Ideas and Impacts: Ublic Olicy Nalysis

1 Apr 2007 12:8 AR ANRV312-PL10-14.
tex XMLPublishSM (2004/02/24) P1: OKZ

10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.071105.094536
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2007. 10:297313

doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.071105.094536
Copyright c 2007 by Annual Reviews. All rights reserved
First published online as a Review in Advance on January 30, 2007
PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS: Ideas and Impacts

William T. Gormley, Jr.
Georgetown Public Policy Institute, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20007;
email: gormleyw@georgetown.edu
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2007.10:297-313. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org
Key Words economics, political science, government reform

by Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile on 06/20/07. For personal use only.
Abstract Both economists and political scientists have made important contri-
butions to the field of public policy analysis. Economists have stressed the roles
of competition, natural monopolies, information asymmetries, externalities, incen-
tives, and federalism in promoting or undermining efficiency. Political scientists, in
contrast, have focused more on the mechanics of agenda change, the likelihood of
nonincremental policy change, and how the policy-making process varies across is-
sue areas. Economists have influenced government decisions that led to the creation
of public utility commissions, emissions trading, revenue sharing, and health main-
tenance organizations. Political scientists have influenced government decisions on
the design of political institutions (environmental impact statements, legislative re-
districting) and on the choice of public policies (criminal justice strategies, welfare
reform). In general, the presence of a scholarly consensus facilitates the use of pol-
icy analysis. However, interest group politics and electoral incentives also play an
important role.
INTRODUCTION
The proverbial blind men asked to describe an elephant had something to grasp
or feela sharp tusk, a rough hide, or a quivering trunk. A sighted person asked
to describe the field of public policy analysis has a far more difficult task. The
field is ever-changing, with multiple strands, practitioners, goals, and audiences.
Unlike many academic fields, it does not spring from a single discipline. Unlike
many academic fields, it is not the exclusive province of academia but rather an
enterprise shared by universities, think tanks, advocacy groups, and governmental
institutions. Unlike that of many academic fields, its worth resides not simply in its
utility to students but also in its value to public officials and other clients. Unlike
those of many academic fields, its products are widely used and just as widely
distorted by interest groups that have their own claims to promote. Imagine an
elephant enshrouded in mist in a remote jungle accessible only to a few intrepid
explorers. That is the beast I attempt to describe here.
Public policy analysis can be defined narrowly or broadly. A relatively narrow
definition has been advanced by Weimer & Vining (1999, p. 27): client-oriented
1094-2939/07/0615-0297$20.00 297
1 Apr 2007 12:8 AR ANRV312-PL10-14.tex XMLPublishSM (2004/02/24) P1: OKZ
298 GORMLEY
advice relevant to public decisions and informed by social values. A relatively

broad definition has been advanced by Dye (1987, pp. 79): the study of the
causes and consequences of public policy. As in chaos theory, where one innocent
choice triggers an avalanche of repercussions, a definition of public policy analysis
is fraught with consequences. A broad or generous definition allows ample room
for the contributions that political scientists have made to the field. That is because
political scientists often study how the policy-making process works, without ex-
plicit regard for the consequences of public policy choices. In contrast, a narrow or
restrictive definition guarantees a very prominent place for economists, who have
used the tools of their discipline to measure and appraise the consequences of pub-
lic policy choices for the general public as a whole and sometimes for particular
segments of the public.

In this essay, I adopt Dyes broader definition of policy analysis in order to
highlight some important differences in how economists and political scientists
approach the field of public policy. However, I also argue that economists have
had a much more substantial impact on public policy than political scientists have.
A key reason for this is that economists narrower conception of public policy
analysis (in effect, Weimer & Vinings definition) is much better suited to the daily
information needs of public officials. To put it another way, political scientists
help us to understand how the policy process works, whereas economists help
us to choose better policies. In general, public officials are less interested in how
the policy process works (because they already understand this) or even how it
might be able to work better (because such improvements might adversely affect
their political interests) than in the consequences of alternative policy choices.
Public officials are not motivated solely by the desire to promote good public
policy, but good ideas and good empirical research can be persuasive under some
circumstances.
I begin by highlighting some of the distinctive intellectual contributions of
economics and political science to the field of public policy analysis. The fo-
cus of this section is on important ideas, regardless of whether they are aimed
at practitioners, professors, or students. I then discuss some examples of pub-
lic policy research by economists and political scientists that has made a differ-
ence in the real world. The examples from economics flow rather nicely from
the disciplines intellectual contributions. The examples from political science are
more idiosyncratic, because the intellectual contributions of that discipline point
in one direction whereas the practical contributions of individual political scien-
tists point in another. It is only in the field of institutional policy analysis that
these contributions converge (Gormley 1987). In my concluding section, I dis-
cuss the circumstances under which public policy analysis, whether conducted
by economists or political scientists, is likely to make a difference. My overall
perspective is more optimistic than many commentaries on this subject. In my
view, both economists and political scientists have made many useful contribu-
tions to the practice of public policy, although economists contributions are more
conspicuous.
PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 299
INTELLECTUAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF ECONOMICS

Economists have made numerous contributions to our understanding of how to
design better public policies. Many of these contributions come from the field
of public finance (also called public economics) or the related field of microeco-
nomics. Others come from macroeconomics, but this essay does not discuss them,
partly because of space constraints and partly because my expertise lies elsewhere.
A key value in microeconomics is competition, which is thought to promote
economic efficiency (Pareto optimality). Expressed a bit differently, economists
believe in the virtues of the marketplace, provided that certain conditions are met.
These conditions are (a) that firms sell a standardized product, (b) that firms are
price takers, (c) that factors of production are perfectly mobile in the long run, and
(d) that firms and consumers have perfect information (Frank 2006, pp. 36869). In
practice, perfect competition is difficult to achieve or sustain. Nevertheless, many
economists have endorsed privatization, deregulation, and other options that move
in the direction of an unfettered marketplace.
For years, economists have argued that certain services (e.g., electricity) are
best provided by natural monopolies (e.g., public utilities), because economies
of scale make it easier for one company to supply this service within a given ju-
risdiction. This thinking, highlighting a form of market failure, led state public
utility commissions to carve out exclusive service areas for electric, natural gas,
and telephone utilities within their states. More recently, however, economists have
challenged the logic behind natural monopolies in certain areas, including tele-
phone service and electricity distribution. This led some economists to recommend
that telecommunications and electricity markets be deregulated to allow greater
competition among firms.
A similar pattern can be discerned in transportation policy. Early in the twen-
tieth century, prominent economists such as John R. Commons recommended the
creation of state commissions to regulate railroad rates because the market was
thought to be failing. The argument was that the railroad industry was too prone
to oligopoly and too vital to the national interest to be left unregulated. Later, in
the 1960s and 1970s, distinguished economists recommended the elimination or
reconstitution of bodies that determined entry and rates in the airline industry, the
trucking industry, and the railroad industry. Their central argument was that regu-
lation of price, entry, and exit often undermined economic efficiency (Meyer et al.
1959, Averch & Johnson 1962, Joskow & Noll 1981). Their preferred remedy was
deregulation, and they were virtually unanimous in that recommendation. Other
social scientists agreed. As economist Roger Noll (cited in Derthick & Quirk 1985,
p. 54) noted, I know of no major industrial scholarly work by an economist or
political scientist or lawyer in the past 10 years that reaches the conclusion that a
particular industry would operate less efficiently and less equitably (without) than
with regulation.
Beginning in the 1960s, some economists challenged the primacy of fee-for-
service medicine by arguing that sharp increases in health care costs were inevitable
300 GORMLEY
so long as consumers had no incentive to seek out less costly care and health
providers had no incentive to offer it. As Enthoven (1978a, p. 651) put it, The
main cause of the unjustified and unnecessary increase in costs is the complex
of perverse incentives inherent in the tax-supported system of fee for service
for doctors, cost reimbursement for hospitals, and third-party intermediaries to
protect consumers. The solution, he argued, was to introduce competition and
consumer choice into the health care market. In support of health maintenance
organizations as an alternative, Enthoven offered both theoretical arguments and
empirical evidence that HMOs achieved substantial cost savings in markets where
they flourished (Luft 1977 cited in Enthoven 1978b).
A conspicuous form of market failure noted by many economists is the presence

of information asymmetries between the producers of goods and services and the
consumers of goods and services. In many markets, consumers possess far less
information about the quality of a product than producers or owners do. The used
car market is a good example, as evidenced by the sale of numerous lemons
to unsuspecting consumers (Akerlof 1970). There are, in fact, solutions to this
problemthe provision of information, warranties, etc. To mitigate information
asymmetries, economic policy analysts have recommended better labeling of food
and drugs, consumer product alerts, and other measures to help consumers protect
themselves.
The concept of externalities is very important to economics and to policy anal-
ysis conducted by economists. When a firm produces pollutants as a byproduct
of its regular production process, it imposes uncompensated costs (negative ex-
ternalities) on those who live or work in that area. Unless government intervenes
in some fashion, private firms will generate excessive pollution because they are
not being asked to compensate those who are harmed by their pollution (Baumol
1972). Although some economists stressed that the assignment of property rights
helps to resolve externality problems (Coase 1960), most economists argued in fa-
vor of government intervention, usually through taxes, as first suggested by Pigou
(Cropper & Oates 1992).
The federal governments approach to environmental protection in the 1970s
moved in a very different direction, as illustrated by the Clean Air Act of 1970, the
Clean Water Act of 1972, and many subsequent laws. In those statutes, the federal
government required polluters to curb their emissions and required state govern-
ments to enforce federal antipollution laws. As Cropper & Oates (1992, p. 675)
have conceded, The economists view hadto the dismay of the professionlittle
impact on the initial surge of legislation for the control of pollution. In fact, some
key environmental laws explicitly prohibited the weighing of benefits and costs in
setting environmental standards. The prevailing approach for approximately two
decades, sometimes known as command and control regulation, represented a
triumph for lawyers and environmental groups, a defeat for economists and busi-
ness organizations.
Before and after passage of these laws, economists complained that command
and control regulation is inefficient. A better approach, they argued, would be
to establish a pollution tax or a levy on the polluting agent equal to marginal

social damage, sometimes known as an effluent fee. The tax would be linked
to the number of units of waste emissions into the environment. As Kneese &
Schultze (1975, p. 90) noted, Economists have long advocated, in abstract terms,
a tax or charge on activities like pollution that impose costs on society but are not
recognized in the accounting that underlies business decisions. . . . This approach
was foreign to the engineering profession, however, and to those most responsible
for public policy in this area. As an alternative to effluent fees or taxes, some
economists proposed a system of marketable permits. Under this arrangement,
environmental agencies would determine an efficient or allowable level of pollution
and would then issue emission permits (licenses to pollute) to each polluting
firm. These permits could be traded in an open market, with the expectation that
firms facing more costly pollution reductions would buy permits and firms facing
less costly pollution reductions would sell them. A tax (or price-based approach)
and emissions trading (or quantity-based approach) should yield identical results,
provided that perfect information is available to regulators and firms (Cropper &
Oates 1992, p. 682). In theory, such trades should result in a lower national price
tag for pollution reduction, because firms that can reduce pollution more cheaply
will do so. Carbon trading, recently promoted as a solution to global warming, is
based on the same premise. In the words of one economist, The beauty of carbon
trading is that it takes a primal human impulsegreedand redirects it toward
saving the planet rather than destroying it (Goodell 2006, p. 36).
Although many propositions within economics are relevant to the design of
public policies, others are more relevant to the design of political systems. An
example is the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis, which says that residents of smaller
jurisdictions (e.g., local governments) are better able to express their preferences
than are residents of larger jurisdictions (e.g., the United States as a whole). If
the residents of Chicago think they are overtaxed, they can move to Bloomington
or Normal or a neighboring state. If the residents of Peoria would prefer more
public goods, they can move to Chicago or St. Louis. Tiebouts conclusion is
that local governments tend to be more responsive to their citizens than other
levels of government are. This leads him to advocate greater discretion for local
governments.
INTELLECTUAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

The primary contribution of economics to the field of public policy analysis has
been to enhance our understanding of the consequences of public policies, both
proposed and actual. In contrast, the primary contribution of political science to
the field of public policy analysis has been to enhance our understanding of the
causes of public policies, or how the public policy-making process actually works.
Kingdon (1984) borrowed from garbage can theory to develop a compelling
analytic framework for thinking about how issues come to acquire agenda status
302 GORMLEY
and how policy alternatives come to be developed. Kingdons framework is some-

times known as the converging streams framework because he argues that agenda
change can occur when three streams converge: the problem stream (recognition
of a problem as a public problem that requires the governments immediate atten-
tion); the policy stream (a particular solution that is likely to solve or ameliorate
the problem); and the politics stream (concern about the problem and support for
the solution among the general public, the interest group community, and media
elites). The convergence of streams does not guarantee agenda change. According
to Kingdon, that depends on the emergence and ability of a policy entrepreneur
who takes advantage of the window of opportunity that permits reform when
these streams converge.

Another important analytic framework is that of Baumgartner & Jones (1993),

who employed the idea of punctuated equilibrium to capture the mix of stability
and change that seems to characterize public policy making in the United States.
According to these authors, the dynamic element of public policy making is most
apparent when images and venues are reconfigured. By images they mean the
way an issue is portrayed in the mass media and in legislative hearings; venues
are the exact locus of decision making. Changes in images induce changes in
venues and vice versa. The transformation of U.S. pesticides policy illustrates that
public policy agendas can change abruptly at times. During the 1960s, images of
pesticides began to change from very positive (an aid to farmers) to very negative
(a threat to the environment). Venues for decision making also began to shift,
as issues previously confined to the House and Senate agriculture committees
were taken up by committees devoted to environmental protection. These changes
contributed to the passage of important legislation aimed at reducing the use of
pesticides throughout the United States, such as the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (Baumgartner & Jones 1993, Bosso 1987).
These analytic frameworks represent an important challenge to an older body
of literature in political science that stressed the prevalence of incremental de-
cision making. Studies of congressional appropriations (Wildavsky 1984) and
administrative decision making (Lindblom 1959) had found evidence of strong
institutional bias in favor of the status quo or, at best, modest departures from
the status quo. Although Kingdon and Baumgartner & Jones acknowledged the
power of inertia, they also stressed the reality of nonincremental change. Many
political scientists studying the policy-making process have embraced the ideas
of Kingdon and Baumgartner & Jones, wholeheartedly or with some reservations
(Diehl & Durant 1989, Camissa 1995, Gormley & Weimer 1999).
Whereas some political scientists have attempted to explain the functioning of
the policy-making process as a whole, others have challenged the premise behind
this undertaking. Is there in fact a single policy-making process? According to
some political scientists, the nuances of the policy-making process vary dramati-
cally and predictably. Lowi (1964) put it most emphatically when he declared that
policy determines politics. What he meant was not that the adoption of a policy
encourages the formation of new political coalitions (although he undoubtedly
would agree it does) but rather that consideration of a particular issue or type of
issue by public officials carries important political consequences. For example,
presidential involvement tends to be high when redistributive issues are consid-
ered, low when distributive issues are considered, and moderate or variable when
regulatory issues are considered. Peak associations play a significant role when
substantial income transfers from the rich to the poor are under review, small inter-
est groups play a dominant role when porkbarrel projects are at stake, and trade
associations get involved when the government regulates private firms. Redistribu-
tive issues have many of the characteristics of a zero-sum game for society as a
whole, whereas distributive issues have many of the characteristics of a positive-
sum game. Regulatory issues have some zero-sum characteristics but only within a
particular sector of the economy (e.g., long-distance carriers versus local telephone
companies).
In a similar vein, Wilson (1973) advanced a different typology. Unlike Lowi,
who focused on issues or issue areas, Wilson focused on policy proposals. He
argued that the politics of a legislative proposal to protect the environment will
differ from the politics of a legislative proposal to pollute the environment. More
specifically, he urged policy analysts to consider whether the costs and benefits
of a policy proposal are widely distributed or narrowly concentrated. If costs and
benefits are narrowly concentrated, interest group politics will result, with com-
peting interest groups clashing over the specifics. If costs and benefits are widely
distributed or dispersed, majoritarian politics will emerge, with the general public
playing a significant role. If benefits are narrowly concentrated but costs are widely
distributed, clientele politics will ensue, with special interest groups dominating
the field. If benefits are widely distributed but costs are narrowly concentrated,
entrepreneurial politics will occur, with policy entrepreneurs championing the in-
terests of the general public.
Many political scientists have utilized, applied, and tested these typologies, with
good results (Wilson 1980, Ripley & Franklin 1991, Sharp 1994). Other political
scientists have developed their own typologies, focusing on salience and conflict
(Price 1978), salience and complexity (Gormley 1986), or other variables. These
typologies have also been tested and applied (Gerber & Teske 2000, Gormley &
Boccuti 2001, Eshbaugh-Soha 2006).
Although political scientists have largely defined the policy-making process
as the public policymaking process, a number of scholars have highlighted the
growing importance of nonprofit organizations and for-profit firms in delivering
services on behalf of the government (Savas 1987, Kettl 1993, Light 1995, Salamon
2002). From this literature, we have learned how attractive contracting out can be
at all levels of government but also how difficult it can be to hold contractors
accountable for what they do or fail to do. Some political scientists have also
drawn our attention to the extraordinary importance of the private sector in the
United States in providing social benefits such as pensions and health insurance to
employees. While acknowledging that the public sector accounts for a lower per-
centage of the GDP in the United States than elsewhere, Hacker (2002) notes that
304 GORMLEY
the United States looks like many other industrialized countries when one com-
bines public and private social benefits. What is most distinctive about American
social welfare practice, he observes, is not the level of spending but the source
(Hacker 2002, p. 16). This insight opens up new vistas for research as we think
more broadly about what constitutes the policy-making process.
PUBLIC POLICY IMPACTS OF ECONOMICS

Economists have made important contributions to the design of public policies
over an extended period. For example, University of Wisconsin economist John R.

Commons helped to convince the Wisconsin State Legislature and Governor Robert
LaFollette to create the nations first (or second) public utility commission. He also
made suggestions on how the commission should be structured and later served
on it. Later in the twentieth century, economists made contributions to the design
of public utility commission policies aimed at promoting energy conservation.
Prominent economists recommended the adoption of marginal cost pricing, which
enabled utilities to charge consumers (both industries and residents) higher prices
during periods of peak demand. As chairman of the New York Public Service
Commission from 1974 to 1976, Alfred Kahn, formerly an economics professor
at Cornell University, seized every opportunity available to promote the virtues
of marginal cost pricing. At daily swims, with only his head visible, he would
lecture staff members on the finer points of cross-subsidies, elastic demand, and
peak-load pricing (McCraw 1984, p. 247). By the early 1980s, most state public
utility commissions had incorporated marginal cost pricing principles into their
rate structures (Gormley 1983).
Economic thinking also contributed significantly to debates at the federal level
over airline deregulation (and surface transportation deregulation). In 1975, Sena-
tor Edward Kennedy (DMassachusetts) held hearings on the airline industry, with
assistance from an able staff member, Stephen Breyer, a Harvard law professor who
took a leave of absence to work on these issues (Breyer is now a Supreme Court
justice). These hearings were instrumental in establishing a connection between
economic theory, empirical evidence, and proposals to deregulate the airline in-
dustry. As Derthick & Quirk (1985, p. 54) have pointed out, deregulation benefited
from having a broad base of support in academic opinion and analysis. In one way
or another, the intellectual premises of this policy prescription had been adopted
to an exceptional degree by academics, especially in the elite universities. While
some academics made the case against regulation by invoking capture theory
an idea promoted by both economists and political scientistsothers relied more
on marginal cost pricing as the justification. Alfred Kahn, appointed by President
Jimmy Carter to chair the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1977, became a staunch
advocate of deregulating the airline industry and abolishing his own agency. Dur-
ing his tenure as chair, Kahn initiated significant deregulatory policies, including
rate competition, open entry, and new route authority (McCraw 1984, p. 290).
The passage of the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978 represented the triumph of
economic thinking in both the legislative and executive branches of the federal
government. As Derthick & Quirk put it (1985, p. 246): If economists had not
made the case for procompetitive deregulation, it would not have occurredat
least not on the scale the nation has witnessed.
As noted above, the environmental legislation of the 1970s reflected the tri-
umph of legalistic rather than economic thinking. The Clean Air Act of 1970
and the Clean Water Act of 1972 embodied the principle of command and con-
trol regulation; both statutes explicitly stated that a benefit-cost analysis was not
to be applied when formulating environmental regulationsa stinging rebuke to
economists. Over time, however, critics contended that such environmental laws
were overly costly and inefficient. A new approach was adopted with the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990. That approach, as exemplified by emissions trading,
effectively incorporated the economic premise that a market should be created for
trading licenses to pollute. This was a clear victory for economists. In testimony
before a House subcommittee, Richard Schmalensee, an economist serving on the
Council of Economic Advisers, argued strongly in favor of emissions trading. One
of his selling points was a letter of support from 11 of 13 living Nobel laureates
in economics (Schmalensee 1989, p. 212). According to most analyses, emissions
trading has been a success, achieving greater environmental protection at a lower
cost (Burtraw & Mansur 1999, Goodell 2006).
Economist Walter Heller, who served as Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisers under Presidents Lyndon Johnson and John Kennedy, advocated revenue
sharing (and block grants) that would give state and local governments more dis-
cretion. He urged, We must move toward broader categories [of aid] that will give
states and localities more freedom of choice, more scope for expressing their vary-
ing needs and preferences, within the framework of national purpose (Heller 1966,
p. 142). Although Hellers ideas were ultimately rejected by President Johnson,
they were embraced by both presidential candidatesNixon and Humphreyin
1968 (Conlan 1998, p. 28). Shortly after becoming president, Nixon proposed
a bold New Federalism package that included general revenue sharing for
state and local governments and several new block grants. Congress subsequently
adopted general revenue sharing and two of the block grantsthe Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act (CETA) and the Community Development Block
Grant (CDBG). Eventually, general revenue sharing would be abolished by the
Reagan administration in 1986. But the broader principle of devolving authority to
state governments would remain popular and would be integrated into subsequent
block grant proposals in the 1990s, including welfare reform.
The concept of HMOs has been aggressively promoted by economists in re-
cent years, with considerable success. Dr. Paul Ellwood, a physician, played a
critical role in the early 1970s by developing some of the key concepts behind a
managed care system and by persuading the Nixon administration to embrace this
approach as an alternative to fee-for-service medicine (Belkin 1996). Economist
Alain Enthoven helped to fuel the HMO movement in the late 1970s and 1980s.
306 GORMLEY
The Clinton administration enthusiastically embraced the HMO concept as one

of the key elements of its national health insurance plan in 1993. Although the
Clinton plan was unceremoniously rejected by Congress in 1994, the HMO ele-
ment became de facto federal policy, as the federal government routinely granted
waivers to state governments that wanted to extend managed care to some or all of
their Medicaid clients. Today managed care organizations serve 60% of Medicaid
clients (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2006).
Although economists have made more conspicuous contributions to legisla-
tive and executive branch decisions than to judicial decisions, they have also had
an impact on judicial decisions. For example, economist W. Steven Barnett of
Rutgers University introduced evidence on early childhood education impacts

in a New Jersey Superior Court case aimed at increasing state outlays on early
childhood education in poorer school districts. Barnetts testimony cited two long-
term studies (the Perry Preschool Project and the Abecedarian Project) that had
found substantial long-term benefits from high-quality early-childhood interven-
tions aimed at disadvantaged children. He recommended at least one year of state-
funded preschool for disadvantaged children. In an opinion mandating two years of
preschool for children in disadvantaged school districts, the Superior Court cited
Barnetts analysis approvingly and at some length (Abbott v. Burke 1998, Appendix
I). Later the New Jersey Supreme Court would affirm the lower courts decision
(Abbott v. Burke 1998). Thanks to these and other decisions, New Jersey now
guarantees a high-quality pre-kindergarten education to children in poor school
districts (Barnett et al. 2005).
To cite another example, economist Orley Ashenfelter was hired by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) to conduct an econometric analysis of the probable
impact of a proposed merger between Staples and Office Depot, two of the largest
office supply firms in the United States. That analysis, which found evidence of
anticompetitive effects and probable price increases, helped to convince the FTC
to oppose the merger (Baker 1999). A federal district court judge, who considered
the case, cited Ashenfelters econometric evidence as a key reason for his decision
to ban the proposed merger (FTC v. Staples 1997).
Some of these reforms have proven more durable and more successful than
others. According to Patashnik (2007), the durability of a given reform depends
on two key factors: group investments in favorable institutions (modest or exten-
sive) and group identities and affiliations (stable or unstable). Tax reforms enacted
in 1986 have eroded over time, because social actors failed to make large-scale
investments in the war against tax loopholes and because group affiliations have
remained largely untouched. In contrast, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
has led to a major reconfiguration of the airline industry and customer behavior,
because interest group affiliations and identities have changed and because the in-
stitutional environment changed profoundly as well. As Patashnik (2007, p. 285)
cautions, Sustaining market-oriented reforms against the threats of erosion and
reversal may be, if anything, an even more challenging political task than winning
the passage of these reforms in the first place.
PUBLIC POLICY IMPACTS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Although political scientists have made fewer striking contributions to the practice
of public policy than economists, they have nevertheless achieved some impacts
outside the classroom. In some instances, political scientists have successfully of-
fered advice on the structure of government itself. For example, L. Keith Caldwell,
an expert on environmental policy, advised Congress when it drafted the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1970. In testimony before the Senate Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, Caldwell recommended that Congress should at
least consider measures to require the Federal agencies, in submitting proposals,
to contain within the proposals an evaluation of the effect of these proposals upon
the state of the environment (U.S. Senate 1969, p. 116). Later in the same Senate
hearing, the chairman, Senator Henry (Scoop) Jackson (DWashington) told Cald-
well that he would be calling on him for some specific language to implement
what we have discussed here this afternoon (U.S. Senate 1969, p. 121).
Based on Caldwells advice, Congress included a little-noticed provision requir-
ing federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) when
their proposed rules or actions threatened substantial harm to the environment. The
EIS would become legendary (or infamous, depending on your point of view), be-
cause it sensitized agenciesnot just environmental agenciesto environmental
considerations. Eventually, the EIS requirement led federal agencies to hire huge
numbers of professionals who would bring to their job a much greater awareness
of environmental impacts. The EIS requirement also advantaged environmental
groups seeking some leverage with which to file a successful lawsuit to block a
federal agency decision that might adversely affect air quality or water quality.
In his powerful 1969 book The End of Liberalism, Lowi argued that Congress
had delegated too much power to the federal bureaucracy. Congress, it seemed,
preferred delegating to legislating. Not only was that a bad practice, asserted Lowi
(1969), but it was also unconstitutional, a violation of the nondelegation doctrine.
Lowis constitutional arguments have not impressed the Supreme Court in recent
years, although they have occasionally been articulated (Whitman v. American
Trucking Associations 2001). However, his arguments about legislation seem to
have impressed Congress. During the 1970s, following publication of Lowis book,
Congress passed many environmental and consumer protection laws, which were
noteworthy for their detail. Although these statutes were not sufficiently detailed
or specific to satisfy Lowi and other critics, they nevertheless reflected a substantial
shift from the status quo. Lowis book, more widely read than most political science
books, probably played a role in that shift.
Political scientists have long been interested in legislative redistricting and
the consequences of reapportionment decisions, especially for minority voters.
One question that has generated interest in recent years is whether the creation
of majority-minority districts benefits or harms racial minorities. Some politi-
cal scientists have argued that it is better for minorities to wield some influence
over voting outcomes in a larger number of legislative districts than to be able
308 GORMLEY
to control the outcome in a smaller number of districts. Researchers at Columbia

University demonstrated that the interests of the black community in the South are
promoted more decisively by legislative districts in which blacks represent 45%
47% of the voting-age population than by majority-minority districts (Cameron
et al. 1996). They further argued that majority-minority districts may advance the
cause of descriptive representation while undermining the cause of substantive
representation. The Columbia University research was cited approvingly by Jus-
tice Sandra Day OConnor in the Supreme Courts majority opinion in Georgia
v. Ashcroft (2003). The Supreme Court also explicitly echoed the authors con-
cerns about substantive representationconcerns that were previously articulated
by Swain (1993), whose empirical work built on concepts developed by political

theorist Hanna Pitkin.

If political scientists have a distinctive role in the design of political institutions,
they also have a role as policy analysts with expertise in a particular policy do-
main. A good example is Lawrence Mead, of New York University, whose book on
welfare policy, Beyond Entitlement, advocates a reciprocal relationship between
government and the poor: The poor should work in order to receive a welfare
check, but the government should provide them ample incentives to leave welfare
and accept a paying job. As Mead (1986) saw it, that reciprocity should take the
form of a social contract between the government and the poor. Meads ideas found
a receptive audience in Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson (Mead 2004). As
an informal adviser to Thompson and as a member of the governors technical
advisory board, Mead successfully promoted his ideas. Wisconsins welfare re-
form effort, known as Wisconsin Works (W-2), became a model for the rest of
the nation in 1995 and 1996. Mead testified before Congress on several occa-
sions, promoting his version of welfare reform. Several participants in the national
welfare policy debate mentioned Mead as someone who influenced congressional
thinking on these issues (Winston 2002, p. 79). But Meads principal impact on
federal policy was indirect, by virtue of the ideas he successfully championed in
Wisconsin.
James Q. Wilson has long been acknowledged as one of our nations leading
experts on criminal justice. In a famous Atlantic Monthly article, coauthored with
George Kelling, Wilson introduced broken windows as a metaphor for threats
to the social order that ought to be addressed early, before they escalate into more
serious crime. According to Wilson & Kelling (1982, 1989), broken windows,
graffiti, and squeegee men pose a serious threat to society because they convey
to criminals the appearance or the reality of a breakdown in the social fabric. If
law enforcement officials can clamp down on these harbingers of more serious
crime, Wilson argued, then they can reduce crime rates. Mayor Rudy Giuliani
of New York City embraced Wilsons ideas with enthusiasm and used them to
help justify his anticrime policies, including a crackdown on graffiti. Later, in his
autobiography, he cited the broken windows theory as an important contributor to
his thinking on this subject. The lesson Giuliani learned is to always sweat the
small stuff (Giuliani 2002, p. 46).
DISCUSSION
In Politics and the Professors, Aaron (1978) offered a bleak assessment of the role
of public policy analysts in evaluating Great Society programs. The Head Start
program, he noted, received some negative evaluations, yet the program remained
enormously popular. The Job Corps program received mixed reviews, yet the
program was curtailed. The college work-study program was not evaluated at all,
yet it remains very popular. The connection between public policy evaluation and
public policy, he argued, was tenuous at best.
I am more optimistic about the capacity of public policy analysis to shape pub-
lic policy outputs. Both economists and political scientists have made important
contributions to a wide variety of decisions, involving public utility regulation,

environmental policy, transportation policy, health policy, early childhood educa-
tion policy, criminal justice policy, welfare policy, federalism, and the nature of
lawmaking itself. Public policy analysts have shaped the debate through their ideas
[what Weiss (1977) would call the enlightenment function of social science],
their empirical research, or both.
In general, economists have influenced public policy debates by applying eco-
nomic theory to pressing issues (e.g., Tiebouts work on federalism) or by apply-
ing econometric techniques to good, policy-relevant databases (e.g., Ashenfelters
work on a proposed merger). The economic underpinnings of policy analysis by
economists are relatively easy to discern. Political scientists have sometimes ap-
plied their understanding of how political institutions work to institutional choices
made by government officials (e.g., work on legislative redistricting). On other
occasions, political scientists have influenced raging policy debates (e.g., Wilson
on crime and Mead on welfare reform) by speaking with a distinctive voice but not
necessarily one that reflected well-established political science principles. Both
economists and political scientists have influenced debates on the design of public
policies and the design of political institutions.
Of course, I might have chronicled examples of public policy analysts whose
ideas and empirical research have fallen on deaf ears. A number of prominent
scholars have recommended a guaranteed annual income, but Congress has de-
clined to adopt such a policy (Moynihan 1973). Irving Garfinkel has long sup-
ported universal child support assurance, but Congress has disregarded this too
(Crowley 2003). John Chubb, Terry Moe, Paul Peterson, and others have advo-
cated school vouchers, but Congress has chosen a different set of policies. Many
policy proposals have foundered at the state level as well. Authentic voucher
systems have been embraced by only a handful of states and school districts.
Legislation to combat global warming has often failed at the state level, de-
spite strong scientific evidence that global warming poses a serious threat (Rabe
2004). In a recent California debate over Proposition 82, several academics, in-
cluding myself, argued in favor of a ballot initiative establishing a universal
pre-kindergarten program, but the voters rejected that idea by a margin of 60%
40%.
310 GORMLEY
How might we explain the adoption of some policy proposals ostensibly sup-
ported by empirical research, and the defeat of others? In thinking about the appli-
cations of public policy research, Esterling (2004) has developed a useful analytic
framework that stresses the extent of consensus among academics and other experts
in the relevant field. According to Esterling, the presence of good, unambiguous
empirical research in support of a policy proposal enables interest group advocates
to make both instrumental and normative arguments in favor of the policy proposal,
whereas opponents must content themselves with normative arguments alone. This
enhances the influence of interest groups that support the policy at the expense of
interest groups that oppose it. Esterling argues that where a consensus exists, public
policy analysis is much more likely to have an impact, and he cites the debate over
emissions trading as an example. Where no consensus exists, public policy analysis

is far less likely to have an impact, as he sees in the debate over school vouchers.
Thus, part of the explanation for the defeat of some ideas is that the empirical
evidence is either weak or inconclusive. The school voucher debate is a classic
example of a policy dispute characterized by dueling experts. Each paper produced
by one of these experts is sure to be skewered by someone from the opposing side.
Under such circumstances, experts are much more likely to provide ammunition
to opposing sides in the debate than to change anyones thinking on how to proceed.
Of course, providing ammunition is itself an important role. Whiteman (1985)
would call this kind of use of policy research strategic rather than substantive.
If one side provides better ammunition than another, its views may prevail, at least
at the margins. At both the federal and state levels, the strategic use of policy
information appears to be quite common (Mooney 1992, Whiteman 1995). Even
if empirical research on a particular issue is ambiguous, the failure of one side to
publicize its research can be detrimental to that sides point of view.
Still, there is much more to policy making than ideas and empirical evidence.
Consider, for example, gun control. A substantial body of empirical literature sup-
ports the proposition that guns account for a high number of fatalities every year
and that gun control laws could diminish the number of homicides considerably
(Cook & Ludwig 2006). Public support for gun control legislation is high. Yet
Congress, under pressure from the gun lobby, has resisted passing meaningful gun
control legislation (Goss 2006). It is here that political science makes a contribu-
tion. Sometimes interest groups matter, not because of their ideas or the evidence
they muster, but because they are well-organized, well-financed, and persistent. Or
consider legislative redistricting. Here the problem is not strong interest groups but
legislators who place reelection above all other goals. In short, Esterlings frame-
work is useful but incomplete. Evidence and ideas matter more when a scholarly
consensus exists, but they also matter more when public officials are inclined to
pursue the goal of good public policy at the expense of other goals. Policy analysis
flourishes best when public officials are capable of looking beyond the next inter-
est group contribution and the next election. The ability of economicsand other
disciplinesto shape public policy depends in part on the characteristics of the
political system that political scientists take great pains to describe and understand.
In his presidential address to the American Political Science Association, Harold

Lasswell articulated a vision of political science as the preeminent policy science.
In Lasswells words, political science was poised to become the policy science,
par excellence (quoted in Farr et al. 2006, p. 580). As Lasswell saw it, political
scientists would combine democratic values, empirical research skills, and sub-
stantive expertise to produce policy research that was highly relevant to public
policy decisions. As the decades have passed, economics, not political science,
has emerged as the preeminent policy science. Nevertheless, political science has
made and will continue to make important contributions to the field of policy anal-
ysis. Political scientists enjoy a virtual monopoly of the systematic study of how
public policy is made, and many political scientists have contributed to decisions
on which public policies should be adopted, how they should be implemented, and
how the process itself should be restructured. This is a strong foundation on which
to build in the twenty-first century.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The author thanks Joanna Mikulski for her helpful research assistance.
The Annual Review of Political Science is online at

http://polisci.annualreviews.org
LITERATURE CITED
Aaron H. 1978. Politics and Professors: The Belkin L. 1996. But what about quality? NY
Great Society in Perspective. Washington, Times Mag., Dec. 8, pp. 68106
DC: Brookings Inst. Bosso C. 1987. Pesticides and Politics: The Life
Abbott v. Burke. 1998. 153 N.J. 480 Cycle of a Public Issue. Pittsburgh, PA: Univ.
Akerlof G. 1970. The market for lemons: Pittsburgh Press
quality, uncertainty and the market mecha- Burtraw D, Mansur E. 1999. The effects of
nism. Q. J. Econ. 84:488500 trading and banking in the SO2 allowance
Averch H, Johnson L. 1962. Behavior of the market. Disc. Pap. 9925. Resourc. Future,
firm under economic constraint. Am. Econ. March, Washington, DC
Rev. 52:105269 Cameron C, Epstein D, OHalloran S. 1996. Do
Baker J. 1999. Econometric analysis in FTC v. majority-minority districts maximize sub-
Staples. J. Public Policy Mark. 18:1121 stantive black representation in Congress?
Barnett S, Hustedt J, Robin K, Schulman K. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 90:794812
The State of Preschool: 2005 State Preschool Cammisa A. 1995. Governments as Interest
Yearbook. New Brunswick, NJ: Natl. Inst. Groups: Intergovernmental Lobbying and
Early Educ. Res., Rutgers Univ. the Federal System. Westport, CT: Praeger
Baumol W. 1972. On taxation and the con- Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
trol of externalities. Am. Econ. Rev. 62:307 vices. 2006. http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
22 MedicaidManagCare, accessed Aug. 4,
Baumgartner F, Jones B. 1993. Agendas and In- 2006
stability in American Politics. Chicago: Univ. Coase R. 1960. The problem of social cost. J.
Chicago Press Law Econ. 3:144
312 GORMLEY
Conlan T. 1998. From New Federalism to De- Gormley W. 1983. The Politics of Public Utility
volution: Twenty-Five Years of Intergovern- Regulation. Pittsburgh, PA: Univ. Pittsburgh
mental Reform. Washington, DC: Brookings Press
Inst. Gormley W. 1986. Regulatory issue net-
Cook P, Ludwig J. 2006. Aiming for evidence- works in a federal system. Polity 18:595
based gun policy. J. Policy Anal. Manage. 620
25:691735 Gormley W. 1987. Institutional policy analysis.
Cropper M, Oates W. 1992. Environmental eco- J. Policy Anal. Manage. 6:15369
nomics: a survey. J. Econ. Lit. 30:675740 Gormley W, Boccuti C. 2001. HCFA and the
Crowley J. 2003. The Politics of Child Sup- states: politics and intergovernmental lever-
port in America. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge age. J. Health Polit. Policy Law 26:557
Univ. Press 80
Derthick M, Quirk P. 1985. The Politics of Gormley W, Weimer D. 1999. Organizational

Deregulation. Washington, DC: Brookings Report Cards. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Inst. Univ. Press
Diehl P, Durant R. 1989. Agendas, alternatives, Goss K. 2006. Disarmed: The Missing Move-
and public policy: lessons from the U.S. for- ment for Gun Control in America. Princeton,
eign policy arena. J. Public Policy 9:179205 NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
Dye T. 1987. Understanding Public Policy. Hacker J. 2002. The Divided Welfare State:The
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 6th ed. Battle over Public and Private Social
Enthoven A. 1978a. Consumer-choice health Benefits in the United States. New York:
plan (first of two parts). N. Engl. J. Med. Cambridge Univ. Press
298:65058 Heller W. 1966. New Dimensions of Political
Enthoven A. 1978b. Consumer-choice health Economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ.
plan (second of two parts). N. Engl. J. Med. Press
198:70920 Joskow P, Noll R. 1981. Regulation in the-
Eshbaugh-Soha M. 2006. The conditioning ef- ory and practice: an overview. In Studies in
fects of policy salience and complexity on Public Regulation, ed. G Fromm, pp. 165.
American political institutions. Policy Stud. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
J. 34:22343 Kettl D. 1993. Sharing Power: Public Gov-
Esterling K. 2004. The Political Economy of ernance and Private Markets. Washington,
Expertise. Ann Arbor: Univ. Mich. Press DC: Brookings Inst.
Farr J, Hacker J, Kazee N. 2006. The policy sci- Kingdon J. 1984. Agendas, Alternatives, and
entist of democracy: the discipline of Harold Public Policies. Boston: Little, Brown
D. Lasswell. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 100:57988 Kneese A, Schultze C. 1975. Pollution, Prices,
Frank R. 2006. Microeconomics and Behavior. and Public Policy. Washington, DC: Brook-
Boston: McGraw-Hill. 6th ed. ings Inst.
FTC v. Staples, Inc. 970 F. Suppl. 1066 (DDC Light P. 1995. Thickening Government: Fed-
1997) eral Hierarchy and the Diffusion of Account-
Georgia v. Ashcroft. 2003. 539 U.S. 461 ability. Washington, DC: Brookings Inst.
Gerber B, Teske P. 2000. Regulatory policy- Lindblom CE. 1959. The science of mud-
making in the American states: a review of dling through. Public Admin. Rev. 19:79
theories and evidence. Polit. Res. Q. 53:849 88
86 Lowi T. 1964. American business, public pol-
Giuliani R. 2002. Leadership. New York: icy, case-studies, and political theory. World
Hyperion Polit. 16:687713
Goodell J. 2006. Capital pollution solution? NY Lowi T. 1969. The End of Liberalism. New
Times Mag. July 30, pp. 3439 York: W.W. Norton
McCraw T. 1984. Prophets of Regulation. of Representatives, pp. 21233. Washington,

Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press DC: US Gov. Print. Off.
Mead L. 2004. Government Matters: Wel- Sharp E. 1994. The dynamics of issue expan-
fare Reform in Wisconsin. Princeton, NJ: sion: cases from disability rights and fetal
Princeton Univ. Press research controversy. J. Polit. 56:91939
Mead L. 1986. Beyond Entitlement: The Social Swain C. 1993. Black Faces, Black Interests:
Obligations of Citizenship. New York: Free The Representation of African Americans in
Press Congress. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ.
Meyer J, Peck M, Stenason J, Zwick C. Press
1959. The Economics of Competition in the Tiebout C. 1956. A pure theory of local expen-
Transportation Industries. Cambridge, MA: ditures. J. Polit. Econ. 64:41624
Harvard Univ. Press U.S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insu-

Mooney C. 1992. Putting it on paper: the con- lar Affairs. 1969. Hearings on National En-
tent of written information used in state law- vironmental Policy, April 16, pp. 11235.
making. Am. Polit. Q. 20:34565 Washington, DC: US Gov. Print. Off.
Moynihan DP. 1973. The Politics of a Guar- Weimer D, Vining A. 1999. Policy Analysis:
anteed Annual Income: the Nixon Adminis- Concepts and Practice. Englewood Cliffs,
tration and the Family Assistance Plan. New NJ: Prentice-Hall. 3rd ed.
York: Random House Weiss C. 1977. Research for policys sake: the
Patashnik E. 2007. The day after market- enlightenment function of policy research.
oriented reform; or what happens when Policy Anal. 3:55365
economists reform ideas meet politics. In Whiteman D. 1985. The fate of policy analy-
Creating Competitive Markets: The Politics sis in congressional decision making: three
of Regulatory Reform, ed. M Landy, M Levin, types of use in committees. West. Polit. Q.
M Shapiro, pp. 26789. Washington, DC: 38:294311
Brookings Inst. Whiteman D. 1995. Communication in
Price D. 1978. Policy making in congressional Congress: Members, Staff, and the Search
committees: the impact of environmental for Information. Lawrence: Univ. Press
factors. Am. Poli. Sci. Rev. 72:54874 Kansas
Rabe B. 2004. Statehouse and Greenhouse: Whitman v. American Trucking Associations.
The Emerging Politics of American Climate 2001. 531 U.S. 457
Change Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Wildavsky A. 1984. The Politics of the Bud-
Inst. getary Process. Boston: Little, Brown. 4th
Ripley R, Franklin G. 1991. Congress, the Bu- ed.
reaucracy, and Public Policy. Pacific Grove, Wilson JQ. 1973. Political Organizations. New
CA: Brooks/Cole. 5th ed. York: Basic Books
Salamon L, ed. 2002. The Tools of Government: Wilson JQ, ed. 1980. The Politics of Regulation.
A Guide to the New Governance. New York: New York: Basic Books
Oxford Univ. Press Wilson JQ, Kelling G. 1982. Broken windows.
Savas ES. 1987. Privatization: The Key to Atlantic 249:2938
Better Government. Chatham, NJ: Chatham Wilson JQ, Kelling G. 1989. Making neighbor-
House hoods safe. Atlantic 263:4652
Schmalensee R. 1989. Testimony before the Winston P. 2002. Welfare Policymaking in the
Subcommittee on Energy and Power, Com- States: The Devil in Devolution. Washington,
mittee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House DC: Georgetown Univ. Press
P1: JRX
April 9, 2007 10:54 Annual Reviews ANRV312-FM
Annual Review of Political Science

Volume 10, 2007
CONTENTS
STATE REPRESSION AND POLITICAL ORDER, Christian Davenport 1

BRINGING THE COURTS BACK IN: INTERBRANCH PERSPECTIVES ON

THE ROLE OF COURTS IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND POLICY
MAKING, Jeb Barnes 25
NEOPLURALISM, Andrew S. McFarland 45
IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN EUROPE: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH,
Terri E. Givens 67
THE LIBERAL TRADITION AND THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION,
Marc Stears 85
FRAMING THEORY, Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman 103
POLITICAL PLACES AND INSTITUTIONAL SPACES: THE INTERSECTION
OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY,
Philip J. Ethington and Jason A. McDaniel 127
ELECTORAL LAWS, PARTIES, AND PARTY SYSTEMS IN LATIN
AMERICA, Scott Morgenstern and Javier Vazquez-DEla 143
BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR: THE RISE OF RESPONSIBLE
PARTIES IN AMERICAN NATIONAL POLITICS, Nicol C. Rae 169
POLITICAL FINANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, Susan E. Scarrow 193
WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED ABOUT THE CAUSES OF CORRUPTION
FROM TEN YEARS OF CROSS-NATIONAL EMPIRICAL RESEARCH?
Daniel Treisman 211
DIVIDED POLITICS: BICAMERALISM, PARTIES, AND POLICY IN
DEMOCRATIC LEGISLATURES, William B. Heller 245
THE END OF ECONOMIC VOTING? CONTINGENCY DILEMMAS AND THE
LIMITS OF DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, Christopher J. Anderson 271
PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS: IDEAS AND IMPACTS, William T. Gormley, Jr. 297
IRRATIONAL CHOICE AND MORTAL COMBAT AS POLITICAL DESTINY:
THE ESSENTIAL CARL SCHMITT, John P. McCormick 315
HOW DOMESTIC IS DOMESTIC POLITICS? GLOBALIZATION AND
ELECTIONS, Mark Andreas Kayser 341
v
P1: JRX
April 9, 2007 10:54 Annual Reviews ANRV312-FM
vi CONTENTS
ELECTORAL LAWS AS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES: EXPLAINING THE

ORIGINS AND CHANGE OF ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS, Kenneth Benoit 363
INDEXES
Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 110 391
Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 110 394
ERRATA
An online log of corrections Annual Review of Political Science chapters
(if any, 1997 to the present) may be found at http://polisci.annualreviews.org/


Ideas and Impacts: Ublic Olicy Nalysis

Diunggah oleh

Informasi Dokumen

Judul Asli

Hak Cipta

Format Tersedia

Bagikan dokumen Ini

Bagikan atau Tanam Dokumen

Opsi Berbagi

Apakah menurut Anda dokumen ini bermanfaat?

Apakah konten ini tidak pantas?

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

Ideas and Impacts: Ublic Olicy Nalysis

Diunggah oleh

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

1 Apr 2007 12:8 AR ANRV312-PL10-14.

tex XMLPublishSM (2004/02/24) P1: OKZ

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2007. 10:297313

PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS: Ideas and Impacts

Key Words economics, political science, government reform

advice relevant to public decisions and informed by social values. A relatively

segments of the public.

PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 299

INTELLECTUAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF ECONOMICS

A conspicuous form of market failure noted by many economists is the presence

PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 301

to establish a pollution tax or a levy on the polluting agent equal to marginal

INTELLECTUAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

and how policy alternatives come to be developed. Kingdons framework is some-

these streams converge.

Another important analytic framework is that of Baumgartner & Jones (1993),

PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 303

PUBLIC POLICY IMPACTS OF ECONOMICS

over an extended period. For example, University of Wisconsin economist John R.

PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 305

The Clinton administration enthusiastically embraced the HMO concept as one

Rutgers University introduced evidence on early childhood education impacts

PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 307

PUBLIC POLICY IMPACTS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

to control the outcome in a smaller number of districts. Researchers at Columbia

by Swain (1993), whose empirical work built on concepts developed by political

theorist Hanna Pitkin.

PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 309

contributions to a wide variety of decisions, involving public utility regulation,

emissions trading as an example. Where no consensus exists, public policy analysis

PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 311

In his presidential address to the American Political Science Association, Harold

The Annual Review of Political Science is online at

Derthick M, Quirk P. 1985. The Politics of Gormley W, Weimer D. 1999. Organizational

PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 313

McCraw T. 1984. Prophets of Regulation. of Representatives, pp. 21233. Washington,

Harvard Univ. Press U.S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insu-

Annual Review of Political Science

STATE REPRESSION AND POLITICAL ORDER, Christian Davenport 1

BRINGING THE COURTS BACK IN: INTERBRANCH PERSPECTIVES ON

ELECTORAL LAWS AS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES: EXPLAINING THE

(if any, 1997 to the present) may be found at http://polisci.annualreviews.org/

Anda mungkin juga menyukai