DA

Overview
Disad outweighs and turns case
1. Magnitude- Asian prolif causes nuclear arms race which spills over causing
massive instability and nuclear war which culminates in extinction, draws in
major powers
2. Timeframe
1. Prolif possible and fast- already developing delivery capability
Friedberg- Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University- 2015 (Aaron l.
Friedberg is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, 1/2015, Approaching
Critical Mass: Asias Multipolar Nuclear Future, asia policy, number 19, 148)\\WDB

Regarding the furthmay feel compelled to follow suit, including Saudi Arabia and Turkey. If it does not,
Israel may remain the regions only nuclear weapons state. In East Asia, those states most likely to
contemplate pursuing nuclear status are also anxious friends and allies of the United States. Japan,
South Korea, and (albeit implicitly) Taiwan have until now been content to take shelter under the U.S.
nuclear umbrella. But they could come to doubt the reliability of U.S. guarantees in the face of North
Koreas new capabilities, Chinas nuclear modernization programs, or, especially in the case of Japan,
both developments taken together. While this once-taboo topic has been discussed more openly in both
Japan and South Korea in recent years, neither country shows any overt signs of moving to acquire its
own nuclear forces. Still, as Noboru Yamaguchi explains in his essay, there is nothing in Japans peace
constitution that absolutely precludes the possibility, should the nations leaders deem it necessary for
self-defense. Like South Korea and Taiwan, Japan has shown an interest in acquiring rocket and cruise
missile technology that could someday serve as the basis for an independent deterrent force. For the
moment, however, the potential for further proliferation in East Asia remains latent.

Turns case
Disad turns rels and scs

Ilman, 7-3Pacivis (Global Civil Society Research Center) of University of Indonesia (Zidny, Is the South
China Sea the Stage for the Next World War?, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-south-china-sea-
the-stage-the-next-world-war-16833?page=show, dml)

Recent skirmishes in the South China Sea between the Indonesian navy and Chinas coast guard have reinvigorated public
interest towards the region. Some applauded Indonesias resolve in defending her rightful maritime territory. However, some are still
left wondering over Chinas motives in provoking such regional conflictincluding with Vietnam, Malaysia and the
Philippines. How can one explain why China risks a major war that could potentially drag the United States
in for a bunch of uninhabited rocks?
Some say they are fighting for control over major oil and gas reserves in those seas. But this seems not to be the case. After all, great powers have rarely fought one another in a major war over economic resources in modern
history, if at all. Or is it because of Chinas nine-dash line? For sure, one needs to differentiate the means, ways and ends of phenomena. The nine-dash line is a means that China uses to justify its policy ends. But it does not explain
the endgame it wants to achievetherefore, it cannot be used to explain its motives in the South China Sea.

Lets take a look back at the twentieth century. World War I started when Austria-Hungary declared war on and attacked Serbia. So, does it mean that World War I was caused by Austria-Hungarys invasion? No. Austria-Hungary
did start the war, but it was certainly not caused by it. The cause of the war was the great powers concern about the prevalent regional order in Europeand their wish to alter it.

The Germans (together with Austria-Hungary) looked uncomfortably at the shifting balance of power towards the Franco-Russian (and possibly British) alliance. They saw the erosion of Germanys dominance over the European
order while looking for a way to reverse the trend. The French and the Russians, boosted by newly gained power, had been humiliated during the German-led political order before and were also looking for a way to punish
Germany along with her allies.
Similar to World War I, World War II started with an invasion, when Hitler invaded Poland. However, Poland was not the cause of the Anglo-French and German rivalry escalating to a war in 1939. Instead, the Anglo-French were
concerned over the shifting balance of power towards Germanys favor and sought to prevent it from going further in that direction. That determination finally led to war over Polands survival.

Put simply, what Serbia and Poland have in common with the South and East China Seas is that they served as a venue of great-power rivalry. But they are definitely not the cause of that rivalry.

To understand the cause of the current U.S.-China rivalry, one needs to see the history and strategic picture of the Asian region. Put simply,
one needs to see beyond the South China Sea . Following the defeat of Imperial Japan in World War II, the United
States has been the sole great power that can project its power throughout the region. Since that day, the
region has come under American-led regional order. Having only a fraction of the United States power, other states in the
region accepted American primacy.

What is happening today is that China has gathered enough power and is becoming powerful enough to match
(or even surpass) Americas ability to project power throughout much of Asia. Power means leadership throughout
history and with its newly gained power, China wants a bigger role in regional leadership. For sure, though it seems weird for
most people, anyone who carefully study history will concede that this is a normalthough arguably regrettablestate behavior.

One might point a finger towards Japan and Germany as comparisonsboth of whose rise of power in recent times does not correspond with a
regional crisis that risks regional warand, therefore, accuse Chinas behavior as not normal. However, history once again shows that both
states are the anomalynot China.

As Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew once remarked, Unlike other emergent countries, China wants to be China and accepted as such, not as
an honorary member of the West. It is clear from his observation that China has set its sights on displacing the United
States as the dominant power that will dictate the regional order in the Asia region. This is not to say that we
must agree with or accept all China wants to do. We may dislike how our rival thinks and behaves, but we have to understand them. Without
understanding how China thinks, a plausible solution to the current conflict will be hard to devise.

Chinas aspiration for greater regional leadership is unfortunately met with fierce challenges from the United States as well as other regional
great powers such as Japan and India. Following the rise of Chinas assertiveness, the United States introduced the
term pivot (later rebranded as rebalancing) while her ally, Japan, has reinterpreted her constitution, allowing
Tokyo to be more active both politically and militarily abroad. India, for her part, introduced an eastward-facing policy
while trying to strengthen her maritime power to prevent Chinese incursion into the Indian Ocean.

Facing the prospect of containment (instead of accommodation), the

question of paramount importance for Chinas
leaders is: how can China displace the United States (and, therefore, U.S.-led regional order) from Asia?

China seems to believe that the U.S.-led regional order is based on the U.S.-led political security regional
order. This political security order in turn is based on the U.S. regional alliance system , which is known as hub-and-spoke
system, encompassing Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand. This alliance system grants the United
States access to forward bases that ensures her ability to rapidly project her power throughout the
region whenever crisis erupts.

Without such bases, the United States wont be able to effectively project forces and, therefore, will have
only marginal influence in a crisis. Thus, curtailing the United States capability to respond to a regional crisis means much less
U.S. influence upon regional order.

So, as the logic goes, breaking this alliance system will lead to a breakup of the U.S.-led regional order. Thus,
the question now becomes: how can China break up the U.S. alliance system?

Alliance, by its nature, means an insurant. By inking an alliance, the United States has assured her allies that
she will help defend them in times of crisis. Just like a commercial insurance company, the success of the business
rests on the insurers credibility. As long as U.S. allies believe that Washington will fulfill her words,
the alliance system will hold up. However, if U.S. allies do not believe her wordsthereby doubting
the credibility of her wordsthe alliance system will unravel .

A new question emerges as a consequence: how

can China damage U.S. credibility so much that it will lead to the
unraveling of its regional alliance system? For sure, there is no better way to damage ones credibility than
proving that one is unable to fulfill ones words . Put it another way, China must show U.S. allies that the
United States will not come by their side when they need her. That means instigating a conflict with
U.S. allies, making sure they will call for U.S. assistance and, at the same time, making sure that the United
States will not fulfill her insurance policy.
 AT: non-Unique
Significant allied cooperation now sends the signal of commitment
Tsuruoka, 6-30National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), Japan (Michito, The NATO vs. East
Asian Models of Extended Nuclear Deterrence? Seeking a Synergy beyond Dichotomy,
http://www.theasanforum.org/the-nato-vs-east-asian-models-of-extended-nuclear-deterrence-seeking-
a-synergy-beyond-dichotomy/, dml)

In addition to hosting US nuclear weapons, South

Korea, particularly in the 1970s under President Park Chung-hee, secretly sought to
develop its own nuclear weapons. The idea of developing endogenous nuclear weapons came essentially
from Seouls anxieties about US abandonment .16 Washingtons successive efforts to strengthen the
credibility of extended deterrence to Korea have proved to be effective in preventing Seoul from trying
to acquire its own nuclear weapons again. However, what is different from Japan is that the public approval rating for the
idea of developing Koreas own nuclear weapons has been consistently high around two-thirds support itwhich is why,

it is often argued that if a new nuclear-armed state were to emerge in Northeast Asia, it would most likely be the Republic of Korea.17 Japan and South

Korea have been making more efforts to maintain and enhance the credibility of US extended
deterrence, facing what they perceive as a deteriorating security environment, most notably due to China and North Korea. Common to the two
allies is to start and strengthen consultations with Washington on nuclear deterrence and extended deterrence.Such
consultations on nuclear issues with Japan and South Korea among other allies and partners in 2009 began in the context of a new US Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR), which was released in April 2010. Following the initial success of such consultations, the United States and Japan established the Extended Deterrence
Dialogue (EDD) and the United States and South Korea the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC), both in 2010.18 The US-Korean one was renamed in

2015 the Deterrence Strategy Committee (DSC).19 These dialogue frameworks have quickly become a premier venue to
discuss extended deterrence issues between the allies and an assurance tool by fostering a sense of
inclusion for Japanese and Koreans. The dialogues now include table top exercises based on high-intensity contingencies and onsite visits to US
nuclear facilities.20 The Obama administration has shown greater willingness to institutionalize and expand

these dialogues , indicating that the United States accepts the fact that it is not in the US interest to leave allies ill-informed about US intentions (policies)
and capabilities and questioning the US commitment. Keeping the allies well informed and updated is now seen as one of
the surest ways to reassure them , i.e., educating the allies from the US point of view.

Recent carrier exercise proves

Johnson, 6-19staff writer, Japan Times (Jesse, U.S. sails carriers near South China Sea in bid to
reassure Asian allies, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/06/19/asia-pacific/u-s-sails-carriers-
near-south-china-sea-bid-reassure-asian-allies/#.V4KPTDkrJ-U, dml)

In a massive show of strength that analysts said was meant to reassure nervous allies in the Asia-Pacific region,
the U.S. Navy deployed two aircraft carrier strike groups for an exercise in the Philippine Sea on Saturday. The
exercises, which came ahead of a key international court ruling on Chinas claims in the disputed South China Sea, brought together the USS
John C. Stennis and USS Ronald Reagan, and featured over 12,000 sailors, 140 aircraft and six other ships, according to a statement released by
the U.S. Pacific Command. This is a great opportunity for us to train in a high-end scenario, Rear Adm. John D. Alexander, commander of the
Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture-based Carrier Strike Group 5, said in the statement. We must take advantage of these opportunities to
practice war-fighting techniques that are required to prevail in modern naval operations. The strike groups conducted air defense and sea
surveillance drills in the Philippine Sea, in the Western Pacific, near the South China Sea. U.S. Navy aircraft carriers have conducted dual carrier
strike group operations in the Western Pacific, including the South and East China seas and the Philippine Sea for several years, the statement
said. As a Pacific nation and a Pacific leader, the
United States has a national interest in maintaining security and
prosperity, peaceful resolution of disputes, unimpeded lawful commerce, and adherence to freedom of
navigation and overflight throughout the shared domains of the Indo-Asia-Pacific, the statement added. As
part of its pivot to Asia, the U.S. has strengthened security alliances and beefed up its ties with
nations in the region. Beijing has slammed the moves as part of a U.S.-led China containment policy. The timing of Saturdays
operations comes as Washingtons Southeast Asian allies eagerly await a ruling from the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague on a case
filed by Manila against Beijings so-called nine-dash line claim to much of the South China Sea. The arbitration court is widely expected to rule in
favor of the Philippines in the coming weeks or days. China has not taken part in the case and has vowed to ignore the ruling, saying the court
does not have jurisdiction over the issue. An unidentified source told The Manila Times on Wednesday that the court would announce its ruling
in the case July 7. Observers had initially said the ruling was likely to come at the end of May. China claims almost all of the energy-rich waters
of the South China Sea through which more than $5 trillion in trade passes each year. Aside from the Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia and
Taiwan have overlapping claims. Beijings massive land-reclamation program in the contested waters, and U.S. claims that it is militarizing its
outposts in the area, have prompted Washington to conduct what it calls freedom of navigation exercises near the Chinese-controlled
islands. Combined exercises by two carrier strike groups certainly send a message about Americas
strategic commitment to the Asia-Pacific region and its unrivalled capacity to project naval power, said
Ashley Townshend, a research fellow at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and visiting fellow at Fudan Universitys
Asia-Pacific Center. Townshend said that drills
such as this and recent military deployments to the Philippines and Singapore,
as well as the normalization of U.S.-Vietnam defense ties, signal to Beijing that Washington is serious
about upholding freedom of navigation for military ships and aircraft. This large-scale show of
American power is also about reassuring anxious Asian allies and partners about Washingtons resolve
and security guarantees in the region, he said.
 AT: no Link
Assurance is highly perceptuallow-level disagreements spill up
Hooper, 15Fellow in the Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the
Director of CSISs Maritime Transparency Initiative (Mira Rapp, Uncharted Waters: Extended
Deterrence and Maritime Disputes, The Washington Quarterly 38:1 pp. 127146, dml)
One reason why Washington should be attentive to the relationship between Japan and the Philippines sovereignty disputes and its extended
deterrence commitments is because of the role assurance plays in any alliance. Extended deterrence is a highly perceptual
undertaking, where both allies and adversaries are concerned. The failure to persuade allies that their
defense needs are being met at low levels of conflict could conceivably have a deleterious effect on U.S.
security guarantees broadly. The belief that U.S. extended deterrence is inoperable at any level of
escalation could erode allies faith in its overall credibility . To remain active and engaged in the region, the United States will
need to rely on its forward bases and strong host-nation supportif allies are wary of U.S. support in discrete areas, they may
pursue capabilities or policies that may be inimical to these interests.

Taiwan is the canary in the coal mine for other U.S. allies.
Mazza 11 Michael Mazza, Research Fellow in Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at the American
Enterprise Institute, former Research Assistant in the Southeast Asia Program at Cornell University,
holds an M.A. in International Relations from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns
Hopkins University and a B.A. in History from Cornell University, 2011 (Dont Ditch Taiwan, The
American, November 18th, Available Online at https://www.aei.org/publication/dont-ditch-taiwan/,
Accessed 07-15-2016)

Today, America has little strategic interest in Taiwan

In fact, Americas strategic interests in Taiwan are quite extensive. Taiwan is to the 21st century what
divided Berlin was to much of the 20th century. It is the canary in the coal mine. How China treats
Taiwan in the coming years will tell the world much about how a rising China will deal with its weaker
neighbors. And how the United States handles its commitment to the island will likewise send a signal
about how Washington will approach its obligations to its allies.

Its a litmus test for U.S. resolve.

Serchuk 13 Vance Serchuk, Hitachi International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations
based in Tokyo at the Canon Institute for Global Studies, former Senior Advisor for National Security and
Foreign Affairs at the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
former Foreign Policy Advisor in the Office of Senator Joseph Lieberman, former Research Fellow at the
American Enterprise Institute, holds a J.D. from Yale Law School, 2013 (Obamas silence on Taiwan
masks its significance in U.S. relations with China, Washington Post, May 23rd, Available Online at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obamas-silence-on-taiwan-masks-its-significance-in-us-
relations-with-china/2013/05/23/a1b40470-c243-11e2-914f-a7aba60512a7_story.html?tid=a_inl,
Accessed 07-16-2016)
Beyond geography, Taiwan is also a litmus test of U.S. reliability. If Washington were to be perceived as
abandoning the island, a vibrant democracy, it would provoke a wider crisis of confidence among those
in Asia counting on the United States for protection from China.

Taiwan is a litmus test for the US commitment to East Asian allies

Kunti, 15 visiting fellow at European Union Centre in Taiwan, National Taiwan University; PhD
candidate at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb (Dario, The Ominous Triangle: China-
Taiwan-the United States relationship CIRR XXI (72) 2015, 239-280)

Finally, by supporting Taiwan the United States sends a clear message to its other allies that it will stay
committed to their security as well. Cutting off an old U.S. ally would transform the calculus of other
allies who might plausibly wonder whether the U.S. commitment to their security is flexible as it was
towards Taiwan. If the United States reneged on this commitment and allowed the mainland to
reintegrate Taiwan forcibly into China, then Americas commitment to Japan, as well as reliability in the
eyes of its other allies in East Asia, would suffer grievous harm (Art 2008: 276). Since the United States is
willing to remain engaged in the region and keep credible economic and strategic commitments,
abandoning Taiwan would certainly be counterproductive to its interests in East Asia. Taiwan is an
important link in the network of U.S. security alliances.

Downgrading ties with Taiwan causes allied prolif

Mearsheimer, 14 - John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of
Political Science at the University of Chicago. He serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest.
This article is adapted from a speech he gave in Taipei on December 7, 2013, to the Taiwanese
Association of International Relations. An updated edition of his book The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics will be published in April by W. W. Norton (Say Goodbye to Taiwan National Interest, March-
April,

http://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931

Second, Americas commitment to Taiwan is inextricably bound up with U.S. credibility in the region,
which matters greatly to policy makers in Washington. Because the United States is located roughly six
thousand miles from East Asia, it has to work hard to convince its Asian alliesespecially Japan and
South Koreathat it will back them up in the event they are threatened by China or North Korea.
Importantly, it has to convince Seoul and Tokyo that they can rely on the American nuclear umbrella to
protect them. This is the thorny problem of extended deterrence, which the United States and its allies
wrestled with throughout the Cold War.

If the United States were to sever its military ties with Taiwan or fail to defend it in a crisis with China,
that would surely send a strong signal to Americas other allies in the region that they cannot rely on the
United States for protection. Policy makers in Washington will go to great lengths to avoid that outcome
and instead maintain Americas reputation as a reliable partner. This means they will be inclined to back
Taiwan no matter what.

Taiwan is linked to US credibility democracy, public statements, and test case

Bosco 15 Member of the US-China Task Force at the Cetner for the National Interest and Senior
Associate at the Center for Strategic and international Studies (Joseph, "Taiwan and Strategic Security,"
The Diplomat, 5/15/15, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/taiwan-and-strategic-security/)\\BPS

To summarize, Taiwans strategic importance from a military, economic, and humanitarian assistance
standpoint is clear, even though there have been historical periods when U.S. administrations of both
parties have seemed to minimize it for what they saw as the greater goal of accommodating the Chinese
government. Since the 1980s, however, the people of Taiwan have added an entirely new dimension to
the countrys value to the West. Taiwans political opposition, and eventually its leaders, recognized that
once official U.S. diplomatic relations had shifted from Taipei to Beijing because of considerations of
realpolitik, its salvation as a viable de facto independent entity depended on moral and political values.
Taiwans phased, planned transition to democracy meant that Washington and the West no longer had
the easy realist rationale that is, that the Taiwan policy dilemma was merely a matter of choosing a
small, friendly dictatorship or trying to improve relations with a larger, formerly hostile one. Now
Americans, and Japanese, could look at Taiwan as a moral and political soul mate, certainly by contrast
to a country ruled by the Chinese Communist Party.

For the same reason, Taiwan now became even more of a bone in Beijings throat as a model of
democratic governance in a Chinese society, undermining the myth that democracy and Confucianism
are incompatible. The potential internal pressure for political reform in China increased during the
1980s, culminating in the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre. Given those geopolitical stakes regarding
the future of Taiwan, the U.S. commitment enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act took on even greater
strategic significance for the United States.

When President Barack Obama announced what he called the U.S. pivot to Asia before the Australian
parliament in 2011, he linked Americas strategic interests to the success of democracy in the region and
pledged every element of American power to achieving security, prosperity, and dignity for all. That
places Taiwan and its democratic future at the strategic epicenter of Americas moral and political
commitment to the region. U.S. credibility is now tied inextricably to Taiwans fate, with or without an
explicit defense commitment in the TRA. Any weakening of American resolve to ensure Taiwans
continued security would significantly undermine that credibility throughout the region among friends,
allies, and most critically, our adversaries.

Those who argue that the Taiwan game is not worth the candle fail to grasp how much weight other
countries in the region place on Americas commitment to Taiwan as a bell-weather of U.S. reliability
should any of them come under increased coercive pressure or outright hostility from China. They see
the U.S. as the necessary balancer to Chinas military buildup and expansionist policies and Taiwan is
the number one test case of U.S. will.
Abandoning Taiwan has a larger effect on US cred than any previous act
Easley 16 Assistant Professor in the Division of International Studies at Ewha University and a Research
Fellow at the Asian Institute for Policy Studies (Leif-Eric, "Grand bargain or bad idea? US relations with
China and Taiwan," International Security, v. 40 #4, Spring 2016, p.178-191)\\BPS

Abandonment of Taiwan would be a greater shock for U.S. credibility than the 2008 financial crisis, Arab
Spring, Syrian civil war, or Ukrainian conflict because it would contradict decades of U.S. policy, be a sin
of commission rather than omission, and have greater direct relevance to Asias geopolitics. A grand
bargain with China would not only degrade U.S. soft power and alliances; it could drive Asian countries
to unilaterally enhance their own defenses, fueling an arms race and further diminishing security in the
region. Glaser suggests that such dynamics could be avoided if U.S. leaders visit Japan and South Korea
with security treaties in hand and clarify why those countries are different from Taiwan. Alliances among
democracies are based not only on treaties and national interests, however, but also on shared values
and popular support. Perceptions of reliability affect how people vote and can redirect democratic
processes behind alliance cooperation.

An unrestrained China forces Japanese Proliferation because it stresses U.S. regional

security
Glosny 11-an instructor in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School
and an Adjunct Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National
Defense University (Michael A., Getting Beyond Taiwan? Chinese Foreign Policy and PLA
Modernization, January 2011, Strategic Forum, National Defense University,
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-261.pdf)//SL

Potential threats from a rising, unconstrained China will likely force the United States to clarify its
defense commitments to regional allies and friends. American allies and friends are likely to press for
clearer commitments in the South China Sea and East China Sea, areas where U.S. commitments have
been limited and sometimes ambiguous. In the face of Chinas rising power and a global diffusion of
power, these states are likely to ask the United States to make these commitments more credible. If
worries about China cause a strengthened U.S. commitment to the region and strengthened defense
ties between the United States and Asian countries, this will complicate Chinas security environment,
damage Chinas relations with its neighbors, and potentially unleash spirals of hostility.

If the U.S. response to demands for a clearer commitment to the region is insufficient, or if its
commitments are no longer seen as credible, this could have various implications for China. If Americas
alliances weaken or collapse and the United States reduces its presence in Asia, this could greatly
improve Chinas international environment as it would face several weaker powers that may have
difficulty cooperating to oppose it. On the other hand, this could also lead to an independent Japan that
acquires nuclear weapons and devotes more resources to military modernization. Regional powers,
even without cooperation with Washington, are powerful enough to complicate Chinas international
environment, especially if they work together to prevent Chinas dominance.
Negotiating away the US security commitment wrecks US credibility and deterrence
supercharges Asian conflicts and instability
Lee and Scheer 16 - Sheryn Lee is a PhD Candidate at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Australian National University. Her
dissertation examines the strategic and domestic rationales for arms acquisitions in East Asia since 2001. She was previously a non-resident
WSD-Handa Fellow at Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies; and holds an AM in Political Science from the University of
Pennsylvania, Professor Ben Schreer is the Head of Department at SSC. He teaches and researches in security and strategic studies, with a main
focus on Asia-Pacific strategic trends and the evolution of Australian defence policy. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic
Studies in London (Time to start worrying again? Cross-Strait Stability after the 2016 Taiwanese elections, March 2016,
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/196298/SI104_Taiwan.pdf)//EM

Essential for cross-strait stability is the role (or perceived role) played by the US as Taiwans informal
security guarantor. US policy towards cross-strait stability has traditionally been based on the concept of
strategic ambiguity to deter China from using force against Taiwan by creating doubts in the minds of
the CCP leadership about whether the US would come to the islands defence. As well, the 1979 Taiwan
Relations Act is widely regarded in the US political establishment as an informal US commitment to
defend Taiwan against unprovoked Chinese aggression. During a joint press conference with President Xi
in September 2015, US President Barack Obama reaffirmed Washingtons strong commitment to the
One-China policy based on the Taiwan Relations Act.18 In the case of an unprovoked Chinese attack
on Taiwan, it would be politically very difficult for any US President to not honour the obligation under
the Act. Yet, Americas ability to defend Taiwan has arguably been weakened. Over changing the cross-
strait military balance in its favour and on complicating a potential third-party intervention by the US.
While its difficult to truly assess the PLAs likely operational ability in times of conflict with the worlds
most advanced military power, the US would face a much higher risk environment in a Taiwan
contingency. A study by the RAND Corporation concluded in 2015 that American forces would now
encounter major operational difficulties in achieving dominance in a contest with the PLA
over Taiwan.19 This challenge is compounded by the difficulties that the ROC Armed Forces face in
adapting effectively to the changing cross-strait military balancea task which hasnt been helped by a
steady decline in Taiwans defence budget. In the event of a Chinese military attack, the best bet for
ROC forces would be to hold out as long as possible until US reinforcements arrive in theatre.20 As a
result, similarly to Australian analyst Hugh White, some American scholars have argued that, given
Chinas growing power potential, a war over Taiwan would simply not be worth the cost. Instead, the US
would be better off to abandon Taiwan as part of a great-power bargain over the future East Asian
security order.21 However, that remains a minority view within the US strategic expert community.
Overwhelmingly, the view is that the defence of Taiwan remains critical for strategic and operational
reasons.22 Indeed, in the context of growing US-Sino tensions over the East Asia maritime order, Taiwan
is emerging as a key partner in the US rebalance to the region. As a recent independent assessment by
the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on the future of the US rebalance pointed out:
Deterring China from using coercion or force against Taiwan is critically important to US interests
Where possible, the United States should consider providing additional assistance to address key gaps in
Taiwans defence capability.23 As mentioned already, the Taiwan issue is directly linked to the USs
leadership role in the AsiaPacific. As a treaty ally and security guarantor for Japan, South Korea,
Australia, Thailand and the Philippines, withdrawing support for Taiwan would erode the credibility of
US extended deterrence and deal a major blow to its leadership credentials in the wider AsiaPacific
region. As well, US abandonment of Taiwan as part of a great bargain is likely to be perceived in Beijing
as a sign of declining US power and resolve. And it wouldnt make cross-strait unification any easier,
given Taiwans unwillingness to surrender its way of life to Chinas authoritarian system. As Paul Dibb
has argued compellingly, those calling to give up Taiwan fail to make a convincing case about which
specific concessions must be made to accommodate a rising China.24

Taiwan is the litmus test of US credibility in Asia

Liao, 15 - Institute of Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, Taipei Ph.D., Graduate Institute of
East Asian Studies, National Chengchi University (Nien-chung, DELICATE BALANCE REBALANCING
TAIWANUS RELATIONS Survival, November, http://cwp.princeton.edu/news/delicate-balance-
rebalancing-taiwan%E2%80%93us-relations

If the pessimists aim is to shape the trajectory of China's ascendency to US advantage, however, then
abandoning Taiwan would be a mistake. Historically, the United States has consistently prevented any
power it sees as potentially hostile from controlling Asia. The likelihood of a Sino-US crisis triggered by
maritime disputes will increase as long as Washington finds it necessary to maintain a substantial
military presence and support to its allies in the region.12 (link is external) Given its location at a
strategic crossroads of the Asia-Pacific, Taiwan will remain an indispensable part of the US regional
security architecture. US regional allies and partners, such as Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asian
countries, thus also have much at stake in Washington's continuing commitment to Taiwan. Cutting
Taiwan loose will not only weaken US credibility as a reliable partner, but will also enhance the PRC's
ability to project power, should the island fall into its orbit. The fate of Taiwan's autonomy is a litmus
test of China's wider intentions as well as US resolution and commitment to the Asia-Pacific.
 AT: Glaser allies like it

Glaser underestimate allied reactions because hes too invested in theory instead of
politics
Nakazawa, 15 - Noriya Nakazawa is Lieutenant Commander of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
(JMSDF). He graduated from Japans National Defense Academy in 2003, and joined the JMSDF as a
surface warfare officer. He is currently a graduate student of the Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy
program at the Fletcher School, Tufts University (On Taiwan: An Option between Total War and
Withdrawal for the U.S. https://inpecmagazine.com/2015/11/07/nakazawa/

The US should not and cannot fight a total war for Taiwan as mentioned above. Nevertheless, the US
will face a problem if it abandons Taiwan. If the US does not defend Taiwan at all, other countries in East
Asia and South East Asia will rush into building strong military capability to deter China. Although Glaser
seems for abandoning Taiwan, even he mentions possible objections from US allies. That is because US
abandoning its commitment to Taiwan would deteriorate US credibility of defense commitments to
them.[63]

Glaser argues that the concern is overstated. His stance, however, is mistaken because it is merely an
American defensive realists view, which does not see the problem from the perspective of other
countries around Taiwan. From a Japanese view, if the US abandons Taiwan, it also implies the future
possibility that the US would abandon Japan to tie up with China. In such a case Japan would have to
consider acquiring more effective weapons, to deal with potential nuclear blackmail. If the US does not
protect small democratic Taiwan from the current authoritarian China, other states must recognize that
the security environment in East Asia is based on pure Realism. Hence, they will prepare for a war to
defend their land, thereby accelerating a dangerous arms-race. That arms-race may not be a direct
threat to the US; however, the US will have to invest much in deterrence cost to enjoy freedom of
navigation in East Asia. In sum, the US has to select a Pareto optimal answer between selling Taiwan,
and total war for Taiwan.
 No prolif
2. Motivation, not potential obstacles, is the determining factor
Richard J. Samuels, Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for
International Studies @ MIT, and James L. Schoff, Senior Associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 13

("Japans Nuclear Hedge: Beyond "Allergy" and Breakout", July 15 2013, National Bureau of Asian
Research, MIT Open Access Articles, http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=705)\\WDB

Institutional opposition. Japanese political leaders considering nuclear breakout will face other obstacles
besides public opinion, including opposition from an expanding variety of political, bureaucratic, and
economic actors. For decades, bureaucratic responsibility for nuclear strategy resided solely in the Cabinet, with support from MOFA.
Over time, however, the JDA renamed the Ministry of Defense (MOD) in 2007assumed a greater policy role. Nuclear power
research and development, which is critical for any potential dual use, was split between the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI)now the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (METI)and the Science
and Technology Agency, which is now part of the Ministry of Education. Each had its own preferences. 78
In the economic realm, there are those whose interests lie in preserving a purely commercial
exploitation of nuclear power.79 Japans utilities, the wider business community, bureaucrats charged
with promoting economic growth, and politicians with ties to these interests are all powerful actors who
would likely oppose a nuclear weapons program. In the event of a nuclear breakout, Japans electric-power industry could be
crippled by a loss of access to nuclear fuel and would possibly be required to return current fuel stocks, given that their purchase was
predicated on peaceful use. Moreover, large manufactures such as Hitachi and Mitsubishi could be shut out of overseas nuclear-development
projects, and there might be a wider economic backlash against Japanese firms in key markets like China and South Korea, as their governments
hype the fear of a remilitarized Japan.80 Prefectural
governors also have an important vote on what kinds of
nuclear-related activities can occur within their jurisdiction. In addition, some influential nonprofit
organizations dedicated to preserving Japans non-nuclear status gained strength following the
Fukushima crisis.81 Proponents of changing the nuclear status quo in Japan would likely face numerous
legal and bureaucratic hurdles, including the certainty of drawn-out legal challenges. Although there is
no question that weaponization would be difficult in Japans contested political system, circumstances
can change over time. Japans robust democratic politics and its determined leadership have repeatedly
demonstrated that opposition and veto power are not the same. The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was
ratified in 1960 over violent protests and widespread opposition and now is widely embraced. Japans
Self-Defense Forces, which began as the National Police Reserve during the Korean War, became a robust and lethal
military force despite Japans pacifist constitution and early public opposition. It has never been more
widely embraced by the Japanese public than it is at present. The postwar history of the Japanese
military is filled with examples of government restrictions applied, only to be loosened at a later date.
This was the case with Japans acquisition of fighter jets (first denied, then allowed), as well as its acquisition of
mid-air refueling capabilities, legislating an ability to deploy overseas, use of outer space for defense
purposes, and now the possible development of a long-range strike capability.82 Moreover, while approval
for a weapons-related program surely would be even harder to obtain from local officials than approval
for nuclear-power reactors, it is worth noting that some prefectural governors, such as Issei Nishikawa
from Fukui, support nuclear power as the leading employment vehicle in their prefectures. And some
governors, like Shintaro Ishihara of Tokyo, openly argued for acquiring nuclear weapons.
Weaponization work could be done in prefectures with supportive leaders, even if they hosted no
reactors. Finally, even if Japans plutonium stockpile in Europe is out of reach and much of the
separated fuel is controlled by private firms worried about repercussions in international markets, more
than enough is held domestically under the aegis of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), a
governmental unit. The rest is held by Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, which is nominally a private firm, but one that performs public
functions under close government supervision. Even allowing that only two tons of Japans plutonium stocks is both
owned by the state (through the JAEA) and present in Japan, and that this might be the only plutonium
available for Japanese weapons, this amount alone would be enough to build a large nuclear arsenal of
several hundred weapons. In short, it is not clear how much of a constraint contending interests, private
ownership of weapons materiel, and the overseas location of much of Japans plutonium would
actually place on Japan if it were to decide to move from being a latent to an open nuclear weapons
state. The motivation is the critical factor, not the obstacles.

Asian allies can prolif

Sharp, 16Australian Strategic Policy Institute (Ashleigh, What comes after the Non-Proliferation
Treaty?, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/what-comes-after-the-non-proliferation-treaty/, dml)

These developments call into question something often taken as fact: US extended nuclear deterrence to Northeast Asia. The extension of
Americas nuclear umbrella has previously deterred South Korea from pursuing its own nuclear capability and underpins Japans non-nuclear
stance. But the actions of North Korea and developments in the US have threatened to undermine the credibility of this deterrent. In
Japan,
weve witnessed the head of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau state that the Japanese constitution doesnt
necessarily ban the use of all kinds of nuclear weapons. Whilst there are a number of normative and cultural barriers to
pursuing an actual nuclear capability in Japan, a US that walked away from the doctrine of extended nuclear
deterrence would open the floodgates to a serious reconsideration of Japans nuclear identity.

South Koreas an even more pressing case. Seoul

has pursued a nuclear weapons program in the pastin the mid-1970s
under President Park Chung-heebut
was eventually deterred by US pressure and assurances. After the DPRKs
fourth nuclear test, however, conservatives in South Korea have been increasingly vocal about
reconsidering the nuclear option. The former leader of the governing Saenuri Party, Chung Mong-joon, said that South Korea
should consider breaking away from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and highlighted the contradictions in its system which failed to prevent
North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The NPT is the most widely adhered to multilateral disarmament agreement. It entered into force for a period of 25 years in 1970, was
extended indefinitely in May 1995 and has a total of 190 parties. North Korea is the only country to have joined the NPT, withdrawn under
Article Xwhich allows parties the right to withdraw if its national interests are threatenedand gone onto develop a nuclear capability. India,
Pakistan and Israel currently sit outside the NPT and all have acquired nuclear weapons.

If the credibility of US extended deterrence is seriously undermined in Seoul or Tokyo, or let alone removed
altogether, we would need to think much more seriously about the possibility of another state going
nuclear. If that happened, the number of states with nuclear weapons outside the NPT will equal the number in it (five and five). And
regardless of who the next proliferator might be, any new nuclear state could push others to follow. In
Northeast Asia, a nuclear weapons program in South Korea might lead Japan and Taiwan to consider
their options. What happens to the NPT when there are more nuclear weapon states outside than
inside?
If were going to start thinking seriously about the future of nuclear proliferation, we also need to start thinking about the future of the NPT.
Its debatable whether the NPT (and the non-proliferation regime that supports it) can survive another country
crossing the threshold; but its hard to assume that such an event wouldnt seriously undermine its
already cracked foundations. Still, cracked foundations might be better than none. Despite its problems, the
regime codifies both a principle and an objectivenuclear minimalism and eventual disarmamentthat the vast bulk
of its signatories take seriously. Moreover, the NPT and its associated structures are important to ensuring the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, the control of dual-use technologies and the safety and security of nuclear materials. Even in a more densely proliferated world,
thats a set of principles, objectives and controls we shouldnt lightly throw aside.

South Korea has public and political support to get nuclear weapons

Muoz 16 (Carlo Muoz is the military correspondent for The Washington Times focusing on U.S.
defense and national security policy, programs and operations. Mr. Muoz also reported on U.S. and
foreign military operations in South America, Cuba and the Asia-Pacific region. His work has appeared in
The Guardian, United Press International, Atlantic Media, Air Force Magazine, USNI News and
elsewhere. Donald Trump stirs nuclear weapons interest in South Korea, Japan Washington Times.
4/26/16, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/26/donald-trump-stirs-nuclear-weapons-
interest-in-sou/, AB)

But in a widely noted editorial, one of the countrys most respected conservative newspapers said the
issue isnt so clear-cut. Seoul can no longer sit idly by as the [nuclear] talks lead to no results and
Washington and Beijing are busy blaming each other for their diplomatic failures, the Chosun Ilbo
wrote in its editorial, published shortly after another North Korean nuclear test at the beginning of the
year. In February, Won Yoo-chul, a floor leader in parliament for Ms. Parks ruling Saenuri Party, said
the South should develop peaceful nuclear weapons to deter North Koreas fearful and self-
destructive ones. Although the Defense Ministry rejected his comments, Mr. Won said Seoul could
not rely on Washington forever to protect it from its implacable next-door neighbor. We cant
borrow umbrellas from next door every time it rains. We should wear a raincoat of our own, Mr.
Won said. Polls show that Mr. Trumps idea is popular with ordinary South Koreans. National surveys in
2013 and in February this year found a clear majority in favor of South Korean development of its
own nuclear arsenal.
 AT: Plan solves

Plan doesnt solve- no articultation as to why relations between u.s and china could
solve u.s japan relations or south korea
 T
Concede their counter interp- a topical aff has to have specific concessions from china
in exchange for a positive inducements
Well also concede that they meet- the plan is an unconditional offer which means
that they are not topical
They cant be both- the explicity said in the 2ac that they are an unconditional offer,
means that they dont meet the QPQ defitinition
Limits outweigh they justify affs that establish meetings with Xi to discuss human
rights, climate change, trade policies, immigration, any aff that acts through a 3 rd party
such as the World Bank, or WTO, removing telecommunication barriers ALL WITHOUT
requiring a concession from China - the topic is already large in including BOTH
economic and diplomatic engagement and now it becomes unmanageable - quid prop
quos prevent squirrely affs because in order to alter Chinese behavior, they will have
to offer a meaningful concession - limits o/w theyre key to in-depth clash which is
the key internal link to advocacy skills because a prerequisite to learning to be an
effective advocate is being trained to defend your proposals against a well-prepared
opponent advocacy skills outweigh b/c theyre the only portable impact outside of
debate
They give unique ground such as say no debate
Competing interpretations are best-
a. Reasonability is arbitrary- every judge has a different interpretation of whats
reasonable which makes it impossible to predict what is and isnt topical and
guts fairness.
b. Unlimits the topic- the combination of all reasonable affs and interpretations
forces the topic to be as large as possible.
c. Education about definitions is good -- entire Court cases are decided around the
meaning of one word -- that makes this legal and definitional education
valuable in the real world.
d. Theyre not reasonable the limits debate sufficiently proves also, [EXPLEN]