
but withinit,at thelevel of a fundamentalsemantics.In thissense, the
model is not discursivein the sense of discourse being a wider unit
than utterance.We have thereforeto presuppose the existence of a
homological arrangementof the infra-and supraphrasticstructures
which is not thematicallydeveloped here.8
It willalso be noted thatthe semicanalysishas to be completed first,
or at least to have reached the stage at which it allows for a "limited
inventoryof the semic categories"(161), as in the example of white
versus black. This requirementis rarelymet.
But above all, itwillbe noted thatthe taxonomicmodel has a strictly
logical significanceonlyifitremainsa verypowerfulmodel. Let us be
clear: the threerelationsof contradictions,contraries,and presuppo-

sitionsare what theyare only if contradictionsignifiesno more than
the relation between s, and non-s1; if the relation of contrariesbe-
tween s, and S2 trulyconstitutesa binarysemic categoryof the white
versus black type, that is, withinthe precise frameworkof a polar
opposition between semes of the same category; and finallyif the
presuppositionof non-s1by S2 is trulypreceded by two relationsof
contradictionsand contrarieswhichobey the rigorousconditionsjust
mentioned. Now, one can justifiablydoubt that all three conditions
will be met rigorouslyin the area of narrativity.If they were, all
subsequent operationswould have to be "predictableand calculable"
(166). But then nothingwould happen. There would be no events.
There would be no surprise.There would be nothingto tell.One can
suppose thatthe surfacegrammarwillmore oftenbe dealing in quasi
contradictions,quasi contraries,quasi presuppositions.As we shall
see, many of the author's "schemata" (so he calls the twosome con-
structed from the relation of contradiction)are only analogous to
contradictions. Many of the "correlations" between two such
"schemata" are weak contraries(thatis, theycould not sustain a true
semicanalysisand cannotbe authenticatedby pointingto theirresting
on a binarysemic categoryof the whiteversus black type). Finally-
and above all-the crucial point for the proper functioningof the
constitutivemodel has to do withthe kind of constraints-introduced
by the relation of presupposition,which links non-sa to s2-which
regulatethe deixes.These constraintsare entirelydependent upon the
force of the other two relationsbetween contradictionsand contrar-
ies. Therefore,onlyin a case wherethesethreerequirementshave not
been weakened can we speak of the "unityof meaning" of the four-
termmodel and of the isotopyof the semanticmicrouniversearticu-
lated bythe constitutivemodel. In a case in whichthe relationsare too
attenuated,too muchjust a factof analogy,if not simplycounterfeit-
ing, the relation of presupposition no longer holds. The unity of
meaning is broken up and the isotopyvacillates.It is perhaps at this
point thatsome novelty is included in the operations made upon, and
the manipulationsof, the constitutivemodel.
3. What of the "narrativization" of the taxonomicmodel? It is sup-
posed to be guaranteed by the factof one's movingfromthe idea of
relation to that of operation. This is assuredlythe key point and is
withinthe deep grammaritself.
At firstsight-and if one reads the "1llments d'une grammaire
narrative"in the light of "Les jeux des contraintessemiotiques"-
primacyis given to morphologyin a reading which is avowedlypar-
adigmatic.The emphasis is thus not on the differencebetween rela-
tionsand transformations, but on the factthatthe constitutivemodel

is, of itsessence, of a discursivenature--or at least an articulatedone.
Since each case of significationconstitutesa relationalmicrouniverse,
reformulationin termsof operations appears to be no more than a
corollaryof thissignificationnetworkarrangement.The equivalence
betweenrelationsand operationsremainsunthreatened,but one can-
not understandhow an achronicmodel can containthe conditionsfor
narrativity. Is it enough for
Is it enough to take relationsas operations?
these operationsto be oriented9 and formseries?Do these thingsallow
us to speak of narrativization? Even more,the whole enterprisecan be
suspected of having, from the outset, misunderstoodthe narrative
dimension of discourse.
For a reading thattakes more closelyinto account the shiftin em-
phasis seen between the "Contraintes"and the "'lements" (to which
the author himselfattests),10movingfromthe idea of relationto that
of operation implies the need for wholesale additions to the taxo-
nomic model which really change its nature and also give it an au-
thentic chronological nature. These additions are evident in the
"l1ments" in the notion of "productionof meaning by the subject"
(164). What subject?If it is not yetthe actantof surface grammar,it
is already the subject of a doing, of a syntacticdoing which will pre-
ciselybringabout the transitionto a general doing, a centralpoint for
all of the anthropomorphicmeaningsof the story.We thus have here
much more than reformulation.Instead it is the introduction,on an
equal footing,of a syntagmaticfactoralongside the paradigmaticfac-
tor. This is in fact a process involving"already established terms"
(164), or "termswithalready investedvalues" (164). In a case where
you have a relationof contradiction,you effectuatethe negation of
one of the terms.You change it intoitscontradictory, whichyou then
affirm.It is thistransformation of investedcontentintoothercontent
thatconstitutesnarrativization.There is thus a syntacticinitiativeap-
plied to the simple taxonomicmodel. But if thatis so then the notion
of equivalence loses itsmeaningin termsof reciprocalrelations,when
we move frommorphologyto syntax." It even loses itsstrictmeaning
in termsof isotopic,although not isomorphic,relations:In what way
are a stablerelationand itstransformation equivalent,iforientationis
what is important?12 To go even further,one mightask whetherthe
constructionof the taxonomic model was not guided by the idea of
the transformations to be made to itsterms.This question,as we shall
see, can and willbe asked at all levels: the finalpoint of an operation
should be the next operation,ending withthe narrative'scompleted
project. And if the taxonomicmodel was constructedin view of the
syntacticoperations to be grafted onto it, is it not true that these
588 NEWLITERARY
HISTORY
operations in turn become conditions for narrativityonly retro-

spectively? This follows from their use in the narrative surface
grammar-where they are linked with characteristicswhich appear
and occur only in terms of phenomena unique to the surface
grammar.
For my part, I am inclined to thinkthat the enterprise,frombe-
ginning to end, obeys a twofoldpostulate: on the one hand, in an
unfoldingprocess,itapplies, to all levelsof narrativization,
the logical
forceof the initialtaxonomicmodel in such a way as to elevate semi-
otics to the rank of a deductive science; on the other hand, the en-
terprise,in a reverse process, seeks to constructthe stages of the
conditions for narrativityin the light of the end point of a given
narrative.To satisfythe firstrequirement,all additions to the model
must appear to be equivalent transformationsbetween isotopic
metalanguages(167). To meet the second demand, new specifications
must be introduced at each stage in order to enhance the initial
model, given itsultimateapplicationin termsof the end point of the
narrative. Movement from one level to the other thus loses all its
deductive nature. The complex interplayof these two requirements
gives the whole enterprisethe ambiguous appearance of reducing
narrativeto logic or of seeing narrativeas a surpassingof logic. This
ambiguous nature is obvious even at the initialstage, where narra-
tivizationappears to be the object of a reluctantrecognition,half
denied, scarcelyavowed.
II. From the Fundamental Grammarto the Surface

NarrativeGrammar: The NarrativeUtterance
The decisive grammaticalshift is that which takes us from the

"deep" or fundamental level to the level which Greimas calls
"surface,"even though it is still,in his view, an intermediateplane
between the strictly
conceptual one we have been looking at, and the
strictly"figurative"one, the one at which actors accomplish tasks,
undergo tests,reach goals. Although the differencesbetween deep
and surface structuresmay be easy to characterize,the difference
between the superficialand figurativelevels is difficultto describe.
The level that we are now going to concentrateupon is, like the
precedingone, a metalanguagelevel vis-a-visthe figurativelanguage.
The discussionof "figurative"will come later.
The distinctivefeatureof thislevel is the anthropomorphic
represen-
tation of the operations described earlier. If one says "anthropo-
morphic"one means interpretingthe notionof operation in termsof
"doing."In otherwords,
"doingis an operationthatis madespecific
by theadditionofa humanclasseme" (167).The syntactic
operations
of affirmingand negating
byconjunction are thus
and disjunction
rewrittenas a syntacticdoing. To thisdoing,whichis syntacticbecause
the reformulatedoperationswere themselvessyntactic,Greimas adds
all the doing of human activity,to the extent that, in semiotics,all
doing,whether goesout")orrecounting
anaction("Peter
performing
a doing("Petertells"),comesintoplayonlywhentranscodedintoa
message. That is, it becomes an object of communicationcirculating
between a sender and receiver.So it is that the notion of a syntactic
tothatofan operation
doing,equivalent (itself toa
beingequivalent
relation),providesthe mediationrequiredto generatethe kindof
utteranceneeded in order for the author legitimatelyto characterize
a surface grammar as being a narrativegrammar. This utteranceis
the narrativeutterance. It expresses a process whicharticulatesa func-
tion,in Propp's sense, and an actant.This can be representedas NU
= F(A). "One can thus say thatany operation upon the deep gram-
mar can be converted into a narrative utterance whose minimal
canonic formis F(A)" (168).
As can be seen, the equivalences upon which the entireenterprise
restsare the homogeneitybetween syntacticoperation and syntactic
doing on the one hand, and on the other,betweensyntacticdoing and
any utteranceexpressingthe doing of an actant.
Once this "isotopywithoutisomorphism"has been allowed (167),
the theoryof the narrativeutterancedevelops in a remarkableway.In
a thoroughlyfelicitousway the author has the narrativeutterances
spawn utteranceswhichdescribe an effectivedoing and otherswhich
describe a wantingto do. If you consider thatthe complete utterance
of the wantingto do is of the followingform: X wantsY to do, then
you can see that thiswantingto do, formulatedwithinthe left-hand
side of the complete utterance, modalizes the narrative utterance
which,in turn,becomes the object of the wanting.It modalizes it in
the sense that it makes it possible,thus causing it to go throughthe
successionof the possible,thereal,and the necessarymodalities.Thus
we will call modal utterances-so that we can distinguishthem from
simple narrativeutterances,which we will from now on refer to as
descriptiveutterances-those utterancesof the wantingto do form
and those showingthe same formwhichwillbe presentedlater. The
introductionof wantingin factconstitutesthe firstin a series of "pre-
determinedsemanticrestrictions"(168) whichidentifyactantsas sub-
jects, thatis, as potentialoperatorsof doing. The narrativeutterance
is itselfspecifiedas being a program which a subject wishes to carry
out. In a general way, we call the complete modal utteranceof the
followingtype a program: (1) "X wants Y to do... ." Greimas next

constructsa seriesof model utterancesof the same form.First:(2) "X
wantsX to do... ." In thiscase, the same actor both wantsand does.
Then: (3) "X wants to have .. ."; (4) "X wants to be... ." In these
cases the object of the wantingis an attributionof objects or values.
We will speak of attributiveutterances(which will play a key role in
the last phase in the constructionof the completed model) when
dealing withutterancesof types (3) and (4). We stillhave leftthose
modal utterancesof the form:(5) "X wantsto know (how to do ...)";
(6) "X wants to be able (to do .. .)." Here, the modal utterance is
doubled to become a wantingto know how and a wantingto be able.
At the end of this remarkablereconstructionof the typologyof de-
scriptiveand modal utterances,the author believes that he has kept
the equivalence betweenthe elementaryunitsof the surfacegrammar
and those of the deep grammar(172).
Discussion
Discussion of the second segmentof the semioticreconstructionof

narrativitywill follow the same order as the discussion of the first
segment.
1. The general question concerningthe relationbetweendeep and
surfacegrammarcan now be takenup in more detail. Does the logical
level purely and simplyprecede the anthropomorphiclevel? This is
certainlytrue in termsof the order of the exposition,since it is nec-
essaryto introducedeterminingfactorswhich"specify,"which"tran-
scribein a more complex way" the operationsof the deep grammar.
But can the same be said concerningthe order of discoveryon the
part of a reader? It is the anthropomorphiclevel which,in myopin-
ion, carries all of the significationsof doing. All these cases of signi-
ficationare born of what I would call the semantics of action.We al-
ready know, a
concerning knowing that is immanent to doing itself,
that doing is the object of utteranceswhose structurediffersin es-
sence fromthatof predicativeutterancesof the type"s is p," as it does
also fromthe relationalutterancesof the type"X is betweenY and Z."
This structureof the descriptiveutterance of action has been the
object of precisestudyin analyticphilosophyand I give an account of
this in "La semantique de l'action" (in which I refer particularlyto
AnthonyKenny).'3 One remarkablecharacteristicof these utterances
is thattheirstructureallows foreverythingfrom"Socratesspeaks.. ."
to "Brutus killed Caesar on the Ides of March in the Roman Senate
witha dagger...."
It is this semanticsof action which in fact is presupposed in the

narrativeutterance.Here, doing is substitutableforall verbsof action
(as with the English to do) and is equated with them in the canonic
formNU = F(A).
I thereforenow make the above suggestionmore precise. It willbe
remembered that it dealt with the relation between semiotics and
linguisticsand saw themin termsof a mutual precedence. The semi-
oticsquare givesus itsnetworkof interdefinedtermsand itssystemof
contradictions,contraries,and presuppositions.Semantics of action
offerus the principalsignifications of doing and the specificstructure
forutteranceswhichreferto action. In thissense, surfacegrammaris
a mixed grammar: semiotic-praxic.
Nowhere is the specificityof the semanticsof action more evident
than in the movement from utteranceson doing to utterances on
being able to do. What makes it certain that wanting to do brings
about doing? Nothingin the semioticsquare allows us to believe this.
Furthermore,the typologyof wanting to do, of wanting to be, of
wantingto have, of wanting to know, and of being able to want, is
excellent.But, fromthe pointof viewof linguistics,it is implicatedin
a veryspecificgrammarwhichanalyticphilosophyhas developed with
great sophisticationunder the name of intensional logic. But if a
special grammar is required to put into logical form the relations
betweenmodal utterancesof the "wantingthat.. ." typeand descrip-
tive utterancesof doing, it is the phenomenologyimplicitin the se-
manticsof action which gives meaning to Greimas's declaration that
"modal utteranceswhichhave wantingas theirfunctionset the subject
up as a virtualityof doing, whereas the other two modal utterances,
characterizedby the knowinghow to and being able to modalities,
determinethis potentialdoing in two differentways: as a doing re-
sultingfromknowinghow to or as one founded exclusivelyon being
able to" (175). This implicitphenomenologyis broughtto lightwhen
"one can interpretthe modal utterancesas 'the desire to realize' a
programwhichis presentin the formof a descriptiveutteranceand
is at the same time part of, as an object, the modal utterance"(169).
One mightsay,in termsof "desire,"thatwe have already moved from
the anthropomorphiclevel to the figurativeone (hence the quotation
marksaround "desire to realize"). But can these two levels be distin-
guished fromeach otherwithinmodal utterances?14 Can an utterance
withtwo actantswhich links a virtualsubject withan object which is
itselfa doing in factutteranythingelse but desire? The author con-
tradictshimselfwhen he again takes up the termdesire(withoutquo-
tationmarksthistime)in order to account forthe structureof modal
utterances:"the axis of desire whichlinks[the twoactants:the subject
592 NEW
LITERARY
HISTORY
and theobject]legitimizes, in turn,a semanticinterpretation of them

as a virtualperforming subject and an set
object up as a value" (171).
Likewise, ifthefigurative levelis "thatat whichhumanor personified
actorsaccomplish tasks,submitto tests,reachgoals"(166),one might
wonderiftheanthropomorphic level,giventhatitincludesutterances
on wantingto do, beingable to do, knowinghow to do, hence"the
desireto realize"a program,can be definedwithouttasks,tests,and
goals.Here again,themeaningsproffered bythesemantics ofaction
precedethesemioticsquareevenifthatsquare,byitslogicalsimplic-
ity,precedesthecomplexity ofthecategories ofthesurfacegrammar.
2. We can moveon to thenextpointand inquireintotheequiva-
lence of the twometalanguages-that of the conceptualorderand
thatoftheanthropomorphic order.Thisequivalence, as we haveseen
above,has as guarantorthenotionof syntactic doing,a doingwhich
is homogeneoussimultaneously to syntactic operationsand to ordi-
narydoingtranscodedintomessage.I fearthatin thisreasoningwe
have a certainparalogism.'5Syntactic doingcan designateonlythe
operationsofconjunction and disjunction whichgiveriseto affirma-
tionsand negationson thesemioticsquare.You cannot,withoutam-
biguity, callordinary doingtranscoded intomessagea syntactic doing.
The transcoding operation which transforms doing into an object
messagewithina relationof communication does not preventthe
descriptive utterance from precisely describing a doingwhichis not
theequivalentof a syntactic operation, but is rather theformalterm
thatis substituted forall termsofaction.This is whytheutterance of
a doingcannotbe equivalentto syntactic doing, which reformulates,
in an anthropomorphic language,syntactic operations.On the con-
trary, it is becauseutterances of doingare specificthatone is saying
something new when one reformulates logicaloperationsas a syntac-
ticdoing.Evenin theexpression"syntactic doing,"theauthoris bor-
rowing from the semantics of action.16
Whatcan concealtheparalogism is thefactthatdoing,transcoded
into message,developsits own syntax(a predicatewithtwo argu-
ments,specificgrammarfortheverbaltenses,open structure of the
utterance,and so on). But the syntaxof doing,whichpraxiology
discusses,and thatof wanting, ofbeingable to,and of knowinghow
to do, whichintensional logic studies, do not derivefromsyntactic
doing in the strictsense defined above.
It is therefore verydifficult to findan equivalencebetweenthe
structures used bythesemantics ofactionand theoperationsimplied
bythesemiotic square.It is truethatthesimplenarrative utterance is
stillan abstractionwithinthe surfacegrammar,to the extentthatthe
polemical relationbetween contradictoryprogramshas not yetbeen
introduced. Only this relation can give rise to series admittingof

comparison withthe syntacticseries of operations followingthe tax-
onomic model. This is whywe mustpostpone the completediscussion
concerningthe isotopyof the two metalanguagesto the thirdstage in
the constructionof the complete model. However, to the extentthat
the author himselfhintsat thisisotopyat the level of syntacticdoing,
we must oppose this hint,by making referenceto the discontinuity,
which is introducedby doing and its syntax,between the logical and
the anthropomorphiclevels.
3. The preceding remarkconcerningthe abstractcharacterof the
narrativeutterancein relation to the unfoldingnarrative,of which
more later,leads us to a thirdobservation.This concernsthe narrative
qualifyingof the descriptiveutterance(X does A) and of the modal
utterance(X wants to do A). If we examine doing, and even more,
wantingto do and the other modalities,this bringsus, decisively,to
the order of story.However, I willnot call the utterancesof these two
typesnarrative.What theylack, in order to be narrative,is the factof
being articulated in a series of utterancesof the same kind which
togetherconstructa plot, witha beginning,a middle, and an end. I
willcall such simpleutterancesactionutterancesratherthan narrative
utterances.This is based on ArthurDanto's definitionof "narrative
phrases.""7Greimas would probablyallow me this reservation,since
from the outset he established,as the criteriafor the autonomous
level of narrativestructures,the requirementthat the lattercontain
unitsof meaning thatare longer than a simple utterance.
Having reached the end of these two stages, we see the following
results: (1) we have set up two conditions for narrativity,but not
narrativity itself;(2) these two conditionsare irreducible,one to the
other: one is of a logicalorder,and theotherof a praxicorder; (3) the
praxicconditionsetsa semanticsof actionintoplay,and thislattersets
up a syntaxwhose intelligibility is itselfnot unalloyed: phenomeno-
logical and linguistic.
III. FromtheNarrative to theNarrative

Utterance
Unit:"Performance"
By introducingrelationsof confrontationand resistance,therefore
a polemical
bygiving representation wegiveto
ofthewholeschema,
the relationsof the semioticsquare theirtrulyanthropomorphic
equivalent. But, more precisely-and thiswill have consequences for
our discussion-it is of contradictionthat a confrontationbetween a
subject sl and an antisubjects2 gives an anthropomorphicrepresen-
594 NEWLITERARY
HISTORY
tationpar excellence. Nonetheless,it is the successionof transforma-

tions of content,along the axes of contrarietyand presupposition,
which then gives rise to a chain of narrativeutteranceswhich,taken
together,constitutethe narrativeunits.According to thisnew refor-
mulation, negation presents itselfas domination and affirmationas
attribution(attributionof a value-objectaccording to whetherthe ut-
terance is wantingto be or wantingto have).
We thus obtain a syntagmaticsuccessionof the type:confrontation
(NU1), domination (NU2), attribution(NU3). This succession consti-
tutes a unit of a syntacticnature which,it is decided, will be called
performance. Since narrativeutterancescan be of two kinds,according
to whethertheyinvolvedoing or wantingto do (or the other modal-
ities of doing), we will have performancenot only of doing, but of
wantingto do, knowinghow to do (manifestedas ruse and trickery),
and of being able to do (manifestedas real or magical power).
For the discussion of the equivalence between the two metalan-
guages, it is absolutelynecessaryto emphasize the complex and ar-
ticulatedcharacterof the phenomenon which,in relationto the per-
formanceseries (see below), appears as a "narrativeunit." Again we
emphasize that what is here called "narrativeunit" is not the same
thingas the simplenarrativeutterance.It is, in fact,a syntacticunitin
the sense that it is a unified syntagmaticsuccession. It is this unit
whichappropriatelycan be superimposed upon the interplayof tax-
onomic relationsand upon the interplayof disjunctionand conjunc-
tion operations.18
This is whyit is fromthe complex makeup of performance,much
more than fromthe simplenarrativeutterance,thatwe should be able
to read an equivalencebetween deep and surface grammar.Greimas
sees thisequivalence at playbetweentheorientationof the relationsof
the taxonomicschema and the relationof implicationby which NU3
(attribution)implies NU2 (domination)whichimplies NU1 (confron-
tation): "with,nonetheless,this difference,if the orientationfollows
the order of the utterances implicationis oriented
NU---NU2--NU3,
in the reverse direction"(174). Thanks to the equivalence between
orientationand implicationwe can say that the final narrativeutter-
ance of a performance-attribution-is "the equivalent,at the surface
level, of the logical affirmationof the deep grammar"(175).
Discussion
1. This discussion will not dwell on the general relationshipbe-

tweenthe deep and the surfacegrammars:since performancederives
fromthe narrativeutterance,all of thesemanticsof action,whetherat

the level of doing or at the level of wantingto do, knowinghow to do,
and being able to do, is found here. Nonetheless,a complementary
argument appears with the polemicalrepresentationof logical rela-
tions. This representationbrings with it several new characteristics
which,before takingon a logical significance(which is, however,du-
bious, as we shall see) of the contradiction/contrariety
type,possess an
autonomous praxicsignificance.Confrontationand resistanceare fig-
ures forthe orientationof actiontowardothers,thatis, of a significant
phenomenon whichMax Weber places at the head of the constitutive
categories of his comprehensive sociology.19Context or resistance
(Kampf)is a specifyingof the orientationtowardothers which comes
into play later when the semanticsof social action are constructed.20
To the extent that performance,for Greimas, complements the
idea of program with that of polemic, we have to say that perfor-
mance, in which the author sees "the most characteristicunit of nar-
rativesyntax"(173), is also the most characteristicunit of the mixed
character-logical and praxic---ofthe whole of the narrativeorder. A
more importantproblemis to evaluate the degree of equivalence that
can subsistin thisalloy of logic and praxis whichwe see between the
two metalanguages,the logical and the anthropomorphic.21
2. Let us consider the reasoning upon which Greimas bases this
equivalence.
Three remarks:(a) We are surprisedto read that confrontationis
the anthropomorphicrepresentationof contradiction(thereforeat
thelevel of each of the schematasl versusnon-s1and s2 versusnon-s2)
and also that two subjects,sI and s2 (subject and antisubject)corre-
spond to two contradictorydoings (172). Has the author confused
contrarietyand contradiction?It is unlikely.Thus several hypotheses
suggest themselves: for example, if confrontationdoes not corre-
spond to contradiction,contrarietycannot have anthropomorphic
representation.To fill this lack do we have to posit confrontation/
contrarietyalongside confrontation/contradiction? This seems to be
the case, to the extentthatit is the correlationbetweentwo schemata,
thereforecontrariety,which allows for completion of the trajectory
throughfour poles, sl, non-s1,s2, non-s2,of the semioticsquare. But
thisattenuatingof the logical model allows only for establishingthe
equivalence of confrontationwithboth contrarietyand contradiction.
And indeed thisstillrequires thatveryweak formsof contrarietybe
postulatedwhichare far removed fromthe white/black type. Indeed
this is so and we are given a "limitedinventoryof semic categories"
(161). We can thusexpect thatthe equivalence willbe proportionately
attenuated.
596 NEWLITERARY
HISTORY
(b) This attenuationis particularlynecessarywhen the author tries

to establish a correspondence between the functionof attribution
(NU3) and instancesof affirmation.Let us come back to the semiotic
square: the finalaffirmationis the one which posits s2 throughpre-
supposition from But have we not already said that presup-
position cannot non-sI.
take place unless the accompanyingcontrarietyis a
strongcontrariety? And have we notjust seen that contrarietyhere
remained withouta determinatepolemic?
(c) What is even more serious is that the chain of the narrative
utterancesNUI, NU2, NU3, which are constitutiveof performance,
does not constitutea chain of implicationunless, as the author him-
selfadmits,you reversethe order of the utterancesand therebymove
fromattributionto dominationand confrontation.Now, orientation
was necessaryfor the narrativizationof the taxonomic model. Does
thisnot amount to an admissionthatthecorrespondencebetweenthe
relationsthatare internalto performanceand those thatare internal
to the taxonomic model does not apply to the very condition for
narrativity as engendered by the model? Here, the equivalence is no
longerjust weak. It is forced.
Indeed, the notion of polemic, so felicitouslyintroduced by Grei-
mas at the root of narrativity, brings into play a type of negativity
which Kant was the firstto show, in his Versuch,denBegriffdernega-
tivenGr6ssenin die Wetweisheit to be irreducibleto contra-
einzufiihren,
diction. Opposing a subject to an antisubjectdoes not set up an op-
positionbetweentwocontradictory doings. It is legitimateto fear that
it is not at all like contrarietyeither.
If I now bringtogetherthelastseriesof remarksconcerning(1) the
mixed logical and praxic model and (2) the weakness of the equiva-
lence between the two metalanguages,we can expect two kinds of
resultsfromthe correspondencebetweenthe logical propertiesof the
semioticsquare and the praxic categorieswhich are the most deter-
mined bythe polemicalnatureof action.To theextentthatthe logical
model, even when weakened, retainsa certainpriorityin the reading
of a narrativetext,the semioticsquare exercisesa heuristicfunction
which I happily admit. However, to the extentthat the praxic rela-
tionsof a strictlypolemical nature escape logical contradictionrepre-
sentation-even logical contrarietyrepresentation-the semiotic
square runs the riskof being reduced to a presentationalartificeby
which the semioticianconformshis readings, after the fact, to his
models.
3. As to the strictlynarrativetenor of the syntagmaticsuccession
which articulatesperformance,I would say thatit is superior to that
of the simplenarrativeutterance,by virtueof the introductionof the
polemic factor.However, performancestilldoes not go beyond the

stage of the conditionsfor narrativity.The author admits this: it is
onlywiththe performanceseries,whichwe willspeak of shortly,that
he is able to constitutethe complete set of conditionsfor story.
This is whyhe, quite properly,designatesperformanceby the term
narrativeunit.Will we neverthelesssay thatthe syntagmaticsuccession
of confrontation,domination,attributionconstitutesof itselfa mi-
crostory?We can withoutdoubt say so, but only if we emphasize that
this oriented succession presents relationswhich are inverse to the
relationof implicationwhich alone can legitimizethe statementthat
NU3 "is the equivalent,at the surfacelevel, of logical affirmationat
the deep grammar level" (175). Now it is preciselyin this inverse
relation of implicationthat something new happens, of which a story
can be born.
IV. The Last Stage: The PerformanceSeries

Greimas'sfinalstrokeof inspirationis to complete the constitution
of his narrativemodel by adding the polemical category,the anthro-
pomorphic doublet of the relationof contradiction,the categoryof
transferborrowedfromthe communicationschema or more generally
from the structureof exchange.Here is how this new structureis
applied to the previous system.We pointed out that the last of the
three narrativeutteranceswhich constitutedperformancecould be
expressed as an attributiveutterance,according to which a subject
acquires an object or a value. To reformulateattributionin termsof
exchange, one could say thata subject acquires what another subject
is deprived of. Attributioncan thus be broken down into two opera-
tions: deprivation,whichis equivalentto disjunction,and an attribu-
tion proper, which is equivalent to a conjunction.
This reformulation-thelast one proposed by the author-leads to
the notion of the performanceseries, an abbreviated form for the
"syntagmaticseriesof performances."Such a seriescan be seen as the
formalframeworkof everynarrative.It is only at this stage that the
narrativegrammaris complete (or, as we shall see, almostcomplete).
The general advantage of thisreformulationis thatit permitsone
to representall the previous operations as changes of "place"-the
initialand final places of transfers.In other words,it corresponds to
a topological syntaxof translativeutterances.In turn,the richnessof
this topological syntaxcan be observed as the topological analysis is
carried out at the two levels of doing and wantingto do.
If one firstof all considers only value-objects,acquired or trans-
598 NEWLITERARY
HISTORY
ferredby doing, then the topological syntaxenables us to represent

the ordered seriesof operationson the semioticsquare along the lines
of contradiction,contrariety,and presuppositionas a circulartrans-
missionof values.One can say withouthesitationthat this topological
syntaxof transfersis the true motivationof narrationas the creative
process of values (178).
If one now considers no longer only the operations,but the
operators,22 that is to say, in the exchange schema, the senders/
receivers of the transfer,then the topological syntaxregulates the
transferof the capacityto do, and thereforeoperates the transfersof
the values consideredabove. In otherwords,it regulatesthe institution
proper of the syntacticoperators by creatingsubjects endowed with
the virtualityof doing.
Separating the topological syntaxthereforecorresponds to sepa-
rating doing and wanting (being able to do, knowing to do)-
corresponds,thatis, to dividingnarrativeutterancesinto descriptive
and modal utterances,or dividing them into two series of perfor-
mances: acquisitionthen corresponds to transfer,bearing either on
object-valuesor on modal values (acquiringthe being able, the know-
ing, the wantingto do).
The second seriesof performancesis the mostimportantone from
the point of view of the activationof the syntactictrajectory.The
operators mustbe institutedas being able, knowing,and wanting,in
order in turnfortransfersof value-objectsto take place. If one wishes
to knowwhere the firstactantcomes from,it is necessaryto evoke the
contractwhichinstitutesthe subjectof desire byattributing to him the
of
modality wanting. The specificnarrativeunityin which the want-
ing of the "knowing" or "able" is
subject posited constitutes the first
performance of the narrative.
The "completednarrative"(180) combinesthe seriesof transfersof
value-objectswiththe series of transfersinstitutingthe "knowing"or
"able" subject.
Discussion
1. The last stage of the completedconstituentmodel enables us to

raise for the last time the general question of the mixed nature-
logical and praxic--ofthismodel. The new addition to be considered
is the transferby whicha subjectis deprived of what is attributedto
another.Now anyone can see thatto deprive and to give signifymore
than to disjoinand to conjoin. Lack and deprivationare categoriesthe
anthropomorphicnature of whichbecomes manifestonly if one con-
siders,as was so wellshownbyClaude Bremond in Logiquedu recit,the

relationshipbetween beingsubjected toand acting:"We define as play-
ing the role of patienteveryperson which the narrativepresentsas
being affectedin one way or another by the course of the events
narrated."2, The notion of a patient affectedby a certain state logi-
callyprecedes thatof any modification(or conservation)of state.The
deprivationof a value-object,sufferedby a subject,and the attribu-
tion of thissame object to another subjectare modificationsaffecting
a patient.What the last stage of the constitutionof the model there-
fore adds is a phenomenologyof suffering-acting, in which notions
such as deprivationand donation take on meaning. As far as I am
concerned, it is thisimplicitphenomenologywhich permitsGreimas
to write:"actantsare conceived no longer as operators,but as places
where value-objectscan be situated,places where theycan be brought
or fromwhere theycan be taken" (176). The topologicallanguage of
thislast phase is thusa mixtureof logical conjunction/disjunction and
modificationswhichhappen not onlyin the practicalfield,but also in
the patheticone. The operative value cannot thereforecome exclu-
sivelyfromthe logical aspects of attribution,but also, in turn, from
the topological syntaxand the semanticsof acting and sufferingac-
cording to whetherthe topologicalsyntaxplays an effectively heuris-
tic role in the reading of the text, or whether it is an artificeof
exposition in relationship to interplay of the pathico-praxic
categories.24
2. This compositenature of the topologicalsyntaxresultsin a new
weakeningof the equivalence between logical metalanguage and an-
thropomorphicmetalanguage.In fact,just as the author attemptedto
link the polemical values of narrativitysolely to the relation of con-
tradictionof the taxonomicmodel, now the circulartransmissionof
values, in the topological syntax of the transfers, rests on the
correlation25between the two schemata (d, versus non-d1,d2 versus
non-d2):
d, d2
d2 d,
This opposition is whatcreates spatial heterotopy.Consequently,it is
the relation of presupposition and which
(non-d2---dI non-dl---d2)
bears the entirelogicalweightof the topologicalapparatus. Two sche-

mata, two programs can in fact be correlated in various ways. The
logical projectionof thiscorrelationcan be called contrarietyonly if
the termsare in the same relationas black and white,whichis rarely
borne out in the praxic and patheticorder. All sortsof modifications
can affecta state,withoutthe correlationof roles being reduced to
theircontrariety.Now if the correlationis reduced to a weak contra-
riety,indeed analogical, then presuppositionin turnloses its charac-
teristicof logical constraint.That is not to say that correlationand
presuppositionbecome relationsemptyof all meaning.Greimaschar-
acterizes,and justly so, the places occupied or attained by the corre-
lated programsas "heterotopic spaceswhose deixes are disjoined, because
theydo not belong to the same schemata,but conformal, since theyare
linked by the relation of presupposition" (177). When correlation
moves away from strong contrariety,conformitymoves away from
strongpresupposition(or implication).Must one not now say thatthe
hypotacticaxes (non-d2--d and non-d1---d2),the functioningof
whichfromthe beginningseems to have constitutedthe criticalpoint
of thisentirelogical system,have only a narrativecontent,insofaras,
lackingcategoricalunity(as in thecase of the polar termsblack/white),
it is the unityof plotwhichensures the "conformity of the heterotopic
spaces"? To what do they conform? They conform to what Aristotle
calls the dianoia,correlativeto the mythos of narrative.In this vein,
Northrop Frye remarksthat the typologyof mythos is systematically
coupled with a of
typology dianoia. It is the of
history culture which
engenders the schematization of this dianoia and these mythoi, which
are the matrixof the weak logical operations and relations.
This conclusion should not be surprisingif it is true thatthe topo-
logical syntaxof the transfers, whichfunctionsin conjunctionwiththe
trajectory of the logical operationsof the semioticsquare, "organizes
narrationas a process creatingvalues" (178). How can this redupli-
cation account forthe passage fromthe syntacticoperations,whichin
the taxonomicframeworkwere "predictableand calculable" (166), to
"process creating values"? Of necessity,logicitymust somehow be
inadequate in relationshipto creativity, whichcharacterizesnarrative.
This gap becomes obvious at the level of transfer,insofaras correla-
tionand presuppositionmove awayfromthe stronglogical model and
express the dissymmetry of deprivationand attributionand the new-
nessproper to attribution.The natureof newnesslinkedto attribution
is more evidentwhen being able to, knowinghow to, and wantingto
do-that is to say, the actual virtualityof the doing-is granted the
subject.The word "institution"-inthe expression "institutionof the
syntacticoperators"-is not too strongto express the newnessin "the
contractinstituting the subjectof desire throughthe attributionof the

modality wanting.. ." (179).
of
This gap between the initialschema, where all the relationscom-
pensate forone another,and the finalschema, where new values are
produced, is masked by the particularcase of Propp's Russian folk-
tales,wherethe circulationof values ends up restoringthe initialstate.
The king's daughter, carried off by the villain who transfersher
elsewhere to hide her, is found by the hero and broughtback to her
parents! In Structural Semantics, Greimashimselfadmitsthatthe most
general functionof narrativeis to reestablishan order of threatened
values. Now we know,thanksto the schematizationof plots produced
by the cultureswe have inherited,that this restorationcharacterizes
only one categoryof narratives,and even probablyof folktales.Di-
verse are the waysin whichplot articulates"crises"and "conclusion"!
And diverse are the waysin whichthe hero (or antihero)is modified
in the course of the intrigue!Is iteven certainthateverynarrativecan
be projected onto this teleological matrix,having two programs, a
polemical relation and a transferof values? Although this method-
ological a priorican help the reader respect the textand discover its
hidden articulations,it also risks becoming the Procrustean bed on
which the textis racked.
3. There remainsthe question of confidence:are the conditionsof
narrativity complete,once the syntacticoperatorsare institutedand the
topologicalsyntax the modal values added to those of the objective
of
values? That the terminalmodel constitutesthe most rigorous ap-
proximationof the narrativestructurepermittedby the method is
undeniable. But how far is thisapproximationfromwhat constitutes
narrativeproper, thatis to say, fromplot?
With exemplarylucidity,the author himselfsuggestsat the end of
his essay thathe has sketchedout the main pointof "onlypart" of the
superficialnarrativesyntax,that is to say, the part "dealing withthe
body proper of narrative.""What is missingin thissketch,"he says,"is
the examination and the establishmentof the syntacticunits which
frame narrative,and which correspond to the initial and final se-
quences of the manifestnarrative"(181). Now, are these sequences
not as essential to plot as opening and closing? It is true that the
superficialgrammar has the potentialto describe its own inadequa-
cies. We already alluded to the contractby which the firstactant is
institutedinto a subject of desire. We can add that "the opening of
narrativewould be representedas the establishmentof a conjunctive
contractualrelationbetweena sender and a receiversubject,followed
by a spatial disjunctionbetween the two actants.The closingof narra-
tivewould be marked,on the contrary,by a spatial conjunctionand a
last transferof values, institutinga new contractby means of a new

distributionof values, whichcan be eitherobjectiveor modal" (181-
82). Why then have these characteristicsnot been incorporated into
the surface grammar and why are they attributedto a lack in the
sketch?The authorcircumscribesthe difficulty when he observesthat
these framingsequences correspond to "what are, at the level of the
deep grammar,the hypotacticrelationsof the taxonomicmodel, that
is to say, to the relationswhich can be establishedin the model be-
tween the terms sI and non-s2 on the one hand, and between the
termsS2 and non-sl on the other" (181). Now, what are these hypo-
tacticrelations,if not relationsof presuppositionwhose weak logical-
itywas demonstratedeverytime the relationof contrarietycomplet-
ing the relationof contradictionin thesemioticsquare was weakened?
Does the criticalpoint revealed by the incompletenessof the sketch
not correspond to the criticalpoint in the logical structureof the
sketchitself?.
This technicaldiscussionshowshow difficultitis,on the basis of the
"predictableand calculable" (166) syntacticoperations,to derive the
topologicaloperationsof transferwhich"organize narrationas a pro-
cess creating values" (178). The fundamental question raised by
Greimas'sattemptis relatedto the natureof the generation,fromone
deep level of the semioticmodel to another. Does the stratification
into levels of depth functionas the extensioninto each new stage of
the initialvirtuesof the taxonomicmodel? Or, on the contrary,does
the introduction,at each level, of new semantico-syntactic compo-
nents(anthropomorphicrepresentation,additionof figurativity) con-
ferrichnessto the apparatus? In an "Interview"publishedby Fr6d6ric
Nef, Greimas admits that "a theoreticalapparatus, no matter how
satisfactory it seems at first,could easily remain hypotheticalas long
as the problemof equivalences betweenvarious levels of depth has not
been clearlyposited,as long as the proceduresof conversion fromone
level to another have not been elaborated" (24). To raise the question
in somewhatdifferentterms,one mustask how the paradigmaticand
the syntagmaticare equated in Greimas'smodel. The author's inten-
tion is never in doubt: to find for each new syntagmaticaddition a
paradigmaticequivalent, that is to say, to extend the "squaring" of
everyprocess. In thissame interviewGreimas declares: "If one now
considers narrativefromits syntagmaticperspectivewhere each nar-
rativeprogram appears as a process made up of the acquisitionand
loss of values, of the enrichmentand the impoverishmentof subjects,
then one noticesthateach step forwardon the syntagmaticaxis cor-
responds to (and is defined by) a topological displacement on the
paradigmaticaxis" (25). But if,as we attemptedto demonstrate,it is
true that a syntagmaticnewness appeared at each level, under the

pressure firstof all of a semanticsof action,then of praxico-pathetic
categories of polemics and exchange, then the innovativepower is
situated in these praxico-patheticinvestmentsand not in the initial
taxonomicmodel. The authoralmostadmitsas much in the verysame
interview:"However it is only a question there of a manipulatory
syntax,throughuse of disjunctionsand conjunctions,of utterancesof
statewhich only give a staticrepresentationof a series of narrative
states of the narrative.Just as the taxonomic square must not be
considered simplyas a place where logical operations happen, the
series of utterancesof stateare organized and manipulated by utter-
ances of doing and by the transformingsubjectswhich are inscribed
there" (26).
Greimas's topological preoccupations can be seen as an ultimate
attemptto extend the paradigmaticas faras possible into the heartof
the syntagmatic.Nowhere else does the author feel thathe is closer to
realizing the dream of making linguisticsan algebra of language:
"The figurativecirculationcan thusbe considered as the resultof the
conversionof communications,taking place according to a predict-
able order, value objects passing fromone subject to another, com-
munications that can be represented as disjunctionsand conjunc-
tions"(25). Thus the topologicaltrajectorysimplyexplicatesthe prin-
ciple of the polemical structureof narrativediscourse. Greimas can
then declare that "each step forwardon the syntagmaticaxis corre-
sponds to (and is defined by) a displacement on the paradigmatic
axis" (25). But, once again, should the prioritiesnot be switched
about? In the same way thatthe syntactictransformations are linked
to the morphologicalrelationsand the polemicalstructuresare linked
to the syntactictransformations, should it not be admitted that the
topological displacements in turn are linked to the simple represen-
tationof the statesat the extremitiesof the paradigmaticaxes?
In conclusion,Greimas's model seems to be bound by a dual con-
straint,on the one hand logical, and on the other praxico-pathetic.
But itcan satisfythe former,thatof the inscriptionof the components
of narrativityintroduced at each new level and pushed on to the
followingone, only if together the understanding we have of the
narrativeand of the plot establishesthe necessaryadditions of a de-
cidedlysyntagmaticorder withoutwhichthe taxonomicmodel would
remain inertand sterile.
To recognize the mixed nature of Greimas's model is not at all to
refuteit: on the contrary,it is to clarifythe conditionsof its applica-
tion and to explain to readers of works stemmingfrom this school
why the semiotic square sometimes seems to have a true heuristic
604 NEWLITERARYHISTORY
value, and sometimesto be simpletranscription,

whichcan be more or
less elucidatingbut sometimescorresponds to a more or less forced
understandingof narrativewhichproceeds not according to the log-
ical component,but according to the praxico-patheticcomponent of
the mixed model.
PARIS
(TranslatedbyFrankCollinsand Paul Perron)
NOTES
1 AlgirdasJulien Greimas,"'l1ments d'une grammairenarrative,"in Du sens:Essais

sbniotiques(Paris, 1970), p. 164; hereaftercited in text. Here and elsewhere, unless
otherwisenoted, translationsare myown-Tr.
2 "To do this, one must thinkof semiotic theoryin such a way that between the
fundamentalinstancesab quo, where semanticsubstancetakes on its firstarticulations
and constitutesitssignifying form,and the last instancesad quem,where significationis
manifestedthrough its multiple languages, a vast area must be set up in which a
mediating instanceis establishedwhere semioticstructureshavingan autonomous status
would be situated-the narrativestructurewould be part of these-a place where the
complementaryarticulationsof contentand a sortof grammar,at the same time gen-
eral and fundamental,commandingthe institutionof articulateddiscourseswould be
worked out" (159--60). A year earlier, Greimas wrote: "Perhaps out of a desire for
we can imaginethatthe human mind,in order to achieve the construction
intelligibility,
of cultural objects (literary,mythical,pictorial,etc.) startswith simple elements and
followsa complex course, encounteringon itsway constraintsto whichit mustsubmit,
as well as choices which it can make." See Algirdas Julien Greimas, "Les jeux des
contraintess6miotiques,"in Du sens,p. 135.
3 "In other words: the generationof significationdoes not pass through,firstof all,
the productionof utterancesand theircombinationinto discourse; it is relayed,in its
trajectory,by the narrativestructuresand it is these thatproduce meaningfuldiscourse
articulatedby means of utterances"(161).
4 "The constitutivemodel is, henceforth,only the elementarystructureof significa-
tion utilized,as form,to articulatethe semanticsubstanceof a microuniverse"(161).
5 For the reader of the "16Cmentsd'une grammairenarrative,"the representationof
the semioticsquare in its purelymorphologicalform,thus independent of the opera-
tionswhichintroducethe firstconceptof narrativization, seems transparent.This is not
the case when one attemptsto reconstitutethe stages of the constitutionof the model
by Greimas since Structural Semantics(1966), by takinginto account "Les jeux des con-
traintess6miotiques"(1968). The difficulties overcome,the tracesof whichare more or
less erased in the axiomaticpresentationsof 1968 and 1969, can only be reconstructed
if one compares the Greimassiansquare withits logical and linguisticancestorsand if
one measures the distance separatingit fromitsantecedents.It is firstof all clear that
the semiotic square has nothing in common with Aristotle's,or rather Apuleus's,
square: first,the latteris concerned withpropositions(labeled A, E, I, O), whereas the
level at which Greimas operates is thatof the analysisof significationinto semes-that
is to say,into unitswhichare to lexemes whatdistinctivefeaturesare to phonemes (this
is the main featurelinking"Les jeux des contraintess6miotiques"and the "'lments
d'une grammaire narrative" with StructuralSemantics).Next, the oppositions in
Apuleus's square reston the choice of two pertinentfeaturesof the propositions:the
quality (affirmation-negation),and the quantity (universal-particular).Hence the
meaning given to contradictionas the complete opposition between the universal af-
firmative(I) and the universalnegative(E), and to contrarietyas the partialopposition
between the universal affirmative(I) and the particular negative (0). For Greimas,
contradictionand contrarietyare not distinguishedon thisbasis, since sl, non-sl, s2,
non-s2 as semes are simpleterms. For the same reasons, the semiotic square is not
derived fromBlanche's hexagon. Of course, the latteris concerned not withproposi-
tions,but withpredicatesbelonging to the same categoryof thought;but these pred-
icates are lexicalized terms,whereas for Greimas the basis of the constructionis the
semanticaxis linkingthe semes. As forthe Piaget group, the psychologicalapplication
of Klein's group, the distinctionbetweencontradictionand contrariety, as in Apuleus's
square, is founded on the dual natureof theopposed terms(black square, whitesquare,
black circle,whitecircle). Contradictionis thereforea totalinversion(black square vs.
whitecircle,black circlevs. whitesquare) and inversion(black square vs. whitecircle,
black circle vs. white square) and contrarietyis a partial opposition (black square vs.
whitesquare, etc.). From two thingsone can thusderive the relation:AB, AB, AB, AB.
In spite of the fact that Piaget's group operates with lexicallyperceived objects, its
double termsdo correspondto Greimas'ssemicopposition.(For a furtherdevelopment
of this, see Structures de la signification,
elfmentaires ed. Fr6d6ric Nef et al. [Brussels,
1976], esp. pp. 9-17, 20-21, 28-33, 49-55.) The true filiationof the semioticsquare
mustbe sought elsewhere.One mustbegin withSaussure's thesisthata sign is defined
by its differencewith other signs in the same system; but one must abandon the
Saussurean level of sign for thatof seme. Here one encountersthe linguistBrondal's
epistemology,the role of opposition in Lvi-Strauss's theoryof myth,and especially-
this is the decisive stage-binary oppositionsapplied on the phonological level by Ja-
kobson to distinctivefeatures,thus to unitsof the subphonematiclevel. But it is also in
restoringthisfiliationthatthe difficulties adumbratedbyGreimas'sdidacticexpositions
appear. In particular,it is verydifficultto make contrarietyand contradictionaccord-
ing to Greimas correspond to one or other ofJakobson'sbinaryoppositions,in partic-
ular those referredto byGreimasin "La mythologiecompar6e," in Du sens,p. 129: that
is to say, a vs. non-a (marked vs. nonmarked),and a vs. -a, where -a is the negation
of a. The equivalences,or ratherthe comparisons,proposed by Nef between Greimas
and Jakobson are, in turn,far fromconvincing;see Fr6d6ric Nef, "Pr6sentation,"in
Structuresftlmentaires, p. 15. On this point the interviewwithGreimas throwsno new
light; see Fr6d6ricNef, "Entretienavec A. J. Greimas,"in Structures p. 21,
Mldmentaires,
hereaftercited in text. In fact what does contrarietybetween sl and s2 mean? It
opposes twoequally positivesemes,in whichone is the contraryof the otheronlyif one
can oppose them as poles, as the extremesof a graded series, consequentlyas polar
qualities of the same category (of the type high vs. low, white vs. black). Will the
rigorousconditionsof thispolar opposition betweensemes always be respected in the
course of the successiveinvestmentsof the constitutivemodel?
6 In "Les jeux des contraintess6miotiques,"the distinctionbetween relations and
operations,thus betweenmorphologyand syntax,is not worked out: thus the name of
operationsis oftengivento relations,and the relationsof contrarietyand contradiction
are immediatelylabeled disjunctionand conjunction(137). This is no longer the case in
"'lments d'une grammairenarrative."Rigor now demands that morphologybe the
domain of relationsof contrariety,contradiction,and homology,as well as of the no-
tion of contrary,contradictory, and homologous terms. It is onlyon the syntacticallevel
thatone can speak about the operations of negation/assertion (manifestingthe contrary
termsof the axis), of negation/assertion (manifestingthe contradictoryterms on the
schemata),of implication/presupposition (manifestingthe homologous terms on the
deixis). For further discussion see Georges Combet, "Complexification et carr6
performatoire,"in Structures ilmentaires,pp. 68-69.
606 NEWLITERARY
HISTORY
7 I will not raise again the issue thatsemioticsand linguisticsare in a relationshipof

reciprocity.Greimas is correct to say that his semioticsis based on a "fundamental
semanticswhichis differentfromthe semanticsof manifestationin linguistics"(160). It
nonethelessremainstruethatitis withinthe latterthatitis effectively constructed.And
Greimas characterizesas "universalsof language" (162) the categories necessary to
formalizethe elementarystructureof signification.Here linguisticsis the paradigm of
semiotics.
8 The postulation of this homology is characteristicof structuralism,as Roland
Barthes clearlysays in his "IntroductionAl'analyse structuraledes r6cits,"Communica-
tions,8 (1966), 3-4, reproduced in Roland Barthes et al., Poetiquedu ricit(Paris, 1977),
pp. 10-13.
9 One should remark Greimas's hesitationconcerning the relation of implication:
"If the existenceof thistypeof relationseems undeniable, the problem of its orienta-
tion (sl--non-s2 or non-s2--*sl)is not yetsettled.We willnot raise the issue here since
its solution is not necessary for the rest of the demonstration";see "Les jeux des
contraintes,"p. 37, n. 1. Cf.on thispoint"Pr6sentation,"in Nef,p. 15; and Combet,pp.
68-69.
10 In the "Entretienavec A. J. Greimas," it seems that in the eyes of the author
himselfthe operations must be stressedratherthan the relations,or the relationsin
terms of the operations: "In relationshipto the 'Contraintes,'which only raises the
problem of the narrativestates,the 'Ilements' attemptto make explicitthe operations
giving rise to narrativizations"(22). Consequently,in the syntacticinterpretationthe
dominant question remains that of "representinghow significationis producedby a
series of operationscreatingdifferentiatedpositions"(22). Hence the phenomenon of
narrativizationcan be conceived as "a series of logicallyoriented operations taking
place withinthe frameworkanticipatedby the semioticsquare" (22).
11 Again, the criticalpoint remains (cf. above, n. 9) thatof the relation of presup-
position: "the operation of contradictionwhich,in negating,forexample, the terms l,
posits at the same time the term non-sl, must be followed by a new operation of
presuppositiongivingrise and conjoiningto the term non-sl the new terms2" (165).
Can the operation be at the same time "predictable,"thus "calculable," (166) and
"new"?
12 The commentatorsin Fr6d6ricNef's work suggestthatby thus puttingthe main
accent on the operationsof transformation, Greimas in a way increases the initialgap
betweenlogical oppositionand semioticsquare. Thus, Alain de Lib(ra, "La semiotique
d'Aristote,"in Structures p. 41, begins by statingthatApuleus's square was
Mlfmentaires,
already more than a simple pedagogical device insofar as it engendered a series of
permittedoperations (concerningthe contradictioncouples: who refutesE proves I,
etc.; the contraries:who proves A, destroysE, but who destroysA does not prove E,
etc.); but he does so only in order to deny that the Apulean square is in any way
productive (41). Going further,the commentatordenies that thought founded on
disjunctioncan have the virtueof a foundinga priori: "Disjunction,"he says, "is the
stabilizingoperator of formsnecessaryforany ontologyand for any idealist thought"
(47); "logical disjunctionborne by the verb to be is the inaugural exteriorwhich re-
presses all dialectic"(48). Turning one's back to Aristotlemustone now turnto Hegel
to give meaning to a productiveopposition? This is suggested by de Libtra when he
compares Jakobson and Greimas. It is said that one must radically distinguishthe
logical square fromthe semioticsquare: "There is not (in fact)contradictionin inscrib-
ing at the same timesl and -s1. They are not on the same level. S1 is a term(seme), -sl
is an operation on the term(sl), or again: the illocutionarynegationof thisterm"(53).
A littlefurtheron: "In factwithGreimas (as withLUvi-Strauss)contradictionmust be
understoodin theHegeliansense" (53). FollowingUtaker,Alain de Lib(ra, in "Note sur
'On binaryopposition' de Arild Utaker,"in Structures p. 55, interpretsthe
ilimentaires,
semioticsquare as the dual interactionof the qualitativeopposition and the privative
opposition: "One can thus consider the logical square as a logical apparatus which
produces privativeoppositions startingwithqualitativeoppositions. The productivity
of the square makes it an open model, a generativestructure:all complex or neutral
termsof any square can be taken at anotherlevel as the simple termgeneratinga new
semiotic square. Here is where its applicabilityresides: myths,tales, etc., and in a
general way,everydomain where an oppositionis 'negated' bythe productionof a new
opposition which at the same time seems to reproduce and not to reproduce the
original"(55). In the same vein, Nef's workcontainsvarious attemptsto engender one
semiotic square from another one and thus to complexifythe model by a chain of
"squarifications"(see Combet, in Nef, pp. 67-72). In the "Entretien,"Greimas shows
interestin this attemptwhich accentuatesthe logical and deductive aspects of semiol-
ogy; see Nef, "Entretien,"pp. 22-24. But is this logic Aristotelian,Hegelian, or ...
other?
13 AnthonyKenny,Action,Emotionand Will (London, 1963). On the analyticalphi-
losophy of action, see Paul Ricoeur, Simantiquede l'action(Paris, 1977), pp. 3-137.
14 Greimas proposes the followingexample of a wantingwhichwould be anthropo-
morphicwithoutbeing figurative:"thisrule requires that .. ." (168). The example, it
seems to me, is not valid, since the rule cannot preciselyfunctionas the virtualsubject
of a possible action. The obligationby the rule is of another statusthan wantingis.
15 The paralogism is the following:"narrativeutterancesare syntacticutterances,
thatis to say independent of contentwhichcan be investedby such and such a doing"
(168). To substitutedoing for all action verbsis not to transformthem into a syntactic
doing.
16 This could have been foreseen: already at the deep level, virtualnarrativization
consisted in the factthat the dynamicrepresentationof the semioticsquare was con-
sidered as "a bringingtogetheror as the productionof meaning by the subject" (164).
17 See ArthurDanto, Analytical Philosophy ofAction(Cambridge, 1973).
18 The resultis "the constructionof a particularnarrativeunit,performance:due to
the factthatit constitutesthe operative schema of the transformation of contents,it is
probablythe most characteristicunit of narrativesyntax"(173).
19 See Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft,5th ed. (Tiibingen, 1972).
20 See Weber, "Begriffdes Kampfes,"in Wirtschaft pp. 20-21.
und Gesellschaft,
21 In the "Entretien,"Greimas insiststhatthe polemic structureof narrativeis what
permitsthe unravelingof the initialparadigmatic articulationof the taxonomic model
into the entiresyntagmatic unfoldingof the narrative(25). By opposing an antisubjectto
a subject,an antiprogramto a program,by even multiplyingactantial squares by di-
vidingeveryactantintoactant,negactant,anatactant,negantactant.The polemic struc-
ture ensures the infiltration of the paradigmaticorder into all syntagmaticorder: "It is
not surprisingthen that the analysis of even slightlycomplex texts necessitatesthe
multiplicationof the actantialpositionsand so reveals, besides its syntagmaticunrav-
eling, the paradigmaticarticulationof narrativity"(24). But one can also say the in-
verse: It is because somethinghappens of a conflictualnaturebetweentwosubjectsthat
one can project it onto the square. And this projectionis in turn possible because the
square itselfhas been treated"as the place wherethe logical operationsare carriedout"
(26), in short it has been narrativized beforehand. The entire progress of
"squarification"fromlevel to level can appear in turn as the progressionof the para-
digm to the heartof the syntagmatic, or as the addition of new syntagmaticdimensions
(quest, struggle,etc.) secretlyfinalizedby the dual paradigmaticand syntagmaticstruc-
ture of the finishednarrative.
22 "That is, a syntaxof operators must be constructedindependentlyfrom a syntaxof
operations:a metasemioticlevel must be worked out in order to justifythe transferof

values" (178).
23 Claude Br6mond,Logiquedu ricit(Paris, 1973).
24 Is it for this reason that the author writesthat "a metasemioticlevel must be
worked out in order to justifythe transferof values"? (see n. 23 above).
25 The reader can here formulatea doubt whichis the opposite of the one raised by
the interpretationof the polemic category.The latterwas explicitlysuperimposed on
the relationof contradiction,but also seemed to permitan anthropomorphicinterpre-
tationof contrariety.On theotherhand, topologicalsyntax,afterhavingbeen explicitly
related to the correlationbetween schemata, and thus to contrariety(176), is then
superimposedonto contradiction,whichopposes the twosubjectss 1 and s2 foreseenby
the constructionof the performance:"Consequently,it is the axis of exchange between
these two subjects which constitutesthe place of transferof the modal values; the
attributionof any modal value to sl presupposes thats2 is at the same time deprived
of thatvalue" (180).

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WHAT IS INTERESTING grammaris

grammar, where a polemicalfactor is introduced which shapes the

I. At the Fundamental Grammar Level: The FirstStage

We have to rememberthe requirementsmade of the initialmodel:

Thus the initialmodel mustfromthe outset presentan articulated

whichwillunderlieall subsequentdevelopmentsof the model, thatis,

Before moving from the deep grammar to the surface narrative

This objection is not inconsequentialas far as narrativityis con-

clear: the threerelationsof contradictions,contraries,and presuppo-

tionsand transformations, but on the factthatthe constitutivemodel

operations in turn become conditions for narrativityonly retro-

II. From the Fundamental Grammarto the Surface

The decisive grammaticalshift is that which takes us from the

followingtype a program: (1) "X wants Y to do... ." Greimas next

Discussion of the second segmentof the semioticreconstructionof

It is this semanticsof action which in fact is presupposed in the

and theobject]legitimizes, in turn,a semanticinterpretation of them

introduced. Only this relation can give rise to series admittingof

III. FromtheNarrative to theNarrative

tationpar excellence. Nonetheless,it is the successionof transforma-

1. This discussion will not dwell on the general relationshipbe-

fromthe narrativeutterance,all of thesemanticsof action,whetherat

(b) This attenuationis particularlynecessarywhen the author tries

polemic factor.However, performancestilldoes not go beyond the

IV. The Last Stage: The PerformanceSeries

ferredby doing, then the topological syntaxenables us to represent

1. The last stage of the completedconstituentmodel enables us to

siders,as was so wellshownbyClaude Bremond in Logiquedu recit,the

bears the entirelogicalweightof the topologicalapparatus. Two sche-

contractinstituting the subjectof desire throughthe attributionof the

last transferof values, institutinga new contractby means of a new

true that a syntagmaticnewness appeared at each level, under the

value, and sometimesto be simpletranscription,

1 AlgirdasJulien Greimas,"'l1ments d'une grammairenarrative,"in Du sens:Essais

7 I will not raise again the issue thatsemioticsand linguisticsare in a relationshipof

operations:a metasemioticlevel must be worked out in order to justifythe transferof

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Greimas's Narrative Grammar - Paul Ricoeur

Greimas's Narrative Grammar - Paul Ricoeur