Husserl Stud (2013) 29:143162

DOI 10.1007/s10743-012-9117-2

The Many Senses of Imagination and the Manifestation

of Fiction: A View from Husserls Phenomenology
of Phantasy

Javier Enrique Carreno Cobos

Published online: 20 November 2012

 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012

Abstract The systematic importance of the eidetic account of phantasy for

Husserlian phenomenology in general is undisputed, but whether this account can be
relevant for Aesthetics has often been put into question. In this paper I argue that
Husserls rich phenomenology of phantasy, and in particular his account of per-
ceptual phantasy, can nevertheless significantly enhance our understanding of how
we recognize and imaginatively participate in artistic fictions. Moreover, I show
how Husserls peculiar formulation of a non-intuitive phantasy at stake in artistic
representation anticipates some uses of the imagination in Aesthetics suggested by
Ernst Gombrich and Kendall Walton.

It is with great ease that we put into words the things we imagine, but we struggle to
find the right words for speaking philosophically about the imagination. Aristotle
was perhaps the first one in our tradition to have encountered this difficulty. A lucid
and straightforward thinker, his exposition of the imagination in De anima Book III
remains admittedly obscure. As is well known, the cornerstone of Aristotles
treatment is the distinction between sensation and imaginationevinced, for
instance, in the fact that while we sleep our sensations are suppressed, yet we dream
thanks to the unconscious movement of the imagination. But no sooner is this
distinction formulated than Aristotle is compelled to acknowledge their simulta-
neity, reciprocity, and functional interdependence, casting doubt upon this
differentiation.1 Even Aristotles crucial definition of the imaginationin a
1
Aristotle claims, for example, that there is no imagination without sensation, and that when sensation is
present, imagination, too, is present. The simultaneity of sensation and imagination may imply that the
imagination operates in sensation to such an extent that without this interpretative work all that is left to
sensation is merely a passive affection (Turnbull 1994; Ross 1923).

J. E. Carreno Cobos (&)

Austrian Program, Franciscan University of Steubenville, Kartause 1, 3292 Gaming, Austria
e-mail: javier.e.carreno@gmail.com

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non-metaphoric sense as that in virtue of which an image is formed in us, a power or

habit by which we discriminate truly or falselywill often be found translated as a
question (Sachs 2001, p. 135).
Part of the difficulty in speaking about the imagination is that talk of images
arising in us is already metaphorical and borrows from the language of another
experience. In this regard, perhaps no one more than Edmund Husserl has made us
attentive to the limitations of these metaphors and borrowings. For despite their
affinities, to imagine a centaur is not quite like stepping into a room with a statue of
a centaur in its midst (Hua XIX/1, p. 437). How the centaur appears in
imaginationsometimes vividly, sometimes with wholly unsaturated colors,
sometimes as if hidden by a veil, then as if breaking through the hazehardly
compares to how things normally appear in my perceptual field of regard
(Hua XXIII, p. 58/63). To speak of an image being formed in us is not to give a
precise description but only to give a name to the mystery of imagination.
But perhaps the demand for a concrete, eidetic or essential, description of the
imagination misses the point and asks too much of the phenomenon. Franz
Brentano, who for a time was intensely occupied with describing the imagination
and its relation to perceptual presentations,2 concluded that the borderlines of the
imagination are blurred (Brentano 1959, pp. 8687). For Brentano, one will for the
most part distinguish between a jazz trumpet solo playing live and simply imagining
the solo on a different occasion. The imaginative presentation, albeit having an
intuitive core, will nevertheless operate much like a conceptual presentation, since I
am not actually hearing that solo, but rather, it comes to mind (Claesen 1996).
However, if my imagination becomes too potent and my alertness decreases,
according to Brentano, I could take it that I am actually listening to that trumpet
solo. Hence, for Brentano, there is no theory of the imagination, and none would
really be needed, except perhaps for discussions in Aesthetics. The mystery of the
imagination thus becomes a mundane and circumstantial matter, what Jean-Paul
Sartre would call an accidental characteristic of consciousness (Sartre 1940,
pp. 188, 357): the empirical having of phantasms that in themselves count neither as
genuine intuitions nor as pure concepts.
Husserl, however, cannot acquiesce to Brentanos diagnosis, and this not just out
of the scholarly desire to improve on his revered master. Without clarity on the life
of imagination, the phenomenological accounts of perception and of categorial acts
of thoughtthemselves essential points for a critique of knowledgeremain
incomplete. Moreover, without a proper differentiation of the imagination, the
claims of phenomenology as the eidetic science of transcendentally reduced
phenomena become tentative. Whereas other eidetic researchers like the geometer
and the mathematician rest content with using merely imagined figures or models,
the phenomenologist cannot avoid the task of showing that the imagination indeed

2
As Husserl himself tells us, the first suggestions to occupy myself with these problems [sc. concerning
perception, sensation, imaginative presentation, image presentation, remembrance] I owe to my genial
professor Brentano, who already in the middle of the 1980s at the Viennese University gave an
unforgettable seminar on Selected Psychological and Aesthetic Questions and in which (running weekly
for 2 h) he toiled nearly exhaustively with the analytical clarification of imaginative presentations in
comparison with perceptual presentations (Hua XXXVIII, p. 4; my translation).

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makes possible a perfect seizing upon essences and that the findings in imagination
are indeed legitimate even for a phenomenology of perception. In other words, for
the phenomenologist it is a basic task to show that to every possible perceptual
intuition corresponds a possible imaginative presentation of the same object (Hua
XXIII, pp. 1/1, 15/16; Jansen 2005).
But perhaps we have not yet understood Husserls deepest reason for searching
so restlessly after the imagination. For Husserl earnestly believes that without
clarity on the essentialsthat is, without the ability to look actually into the
Promised Land, on my own and with clear eyes (Husserl 1956, p. 297/324)his
life is not worth living. The eidetic account of imagination is part and parcel of that
Promised Land. But given that the imagination is also the main source for acquiring
eidetic insightsand that fiction is the living essence of phenomenology (Hua
III/1, p. 148/160)one may say that the imagination actually brings the
phenomenologist closest to that Promised Land.
In light of these concerns, and thanks to the posthumous edition and translation of
the relevant materials, Husserls phenomenology of imagination is finally receiving
its due in recent scholarship and has given rise to important critical studies (Bernet
2004; Dubosson 2004; Richir 2000). However, whether a descriptive theory of
imagination such as Husserls carries weight for discussions in Aesthetics (as
Brentano, before Husserl, supposed such a theory would) still remains a point of
contention.3 In this paper I will argue that Husserls rich phenomenology of
phantasy, and in particular his account of perceptual phantasy, can significantly
enhance our understanding of how we recognize and imaginatively participate in
artistic fictions.

1 Imagination in the Sense of Image Consciousness

Probably no other phenomenologist in the wake of Husserl has been more insistent
than Sartre in stressing that phenomenology is not only capable of bringing about a
new conception of the image, but in fact demands it (Sartre 1940, p. 144/131).
Husserl sees consciousness as an irreducible fact which no physical image can
account for (Sartre 1947, p. 32/258). The converse, however, is also true: how a
physical image is an image of something is a matter that conscious intentionality
has to account for.
But first, what is intentionality, this irreducible fact? The rubric names the
wonder that consciousness is consciousness of somethingin Brentanos words,
3
On one side of the spectrum we have Jansens minimalistic thesis that whoever looks for aesthetic
insights in Husserls texts will be sorely disappointed: The crucial question is how what we see in
phantasy applies to our experience in general and thus can be more than a mere construction of the mind.
In this sense, we might want to state the obvious and say that Husserl is more a geometrician than an
artist (Jansen 2005, pp. 236237). On the other side of the spectrum we have the maximalistic thesis
of Nuki, who claims that Husserls comments on the theater alone do justice to the twentieth-century
invention of post-dramatic theatera form of theater that Husserl, in all likelihood, did not anticipate
(Nuki 2010). More towards the center, and closer to our own position, is Pierre Rodrigos claim that there
is an important, albeit implicit, debate between Husserls and Sartres approaches to the aesthetic
phenomenon of the theater given their diverging conceptions of the imagination (Rodrigo 2009).

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that in a presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or

denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired, and so on (Brentano 2008,
p. 88/106). The fact that in a presentation something is presented does not mean,
however, that there are two things present in experience: for
we do not experience the object and beside it the intentional experience
directed upon it, there are not even two things present in the sense of a part and
a whole which contains it: only one thing is present, the intentional
experience, whose essential descriptive character is the intention in question
(Hua XIX/1, p. 386/98).
The object of consciousness is not the content of the said consciousness in the sense
that the intentional object is not a real component of this consciousness. The tree I
perceive is nothing entrapped by consciousness but precisely something transcen-
dent. And yet, it is this transcendent object and not some sort of immanent
contenta little mental tree, as it werethat is intended by consciousness.
Whatever the constituents of the perception, these constituents are not intended by
that consciousness but merely provide the points dappuis for conscious activity: I
do not see colour-sensations but coloured things, I do not hear tone-sensations but a
singers song (Hua XIX/1, p. 387/99).
Thus Husserl surmounts the temptation to turn consciousness into the proverbial
storage room where the forms of things can dwell in the mind. From a
phenomenological standpoint, just as appearances are neither things nor parts of
things, so also consciousness itself is neither a thing nor an appendage to a natural
object. Consciousness can neither envelop nor surround things. It has no inside
pockets, no inner spaces; it is no kind of container of things or of forms of
things, and to claim that it is engenders myriad difficulties.
One of these difficulties can be of interest to us. Husserl claims that to account
for our awareness of an object in terms of the presence of an image abiding in the
mind and resembling an extra-mental object is futile. One shortcoming is that talk of
resemblance between two things supposes that I have or can have an original access
to these things independently, whereas this is precisely what is denied if I suppose
that my awareness of something perceptual is inevitably mediated by an image.
Another, and for us more important, obstacle is that talk of resemblance alone
cannot make one object into the image of another. A twin may look exactly like her
twin, but we do not say that she is an image of her twin. This point is far from
trivial, since it proves that an image is neither a thing nor a property of a thing, and
it is not in the intrinsic character of anything to be an image. To be an image is
rather a modifying predicate, the constitutive accomplishment of an intentional
consciousness whose inner character not only constitutes the appearance of an
image but also constitutes it as the image of this object (Hua XIX/1, p. 436/125).
Husserls claim may initially be met with a certain resistance. In his view, a
colored piece of Kodak paper is not an image of anything until it functions in
such a way that one becomes aware of something absent but depicted in it. Without
such a depictive function, there is nothing left to the image: the residue is just a
thing, a piece of paper. To be sure, in arguing thus Husserl does not have to deny
that some pieces of paper will not function as images regardless of what the viewer

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tries to see in them. Nor does he have to deny that certain objects are furnished with
the intention of serving as images. All that Husserl needs to affirm is that images
encountered in the course of perceptual life are inextricably interwoven with a
specific form of intentionality, called perceptual depictive image-consciousness.
Before we say more about the latter, let us note that Husserls main motivation
for addressing images is not really to confirm that an image is a form of intentional
consciousness. Rather, what compels him to account for images in greater detail is
the increasing need in the course of his thought to do justice to the manifold ways in
which we become intuitively conscious of something absentfor example, in
recollection, expectation, and in pure imagination. How can something absent
nevertheless be genuinely and intuitively given to consciousnessas intuitively as
something perceivedand yet not pass for something actually perceived? For to say
that the imagination gives its object genuinely and intuitively means precisely that
the imagination does not merely intend its object emptily or conceptually. The
imagination already has the positive moment of fullness. As Husserl writes in the
Logische Untersuchungen,
however far an imaginative presentation may lag behind its object, it has many
features in common with it, more than that, it is like this object, depicts it,
makes it really present to us (Hua XIX/2, p. 607/233234).
Why then do I not take what is genuinely and intuitively given to me in
imagination as actually present? Husserl thinks that in order to answer this question
we must first sort out why I do not take what is genuinely and intuitively given to
me in a picture as actually present. And the reason for this manner of proceeding
seems to be that, between imagining a centaur and stepping into a room with a
statue of a centaur in the midst of it, in the latter case I am arguably closer to taking
the centaur for something actually present itself. After all, the sculpted centaur
appears in the midst of the perceptual field and is given to consciousness with the
force of something perceived. One could also conceive of certain circumstances that
would push the appearance of a centaur in image into that grey zone where I do not
know if what I have before me is an actual centaur. Thus, it would seem that if one
can account for the absence of the depicted centaur which appears in the midst of
our perceptual field of regard, one could also account for the absence of what is
recollected or merely imagined, whose appearance is not entangled with a present
perception. This is also why Husserl does not give equal consideration to the many
different kinds of images, but mainly focuses on realistic depictions, since such
images arguably push image consciousness to the boundary it shares with illusory
perception. And it bears remembering that Husserl is really interested in
establishing the limits between perception and imagination with a view to a
critique of knowledge.4
In order to spell out the eidetic structure of image consciousness, we must discern
three different moments in the constitution of the image. A first distinction obtains

4
I suggest that we take these points into account because critics of Husserlian image consciousness such
as Lotz (2007) have, perhaps prematurely, condemned his focus on depiction while failing to do justice to
Husserls stakes in inaugurating a phenomenology of image consciousness.

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between the physical image-thing, or Bilddingfor example, the poplar panel

hanging on a wall in the Louvreand the image (Bild) of, e.g., Mona Lisa. Patently,
we appreciate not just stained canvases with blotches but rather the images
supported by these components. However, a typical depiction affords yet a further
distinction between the image-object or Bildobjekt, and the depicted subject, the
Sujet or Bildsujetthat of which an image is an image. Already here we need to
take stock of the fact that, by entailing as many as three distinct moments, the
appearing of an image is altogether more complicated (Hua XXIII, p. 26/27) than
the straightforward appearing of a thing in the course of perceptual life.
This complexity of images has to do, first and foremost, with our awareness of both
an image and of its subject as distinct from the image. In the language of Husserls
early analysis of presentation as a matter of an apprehension (Auffasung) of
sensuous contents, image consciousness involves a double apprehensionof an
image object and of an image subjectwhereas straightforward perception only
requires a simple apprehension. Indeed, in perception, the intended object is the
perceived object, while in image consciousness the intended object is the depicted
subject, which is nothing perceived (Drummond 2008). The complexity of images is
thus secondly evinced by the distinctive manner in which the Sujet is intended.
Whereas in perceptual experience I may freely intend one or another apprehended
object, as soon as I apprehend an image my intention is immediately directed towards
the depicted subject. As Husserl explains, we see the meant object in the image, or it
is picked out for us from the image intuitively (Hua XXIII, p. 30/31). Thus, when we
contemplate a depiction, there is a sense in which the canvas, brush strokes, and ink
blotches do not quite appear for what they are; instead, we see the image sustained by
these components. Yet in another sense we do not see the image per se. We stand
before the image, but what we see is the Sujet that appears depicted. When
beholding the Mona Lisa, I do not see Leonardos creation on a poplar panel and,
somehow imposed onto it, Gioccondos wife. On the contrary, upon beholding the
painting I already see the Sujet, Mona Lisa, in the image.5
Hence, in contrast to directly perceiving an object, in the appearing of an image
something else is indirectly given. For this reason, to see something in an image is not
a way of perceiving anything whatsoever. And yet, paradoxically, we could not see
anything at all in an image if we were to lose our awareness of its perceptual
contours. Without being conscious of the actual present and of the real components
that anchor the image in an actual location, we could not see an image for what it is,
namely, an unreality or a nothing as far as the actual perceptual world goes. It is thus
that, when facing images, we are aware of a certain incompatibility or conflict between
the reality given in our perceptual field of regard and the unreality of the image in the
midst of that field. We are aware that an image appears where a mere thing should
normally appear, and that the real thing at stake thereinthe Bilddingno longer
appears in its own right, for the sensuous contents of its corresponding perception have
been taken up by an image apprehension. Moreover, we are aware of a second conflict

5
That the image-subject is irreducible to the image-object does not mean, however, that the image-
subject is something altogether separable from the image. The wife of Gioccondo is an other encountered
in actual life, but the Sujet of Leonardos Mona Lisa is a moment of image-consciousness.

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between the images plastic form and the depicted subject, in the sense that they can
resemble and thereby coincide, but only and always to a degree. Were an image to fully
resemble and express its subject perfectly, the beholder could no longer take the
depicted subject as absent. Husserl thus elucidates the complexity of images in yet a
third aspect as the engendering of two mutually irresolvable conflictsbetween the
apprehension of the physical substratum and the image apprehension, on the one hand,
and between the apprehension of a Sujet that is necessarily other than its image.
The claim that our awareness of images is steeped in conflict, and that the
appearance of a subject in image is more conflicted than even an illusory perception,
may initially startle us, yet the situation compares to the engineers claim that the
pediments and the columns of a building, seemingly so still, are bound together in
their permanence by perpetually opposing forces. From Husserls standpoint, the
wonder of an image has less to do with what Ernst Gombrich (1960) calls
Pygmalions dreamthe possibility that we could take the image subject as
actually presentand more with the fact that I cannot keep myself from seeing the
subject in an image. Just as I am not free to see in an image whatever I please but
only what it depicts, so also I am not at liberty to stop seeing in an image what it
depicts. I can, of course, dwell on the appearance per se rather than on what appears
depicted, but I can never come to the point of just seeing the image without seeing
what it depicts. What such unfreedom demonstrates, however, is precisely that a
form of freedomone with effective consequenceshas already been involved
from the start in image consciousness. While an illusory object forces itself upon us
as a real object, an image makes its unreality clear from the start; it is the kind of
phenomenon that can appear only with the willful doubling of consciousness into
image and subject apprehension. In short, an image always needs us as participants
or accomplices in the indirect presentation of something absent. But the deed, once
it is done, cannot be undone.

2 Imagination in the Sense of Pure Reproductive Phantasy

We have mentioned that one of Husserls concerns with the phenomenology of

images is to shed light on the many phenomena in which we are conscious of an
object that is not just absent but appears intuitively as absent. The great temptation,
of course, is to claim that the centaur I imagine appears as absent somewhat
analogously to how, when I step into a room with a statue of a centaur, I intend the
centaur in image. We could also call this the temptation to synthesize the two grand
philosophical traditions concerning the imagination: the Platonic tradition of the
external image or eidxkom, and the Aristotelian tradition of mental images, or
ua9msarlasa.6 Now, even though Husserl is initially much in favor of this synthesis,
already his analysis of image consciousness indicates to him that there is nothing in
the imagination that is even remotely analogous to physical images. Briefly put,

6
Saraiva (1970), working solely on the basis of the texts published by Husserl himself, argued for such
reconciliation. But in light of the posthumously published texts, this thesis can no longer be sustained, as
Dubosson (2004) argues.

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there is no point of comparison between the conditions for speaking about a centaur
appearing in image and the conditions for speaking about the imagining of a
centaur. The incommensurability between imagination and image consciousness,
however, goes deeper still. After all, perception and image consciousness are said to
intuitively give an object by taking actual sensuous contents as points dappuis.
When I hear early in the morning the construction workers excavating the land
behind my back yard to create a road, I acutely experience noise sensations.
Similarly, when I look at a drawing made by my son, I do experience color
sensations. In neither case is my intention directed at these immanent contents but,
in the first case, at the early morning excavation and, in the second, at the drawn
airplane and clouds. But when I imagine the centaur, I do not actually and originally
experience the sound and color sensations corresponding to this imagining. The
phantasms of sounds and colors that are taken up in merely imagining the centaur
are nothing veritably present in experience, and yet imagination steadfastly holds on
to its claim to be an intuitive consciousness (Hua X, pp. 127128/130131).
Evidently, addressing this paradox requires a new analysis (Sokolowski 1974,
57) and therefore also a giving up on our tendency to think of the imagination as a
sort of imaging or picturing. There are no images in imagination. This is why, on
pain of redundancy, we are better off translating Husserls German term Phantasie
into English as phantasy rather than imagination.
What, then, is phantasy? First of all, it is an intentional act of consciousness.
Unlike Aristotle, Husserl cannot speak with evidence about faculties, powers, or
psychic dispositions and their interrelations in the life of an empirical subject.
Within the framework of a critique of knowledge, we can only speak with evidence
of phenomena (Hua XXII, p. 303/259). Second, phantasy is a presentification
(Vergegenwrtigung), by which Husserl means an intuitive act of consciousness
whose object is not given as actually and corporeally present before me. In this
regard a presentification contrasts with perceptionthe latter being the act
privileged with the intuitive givenness of an object as actually present. In this
sense, then, not only phantasy and image consciousness but also recollection,
expectation, co-presentation, and the experience of other minds are presentifica-
tions.7 Third, phantasy is a kind of neutrality modification,
the pure and simple representation of something individual [] in the absence
of the conscious sense of existence (belief) which would posit it as an object of
perception or of memory. One has it in view, but without deciding whether it
is believable, or even without believing it (Hua XXII, p. 304/260).

7
The term Vergegenwrtigung is usually rendered into English as representation or presentification
but neither rendition makes a snug fit. Representation is evidently less awkward than the neologism of
presentification, but it may trigger the wrong sort of associations. For example, representation is
redolent of the Empiricist representative theories of consciousness (such as Humes) which Husserl has
rejected in the Logische Untersuchungen and in Hua X (Text N. 39) and Hua XXIII (Text N. 8).
Representation also brings to mind the paradigm according to which there is nothing in the imagination
that has not been first perceived, whereas Husserls new concept of phantasy precisely breaks free of such
a requirement. A pure phantasy corresponds to a possible pure perception and reproductively entails an
original perception of the object which was never originally lived.

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But this is only half the story of phantasy. The other, and perhaps more important,
half has to do with Husserls developments in the field of time consciousness, and in
particular with the emergence of the concept of an absolute consciousness.
This consciousness is called absolute for at least two reasons. On the one hand,
it is the ultimate ground of all constitution, since it accounts for our awareness of
act-intentionalities and hyletic data as temporal unities in immanent time, whose
correlatesfor instance in the case of perceptual actsare transcendent objectiv-
ities in objective time. On the other hand, through its horizontal intentionality, the
absolute flow of consciousnesswhich is not something temporalis nevertheless
aware of itself and of its phases in the flow (Hua X, pp. 378382/390394).
The fact that Husserls new analysis has to take this ultimate or absolute ground
of conscious life into account should already tell us something about phantasy,
namely, that phantasy is not a mere phenomenon, a mere appearance of something
that just happens to be absent. In fact, phantasy can only be the presentification of
an object because it is also the modification of an internal time-constituting
awareness of an original consciousness that was never originally experienced (Hua
X, pp. 126130/130133; Hua XXIII, pp. 329334/401406). The mere phantasy of
a centaur already involves the deepest ground of consciousness in a unique way.
Hence one might say that although Husserl does not follow Aristotle in taking
phantasy for a faculty or power, he nevertheless does justice to the original
motivation behind these ascriptions, namely, the insight that our phantasies are
not just mere after-effects following upon a corresponding perceptual encounter,
but stem from the innermost depths of conscious life. In fact, Husserls
phenomenological concept of an absolute consciousness clarifies a matter that remained
ambiguous in Aristotle, namely, the fact that phantasy, without including an actual
perception, nevertheless relates to the corresponding perception of the same object.
Traditionally it has been tempting to account for phantasys relation to an
original perception by turning phantasy into the neutrality modification of a
memory, which in turn related to an original perceptual experience. Husserl
successfully resists this temptation because he develops a new analysis of
recollection as the reproduction of an original consciousness that was effectively
lived. When I recollect, e.g., my last visit to Washington, I not only remember the
people I saw then; I also gather my having seen them. Thus we can say that in the
present act of recollecting, I am re-living those past events and displacing myself
into that past. In my present recollection, which intends things past, my own
previous experiencing becomes reproductively nested or entailed, allowing me
not only to re-encounter things past but also to experience my own identity
throughout time. Like a bird, recollection indefatigably soars on these two non-
separable but distinct wings: the awareness of the past and the implication, via
reproduction, of the corresponding earlier effective experience.
Against this backdrop of recollection, Husserl can shed light on the fact that
although phantasy is not a present perceptual experience, it nevertheless reproduc-
tively involves a perception. When I phantasy a centaur I am internally aware of the
corresponding perception of the said centaur, but, in contrast to recollection, not
only in a reproductive way but also as in absolute distance from my actual
consciousness. We understand absolute here in its etymological sense of

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absolvere, namely, as freed or separate. I phantasy a centaurinstead of, e.g.,

recollecting or perceiving itbecause I am internally aware of it as having never
been perceived. The centaur and its corresponding reproduced perception wholly
transcend the sphere of actuality.
In this manner, Husserl steers clear of the following Empiricist dilemma. On the
one hand, it is said that there is nothing in imagination that has not been first in
perception. On the other hand, it is said that sometimes imagination is genuinely
creative, and that we imagine things that we have never seen. The one position as
much as the other, however, presupposes that the imagination operates with actual
sensuous contents and either can or cannot manipulate these sensuous contents. If
Husserl can overcome this dilemma, it is precisely because he no longer
presupposes that phantasy operates with actual sensuous contents. For Husserl,
pure phantasy is a genuinely productive consciousness that is always already related
to a perception of the same object.

3 Imagination in the Sense of Perceptual Phantasy

The beating heart of our examination of Husserls approach to phantasy does not lie
in the description of a pure phantasy consciousness, however, but in the analysis of
what Husserl goes on to call perceptual phantasy (perzeptive Phantasie), and which
he distinguishes from what we have called reproductive phantasy (reproduktive
Phantasie) (Hua XXIII, pp. 476/565). One reason why we should gather what
Husserl has to say regarding perceptual phantasy is that this new concept
incorporates, and yet also goes beyond, the earlier description of depictive image
consciousness in shedding light on our encounters with artworks. For perceptual
phantasy covers the manifold ways in which we can see without believing in what
we seefor example, when we hesitate between two perceptual apprehensions;
when we contemplate an image aesthetically and delight in the image appearing;
when we rejoice or sorrow or express other feelings for what appears in an image;
when we read a novel, and its text reveals for us a fictive world; when we play a
role-playing game or partake in virtual realities.
In order to grasp what occurs in perceptual phantasy, let us return to what
happened in the new analysis of reproductive pure phantasy. We saw previously
how Husserl discovered that there is more to a mere phantasy than just an
appearance of something as absent. Phantasy can only presentify something fictive
because it coincides with the reproduction of the corresponding fictive perception.
Now, perceptual phantasy is also to be understood as the realization that there is
more to image consciousness than the mere intuitive appearance of something
absent or fictive in image. In other words, there is more to our dealing with
physical images than just depiction. For example, the fact that, in contemplating a
beautiful portrait, my interest is not solely or even mainly directed at the depicted
portrait sitter but alsoand, in non-figurative art, even solelydirected to the
image as such, is no longer a matter of depiction. Nevertheless, this contemplation
of the image as such is a matter of phantasy, since I am still dealing with an unreal
object, in the existence of which I do not believe but which nevertheless appears in

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the midst of the perceptual field. In fact, there can be experiences of pictoriality, or
Bildlichkeit, where an image does not at all function in a depictive manner, that is,
according to the concept of Abbildlichkeit.
For Husserl, however, the sort of artistic production that best exemplifies this
notion of perceptual phantasy is not abstract, non-figurative painting but, curiously
again, a highly plastic art: theatrical representation. And it would seem, again,
that a theatrical performance has special affinities with an illusory presentation. Yet
clearly, to characterize a theatrical play as deceitful and illusory would be
premature; a theatrical representation, unlike illusory perception, is or entails an
image. However, Husserls groundbreaking insight here is that one cannot speak of
a theatrical play as a sort of total or environing depiction. In other words, it is not by
apprehending a depicted something at stake in a performance that I refrain from
taking the show as the real thing. For Husserl (unlike Sartre), I am not really aware
of the actor Lawrence Olivier as the analogue of a person of the drama by the name
of Hamlet. Likewise, Shakespeares play does not refer me to what is rotten in the
state of Denmark as, for instance, something absent made present in vignettes, as it
were. For the duration of the play, I perceive Hamlet, Ophelia, and Ellsinore castle.
That is, I perceive them, and yet I do not take these fictive characters, events, and
places as unfolding actually before me. I do not believe in the effective existence of
the theatrical world of fiction, but neither do I experience in the theater much of the
complexity that earlier characterized depictive image-consciousness. In the theater
we are, of course, still dealing with representation and the constitutive accomplish-
ment of image consciousness.8 And yet, phantasy here plays a more exceptional
constitutive role.
On the one hand, phantasy disengages the image from picking out for us a
depicted Sujet. This is not to say that theatrical images are images of nothing at all;
on the contrary, they are representations (Hua XXIII, p. 515/616). However, what
comes to representation in the events unfolding before us is not some absent thing
per se butin the case of tragedy for instancea serious complete action of
universal significance. In the words of Aristotle, not the thing that has happened,
but a kind of thing that might happen (Apostle and Gerson 1991, p. 656).
On the other hand, phantasy also delivers the image from being taken by us as a
perceptual figment, e.g., an illusion la waxworks. As the spectator, I am all along
aware of the unreality of the image (through what Husserl calls a passive
nullification), but my interest in engaging the theatrical play lies not in mapping
this unreality which I acknowledge from the start, but rather in participating in it.
And the forms in which we participate in theatrical representation are indeed
through phantasy self-displacements (Versetzungen), qualified by the cultural
awareness of the correct attitude towards these phantasy-images.
As the Argentinian author Jorge Luis Borges puts it, actors can only play their
roles for an audience that also plays at taking them for these fictive persons
(Borges 1960). In a non-philosophical attitude we tend to think that only the actor
8
Of course a theatrical representation is a highly complex image, one that requires a more elaborate
accomplishment of phantasy than mere depiction. But in one sense a theatrical representation is simpler
than mere depiction, namely, it lacks the dual set of conflicts and the trio of objective moments that
characterize depiction as a mediate intentionality.

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employs his body and transposes his body in imagination in order to bring about a
show. From Husserls phenomenological standpoint, in contrast, it becomes clear
that those in the audience, too, transpose themselves bodily into the world of fiction.
A phantasy onlooker needs phantasy corporeality.9 Naturally, there is a difference
between the actors transposition into a fictive person and the spectators
transposition into the same world as onlooker. However, let me stress that both
transpositions are equally free and voluntary, and this is not without consequence.
Artistic phenomena do not impose themselves on us against our will, even though
they demand of us that we play according to their rules. And perhaps nowhere is this
freedom more explicit than in the fact that our awareness of reality for the duration
of the artistic performance is never quite suppressed. If in the course of a theatrical
play I, as spectator, judge that the actor playing Hamlet is doing a superb job, the
world of artistic illusion does not necessarily come to an end the way a dream
abruptly comes to an end when we wake up and cannot fall asleep again. The show,
in any case, just goes on.
So once again, we arrive at what seems to be a fairly trivial point but in fact is of
broader phenomenological importance. For what the phenomenon of perceptual
phantasy shows in the case of artistic performances is that there is less of an
opposition and mutual exclusion between perception and phantasy than Husserl
initially thought. Instead, in the experience of an artwork, there is an inextricable
intertwinement of reality with fiction, even though they remain distinct, and
phenomenologys high regard for perception as the primal mode of consciousness
favored with the originary and intuitive experience of an object is never quite
compromised.

4 Perceptual Phantasy and Fiction: Some Aesthetic Implications

We have seen that Husserl understands the imagination to have many senses, among
which pure reproductive phantasy is arguably primary.10 Nevertheless, for the
purposes of understanding artistic and aesthetic experiences, the concept of
immediate perceptual phantasy has primacy, given that such experiences are
admittedly dependent on, aim at, or are anchored in an encounter with real objects in
9
See Hua XIII (Text Nr. 10) especially, where Husserl says that the spectator of an artwork carries out
acts for the sake of fiction (p. 292) leading to a doubling and displacement of Ego and animate
corporeality in phantasy: As an appearance refers to the I or the Ego, and the kinesthetic data refers to
ocular movements, and exhibiting data to the fields of sensation and of appearing (the visual fields, the
tactual fields), the Ego and the egoical animate corporeality are equally necessarily implicated in
pictorialization (p. 302; my translation).
10
One reason for this primacy is that both depictive image consciousness and immediate perceptual
phantasy entail the doubling and displacement of the self which pure reproductive phantasy carries out to
the fullest extent. Pure reproductive phantasy offers the pinnacle of our awareness of what is absent or
fictive. Another reason is that both depictive image consciousness and immediate perceptual phantasy
entail the accomplishment of a corresponding reproductive phantasy: Something not present (something
that in other circumstances would be intuitive and even be presented in a reproduction or else in
perception) is pictorialized and rendered perceptible [perzeptiv] to the senses for me in the perceptual
figment. The figment masks from me the presentifying (reproductive) presentation, coincides with it: what
is presentified slides into what is present, coincides with it (Hua XXIII, pp. 383384/456).

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Husserl Stud (2013) 29:143162 155

the world (Walton 1990, p. 21). One aesthetic issue for which this primacy proves
particularly elucidating concerns the problem of the recognition and disclosure of
artistic fictions.
I recall taking my son Daniel to the puppet theater for the first timemore
precisely, to a show of Red Riding Hood using life-size puppets. Unlike his other
four year old friends, however, Daniel was greatly upset by the show. He was afraid.
Some of the puppet faces (the Wolf and the Grandmother) were arguably grotesque,
but even the refined face and appearance of the titular character made no difference.
From the very beginning the entire puppet show qua show bothered him, and he
demanded to leave. Thinking that he could have enjoyed the show if he had had an
earlier exposure to a puppet theater of sorts, my wife and I put together a small
puppet theater for our one-and-a-half year old daughter Lina. But earlier exposure
also posed some initial problems: for a while Lina would not focus on the show but
would keep walking around and behind the puppet stage, wondering what mom was
doing.
Arguably, in both cases something is amiss on the level of the imaginative
engagement of the viewer. But should we say that the mark is missed on the strength
or weakness of their imaginative engagement? Should one say that Daniels
imagination is too strong, and that as a result the show appears to him as real as
opposed to unrealhence the fact that it was uncomfortable for him and that he did
not experience the work of fiction at the requisite distance? Should one say in turn
that Linas imagination is not strong enough for her age, and that as a result the
show does not even appear to her in the first place as fictive? However tempting it
may be to account for the phenomena in this way, the problem arises that
phenomenologically nothing becomes more or less real (or unreal) on the strength of
the imagination. If both children miss the show, this is arguably not because they
lack imagination but rather because they do not (yet) quite know how to use it in
each specific case, i.e., how to bring about the correct imaginative attitude that lets
the puppet show appear.
And there is a good reason why they would initially lack that attitude. For
Husserl, it is only natural that the starting point in our engagement with images
should be one of slight disorientation: not only depictions but in fact all artistic
images are interlaced with conflict. What the image presents is in conflict with the
actual perceptual presentation of things in actual space. What happens in an artwork
is not really happening at all, and this can be disquietingas disquieting as when
we confuse a manikin for a human being, perhaps, but not disquieting in the same
way or in the long run.
In the case of depictive image consciousness, the image object is a figment, but
not an illusory figment, since it is notas in the case of an illusionsomething
harmonious in itself that is annulled by the surrounding reality (Hua XXIII, p. 490/
585). The image object, albeit not a real object, is not an illusory object because it
does not give itself as belonging to the environing real world. In contrast, the
manikin of a lady, placed in a context where one would expect a person, may give
rise to such an illusory perception precisely because it gives itself as a real lady
without being one. For Husserl, in contrast, the image object is annulled from
within, as nothing within it aims to give an actual perceptual reality. We may recall

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here the already mentioned sets of conflict between the apprehension of a Sujet and
image-object apprehension on the one hand, and, on the other, between the image-
object apprehension and the apprehension of a physical substratum.
In the case of theatrical representation, however, what appear on stage are not,
prima facie, figments: all along actors and props remain real objects concordant
with their perceptual surroundings. Moreover, actors and props are not necessarily
annulled from within as described above: a chair on stage is not a semblance of
another chair. How, then, does the apprehension of something real conflict with
itself, as it were, and incite the appearance of something fictive?
As experience [Erfahrung] teaches (the experience, of course, is not merely
simple experience), certain things show themselves to be suited to excite a
double apperception; specifically, a double perceptual apperception. Their
perceptual appearances, or those belonging to certain circumstances favorable
in this respect, easily change into other perceptual modes of appearance, and
do so in such a way that the stock of what is genuinely perceived is common,
or almost entirely common, to both perceptions entering into the conflict-
unity, while the stock of what is not genuinely perceived (of what is co-
perceived) on both sides is the ground for the conflict relationship. And these
things are then offered under such circumstances to perception or to the
perceptual consciousness of conflict, and are supposed to cause us, in shifting
to a mere phantasy, to place ourselves on the ground of the cancelled
perception, hence to inaugurate a purely perceptual phantasy (Hua XXIII,
pp. 517518/619).
Whereas for illusory perceptions and for depictions conflict remains on the level of
what is genuinely and directly intuited, in the case of theatrical representation
conflict arises on the level of what is apperceivedi.e., the perceptually co-
intended but not intuitively given, unseen sides of things.
A no show is at the heart of the theatrical show; for if things were given to my
perceptual regard all-sidedly and in one go, we would not be free to take them as
parts of a fictive world. And yet, in theatrical representation, that is precisely what
occurs: I take what appears on stage as fictive not because the actors appear to be
fakeon the contrary, they appear to be quite realbut because, as they appear, I can
apperceive in them the persons of the drama. Naturally this phantasy apperception is at
odds with the positing perceptual apperception (Wahrnehmung) of the actors as
actually and corporeally present before me. But the experienced theatergoer, instead of
actively carrying out this conflict between the positing perception of the actor and the
phantasy perception of the person of the drama, places herself on the ground of fiction.
She does not go about the theater either as an idolater or else as an iconoclast; she
correctly deals with the theatrical image in such a way that fiction co-appears
intertwined with appearing realities without obliterating their distinction.
For the informed viewer, then, the experience of conflict is that touchstone for the
unreality of dramatic fiction, but it is not really and actively brought about
because she already knows that this is not what she is meant to do with the
appearances. Thus, Husserl arrives at the nontrivial conclusion that an empirical
clue is needed for the immediate perceptual disclosure of things as fictive: a

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Husserl Stud (2013) 29:143162 157

peculiar sort of empirical phantasy-modification (Hua XXIII, p. 519/620) in virtue

of which we, who are not children (Hua XXIII, p. 516/618), will refrain from
actively discarding the theatrical representation and instead take its components as
triggers for, and parts of, a perceptual phantasy. Those in attendance at the show
know they must move beyond the primary task of distinguishing reality from fiction
and take on the task of playing along with the actors.
Husserls point here is ably illustrated in a short story by Jorge Luis Borges in
which an Iberian Muslim of the Middle Ages tells his Muslim comradeswho,
brought up in their Islamic culture, ignore the tradition of the theaterof his first
visit to one such abroad:

One afternoon, the Muslim merchants of Sin Kalan [China] took me to a house of
painted wood in which many people lived. One cannot tell how that house looked,
for it was more like one room, with rows of shelves or of balconies, one on top of
the other. In those cavities there were people who ate and drank, and so also on
the floor and on the terrace. The people in that terrace played the drum and the
lute, except some fifteen to twenty people (wearing red-colored masks) who
prayed, sang, and talked to one another. They suffered imprisonment, and no one
saw the jail; they did horse riding, but no one could see the horse; they fought
amongst themselves, but the swords were made out of cane; they died, and shortly
afterwards, they stood up.
The acts of mad peoplesaid Farachexceed the foresight of the sane.
They were not madexplained Abulcasim. They were figuring, one merchant
told me, a story (Borges 2007, p. 704; my translation).

Indeed, the theater at first hearing simply strikes one as collective madness. But
looked at more closely, such a first encounter has to be superseded by experience
and with the help of, e.g., cultural indications. Men on stage seeming to fight to the
death with spades of cane, or seeming to be imprisoned in invisible cells, are not
quite like the Cartesian madmen who firmly maintain that they are kings when
they are paupers, or say they are dressed in purple when they are naked (Descartes
1996, p. 13), even though nothing on the level of mere perception would necessarily
distinguish one from the other. And yet, when an actor on a stage seems to be riding
a horse when ostensibly there is no horse, he is not aiming to deceive; he is inviting
the viewers to imagine what is not seen.
In our reading, Husserls stipulation of an empirical, perceptual phantasy
modification is conceptually close to Kendall Waltons claim that representations
are make-believe games which have an ineradicable, underlying principle of
generation. For Walton, as for Husserl, a principle of generation or contextual
clue of sorts needs to be established in order for certain things to be imaginedfor
example, lets say that the people in the terrace are figuring a story. But while not
all such make-believe games start up with an explicit imperative, nobody
participates in such games without at least an implicit acceptance of the principle
corresponding to the given game. Waltons following remark also sheds light on the
broad sense in which such a principle of generation is empirical:

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I do not assume that the principles of generation are, in general or even

normally, conventional or arbitrary, nor that they must be learned.
Nevertheless, what principles of generation there are depends on which ones
people accept in various contexts. The principles that are in force are those
that are understood, at least implicitly, to be in force (Walton 1990, p. 38).
The recognition and participation in artworks such as theatrical representations
requires us to imagine what is not seenand this is not an exceptional circumstance
characteristic only of drama. In fact all artworks demand an analogous use of the
imagination:
Art is the realm of phantasy that has been given form, of perceptual or
reproductive phantasy that has been given form, of intuitive phantasy, but also,
in part, of nonintuitive [unanschaulicher] phantasy. It cannot be said that art
must necessarily move within the sphere of intuitiveness (Hua XXIII, p. 515/
616).
Husserls claim that art is the realm of phantasy that has been given form resonates
with traditional claims made in Aesthetics and literary criticism regarding the
primacy of formeven though Husserl works in this passage with a more technical
concept of form, one which describes the distinctive feature of temporally
individuated, or else phantasy quasi-individuated, objects (Hua XXIII, Text 18a;
Bernet 2005). But what does it mean to say that art moves within the sphere of non-
intuitive phantasy? Have we not established from the start that for Husserl phantasy
is an intuitive consciousness? In order to clarify the meaning of this ascriptionand
in general the way imagination works in aesthetic experiencewe must turn first to
the two paradigmatic forms of intuitive phantasy previously dealt with: depiction
and reproductive phantasy.
In the case of depiction, the sensuous contents corresponding to the appearance
of a physical image-thing are dislocated and taken up in the appearing of an image-
object, in which the Sujet appears. For as long as the physical image-object
instigates a depiction, it does not appear on its own, i.e., apart from the image
apprehension: Indeed, even if I wanted to, I could by no means just push aside the
appearance belonging to the image-object and then see only the lines and shadows
on the card. At most I could do this with respect to the particular spots that I pick
out (Hua XXIII, p. 488/583).
In the case of pure reproductive phantasy, there are no such dislocated sensuous
contents at stake. The phantasms serving as contents for a phantasy apprehension
are themselves reproduced. Still, phantasy remains an intuitive consciousness on
account of the fact that the phantasied object appears immediately itself and not via
a sign or depiction.
The intuitiveness of a depiction is accounted for by the dislocation of actual
sensuous contents, in virtue of which a new object, the image-subject or Sujet,
appears indirectly and yet intuitively. In turn, the intuitiveness of pure phantasy is
accounted for by the reproduction of phantasms and their apprehension, in virtue of
which the phantasied object appears directly as phantasied. But in a perceptual
phantasy such as a theatrical representation, the intuitive moment of this experience

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is accounted for not by phantasy but by perception (Perzeption). In the case of the
theatrical representation, phantasy neither depletes the appearance of a real object
from its sensuous contents in order to generate the appearance of something unreal,
nor reproductively generates phantasms. Here phantasy is literally nonintuitive.
Instead of acquiring or generating new intuitive materials, perceptual phantasy turns
what we would otherwise normally perceive (in the sense of Wahrnehmung) into
objects of phantasy. Instead of a tripartite distinction of Bildding, Bildobjekt, and
Sujet, artistic representation rather awakens a consciousness of the fictive in the
form of an immediate imagination [unmittelbare Imagination] (Hua XXIII,
p. 515/617) with two distinct moments: a perceptual moment (Perzeption) that gives
the object immediately and intuitively, and a phantasy moment that takes the
perceived object as fictive. Without bringing about an active consciousness of
conflict and of nullity, I take the actors on stage for the characters they represent,
and the latter are given to me with the force of something perceived, though not as
actually and bodily existing before me.
Husserls revision of depictive image consciousness thus seems to anticipate the
distinction between prompters of imaginings and objects of imaginings
proposed by Walton (1990). For the actors on stage do not trigger the appearance of
an imaginary object the way that a certain arrangement of lines on a canvas triggers
the depiction of a face. Nor do actors on stage require us to reproductively
phantasize the scene that they are representing, not even as a supplement to what
they represent. Those in attendance at the show are not required to daydream
though naturally they could, at the price of not really paying attention to the show
for the span of the daydream. Rather, those in the audience are required to take the
perceived objects on stage for fictive objects. Some objects on stage may even seem
to fulfill both functions of imaginatione.g., a doll on stage may trigger the
depiction of a babybut even here the non-intuitive phantasy function takes
precedence, for the doll is not meant to depict a baby (not even one in the world of
fiction) but to be taken for a baby in that world, unless it is meant to be taken
precisely for a doll in, e.g., The Nutcracker, following the artistic intention
fashioning that world.
We are now in a position to explain why Husserl thought that the formulation of a
nonintuitive phantasy is revelatory of the realm of art in general. As the analysis of
theatrical representation shows, to bring about an intuitive presentation of
something fictivewhether in the manner of depiction or else in pure reproductive
phantasyis only one of the imaginative functions that an artwork might require of
a participant. Another might be to take something perceived for something fictive. A
third might be to take an artistic images apparent failure to faithfully depict an
aspect of a Sujet as, in Gombrichs words, the call to join in the game and
supplement with our imagination what the real motif undoubtedly possessed
(Gombrich 1963, p. 9). Depending on the given art form, the imagination may be
called in to supplement in various ways. But the crucial point here is that such
supplementation does not have to be brought about by an intuitive phantasy
whether we understand this intuitiveness in the manner of depiction or else of
intuitive reproduction. The shadowy edges around Mona Lisas mouth, left
deliberately diffused in sfumato, are not filled in intuitively by the viewer as

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either a candid smile or a stiff upper lip (as in a daydream): the viewer does not alter
the appearing image (lest she hallucinate) nor necessarily goes on to daydream
about a fully graspable smile of the Mona Lisa (though she could). Rather, the
viewer who actively engages the artwork not only grasps the depicted Mona Lisa
but also phantasizes nonintuitively, joining the game and taking the Mona Lisa to
be, e.g., in a glad or else sour mood, etc.
In speaking about nonintuitive phantasies Husserl has not, to be sure, blurred the
distinction between conceptual (signitive) and intuitive presentations. In fact, he has
only deepened it. The case here is analogous to the development in Husserls theory
of perception according to which the awareness of the back side of a currently
perceived object is not signitively intended but is already perceptually co-intended
via an apperception, even if not intuitively given. Similarly with artworks, from
theatrical representations to artistic depictions: what they do not intuitively give is
not therefore conceptually referred to but is already phantasied, however non-
intuitively, in and with what is intuitively given. A whole world of fiction is clearly
more than what is intuitively offered in reproductive phantasy or in depiction, even
though the conditions for further imaginative experience are obviously different
than the conditions for further actual perceptual experience. In this way fiction turns
out to be larger than what is effectively and intuitively phantasied by a subject and
becomes what is to be phantasied, intuitively or not, given the artwork in question.
In this way, the concept of perceptual phantasy, and moreover, the concept of
non-intuitive phantasy can shed light on the plurality of ways in which the
imagination, broadly conceived, becomes involved in artistic or aesthetic experi-
ence. But given the variety of functions that an aesthetic imagination would
shoulder, and especially given the divergence of these functions from the paradigm
of rendering something intuitive, it seems that we have not so much dispelled the
cloud of mystery surrounding the imagination as only stepped deeper into it.

Acknowledgments Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at a graduate seminar at the Husserl
Archives of the Catholic University of Leuven, and at the School of Philosophy of the Catholic University
of America. I would like to thank Dr. Rudolf Bernet and Dr. Roland Breeur of the K. U. Leuven, as well
as Dr. John McCarthy and Msgr. Robert Sokolowski of CUA, for the respective invitations to speak, as
well as for their helpful comments. Finally, my thanks to the reviewer of this article for his illuminating
remarks.

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